COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy An extended study of the interactions of science and technology with United States foreign policy Volume II COMMITTEE PRINT U.S. House of Representatives COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy An extended study of the interactions of science and technology with United States foreign policy U.S. House of Eepresentatrt:s U.S. Government Printing Office Washington: 1977 For sale by the Superintendent of Documents. U.S. Government Printing Office Washington, D.C. 20402 (3-Part Set; Sold in Sets Only) Stock Xo. 052-070-04350-4 COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Micliigan EDWARD J. DERWIXSKI, Illinois PAUL FINDLEY, Illinois JOHN H. BUCHAXAN, Jr., Alabama J. HERBERT BURKE, Florida CHARLES W. WHALEN, Jr., Ohio LARRY WIXN, Jr., Kansas BEXJA:VIIN a. oilman, Xew York TEXXYSON GUYER, Oliio ROBERT J. LAGOMARSIXO, California WILLIAM P. GOODLING, Pennsylvania SHIRLEY N. PETTIS, California CLEMENT J. L. H. FOUXTAIN, North Carolina DAXTE B. FASCELL, Florida CHARLES C. DIGGS, Jr., Michigan ROBERT N. C. XIX, Pennsylvania DOXALD M. ERASER, Minnesota BENJAMIN S. ROSENTHAL, New York LEE H. HAMILTON, Indiana LESTER L. WOLFF, New York JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York GUS YATRON, Pennsylvania MICHAEL HARRINGTON, Massachusetts LEO J. RYAN, California CARDISS COLLINS, Illinois STEPHEN J. SOLARZ, New York HELEN S. MEYNER, New Jersey DON BONKER, Washington GERRY B. STUDDS," Massachusetts ANDY IRELAND, Florida DONALD J. PEASE, Ohio ANTHONY C. BEILENSOX, California WYCHE FO^^^:,ER, Jr., Georgia E (KIKA) DE LA GARZA, Texas GEORGE E. DANIELSON, California JOHN J. CAVANAUGH, Nebraska John J. Brady, Jr., Chief of Staff George R. Berdes, Staff Consultant Subcommittee on International Security and Scientific Affairs CLEMENT J. ZABLOCKI, Wisconsin, Chairman L. H. FOUNTAIN, North Carolina WILLIAM S. BROOMFIELD, Michigan JONATHAN B. BINGHAM, New York LARRY WINN, Jr., Kansas GERRY E. STUDDS, Massachusetts ANTHONY C. BEILENSON, California Ivo J. Spalatin, Subcommittee Staff Director William H. Fite, Minority Staff Consultant Forrest R. Frank, Suhcommittee Staff Associate La Verne Still, Staff Assistant (H) Contents — Volume II Page Organization of the Study V Part 2 — Six Issues: Chapter 9 — The Evohition of International Technology . 607 Chapter 10— The Politics of Global Health 681 Chapter 11 — Beyond Malthus: The Food/People Equa- tion 765 Chapter 12 — United States Scientists Abroad : An Exam- ination o.f Major Programs for Nongovernmental Scien- tific Exchange 865 Chapter 13 — Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International Scientific Mobility 1037 Chapter 11 — ^Science and Technology in the Department of State : Bringing Technical Content into Diplomatic Policy and Operations 1319 (in) ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY ^■n» Volume I Introduction to the Study as a Whole Toward a Neic Diplomacy hi a Scientific Age The Global Context of Science, Technology, and Diplomacy Part 1 — Six Cases The Bariich Plan Commercial Nuclear Power in Europe The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year The Mekong Project Exploiting the Resources of the Seabed United States-Soviet Commercial Pelations Volume II Part 2 — Six Issues The Evolution of International Technology The Politics of Global Health Beyond Malthus U.S. Scientists Abroad Brain Drain Science and Technology in the Department of State Volume III Introduction to the Analysis and Findings Recapitulation of Purpose, Scope, and Methodology of the Study Part 3 — Analysis of the Cases and Issues Analysis of the Cases Analysis of the Issues Part 4 — Principal Policy Implications About the Essays to Follow Initiative Versus Reactive Foreign Policy Bilateral Versus Multilateral Diplomatic Relationships High-Technology Diplo)nacy Versus Low-Technology Diplomacy Roles and Interactions of Public and Private Institutions in International Technology Independence Versus Interdependence Long-Range and Short-Range Planning Concluding Observations Bibliography (V) PART 2— SIX ISSUES C>K9 Chapter 9 — The Evolution Of International Technology CONTENTS Page I. Introduction 611 Technology as the Underpinning of Diplomacy 611 Contemporary Importance of Technology 612 Pace 613 Size — 613 Complexity 614 Variety or Scope 615 Range and Pervasiveness of Impacts 615 National Infrastructures of Technological Growth 616 Interactions of Technology With Diplomacy 617 Institutional Matters 618 Substantive Technological Matters 618 Diplomatic Need for a Coherent Policy Toward Technological Change 619 II. Historical Influence of Technology on Diplomacy 619 The Industrial Revolution as a Global Process 620 British and German Technological Supremacy 620 Technological Support for Germany's Struggle for Power 621 U.S. Rise to Technological Maturity 622 Trends in Industrial Research and Scientific Management 623 Maturing of the American Technological Posture 623 Diplomatic Implications of U.S. Technological Maturity 624 Frustration of U.S. Efforts to "Wield Technological Power 626 III. Trends in Contemporarv Technologv 627 ._ 628 ._ 629 ._ 631 ._ 632 Achievement of Overwhelming Nuclear Force The Problem of Stabilizing Deterrence Paramountcy of Offense A Dissenting View of Deterrent Stability The Diplomatic Significance of Space Technology 633 The Space Race With the Soviet Union 634 Measures of Progress in Space Technology 635 Diplomatic Aspects of the Space Race 635 -_ 637 ._ 637 ._ 638 -_ 639 ._ 640 Communications Satellites Feasible Functions of Surveillance Satellites Weather Forecasting by Satellite Earth Resources Satellite Surveys Growing Importance of Space-Diplomacy The Interaction of Agricultural Technology With Diplomacy 640 Modern Contrast With Jeffersonian Ideal 641 Political and Economic Trends 642 Some Diplomatic Consequences of Agricultural Change 643 Supporting Elements of National Technological Change 645 Different Views of "Infrastructure" 645 Education and Training 646 Health 647 Power 648 Transportation 648 Communications 649 International A.spects of Infrastructure 650 Recapitulation : Diplomatic Consequences of Technology 651 IV. The Internationalization of Technology 652 Assessment of National and International Technology 652 International Aspects of Technology Assessment 654 (609) 610 IV. The Internationalization of Technology — Continued Assessment of National and International Technology — Continued Page Suggestions for International Institutions 655 The Assessment Role of International Law 657 The Internationalization of Military Technology 658 Factors of Sub-Nuclear Technology 659 The Increasing Scope of Global Technology 661 Hazards of Economies of Scale 661 The Internationalization of Commercial Technologies 662 American High-Technology Bias 663 The Spread of Multinational Businesses — 664 National Control of International Corporations 665 Commercial Transfers of Technology 665 Technological Obstacles to U.S. Export Trade — 666 Regional Organizations for Technology 667 International Transfer of Technology 667 President Nixon's Foreign Policy 668 Review of U.S. Technical Aid Program 670 U.N. Study of Technical Assistance 672 Presidential Policy for Future Technical Aid 673 Some Future Problems in Technical Assistance 674 V. The Emerging Policy Issues of International Technology 675 The Issue of National Strategy in Technological Innovation 675 The Issues of Global Strategy in Technological Innovation 678 The Ultimate Issue : Reconciling National and Global Technologi- cal Advance 680 TABLES 1. Gross Domestic Product, Private Farm and Nonfarm Sectors, Selected Years 643 2. Suggested Required Levels of School Enrollment 646 3. How Trade Follows Research and Development 663 CHAPTER 9— THE EVOLUTION OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY I. IxTRODUCTIOjST The focus of this chapter is on technology : it is intended to delineate the iini)ortant ways in which technology influences diplomacy ; to show technological change as a process producing effects tliat diplomats must deal Avith; and to raise questions as to whether and how govern- ments can make j^urposeful, constructive use of these processes to fur- ther diplomatic objectives. A survey of the history of tcclmology observes that the Industrial Kevolutiou — which might also be called the "Technological Eevolu- tion'* — was and continues to he a revolution of power, but not only in the power of the mnclnne. "It revolutionized the power of the middle- class em])loyer and the power of labour, the economic power of nations and the power of armaments. But power in itself is neither good nor evil : in the last analysis, its uses are subject to man's good sense or his stui)idity. If this is a truism, it is one tliat man, in tlie age of nuclear energy, can scarcely afford to ignore."* ^ Similarly, Professor Warner Schilling of Columbia University, who has written extensively in the field of international politics, observes that the industrial revolution changed all the elements of the "inter- ]iarional i)olitical process" including the structures of states, their policies, and their purposes, expectations, and means. Consider the chauges in * * * the number, location, and relative power [of states in the world coiiinumity of nations]. As the industrial revolution trans- formed the bases of military power and increased its mobility, international rela- tions became global, rather than regional, in scope, and the relations among the members of this global system became continuous, rather than episodic.^ Teclinology as the TJndcrpmnhig of Diplomacy The profound influence that technological change has had in the past, and promises to have for the, future, implies the need for a strong cori)S of diplomats trained to anticipate and prepare for the direct and indirect impacts of technology on diplomatic concerns. As William P. liogers, the Secretary of State, observed to the scientific ] numbers of his diplomatic service, January 29, 1970: "Science and ' Charles Sinffpr, E. ,T. Holmyard, A. R, Hall, and Trevor I. Williams, eds. "A History of Technology." Vol. V : The Late Nineteenth Century, 1S50 to 1900 (New York, Oxford University Press, 19.'>S), page S40. - Warner R. Schillins;. "Teehnolosy and International Relations." International Encyclo- pedia of the Social Sciences. Edited by David L. Sills, (New York, , The Macmillan Company and the Free Press. Volume 15), 19GS, page 590. Note : This chapter was prepared in 1970 by Franklin P. Huddle. (611) 612 technology today have a telling impact on policy decisions in both national and international affairs * * *. We do not have to look far to find examples * * *." It would be foolhardy in this day and age [the Secretary went on] to set political objectives without an accounting of the technical realities — or to approach technological problems without regard to their political and social implications. Indeed, the assessment of what science and technology holds for us in the years ahead must be an integral part of today's policy and decision-making machinery. The conduct of our foreign affairs — the formulation of our policies and goals — must reflect the sometimes complex, sometimes subtle, but persistent influence and interaction of science and technology on the affairs of man. So it is obvious that in forging the capability of the State Department to deal with the problems of the 70s, the professional corps of the Foreign Service and the Department must develop the capacity to keep abreas't of these develop- ments and the skills necessary to cope with them. Diplomacy deals with problems between sovereign nations and with the common concerns of members of the world commmiity of nations. The objective of diplomacy is to reconcile or resolve issues and establish agreement^ to advance the national interest in a constantly changing world. Changes within the jurisdiction of each member of the world community alter its relations with others. No source of change is more potent than an alteration in a nation's technological condition. It produces changes of many kinds at many levels of impacts and interactions: military, commercial, cultural, political, and scientific; these changes involve many agencies of government, the academic world, private business, and the public at large. Familiarity with tecluiolog}' , and with the nature of its impacts, is thus an indispensable tool of the diplomat. Moreover, the skill with which a nation manages and advances its own technology contributes to the status of its diplomats, and to the options with which they can negotiate. In both senses, national technology confers diplomatic power. Moreover, it is more than a hypothesis that developments in U.S. teclinology have bearing on the achievement of such national and international objectives as peace, lessened tension, mutual trade, and easement of the plight of the less developed nations of the world. Accordingly, the Department of State has a cause for concern with the health and vigor of U.S. technology, both generally and with specific reference to technological fields that can be identified as con- tributing most directly to diplomatic objectives of the United States. The future direction of U.S. technological advances, no less than the Nation's general level of technological competence, has far-reaching consequences beyond its borders. Of great importance also are the uses made of this burgeoning technology, and the organizational arrange- ments— domestic and international — for overseeing these uses. In these senses, technology is an important basis for national power. Contemporary Importance of Technology Technology is a general term covering a wide variety of scientific and technical activities and products. In its simplest usage, it merely signifies "tools." At the other extreme, it conveys the broad meaning of "how man works" ^ and indeed "denotes the broad area of purposeful 3 Peter P. Drucker. "Technology, Management, and Society : Essays by Peter F. Drucker. (New York, Harper and Row, Publishers, 1958, reprinted 1970), page vil. 613 application of the contents of the physical, life, and behavioral sciences." ^ In Part I of this study, technology was described as "the cutting edge of science." It is the point in the system of scientific inquiry and application at which tangible and material impacts occur upon human affairs, and the point at which economic and political decisions are required. Expressed another way, technology is the rational use of knowledge about man's universe, while science is the process of discov- ering additional pieces of that knowledge. Notable changes have taken place, over the past several decades, in the role of technology in the United States. Tlie years 1950-1970 might perhaps be described as a "Golden Age of Technology" in this country. The changes can be described along five general headings of pace^ sise, coTJiplexity, variety or scope, and range and pei'vasive- ness of iTTipacts.^ PACE Speaking as Special Assistant to the President for Science and Tech- nology, in 1960, George B. Kistiakowsky declared: "What is new today is the rapidity with which the developments of science are alter- ing the human condition, the rapidity with wliich policy, particularly foreign policy, must adjust to the changes being wrought by the pace of scientific advance. Not only adjust — policy must prepare for, must predict, the impact of scientific discovery and must also in some sense attempt to guide it." ® The rate at which technological innovations have been introduced into the American culture has been a factor of the large postwar in- creases in the public investment in scientific research. It has also re- sulted from large public expenditures in related, areas (defense, space, and atomic energy) and supporting fields (communications and in- formation processing). Acceptance of such innovations is a factor, also, of the extensive public education in scientific subjects. The increased pace of change increases the rate at which interna- tional issues, problems, and opportunities arise. It confronts the diplo- mat with an ever-lengthening agenda, the need for a deeper under- standing of the processes of change, and the requirement for a great increase in the orderly flow of exact information concerning its ingredients. SIZE Although historical achievements in technology have sometimes approached heroic proportions (the Pyramids, Eoman roads, the Great Wall of China, and the Panama Canal, for example) , the size and cost of some of the modem technological systems is quite unprec- edented. Most notable are those in the field of military hardware, * Erich Jantsch. "Technological Forecasting in Perspective : A framework for tech- nological forecasting, its techniques and organisation ; a description of activities and an- notated bibliography by Erich Jantsch, consultant to the OECD. (Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1967), page 15. 5 This enlarges somewhat on a statement by Herman Pollack, (then) Acting Director, International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State, at a Colloquium on Science and Human Affairs, University of Illinois, May 17, 1967. He said, in part : "We are in the midst of a technological revolution without precedent In its combination of scale, pace, and impace on the offices of men. The crucial element in that combination is pace. . . ." « Address to American Physical Society and American Association of Physics Teachers, reprinted In "Department of State Bulletin," (February 22, 1960), page 276. 614 such as the Miniiteman complexes, the DEW Line, air defense sys- tems, the Polaris system, and nuclear test detection systems. Othere include spacecraft like the Apollo series, global communications net- works, air traffic control systems, a global weather forecasting net- work, the Interstate Highway System, electric power grids, and the complexes of multipurpose dams on the Tennessee and other major rivers. The willingness and albility of American society to concentrate re- sources on miajor technological systems like these has been a striking phenomenon of recent years. Moreover, each of these large endeavors produces in its wake an array of lesser innovations useful elsewhere, and a technological "multiplier" effect analogous to the Keynesian eco- nomic multiplier seems to result, raising the general level of the Na- tion's technological culture to new orders of capability. Large technological projecte of an inlierently international char- acter impose burdens on the diplomat. Problems and benefits must be shared equitably by many nations. Acceptance of roles of participa- tion must be negotiated. New meclianisms of diplomacy are required. COMPLEXrrY The historical evolution of teclinology appears to have followed a series of cycles. An initial stage was the development and use by man of simple manual tools. Then the effectiveness of the tools was multi- plied by the use of energy sources — horses, wind, waterpower, steam, and electricity. Progressively, tools became more highly specialized and explicit in purpose. Then, tools of different functional purpose were integrated into large systems—such as the assembly line, rail- road and telephone systems, and petroleum pipelines and refineries. The most recent step has been the introduction of computers into these large systems, to automate the making of routine decisions in their management. These systems have now become so complicated in design and function that even to build them has come to require elaborate systems of planning and control, and these have also required the assistance of computers. Particularly in the fields of military weaponry and space explora- tion have systems of extreme complexity emerged. A typical air de- fense system might extend over a thousand miles, with hundreds of persons in each of dozens of stations, served by electronic sensors, tele- phone lines, computers to convert signals into readable forms, cathode ray tubes to display information visually, and computers to translate information into instructions for actions to be taken by interceptors, ground-to-air missiles, and other tracking stations. Equally complex is the arrangement of a manned space flight. Taken together, the com- puter and electronic communications have greatly enlarged man's ability to design and operate complex and far-flung systems. The evolution of the systems concept imposes burdens and offers opportunity to the diplomat. On the one hand, complexities of systems design present formidable obstacles to quick understanding of these large enterprises. On the other hand, it has been suggested that the disciplines and orderly methodologies they require can make a direct contribution to the processes of diplomatic analysis and problem solving. 615 VARIETY OR SCOPE The variety of technological innovations to which the individual citizen is today exposed seems to have increased by orders of magni- tude in the past quarter-century. This increase seems to be attributable, again, to the heavy and rising public investment in basic and applied physical science, to hea^^ developmental outlays in the high technology of military and space programs, to the initiative of entrepreneurs in effecting lateral transfers of new hardware to consumer markets, and to the receptivity of a teclmically literate and affluent consumer mar- ket. The imiovative trend is indicated by the automation and pro- ductivity of agriculture and industry; the great variety of consumer goods m the home ; the elaboration of hardware for recreational pur- poses ; the introduction of computers into banks, brokerage houses, ticket officers, the management of credit cards, and other services ; the elaborate expansion of hardware and technological systems into group medical practice and hospitals, school systems, and law enforcement administrations ; and the great range of different vehicles in service in the air, on the highways, and in shops, airports, heavy constmction projects, and urban areas. While the scope of diplomacy has not excluded attention to all these topics, there is a tendency for teclmology to make them more salient. Assigning priorities among a growing array of salient developments becomes increasingly difficult as a problem of formulating and imple- menting foreign policy. RANGE AND PERVASIVENESS OF IMPACTS The effects of an onrushing technology on the United States and in its relations with other countries are virtually without limit. His- torical concepts of war, and of the military base for diplomacy, have been unseated by atomic weapons and their long-range delivery systems. Industrial productivity, supported by technological innovations, has risen so impressively in relation to hours of work that a "post-indus- trial" condition can be foreseen in which standards of livmg will no longer be limited by the length of the work week. Consumption of industrial materials continues to rise, to support present high levels of industrial output, so that the future adequacy of minerals and fuels is increasingly in question. Consumption of electrical energy to run all the appliances and durable goods in the household, and for all manner of industrial appli- cations, has been doubling every decade in the United States, and seems destined to continue to double at this rate, at least through 1990. Impacts of power generation on environmental quality are a source of growing pul3lic and professional anxiety. Imperfections in technology are coming increasingly under attack : in terms of pollution of the air and surface waters ; in terms of noise, radiation, and thermal effects ; and in terms of massive quantities of waste products to be disposed of, and minute additions of toxic mate- rials that progressively accumulate in the environment. Agricultural technology has enabled the highest rate of per- worker productivity in all histoi-y, but at a cost of heavy uses of chemicals, some of which re- 616 main indefinitely in tlie environment. A further cost or hazard results from agricultural simplification — ^the reduced variety of crops — such that any attacking blight or pest that technology cannot control might wipe out a large fraction of the Nation's food supply. Technology of health and medical practice has imposed increasing burdens of knowledge on medical practitioners and increased costs on those treated, as well as on society at large. The same problem of infor- mation overload confronts technologists in most other fields ; indeed, the public at large is exposed to more choices, more solicitation and appeals for attention, and more stimuli, than ever before. As standards of material well-being in such affluent countries as the United States, Japan, the Scandinavian countries, and those of West- ern Europe, continue to rise, their condition becomes the source of envy and the target of the aspirations of less developed countries of the world. Defects perceived by the developed countries in their own technologies tend to be discounted by those less developed. Continued growth of technology and productivity, with their con- current imperfections and environmental effects, cannot reasonably be expected to go on indefinitely. In countries with less advanced tech- nologies and production systems, the United States is today a much- admired model for emulation. Global growth in the uses and defects of technology is in prospect, strongly supported by positive programs for the export of U.S. technology and by the efforts of the less-developed countries to increase their own technological sophistication through schools, universities, and institutes. The impacts of this growth on a finite world are sobering; to the extent that adverse effects of technol- ogy are attributed to the United States as the foremost technological nation, the consequences of this technological leadership seem to pose awkward problems for future diplomacy. However, for the present, the main theme is one of enthusiastic emulation. National Infrastructures of Technological Growth The rate at which a nation's technology grows, intensifies, integrates, and comes to dominate its culture, depends in large measure on a com- bination of foundational elements or "infrastructure." Marked differ- ences are evident among nations as to the completeness with which this infrastructure is developed, and accordingly as to their relative prospects for rapid teclinological advance. The extent of attention given to this infrastructure, historically, seems to have been more acci- dental than consciously directed. However, since about 1955, there has been a growing appreciation of the importance of the infrastructure for the evolution and strengthening of a nation's technology. Infrastructure encompasses many elements. A nation must be able to feed itself, for example, but unless the productivity of its agri- culture is such that one family can feed several by its efforts, there will be no food available for those who leave the farm for the urban factory or to sell abroad to buy machinery with. In the United States, a single farm worker — statistically — feeds something like 30 to 40 persons. To increase agricultural productivity requires mechanizatioia, agricultural science, and capital; this set of requirements in turn suggests the need for credit institutions, agricultural training pro- grams, research institutes (to provide information pertinent to the crops produced in the country concerned), an agricultural marketing system, and so on. Other elements of infrastructure are arrangements 617 for broad public education, a strong national health program, training in entrepreneurial and managerial skills, sophistication in the han- dling of industrial machinery, a national standards laboratory, and many other basic institutions. Rail and highway networks are of great importance to miify a national market and to open up the hinterland to the global network of ocean freight. Of course, as a practical matter, the infrastructure contains a host of other ingredients, such as the abundance of teclinological artifacts for youth to experiment with, the level of technology in the home with reference to such features as the American "do-it-yourself^ craze, the wide availability of popular science literature, the American consciousness of the importance of the worker-manager and worker- company relationship, the speed with which technology finds its way into toys and recreational hardware, the institution of the "science fair," and many more. There are many ways in which diplomacy and technological mf ra- structure are related : in the formulation of plans with or for develop- ing countries for aiding them to build their own infrastructure, in dealing with developed coimtries on issues of comparative excellence and competition in infrastructure-building, in exchange of informa- tion on measurement of aspects of infrastructure, and in resolving conflicts in foreign trade resulting from differential costs based on different levels of infrastructure, and so on. Interactions of Technology with Diplomacy The uses of teclinology have involved or affected relations between nations m many ways. The essence of technolog}^ is power : to increase the production of some manufactured good, to contrive some military weapon of surpassing potency or effectiveness, to perform some so- cially necessary or desired function, to demonstrate some demanding feat of skill, to secure resources and convert them into artifacts that modify the human environment in purposeful ways. The relations between nation states constitute an endless bargaining process in which the currency is power. A nation that consciously and dynamically lays the gromidwork for technological advance, encourages teclinological skills, rewards innovation, and systematically increases the variety, depth, sophistication, and universality of its tcchnolog;^', is in a stronger bargaining position than a nation that does not. Technology' increases the range of options open to a nation in its internal affairs and in its alternatives abroad. Selection and negotiation of courses to support foreign policy, which is the task of diplomacy, is broadened, strength- ened, and often made more flexible, by the achievements of tecluiology. On the other hand, not all the outcomes of technology are equally felicitous. A nation achieving a relatively high level of teclinological power may have the effect of encouraging other nations to combine forces to reduce its bargaining power. A nation generous with its tech- nological innovations (for example), the British in 1825-1850 or so, with their export of railroad locomotives and rolling stock) may com- bme benefits in one industry with injury to another. (In the British case, the effect was to stimulate tomiage impoits of agricultural products from the United States to the disadvantage of British farm- ers). Even if a nation bends every effort to achieve technological superiority, its lead over competitor nations will be only marginal at best because other nations will quickly duplicate its successes without 97-400 O - 77 - 2 618 involving themselves in the costs of its failures. Moreover, technological leadership, though gained at great cost, can be quickly lost if a nation relaxes from the effort even momentarily. For example, the United States pioneered the metallurgical technology in titanium, only to see Japanese metallurgists winnow the best information available and proceed to improve on it — efficiently and at low additional cost. Semi- conductor technology followed a similar course. The whole history of textiles has been a succession of international transfers of teclinology, with improvements occurring after almost every transfer. Qualitative differences in the directions taken by a nation's tech- nology can have important differences in the effect on quantity and intensity of diplomatic interactions. The relative power resulting from the British steel industry and the Chinese ceramics industry is ob- vious. Nations emphasizing maritime technologies increase the fre- quency of international contacts. Mass production of low cost items results in a need to export and often in an accompanying need for ever- increasing external sources of raw materials. From the literature of science and technology, and of diplomatic discussion, it is possible to delineate a long list of technological-diplo- matic problems, issues, and concerns, of which the following are illustrative : INSTITUTIONAL MATTERS Technological institutions to aid the less developed nations and to further U.S. technological relations with comitries phasing out of the AID program; Opportmiities for creative technological relationships and the evolu- tion of suitable, mutually-supported institutions with nations on the geographical and ideological periphery of the Soviet Union; Coordmation of the midtifarious teclinological programs, interests, and institutions of the United Nations, and also the many regional treaty organizations, European Community and Western Hemisphere organizations, and the like ; Resolution of j)olicy issues associated with the development of high-teclinology-oriented, multinational corporations. SUBSTANTIVE TECHNOLOGICAL MATTERS Development of plans for international cooperation to exploit satellites for coinmunications, meteorological research and forecast- ing, earth resources surveys, geographic mapping, navigation, pollu- tion detection, early warning of plant and forest diseases and insect infestation, and other purposes ; Teclinological and environmental problems of the Arctic regions ; Development of quick-response arrangements on an international basis to combat the spread of epidemics (whether afflicting man, animals, or plants), to disseminate curative and preventive teclinolo- gies, (to assure global availability of curative agents and instruments, to enable rapid mobilization of medical teams for emergencies, and to eliminate sources of endemic diseases ; Formulation of policies for the international exchange and use of government-owned patents, the protection of privately owned patents, and the exchange of trade secrets and other "intellectual property," especially where international consortia or multinational corporations are involved; 619 The bearing of the rate of teclinological advance in the United States, both absolutely and relative to particular countries and groups of countries, on U.S. diplomacy and diplomatic objectives; The importance for U.S. objectives of the fact that U.S. teclinologi- cal achievement is not imif orm across all of industry, but ranges from the high extremes of computers and control instruments to the rela- tively lower level of achievement in the steel industry and textiles. Diplomatic Need for a Coherent Policy Toward Technological Change The question to be explored in this chapter pertains to the inter- national role, past and prospective, of technology itself as an aspect of the national culture and power. 'What does it mean for the future role of the United States in relation to the community of nations ? ^^^lat could it mean ? In what ways can and should technology be exploited for diplomatic purposes ? What are the costs of this exploitation, and are they tolerable ? Technology is a concept in which every citizen is involved. It is capable of being influenced by Government action. It is a source of national strength and wealth. It requires elaborate institutional ar- rangements, and the more sophisticated it becomes the more complex and far-flung are the arrangements needed to manage it. Technology has been shown capable of advancing U.S. foreign policy objectives, but it is neither infallible nor invariably beneficial. The question, then, is how to determine what the Federal policy should be with respect to technology, for purposes of U.S. diplomacy. It is certain, in any event, that technology will continue to advance. Once set in motion, it has a momentum of its own. The question is whether and how the dynamics of this changing feature of the Amer- ican culture can be guided and directed to serve the objectives of U.S. international relations. Implicit in this question is the further issue of whether such diplomatic gains should be pursued or aban- doned when they are found to conflict with domestic or regional pro- grams. What sacrifices are necessary ? Are they tolerable ? AVlio should decide ? "Who should determine the rules of the game — the criteria and values on which the choice is made? What organizational resources are available to make these decisions ? Are they adequate for the pur- pose ? T\Tiat else needs to be done ? The hypothesis of this chapter is that technology is a primary source of national power and diplomatic influence. The section to fol- low will discuss briefly some of the liistorical effects of technology on the world scene and on the emergence of the United States as a world power. Section III, Trends in Contemporary Technology, selects for more extended treatment several important technologies or aspects of technology. Its purpose is to show that as each teclinology evolved it became internationalized, its substance became the subject of inter- national conversations, its effects extended beyond natiional .bound- aries, and an ultimate outcome to be foreseen would be the evolution of a global system mcorporating or resolvmg the teclinology. II. Historical. Ixfluence of Techxology on Diplomacy Technology today is at once the substance, an instrument, and a com- plicating factor of foreign policy. It involves every citizen ; it can be influenced by government action; it imposes on society the need for 620 more and more elaborate institutions for its use and control. On the world scene, technology is a source of national strength and wealth; it can advance a nation's foreign policy objectives ; but it is often un- predictable and sometimes injurious in its effects. The purpose of this section is to trace briefly the emergence of technology in the Western World, and chiefly in the United States, to provide an overview of the national and international role of teclmology as an aspect of na- tional culture and power. In general, it may be said that technology has contributed both divisive and cohesive factors to the spectrum of international politics. The development of military weaponry has increased the power in- ventory of nations; yet, vigorous development of military hardware by leading protagonists has merely tended to stabilize the balance of power between them. The application and pui^uit of technology expands national frontiers, but the quest for resources abroad has tended to stimulate closer economic relations with remote territories. Uneven growth of teclmology in developing countries has raised living standards, but has also generated tensions as hmnan expectations have outrun rewards. The Industrial Revolution as a Glohal Process Early in the industrial revolution, a race began for both overseas markets for manufactured goods and supplies of needed raw materials. In this race the process was one of commercial penetration, followed by military enforcement of commercial rights. It is described as follows : Ckmscious of their unassailable position, merchants demanded commercial privileges, and disputes over them often led to wars. From military victories followed the necessity to assume administrative and political authority. Thus, granted the immense European naval and military superiority, European control of the Far East was an almost inevitable consequence of Europe's commercial intrusion in the fifteenth century. Conquest, like missionary effort, was an aspect of the boundless energy of the west. It was the western ascendancy in warlike affairs, ship-building, and naviga- tion that first impinged upon the East [Products of artistic quality and crafts- manship did not emerge from the application of western technology.] . . . The huge, basic steps in technological progress seem to be linked with the satisfaction of the most elementary and insatiable human needs. Water- and wind-power were first applied to the grinding of corn, then to fulling cloth, then to mining and metallurgy. Steam-power went first to the mines, then to the mills. Mass- production methods appear first in ship-building yards, then in armament factories. Modern chemical industry begins with the 'heavy' chemicals, and so on. . . . The superiority of the West lay in its greater use of power and machinery, in its chemical industry, and, in a few respects, in its applications of natural science. These advantages enabled Europe to produce more goods more cheaply, and so gradually to raise its standard of living to an unprecented level, while dominating the commerce of the world and drawing to itself every necessary raw material.^ British and German Technological Supremacy From the close of the Napoleonic Wars to about 188.5, England remained dominant technologically and industrially over the other nations of Europe, and indeed the rest of the world. Factors behind this leadership included : the proximity of coal and iron at the outset of the age of steam ; superior flexibility in the availability of acciunu- lated capital for investment ; and early developments in machine tools ■^ Charles Singer, E. J. Holmyard, A. R. Hall and Trevor I. Williams, eds. "A History of Technology." Vol. Ill : From the Renaissance to the Industrial Revolution, 1500 — 1750. (New York, Oxford University Press, 1957), pages 709-711. 621 and precision metal-working. However, between 1870 and 1895, Ger- many passed the British and assumed world technological leadership. In Germany the advent of the railway age resulted in the iron-ore deposits becoming, for the first time, economically linked with coal in that country. The era of 'blood and iron' was dawning. By 1866 Prussia had replaced Austria as leader of the German-speaMng peoples. Four years later, a pretest had been found for war against EYance, and Bismarck's concept of a unified Germany had materialized. In achieving military victories the Prussian armies were consider- ably aided by their technological advantage in small arms. . . . Emergence of a united Germany and its acquisition by conquest of the low-grade phosphoric iron ores of Lorraine had a dominating significance in world events for the next three-quarters of a century. The Gilchrist and Thomas process, invented in England in 1879, permitted the first use of the iron ores of Lorraine and Luxem- burg in the manufacture of steel. The new powerful and energetic Germany was not long in rivalling Britain's early lead in steel production. By 1895 the British output was surpassed by the German.* German emphasis in education was on technological skills q,nd in- novation. '"The United Kingdom, on the other hand, was by then lagging technologically, especially in the newer fields of electrical engi- neering, organic chemical manufacture (particularly of dyestuffs) , and the motor-car industry. . . . Politically, at that time, German progress in arms manufacture — ^typified by the mighty Krupp works and great naval yards — seemed the most serious consequence of her industrial expansion." ^ Technological Support for Germany'' s Struggle for Power On the eve of World War I, Germany's energy showed itself in many ways : in ambitious plans for a railroad line to the Middle East, con- struction of a modern war fleet, development of African colonies, and the prospect of a technological hegemony over the European Con- tinent. ^^Hien the war broke out, Germany's superior technology very nearly enabled her to overmatch the combination of England, France, Italy, and Russia. In World War I, German submarines threatened England's command of the sea. German chemistry enabled her to produce synthetic nitrate fertilizer and synthetic nitrate explosives to frustrate the British blockade. German metallurgical skills enabled her to substitute available metals for those deemed indispensable. At this time. Imperial Germany led the world in most branches of the physical and biological sciences, and many fields of technology. Her collapse in 1918 was only partial, but the two decades that fol- lowed were marred by social upheavals, runaway inflation, political instability, and finally a dictatorship too erratic in its concepts to exploit systematically the undoubted talents of its people in science and technology. By the close of World War I, moreover, the industrial technology of the United States — in quantity if not quality — had overtaken Ger- many's. From then on, the United States assumed world technological leadership and provided the standard of achievement toward which the developed and developing nations of the world came to aspire. Yet, even in the period of decay, after 1939, the technological gains of Germany disturbed the world by the disclosure of the V-2 ballistic rockets, one of the major achievements in World War II. 8 "A History of Technology," Vol. V : The Late Nineteenth Century, 1850 to 1900, op. cit., pages 820-21. » Ibid., pages 821-822. 622 U.S. Rise to Technological Maturity Many factors, some geographic or historical and some sociological or economic, contributed to the emergence of the United States as the most dynamic technological nation of the world. An unpeopled con- tinent with rich natural resources and temperate cliinate was settled by immigrants who tended to be self-selected for initiative, education, independence, and political sophistication. A chronic labor shortage automatically placed value on labor-saving devices and machinery. These combined to sustain rapid progress in technological innovation toward high manpower productivity and swift economic growth. Foremost among the new Nation's needs were roads, canals, and a postal system, all of which the early Government undertook to pro- vide. Later, the railroad and telegraph were eagerly seized upon to link up throughout all parts of the Nation the flow of goods and information. The American Civil War had a profound effect on technology. For the first time, ". . . the technological resources of a whole nation were ultimately mobilized to overwhelm an opponent. There was mass- production of weapons and ammunition, of uniforms and boots; canned food was supplied to armies transported for the first time by rail."" The revolutionary nature of "mass production" made it the "great- est contribution of America to the development of technology." Eli Whitney, inventor of the cotton gin,^^ is also credited with the key technological developments that paved the way for modern mass pro- duction. There were four steps in this process : interchangeability of parts, specialization of production function, the conveyor belt, and mechanical instrumentation. The first two of these were demonstrated at AMiitney's arms plant in Connecticut, and the third came much later in the Dearborn plant of Henry Ford. The fourth step, which is still evolving, consists of instrumented controls, computers, computer software, and mechanical slaves, all to replace human operators. Rostow describes functionally the passage of the United States through the stages of economic growth : Steel launched this great expansion, and railway steel remained an important category of use ; but in these decades, mass-produced lighter engineering products came into their own : agricultural equipment, the typewriter, and those two almost universal harbingers of the age of durable consumers goods — the sewing- machine and the bicycle. Above all, with the railways mainly laid by the 1880s, the nation became a unified Continental market with powerful incentives within it to organize production and distribution in vast centralized bureaucratized units. Much in this industrial surge was based on radical improvements in the metal- working machine tool, which comes as close to being a correct symbol for the second phase of industrial growth as the railway is for the first. And, by the 1890s, electricity, chemical, and automobile industries, which were to play an extremely important role in the third phase, were commercially in being, the first two rooted in new and expanding fields of science and technology." i« Ibid, page 819. " Of this 1793 invention, the History observes that it had "led to a great increase in the size of cotton plantations, [and had] affected directly the lives of every man and woman, black and white, in the Southern States, and ultimately, through the slavery ques- tion and the Civil War, the whole of the North as well." (Ibid., page 818.) "Walt W. Rostow. "The United States in the World Arena: An Essay in Recent History." (New York, Harper and Row, Publishers, 1960), page 7. 623 Trends in Industrial Research and Scientific Management With the opening of the Twentieth Century, two important new trends heightened the intensity of U.S. exploitation of industrial technology. One was the appearance of the large industrial laboratory and the other was the rapid spread of the doctrine of "scientific man- agement" by the Taylor Societies. The first development, epitomized by the Bell Telephone Laboratory at Murray Hill, N.J., and the Gen- eral Electric Company laboratory at Schenectady, N.Y., proposed to shorten the time sequence between basic scientific discoveries and their commercial application. For the first time the tools and methods of science were employed by industry to "invent to order." Operating in another direction, the concept of scientific manage- ment involved the application of the quantitative scientific method to the actions and behavior of production-line workers as well as to the flow of materials and parts through industrial processes. It focused attention on "time and motion studies" to discover ways to reduce in- put costs and increase output of product. An important supplement to this program of industrial efficiency was the campaign by Herbert Hoover, as Secretary of Commerce in the early 1920s, to encourage the reduction of waste in industry and the adoption of industrial stand- ards and standardized methods of all kinds. The great industrial lab- oratories made products better and scientific management made them lower in cost. Maturing of the American Technological Posture World War II dramatized the importance of science for military power, but as a practical matter it was technology that proved itself of importance. Trained American scientists, with an impressive sup- plement of refugee and British scientists, were able to turn themselves into technologists to serve a great national and international purpose. In 1945, when the scientists called attention to the opportunities of the "endless frontier" of science, and urged its public support, they based their claim on the proposition that investment in research and education in the sciences would automatically reward society — would stimulate innovation, and develop opportunities for an expanding economy — in addition to its having military implications. When their appeal was heeded, beginning about 1950, a veritable explosion, scien- tific and technological, took place. Pursuing this course, and combining a high consumption economy with a heavy emphasis on scientific innovation, the United States, by 1970, had built a teclinological structure that included the following principal elements: A large number of very large, efficient, highly productive, geo- graphically extended busmess enterprises with families of satellite suppliers of materials, components, and specialized services, com- prising complex, interconnected, production-distribution-service enterprises; Separation of business ownership from business management; A great increase in policy, planning, and administrative staff in the management of enterprises of all kinds. The commercially-oriented part of this technological structure achieves higli levels of mass production at low cost, based on high levels of productivity of its labor. There is also a "high technology" 624 part of this structure (specifically, the aerospace and military systems industry) which is characterized by low production of items of high quality and j)erf ormance ; workers in this industry include a high pro- portion of scientific and technological professionals, skilled in solving complex and difficult problems. The outbreak of the Korean War was the signal for a great increase in military research and development. Demonstration of the feasibility £)f the hydrogen bomb accelerated efforts to exploit its high potency in an array of sophisticated attack systems, and at the same time to devise <3ountermeasures against these same systems in the hands of an ad- versary. With the exhibition of advances by the Soviet Union in rocketry and spacecraft, the efforts of the United States were redou- bled. To recapture the lead in space technology, the United States in- vested some $60 billion in the Apollo and other large programs of re- search, technological development, design, and system-building. Otlier programs of science and technology were concurrently ex- panding, such as the support of basic science by the National Science Fomidation, basic research installations in high-energy physics spon- sored by the Atomic Energy Commission, medical research in the Na- tional Institutes of Health, interdisciplinary research in the basic sci- ences and programs to create new scientific ''centers of excellence" with supix>rt by the Advanced Research Projects Agency of the Department of Defense, research in meteorology h\ the Environmental Science Services Administration, water desalting studies in the Department of the Interior, and so on. Servan-Schreiber sums up the consequences of this ferment in these words : During the past ten years, from the end of the cold war and the launching of the first Sputnik, American power has made an unprecedented leap forward. It has undergone a violent and productive internal revolution. Technological innova- tion has now become the basic objective of economic policy. In America today the government ofl5cial, the industrial manager, the economics professor, the engineer, and the scientist have joined forces to develop coordinated techniques for inte- grating factors of production. These techniques have stimulated what amounts to a permanent industrial revolution." Diplomatic hnpUcaticms of U.S. Technological Maturity At the beginning of the present century, when the United States was at the threshold of technological niaturity, the nation was con- fronted by three options : * * * To expand its power on the world scene ; to soften the harshnesses of industrialization through the devices of the welfare state; to elevate the stand- ard of mass consumption." This author concludes that the United Staites "opted*' rather whole- heartedly for the third course.^^ There were several diplomatic consequences of the U.S. decision to opt for a high-consumption economy: (1) As raw material resources at home were quickly consumed, American industry looked increasing- ly abroad for sources to make good a growing list of deficiencies. Heavy U.S. investments were made to develop overseas sources of chrome, manganese, bauxite, tungsten, and other metals needed by American i*.T.-J. Servan-Schrelber. "The American Challenge." Translated from the French by Ronald Steel. (New York, Atheneum, 1968), page 27. 1^ Rostow : "The United States in the World Arena : An Essay in Recent History," op. clt.. page 7. 15 Ibid., page 8. 625 industry. (2) Production of industrial goods in increasing volume exceeded the domestic capacity to consume, and led to progressive penetration of foreign markets. (3) Lagging sectors of the U.S. econ- omy sought protective tariffs and agricultural producers relied in- creasingly upon Government subsidies and assistance to maintain "parity" with the industrial sector of the economy. These developments brought the United States into the tangled maze of international monetary relations, currency exchange prob- lems, tariff negotiations, and questions of trade regulation. The need grew for commercial representation in foreign ports, for commercial and technological intelligence about agricultural production and min- eral discoveries abroad, and for information about export and import regulations and trade practices. World War II marked a revolutionary phase in the growth of U.S. diplomacy. Before the war, the style of the Nation's diplomats was that of an "observant wary minor power, with no bargaining instil- ments to bring to bear. . . ." But, "With the fall of France in 1940 and the British demonstration of military viability in the autumn, the United States turned to the task of bringing its assets to bear in relation to its interests on a worldwide basis ; and thus was launched the third and truly revolutionary phase of the American diplomatic tradition." ^® The primary basis for American diplomatic resources was the com- bination of industrial productivity and military potency displayed in that war. Characteristic of the war was the emphasis on science and technology. The experience of the Second World War was distinctive in three respects. First, military technology became linked to one area of science virtually at the level of fundamental science — atomic physics. Second, military technology became linked to several ai^eas of rapidly developing technology . . . notably electronics, rockets, and jet turbines. In all of these areas major new engineer- ing (rather than fundamental scientific) breakthroughs were in the process of developing in the intervrar years; and military technology . . . accelerated their unfolding practical possibilities. . . . The third characteristic . . . was simply that the scale on which first- rate minds were mobilized exceeded anything in past experience ; and this yielded a flow of technological developments derived from all levels of sci- ence and technology and applied over the full range of military activity on a unique scale. Like modern industry, modern warmaking came to build into its institutional structure the process of purposeful invention and innovation; and thus in quite new ways and on a quite new scale, a partnership was launched between the professional military men and the men of science and engineering." Following the close of the war, the shapers of American foreign policy found themselves confronted with an amazing array of un- resolved problems and alternatives. Collapse of the German Reich had left a power vacuum in war-torn Central Europe, and the United States accepted the obligation to aid the belligerent Powers to repair the destruction of their technological structures and infrastructures. An initial diplomatic effort to achieve multinational cooperation through' the United Nations failed with the withdrawal of the So- viet Union from the wartime alliance, the collapse of Nationalist " Ibid., pages 34-5. " Ibid., pages 59-60. 626 China, the rejection of tlie U.S. proposal to transfer an atomic mo- nopoly to international control, and the rise to power of an inward- looking Labour Government in the United Kingdom. The first manifestation of U.S. technological diplomacy after the war was the highly successful Marshall Plan to restore European industry. Early in this program, the United States scored a tech- nological coup by the Berl'in Airlift, which demonstrated the capa- bility of preserving a large city's viability by air shipments alone. However, elsewhere U.S. employment of technology as an instrument of foreign policy enjoyed only limited success. Frustration of U.S. Efforts to Wield Technological Power The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 was the signal for an intensification of military research and development, and vigorous expansion in industrial capacity. However, this war (like the Viet- namese conflict later on) was to demonstrate the serious, painful, and frustrating limitations of technology in waging a limited war against a highly organized and resourceful, if teclmologically unsophisticated, adversary. The Soviet Union had quickly caught up with the United States in the development of fission weapons, and was nearly even also in fusion (hydrogen) bombs. But in the United States, progress in nu- clear development had not been matched by progress in the develop- ment of delivery systems. "Thus, at a decisive period, when Russian science was organized in an all-out effort to close the gap between Soviet and American strength, there was a substantial deterioration in the efficacy with which the pool of American science and technology was applied to military problems." ^^ This trend was to change abruptly, with the evidence of Russian advances in nuclear delivery capability. There is no clear analogy in American history to the crisis triggered by the launching of the Soviet earth satellite on October 4, 1957. This intrinsically harmless act of science and engineering was also, of course, both a demonstration of foreseeable Soviet capability to launch an ICBM and a powerful act of psy- chological warfare. It immediately set in motion forces in American political life which radically reversed the Nation's ruling conception of its military problem, of the appropriate level of the budget, and of the role of science in its affairs. The reaction reached even deeper, opening a fundamental recon- sideration not only of the organization of the Department of Defense but also of the values and content of the American educational system and of the balance of values and objectives in contemporary American society as a whole.^® The most direct response, in the United States, was an expansion in outlays for space activities. These virtually doubled in each fiscal year after Sputnik, until 1961; they peaked at $7,688.5 million in 1966. Military R«S:D similarly rose : peaking in the Korean War period (fiscal year 1953) at a little more than $1 billion, rising again to $3 billion in the fiscal year 1957, to $5 billion in 1959, and continuing to rise thereafter to a peak of $8 billion in 1967.^*^ World admiration for U.S. achievements in manned lunar missions was tempered by reservations over U.S. inability to solve such domes- is Ibid., page 248 w Ibid., page 366. 2" U.S. National Science Foundation. "Federal Funds for Research, Development, and Other Scientific Activities, Fiscal Years 1968, 1969 and 1970." Vol. XVIII. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), pages 248-9, (NSF 69-31.) 627 tic problems as pollution, racial tension, crime, and highway accidents ; the limitations of technology for the waging of limited war were also to be noted. The application of U.S. technology in support of world health seemed to offer great opportunities, accompanied by awkward side effects. For example, the insecticide DDT played an important role in malarial control and resultant population increase, but raised its own questions as to its ecological consequences. Various nations, developed and developing, became seriously con- cerned over the net emigration to the United States of technologically skilled persons. The territorial sovereignty concept in international law came in- creasingly in question with the evolution of high flying aircraft, ob- servation satellites, satellite communications, the Aiitarctic Treaty ^^ (in which, as in the later agreement for lunar exploration, a condi- tion of universal extraterritoriality was to prevail) , and the issue of the ownership of the ocean floor. Related to the sovereignty question also was the rise of the multina- tional corporation, resulting mainly from the opportunity seized by American entrepreneurs to exploit U.S. computer and electronic tech- nologies in European markets. Relieving and also complicating the emerging problem of world population control was the "Green Revolution" — by which the evolu- tion of new kinds of seeds significantly increased the farm labor productivity of developing countries. This innovative development seemed to offer at least a breathing space in which to search for solu- tions of the great future problem of balancing food and population. Thus, by the close of 1970, it was e\adent that U.S. technology had not been an unqualified success in furthering either U.S. foreign policy objectives or the aspirations of tlie world at large. The undoubted promise of technology had not achieved fulfillment. It was not clear why. Was it because technologists were unable to produce unflawed innovations? Were the diplomats unable to specify the performance of technologies for global effects ? Was there an insufficient coupling of technologists with diplomats to achieve proper teamwork toward a successful product ? WTiere did — and do — ^the weaknesses lie ? III. Trends in Contemporary Technology This section considers the evolution of atomic weapons and de- livery systems, space developments, agriculture, and the technological infrastructure. These elements, chosen more or less arbitrarilv. illus- trate a wide range of national and international issues of technology evident in the world today. Four trends are to be observed: (1) the important ways in which evolving technologies add to the problems and issues confronting the diplomat, (2) the ways in which technology te^ds to draw nations together in international enterprises, (3) the emergence of many posi- tive values and serious dangers of technology that are of concern to many nations, and (4) the need generated by technology for explicit governmental plans and programs to ensure that its consequences over the globe are compatible with U.S. foreign policy. 21 Antarctic Treaty. Signed at Washington, December 1, 1959. 628 A chievement of Overwhelming Nuclear Force Probably the most salient and far-reaching tecluiological achieve- ment of the present century is the atomic bomb. Traditionally, mili- tary power supplied the principal support of the diplomat at the bargaming table. But the undeniable force of nuclear weapons has been of uncertain \'^lue in this role. These weapons are so destructive that even the threat of their use has doubtful credibility. Accordingly, the capability of a nation to produce a bomb, while it accords the achieving nation technological distinction as a member of the "Nuclear Club", does not automatically confer significant advantages of negotia- tion in diplomacy. Nor does diplomatic advantage flow from the fur- ther capability of delivering a large number of atomic bombs ac- curately on remote targets by intercontinental guided ballistic missiles. The ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to wreak de- struction on any nation has not, for example, enabled resolution of conflicts in Vietnam or the Middle East, persuaded a settlement of the Kashmir issue, quieted dissonance in Cuba, or made a viable in- strument of peacekeeping out of the United Nations. Many aspects of atomic technology present intractable problems of contemporary diploipacy. The enormously destructive force of a hydrogen bomb explosion has made general war unthinkable as a rational course. Possession of a monopoly of nuclear weaponry from August 1945 to October 1949 seemingly gave little advantage to Amer- ican diplomats and generated many problems. One can only surmise what might have happened without them, but their conjectural bene- fits were accompanied by unmistakable diplomatic costs. During the monopoly period, the first issue was the possibility of international control and ownership of atomic technology ; a move by the United States to bring this about was abortive. The next issue was the desirability of sharing atomic teclinology with allies of the United States; the outcome of this issue was not only unfruitful but even disadvantageous : When President Truman's proposal of July 14, 1949, to continue joint under- takings with the United Kingdom was rejected in a meeting of leading oflBcials at the White House, the decision was "resented by the British Government as a repudiation of the close relationship that had existed during the war. . . ." ^ Rejection of the French request for assistance in atomic weapons and energy programs ". . . affected the entire range of our diplomatic relations with the central nation of the Common Market and of NATO and the NATO military forces." ^ According to a French military analyst — From 1945 to 1953 or 1954, a period characterized by the American atomic monopoly, Soviet expansion in Europe was limited only by United States negotia- tion and, later, by the North Atlantic treaty. Hitherto everything had occurred as though Moscow deliberately ignored American military possibilities, while Washington took no further account of the decisive nature of the means the West then possessed to oblige the Communist menace to withdraw. Each side had been the dupe of the atom : the Soviets, in their ignorance, not fearing it ; and the Americans not realizing the advantage their monopoly might have given them.** ^ David E. Lilienthal. "Change, Hope, and The Bomb." (Princeton, New Jersey, Prince- ton University Press, 1963), page 121. 23 Ibid., pages 122-3. 2* Pierre Gallols. "The Balance of Terror : Strategy for the Nuclear Age." (With a fore- word by Raymond Aron, Translated from the French by Richard Howard.) (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1961), page 23. 629 When the Soviet Union broke the atomic monopoly, late in 1949, the response of the United States was to proceed with the development of fusion weapons, weapons for limited nuclear warfare, and studies of air defense.25 Diplomatically, the Soviet Union exploited its possession of atomic weapons as an advantage : Each visible stage of the increase of Soviet power has provoked and justified new pressures. After the first Russian atomic explosion of 1^9, it appeared pos- sible to shift from the cold war in Europe to the warm war in Asia. After Sputnik I and the Soviet ballistic missiles came the Berlin ultimatum, the cam- paign of visits, the demonstrations of the inanity of the atomic armament . . . and then the offer of a disarmament plan which would permit the numerically superior side to impose its own laws.^ Nevertheless, the withdrawal by the U.S.S.R. of nuclear aid and tech- nicians from China seems to have been a factor in precipitating what has proved to be a persistent disaffection toward the U.S-S.R. The outcome of this tremendous technological effort by the two rival forces is now that neither can exploit the force of the weapon, or even threaten seriously to do so. THE PROBLEM OF STABILIZING DETERRENCE The mutual threat of nuclear attack seems to have had a stabilizing effect on United States-U.S.S.R. relations since 1955, or thereabouts, and the development of intercontinental and submarine-launched missiles has apparently strengthened this effect. This technological impasse was described in 1957 by Henry Kissinger. The essence of the nuclear stalemate is that it keeps the two superpowers from launching an all-out war because each can force the other to pay an exorbitant price for victory.^ [Accordingly] The destructiveness of modern weapons deprives victory in an all-out war of its historical meaning. Even the side which inflicts a greater devastation than its opponent may not retain suflScient resources to impose its will.^ The existence of atomic weapons and delivery systems apparently means that under conditions of general conflict, there can be no "total victory" and that only limited conflicts for limited gains are feasible. This kind of conflict, limited war, involvmg the renunciation of total victory, is repugnant to our military thought with its emphasis on breaking the enemy's will to resist and its reliance on the decisive role of industrial potential." ^^ The various alternatives that have been advanced for the U.S. posture include nuclear superiority, nuclear sufficiency, nuclear parity, and perhaps a fourth category involving an assured and adequate *'post-attack" striking capability — consisting of weapons of low vul- nerability and high probability of penetration of an adversary's territory. Maintenance of the deterrent posture can apparently take any of these forms. There appears to have been a tendency for both the United States and the Soviet Union to reject the fourth category. ^ Rostow, "The United States in the World Arena : An Essay in Recent History," op. cit., pages 248-9. =» Gallols, op. cit., page 231. ^ Henry A. Kissinger. "Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy." New York. (Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by Harper and Brothers, 1957), page 125. » Ibid., p. -90. *» Ibid., pages 86-7. 630 and to strive for a more commanding position in arms, although the policy of the Nixon administration has been explicitly to seek "suffi- ciency rather than . . . the meaningless 'will of the wisp' of nuclear superiority." ^° As President Nixon told his press conference, Janu- ary 27, 1969 : Our objective in this administration ... is to be sure that the United States has sufficient military power to defend our interests and to maintain the commit- ments which this administration determines are in the interest of the United States around the world. I think "sufficiency" is a better term, actually, than either "superiority" or "parity." ^ In announcing his decision on the antiballistic missile system, in his press conference March 14, 1969, the President disclaimed any thought that it was aggressive in concept. It would be merely a "safeguard of our deterrent system which is increasingly vulnerable due to the advances that have been made by the Soviet Union since the year 1967 when the Sentinel program was first laid out." 32 The President's concept of "sufficiency" required a good under- standing of the adversary's diplomatic motivations and purposes and a reliable set of offensive weapons to make it certain — (a) that the consequences of their use would be unmistakably disastrous to an adversary ; (b) that the known diplomatic objectives of the adversary would not justify any serious risk of invoking this retaliatory mechanism. Whether because or in spite of the vigorous programs of military technological development of the United States and the Soviet Union, both of the Great Powers have maintained their respective nuclear capabilities in some sort of balance. There is some assurance that the stability of the mutual deterrent is unlikely to be upset by further innovations. Jerome B. Wiesner, who had been science adviser to President Kennedy, expressed the opinion in early 1969 that "In my judgment there is no immediate danger of this stability being upset . . ." 33 On the same occasion, George B. Kistiakowsky, who had earlier been President Eisenhower's science adviser, declared : Mutual strategic deterrence provides whatever stability there is to nuclear peace. Beyond this necessary but st^itic role, nuclear weapons have almost ceased to be a useful instrument of national policy ; their possession provides few additional foreign policy options.*' In the Department of Defense, Harold Brown, as Secretary of the Air Force, declared May 14, 1968 : "There can be no successful ag- gression by means of strategic war today." And in the Department of State, U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, said 3" Herbert Scoville. Jr. "The Polities of the ABM Debate : The View From the Arms Con- trol and Disarmament Agency." Prepared for The American Political Science Association [Convention's] Panel on the Politics of the ABM Debate. (Mimeo, September 1970), page 7. 31 "The President's News Conference of .January 27, 1969." Weekly Compilation of Presi- dential Documents, (February 3, 1969, Volume 5, Number 5), page 178. 32 "Deployment of the Antiballistic Missile System." In "The President's News Confer- ence of March 14, 1969." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, (March 17, 1969, Volume 5, Number 11), pages 401-2. 33 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. "Strategy and Science : Toward a National Security Policy for the 1970's." Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy "and Scientific Developments of the . . . 91st Congress, first session. March 11, 13, 18, 19, 24, and 26, 1969. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), page 9. »* Ibid., page 40. 631 March 26, 1968: ". . . There seems little likelihood that either side can break out of this situation of mutual deterrence and achieve a marked strategic advantage." PARAMOUNTCY OF OFFENSE Throughout the history of atomic weaponry one consistent theme has been the superiority of offense over defense. As a practical matter, the stability of the mutual nuclear deterrent rests on the assured ability of an attacked nuclear power to retaliate. Dr. Herbert York in testify- ing for the Test Ban Treaty took the position that ". . . it is simply easier to build devices that will penetrate a ballistic missile [i.e. assure that the missile warhead reaches its target] than it is to build an anti- missile which can cope with it." ^^ Similar confidence in the offense was expressed by Dr. Harold Brown, as Secretary of the Air Force, He declared, May 14, 1968, that "The Soviets could develop and deploy means to penetrate our defense at substantially lower cost than we could build it." He did, however, hold out hope that eventually "lesser levels of ABM defense, located around our missile fields, could serve to make an attack on our retaliatory force more difficult," ^^ The vulnerability of the United States to ballistic missile attack was also confirmed by Dr. John. Foster, the present Director of Defense Research and Enginering : The likelihood of large and sophisticated attacks with the deployment of significant U.S. defenses increases the technical uncertainty of the defensive sysitem. Even vv'ith an ABM deployment we would have to expect that in an all- out exchange, dozens of their warheads would likely exijlode in our cities.*^ Earlier, Secretary McNamara had stated that "none of the [ABM] systems at the present or f oi-eseeable state of the art would provide an impenetrable shield over the United States." ^* An analysis of future weapons and space systems by Harold A. Linstone, Associate Director of Development Planning-Systems Analysis, Lockheed Aircraft Corp., March 13, 1969, came to a similar conclusion. He described ten technological options at the disposal of the designers of offensive weapons, and concluded : "This diverse menu of options to maintain a second strike capability in the face of tech- nological changes also shows the difficulty of i)roviding an airtight defense against the offensive arsenal of a teclniologically alert and capable opponent, i.e., the Soviet Union." ^^ ^•■^ Dr. York's qualifications included : his position at that time as Chancellor of the University of California (San Diego), and his previous service as the first director of the Lawrence Radiation Laboratory at Liverniore, and as the first Director of Defense Research and Engineering, during the Eisenhower administration. (U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. "Nuclear Test Ban Treaty." Hearings before the . . . SSth Congress, first session on Executive M. SSth Congress, 1st session, The treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, and underwater, signed at Moscow on August 5, 1963, on behalf of the United States of America, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. August 12, 13, 14. 15. 19, 20, 21. 22, 23, 26, and 27, 1963. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Ofiice, 1963) page 763.) ^ Quoted in "U.S. Strategic Forces." In "Secretary Brown On U.S. Strategic Forces." Extension of remarks of the Hon. Charles H. Wilson. Congressional Record, (May 20, 1968). page E4377. Dr. Brown had succeeded Dr. York as Director of Defense Research and Engineering. 3" Quoted in "The Proposed ABM System." Discussion on the floor of the Senate. Con- gressional Record, (June 13, 196S), page S7227. 38 Statement by Secretary of Defense Robert S. MoNamara. In Ibid., pages S7235-6. 39 Harold A. Linstone. "Future Weapons and Space Systems — Comments on Technological Forecasts for the Late 1970's and Beyond." In House "Strategy and Science : Toward a National Security Policy for the 1970's." Hearings, op. cit., page 46. 632 President Nixon, after an examination of the ABM issue, declared March 14, 1969 : Although every instinct motivates me to provide the American people with complete protection against a major nuclear attack, it is not now within our power to do so. The heaviest defense system we considered, one designed to protect our major cities, still could not prevent a catastrophic level of U.S. fatalities from a deliberate all-out Soviet attack. And it might look to an op- ponent like the prelude to an offensive strategy threatening the Soviet de- terrent.^" A DISSEXTIKG VIEW OF DETERRENT STARILITY The durability of the deterrent and the effect of technology on arms cx)ntrol negotiations (currently, tlie so-called SALT or ' Strategic Arms Limitations Talks'") between the two super-powers were both called into question by Dr. York in a recent article in Science. He noted that there had been evidence, beginning around 1960. of a "major Soviet effort in the ABM field" which had precipitated a ''technologi- cal contest between missile defense and missiie offense . . .*" The prin- cipal technological outcome of the contest was the "multiple warhead idea-' or "MIRV". The Soviet Union had deployed about 70 ABM interceptors, he said, and the response of the United States was to deploy MIRVs, which would mean a net increase of around 5000 in the number of warheads aimed at Russia, The Soviet response to this response was a multiple warhead development of their own, based on large SS-9 missiles, said to contain three separate warheads of five megatons each. The U.S. response to the SS-9 development was to deploy the Safeguard ABM system to defend the Minuteman force. He concluded: ABM and MIRV are thus inseparable; each one requires and inspires the other. Separately or in combination, they create imcertainty in each of the nuclear powers about the capability and even the intentions of the other. These uncer- tainties eventually lead in turn to fear, overreaction. and further increases in the number and types of all kinds of weapons, defensive as well as offensive. Moreover, Dr. York went on, the "ABM is a low-confidence system." Its use would require a quick response or "launch-on-waming" doc- trine. He declared : "The decision will have to be made on the basis of electronic signals electronically analyzed, in accordance with a plan worked out long before by apolitical analysts in an antiseptic and unreal atmosphere. In effect, not even the President, let alone the Congress, would really be a party to the ultimate decision to end civilization." Even if the U.S. technology was equal to the task of designing fail- safe electronic responses to control the ABlSf and the other elements of tlie defense system. Dr. York questioned whether the Soviet Union would be sufficiently competent. "Do they have the nece.ssary level of sophistication to solve the contradiction inherent in the need for a 'hair trigger' (so that their system will respond in time) and a 'stiff trigger' (so that they will not fire accidentally?) How good are their computers at recognizing false alarms? How good is the command and control system for the Polaris-type submarine fleet they are now ""T^.S. President (Richard M. Nixon). "Ballistic Missile Defense System. Statement by the President Announcing His Decision on Deployment of the System. March 14, 1969." In Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (Vol. 5, No. 11, March 17, 1969), page 406. 633 Tapidly^ if belatedly, building? Will it be 'fail-safe' r The point was that "unfavorable answers to these (questions about tJieir capability "will mean diminished national security for ws." ^^ . A more hopeful view of the arms race was voiced by Herbert ScoTille, Jr., of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, in September,*^ He suggested that "The resumption of new 'construct ion on Soviet SS-9 missile sites * * * may well have been occasioned by a Soviet decision under pressure from the military to emulate the stated US policy of pressing forward with all programs until agree- ments had been reached at SALT." Soviet awareness of the hazards of the present situation was shown in a statement attributed to For- eign Minister Gromyko (quoted in Dr. York's article in Science) to tlie effect that : The command and control systems for arms are becoming increasingly autono^ mous . . . from the people who create them. Human capacity to hear and see are incapable of reacting to modern speeds. The human brain is no longer capable of assessing at suflBeient speed the results of the multitude of instruments. 1 he decisions made by man depend in the last analysis on the conclusions provided by computers. Governments must do everything possible to be able to determine the development of events and not to find themselves in the role of captive of events. There appear to be at least six principal diplomatic effects of nu- clear arms technology: (1) Unlimited general war is an impractical and irrational enterprise and is not regarded as a realistic alternative to diplomatic agreement as was pre-atomic warfare; (2) possession of nuclear arms and delivery systems is essential to preservation of the mutual deterrent posture of the two superpowers and pursuit of nu- clear technology is essential in maintaining the balance of terror, a form of stability; (3) deployment of new weapons is a competitive activity in which both sides lose, which inhibits beneficial diplomatic processes, and which obstructs efforts toward agreement in the control of arms; (4) technological developments by either party are of in- tense interest to the other; (.5) the dangers in this relationship are so evident that formal means of direct communication have been judged necessary to reduce the possibility of a triggering misunderstanding of intentions; and (6) the condition of world peace, once only a pre- ferable alternative, has become a paramount and imperative goal of diplomacy. The Diplomatic Significance of Space Technology When the Soviet Union launched Sputnik I, the first manmade Earth satellite, October 4, 1957, and followed this with a second suc- cessful launch of Sputnik II, November 8, the Russian achievements "caused a great deal of turmoil in the United States." It was a "real jolt to the complacency of the American people." In true American tradition, a great clamor went up as to why the Soviet Union was ahead of the United States, who was to blame for the situation, and what was to be done about it.** « Herbert F. York. "ABM, MIRV. and the Arms Race." Science, (July 17, 1970, Volume 169), pages 2.57-60. *2 iJr. Scoville is currently with the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Earlier he was Assistant Director for Science and Technology, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. His views were expressed in a paper delivered in September before a panel of the American Political Science Association in Los Angeles. " U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Scientific and Technical Infor- mation Division. Office of Technology Utilization. "Venture Into Space: Early Years of Goddard Space Flight Center." Prepared by Alfred Rosenthal. (Washington, U.S. Govern- ment Printing Office, 1968), pages 21, 23. (NASA Sp-4301). 97-400 O - 77 - 3 634 The Soviet achievement carried the implication that the Soviet Union had mastered the primary technology required for an intercon- tinental ballistic missile. At one stroke, this achievement erased the issue of the "Bomber Gap," created a "Missile Gap," rendered obsolete the elaborate early warning system of the United States against bomb- er attack, reduced the warning time of an attack from hours to min- utes, and raised the issue as to whether manned strategic bombers would not soon be obsolete. It gave a practical demonstration of the possibility and advantages of technological surprise. And, finally, it raised the prestige of the Soviet Union as a technological power of the foremost rank. The U.S. response was enactment of Public Law 85-568, the N'a- tional Aeronautics and Space Act, approved July 29, 1958. From this point on, the American space program was launched on an arduous and costly technological course for more than a decade of competition with the Soviet Union ; it was to embrace a tremendous range of scien- tific investigations, technological concepts, and practical applications. Most importantly, for the purposes of this study, it was a form of activity of inherent importance in international relations : its achieve- ments were prestigious and enabled the United States to recover and even raise its diplomatic stature ; its operations were obviously global in nature and required the cooperation of many nations; and the ex- ploitation of its technological capabilities offered attractive rewards to many nations, developed and undeveloped alike. While space was later to be formally abjured as a military combat regime, satellites obviously offered great advantages for surveillance (which would contribute to the stability of the mutual deterrence evolving between the United States and the Soviet Union). Surveil- lance from space also offered a way out of the awkward impasse presented by Soviet reluctance to admit any form of external inspec- tion as an adjunct of arms control agreements. THE SPACE RACE WITH THE SOVIET UNION There are many descriptions of the space race that began in 1957 and reached a dramatic climax with the first manned lunar landing, in July 1969. Comparison of U.S. and Soviet achievements in this race are difficult because the goals of the two programs are somewhat divergent. Among the Soviet goals have been the development of FOBS (a "fractional orbital bombardment satellite"), the achievement of a completely mechanized and unmanned vehicle to obtain geological specimens and return with them from the Moon to the Earth, a heavy emphasis on manned Earth-orbiting satellites to conduct experiments in the near-space environment, and various surveillance and weather satellites as well as some not yet explained. By contrast, one set of U.S. goals has included a series of progres- sions all directed toward the climax of landing a man on the Moon and returning him safely to Earth. Another set of objectives has been aimed at making practical use of space technology in the form of satellites to enable global electronic communications, survey the Earth, facilitate navigation, study the weather, and perform various other useful functions. 635 Both countries have made extensive use of satellites for purposes of military surveillance, planetary exploration, probes of deep space, and scientific observations from the space environment. MEASUEES OF PROGRESS IX SPACE TECHNOLOGY One measure of success is the comparative national effort invested in it. In rough terms, it appears that the total effort in both the United States and the Soviet Union is about even.*^ Another measure is the recognition, worldwide, of space achievements. Although the Soviets scored first, and remained well in the lead for 7 or 8 years thereafter, the U.S. moon landing reversed the relationship decisively. Moreover, U.S. practice in announcing nonmilitary launches in advance and admitting to failures has added credibility to U.S. announcements of successes. Advance announcements are also important in enabling the \vorld — in effect — to participate as an observer of each maj^r U.S. endeavor. As to numbers of satellites carrying out a mission successfully, the Soviet practice of not annoimcing failures makes comparison diffi- cult. Numbers of known launches and numbers of satellites actually orbited or dispatched on missions are roughly comparable. With respect to the utility of the space program — the commercial or economically beneficial uses of satellites — it would appear that the United States has a lead. The Syncom series of synchronous orbiting communications satellites, developed first by the United States, has provided the technological basis for global telephone and television systems that have now become an important and expanding commercial activity. Similarly, the world has been invited to share the benefits of the U.S. series of Tiros weather observation satellites. However, the Soviets have entered vigorously into both of these fields and apparently intend to match U.S. efforts in the forthcoming program of Earth resources satellite surveys. DIPLOMATIC ASPECTS OF THE SPACE RACE The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, in its declaration of policy (Sec. 102-a) stated: "The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind." Such activities, moreover, should be conducted so as to contribute to ". . . co- operation by the United States with other nations and groups of na- tions ..." in the work and the enjoyment of its benefits. (Sec. 102-C-7) To this end : Sec. 205. The Administration, under the foreign policy guidance of the Presi- dent, may engage in a program of international cooperation in work done pur- suant to this Act, and in the peaceful application of the results thereof, pursuant to agreements made by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. By 1970, the United States had entered into 250 international project agreements with some 74 nations under the space program. ** U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. "Review of the Soviet Space Program : With Comparative United States Data." Report of the ... . Prepared by the Science Policy Research Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. 90th Congress, first session. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967), pages 83-4. [Committee Print.] 636 The non-militarj^ part of the U.S. space program is operated on a virtually open basis with "international exchange of personnel, visits,, combined experiments, shared tracking, and many other joint activi- ties." By contrast, the Soviet Union's combined military-civilian pro- gram has lacked any convenient way of arranging for international cooperation. It has been only in the last year [1966] that it has held a meeting of bloc countries to consider joint scientific experiments, and has negotiated with France a plan to put up a payload in about 1972. Most earlier Soviet coopera- tion consisted of a one-way flow of optical tracking reports from many bloc and associated countries to Moscow in support of Soviet studies/" Nevertheless, the inherently international nature of space activities offers encouragement for the evolution of cooperative programs ; in- formal understandings and the exploitation of practical applications seem to be on the increase, and may pave the way for more forma] arrangements. For example : ... In scientific circles, the Russians have appeared at meetings in the "vVest including the United States, and have permitted Americans to go to meetings in Russia at which technical papers have been given on each side. Through GOSPAR (the Committee on Space Research of the International Coun- cil of Scientific Unions) both countries and others have met to exchange flight data on a routine basis. On the political level, both have also filed flight data at the United Nations, and it was through the U.N. that the recent space treaty was negotiated. . . . Agreements have been negotiated which call for an ex- change of space-gathered weather data, with data passed over the so-called "cold line" between Moscow and Suitland, Md. This same agreement has called for exchange of geo-magnetic data, and also the joint preparation of a book on space medicine. . . . About the only other international activity of the Russians has been their exchange of television between Moscow and Paris. They have suggested to the Japanese they may also wish to exchange programs. For a long time they opposed the international consortium plan for communications satellites as un^- necessarily dominated by the United States." From time to time, both the United States and the Soviet Union have made overtures toward cooperation in their space programs. The USSR delegate Kuznetsov to the U.N. General Assembly announced,, October 6, 1959, that his country would propose : The calling of an international conference of scientists under U.N. auspices^ on the question of exchange of experience in the study of outer space." " The most positive suggestion, however, was that offered by Presi- dent Kennedy in September, 1963. This was an evident move to main- tain the momentum toward detente that had begun with his speech at The American University, June 10, and seemed likely to be fur- thered by anticipated favorable Senate action on the Test Ban Treaty.*^ Accordingly, on September 20, 1963, the President went be- fore the United Nations General Assembly to propose a global pro- gram in space, rather than a competition between the two leading contenders : Why . . . should man's first flight to the moon be a matter of national com- petition? Why should the United States and the Soviet Union, in preparing for such expeditions, become involved in immense duplications of research, con- struction, and expenditure? Surely we should explore whether the scientists and « Ibid., page 82. " Idem. *" Eugene B. Skolnikoff. "Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy." (Cam.. bridge, The M.I.T. Press, 1967), pages 29-30. *8 Senate approval of the Treaty came on Sept. 24. 637 astronauts of our two countries — indeed, of all the world — cannot work together in the conquest of space, sending some day in this decade to the moon not the representatives of a single nation but the representatives of all of our countries."* Nothing came of this dramatic attempt to exploit space technology for diplomatic gain. COMMUXICATIOXS SATELLITES Many proposals have been advanced for ways to use Earth satel- lites for practical purposes, as distinguished from research. These proposals fall generally into three categories of satellite use : as point sources or relay ])oints for global comnumications systems; as stations to exploit the properties of the space environment ; and to perform surveys from a truly global vantage point. One of the earliest and most significant practical uses of satellites was for global communications. The commercial practicality of satel- lites for this purpose was accelerated by the development of syn- chronous satellites, which moved through space at the precise rate required for them to remain fixed above a pre-selected point on Earth's Equator. From this position, a satellite had many advantages for global communications : to relay voice communications from point to point, to distribute television programs from one continent to another, to broadcast programs directlj^, and to provide information for air traffic control. Other satellite functions — not necessarily requiring syn- chronous satellites — include the providing of position data and com- munications for aerial navigation, air transport separation standard management, position determination, collision avoidance, and search and rescue information. A legislative action to provide an administrative instrument for the management of commercial space communications was the Com- munications Satellite Act of 1962, approved August 31, 1962, Public Law 87-624 (76 Stat. 419) . Subsequently, an agreement was entered into, August 20, 1964, for international cooperation of the parties in the design, development, construction, establishment, maintenance and operation of the space segment of a global commercial communications satellite system, which had as its objective the achievement of basic global coverage in the latter part of 1967. The concept was that this agreement would be an interim arrangement and that recommendations would be forthcom- ing after the system became operational, for either (a) continuance of the interim program on a permanent basis or (b) a permanent in- ternational organization supported by an international administra- tive and technical staff. FEASIBLE FUNCTIONS OF SURVEILLANCE SATELLITES A\nii]e synchronous satellites appear to be the principal foundation element of global communications technology, satellites in uniform circular orbit closer to Earth seem most useful for many possible sur- veillance functions. Apart from their obvious advantages in arms in- spections and military operations, surveillance satellites are already useful for many commercial services and give promise of still greater *9U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. "Documents on Disarmament, 1963." (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), page 529. 638 future benefits over a wide range of applications. A NASA study in 1967 listed some of these as follows : hydrology (river forecasting and flood warning) tracking of migratory fish, animals, and birds iceberg reconnaissance mapping of land areas and ocean bottoms tsunami warning earthquake prediction air pollution monitoring and forecasting weather forecasting support for weather modification (precipitation enhancement, hail and lightning suppression, fog dispersal, atid storm modifica- tion) earth resources surveys (agricultural and mineral). WEATHER FORECASTING BY SATELLITE A measure of the possible economic advantages of weather forecast- ing was deA^eloped by a panel of the National Academy of Sciences, in 1965, which suggested that upwards of $2 billion "could be saved by farmers, fuel producers, public utilities, builders, and water managers if they were equipped with better forecasting tools." ^° International cooperation in this field has been quick to develop. For example, in a letter to Chairman Khrushchev, March 7, 1962, President Kennedy suggested "the joint establishment of an early operational weather satellite system"' to provide global weather data for use by any nation. To initiate this service, [the President continued! I propose that the United States and the Soviet Union each launch a satellite to photograph cloud cover and provide other agreed meteorological services for all nations. . . . This im- mensely valuable data vrould then be disseminated through normal international meteorological channels and would make a significant contribution to the research and service programs now under study by the World Meteorological Organiza- tion in response to Resolution 1721 (XVI) adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on December 20, 1961.^ Khrushchev agreed. In his reply, March 20, 1962, he said: Precise and timely weather prediction would be still another important step on the path to man's subjugation of the forces of nature ; it would permit him to combat more successfully the calamities of the elements and would give new prospects for advancing the well-being of mankind. Let us also cooperate in this field. °- Good progress appears to have been made in this subject. By April, 1967', the National Aeronautics and Space Administration was to report : One of the political benefits of weather satellites has been in fostering coopera- tion with other nations, particularly between the United States and the Soviet Union. An example of this is the 1962 agreement with the United States and the U.S.S.R. The agreement stated in part : "In the field of meteorology, it is im- portant that the two satellite launching nations contribute their capabilities 60 National Research Council. Committee on Oceanography. "Economic Benefits from Oceanographic Research, A Special Report." (Washington, D.C., National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, 1964), page 37. (Publ. 1228.) SI Department of State Bulletin, (April 2, 1962), pages 536-7. s-U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences. "Documents on, International Aspects of the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, 1954-62." Staff report prepared for the use of the .... (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, May 9, 1963), page 250. 639 toward the establishment of a global weather system for the benefit of other nations." The first major activity in this area was the installation of the "cold line" between Moscow and Washington for the exchange of meteorological data. For many months only conventional data flowed across the line. However, in August 1966 the Russians began to exchange satellite cloud pictures and infrared data over the coldline from information provided by Cosmos 122. This exchange terminated after a few months presumably due to failure of Cosmos 122, and was resumed in March 1967, immediately after the launching of Cosmos 144 : This two way exchange is still in progress.^ The cooperative international program known as "World Weather Watch," under the aegis of the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) also relies extensively on satellites. It envisions a cooperative effort among the nations of the world to develop a global system for complete surveillance of the atmosphere and for the rapid dissemina- tion of weather information on a world wide basis. To support the program of TVTVIO, President Johnson, by letter of October 23, 1964, instructed Secretary Luther Hodges of the Department of Commerce, to "take such action as you may deem necessary to bring the interested Federal departments and agencies into closer consultation and coor- dination with regard to international activities in meteorology and the formulation of U.S. international meteorological policies and pro- grams to insure that the United States will continue to make a signifi- cant contribution, . ." ^* EARTH RESOURCES SATELLITE SURVEYS Of possibly great significance is the use of satellites for surveys of global resources of agricultural and mineral wealth, and for the management of these resources. On this subject, a NASA report has spelled out the advantages of gathering information about Earth resources. Accurate, timely, and broad-scale surveys of agricultural and forestry resources on a periodic basis by Earth-orbital remote sensing will become increasingly im- portant in future years. These techniques combined with automatic pattern recognition methods will yield information necessary to allow improved produc- tivity, development, and utilization of agricultural resources on a worldwide basis.^ These, said the report, should yield information useful with respect to soil classification, land use capability and changes, natural vegeta- tion, range surveys, crop identification, crop disease and insect inva- sion detection, flood control survey, watershed and hydrologic studies, recreation site evaluation, wildlife habitat studies, forest species iden- tification, forest fire detection, forest disease and insect invasion detec- tion, soil conservation programs, irrigation development, agricultural development projects, and crop acreage control programs. With respect to geology and mineral resources, the report suggested a number of possible applications of satellite data, such as : geologic mapping, mineral resource investigations, thermal activitj^ in connec- tion with volcanic eruptions, observations of magnetic and gravity ^ U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration. Space Applications Programs Office, Office of Space Science and Applications. Office of Technology Utilization. "A Survey of Space Applications . . . for the benefit of all mankind." (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1967), pages 90-91. (NASA SP-142.) s* Department of State Bulletin (November 30, 1964), pages 792-4. ^ National Aeronautics and Space Administration. "A Survey of Space Applications '. . . for the benefit of all'mankind.' " Op. cit, page 5. 640 fields on a global basis, tectonic analysis of earthquake belts, data use- ful in planning and site selection for large engineering works, and continuous mapping of "subaqueous deposition, channel filling and excavation, effects of floods and other natural changes" in large coastal deltas. President Nixon has given support to the Earth resources satellite program. Addressing the United Nations General Assembly, Septem- ber 18, 1969, he announced that ". . . we are now developmg [such] satellites with the first experimental satellite to be launched sometime early in the decade of the seventies." These would be capable of yield- ing such data as the location of schools of fish in the oceans, the location of mineral deposits on land, and the health of agricultural crops.^^ Subsequently, the U.N. was notified (a) that a detailed descrip- tion of the U.S. program had been presented to the U.N. Secretary- General for dissemination to all U.N. members, (b) that an interna- tional workshop would be convened on Earth -resources-survey systems in the spring of 1971, (c) that various opportunities for education and training in the technologies involved would be made available by the United States to nationals of U.N. members, and (d) that the United States proposed to ". . . invite potential international users to work with us as we explore, from the standpoint of their needs and problems, the best ways of approaching such technically difficult matters as data processmg, interpretation, and dissemination." Although warning that there were many constraints and obstacles to be overcome in this pro- gram, one study concludes that "the 1970's could become a decade of international space cooperation." ^^ GROWING IMPORTANCE OF SPACE-DIPLOMACY Manifestly, the new technology of space has many implic'ations for diplomacy. It afforded a new and relatively non-controversial area of opportunity for joint US-USSK action. It was inherently global. It offered economic advantages and opportunities to all coun- tries. It demonstrated U.S. leadership in practical application of a dramatic new^ teclinology. As a communications link it brought the entire world closer together. It offered promise of solving such grave global problems as arms inspections, pollution detection, and resource inventory. At the same time, it raised a host of legal and diplomatic questions as to sovereignty of near space, content of global television programs, the equities of developing countries in an activity beyond their limited means, and the rights of nations and individuals to use information secured by satellite. The Inte7'action of AgHcuUural Technology loith Diplomacy The ideal state for Thomas Jefferson was a community of small, independent land -holders, deriving their income and subsistence from the soil. Something of this philosophy persisted in the United States 56 '"phe President's Address to the 24th Session of the General Assembly. September 18, 1969." Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, (September 22, 1969, Volume 5, Number 38) , page 1281. ^■^ John Hanessian, Jr. and John M. Logsdon. "Earth Resources Technology Satellite : Securing International Participation." Astronautics and Aeronautics. (August 1970, Vol- ume 8), pages 56, 60. 641 long after the reality had waned. Jefferson sa^Y agriculture as the most virtuous of employments: "When we get piled upon one another in large cities, ag in Europe, we shall become corrupt as in Europe, and go to eating one another as they do there." ^^ It was better, he said, "to carry provisions and materials to workmen there, than bring them to the provisions and materials, and with them their manners and principles." ^^ On the other hand, Alexander Hamilton, while granting the pre- eminence of agriculture, nevertheless considered industry important for "augmentation of the Produce and Revenue of the Society." In- herently, he said, division of labor made for a more productive and prosperous society ; mechanization increased productivity and employ- ment opportunities ; immigration would be encouraged ; and a market would be provided for surplus agricultural products.^ Application of the scientific method to agriculture was generally favored in the early Republic. Jeffersonians saw in it a means by which the individual could improve his lot ; Hamiltonians considered it a means to a prosperous and expanding economy. MODERN CONTRAST WITH JEFFERSONIAN IDEAL The application of technology to agriculture — scientific farming — has had precisely the opposite effect from that Jefferson sought. The subsistence farmer has been replaced by the large farm as the primary source of food and natural fiber. The small farmer is waging a des- perate rearguard action, finding it increasingly difficult to compete. Farming as a way of life is reserved for an ever-dwindling percentage of the population in the United States. Those remaining on the farms— who are still able to succeed — are doing so by specialization. The fact is that the farmer today is a part of a larger industrial sys- tem of mutual interdependence. He does not eat his own wheat; he does not grow his own truck; he relies heavily on the Government to supplement his own uncertain income. All these characteristics are in stark contrast with the Jeffersonian ideal. Initially, the application of technology to farming in a new, un- peopled continent where land was abundant meant that the skillful farm manager could expand his acreage and his production per acre. Additional acreage was made available for cultivation by impounding streams in arid regions and irrigating the land. Higher agricultural productivity was achieved by supplemental irrigation. Farms around urban areas, to provide milk and truck garden products, grew along Avith the urbanization of the country. Production of large volume com- modities— wheat, corn, cotton, rice, and the like — was increasingly con- centrated on very large farms. These were able to make heavy use of specialized farm machinery (powered first with animals, then with 58 "Letter to James Madison, December 20, 1787." In "The Complete Jefferson : Containing his Major Writings, Published and Unpublished, except His Letters." Assembled and ar- ranged bv Saul K. Padover. (New York, Tudor Publishing Company, 1943), page 123. ^ In Padover, Ibid., pages 678-9. «<• Alexander Hamilton. "Report on Manufacturers." In "The Reports of Alexander Hamil- ton." Edited by Jacob E. Cooke. (New York, Harper Torchbooks, Harper and Row, Pub- lishers, 1964), pages 118. 128. 642 steam and later with internal combustion engines) , chemical fertilizers and pesticides, aircraft to sow seed and spread chemicals, and mechani- cal contrivances to convert many different crops into standardized marketable units. Among the most important of technologies were the discoveries in plant and animal genetics. As a consequence of technology, agriculture in the United States became increasingly divided into two distinct categories : one was an industrial business and the other a precarious way of life, yielding barely enough product with Government assistance to maintain the capital and the soil. At first, the numbers of farms increased as land was opened to pur- chase, homesteading, and subdivision of unmanageable land grants. This process continued up to around 1935, when the number of farms peaked at 6.8 million. Thereafter the number started to decline to 3.7 million in 1962, with 1 million forecast by 1980. Significantly, the num- ber of farms of 1000 acres or larger rose from 29,000 in 1880, to 81,000 in 1930, and to 131,000 in 1954." "By 1959 these big units, which were only 3.7 percent of all farms had acquired 49 percent of all the land and their average size had reached 4,048 acres — more than six square miles apiece." They averaged annual sales of $94,000, had an average value of $220,000, and produced almost one-third of all crops and live- stock. By 1963, the top three percent of all farms was producing more than the bottom 78 percent.*'^ POLITICAL, AND ECONOMIC TRENDS The political role of the farmer and the response of the Congress to the needs of the farmer appear to have been affected by the techno- logical revolution in agriculture. Around 1800, something like 90 per- cent of all citizens of the United States lived on farms. Much of the legislation between 1800 and 1900 had a rural or agricultural bias, including the Northwest Ordinance, creation of the Department of Agriculture, the land grant colleges, the Homestead Act, railroad land grants and subsidies, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and sustained support for agricultural research. But urbanization began to take its toll before the end of the century. By about 1890, the Nation was divided 50-50 between urban and rural populations, and thereafter the disproportion proceeded swiftly. By 1970 it was approaching 95 urban and five rural. Concern for the non-agricultural sector was indicated in the creation of Departments of Commerce, Labor, and Housing and Urban Development. The gross value of agricultural production in the United States climbed steadily throughout the latter half of the 19th century — from $4.1 billion annually during the decade 1869-1878 to $8.4 billion in the years 1897-1901. Thereafter, it remained fairly constant through 1936 ($9.8 billion), and then began to creep upward again, reaching $14.1 billion in 1955.*^^ It is interesting however, to compare farm and non- farm productivity during these years. (See table 1) 81 "Series K 61-72. Farms and Land ia Farms, by Size of Farm : 1880 to 1954." In. U.S. Department of Commerce. Bureau of the Census. "Historical Statistics of the United States. Colonial Times to 1957." (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960), page 279. ^2 Edward Higbee. "Farms and Farmers in an Urban Age." (New Yorli, The Twentieth Century Fund, 1963), page 3. *• "Series F 44^8. Gross Domestic Product Originating in Private Farm and Nonfarm Sectors and Government, in 1929 Prices : 1869-1955." In "Historical Statistics of the United States : Colonial Times to 1957." op. cit., page 140-1. 4.1 6.8 8.4 27.4 9.8 83.2 12.3 116.4 14.1 198.8 643 TABLE 1.— GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, PRIVATE FARM AND NONFARM SECTORS, SELECTED YEARS' [Billions of 1929 dollars] Years Farm Nonfarm 1869-78 - 1897-1901 , -- 1936...- 1941 1955 1 Source: Adapted from "Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957," op. cit. Accordingly, "There is, in the mid-1960's, virtually no theoretical limit to possible increases in agricultural productivity over the next several years, although gains in productivity will tend to level off . . ."®* A contemporary analysis suggests that this leveling-off process is at hand as man begins to take account of some of the adverse conse- quences of farm technology. This concern for the environment — * * * would operate to protect and improve man's environment, to render technological developments more sophisticated and more costly, to increase the cost of producing food, to slow the rate of output expansion and to drive farm prices upward. This, indeed, would be a new era for farmers of the developed world.® The great expansion in U.S. agriculture during the 19th century had important impacts on Europe. The industrial revolution brought to that continent a population increase of more than 200 million, and European agriculture was unequal to the task of feeding those in its cities and industries. Accordingly : "By the close of the century, the gravity point of world agriculture shifted decisively from Europe to the United States: the significance of [the vast expansion of acreage] brought under cultivation in the United States, in the period 1860-1900, was tremendous." <=« SOME DIPLOMATIC COXSEQUENCES OF AGRICULTURAL CHANGE During the 19th century, despite the progressively smaller percent- age of the U.S. population engaged in agriculture, the Nation's highly technological fanns became progressively more significant as a factor on the world scene. Four aspects of technology related to agriculture have emerged as important for present and future diplomacy : 1. The population explosion, worldwide, will necessitate resort to the best available technology on a worldwide basis, if famine is to be averted. Technology employed on U.S. farms is not necessarily appro- priate elsewhere; what is more likely to be needed is the building of the same kinds of research institutions in developing countries that were created in the United States during its initial period of growth. The question remaining is whether there is time for such a long-range approach. "^ Wayne D. Rasmussen. "Scientific Agriculture." In Melvin Kranzberg and Carroll W. Pursell, Jr., ed. "Technology in Western Civilization. Volume II : Technology in the Twentieth Century." (New York, Oxford University Press, 1967), page 353. ^^Willard W. Cochrane. "American Farm Policy in a Tumultuous World." [From Min- nesota Agricultural Experiment Station Misc. J. Series No. 7325.] In "Commercial Farm Policy." Extension of remarks of the Hon. Donald M. Eraser. Congressional Record. (Octo- ber 14, 1970), pages B 9404-9. The quotations appear at page E9406. <» George Borgstrom. "Food from the Sea." In Technology in Western Civilization. Volume II : Technology in the Twentieth Century." Op. cit., page 424. 644 2. The use of U.S. agricultural surpluses abroad as an instrument of diplomacy presents increasingly awkward and complicated prob- lems of balancing such factors as — (a) Domestic U.S. prices of farm products ; (b) Specific quantitative requirements of countries for U.S. aid; (c) Humanitarian considerations of urgent need, and the de- sirability of maintaining emergency reserves of food stocks; (d) The question of obligations of nations receiving U.S. aid in the form of agricultural surpluses ; ^ (e) Distinctions between "assistance" and "dumping"; and (/) Effects of U.S. food contributions on the agricultural econ- omies of developing nations. 3. The need also exists to encourage increased agricultural produc- tivity in developing countries to provide an agricultural surplus for export against the purchase of industrial and social overhead capital, and to enable labor in these countries to leave the farm to accept indus- trial employment. This concept is firmly associated with that of bal- anced economic growth. Involved also is the question of devising or applying agricultural technology in these countries. On this subject, the President's Task Force on Science Policy has warned : Advanced agricultural techniques which are of great imi>ortance in the United States may have little or no effectiveness in a country where the pointed stick is one of the most widely used farm implements. The Task Force believes that much greater emphasis must be placed on the transfer of research and development capabilities, rather than of technology it- self, if we hope to increase the effectiveness of our assistance to underdeveloped countries. We must place stress on the transfer of methods for technical research and education within the ethnic and environmental framework of the receiving country itself, rather than within our framework.*^ 4. The impact on the euAironment of measures to increase agricul- tural productivity raises another set of questions. Whether couched in J(;ffersonian terms or in those of contemporary "environmentalists," objections can be foreseen to the application abroad of technologies judged injurious in the United States. For example, one report of the President's Science Advisory Committee urged restraint in the use of pesticides as "toxic to beneficial plants and animals, including man" while another called for a sixfold increase in U.S. shipments of these chemicals to the developing world.^^ There are many other questions concerning the interaction of farm technology, and resulting agricultural productivity, with diplomacy. What diplomatic consequences might be foreseen for possible break- throughs in the technology of tropical agriculture, that might yield vast increases in foods from tropical rain forests ? How dependent is the world's second-largest nation, India, on relief shipments of T"''.S, food, and what are the effects of this reliance on U.S. foreign policy goals and decisions? To what extent is food a legitimate instrument of foreign policy; is it — like atomic weapons — too decisive and «' U.S. The President's Task Force on Science Policy." "Science and Technolog.v : Tools for Progress."' The Report of the President's Task Force on Science Policy." (Washing- ton, U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1970), page 41. «» Chapter Fifteen. "The Insecticide. Fungicide and Rodentlcide Act of 1947." In U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. "Technical Information for Congress." Report to the Subcommittee on Scienx?e, Research, and Development of the. . . . 91st Congress, first session. Prepared b.v The Science Policy Research Division, Legislative Reference Service. Library of Congress. April 25. 1969. House Document No. 91-137. (Washington, U,S. Government Printing Office, 1969), page 409. 645 repugnant a compulsion to be employed? To what extent are the chemical technologies used in modern agriculture necessary to feed the world, and to what extent do they affect the environment so ad- versely as to require international agreement to halt their widespread use? Supporting Elements of National Technological Change National ability to exploit technology for specific fields of produc- tion depends on many supporting conditions that need to develop along with the technology they support. Authorities differ as to the precise range of these elements and as to their relative importance. Those cited may be considered illustrative of the general range of elements of the technological "infrastructure." DIFFERENT VIEWS OF "iNFRASTRUCTUBe" Barbara Ward stresses the idea of equality, the idea of progress, the fact of human population increase, and the application of science and capital to nearly all forms of human activity.^^ David C. McClelland suggests that an important element is the at- titudes and quality of the leaders and managers of industry and com- merce in a nation : The crucial issue [seems to be] what kind of men are in which sector. . . . What kind of men are available for leadership positions in economic organiza- tions in various countries? For in the long run it is they, and their primary concerns, whether for achievement, affiliation, power, or something else, that determine the rate at which the economy of their country develops."" In a later discussion. Miss Ward suggests that the availability of capital to support the process of technological development is crucial : The world economy is the creation of technology. Technology in turn is the creation of two factors which first appeared in a decisive alliance, inside the Atlantic community. One, of course, is experiment leading to invention. The other is capital or savings.'^ Walt W. Rostow relates the acquisition of capital to agriculture: Technically, the preconditions for sustained industrialization have generally required radical change in three nonindustrial sectors. First, a build-up of social overhead capital, notably in transport. . . . Second, a technological rev- olution in agriculture. . . . Third, an expansion in imix»rts financed by the more efficient production and marketing of some natural resources plus, where possible, capital imports.'" Martin Goland, President of Southwest Research Institute, enumer- ate six essential ingredients of technological evolution : First, the technical knowledge which makes new technology possible ; Second, a social climate which is receptive to a more material way of life ; Third, a political and governmental structure which encourages new tech- nology ; Fourth, the availability of the necessary labor and management skills, coupled with an entrepreneurial attitude ; Fifth, the availability of venture capital ; and Sixth, an effective distril,)ution and marketing system. o» Barbara Ward. "The Rich Nations and the Poor Nations." (New Yorl£, W. W. Norton and Compan.v, Inc., 1962), pages 13-6. ™ David C. McClelland. "The Achieving Society." (New York, The Free Press, 1961), page .300. ^ Barbara Ward. "Technological Change and the World Market." In U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. "Applied Science and World Economy." A Compila- tion of Papers Prepared for the Ninth Meeting of the Panel on Science and Technology, 1968. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office. 196S). pages 7-9. ■^2 w. W. Rostow. "The Process of Economic Growth." Second Edition. (New York, W. W. Norton and Company, Inc., 1962), page 31.3. 646 Science and engineering, he notes, ". . . which are normally thought to be the backbone of technology, actually represent only one-sixth of the process." ^^ W. Arthur Lewis suggests that in any specific case systematic analysis is required to determine which elements of infrastructure are needed, should be accorded priority, .and should be related to other elements of growth of a national economy/* Infrastructure requirements deemed necessary by U.S. industrial managers, according to a recent United Nations survey, are listed in descending order as follows : 1. Availability of labour 2. Convenience of markets 3. Availability of property 4. Costs of labour 5. Availability of raw materials 6. Degree of unionization 7. Co-operativeness of local area 8. Location of management 9. Suitability of climate 10. Costs of transportation 11. Adequacy of power 12. Location of industry centre 13. Adequacy of transportation 14. Decentralization of operation 15. Favourability of tax structure 16. Extent of financial aid. It is to be not^d that this list suggests the relative importance of trained labor as the paramount ingredient of the infrastructure. EDUCATION AND TRAINING In his study, Lewis suggests a quantitative relationship between education and such other elements of development as agricultural and industrial occupations. He suggests as a rough approximation the following table: TABLE 2.— SUGGESTED REQUIRED LEVELS OF SCHOOL ENROLLMENT Percent of occupied in agriculture Percent completing secondary school Percent completing higher edu- cation 70 6 0.8 fin 9 1.1 sn 13 1.6 40 - . 18 2.3 30 21 2.6 '^ Martin Golaiwl. "What Makes Technology Run?" In House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. "Applied Science and World Economy." A Compilation of Papers. . . . Op. cit., pages 87-8. ''^W. Arthur Lewis. "Development Planning: The Essentials of Economic Policy." (New York, Harper and Row, Publishers, 1966) , pages 97-8, and generally 97-111. 647 Education has long been recognized by students of the development process as a paramount element of the technological infrastructure." The characteristic pattern of education in the United States, by com- parison with several nations of Western Europe, was discussed by the U.S. delegation to the 6th session of the Industry Committee of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, March, 1968. It noted that diversity of educational backgrounds, characteristic of the United States, "... seems to be an advantage, for broad possibilities of matching the education of workers with educational requirements for specific types of work." Conversely, the miifonnity of educational attainment in Western Europe made for reduced flexibility and adaptability of labor in those countries. It was also important, said the OECD Committee report, that in- dusti-y and the universities maintain contact "so that the former can make known its requirements and the latter make known what they can offer." "^ At the other extreme, Paul G. Hoffman, Managing Director of the United Nations Special Fund, declared : "Of the 1,300 million people living in the less developed countries for which the United Nations has some responsibility, almost half cannot read or write." '" HEALTH Health as an essential element of the "living infrastructure" was stressed by Dr. M. G. Candau, Director-General of the World Health Organization, who told the United Nations Conference on the Ap- plication of Science and Technology, 1963, that "the health of a people is among its greatest assets, and an indispensable source of its wealth." '« In the past [Oandau continued], neglect of these obvious facts has had un- fortunate consequences. . . . History is full of the records of the effects of killing and disabling diseases. Malaria has destroyed civilizations; great pes- tilences like plague have brought misery, poverty, and the destruction of society in their train ; i)oisons like opium and alcohol can eat insidiously into the life and prosi)erity of a community.™ According to W. Arthur Lewis, the principal opportunities for social investment were in public health : The spectacular fall in the death rate over the past hundred years owes very little to curative medicine. The great killers have been wiped out at relatively small cost, using the services of only a handful of doctors, either by improve- ments in the water supply — which have curbed cholera, typhoid and dysentery — or by environmental sanitation which has materially reduced the incidence of '5 United Nations. "Science and Technology for Development. Volume I. World of Opportunity." Report on the United Nations Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefit of the Less Developed Areas. (New York, United Nations, 19.36). page 56". The quotation is by -Professor M. S. Thaeker, president of the United Nations Conference on the Application of Science and Technology for the Benefits of the Less Developed Areas, at Geneva, Switzerland, in February, 1963. At the same conference, Pro- fessor V. K. R. V. Rao, director of the Institute of Economic Growth, in the University of Delhi, India, declared that 'Even if we could get all the capital in the world, that would not give us the kind of rate of economic growth that we want." What was important was the "human factor" — the development of human resources. He declared : "The human being has got to be trained, has got to acquire knowledge, and has got to be given the capacity, and organized to use that knowledge." (Ibid., page 59.) ™ Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development. "United States Industrial Policies." Observations presented by the U.S. Delegation before the Industry Committee at its 6th Session, March 1968. (Paris, Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Develop- ment, 1970), page 64. •^ Ibid., pages 62.-65. '« United Nations. "Science and Technology for Development. Volume I. World of Oppor- tunity." Op. cit., page 58. ™ Ibid., p. 56. -^ 648 malaria, yellow fever and tuberculosis — or by vaccmation — which has nearly eliminated smallpox, diphtheria and poliomyelitis. One dan see this by comparing statistics for developed and underdeveloped countries. The death rate is now about the same in Jamaica as in the United States.*" POWER Three interlocked networks of technology provide an indispensable underpinning for all raw material supply, transfer of materials and products, manufacturing, and marketing. These are the networks of power, transportation, and communications. With respect to power — It was the accessibility of fossil fuels and metallic ores in Britain, Europe, North America and the USSR which, first with the steam-engine and later with the oil-engine, gave countries there the impetus of industrialization which now rates them as "highly developed." Countries which, during the nineteenth cen- tury and the first half of this century, had not accessible energy resources and contiguous minerals of this kind could not have comi^irable industries and, what- ever their innate capacities, remained the suppliers of raw materials and food for the factories and workers of the geologically favored nations.*' A recent Congressional report describes the impact of energy on transportation and production technology in these terms: Today human labor provides energy for far less than 1 percent of the work performed in factories, refineries, and mills in the production of their products. Literally, our economy and our way of life could not continue without use of vast amounts of energy. One measure of this situation is the increase in the total power for all engines, turbines and work animals over the past 3 decades. [There has been an] increase from 2.7 billion horsepower available in the United States in 1940 to 17.9 billion in 1968. Of this, engines in trucks, buses, and automobiles accounted for by far the largest part, increasing from 2.5 billion horsepower in 1940 to 16.9 billion horsepower in 1968. Over the same period, the power of ejectric gen- erating stations increased from 53 million horseixjwer to 371 million horse- power.*^ Characteristically, developmg countries are deficient in electric power and also in fuel for either electric or steam power. 83 TRANSPORTATION Transportation facilities are of similar importance. In the words of Hilaire Bellpc, "A road system, once established, develops at its points of concentration tJie nerve centers of the society it serves ; and we remark that the rise and decline of a state are better measured by the condition of its communications — that is, of its roads — than by any other criterion." ^* A geographic analysis of transportation stresses that good trans- portation ". . . permits the development of regional specialization in production." Unless goods could be readily moved from places of excess to regions of deficiency, each region would be compelled to produce all the kinds of things * Lewis. "Development Planning: The Essentials of Economic Policy." Op. cit., page 111. ^ United Nations. "Science and Technology for Development. Volume I. World of Oppor- tunity." Op. eit., page 10. ^ U.S. Congress. Joint Economic Committee. "The Economy, Energy, and the Environ- ment." A Background Study prepared for the use of the ... By the Environmental Policy Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, September 1, 1970. 91s"t Congress, 2d session. (Washington U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), page 1. [Joint Committee Print.] 83 United Nations. "Science and Technology for Development. Volume I. World of Oppor- tunity." Op. cit., page 82. ^ Hilaire Belloc. "The Road." (New York, Harper and Brothers, 1925), Introduction. 649 needed in just the right quantities — no more and no less than could be consumed' at home. Where communications are adequately developed, however, there is- no such inhibiting influence, and regions are permitted to specialize in those- types of production that they are best fitted by natural endowment or cultural heritage to do and at the same time neglect those for which they are less well equipped.*^ Historically, transportation investment was an important character- istic of the American system as it approached technological leadership.. According to one early study — We [i.e., the United States] have built almost as many miles of railroad as the whole of Europe, and consequently have used in their construction almost as many rails, and now use almost as many railroad cars and locomotives. At the close of 1881 this country had 100,000 miles of railroad, Europe had about 106,000 miles, and all the rest of the world had about 45,000 miles. The United: States had nineteen miles of railroad to every 10,000 of iwpulation^ while Europe had a little more than three miles to the same population.™ In the developing countries, transportation is a foremost need and the most expensive element of teclmological infrastructure. Transport costs form by far the largest single element in building up the economic infrastructure. It has been estimated that they represent as much as 30 per cent of the cost of finished goods in countries with a high cost-structure,, and in areas where the iMjpulation is widely scattered and industrial activity is dispersed, expenditure on transport equipment and operations can amount to 33% percent and more of the national income.*' COMMUNICATIONS Communication is even more widely varied in character; One vie\^ is that "the prime function of communications is to bridge the gap between the leaders and the masses and thus to enable the people to. participate in the modern world." From this point of view— The imijortance of an effective communications system to assist in establish- ing the new outlook and attitudes is obvious. Furthermore, if a nation exi>ects to exist as such and to maintain a place in the modem world it must create and. maintain a system commensurate with its larger expectations. In short, com- munications must be an integral part of the national economy. UNESCO has suggested that eflScacious mass communications can be assured' when for every 100 inhabitants of any country there are at least 10 copies of a. daily newspaper, 5 radio sets, 2 cinema seats and 2 television receivers. This minimum has not been attained by 2,000 million people ; one hundred States in Asia, Africa and Latin America fall below this level. Vast disparities are evident between nations, as to their use of mass communications. "For example, Australia with an annual inoome- of more than $US800 fer caput^ has about the same population as Tanganyika with only $US100 of such income but has nearly 900 times the newspaper circulation and perhaps 750 times as many radio, receivers." Increasingly the United States has seen the evolution of a truly national system of telecommunications. Into this complex is now being introduced the transmission of television programs and the facilities of the digital computer as a repository and source of electronically 8^Vernor C. Finch and Glenn T. Trewartha. "Elements of Geography." (New York,. McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 19316), page 653. '"Benjamin Rand, compiler. "Selections Illustrating Economic History Since the Sevens Years' War." (Cambridge, John Wilson and Son, 1895), page 435. *^ United Nations. "Science and Technology for Development. Volume I. World- of- Oppor- tunity." Op. cit., pa^es 135-6. 97-400 O - 77 - 4 650 communicated information. The national management of information as an adjunct of the national communications net makes for a closer integration of national technology and other forms of social orga- nization. The still more recent development of commmiications satel- lites extends the reach of this national network to other nations and can be expected to effect a similar integration of culture, technology, knowl- edge, and trade on a virtually global basis. INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF INFRASTRUCTURE The foregoing discussion of the importance of infrastructure as the basis of a nation's technology indicates the complexity of a total national system of industry and commerce. Human resources are sug- gested as more important than material wealth. Science contributes to technological systems as a necessary, but insufficient, condition. In short : "The advance of scientific technology can only be part of a concerted national programme of educational, economic, industrial and social change." ^^ Although the total pattern of a nation's infrastructure is a matter of primarily domestic concern, there are many international aspects to the separate ingredients. Even the total pattern is of some concern internationally; within a developing country, for example, if U.S. policy calls for a program of aid to help with its industrialization, the improvement of these conditions of growth become a U.S. problem. Even the definition of the components of the infrastructure in order to assure their proper recognition and support becomes an inter- national problem, to be studied in AID, in the United Nations, in the various specialized U.N. agencies, in O.E.C.D., and elsewhere. In addition, the various elements of infrastructure discussed in this subsection have their own international aspects. Thus, education and training raises questions involving the gain or loss of trained man- power, the planning of institutions to train technicians for interna- tional service, establishment of standards of comparative national educational achievement, exchange of educational personnel, and dis- semination of knowledge. Although health is primarily a domestic problem, it lias vast im- plications for diplomacy : the wealthy nations of the world ignore the health problems of the less developed nations at their peril. Modern transportation systems make possible the global spread of infectious disease with great speed. Pockets of disease and disease vectors serve as natural time bombs, threatening danger at any t-ime. Drugs and sera — their development, production, and availability in time of need — are of concern to all nations. Organizations for the detexjtion of disease and medical problems cannot be other than international. Similarly, the world as a global unit is concerned with the total availability and dis- tribution of trained public health and medical ser\dces, and with the standards of health and medical care. International transfer of electric power is of no great consequence but the transfer of power technology — particularly atomic power — is of wide international concern. Control of the facilities, the fuel, and the processing of spent fuel elements are all international problems. 88 Ibid., page 53. The statement is by Professor P. H. S. Blackett. 651 Supplies of coal, natural gas, petroleum, and other fossil fuels are not uniformly distributed among the nations of the world and raise ques- tions of international adjustment and accommodation. The global problems of air pollution and dis])osal of radioactive materials are also €losely related to power generation. Ground transportation is already an internatioiinl network in Europe and North America ; similar networks are of increasing impor- tance in Africa and South America. Air transportation is clearly global, with enormous problems of safety standards, prevention of dis- semination of disease vectors, standardization of operational training, specialized international language and codes, procedures for interna- tional air shipment, security of air cargoes, international sales of air- craft and engines, and — most recently — the competitive development of three large supersonic transport aircraft. Communications networks are inherently global, and promise to become more so with the advent of communications satellites for tele- phone, radio, and television. Some of the international diplomatic aspects of this subject will be discussed in a later study. Involved are allocation of the electromagnetic spectrum, content of international television programs, standardization of codes and procedures, and many more. The role of the computer in association with international communications has yet to be defined, but appears certain to be a major one. Also of importance is the economic power of the large corpora- tions specializing in the development and production of communica- tions and computer hardware ; this field of activity received primary attention in the French study of the penetration of Europe by Ameri- can corporations.^® Recapitulation: Diplomatic Conseqiiences of Technology It is no easy matter to inventory the myriad of international con- sequences flowing from the four kinds of technology discussed in this section. Foremost, perhaps, is the conclusion that international com- petition for primacy among nations is to a very large extent a tech- nological race. Nuclear weapons and atomic power have profoundly influenced the international scene in many subtle and unexpected ways : creating the need for a deeper mutual understanding between the superpowers as a means toward their mutual security; creating opportunities for large multipurpose projects to open desert regions of the world to habitation; and generating a host of international agencies and ac- tivities to control and exploit this still new product of science. Space exploration has led to a similar need for closer understand- ing and cooperation among nations, as well as conferring prestige and power upon the leaders in this technology. The securing of various new benefits by all nations from space teclinology requires cooperative agreement and joint action. Planet Earth has been shown visibly and coherently as a single unit whose artificial divisions by mankind can be ignored in the global study of weather, resources of land and ocean, and even the superficial changes brought about by industry, agricul- ture, and human settlement. The mundane field of agTicultural technology', among the first at- tempted by man, has also generated its worldwide conflicts and ten- ^ J. J. Servan-Schreiber. "The American Challenge," Op. cit. 652 sions as we'l as offering solutions to global problems. It has required study by international bodies, international exchange of information, negotiation to resolve new issues, and an awareness of the A^alue of cooperation among governments as well as among peoples. Even the primarily domestic aspect of tec-hnological infrastruc- ture is found to have significant international aspects. Programs in technical assistance, international activities in education and health, exchange of technical information about transportation, counnunica- tions and power, all provide a basis for closer relations among gov- ernments and individuals. Some aspects of infrastnicture are themselves taking on an inter- national character, such as air transportation and satellite communica- tions. These can serve both to help and hinder the work of the diplo- mat: While information can now be transmitted virtually instantane- ously, to facilitate long-range bargaining, the time available for deci- sion-making has decreased. The traditional conduct of secret, official diplomacy tends to be nullified by radio and television propaganda and by educational, cultural, and scientific exchanges. Swift transit of trouble-shooting negotiators to points of tension by air transport or for consultation with national leaders is counteracted by the ability of trouble-makers and dissident groups to use these same means of travel. It seems evident that modern diplomats and policy-makers re- quire special training in understanding and using technolog}^, and in "formulating plans that involve the new uses or development of new kinds of technology. Parliaments are called upon to evaluate and ap- prove agreements and treaties with a technological content. New in- formation is needed for assessing the relationship between technologi- cal information and practical politics. IV. The Internationalization or Technology The preceding section (III) demonstrated a consistent series of trends in nuclear weaponry and atomic power, space development, agriculture, and technological infrastructure. In each case, the evolv- ing teclinology generated problems for diplomacy, postulated inter- national enterprises, attracted international interest, and implied a need for the design of a U.S. policy to ensure that the de\'elopment and its international consequences served U.S. foreign policy goals. The question to be explored in the rest of the chapter is whether future technology can be purposefully exploited to serve the purposes of diplomacy. The discussion in this section will describe the processes by which technology becomes internationalized, i.e., managed and applied internationally. The concluding section will identify some of the major issues in the use of international technology to advance the foreign policy of the United States. Assessment of National and International Technology Since 1966, numerous articles and papers have offered proposals for institutions to monitor and control the imperfections of modern tech- nology .^° There are many notions as to the definition and solution of *' U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. "Teclinology Assess- ment : Annotated Bibliography and Inventory of Congressional Organization for Science and Technology." Prepared for the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, 91st Congress, second session. July 15, 1970. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), 92 pages. [Committee Print.] 653 this broad problem. Some critics attack technology itself as the villain. Others charge society with using technology improperly. However, there appears to be a consensus that beneficial technological innova- tions tend to have unexpected, unplanned, and adverse secondary con- sequences. In some cases, a defective innovation is questioned at the outset, but eagerness for its adoption is so great that it is rushed into wide use without adequate testing or assessment. (Such was the case with enzymes for stain removal.^^) In other cases, a teclmologj^ meets con- ventional tests and is later found to be defective in ways that conven- tional testing had not disclosed. (This was the case with the drug. Thalidomide.^^) Still other technologies reveal flaws when the mass effect of their wide public use magnifies their imperfections. (Examples are the automobile and DDT.) Technological shortcomings also result from many kinds of interactions, of one technology with another, or of some technology with an "eco-system," or a subtle effect that in- novative technology is needed to detect, and so on. Since the only justification for the adoption of a technology is its benefits to man, it is appropriate for society to be assured that the benefits oA-erweigh the costs. Assessment will also be concerned with seeking out alternative ways of increasing the benefits or reducing the costs. The need for an assessment institution is intensified in cases where different persons or groups receive the benefits of a technology from those who bear the costs of the adverse secondary consequences of the technology. Problems arise, for example, when a plant dumps pollut- ing waste into a stream that impairs the value of the water for down- stream users, or when a smoke plume dirties clothes and houses down- wind. This circumstance can be international as, for example, when plants at Niagara Falls send smoke into Canadian communities. Sometimes it is unclear as to whether a consequence is adverse or not : for instance, there is no agreement as to whether the waste heat from a power plant dumped into a lake or bay is thermal pollution or thermal ennchment. The adverse consequences can appear as a tenu- ous chain of circumstances : as an example, the DDT spread on a bean field may destroy a nearby hive of honeybees, and thereby prevent pol- lination of a fruit orchard a half-mile away, raising the price of fruit in a city 50 miles away. The wide dissemination of lead in gasoline and paints, the general use of asbestos in brake linings and household in- sulation, and the use of toxic chemicals as plastic additives are all viewed as general hazards to mankind. Proposals to institutionalize the assessment of beneficial and adverse impacts of technology have included establishment of assessment units in various technologically-oriented departments and agencies, estab- lishment of an independent agency or board in the form of a regula- tory agency, the creation of an advisory body to the Congress, and «' ". . . A clothes-washing compound featuring an enzyme for protein stain removal could be and was developed, manufactured, advertised, distributed, and sold — and then pumped into sewage treatment plants all over the country in a matter of weeks — with no formal consideration of the possible consequences of a new ingredient." U.S. (President Nixon's) National Goals Research Staff. "Toward Balanced Growth : Quantity with Quality." Report of the National Goals Research Staff. July 4, 1970. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970) , page 126. *- See Chapter Fourteen. "Thalidomide : The Complex Problem of Drug Control In a Free Market." In House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. "Technical Information for Congress," Op. cit., pages 375-85. 654 various combinations of tliese.^^ An analysis of 14 cases of congres- sional decisionmaking on technological issues since 1945 has shown that there are available no standards and no systematic procedure for this task. It was observed that there was a need for early identification of technological issues to enable their orderly analysis before political pressures could operate to obscure or bias the findings. 94 INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS OF TECHNOLOCxY ASSESSMENT Because of the widespread interest in the subject of technology assessment in the United States, it was only to be expected that inter- est in it would go abroad. According to John Lear : The technology -assessment idea is * * * being pursued on the international front : in UNESCO, in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Develop- ment (OECD). in the Council of Europe, and in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).*^ One of the more perceptive statements on the subject was offered by Anthony Wedgwood Benn, Labour Government Minister of Tech- nology in the United Kingdom. He wrote that it was necessary to "* * * identify the main problems facing society and [to] find ways and means of converting these needs into real demands which can be met best by the use of technology." ^'^ In the 14 case studies referred to above, there were five that were primarily international in scope,"^ and another three cases with sub- stantial international implications.**^ An increasing number of tech- nological developments are appearing tliat seem to have international aspects. For example : The developed nations in Europe and elsewhere have a special responsibility to the less developed ones. We advise them to industrialize cleanly in order to escape what we are suffering, yiet they turn and ask us why they should handicap their products in the world market while we continue to be dirty. We can do no less than make a determined effort to clean up internationally.*® With the appearance of technologies of global impact and influence, the question of international regulation begins to be asked : As technology has made the world more a "village world," there has been a growing tendency since the foundation of the United Nations for international bodies to concern themselves with matters . . . which were formerly held to be the exclusive province of a nation-state. It is in the fields of science and technology »3 For a summary of some of these proposals, see : Franklin P. Huddle. "Government Technology Assessment : The Role of the Social Sciences." Panel-Round Table at Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association." October 2, 1970. (Multilith, Science Policy Research Division, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 1970), 45 pages. (70-246 SP.) "■' See : House, Committee on Science and Astronautics. "Technical Information for Congress," op. cit., especially pages 519-.521. This reference states that "The hypothesis is this : If an issue can be certified for congressional study at an early point and surveillance maintained over it by skilled people, the process of maturation can occur without con- suming congressional time and attention, until the need for action is manifest. Issues might then be dealt with by the Congress on an orderly time schedule, with less reliance on crash decisionmaking and a reduced frequency of sudden sensational alarms." (Page 519.) ^'^ John Lear. "Predicting the Consequences of Technology." Saturday Review. (March 28, 1970), page 46. . »« Anthony Wedgwood Benn. "Technology and the quality of life." Technology plus So- ciety. (May 1970, Vol. 6, No. 1), page 7. *' These were : the Test Ban Treaty, the Point IV Program, the Peace Corps, the Thalid- omide Case, and Camelot. <"* These were : the control of pesticides, high energy physics, and the Mohole project. ** Frank Fraser Darling. "Thinking planet-wise." New Scientist, (April 16. 1970), pages 106-108. Dr. Darling is a member of the standing Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution of the U.K. 655 that this need for international rather than national action is most strongly felt, and for many reasons. These reasons were: the traditionally international character of science, the need for international cooperation in inherently global activities such as civil aviation, the need for control of dangerous teclinologies like atomic energy, and the regulation of global dissemi- nation of pollutants. With respect to the last item, the author observes : (Combating pollution will inevitably require international rather than national regulation as its starting point. First, pollution originating in a single nation- state might well spread, through one of the components of the environment such as the air or oceans, into the territories of other nation-states. Secondly, in the context of current patterns for modernization of economies by the export from the most advanced countries of capital equipment for technological manufacturing, a plant which fails to contain adequate anti-polluting equipment will spread pollu- tion by the very fact of its export. Thirdly, the measures to combat pollution need to be internationally prescribed and enforced for they will undoubtedly affect costs, and states which fail to observe them will gain a competitive advantage over those who do.^"* As a corollary of the author's third point, U.S. insistence on the incorporation of anti-smog devices on American cars for domestic use might be regarded as a form of trade barrier by nations exporting cars to the United States, unless such devices are freely available under cross-licensing arrangements. SUGGESTIONS FOR USTTERISTATIOXAL INSTITUTIONS A proposal has been advanced for an international assessment agency under the aegis of the United Nations, in an article by Dennis Living- ston of Case Western Reserve University.^"^ His plan relies on three propositions: (1) there is already a considerable assessment activity in international bodies, (2) adverse secondary consequences of tech- nology are often international in their impacts, and (3) assessment of technology is involved in the processes of aid to developing countries, with respect to their own policies in the adoption of technology, in eval- uation of impoited technology, and in evaluating technological trends and their social consequences in the developed countries. Professor Livingston cites niunerous instances of assessments under existing international arrangements, such as : Outer space ; Pollution abatement; . Civilian nuclear reactors ; Resources management ; International brain research ; Nuclear energy research ; Research in the "planetary biosphere" ; Safeguards for nuclear reactors and materials ; The seabed ; and Oil pollution on the high seas. ^o" Allan McKnight. "International Regulation of Science and Technology," Interna- tional Journal, "Autumn, 1970," pages 745-746. ifi Dennis Livingston. "International Technology Assessment and The United Nations System." American Journal of International Law, (September 1970, Vol. 64), page 163-172. 656 Other items might well have been added to this list, such as : Control and testing of proprietary drugs ; Usesof nuclear explosions for civil purposes ; Weather modification, control, and prediction ; Persistent pesticides ; Communications satellites ; Genetic engineering ; Arms control ; Aircraft noise and environmental effects ; Human resources management: the international movement and concentrations of scientific and technological talent; Inadvertent weather modification ; and Control of infectious disease and disease A^ectors. Ac-cordingly., Professor Livingston proposes the creation of an "In- ternational Technology Assessment Board, charged with four func- tions: (1) contracting out specific technology assessment studies, (2) liaison and cooperation with national technology assessment bodies, (3) issuance of an annual report on the use of science and technology for mankind, and (4) provision of fact-finding and mediation services. He elaborates on all of these, but his comment on the fourth point is -especially illuminating : This is a function not contemplated in the reports for a U.S. asse.ssment agency, but iJotentially useful on the international level. Some of the important disputes among states involve disagreements about the anticipated effects of large-scale technological projects, particularly the multi-utilization of international river systems and the carrying out of space experiments. . . . [Provision of such .^services] would not be unprecedented. ICSU's Committee on Space Research established a Consultative Group on Potentially Harmful Effects of Space Experiments. ... At the adjudicatory level, several cases of air and water pol- lution exist in wfhich states claimed damages resulting to their territories by the harmful activities of neighboring states, with the issue resolved by tribunals or courts."^ It is not evident whether or not the world is yet ready for an inter- national agency of technology assessment. Indeed, in the United States the issue as to the desirability of a domestic agency for this purpose has not yet been resolved. Nevertheless, sentiment seems to be increas- ing in the direction of some sort of international concordance regard- ing the global impact of technology. For instance, the first annual report of tlie Council on Environmental Quality "^ tabulated inter- national agencies currently engaged in "international cooperation on •environmental matters," in many of which the United States was a participant. Tliese included: A. The United Nations : Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) : ^ Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization (IMCO); U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) ; World Health Organization (WHO) ; Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) ; World Meteorological Organization (WMO) ; International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) ; and U.N. Conference on the Human Environment. 102 Ibid., pages 166-170. i<" U.S. President's Council on Environmental Quality. "Environmental Quality : The ^rst Annual Report of the Council on Environmental Quality together with The Presl- ■dent's Message to Congress." (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pages 199-209. 657 B. Other Intergovernmental Bodies : NATO Committee on Challenges of Modern Society (CCMS); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD); Organization of African Unity (OAU) ; Organization of American States (OAS) ; and Council of Europe. C. Bilateral Cooperation (with the United States) : Japan ,-^ Germany ; France; Soviet Union ; and Canada, D. Nongovernmental Organizations : International Biological Program of Intemationai Council of Scientific Unions ; and International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Kesources (lUCN). In this same context, Senator Warren Magnuson has proposed the creation of a "World Environmental Institute" to serve as a central information center for all nations. Every nation— regardless of its form of government or its international and domestic policies — could consult the Institute for expert advice on all forms of environmental problems. The Institute would serve both as a research cen- ter and as the repository of that worldwide pool of knowledge and talent. Through the use of computers, any country could obtain a thorough guide to the scientists and scientific studies around the world that relate to a particular en- vironmental problem. Under the auspices of the Institute [Senator Magnuson continued], a con- tinual exchange of scientists and technological information between the coun- tries of the world would be possible on a non-political basis — not simply on the unilateral scale of today but on a multilateral level never dreamed of be- fore. Task forces could be set up — consultants who would work as a team and on request visit the distant parts of the globe to undertake special projects.^** THE ASSESSMENT ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW Just as the legal profession has taken an increasing interest in. teclmology assessment as related to the processes of law in the United States, the role of international law has also been seen as importantly linked to the global function of technology assessment. Herman Pollack, director of the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs of the Department of State, suggests the need for "systematic technological assessment" at the international level, where it — * * * also encompasses an evaluation of the adequacy of international law, arrangements and institutions for the management of technologies which are- inherently international in their scope, such as those relating to weather modification and communications.^'^ JVIr. Pollack's point was enlarged on in an article by C. Wilfred Jenks, Principal Deputy Director-General, International Labour Office. He declared that "the progress of advanced technology poses immediate practical problems of legal regulation and legal liability. 104 "\ World View of the Environment." Remarks of Sen. Warren G. Magnuson before the second annual International Geoscience Electronics Symposium, Washington, D.C. April 16, 1970. In "Senator Magnuson's Plan for a World Environmental Institute." Re- marks of the Honorable Mike Mansfield on the floor of the Senate. Congressional Record, (April 23, 1970), page S6069. 106 Testimony before Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, House Com- mittee on Science and Astronautics, July 28, 1970. (Mimeo), page 7. 658 The question becomes that of whether we can foresee and take effective action concerning these problems before they become insoluble or whether law must always lag behind life. It took the Titanic disaster to produce the Safety of Life at Sea Convention. It has taken the Torrey Canyon disaster to prompt vigorous action conc-erning the oil-pollution risk from giant tankers. Must the progress of the law to cope with the new problems arising from the progress of science and technology always wait upon disaster? There are clearly fields, notable among them that of nuclear energy, in which the consequences of disaster may be so far-reaching that the failure of the law to keep in step with life may involve not merely frustration, hardship and injustice, but the collapse of the whole legal order. He noted that there were prototypes such as the U.N. Conventions on the Law of the Sea, the Antarctic Treaty, the Moscow Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Nuclear Liability Conventions, and the Space Treaty. Others were needed, such as an Open Depths Treaty, an Arctic Treaty, a Radioactive Pollution Treaty, and a World Weather Treaty. In- deed— "We may . . . within the next few years need a Sonic Boom Treaty, a Center of the Earth Treaty, a Cybernetics Treaty and a Molecular Biological Treaty.'' However, he questioned whether it would be adequate to deal separately with each of these problems. They were all "aspects of the broader problem of the role of law, internationally as well as nationally, in the social control of the new relationship between man and his environment created by contempo- rary scientific and teclmological progress." Accordingly — The social control of science and technology takes its place with the renuncia- tion of force as an instrument of national policy, the promotion of economic stability and growth, the protection of civil liberties and the progress of social justice among the major objectives of policy which are giving altogether new dimensions to international law in our time and gradually but relentlessly trans- forming it from a law between States only and exclusively into the common law of mankind.^'* The need for a general strengthening of institutions for interna- tional assessment and control of technology was seen by Allan Mc- Knight, formerly Inspector-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency : If the scale of international regulation of science and technology increases (and this writer believes that it must), then the content of the business of our Institutions mu.st change. These consequential changes will include : (a) much closer links between foreign ministries and the scientific coonmunity, ( & ) much greater concern within scientific communities with r^ula- tion of activities rather than positive conduct of activities, (c) a larger component of scientific skills and knowledge within foreign ministries, (d) a deeper concern with regulation within the governing bodies and secretariats of international organizations, (e) closer links all over between scientists, technologists, politicians, and lawyers, (/) above all, a logical process for achieving Lnternational regu- lation.'*" The Internationalization of Military Technology Of the three options that Rostow sees as open to a technologically advanced nation ^"^ the first seems to have been largely blunted by technology itself. In the face of a nuclear weapons capability, mili- tary conquest in the future dare not be too ambitious ; war must be ^"^ C. Wilfred Jenks. "The New Science and tlie Law of Nations." International and Comparative Law Quarterly. (April 1968, Volume 17), pages 328-332. 10^ McKnight. "International Regulation of Science and Technology," op. cit., pages 752-3. 108 These were : military expansionism, achievement of a high-consumption economy, and development of the welfare state ; see page 14. 659 limited in scope and for limited objectives. Nuclear missiles have demonstrated their negative value to assure inaction ; but they do not appear useful as a means of positive action. Nevertheless, a long chain of diplomatic exchanges have resulted from this ultimate weapon. For example: A considerable amount of the business of the United Nations has been concerned with nuclear disarmament, nuclear limitation, and arrangements for the regulation of atomic power operations. A lively dialogue has continued between the United States and the Soviet Union to develop international understanding as to the limits of military commitment short of nuclear confrontation. The mutuality of interest in avoiding nuclear exchange, or for that matter the serious threat of such an exchange, has led to an increase in exchange of views and even to the provision of a tech- nological mechanism (the "Hot Line") for emergency consulta- tion between Chief Executives of the two powers. Worldwide surveillance has been established, in the form of seismic and air-sampling detection systems, to detect nuclear weapons tests. Nuclear-armed bases on the territories of a number of aligned States have been negotiated for. Extensive negotiations have been undertaken toward the goal of refusing the admission of nuclear weapons to entire continents ( in particular, Africa and South America) . FACTORS OF SUB-NUCLEAR TECHXOLOGY Though strategic war has apparently been eliminated as a viable instrument of policy, capabilities still exist in most States for the conduct of limited, sub-nuclear war. Nuclear powers maintain these capabilities to enlarge their power options, to influence the course of combat among States where their interests are involved, and to stabi- lize or otherwise atfect the military balance of strength among lesser powers. Technology is also involved extensively in these activities in ways that are of diplomatic concern. For example : — There is considerable agitation over the U.S. use of herbicide tecluiology in Vietnam, and a more general concern as to what kinds of technolog}^ ought to be foresworn by belligerents under international law. — Extension of U.S. arms technolog}^ and even the development of international technological standards of armaments to the many participating countries have resulted from the various re- gional treaties of mutual security (NATO. SEATO. OAS. etc.). — Construction of large, expensive, air-defense networks has occurred or is in process in many countries (emplo^'ing U.S. tech- nologies for radar, computers, display tubes, and various sub- systems of active defense) . — Various forms of U.S. military assistance have been provided by negotiation, such as supply of combat aircraft, ground support equipment, ordnance, and communications ; training arrangements have also been provided in the use and maintenance of the equip- ment, and in basic science and technology to understand its opera- tion and design. — The deployment of U.S. troops abroad, and their use in asso- ciation with indigenous troops or people has had the derivative effect of being a teclmological training device. 660 — The wide deployment of U.S. troops and the Fleet means^ that U.S. service people are frequently in a position to aid local populations in time of emergency or natural disaster, or even as a routine activity, with the effect of demonstrating the operational utility of U.S. technology in the process. There is one body of opinion that holds that the role of subnuclear conflict is tending to diminish. The rationale behind this view is that as the spheres of influence of the Great Powers become more sharply defined, both functionally and territorially, there wnll be less and less occasion for initiatives and ventures involving the productive use of force. It Avill be in the interest of these Powers, also, to try to damp out any violent quarrels among lesser States, in order to avoid the possi- bility of nuclear confrontation. The implication of this trend — to the extent that the hypothesis is valid— would seem to be that a principal remaining avenue for the ex- ercise of national influence is in competitive technology. This view is expressed in the following passage by Victor Basiuk of the Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University : Over the centuries, nonmilitary technology has been one of the major causes of change in the distribution of worid power. In recent times, nations have grown powerful thanks in large part to the peace-time technologies which made it pos- sible for them to become great industrial centers. Military power usually fol- lowed in the wake of industrial capability. . . . There is no sign of the emergence of a stalemate to prevent nonmilitary technology from effecting changes in the distribution of power of nations and regions. The evolution of nonmilitary technology suggests at least one important con- clusion. Because nonmilitary technology now occupies a larger part of the spec- trum of technologies capable of changing the distribution of world power and because its share of the non-stalemated spectrum is growing, its importance prom- ises to be greater than it was heretofore.^™ However, even under this hypothesis, tliere are many points of inter- national contact involving technology in Avhich U.S. military and paramilitary agencies can participate. For example, a report by the U.S. Coast Guard of its "involvement in international affairs'' list« 20 international agencies and 15 international activities in which it is a. participant. Among the international programs are Loran stations, the ocean station program, the automated merchant vessel report (AMVER) system, training of foreign nationals, and sea-air rescue technology and studies. Of the AMVER program, the Coast Guard reports : » Close liaison with foreign embassies, foreign governments, foreign shipping in- terests, foreign communications representatives and foreign airlines is required to encourage participation in the AMVER program and to arrange for the neces- sary communications for exchanging the ship reports and passing surface pic- tures. General instructions for participation in AMVER have been reproduced in twelve foreign languages. The International Radio-Medical Center, Rome- (CIRM ROMA) is an active interested correspondent. . . ."" By various agreements or treaties, the Coast Guard has established its Loran stations on the territories of 14 countries, and provides tech- nical assistance and replacement parts to 43 Loran stations manned by host nations. What has been said about the far-flung international contacts of the Coast Guard on technological matters applies with greater force 109 Victor Basiuk. "Technology and World Power." Foreign Policy Association, Headline Series. (April, 1970), page 53. "" U.S. Department of Transportation. Coast Guard. "Participation in International Aflfairs." [1968.] (Mimeo, May 22, 1968), pages A-2, B-2, B-5, and B-7. (CG-389.), 661 for the three military departments and for the Department of Defense generally. The Inc7'easv)ig Scope of Global Technology The growth has been described of international participation in Earth satellite systems for global communications, resource surveys, weather prediction, navigation, and other useful services derived from the space program. One effect of this activity has been to advertise globally the teclmologiciil accomplishments of the United States in a difficult and costly field. Another effect has been to encourage a global attitude toward the Earth itself — perceivmg it as itself a "space sliip,'- whose passengers share its fate, irrespective of country or re- gion. A third effect is to tie together into single systems global com- munications, transportation systems, resources, environmental effects, and weather and climate. International participation in space projects is demonstrably being stimulated by the opportmiities for tangible benefit as well as by the prestige they afford. As tecluiologies grow in size, cost, complexity, sophistication, and range of effects, they may tax the willingness (if not indeed the physi- cal means) of individual nations to support their development. This effect has already been observed in the case of the Concorde super- sonic transport aircraft, whose development is currently being shared by France with the United Kingdom. As Basiuk notes — First, confronted by rising costs and problems of increasing scale, even the superpowers individually may lack the capability of taking advantage of the full potential of future technology. This factor will increasingly generate pressure for international cooperation among the middle-rank powers (e.g. Britain, France, Germany, Japan), between the superpowers and the Western Euroi)ean powers and Japan — and perhaps between the superpowers themselves. Second, some forms of future technology such as large-scale climate modification, wili require international cooperation not so much because of the costs involved but because more than one geographic region will be affected and the participation of those concerned will be esisential."^ Numerous proposals for large-scale international technologies or developments have been advanced in recent years. Among the more notable have been proposals for damming the Bering Straits, for large-scale transfer of water from Canada to the Great Basin of the United States, large agro-industrial-nuclear desalinization projects for desert regions, and systematic extraction of materials from the sea bed. Leadership in large international projects of technology con- tributes to diplomatic influence at the same time that diplomatic skills are needed in the design and construction of international consortia to execute such projects. HAZARDS OF ECONOMIES OF SCALE The exploitation of economies of scale has led to remarkable in- 'creases in the size of many technological installations. With increased size may also come the possibility of danger to nearby populations or to the environment from technical flaw, operating error, act of Nature, or even sal3otage. The oil spill at Santa Barbara and the Torrey Canyon episode illustrate these dangers. A number of tragic aircraft accidents in recent history serve to highlight the possibility that as 1^' Basiuk. "Technology and World Power," op. cit., page 16. • 662 aircraft continue to grow in size and passenger capacity the numbers wiped out in single disasters will likewise increase. Safety of mankind and his environment, in the face of this growth of technological units, calls for an increase in intergovernmental relations to enforce uni- form standards of design reliability, uniform codes of operating be- havior, and reasonable standards of environmental quality. It would seem that closer international ties are postulated not only to construct the supersize units of present and future technology but also to pro- tect mankind and his world from their faults. Tlie Internationalization of Commercial Technologies Many international networks have been constructed that involve the exploitation by private companies of innovative products with world markets. Servan-Schreiber regards these networks as essentially Amer- ican-built and American-dominated (thanks to the superior public education, management training, and scientific infrastructure in the United States). Being alien to Europe, these networks are also — in his judgment — potentially inimical and divisive. Accepting the Servan-Schreiber thesis, and declaring the existence of a "technological gap" between Western Europe and the United States, Aurelio Peccei declares that technological change is bringing about disruptions that threaten "assured and possibly total disaster." He cited as the special advantages possessed by the United States in achieving its superior technological posture in industry the following : U.S. lead in computer technology U.S. lead in atomic energy, aircraft, and space U.S. lead in comprehensive communications systems Greater U.S. effort in research and development Greater size of American firms, with superior profit picture Superior U.S. managerial skills The flow of European scientists to the United States Higher U.S. expenditures on education (especially technical) Mobility of movement geographically and institutionally Superior communications among and within institutions Absence of trade barriers within a large market area Flexibility and adaptability of social and economic institutions. According to Peccei, Americans refuse to admit to the existence of this gap, and this conflict in views "has been a point of contention at the comitless meetings and conference devoted to the subject in the last few years." "2 A rejoinder to the Servan-Schreiber thesis is presented by John B. '"Rhodes, who declares that the capabilities of the industry of Western Europe and the United States are both "being matched or surpassed in many products by those of Japan," that many new manufacturing centers were emerging outside the United States, that "There are few goods available to the American consumer that are not produced at competitive prices in Europe," and that on balance "the odds favor a significant role for European industry even in those fields [such as atomic energy and space] where it now seems far behind." In less limited fields, the resilience of industry in Europe has been remark- able. . . . The European automobile industry is vital and growing even after some .50 years of competition from General Motors and Ford. IBM has been successful in Europe, but not noticeably more so than in the United States, and is bound to face increasing competition in the years ahead both abroad and at iu> "xhe Transatlantic Cleavage — The Technological Gap." From the Atlantic Union. In "The Transatlantic Cleavage — The Technological Gap." Extension of remarks of the Hon. Howard W. Robison, Congressional Record, (September 30, 1970), pages ES785-89. 663 home. In fields such as power generation, primary metals, road and rail trans- portation, consumer durables, and communications, European companies are among the world leaders."^ AMERICAN HIGH-TECHNOLOGY BIAS Another American view, by Arnold Kramish, suggests that not only does a technological gap exist, but that it is likely to persist. He ob- serves: (1) "... At any given moment, the rate of a nation's tech- nological growth is proportional to the external pressures, and to a vague factor incorporating national awareness and will." and (2) ". . . The United States will never be content with anything less thaji a position of world technological leadership, a position which is rein- forced by her determination to maintain strategic superiority over any other country. She will thus continue to have a high investment in esoteric or pioneer forms of technology." ^^* It was this U.S. preoccupation with strategic (i.e., military) hard- ware that diverted American technologists from "prosaic problems such as those of improving old processes or dealing with air pollution and waste disposal." He noted that the British had perfected an Ameri- can invention of "float glass" and today enjoy a strong international position in a lucrative field, "Why was not this process developed in the United States, since it was American in origin?" Kramish's ex- planation is that Europeans have a greater interest in increasing the efficiency and productivity of commonplace processes, rather than risking development of "frontier" teclinology."^ TABLE 3— HOW TRADE FOLLOWS RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT |A comparison of competitive trade performance in 18 U.S. industries witli research and development) Industry Aircraft _ Office machinery Drugs Other machinery I nstruments Chemicals, except drugs Electrical equipment Rubber Motor vehicles Petroleum refining Fabricated metal products... Nonferrous metals Paper and allied products.,. Stone, clay, glass products.. Other transport equipment. . Lumber and wood products. Textile mill products Primary ferrous metals U.S. exports as percent of Scientists and exports by 10 engineers in R. leading indus- & D. as percent trial countries, of employment, 1962 January 1961 59.52 7.71 35.00 5.09 33.09 6.10 32.27 1.39 27.98 4.58 27.32 3.63 26.75 4.40 23.30 2.95 22.62 1.14 20.59 2.02 19.62 0.51 18.06 0.69 15.79 0.47 15.22 0.60 13.71 0.46 11.68 0.08 10.92 0.29 9.14 0.43 Source: D. Keesing, The Impact of Research and Development on United States Trade, International Economics Workshop, Columbia University, February 1966. (As reproduced in: Christopher Layton. "European Advanced Technology, A Pro- gramme for Integration" (London, George Allen PEP, 1969), p. 278.) U3 " 'The American Challenge' Challenged." Harvard Business Review, (September- October, 1969), pages 46-49, 52. ^* Arnold Kramish. "Atlantic Technological Imbalance : An American Perspective." Defense Technology and the Western Alliance. Institute for Strategic Studies, (occasional paper, 1967). Mr. Kramish is author of Atomic Energy in the Soviet Union (1959) and The Peaceful Atom in Foreign Policy (1963) ; he is co-author (with E. M. Zuckert) of Atomic Energy for Your Business (1956) . ^5 Ibid., page 4. 664 That American export trade reflects this bias toward "exotic" tech- nological products is confirmed by several sources. One confirmation is presented in Table 3. A similar view was recently offered by Patrick E. Haggerty, chairman of Texas Instruments, Incorporated. He -asserted that only in technology-intensive products does the United States have a favorable commercial balance in its trade with the rest of the world. This balance (for such products) amounted to $8 or $9 billion annually. Mr. Haggerty's main thesis, however, was that ". . . •even in technology-intensive products, and after our tremendous na- tional expenditures for research and development, our lead over our industrial competitors and customers in the industrialized world is narrowing rapidly," ^^^ However, in the field of computers, which are widely considered "among the most significant indicators of the new technology," the United States has installed 56,000 compared with 20,000 in Western Europe, 5500 in the Soviet Union, and 6000 in Japan. "A look ahead to the late 1970s is instructive, when the United States will have about 100,000 of a world total of 215,000 computers, Western Europe 50,000, the USSR 35,000, Japan 20,000, and the remaining three-quarters of the world only 10,000." ^" By comparison, long-established technologies appear to be lagging in the United States. According to Walter J. Campbell, editor of In- dustrial Week, American steel production — while still leading the world — had declined in world markets from 57 percent to 31 percent and domestic sales from 99 percent to 90 percent, from 1950 to 1969. Quantitatively, while U.S. production of steel had risen during this period from 96 million tons to 141, Japan's steel production had in- creased from 5 million tons to about 90 million. Similarly, the auto- mobile industry, which in 1950 supplied more than 75 percent of the world market, now served only 34 percent."^ THE SPREAD OF MULTINATIONAL BUSINESSES Too much should not be made of visible trade balances. Trade statistics do not reflect the fact that many American corporations are •doing business on foreign soil and are actually contributing to trade deficits in particular areas. The Servan-Schreiber thesis relies heavily on the fact of the extensive penetration of American corporations into European countries, either through wholly-owned subsidiaries or in consortia with European partners. There has indeed been a great outward movement of U.S. capital in recent years. During the 15-year period after 1950, external U.S. investments tripled and investment in Europe rose more than tenfold. Information on the vutnber of American firms operating in Europe is more diflSeult to obtain tlian information on the flow of funds. One survey shows that there were over 3.700 "new operations" — acquisitions, expansions of existing plant, or ne~w establishments — by American firms In Europe in the eight years 1958-65, of which over 2,800 were in the countries of the EEC [Common Market] "* Testimony before Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, House 'Committee on Science and Astronautics, on National Science Policy, (Mimeo, August 13, 1970). "' Lee Stull. "Continuity and Change in the International E^nvironment." Foreign Service Journal (January, 1970), page 17. ii8Walter.J. Campbell. "Shrinking Share." Industry Week. ("October 19, 1970), editorial 3>age. 665 and most of the remainder in the United Kingdom and Switzerland. More than 60 per cent of these operations represented new establishments, 20-30 per cent were acquisitions, and the remainder were expansions of existing direct invest- ments. [It is probable that] many American firms began operations in the European market for the first time."* NATIONAL CONTROL OF INTERNATIONAL CORPORATIONS The study identifies three sets of problems "created for national control by the international mobility of business''; these are: Problems created, or allegedly created, by the foreign-owned enterprise for the countries in which investment takes place ; problems created for the country of the parent firm ; and problems created for host countries by the government of the home country. Under the first heading are comjjlaints "that foreign firms do not export enough, that they give preference to suppliers in the home country and hence enlarge imports, that they igTiore local employ- ment practices, that they do not contribute to local charities, that they rob the country of research, that they interfere with national planning." Under the second heading (control problems for the home country) is the allegation that high mobility of these business establishments offers the possibility of escape from both taxation and regulation, including disclosure of operations. Under the heading of inter-governmental problems is the comment that "In order to make its regulations effective in the face of interna- tional mobility ... a country may be tempted to reach out to its firms operating abroad. This involves the unilateral extension of jurisdic- tion into areas of potential conflict with other jurisdictions." COMMERCIAL TRANSFERS OF TECHNOLOGY On the subject of international technological transfer, the study reports : Nati:onal differences in technological skills and knowledge, like national differences in the capital stock available per worker, can provide the basis for profitable specialization and trade. But as in the case of capital, technical knowledge is traversing national boundaries with increasing speed and in increasing volume. The movement of technology is often associated with direct investment abroad; indeed, the rationale for the investment may be special technical knowledge embodied in a patented process or product. But increasing- ly technology moves by itself, disembodied from capital movements. In 1965, for example, residents of the United States earned over $1 billion in royalties and licensing fees (excluding movie royalties), largely earnings on technical know-how, and over $300 million of this was not associated with American direct investment oi)erations abroad. 9|f 3|* #1* r|5 *J* ^P ^^ The extensive trade in technology has two implications : first . . . differences in production possibilities based on technology will gradually disappear over time ; second, countries such as the United States, which have relied extensively on new products for a strong export position, will find it increasingly difficult to do so, since the new techniques of production may move in international trade as easily as the new products themselves.^ lie Richard N. Cooper. "The Economics of Interdependence : Economic Policy in the Atlantic Community. " A volume in the series "The Atlantic Policy Studies". (New York, Published for the Council on Foreign Relations by McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1968), pages 82, 85. 120 Ibid., pages 105-106. 97-400 O - 77 666 One characteristic of multinational corporations with American, participation is that the research and development function cannot easily be decentralized and ", . . most companies carry out the bulk of it in the United States." Coordination of international li&D en- counters differences in product needs and standards of teclinical proficiency, as well as difficulties in communication. One solution has been the use of technical specialists or technical liaison groups who go the coi-porate rounds to keep management, new product develop- ment, and national sales outlets in touch.^^^ One industrial machinery coiporate executive (international operations) described a formal arrangement in his organization to achieve this coordination by means of formalized technical meetings of teclinical executives drawn from his far-flung subsidiaries : One of the major communication devices we have established is an interna- tional engineering conference, which is held every 18 months on an alternating basis here at our home office and at one of our overseas locations. This confer- ence is attended by the managing directors and chief engineers of all our inter- national associates. All of our major manufacturing associates as well as per- sonnel from our engineering department at home office present pai>ers during the week-long conference, outlining product improvements and the results of research and development during the prior 18 months at each of the various locations throughout the world. . . . We make special efforts to ensure that our various operations throughout the world know the research progi'ams that we are working on ; and they, in turn, keep us Informed of the programs that they are working on."* TECHNOLOGICAL OBSTACLES TO U.S. EXPORT TRADE The fact that U.S. industries in "non-high-technology" fields lag behind their European counterparts has several explanations : superior attention in Europe to minor improvements on conventional products and processes, tested routines, established markets, and lower wages. However, European industry has begun a vigorous program in one area of general importance: to harmonize technical standards. The general use of the metric system tends to be restrictive to non-users. Now standards are being adopted in Europe for reliability and (Quality control.^^^ In comment on this situation. Ambassador Carl Gilbert, the President's Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, de- clared : For a country which has long pursued a course of minimal Government inter- vention, exc-ept where public health or safety is involved and the Congress has determined there was no acceptable alternative, the standards systems being developed abroad today will, if we desire to participate and to insure that our own products are not placed at a disadvantage, require in all likelihood new forms of government-industry cooperation and new institutions to act on an international basis."* Similarly, Lawrence C. McQuade, as Assistant Secretary of Com- m.erce, called attention to the role of standards as a form of trade barrier: "21 Michael G. Duerr. "R and D in the Multinational Company: A Survey." (National Industrial Conference Board, 1970), pages 2, 20, 44—5. (Managing International Business, No. 8.) 122 Ibid., page 51. 123 "Competition Comes Home to Haunt Us." Industry Week, (July 6, 1970). page 51. i2< "U.S. Foreign Trade Policies for the 1970's." Speech delivered September 30, 1970, Raleigh, North Carolina. In "The Trade Bill of 1970." Remarks of the Hon. .Tacob Javits on the floor of the Senate. Congressional Record, (October 12, 1970), page S 17684. 667 The Amoriean businessman who has been kept f>nt of a foreign market because his product — quality and performance notwitlistanding — does not meet foreign standards is well aware that standards can he a crucial factor in international trade. Various groups, including the I'anel ou Engineering and Commodity Standards of the Commerce Ttn-hnical Advisory Board (the LtiQue Committee), have suggested that the role of the United States in international .^standardization .should he strengthened. Unlike the other indu.sl rialized countries, tlie United States is not represented ofhcially by government delegates in international standardization organizations. This means that we cannot effectively encourage the international adoption of staiidards which would be more liarnmnious with American technological and industrial ju-actices. Legislation has been proposed to improve this sitmition. An international standardization bill pending in Congress would provide grants to qualified standardization organizations for participation in the international standards process and for information activities.'^ rp:giux.\l oug.vxiz.miox.s fou tkcjixouogy The hypotliesis appears to be tliat U.S. tecliiioloiiical superiority does exist, that it is a uece.ssary cousequeiu-e of I'^.S. concei-u for na- tional security, and that it has alienated European nations. .V])par- ently, ])()wer is ecjnated with lii^h technolojxy rather tlian with profi- ciency in the producti(ni of jihiss, textiles, shoes, and the like. To re- store the vitality of tlie NATO Alliance by dealino: directly with this source of commercial dissatisfaction was the theme of an analysis by the late Ed,;\v. .Suinnier. I'.M'iT. In "" Transnational 'J i ans.iclidns. Teelinolo;.'y and tlie Law : an .\nalysls of Cnricnt 'Lrends.' " Extension of remarks of the Hon. .John IJrademas. Conirressioiial Kecord. (I'ebniary 7, 190S). jiajre 10(ii!4. iji •■Western Alliance Development and Terlmolofrieal Cooperation." International Studios Quarterly, (Deeenilier, I'.MjT, V'olume 11. Niimher 4) \r,\'^c '.','■','.). The article was originally written for the House Heimliliean Committee on X.VTO and the Atlantie Comniunit.v. Furniss was director of the Mershon Center for Education in Xational Security, Ohio State I'niversitv. i-'^EdK:ir S. Furniss, .Tr. •■-\. Xew Task for XATO?" International Studies Quarterly. (Deeenil.ev I'.lfiT. Volume 11. Xu)iil)e)- 4 I. padres :'AT,, :\,A~'2. i^r.S. President (Harry S. Truman). Inau;.'ural address. .Tan. 20. 1040. In l'..S. Conpress. Senate. Committee <^n ForeijiU Kel.itious. Development of teclinicil .assistance programs: Background information and documents. Sulicommittee on Technical .\ssistance Programs (•ursuaiit to S. lies. 214, S;;d Coui.'. Xov. Tl. l!».-i4. S.'ld Coufr. 2d sess., Committee I'rint. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Ollice, 10.j4), pages 0o-o4. 668 had little experience with colonies or undeveloped regions, with lan- guage and cultural barriers, with national economic planning, or with the complex phenomenon of technology transfer. The program went forward on the simplistic notion that the developing countries wanted "American know-how" and that sending U.S. experts abroad would provide it.^-^ One difficulty with the program was that its objectives were seen differently by the various groups involved ; various of its supporters looked for different outcomes. Was it a humanitarian program to raise living standards in poor countries ? Was it intended to effect political stabilization of these regions to halt the spread of communism, under the containment doctrine of the period? Was it to render the political soil less fertile for subversion ? Was it to strengthen with gi\atitude U.S. relations with less- favored nations? Was it to provide assured future sources of essential materials for U.S. industry or possible wartime military requirements? All of these were offered at one time or another during the two years in which the Point IV Program wa^ debated in Congress. When John F. Kennedy came to the Wiite House in 1961, he called for a sweeping review and revision of the program, and the design of a new effort ". . . tailored to meet the needs and resource potential of each individual country instead of a series of individual unrelated projects." He criticized past efforts because "our development goals and projects have not been undertaken as integral steps in a long- range economic development program." "° However, again the goals recognized by the President were to develop lagging economies and technologies, without explicit statement as to why this should be done by the United States, or why the United States was the appropriate instrument for raising the technological/economic level of the unde- veloped world. PRESIDENT NIXON's FOKEIGN POLICY In his special message to the Congress, February 18, 1970, on "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's", President Nixon fur- ther developed the theme of foreign aid and technical assistance. He described the goal of U.S. foreign policy as being the creation of a "durable structure of international relationships which inhibits or removes the causes of war." The^ means would be (a) partnership with all friendly nations, (2) strength to match the strength of any potential aggressor, l)ut coupled with willingness to accept cooperative arrange- ments for the control of arms, and (3) willingness to negotiate differ- ences, toward the building of a durable structure of peaceful relations. His criteria were that the specifics of foreign policy needed to be crea- tive, systematic, based on factual knowledge, selective among alterna- tives, competently responsive to crises while seeking to anticipate them, and — finally — capable of being carried out effectively. American foreign policy [the President declared] must not be merely the result of a series of piecemeal tactical decisions forced by the pressures of ''^ Some of the rleficiencies of this early program are discussed in Chapter Four — "The Point IV Projrram : Technological Transfer as the Basis of Aid to Developing Countries," In "Technical Information for Congress." op. cit.. page 61 sq. ^^0 President ,Tohn F. Kenned.v. "Special message to the Congress on foreign aid." March 22. Ifl61. In Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States. John F. Kennedy. Con- taining the public messages, speeches and statements of the President Jan. 20-Dec. 31, 1969. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1962), page 206. 669 events. If our policy is to embody a coherent vision of the world and a rational conception of America's interests, our specific actions must be the products of rational and deliberate choice. We need a system which forces considera- tion of problems before they become emergencies, which enables us to make our basic determinations of purjMJse before being pressed by events, and to mesh policies.^ "With respect to the Western Hemisphere Nations (emphasized in the message) , the President offered the beginning of a comprehensive program with a substantial technological content. He urged that bi- lateral relations be replaced by a multilateral approach, developed multilaterally. Other points were an increase of trade, eased AID restrictions, establishment of the post of Under Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, the support of regional cooperation, and easing of the burden of debt. "To help turn science to the service of the hemisphere," the President proposed : We will contribute to the support and financing of initiatives in these fields, including research and development, regional training centers, and transfer of technology. We are developing a program for training and orientation of Latin American specialists in the field of scientific and technical inform'ation. The 0[rganization of] A[merican] S[tates] will sponsor a conference next jear on the application of science and technology to Latin America."^ With respect to general foreign assistance, the President again stressed the importance of multilateral rather than bilateral relations, and of the need for the developing countries to take the initiative in charting their own development strategies. He recalled that, Septem- ber 18, in his address to the UN General Assembly he had suggested a number of specific undertakings to that body, many of them, tech- nological in essence. Then he declared : In an era when man possesses the power both to explore the heavens and desolate the earth, science and technology must be marshalled and' shared in the cause of peaceful progress, whatever the political differences among nations. Innumerous and varied fields — the peaceful use of atomic energy, the exploration and uses of outer space, the development of the resources of the ocean and the seabeds, the protection of our environment, the uses of satellites, the development of revolutionary transportation systems — we are working with others to channel .the products of technological progress to the benefit of mankind."^ Within the broader context of national science policy, a presidential advisory task force offered a prescriptive formula, April, 1970, for "International Initiatives Utilizing Science and Technology." The formula involved U.S. leadership in large projects, shared efforts on mutual problems, technical assistance where appropriate, and the building of national capabilities for scientific self-help. Excerpts : — The intrinsic nature of science results in imusual opportunities for inter- national scientific cooperation and assistance. — Some technological enterprises — the space program, for example — offer unusual opportunities for foreign policy and international initiative. — Universal human interests crossing all international boundaries — in agri- culture, health, clean air and water, education, and communications— all suggest similar though more diffuse opportunities. — . . . The Federal Government is presently making insufficient use of our extensive sciemtiflc and technological capabilities as instruments of foreign cooperation and understanding. 131 U.S. President. (Richard Nixon.) "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's, A New Strategy for Peace." A report to the Congress, February 18, 1970. (Mimeograph), pages 3, 11-13. ^ Ibid., pages 33-35. i» Ibid., pages 78, 82-83. 670 — The question of international technology transfer — the delivery and applica- tion of scientific and technological knowledge, methods, and techniques fronL one nation to another — is one which the United States should give very searching consideration in its formulation of a more effective science policy. — . . . It is unlikely that indiscriminate efforts to transfer technology will be effective ; technology, to be useful, must be related properly to local environment and cultural and economic restrictions. — . . . Much greater emphasis must be placed on the transfer of research and development capabilities, rather than of technology itself. — . . . An enlarged program of educational assistance in areas of science and technology should be made an essential element in our foreign aid program."* President Nixon's message on foreign policy for the 1970s made reference to two studies of foreign assistance. One of these, conducted by a task force under the chairmanship of Rudolph A, Peterson, presi- dent of the Bank of America, dealt exclusively with U.S. aid policy. The other, a report by the Commission on International Development, chaired by Lester B. Pearson, former Prime Minister of Canada, was made to the President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and discussed generally what the rich countries and the poor countries ought to do to help the poor countries. REVIEW OF U.S. TECHNICAL AID PROGRAM The Peterson Report, March 4, 1970, told the President that "For the first time in history, it appears feasible to approach this world problem [i.e., international development] on a worldwide basis." The report called for a less prominent and obtrusive role for the United States in extending aid to developing countries. It urged greater partnership with developing countries, with the aided countries carry- ing out more of the strategic planning. It urged repeatedly that bi- lateral assistance should be reduced and multilateral assistance in- creased. The goal should be the achievement by the aided countries of a self-sustaining posture of development. To implement the proposed change in emphasis of the U.S. aid program, the task force recom- mended the establishment of four institutions. These were (1) a U.S. International Development Bank, (2) a U.S. International Develop- ment Institute, (3) the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) which the task force noted had already been authorized by the Congress, and (4) a U.S. International Development Council. The Peterson Report strongly emphasized the funding of aid, and devoted less attention to the functional role of technology in the field of foreign assistance. For example, the International Development Council was proposed to correct an executive deficiency which the task force described as follows : Presidential interests in international development are not adequately served by existing decisionmaking machinery. International development does not re- ceive enough emphasis in the determination of U.S. trade, investment, financial, agricultural, and export-promotion policies. A number of departments and agencies have competing interests and responsibilities in this general area, with the result that too many isisues go to the President for resolution. Furthermore, opportunities to take initiatives in policies toward developing countries are sometimes lost. "* U.S. President's Task Force on Science Policy. "Science and Technology : Tools for Progress." The report of the President's Task Force on Science Policy. April 1970. (Wash- ington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pages 40-42. 671 The significance of technology in diplomatic relations generally^ and with specific reference to the developing countries, has been sub- stantially documented in the present study. Yet, the membership of the proposed Council, as advanced by the Peterson Report, would consist of the Secretaries of State, Treasury and Agriculture, the President's Special Trade Representative, the President of the Export- Import Bank, the Director of the Peace Corps, the President of the (proposed) U.S. Development Bank, the Director of the (proposed) U.S. International Development Institute, and the President of the (pending) Overseas Private Investment Corporation. It does not ap- pear that provision was made for a strong input from the scientific and technological .sectors of the Government and its advisory system. The proposed U.S. International Development Institute would have four principal areas of concern : ( 1 ) research on the population prob- lem; (2) research at home and abroad on problems and teclmologies of development, but emphasizing local institutions in developing coim- tries; (3) training [and strengthening the training function in developing countries] in vocational, commercial, agricultural, indus- trial, scientific, and professional skills; and (4) support of social development. The Institute would concentrate on a limited number of specific problems, it would work principally and increasingly through private channels, and it would seek to develop self-sustaining and continuing programs in its field. In substantiation of the second area, research, the report said : New technologies are urgently needed to provide breakthroughs in a variety of fields essential to broad-based development. They must be adapted to the needs of the developing countries and related to programs and local institutions that can ensure practical applications and evaluation of results. The successful com- bination of the development of new seeds for rice and wheat, and the programs to apply them, are a model. The United States should strongly support similar long- range efforts in agriculture, health, education, and other fields through national, regional, and international projects."^ The report gave some attention to the need for more coherence in aid programs — (Bringing coherence to the work of international development organizations is essential to the success of the new approach to foreign assistance we recommend. The various international institutions do not now make up a system. A wide area of overlapping and sometimes competing responsibility exists. The same is true for the individual programs of the industrial countries. . . . Constructing an effective international system and establishing international development pri- orities in concert with others would do much to advance what must be a global enterprise, (p. 26) However, in seeming contradiction with the above, the report said : The recommended program for reorganizing foreign assistance calls for much smaller field representation than now exists. The [proposed] U.S. International Development Bank and the [proposed] U.S. International Development Institute will need regional representatives and in some cases country representatives, but the principal operating decisions will be made in Washington, (p. 36) A succinct assessment of the Peterson Report, generally favorable, was offered by John Franklin Campbell, formerly staff assistant to the Under Secretary of State. He interpreted the report to signify i3« U.S. President's 'Task Force on International Development. "U.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970's : A New Anproach." Report to the President From the Task Force on Inter- national Development. March 4, 1970. (Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), especially pages 4, 29-30, and 34. (Peterson report.) 672 that ". . . most of the 5,234 U.S. Aid employees abroad [would] come home and that this agency [would] be abolished." Bilateral pro- grams would be administered directly through the economic sections of embassies. In Washington there would be ". . . a modestly staffed development bank and an institute for technical assistance, which would channel most of our future foreign aid through international institutions." This approach, he said, would (a) "remove foreign aid from its cold war context of political expediency," and (b) "prom- ise a more serious aid program which is in accord with the realities of development." ^^^ TJ.N. STUDY OF TECHNICAL, ASSISTANCE In view of the insistence of presidential and presidential advisory sources on multilateral over bilateral approaches to aid, it seems ap- propriate to examine what the Pearson Report, prepared under United Nations or World Bank auspices, recommends for the international uses of technology. Its stated goals were not dissimilar to those ex- pressed in the Peterson Report: "Concern with the needs of other and poorer nations is the expression of a new and fundamental aspect of the modern age — the awareness that we live in a village world, that we belong to a world community." "^ And there was also the underlying uncertainty — ... The acceleration of history, which is largely the result of the bewildering impact of modern technology, has changed the whole concept of national interest. Who can now ask where his country will be in a few decades without asking where the world will be? (p. 9) Wliat needed to be done, therefore, was ". . . to put the less devel- oped countries as soon as possible in a position where they can realize their aspirations with regard to economic progress without relying on foreign aid." (p. 11) The aid and development strategy proposed in the Pearson Report had 10 elements : To create a framework for free and equitable inter- national trade ; to promote mutually beneficial flows of foreign private investment ; to establish a better partnership, a clearer purpose, and a greater coherence in development aid ; to increase the volume of aid ; to meet the problem of mounting debts; to make aid administration more effective ; to redirect technical assistance ; to slow the growth of population; to revitalize aid to education and research; and to strengthen the multilateral aid system, (pp. 14-21) In some of these particulars, the Pearson Report and the Peterson Report stress the same points, such as the need for more organiza- tional coherence. However, not all the effects of the existing profusion of agencies were adverse. "The emergence of consortia, consultative groups, and the multilateral procedures of the Alliance for Progress serve very considerably to increase the effectiveness of aid by making it possible for donors, whether bilateral or multilateral, to help recip- ients develop policies more likely to promote self-sustaining growth." (p. 129) J^John Franklin Campbell. "What Is to Be Done?" Foreign Affairs, (October, 1970), ^ Commission on International Development. "Partners in Development." Report of tha Commission on International Development. (New York, Praeger Publishers, 1969), page 8. (Pearson report.) 673 The Pea|:^on Report takes a realistic view of the deficiencies of mul- tinational agencies and programs. There were reasons, it noted, why nearly 90 percent of official development assistance (in 1967) was bilat- eral. Apart from historical colonial relationships, bilateral aid was often more efficient. Personnel recruitment was less of a problem. Bi- lateral programs could be more flexible and experimental in their pro- cedures. They could encompass a wider scope of responses to real need. There were also important political considerations : Most countries will usually feel that at least some multilateral agencies are unduly dominated by the 'wrong' countries, whether aid-givers or recipients ; or that they are following erroneous aid philosophies, either too hard or too soft, too interventionist, or too lax ; or that they are simply badly run and that their procedures are slow and expensive, (p. 209) Reasons in favor of multilateral aid were also set forth. It reduced any overtones of charity or interv^entionism. It helped provide a frame- work within which bilateral aid to whole nations could be better inte- grated into a total program. It would reduce unequal geographical preferences in aid distribution. It would stunulate regional integra- tion among developing countries. It would pave the way for interna- tional centers of documentation, advice, and guidance, (pp. 213-214) The Pearson Report emphasized the need for assistance programs to be controlled and developed within and by the receiving nation. Too often, such programs tended to be an extension of the thought and culture of the donor country. Sometimes a program developed a "life of its own, little related either in donor or recipient countries to national or global development objectives." In particular, the Re- port recommended that : (1) specialists and planners in developing countries consult regularly to de- termine their priority needs for advisory services, institution building, project aid, and the operation of educational and other public services, and (2) develop- ing countries program technical assistance requirements by spelling out the sequence of operations, the performance objectives of the i)ersonnel and of the training schemes, the cost of each stage, and their own commitments to institu- tional and structural change, (p. 183) It was also important that technical assistance be used to facilitate the transfer of technology and management. To this end, it was recom- mended "that international technical assistance be strengthened by the creation of national and international corps of technical assistance personnel with adequate career opportunities." (p. 185) PRESIDENTIAL POLICY FOR FUTURE TECHNICAL AID The President acted on the Peterson Report in a message to Con- gress, September 15, 1970, on "Foreign Assistance for the 'Seventies.' " In it he accepted virtually in full the report's recommendations. With respect to the proposed U.S. International Development Institute, he announced : I shall propose establishment [of the Institute! which will bring U.S. science and technology to bear on the problems of development. The Institute will fill a major gap in the international development network. It will match our vast talents in science and technology with institutions and problems abroad. Research has created the basis for the Green Revolution — the major breakthrough in agricultural production — ^but continued, progress in the 1970's will require the lower income countries to deal with more, and more com- plex, problems. The Institute will concentrate on selected areas and focus U.S. 674 technology on critical problems. This requires flexibility, imagination and a minimum of red tape. If we can provide this Institute with the operational flexi- bility enjoyed by our private foundations, we can make a major contribution to the lower income countries at modest exi)ense. An Institute, so organized, could — 'Concentrate U.S. scientific and technological talent on the problems of develoipment. — Help to develop research competence in the lower income countries themselves. — Help develop in^itutional competence of governments to plan and manage their own development programs. — ^Support expanded research programs in population. — ^Help finance the programs of U.S.-sponsored Schools, hospitals, and other institutions abroad. — Carry out a cooperative program of technical exchange and reimbursable technical services with those developing countries that do not require finan- cial assistance. — Cooperate in social development and training programs. — Administer our technical assistance programs. — Permit greater reliance On private organizations and researchers.^ One innovation proposed by the President that had not been in the Peterson Report was the suggestion that : As a long-run contribution to the funding of development, the U.S. wiU seek the utilization of revenues derived from the economic resources of the seabed for development asssistance to lower income countries. I have recently proposed that all nations enter into a treaty to establish an international regime for the ex- ploitation of these vast resources, and that royalties derived therefrom be uti- lized principally for providing economic assistance to developing countries parties ipating in the treaty.^'' Assertedly, the new foreign assistance institutions which are pro- posed to replace the existing AID structure, would also coordinate the funding activities of the various overseas credit institutions supported by the United States. These new institutions would also relate to the assistance operations of the United Nations, and to its lending opera- tions. And, in addition, the evolution of regional institutions (such as .the 'Central American Common Market, the Alliance for Progress, etc.) and regional credit institutions (Central American Bank for Economic Integration, Caribbean Development Bank, Andean Devel- opment Corporation, Inter- American Development Bank, Asian De- velopment Bank, etc.), implies the eventual need for a relationship with U.S. institutions for foreign assistance. It se-ems like a heavy burden of policy planning, for the same agency to administer three sets of relationships, toward three sets of national, regional, and global objectives. SOME FUTURE PROBLEMS IN TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE The issue of multilateral versus bilateral aid is complicated by a practical political consideration. Some of the objectives ascribed to the early Truman program, still persuasive for some groups, are largely incompatible with the patterns of cooperation essential in a multi- lateral program. A multinational program of assistance is likely to find few friends and fewer sponsors. It may be easier to win political sup- 138 U.S. President (Richard Nixon.) "Foreign Assistance for the Seventies: The Presi- dent's Message to the Congress Proposing Reform of the United States Foreign Assistance Program." September 15, 1970. WeelJly Compilation of Presidential Documents, (September 21. 1970), pages 1220-21. ^ Ibid, page 1224. 675 port for foreign assistance, no matter how strongly supported by theoretical or policy considerations, if the U.S. electorate can identify directly the relationship with the recipient. And finally, the problem remains unsolved of how to assess the im- pacts of present and future technology at all these different levels, in relation to the various sets of national and international objectives. The United States is only beginning to appreciate the difficulty of as- sessing technology domestically. The task is recognized as one of trans- cendent difficulty. The power of teclinology to alter the human ' con- dition, so evident in the United States, can be equally potent on the world scene. Effects of technology can be favorable or adverse. Com- binations of technological effects can operate synergistically toward good or bad results. The many nations of the world differ widely in their sophistication, their grasp of these considerations. How far the United States should go in exercising leadership, globally, in the in- ternational transfer of technology, and in the effort to separate good from bad technology, in view of all the other elements of this great catscradle must remain an open question. V. The Emerging Policy Issues of International Technology Preceding sections of this chapter explored the evolution of tech- nology as the dominant factor of change that has shaped the modern world. Its effects have been shown to be both beneficial and injurious. The point has been made that technology is the most obvious avenue to national strength and international influence. Technology has also been shown to be a potent force, linking the world together by many threads. Technology itself has an evident propensity to "go global." The United States, by virtue of tremendous vigor and public ex- penditure for the past two decades, currently enjoys a commanding technological lead among the nations of the world. As Herman Pollack has said : Our preeminence in science and technology is now one of the pillars of U.S. strength and image abroad. The attraction generated by this preeminence among the nations of the world, especially those in the process of development, is perhaps one of the lesser understood buit more i)ervasively powerful forces at work in international relationships today.^^ He added that "If we are wise and imaginative and vigorous, these forces can be turned to our advantage in support of our foreign policy objectives and our hopes for a stable and peaceful world." The emerging question posed by the onrush of technology, and its effect on the relations among the countries of the world, is whether this potent factor of change and national power is to operate in a random way, or whether it is possible, and desirable, to devise a na- tional strategy to guide and direct it, to stimulate imiovation in some directions, and possibly to slow and inhibit innovation in others. The Issue of NalMonal Strategy in Technological Innovation In a recent article in Science, Professor Robert Gilpin, of the Center of International Studies, Princeton University, identifies three major 1*0 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. "1970 National Science Foundation Authorization." Hearings before the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the . . . on H.R. 4283. March 17. 18. 20, 24. 25. 26, 27, 28 ; April 1, 1969. 91st Congress, first session. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), page 488, 676 interrelated economic consequences of modern technology. The first is the "increased interdependence among national economies and the consequent greater sensitivity of foreign trade to changes in economic conditions." The second is the "enhanced role of technological inno- vation in economic growth and competition." The third is the rapid spread of multinational corporations, primarily dominated by Amer- ican capital. He suggests that a "new international economy" is devel- oping, under the stimulus of technology. There are, Gilpin's argument continues, three alternative national strategies in response to this development: (1) "to support scientific and technological development across the broadest front possible;" (2) scientific and technological specialization; and (3) the importa- tion of foreign technology. The United States and the Soviet Union have followed the first strategy ; Sweden, Great Britain, and a number of other countries have followed the second ; while Japan and West Germany have in general followed the third. Although the U.S. strat- egy has been relatively successful, particularly in fields of high tech- nolo^ like space and the computer, it has begun to show defects, and, in Gilpin's opinion, "the direction of America's technological strategy will become an increasingly important political issue." In the first place, even America does not have the economic and technical re- sources to support all projects of importance ; it too must choose. Second, a high proportion of the limited resources has gone into military and military-related projects, while pressing social and economic needs of the society have been neglected. Third, the devastating consequence of technological advance for the environment has suddenly emerged as a major national concern. . . . Accordingly, thought might be given ". . . to the formulation of a more explicit technological strategy designed to increase the social return of its immense investment in science and teclmology and to minimize its negative environmental effects." Gilpin concludes with a prediction that : ... To a degree perhaps unparalleled in the past, economic and technological considerations will shape the ways in which political interests and conflicts seek their expression and work themselves out. In a world where nuclear weaponry has inhibited the use of military power and where social and economic demands play an inordinate role in political life, the choice, success, or failure of a na- tion's technological strategy will influence in large measure its place in the international pecking order and its capacity to solve its domestic problems.^" In Riesman's book, "The Lonely Crowd," he develops a theory of a society divided into persons characterized as "Inner-Directed" and "Other-Directed." If nations were so categorized, in aspects of their behavior, it might be said that in the field of technology the United States to a considerable degree is "Other-Directed." The great efforts of the United States in science and technology — since 1940, at least — were inspired by external events. The Manhattan Project was initiated from fear that Nazi Germany might achieve nuclear power first. Work on the H-bomb was impelled by the conviction that it was necessary to beat the Russians to it. The Polaris ballistic misstte submarine was a response to the Soviet missile threat. The whole first decade of the space race was an effort to catch and pass the Soviets in an area in which they had assumed a lead. The great technological programs 1*1 Robert Gilpin. "Technological Strategies and National Purpose." Science, (July 31, 1970, volume 169), pp. 441-2. 677 supported by the United States are still in military, atomic, and space developments, and all are motivated by events outside the United States or else support for them wanes. Professor Harvey Brooks of Harvard declares that national defense is too often used as justification for doing what is needed to be done for the good of American society. It was a "convenient route for doing the things that needed to be done without the necessity of engineering the large scale democratic consensus that would have been necessary had the same things been done under civilian auspices." For example, "We backed into federal support of higher education while stoutly insisting that we were only buying necessary military research results. We entered upon school curriculum reform, long overdue, on the grounds that it was needed to make our engineers and scientists better than their Soviet counterparts. We laimched a gigantic interstate highway program on the grounds that it was needed for national defense. We fostered the study of international affairs and the development of foreign area research on the grounds that a great power needed this knowledge to maintain its power position.^*^ It seems paradoxical that the United States, best equipped to apply science and technology to the solution of man's global problems, and credited with the highest development of managerial skills, has been reluctant to devise and implement a positive technological strategy of its own. There would seem to be no lack of opportimities : earth re- sources satellites, ocean and ocean floor development, urban improve- ment, recovery of resources from all forms of waste, the Oak Ridge pro- posal for large agricultural-industrial-nuclear complexes, and many more. One of the consequences of this "Other-Directed" syndrome in na- tional technological strategy is that the United States has concentrated its efforts on technologies characteristically remote from everyday experience. It has supported the laser but not the science of processing garbage. There are lags in the technological levels of a number of in- dustries in the United States; such lags may in time impair the credibility of the U.S. posture of world technological leadership. On this point, one issue of U.S. technological strategy would seem to be a conscious set of decisions as to the domestic technological gaps to be closed or ignored. Wliat older technologies might be revitalized by an infusion of fresh technological effort, such as the railroads, glass and ceramics, coal, lumber, and textiles? "What would be the diplomatic consequences of a vigorous technological effort in one, several, or all of these fields ? And more generally, how strong or superior should the United States aspire to be in technology ? It has been shown repeatedly in the recent past that enormous outlays of public funds by the United States to support a new field of research brought only a short-lived technological advantage that quickly disappeared. Other nations came into the act and duplicated the U.S. successes, wliile avoiding the fail- ures and blind alleys that are an inescapable part of pioneering. Clearly, there are added costs as well as benefits in the hard-earned role of technological leader. The various fields of science and technology may offer their own version of national "comparative advantage" such 1*^ Harvey Brooks. "Appendix E. Impact of the Defense Establishment on Science and Education, October 1970." In U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics. "National Science Policy, H. Con. Res. 666." Hearings before the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development of the . . . 91st Cong. 2d sess. July, August, September, 1970. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), page 962i. 678 that specialization may be of mutual benefit within the community of nations. But to exploit in the field of technology tliis long-established economic principle would require a conscious decision to abjure lead- ership in favor of an international partnership in technological progress. Finally, what are the policy resources the United States can bring to bear on these issues of national strategy in technology? U.S. efforts have been concentrated in fields of high technology in a reaction against external threats; the result has been to assemble large organi- zations in the fields of military, space, and atomic teclinologies. That these fields continue to be important is not questioned. But in the de- sign of a total national strategy of technology, the effect of their being already on the scene in great numbers is to provide pressures for the United States to keep on doing what it has been doing. Where can objective analysis and innovative policy be found that can examine alternatives or additions to the national program ? The Issues of Global Strategy in Technological Inncn^ation Examination of the history of a number of fields of technology has demonstrated the tendency for technology to cross national boundaries, to generate problems involving many nations, to offer opportunities for general global benefit, and to effect profound changes in the world scene for better or worse. Perhaps the most significant fact about tech- nology is this force for interdependence among nations. Tlie philosopher, Kant, proposed the "Categorical Imperative," an ethical principle to govern human behaAdor. It postulated that man should "Act as if the maxim from which you act were to become tlirough your will a universal law." In other words, one should inquire of his actions as to what the effect would be if everybody did them. Perhaps the same principle warrants examination as applied to nations. Are there some general principles governing the develop- ment, application, and sharing of technology that should be incor- porated in a Technology Treaty ? Reference has been made to the growing cost and scope of some fields or projects of technology : exploration of space, weather modifica- tion, global resource surveys, and the like are examples. T\Tien projects of this sort are not only costly but also inherently affect many nations, would it be feasible to mobilize all interested nations in a joint en- deavor ? For example, throughout all the literature on foreign assist- ance runs the theme of the population explosion and what to do about it. Examination of this problem would be a major function of the U.S. International Development Institute the Peterson Report recom- mended and the President has proposed to the Congress. The food/ population balance and the threat of widespread starvation are pre- dicted to become a major crisis of the late 1970s. A global strategy mobilizing the teclmological resources of many nations, with general funding support, and a central coordinating administration might serve beyond the capabilities of any single nation to achieve a goal or aA'ert a catrastrophe. Can the United Nations be used as an institu- tion to devise a global strategy in the application of technology for the betterment of all mankind ? The President has suggested the use 679 of the resources of the seabed to finance U.N. programs of teclinological aid. Should this concept be expanded ? Many criticisms have been directed at the multiplicity of loosely affiliated agencies under the umbrella of the United Nations. An obvious issue is whether management principles applied in such tightly and effectively organized agencies as AEC and NASA could be transferred to international application. It is axiomatic, for example, that an institution with a diffused structure requires tight policy con- trol at the top, supported by an abimdant and accurate flow of in- formation from all its elements. Policy decisions require information about the organization itself, its persomiel, projects and results ; and about the status, needs, and future prospects of the areas it serves. At the same time, the access of the public to this same information enables a closer understanding of the problems and opportunities of the or- ganization and a means for improving its performance through gen- eral review and criticism. How well has the congeries of U.N. agen- cies performed in this respect ? If the United States is indeed technologically "Other-Directed", the same can probably also be said of the Soviet Union. To the extent that this is true of both countries, there are repeated pressures on both to "catch up" in some field of technology in which the other has scored an advance. Under these conditions, the more joint programs of technology in which both countries can participate, the less of this pressure is generated and the more progress with less effort toward shared goals. Some evidence of this technological teamwork already exists with respect to the exchange of meteorological information, and there have been discussions as to the possibility of a joint program of cancer research. However, it is not evident that there is any particular merit in maintaining such teamwork efforts on a bilateral basis. The possibility is open for the United States and the Soviet Union to provide joint leadership within the United Nations system to mount global projects in some directions. Who in the Federal Government is currently responsible for thinking up innovative possibilities for further cooperation along these lines ? It is a truism that the nation coming last to exploitation of a tech- nology achieves the highest level of efficiency and the highest sophis- tication of design. What use is made of this principle in the extending of technical assistance to developing countries? Moreover, is there opportunity for a general feedback of technological information from countries with advanced technologies to those with lagging tech- nologies ? Lags occur when a technology involves heavy initial outlay and commits an industry to a pattern of capital equipment that is superseded elsewhere. This happened in the steel industry in the United States when Ij-D oxygen converters went into use abroad. It happened in the glass industry with the development of float glass. When a large industry is confronted with this situation, it has the alternatives of seeing its markets dwindle as it fails in competition, or of gathering resources to replace its outmoded equipment. Looked at from a global perspective, this is an inefficient and costly arrangement. Before World War II, it was widely resolved by the emergence of interna- tional cartels that allocated markets and fixed prices. The emergence of the multinational corporation suggests that a similar accommoda- 680 tion may be in prospect for the future. What alternative solutions are there, and is this an appropriate subject for study within the United Nations ? The Ultimate Issue: Reconciling National and Global TecJmological Advance Technology emerges as a powerful force — perhaps the most power- ful of all forces — for change in the modem world. Excellence in tech- nolo^ serves to establish a new measure of a nation's leadership withm the community of nations. At the same time, it affords a means by which all nations can progress toward their own internal goals of reducing human hardship and enlarging human opportunity^. How are these two effects of technology to be reconciled ? Wliat policies and what compromises are suggested for the United States, to optimise the benefits and minimize the adverse effects of technology within the United States and globally ? There is no mistaking the potencj of nationalism as a spur to action. It ranks with personal gain, religious devotion, and ideological com- mitment, as human motivations compelling man to achieve and surpass. No comparable sentiment exists to unite or mobilize to action the nations of the world and their peoples. Participation in international technological efforts and programs may be, as the President and others have said, a necessary course for the achievement of peace and progress. Moreover, as the President has also said, "Peace and progress are impossible without a major American role." The appropriate motivation has also been suggested by the President : "If our policy is to embody a coherent vision of the world and a rational conception of America's interests, our specific actions must be the products of rational and deliberate choice." Chapter 10— The Politics of Global Health 97-400 n - T! CONTENTS Page I. Introduction 685 Scope and Limitations of the Study 685 The Evolution of Preventive Medicine 687 Historical Overview of World Healtli Cooperation 688 Early Efforts Toward International Collaboration G91 Establishment of a Permanent Quarantine Office 692 The First International Health Organization 693 The League of Nations Health Organization 694 II. The World Health Organization 696 Constitutionnl Foundations of the World Health Organization — 696 Organization and Structure of WHO 698 WHO'S Epidemiological Intelligence Network 702 The Network Organization and its Activities 702 Current Problems of Epidemic Control 703 U.S. Involvement in Epidemiological Problems 704 Recent Evaluations of the World Health Organization 706 Politics and Diplomacy in the World Health Organization 709 WHO'h Intent To Be Xon-Pohtical 709 U.S. Membership: The First Big Test 709 The Test of Soviet Bloc Withdrawals 710 Return of the USSR and Eastern European States 712 The China Question Considered Political 712 Consensus Versus Regulation on Pharmaceutical Questions.- 713 Political Proltlems Outside of the World Health Organization — 715 The Development of Political Blocs Outside of WHO 715 Political Problems in the Eastern Mediterranean Region 717 Some Difficulties in Achieving and Sustaining International Cooperation in Health Through WHO 720 Persistent Tendency To Neglect Health as an International Goal- 722 Cost of U.S. Participation in the World Health Organization 723 Some Aspects of U.S. Support of the WHO Budget 724 The Impact of Development Studies of WHO 726 Total Cost of WHO Activities and Total U.S. Contribution— 728 III. U.S. Agencies Supporting International Health Programs 729 International Health Activities of the Department of State 729 AID'S International Health Activities 730 Trends in the Level of Support for AID'a Health Activities- 731 AID Health Technicians 732 Continuing Resources of AID 733 Recapitulation of A/D Activities 733 International Activities of the Department of Health, Educa- tion, and Welfare 734 Overseas Units of the National Institutes of Heath 734 The Fogarty International Center 73.j The Rise and Decline of PHS and NIH Grants in Inter- national Health 736 Role of HEW in Multilateral Project Support 737 Failure of Bill To Support International Health Training-- 738 Recapitulation of HEW Activities 739 International Health Activities of the Department of Defen.'je.. 739 Overseas Offices of the Department of Defense 740 DOD Medical Research Laboratories Overseas 741 (683) 684 Page IV. International Health Organizations and the U.S. Congress 7J3 The Problem of U.S. Funding of World Health Programs 743 In the Senate 745 In the House of Representatives 747 Recapitulation of U.S. Legislative Problem 748 Cost/Benefit Analysis as a Possible Solution 748 Some Examples of Approaches to Cost/Benefit Analysis in Health Programs 749 The Complex Issue of Health and Overpopulation 751 Policy Issues of World Health — A Summary 754 U.S. Benefits from Increased Investment in World Health 755 V. Summary, Conclusions, and Comments 756 TABLES 1. Recent Evolution of the WHO Budget and U.S. Assessments 725 2. Source and Amount of Total Funds Administered by WHO, Including Total U.S. Contributions (1968) 728 3. AID Dollars Contribution and Withdrawals for Country Use of Coun- terpart Funds and U.S. Owned Local Currency, 1956-65 732 4. AID Technical Cooperation Projects in Fiscal Year 1969 by Field of Activity 732 5. XIH Special Foreign Currency Program 736 6. Biomedical Research and Training Grants or Contracts Awarded by NIH to Institutions in Foreign Countries and to International Orga- nizations, Fiscal Year 1969 737 7. PHS Research and Training Grants and Contract Support to W^orld Health Organization, Pan American Health Organization, and Insti- tute of Nutrition of Central America and Panama 738 8. DOD Contracts and Grants for Medical Research Performed in For- eign Countries (Fiscal Year 1969) . 741 9. DOD Medical Research Laboratories Overseas S _ 741 10. Contributions to International Organizations 744 11. Voluntary Contributions to Multilateral Organizations and Programs — 744 FIGURES 1. WHO Regional Offices and the Areas They Serve 700 2. Network of Epidemiological Radio-Telegraphic Communications 701 CHAPTER 10— THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL HEALTH I. In'TRODUCTTOX The purpose of this study on the politics of global health is to open up the subject of international health to greater visibility. The degree of freedom from epidemic disease enjoyed by Americans is the result of many steps taken by physicians and statesmen over many decades, toward improving global health conditions. The American people contribute to a large variety of vitally es- sential but unglamorous programs with health benefits in small trop- ical villages and thriving modern cities all over the world. The un- publicized programs of worldwide disease surveillance and health assistance are supported by the commitments of the U.S. Government to the AVorld Health Organization and the Parf American Health Or- ganization. There is little awareness as to why or how these oriianiza- tions came into existence, what tliey have achieved, or what they are supposed to accomplish. The closest voluntary involvement of the public is with T'XICEF, the United Nations Children's Fund, many of whose activities are worked out with the advice and assistance of the "World Health Organization wliich. like T'^NICEF, is a specialized agency of the United Xations. Benefits from these programs accrue not only to the less developed countries of the world but also to the highly urbanized industrial nations. The benefits are likely to be greatly in excess of the costs, but little evidence has been offered to show this. Scope and .LimHations of the Sfiidy The study describes the origin of early international agree- ments for control of epidemic disease, up to the broader and more comprehensive constitutional machinery under which international health experts now operate. Questions are raised about how pur- poseful the world's governments were, over the years, in establish- ing conventions to control the spread of disease ; the extent to which national sovereignty yielded to international health imperatives: the use of health airreements in foreign policy objectives; and whethor health technology remains an appropriate area of exploitation for national interests. In formulating the elements of diplomatic policy having to do with world medicine and improved conditions of public "health, national leaders have historically been strongly influenced by such other consid- erations as trade advantage, national prestige, and the quest for profits abroad. Althou2:h commanding high respect and priority as a nolitical and economic force within most nations, public health and medicine have yet to become an attractive base to srlamorize institutional re- form of the relations among nation states. The question persists : "Wliy a concern so important to all mankind — personal and public health — has not become a more effectn-e. comprehensive, and dynamic focus of inten^.ntional cooyyeration. Note : This chapter was prepared in 1971 by Freeman H. Quinsy. (685) 686 Other questions emerge about present perspectives on the implica- tions of global health : About the practical necessity of a healthy world in order to safeguard health in the United States, and about the possibility that health programs for the "world village" may be o:rossly undercapitalized as compared with growing demands for individual health care in the United States. Indeed, there are striking differences between the emphasis of international health agencies on highly cost-effective, preventive medical care and the curative emphasis of U.S. medicine, which only an affluent society can afford — if even such a society can. Another interpretatic^n available from the data and trends presented in the study is that public health and preventive medicine may have already played their major role in histoiy, and that the future solution to health problems lies in the character of the curative-oriented Ameri- can medical enterprise and its emulation by other countries around the Avorld. It may be that the international health machinery for which there were such high hopes twenty-five years ago has run its course, that a technolog;\' with predictable but unexciting results has failed to enlist world support, and that the apathy surrounding international health activities in both political and medical circles will reduce further the lonely concern with which only a relatively fcAv com]>etent Ameriraji scientists and statesmen are now engaged. The study deals with an immensely complex subject. It is a piece- meal attempt to provide an adequate picture of the situations and changes in U.S. involvement in global health institutions. The ap- proach is to select and deal in some depth with several elenionts crucial to underetanding and policy, rather than to provide a cursory overall treatment of the subject. The elements selected include: — The historical perspective of international health conventions; — The objective and functions of international health organizations; — The ability of international health institutions to function effec- tively under cold war conditions ; — The cost of U.S. participation in international health organiza- tions ; — The activities and trends of U.S. Federal agencies in overseas biomedical work; and — The links and barriers between congressional committees and the Federal agencies responsible for the administration of U.S. com- mitments to international health organizations. In the effort, to concentrate research effort on activities of the highest current concern, in which the decisions of the U.S. Congress could be most decisive, many fields of global medicine were glossed over or virtually ignored. The global network of industrial corporations and international corporations dealing in drugs and medical supplies was not considered. Little space was given to the health activities of the Communist World, or to bilateral arrangements of the Soviet Union with aided countries. The various programs of imperial countries to extend health services to their colonies, or former colonies, and the various "World War II health programs by the United States over much of the world were not researched, although in particular areas they may well have been of decisive importance. In short, the study is largely future-oriented : being concerned with those kinds of inter- national health activity judged of high cost/effectiveness, and with 687 an appropriate claim to the attention of congressional decisionmakers at the present time. The Evolution of Preventive Medicine Xothing is more international than disease. It recognjzes no political boundaries and few natural ones. It moves freely across national frontiers and spreads as conditions permit from one area to another. The picture usually drawn is that of great pestilences moving from backward regions to the more modern countries. But disease can also go the other way, as shown in numerous accounts of aboriginal popu- lations' becoming infected by the customary diseases of tlie missionary, trader, explorer, and traveler. If one extends the problem to include the diseases of plants and animals, there is little doubt today that pathogenic organisms themselves are either already globally distrib- uted or can rather rapidly become so. However, large numbers of these organisms, and the diseases which they cause, remain largely seques- tered in regions Avhere unsanitary conditions and certain insect vectors prevail. These conditions are the reasons for tlie generally endemic nature of such diseases as cholera, malaria, and plague in the less developed countries. Preventive medicine, like disease, is inherently international. Had there not been the problem of preventing the entrance of disease from one country to another and of controlling the spread of disease v.ithin countries, preventive medicine would not have developed as early as it did. Public outcry demanded that corrective measures be taken against recun-ing epidemics based upon the observed- association be- tween polluted water and disease. Thus was born the first phase of preventive medicine — sanitary engineering and public hygiene. Historically, the origin of this phase is marked by legislative Acts in England like the Great Keform Bill of 18S2, the Metropolis Water Act of 1852, and the Public Health Act of 1875. In England, at least, the origin of preventive medicine and its early institutionalization as a public health service was essentially a layman's movement. The scientific or experimental phase of preventive medicine, which both overlapped and followed the sanitation movement, provided the factual foundation upon Avhich sanitary water and sewage disposal remain in their pt^sent practice. It also provided a foundation for more intelligent decisions regarding the limitations of sanitation, and on whether or not to quarantine and for how^ long. A ^ast array of vaccines and other measures for the prevention and control of com- municable disease evolved. This experimental phase of preventive medicine can be called the era of bacteriolog;\\ Although as a discipline it goes well beyond bacteriology, the early classical discoveries vrhich revolutionized the nnders<-an(linss the political and ideological gulfs that divide mankind. Health is something that all nations desire, and no nation by the process of gaining it takes it away from another. There is not a limited supply of health for which nations must compete. Rather, every nation by promoting its own health adds to the better health of other nations, just, as by assisting in the public health efforts of other nations it protects itself.^ ^ Rprip Diibns. "Mnn Adapting. " CNew Havpr. Talp TTn1vpr<;ltT Pfpss. If>fi5), pagps !?37-.9. spanl F. Russell. "Intprnatinnal Preventive MedJcine." The Scientific Monthlv (Decem- ber R. 1950). pages 39S-4. » Austin T. Kerr, e<1. "Bulldlne the Health Bridpe : Selection from the Works of Fred L. Soper, M.D." (Bloomington. Indiana I'niversity Presp. 19701. faceplate. 689 And as Rutli Masters stated two years later : Today there are few spheres of governmental activity in which states so readily agree to pool experience, to render each other assistance, to harmonize their administrative practices, and to share their knowledge freely, as in that of public health/ But even in public health, today's level of international coopera- tion was not easily achieved nor is it easily sustained. Historically, the cycles of pestilence were accepted as a fact of life. There was a series of di^ase invasions beginning with the Christian era, running on through the fall of Rome, and climaxing in the Black Death of the fourteenth century. Most of this was probably plague, but typhus came into the early picture too and it is now known that "more cru- saders were slaughtered by typhus and plague at the gates of Antioch and Jerusalem than by the infidel." Much laiter it was thought in the developed countries that the scourges of plague and cholera could be kept awuy by sanitary practices at home. The fact is, however, that many infectious diseases can threaten advanced countries. It was not cholera or plague which took the lives of twenty million people in 1918-1919, but rather a particularly virulent strain of influenza in pandemic — twice the number of casualties produced by World War I itself. These casualties occurred in the developed world where death re<5ords were kept; uncounted additional deaths occurred elsewhere." In the early deliberations (1850-1900) of nations on public health there occurred the )iow well-known phenomenon of scientific dispute. The paucity and uncertainty of scientific knowledge about health and medicine left much room for debate, and the doctors could more easily align themselves with views held vital to the national interest- of their countries. The quarrel between French and British doctors about how to control the spread of international disease was intensified and em- bittered by traditional Anglo-French political rivalry. The German members of the International Sanitary Council of Constantinople made decisions of little consequence to disease but calculated to expand the political dominance of Germany in one instance and to weaken British commercial dominance in the other.^ According to Masters, Turkey rarely observed sanitary rules, holding that the whole system was a tool of imperialist power politics rather than a system for the protection of Europe against epidemic invasions.^ British physicians, even with French scientists ridiculing their logic, had little difficulty in supporting British foreign shipping interests by downgrading the importance of quarantine restrictions. The "medical plank" which most of the British doctors were sup- porting is described in the 1849 British Report on Quarantine, which concluded "that the only real security against epidemic disease is an abundant and constant supply of pure air * * * and that ventilation «Ruth D. Masters. "International Organization in the Field of Public Health," (Wash- ington, D.C., 1947). page 2. ^^. ^ sihld., p .^1. Onlv recently, as the instrnmentR of war have reache'' the capacity of high kill, have their (toll In casualties exceeded that of disease. Not until World War II did more soldiers die from bullets than from disease. As for the great World War I Influenza i^n- demic, it must be stated in all fairness that the deaths were low compared with the 700,- 000.000 people who came down with the disease. There were hardly that many soldiers or civilians exposed to bullets, gas. or any other deliberate weaponry. So, while the deaths were relatively low, the casualties were enormoun. Then as now the primary enemies of man were diBeaf^e and disease-producing organisms. •Ihld., page .S8. ' Ibid., pages 7-8. 690 and dispersion can dissipate any contagion." ^ This notion continued for at least another 30 years, as can be seen in the Governor of Ber- muda's 1878 report on "Climate and Public Health": It is singular that with such a summer atmosphere, and with a considerable portion of its surface occupied by un- drained marshes, the exhalations from which must neces- sarily be more or less prejudicial, Bermuda should have no local summer fevers, such as prevail at Malta and at Gibral- tar. This immunity from local disease may probably be due to the small extent of land surface, and its distribution in long narrow bands separated by arms of the sea and raised but slightly above its surface, so that the whole area of each island is frequently swept by the sea breeze which carries away with it every unwholesome emanation.^ And in the same year from the report from Penang : The gaol was at the moment of outbreak overcrowded, and the probable cause of the outbreak [cholera] was the admis- sion of an incipient case of the disease into an atmosphere rendered, through overcrowding, suitable for its generation and rapid dissemination.^" An even more disturbing note of the times was that the medical men were seemingly trjang to get out of the argument altogether : In England the conviction that quarantines are ineffective against epidemics has advanced with greater decision and rapidity among non-professional persons engaged in com- mercial and public life than among medical men. It is not a technical question, but one of evidence, on which a person capable of observation is as competent a judge as any physician.^^ This state of ignorance and fear, of political and economic domi- nance, of unilateral 40-day quarantine periods based upon arbitrary grounds, of resentment by the Moslem States that their coimtries were regarded as less than clean, of medical argument instead of experi- mentation, and of an extraordinary pursuit of national interests at the risk of national and global health, dominated the picture of inter- national discussion of communicable disease during the entire second half of the nineteenth century. 8 Ibid., page 37. * "Papers Relating to Her Majesty's Colonial Possessions, Reports for 1876 and 1877. Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Comni:mf! of Her Majesty" (London, George E. Eyre and William Spotteswoode, Printers, August 1878), page 25. 1" Ibid., page 327. The treatment for this disease was worse than ideas on its transmis- sion : "Thirty-three cases, of which 27 were fatal, were treated by hypodermic injections of chloral hydrate; 6, of which 4 were fatal, with camphor : and 36, of which Tt were fatal, by inhalation of sulphur fumes • * * tliis treatment was supplemented by half drachm doses of dilute sulphuric acid, and a plentiful supply of iced water to drink" (pages 327- 328) The treatment did not have to be this way. In a brilliant monograph published by Dr. William P.rooke O Shauglinessy in The Lancet in May 1R.''.2, an effective fluid therapy for sufferers of cholera was described. It was similar to that used today. The thesis was lost for over a century. However, Dr. O'Shaughnessy could not even apply it at the time to London where cholera was devastating the city. He had been educated in Edinburgh and moved to Lundnn. He was not jiermitted to practice medicine within seven miles of the city because he did not have a license from the Royal College of Physicians". (See Abel Wolman. "The Unreasonable Man", Second WHO/PAHO Lecture of Biomedical Sciences, Pan Ameri- can Health Organization, 1867, page 1,4.) " Masters, op. cit., page 37. 691 Early Efforts Toward International Collaboration It is to the credit of diplomacy in international action under these circumstances that the nations sought a constructive plan to control the spread of disease. It was a long step forward, for example, when in 1851 the French government convened the first international quar- antine congress. The 12 nations which sent delegations to the congress in Paris were fully aware of the "* * * pressures of the non-mai-itime powers to bar the entrance of disease, at any cost [and of] the great shipper, the United Kingdom * * * at any cost, to keep commerce and traffic moving." ^^ Knowledge of the origin and transmission of infectious disease was not well enough advanced to impose a purely technological decision. Nevertheless, the participants from time to time seemed willing to do just that and to do it as a basis for international action. The scientific community, such as it was at the time, was di- vided between the sanitarians and the quarantinists. It is interesting to point out that their views were both wrong as single solutions to the problem, but both correct as combined approaches to it. Today, sanitary control and quarantine are significant components of the man- agement of international epidemics. When the delegates to Paris in 1851 got down to work it was with considerably more skill in negotiation than knowledge of epidemi- ology. In an atmosphere of ignorance concerning the origin and trans- mission of diseases like cholera and plague, diplomacy was faced with a unique challenge. Since the medical men were unable or unwilling to agree on whether or not certain diseases were contagious, the diplomats were forced to use a political strategy regarding the retention or abo- lition of international ship quarantine practices. Meanwhile, delegates from the same nation were free to exercise difi'erent motives and even to vote against each other. Thus — Each nation was represented by a doctor and a diplomatist, and it was decided at the outset that they should vote individually. This set up tensions between medical men and the administrators, making the voting at times useless, since they tended to cancel each other out.^' Accordingly, it was possible for the diplomat from France to express the concern of the central government with the effect of prevailing reg- ulations on trade, while the French expert familiar with epidemics in- troduced by travellers at the port of Marseilles advocated strict ap- plication of the regulations. This pattern of one diplomat and one doctor from each country continued during ten international sanitary conferences which followed between 1851 and the end of that century. Although this first conference ended on a predictably inconclusive scientific note, the diplomats and doctors finally were able to put to- gether 137 articles on international sanitary regulations. There is evi- dence of a considerable amount of patience behind this achievement; it required six months of work involving 48 plenary sessions. In perspective it seems to have matterea little that the Convention was not ratified by all the governments, or indeed that it lapsed com- pletely in 1865. TTie fact remains that a number of important inter- national rules were established to promote uniformity m quarantine 1= H. van Zile Hyde. "The International Health Program," an address before the Army Medical Service Graduate School, Walter Reed Army Medical Center (Washington, B.C. March 9, 1954), pace 4. "John Taylor, 'Tlrst Steps." World Health (World Health Organization, March 1968), pa?:e 5. 692 procedure and many of the main rules continued in j>ractice for the remainder of the century. What is more important is that for the first time doctors and diplomats from the then European powers had met in earnest to discuss common global disease problems. And as a practical matter, diplomacy rather than science "saved the day" for this first congress. Although arguments over rival scientific theories oc- cupied most of the time, the French diplomatic representative who was president of Mi*^ conference continued to seek workable solutions. In addition, the diplomats appeared to have had definite instructions not to vote for either of the extreme scientific positions. Subsequent events and discoveries suggest that this compromise was all to the good.^* International quarantine congresses continued to be called. In suc- cession they oc<5urred in Constantinople in 1866, in Vienna in 1874, in Washington in 1881, in Rome in 1885, and in Venice in 1892. Three other agreements which followed in 1893, 1894, and 1897, and which like many of the others dealt with protection against cholera at spe- cific places, were later combined in a single International Sanitary Convention in 1903. Estdblishment of a Permament Quarantine Office Finally, as knowledge advanced and statesmen agreed on the need for contmued international cooperation, a permanent International Office of Public Hygiene was created. The Office was set up in Paris in 1909 as a result of a 1907 meeting in Rome of twelve major nations, including the United States. According to Russell the advantage of the 1909 convention over its many predecessors was that the inter- governmental correspondence regarding the codes and regulations did not go "* * * through departments of state and foreign affairs * * *. It provided an operating agency outside lay diplomatic channels." ^° The disadvantage of the International Office of Public Hygiene in Paris was its functional limitation to only those aspects of public health having to do with quarantine and the notification of cases of communicable disease. Its work was confined to its secretariat and its influence was limited even in the control of epidemics. It was ex- pressly forbidden to "meddle in the administration of the several states" supporting it.^^ With national sovereignty, ports, and bound- aries protected at every point there was still nonmedical resistance to the idea of the International Office of Public Hygiene. The resistance came from Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Great Britain. Great Britain, however, later changed its views and supported the "Paris Office", doing so under the consideraJble pressure of spokesmen for its doctors, who were apparently beginning to give more professional content to their thoughts and recommendations regarding interna- tional health. According to Goodman, the British medical journal, the Lancet, had severely castigated the parochial attitude of the Brit- ish delegation.^'^ In this way the "Paris Office" of 1909 became the first international quarantine organization involving the major European powers and 1* N. M. Goodman. "International Health Organizations." (Philadelphia and New York, The Blaklaton Co., 1952), pages 40--41. ^s Russell, op. cit., page 394. i« Masters, op. cit., page 49. ^^ Goodman, op. cit., pages 81-82. 693 the United States. As in 1851 the French had taken the .initiative, this time under the leadei*ship of dij)lomatist Camille Barrere, French Ambassador to Rome. Although later resisting the absorption of his "Paris Office" by the Health Office of the League of Nations, it was diplomat Barrere who brought order out of chaos in international quarantine during the 1907-1909 period.^s The "Paris Office" con- tinued to function through both World War I and World War II, and was not dissolved until the World Health Organization came into existence. Tlie First Infetmxitwn million in 1045 to $7-'^ million for 1971,^*' plus $50 million or more from other sources which the Organi- zation will administer in 1071. Today WHO : — Has IHl Member States and Associate ^Members. — Continues its six regional offices and committees in Copen!\ageii. Alexandria, Brazzaville, Manila. New Delhi, and Washington. with headquarters in Geneva. (See Fig. 1 ) — Maintains hundreds of reference centers or laboratoiio all o\er the world. — Has formal working interfaces with some 82 major health- relevant international goveinmental and non-governmental oiganizations. — Has a total staff in the order of 4500. Ai)proximately a fourth of these are at headquarters with the remainder in regional and zone offices and in the countries. — Is supported technically by some 45 Advisory Pane's and Plxi)ert Committees in virtually every health or health-related subject area, including air pollution, food additives, cancer, drug de- pendence, human genetics, insecticides, nutrition, occupational health, medical research, international quarantine, venereal disease, mental health, and environmental health programs. — Initiates per year about 200 co]hil)oi"ati\e research conti-acts. lOd training and exchange grants, aiid l')500 fellowships. — Manages an extensive woild-wide malaria eradication and control program. — Administers the 107 Article, International Health Regulations, adopted by the World Health Assembly in 1969. — Operates as a part of the above regulations a global intelligence network on the principal epidemic diseases of the world. (See Fig. 2) ^Personal communication with Howard B. Calderwood. (November 25.1970). "As adopted by the 23rd World Health Assembly. WHO Chronicle (Geneva, World Health Organization, July 1970), page 293. 699 — Is a major publisher of biomedical liferature. WHO ])iiblishes numerous monographs, technical reports, directories and guides, special scientific papers, and six periodicals. The monograi)hs and technical reports often represent, in effect, a world r-cientific or medical consensus. Perhaps more frequently they are the collecti\ e views of international experts which do not necessarily represent the decision or policy of WHO. The international reference centers are usually prerexisting insti- tutions designated to function as a part of the WHO network of competent and specialized units. The technical excellence required here may tend to skew the centers towards the developed nations. There are for example, 40 institutions in the United States particii)ating in .support of WHO programs. The forty-five or so WHO advisor}' panels and expert committees are also well represented iby the technically advanced nations including, of course, the United States. The effect of this arrangement is that this network of reference centers and the advisory committees — who con- tribute to WHO on a cooperatiAe ( i.e., reimbursable) basis, i-ather than as beneficiaries under its budget — makes for a considerable expansion in the total" WHO apparatus. As advanced technological expertise is being chaiineled into this apparatus by this arnvngement, WHO is able to coordinate and tap a large, global resource of talent and information. 700 701 en oc p. •H J3 CO c H en u 00 702 who's E pidemiologicaZ Intelligence Network The service performed by WHO in regard to international epi- demiological intelligence deserves special emphasis for three reasons : (1) Disease surveillance and quarantine were the original bases for international collaboration in public health ma*t«rs and they remain among the more difficult and dramatic aspects of such collaboration; (2) WHO has a unique semi-legislaitive authority over international epidemiological and quarantine procedures; and (3) the network may serve as a model of international authority with respect to the control of global diseases of as yet unknown etiology, as well as the manage- ment of emerging global environmental problems. THE NETWORK ORGANIZATION AND ITS ACTIVITIES The WHO Epidemiological Intelligence Network is an international system of surveillance and quarantine designed to rex;eive and provide rapid information in order to prevent the outbreak and to control the spread of communica;ble disease anywhere in the world. As in the past, but under new "International Health Regulations", the health admin- istrators of governments are obliged to inform WHO of the first cases or suspect cases of cholera, plague, smallpox, and yellow fever.^^ The information must be supplier! within 24 hours of disease identi- fication, by means of telegram or telex directly to the intelligence head- quarters in Geneva. The information is then given in a daily radio bulletin broadcast from Geneva and retransmitted throughout the world. Over 3,000 such disease case intelligence notifications come into Geneva every year. (Governments can obtain WHO assistance in investigating and controlling outbreaks of these reportable diseases.) This rapid information service is essential in view of the risk of high-speed international spread of potentially epidemic diseases through the ever increasing volume and range of air traffic. The speed of dissemination of pathogenic micro-organisms (either the organisms themselves in infectious materials, or in vectors like mosquitoes and rats, or in carriers like human beings with or without obvi- ous symptoms) , may be even greater than at present with the advent and extensive use of large transcontinental aircraft. The new regulations impose stricter requirements at ports and air- ports to ensure greater protection for and from the international traveler. Vaccination certificates are required for such diseases as cholera, yellow fever, and smallpox. Ships and aircraft arriving from ports outside a given territory are required to submit a declaration of health concerning all persons on board. Cargo, goods, and containers are subject to regulations and requirements to assure within practicable limits that they are free of infectious material, vectors, or rodents.'*" Ships, aircraft, trains, and road vehicles, depending on circumstances and the disease in question, are subject to quarantine or isolation. Per- sons on an international voyage not showing evidence of protection from a disease (like smallpox) may be placed under sun^eillance by =» Loiise-borne typhus, relapsin,? fevpr. viral influenza, paralytic poliomyelitis, any one of a series of "hot" virnses. may also he reported, but .ire not suhlect to quarantine. There is a single special provision for malaria. Resrardless of snecific disease a health authorit.v may act to control the discharge from any ship of sewage and refuse which mifht con- taminate the waters of a port, river, or canal. Also, no matter capable of causing any epidemic disease shall be thrown or allowed to fall from an aircraft when it is in flight. ^o "Initernational Health Regulations." Chapter V. (Geneva, World Health Organization), page 15. 703 a national health administrator. If a person requires vaccination in the interest of public health and refuses the vaccination, he may be isolated for a period up to foui-teen days.*'^ Ships, aircraft, trains, and road vehicles are also subject to disinsecting or disinfection, depend- ing on circumstances at the port of arrival. Further health measures may be applied to any vehicle as determined by conditions on board during the voyage or which exist at the time of medical examination bv the port health authority. ■"The United States' part of the WHO epidemiological intelligence network is operated by the Public Health Service Center for Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia. The Center also serves as the Interna- tional Influenza Center of the Americas and the Arborvirus Center for the Western Hemisphere; it is also the International Center for Shigellosis (a form of dysentery). To implement the International Health Regulations and to protect the United States from the importation of disease from abroad, the Public Health Service spends about $10 million annually and checks about 140 million international travelers arriving at some 400 differ- ent points of entry. The Public Health Service also maintains physi- cians on duty in more than 30 nations in order to examine an average of 250,000 applicants per year for visas to the United States. CURRENT PR0BLE3IS OF EPIDEMIC CONTROL Perhaps the main problem in implementing the International Health Regiilations is a tendency on the part of some governments not to report diseases for fear of restrictive action that would affect trade and travel.*^ This problem came to the fore recently when WHO reported the presence of cholera in Guinea without awaiting notification of the serious outbreak there from the Guinea Health Ministry. WHO's notification of 2,000 cases and 60 deaths from cholera in Guinea came as it was completing its preparations for an emergency anticholera training program for African countries. The present epidemic (which began nearly a decade ago) has penetrated south of the Sahara where cholera had not been seen for more than a century.*^ WHO had earlier provided technical assistance for use in Conakry, the capitol of Guinea, when the government reported 230 cases of an unidentified illness which had already caused 27 deaths.** The outcome of WHO's report of the nature and extent of cholera in Guinea were (1) a threat from the Guinea Government to withdraw from WHO in protest to the report *^ and (2) "no further news" from Guinea as of September 8, 1970, when the first WHO notification oc- curred concerning 2,000 cases of cholera there.*^ Notifications have been received from Dubai [one of the Trucial States], Israel, Lebanon, Libya, and the U.S.S.R. ; however, Iran and the United Arab Republic have repeatedly denied the presence of cholera.*^ As the Medical Tnhune states, "it seems clear that the haziness surrounding the exact locations outside the officially notified areas where cholera has appeared " IWH. Chaptpr IV. napp 24. « WHO Chronicle (World Health Orsanization. June 1970). page 262. "Medical Tribnne (September 21. 1970). page 3. ♦•Medical Tribune (Sentemher 7. 19701. pR?p 1. ** Medical Tribune (September 21. 1970). page 3. « The Lancet (September 12. 1970) , page 578. " Ibid. 704 is a gesture of self-protection [not against the disease itself but] against possible reprisals by other countries." *^ This situation is a reminder of exactly how far the world has — or has not — progressed since the quarantine regulations of over a century ago were reluctantly adopted despite ignorance, fear, and vested interests. U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN EPIDEMIOLOGICAL PROBLEMS Cholera may not be of immediate geographic concern to the Amer- icas, but poliomyelitis is a growing problem in several countries in Central and South America *^ and viral influenza is an annual seasonal hazard in the United States. If the American political and diplomatic community is somewhat indifferent to tropical disease in the tropics, perhaps it should be more interested in Asian disease in the United States. For example, the new strains of influenza virus A2 in the Hong Kong epidemic of 1968 later spread and reached the temperate areas of the northern hemisphere, causing numerous epidemics in the 1968- 1969 influenza season. In the United States the outbreak was exten- sive, covering nearly all of the States and "was associated with a large number of deaths from acute respiratory disease." ^° In testimony before the House Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments in December, 1969. Dr. Joshua Lederberg warned that the American public health authorities were not "suffi- ciently sensitive to the possibilitv of a devastating worldwide epi- demic." He used the example of the Hong Kong flu as a foretaste of what could have happened and of what could happen in the future: I think there is a considerable amount of sel f -delusion that the antibiotics will take care of any bacterial infection ; we need never worry about the plague again : the plague has been conquered by medicine ; that virus infections will somehow be taken care of, although when you see a pandemic like the Hong Kong flu, you have a foretaste of what really can happen. That was a world-wide epidemic. The attack rate was some- thing like 20 to 30 percent of the world's population that was infected by this virus. It was not a particularly lethal one, but it is only a minor accident that it is not a lethal virus. Such events are undoubtedly going to occur in the future that will be very much nastier, and we have simply not been oriented to take a sufficiently aggressive and sensitive view about this matter.^^ Throughout his testimony. Dr. Lederberar saw public health defense as a global parallel to defense against biological warfare ; he consid- ered pathogenic micro-organisms to be the natural enemies of man, and recommended two measures of worldwide self -protection : (1) The establishment of central, international labora- tories to monitor the occurrence of threatening organisms and "8 Medical Tribune (September 7, 1970), page 1. « "The World's Poliomyelites." The Lancet (September 26, 1970), pa^e 646. w WHO Chronicle (June 1970) , pages 263-4. ^ U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. "Chemical-Biological Warfare : U.S. Policies and International Effects." Hearings before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the . . . November and December 1969. 91st Congress, first session. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), page 128. 705 to liolp develo}) ofenerally available means of protection against them; [and] * * * (2) A general acceleration of research and health services to minimize the incidence of infections disease, particnlarly in underdeveloped countries. No situation could be better de- signed for the evolution of serious new vinises than the exis- tence of crov.'ded, underfed human populations in which foci could spread with a minimum of medical control.^- During 1969, WHO extended the scope and activities of its refer- ence centers and collaborating laboratories on the viruses in general and established a new regional center for the enteroviruses at the Enterovirology Unit, Center for Disease Control, Atlanta, Georgia. The Center, Emory University, and WHO jointly conducted a con- ference on Hong Kong influenza and published the results.^^ The WHO Director-General's report of 1969 expressed the belief that the cooperation of national centers had resulted in a degree of control of influenza : To cope with [influenza], a world network consisting of two international centres and 85 national centres in 55 countries has been established. WHO plays the role of central- izing agent, receiving and passing on to all INIember States, as rapidly as possible, the significant information that reaches it through the international network. Perhaps it is not by mere chance that the many foci of influenza re}X)rted during the past year in the southern as well as the northern hemis- phere remained limited in extent.^* Wliether or not the United States contributes to WHO for the global monitoring, control, and eradication of communicable diseases, or to some other organization over which it might have more direct power, the fact remains that the United States is subject to worsening hazards domestically in the infectious disease area. In the developed countries, including the United States, the natural decline in the in- cidence of tuberculosis is slowing down; malaria and yellow fever are within the national boundaries ; and there is an observed upward trend in the incidence of gonorrhea. Resistant forms of some of these diseases (malaria and gonorrhea) acquired by troops in Viet-Nam are not likely to become less resistant when troops with residual organisms return home. Plague may not be importable by American troops from Viet-Nam; nevertheless the disease is there. In 1969 "the highest in- cidence of plague was again in the Republic of Viet-Nam, where the numl)er of cases was greater than the combined total for all other countries." ^ As the Director-General of the World Health Organization stated a few years ago, "* * * the quarantineable diseases, which many people think of as scourges of the past, are still daily realities.'' "= Ihif'.. i)a,'re 90 s'! Bulletin of the World Health Organization (Vol. 41, Nos. 3, 4, and 5. 1969). " WHO Chronicle (.Tulv 1970), page 292. •"*■■ WHO Chronicle (.Tune 1970), page 269. 706 RECENT EVALUATIONS OF THE WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION G. E. W. Wolstenholme of the Ciba Foundation in London has praised the achievements of WHO and deplores the lack of news cov- erage concerning its constructive work. Of all the special United Na- tions agencies, fie says, none "* * * contributes more to current im- provements in our daily lives and gives more hope of a better future for all mankind than the WHO." Many people in positions of respon- sibility were totally ignorant of the work of this agency. In a recent symposium giving emphasis on our "stressful, diseased, crowded, ill- educated and uncooperative world," he said : ^ WHO is a world intelligence agency for communicable diseases, on which all quarantine measures are based. It spon- sors international reference laboratories for diseases which scorn national frontiers. It is the ultimate authority on the health standards of foods, on vaccines, drugs, systems of disease classification and diagnostic procedures, and it runs the counter-spy system against the traffic in illicit and dan- gerous drugs of addiction. As the recorder of rare reactions to drugs, it may forestall another thalidomide-like tragedy. It awards some 2,500 fellowships a year for postgraduate training in medicine, nursing and environmental health. It organizes each year about 40 short instruction courses and around 80 technical conferences. It contributes at any one time, in manpower and in money, to 1,000 health projects in 150 countries. WHO is an organization which between 1948 and 1963 treated, for example, 43 million people in 45 countries for the syphilis-like disease of yaws, and set lf)0,000 trained workers to the task of essentially eliminating malaria, to which half the world's peoples were exposed — and almost one-third of the world's population has by now been given protection from malaria, though 360 million remain at risk. It is WHO which lends hundreds of experts and teaches thousands of health workers to attack a host of disorders and diseases: for ex- ample, smallpox (a campaign to vaccinate 220 million in one year has just begun, to continue over ten years) ; tuberculosis (still some two to three million preventable deaths each year) ; leprosy (about 15 million j^eople in 50 or 60 countries blighted by its mutilation) ; maternal and infant mortality (a ten- fold difference between the most fortunate and the unhappiest countries) ; cancer, heart disease, rheumatism (the bijr killers and cripplers with widely varying incidence in different areas) : water, soil and air T)ollntion (in tlie world as a whole it is said that one in four hospital patients is ill because of infectefd ^^ater^ : blindness (10 to 12 million siirhtless) : deaf- ness (millions still uncounted) : infestations by parasites (many hundreds of millions of people chronically weakened and defeated by three or four such diseases together) ; mental illness ; senility ; accidents ; malnutrition : and animal diseases. ^■^ G. F. W. Wolstenhnliup. In "Health of Mankinrt," A Ciba Foundation Symposium. (Bos- ton. Little Brown and Company, 1967), pages 254-6. 707 The last details in this hasty, impressionistic sketch of WHO refer to its work on the co-ordination and stimulation of medical research, such as that on human genetics, heart diseases, cancer, dental health, bacterial resistance of insecti- cides— wherever a comparison from different areas may be revealing, or where a condition, a reaction to a drug for instance, may be too rare to excite attention in any one country. It is an impressive record — yet this is only preliminary work in bringing to most people in the world a modest chance to enjoy the health which imtil recently has been the blessing of a privileged few. And already we have such an increased expectancy of life and so many more children survive that the problem of population growth makes almost every other problem trivial. Impressive — ^but WHO can only act on request from gov- ernments. Its expert advisers operate only within national limits. And because of lack of money or skilled manpower not all requests can be met. Where it is able to help, WHO does its best to encourage the mobilization and creation of the local infrastructure which will maintain, or at least not wholly throw away, the value of WHO's efforts in disease control. A year later (1968), in the British Medical Journal^ Sir John Charles took a similar measure of WHO for the 1960 to 1965 time period: In 1960 the UN and WHO were faced with a serious emergency in the newly independent Republic of the Congo ( Leopold ville). Owing to the political crisis the health situa- tion had gravely deteriorated. WHO demonstrated its co- ordinating and advisory functions in a variety of ways. [It placed] 37 Red Cross medical teams where they were most needed. By recruiting a few key health persoimel it helped to avert the breakdown of environmental services and strength- ened the control of disease. Finally, looking beyond the immediate present to the future stalling of the health services, it worked out a long-term programme of education and train- ing of doctors and other personnel which is now bearing fruit. Altogether it was a highly successful reply to a challenge. Another factor in increasing WHO's African responsi- bilities was the rapid accession of many states to independ- ence, followed by their admission to the Organization as full members. At the end of 1960 only seven governments in the Africa Region were members of WHO. Five years later there were 27. "WHO's serious interest in national health planning can be traced to Latin American activities which began in 1959. It extended to the African Region in 1963, when the Organiza- tion became associated with the governments of five African countries in the preparation of health plans which were to be integral part of the national plans for social and economic development. It is now an advisory activity of major importance. 708 Population problems in many parts of the world have been a major concern of the United Nations for several years, and their rei>ercussions have affected WHO. They arise not only from population increase but are associated with urbaniza- tion, industrialization, and changes in the age structure of the population, and involve questions of family planning and Jhuman reproduction. This complex of difficult problems re- ;sulted in AVHO's establishing a Human Reproduction Unit in 1965, About the same time the Assembly authorized the provi- :sion of technical advice on the subject to such member states as requested it. This IS only one example of the continuing extension of who's interests. Sometimes the activity is an entirely new venture, as with human reproduction and the even more re- cently created Division for Research in Epidemiology and the Conununication Sciences. At other times it is a more vigorous and comprehensive attack on an old -standing health problem. Typical of this approach are the community water supply programme and the world-wide smallpox eradication campaign, both of wliich were launched in 1965. It is, as yet, difficult to measure that achievement in quanti- tative terms. Improved health statistics in many parts of the world are some indications of success, but the mere existence of a service or laboratory can also be evidence of an advance. Nevertheless it is possible to recognize certain positive achievements. First amono^ them is the universality of WHO. This is shown by its memoership of 129 states. It is manifest in the system of regional offices serving as foci of advice and action. It is seen again in the network of reference laboratories and services for the collection of epidemiological data. Next there are the results of the great campaigns against such diseases as malaria, yaws, and tuberculosis, which have saved inmmierable lives, and been of imnieasuraWe benefit to the economy of many developing countries. There is the major contribution which has been made to educational activities of member governments in helping them to raise the total of medical schools in their territories from 553 about 1950 to 717 in 1966. Another facet of tliis activity is the granting of fellowships to individuals, who now total some 3,500 each year. The strengthening of health services, always one of who's primary functions, has extended into the planning of national health services as a concurrent and integral part of economic and social development. And at the local level the development of the basic health services idea is an equally great achievement. Then there is the international co-ordination of medical research in certain fields, and the communication and sharing of the results. Finally, though the list could be continued, there is the accomplished fact of getting the nations to work together." 5' Sir John Charles. "Origins. History iind Achievements of the World Health Organiza- tion," British Medical Journal (May 4, 1968), pages 295-6. 709 Politics and Diplomacy in the World Health Organization WffO'S INTENT TO BE NON-POLITICAL The World Health Organization has long regarded itself as a tech- nical and non-political organization. Opponents of various proposals and amendments, whether they won or lost on issues before the Assem- bly, have based their opposition on this cherished assumption. For example, in dealing with applic^itions for membership, the "Assembly has been more interested in the capacity of the applicant to fulfill the obligations of a ^Member than in the question of the applicant's pos- sessing the attributes of sovereignty." ^® While the International Health Conference agreed to consider mem- bership in the United Nations as a basis upon which the WHO should enter into force (when 26 members of the United Nations had accepted the WHO Constitution), it rejected the criterion of membership in the United Nations as a standard requirement for membership in WHO. Before the First Assembly met, it was decided that those non- membei-s of the UN that had been invited to send observers to the planning conference could become members of WHO merely by ac- cepting the WHO Constitution. Questions concerning the competence of the Health Assembly to determine statehood before exercising its authority to admit a member were deferred to agreements between the UN and WHO.^'' Although it would be a mistake to assume that ques- tions of WHO membership have not been influenced by actions of the United Nations, the fact remains tha;t both the Assembly and the Director-General have asserted the autonomy of WHO in the deter- mination of membership questions.^" Spain was dissuaded from apply- ing for membership in WHO as a result of the recommendation of the UN General Assembly of 1946 that that country not be admitted to any international organization in the UN family. When this barrier to admission was rescinded by the UN, Spain applied for membership in WHO in 1951 and was admitted in that year. U.S. MEMBERSHIP : THE FIRST BIG TEST Before WHO entered into force (Sept. 1, 1948) the question of United States membership came before WHO'S Interim Commission. Once again, the Health Assembly asserted its competence to interpret or apply the Constitution concerning membership, and powerful na- tions who were already members took functional and realistic stances rather than legal ones in dealing with the unusual United States case. The situation was that the I'.fe. instrument of acceptance, submitted in June 1948, stated that U.S. acceptance of the WHO Constitution was subject to certain reservations. Not only was the United States the first nation to pose reservations in its application, but there was no provision in the WHO Constitution for reservations to acceptance. The U.S. reservations, of course, were statutory : The President is hereby authorized to accept membership for the United States in the World Health Organization * * *. 55 Howard B. Calderwood, "Membership in the World Health Organization" (unpublisheH draft), page 3. '^ Ibid., page 3. o" Ibid., page 5. 710 The Congress does so witli the understanding that, in the absence ol" any provision for withdrawal from the Organi- zation, the United States reserves its right to wnthdraw from the Organization on a one-year notice : Provided, however, tliat the financial obligations of the United States to the Organization slia)! be met in full for tlie Organization's cnr- rent fiscal year. [Also] the Congress does so with the under- standing that nothing in the Constitution of the World Health Oiganization in any maimer commits the United States to enact any specific legislative program regarding any matters referred to in said Constitution.*'^ The Credentials Committee Avas undistui-l^ed by the restn'\ation and the Health Assembly at its second plenary session seated the United States delegation with full rights, on the understanding that the prob- lem of U.S. reservations would be discussed at a later date.*'- When the problem did come uj) for discussion on July 2, lO-tS, India, the United Kingdom, and the USSR placed emphasis on evidence of participation of the United States in international health activities and on assurances given by its chief delegate that the U.S. would ful- fill its responsibilities under the WHO Constitution. The representa- tives of the USSR, speaking before the Assembly proposed that the United States "* * * be accepted for membership." '^^ The representative of India stated that an ''* * * unwilling ]\Ieml)er might withdraw in one of many ways [and the U.S.] provision for termination on a year's notice be considered a more straightforward method than other possibilities." *""* The Assembly accepted the proposal of its President that the United States should be admitted as a full member of WHO.''^ Obviously striving for universality of membership and global function, the Assembl}^ not only accepted the United States as an im- portant technical and financial contributor to WHO, but at the same time refused to permit termination of membership to become an issue for the future or for the U.S. method of termination to become acceptable for other members. The representative of India proposed that the Assembly "* * * lay down a proposition of general applica- tion that any Member State may terminate its meml)ership on a yeai-'s notice." ^'^ However, no observations were made with respect to his proposal at that time, and when subsequent withdrawals did occur tlie Assemblies made no reference to the U.S. technique of formalizing tliem. THE TEST or SOVIET BLOC WT!'] IDKAWALS Withdrawals did occur, however, and tlie manner in which tliey Avere handled by the Assembly was undoubtedly more im|)Oitant tlian the terminations themselves or the alleged reasons underlvino- them. In 1949, three Soviet States, the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR and Bye- lorussia, notified the Director-General of WHO that they no longer considered themselves as Members. As might l)e expected, tliere fol- "1 TTnited States CocTe, titlp 22. pafjcs 4477-447S. "'-' Cildorwood. on. cit.. p;ifri' 10. "3 "Official Records of WHO" (13), pages 77-79. "* Il)id., pasre 7R. "^ Ibid., page 80. Of course, as a practical matter the right of unilateral withdrawal Trom such a coiiimitin<'nt inheres in national sovereignty even witliout explicit statntury provision. «« Ibid., page 48. 711 lowed withdrawals by Bulgaiia, Ivunuinia, Albania, Czeclioslovakia, Hiingaiy, and Poland. Iceland's withdrawal, which brought the termi- nations to a total of nine countries, occurred on Aug. 15, 1050.'^' Tlie criticisms otYered by the USSK had to do with WHO"s failure to abide by the activities proposed for it in 1946, its failure to accomplish the prevention and control of disease at the international level, and the high cost of who's administrative machinery.*^** The six Eastern States provided similar reasons for withdrawing and added a new- one that the Organization was under U.S. domination.*''' The eastern members of the Soviet Bloc argued for medical supplies for the war-devastated countries — insecticides, vaccines, antibiotics, drugs, and materials for research and education; their charge of '"subordination" may have meant that the United States was not sup- plying such materials through WHO in the amounts requested. The theme of the USSR from the beginning w-as that WHO should direct its efforts and organize its activities for the consolidation and de- velopment of national health services. Once again, this attitude em- pliasizes the view^ at that time of the USSR and other Members of the Soviet Bloc that W^HO should provide national health adminis- trators wirh supplies, medical literature, and the results of research.""^ Political or otherwise, the official W^HO reaction to all this was essentially non-reactive: (1) The Director-General requested an invitation from the USSR to visit Moscow, (2) A draft resolution for the Assembly took account of the prevailing sentiment that llie Mem- bers concerned reconsider their decisions and resume active participa- tion in WHO, and (3) A resolution was passed by the Assembly (4^^0-6) stating that the objectives of WHO required the cooperation of all countries ; expressing regret o\er the absence of these States from WHO ; pointing to their loss to the work of the Organization ; hoping that in the near future they mi^ht w'ish to reconsider their position; and inviting them to join, if possible, tlie present and following session of the Health Assembly.'^ These and certain ''non-developments'' in- dicated that the Members of the Assembly were primarily motivated by the desire to have the withdrawn States return to the Organiza- tion. The non-developments were the almost complete silence of the Assembly on tlie withdrawal actions and on the implications of such withdrawals on the financial condition of the Organization.'- Subsequent resolutions reiterated the desire of the Assembly for the non-participating States to resume full cooperation in WHO. In the meantime, expenditure levels were adjusted, but the Assembly assumed that the contribution of what they called "inactive Members" would eventually be paid. The Second Assembly refused to recognize the withdi-aAval of the Soviet States, and Members were generally opposed to taking ]X)sitive steps to suspend services to these States. Assembly after Assembly labored with assessment and budget prob- lems but continued to assess the "inactive Members" for contributions which in all likelihood would not be paid. It was difficult to get any 6- "Official Records of WHO" (17). pages 52-53; "Official Records of WHO" (28), luitrps ri."i.'!— ■'1.-4. s^ "Official Records of WHO" (17). page 52. "'"Official Records of WHO" (28), pages 553-554, "Official Records of WHO' (35). pases .SSO-SSt. •» "Official Records of WHO" (13), pages 39-72, and 120-147. ■^ "Official Records of WHO" (21 ). ■- Calderwood. "Membership in the WHO ', op. cit., page IT. 712 proposal through the Assembly which assumed that the "inactive Members-' would not eventually renew their participation in AVHO." RETURN OF THE VSSR AXD EASTERN EUROPEAN STATES Thus by a "fictitious position" that Member States who had termi- nated their memberehip in "WHO were nevertheless Members ("in- active") ; by continuing to assess them as if they were active ISIembers; by refusing to resort to any type of punitive acts or by "lecturing'' against them in the Assemblies: by continuing to invite them back into the fold ; and by preparing the way for settlement of payments in arrears, the resumption of active partici]:)ation of Russia and the Soviet Bloo States in WHO became a reality. Albania, Bulgaria, Poland and the I'SSR were represented at the tenth Health Assembly of WHO in May 1957. Czechoslovakia and Rumania resumed active participation in 1958, and Hungary became an active member in 1963. For what it is worth as a lesson in diplomacv, the patient ex])ressions and actions of the Members and the Assembly were specifically de- signed to facilitate the return of the separated States of WHO back to active participation. "Little attention was given to the legal and other relevant aspects, although they were not completely ignored." ''* Although all of the States concerned had originally notified the Orga- nization that they no longer considered themselves Meml^ers of WHO, none objected to the Assembly's persistent thesis that they were merely resuming active participation. '^^ THE CHINA QUESTION CONSIDERED POLITICAL The political question of the Republic of China vei-sus Red China came u]) early in the liistorv of WHO. The third Health Assembly ■"-as notified that the Republic of China wished to withdraw from WHO, presumably promj^ted by financial considerations. The notifi- cation wa'^ by telegram, dated 5 ]May 1950. Another telegram from the Central People's Government of the People's Rei^ublic of China, dated 13 May 1950, advised that the Republic of China should not be seated at the Assembly anyway, since it was not the legal government representing the Chinese people.'^ Finally, the Assembly (in plenary) accepted a resolution, without discussion or vote, which substituted "China" for "Republic of China" and which stated that "the resurnp- tion of China of full participation in the work of the Organization will be welcomed." ^^ However, as Calderwood states : By treating the communication from Formosa as a com- munication from a Member of the Assembly, in effect, [the action] recognized the Government in Formosa as the Gov- ernment of China [all China]. The Assembly's subsequent decision * * * inregard to the settlement of China's financial obligations to the Organization when China resumed active participation, had the same effect. ^^ "^ Ibid. pajTPS 21-22. . '* Thid.. nacTP 2fl. "= Ibifl.. pasre 26. ™ "Offleial Records of WHO," (2S). pasos 555-556. '■ Calderwood. op. cit., "Memhersliip in the WHO"', page 2S. ~^ Ibid., page 27. 713 The final solution to the question of China's financial obligation to "\^TH[0 was not worked out until the meeting of the Sixth Assembly ( 1954) . Calderwood says : The practice followed at the Sixtli Assembly in r-egard to the question of China's financial obligations is illustrative of the Assembly's attitude in dealing with almost every controversial issue, particularly one having a political aspect. The resolu- tion which was finally accepted was the product of many in- formal conversations and meetings. Representatives of the Republic of China were consulted at various stages of these conversations, largely arranged on its behalf by representa- tives of States friendly to the Government in Formosa. The Secretariat wa^ consulted as to the feasibility of sue:o:ested courses of action under consideration. These were also dis- cussed with representatives of the Members that had recog- nized the People's Republic of China, with a view to finding a solution acceptable to a substantial majority of the Assembly.'^ Calderwood does not note that by the time of the Sixth Assembly the number of Members present that had recognized the People's Republic of China was somewhat limited l)ecause of the prior with- drawal of the Eastern European States. Tlie politics of the situation was kept in hand because of their temporary absence. On the whole, WHO has dealt successfully with politically moti- vated proposals or proposals with distinct political connotations. Although some of these have been resolved for the time being they are likely to reappear. Some of these will have to do with the credentials of the Chinese Delegation, the Arab-Israeli dispute, suspension of cer- tain rights of South Africa and Portugal, radiation, nuclear testing, and disarmament. At the Twentieth World Health Assembly the United States and 39 other Members abstained on a vote in plenary session urging IVIembers of the UN to implement a resolution of the General Assembly with respect to the use of poisonous and other gases. The United States had argued in Committee that the World Health Assembly was not the proper forum for resolution of this issue.*"' CONSENSUS VERSUS REGUL.VTION ON PHARMACEUTICAL QUESTIONS •ilk The questions of drug safety, well within the domain of considera- tion by WHO, though non-political are controversial. Resolutions to warn countries about the use of "wonder dru^,'' ^' and narcotic and psychotropic drugs ^^ have met with little resistance. However, as in the United States, resolutions which have become controversial invohed the establishment of an international system for monitoring the adverse side efi'ects of drugs, drug efficacy,''^ quality of drugs,-* and ]5harmaceutical advertising.*^ ^9 Ibid., page 30. 8" Twentieth World Health Assembly, Resolution No. 54. In "Handboolv of Resolutions." (Eighth Edition. 1948-1967.) ^ Fifth World Health Assembly, Resolution No. 76, In Ibid. s2 Eighteenth World Health Assembly, Resolution 47 and Twentieth World Health Assem- bly Resolution 43. In Ibid. S3 Fifteenth World Health Assembly, Resolution 41 : Sixteenth World Health Assemtilv. Resolution 36. Tv,entleth World Health Assembly, Resolution 51. and Twentv-third World Health Assembly. Resolution 13.. In Ibid. 8* Twenty-first World Health Assemblv, Resolution 41, In Ibid. ^ Twelfth World Health Assembly, Resolution 3S. Twentieth World Health Assemblv Resolution 34, Twentieth World Health Assembly, Resolution 51, and Twenty-third \\ orlii Health Assembly, Resolution 13. In Ibid. 714 T)n one of these issues, it was the absence of a systematic interna- tional warning system, among other things, which precipitated tlie thalidomide tragedy j-^*^ and WHO has only recently initiated steps toward a fully operational system for international dnig monitoring. But the delay has been more of a technical problem than a political one.*' In recent years pressure has increased within WHO to adopt health regulations concerning phannaceutical products. Under Article 22 of the Constitution, the Health Assembly has the authority to bring such regulations into force (if it were to pass them) "for all members after due notice has been given of their adaption by the Plealth Assembly •except for such members as may notify the Director-General of rejec- tion or reservations within the period stated in the notice." ^* Also Article 21 points directly to "standards with respect to the safety, purity and potency of biological, pharmaceutical and similar l^roducts moving in international commerce; advertising and labeling of biological, pharmaceutical and similar products moving in inter- national commerce." *^ As a general practice, however, in this area as well as others, the Assembly has preferred to make recommendations in order to obtain uniform practices rather than adopting conventions or regulations under constitutional provisions.^" With few exceptions, ever since the First Assembly the attitude of ^VHO has been to rely on the discretion of Members as to the methods to be employed to attain the objectives of Assembly resolutions.^^ In some instances the Assem- bly has sought to achieve the objectives of WHO by simply declaring itself against certain practices rather than regulating against those practices. For example: The Assembly "* * * considers that any with- holding of scientific or t«drninistration matter. The Health Assembly ^-^ constitutionally empovored to redefine the member composition of "\"\T^IO's recional areas, but apparently has not been disposed to remove Israel from the Eastern Mediterranean resrion for political convenience or expedien^p. Once again, therefore, while the World Health Assembly has exercised diplomacy in handling political problems related to health, it con- tinues to reject political solutions to political problems. In the mean- time, health services as requested of T\TFTO have been provided to all of iihe countries involved, and the United States continues to cooperate with both Is^-ael and the Arab States on health matters throufirh various bilateral instrmnents. 104 "Offioiil ■Rp'^ords nf WHO " n!i!rr>« 4'>fi-427. i<« Kohort Berkov. "The World Hpalth Organization: A StiKlv in Decent rnlizod Inter- Tiati'innl Administration' ^Geneva. T/ibrarie K. Droz. If*")?), paces 183-4. 719 But tlie continuation of function of WHO in this most difficult situation is not limited to services rendered to the countries involved. One of the resolutions of the World Health Assembly in attempting to deal with this problem was to take the regional contestants out of thc- same arena. To accomplish this it established two subcommittees, Sub- committee B essentially for Israel, and Subcommittee A for the other States in the Eastern Mediterranean group. Both the Secretary Gen- eral of WHO and the Eegional Director have made every effort to con- vene both subcommittees but the Regional Director was unable to convene a meeting of the "Israel"' (B) subcommittee in either 1969 or 1970. Under these circumstances, and according to the 33rd Resolution of the Seventh World Health Assembly, Subcommittee (A) submitted its "opinion" (report) to the Director-General. It had met in Lebanon during Sej)tember 1970, with regrets being expressed that- Ethiopia and Jordan did not attend. France sent a delegate who chanced to be located in an Eastern Mediterranean French territory- ; and, of course, Israel was not supposed to attend. It had been a "Sub- committee B" country for several years. But the meeting came off well just the same, with 19 members and associate members attending, as well as representatives of the UN, the UNDP, UNICEF, FAO, and some 14 international non-governmental and intergovernmental or- ganizations. The 35-page report to the Direct or- General dealt with environmental deterioration, clironic and coimnunicable disease, the Pearson and Jackson Reports, the integration of family planning liealth services into maternal and child care, the shortage of health manpower, and medical education.^"® In fact, an impressive agenda was competently handled by this rather makeshaft rump session. Its ac^^omplishment reveals both the abilit}' of who's participants to overcome adversity and the prospect of still larger benefits that could result if the dissident factions cx)uld find a viable coui'se to more general cooperation. On this basis, it is worth- while to examine in detail the achievements of Subcommittee A at its 1970 meeting. The Director's report stated that the "brain drain" was being over- come with the assistance of WHO, that there were new efforts to eradicate smallpox in Ethiopia, and that a poliomyelitis outbreak in Lebanon had been controlled with WHO assistance. A WHO scientist had surveyed X-ray equipment and safety measui-es in 15 countries. A number of recommendations were macle with respect to the control of cholera and tuberculosis and to the strengthening of national health services through a network of health centers. The Subcommittee gave high priority to the training of national manpower; the control and eradication of communicable diseases; and improvement in environ- mental health, community water supplies, laboratory services, nutri- tion, medical research, and radiation protection. The report spoke of improved working and housing conditions and of special attention to vulnerable populations. The responsibility of national authorities concerning the health manpower problem was repeatedly emphasized. It was estimated that 5000 new teachers would. K* "Report of the 1970 Session of Snb-Committee A of the Regional Committee for the Eastern Mediterranean" (November .'50, 1970). 720 bo required in the Region in the next fi\e or ten years, and there was an extraordinaiy emphasis that such medical teachei"S know how to teach as well as to possess an aderpiate knowledge of the subject matter. There was a discussion on how to reduce the present pressure on hospital beds by means of preventive measures, less si^ecialized hos- pitals, and the removal of disabled patients for rehabilitation and ambulatory care elsewhere. The medical schools in the region had increased to 46 with six more planned to start next year. WHO had supplied teachers, consultants, fellowships and means for exchange visits of medical faculty members within the Eegion. The 1972 budget for tlie Eastern Mediterranean Region, including UNDP and Funds-in-Trust, was approximately $12,000,000. The Regu- lar budget showed a 9 percent increase over the 1971 figure. (This regular budget increase was about the same as that for WHO as a whole, and is ah example of one of the primary sources of WHO budg- etary increases over the years — the regional requirements.) Some Difficulties in Achieving and Sustaining Internationa]. Coopera- tion In Health Through WHO In the Introduction to tliis study, the statement was made that inter- national cooperation in public health Avas not easily achieved nor is it easily sustained. This statement refers to the World Health Organiza- tion, but it applies to any of WHO'S predecessor organizations involv- ing more than two gOA^ernments. The birth of such multinational organizations as the Office of International Hygiene, the Health Organization of the League of Nations, and the World Health Organization was difficult despite the evident need for such international health treaties. It is t-empting at first to ascribe blame for such difficulties to the natural political orientation of go^'ernments ■per se. Indeed, there is no doubt that scientists, engineers, and physicians have less friction at international congresses and that public health workers get work done more expeditiously when they do not have to worry about the position of their governments or when long-term national commitments on behalf of their governments are not involved. But when either pei-sonal or governmental interests are at stake in i)ermanent international agreements, professional medical people are often as politiail as their professional diplomatic counter- parts are expected to be. For example, there is every reason to believe that the inordinate two-year delay of the United States in ratifying the constitution of WHO was motivated by lx>th medical-political and national-political considerations. According to Allen ^°' and Goodman ^°^ there were fears that WHO would become involved in such questions as health insurance and socialized medicine. Agreements concerning the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO) and the World Health Organization were delayed even longer. It was not until 1950 that an agreement between PAHO and the Organization of American States (OAS) authorized the former to act as a regional organization of the World Health Organization in the Western Hemisphere. In this c^ipacity, PAHO w^as to remain "" C. E. Allen, "World Health and World Politics," International Organization (Vol. 4, 19r,0),page27. 1'^'* Goodman, "International Health Organizations." op. cit.. page 20. 721 an Inter-American specialized organization, to continue to enjoy the fullest autonomy and to respond to the recommendations of the OAS Council. ^°^ This action by the OAS left hanging an earlier (1949) "first step-' integration agreement between PA HO and WHO and the issue has not been revived.^^°. A few months after the Internatioual Health Conference of 1946 had made provision for integration of PAHO with WHO (Article 54) , the Directing Council of PAHO adopted a resolution deliberately designed to prevent such integration from : * * * affecting the identity of tlie Bureau, lessening its administrativ^e autonomy, limiting its economic independence, disturbing its essential develoi)nient and detracting from its character as a continental, coordinated health organization of the people of the Americas.^^^ The Directing Council of PAHO went e\ en further and " * * * advised the American States in ratifying the World Health Orga- nization Constitution, to make a reservation that w^ould recognize the supremacy of the Pan American Haalth Organization over the Con- stitution of the World Health Organization." ^^- The obstacle to full integi'ation was made essentially insurmount- able in a charter adapted by OAS in June, 1948. Article 100 of that charter was apparently aimed directly at the 1946 AVHO Constitution. That article states : The specialized organizations shall establish cooiDerative relations with world agencies of the same character in order to coordiuute their activities. In concluding agreements with international agencies of a worldwide character, the Inter- American specialized organizations shall preserve their iden- tity and their status as integral parts of the Organization of American States, even when they perform regional functions of international agencies.-" AVhatever it was that PAHO or OAS had in 1946 that it Avished to ])rotect from full integration with WHO is not evident. The situa- tion and the outcome are not altogether unlike those of the final devel- opments concerning the "Paris Office" and the Health Organization of the League — ^the coexistence of two international organizations, one regional and the other universal, with the regional organization ful- filling obligations to two different international agreements and with overlapping regional interests. This latter specific problem in PAHO was solved by providing that all meetings of the Directing Council or of the Pan American Sani- tary Conference would be at the same time meetings of the Regional Committee of the World Health Organization, except when constitu- tional or juridical matters were under consideration. Accordingly, representatives of tlie European States with territorial interests in tlie Americas have attended PAHO meetings with full voting rights since 1951."* "*' Calderwoofl. "The World Heullli Orjianii^ation aiul Its Regional Organizations," op cit., jiMfre 24. ""Ibicl.. page 25. 1" Ibifl., page 23. "- Ibid., page 23. ""Ibid., page 23. "' Ibid.. pa.£rps 24 5. 722 lliG ^YHO concept of a single international health organization re- mains technically unfulfilled. Meanwhile, in accordance with prior agreements, the Pan American Sanitary Bureau functions much as do the other Regional Offices of WHO."=^ The Pan American Health Or- ganization remains legally an Inter- American specialized organiza- tion of OAS. But the arrangement is working and the technicalities are being ignored. Persistent Tendency to Neglect Health oh an Internatloval Goal Apart from the scientific and political difficulties of establishing multinational machinery for cooperation in health, it is disconcerting to note that on at least' two major occasions formal diplomacy came close to overlooking global health altogether. Both the Health Or- ganization of the League of Nations and the World Health Organi- zation were last-minute additions to the Covenant of the league and the IT.N. Charter. Dr. K. E^^ang of the Health Services of Norway recalls : One interesting historic exami)le is that health was "for- gotten" M-hen the Covenant of the Tieague of Nations Avas drafted after the first World War. Only at the last moment was world health brought in, producing the Health Section of the League of Nations, one of the forerunners of the pres- ent FAO, as well as of WHO. Althougli international par- ticipation in the League of Nations was limited, the Health Section of the League developed into one of the most success- ful and non-controversial parts of the organization, making itself indispensable through its statutory functions. Who Avould have thought, therefore, that health would again be "forgotten" when the Charter of the United Nations was drafted at the end of the Second World War? However, tliis was exactly what happened, and the matter of world health again had to be introduced more or less ad hoc at the United Nations conference at San Francisco in the spring of 1945."'' It was only the vigorous intervention of the national delegations from Brazil, China, and Norway that held a plac« for an international health organization under the United Nations.^^'^ Three advisers in health matters. Dr. De Paula Souza, Dr. Szeming Sze, and Dr. K. Evang— hardly diplomats or politicians in the usual sense — took the initiative which ultimately resulted in the World Health Organization. Evang is quick to note that the reluctantly-launched WHO Avas not to be in for smooth sailing : The World Health Organization came into being just nt the time (1948) when the political honeymoon which the United Nations had enjoved for a short period after the Second World War had definitely come to an end, and the "cold war" had started. It was of coiu-se a most unfortunate political cli- mate for a newcomer which was supposed to act non-politi- cs Ibid., paK*' 24. "" ••Rcaltli of Miiiikiiul," oil. cit.. i)ai,'(s 202-::. ^ ^ „, ,^ ""Ibid., page 20;i. See also: Charles. "Origiii>', bistor.v. and achievements of the World Health Ovgaiiization," op. cit., page 294. 723 cally in the field of internatioiiul health, but which was built and run by member governments. Tlie withdrawal for a short period into "inactive membership'' of the group of Eastern European countries was a blow to the organization, from which, however, it recovered. The lacli of success in bringiiig the People's Republic of China in as a member, was — and still is — much worse. It means that a whole wall is missing in the building. The Arab- Israel conflict also created some trou- ble. As if this was not enough, influential political forces of a more general character made themselves felt through the UN itself, threatening the independence and technical integ- rity of WHO and other specialized agencies. The ver}^ prin- ciple established at San Francisco in 1945, namely to give scientists, technicians and administrators a chance, in the specialized agencies and independently of political considera- tions, to build international co-operation on a broad scale, was in the process of being betrayed. The most dangerous attack came through the proposal in the UN for a "consolidated budget". In principle this meant that all the member states of the UN would liave had to pay only one contribution, namely directly to the United Nations. Like the individual ministries in a national government, the various specialized agencies would have to produce their sep- arate programmes. A clear-cut political body, namely the UN itself, would then have discussed, accepted or rejected these programmes, decided priorities and finally allotted to each specialized agency one part of the total consolidated budget. If I am not wrongly informed, high credit goes to the Di rectors- Greneral of the most important specialized agencies at that time — Morse, Iloxley, Boyd Orr and Chisholm — for stopping this frontal attack to get political control over the specialized agencies. A weaker and more indirect attempt was made later when the UN progrannne of technical assistance was introduced, but this also worked out in a satisfactory way on the whole. Again great credit for political wisdom goes to the non- political heads of these organizations, including Dr. Candau (AYHO)."^ Cost of U.S. Participation in ths World Health Organization Few problems have come before the governing bodies of WHO so regularly and have remained so stubbornly controversial as the ques- tion of how nnich money it should spend on its work. In the early period of the Organization's history C. E. A. Winslow tried to lay out the general guidelines : The tavsk is a vast and difficult one. It is particularly chal- lenging to the World Health Organization, because it seems clear that a public health program adapted to the individual needs of each area offei-s the most economical method of break- ing the chains of disease and poverty and initiating an up- ward cycle of social evolution. To accomolish the end in view 1"* "Health of Mankind," op. cit., pages 205-206. 724 two things are necessary. The first essential is an analysis by each country — at whatever stage of health evolution it may be — of the most vital health problems which may be attacked with maximum results at minimum cost. The second essential is the development of cooperative prog-rams of technical as- sistance, in whicli the more fortunate areas may cooperate with those of less advanced development for the common goal of a healthful, prosperous, and peaceful world.^^^ Xevertheless, disagreement has persisted. On the one hand, ancl speaking for a number of countries, Dr. Evang told the third World Health Assembly : If half, or one-third, or even one-tenth of the present scien- tific knowledge of medicine had been spelt out in terms of public health administrations, hospitals, sick insurance schemes, doctors, nurses and auxiliary personnel, in a proper production and distribution of drugs and insecticides, medical literature and equipment, the picture of the Avhole world would have been very different indeed from that which meets the eve today * * =^\ "The vast majority of the peoples of the world still live in bondage to disease and misery. Science knows the means to rapid improvement, and we know how to administer the proper health measures. We are not dreamers, but practical men. Nevertheless, a majority of the member countries them- selves voted a budget for WHO which is disastrously inade- quate. Wliy has this situation arisen and why do we uphold it ? I am not offering an explanation, because I know of none which would satisfy you and me.^^*^ Representatives of other nations at the same Assembly dissented and expressed other concerns : . * * * Ivest the Organization attempt to cover too much ground superficially, and pointed out that it was essential to limit its activities to work that could only be done through inter- national machinery or particularly lent itself to international action. That international funds should be spent sparingly, and primarily to help countries face problems for which their own resources are inadequate, has been repeatedly emphasized by representatives of all governments and is one of the funda- mental principles on which international w^ork rests.^-^ SOME ASPECTS OF U.S. SUPPORT OF THE WHO BUDGET As the activities of WHO began to appear rewarding, and as the number of member nations increased, the Organization received more requests for aid and assistance. The Director-General's budgets re- flected this growing need for funds and the World Health Assembly with few exceptions voted approval of the increased budgets each year. The budgetary approvals often resulted from the large vote "9 C. E. A. Winslow. "The cost of sickness and the i)riep of health.'' WHO Monograph Series, No. 7 (Geneva. 1951), pages 9-10. 12" Third World Health Assemhly, 1950. 121 WHO Chronicle, (July 1960). 725 from llu' new luid needy countries. The United States rarely voted for approval of the bndget, and has recently Avorked with the other major contribntjng States ("the Geneva Group"') to try to reduce it. One of the few times that the United States did vote for the Director-Gen- eral's working budget as proposed was in i5).3h. On this occasion the budget was approved by ac(damation. TABLE l.-RECENT EVOLUTION OF THE WHO BUDGET AND U.S. ASSESSMENTS' (CALENDAR YEAR) Year 197P 1970_ 1969. 1968. 1967. 1966. 1965 1964. 1963. 1962. 1961. WHO regular budget Percent increase over previous year U.S. assessment Percent U.S. assessment to regular budget _ $73,230,000 8.2 8.9 10.7 7.8 li.7 12.6 14.4 13.6 22.2 25.7 16.9 $23, 648. 660 21,680,810 19, 533, 130 18,075,620 16, 627, 320 13,578,420 12,327,120 10, 852, 040 9,611,280 7, 657, 430 5, 999, 700 30 87 67,650,000 30.87 62,121,700 31,20 56,123.000 31.20 52,075,600 31.20 44,481,800 39,507,000 31.20 31.29 34,542,750 31.29 30,394,100 31.12 24,863,800 31.71 19,780,448 31.70 1 Figures obtained from Office of International Health, Public Health Service. In 1958 a statutory limitation was placsd upon tiie U.S. payment which lequired that for any fiscal year it could not exceed 33)^ percent of the total assessments of the active members of WHO for that year. - Proposed. Beginning in about 1060 the WHO regulai- budget increased each year in increments var3'ing between $3 and $6 million (see table 1). The budget for 1971 was roughly 31/2 times larger than that for 1961. The percent of increase per year over this same j^eriod, hoAvever, showed a generally downward trend from 16.9 percent in 1961 to 8.2 percent in 1971. The average increase 196f)-1971 was 9.5 percent. The table reflects the continued growth of the United States' assessed con- tribution. The recent preoccupation of the United States, and of some other major contributors/-^ is to stabilize the WHO budget and i-educe the rate of increase. Although U.S. participation in WHO has been influenced by neces- sary budgetary restraint in recent years, there is reason to believe that other restraining factors of one sort or another have been operating from the very beginning. Some of these factors seem well established in spite of the good performance of the T'nited States in voluntary contributions to international health activities in general and its faithful ])ayment of assessments to WHO in particular. For example, early congressional actions with res])ect to WHO were not enthusias- tic, as has been documented by Ivussell in a paper on '"International Preventive Medicine" ])ul)lished in 1950: Although .Vmeiican leaders in preventive medicine had a prominent part in laying the groundwork for WHO, the Ignited States Congress has thus far given it reluctant and limited support. ^-^ Slow to ratify the | AVHO] constitution. Congress arbi- trarily fixed ourannual pai-ticipation in the budget of WHO iKIn i;)(V2: U.S. share, 31.7 percent; U.S.S.R., 12,48; United Kiugdom, 7.13; France, 5.86 ; Federal Republic of Germany, 4.88 : China (Taiwan). 4.59 ; Canada, 2.85 ; India, 2.25 ; Italy, 2.06: Japan, 2.01; Australia. 1.64; Sweden. 1.27: Poland, 1.25; Belgium, 1.19; Argentina. 1.02. Mo.st of the member nations contributed less than 1 percent. ^-' RussoU. ■"International Preventive Medicine." op. cit., page 397. 726 at 1.9 niiJlioii dollai-s '"'' (moanwhilo appropriatinir tens of millions for fshoi-t-terin bilateral health aid * '•' '■"■.) ^-'' A measure recently passed by Conaress j^ermits onr an- nual a])prC)iiriation for WHO to be increased np to H mil- lion dollars ^^^ * * * this new bill met stiff opposition.^-* Such hesitant cooperation is regrettable, for (^onixre'^s, has re]>eatedly demonstrated oi-eat interest in public health. Doubtless this o])position is simply the reflection of a lack of active and informed concern on the part of laymen and most physicians about the subject of international preven- tive medicine.^^ Perhaps two hypotheses can I)© derixed from Ixussell's points con- cernine: the prominent role of American leaders in layinjs; the ground- work for WHO and the lack of active and informed concern on the ])art of most American physicians in international preventive medi- cine : ( 1 ) The American leaders involved in the planni ng of WHO were more likely to have been mostly diplomats and specialists in preventive ined'ichie or piihlic healfli. rather than ex{)erts in curative mediehie lolth hidivuJiial patient orientation, the latter dominating the power structure of American medical practice at the time. (2) The concern of American physicians during the planning and Congressional rati- fication of WHO may have involved the implications of health insurance jind socialized medicine in. an international context rather than the problems of preventive medicine on an international scale.^^° THE IMPACT OF DEVELOPMENT STUDIES ON WHO Little in the recent studies available to the Congress concerning international deA'elopment focuses attention adequately on the extent to which poor health impedes social and economic progress of man- kind. The Pearson Report,"^ for example, dismisses international healtli ])roblems in two pages (of some 400), vet conveys the impres- sion of sweeping advances in the control of infectious diseases and the sweeping spread of therapeutic health services worldwide. It credits to "\^TTO achievements which that agency Avould not itself claim; as a practical matter, the unsolved health problems confronting WHO and other international health institutions are extensive and diflficult. Of the report the New England Journal of Medicine states : The cursory and grossly inaccurate treatment afforded health is representative of current economic thought.^^^ The Jackson Report ^^^ appears to deemphasize the World Health 12= This action In effect fixed the size of WHO's regular budget, because of the assessment formula. 1^ Russell, "International Preventive Medicine," op. cit., page 397. ^^ This action, too, in effect fixed the size of WHO's regular budget. 1^ Russell, "International Preventive Medicine," op. cit., page 397. ^ Idem. 130 Allen, "World Health and World Politics," op. cit, page 27, and Goodman. "Inter- national Health Organization," op. cit., page 20. See also WHO Constitutional Function, "P," Part 11. 1=^ Lester B. Pearson, "Partners in Development," Report of the Commission on Inter- national Development. (Set up at the request of Robert S. McNamara, President of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.) (New York, Praeger Publishers, September 15, 1966), pages 12, 40-41. 13^ "Medical Research as Measured Against the Needs -of All," op. cit., page 537. 133 "X Study of the Capacity of the United Nations Development System," Vol. 1, (Geneva, United Nations, September 30, 1969). Organization in favor of a reorganized United Nations Development Program as the focal point of funds, coordination, review, ancl deci- sion in technical assistance for country-centered health programs. It proposes that somehow the UNDP can simultaneously coordinate and decentralize. Using WHO as an example, this report tells the member governments that they can stabilize that Organization's budget at its present level. On the basis of the Jackson Capacity Study, one could hardly expect present and future appropriation committees to expand the budget of WHO, even though full implementation of the United Nations Development Cooperation Cycle (UNDCC) con- cept, which the report recommends, may be several years away. The Peterson Task Force report ^^ would rely on multilateral orga- nizations like WHO in place of AID, but there is no specific rec- ommendation that AID funds in health and sanitation be transferred to WHO. There is also little reason to believe that new breakthroughs in science and technology as anticipated through a proposed U.S. International Development Institute represent a primary need at this time for WHO or any other organization working in the field of inter- national health. The report doesn't mention WHO and rarely mentions health, but its philosophical stance warrants elaboration in a later section.. The economists, international organization experts, bankers, and fiscal managers who prepared these three reports are distinguished scholars and businessmen whose conclusions deserve serious considera- tion in the long run. However, for the immediate future and possibly for the next few years appropriation committees of Congress might also examine the growing budgets of WHO and PAHO and the U.S. contributions thereto in the light of applying the technology already available to alleviate the mass misery of ill health abroad as well as at home. A report of this type, by Dr. John Bryant of the Rockefeller Foundation, is commended by The New England Journal of Medicine, citing especially the following paragraph from the preface of Dr. Bryant's book: Large numbers of the world's people, perhaps more than half, have no access to health care at all, and for many of the rest the care they receive does not answer the problems they have. The grim irony is that dazzling advances in biomedical sciences are scarcely felt in areas where need is greatest. Vast numbers of people are dying of preventable and curable diseases, or surviving with phji-sical and intellectual impair- ment for lack of even the simplest measures of modern medicine.^^^ The Journal notes incidentally that "Bryant's excellent study bene- fited from an Advisory Committee, representing a broad experience in the international health field, and including senior staff members of the World Health Organization.'^^ 13* ' r.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970's : A New Approacli.' Report to the President from the Task Force on International Development. March 4. 1970. (Washington. U.S. Government Printing OflBce, 1970). page 2. i»6 John Bryant. "Health and the Developing World." (Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 19R9). preface, and page IX. "« "Medical Research as Measured Against the Needs of All," op. cit., page 538. 728 The cost of international collaboration in public health through multilateral organizations may be relatively less in the future than in the past. The "engineering'' lessons have been learned and institu- tions can now devise more cost-eifective designs. Much is known about, how, where, and when to provide technical assistance in international healtli. As Bryant says, "to give effectively is an exacting task. To give without doing harm is, surprisingly, equally exacting." ^^^ TOTAL COST OF WHO ACTIVITIES AND TOTAL U.S. CONTRIBUTION Actually, the United States contributes larger funds to WHO than those indicated in Table 1 "The Recent Evolution of the WHO Budget and U.S. Assessments." WHO's regular budget on which assessments are based does not adequately reflect the total amount of funds avail- able to the Organization and for which it is administratively respon- sible. Table 2 provides some estimated data for 1968 to enable comparison of sources of all funds administered directly or indirectly by WHO and the U. S. assessed and voluntary contributions to those sources as utilized by WHO. Since one study (Jackson) suggests that the WHO regular budget might be. fixed at its present level and that future voluntary funds for technical assistance be centralized under a "beefed up" and re- organized UNDP, it becomes possible to visualize stronger U.S. influ- ence over any future expansion of international health activities. TABLE 2.— SOURCE AND AMOUNT OF TOTAL FUNDS ADMINISTERED BY WHO, INCLUDING TOTAL U.S. CONTRIBUTIONS (1968) 1968 obligations for activities funded directly U.S. contributions or indirectly to WHO Source of funds by WHO activities— 1968 Regular budget $56,123,000 $17,989,000 UNDP: Expanded program of technical assistance U.N. Special Fund 7.616,526 3,046,810 Voluntary funds for health protection 6. 922, 419 1, 288, 930 International Center for Research on Cancer 1,600,000 150,000 UNICEF 17,000,000 12,000,000 PAHO (regular and other) 14,589,460 8,479,825 Total .., 107,073,731 43,249,645 Funds-in-trust. -_ 2,860,499 That is to say, unlike the AVHO Executive Board and Health Assembly where the U.S. has one vote out of 24 and 181 re^spectively, in the UNDP the United States sits as a memloer of the Governing Council wliich is composed of equal numbei'S of representatives of developed and less developed States. In addition, the UNDP at the present time is under strong and competent management by an American administrator. The implications of these prospects become even greater, if a larger amount of T".S. funds for loans, foreign aid, and technical assistance are transferred from bilateral programs to such multilateral agencies as the UNDP and others. It does not necessarily follow that increased United States technical and programatic influence over international health activities is the "' Bryant, op. cit., page 29.S. 729 clue to a substantially improved health picture for the world. A greater U.S. influence, however, would satisfy the demands of American policymakers that such influence exists. The Congress can also be expected to find merit in the equal representation of donor and recipient countries on the UNDP Governing Council as well as improA-ed coordination of international health work through that Council. For comparative purposes it is useful to show the relative amounts which the United States contributes to international health (WHO) through involuntary assessment and the amount which it spends on certain related activities. The U.S. assessed contribution to WHO for 1971 represents approximately: — One dollar for every 800 dollars which the Federal Government appropriates in one way or another to its own total health budget ; — One dollar for every 2000 dollars which United States citizens spend for health care ; —Less than one half of one percent of the total outflow of funds for overall technical assistance to the lesser developed countries; — About 15 percent of the total assessed contributions of the U.S. to all international organizations; and — Abont 20 percent of the total U.S. assessed contributions to the UN and its Specialized Agencies. III. U.S. Agencies Supportixg International Health Programs There are 20 U.S. Government units w^hich in one way or another are involved in international health and related programs. The latest estimate for the amount of funds provided annually by the U.S. Government in support of this omnibus category is "$175 million, exclusive of the Food for Peace Program, foreign currencies generated by repayment of loans and the sale of agricultural surpluses under Public Law 480, and the funds made available through the internaitional lending agencies." "^ Apparently, overseas scientific activities, including biomedical research, peaked around 1965 and together with AID health activities have been gradually declining since then. The major U.S. Government departments or agencies which support programs of research, technical assistance, or economic aid in health and related subjects overseas, are the Department of State, the Depart- ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, and the Department of Defense. International Health Acticities of the Department of State The two principal organizations in the Department of State that have to do Avith international health matters are the Bureau of Inter- national Organization Affairs and the Agency for International Development (AID). The Bureau of International Organization Affairs administei"S the U.S. contributions to international and Inter- American organizations and to certain special programs. These activities, especially as they relate to WHO and PAHO, are discussed in Section IV. '38 "International Cooperation in Health and Sanitation Programs." Draft prepared by the U.S. Department of Health. Education, and Welfare, and the Agency for International Development (November 8, 1965), page 18.5. 730 AID administei"S the bulk of United States bilateral technical find economic assistance, inchidino- healtli and sanitation projects, and makes voluntary contributions to multilateral organizations like the United Nations Development Program. Although the U.S. foreign aid program has luidergone many changes, is re-organizing now and will doubtless reorganize again, the original objective remains essentially intact. The concept as it applies to the health of the less developed countries was described several years ago by David E. Bell, administrator of AID at that time : — to help them act to meet their most immediate health problems — of which the most conspicuous are malaria and the water-borne diseases — and — to help them create the trained personnel and the functioning institutions to enable them progressively to overcome their health problems. The most urgent of these institutional changes are generally taken to be those which are concerned with training health personnel, those concerned with the provision of public health services, and those concerned with the study of a nation's health problems and with planning how to meet them." ^^^ In what may be considered a well-phrased political objective, the health progi^ams supported by AID are : * * * Measures that bring better health to the whole popu- lation, or a large segment of it, lay a basis for a bix>ader distribution of political power, for where only the elite are healthy and vigorous and most of the people are lethargic from sickness, power tends to remain concentrated and demo- cratic institutions are not likely to develop. 140 AID'S INTERNAmONAL HEALTH ACTIVITIES It is difficult to determine from AID's diverse activities in health matters which ones should be regarded as clearly emergency or relief as against longer term public health pi'ograms, or indeed which pro- grams are bilateral and which multilateral. Tlie war on hunger, the green revolution, population and family planning, nutrition and child feeding, and food from the sea, as described in the Foreign Assistance Program report for 1969,"^ are crucial to the health of all populations and especially those where malnutrition and endemic disease work together in the production of high morbidity and mortality. Also what may appear to be a straight ward engineering operation may have a most profound significance for public health. For example, one of the largest health programs, in financial terms, which AID has supported was that for community water supply development and sewerage and waste disposal. The financial assistance (from about 1961 to 1965) was nearly $400 million, but was largely in the form of loans from international lending agencies. These funds, together with local ex- penditures made by the developing countries involved, constituted an $800 million improvement in water supply and sewage dis})osal sys- tems."^ Tliis type of cooperative venture does not require a pliysician "9 Ibid., piige 69. "" Ihid.. pnges 75-76. 141 "The Foreign Assistance Program, Auniial Report to Congress for FY 1969" (Wash- ington, U.S. Government Printing OflSce, 1970), pages 11-14. >" 'International Cooperation in Health and Sanitation Programs," op. clt., page 76. 731 either from the United States or in the host country, but it is never- theless "preventive medicine" and in this sense is a health program. It will be noted in a later paragraph that AID is still active in promo- tion of the management, operation, and maintenance of water and sewerage systems. AID health work is bilateral, except for U.S. voluntary contribu- tions from the AID appropriation to the United Nations Development Program ($71 million in 1969), a part of which is utilized by WHO; or contributions to UNICEF, much of which is administered by WIIO."^ AID also contributes to the Special Development Assistance Fund of the Organization of American States which supports multi- lateral activities."* A general de^scription of AID's health activities was presented in the 1969 AID report to Congress : AID health programs in fiscal 1969, amounting to $123 million [iiichiding $45.4 million for population programs], were coordinated Avith those of international organizations, such as the World Health Organization, Pan American Health Organization and the United Nations Children's Fimd. Support for malaria eradication programs was provided in 18 countries under bilateral agreements. Of a population of 753 million in the malarious areas, 256 million now live in areas where the disease has been eradicated and 189 million where malaria transmission has been stopped. An active anti- malaria campaign is protecting an additional 288 million people. ^leasles control and smallpox eradication programs covered 19 countries in Central and West Africa where more than 68.4 million people have been vaccinated against smallpox and 11 million children vaccinated against measles. In environmental health activities, the management, oper- ation and maintenance of water and sewerage systems con- tinued to be emphasized in efforts to lessen the danger of dis- eases caused by pollution. Research projects have developed new approaches to the control and eradication of epidemic and endemic diseases. Promising leads to possible immunization techniques for the prevention of malaria were established. The major causes of death in infancy and childhood were also studied."^ TRENDS IN THE LEVEL OF SUPPORT FOR AID'S HEALTH ACTIVITIES Beginning in 1956, the overall trend in AID dollar contributions in support of health and sanitation programs and the use of counter- "' "The Foreign Assistance Program.'" op. cit.. page 42. There are two t.vpes of appropria- tions involved in the State Department from which funds may be utilized for health work In fi>rpi?' '•■>i'nt''f< On^ Jiiiproiirintion is rMre^-tl.v to State for the assessed contributions Of the United State® to international organizations. The others are pursuant to the Foreign Assistance Act (AID) in "Funds Appropriated to the President." (See: "The Budget of the United States Government, Appendix, Fiscal Tear 1971," Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), page 80. When funds from the later source are con- tributed to an international organization, AID's bilateral character becomes functionally multilateral. When a multilateral organization, such as WHO or PAHO sets up a project wtth a host country, the agreement is a bilateral one — between the international organi- zation and the host country. The difference in the latter case is that the agreement is not country with country. 144 "The Fore 'gn Assistance Program." op. cit.. page 3?. U6 "The Fort gn Assistance Program," op. cit.. page 15. 732 part funds for these programs is one of general increase up to 1963 and 1964. In 1965 these funds were sharply decreased to $48 million each. Table 3, below, shows the figures for the 1956-1965 time period. TABLE 3.— AID DOLLAR CONTRIBUTION AND WITHDRAWALS FOR COUNTRY USE OF COUNTERPART FUNDS AND U.S. OWNED LOCAL CURRENCY. 1956-€5 (Millions of dollars or dollar equivalent] < Category 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 Esti- mated 1965 Dollars _ _ Dollar equivalent in local currency . 34.2 5.7 45.6 3.7 45 5 38.3 15.6 48.7 36.0 48.2 1.9 63.4 78.9 88.5 67.4 67.3 118.8 48.5 48.1 Total. . 39.9 49.3 50 53.9 84.7 50.1 142.3 155.9 186.1 96.6 > Report on the health and sanitation activities of the Agency for International Development for fiscal year 1967. Pre- pared by the Office of International Health, Department of Health. Education, and Welfare (1968), p. 79. This decreasing trend continues into recent years where it may be followed by observing the health and sanitation category in AID's tables on technical cooperation. For example the amount of pro]ect assistance in health and sanitation was $35.5 million in 1967 "®, $18.4 million in 1968,"^ and $13.2 million in 1969. Table 4, below, shows the level of AID health and sanitation projection assistance in 1969 of $13.2 million as compared with other fields of activity, totaling $250.3 million. TABLE 4.— AID TECHNICAL COOPERATION PROJECTS IN FISCAL YEAR 1959 BY FIELD OF ACTIVITY' [In millions of dollars] Field of activity Technical cooperation Total project assistance 2 263. 5 Regional and cou ntry programs 209. 5 Food and agriculture 38. 2 Industry and mining 6.0 Transportation. 6. 3 Labor. 9.1 Health and sanitation 13.2 Education. _ . 44. 5 Public safety 6.7 Field of activity Technical cooperation Regional and country programs— Continued Public administration. 14.0 Community development and social welfare... 3.0 Housing... 1. 1 Private enterprise promotion... 2. 5 General and miscellaneous.. 28. 2 Technical support 36.8 Nonregional projects 54. 0 • Foreign assistance program, 1959. op. cit., p. 51. 2 Project total only; excludes $7,400,000 in program (nonproject) assistance funded from the technical cooperation/ development grant appropriation. AID HEALTH TECHNICIANS The number of U.S. technicians in health programs financed by AID declined much earlier than did the available fimds. There were 366 AID technicians in health and sanitation in 1960, 328 in 1962, and 215 in 1965. The reduction in South America was particularly marked, declining from 93 to 25 during the years 1960 to 1965.^** Both AID and Public Health Officials expected this downward trend in the number of U.S. technicians and advisers to be reversed. And by June 1967 it was ; there was at that time a total direct-hire and PHS i« Ibid., Attachment 5. 147 "The Foreign Assistance Program, Annual Report to Congress for FT 1&68," (Wash- ington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), page 45. 148 "Report on Health and Sanitation Activities of AID for FY 1967," op. cit., pages 7-9. 733 AID-financed staff of 501 people (health, sanitation, and administra- tion). One hundred nineteen of these Avere located in Washington at AID and PHS and 197 were in Vietnam. The remainder were dis- tributed as follows : ^*^ Africa 82 East Asia 39 Latin America 34 Near East and South Asia 30 Total 185 CONTINUING RESOURCES OF AID In spite of continuing reduction in funds appropriated to AID it remains a sizeable organization. It had nearly 4,000 permanent posi- tions in 1970 as compared with 23,266 for the entire Department of State.^^" By direct-hire or interagency agreement AID employs thou- sands of additional people. Eighty-one U.S. voluntary agencies (most of them health-related) are registered with AID's Advisory Committee on Foreign Aid for the purpose of receiving overseas freight payments of supplies donated by numerous tj^pes of religious, regional, welfare, and national or ethnic interest groups. In 1969 this freight bill was about $5,000,000.^^^ U.S. Government excess property may also be shipped out under this ar- rangement, as well as food and drug surpluses of industry ; these last are transferred by donating the surplus to one of the registered volun- tary agencies. Some 500 nonprofit organizations, foundations, and missionary groups maintain overseas programs. In order to provide a central source of information concerning these various types of assistance projects, AID arranges under contract for the publishing of directo- ries by the Technical Assistance Information Clearing House. This idea is not unlike that recommended by the Public Health Service evaluation group as a result of a study conducted in Latin America in 1952. If these directories are complete and are utilized it should be possible to prevent duplicate materials from piling up on sliipping docks and air terminals as well as preventing technical assistance and missionaries from "stTimbling over each other" in a country in need at any given time. What is required, of course, are country registers: records of who is giving short and long-term assistance to a country and what the amount and nature of tliat assistance is. Such registers do not exist, very likely because of the high cost of assembling the data. RECAPITULATION OF AID ACTIVITIES In summary', AID has established unique guidelines and machinery for operations in international health work. However, funds available for sucli operations have been decreasing, year by year. AID still con- tributes significant amounts of money to ]nultilateral organizations such as the L^nited Nations Development Program, the U.N. Special i« Ihid., page 9. 150 "The Budget of the United States GovernniPiit. Fiscal Year 1972, Appendix," pages 77 and 6S4', 151 "xhe Foreign Assistance Program, Annual Report to Congress for FY 1909," op. cit., page 7.5. 734 Poi)uhuinii Fund, and UXICKF. Some of tliese funds are made avail- able to WHO and PAHO. The principal limitations of AID as an organization to serve the Nation's interests in health in all parts of the world are its lack of ade- (luate stati' in the medical field and its practice of concentrating as- sistance in relatively few countries. In the fiscal year 1060. 87 percent of aid's countrv assistance went to only 15 nations. [nfiriKitional Actlvitic.s of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Tiie Public Ilealtli Service (PHS) in the Department of Health. Education, and Welfare (DHEW), is the primary U.S. (iovermnont resouiT7> ill both national and international health. It is tiie official teclinic:i! liaision of the U.S. Government with the World Health Organization and the Pan American Health Organization. (The liai- son is in the Office of International Health, now under the Assistant Secretary for Health and Scientific xVffairs.) Its Chief Medical Officer played a major role in the drafting of the WHO constitution and has usually served as the liead of the U.S. delegation to the World Health Assembly. In addition to its constitutional role in WHO. PHS prepares tlie U.S. teclmical i)osition ])apcrs for the World Health Assembly, sup- plies or assists in providing experts for the WHO advisory commit- tees, and is tiio teclmical point of contact between the World Health Organization and the U.S. (lovcrnment. Many of DIIEW's ]al>oratories and institutes participate as Refer- ence Centers for the World Health Organization. There are 40 such WHO renters or laboratories in tlie United States. The National Cen- ter for Disease Control in Atlanta. Georgia, is the home of at least 8 of these Reference Centei's for the World Health Organization at the present time. The Department's prominent role in international health organiza- tions does not make for an exclusively multilateral orientation on its part. It ••"• * * has actively participated in bilateral health and sanita- tion ]>i-ograms supported by the I'.S. Government in many countries since World War II." ^ '- t'nder interagency agreements witli AID. 200 or more PHS staff membei-s work in cooperation with AID head- quarters or are on field location with AID missions. Additional PHS medical officei-s and other officers are assigned to the Peace Corps. ovf:rskas I'xrrs of iiif, xatioxal ixstitutes or health The National Institutes of Health (NIH) maintains overseas offices in U.S. E:iil)assies in Paris. Rio de Janeii-o, Tokyo, and New Delhi. It also supports research laboratories in the Panama Canal Zone (the Middle America Research T'nit), in Puerto Rico (Laboratory of Peri- natal Diseases), in Guam (Epidemiology and Genetics Centers) ; and adniipisteis tlie Pakistan (^holera Research Lal)oratory for SEATO.^^^ 3-- •Iiiteriiatioiial Cdoperation in Health and Sanitation Programs," (19Go), op. clt., IKitif !i4. 'M"Nin Almanac, 1970," (Washing-ton U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pages IMT-tt : See also: U.S. Congre.^s, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics. "The PMrtiiip.itioii 1,1" Federal A-incies in International Scientific Programs," Rei)ort of the Science I'ldicv Research and Foreign Affairs Divisions, Legislative Reference Service, to the Subconiiiiittee on Science. Research, and Development, 90th Congress, first session, (Wash- ington, I'.S. (J.ivernment I'rinting Ottice, 19G7), pages 137-9. 735 Other overseas laboratories supported by NIH are administered through grants to American universities. This is a five-laboratory program called the International Centers for Medical Rese^arch and Training.^^^ The total cost of the supporting grants in 1969 was about $2.3 million. The five centers are located as follows: 1. The Institute for Medical Research, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 2. All-India Institute of Hygiene and Public Health, Calcutta, India 3. Center at the University of Costa Rica, San Jose, Costa Rica 4. Institute of Hygiene, Lahore, West Pakistan 5. Center at the Universidad del Valle, Call, Colombia. THE FOGARTY INTERNATIONAL CENTER On July 1, 1968, the Congress and the President approved a bill of- fered by Rep. Melvin Laird of Wisconsin to establish the Fogarty In- ternational Center at NIH.^^^ To date, the Center has established pro- grams (1) for encouraging international communication among bio- medical scientists through conferences, seminars, and worksliops; (2) for Scholars-in-Residence, called "Fogarty Scholars," for the purpose of making advanced contributions to the health sciences, including philosophical, social, economic, and legal issues; and (3) for an Inter- national Visitors' Center as the focal point at NIH for the reception of international dignitaries and scientists. Tr> addition, the Fogarty International Center now administers the NIH International Postdoctoral Fellowship Program and the Special Foreign Currency Program. Under the Fellowship Program young scientists come to the United States for one or two years of advanced research training. The fellows come from about 40 countries. In Fiscal Year 1969, 173 fellowships were awarded (new and second-year) at a cost of $1,408,102. The Special Foreign Currency Program, earlier called the "Spe- cial International Research Program" (SIRP) , is a system of overseas health research projects utilizing P.L. 480 funds. These cooperative re- search agreements are usually set up for three- to five-year periods. Unless there has been a very recent change in the situation with respect to the availability of foreign currencies to NIH, it is correct to state that this program has been undergoing a rapid decline. As of June 30, 1966 current projects numbered 143 and the U.S. dollar equivalent in- volved was over $19 million ; ^^^ the 1967 appropriation Congress re- duced this program to $10 million ; ^^^ and the program was further reduced in 1969, as seen in Table 5 below: 164 "NIH Almanac. 1970," op. cit., page 139. IK "NIH Annual Report of International Activities, FY 1969," Prepared by the Fogarty International Center, National Institutes of Health. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing OfQce, February 1, 1970), pages 1—5. 156 'The Participation of Federal Agencies in International Scientific Programs," op. cit., page 138. ^" Ibid., page 144. 736 TABLE 5.-N1H SPECIAL FOREIGN CURRENCY PROGRAM' Name of country Number of projects Amount awarded fiscal year 969 Poland - . . - - 7 6 4 1 23 3 $1,254,309 Yugoslavia - 492, 830 United Arab Republic - - 478, 701 Israel 1,000 India - - 2.017,525 Pakistan . . - - 3,068,057 Total - : 44 7,312,442 I "NIH Annual Report of International Activities, fiscal year 1969," op. cit., pp. 141-153. THE RISE AND DECLINE OF PHS AND NIH GRANTS ^N INTERNATIONAL HEALTH I PHS and NIH awarded a limited number of grants to institutions in foreign countries and to international organizations between 1944 and 1960. The basic Public Health Service Act of July 1, 1944, was interpreted as providing sufficient legislative authority to empower the Secretary and the Surgeon General to conduct and support re- search overseas during that period. However, on July 12, 1960, new statutory authority for international health activities was provided : July 12, 1960 — Recognizing the importance of cooperation in international health research, Congress passed the Inter- national Health Research Act. Under the new law the Surgeon General was authorized to establish and make grants for fellowships in the United States and participating foreign countries; make grants or loans of equipment and other ma- terials to participating foreign countries for use by public or nonprofit institutions and agencies; participate in interna- tional health meetings, conferences, and other activities ; and facilitate the interchange of research scientists and experts between the United States and participating foreign coun- tries. ( Public Law 86-610, 74 Stat. L. 364. ) ^'^ For several years following the passage of this act, PHS and NIH international activities of all types were increased. Two additional programs have to do with research and training performed overseas. The programs differ primarily in the nature of the performer. In the Research and Trainees Abroad Program, the performer is an American scientist who goes to an institution in a foreign country for additional research and training. The institution is selected by the applicant and is usually located in a developed nation where biomedical research is well established and where the institution has won recognition of excellence in research. In the other program, of Research and Training Grants Awarded to Foreign Institutions, the research is performed by foreign nationals in these institutions. Once again, although many nations are recipients of these awards, the bias is in favor of the dei^eloped countries and the work is heavily research- oriented. These programs have also been declining. For example, the research grants awarded by NIH and the Bureau of State Services to foreign institutions in FY 1963 were 1,001 in number at a total cost 1-9 As summarized in the "NIH Almanac, 1970," op. clt., page 16. 737 of $15,477,000. In lOGO the coiTesixHuliiig- figures were 707 and $10,710,000.^*=^ By FY 10G9 the number of .such projects had decreased to 360 and tlie level of supi>ort to $5,00!),0(')0. The country distribution of projects and funds for FY lOGO are shown in the Table G, below: TABLE 6.— BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH AND TRAINING GRANTS OR CONTRACTS AWARDED BY NIH TO INSTITUTIONS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES AND TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, FISCAL YEAR 19691. Number of ArLOUiit Number of Amount Name of country projects awarded Name of country projects awarded Argentina 15 15 $20R. 571 204 332 Nigeria 1 45, 900 Australia Norway . . 3 75, 680 Austria 2 9.094 Pakistan.. 1 2,500 Belgium 7 79 SS2 Papua and New Guinea . 1 3,050 Brazil 12 120 eriod (1966 to 1969) the overseas biomedical research grants and contracts of DOD were reduced by a factor of between four and five. The 1969 country distribution of funds for medical research projects by the three services is shown in Table 8 below : 163 "The Participation of Federal Agencies in International Scientific Programs," op. cit., page 128. "« Ibid., paire 1.30. '"^ Letter from A. E. Ha.vward, Acting Deputy Director for Research and Technology, Office of the Director of Defense Research and Engineering to Charles S. Sheldon II, Chief, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, .Tanuary 20, 1971. 741 TABLE 8. --DOD CONTRACTS AND GRANTS FOR MEDICAL RESEARCH PERFORMED IN FOREIGM COUNTRIES.' (FISCAL YEAR 1969) . ^ ' [In thousands of dollars] Country India West Germany U nited Kingdom France Pakistan Australia Egypt Brazil Canada ■_. Republic of China. _ Israel. _. Italy Japan _l South Korea Malaysia Peru_ Philippines. Thailand Chile Ceylon Austria Belgium Holland Total 563.1 Army Navy 2 Air Force DOD total 200.7 3i."4" 15.0 15.2 10.0 11.0 215.7 6.0 ... 39.1 21.2 80.5 32.3 ... 43.3 283.1 -. 12.8 283.1 4.3 16.8 303. 0 . . 303.0 - 106.9 - -. 106.9 45.4 ... 45.4 26.7 ... 26.7 53.7 ... 53.7 37.4 . . 37.4 41.6 .... 32.7 .... 27.9 41.6 32.7 27.9 22.7 . 22.7 7.6 . -. 7.6 18.8 ._. 27.0 18.8 27.0 1.0.... 15.0.... 1.0 15.0 15.0 15.0 2.0... 2.0 831.0 51.2 1,445.3 ' Letter, Hayward to Sheldon, January 20. 1971, op. cit. 2 Includes Public Law 480 special foreign currency funds. DOD MEDICAL RESE.VRCII LA P,OR.\ TORIES OVERSEAS For a great many years the Army and Xavy, have conducted medi- oal rescarcli in overseas lalxiratories which they own and operate nnder aj^reement with t]ie local go>p]-ninen.t and in cooperation with tlie scientists of the country in Avhich tlie hibovatory is located. The laboratories are usually located where tropical diseases (parasitic and infectious) can be stiidiecL A comprehensive summary of relevant information on these international health actiA'ities as they exist today is presented in Table 9, below : TABLE 9.-D0D MEDICAL RESEARCH LABORATORIES OVERSEAS' Unit Major program area Total Fiscal Total other Total year 1969 DOD per- U.S. per- foreign Area size (thou- sonnel sonnel nationals ft.2 sand) 2 U.S. Army Medical Component. SEATO Infectious diseases.. Medical Research Laboratory, Bangkok, Thailand. U.S. Army WRAIR Medical Research Unit, do Saigon. Vietnam. U.S. Army Medical Research Unit, Mid- do die America Research Unit. Canal Zone, Panama. U.S. Army Medical Research Unit Insti- do tute for Medical Research, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. U.S. Army Medical Research Unit, Nuclear medicine Landstuhl, Germany. U.S. Navy Medical Research Unit No. 2 Infectious diseases.. Taipai, Taiwan. U.S. Navy Medical Research Unit No. 3 do Cairo, Egypt.5 ' Letter, Hayward to Sheldon, January 20, 1971, op. cit. 2 Does not include military salaries. 3 National Institutes of Health. * Total laboratory, 40.700 sq. ft. 5 There is a small extension unit of this laboratory in Addis Ababa. 65 325 100. OCO 41 15 10,000 16 ! 12 44 4 5. 000 6 60 10,000 7 5,100 36 342 89.000 38 220 217.800 $1,374 251 155 176 15 1,168 1,372 742 Unlike overseas health research grants from all agencies, which have declined precipitously during the past five years, and unlike the five overseas laboratories of the National Institutes of Health, which have held their own in size and level of support, the DOD Medical Research Units Overseas have doubled their operating budgets. The Navy installation at Cairo is nearly twice the size it was five years ago and the number of foreign nationals working in the Navy units at Taipei and Cairo has increased significantly. The combined total of foreign nationals on the staff and in the overall work force of these two labora- tories is now 562. In view of the declines in almost every other aspect of international collaborative research in the health field, including military grants and contracts, this development must be regarded as an encouraging one to those interested and concerned with global pre- ventive medicine. In a recent pai>er, Dr. John C. Cutler, Professor of International Health and Director of the Population Division, T'niversity of Pitts- burgh, ])oints to the imiiwrtance of military medical experience abroad as it benefits health work among U.S. nationals both abroad and at home. He sums up this picture of experienced medical manpower in connection with industry, bilateral and multilatei'al organizations, and pri\ate foundations as follows : With the passing of the colonial era it has been interesting to note that the military has taken on responsibility for filling the need for technical medical and health work abroad and bringing back to this countiy and to other countries the bene- fits of this experience for the protection of our own manpower here as well as abroad. American industry has drawn very heavily upon military experience in this respect and I think it is interesting to note the magnitude. In Wright's study of a few years ago 83 natiA^e American corporations were studied. 24 replied describing 49 programs in 27 countries. They had 58 hospitals totaling 5,000 beds with approximately 313 American physicians working in these installations, 33 den- tists, and almost 1,000 nurses, at a total budget of $27,000,000. And the involvement of industry is increasing rapidly. The per capita expenditure on health services by American indus- try in every country in which work is carried on is much greater than that provided by the Governments of the coun- tries themselves, although not usually available to the entire population * * *. With the decline in teaching of tropical medicine in United States medical schools about the only way a physician can jjrepare to deal with exotic diseases such as malaria is through the experience he had as a military medical person, or by working abroad in industry, or from experience in one of the international health programs either multilateral or bi- lateral. Unfortunately it is to the discredit of American medi- cal education that we have with few exceptions discontinued completel^y the type of teaching required to prepare American medical professionals to deal intelligently with the health prol>lems of the increasing international movement of Ameri- can tourists today. 743 It is unfortunate from the political point of view that we have not made sufficient study of the yield from the group of American health professionals who have served abroad in the bilateral programs of the United States since the 2nd Woild War, nor of the large yield from returned military who lia\e had this experience and avIio developed while abroad both increased adaptability and motivitation. The public is mifor- tunately also quite unaware of the returns to our country from service with the international multi-lateral organizations and with the many volimtary organizations. Yet we can put our fingers on large numbers of individuals in key positions and say, on the basis of individual case studies, that their exper- ience abroad was crucial to them. It is essential that we docu- ment this very much more, and publicize it ; because otherwise we shall continue to see further cuts in the U-S. budget for health work in the foreign aid programs. 166 IV. International Health Organizations and the U.S. Congress The U.S. share of funding supjx)rt of the World Health Organiza- tion and the Pan American Health Organization is implemented through the Department of State, under "Contributions to Interna- tional Organizations." The Department presents a budget justification each year before two committees of the Congress : In the House, before the Subcommittee on Department of State, Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations of the Committee on Appropriations; "^ and in the Senate, before the Subcommittee of the Committee on Appropriations ^^^ (same agency units as in the House) . The Problem of U.S. Fumding of World Health Programs The State Department presents its request for funds in support of WHO as part of a total package that includes the United Nations and its nine specialized agencies (of which WHO is one) . The package also includes six inter- American organizations (including the Pan American Health Organization) ; seven regional organizations (in- cluding NATO) ; and 15 miscellaneous bodies. So far as WHO and PAHO are concerned, the Committees see two tables, one on Con- tributions to International Organizations (see Table 10) and one on Voluntary Contributions to Multilateral Organizations and Pro grams (see Table 11). There are back-up tables on legislative authori- zation, a formal budgetary defense, and some discussion. W9 John C. Cutler. "Dividends to Americans from Experience Abroad." American Review of World Health. (Published by the American Association for World Health, Inc., Vol. 18, No. 1, 1970), pages 16-17. (Quoted in part. Dr. Cutler is Professor of International Health and Director of the Population Division, University of Pittsburgh.) ^'' U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. "Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriataon® for 1971." Hearings before a Subcommittee of the . . . Pant 2. 91&t Congress, second session. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pages 349-414. "« U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Appropriations. "State, Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations. FY 1971 on H.R. 17575." 91st Congress, second session. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pages 436-^78. 744 TABLE 10.— CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS! Increase (+) or Program by activities - 1971 decrease (—) A. United Nations and specialized agencies: 1. United Nations $46,450,986 +$5,181,137 2. United Nations Educational Scientific, and Cultural Organization... 10,531,058 3. International Civil Aviation Organization 3,769,464 +38,486 4. World Health Organization. 21,680,810 +2,147,680 5. Food and Agriculture Organization 10,085,782 +1,749,700 6. International Labor Organization 7,458,875 +805,691 7. International Telecommunication Union 642,175 +26,447 8. World Meteorological Organization 774,565 +75,970 9. Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization.. 121,659 +10,605 10. International Atomic Energy Agency 3,672,502 +298,267 Subtotal 105,187,876 +10,333,983 B. Inter- American organizations: 1. Inter-American Indian Institute. 61,561 2. Inter-American Institute of Agricultural Sciences. 2,758,800 +321,708 3. Pan American Institute of Geography and History 90,300 4. Pan American Railway Congress Association 5,000 5. Pan American Health Organization 9,263,557 +861,092 6. Organization of American States 16,155,404 +2,514,035 Subtotal....:..... 28,334,622 +3,696,835 Total, 1971 estimate 144,611,000 14,824,000 1 House. "Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1971," hearings, op. cit., pp. 350-1. TABLE 11.— VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO MULTILATERAL ORGANIZATIONS AND PROGRAMS' Fiscal yeai 1971 proposed Technical assistance: U.N. Development Program... _ $100,000,000 U.N. Children's Fund 13,000,000 U.N. Technical and Operational Assistance to the Congo 0 U.N. Food and Agriculture Organization, World Food Program 1,500,000 UN. Population Program 3,500,000 U.N. Institute for Training and Research ^.._ 400,000 U.N. Programs for Southern Africans. _. Special Contributions for Vietnam 950,000 International Atomic Energy Agency. Operational Program 1, 500, 000 Wolrd Health Organization-Medical Research 150,000 Wolrd Meteoroglocial Organization A/oluntary Assistance Program 1, 550,000 I nternational Secretariat for Volunteer Service 70, 000 Subtotal 122,620,000 Supporting assistance: U.N. Relief and Works Agency 2 13,300,000 U.N. Force in Cyprus 6,000,000 Subtotal 19,300,000 URWA-Arab Refugee Training, Subtotal 1,000,000 Total.. _ 142,920,000 ' House. "Department"! of State, Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1971," hearings, op. cit.. pp 413. 2 Plus commodities available under Public Law 480, title, II valued at $8,900,000. Most recently, Assistant Secretary of State, Samuel DePalma ^®® justified this total package in such terms as : "in our national interest" : as work "where many important steps are being taken to build a better world order"'; and as "some activities of direct benefit to the TTnited States''. The World Health Orcranization was one of three UN specialized agencies mentioned by Mr. De Palma as an example of benefit to the United States. ^^ Senate. "State. Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary and Related Agencies Appropriations, FY 1971.' op. cit.. p. 4.92. 745 These recent hearings records on budgetary justification for in- ternational organizations do not deal with the nature and merit of the substantive work of the specialized agencies, including WHO, or with the inter-Ajnerican agencies, including PAHO. Attention is largely focused on increasing budgets and balance of payments; this concern applies to all of the international organizations, regardless of their somewhat different objectives, achievements, and potential. It would appear that the pre^'ailing view holds the United States to be- over-assessed in the first place, and overcommitteed to ever-increasing organizational budgets : assessments from multilateral enterprises are viewed as one more form of foreign aid. International health has not been spared from the growing doubts about costs, about lack of control over the budgets, and about tiie desire to restrict the outflow of 'American dollars. Indeed, international health organizations were most often singled out for budgetary dis- cussion in the Senate and House Appropriations Hearings. The gen- eral climate under which international health organizations are con- sidered can be seen in the following items of testimony. IN THE SENATE Convinced as we [in the Department of State] are of the benefits of U.S. participation in international organizations, we are nevertheless seriously concerned about the increases in their budgets. I can assure you that we have fully taken into account the views expressed by the Senate Appropriiitions Committee last year and that we have made every effort to keep the budget as low as possible."^ * * * In the World Health Organization, which has the largest assessed budget of any of the specialized agencies, we [State] concerted throughout the budget process with other major contributors to keep down the budget. I would point out that for the fii^t time the WHO Assembly, as a result of U.S. leadership, rejected the Director-General's proposed budget. However, we were unable to obtain support for an acceptable compix)mise figure and consequently we voted against the budget as adopted.^"^ * * * We also, of course, sought to restrain budget increases in the organizations outside of the UN system. In the Pan Amer- ican Health Organization, the strong approaches of the Ignited States to other members last year resulted in a re- duction in the original budget proposed by the Director. This was the first time in at least fifteen yeare that the Directing Council of that organization was prevailed upon to vote for a budget smaller than the Director's request.^^- * * * Senator McClellan: With respect to the agreements that are now in force, have you re-evaluated them and found where our participation could be modified or reduced ? ^'^ Mr. De Palma. AVe have made a continuous check on them.-"^ i™ Ibid., pp. 43.5-434. 1" Ibid., pp. 43.5-4.36. !«! Ibid., p. 436. "3 Ibid., p. 44.5. I'Mbid., p. 445. 97-4on n - 77 746 Senator MgClelian. In our contribution to these agencies have we in some measure contributed to the imbalance of payments ? Mr. De Palma, Actually, sir, our estimate is — based on data provided by the organizations — that our overall balance of payments benefit by our participation in these interna- tional organizations. In fiscal year 1970 we estimate that they spent $25 million more in the United States than was con- tributed. It is beciause of substantial expenditures here by the U.N, and the OAS, for example. Senator McClellan. We benefit ? Mr. De Palma. Actuall}' we benefit. There is a net inflow. It is small, but it is actually a net inflow. Senator McClellan. Then there is no way, as now con- stituted and operating, that it would contribute to the imbal- ance of payments, that is your statement ? Mr. De Palma. Yes, sir.^^^ , Senator Ellknder. Mr. Chairman, it indicates that the Pan-American Organization receives a contribution from us of 66 percent. Senator McClellan. On what? Senator Ellender. Pan American Health Organization, the Organization of American States. Our contribution is 66 percent. That organization was established in 1925. Senator McClellan. If those countries down there don't care enough to try to improve the health of their people. I don't think we will improve it very much by just spending money.^^^ Mr. De Palma (continuing from prepared statement). In fact, close to two-thirds of the increase we are requesting for the United Nations, for example, is attributable chiefly to rising prices and salaries. By far the largest part of the increase requested for the fiscal year 1971 is for the ITnited Nations and the specialized agencies, and is mainly due to increases in the budgets of the U.N., the World Health Organization, the Food and Agricul- ture Organization, and the International Labor Organization. In each of these organizations we pressed hard for budg- etary restraint. In my prepared statement, I explain specifi- cally what we did in each case to control the rise in the budgets. I'sihld.. p. 471. !■« Ibid., p. 477. 747 I can assure you, Mr. Chairman, that we will continue to press for tight budget levels in the future. As in the past, we will continue to approach the executive heads of the major organizations to urge them to prepare reasonable budgets before they put pen to paper because we do not have the votes in the organizations on budget matters, and the best time to influence budget levels is before the estimates become frozen in a printed document. We will also, of course, push for budgetary stringency in the governmental bodies of the organizations. Throughout the process we will continue to concert with other major con- tributors to try to maximize our impact on the programs and budgets. A dozen of the largest contributors have developed the practice of coordinating their positions on these matters in the major specialized agencies. For example, I attended a 2-day meeting of these major contributors in Geneva last March. This meeting devoted a great deal of attention to the problem of rising budgets. There was wide agreement on the need to promote a policy of budgetary restraint, and plans were made to pursue this objective during this year. At the same time, I have to note that while other major contributors share our desire for effi- ciency and economy, not all of them think that the budgets of these organizations are excessive. In fact, we often find it very difficult to persuade them to join us in pushing for budget levels as low as we like. We are also working to estab- lish better administrative and fiscal procedures to promote efficiency and economy in these organizations. Again, in my statement, I have pointed out a few of the things that are being done. I will not go into them at this point. In addition to these efforts to improve the operations of the international organizations, we are also trying to make our own participation in international organizations as effective as possible. On the 8th of January of this year the White House issued a memorandum which conveyed the President's wish that the Secretary of State direct, coordinate, and super- vise the activities of the executive agencies relating to our participation in international organizations. To implement this memorandum, I held a meeting of an interdepartmental committee on international organizations, consisting of offi- cials from 15 Government agencies, and I asked for their help in carrying out the President's directive. I particularly asked them for help in assessing the programs of the organizations in terms of current and future priorities.^" IN THE HOUSE OF RErRESEXTATIVTSS ]Mr, RooNEY. I feel this committee has been wasting the taxpayers' money with the Government Printing Office in printing each year an admonition in our report to cut down »" Ibid., page 443. 748 our contributions to these international organizations. We just don't get anywhere doing that, do we ? ^'* Mr. De Pai.ma. We have not succeeded in slowing the rate of increase ; no sir * * * there have been two principal reasons for the increase [$14.8 million for total increased U.S. con- tributions to all international organizations=10%], Mr. Chairman. A substantial portion has to do with just main- taining the current level of activity in the face of rising prices and wages.^^^ Mr. De Palma. * * * We have managed in every case to work out certain savings in the budgets as proposed. We have not managed to prevent increases. We have not done that, sir, because in the first place we did not have the votes * * *. We have also been unable to do it, because in some cases even some of the major contributors have felt that the ceilings we were trying to impose were unjustified. ^^° RECAPITULATION OF U.S. LEGISLATIVE PROBLEM There is no question but that the costs and benefits of external activities of the United States, after an impressive outpouring of wealth in World War II and large foreign assistance and military activities thereafter, are coming under increasing public scrutiny. Congressional control of policies and programs is historically exerted by means of the purse strings. Accordingly, funding levels of U.S. foreign programs are a proper subject for congressional examination. However, it seems also to be an important question as to precisely what the consequences are of such U.S. expenditures, in terms of benefits to the United States. It is suggested that these aspects are not sufficiently examined ; and the reason seems to be the enormous range and complex- ity of the subje^'t matter. Accordingly, the possibility might be enter- tained of enlisting the services of a qualified research institution to make a thorough investigation, in depth, of the relationship between actual costs and direct and indirect benefits of foreign assistance, with particular reference to international agencies concerned with health. Few fields of international activity present more difficult problems of fiscal accountability than do health and medicine. Cost /Benefit Analysis as a Possible Solution Few programs of major significance become or remain a fruitful effort which do not rest on a mutual understanding of objectives and costs on the part of the practitioners and the politicians. WHO and PAHO are major international health programs, and to present their costs in the absence of information concerning their qualitative and quantitative benefits makes the entire appropriation process an exercise in arithmetic. If the American taxpayers' investment in global health is not achieving the results ex]>ected from that investment, what institutional and policy reforms can be implemented to change the situation? And how does one determine that benefits are consistent with cost ? A rational basis for the determination of priorities and in 1'* HniiRp. "Dvpartments of State, .Tustice, Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Ajrencies Appropriations for 1971," Hearings, op. cit. page 401. "9 Idem. '80 Ibid., page 404. 749 promoting the efficient use of available resources faces obvious ethical and moral obstacles. Nevertheless the economics of health and disease is a legitimate way of evaluating certain kinds of international cam- paigns against disease and the techniques of cost/benefit analysis are proving of value in a number of other fields of medicine. In additioii to international health activities which would have to be explained and justified to Congress along non-quantifiable lines, there remains the possibility of satisfying the Congress as to the nature of failures and successes with numbers or with concepts derived from a numerical approach of one kind or another. As Dr. John Bryant states : The major, analytical tool used to evaluate alternative health programs in the United States has been cost-benefit analy- sis * * *. Benefits are generally measured in terms of number of lives saved, amount of disability prevented, or amount of economic loss avoided * * *, There are special problems in ex- tending [these] concepts * * * to the less developed coun- tries * * *. Still, the concepts of cost -benefit analysis are very important, whether applied with carefullv derived data or as an aid to common sense in making decisions on health programs.^®^ Some Examples of Approax)hes to Cost/Benefit Analysis in Health Programs The difficulty of obtaining quantitative information about the results of health nro^rrams 1vis been a liistorir^a^ obstacle to their orderly pres- entation in the budget and accounting process. Nevertheless, some sources of quantitative information are available, and these may not be adequately exploited for policy purposes. The following is a brief sampling from the literature of such sources. 1. A study of the control of poliomyelitis in the USSR showed that the cost of vaccinating 127 million people amounted to nearly 46 million roubles; l:>enefits were evaluated bv comparing actual incidence of the disease following vaccination with estimated incidence in the absence of the program : The benefits were evaluated by working out the number of cases that would have occurred in the period 1958-1965 (as- suming a continuation of the 1958 morbidity figure), the cost of treating them, and the financial losses due to disablement and deatli. On tl\is bapis. the l~>enefit was found to l)e over 8000 million roubles, or 66 roubles saved for every rouble spent. The assumption of a continuation of the 1958 morbidity level may well have given this estimate an upward bias, but a benefit so much greater than the cost allows ample scope for more strin- gent assumptions.^^^ 2. In a Yugoslavian program to reduce infant mortality from its existing level of 44 per thousand live births to 20 or below, two alter- nate methods were used: (a) a child health dispensary and a 12-bed unit for normal deliveries, staffed by a pediatrician and two nurses ; and (b) a clinic staffed by a midwife, supported by periodic visits (three times a week for six hours) of a general practitioner. "After '^ Bryant. "Health and the Developing World." op. cit., pnges 106-7. 182 "Economics of Health and Disease," WHO Chronicle (January 1970), page 22. 750 ten years, infant mortality in [the (a) area] had fallen to 17.1, while in [the (b) area] it had fallen to 18.1." It was concluded that these results were essentially the same, although the cost of the (b) method was much less, "* * * an experience which may be of value to developing countries where both financial resources and highly trained health personnel are in short supply." ^^^ 3. The productivity of labor was used in one U.S. study to illustrate a method of formally calculating the monetary value of health services. For example — * * * The health costs of producing a member of the United States labor force, aged eighteen, in 1960 were about $1,000; therefore, the 73 million persons in the labor force in 1,960 represent a 73-billion-dollar investment. Other costs of up- bringing would of course be added to this figure. The costs would then be compared with the return on investment in terms of labor productivity. The study notes that in less developed countries a different pattern of costs and productivity would prevail, but that "one of the troubles in [such countries] is that there is too much unproductive investment." High rates of death and disability detract from the economic return from the investment in feeding and bringing up of a new generation for productive work.^^* 4. Tliree sets of calculations as to the differential productivity of the U.S. working population with and without health care show large value differences : (a) In the years 1900-1960, with 1900 death rate assumed through- out, compared with actual reduced death rates, an additional 13 mil- lion population yielded in excess of $60 billion in additional national income ; (b) In the period 1938-1952, the use of antibiotics and chemotherapy in pneumonia and influenza saved 1.1 million lives, and as a consequence national income in 1952 was enlarged by more than a billion dollars; (c) The asset value in 1960 of the labor product attributable to workers "added to the labor force by reduction in mortality rates since 1900" was estimated at $820 billion. That sum is to be weighed against investment in public health over this period, which is of course a much smaller figure.^^^ 5. Absenteeism of labor due to malaria in one area of the Philippines was reduced by an antimalaria program from 35 percent to less than 4 percent; at the same time, labor productivity rose by 20 to 25 percent.^^^ 6. A yaws eradication campaign in Haiti returned an estimated 100,000 incapacitated workers to their jobs.^^^ 7. On a broader basis, an analysis conducted on 22 less developed countries, in 1970, showed a very high inverse relationship "between variations in infant mortality rates and variations in changes in sub- sequent agricultural output." In fact, in this study, it was found that 183 Ibid., page 21. 'w Bryant, '^Health and the Developing World," op. cit., page 105. i« Ihid., pages 10.5-100. 1S8 Ihid., page OS. '" Ibid., page 90. 751 the relationship between health (plus education) and agricultural productivity was "more vigorous"' than that of labor and fertilizer, the more usual indices of changed agricultural productivity.^*^ In summary : There does emerge clearly the evidence of an output response in the rural parts of poor lands when acti\dty in the health field changes, and this in a society and economy where popular arguments notwithstanding — labor is a relatively under-utilized resource. The health influence may thus not ODerate simply tlirough more man-hours * * *; it is rather, or also, a consequence of attitude shifts on the part of the laborer.^^^ Output per person in Africa, Asia, and Latin America has increased in recent decades even as population growth reached record rates of expansion * * *. On the record, therefore, economic progress has begun even as population growth expanded.^®" Malenbaum considers health benefits so obvious that there is little effort to quantify them. When that effort is made a whole spectrum of social and economic indicators (in 115 countries) showed that health variables tended to be the most highly correlated with all measures of progress.^®^ He states further that the use of statistics which lump urban and rural data together tends to conceal rather than reveal the benefits of health service to poor people in poor nations. Cost/ benefit statistics in such countries must be worked up below the national level because national statistics obscure too many important subnational or regional differences : Preliminary statistical analysis of changes in health and in health programs in poor areas, where labor is the dominant factor of production, suggests a positive effect of health inputs on subsequent output. There is an economic rationale for such a relationship in poor lands, through changes in the \dgor and motivation of the self-employed workers who are predominant in the labor force. Such a positive role also fits new doctrines of growth, in which quality of factor inputs receives greater weight than quantity of labor or capital. There exists a need for such additional statistical analyses, and especially in small areas (villages, counties, districts), where outputs and pro- duction processes are more homogeneous than in nations as a whole.i»2 The Complex Issue of Health and Overpopulation The most provocative dilerama of all faces those who would try to show by analysis that, on a short-term basis at least, the saving of lives which increases population also produces a net economic gain in today's low-income, non-developed lands. There is a gain in production, includ- ing food, but there is also reduction in morbidity rates which increases 188 Wilfred Malenbaum. "Progre» in Health: What Index of Progress?" The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. (January 1971), pages 109-113. i8» Ibid., page 114. i^o Ibid., page 110. i°i Ibid., page 110. »=' Ibid., page 113. 752 birth rates and life expectancy — so that the number of consumers is equal to or greater than the gains in production. Malenbaum's claim is that all or most developed nations have gone through this transition of high population growth rates and that the dilemma is solved when the percentage gain in output exceeds that in population.^^^ But this argument assumes a course of growth in the developing nations similar to that of the Industrial Revolution in the Western world. It also assumes an ultimate socioeconomic status like that of the United States where in 1960 middle and upper income families were averaging three and two children per family, respectively."* The theory of the relationship of population growth to improve- ment in public health measures combined with rising standards of living is not well developed. In the nations of Western Europe, \A'hen living standards rose during a period of improved public health and sanitation, populations tended to rise more slowly. On the other hand, in the developing countries, population increases have responded to public health measures by proceeding at even steeper rates, while living standards have increased slightly if at all. Observation of this set of conditions has tended to cast doubt on the idea that declining rates of population in these countries ^o hand in hand with rising standards of living. Moreover, the implication is that because of the threat of pojiulation explosion, public health measures should be de- ferred until the populations of the less developed countries have been brought under control. This thesis is challenged by Dr. John Bryant, who contends that there is still some validity in the concept that rela- tive stability of populations is coupled with economic and health fac- tors. In particular, he warns that it is contrary to the values of the medical profession or of civilized society to solve the problem of the population explosion by relying on ill-health, under-nourishment, and the misery of poverty; on the contrary, he declares that population control is incompatible with such conditioning. As we think about the interrelationships of health, popu- lation, and economic development at a national level, we must not lose sight of the meaning of these terms for individual families and communities. Consider, for a moment, the find- ings of Aguirre and Wray in a small Colombian community. They found that 42 percent of children under six years of age were malnourished and 30 percent had diarrhea at any one time. In seeking cultural, social and economic reasons for the malnutrition, they found a dramatic correlation with factors that lead to a low per capita expenditure on food. With increasing age, incomes of fathers remained static be- cause as untrained workers their value did not increase with age. But they had increasing numbers of children, and there was, therefore, a steady decrease in the amount of food money for each child. Just as steadily, there was a mounting propor- tion of malnourished children. Aguirre and Wray initiated a nutritional supplementation program simple enough and economical enough to be within the resources of the community, and this led to a drop in the 103 Ibid., page 110. "« Arthur K. .Ipnson. "IQ and Scholastic Achievement." Harvard Educational Review (Winter 1969), page 98. 753 incidence of both malnutrition and diarrhea. But there should be no underestimating the awesome difficulties of searching for the best answers among such tangled relationships. The number of children in a family may al-ready be at insupport- able levels, and another life saved would depress even more the amount of food-money per child. Indeed, the study re- vealed the desperate efforts of these people to limit the num- bers of their children. But acting in ignorance, their efforts were often futile or tragic. It is important to recoa^nize that while health services have contributed to increased rates of population growth, they also have an essential role in limiting population growth. Walsh McDermott has described a fertility-mortality cycle in which high fertility leads to large numbers of children, often crowded into a setting of poverty and ignorance with a resulting high childhood mortality, which in turn sustains hi^h fertility. He argues that reducing the death rate in small children is a necessary precondition for reducing fertility. McDermott's thesis has historical support. Fertility and in- fant mortality have always been highly correlated, and in- creasing evidence indicates that a lowered infant mortality must antedate lowered fertility. * * * Itwproved health if< a precond'/tion to reduced ferfilHy}^^ [Emphasis supplied.] Moreover, Bryant goes on to say — The hsue mu!e%-eloping World." op. cit.. pages 100. 102-3; Also described In : John H. Br.vant. '"The Gap between Modern Biomedical Technology and Health Needs m Developing Countries.' In "Science and Technology in Developing Countries," (Cam- bridge Univpisity Press, 1969 ) . "•Bryant, "Health and the Developing World," op. clt., pages 99-100. 754 controlling the rate of reproduction. The widely acclaimed family planning program of Taiwan may, at most, have somewhat speeded the later phase of fertility decline that would have occurred anyway because of modernization. Even so, the aim of the program is that women should have the numbers of children they want, a number that currently aver- ages 4.5 children each. Even if social choices change and the Taiwanese women decrease their wishes for children to the United States level for 1966 of 3.4, this would yield a long- run rate of natural increase of 1.7 percent per year and a dou- bling of population in forty-one years. Davis points out that the characteristics that make family planning acceptable are the very characteristics that make it meffective for population control. By stressing the right of parents to have the number of children they want, it evades the basic question of population policy — how to give societies the number of children they need. By offering only the means for couples to control fertility, it neglects the means for societies to do so. By sanctifying the doctrine that each woman should have the number of children she wants, and hy assuming that if she has only that number this will automat- ically curl) population growth to the necessary degree, the leaders of current policies escape havittg to ask why icomen desire so many children and. how this desire can he in-fiuenced.^^' [Emphasis supplied.] Policy Issues of World Health — A Sum,mary In this section on what, in effect, is an approach to establishing a better dialogue between the international health profession and the people, Congress, and Government of the United States, an attempt is made to extract from the literature examples of how one might some- how close this very serious communications gap. The arguments from these examples is more convincing where the cost/benefit equation is obviously attractive, less convincing when questions of goals and man- agement are raised, and difficult in connection with the population problems. But the international health literature shows that better cost/effective programs are being established as time goes on, that definitive goal setting and improved management practices are mak- ing headway in the less developed countries, and that there is some progress with the dilemma of health and population. On the latter problem it was pointed out ( 1 ) that developing nations can be expected to go through a transition of high population growth, (2) that in a Colombian community ignorance rather than indifference was the cause of failure to limit the size of families, (3) and that McDermott's thesis concerning improved health as a precondition to fertility con- trol is biologically and historically sound. While it is true that governments of poor countries which have popu- lation policies do not have very effective ones, it might be noted that any government of a rich or poor country which utilized coercion today to control the birth rate would very soon be out of power. At any rate, until the countries understand and agree on the number of human beings which can be supported by the earth and its resources, ^»' Ibid., pages 101-102. 755 there seenm little 'point in icithholding medical assistance and advice to lesser developed countries on the grounds that the more lives we save the more lives there are. Obviously, one should expect some long over- due philosophical and educational assistance along these lines from non-medical sources. It is not the business of doctors to make social decisions simply because they know how to implement them. U.S. Benefits From Increased Investment in World Health It is difficult to present an explicit statement of the return to the United States taxpayer of a vigorously supported and ex- panding program of global jjreventive medicine under the aegis of the World Health Organization. The scope of the canvass is too large, and the options for improvement are too varied and detailed. However, a general statement of the proposition may be in order. Several lines of oppoitunity are given as illustrations : 1. Pockets of infectious and communicable disease exist all over the world — not only in the less developed countries but in the ad- vanced countries as well. Under conditions of social disruption, floods, hurricanes, and other natural disasters, these pockets can become sources of world epidemics. Conversely, by a relatively modest in- vestment in each case, they can be eradicated or controlled. 2. Heavy U.S. investnient in capital equipment has for two decades gone to the less developed countries to advance their productivity. However, measured in terms of labor productivity alone, the dollar investment in the capital of public health has yielded higher returns. 3. Arrangements for global medical surveillance and early warning of the dangerous spread of disease have hardly scratched the surface. The benefits of a more thorough system of early warning, especially in influenza and the more lethal viruses, and of an ability to take prompt remedial measures of global control, seem obvious. More controls mean international surveillance, rapid identification, rapid vaccine development, and rapid application to susceptible populations. 4. Smallpox eradication, already a global campaign of WHO, could be brought to a much earlier and effective conclusion with additional funds and effort among the cooperating countries. This would be particularly valuable to the United States, which must now contend with the cost of protecting its people against this infrequent but dan- gerous, incurable, and highly infectious disease. 5. With the growing problem of medical education and increasing demands for health care in the developed nations there is need in the World Health Organization for a greater sharing of country experi- ences and experiments in the delivery of health service. It would ap- pear that the United States could benefit greatly by evaluating some of the various systems of health care now in operation around the world. 6. The United States might benefit from a set of international standards and guidelines accepted by WHO on : a. electronic medical diagnostic equipment b. water and air pollution c. methods of choice in the treatment of alcoholics and heroiu addicts d. safety and efficacy of drugs. 756 7. The United States would also benefit by a set of international standards ao;reed upon by WHO and the FAOi ( Food and Aoriculture Organization) with respect to the amount of lieavy metals to be per- mitted in edible foods. 8. Severe protein-calorie malnutrition does not exist with sufficient identifiable frequency in the United States to permit in-depth study of malnutrition on development, especially the effect of prenatal and postnatal protein malnutrition on earlv development and subsequent learning ability. WHO, FAO, INCAP have both the methodology and the observable populations at their disposal. Such studies are already underway, but the importance of the results on possibly im- paired future physical and mental health justifies a greater interna- tional research effort. The economic considerations are important to developed and developing countries alike. 9. Populations for the study of groups and conditions resistant to certain types of cauf^er and heart dipease are not available in sufficient numbers in the United States. The WHO International Agency for Research and Cancer nt Lyons, France, is an example of a WHO effort which could be expanded on behalf of the developed nations. Cardio- vascular diseases mav deserve a siimilar international approach for the same reasons and for the same developed countries Avhere degenera- tive diseases are among the leading causes of death. V. Summary, Conclusions, and Comments During the earh- history of man, famine, disease, and pestilence in combination were essentially global for the then known world. Pandemics raged on through the middle ages, at one time destroying up to a quarter of the population. With only a slight change in the pre- vailing biological conditions, the entire human race in Europe might have been eliminated. Later, the provision of clean water and sanitary w^'xste disposal, to- gether with geographic climatic conditions unfavorable and favor- able to the prevalence of disease vectors, divided tlie world into lesser and greater diseased parts. When this division was recognized, un- organized efforts were taken to isolate and quarantine people and materials against the introduction of disease from one area to another. By 1851, Nation-States began formal coonerative efforts to control the spread of communicable dtsease, but labored under the lack of knowledge and under the distorting influence of the special interests of commerce. After some 50 years of contimiing diplomatic efforts and gains in the understanding of the cause of disease, modest, non-intrusive in- ternational agreements were reached and a permanent organization was set up to manage the control of communicable disease on the part of the signatory nations. Two such organizations appeared on the international scene almost simultaneously, shortly after the turn of the 20th century. These were the Office of International Hygiene in Europe and the Pan American Sanitary Bureau in the New World. The world in 1900 A.D. was a relatively small one, commercially, and so was its total human population. It was, however, relatively large in reference to the barrier protection offered by the oceans and the atmosphere, the limited amount of goods and people moving to and 757 fro, the slow speed of such movement, and the general agrarian dis- persal of the population. Today the world is small in these latter re- spects, is rapidly becoming a unit, epidemiologically speaking, and urban sprawl threatens to renew the dangers which were inherent in the unsanitary conditions of the past. International health institutions, the public health profession, in- dividual nations in bilateral agreements, and the private foundations have attempted to keep pace with these explosive developments. The nature of the problems was such that most of these efforts have focused on large sections of a country, on large geographic regions, or on vir- tually the entire globe. All of the efforts liave been temporarily in- terrupted by the great wars; conditions against which such efforts were aimed have been worsened by these wars. Public health on a worldwide scale has yet to command the atten- tion of governments which a global perspective of health would appear to require. The nature of the work is undramatic; the subject offers little in the way of political capital as do so many other medical topics. Disciplinary development and professional status for public health and preventive medicine are low compared with those of modern diagnostic and curative medicine in the United States and other de- veloped countries. The public and its elected representatives may not be aware of the miracles which have been achieved in the field of pre- ventive medicine ; it was these, rather than the glamorous surgical and pharmaceutical inventions of recent vintage, which so dramatically changed the life expectancy of man. The world was made a relatively safe place in which to live and travel many years ago by the application of what now appear to be rather simple biological, medical, and engi- neering facts. Indeed, the tecliniques of preventive medicine have been so successful in developed lands that neither cris'is nor controversy worthy of intensive political attention has emerged in i-ecent years. In the less developed lands, tlie power to improve human health at least cost still lies in the application of proven teclinology in the pub- lic health and sanitation field. Curative medicine in the poor countries has as much appeal as it does in advanced countries with large popula- tions of people with various forms of degenerative disease, but there are lacking the medicines, the doctors, and the places in which to ap- ply the cures. In many of these developing areas, the services of sani- tary engineer, hydrologist, or geologist are more essential to permanent health gains than is the increased availability of doctors and clinics. Plant geneticists and agrarian reform, together with culturally adapted population policies, will contribute more at this time to a revolution in the health of some of the economically depressed coun- tries than will the importation of modern medical technolog\'. The skills to prevent or control the spread of a new virulent "germ" lie in the now vast and potent technologj'^ embracing physical and chemical detection, microbiology, biochemistry, molecular biolog}', water treatment and rapid A'accine development. These are perhaps the more modern elements of preventive medicine. Some students be- lieve that a resurgence of the preventive medicine and public health point of view will also prove to be the most incisive channels of ex- ploiting modern biological knowledge on behalf of the degenerative diseases. Lederberg, for example, has noted the high cost of a cure of cancer after the fact, versus the application of existing knowledge ,758 and of knowledge yet to be gained for preventing some forms of the disease in the first place."'^ Other experts have made similar arguments with respect to cardiovascular diseases. The magic of health as a rallying point for international unity does exist to a degree but it is not as persuasive as some well-turned phrases would imply. Transnational medical work, of course, is performed with greater ease by private organizations (such as, for example, the hookworm eradication program of the Rockefeller. Foundation), but multilateral institutions are necessary and might function almost as well if fewer reservations and restraints were imposed upon them. Thus the hypothesis is advanced that it may be the attitudes of member governments of international health institutions which are in need of change, as well as the priorities and management l^ractices of the institutions themselves. The nations have experimented for 70 years with organized intergovernmental cooperation in the control of disease and more recently in the direct promotion of health. From agreement to agreement, it is generally held among health authorities that the member states have been overcautious and have either stmctured the organizations to protect their sovereign interests or have avoided full coiiunitment to the regional or global health objectives which were formalized in the charter of those organizations. When special circumstances kept member governments occupied with other important matters, so that the health institutionc were left to their own devices, a great deal somehow was accomplished, even with very modest resources. The Health Organization of the League of Na- tions is an example of this. However, when relative bigness and in- creased autliority prevail, as in WHO and PAHO, there is some anxiety about new international health regulations, concern over the high arid growing costs of operations, and sus])icion and fear that global health philosophies might challenge traditional health care systems of any given country. The pharmaceutical industry may be especially wary of resolutions and regulations affecting their products and their profits. The WHO/PAHO arrangement grew slowly at first, adapted to many kinds of anticipated resistance and to some difficulties which M-ere not anticipated — the cold war, the Korean conflict, the Vietnam war, and even to the situation in WHO's Eastern Mediterranean region. But the system of international health institutions flourished anyway and it continues to grow in worldwide influence. There are several reasons for this relative success : 1. There was work to be done; it was needed, as statesmen and doctors had agreed when they established prior conventions, offices, and organizations over a period of many years. 2. WHO has utilized di idiomatic assistance both during the structur- ing of its constitution and hi subsequent problem 'olving, but WHO is a professional, scientifically based, international complex. Wliile all of its halls may not be decked with eminent scientists and physicians it still has them at its disposal. It appears to have followed at least two of the axioms of successful international technical enterprise : a. If se/enf/-'^.fs or enfjineerfi con render technical a^shtance to a ilevelo'ping country it can succeed }) est with good science at the helm. »' .Toshua Lederberg. "Cancpr 'Cure' Has Limitations." The Washington Post (t'eb- riiary 14. 1971), page C-2. It is well known among dermatologists, for example, that an important reduction in the incidence of skin cancers of the most prevalent type could be eflFected by the simple expedient of shielding the body from the sun more carefully, especially in subtropical latitudes and in open-air occupations. 759 jb. If sGie/titlsts of many nations find it necessary to pool tfieiv reso%irG€8 and talents on a global prohleTn th'at trdTiscends national boundaiies^ thsy will do well to he in control of the enterprise as a .3. WHO worjfed out solutions to some political and controversial issues, or refused to deal with others because they were political. It continues to -function effectively even in the presence of unresolved political, problems. ■ 4. Its members are bound by treaty to support it at a budgetary level deterrnined by the organization itself. 5. Th^ member states ho,nor their commitments to international health organizatioiis today more than they did in the past. '"On time'' collections pyer the period 1958 to 196T were over 96 percent. The United States is the chief contributor to WHO and is also one of tlie chief sources of complaint — principally with its heavy share of the financial burden as matched against its lack of direct control over the WHO programs. A ReJDort of the Comptroller General of the United States"^ was critical of WHO and many agencies connected with it. As a result the UN, the Department of State, and Health, Edu- cation, and Welfare have sought to improve WHO 's fiscal and admin- istrative practices. AVHO itself recently ' set up a Headquarters Program Review Committee (HPRC).^"^ But the climate in the Congress is cool, with the Federal agencies unable to change the apathy, the outlook, or the nature and extent of the dialogue. In addi- tion, the !N^ation*s health practitioners, researchers, and medical edu- cators are very much preoccupied' with their own problems. Indeed the entire tripod of support (goverhment-industry-education)^°^ essential to the success of any technicallj^ based enterprise is missing. Yet the United States abides by its treaty obligations to WHO. Through other channels, the United , States provides additional sup- port to both WHO andPAHO by means of voluntary contributions whicli more than double the amount it is, obliged to provide under the United Nations scale of assessment. There is no doubt about it : For some reason the moral support for international health institutions as seen in the public record is extremely low-keyed, yet the overall level of financial support provided by the United States to the multilateral health organizations is actually quite substantial. It is important that this multilateral support continue and that the level of it increase somewhat each year, because other foT*ms of U.S. supported direct or related activities in international health have been extensively curtailed in recent years. W^ith the exception of a few overseas laboratories operated by NIH and DOD, the activities of a number of Federal agencies relevant to health, and especially the health and sanitation work of AID, have been reduced to very small percentagesof their earlier peak levels. . Recent trends reflect the deliberate movement of international health activities from bilateral program? to multilateral ones such as the United Nations Development Program and the World Health i»B "U.S. Participation In the World Health Organization." Report to the Congress by the Comptroller General of the United States. (Washington. IGBS"), page 1. »" Airgram from U.S. Mission Geneva, to the Secretary of State re : Information. Office of International Health, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. December 24. 1970.: , , .. - - *<^ Caryl P. Haskins. "Science and Policy for a New Decade." Foreign Affairs (January 1971), page 251. 760 Organization. Various studies have recommended this approach. In particular, President Nixon's initiatives along these lines appear to be based on the report of the Peterson task force,^- the study group which was appointed by the President to advise him on the appropri- ate role of the United States in foreign assistance. The report repeat- edly urged that bilateral assistance be decreased and that multilateral assistance be increased. The move in this direction has already started, beginning with the multilateralization of the malaria eradication programs — Current U.S. policy indications are for as rapid a thrust toward withdrawal of U.S. technicians as may be consistent with minimum determined staffing requirements. This will be carefully managed to avoid too precipitous withdrawal of U.S. staff with undesirable effects on the program and the individuals involved. A sufficient interim j>eriod is required for the necessary services to be transferred to an effective level of "WHO financial and manpower resources; however, this need not be a long or difficult transition. While WHO budget development and approval are lengthv processes, WHO has a considerable field force already at work in country malaria programs, and host governments may have improved technical capacity reducing advisory needs * * *. A major trend in U.S. foreign assistance is toward reducing overseas U.S. personnel in bilateral assistance programs while encouraging increased responsibility of multilateral agencies for development programs. The world- wide malaria eradication program is a case in point * * *. A.I.D. fully supports this important effort. However, we now are looking to WHO to take greater responsibility for most technical assistance to host governments in their malaria programs. In conformance with the resolutions of the World Health Assembly for malaria eradication, WHO is already providing the greater part of the technical services requested by participating governments in this program * * *.-''^ Peterson's point that "a predominantly bilateral U.S. program is no longer politically tenable in our relations with many developing countries * * *," ^o* is partly undone by another reality, namely that the Peterson "approach is not certain to commend itself to Con- gress." 205 Certainly the hearings records examined during the prep- aration of this study show Congress to be clearly on the side of bilateral programs. For this reason one might be expected to dis- miss a report like Peterson's, especially since it does not even mention international health institutions. But there is cause to continue along two lines : First, and almost surely without knowing it, a good deal of the "thrust*" of the Peterson report, matches the mode of oi>eration of the «"' "U.S. Foreign Assistance in the 1970's" op. clt. *^ "A.I.D. Policy for Malaria Eradication — Multilateralization of Technical Services." Airgram Department of State, August 8, 1970. (Quoted in part.) 2IH "XT.s. Foreign Assistance in the 1970s," op. clt., page 22. »»John Franklin Campbell. "What is to be Done?" Foreign Affairs (October 1970), page 97. 761 World Health Organization — "work out programs and performance standards with developing countries * * * establishing their own priorities * * * the [unrealistic] expectation of immediate results * * * policies and new technologies adapted to the local government * * * strengthening of local institutions * * * the principle that administra- tors are accountable for achieving objectives * * * restrictions on op- erations should be held to a minimum * * * all people, rich and poor alike, have a common interest in peace, in the eradication of poverty and disease, in a healthful environment * * ♦.'■^oe Second, a key conclusion of the Peterson Report is its distinct turn away from the short-term, national interest, foreign policy orientation of past U.S. participation in international institutions : This country should not look for gratitude or votes, or any specific short-term foreign policy gains from our participa- tion in international development. Nor should it expect to influence others to adopt U.S. cultural values or institutions. Neither can it assume that development will necessarily bring political stability. Development implies change — political and social, as well as economic — and such change, for a time, may be disruptive.^"' If the national objectives of the United States as a member of WHO and PAHO are perceived within the philosophy of the above paragraph, it might be appropriate to consider a change in the De- partment of State as the prime mover of the U.S. administrative ma- chinery for these organizations. The line of reasoning for such a change is as follows : The expansion of national public health interests to global dimen- sions calls not only for diplomacy or statesmanship of the conventional type; it calls for worldwide experience with science, medicine, and public health as political systems themselves and for experts in the subject matter. The more reliance there is on multilateral organiza- tions for controlling disease and assisting all the countries of the world in improving their state of health, the less need there is for a national or bilateral point of view. The more the health of the State becomes de- pendent upon the health of the world, the more the interests and tech- nology of the State become blended into those of the world. If and when it appears that the only feasible approach to the problems of human health is indeed a worldwide approach, it will be necessary for knowl- edge to be shared and exchanged by those who are in possession of it and who by tradition and practice are used to sharing and exchanging it. The multilateral health organizations are simply institutional devices for encouraging this process in the international health profession. For guidelines on what to change to, if the Department of State does not appear to be the logical home for the WHO and PAHO of the future, the following is a possible alternative for consideration : Let it be supposed that the national objective of U.S. participation in WHO and PAHO is to protect Americans from disease from abroad by means of rational and accepted public health procedures. ;<« ..jT s Foreign Assistance in the 1970's." op. clt., selected passages. "" Ibid., nuec 2. *" Ibid., page 2 97-400 O - 77 - 11 762 Let a second objective be to attacjv those diseases endemic to .the less developed c.oi;i,ntries a,nd amenable to .eradication or control by means of , scientifically based sanitary and medical practices, ar^d to mount sych attacks in the common interest of economic and social progress of both the less developed countries and the United States, Finally, consider a thirid objective to be to promote on a generally global scale tjie utilization of readily available and effective mpdical and engineering technology towards the improvement of the state of health of the human species. If these objectives are a reasonable. approximation of the Anierican purpose in contributions to and participation in the activities of WHO, it may follow that the structure of policy and the working .re- lations between the United States and WHO are a combined function of the Congress in general and of an expert Federal health agency in particular. Technical asn'ifitcnce is technical cwd it is good or had tecJinicaUy before if cam hecowe anything else. As and if U.S. tech- nical assistance in health matters becomes more concentrated in multi- national health organizations, the greater the need will be to appraise its results and to apply American technical competence in that field. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare might well be considered as the future and more emphatic focal point of technical documentation, plaiming, review, and analysis of issues in connection with U.S. participation in AVHO. PAHO, and certain bilateral bio- medical programs. DHEW successfully explains and defends a multi- billion dollar program before the Congress, which includes overseas laboratories and grants. The extension of that performance to V.S. participation in international health organizations sliould not be be- yond its capacity. By training, by alnlation. by profes'^ional contacts with counterpart experts around the world, the DHEW seems to be a logical Federal a.Qency to establish and maintain a working liaisojn. between Congressional appropriation committees and international; health organizations to which the appropriations are made. The World Health Organization is chartered to do a great deal about the health of human beings. It appears to be a satisfactory in- stitution for arriving at international health priorities, even if it is often criticized for not stating categorically what these are. It pro-i vides technical assistance and advice to national health services where the need appeai-s to be greatest, but those needs far exceed its resources. The Regional Directors and Committees of WHO bring both de- mands and influence from their sections of the world. The World Health Assembly yields to this influence and supports the Secretaryr General's program, wliich is in effect tlie sum of the reg'onal requii^e- ments. The power of WHO's Secretariat, its Executive Board, and its Assembly far exceeds the amount of money which is acquired and dispensed each yeaj- by the organization. The funds v.hich WHO spends to maintain its stafl' at Geneva and elsewhere and the amount it si^rinkles around the world on activities it rarely has time to follow up on, is a drop in the international monetary bucket. The power of WHO is not in its budget but rather in the universality of its membership, the high regard in which it is held among scientific and public health people of the world, and its acceptance as the highest medical forum or final consensus of world medical opinion. 763 It would seem appropriate for the United States to utilize the au- thority of WHO and the power of its international voice in the sup- port of national as well as infernational programs. Tliis country has the resources, the systems skills, and the biomedical technology for making "WHO a better institution than it now is. The United States can be the instrumentality for preparing and shaping WHO to manage the common global health problems of the future. Yet WHO will shape nothing without stronger support than is now evident for international health institutions, in the Congress or at Secretarial levels in the Departments of State and of Health, Ed- ucation and Welfare. The situation seems to be a most peculiar one for world health, namely, commitment without involvement. The United States is meeting its fiscal obligations to WHO and PAHO with very little organizational evidence as yet that it also intends to play a posi- tive determinant role -°^ in an area where American technical com- petence is at its best, where its presence is least offensive, and indeed where American leadership is fully expected by the rest of the world. Perhaps there is need to mount an educational program so that a larger segment of the public is included in the discourse surrounding the issues of national and global public health. The status of the world's health might become a public issue; and that issue could stimulate scientific, medical, and economic debate. For in the United States, at least, debate is absolutely essential to both clarification and political action. 208 Ibid., page 2. Chapter 11 — Beyond Malthus: The Food/People Equation CONTENTS Page I. Introduction 769 U.S. Stake in Resolving the Food/Population Problem 769 Growth of Population Versus Balanced Development 770 Scope and Limitations of the Study 770 II. Defining the Food/People Equation in Developing Countries 772 Famine as Perceived in an Affluent Country 772 Achievement and Maintenance of Adequate Diet in Europe 773 The Malthusian Hypothesis and Its Revival 774 Weaknesses in the Fundamental Data on Food and Agriculture 775 Weaknesses in the Fundamental Data on Population 776 Technical and Cultural Barriers to Birth Control 777 Summary Statement of the Food/Population Problem 779 III. Meeting Food Requirements of Developing Countries 781 Defining Calorie Shortages of the LDCs 781 Varying Needs for Fuel-Foods 781 Food and Metabolism 783 Technological Opportunities Opened by Plant Genetics 784 Successes of the Green Revolution 784 The Incomi)lete Promise of the Green Revolution 785 The Problem of Water 786 The Problem of Fertilizer 787 The Problem of Farm Mechanization 788 The Problem of Pests 789 The Problem of Marketing 792 The Problem of Taste 793 Dealing With Shortages of Protein in the LDCs 793 High-Protein Foods 794 Easing the Shortage of Protein 794 New Protein Sources 795 Fortifying Foods 795 Expansion of Traditional Protein Sources 797 Vitamin Deficiencies and Corrective Measures 798 Thiamine 798 Riboflavin 799 Niacin 799 Vitamin A Deficiency 799 Calcium Intake 799 Other Nutritional Deficiencies 800 Dietary Deficiencies. Public Health, and Economic Development- 800 IV. The Politics and Diplomacy of Food 803 Evolution of U.S. Technical Assistance to Agriculture in the LDCs 803 LT.S. Food Aid to Developing Countries 804 Present Status of Public Law 480 805 Institutional Resources for Orderly Development of Agri- culture 807 Conflicting Agricultural Plans and Programs 809 An Enumeration of Non-Technical Obstacles 810 Surplus Versus Shortage 811 Economic Dislocations 811 Human Dislocations 814 The Need for Social Reform 814 Agricultural and Social Revolution 816 The Impact of Food Programs on U.S. Diplomacy 817 Trade Demands of the LDCs 818 The Necessity for Balanced Development 819 Requirements Impo.sed on U.S. Diplomacy 820 (767) 768 Page V. Technology for Controlling the Population Explosion 822 Current Growth Rates in Asia, Africa, and Latin America 822 The Impact of Population Growth on Economic Development — 824 Opposition to the Limiting of Population Growth 827 The Technology of Controlling Conception and Birth 827 The Oral Contraceptive (The Pill) . 828 The Intrauterine Device (lUD) 829 Sterilization 829 Conventional Methods 830 New Lines of Scientific Research 830 Abortion 831 The Problem of Medical Support 833 VI. Political and Diplomatic Issues of the Population Problem in the LDCs 834 Social Resistance to Birth Control and Family Planning Pro- grams 834 The Status of AVomen 834 The Masculine Image 83-1 Cultural Inertia 835 Religion and Population 836 Administrative Weaknesses in the LDCs 838 U.S. Diplomatic Mobilization To Deal With the Population Issue_ 839 Evolution of U.S. Concern 839 The Strengthening of U.S. Policy 840 U.S. Policy Today 844 U.S. Agencies With Overseas Population Programs 844 The Department of State 845 The Department of Health, IMucation, and Welfare 845 The United States Information Agency 846 The Peace Corps 847 The Agency for International Development 847 AID Assessment of Program Requirements 849 The Congressional Role 851 Multilateral Programs Dealing With the Population Problem 852 Recommendations for Future U.N. Population Measures 854 VII. Future Diplomatic Issues of the Food/People Equation 855 The Politics ond Diplomacy of Food for the Future 856 Multilateral Approaches to Problems Generated by the Green Revolution 858 The Politics and Diplomacy of Stemming the Population Ex- plosion 859 Political and Diplomatic Problems of the Food/People Equa- tion 861 TABLES 1. Expansion of Acreages in High-Yielding Grain Varieties — Selected Countries 785 2. Losses of Potential Crop Production by Region 790 3. Protein Content of Selected Food Staples 794 4. Population Growth Rate, Selected Countries 822 5. The 15 Most Populous Countries 823 6. Summary of AID Dollar Obligations for Population and Family Plan- ning Projects, by Fiscal Years 843 7. Students Receiving Family Planning and Population Training in AID- Funded Courses Given in the United States 849 8. Selected Measures of Family Planning Program Performance 850 CHAPTER 11— BEYOND MALTHUS: THE FOOD/PEOPLE EQUATION I. Introduction This study explores the interaction of science, technology, and American diplomacy in the extraordinarily complex problem of the changing balance between food and population in the less developed countries (LDCs) of the world. It shows how foreign aflfairs institu- tions of the United States Government have responded to the chal- lenges of this problem. Analysis of this particular issue, it was as- sumed at the outset, would furnish clues to a better understanding of problems involved in the interplay of science, technology, and diplo- macy in general. The substantive conclusion of the study is that the growth of world population is outpacing food production, while available techniques are not being sufficiently applied to improve agricultural production and marketing efficiency on the one hand, or to slow the rate of popula- tion increase on the other. Achievement of a global balance of food and population calls for many explicit improvements in political, economic, social, and diplomatic organization and management to achieve stronger human motivation, to improve the acquisition and dissemination of pertinent information, and to design and implement coordinated social programs which can apply existing technology more effectively. Without all of these, the goal of balance will continue to recede with results that seem likely to be tragic. Science and technology have had an increasingly significant impact on the modern world, penetrating deeply into the substance and con- duct of international relations. Traditional modes of diplomacy may not always be appropriate to the resolution of international problems with a substantial technical content; diplomacy may need new capa- bilities to deal with such problems. There are encouraging signs that this development may in fact be taking place. The question is whether, in the particular issue at hand, it is proceeding fast enough and com- prehensively enouarh. It seems clear that in devising programs to deal with both sides of the food/population balance, urgency is of para- mount importance. U.S. Stake in Resolving the Food/ Population Prohlem For some twenty-five years, through bilateral pacts and multilateral channels, the United States has been furnishing aid to the LDCs. Other developed nations have followed suit. U.S. motivation in pro- vidinsr development assistance has both humanitarian and political elements. These converge in the goal of fostering orderly political and economic progress, rapid and palpable enough to dissuade the people of the LDCs from destructively radical political solutions in their senrch for a better life. In the pursuit of this aim, the United States has made the largest national contribution to the modernization efforts of the LDCs. Total U.S. assistance to these countries, 1946-1970. Note : This chapter was prepared in 1971 by Allan S. Nanes. (769) 770 amounted to some $93 billion.^ Food represents a significant portion of thattota].^^ fe r (ri'ou-fh of Population versus Balanced Developriient As long as hard-won expansions in food production are matched by population increase in an LDC, the outlook for balanced development and the future of development assistance will be dim. The fact is that from a global standpoint, population has tended to increase faster than food production in the years since World War 11. If population in- creases too fast, it can halt economic development in the LDCs and even worsen conditions in these countries. Recognition of this fact has led in recent years to substantial funding of population-limiting programs by U.S.A.I.D.^ If economic development becomes a kind of treadmill, with gains in production nullified by gains in population, development aid will have failed. The United States will then have spent many bil- lions of dollars of foreign assistance to no lasting purpose. U.S. public opinion would probably not long tolerate such an outcome. Should run- away population growth lead to a termination of U.S. foreign as- sistance, the task of U.S. diplomacy in the underdeveloped world could become far more difficult than it already is. On the other hand, while a solution of the food/population issue will not guarantee the success of U.S. and other development assistance pro- grams, it would presumably enable the assignment of additional re- sources to other phases of development now receiving less attention. Today, a large investment of resources and technical skills is directed to the improvement of food supplies in preference to other sectors. If it proves possible to strike a balance between food resources and popula- tion, the LDCs should then be able to proceed with a better overall balance in their development programs. Such a result would be to their interest, as well as to the interest of the more affluent countries provid- ing the assistance. Whatever solution is found to the food/population problem, it is evident that it cannot be separated from the total process of develop- ment. An important conclusion of this study is that development is a seamless web. One cannot think exclusively in terms of the food/ population equation. Rather the problem must be seen in the whole context of development as it relates to attracting investment, creating new jobs, training manpower in new industrial skills, improving pub- lic health, and all the other elements that go into the development process. Scope and Limitations of the Study The dual subject of this study introduces a great range of highly technical ramifications which cannot be fully explored. However the study does attempt to identify and put in perspective the most salient ' U.S. Agency for International Development. "U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants. Pre- llmlnRry F.Y. 1970 and Trend Data." Washington. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), page 2. (By comparison, the United States had spent some S120 billion on mili- tary assistance and action In Vietnam in the six fiscal years 1966-1971. nlus an addi- tional several hundred million dollars annually in economic assistance. The U.S. space program, military and civilian, up to the end of the fiscal year 1971. ha"? cost an estl- I'lated f62.2 billion. See: U.S. Congress. Senate. Commlttep on Foreign RplaMons. "Imnnct of the Vietnam War." 92d Congress, 1st session. June 30, 1971. (Washington, U.S. Gov- ernment Printing Office, 1971. 36 pages. Committee Print.) «The total of U.S. assistance in food throughout the program 1-= listed as ll.^,- 371.000,000. ^Expenditure for population and famllv planning programs under Title 10 of the f'oreign Aid Act of 1961 Is listed nt $165,172,000 since 1965. 771 technical issues. To discuss the balance between two variables requires discussion of both. The study needs to deal with food, its availability, the qualities of foods req^uired, and the technologies related to food production and distribution. It needs also to deal with population growth, the technology of birth limitation, and the motivations neces- sary to forestall the increasingly rapid expansion of population. And finally, the study must be concerned with the orgamzational concepts, plans, programs, and international arrangemente to operate on these variables. The technologies of food availability and birth control are discussed sufficiently to show their technical feasibility and to make it clear that the problem lies elsewhere. On the other hand, the enormous complex- ity of the human side of the problem — social, cultural, economic, reli- gious, administrative, political, diplomatic — can only be touched on in barest outline. Enough is said, however, to demonstrate that the prob- lem is real, but that its dimensions are potentially manageable, given concerted and determined cooperative effort among all nations concerned. II. Defining the Food/People Equation In Developing Countries The consequences of population pressure pn insufficient food sup- plies are generally recognized. The technologies of expanding agri- cultural output and of exercising control within the family on num- bers of progeny are sufficiently advanced to make famine generally avoidable. The problem of holding food and population in balance appears to lie elsewhere: (1) in stimulating public recognition of the need for concerted action, (2) in devising economic incentives for action, and (3) in developing political programs to make necessary actions feasible and acceptable. The history of western civilization during the epochal events of the Industrial Revolution affords insufficient guidance for the coun- tries now striving for development and encountering unprecedented pressures of population. The industrialization of Western Europe coincided with enormous emigration to the open lands of America, the expansion of American agricultural productivity, and the broad ac- ceptance of a middle class ethic and living standard. Each developing country has its own special problems of balancing food and people; l)v aiul large the circumstances of the United States or Western Eiiro])e during the expansionist period of the Nineteenth Century donot ap])ly. Fanihu- as Perceived in an A^iwrit Canntrj/ From the U.S. perspective of a national economy in which agricul- tural surpluses have been troublesome for more than half a century, it is hard to comprehend the causes, ronditions, or conseouences of famine. In the United States, virtually every factor contributing to fimniip is absent: Relative to population there is abundant arable land, well watered, favored by a long growing season, and worked by educated farm managers; production areas are connected with consuming markets by a network of railroads and highways; economic support is highly institutionalized in the form of farm credit, price supports, and producer cooperatives; farm technology (especially plant genetics, fertilizers, mechanization, and pest con- trol) has been developed over a f-entury of public and private invest- ?nent and applied in a hich-capital, low-manpower system of indus- tiiali/ed. electrified farms: the technology of crop storage is similprlv de\eloped in the form of grain elevators, deep-freeze lockers, drving rbanibers. packing houses, and wholesale warehouses, so that the food carrv-over provides a secure ffiiarantee of future supply- ]\fanv of the human factors assuring: an absence of famine condi- tions have developed gradually in the United States, from the earliest settlement of the new Continent. Although pockets of poverty and lag- ging regions persist, even in the face of many favorable elements, 773 famine conditions are rare and mass famine unknown. Not all Ameri- cans are well fed: Despite conditions of abundance, there are many persons whose dietary habits predispose them to malnutrition ; others who are ignorant of what constitutes an adequate diet ; and still others whose poverty denies them the means to buy adequate food. But as a general proposition, in the United States the pressure of population on food supplies appears to have been effectively dealt with by a com- bination of favorable circumstances, in which technology is an im- portant element. Habits of thought formed by the American experience have made it all too easy to assume that a facsimile of U.S. conditions (with per- haps some substitutions, like irrigation to correct a deficiency of rain- fall) can be readily introduced into a given country to solve the prob- lem of famine. Technological factors can be systematically tabulated: Production technology Transportation technology Storage and preservation technology Urban-rural balance Market organization Agricultural credit institutions Managerial expertise and systematically imparted to the famine-prone area. To a consider- able degree, the assumption that it is enough to concentrate on these factors has been reinforced by European experience. A.rhier'einent ar^d Maintenance of Adequate Dwt in Europe The ability of an expanding population in the United States to feed itself was roughly paralleled in leading industrial states of Western Europe. In Great Britain and Germany, this ability was attained through a combination of improved agricultural techniques and larfre-scale imports from overseas. For example, "German agri- cultural production more than doubled and maybe even tripled in the nineteenth century," while Germany's population increased propor- tionatelv.* "With growing production German agriculture might have been able to provide bread for her ever-larger population. But the demand for higher-quality food, in the form of both finer flour and more meat, which meant the rliA^ersion of grain to cattle feeding, necessitated the import of foreign grain after 1871." ' The British similarly supplemented domestic food production with imports. The people of France, on the other hand, industrialized at a slower pace and, with a substantially larger portion of the population living on subsistence farms, were largely able to feed themselves. In the Far East, Japan supported a rapidly increasing population by intensive and skillful cultivation of the land and by extensive fishing operations. The fact that the tnore heavily industrialized countries were rela- tively successful in meeting basic food needs appeared to run counter to early theories of the inherent inadequacy of food to sustain popula- *HaJo Halborn. "A History of Modern Germanv. 1840-1945" (New York. A. A. Knonf. 196fi). page .^72. According to Koppel S. Pinson. the region of "Bismarckian Oernianv" in- orease'1 in population from 24 million to 68 million in the 19th centurv ("Modern Ger- many," New Tork, Macmillan, 1966). » Ibid., page 371. 774 tions. The dynamic changes during the nineteenth century, through the development of transportation, massive emigration to the United States, the opening up of unused acreages of fertile lands in the American West, and the development of world trade in agricultural surpluses, all helped the industrialized nations to satisfy the needs of their populations for food. Countries like England and Germany could concentrate on the development of industry and on the furnish- ing of investment capital and services to other countries, secure in the knowledge that their populations could be fed on imported food- stuffs, particularly on cheap American grain. The combination of these factors contributed to a sense of self- confidence that these nations need not fear that mass hunger would result even if their populations should greatly increase. But as a matter of fact, in most of the countries of Western Europe, popula- tions remained relatively stable after 1900 : After World War I, the populations of France, Sweden, and Ireland actually declined. Only under the dislocations of war or revolution, or in the rela- tively less developed territory of Russia, were there even localized episodes of actual food shortage. When these occurred, as in Russia in 1891-1802 and in 1921-1922, they were not perceived as resulting from an excess of population over food supply. However, the fortunate experiences in Western Europe and the United States obscure the fact that for most of the world, and most notably amongst the huge populations of Asia, the availability of food has been close to the bare minimum necessary to sustain life. The Malthiismn Hypothesis and Its Revival When Malthus first published his Essay on Population^ he proposed the j^oorly supported hypothesis that population increased geometri- cally ( 1. 2, 4, 8, 16 . . . ) while food resources increased arithmetically (1,2,3.4,5 . . . ). In the more fully documented later editions of his work, he abandoned this idea in favor of the more general assertion that population always tended to outrun food supply. If this theory was not borne out in Western industrialized society, there appears to be some evidence in support of it in the LDCs, where famines still re- cui* M if h dismaying frequency.® It is an easy assumption that the one missing factor that distinguishes developed countries from underdeveloped countries, famine-free coun- tries from famine-prone countries, is technology. Technology enables expanded agricultural output and the control of numbers of progeny. Unquestionably, therefore, technology plays a powerful role in ena- bling a population to achieve and sustain a satisfactory food/popula- tion balance. However, the conscious and deliberate balancing of food and popu- lation, and the systematic application of technology to agriculture (or to the limiting of population), are difficult policies to implement in a developing country. Many obstacles stand in the way. Among the most notable is the general deficiency in knowledge of the complex • In India there were particularly severe famines In 1838. 18B1. 1866. 1869. 1874. 1876- 1878. and 1899-1901. In China, there were such famines in 1877-1878. 1887. 1889. and 1916. Tt is estimated that 5 million persons perished In the Indian famine In 1876-1878. and 9.r> million in the North China famine of 1877-1878. In such countries, where trans- portntlon and distribution systenis are poorly developed, localized famines arc likely to occur In any .vear. 775 factors involved. The processes of population growth are not under- stood. The statistics of food and population are poor. Even the tech- niques for disseminating improved technology are faulty. Under these conditions, the negotiation of positive diplomatic arrangments and the task of planning programs to achieve the goal of food/ population balance tend to be unsystematic and episodic. It may well be true that people in poor countries, with short life spans, have strong motivation to reproduce : To perpetuate their own families, and to assure old-age protection for themselves, are strongly engrained cultural drives. The availability of technology' and the hope of material betterment do not seem sufficient to moderate this motiva- tion. External efforts to aid in the control of the birth rate in a poor country may be met with suspicion and resentment. This combina- tion of factors constitutes an exacting challenge to diplomacy. Weaknesses in the Fundamental Data on Food and Agnrvlfvre Agricultural production in the LDCs tends to be largely for subsis- tence. Since the product does not enter channels of trade, and is not concentrated, it is difficult to gather reliable information on the amount of food actually produced in such a country. There is also a deficiency of information concerning storage, credit, transport, farm organizations, marketing and trade, and agricultural manpower re- quirements. In assisting an LDC in planning an agricultural develop- ment program, such information is essential, but constructing an or- ganizational framework to provide it is a long and costly undertaking. Some other informational shortcomings relative to food production in the less developed countries were described by Dr. Joel Bernstein, Assistant Administrator for Technical Assistance of AID: * * * We are impressed by the need for a great deal more knowledge of such elemental subjects as soil and water as they are found in the developing world. Without exhausting the list, one can cite needs for better mapping, more soils analysis, greater knowledge of the interaction of soil and water, better methods of water management. We really know next to nothing about how to farm pro- ductively in the humid tropics, where a systematic study of soil and water re- lationships is only one obvious need/ Other authorities have pointed out that the new high-yielding seed and plant varieties were developed within and for given ecological and climatological conditions. It has been possible to transfer the re- sults over a wide area geographically, but a somewhat narrow one with respect to ecology and climate. Additional information is needed if the area of transferability is to be increased, not only within the limits already defined, but for the development of new genetic, stocks suitable to the climatic and ecological conditions of the areas where they are to be grown. The need for information means, of course, a need for research — specifically, for what is known as adaptive re- search directed to solving urgent and pressing problems, as opposed to that type of. research which simply increases the sum total of hu- man knowledge. The subjects for adaptive research in agriculture, ac- cording to J. George Harrar and Sterling Wortman of the Rockefeller Foundation, are : ' "The Changing Role of American Technical Assistance in Agricultural Development." Public lecture before the Cornell Workshop on Some Emerging Issues Accompanyiijg Recent Breakthroughs in Food Production" (Mareli 31, 1970). 776 The development of food crop varieties that have the gr^atfest produc- tive capacity under local conditions and are resistant to the major pests and pathogens which commonly threaten the productivity of local varieties ; the identification, through studies of soils, soil and water management, and per- fonuanie of crop varieties, of practices that will maximize yields in each season of each region ; the determination, through studies of the physiology of plants, of nutritional requirements, and how these can be satisfied ; and studies of the quality of harvested products and means of improvement.* Wlini the comments of Drs. Itariar and Woitmaii are added to those of Dr. Bernstein, the weakness of the data hase relatino; to food production is thrown into sharp relief. Greater knowledge of the relationship of these fartors; individually and collectively, to the stimulation of agricultural production could be most useful to development planners and administrators. Despite great gains m the twentieth century, knowledge about human nutrition — the requirements of diet — is seriously incomplete. There are many variables: Persons engaging in hard manual labor require higher caloric intake : persons with recurrent fevers need high ])rotein intake; different regions have various cultural preferences in diets; there are many geographic differences in the kinds of foods available; standards of quality and food sanitation differ widely; and so on. Statistics cannot readily accommodate all these variables, and simplificatin the Interactions Between World Food and World Population," op. cit., pages 10-11. 780 and training methods. It requires the development of irrigation sys- tems, intensive use of fertilizers, and in the view of many experts the development of new crops even more r^ponsive to fertilizers ; this in turn involves research in plant genetics. The depredation of food sup- plies by animal and insect pests must be brought under control. Im- proved food preservation techniques need to oe developed. Disease, which cuts down the caloric efficiency of ingested foods, must be fought, so that ill health does not diminish the supply of manpower during a planting season, or cause the loss of a crop. In many instances a market economy must be developed where none existed before. What needs to be done is virtually endless, and it is all intercon- nected. This interconnection of very many diverse elements is charac- teristic of the entire modernization process in the underdeveloped countries, and the solution of the food/population equation is simply a specialized model of that J)rocess. As Roger ReveUe has pointed out, if the food/population ratio is to be broi^ht into balance it means virtunlly changing a whole way of life.^" This is the implication of overall economic development as well. Yet whatever the social knd political barriers to mounting a vigor- ous attack on the food/population problem, the lack of technical means to deal with the problem effectively needed to be overcome first. Until introduction of modem agricultural techniques resulted in increased food production by means of the "Green Revolution," the rate at which food production increased could not keep pace with the rate at which population increased. The rate of population increase, in turn. could probably not have been effectively curbed with the techniques of contraception then available. Had the technical means not been found for effecting revolutionary increases in food production — and in the absence of a drastic decline in the birth rate — the danger that the un- derdeveloped world would sink into chaos (as some have predicted) would have been greatly increased. As matters now stand there is at least a chance that development aid, abetted by a skillful and flexible diplomacy and working in conjunction with science and technology, may prevent such a tragedy. This combination could help to bring about a reasonable equilibrium between population and food resources in the so-called third world. " Remarks at "Symposium on the Food-People Balance," held by the National Academy of Engineering, Washington, April 29, 1970, op. clt. III. Meeting Food Requiremexts of Developing Countries Human dietary requirements are a complex and incompletely re- searched subject. However, it is not necessary to consider refine- ments of modern dietary science in dealing with problems of gross malnutrition in the poor countries o£ the world. The specific need for minute quantities of trace elements and vitamins which usually ac- company a sufficient and varied diet is of trivial importance in a re- gion barely surviving on meagre resources of grain and less meat. These dietary requirements may be viewed as a pyramid of food components of which calorie content (mainly supplied by sugars, starches, and fats) are at the base; proteins or "amino acids" (mainly supplied by animal products like meat, fish, poultry, milk and eggs) are next; and the vitamins and minerals (supplied in part by the fore- going, and also by fresh vegetables and fruits) are at the apex. Food concentrates and supplements have been developed for most of the known human dietary requirements, but only the most basic ones are relevant for this study. This section of the study will consider, for each dietary component, the consequences of a deficiency, the quantities required to overcome present deficiencies, and the technological options already available or in prospect. The gist of the discussion is that for each category of foodstuffs there are technological means available for providing an adequate diet for the present and for the foreseeable future, but that the problems of doing so, and the consequences of doing so without taking other measures on the population side of the food/popula- tion balance, could have serious disadvantages economically, socially, politically, and internationally. The political and diplomatic aspects of the food problem are devel- oped in the next section of the study. Defining Calorie Shortages of the LDCs The most immediate and obvious kind of food shortage is that of energy-providing elements. Sugars, starches, and fats provide a pop- ulation with human energy ; they are the fuel of human labor. VARYING needs FOR FUEL-FOODS To determine the calorie requirements of a nation it is not enough to establish an optimum quantitative diet for a standard individual and then multiply this by the numbers of population to be fed. Individual needs differ widely, being influenced by such vari- ables as age, sex, physical size, occupation, health condition, and deep- seated dietary preferences. In formulating policies to achieve sound nutritional conditions in the LDCs, governments must take account of these variables. (781) 782 A New York longshoreman, of greater height and weight than his East Indian counterpart, will probably require more food to perform his work efficiently. He may well require more simply not to feel imderfed. Differences like these point up the difficulty of measuring food shortages in strictly quantitative terms. Furthermore, quantita- tive shortages are accompanied by qualitative deficiencies. Not only are the people of the LDCs undernourished, they are malnourished as well. Despite the difficulties in obtaining accurate data, "all authorities are agreed that in most countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin America today the average food consumption falls considerably short of the optimum desiralale from the point of view of the health, as well as the efficiency, of the worker." ^^ According to the Third World Food Sur- vey of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, at least 20 percent of the population in the LDCs received too few calories, while about 60 percent received diets that were of inadequate nutritional quality (that is, their diet was deficient in other compo- nents than calorie content — mainly in proteins) .^^ The FAO and others concerned with the world food problem can make statements like these because, despite all the variables, it is possible to measure a person's re- quirements for calories in relation to the work he does. Empirical studies already performed have been helpful in formulating these requirements.^" Physiological effects of calorie deficiency were explored in an ex- periment in starvation which took place in the U.S. during World War II. In this experiment 32 volunteers lived for 24 weeks on a diet of only 1,800 calories a day, with reduced amounts of protein and other nutrients. A decline was soon noticed in the muscle tone and the endur- ance at work of these volunteers; it continued, along with a loss of body weight, throughout the experiment. At the end of the 24 weeks of semistarvation, muscle strength of the subjects had been reduced by almost 30 percent, and precision of movement by 15-20 percent. Their cardiovascular systems also performed with reduced efficiency. It was also observed that the effects of malnutrition in this particular experi- ment were more severe, and occurred earlier, than in areas where the population is chronically undernourished and has managed to adapt to that state. The FAO, through its Committee on Calorie Requirements, has attempted to define levels of caloric intake, depending upon an indi- " United Nations. Food and Agriculture Orsranization (FAO), "Freedom from Hunger Campaign. Basic Study No. 5. Nutrition and Working Efficiency" (Rome, Italy. 1962), page 3. i» Cited In : "The World Food Problem." A Report of the President's Science Advisory Committee, Vol. II: Report of the Panel on the World Food Supply, May 1967 (Washing- ton U.S. Government Printing Office. 1967), page 5. "Thus, during and after World War IHt was observed that, when German miners in the Ruhr were provided with a daily ration of 4,500 calories. 2,200 were necessary for the maintenance of the bodv's metabolism, while the remaining 2.300 were available for work. On these "2,300 work calories the miners turned out 1.9 tons of coal daily, or slightly under 1,200 calories per ton. By 1942 these miners had only 1,700 work calories in their diet, and coal output was diminishing. When for some time only 900 work calories were available the workers lost weight. In 1944 the miners had 1,900 work calories, and mined 1.65 tons per day, which again averages out to approximately 1,200 work calories per ton of coal. In a German steel mill which escaped wartime bombing, it was possible to trace a pattern of declining production coinciding with a decline In caloric Intake. In 1939, on a ration of 1.900 work calories dally, a worker turned out 120 tons per man per month. By 1944, on 1,150 work calories dally, the same man produced less than 80 tons of steel per month. In both cases, a decline in food consumption resulted in a reduced output in proportion to the caloric Intake. United Nations, Food and Agriculture Organization, "Nutrition and Work- ing Efficiency," op. clt., pages 14-15. 783 vidual's degree of activity. It set up a theoretical individual, called "Reference Man,'' who is 25 years of age and healthy, weighs 65 kilo- grams, and lives in the temperate zone where the annual mean tern- perature is 10 degrees centigrade. Using these standards, a person in a sedentary occupation would need 2,800 calories a day, one whose work made him moderately active would need 3,200, and one doing heavy work would need 4,400. Of course, these are approximate ref- erence points. Within each occupational group there are wide varia- tions in the energy expended to do some particular task. Furthermore, conditions within occupations vary from one country to the next. For all groups, however, inadequate food consumption reduces working efficiency. FOOD AND METABOLISM The quantity of basic energy foods an individual can use effectively is determined in part by the amount of protein available to him. Pro- tein provides the "building blocks" of the body — the muscle and sinew that must be replaced when work wears them out. The body com- pensates for a lower protein intake by reducing the breakdown of its own protein, and an equilibrium is established between protein intake and protein destruction at a lower level than would be tne case with a more balanced diet. The effect of protein deficiency is an inability to expend energy at a high rate or to perform strenuous work for a pro- tracted period of time without a loss of weight and perhaps even damage to health. People in the LDCs who subsist on an unbalanced diet tend to avoid prolonged physical work which might cause a break- down in their precarious metabolic equilibrium. However, since they do less work, they require less of the fuel-foods as well. But the effect is to cut down their physical productivitj. While chronic undernourishment (insufficient energy-food) and malnutrition (unbalanced diet, mainly protein shortage) do not con- stitute famine, there have been instances in recent years in which food shortages either threatened or actually reached famine proportions. In the mid-1960s, the failure of the Indian monsoon to bring adequate rainfall occasioned a sharp decline in Indian cereal production and India reached the brink of famine.^^ U.S. food stocks eased the crisis, although even these supplies were not as plentiful as they had been in the past. The civil war in Nigeria brought starvation to the Biafran faction. Toward the close of World War II, the exigencies of war brought actual famine to the people of parts of The Netherlands. Real famine, however, is the exception rather than the rule. Generally speak- ing, hunger is endemic in the LDC, but starvation is not. They need more food, and more especially a better balance in their diets. Although all elements of diet are important, the first step in over- coming food shortage is to deal with tne problem of nourishment — literally, to ease the pain of hunger. The most important sources of high-calorie foods are wheat, rice, and other grains. It is here that some of the most spectacular steps are already being taken, through the introduction of new, high-yield genetic strains. ^ U.S. Congress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, "The Green Revolution, Symposium on Science and Foreign Policy." Proceedings before the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the 91st Congress, 1st session, December 5, 1969 (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), pages 213-214. 784 Technological Opporty/nities Opened hy Plmxt Genetics The hopes of the world that the food/population crisis might be nearer a solution were raised considerably with the advent of the "Green Revolution." The Green Revolution has been defined by Bar- bara Ward Jackson as "the new farm technology based on hybrids, v\ ater, and fertilizer which can double and treble food and work for the Avorld's developing peoples." ^^ But Lester Brown, who has been closely identified with the Green Revolution, warns that this "break- through" "foreshadows widespread changes in the economic, social, and political orders of the poor countries." " The Green Revolution began in Mexico in 1943 with a cooperative program between the Rockefeller Foundation and the Mexican Gov- cniincnt aimed at improving Mexican wheat production. A number of years later the so-called "Mexican wheats" were developed, wheats with a short stiff straw that could stand up with the added load of grain resulting from the application of fertilizers. The first to produce a sturdy short-stra wed wheat were actually the Japanese, and seeds from their strains were brought back to the'United States, where they were used in wheat-breedipg programs at Washington State Univer- sity. World record yields were produced with these seeds in the ir- rigated and high rainfall conditions of the Pacific Northwest. Even- tually these strains were sent to the Rockefeller team in Mexico, where further experimentation produced a variety of dwarf wheat adaptable to a wide variety of growing conditions. The Mexican wheats began tlie process of the Green Revolution in yielding redoubled harvests by lesponding to water and fertilizers. Recocjnizing that rice, rather than wheat, is the staple of much of the underdeveloped world, the Rockefeller and Ford Foundations joined to establish the International Rice Research Institute at Los Banos, in the Philippines. Organized in 1962, the Institute produced results within two years. Two strains, IR5 and IR8. also with a short, stiff strav/, demonstrated that they too could hold a heavier yield without falling over before the grain was ripe. Like the Mexican wheat, the new rice when properly managed can double the yield of the old. It is more responsive to fertilizer than the old rice seeds, and it has a shorter growing cycle. IR8 matures in 120 days, whereas old varieties took 150-180 days. This means there is time during the year to plant an extra rice crop, or some other crop altogether. Thus the potentiali- ties of each acre of land throughout the rice growing area of the tropics have been dramatically increased. The same cooperative program of the Mexican Government and the Rockefeller Foundation which had developed the new high-yield wheat applied the same methods to research on corn, another staple food of the LDCs. Although less spectacularly successful than the new wheat and rice, nevertheless corn yields have increased significantly. Successes of the Green Revolution Revolutionary increases in agricultural production resulting from the introduction of the new varieties of wheat and rice have occurred in many countries. Mexico, a country whose population has doubled -a Comment quoted on rear dust jacket of : Lester R. Brown, "Seeds of Change. The Green ^^111".**°° *°*^ Developments In the 1970's" (New York, Praeger Publishers. 1970). =" Ibid., page 6. 785 since 1948. hns been able to satisfy its requirements for the production of wheat find corn since the mid-l^oO's. As progressively increased acrea.n'es are planted in the new varieties, further gains are hoped for. Department of Agriculture experts estimate that roughly one-sixth of the total wheat acreage in West and South Asia is planted with the new wheats. Tt is also estimated that approximately seven percent of the riceland in South and Southeast Asia is used for growing the "miracle" rice. TABLE l.-EXPANSION OF ACREAGES IN HIGH-YIELDING GRAIN VARIETIES-SELECTED COUNTRIES* |ln thousands of acres] Crop year Wheat Rice Total 1965-66 _ -.. 23 18 2.505 6,487 11,620 19, 250 41 1966-67 .. 1,542 4,047 1967-68 - 10,173 16.660 1968-69 --- 19.699 31,319 1959-70 - - 24,664 43,914 < Most of the wheat and all of the r^portfld rice area was in South and East Asl^ ; of the 1969-70 total for both, 59 percent .^- J_ t|^^|A BnH 90 p'-^— "* *~ n»t acres. •"Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, "Provisional Indicative World Plan for Agricultural Development," op. clt.. page 60. *^ Brown, "Seeds of Change," op. cit., page 27. 788 tilizer plants in the LDCs. Both the United States and the World Bank have exerted pressure in this direction, with a favorable effect on India, for one example. However, other countries are less able to strike an effective balance between imports and domestic production. Lacking the ability either to produce or buy essential fertilizers, an LDC can only look on while other more fortunate countries advance by rapid strides to exploit the Green Kevolution. Potentially, at least, the situa- tion threatens to divide the LDCs into two new categories of have and have-not nations. THE PROBLEM OF FARM MECHANIZATION One of the consequences of the Green Revolution is that heightened agricultural productivity provides a margin of return that enables successful farmers to replace manpower with machines to increase still further their manpower productivity and incomes. There is much scope for this in the LDCs where more than 90 percent of the labor is agricultural (compared with approximately five percent in the United States). But if agricultural workers are replaced by machines and throng to the cities to join the already massive numbers of unemployed, a new problem will have been created. The advance of agriculture in the developing world is also held back by deficiencies in machinery to work the land. There are times when adequate mechanization might make a critical difference, as in seedbed preparation, sowing, and harvesting. Additional inputs of human labor and animal draft equipment will not do the job as fast at these crucial times. But at the same time, as already suggested, extreme care must be exercised as to the manner in which additional mechanization is introduced, to avoid substantial displacement of agricultural labor. Among the tasks for which the FAO experts suggest that mech- anization is appropriate are land clearing, including leveling ; plough- ing and seedbed preparation to allow earlj planting for increased yields ; other cultivation work such as subsoiling, chisel ploughing or stubble mulching ; threshing ; transport ; and pumping water for irri- gation. The FAO suggests that such measures could actually increase overall labor requirements since manpower released from one opera- tion could be utilized in some other work for which it was better suited in the farming system as a whole. Among these would be better weeding, more frequent crop protection operations, pruning, more careful irrigation, and improved marketing of produce.^^ How selective mechanization might actually create jobs is illustrated in the case of irrigation. Traditional methods of irrigation do not supply enough water for the new seeds to yield their maximum crops, and are quite expensive. The introduction of a diesel-powered pump not only cuts costs tremendously but also makes more water available for production. Increased supplies of water mean increased production. In turn, new land has to be prepared, planted, fertilized, weeded,, harvested, and threshed, and each of these operations requires more ='2 Food and Agrknlture Orga nidation of the UnltPd Nations. "Provisional Indicative Worlci Plan for Agricultural Development. Vol. 1," op. cit.. page 177. 789 labor. If multiple-cropping becomes possible on this land, the demand for labor could be doubled or even trebled. In addition, mechaniza- tion should theoretically provide work in maintenance and spare parts services — i.e., in the establishment of rural workshops making simple parts, tools, and implements — leading eventually to the domestic manu- facture of farm machinery. The upshot of selective mechanization, as seen by Lester Brown, is that: The conventional wisdom that farm mechanization is labor-displacing and therefore undesirable in countries with large numbers of unemployed no longer holds. Selective mechanization can be employment-creating." This optimistic statement is tempered by the admonition that farm mechanization can be an invitation to social chaos if the benefits and costs of only the richer farmers are considered. Disaster can ensue if mechanization is not selective, and does not encourage intensive use of labor. If tractors, gang plows, cultivators, and cotnbines are im- ported to bring American-style "factories in the field" to the LDCs, many already unstable countries may find their internal stresses un- manageable. Yet the situation varies from country to country, and where an LDC is actually faced with a declining farm labor force, mechanization may have to be faster and on a broader scale than in a country whose farm labor force gives every indication of continuing to grow. THE PROBLEM OF PESTB Agriculture in the LDCs is particulariy prone to infestation by pests, both before and after the food has actually been harvested. Insects, rodents, birds, and rot take a toll of food resources, even in the developed countries. How large a loss is hard to estimate ; it varies with the type of pest involved, the crop, the Beaeon, the time of in- festation, aiid the particular agro-climatic zone in Adiich the damage took place. In 1^65, for example, the U.S. ctop losses were estimated at $9..5 bil- lion, $3.7 of which was attributed to insects and nematodes, $3.3 billion td disease, and $2.5 billion to weeds. In 1968 the Indian F\>od and Agri- culture Ministry' Estimated that dits devoured almost 10 percent of India's grain production, and other estimates put the figure at 12 per- cent. The FAO cit6s a figuiie of 15-20 percent pre-harVest loss of po- tential cereal production in India due to insect pests, plant diseases, and parasites. The figure for fruits, vegetables, pulses, and oilseeds is set as high as 25 jiercent. Six different authorities have estimated that total crop losses from pests during the decade of the 1960's was some- where between $30 and $60 billion dollars, with a leaning toward the higher fi^re. H. H. Cramer, a German fexpert in this field, set the total at a minimum of $70 billion, in 1965 prices. Table 2 gives a graphic presentation of the extent of crop losses because of insect pests, dis- eases, and weeds, in both the developed and underdeveloped regions of the world.^* 3» Brown, "Seeds of Change," op. clt., page 105. »' Source : Food and Agricultural Organizations. "Provisional Indicative World Food Plan." Vol. 1, op. clt.. page 207. 790 TABLE 2.— LOSSES OF POTENTIAL CROP PRODUCTION BY REGION* Actual value (million) Potential - value (million) Percent losses due to 1- Loss as percent of poten- tial value Value of lost Region Insect pests Diseases Weeds production (million) North and Central America South America . $24,392 9. 276 35,842 10, 843 . 35,715 1,231 . 20, 140 $34, 229 13,837 47,769 18,578 63, 0C5 1,707 28, 661 9.4 10.0 5.1 13.0 20.7 7.0 10.5 11.3 15.2 13.1 12.9 11.3 12.6 9.1 8.0 7.8 6.8 15.7 11.3 8.3 10.1 28.7 33.0 25.0 41.6 43.3 27.9 29.7 19,837 4,561 Europe Africa 11,927 7,735 Asia Oceania U.S.S.R. and People's Republic of China.. 27, 290 476 8,521 Total . 137,439 207,786 12.3 11.8 9.7 33.8 70,347 'Source: Food and Agricultural Organizations, "Provisional Indicative World Food Plan," vol. 1, op.cit, page 207 . Obviously the developing countries must deal effectively with the problem of crop destruction by pests, or much of the upward thrust of the Green Revolution will be lost entirely. Indeed, the Green Revolu- tion itself, by simplifying the agro-ecosi^stem, may actually create more favorable conditions for pests. New high-yield varieties may lack resistance to indigenous insects and diseases. The extension of irriga- tion, the greater use of fertilizers, and other modem methods foster higher and more reliable yields, but at the same time can bring about an increase in pests, diseases, and weeds. Double-cropping merely com- pounds the problem. Chemical agents in great variety are available to combat the depredations of pests. There are insecticides, fungicides, and materials for rodent control. Indications are that except for cam- paigns against locust-breeding areas, the use of these chemicals has been more for curative than preventive purposes. Further, the empha- sis has been more on the protection of industrial and export crops than on domestic food crops. This situation may change as the small farmer becomes more knowledgeable and as advisory services are made more widely available. In the long nm the problem will be to control crop losses in the fields without creating serious ecological problems. A great deal of research is necessary to develop cheap and effective crop protection agents which can be applied without the risks to the user or the environment that accompany so many of the present pesticides anci insectici(ies. Research could also focus on the development of ge- netic resistance to plant diseases, the introduction of predators and parasites of the mam insect pests and rodents, and sterilization of the male in some species of pests. Effective crop protection will also require large-scale experimenta- tion to test the results of research in operation and to work out their costs and benefits. Demonstrations will be necessary so that farmers can learn to use new methods and products developed by research. The extension services of the developing countries can help in these activi- ties and in the organization and execution of pest surveys and control schedules. In general, the chances for effective pest control will be enhanced by strengthening the ministries of agriculture in the LDCs, and by encouraging the farmers to act jointly for ihe protection of their ciops. 791 Crops also need protection after harvesting;, which calls for the de- sign and construction of better storaire facilities. Rats, insects, and other pest-^ do much of their dania<;e in the primitive facilities available in the LDC's. Many existino: stora=e milk and milk products arc. such a jrood Fourcc and are in wide use. This is not the case in the LDCs. There calcium comes from ce- reals, leafy vegetables, and to a smaller extent animal products. If ce- reals are the principal food item and the principal source of calories, calcium intake can be increased by consumption of substantial amounts of pulses and nuts as well. As with vitamins, the ability to meet cal- cium requirements will be closely linked to the ability to meet calorie iind protein requirements. OTHER NTJTRrnONAL DEFICIENCIES IVliile other nutritional deficiencies exist in the LDCs, they do not appear to constitute a major barrier to development. Rickets, ^he childhoofi form of osteomalacia, is due to vitamin D deficiency, but can be prevented by sufficient exposure to sunlight. It has not been a major health problem in recent years. Vitamin C, necessary to prevent scurvy, can be found in many vegetables, including potatoes and mem- Iwrs of thf» cabbage family, as well as in citrus fruits. Foods containing vitamin C, can be found in most countries of the world. It may occa- sionnllv be necessary or desirable to fortify food products or supple- ment dif^ts with a synthetic form of this vitamin. In some underdeveloped countries there is a problem of endemic goiter (thyroid enlarirement due to iodine deficiency). A very good source of iodine is seafood, but this is eaten in relatively small amounts in many LCDs. lodization of salt is the most common preventive meas- ure against goiter, but in some countries there are technical problems connected with this process. Iron deficiency anemia is apparently quite common in Africa and Latin America, even though the iron intake in these areas has been fomid to be far in excess of the dietary standards suggested for the United States. Obviously this is a research field in which further inr formation is required. The same thing can be said for other nutrients, vitamins p.nd mmcrals, for which requirements cannot be estimated at the present time, either for the world or for specific countries." Some so-called "trace elements"^ — minerals required in very tiny amounts — can easily be overlooked, yet they are vital to health and even to life." It lias been suggested that they may not be consumed in large amount? in the LDCs, and that research is required on this subject. Dietary Deficiencies, Public ffealth, and Economic Development One aspect of the problem of dietary deficiencies in the underdevel- oped world that has perhaps not received the attention given to the protein gap, is the devastating and cumulative effect of disease on the entire problem of nutrition. Malnutrition, especially protein defi- ciency, lowers resistance to disease. Acute infection may precipitate nutritional deficiencies because infectious diseases accelerate the metab- olism of the victim. (Each Fahrenheit degree of fever raises the meta- bolic rate by 7 percent.) What is more important, however, is the spe- cific effect on protein metabolism. In the normal, steady metabolic ^'Ibld.. page 67. "I'niil R. and Anne H. Ehrllch. "Population, Resources, and Environment" (San Fran- cisco, W. H. Freeman, 1070), page 346. 801 state, the amount of nitrogen excreted by an adult equals the amount of liis intake. But during acute or chronic infectious states the indi- vidual suffers a negative nitrogen balance, exhausting protein faster than he can take it in, even with a thoroughly adequate diet. If the diet is inadequate, so often the case in the LDCs, an individual may never achieve a nitrogen balance. His diet will never satisfy his re- quirement for protein, and indeed, the gap between requirement and in- take will continue to enlarge. The various yardsticks suggested by different governments, inter- national organizations, and private groups appear to be predicated on the good health of the population in the LDCs. It would seem impor- tant to take some approximate account of the impact of disease as it affects these standards. For example, respiratory tuberculosis in- creases basic requirements about 20 percent, while malaria and dysen- tery, in their acute stages, increase metabolic requirements 20 to 40 percent. In addition, worms and other parasites reduce the caloric efficiency of ingested foods, and use up small amounts of iron and protein. In the case of malaria and yaws, a drain of calories and pro- tein is accompanied by a distinctive side effect : Highest incidence of these diseases occurs during the planting season : agricultural workers suffering one of these ailments may miss a planting (or harvesting) season.^^ An epidemic of either disease can thus seriously deplete the food supplies of the country or region in which it occurs. Protein deficiencies are reported to do permanent damage, especially to small children. It has long been known that they contribute to dwarfing or delayed physical maturity, even if an original insuffi- ciency had been overcome. Now it appears that protein deficiency in infancy or early childhood can result in permanent brain damage. Furthermore, studies in Central and South America have found a strong correlation between nutritional levels and physical and mental development in preschool and school-age children. In Santiago, Chile, a comparison was made of two groups of slum children and a group of middle-class children. One group of slum children was put on a sup- plemented diet, and received medical care. This group soon resem- bled the middle-class group both in physical and mental development, although apart from the food, the environment of the two groups of slum children was very similar. "Of the malnourished children, only 51 percent reached the normal range of development, compared with 95 percent of the supplemented group and 97 percent of the middle class group." '' In another study, a group of children who had had marasmus (often defined as protein and calorie deficiency) as infants, and then had been given medical care and supplemental food, were all found to have an intelligence level considerably below normal 3 to 6 years later. Finally, although the results of animal studies can be applied to hmnans only with considerable caution, studies on rats suggest that malnourished mothers may produce children whose brain development is impaired. Accordingly, the higher the incidence of disease, the more difficult the task of the developing country seeking to provide its people with " This subsection down to this point is based on the remarks of Dr. Herbert Pollack at the "Sympoeium on the Food/People Balance." sponsored by the National Academy of Engineer- InK. April 29, 1970, and pages 3 and 4 of the summary report of its Panel on World Nutri- tional Resources. •» Ehrllch and Bhrlich. "Population, Resources, Environment," op. cit., page 77. 802 f.n adequate diet. The greater the number of malnourished infants and toddlers, the smaller proportionately, and perhaps absolutely, will be the eventual number of those qualihed to carry out the more sophisti- cated tasks of economic development. This is a discouraging prospect for the developing countries, and for the United States and other de- veloped countries which seek to assist them. IV. The Politics and Diplomacy of Food The preceding section indicated that a solid base already exists, with many opportunities for further advances, in the technology of food production. Whether it is possible administratively, economically, politically, socially, and diplomatically to achieve an end to malnutri- tion by exploiting this technology is much more uncertain. The humane and diplomatic interest of the United States in this out- come is of long standing. This section of the study discusses the dimen- sions of the U.S. effort directed toward this end. Evolution of U.S. Technical Assistance to Agriculture in the LDCs The food relief program in the famine areas of Europe during and after World War I was the first U.S. experience with large-scale international relief operations. Although these programs had the single nonpoUtical objective of feeding hungry people, they called for special administrative machinery, and considerable international cooperation. Further and broader experience was gained when foreign assistance operations were organized again, during and after World War 11. During that war, materials and food supplies were sent to allies under.the authority of the Lend-Lease Act. Assistance was made available to the civilian populations of occupied areas. When the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Admmistration (UNRRA) was organized in 1943, the United States provided the bulk of its support. Immediately after the war the Congress responded to pleas to relieve distress in Europe by enacting several short-term relief programs., The legislation establishing these programs contained safeguards against political misuse of relief supplies, such as that which had occurred in both Poland and Yugoslavia with UNRRA- f umished items. The United States also took a leading role in the creation of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (AVorld Bank) and the International Monetary Fund, both of which began operations in 1946. These agencies were envisioned as the principal multilateral monetary instruments through which the U.S. could assist in rebuilding the war-ravaged countries and in stabilizing their cur- rencies. Today these agencies, especially the World Bank, figure im- portantly in world development projects, and are giving considerable empha,sis to those relating to the food/population question. During the early postwar years, leaders in the United States ex- pected that with appropriate assistance the developed countries re- ceiving Marshall Plan assistance would be able to get back on their feet, and once more would be able to feed themselves, either through domestic production or bj' import. The severe stringencies that existed after World War II were simply viewed as an emergency situation, and not as arising from any persistent food/population imbalance! However, ^Marshall Plan assistance went also to the underdeveloped (803) 804 world, since an important feature of the program was "the carrying out of what was in fact a large-scale technical assistance program in the overseas territories of the participating countries."" °^ President Truman publicly recognized the needs of the less developed countries in the fourth point of his 1949 inaugural address, calling for a "bold new program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and growth of un- derdeveloped areas." ** The ensuing program of technical assistance, known as the Point IV program, launched the United States into di- rect involvement with the problems of developing nations, now the main focus of all foreign aid. The United States was also involved indirectly, through contribi^tions to U.N. technical assistance and through bilateral assistance to those countries with colonial dependencies. U.S. FOOD AID Ti) DEVELOPING COUNTRIES The United States moved into the field of technicel assistance to the developing countries at a time when food shortages had become a worldwide p;-oblem. There had been famine in India following a crop failure in 1943, and in 1952 starvation threatened both India and Pakistan. The struggle between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chi- nese Communists had disrupted food production over wide areas of the Chinese mainland, and there was famine among the refugees from that conflict. The Arab countries were inundated with refugees from Israel, and lacked sufficient food resources to handle the influx. At this time Avhen the LDCs were desperate for food, U.S. food sur- l)luses were beginning to accumulate. No machinery existed for trans- ferring this surplus abroad. Furthermore, although it seemed both morally and politically sound for the United States to set up such ma- cliinery, it needed to be done without adversely affecting the food pro- duction and commercial trade of other countries. The solution devised for this problem was the Agricultural Trade and Development Act of 1954, popularly known as "P.L. 480." This Act declared that the policy of Congress was "* * * to make maximum efficient use of surplus agricultural commodities in further- ance of the foreign policy of the United States." To achieve this ob- jective the law provided that "surplus agricultural commodities in excess of the usual marketings * * ♦ may be sold through private channels, and foreign currencies accepted in payment thereror." " The foreign currencies thus acquired could be used, among other things, "for promoting balanced economic development and trade among na- tions." Some of the "soft currency" earned by the United States in this manner has been spent in the countries of origin to cover mainte- nance costs of U.S. embassies, for example, or military installations. A substantia,l part of it, however, has either been loaned or granted to the receiving countries to be used in development projects. *» William Adams Brown. Jr. and Redvers Ople. "American Porelm Assistance" (Wash- inpton. The Brookings Institution, 1953), page 433. ""Public Papers of U.S. President Harry S. Truman: 1949" (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1964), page 117. •» Section 2. Public Law 480, 83d Congress. Also section 104 (e) 68 Stat. 454, approved July 10, 1954. See "Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 and Amendments." Compile by Oilman O. Udell, Superintendent, Document Room, House of Representatives (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971). pages 1, 3. 805 Between 1954 and 1961 the amount of food shipped abroad under P.L. 480 grew steadily. However, since the law required that only commodities in surplus could be shipped under its terms, the main thrust of the program was the disposal of U.S. surpluses.^^ When U.S. stocks were reduced to what were considered reasonable levels, offers to give or sell such commodities under P.L. 480 were withdrawn. This happened, for example, to butter, dry skim milk, cheese, and vegetable oils. Wheat, however, continued to be in surplus and was shipped abroad in large quantities. There is no doubt that food aid under P.L. 480 has been massive, and that the proceeds from the sale of P.L. 480 food have made a sub- stantial contribution to development. Af^ricultural exports under P.L. 480 for the period 1954-1967 amounted to 5^17.2 billion, of which about $11.0 billion was shipped under Title I of the act (sales for foreign currency). Food was supplied to 116 countries containing half the world's population." The development of Taiwan, Israel, and South Korea benefitted markedly from P.L. 480 assistance. In the view of at least one informed observer, India would not have survived as a democratic state without the great transfer of food on a concessional basis provided by P.L. 480.^* In Tunisia, food donated under Title II was used as wage payments on work relief projects. In the 1960s food aid began to be used as an instrument of develop- ment. President Kennedy, on January 24, 1961, called for th6 construc- tive use of ''' American agricultural abundance" to promote peace and "to play an important role in helping to provide a more adequate diet" in the LDCs.^* Orville Freeman, then Secretary of Agriculture, urged similarly that the United States use its agricultural abundance to en- courage economic growth in underdeveloped areas.*^° Congress extended and expanded P.L. 480 assistance in 1961, and again in 1964 and 1965. PRESENT STATUS OF PUBLIC LAW 4 80 As the program evolved, various defects became evident. Sometimes, a developing country would use U.S. surplus food shipments to replace commercial food imports, diverting the credits to the purchase of consumer goods which would not contribute to development. Some- times the surplus imports were used to postpone the making of hard decisions in the modernization of a country's agriculture, or with re- gard to an explosively increasing population. Cochrane implies that the uge of food in this manner lay behind the failure of food aid to make a significant contribution to development in those Latin Amer- ican countries which received it.®^ Food assistance need not lead to unbalanced or lopsided develop- ment. But it can release officials in developing countries from the pressing obligation of taking distasteful steps necessary to sound development, by mitigating an immediate food shortage. The ar- gument has been advanced that P.L." 480 assistance in the 19o0s, by failing to oblige developing countries to take steps to limit popula- ™ Orville Freeman. "World Without HunKer" (New York, PrneRer, 1968). pape 20. =7 WiUard W. Cochrane, "The World Food Problem" (New York, Crowell, 1969), page IM. « Ibid., page 13R. ™ Ibid., pages 29. 30 *> Ibid., page HO. « Ibid., page 139. 806 tion growth as a condition of receiving U.S. food aid, actually encour- aged them to ignore the problem in the belief that food from the United States would always be available in a time of crisis. Such an argument, however, overlooks the fact that even today family planning is reluc- tantly accepted in the developing countries. The problem did not seem so apparent or so pressing in the 1950s, and many developing countries were probably not as ready to adopt measures that would restrict population growth as they were to become a decade later. It is even possible they would not have accepted U.S. assistance for such activity, or would have pursued it in very desultory fashion, had P.L. 480 food been linked to population planning. In 1966, P.L. 480 underwent a major overhaul ; the program of food assistance was tied directly to the efforts of the developing countries to limit their population growth. These changes can be found in the Food for Peace Act, P.L. 89-808. In the first place, the entire rationale of the law was changed. Instead of a device to dispose of U.S. agricul- tural surpluses, the new law advances a program to combat hunger and malnutrition and assist economic development, particularly in those countries that do the most to help themselves. In line with this pro- gram, the President is directed, in negotiating and carrying out agree- ments for the sale of agricultural commodities, whether for dollar credits or foreign currencies, to take account of the efforts of the other countries to meet their problems of food production and population growth. In the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 one of the purposes for which agreeanents concerning the use of foreign currencies can be made is that of " * * * activities, where participation is voluntary^ related to problems of population growth ♦ * *. Not less than five (5J percentum of the total sales proceeds received each year shall, if requested by the foTcign country, bo used for rohmfnt^ programs to control popula- tion growth." (Emphasis added.) That same law also contained a provision stipulating, as one of the self-help criteria the developing country must meet in order for the President to agree to the sale of agricultural commodities, the criterion of "carrying out voluntary programs to control population growth." This is stronger languasre than that which would merely take account of LDC efforts at self- help. Thus today the distribution of U.S. foodstuffs abroad under P.L. 480 is definitely linked to action by the receiving country to deal with its population problem. Obviously, this linkage does not apply when there is a natural catastrophe, such as the earthquake in Peru or the floods in East Pakistan. In those instances food is likely to be made available whether or not the stricken country is doing anything to alleviate its population problem. Otherwise food assistance, if implemented in accordance with the law, will be geared in with total development. Such aid is no lonjrer an outlet for surpluses, but rather a catalyst to induce the develop- ing countries to go forward with their own food production, and to establish and support family planning activities. The food that is shipped no longer has to be in a surplus category. Whether this may simply be a short-term phenomenon, derived from the elimination of U.S. surpluses, or a really long-term trend, remains to "be seen. If 807 U.S. food production generates domestic surpluses once again, the demand for a return to the surplus disposal philosophy could become a very live issue. Imtitutional Resources for Orderly Development of Agriculture The extent to which agricultural policy can be implemented is limited by the nature of agriculture itself — whether in the small farm, managed'^by a single owner, or the large farm, handled like a substan- tial business firm. Operating decisions in agriculture are usually an inherent prerogative of land ownership in the non-communist devel- oping "countries. This principle limits the scope and effectiveness of national agricultural policy, and complicates the role of international organizations formed to coordinate or promote balance in the develop- ment of global or regional agriculture. As Dr. A. H. Boerma, Direc- tor General of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Xations (FAO) , complained, despite a quarter-century of FAO efforts the agricultural scene today was "a very mixed one still containing distortions, imbalances, injustices, and deep unrest." For what dn we liaveV [Hoeruia lontiimed ] On the othpr hiiid. thnt- are "■■■"i^t regions where neither the land nor the waters of the earth are properly culti- vated, where the majority of mankind is in one way or another badly fed, where the countryside is inhabited by millions of people living in extreme poverty, and where most of them are unable to lind work. On the other hand, there is a smaller part of the earth where it seems that far too much food is being pro- duced, where governments are either actively paying farmers to cultivate less of their land or dispensing huge sums to keep up the prices of their overproduc- tion, and where large numbers of people are dying from diseases at least partly brought on by overeating. Could there be a more illogical pattern than that currently presented by the completely unbalanced situation of world agricul- ture and food consumption?®^ As a practical matter, the dislocations Boerma referred to are the focus of a considerable organized effort by agricultural institutions at all levels— private, public, instructional, commercial, local, national, regional, and global. At the global level, there is the FAO itself stimu- lating cooperation, encouraging international participation of nations in food contribution programs, collecting statistics, disseminating information and training, and setting up global objectives, priorities,, and plans. There is regional cooperation in agriculture through organizations such as the Alliance for Progress, the Organisation for Economic Co- operation and Development, and the United Nations Economic Com- mittee for Asia and the Far East. These generally serve as regional counterparts to FAO. In addition, of course, each country has its own. internal organization for agricultural development and stimulation. Although the United States has led in time and volume of agricul- tural and food aid, most of the developed countries have followed suit in contributing to the agricultural development of the LDCs. The com- plex U.S. program of agricultural and food assistance involves the Department of State, U.S.A.I.D., the Department of Agriculture, the various congressional appropriations and oversight committees, mon- "2 Addeke H. Boerma, (Director-general of FAO). "Address to the Eighteenth General Conference of the International Federation of Agricultural Producers on the Occasioa of Its Twenty-fifth Anniversai;i'" (Paris, France. May 14. 1971), page 4. 808 itoring by the Office of the President, and the less formal assistance of private groups like the Rockefeller Foundation. A vast network of private inteinational organizations has been constructed, to provide assistance in areas such as labor standards, technical information, marketing, credit, and capital. Despite the great amount of effort, and the multiplicity of agencies, engaged in various parts of the task of encouraging agricultural de- velopment in the LDCs, the total result seems disappointing. Boerma observes that "there has not been much meaningful cooperation among countries for the harmonization of national policies or measures affect- ing agriculture." The Pearson Report finds a similar lack of direction. The international aid system today, with its profusion of bilateral and multilateral agencies, lacks direction and coherence. A serious effort is necessary to coordinate the efforts of multilateral and bilateral aid-givers and those of aid-receivers.®^ The Peterson Report, while offering no explicit criticism of things as they are, is suggestive of these dissatisfactions in the recommenda- tions it oti'ers for change (paraphrase) : Private investment is under attack. Enlightened trade policies toward the LDCs are an essential element in achieving international development. Accept- ing imports is one of the responsibilities of industrial countries. More reliance should be placed on international organizations; an international organization like the World Bank, with no political or commercial interests of its own, is able to obtain pood results. Strengthen the capabilities of international organiza- tions and build more coherence into their operations. Encourage them to take a broader view : to give increasing attention to the management, social, techni- cal, .scientific cooperation, and popular participation aspects of development Encourage them to be diplomatic, flexible, sympathetic, and persuasive — but pre- pared t«> say no and to withstand political pressure. With respect to "U.S. assis- tance, there is an excessive number of statutory and procedural requirements that encumber the program and reduce its flexibility. A number of departments and agencies have competing interests and responsibilities with the result that too many issues go to the President for resolution, and opportunities to take initiatives in policies toward developing countries are sometimes lost.** Bocrma's analysis suggests the need for a more comprehensive and more vigorous global approach : "The developing world as a whole is in need of help. The developed world as a whole must provide it." Subjects tliat call for action, he says, are: "* * * population, em- ployment, agrarian reform, nutrition, research, marketing, credit, agricultural extension, training, and the improved processing of agri- cultural products ♦ * ♦ ." The world of agriculture is interconnected, and "the level of national agricultural production in any one trading country automatically affects the siutation in others. * * * In the world of today, agricultural policies can no longer be formulated in an exclusively national or even regional or subregional context." Moreover, in dealing with these problems "what is required is in- " Lester B. Pearson, et al. "Partners In Development, Report of the Commission on International Development" (New York. International Bank for Reconstruction and De- velopment. 1969), page 22. . „ .^ •< "U.S. ForeJRn Assistance In the 1970'8 : A New Approach," Report to the President from the Task Force on International Development, March 4, 1970 (WashinRton, X:.S. Government Printing OflBce, 1970), 39 pages. 809 creased dynamism * * *." ^' All these comments add up to one con- clusion : That the diplomatic, economic, political, social, and adminis- trative aspects of the Green Revolution lag behind the technological aspects, ^nd that the problem of orderly agricultural development on a balanced, global basis is far from being solved. ConfllcUng Agricultural Plans and Programs On the one hand it is asserted (by Boerma, for example) that "too little attention is paid to agriculture." Industry has been given priority in the allocation of scarce financial resources. On the other hand, it is suggested that insufficient emphasis on urban industrial opportunity will result in hardship for those released from the new, highly pro- ductive agriculture, (Even this conclusion is controversial, in view of the belief held by some analysts that the Green Revolution will cause an increase in agricultural employment. See pages 20-21.) Boerma calls for more liberal trade policies toward the developing w6rld, a global balance of agricultural supply and demand, more and better international commodity agreements — hopefully combined into an integrated scheme for international commodity control — and agree- ment on guidelines for national agricultural policy as well as on pro- cedures for reviewing their strict application. One related issue concerns the rate at which the Green Revolution should be pressed. Various observers have pointed out that dissatisfac- tions and tensions are likely to accompany the Green Revolution in the LDCs, and that if it proceeds rapidly the tensions will be the more severe to the point where actual conflict and revolutionary activity may occun • Another issue may be that well-intentioned diplomats and scientists are urging a faster pace of acceptance of new agricultural technology than is warranted by the technology itself. For example, Dr. Borlaug, in describing his program in Mexico, advocated that exploitation be- gin immediately of the "better" without waiting for the "best." In Mexico [wrote Dr. Borlaug], as soon as significant improvements were made by research, whether in varieties, fertilizer recommendations, or cultural practices, they were taken to farms and incorporated into the production pro- grams. We never waited for perfection in varieties or methods but used the best available each year and modified them as further improvements came to hand.** Yet elsewhere in his report. Dr. Borlaug noted that a variety [IRS] of rice introduced into monsoon areas of India and East Pakistan was not well adapted to climatic conditions there and had had only a "modest and occasional impact." Dr. Borlaug has also appealed for "the will and commitment of gov- ernments to support national production campaigns." It seems evident that when national or even international mobilization of a vigorous administrative and political effort is required, careful attention should be given to the question of whether the technology is sufficiently per- fected and properly adapted to local conditions before it is appHed. «* Boerma. "Address to the Eighteenth General Conference of tlie International Federa- tion of Agricultural Producers . . ." op. clt., pages 14—15. "" Xorman E. Borlaug. "The Green Revolution . . .," op. cit.. Page 44. 810 Difficult though the development of a technology may be, it is q^uick, cheap, and easy compared with the political problem of mounting a concerted human effort. If political effort is mobilized to apply an im- perfect technology, yielding disappointment and costly failure, the })olitical effort may be fruitless and the failure may add greatly to the difficulty of mounting a second political effort after the technology is perfected. A third issue is reflected in differences between the Peterson Report and the position of FAO as reflected in Boerma's recent statement. The primary thrust of the Peterson Report is that necessary organization, motivation, and administrative control can be best mobilized for the development of the LDCs by skillful use of the management leverage supplied by an international credit institution, viz., the World Batik. "Without playing down the importance of money, credit, and markets, Boerma in his address to the International Federation of Agricultural Producers saj'S he believes that "there has been too much emphasis on the economic at the expense of the social aspect,'' It is, he says, "a rnis- take to plan for development solely in terms of economic growth, whicli neither necessarily nor automatically covers such problems as unemployment, malnutrition, and education, to mention the most obvious." The T'nited States has an obvious interest in the conflicts that seem to liave been provoked by agricultural progress in the LDCs. However, in the jnnnagement study reported to the Secretary of State by his Deputy Under Secretary for Administration, November 20, 1970, the recommendation was made that agricultural officers (up to now, sup- plied by the Department of Agriculture) be assigned to missions abroad on tlie priority basis of (a) wliether the countries are actual or j)otential customers of U.S. agricultural exports, or (b) whether they are compet itors of the United States. The need to observe ongoing agiicMltural cliange is accorded no priority.*'^ Contemporary agricul- tural 1 it eraturc conta ins vai'ious references to the problems encountered by U.S. agricultural emissaries abroad in their contacts with their coimterparts: in particular. susi)icions as to U.S. motives need to be oveiconie. The rcix)rt cited aboxc imi)lies motives that seem to feed rather than to allay such suspicions. ^4 n En nmcrat'ion of Non-Terhnical OhHtdcles A considerable literature has appeared iji evaluation of the conse- f|uencos of the Green Revolution in the developing countries. After the first wave of optimism, a note of apprehension has been sounded and seems to be growing stronger. Fears are expressed on the one hand that the expanded availability of food will be delayed too long, and will frustrate the expectations of those experiencing the pain of short- age, leading to the violence of organized protest; on the othei: hand, there is concern that the vigorous exploitation of new agricultural tech-j nology will lead to serious dislocations of food supply, monetary sys- tems and — above all — people. 0" "Diplomaey for the 70's : A Program of Management Reform for the Department of Stiti'"' rton. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), page 475. Department of State Publication 8551. 811 SURPLUS VERSUS SHORTAGE It is a characteristic of technology that it cannot be exploited in the same way or to the same degi-ee in all parts of the world. Effective use of technology relates to climate and geography, level of education and technical training, ability and willingness to adopt new methods, re- ceptivity to new diets, relative accessibility of information, and deci- sions as to the extent and kind of mechanical equipment to acquire. Given the proper combination of these factors— and particularly the careful use of irrigated water and fertilizers— the genetic advances of .the "Green Revolution" can yield a two- to four-fold increase in grain production. Historically, the United States has been a grain exporting nation. Other nations, like Australia and Canada, have likewise achieved sustained surpluses. These have been both a source of income from export, and a means of saving lives in times of acute or chronic food shortage in other countries. Those countries that have vigorously accepted the opportunity of the "Green Revolution" have converted from conditions of shortage to conditions of surplus and will not need to rely on foreign surpluses. But as they have achieved surpluses them- selves, they need to find markets for them. Here they come into com- petition with countries long accustomed to exporting surpluses, intro- ducing complications into the global picture of supply and demand. On a smaller scale, it is possible for a single country to be divided into regions that are large producers of surplus, and regions that are in serious shortage : for example, West and East Pakistan. In some countries, transportation facilities are so poor that shortage and surplus situations can occur locally ; this was long the situation in China, for example. Unless surplus grain becomes available to those who need the food, it fails to serve its functional purpose. When grain remains in surplus it tends to fall in price, thereby reducing the incentive of those em- barking on programs of expanded food production. The success of the Green Revolution depends substantially on the assurance that economic and administrative arrangements are in operation to deliver the product to the consumer. ECONOMIC DISLOCATIONS U.S. contributions of grain to developing countries have been dis- tributed in these countries by sales to consumers, with the proceeds used for development purposes. When these countries, by virtue of their own advances in productivity, are able to supply their own needs, and even to export surplus grain, the revenues they formerly received for development will be cut off. There will be no further opportunity to convert revenues from the sale of P.L. 480 foods into investment cap- ital for urban industrialization. It might be possible to replace these funds in any of several ways: for example (a) by taxing the exports of grain surpluses, (b) by ensuring that the proceeds from overseas sales are channeled into urban industrialization (or at a minimum into the kinds of farm mechanization that are least likely to reduce labor requirements), or (c) by taxing the producing farmers. Historically, the need for encouraging production of grain has been so keen that farmers have largely been exempted from taxation ; accordingly, re- 812 sistance is to be expected to any change in this policy, particularly since affluent farmers largely comprise the leadership and the apex of the power structure of the developing countries. An export tax would be equally unpopular for the same reasons. Earmarking of proceeds from overseas grain sales would be difficult administratively. An internal dislocation also results from the Green Revolution. The more prosperous farmers are best able to exploit the new grains. They are able and likely to invest their expanding income in capital equip- ment for further increased production. Most farm capital equipment replaces human labor, particularly the kinds of capital equipment use- ful on larger farms. Cash and credit resources will tend to oe concen- trated on the larger farms, while the increased productivity will re- sult in lowered grain prices, thereby discouraging and inconvenienc- ing the smaller farmers. Considerable emphasis is placed, in current literature, on the need to limit farm mechanization to equipment that increases productivity per acre, but does not replace manpower.** How feasible this policy is remains to be seen. Markets for a country's grain must be found primarily in the cities, but if the bulk of revenue accruing from the Green Revolution goes to the larger farmers, and is invested in further agricultural produc- tivity, financial resources must be found elsewhere to invest in urban industrialization so that there will be an urban market for the new farm abundance. The prospect is that with P.L. 480 funds cut off, the available resources for urban development will be less, not more. The question of the balance-of -payments position of the LDCs is a constant concern of international development. Most of the LDCs still depend on agricultural products to earn them the foreign exr change to pay for the imports of the many items essential to develop- ment. Others have oil and mineral resources desired by the developed countries. Some realize considerable earning through tourism, while others would like to develop tourist attractions. By and large, how- ever, the future of the developing countries is tied to their ability to expand their export trade. The Pearson Report showed, for example, that the growth rates of individual countries correlate more closely with export performance than with any other economic index.^^ ; : ' From 1953 to 1968 exports from the LDCs grew at an average rate of 4.7 percent a year." In the decade of the 1960s the export earnings of the LDCs grew at an annual rate of more than 6 percent. At the same time, however, the total volume of world trade was growing at an even faster pace. In relative terms, the LDCs were lagging behind. Moreover, tne terms of trade — that is the prices of their imports as compared with the prices of their exports — moved against them. The value of their exports incresised, but much less rapidly than that of world trade as a whole. The problem was com- Sounded by the instability of world commodity prices, so vital to the #DCs, which earn some 90 percent of their foreign exchange from ■ •'The critical Importance of finding ways of creating more rather than fewer Jobs was affirmed repeatedly by speakers at the 12th World Conference of the Society for Interna- tional Development in Ottawa, May 16-19, 1971. (The theme of the conference was "De- velopment Targets for the TO's : Jobs and Justice".) ••Pearson et al. "Partners in Development. Report of the Commission on International Development," op. clt., page 45. « Ibid. 813 the export of foodstuffs and other raw materials. It was also com- pounded by competition from synthetics produced in the industrialized countries, and by the increased supplies of raw materials, including foodstuffs produced in some industrial countries for protected markets at home. The competitive position of the LDCs in worid trade is serious for another reason : their increasing burden of debt service. One reason for this increase is the decline in the ratio of grants to loans in the bilateral aid programs of a number of countries. Furthermore, the increased burden of debt service is on harder terms than previously, in both dates of maturity and rates of interest. According to an estimate by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), assuming the present terms and conditions of aid continue until 1975, the total an- nual debt service payable to DAC members will increase threefold from 1967 to 1975.''^ India, Pakistan, and Indonesia have very severe debt-servicing problems, while debt-service payments from other Asian and African countries doubled between 1963 and 1968.'^^ The tremendous increases in agricultural production resulting from the introduction of the new seeds and allied technology complicates, rather than simplifies, the problem of the LDC foreign exchange position. For as long as domestic population continues to increase, the additional supplies of home-grown food will have to be used domes- tically to feed the additional mouths. Production levels will have to continue to increase, requiring continued imports of fertilizers, pesti- cides, and agricultural machinery, with continually increasing loreign exchange expenditures to secure these inputs. Ironically, if an underdeveloped country is fortunate enough to have a surplus of cereals, the prospects are against any substantial betterment of its foreign exchange position. The market in the devel- oped countries may already be saturated, and even where it is not, the LDC would have to compete with an established supplier from the developed countries. In fact, at prevailing prices, the developed coun- tries currently have an excess agricultural capacity, encouraged by price supports and subsidies that effectively serve to shut out grain imports. A prime example can be found in the European Community (Common Market), where grain prices in the member countries are in many cases double those in world markets, but export subsidies are so large that not only are outsiders excluded from the Market itself, but the EEC countries can undercut other exporting nations in world markets.^^ Many developing countries also support agricultural prices, further compounding the problem. Other types of trade discrimination are practiced, and as previously mentioned there is increasing com- petition from synthetic materials to replace agricultural raw materials like rubber, sisal, abaca, and kapok. •" CoTnmlttee for Economic Development. "Asslsfinpr Development In the Low Income Conntries." (New York,^1969), page 44. DAC Secretariat estimate. " Orsranlsatlon for Economic Cooperation and Development. "196S Review : Develop- ment ABsiatance." Report prepared by Edward M. Martin. Chairman of the DAC (De- cember 1968), page 135. ■"Lyle P. S<"hertz. "Food Supplies and Economic Growth in Developinc Countries." Quoted In "The Green Berolutlon : Symposium in Science and Foreign Policy," op. clt, page 81. 814 HUMAN DISLOCATIONS Increased agricultural productivity, concentrated selectively on the larger farms, means that fewer farm workers will have jobs, that small- er farmers will encounter hardship, that machines will replace hand labor, and that the influx to the cities — already causing serious crowd- ing, social tensions, and urban unemployment — will be greatly in- creased. According to FAO Director- General Boerma, there is already unemployment in the developing countries, excluding main- land China, of some 100 million. The increase by 1980 in the working- age population in these countries is estimated at 250 million, so that to employ the available labor force by 1980 will require the creation of about 350 million additional jobs, even without taking into ac- count the additional displacement resulting from the Green Revolu- tion.^* How much additional agricultural unemployment and drift to the cities will be caused by the Green Revolution is difficult to esti- mate, but it seems likely to be a significant addition to an already strained situation. THE NEED FOR SOCIAL REFORM One of the most serious obstacles to the success of the Green Revolu- tion lies outside the field of technolo^ altogether — although tech- nology could conceivably play a role m solving it. That obstacle is the often negative answer to the question : Are the benefits of that revolution distributed for the good of society as a whole? Unfortu- nately, in a number of instances the Green Revolution has had the effect of widening the gap between the rich and the poor. The initial impact of the new agricultural breakthrough has been to benefit the more efficient, more well-to-do farmers. As Wharton points out : For them, it is easier to adopt the new higher-yield varieties since the financial risk is less and they already have better managerial skills. When they do adopt ' them, the doubling and trebling of yields means a corresponding increase in their incomes." In short, the rich farmers can become richer, and may even capture some of the markets earlier served by the small semi-subsistence farmer. The poorer farmer, seeing the increasing share of the new, wealth going to those who already precede him on the economic ladder, may grow increasingly resentful. The landless poor, seeing the in- creased availability of food supplies, quite naturally want a larger share of any increased prosperity, and may be willing to take action to get it. The clash two years ago in Tanjore, India, between landlords and landless workers, in which 43 people were killed, is a very pertinent illustration of the explosive situation which to some degree exists in India already, and could easily be duplicated elsewhere. '^^ Equally worrisome, in the long run, is the prospect of technological unemployment in the wake of agricultural progress. As fewer people are needed to produce more food, those displaced tend to gravitate " Boerma. "Address to the Eighteenth General Conference of the International Federa- tion of Agricultural Producers. . . .," op. cit., page 5. ^Wharton. "The Green Revolution : Cornucopia or Pandora's Box?" op. clt., page 467. '"> An example which could be readily repeated Is that of the so-called Naxalite move- ment in India, which ir.s^olves land seizure by violence and is encouraged by the Maoist wing of India's Communist party. ' 815 to the cities in search of work. Unless they find it, they are forced to live in shacks and slums, adding to the potential for revolutionary agitation. Even if the displaced peasant finds work, housing shortages may compel him to live in appalling conditions. The consequences of involuntary urbanization are a major problem for many of the devel- oping countries. The toppling of the Ayub Khan government in Paki- stan by urban riots was an example doubtless lost neither on other LDC governments nor on would-be revolutionaries. Obviously the governments of the LDCs face the need to find constructive ways of dealing with this problem. Although the outlook seems gloomy, it also contains elements of hope. There is some evidence that the growing urbanization of the LDCs is not as destabilizing as has commonly been assumed.^' Also, if mechanization is employed selectively it can actually create jobs rather than terminate them. Taiwan has been singled out as a good example of how selective mechanization, combined with intensive land use, Cre- ates jobs. (However, selective mechanization must be carried out as part of a wide range of economic policies which permit industrializa- tion and agricultural modernization to go forward together, if it is to result in a rise in agricultural employment. Even then, it is difficult to see agriculture as providing employment for a vastly increased population. ) Perhaps the most important action the governments of the LDCs can take to sustain the momentum of the Green Revolution is to move promptly and effectively either to pass land reform legislation or to implement legislation already enacted. The peasant farming his own land is more likely to have the incentive to maximize production than if he is merely a tenant on a large estate. Indeed, countries where land is widely distributed can be shown to maintain a better agricultural performance than those where land is concentrated in a few hands.^^ However, there is a dilemma facing the LDCs which want to press forward with land reform. Large estates, if efficiently run, may prove better suited to putting the new techniques into practice on a large scale, just as they are better adapted to take initial advantage of these techniques. It is Lester Brown's view, however, that farm size is not as important as Western analysts often rate it in evalu- ating agricultural efficiency.'^^ Japan and Taiwan^ each with farms averaging less than three acres, are among the leaders in agricul- tural development. Selective mechanization, combined with the es- sentially free input of family labor, can render the small farms as as efficient as the large ones. Actually, the choice need not lie between large and small farms. Alternative measures have already been adopted in some LDCs. One such measure is joint or consolidated farming, where farmers voluntarily band together to get both the advantages of intensive family farming and the economies of larger scale operations. In Malaysia, for example, this type of farming is practiced because water management is effective only on a multifarm basis. Barbara '" See Joan M. Nelson, "Migrants. Urban Pwerty, and Instability in Developinp Na- tions." Occasional Papers in International Affairs. No. 22, Center for iHternational Affairs. (Cambridge, Harvard Ijniversity. 1969), 83 pages. ■"" Brown, "Seeds of Change," op. cit.. page 111. '» Ibid., page 113. 816 Ward Jackson has suggested rural agricultural centers where peas- ants forced off the land by the Green Revolution could be employed in "agro-industries" such as warehouses and fertilizer plants. Other measures are doubtless being contemplated, as the LDCs seek to rec- oncile the need for maximum food production with a much wider pattern of land ownership. Again, the United States has a vital stake in the methods chosen by the LDCs to redistribute land ownership. AGRICULTURAL AND SOCIAL REVOLUTION In short, the consequences of genetic developments that produced the new grains are likely to be revolutionary, not only in the techno- logical sense, but politically and socially as well. Vu Van Thai, in a paper presented to the Southeast Asia Development Advisory Group, June, 1969, identified a number of forms of tensions that he could foresee: * * ♦ Modernization causes instability by shifting the relative importance and status of the various classes, thus generating social stresses. * * * The emergence of a political force in the rural areas undergoing the, "Green Revolution" is all but ineluctable. The questions are only whether the political institutions of the country will evolve fast enough to allow for the peace- . ful emergence of this force into the national political fabric, and whether gov- ernments would be able to design and implement policies which would solve or at least keep under control the problems generated ♦ ♦ *. * * * The richer farmers will become richer. ♦ ♦ * Such a development could well lead to a net reduction in the income of the smaller, poorer, and less venture- some fanners. This raises massive problems of welfare and equity. If only a small fraction of the rural population moves into the modem century while the bulk remains behind, or perhaps even goes backward, the situation will be highly explosive. * * * One might foresee that the issue of giving priority to developing one area over another will become increasingly a politically loaded matter. Unless countries revise drastically their economic development strategies and policies, to give first priority to the objective of creation of employment; and unless they take measures to reduce income disparities and to further extend in- comes to the poorer classes, many people will still go hungry or remain under- fed. * * • Thus, if internal demand Is not enlarged, measures to restrict produc- tion will have to be adopted. * • * The "Green Revolution" is likely to increase tensions between landlords and tenants [and generate] pressure on the part of tenants for greater agrarian reform * * *. * • • We are facing a kind of vicious dilemma : In order to keep demand up to the level of increased agricultural production, a government must either accel- erate considerably the rate of growth of the economy or else embark on large expenditures for welfare. To do either of these, it must mobilize more and more resources from the agricultural sector ; by so doing it is slowing down the rate of increase of farmers' real income, thus triggering discontent.** An analysis by Richard Critchfield sees the situation as posing a new form of competition between communist and non-communist countries. He declares: "Virtually every FAO official I interviewed believes some form of social revolution will follow the agricultural revolution in all too many of the poor countries." Moreover, "The gen- eral feeling seemed to be that the allegiance of the poor countries is likely to go to whoever can devise a system that allows the fastest ""Agricultural Innovation and Its IrapHcationi: for Domestic Political Patt«»rns In Southeast Asia." In "The Green Revolution : Symposium on Science and Foreign Policy," op. cit.. pages 18&-95. 817 economic growth and that both the West and Communist bloc are starting with major handicaps." "* Not all authorities are in agreement that the unemployment problem in the LDCs will be exacerbated by the Green Revolution. Lester R, Brown, as previously noted (page 21), suggests that it may result in an increase in agricultural labor requirements : Where the new seeds are in use, two or three crops are becoming the norm where only one crop grew before. Cultivation of the new seeds, and the harvest- ing of bigger crops both require more labor. Higher yields encourage, even neces- sitate, more investment in land reclamation, irrigation, construction of storage facilities and warehouses, road building, marketing and transport. All these factors are leading to a sizable increase in the demand for labor, pushing wages up to higher levels, and providing employment throughout the year rather than only seasonally." However, it seems a likely conclusion on the basis of experience in both the United States and in Europe, that "the great advances in agricultural technology have made the small-farm structure * ♦ * obsolete for the production of most basic crops." *' The Impact of Food Programs on U.S. Diplomacy The food situation in the less developed countries impinges on U.S. diplomacy and the conduct of that diplomacy in countless vrays. In their everyday relations with host countries, U.S. missions in under- developed feoiintries may be called on to make recommendations aS to whether U-S. food sliipments "are needed in that country, or whether, for example, improvements in local food processing might suffice to overcome specific food shortages. A U.S. mission in an underdeveloped country will need an agricultural capability that extends beyond the reportorial :f unction. It may be asked for advice on broad problems of agricultural policy, or on technical methods of food fortincation and similar problems of limited scope. If U.S. assistance is furnished, the mission will want to observe its distribution and use. In short, U.S. diplomatic activity in countries where food supplies are inadequate and malnutrition is common will probably be concerned to a consid- erable degree with the problems arising from this situation. The information garnered by U.S. agricultural attaches and other naission personnel may be useful in stimulating research on the solution of these problems, particularly if there are well developed relationships between the U.S. foreign affairs establishment and the U.S. scientific community. Conversely, U.S. missions may be able to stimulate re- search by scientists in the LDCs. However, massive and complicated impacts on U.S. diplomacy will result from the concerted attack launched on hunger m the LDCs represented by the Green Revolution. Some of these changes are » "Can Politics Keep Up with Technology? — Feeding the Hungry." In Ibid., page 187. Mr. Critchfleld, author of "The Long Charade," is on leave from the Washington Star to write a book on world hunger. His article was reprinted in the hearing from The New Republic October 25, 1969. « "The Social Impact of the Green Revolution." International Conciliation (No. 581, January 1971 ) , page 49. *Boerma, ''Address to the Eighteenth General Conference of the International Federa- tion of Agricultural Producers . . ." op. cit, page 12. Although he was speaking of Europe, the same trend is obserrable In the United States. See part 3 of this series : U.S. Congress. House Committee on Foreign Affairs. "Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy : The Evolution of International Technology." Prepared for the Subcommittee on National Se- curity Policy and Scientific Developments of the. ... by the Science Policy Research and Foreign Affairs Divisions, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. December 197'> (Washington. U.S. Government Printing Offlce. 1970). especially pages 31-33. 818 already evident ; how they are managed will determine to a substan^ , tial degree the ultimate outcome of the Green Revolution. Managed with skill, the Green Revolution can do much to reduce malnutrition and hunger that is endemic in the underdeveloped countries. But if these changes are mismanaged, if the developing countries are not able to cope effectively and in timely fashion with the social implications of the Green Revolution, the promise of the massive agricultural trans- formation could be aborted and even turn into a disaster. One of the most important tasks for U.S. diplomacy, therefore, would seem to be that of lending encouragement and support to the efforts of the less developed countries to persuade their populations to adapt systemati- cally to the changes necessitated by innovative agricultural technology. When prodding is called for, experience has shown that by and large the United States needs to exercise its influence as unobtrusively as possible, and preferably through indirect channels such as the FAO or the World Bank. The Green Revolution will not solve the food/population problem. Rather, it extends the margin of time in which programs of family planning can be brought to a peak of effectiveness. Leaders in the underdeveloped countries are beginning to perceive the problems ac- companying the Green Revolution, such as, the forcing of the poorest jxeasants off the land, the huge capital investments required for irriga-, tiori, the need to modernize now inadequate marketmg systems, the requirement for educating the farmers to new skills, and the need for institutional reforms.** In addition, as the Second World Food Con- gress recently demonstrated, these leaders attribute world hunger to more than the inadequacy of foodstuffs. They see such shortages as caused by a lack of purchasing power, both internal and external, which/can be overcome by liberalized trade policies on the part of the advanced countries, coupled with a broad attack on the root causes of world poverty. Trade Demands of the LDCs Breaking down barriers to their exports has now become the focus of trade policy by the underdeveloped countries. Through the United Na- tions Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) they have demanded preferential treatment by the developed countries. Their de- mand has been accepted in principle by the developed countries, includ- ing the United States, but little visible progress has been made toward this goal. The Latin American countries, in the so-called Consensus of Vina del Mar in May 1969, unanimously arrived at a list of demands for U.S. action to correct what they saw as inequities existing in the economic relations; between this country and its neighbors to the south. Despite these demands, i^ =eems questionable to suppose that the LDCs will succeed in becominjr substantial grain exporters in the near future. The FAO, working on the assumption that the developed countries would continue th^ir present production and trade policies, foresees a growth in agricultural exports from the XjDCs to the de- veloped countries of only 1.8 percent per annum, from 1962 to 1975. . " Wharfon. "The Grepn Revolution : Cornticopla or Pandorp's Box?"- Op. clt. paee'^ 4A4- 47fi. 819 Future growth rates might be even lower.^° When these possibilities are balanced against the demand for imports by the LDCs, it is dif- ficult to see any gain in the latters' trading position. It is more likely, in the short run at any rate, that the developing countries will be thrown back on themselves. This is not necessarily a bad thing, again considering the short run. For the developing countries would be compelled to look to their own internal commercial markets as a force for growth. They could explore the possibilities which do exist for expanding agricultural trade among themselves. In addition, a num- ber of the developing countries have the potential to substitute locally produced agricultural items — besides cereals — for commodities which they now import. If the shortage of foreign exchange helps in the realization of these possibilities, the result could actually be helpful to the LDCs involved. In the long run, however, a collaborative attempt will have to be made by the developed and the developing countries to solve the latters' foreign exchange problems, lest the process of development grind to a halt. The United States would seem to have a stake m the success of any such collaborative effort for two reasons. First, this country has been committed to international development as a corner- stone of its foreign policy for two decades. If development stagnates for lack of foreign exchange, U.S. policy will have received a stunning setback and will have to search for a new direction, a task which can be accomplished neither quickly nor easily. Second, if the de- veloped countries of the West refuse to let the LDCs earn their way in world markets, the developing countries might well conclude that it is the desire of the richer countries to keep the LDCs in a perpetual state of dependency. If such an idea is given any credence it could be most damaging to U.S. relations with these countries. The poorer countries have a better bargaining position since the advent of the Green Revolution. They will also have a greater incentive to press their position forcefully, assuming that the new agriculture will have cre- ated new jobs. The Necessity for Balanced Development Finding a solution to the food/population dilemma is the central problem of international development. It is interwoven with every other aspect of development. Thus it will not be solved in isolation. If population growth is checked effectively, and the growth and diversi- fication of agriculture goes, forward as hoped, the entire development process will benefit immensely. On the other hand, for the new agri- cultural revolution to make its most forceful impact, there must be enormous developments outside agriculture. Asian peasantry has dem- onstrated that it is not as resistant to change as it was so often thought to be. It has responded to the economic incentives offered by the Green Revolution ; these incentives would scarcely be present, however, with- out the development of a market economy. Either the LDCs must be able to earn the foreign exchange to purchase the inputs necessary for agricultural progress, or these imports will have to be produced domes- tically, usually with foreign aid funds. Such domestic production helps establish sufficient purchasing power in the domestic market so that "5 Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations. "Provlaional Indicative World Food Plan for Agricultural Development." Vol. 1, op clt., page 21. 820 the additional food produced by the new methods can be bought ai prices high enough to make it worthwhile for the farmer to utilize the new technology. This process requires economic growth on a broad scale : "The tremendous interaction and interdependency which exists between agriculture and other sectors on both the demand and supply sides make it impossible to separate the problem of food production as such from that of overall economic development." ^' But more than general economic development is involved. What is also involved is distribution of income. The benefits of economic devel- opment should certainly be distributed so that, at the very least, lower- income groups can purchase the additional food that the Green Revo- lution has made available. Unless such distribution is accomplished, not only will food intake and nutrition continue at inadequate levels, but social unrest will be sure to follow. Finally, only as the general drive toward modernization and devel- opment gains momentum can there be sufficient employment and in- come to eradicate hunger. Unless the economies of the LDCs continue to expand, there will not be jobs available for the additional millions that the population explosion will send into the labor market. If these new entrants can find no jobs, the cycle of hunger and malnutrition will begin all over again. Thus far the new agricultural technology has increased labor re- quirements per acre because of multiple cropping and fertilizer ap- plication, while simultaneously decreasing labor requirements per unit of output because of the great increase in yield. The net effect, so far, seems to have been the creation of additional employment and in- creased income in the rural sector. But as the new technology continues to advance, and becomes diffused ever more widely through the LDCs, economic development and employment outside agriculture become ever more crucial. Requirements Imposed on U.S. Diplomacy The job of U.S. diplomacv generally speaking is to advance and il- luminate the goals of U.S. foreign policy. With regard, especially, to a problem as complex and delicate as that of achieving a food/popu- lation balance, it must do so without offending the sensibilities of the countries concerned. As noted earlier the United States seeks to pro- mote the Green Revolution and concomitant economic development. It is evident from what has been said already that this U.S. pc^ture ere- . ates or exacerbates some difficult diplomatic problems. U.S. diplomats are faced with the job of urging technological change on the leaders of the LDCs, even though such change may nave unsettling social and political consequences, fiideed, it is even possible that the very leaders who take U.S. advice may find themselves deposed as a consequence of the social instability introduced by technological innovation. It seems paradoirical for the United States to encourage the LDCs to adopt the new agricultural technology knowing that there is a high risk of social turmoil, if a principal aim of U.S. development assistance is to help bring about stability in those countries. However, ■* National Academy of Bngineering. "STmposlam on the Food-People Balance. Panel on the Interactions between World Food and World Popnlatlon," op. dt, page 4. 821 it is the U.S. hope that any destabilizing effects of the Green Revolu- tion can be confiiied to the short run, and that eventually the position of the United States vis-a-vis the LDCs will be stronger, as the role of the Green Revolution in overall economic development becomes clearer, and its benefits more manifest. Another responsibility of U.S. diplomacy as it confronts the Green Revolution is that of explaining to the governments of the LDCs the concept that technological change necessitates a degree of social change — that if the benefits of the Green Revolution are not distrib- uted widely among all the population the result may be far greater unrest than if no changes were made at all. U.S. missions in the LDCs will be called upon to act persuasively but unobtnaively to put thi? point across. The missions may also be called upon to defend U.S. policy when that policy is deemed by the LDCs to be unresponsive to their needs. Insoiar as the Green Revolution is concerned, tor examj)le, they may be asked to explain why the U.S. does not give preferential treatment to the agricultural products of the LDCs. \^. Technology for Controlling the Population. Explosion The problem of balancing food and population involves the, manipu- lation by governments of two sets of variables: (a) The problem of increasing food supply without achieving unmanageable agricultural surpluses or overtaxing marketing arrangements, and (b) The prob- lem of ensuring that the rate of population increase does not exceed available food supplies or a nation's ability to assure productive em- ployment. The first set of variables has been shown to have a wejl-devej- oped technological component, and a poorly developed political (in- cluding diplomatic) component. At issue in the next two sections of file study is whether the technology and politics of national popula- tion management in the LDCs present a similar relationship. Current Growth Rates in Asia, Africa, and Latin America Population is growing faster now than at any previous time. It took all of recorded history for world population to reach half a billion by the middle of the I7th century. Population doubled to 1 billion by about 1840 or 1850 — ^that is, in 200 years. It doubled again to 2 billion by 1930, or in 80 years. By 1960 another billion had been added, in only 30 years' time,®^ Present estimates place the world's population at 3.6 or 3.7 billion, or even slightly higher. The current annual rate of population growth is generally estimated to average nearly 2 per- cent. On that basis the world's population is increasing by at least 70 million people a year. One set of population projections show a world population of 4.93i3 billion by 1985, and anywhere from 6.1 billion to 7.5 billion people by the year 2000.^^ Moreover, ^"^opulation is growing fastest in those areas that can af- ford it least, the underdeveloped countries. Thus, while the current rate of population growth in North America is 1.2 percent, in Western Europe .6 percent, and in the USSR 1 percent, in Africa it is 2.7 per- cent, in Asia 2.3 percent, and in Latin America 2.9 percent. TABLE 4.— POPULATION GROWTH RATE, SELECTED COUNTRIES* Country Percent Brazil 2.8 Colombia 3. 4 Costa Rica 3. 8 India 2. 6 Pakistan 3. 3 Indonesia ■■ • 2. 9 Laos 2. 5 Thailand 3. 3 Algeria 3. 2 Nigeria 2. 6 Zambia 3. 0 'Source: Population Reference Bureau, Inc., "1971 World Population Data Sheet." (Washington, D.C., August 1971.) Data from the developing countries are not always accurate, and in some instances estimates made by the U.N. Secretariat are Incorporated in the figure cited. Note. — Central America has the highest rate of population growth of any region in the world. 87 "The Population Explosion." Department of State News Letter. (December, 1»66K paee 22. ** The totals shown for the year 2000 are based upon U.N. estimates, the lower fiirure renresentln? the so-called U.N. Medium Variant, the higher figure representing the U.N. Constant Fertility Variant. (H22) 823 TABLE 5— THE 15 MOST POPULOUS COUNTRIES* [In millionsl Rank Country Population Cumulative (1) Mainland China (2) ^ India (3) U.S.S.R (4) United States of A met ica . ?5) Pakistan (6) Indonesia.. (7) Japan «)-........ Brazil (9) L West Germany (10) Nigeria (11) United Kingdom (12) , Italy (13). w.^ Mexico (14). ." France. (15) Philippines 772.9 772.9 569.5 1,342.4 245.0 ■ 1,587.4 207.1 1, 794. 5 141.6 1,936.1 124.9 2,061.0 104.7 2, 165. 7 95.7 2.261.4 58.9 2, 320. 3 56.5 2,376.8 56.3 2. 433. 1 54.1 2,487.2 52.5 2, 539. 7 51.5 2,591.2 39.4 2.630.6 'Source from "1971 World Population Data Sheet — Population Reference Bureau, Inc." (Washington, O.C., Population R^erence Bureau, 1971.) By virtue of current high birth rates and short life expe(5tancy, the underdeveloped world has a very high percentage of young people. Some 42 percent of the population of the LDCs consists of people under the age of fifteen.®^ As these young people move into their re- productive decades a progressive baby hoovci can be anticipated at the. very time when, in the view of the great majority of development ex- perts, there should be a maximum effort to cut back population growth. It is jperhaps the greatest irony of the development process that success m driving down the death rate, has helped produce the popula- tion explosion. In a sample of .18 underdeveloped areas, for instance, the average decline in death rates between 1945 and 1950 was 24 percent.** Some other figures— if the period from 1920-1924 is taken as a base and compared with 1957 — give the following percentages of decline in death rates : Chile, 57 percent ; Taiwan, 67 percent ; Japan, 64 percent; British Honduras, 56 percent; El Salvador, 40 percent; Jamaica, 65 percent.^^ Perhaps the most spectacular decline in the death rate took place in Ceylon, where it was cut in half in approxi- mately three years, an accomplishment which had taken decades in Europe.^^ These spectacular results were the products of victorious campaigns against such diseases as malaria, yellow fever, smallpox, and cholera. The decline in the death rate was highest among young adults and children. Their very success has put some health workers in the LDCs on the defensive, as if the cutbacks in death rates, through adding to the population, were somehow responsible for impeding economic de- velopment. No one seriously contends, however, that the less developed countries should let their health care slide in order to deal with the •^U.N. Working Paper No. 30. (December 1969), page 1. ™Ehrllch and Ehrllch. "Population, Resources, and En\tlronment," op. cit., page 22. » Quoted from William Vogt. "The Arithmetic of People." In U.S. Ongres.«, Senate Committee on Government Operations. "Population Crisis." Hearings on Forp<"n Aiil Expenditures on S. 1676. By the Subcommittee on Foreign Aid Expenditures of the . . . 89th Congress, Ist session. Part 3-A (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965) page 1.509. •0 "The Popnlation Explosion," Department of State Newsletter, op. cit., page 23. 824 population explosion.'' Not only is it unthinkable in terms of the values of all cultures, but, as Carl Taylor, Director of the Di\dsion of Inter- national Health, the Johns Hopkins University, put it: It is demographic noneense to think that the population problem can be post- poned by maintaining high death rates. In underdeveloped countries, if high birth rates had not been biologically adjusted to high death rates, the population would have faced extinction.** Taylor points out that the death rate is sure to fall as part of the de- velopment process, and that this happened in Western countries with little if any assistance from health and medical services. The reality was that the peasant families of the LDCs had to have six or eight children in order to be sure that three or four would grow to matur- ity. Once the parents feel more secure that their children will survive, they may be more inclined to limit the size of their families. The contribution that better health conditions can make toward solving rather than complicating the food/population paradox has been suggested earlier in this study. Widespread disease adds to the bunien on available food supplies and exacerbates protein deficiencies. A pop- ulation in good health gets maximum benefit from its food supplies. Its productivity is higher. Malaria control in Ceylon made possible a mass migration to formerly thinly populated parts of the island, to the bene- fit of the country's economy."* A mass mosquito control program in Ne- pal opened up the Rapti Valley to settlement and to agricultural pro-- duction. Widespread acceptance of family planning is, as we have seen, gen- erally agreed upon as essential, for bc^h economic and political reasons, to the success of the entire modernizing effort. Assistance to family planning is now the top priority of the U.S. foreigii aid program. Helping the LDCs manage their population growth is an important objective of U.S. foreign policy. Health workers who have contributed so signally to development in the past will unquestionably be called upon to contribute to the achievement of this crucial objective. T?ie Impact of PopukUion Growth on Economic Development The extent to which population growth, if allowed to pursue its natural course, will impede economic development can be illustrated in a number of ways. One example mi^ht be the case of the Aswan Dam in Egypt : That dam has made available for cultivation approxi- mately 2 million new acres of land and generates three times the amount of electricity produced in Egypt as of 1963; it may increase agridiltural production in Egypt by as much as 45 percent. Yet the , Egyptian peculation has risen commensurately while the dam was , ^ Some development economists ma.v privately think In these terms, however. At least one publication. World Population and American Responsibility, by Arthur F. Corwin, rather sardonically highlights the contributions to the population explosion of privately financed American public health programs. On the other hand, Gunnar Myrdal, John H. Bryant, and other students of development emphatically reject the idea of permitting continued high mortality as a means of population control. See the section on "The Com- plex Issue of Health and Overpopulation. In U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign AflPairs. "Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy : The Politics of Global Health." Prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the . . . by Freeman H. Quimby, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, May 1971. See vol. II, pages 751-754. w Carl E. Taylor, "Health and Population." Foreign Affairs, (April, 1965), page 475. •« Ibid., page 478. 825 under construction so that the effect of the dam on Egyptian living standards will be zero.®® Population increase also means increased financial burdens; hard- pressed governments must find additional funds for education, health, housing, and water supply. Inevitably they fall further and further behind, and foreign aid does not necessarily make up the gap. Each year in Latin America, where the population increases at the rate of 8 million people, a million new homes are needed. Yet in 1967, when the Alliance for Progress was 6 years old, only 350,000 housing units either had been constructed or were in the process of construction. The best efforts of the LDCs in raising their own production levels are thwarted by the rampant growth in population. A large percentage of the increase in the gross national product (GNP) of the under- developed countries is consumed by population growth. In Latin America there has been a relatively high overall economic growth rate of 4.5 percent since the Alliance for Progress was laimched. But with annual population increases of almost 3 percent, the per capita gain in GNP amounted to only 1.5 percent, affording meagre progress toward the better life that the people of the LDCs are seeking.®^ In fact, the gap between the rich nations and the poor nations is widening. In the years from 1960 to 1968 the total GNP of the less developed countries mcreased roughly 149.8 percent, compared with 147.8 for the devel- oped countries. However, once population is taken into account, the f%ures change to 122.9 percent for the LDCs compared to 134.7 for the developed countries. At present, Latin America elementary schools serve about 65 percent of the children ; the other 35 percent — 18.6 million children — have no schools. If present fertility rates continue, and if Latin America man- ages onlv to keep pace by continuing to provide schools for 65 percent of her children or elementary school age, in 30 years there will be 47 million children without schools.®^ All of these problems are in addition to the immediate one of find- ing enough food to feed this ever-increasing population — plus the stress on the natural environment imposed by the population explosion. All phases of development, such as rising real mcomes, modernized social organization, technological advance, health, education, and rising personal aspirations depend on finding solutions to the rising tide of population. One of the most important aspects of the population problem in the LDCs is the changing pattern of population distribution. The developing impact of the new agricultural technology may render some rural workers surplus. Driven to the city they would become food consumers rather than producers. Moreover, urban population growth is a function of general population growth. As the national populace swells by natural increase, so does the urban populace. The results of wholesale urbanization can be dramatically high- lighted by a few statistics. According to U Thant's report at the^N. Economic and Social Council's Committee on Housing, Building, "Robert L. HeUbroner. "The Great Ascent." (New York, Harper and Row, 1963) pages 55—56. "U.S. Agency for International Development. "The Population Explosion — A Present Danfrer." (Undated), pages not nambered. •• Ibid. a*7-Anr\ r\ 82^^^ and Planning (Document E/C6/102), the combination of rural-to- urban migration and population growth has swamped the facilities of the LDCs. The report estimates that from 1920 to the year 2000 the urban population of the LDCs will have grown from 100 million to an estimated 2 billion, a twentyfold increase. In developed coun- tries, for the same time period, the increase is put at fourfold. This staggering population shift in the LDCs has created a housing situa- tion verging on disaster in some countries. During the next 20 years it will be necessary to double the housing, sanitation, education, power, and other facilities. As U Thant puts it, there are "exploding cities in unexploding economies" ; thus the prospects are dim of meet- ing the needs of the millions who will flock to the cities of the under- developed world. Bombay and Calcutta may reach the fantastic totals of 20 and 30 millions respectively before the end of the cen- tury.®® Acute threats to health are caused by the overcrowding and poor sanitation in the cities of the LDCs. The pollution, traflEic con- gestion, and noise common to the big cities of the developed countries are engulfing cities of the developing world as well. The changing pattern of population distribution in the LDCs is chronological as well as geographical. An increasing percentage of the population is young, and eats but does not produce. The nonpro- ductive children are a greater burden in the underdeveloped countries than in the developed ones. For every 100 productive adults there are 85 noiiproducers in the LDCs, consisting of 79 children and 6 aged persons. In a developed country the ratio tends to be about 100 produc- tive adults to 57 nonproducers. Since developed countries often extend the nonproductive period through age 20, a more accurate figure might show 100 to 76 for such countries.^"" Whatever ratio is selected, however, the age composition of the LDCs compares unfavorably with that of the developed countries in terms of producers and con- sumers. In addition to imposing a greater burden on the producers, this type of age distribution also means that income goes for sub- sistence, leaving less savings for investment, so necessary to develop- ment. Furthermore, the greater the percentage of the population entering the years of fertility compared with those growing beyond their fertile years, the greater the pressures for huge population growth. Population growth generates many physical and social problems."^ Not only must an increasing population be fed, sheltered, and clothed, but it must be educated, and jobs must be found for those of employ- able age. More and more of this increasing population is jammed into cities, compounding the difficulty of feeding and housing, education, health care, and employment, and putting tremendous pressures on the existing social and political structure. Another source of pressure is technological change itself, which caused problems in the industrialized countries during their own era »» Report quoted In "Survey of International Development," Vol. VI, No. 7, (Sept 15, 1969). page 2. '<» .lean Bourgeois-Pichat. "Population Growth and Development," International Con- ciliation. (No. 556. January, 1966). page 46. '01 Professor Philip Hauser has added the oategory of population "rtisplosion" to th^t of explo'slon and Implosion (urbanization). By disploslon he means an Increasing diversity of population who will be sharing the same living space. This diversity encompasses culture, race, ethnicity, values, religion, and similar categories. Presumably this diversity will also be a source of domestic and international tension. 827 of development. The same process is recurring in the developing coun- tries today, but at a time when the tempo of technological change is perhaps more rapid. The very speed of that change, rubbing against traditional values and social arrangements, exacerbates social tensions. Opposition to the Lifniting of Populaiion Groioth It is the consensus of most U.S. students of the subject that fertility in the LDCs must be reduced to enable those countries to develop. There is a contrary view : Economic development requires population growth; powerful industrialized states have large populations; de- velopment must achieve economies of scale, which fact implies a large internal market ; large areas of uninhabited land must be inhabited to support industrialization. Some Brazilians, for example, have argued in these terms. Many Marxists in the LDCs view with a jaundiced eye the interest of the United States and other developed countries in limiting popula- tion growth. They suggest that the idea of limiting population is just a U.S. or Western device to contain their economies in a dependent and semi-colonial status. Apart from their Marxist outlook, their thinking appears to parallel that of persons of a more moderate or even rightist persuasion who believe that large population and industrial prowess go hand in hand. A racial note is introduced by some leaders in the LDCs, who main- tain that family planning and other programs designed to limit popu- lation growth are simply devices to maintain white domination over the non-white peoples of the world. This claim is often coupled with the accusation that the developed countries want to keep the LDCs in economic subjugation. Still another view is that it is wrong to project present population trends siaaplistically. Little is known about the forces shaping popu- lation growth and flat predictions are risky. Moreover, concern over the gap between living standards in the developed and the less de- veloped countries is futile, since it is impossible to close th?.t gap anyway. The important goal, in this view, is to concentrate on attain- ing the greatest possible economic progress within the LDCs in terms which will benefit the peox)le, thus generating support for continued development. The Technology of Controlling Conception and Birth The population explosion that places such a brake on development in the LDCs is attributable to a powerful combination of human motives. In addition to the general motivations of the sex drive and the desire to perpetuate the species, there are special motivations that operate with particular force in the LDCs. One is the prestige reward of the mothers of large families and the "machismo" of male virility. An- other is the role of children as a form of old age insurance in the close- knit families of the LDCs. This combination of motivations makes implementation of birth control technology uncommonly difficult. The technology itself has the effect of separating the individual function of sex gratification from the social function of human reproduction. Both functions are at the core of strong emotions, long-established social mores, and profound religious beliefs. One basic uncertainty involves the extent to which any technologv, however neutral or unob- trusive, ca' win acceptance over these opposing forces. 828 THE ORAL COXTRACEPTIVE (THE PKJL.) Of all the methods of inhibitmg conception, the ingestion of syn- thetic hormonal compounds has perhaps received the most attention in recent years. The oral contraceptive, generally known as "the pill,'' is the most effective means of conception control known today, apart from sterilization. When taken faithfully according to medical instructions, it is virtually 100 percent effective. The pill regimen involves the oral administration of estrogen, the female hormone, and progestin, a synthetic substance chemicallv similar to progesterone (a natural substance produced by a woman s ovaries), taken either sequentially or in a combined form. It is pre- sumed that the pill acts to suppress ovulation. Taken daily for 20 or 21 days of a normal 28-day cycle, it will commonly regularize the men- strual cycle of a woman who may never have had regular cycles before. The pill may have unpleasant side effects in 20-25 percent of the instances in which it is used. These resemble some of the symptoms of pregnancy, such as nausea, retention i>f fluid, headaches, weight gain, and swelling of the breasts. The side effects do not appear to inhibit the use of the pill to a si^iificant degree in the developed countries. What may in time have this effect, in Doth developed and underdevel- oi)ed countries, however, is the question of whether or not the pill causes cancer or embolisms. A number of inquiries have been launched to look into the pill's safety, and some of them have been completed. Studies conducted in this country by the Food and Drug Administra- tion ctmcluded that there was no proof of any causal connection be- tween the dangers attributed to the pill and its actual use. The same conchision was reached by the World Health Organization, and by a liritish research committee. It has been generally recognized, how- ever, that all the evidence is not in, and that the pill must continue to be examined. A study sponsored by Planned Parenthood of New York showed that certain "precancerous" changes in the cervix were more common among women using oral contraceptives than in a control group using diaphragms. Yet the condition involved did not always precede cancer oi the cervix, and in any event is curable, so the results of the study were inconclusive. Studies in England did indicate that women over 3.5 who were using the pill had a significantly higher chance statistically of dying of thrombophlebitis or pulmonary em- i)olism than women of the same age not using the pill. The FDA now requires that the pills be labeled so as to carry a warning of potential hazard to women with a history of venous disorders. The risk is less than half as high for women under 35. In both age groups, however, the risk of death is far less from using the pill than it would be from pregnancy.^"^ In underdeveloped countries there is another drawback to the use of Ihc pill than the (jue^tion of its safety. That is the fact that it must bo taken each day, for most of the cycle. For a woman in the LDCs to submit to this discipline requires a higher degree of motivation than she may ordinarily have. According to the Indian Planning Commis- "^- Ehrlich and Ehrlich. "Populatinn, Rpsonrcop, and Environment," op. clt.. pajre 216. 829 sioner, the pill has failed in India because illiterate peasant women cannot be persuaded to take one daily."^ THE INTRAUTERINE DEVICE (lUD) A contraceptive device employed widely, especially in India, is the intrauterine device, or lUD, This is a plastic or metal object inserted in the uterus, and left there for as long as contraception is desired. The device comes in several shapes, such as a spiral, a double coil, a loop, a ring, and a bow. As in the case of the pill, precisely how it works is not known. Different theories hold that it may interfere with implan- tation of the embryo after conception, or that it interferes with fertili- zation by stimulating the ovum to travel through the fallopian tubes very quickly. One of the drawbacks of the lUD is that it may be spontaneously expelled, often without the wearer's knowing it. This happens to roughly 10 percent of the women who have had the device inserted, and is more likely to happen to young women who have had no children than to those who have had several. Other disadvantages are menstrual bleeding and pain, which are normal when the lUD is first inserted, but may continue thereafter, necessitating the device's removal. If the lUD is retained, and if the discomfort subsides, the device is second only to the pill in effectiveness. , From the standpoint of the LDCs, the big advantage of the lUD is the fact that it does not require the sustained motivation or the educa- tion associated with daily use of the pill. Once inserted, it can theo- retically be forgotten. Strictly speaking, however, this is not the case, because it must subsequently be checked by a physician or a paramedi- cal technician. Furthermore, there may be the discomfort already mentioned. India also furnishes the foremost example of country where the lUD— specifically, the Lippes loop ^"* — was used on a large number of women. Results were mixed: Half the women dispensed with their loops because of excessive pain, nausea, and bleeding. Even with better medical attention, others are now reluctant to try them.^°^ STERILIZATION Sterilization is the most reliable form of contraception. It is a far easier procedure in the case of the male than that of the female. A vasectomy takes 15 or 20 minutes, and involves cutting and tying off the vas deferens, so that sperm is eliminated from the male ejaculate. The sterilization of a woman is an internal surgical operation, and hence entails greater risks. The abdomen is opened, and a section of each of the fallopian tubes is removed, so that ova cannot pass through. Formerly the fact that sterilization was considered an irreversihle procedure caused some hesitancy on the part of people who contem- plated it. But a reversal operation is now possible in both men and ,„^^^'^''"® Sterling. "India's Birth Control Progress." Washington Post. (September 30, 1970) J editorial page. M» Named for its inventor. U.S. physician Dr. Jack Lippes. ^^ Sterllns. "India's Birth Control Progress " op. cit 830 women, with chances for success in the former case of 50-80 percent, and in the latter of 52-66 percent.^"® However, given the psychological comfort of knowing that it can be done, few individuals of either sex are likely to request restoration of their fertility. To take India as an example again, nearly 7.5 million people there have been sterilized since 1966. Vasectomies have been done on an assembly-line basis, in places such as the Bombay railway station. The Indian government offers a small payment to the individual under- going a vasectomy. COXVENTIONAL METHODS Although the pill, the lUD, and vasectomy have all gained promi- nence as technical means of effecting birth control, the so-called con- A'entional methods which have been known for a longer period are still widely used. Some of these methods are relatively effective in pre- venting conception, others are less so. By and large they are not viewed as acceptably reliable solutions to the problem of population control in the LDCs. It seems likely that they will give way eventually to other methods yet to be discovered. These conventional methods comprise the condom, the diaphragm, the cervical cap. various creams and jellies, the douche, the rhythm method, and others. The condom, or sheath, is widely known and j'xtensively used in the developed countries; when properly used, its failure rate is comparatively low. Among the developing coun- ti-ies, India has a state factory with the capacity to turn out 144 million condoms annually, but whether this method, which to many (•f)nnotPS prostitution and adultery, will find ready acceptance in the LDCs may be problematical. The diaphragm, which has to be picscribed and fitted by a doctor, seems impractical for mass use by the women of the LDCs. The same objection can be made to the cervical caj). Spermicidal jellies and foams are easier to apply, but piobably are less effective than the condom or the diaphragm. The rhythm method, which has the sanction of the Catholic Church, in- \'olves abstention on those days when conception should be possible. But tliis period is sometimes so difficult to determine, })articularly if the woman lias an iriegular n)enstrua] cycle, that it may require absten- tion for a good })art of the month. Accordingly, the rhythm method is relatively ineffective, and it may strain conjugal relationships. Also, it seems ill-adapted to the needs of the developing countries. XEW LINES OF SCIENTiriC RESEARCH Prompted by the widespread concern over the population explo- sion and the success of the Pill, a substantial scientific effort is under- way to develop birth control techniques with fewer disadvantages and greater acceptability. The prime need for additional measures is in the developing countries, but the effort is being carried on in the de- veloped countries, chiefly the United States. Reseaich is going forw^ard on the so-called "micro-dose" pill, which would be taken every day, continuously, regardless of a woman's cycle. Since the dose is so tiny, it may be that such a pill would be safer than '"• Elirllch ami Ehrllch. "Population, Resources, and Environment," op. clt., page 220- 831 those now in use. Research is in progi-ess toward development of a contraceptive injection that would be good for six months. Since the people in developing countries have become more familiar with inocu- lations, a reliable injectable contraceptive might find wider acceptance among them than the methods now in use. Research with dramatic possibilities is being conducted on what is known as the cylastic (or silastic) implant, a tiny .cushion of absorbent plastic, superficiallv implanted in a muscle and releasing a measured dose of hormone which would prevent conception for a very long period of time, perhaps as much as 20 years. Conception could occur, should a couple desire a child, by i-emoving the cushion, or perhaps by taking estrogen. One of the most promising lines of investigation now underway has to do with prostaglandins — fatty acid compounds occurring naturally in the body. They may be used once a month for fertility control, and may be administered orally, or by injection, or intra vaginally.^°^ Another lino of investigation is concentrating on the "morning-after pill," which would be taken for three days after intercourse and would prevent implantation of the ovum in the endometrium (membrane lining the uterus). Whether any of this research will bear fruit in time to benefit the developing countries is uncertain. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) requires 10 years of testing of chemical contraceptives on monkeys. There are clinical trials involving large numbers of human subjects with follow-up laboratory testing. Because this research is so sophisticated, it can be done only in those countries that are scientific- ally advanced, and under less pressure to limit births. Obviously, it also takes considerable time. According to Carl Djerassi, before any developing country will accept a contraceptive agent for wide use it must have been approved by the FDA in this country or an equivalent European authority. If the safety of a particular contraceptive is questioned in any developed country, the latter takes both political and moral risks if it encourages a developing country to use the agent in question. The answer that Djerassi envisions to the entire problem of developing new chemical methods of contraception is for independent bodies of experts to act as "final courts of scientific appeal," with au- thority that supersedes that of government regulatory agencies. Such a body would be chosen in this country by the National Academy of Sciences, and internationally by the World Health Organization. He believes that a solution of this nature will compel the advanced coun- tries, particularly the U.S., "to take a global rather than a parochial view of novel contraceptive approaches." He also foresees that such a solution will force the pace in the development of new approaches, a pace which at present is far too leisurely, given the enormity of the problem.^"* ABORTION One of the oldest forms of birth control, but one which has tradi- tionally been subject to social disapproval, is abortion. To abort a fetus is to terminate a pregnancy in its early stages by one of several '0^ Jan Palmer. "Ugandan Presses Prostaglandin Research," War on Hunger. A.I.D. Washington (September, 1971), page 3. ^"*Carl Djerasst. "Progress for the Development of Chemical Birth-control Agents." Science (Oct. 24, 1969), pages 469, 473. 832 methods. The standard method of performing abortions had been what is known in medical jargon as a "D and C" : that is, dilatation and curettage of the uterus. This process removes and destroys the fetus. Other methods now in use include a vacuum method — developed by doctors in the U.S.S.R. — which is safer than dilatation and curet- tage, and a saline induction method. The morality of abortion is the subject of debate, not only in the developed countries but in the underdeveloped ones as well. Opposi- tion to abortion as immoral can be found among Roman Catholics, fundamentalist Protestants, and some Orthodox Jews, in this coun- try. Although many clergymen favor legalized abortion, there are a number who would support it only if necessary to save the mother's life.^"* A survey made in Nagoya, Japan, in 1964, of 153 married women who applied for abortion, showed that "only 8 percent did not think it was morally evil ; 17 percent thought it was evil rather than good; 16 percent thought it was quite evil; and 59 percent thought it was very e%dl.^^° In the United States 33 states permit abortion only to preserve the life of the potential mother or, in some instances, to protect her health as well."^ Seventeen other states have liberalized laws, ranging from those which permit abortion for causes such as fetal deformity or rape of the mother to the absence of any restriction save the recom- mendation of a physician. ^^2 It has been estimated that in the past fifteen months 400,000 American women obtained legal abortions; comparatively few of these had strictly medical reasons for seeking their abortions."^ While the recent trend has been toward easing abortion laws in this country, it is by no means certain that trend will gather momen- tum. Indeed, there is little movement on this issue at present. In most of the world, including the developing countries, abortion is illegal. Even those countries with liberal laws do not permit abortion on request. Jap'an, where the control of runaway population growth is usually attributed to the legalization of abortion, requires that a woman apply for and receive official sanction before the procedure can be performed. Japan is often cited as the model for the underdeveloped countries . to follow in checking rampant population growth. Japan legalized abortion, and it is sometimes implied that developing countries should do the same. But Japan is an inappropriate example to hold out to the LDCs. Moral questions aside, it is obvious tliat Japan is a highly de--t veloped country, with the skills and facilities to operate a large scale abortion program. The less developed countries do not have these skills or facilities. They lack sufficient doctors and hospitals to operate national abortion clinics except at high cost to other branches of their health services. In addition, with legalized abortion held out as an alternative, it would become that much harder for a developing coun- 10.1 Time Magazine (September 27, 1971), page 07. "0 Arthur McCormack. "The Population Problem" (New York, Thomas T. Crowell Com-', pany. 1970), pages 196-7. ' ^"U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. National Center lor Family Planning Services. "Current Status of Abortion Laws — January 1971" (Washington, U.S. Gevernment Printing Office, 1971), table. "2 Idem. »" Time Magazine, op. cit., page 67. 833 try to administer family planning programs based on contraceptive technology. At this juncture there does not appear to be any real thrust in the less developed countries, with the exception of India, for the legaliza- tion of abortion. As long as a social stigma attaches to the practice, and as long as it contravenes the moral feelings of many people, it seems unlikely that political leaders in the LDCs will want to roil the waters by championing abortion reform as the key to population control. The Problem of Medical Support There are also operational barriers, in the form of inadequacies in the staffing and administration of family planning programs in the LDCs. The Indian physician needs a present incentive to participate in what are for him the boring and professionally unrewarding tasks of inserting lUDs and lecturing at birth control clinics. The same argu- ments woidd apply to the trained physician in other developing coun- tries. Presumably the antipathy of most physicians to this type of work might be overcome if the financial incentives were high enough. Yet even with sufficient remuneration many physicians might participate unenthusiastically. Furthermore, doctors could find themselves in a conflict of values. On the one hand they may be trying to reduce infant mortality, on the other to reduce fertility. Many find at least a surface incompatibility between these two programs. Some doctors may be able to work on both with equal dedication, viewing them as different aspects of the broad concept of health care. Others however, more deeply affected by the traditional outlook of the medical profession, may feel more comfortable with programs to reduce infant mortality than with those seeking to reduce parental fertility. The shortage of trained physicians, and the ambivalent attitude with which a number of them approach the subject of birth control, points up the need for large numbers of paramedical personnel fe carry out programs of family limitation. Such personnel could be given sufficient training to advise on contraception, insert lUDs, etc., but need not receive the broader training of regular nurses. Para- medical people trained in this fashion might not only be useful in the execution of family planning programs, but in some instances might spell the difference between success and failure. Before adequate num- bers can be trained, however, the medical associations in a number of countries would have to abandon the rather unsympathetic attitude they have usually tended to hold toward paiamedical personnel. In addition, there would have to be adequate incentives for the para- medics, just as for regular medical workers, and for the men and women at whom the birth control programs are aimed. One category of paramedical personnel already on the scene are the village midwives who sometimes serve as abortionists as well. These women have a certain amount of influence with the other women in the villages and may feel threatened by the introduction of family plan- ning programs. Hence it may be important for the success of such programs to win these women over. The easiest way to do so would probably be through some form of financial inducement. The most effective way might be to combine such inducement with training in the administration of the family planning programs, where feasible, to preserve but redirect their influence in the community. VI. Political and Diplomatic Issues of the Population Problem In the LDCs Despite the persuasive logic, at tlie national level, of applying restraints to the multiplication of populations, powerful economic and cultural forces resist the implementation of national policy in villages and households. Administrative resources and skills in the govern- ments of the LDCs are quickly overtaxed and their efforts tend to be modulated by fear of antagonizing the electorates. A dllferent prob- lem confronts the United States. There seems to be a clear perception in this country of the need to achieve a food/population balance, and of the need for population measures in particular in those countries receiv- ing U.S. assistance. However, bilateral programs of aid conditioned on population measures run the risk of engendering hostility among populations of recipient countries as well as a sense of frustration among their leaders. It is possible that a more promising approach to the population problem is by the combining of resources of developed and underdeveloped countries alike in multilateral programs under U.N. or regional sponsorship. However undertaken, the invasion of this sensitive and deeply emotional issue is fraught with great dif- ficulties. Only the vital necessity of solving the problem justifies the attempt. Social Resistance to Birth Control and Family Planning Programs Probably the main hurdle to the successful implementation of birth control and family planning programs in the LDCs is the system of (cultural and social values that confront these programs. That system has traditionally placed a premium on large numbers of children for reli^ous, economic, and societal reasons. the status of women One reason why women in the LDCs lack motivation to take the pill regularly, or employ other contraceptive methods, is that in traditional societies such as those that prevail in Asia and Africa, a woman^s . prime obligation is to provide sons for her husband. A childless woman bears a stigma, and an unmarried one may be even less well ; regarded. In India, the expression "Two hands, one mouth" epitomizes the usefulness that children are thought to have as potential agri- cultural workers, producing more than they consume and thereby enriching the farm family. Children, particularly sons, in a country without old age insurance constitute a form of social security. The more children a woman bears, the more assurance she has that she will be taken care of in her old age. Social and economic pressures thus militate in the direction of high fertility, and the ordinary woman ^ has little incentive to resist these pressures. Indeed, studies made in ■ Asia, Africa, and Latin America suggest that couples in a number of countries consider four to eight children to be an ideal number, de- ; (834) 835 pending on the area and the group being studied."* In many instances where family planning clinics are operating, or family planning in- formation is available, the women who take advantage of these facili- ties are in the later years of their reproductive period, and have already borne all the children they desire (or believe they need), and even more."^ At thii. point, of course, it is too late to stem the consequences in terms of present and future population growth. As long as woman's role in the LDCs is essentially restricted to a familial one, fertility is likely to remain high. Since the alternative of independent self-support hardly exists (although this situation too is changing in Latin America) , women in the LDCs have little choice, in both economic and social terms^ other than marriage and a family. If birth rates are to be reduced in any marked way, it would seem that the LDCs need to afford the women of those countries greater degree of freedom of choice regarding their role in life than they can now evercise. This suggests the need for upgrading their educational and employment opportunities, perhaps to the point of reserving a cer- tain quota of jobs for childless and unmarried women. Strong measures along these Imes are likely to assure great opposition, and not only from men. Nevertheless, leaders in some developing countries may con- clude that they must move in this direction to check population growth. THE MASCULINE IMAGE A comparable set of cultural imperatives apply also to men. A man's status in some of the LDCs is enhanced by the number of chil- dren he fathers. The same compulsion for security in old age presum- ably motivates the men as well as the women to have large families. Sometimes, moreover, there are cultural factors which increase the likelihood of illegitimate births. Thus, according to one authority, in the middle sectors of Latin American society "free sexual activity may be regarded by the man as a sign of his machismo^ *^* This concept of manliness is a valued ideal in Latin American culture, and is composed of elements such as self-assurance and orientation to action, as well as sexual prowess. It may be that the concept of TnacMsmo is in no way responsible for the great rapidity with which the population is in- creasing in Latin America, but since the macho is an admired figure, a certam subtle pressure would seem to be exercised on many Latin American males to live up to the image. CUIiTURAL rNERTIA Operating as a general constraint on the limitation of family size in the LDCs is what might be called "cultural inertia." Gunnar Myrdal, in his comprehensive work Asian Drama^ points out that suspicion of "♦ Ruth B. Dixon, "Remarks to the Symposium on the Food-People Balance, Proceedings of the Symposium." (Washington, D.C.. National Academy of Engineering, 1970), page 28. lis Ibid. However, Professor Dixon's view is not necessarily upheld by the figures of abor- tions in Latin America, which indicate that in that area, at any rate, many women do want to regulate the number of their children while still in their fertile years. In a Santiago study, for example, 85 percent of the Induced abortions occurred among married women. A woman desperate enough to have an abortion might be expected to take advantage of whatever family planning service might be available. II" Dwlght B. Heath and Richard N. Adams, eds. "Contemporary Cultures and Societies of Latin America." (New York Random House, 1966), pages 272, 509. 836 change and experimentation is characteristic of the populace in the developing countries he investigated, and that this attitude is a cul- tural obstacle to development. As he says, The great bulk of historical, anthropological, and sociological evidence and thought suggests that social stability and equilibrium is the norm and that all societies, and underdeveloped societies in particular, possess institutions of a strongly stabilizing character. In view of these findings the real mystery is how they can escape from equilibrium and develop."' Attitudes and institutions that are part of an inherited culture do not change easily or rapidly, as a general rule. To bring about change there has to be sufficient motivation for change. Insofar as family planning is concerned, the evidence seems to suggest that despite cul- tural barriers it is not as difficult to motivate couples in this direction as toward some other aspects of development. RELIGION AND POPULATION Certain religious beliefs held bjr people in the developing countries constitute barriers to family planning, but these barriers are sometimes more ostensible than real. For example, Hinduism postulates four stages in the life of man, one of which is that of householder, produc- ing sons and fulfilling his family duties. Indeed, preservation of the family, in Hindu ethics, is second only to preservation of the social order as a whole.^^^ The traditional family system was a joint one : that is, a family comprised all or most of the kindred related through both maternal and paternal lines. The head of the household, usually the most important male member of the family, was the steward of the family's property. Under this system polygamy was permitted, al- though it was not approved except when a first marriage produced no living male children. Polygamy was not forbidden by law in India un- til 1055."* (The Indian government has also outlawed such traditional practices as child marriage, and has legitimized widow remarriage.) While Western influences have modifiedthe Hindu outlook, and while educated Indians may be somewhat skeptical of traditional Hindu be- liefs and practices, a large majority of Indians cling to their religion, and what has been called a "pro-natalist" philosophy. In the light of this situation, which would appear to militate against the success of family planning, it is remarkable that the Indians have been able to attain any measure of success in their ambitious program. In Buddhist teachings, procreation and family life are considered to be matters of lesser importance. Buddhist priests are celibate. The religion stresses the avoidance of extremes, either of sensuality or asceticism. Thus pressures to marry and have children do not come from within the religion itself, but arise from extraneous cultural cir- cumstances.^*" A J\^^^^"^' ^" *^^ ^^^^^ ^^"^' ^^^ ^^^ fi"^ pro-natalist teaching. Allah creat>es sexuality and determines fertility or barrenness. To re- strict the birth of offspring by artificial means would seem, therefore, pagl°87r'' ^^^^"^^ ""*^*'*° DT&nuL Vol. 3, Appendix 2." (New York. Pantheon. 1968). „' J Encyclopaedia Britannlca." (1964 edition. Vol. 11), page 511. «»A. McCormack. "The Population Problem." op. clt., page 157. 837 to be against the divine will. Nevertheless, modern religious opinion has found Islamic principles which provide a sanction for contracep- tion. Moslem leaders, like the Shah of Iran, King Hussein of Jordan, former Prime Minister of Malaysia Tunku Abdul Rahman, Presi- dent Bourguiba of Tunisia, and the late President Nasser of Egypt all signed the document known as the Statement of Population by Heads of State, which urged family planning as the remedy for rapid popula- tion growth.^^^ In the encyclical HwmaTiae Vitae, proclaimed on July 25, 1968, Pope Paul VI reiterated the opposition of the Catholic Church to artificial birth control, declaring that each and every marriage act must remain open to the transmission of life. All artificial interference with conception was banned, as was abortion and even sterilization, whether temporary or permanent. If a Roman Catholic couple wishes to limit the number of their children, they should, he said, either ab- stain or limit intercourse to the woman's infertile periods (the rhythm method). In expounding his views, the Pope recognized the special problems that runaway population growth posed for the less developed coun- tries. He contended, however, that the solution of these difficulties diould envisage the social and economic progress of the individual as well as society, and should maintain a respect for "true human values." The encyclical evoked protest both within and outside the Catholic Church, Dr. John Rock, a pioneer in developing the birth control pill and also a Catholic, sharply attacked the Pope's message. The Associa- tion of Washington (D.C.) Priests declared that they would refuse to counsel obedience to the ban on birth control, while the National Con- ference of Catholic Bishops issued a statement in support of the Pope. Abroad, Cardinal Alfrink and the Netherlands Catholic Bishops re- fused to, support the encyclical. It was criticized by Italian papers of varying political coloration because of the appeals it contained to government authorities in the LDCs. Among the Catholics who accepted and supported the papal encvclical were those who never- theless expressed apprehension that adnerence to its principles would severely test the faith of many of their fellow Catholics. The Pope persisted in his position, however, and has not modified it in subse- quent remarks. Since the Catholic countries of Latin America are experiencing the most rapid rate of population increase in the world, the question natu- rally arises as to what connection, if any, there might be oetween their Catholicism and the ongoing rush of new births. The evidence appears to be mixed. For example. Dr. Benjamin Vlel of Chile has pointed out that in Santiago, among wealthier families of strong Catholic persuasion, the birth rate is only 20 per 1,000 while among the lower dass where "Catholicism exerts a doubtful Influence ♦ ♦ • the birth rate, even with two abortions for every five births, reaches 40 per thousand." "• The only explanation for this difference, in Viel's view, was that upper class couples used contraceptives unknown among the lower classes. "I Ibid., pa«e 158. "I "Latin America at the Crossroads," (Victor Fund for the International Planned Parent- hood Federation, Report No. 3, September 1966). page 21. 838 Surveys in Rio de Janeiro, Argentina, and Lima and Chimbote in Peru indicate that women from poor circumstances are more aware of the disadvantages of additional children than women from a more privi- leged background, but again, because of their ignorance of the latest contraceptive techniques, the poorer women have more children. But these same poor women also show a startling high incidence of induced aboi-tions, despite the fact that the Catholic Chuch proscribes abortion. Such evidence, combined with the fact that predominantly Catholic countries outside the Western hemisphere have achieved low birth rates, led former Senator Joseph Tydings to conclude that Catholicism would not necessarily be an obstacle to family planning in Latin Amer- ica, and that the United States should continue to encourage such pro- grams in that area as an integral aspect of total economic develop- ment.^" However, there is also evidence to suggest that Church senti- ment against birth control exercises considerable influence on the pop- ulation policies of some Latin American governments. Thus, while some form of family planning education or research is carried on in almost every Latin American country, in only a handful of these is there any kind of public, government-supported program. In Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina, certainly three of the most important Latin American countries, the official policy is anti-birth control. One element contribut- ing to this stand in each country was the negative attitude of the Catholic Church.^" Uruguay also officially opposes birth control. After the Pope issued Humanae Vitae, the government of Colombia post- poned a family planning program it had been preparing to adopt. The authorities in Puerto Rico, a self-governing commonwealth whose people are U.S. citizens, remained undecided on the issue of fam- ily planning as long as the island's Church authorities were hostile to it. In 1970 the Archbishop of San Juan signified "conditional ap- proval" to a government-sponsored family planning program, and now it is thought that the Commonwealth government will give more enthusiastic support to the program.^^' In summary, the evidence appears to show that the p)oorer classes in Latin America are receptive to the idea of family planning, despite the teachings of the Church. The Church as an institution, however, retains sufficient influence to constitute an important component of those elements in Latin America which inhibit the introduction of family planning on a larger scale, and thus limit the range of choice by which these poorer classes may keep down the number of their off- spring. Yet some of the younger, radical Latin American priests not only reject the Pope's pronouncements on contraception, but actually participate in birth control programs. Administrative Weaknesses in tlie LDCs Perhaps the greatest operational difficulty in running programs that would limit family size is the general administrative weaknesses of the LDCs. Managerial skill sufficient to administer large-scale pro- grams effectively is difficult to come by in the developed countries. It '2^ Joseph D. TydlnRS. "Born to Starve." (New York, Morrow, 1970). page 31. 12* The opposition to family planning is found more among the hierarchy and the older priests. Tlie young priests working in the slums tend to be favorably inclined toward birth ron'rol and family planning. Source : Conversation with Mr. Thomas Lyons, Popnlation Offioe, AID. 125 "People." (Washington, D.C., Population Reference Bureau, May 1970), page 3. 839 is even scarcer in the LDCs. The governments of those countries are often fragile and afraid to tackle problems that would upset internal equilibrium, which development so often does. This is one reason why development lags in some areas. The governments may substitute talk for action, or they may draw up elaborate development plans but fail to carry them out. Such ploys are hardly the exclusive character- istic of bureaucracy in the LDCs, but agam, their negative impact may be greater than similar tactics in the developed countries. Over the years the United States has devoted a good deal of aid money to training in public administration. The effective implemen- tation of family planning programs is likely to strain further the al- ready slender administrative resources of the LDCs. One consequence may be an even greater emphasis on public administration training in the U.S. aid program. Programs may be devised which are devoted exclusively to preparing trainees to administer family planning and birth control programs. Yet administrative and technical training cannot instill the ability to step smartly through political thickets. Thus the most effective administrators of family limitation programs in the LDCs will be individuals who are not only trained in the tech- niques of administration, but who are adept in using the political system in their own countries to generate popular and governmental support for achieving the program's objectives. U.S. Diplomatic Mohilization to Deal loith the Population Issue The delicacy of the task facing American diplomacy with respect to family planning activities in the LDCs exceeds tmt required in the case of the Green Revolution. U.S. missions can show how un- checked population growth is hurting development. They can also inform officials in developing countries of the types of assistance relat- ing to family planning they can receive under the U.S. foreign aid program; as well as of resources available from the private sector and international agencies. U.S. mission personnel themselves need to be apprised of the latest developments in research on fertility control, so they can pass this information on to the countries in which they are stationed. These functions would seem to be essentially a^ matter of maintaining good liaison between the appropriate officials in AID and the State Department, and between Washington and the fidd. While they can offer advice, if requested, it would seem essential that U.S. diplomatic personnel leave the choice of a birth control or family planning strategy to the host government. EVOLUTION or U.S. CONCERN Toward the end of the 1950s the United States began to become aware of what has been called the "developmental equation" — viz., available resources divided by number of people equals degree of well- being. Development planners had long been aware, of course, that improved health and sanitation resulting from U.S. technical aspi st- ance would cut down the death rate and thus increase the population. At the same time, there were innumerable complaints that U.S. aid was inefficiently administered, and that it was not bringing results commensurate with the financial drain it imposed. A presidential committee headed by General William H. Draper was appointed to 840 look into the matter. The Draper Committee was impressed with the fact that in one country after another U.S. aid was being overtaken by burgeoning populations. As a result, the Draper Report to the President, published in 1959, recommended that the United States assist countries requesting aid in formulating their plans for dealing with rapid population growth.^^^ Questioned at a press conference about this report, President Eisenhower replied that as long as he was President the government would support no birth control pro- grams, because "that is not our business." ^" Although the Administration did not respond positively to the Draper suggestions, the recommendations in that report did call pub- lic attention to the fact that population growth was a hindrance to development so that the issue was opened up for examination. In December 1962 the United States voted for a General Assembly resolu- tion, the first in the history of that body to recognize the relationship between population and economic development. It proposed that the United Nations encourage and assist the governments of the under- developed countries "in obtaining basic data and carrying out essen- tial studies of the demographic aspects" of their development prob- lems.^^* In that same year. 1962, AID began to work on the outlines of potential IT.S. programs to assist family planning in the LDCs. AID analysts, along with others, had noted that population growth was ham leering development, but because of previous U.S. policy con- straints there had been no encouragement to develop programs to meet this situation. IIowe\'er, by 1962 it seemed appropriate to proceed with such plans. The following year, the Congress passed and the President signed a foreign aid bill which contained an authorization for fimding popula- tion studies. In the same year this country granted $500,000 to the World Health Organization in support of population research. The United States strongly supported another U.N. resolution calling for a study of the population problem. AID missions were directed to assist host governments, at tne latter's recfuest, in responding to ques- tionna ires circul ated by the UN's Popul ation Commission. In January 1064 AID established a special population unit in its Latin American Bureau, the first time this had been done by the agency. Training programs were set up for AID's staff. The Latin Anipncan Bureau then moved to establish population and family plan- niiir,iin!ttpp on Government Operations. "Population CrlRls," hearlncs. Part 1. op. clt., page 11. 843 earmarked funds, for the first time, for this specific purpose. The amount so designated in 1967 was $35 million. Thereafter the amount was to increase annually. In 1968 the legislation renewing PL 480 (PL 90-436) also ear- marked funds for population-related programs. This law imposed the constraint that "not less than 5 percent of the total [local cur- rency] sales proceeds received each year shall, if requested by the for- eign country, be used for voluntary programs to control population growth." The law also specified that one of the criteria of self-help which the President was to take into account before entering into an aid agreement for the transfer of food to a developing country was the extent to which that country would implement voluntary pro- grams of population control. The effect of this provision was to make family planning an important consideration in the extension of PL 480 assistance to any country. By the end of fiscal 1968 AID had committed $34.7 million for population assistance, or eight times the amount of the preceding year, and help was going to 26 countries. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1969 earmarked $50 million for population assistance, and subse- quent legislation increased the amount to $75 million and then to $100 million. Table 6 summarizes AID's dollar obligations for popula- tion and family planning through fiscal 1970. TABLE 6.— SUMMARY OF AID DOLLAR OBLIGATIONS FOR POPULATION AND FAMILY PLANNING PROJECTS, BY FISCAL YEARS • (In thousands of dollars] Project 1965-«6 1%7 1968 1969 1970 Nonreeional: Office of Population.... 1,554 525 10,623 17,398 22,013 Office of International Training 91 41 38 40 304 AID admini ^ration (D.C.) 119 405 435 1,431 1,908 U.N. Fund for popnlation activities... 500 2,500 4.000 Wonregional total Near East-South Asia : Country missions Regional projects Near East-South Asia total : Latin America: Country missions Regional projects Latin America total.. East Asia: Country missions Regional projects East Asia total Africa: Country missions Regional projects Africa total Vietnam.. Country and regional total. Grand total 6,026 4,445 34,750 45,444 74,507 •Source: AID, "Population Program Assistance," Washington, 1970, p. 17. > A development loan to Turkey, originally for J3,600,000, signed October 1966. 'Includes $2,700,000 loan to India for program vehicle parts. 1,764 971 11,596 21,369 28, 225 1 2, 100 337 J 9, 061 655 3.336 976 22,861 324 > 2, 100 337 2 9,716 4.312 23,185 361 1,178 1,191 5,457 2,468 3,072 7,255 5,437 1,670 5,518 2.031 2,369 7,925 10,327 10, 955 112 334 350 3,475 1,325 6.388 1,608 8,673 623 112 684 4.800 7,996 9,296 19 4 30 404 259 983 457 2,485 181 19 34 663 1,440 2,660 50 50 .. 180 4, 262 3,474 23, 154 24, 075 46, 282 844 The extent to which congressional convictions have crystallized concerning the importance of assistance to underdeveloped countries in the field of population control can be found in the Foreign Assist- ance and Related Appropriations Act of 1971, PL 91-619. In making assistance available to multilateral organizations, including a specific amount for the U.N. Children's Fund, that law provides that no part of the appropriation is to be used to initiate any project or activity which has not been justified to the Congress, "except projects or activ- ities relating to the reduction of population growth." In an era when Congress is concerned with reasserting its constitutional role in the conduct of foreign policy it seems significant that it should be willing to exempt from its oversight international projects for checking population growth. U.S. POLICT TODAY In July 1969 President Nixon became the first President to send Congress a message dealing explicitly with the subject of population. It was, he said, a problem the world could not ignore; the United Nations and its specialized agencies and other international bodies should take the lead in responding to world population growth. He pledged full U.S. cooperation with any U.N. efforts, but also pointed out that the United States could help, and was helping, efforts initiated by other governments. He noted that he had asked the Secretary of State and the Administrator of AID to give population and family planning "high priority for attention, personnel, research, and fund- ing among our several aid programs." ^^- The Secretaries of HEW and Commerce and the Directors of the Peace Corps and the U.S. Information Agency were also asked to give close attention to popu- lation matters in planning their overseas operations. The President further declared that all U.S. efforts in this area should give additional recognition to the important resources of private organizations and university research centers. Finally, he called upon other nations to enlarge their efforts to assist family planning and population programs. The attention given by the President to the subject demonstrates its new importance in U.S. foreign policy. From a minor element in the foreign aid program it has risen to very high priority. Its import- ance is also confirmed by the number of other agencies besides AID involved in U.S. efforts to help contain population growth in the LDCs. U.S. Agencies with Overseas Population Programs As overseas interests of the Federal Government have extended to population matters, various agencies of the executive branch have established programs to collect information, to devise policy, and to establish relationships abroad. Demographic studies have long been conducted in the Census Bureau and the Department of Labor of comparative statistics from overseas. Some sociological research in foreign areas has been sponsored in recent years by the Department of Defense — with arrangements for coordination by the Department of State. However, the brunt of U.S. operational concern in foreign '« U.S. Agency for International Development. "Population Program Assistance." (Wash- ington, D.C. October 1969), page 14. 845 population problems is centered in the Agency for International De- velopment. Second only to the work of AID is that of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, with its expanding relationship to the World Health Organization.^^^ THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE The Department of State is perforce involved in the U.S. effort to cope with the worldwide population explosion. The impact of the expanding population on international relations is a pervasive one. Tne Department has concluded that its officers serving abroad must have a greater knowledge of population dynamics, and the Foreign Service Institute has introduced material on population and family matters into its courses for junior, middle level, and senior personnel. In addition, the Institute conducts a series of seminars on population for key officers at State and other foreign affairs agencies. The Special Assistant for Population Matters, whose office was established by the Secretary of State in 1966, consults with other agencies which have responsibilities in the population field and also acts as the Depart- ment's liaison man with U.S. embassies, particularly in the LDCs. He sees to the exchange of information on developments in popula- tion matters. In addition he maintains liaison with private organiza- tions active in population work. In each regional bureau an official is noSv designated as the Population Officer tor that bureau ; moreover an official is similarly designated in each of the U.S. embassies, in- cluding those in countries where there is no AID mission. THE DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION, AND WELFARE The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is directly concerned with U.S. international population programs, principally in the field of research. Under the Public Health Service's administra- tive umbrella, the National Institutes of Health, the Health Services and Mental Health Administration, and the Consumer Protection and Environmental Health Services are all conducting research, both in this country and abroad, on aspects of family planning. The Center for Population Research of the National Institute of Child Health and Human Development coordinates the research programs carried on in those countries where the United States owns excess local curren- cies accumulated imder PL 480. A number of such projects are cur- rently going f orward- The Center for Population Research is also the focal point for HEW's contract research program in contraceptive development, which was initiated in 1969. TMs program looks to the development of contraceptive methods that will be effective, safe, reversible, inex- pensive, and adapted to the diverse needs of the world's varied popu- lation. Research has been concentrated in four areas : corpus luteum function, sperm capacitation, oviduct function and gamete transport, and the biology of the ovum ; each has demonstrated particular pro- ps' For a discussion of the relationship, see Chapter Nine, "The Politics of Global Health. 846 mise for the development of new methods to regulate fertility. In- vestigations are also going forward on the medical effects of contra- ceptive agents now in use, particularly as to whether there is any con- nection between the use oi oral contraceptives and the incidence of cerebrovascular and other disorders. In 1970 the Center supported nine projects on the medical effects and mechanism of action of steroid contraceptives and lUDs, fields in which research is considered important for family planning the world over. The Center also funds considerable contract research in demog- raphy, as well as projects in the social and behavioral sciences. A num- ber of contracts relate specifically to population problems and pro^ grams in the developing areas : for example, one study covers urbani- zation, migration, and fertility in Thailand. The Food and Drug Administration supports research to evaluate the safety of oral contraceptives. The Health Services and Mental Health Administration supports research in mental health and be-" ha\doral aspects of fertility, and in the operational aspects of family plannincj services. It also provides academic training or field obser- vation for foreign physicians and health personnel in family plan- ning. The Social and Rehabilitation Service, another HEW unit, supports research ovei*seas in the operational side of family planning projects, and also provides training opportunities in the social aspects of family planning for paticipants sponsored by the U.N., AID, or other national or international organizations. For example, it co- operated in planning the 1970 International Conference on Social AV<»rk Education, Population, and Family Planning, which was spon- sored bv the Council on Social Work Education and supported bv AID. THE I'NITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY In contrast with the role of HEW, that of the United States In- formation Agency (USIA) is relatively modest. However it is not in- significant. Its principal function is to disseminate information, par- ticularly to foreign opinion leaders, in order to increase awareness and understanding of population growth and family planning. In those LDCs with programs to check expanding populations, the USIA tries to strengthen public interest in and support for these programs, but within the bounds set by the policies of the particular country and the sensitivities of its people. Its information activities relate population {)r<»blems to housing, education, health, and the ability of the particu- ar country to achieve its own development goals. Materials are pre^ paied in support of U.S. policies and programs, but empha, where they have been most spectacular ; further genetic improve- ments are still possible in these and other crops. But paradoxically, this technological success has spawned a host of problems of such magnitude and complexity that the Green Revolu- tion has sometimes been styled a "Pandora's box." Instead of being recognized as an opportunity for man to overcome hunger for the first time in recorded history, it is viewed with apprehension and alarm. The fact is that it is a radical development. But all technology is radical. It leads to change, to challenge, to reassessment of social mechanisms, and to readjustment of economies. In the last analysis, technology is a great regulator of the human order : It determines what is physically possible. Politics, administration, and diplomacy are terms for the various forms of human relationship upon which technology impacts; they are also terras for the forms of human organization by which technology is put to work. These forms of human relationship determine how effectively man uses his technological opportunities. The Politics and Diplomacy of Food for the Future Broadly speaking, the problems set in train by the Green Revolution fall into two categories : (1) Those appearing within the LDCs them- selves, as a result of the political, social, and economic effects of the new tecimology ; and (2) the consequences for the developed nations of the world of the appearance of the new abundance of staple food commodities. The actions taken in response call for three sets of orga- nizational entities: (1) Institutions and organizational arrangements within the LDC itself to smooth the path and ease the dislocations of the Green Revolutions; (2) bilateral arrangements, such as between the United States and an LDC; and (3) international or multilateral agreements and systems to provide global stability, unify interna- tional purposes, and ease international conflicts arising out of the \; changed patterns of trade. The prospective abundance threatens to generate several kinds of • problems within the LDCs. Gains in food production may be poorly distributed from one district to another, as between East and West Pakistan. They may benefit the wealthier farmers while leaving the poor farmers even less well off. Both of these effects generate tensions 857 within a country. The already evident flight from the farms to the cit- ies is likely to intensify, with unemployment increasing in both poor rural areas and cities. All of these effects call for mediation and correc- tive action by the LDC governments, and in some cases for hard deci- sions on the part of political leaders. If the alternative is between gov- ernmental overthrow and outside assistance, it would seem to be important for the United States and its diplomats to know what form such assistance should appropriately take. It would seem also to be im- portant to know in which countries such outside assistance would be likely to be effective, and where it would be merely support for a losing cause. Among the kinds of support that have been mentioned are : Im- proved credit resources more widely available at regional and local banking levels ; more widespread and longer education of the popula- tion; encouragement of the use of labor-intensive farm equipment; assistance to small farmers in the exploitation of the new genetic forms of grain; increased opportunities for rural industry; improved ar- rangements for storing surplus grains and preventing losses to pests: better arrangements and facilities for the marketing of agricultural products; and above all, a strong administration of government, equipped with adequate taxing power and management skills to dis- tribute equitably the costs and gains of the Green Revolution. Lester R. Brown, author of "Seeds of Change," cites the international rice market as an example of the problems and opportunities of an equitable marketing of agricultural commodities. The world rice mar^ ket, always sensitive, "appears to be headed for a difficult period with the amount of rice available for export at * * * reasonable price almost certain to exceed import needs." Japan, he goes on to say, is a high- income country that is a major consumer ; Japan is not only self-suffi- cient in rice, but is subsidizing exports ; yet the internal price of rice in Japan is nearly triple the current world market price. The effect ef this situation is that the rice-producing LDCs are denied the Japanese rice market ; consumers in Japan pay more for their staple ; and the United States finds it necessary to extend dollar uid to the LDCs because they are unable to sell their product. Moreover, as the Green Revolution goes on its way, these conditions wiU appear in corn, wheat, and other grains.^*^ One question, from the point of view of the Department of State, is how U.S. policy should be represented in the LDCs on agricul- tural matters. Should historic policies of encouraging U.S. exports and prices of agricultural commodities be continued, or should there be a modification in these policies to accomplish other foreign policy objectives? A close reading of the pertinent section of the Macomber report "^ does not reveal an intention to respond to the kind of challenge raised by Lester Brown's study. Emphasis appears to be on the strengthening of the U.S. economic position in agri- culture, rather than searching for a rational accommodation of inter- national interests in stabilizing and strengthening commodity markets. The effect of such a policy would seem to be to transfer the costs of LDC development to the taxpayer, and to the consumer of protected agricultural commodities, while running the risk of creating revolu- "• Brown "Seeds of Change," op. clt, pages 190-194. i« Diplomacy for the 1970's — A Program of Management Reform In the Department of State. Op. clt., page 475. S7-4nn n - 77 - 1 7 858 tionary situations in the LDCs with ensuing complications for U.S. foreign policy. There seems to be considerable support at present for achieving a resolution of the complex problems posed by the Green Revolution through the United Nations and its associated agencies, particularly FAO, WHO, and the World Bank. International programs of assist- ance in management skills, public administration, education, labor training, and availability of capital to exploit the Green Revolution and to provide jobs for displaced workers, all seem appropriate activi- ties for multilateral support. Multilateral Approaches to Prohlems Generated hy the Green Revo- lution The inherent advantage of multilateral over bilateral assistance is that the diplomatic profile of the donor is lowered. Motives of the donors are under less suspicion. Another presumed advantage is that recipients may be more likely to contribute substantively to the plan- ning of general programs. If they are involved in the planning, they are more positively committed to the implementation of plans. Burdens of cost can be more widely distributed. Results can be better analyzed on the basis of international comparisons. Contributions to a genuinely global program can be expected to come earlier from those nations which are initially recipients. Some forms of assistance practically demand a global approach. For example, Herman Pollack, Director of the Bureau of Inter- national Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State, ' has suggested the systematic exchange of germ plasm, a basic ingredi- ent of agricultural development. Cooperative exchanges developed by the Department of Agriculture [said Pollack] have been instrumental in providing new germ plasm to widen the breeding base. For example, a variety of hard red wheat was acquired from ; Turkey resistant to various races of stripe rust. In Montana alone, use of this variety has prevented losses estimated at $2-$3 million annually. Similarly, a tomato variety acquired from South America provides wilt resistance to about 100 varieties grown in the United States. In Ohio alone, it is estimated that the wilt resistance gained from this acquisition has saved growers $1 million per year. A peanut variety acquired from South America was planted on 400,000 acres annually from 19G2 to 1968 and is estimated to have increased production by as much as $9 million annually because of its higher yield. Following an ex- change developed with the Soviet Union, United States corn breeders received an early maturing variety having good stalk quality. This germ plasm is now found in hybrids having an annual value of $500,000 for the seed alone. Many other similar examples in agriculture could be cited."* Whether it would be more effective to continue the exchange of germ plasm on a low level, based on bilateral contacts, with countries at dif- ferent levels of technical sophistication, or to mount a global program of germ plasm management, would seem to warrant considerable at- tention and analysis. Mention has also been made in this report of the recommendation that an early warning and quick response system be developed on a '«« Testimony before Subcommittee on International Cooperation in Science and Space. Houfe. Committee on Science and Astronautics, May 18, 1971. Reproduced in State Department Bulletin (June 28, 1971), pages 39-840. 859 global or multilateral basis for detecting and reacting to the onset of agricultural plagues or blights. In the earlier report, "The Politics of Global Health," it was suggested that such a system needed to be estab- lished by the World Health Organization for human epidemic diseases. The same logic applies, it would seem, to the protection of the plant life on which man depends. The diplomatic aspects of such a program include not only its initial design, but also the problem of overcoming resistance on the part of a country afficted with a plant virus or blight to the measures necessary to contain and eradicate it. Since all nations have at least some interest in further technological advances in nutrition chemistry — in particular, the development of new, perhaps synthetic, protein concentrates and additives—a sub- stantial research program under U.N. auspices might be a logical ex- tension. Other areas of scientific research might also be pursued on such a multilateral basis. Moreover, the statistics of agricultural pro- duction and marketing have been identified as a particularly difl&cult field for a developing country and could thus be an area for con- certed international assistance. In addition, there is widespread interest in the concept of stabilizing farm products and prices on a global basis. This was illustrated by the statement of the Director-General of FAO, Addeke H. Boerma, that the subject of international agricultural adjustment would be a main theme of the FAO Conference to be held in 1973. Boerma has sug- gested that international commodity agreements might be developed one at a time, or combined into an integrated scheme for international commodity control. This would mean, he said, * * ♦ adjustment in terms of what is produced in individual countries [with] the greatest attention possible being paid to the question of comparative ad- vantage. It is also adjustment in the rules affecting the international movement of commodities. This, of course, includes problems of access, problems-:-relating to commodity arrangements in order to ensure reasonable and stable prices, and — assuming that surpluses are likely to continue for some time — problems as to the use of agricultural commodities in food aid.^*® The asserted advantages of the multilateral approach to world agri- culture should not obscure the evident weaknesses of present institu- tions to accomplish purposes generally sought. Some of the weaknesses attributed to the U.N. complex have included: Uncertain funding, varied quality of technical personnel, wavering political support, con- fused lines of functional organization, want of firmness in manage- ment, and absence of accepted overall authority. The desirability of a clearer mandate for specific global chores to be implemented by this system, and a general overhaul and strengthening, would appear to warrant early legislative and diplomatic consideration. The Politics and Diplomacy of Stemrrhing the Population Explosion The population issue presents modem diplomacy with its most fundamental, difficult, sensitive, and universal challenge. The issue concerns the intimate human act of sex, the deep emotional values of self-perpetuation, and the spiritual forces of all religions, as well as questions of national power and prestige. The fact of the population explosion is everywhere perceived. The technology for its control is "'Boorma. "Ad(1r«»ss to the EJighteeiith General Conference of the International Federa- tion of Agricultural Producers " op. clt., pages 16-17. 860 available. But the social and psychological obstacles to the use of this present technology in areas where the population increase is steepest are so substantial that major efforts are under way to discover more acceptable technologies. Attending these efforts is the hope that better formulas or contrivances can be found which will somehow meet the psychological, ethical, and religious, as well as the physiological, re- quirements of population control. One diplomatic problem posed by this situation is that the research into potential new technologies is being sponsored by and conducted in the developed countries — subject to their standards of medical re- liability and safety — while the primary need for the technology is in the Li)Cs whose standards might well be qualified by this greater need. Another diplomatic problem arises from the sheer sensitivity of the issue itself; communication across international boundaries is diffi- cult on any issue involving conflict of values or differences in national purpose, but more so when the subject matter is deeply personal as well as a concern of national policy. Regardless of the objectivity and professionalism with which bilateral aid in matters of population con- trol is offered, the opportunity for misimderstanding of intent and, suspicion of motives is likely to remain. Perhaps in this field more than others, the most hopeful route is through multilateral action. There are many reasons to consider the need for national and global efforts to stem the rate of population increase. Population density af- fects the ability of human societies to preserve the quality of life, to make available adequate resources to sustain life, to maintain order, to govern, to insure the security of the individual from crime, to maintain the security of nations from tension or even insurrection, and to reduce the possibility of international conflicts. Population numbers and rate of increase have a profound bearing on all of these. Considerable emphasis was placed, in earlier parts of this study, on the need for reliable factual information about all aspects of demogra- phy, population movement, the mathematics of human increase, be- navioral differences of various geographic and social segments of pop- ulation, and the like. The advantages of collecting such information in an international rather than a national agency, and of standardizing internationally the procedures and parameters used, would appear to be evident. Moreover, the relationship of numbers of population to the questions of food, urban industrialization, education and training, and public administration, is functionally important. All these matters become subjects for diplomatic discussion, related to aid to the LDCs and to the rational management of food and commerce. A study prepared by the Office of the Foreign Secretary of the Na- tional Academy of Sciencies, announced in July 1971, offers some spe- cific recommendations in the field of population management for adop- tion by multinational organizations. Said the study : The UnitPd Nations and Its specialized agencies, particularly the UN Fund for Population Activities, the World Health Organization, and UNESCO, ought to give high priority to helping their member states learn from one another about population goals and the conduct of fertility-reducing programs • * *. The United Nations Development Program and other UN agencies and re- gional organizations, such as the Pan American Health Organization and the Organization of American States, are urged to greatly strengtiien their staffs 861 and procedures to increase the effectiveness of their technical assistance for fertility reduction programs. Multilateral assistance through intergovernmental agencies will often be more acceptable than bilateral assistance to developing countries ; therefore it is important to improve its quality. A United Nations agency (such as the World Bank) should take the lead in preparing a world budget of needs during the next two decades to carry out pro- grams of fertility and mortality reduction in aU developing countries. [Such a budget would include] provision for research ; training ; collection and analysis of demographic data ; public education and communications ; contraceptive ma- terials ; services of physicians, paramedical and other personnel ; transportation and other expenses ; program evaluation ; and welfare policies that would reduce the desired numbers of children and are feasible in different countries * * *.^ Political and Diplomatic Prohlerm of the Food/People Equation Clearly, the two global tasks of producing enough but not too much food to feed the world's population, and providing incentives and means for the world's population to hold itself within reasonable bounds, are a tremendous challenge for modern diplomacy. The re- wards of success are less impressive than the terrible consequences of failure. There is a regrettable tendency on the part of mankind to respond eagerly to rewarding opportunities, but to ignore the pros- pect of misfortune and delay action to avert it until convinced of its reality by its actual onset. Kationally, men can already perceive the adverse human conse- quences of over-population. But there is a countervailing recognition that there are also adverse consequences of a stable population. Popu- lation growth in some instances is a powerful engine of economic growth and expansion. The developed countries have not vet accepted the consequences of a steady state either in the numbers of their popu- lation or in their industrial productivity. The alternatives that face mankind today are growth or no growth, and either one presents its problems. The logic of the situation is that soon or late mankind must accept the limits of the physical world. In a finite world, infinitely continued expansion is an impossibility. The next question is whether there is at any given time an optimum size of global population. (And mdeed, also, an optimum level of affluence!) If growth in numbers must stop, then when would be the best time to stop it ? By what cri- teria is this decision to be made? Is it the same decision for all coun- tries? Is the final result the same for all time ? And, how is the decision to be reached and then given practical effect ? It is evident that the nations of the world cannot ignore each other's wishes in this matter. Population pressure in one country (for example East Pakistan) cannot help exerting pressure on its neighbors (for example India). Population differences make bad neighbors, just as affluence and poverty make bad neighbors. This dilemma must be re- solved cooperatively if it is to be resolved at all. It will be resolved either rationally by agreement among nations and an orderly process of implementation ; or it is likely to be resolved irrationally by war, disease, and social disorder within and among nations. Given these somber conclusions, it would seem to be advantageous for U.S. long-range policy to search out and exploit every available opportunity to establish a solid and scientific, factual base of informa- tion about the food/population equation, for individual nations, for the '*' "Slowing Population Growth : Recommendations from a Special Study." News Re- port. National Academy of Sciences-National Academy of Engineering-National Research Council. (Vol. XXI, No. 6, June-July, 1971), page 7. 862 regions of the world, and worldwide. It would seem to be essentiftl that the base of education be strengthened in all countries so that their peoples can understand the reality of the problem, and to assure that the best available technology bearing on the food/people equation is everywhere available and in the hands of people competent to use it. There are dangers in the premature adoption of unproved tech- nology and dangers in too prolonged testing and perfecting of tech- nology that shows promise. Risks need to be balanced against alterna- tive consequences, under the specific conditions of individual countries. Nor should technology be expected to provide complete answers. The "technological fix" is a chimera unless it is applied in compliance with social and political rules, unless its application makes use of social and political skills and knowledge. Should scientists be educated to recognize that the problems of hu- man management are far more intractable than are the technological problems associated with the food/people equation? It has been the policy of scientists to apply techniques as soon as they are validated, without subjecting them to rigorous assessment as to possible second- ary effects that may ultimately prove undesirable. U.S. policy in the adoption of technology has been mixed and inconsistent : relaxed and carefree for many consumer products, fearful for some, and painfully protracted for others. The decision as to when a new technology is ready for use is an extremely difficult one, quite apart from the hazard to its users. The great human effort involved in the mobilization of adminis- trative and social action is more difficult than the mobilization of scientific effort. If a government is called upon to administer a grossly faulty technology, more is lost than the wasted effort and the injury resulting from the faults as the program is halted. Failure makes more difficult a subsequent mobilization of social effort when a more relia,ble technology becomes available. Diplomats, no less than scien- tists, need to be aware of this. In some areas, the Green Revolution came too early with crops ill-adapted to local conditions so that effort was wasted, harvests spoiled, and — above all — confidence impaired. Dissatisfactions also have been reported with the initial efforts to introduce the lUD, resulting in a similar toll on confidence. The problem of the food/people equation is so complex that its solution is bound to be piecemeal and incremental, and to contain a fair element of trial and error. There is a general human tendency, moreover, to ignore possibly adverse consequences if they are remote, in order to exploit what is real, concrete, and near at hand. Among the questions raised by the problem for which anprwers may have to be forthcoming are the following. Are there new tech- niques of diplomacy and management that can be applied to acceler- ate the Irinds of corrective action that have been discussed in this study? Can additional new technoloffies further improve the cor- rective methods that have been described, to render them more ac- ceptable politically, economically, and socially? Should each country bear the brunt of the burden of adjustment to achieve its own balance between food and population, or does a more effective solution lie in 863 regional or global balance? The answers to all of these questions, relate to the effectiveness of both U.S. and multilateral eiforts to balance the equation of food and population. A heavy U.S. investment in correcting the global food/population balance would mean the shifting and reallocation of funds earmarked for other development programs, and perhaps the dropping of some, as long as U.S. foreign aid outlays remain roughly what they are now. Whether foreign aid appropriations are increased, rjeduced, or remain at the present level, the greatest positive impact on development mi^ht well come from putting as lar^e as possible a pprcentage of foreign aid money into population-limiting activities. At present, the United States allots approximately five percent 9f its f oreigji. aid to family planning work, while other large countries contribute less than one percent. Sweden, with nine percent and Norway with ten percent, ap- pear to lead in this category."^ ; It is not known how much money would be needed to br^ng popula- tion growth in the LDCs to a stable condition because no comprehen- sive study has been made of the magnitude of the world's effort in this field. To get an accurate picture of the total need requires solid analysis of what is being done by the developed countries, the U.N. agencies, private groups, and the LDCs themselves. Such an inquiry could be launched oy tne Congress, either through hearings or by com- missioning a study. There could also be interest in such a study at both the State Department and AID, which might want to conduct it themselves if it should turn out to be within the limits of their available resources. The United Nations might also be iitferested in doing a study of this kind. Indeed, President Nixon in his foreign aid message proposed that the U.N. Fund for Population Activities make a study of "world needs and possible steps to deal with them" in the popula- tion field.^" Regardless of the total cost of coping effectively with the onrushing tide of population, it is important that every success be as visible as possible. Thus far, the American people and the Congress have sup- ported expenditures of public funds for this purpose. If the expendi- tures show no results, it is unlikely that support for this activity can be sustained in the Congress and with the U.S. public. This eventuality does not seem likely in the present climate of general concern, but given the somewhat tenuous support for foreign aid to begin with, it remains a possibility. An even less likely development at this time, but again not impos- sible, would be the adoption by some developing countries of compul- sory measures of population control. (Indeed, in India at one point it was proposed that compulsory sterilization be enforced upon males with three or more living children ; the proposal was quickly with- drawn in the face of vigorous opposition."^) Should such a proposal be revived and acted upon, it would confront the United States with a "1 Conversation with Philander Claxton, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Population Matters. ""U.S. Agency for International Development. "Foreign Assistance for the Seventies." President Nixon's Message to the Congress. (Washington, U.S. Government Printing Of- fice, September 30, 1970), 15 pages. 163 ved P. Nanda. "The Need for a Global Population Policy — Now," Denver Law Journal. Special Magazine Issue, 1971. Reproduced by Foreign Area Research Coordination Group No. 14488. Department of State, page 10. 864 totally new situation, inasmuch at the U.S* program is grounded, ; legi^y and morally, on the principle of free choice. Again, this eyen- ' tuality 18 one for which the United States should not be completely unprepajred. 1 The one conclusion to which the evidence points most insistently is 'that the food/people ^^^^ cannot be considered in isolation* It is, rather, aii integral part of the total development process, and beyond that a feature of a matunng world. Even if the Green Bevolu- ' tion is successful in feeding a /vastly increased population, develop- ' miont V!ll not go forward. uid living standards will only decline if population growth is not MectiV^y checked. For population is even 'inore intractttt^ a problem) than food supply. All phases of develo^- \Btoht ai^ retarded as long aa expanding population eats into economic ' ^^rowth. Inveaiment is held back <^ channeled into unproductive areas. Job opportunities are not created, and unemployment or underemploy- ment spreads. Social misery gcMitinues unchecKed^ and populations — iniral ' and \u:ba^r-b6come inor^ao^ to appeals to -■yiolenbe.'-.. :^^ " ^'■^:-'/ ,. ' ' /-':a.v--'V:1... . ',,,;•', v.. -;■ - ' The final result of the inteniatiohal campaign to bring food and ««ppt^atk>n into balance in the LDCs— in SMoix a way that economic development oin go fcarward, and an acceptable level of human wel- fare can be achieved and sustained — cannot be foreseen. Certainly the 4^alleiige is^aa difficult ad any ever faced by man ; it calls for the care- ful mi^oagement of a complex interaction of scientific knowledge* di- plomacy, and aocial en^eeriiig. At the beginning of the decade oi the iidTOs, tnft ia^ue^^is very much in doubt. In the years ahead, the extent Mfd cnaractet of thi^ U.S. effort can have a crucial eff^ for go^ or ill. Chapter 12 — United States Scientists Abroad: An Examination of Major Programs for Nongovernmental Scientific Exchange CONTENTS Page List of Abbreviations 871 I. Introduction 873 Scope, Limitations, and Emphasis of the Study 874 Information Sources Used in the Study 877 The Pragmatic and Philosophical Basis of Scientific Exchange- _ 878 The Size and Variety of Overseas Activities of American Scien- tists 879 The Scope and Importance of Nongovernmental Scientific Ex- change Programs 880 The Multiple and Complex Purposes of Scientific Exchange Programs 883 Political Goals 884 National Security Objectives 884 Economic Objectives 885 Scientific and Technical Objectives 885 Humanitarian Objectives 886 Potential Conflicts Among Scientific, Political, and Personal Objectives 886 II. The Fulbright-Hays Program for Senior-Level Exchanges 889 Scope and Limitations of the Section 889 The Foreign Policy Objectives of Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs 891 Early Exchange Programs 891 The Fulbright Program of Overseas Fellowships 892 The Smith-Mundt Act of 1948 893 Origins of the Fulbright-Hays Act : The Need To Improve Existing Programs To Meet Political and Practical Objectives 894 How the Fulbright-Hays Program Oi)erates 896 Assistance Provided by Public Advisory Bodies 897 U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs 897 Scope and Limitations of Scientific Exchanges in the Fulbright- Hays Program 898 Diflaculties of Finding Qualified Scientific Candidates To Serve in the Developing Countries 900 The Discrepancy Between Foreign Policy and the Nature of Scientific Inquiry 903 Administrative Obstacles to Fruitful Scientific Exchange 904 Recommendations To Elevate the Status of Educational and Cultural Affairs in the Department of State 905 Recommendations for Over.seas Educational Affairs Officers 905 The Ambiguous Impacts of the Binational Commission 906 Retrenchment in Fimding 908 The Need To Maintain the Quality of American Grantees 911 Other Recommendations 912 Better Program Planning 912 ._ 913 ._ 913 ._ 913 ._ 914 Better Information About Openings Tenure Science and Technology Exchange Apparatus- Conclusion (867) 868 Pago III. National Science Foundation Programs for Americans Abroad 916 Overview of XSF International Programs 916 Slow Growth in NSF Autliority for International Science 918 Expansion of NSF Authority for International Exchange Pro- grams 920 The Implications of Limited Authority 921 The Office of International Programs 922 Inconsistent Reporting History 924 Absence of Requirements for Reports From Grantees 926 Problems Relating to NSF Overseas Science Offices 926 Termination of Special Advisory Committee on International Science Activities 928 Programs Administered by the Office of International Programs- 928 Cooperative Science Program 929 The United States-Japan Cooperative Science Program. 931 Origin of the United States-Japan Cooperative Sci- ence Program 931 Administration of the Program 932 Seminars 934 Visiting Scientist Program 934 Cooperative Research 935 Difficulties With the Program 936 United States-Italy Cooperative Program in Science 938 United States-India Program for the Exchange of Scien- tists and Engineers 939 United States-Australia Agreement for Scientific and Technical Cooperation 940 United States-Republic of China (Taiwan) Cooperative Science Program 942 United States-France Agreement on the Exchange of Scientists ^ ; 944 Scientific Exclianges With Romania 945 United States-Spain Agreement of Friendship and Co- operation _• 946 Scientific Cooperation With Brazil and Other Latin American Countries 947 United States-Iran Program for Scientific Cooijeration — 948 Other Programs Administered by the Office of International Programs 948 U.S. Participation in Planning and Developing Inter- national Science Programs 948 The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis 951 Special Foreign Currency Program 952 Travel To Attend Scientific Meetings 954 Scojie and Limitations of International Travel Grants Pro- gram 954 The International Travel Grants Program 956 National and Special Research Programs 959 LT.S. Antarctic Research Program 962 National Research Centers 964 International Science Education Programs of NSF 968 Development of Science Education in Foreign Countries 968 AID-Funded Activities 968 Cooperative Program for the Improvement of Science Education in India 969 NATO-Funded Activities 971 NATO Senior Fellowships in Science 971 NATO Postdoctoral Fellowships in Science 972 Advanced Study Institutes 972 International Travel Grants for Science Education 974 International Education Activities as Part of Domestic Mission-- 975 Conclusions: Some Illustrative Questions of Policy 979 869 IV. United States and Soviet-Eastern European Inter-Academy Scientific Page Exchanges ^82 Introduction ^82 Scope and Limitations 983. Tlie Dittlculties of Conducting Research on a Complex Program 987 Unavailability of Consistent and Reliable Data 987 The Need for Academy-to-Academy Exchanges 988 The Need for Scientific Consultation in Establishing Agreements- 990 Eastern European Programs 992 Soviet-American Programs 990 Genesis of Agreements : Poland and Yugoslavia 992 Extension of the Program : Romania and Czecho- slovakia 993 Bulgaria 994 Expansion of the Program : Yugoslavia and Romania — 994 Funding and Size of the Programs 995 Relatively High Cost of the Program 997 Funding Problems 998 United States-Soviet Programs : Numbers and Subjects of Exchanges 999 Specirte Observations : Small Numbers of Exchanges and Problems in Filling Quotas in Exchanges 999 Specific Observations : The Interest in the Hard Sciences 1001 I'nited States and Eastern European Inter-Academy Programs : Numbers and Subjects of Exchange 1002 The Impacts of Politics and Diplomacy on the Exchange Pro- grams 1004 Impacts of International Political Events on Soviet and Eastern European Receptivity to the Conduct of Ex- changes 1004 Visa and Other Administrative Restrictions 1006 Contributions of Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges to Science 1009 Some Concluding Observations on Scientific Exchanges With Communist Countries 1012 V. Scientific Exchanges With the People's Republic of China 1014 Obstacles to Systematic Government-Sponsored Exchange 1015 Moves Toward the Establishment of Regular Exchanges 1016 VI. Issues Surrounding U.S. I'rosranis for Nongovernmental Scientific and Technical Personnel Abroad 1021 Multiple Purposes of Programs 1022 The Need To Meet the Requirements of Science 1022 The Need To Meet the Recpiirements of Diplomacy 1023 Issues Related To Fashioning a More Effective Scientific/Diplo- matic Interface 1024 Interagency Coordination 1024 Obstacles to Interagency Coordination 1025 The Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs i026 The Federal Council for Science and Technology 1027 A Multilateral Alternative 1032 TABLES 1. American Civilians Sponsored by the U.S. Government for Activities Abroad, Total, and Scientific and Technical Personnel, Fiscal Year 1970 (Exclusive of the Peace Corps and Primarily Nonagency Per- sonnel) 1 881 2. Subject Distribution of Recommended Candidates, Programs Admin- istered by the Committee on the International Exchange of Persons, J 1961-62 and 1966-70 890 3. Distribution of Recomi'iended Candidates by Discipline, Committee on the International Exchange of Persons 901 870 4. Percentage of Awards by Subject and Area, Candidates Recommended ^*8e by the Committee on the International Exchange of Persons 902 5. Lecture and Research Awards and Funds, Senior Fulbright-Hays Programs, 1964-71 -^ 909 (j. Recommended Research Awards, Social Sciences and Natural and Applied Sciences, Europe and Other Areas, Senior Fulbright-Hays Program 910 7. American Senior-Level Nongovernmental Scientific and Technical Per- sonnel Abroad, NSF and Department of State, Fiscal Year 1970 916 8. NSF, International Scientific Information Exchange or International Cooperative Activities, Obligations 919 9. NSF Programs With International Implications, Funding 924 10. United States-Japan Cooiierative Science Program, Expansion of Seminar Activities, 1962-69 934 11. United States-Japan Cooperative Science Program — Funding and Activities Under Segments of the Program 937 12. United States-Italy Cooperative Program in Science 939 13. United States-India Exchanges of Scientists and Engineers Program__ 941 14. Office of the Foreign Secretary, Participation in Congresses and Gen- eral Assemblies of International Scientific Organizations, 1970 951 15. U.S. Participation in International Scientific Congresses, 1960-70 951 16. NSF, Special Foreign Currency Program, by Function 953 17. NSF, Obligations for Fiscal Year 1972 Research, Science Education and Related Activities 954 18. NSF, International Travel Grants, Number of Travelers, Cost, Fiscal Years 1952-73 958 19. NSF, International Travel Grants, Americans Abroad, Fiscal Years 1961 and 1970 959 20. NSF, National Research Programs 960 21. American Participation in Foreign Expeditions in Antarctica, Funded by NSF, 1960-70 963 22. NSF, National Research Centers — ^Funds Awarded by NSF and Personnel 965 23. National Research Centers, Foreign Travel, 1965 and 1970 967 24. NSF-NATO Travel Grants for Advanced Study Institutes 973 25. NSF Fellowship Awardees, Foreign Tenure 977 26. NSF Fellowships Tenable Abroad, Fiscal Years 1960-70 978 27. Awards Made by the National Science Foundation to the National Academy of Sciences for Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges.. 996 28. A Summary of Costs, United States-Soviet Exchange Programs, Fiscal Years 1950 to 1970 998 29. U.S.-Soviet Exchanges, Numbers and Man-Months, Fiscal Years 1959-71 1000 30. Americans to the Soviet Union and Soviets to the United States, by Subject and Total Man-Months, 1959-70 1002 31. Inter-Academy Exchanges Between the United States and Eastern Europe, Fiscal Years 1966-70 1003 FIGURES 1. National Science Foundation : International Science Activities 923 2. Distribution of Funds Awarded by the OflSce of International Programs in Fiscal Year 1971 929 LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AID Agenc}^ for International Development. ASI (NATO). Advanced Study Institute, sponsored by North Atlantic Treat}' Organization. BFS Board of Foreign Scholarships. CAO Cultural Affairs Officer. CIEP Committee on the International Exchange of Persons of the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, National Academy of Sciences. CSCPRC Committee on Scholarly Communication \\ith the People's Republic of China CU Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Depart- ment of State IC, FCST International Committee of the Federal Council for Science and Technology. LDCs Less Developed Countries. NAS-NRC National Academy of Sciences -National Research Council. NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NSF National Science Foundation. OIP Office of International Programs, National Science Foundation. PRC People's RepubHc of Chma. SCI Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affau's, Department of State. USIA United States Information Agency. USIS United States Information Service (title for USIA overseas) . (S71) CHAPTER 12— U.S. SCIENTISTS ABROAD: AN EXAMINA- TION OF MAJOR PROGRAMS FOR NONGOVERNMENTAL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE I. Introduction This study describes major i)roo:ranis of the Federal Government which send abroad nongovernmental scientists and technical personnel to lecture, study, attend meetings, or conduct research and it high- lights how these programs relate to American scientific and dii)lomatic goals. During the fiscal year 1970, three-fourths of all Americans sponsored abroad b}-^ the Government were scientists, technicians, or engineers in more than half of the nations where civilian Americans were stationed. Most Federal agencies periodically send abroad scientific and technical personnel as part of the agency mission. However, two agencies have princi|)al responsibility for ])rograms which sponsor overseas activities of nongovernmental senior-level scientists: the National S(;icnce Foundation (XSF), and the Department of State. The National Academy of Sciences (NAS), a nongovernmental agency, also administers substantial overseas programs with funds transferred from the Foundation and the State Department. Issues surrounding the origins, purpose, size, effectiveness, and administrative underpinning of these exchange activities illustrate several dimensions of the interaction of science with diplomacy. These include the constraints and opportunities generated b}" scientific factors such as the rate of scientific participation and requirements for the "unfettered" conduct of scientific research; and also diplomatic factors such as arrangements to facilitate scientific exchanges and to couple these exchange programs to foreign polic}' goals. For instance, the Senior Fulbright-IIays program, funded by the Department of State and administered by an agency of NAS, is designed to support educational and cultural components of the Nation's foreign policy. Programs of NSF have as their major objective the encouragement of the growth of science and of cooperative international scientific relationships. Some programs are designed, or have evolved, to support a mixture of objectives, including technical assistance to hasten the growth of science infrastructure in the develophig nations. Other l)rograms, notabl}^ the bilateral agreements with the Soviet Union and with the countries of Eastern Europe, serve both science and diplomacy by forging continuing working relationshi{)s and a degree of interdependence between the citizens of ideologically disparate states. Still other programs serve the goals of national prestige and national or international cooperative scientific inquiry. A number of these programs were initiated in the immediate post- World War II period; some were established as a response to the Sputnik "launch" of the late fifties; but the bulk are of more recent origin, reflecting current trends toward relaxation of international tensions and broader understanding of the benefits to science and society of cooperative international science. Note : This chapter was prepared in 1974 by Genevieve J. Knezo. (873) 97-400 O - 77 - 18 874 The complexity and variety of these programs within the executive branch and the problems of oversight by congressional committees with different jurisdictions inhibit their comprehensive description and analysis. This study, categorized as a "continuing issue" in the series Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, is partially in- tended to rectify that information gap by highlighting the origin, evolution, and status of several of these programs. The study also identifies several issues which may warrant additional consideration by the legislative and executive branches. These relate to limitations and achievements of specific agency programs with respect to scientific participation, the advance of science, and the promotion of coopera- tive relationships in science and technology with other nations. Also treated are issues posed by program inadequacies in light of emerging national and international scientific and political trends. Notable among these are the questions of: (1) developing conditions and programs to encourage the participation of American scientific and technical personnel in activities instituted under bilateral scientific and technical agreements, (2) improving functional coordination, Government-wide and overseas, and (3) reassessing the legislative- executive branch interface to determine program priorities. Scope, Limitations, and Emphasis of the Study Two basic questions underlie this study and suggest its contents and organization. They are: Wliat are the major impacts of science and diplomacy on the origin and evolution of U.S. Government programs to send non- governmental scientists abroad? and What are the impacts of these exchange activities on the Na- tion's scientific and diplomatic programs? Ideally, the concept of a "world scientific community" would pre- suppose the free movement of scientists from one country to another to exchange information, publications, and research results. However, divided by national barriers, the community of nations does not permit such free interchange. Diplomatic arrangements between nations both sanction and proscribe activities of the world scientific community. Some of these arrangements enable scientists to obtain information for their own research projects or for Government- sponsored research; others permit the exchanges of information between scientists of different countries for national or international political purposes. At the private nongovernmental level, scientists exchange informa- tion through the printed word, through channels increasingly pro- vided by multinational corporations, and through personal visits and correspondence. These devices, however, encounter a number of barriers. Language differences hamper communication between scientists. National security regulations prohibit the free export of scientific information, particularly that obtained from military re- search. And economic and technical competition between nations, internalized and projected by scientists who are first and foremost citizens of their countries, also deters scientific exchange. Some Government programs send abroad U.S. scientists and tech- nicians on oflicial missions designed to obtain or disseminate informa- tion supporting an agency's mission or objectives. These programs 875 serve such national objectives as defense, national security, or the maintenance of U.S. installations abroad. Some give substance to humanitarian objectives of U.S. foreign policy or foreign aid programs. Others promote internationally sanctioned cooperative research efforts. Through other arrangements, often bilateral, the U.S. Government supports and funds overseas activities of nongovernmental scientific and technical personnel. Limitations of time and space permit con- sideration in this paper of programs of only three agencies: (1) The Department of State: The Senior Fulbright-Hays program, funded by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs and administered by the Com- mittee on the International Exchange of Persons of the Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council, under the advisory super- vision of the Board of Foreign Scholarships, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, and binational commissions. (2) National Science Foundation (NSF) : Programs administered by the Office of International Programs, including bilateral science agreements with the countries of Europe, Latin America and Asia, support of international travel and international scientific meetings, and special foreign currency projects; National Research Centers program; and awards tenable abroad under NSF's research support and educational support programs; and (3) National Academy of Sciences-National Research Council (NAS-NRC): Bilateral inter- Academy agreements for scientific cooperation, which are part of Cultural Relations Agreements signed by the United States with the Soviet Union and with individual countries of Eastern Europe (Poland, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and Bulgaria), funded by the Ofi&ce of International Programs, NSF, administered by the Soviet and Eastern European Exchange Staff, Office of the Foreign Secretary, NAS-NRC; and activities of the Committee on Scholarly Cormnunication with the People's Republic of China, afiiliated with the NAS-NRC, These programs represent a sampling of U.S. Government-sponsored activities for non-governmental scientists abroad and they were selected for inclusion because they are the largest, oldest, and most publicized, and have wide geographic distribution. Their different historical origins and administrative arrangements provide a fruitful basis on which to describe interactions of science and technolog}' with diplomacy and to compare interagency similarities and differences. The Fulbright-Hays program differs substantially in objective from either the NSF or the NAS-NRC programs. This activity, from its beginning in 1946, was designed explicitly to promote educa- tional exchange and cultural understanding as purposeful objectives of U.S. foreign policy. The origin and evolution of the program illus- trate issues which arise in using science to serve foreign policy moti- vated exchange programs and in using scientific exchange in a binational cooperative program in which the concerns of science are secondary to the objectives of cooperation. 876 The NSF programs were designed initially to advance the Nation's domestic science base. This limited objective was gradually expanded as a result of both internal directive and legislative mandate giving the agency increasingly greater responsibility for supporting and initiating programs of international and foreign science and technology. The Foundation's programs are best described as foreign science for the sake of science. However, NSF programs seem to be fragmented administratively and to lack a well-balanced diplomatic advisory mechanism. While such factors meet the agency's need to maintain the integrity of science free from undue political interference, they also evoke questions as to whether these programs can satisfy the Foundation's increasing responsibilities for foreign and international scientific exchange programs. The NAS-NRC exchanges with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe illustrate a unique dimension of programs which support nongovernmental scientists abroad. These activities represent an attempt to establish fruitful scientific exchanges between ideo- logically disparate States which maintain mutually restrictive policies regarding the exchange of persons. These programs are the most politi- cally sensitive of the bilateral activities discussed. Their success requires high-caliber nongovernmental scientific participation in plan- ning and execution. This study raises also some broader issues of the interactions and conflicts between science and diplomacy. For instance, each of these programs is subject to a number of factors common to scientific re- search and development in general. At the administrative level all programs have a scrupulous scientific "peer evaluation" mechanism to assist in the selection of participants. Many programs have been influenced by requirements to meet domestic geographic distribution criteria in awarding funds for science, by impacts of retrenchment in overseas research and development funding, and by implications of the need to preserve the integrit^^ of science from undue political and governmental interference. A number of issues common to these programs illustrate the con- :straints which result from conflicts between the objectives of science and foreign policy. For instance the data illustrate that many scien- tists are not eager to participate in overseas programs if remuneration is 'not satisfactory, if participation in foreign or international scientific activities is not as potentially rewarding to research and development as is participation in domestic scientific activities, if a program is •designed specifically to support technical-assistance foreign jx)licy ■objectives, or if a program is distinctly pohtically motivated and ad- ministered. Whether as a result or a cause of these problems, most programs, especially those most designed to support scientific objec- tives, have a weak foreign policy administrative apparatus attached to them; only a few programs require evaluation of a scientists potential for effective cultural interaction with his foreign peers; most have no language requirements nor requirements for participants to report on the special foreign conditions encountered in this work. Generally, the evidence suggests that overseas scientific programs motivated primarily by foreign policy considerations have lower- quality selection criteria than do domestic programs. 877 Administratively, these programs share a number of deficiencies. Most were initiated on an ad hoc basis in reaction to a particular opportunity or problem. In neither their origins nor their operations do they constitute part of a deliberately formulated and coherent set of policies or programs for foreign and international science and technology, or for foreign and international scientific and technical exchange. There is little public information available about the size and scope of activities conducted under them; most lack continuitj^; there is little intra-agency or Government-wide evaluation of their effectiveness or contribution to either science or diplomatic goals; and there is an absence of formal and informal interagency liaison arrangements, both in the United States and abroad, to coordinate programs and to share experiences in program oversight. More important, program achievements and limitations have not been adequately described to the Congress, tending to prevent appropriate legislative planning and oversight. Scientific exchange activities are becoming increasingly important to U.S. foreign policy and to the Nation's expanding commitments in scientific cooperation, sharing of information, solving of global scientific and technological problems, and promoting the develop- ment of science infrastructure in the less developed countries. With respect to these trends the stud}'' indicates that scientific exchange activities can generate and strengthen political relations and scientific cooperation between the United States and other countries. However, it also illustrates the programmatic implications of basic conflicts be- tween science and pohtics. These include the difficulties of establishing administrative arrangements to govern programs and of developing program priorities which meet expanding foreign and international scientific commitments. In relation to these issues activities of the following units are dis- cussed: the International Committee of the Federal Council for Science and Technology (IC, FCST), the Office of International Pro- gi'ams (OIP), National Science Foundation; the Bureau of Inter- national Scientific and Technological Affairs (SCI), Department of State; and the science attache programs of the National Science Foundation and the Department of State. Information Sources Used in the Study Limitations of readily available data preclude detailed analysis of the programs treated in this study. However, an attempt is made to describe the salient features of each agency's programs in terms of numbers, types and location of exchanges, domestic and overseas administrative apparatus, and where available, demonstrable evidence of program achievements, especially in meeting goals of science and foreign policy. For purposes of historical analysis, this stud}^ generally covers the period of 1960-1970. More recent data are added, if warranted, to update a progi'am. With several exceptions treatment is given only to activities in support of sending abroad American nongovernmental scientists. The exceptions are the cases of some quid pro quo bilateral agreements in which the evolution and accomplishments of the pro- gram are related to activities that bring foreign scientific and technical personnel to this country. 878 The data base of the study consists of the following: (1) Congressional authorization and appropriations hearings, docu- ments and reports, 1960-1970, and Congressional reports or investiga- tions of particular programs; (2) In-house reports and published and unpublished materials describing program activities, accomplishments and problems; (3) Data derived from interviews with agency personnel directly in charge of administering separate programs; ^ and (4) Two types of information generated by a study of Government- wide exchange programs, sponsored by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) of the State Department in 1970 and 1971. The resulting computer printouts give specific data on each individual supported for exchange, by agency, during the fiscal years 1968 and 1970; and responses to a questionnaire, administered by the National Bureau of Standards,^ providing descriptive information on how the programs support the development of "leaders," difficulties in adminis- tration, and duplication, if any, with other agency programs.^ The Pragmatic and Philosophical Basis of Scientific Exchange The history of information exchanges among scientists of different countries is as old as the history of science itself. Dr. Jean -Jacques Salomon, an observer of the sociology of science and head of the Science Policy Division of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, would attribute such exchanges, in the absence of conflicting national constraints, to the inherently universal nature of scientific inquiry : Science is by nature universal. The truths which scientists seek to discover are not national truths; they are the same everywhere .... The structure as well as the nature of science is international. Research and discoveries, whatever the particular genius of individuals and peoples, constitute a common and cumu- lative achievement. The growth of modern science since Galileo has been closely associated with two principles which provide the foundation for all forms of cooperation in this field: collaboration between specialists and the publication of knowledge and discoveries.'* ' Conducted by the author. 2 Interview, Mr. Walter SeeUg, OfRce of Polar Programs, National Science Foundation, March 4, 1971. 3 The International Exchange Study Data Bank, 1971. By H. E. Adams and O. G. McPherson. Prepared for Office of Policy and Plans, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State by the Re- search Analysis Corporation, McLean, Virginia, Draft CR, Study 230.301, April 5, 1971. This study was prepared for the Office of Policy and Plans, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs for the President's foreign policy advisor. Its general objective according to Mr. John Richardson. Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, was: "To determine where and how [U.S. exchange activities] might be improved either in the way they are managed or in. the way they are targeted so as to strengthen the overall effect of these exchanges." (U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, The Judiciary and Belated Agencies Appropriations for 1972: Hear- ings, 92d Cong., 1st sess., Pt. 2, pp. 1013-1014.) The specific objective of the study was to obtain information on how U.S. exchange programs strengthen and support the development of leaders in foreign countries. (Interview with Ms. Claudia Rawles, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 1971.) While the data gathered are available, the study report itself is classified. According to Mr. Norman Neu- reiter, Office of Science and Technology, the study did not deal in depth, with scientific exchanges. (Inter- view with Mr. Norman Neureiter, Office of Science and Technology, 1972.) The Hon. William H. Taft III, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State, reports that what little treatment the report did give to scientific exchanges suggested that these could be improved to support the U.S. foreign policy objective of promoting the development of foreign leaders familiar with and sympathetic to U.S. national objectives. This conclusion, according to Mr. Taft, diverges from the primary objectives of many scientific exchange programs— which are to promote the development of science, to promote inter- national cooperation in science and technology, and to assist foreign scientists in improving their skills and training to contribute better to the development of a science infrastructure in their countries. (Interview with Mr. Taft, August 1971.) * Jean-Jacques Salomon, "The Internationale of Science, Science Studies 1 (1971), pp. 23-24." Excerpt from an essay translated from Science et Politique (Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1970.) 879 "Because of its objectivity," Salomon continues, "science is considered to be supracultural . . . ." Even the idea of a national scientific community would be contradictory since scientists share a ". . . single language, similar procedures, comparable experiments, [and] shared norms . . . ." Ideally the scientific community is a "spiritual collec- tivity, . . . and for this reason it so far transcends incompatibilities arising out of nationalism or ideology as to be completely unaware of them." Pragmatically, the supranational momentum of scientific inquiry led early scientists to establish and maintain relations with their colleagues in other countries through exchanges of correspondence, publications, and visits. These first forms of international scientific cooperation served the same function for early scientists as they do for their twentieth-century colleagues. The American oceanographer. Dr. Roger Revelle, has described the scientific rationale for meetings between scientists: 1. Face to face meetings among scientists . . . are a most effective means for exchange of scientific information and ideas. 2. [Imagination and creativity and an ability to s( e relationships that have never been seen before are essential to scientific discovery.] A good deal of science cannot be communicated, much less taught, except through direct personal contact. . . . Details of experimental procedure are hard to describe in words and are rarely published; they must be seen to be believed. 3. . . . Scientific ideas are usually born in conversation, rather than in the mind of one man. . . . The fresh insights, the new association between previously unrelated phenomena, often come from the interplay of two or three minds clashing in conversation. 4. ... In talking face to face, scientists allow themselves to state their intui- tions and partly-formulated ideas, unconstrained by the caution they demand in the printed word.* The Size and Variety of Overseas Activities of American Scientists Members of the American scientific community, like their counter- parts in other countries, travel a good deal. So extensive are their activities it is impossible to describe them fully. In a paper written in the early 1960's, Roger Revelle estimated that between 15 and 20 thousand U.S. scientists and engineers attend foreign scientific meetings each year.® However, a valid portrayal of the size and scope of U.S. overseas scientific and technical activities would have to encom- pass governmental and nongovernmental programs in education, field research, technical assistance, and participation in large international cooperative projects, most likely multiplving Revelle's figure several- fold. The paucity of valid information about U.S. scientific activities abroad is matched by the lack of readily available data describing Government-sponsored overseas programs for nongovernmental scientists. An American attending an international scientific con- ference may have paid his own way or have received his support probably as easily from a non-profit foundation or professional asso- ciation as from a Government-sponsored program. Research performed ' Roger Revelle, "International Cooperation and the Two Faces of Science." In: American Assembly, Cultural Affairs and Foreign Relations (Washington: Columbia Books, Inc., reprinted 1968), pp. 141-142. ' Roger Revelle, "International Cooperation and the Two Faces of Science," op. cit., p. 141. 880 abroad by an American may be financed b}^ a university or foundation grant, or a Federal science education or cultural exchange program. U.S. scientists and technicians also travel abroad as members of technical assistance teams, sponsored variously by religious organi- zations, nonprofit foundations, international organizations, the Agency for International Development (AID), and the National Science Foundation. In addition, the American industrial sector, educational foundations, and ad hoc private groups send scientists, engineers, and technicians abroad for varying lengths of time on a variety of missions. The Scope and Importance oj Nongovernmental Scientific Exchange Programs Although U.S. programs for civilian scientific and technical per- sonnel abroad are not grounded in a deliberately formulated set of programs and policies, scientific exchange programs constitute the bulk and perhaps the most important part of Government-sponsored civilian exchange activities. During the fiscal year 1970, Government agencies supported cul- tural, educational, and scientific activities of civilians abroad in 109 countries and six multistate regions. Sixty-six percent of these indi- viduals were scientific and technical personnel. " More important perhaps, is the fact that scientific and technical personnel comprised 50 percent or more of the U.S. civilian exchange group in each of 75 percent of the countries in which Americans were represented, and 75 percent or more of the U.S. representation in each of more than half of the countries where Government-sponsored Americans were present. (See Table 1.) These data, derived from the 1971 State Department Exchanges Study, ^ indicate, however, that while scientific and technical activities abroad are widespread, their scope varies with country, subject, and agency. For instance, while scientific and technical personnel were sponsored in 10 geographic areas, more than a third of all these personnel conducted their activities in Europe. The majority of scientific and technical activities were conducted in the developed countries, especially in Europe, but also in Japan, Israel, and Australia. (The majority of scientific and technical personnel sponsored by the Atomic Energy Commission, the Public Health Service, and the National Bureau of Standards, primarily agency staff, a group not studied in this report, carry out their scientific activities in Western Europe.) The developing countries, with the exception of South America, generally host more cultural and economic than scientific exchanges. Personnel sponsored by NSF and the Department of State are the most widely distributed of all agencies included in the survey.^ ' Extrapolated from International Exchange Study Data Bank, 1971, op. cit. The length of time spent on these visits was not considered in reaching these conclusions. ' See page 6, above. « In support of this study the author gathered and graphically arrayed data from the State Department study to illustrate the following trends: duration by agency and country; number by agency and country; duration by subject and country; and number by subject and country. The agencies included are: Depart- ment of State, NSF, National Bureau of Standards, Public Health Service, Atomic Energy Commission, and Departments of Agriculture and the Interior. Subject breakdowns are: social science, physics, chemistry, biology, architecture/engineering, geology, health/medicine, agriculture, meteorology, and computer/com- munications. Details of this analysis are available from the author. 881 TABLE 1.— AMERICAN CIVILIANS SPONSORED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FOR ACTIVITIES ABROAD, TOTAL, AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL, FISCAL YEAR 1970 (EXCLUSIVE OF THE PEACE CORPS AND PRIMARILY NONAGENCY PERSONNEL) Country Total Americans Number, scientific and technical Scientific and Technical 50 percent or more 75 percent or more Latin America: Argentina... Bahamas Barbados Bolivia Brazil British Honduras Chile - Colombia Costa Rica Dominican Republic Ecuador.. El Salvador. Guatemala Guyana Honduras Jamaica Mexico Panama.. Peru... Trinidad and Tobago Uruguay Venezuela Multicountry Total Eastern Europe and Soviet Union: Bulgaria... Czechoslovakia Hungary Poland... Romania USSR.... Yugoslavia -.. Total North America: Bermuda Canada... Greenland.. Total Near East and South Asia: ' Afghanistan. Csylon Cyprus •Greece India Iran Israel Jordan Kuwait Lebanon Nepal... , Pakistan Saudi Arabia Turkey UAR... Yemen Multicountry Total East Asia and Pacific Ocean area: Australia Burma. Cambodia. China (Mainland) China (Taiwan) Hong Kong Indonesia Japan Okinawa Korea Laos Malaysia See footnotes at end of table. 27 12 3 4 X X 4 4 X 0 0 8 17 54 17 X X 17 10 X X 24 20 X X 142 129 X X 4 3 X X 19 9 1 X X 1 X 5 4 X X 2 2 X X 1 1 X X 2 1 40 17 X X X 73 18 X 29 29 X X 4 4 X X 12 11 X X 11 9 X X 56, 51 X X 526 678 251 600 1 385 5 3 X 82 X 1 87 3 X 53 24 52 43 X 91 308 170 86 X !330 2 2 X X 247 209 X X 2 2 X X 1213 4 4 X X 4 4 X X 1 1 X X 72 320 63 52 41 X X 47 X X 65 61 X X 1 1 X X 18 17 X X 4 3 X X 2 2 X X 7 7 X X 23 17 X X 24 15 2 1 X 43 1 X X 24 10 4 301 60 55 X X 0 0 1 2 X 46 25 X 5 3 X 3 1 211 152 X 1 IX X 13 5 2 0 8 7 X X 882 TABLE 1— AMERICAN CIVILIANS SPONSORED BY THE U.S. GOVERNMENT FOR ACTIVITIES ABROAD, TOTAL, AND SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL, FISCAL YEAR 1970 (EXCLUSIVE OF THE PEACE CORPS AND PRIMARILY NONAGENCY PERSONNEL)— Continued Country Total Americans Number, scientific and technical Scientific and Technical 50 percent or more East Asia and Pacific Ocean area — Continued Malaya. Micronesia New Guinea New Zealand Philippines Singapore ^ Thailand.. Vietnam Multicountry Total. Europe: Austria Belgium Denmark Finland France West Germany... Iceland Ireland. Italy Netherlands Norway.. Portugal Spain... Sweden Switzerland Trieste United Kingdom. Multicountry Total. Africa : Algeria... Botswana Congo (Brazzaville). Congo (Kinshasa)... Ethiopia. Ghana Kenya Liberia Malawi _ Mali... Mauritius Morocco. Niger Nigeria Rwanda... Senegal.. Sierra Leone South Africa Tanzania Togo Tunisia Uganda... Zambia Multicountry Total. Antarctic and sub-Antarctic. Other multicountry Grand total. 0 3 2 X X 7 7 X X 16 n X X 8 6 X X 23 1 7 1 33 15 3 X X 48 474 <32D 1,456 « 1, 065 20 2 7 1 12 30 30 4 1 1 20 2 1 .. 1 X 7 X 12 X 2 .... 27 X 2 X X X 1 15 6 2 1 50 1 14 5 X X X X X 28 4 33 0 .... 4 .... 7 X 220 « 139 25 115 '25 X 8 105 X 4,350 « 2, 903 39 16 10 14 X X 18 16 X X 20 11 X X 90 81 X X 253 60 5 6 X X 20 13 63 X X 113 27 25 X X 14 11 X X 4 2 X 37 20 28 X X 33 X 44 44 X X 16 16 X X 403 340 X X 305 304 X X X "x "x X X X X X X X X 1 Scientific and technical, 73 percent. 2 Scientific and technical, 49 percent. 3 Scientific and technical, 85 percent. * Scientific and technical, 68 percent. 'Scientific and technical, 73 percent. « Scientific and technical, 63 percent. ' Scientific and technical, 100 percent. 8 Scientific and technical, 91 percent. • Scientific and technical, 66 percent. Source: Extrapolated from data contained in: H. E. Adams and 0. G. McPherson, "The International Exchange Study Data Bank, 1971," prepared for the Office of Policy and Plans, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State, by the Research Analysis Corp., McLean, Va., Draft CR, Study 230.301, Apr. 5, 1971. For additional information, see footnote 3 above. If a country is not listed, no Americans other than Peace Corps personnel visited. 883 Significant trends also hold with respect to distribution of activity by subject in Telation to geographic area. The majority of U.S. scientists and technical personnel in Europe during the fiscal year 1970 were physical, natural, chemical, and biological scientists and health personnel. The developing countries host primarily social scientists and biologists. In some of the developing areas, such as Africa, the bulk of American scientists and technical personnel typi- cally- exchanged were social scientists. ^° Tfte Multiple and Complex Purposes of Scientific Exchange Programs Aggregated data of this nature provide indications of general trends of the dimension, scope, and thrust of Government-sponsored civihan science and technology activities, but leave unanswered questions regarding the specific purposes, impacts, needs, oppor- tunities, and import of these programs.^^ For instance: Do scientists choose to go primaril}- to Europe because of pro- gram limitations in other areas or because scientific activity in Europe contributes more to the pursuit of science? How do programs differ between developed and developing countries? Do programs in the developing countries provide U.S. scientists and technicians with special research opportunities? Or are they designed to promote the growth in the host country of science and technology infrastructure and to enhance the de- velopment of indigenous educational systems? What role does the host country play in administering these programs? Have the scope and character of these programs varied over time? Are international scientific meetings held more frequently in one area than another? Are Federally supported programs for nongovernmental scientific personnel. abroad increasing? Do programs meet objectives established for them by their framers? WWch types of programs serve U.S. foreign policy goals more explicitly than scientific goals? Do U.S. programs evenly distribute the benefits of American scientific know-how? Are there explicit goals for such programs? There are no easy answers to such questions. These programs are governed by a variety of administrative arrangements and serve a complex set of objectives. All such programs, however, have foreign policy implications for the United States. That is, they affect or reflect U.S. political, national security, trade, foreign economic development, or humanitarian objectives. Some grew out of basically scientific motivations in the sense of sharing and exchanging informa- tion or knowledge and some serve personal goals. Herman Pollack, Director, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State, has described the set io Idem. " For an extended review of the variety, scope, purposes, and impacts of worldwide exchange programs, see: Otto Klineberg, International Exchanges in Education, Science and Culture; Suggestions for Research (Paris: Mouton and Co., 1966), 48 pp. (A publication of the International Social Science Council.) 884 of complex motives behind international scientific and technological affairs in recent testimony before the Congress : . . . The overall objective of the U.S. Government in international cooperation in science and technology is first and foremost the advancement of our national interests and the strengthening of our international relationships. Behind all scientific cooperation ... is the desire to advance science and to acquire and diffuse knowledge. Without this, the cooperation can have little, if any, other value. In addition, however, such cooperation is often inspired or motivated by humanitarian considerations. ^^ POLITICAL GOALS Political goals, according to Pollack, are fundamental to all inter- national scientific programs since they directly impact upon the initiation, conduct, and achievements of international science ac- tivities. Testifying in another hearing, Pollack noted the importance of insulating international scientific relationships from "... transi- tory political considerations . . .." But he warned that: . . . We have not emphasized nearly enough the importance of obtaining the political agreement which will be the necessary precedent to the multilateral undertaking of major scientific and technological ventures. . . . The advancement of national security and strengthening of in- ternational relationships, according to Pollack, should be an "oper- ating premise by all who are interested in enlarging governmental support for international scientific cooperation." '^ Specific political objectives of international scientific programs would include: a. To promote understanding and to dispel mistrust by exchange of persons and information. The principal underlaying impetus to the enlargement of cooperative scientific relations and exchanges Avith the Soviet Union originated in our desire to open up a closed Soviet society, to establish mutual understanding which might lessen dangerous tensions, and to signal a move toward improved political relations; b. To work together in a non-controversial area to provide a basis for cooperation in more difficult fields (e.g. the U.S. cooperative programs with Japan and France) ; c. To develop friendship and trust among a highly important segment of the popula- tion, whose role in government will become increasingly significant (e.g. bilateral programs). Foreign relations considerations are important components of the current attempts to expand cooperative efforts with Romania and Yugoslavia. President Nixon in his recent visits has made apparent his hopes to achieve closer relations with these countries ... d. To strengthen political stability of developing countries by improving economic and social conditions through science and technology (e.g. development of Korean Institute of Science and Technology with U.S. assistance) ; and e. To reduce tensions and rivalries between countries by utilizing science and technology for common goals and mutual benefit (e.g. U.S.-Mexico Desalination Cooperation). '< NATIONAL SECURITY OBJECTIVES National security objectives also motivate some international science and technology programs. They include : a. To prevent developments believed inimical to national security (e.g., cooperation in gaseous diffusion technology) ; b. To encourage actions in our long-range national interests (e.g., post-Apollo Space Program) ; 12 Statement of Herman Pollack. In: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics- Subcommittee on International Cooperation in Science and Space A General Review of International Coop- eration in Science and Space: Hearings, 92d Cong., 1st sess.. May 1971, p. 2. 13 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Panel on Science and Technology; Twelfth Meeting: International Science Policy: Proceedings, January 1971, p. 346. HA General Review of International Cooperation in Science and Space: Hearings, op. cit., p. 3, 4,71. (Em- phasis added). 885 c. To delay or prevent access by unfriendly nations to strategic materials or informa- tion; and d. To provide for mutual security by devising reliable methods for ensuring compli- ance with treaty obligations (e.g., international nuclear safeguards) . ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES Closely related to political and national security objectives are economic objectives — to lower the costs of research, enhance op- portunities for fruitful research, and open up new markets. Drawing upon a report recently completed by the International Committee of the Federal Council for Science and Technology, Pollack enumerated these specific direct and indirect economic benefits of international specific cooperation: . . . Instances of direct economic benefit [include]: sharing with other nations the costs of essential research; the incorporation into key U.S. research programs of instrumentation, techniques, and essential data generated in programs sup- ported by other nations; and the opportunities for U.S. scientists to utilize unique research facihties — ranging from oceanographic research vessels to special col- lections of biological materials. . . . . . . Examples of indirect economic benefits [include]: the new markets for U.S. -manufactured scientific instruments . . . , the adoption by U.S. producers of economically important new technologies developed abroad and brought to our attention as a result of cooperative programs , . . [and] the ability to avoid unproductive, and expensive, directions ... in our research planning on the basis of results coming to us through international cooperation. ^^ SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL OBJECTIVES Foreign and international science have become increasingly im- portant in recent years — both for their intrinsic merits, and as tools of foreign policy. Dr. Edward E. David Jr., President Nixon's Science Adviser, in testimony before the Subcommittee on Interna- tional Cooperation in Science and Space, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, described the President's emphasis on expanding joint research and development activities to solve global problems and to capitaUze on cooperative opportunities presented by science and technology: The problems — and the opportunities — created by science and technology dominate an increasing share of our international activ ity. The problems we can no longer ignore, and can solve only through international cooperation. The opportunities we . . . can realize only through international cooperation. Taken together, these challenges constitute the new dimension of our foreign policy and of international life.'^ President Nixon reemphasized the need for greater international scientific exchange in his March 1972 message to the Congress on "Enlarging Cooperative International Efforts in Science and Technology" : The cause of scientific and technological progress has always been advanced when men have been able to reach across international boundaries in common pursuits. Toward this end, we must now work to facilitate the flow of people and the exchange of ideas, and to recognize that the basic problems faced in each nation are shared by every nation. . . . This Nation can benefit substantially from the experience of other coun- tries, even as we help other countries by sharing our information and facilities and specialists with them." >' International Science Policy, Proceedings, op. cit., p. 347. " A General Review of International Cooperation in Science and Space: Hearings, op. cit., p. 130. " "Enlarging Cooperative International Efforts in Science and Technology," Message from President Nixon to the Congress (Excerpts), In Department of State Bulletin (April 10, 1972), p. 548. (Transmitted on March 16, White House press release; also printed as H. Doc. 92-193, 92d Cong., 2d sess.) 886 To meet the need, the State Department has targeted specific objectives for U.S. foreign and international scientific and techno- logical programs. A number of programs meet the objectives of joint cooperative research to solve regional and global problems. According to Mr. Pollack, these objectives are: a. To advance the world's store of knowledge by free exchange of ideas and data (e.g., International Decade of Ocean Exploration) ; b. To create a "critical mass" of intellect and/or instrumentation in attacking common problems (e.g.. Global Atmospheric Research Program) ; c. To speed the solution of critical problems by task appointment or complementary research (e.g., safety vehicle development, U.S., Italy, Germany (CCMS)); d. To meet the need in many studies of simultaneous or coordinated observations for many sites (e.g.. World Weather Watch); e. To compare the effects of geographic, climatic, cultural, etc. variables on a target system under study (e.g.. International Biological Program) ; f. To avoid unnecessary duplicatory research by information and personnel ex- change (e.g.. Medlars Information exchange) ; g. To make available to scientists everywhere unique resources or experimental conditions otherwise available to only a few (e.g., SEATO Cholera Research Labora- tory, Pakistan) ; h. To develop international "banks" of scarce materials (germ plasma, micro- organisms, geological samples, etc.) for the use of all scientists (e.g.. Lunar rock stud}' program) ; and i. To concentrate the talents of many nations on a transitory phenomenon (eclipse, volcanic eruptions, etc.) to provide maximum scientific benefit (e.g., International Task Force at Mexico solar eclipse.) i* HUMANITARIAN OBJECTIVES Some U.S. international science activities are designed to serve humanitarian or technical-assistance goals. These include: a. To improve the health and welfare in developing countries by the application of advanced science and technology (e.g., U.S. -Japan Medical Program) ; b. To develop an indigenous capability to meet their own needs through education and institution building (e.g., AEG sister-sister relationships with laboratories in various countries) ; c. To provide assistance in catastrophes and in the prevention of catastrophes (e.g., U.S. assistance to Iran, Turkey, Chile, etc. after earthquakes) ; d. To control hazards or undesirable conditions transcending national borders (e.g., agricultural quarantine cooperation); and e. To provide networks for early warning systems (hurricanes, tidal waves, etc. e.g., Tsunami warning system), i* POTENTIAL CONFLICTS AMONG SCIENTIFIC, POLITICAL, AND PERSONAL OBJECTIVES U.S. scientists, like their counterparts in other fields and in other countries, play pivotal roles in determining both the content and mechanics of foreign and international scientific programs. In a similar manner, the objectives of these activities — the scientific goal of systematically accumulating knowledge about man and his world, and the political goal of forging closer relationships among states — necessarily^ vary with the waj' the diplomat uses science and the way the scientist views his diplomatic role. It is difficult if not impossible to attribute clear-cut political motives to specific international scientific or scientific exchange 19.4 Ornerdl Review of International Cooperation in Science and Space, Hearings, op. cit., pp. 71-72. (Em- phasis added.) " Ibid., p. 71. (Emphasis added.) 887 programs.^" Salomon reports that grants and other funding are sometimes based on poHtical motives; similarly, achievement in science is used as a legitimate currency in cultural diplomacy: In international scientific relations, private and governmental aspects are interdependent and are often indistinguishable. Grants and subsidies made by governments to scientists to facilitate international exchanges are not without ulterior motives, and iu what has been called "scientific tourism" political or military espionage cannot always be ruled out. In the conquest of Asia, the mis- sionaries supported the settlers and, more recently, the archaeologists, the diplo- mats in carving up of the Middle East; in the same way, scientists are called upon to fulfill, officially or not, pubUc functions which are connected with their tech- nical or private preoccupations. There is also the role which they are called upon to play in the great international fairs where the conquests of science are entered into the account books as national achievements. In the framework of this "cultural diplomacy", which has been defined as the "manipulation of cultural materials and personnel for propaganda purposes", men of science are exhibited like film stars or boxing champions.^' In addition, Salomon seems to imply that scientists participating in ostensibly non-political international scientific activities are frequently given political missions: The Pugwash Conferences, which bring together privately scientists of "good will" do not escape the constraints of technonature — the good will or the com- pliance of governments towards them is in no way absent from the calculation. In fact, a reading of the lists of participants in the Pugwash Conferences is enough to pick out the names of the scientists or political observers who are officiallj^ or unofficially linked with political decision -making bodies, whether in the East or West.22 These considerations undoubtedly present both scientists and policy- makers with a dilemma. Thus, according to Dr. T. O. Jones, director of National and International Programs, NSF, international scientific programs based on purely political motives frequently fail: . It has been my experience in dealing with international science activities over the years, that whenever one contrives a scientific program purely for the purpose of political advantage or motivation it frequently fails, because the science is contrived and not genuine, and is not really of interest to the scientific community. 23 A variety of personal motives have been attributed to U.S. scientists who go abroad in Government-funded exchange programs. For in- stance, Donald J. Shank, as executive vice-president of the Institute of International Education, which administers educational exchange programs below the senior professional level for the Department of State, reports that personal motives, travel, and cultural interests, and the desire to learn a foreign language, motivate many exchange scholars : . . . Although many sponsors say they promote educational exchange in order to build international understanding and peace, they are usually forced to include 20 Objective measurements might be used, for instance, to determine whether one program is more polit- ically or diplomatically oriented than another. For example, a researcher could hypothesize that if an exchange program required its participants to meet certain characteristics it might be more politically oriented than one that did not, such as by being required to possess language capability, to undergo pre- departure and post-trip debriefing by the USIA and the CIA, or to report in detail on the foreign policy aspects of their overseas activities. These questions were asked of administrators in charge of the specific programs surveyed in this study; the responses indicate that while these factors may tend to indicate that some programs directly serve political interests more than others, additional information is required to demonstrate a valid relationship. Other information, such as interviews with scientists, a task beyond the scope of this paper, would have to be utilized. However, according to Ambassador Taft, Department of State, intelUgence debriefing frequently is mandatory in some programs. (Interview, August, 1971.) « Salomon, "The Internationale of Science," op. cit., p. 32, citing F. C. Barghoorn, The Soviet Cultural Oflen»jve (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 5960), p. 10. « Ibid., p. 39. » U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, 1971 National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, p. 252. 888 more specific objectives for participants. . . . Many Americans admit that they go abroad simply to see other countries ... to learn something about the people and the culture of another country [and] ... to learn a foreign language. 2* The support of explicit professional goals, Shank continues, is only one of the motives behind such travel. "And finally," he adds, "there is a relatively small number of Americans who go abroad to teach or to help in the development of foreign institutions." ^^ This introductory section was designed to provide an overview of the exchange programs to be discussed in the study and a characteri- zation of how these programs illustrate the many relationships and potential conflicts between the broader objectives of science and diplomacy. The four following sections describe the origins, evolution, and accomplishments of the scientific exchanges of the Fulbright-Hays program, the NSF-administered nongovernmental exchange activities, the NAS-administered exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, and the origins of formal scientific exchanges with the People's Republic of China. The final section presents some concluding ob- servations. 2* Donald J. Shank, "The American Goes Abroad," The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (May 1961), pp. 9&-111. 23 Idem. II. The FulbrIght-Hays Program for SenIor-Level Exchanges At the request of Congress, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, in 1969, surveyed ". , . all . . . programs of the Federal Government that have to do with educational activities aimed at improved international understanding and cooperation,"^ and found that 31 agencies of the Government administer 159 programs for two-way exchanges of scholars or for other foreign or international educational activities." These programs are authorized by 42 legis- ative acts,^^ and cost somewhere between $400 and $800 million annually. ^^ Scope and Limitations of the Section U.S. scholars in scientific and technical disciplines are sent abroad under a number of these programs. The oldest of these and one which supports exclusively personnel at the doctorate or post-doctorate level is the senior-level Fulbright-Hays program, directed by the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU), Department of State, under the statutory authority of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, Public Law 87-256. It includes two-way exchanges of senior-level lecturers, researchers, and scholars in all academic disciplines. (Exchanges of graduate and undergraduate students in all disciplines and exchanges of artistic, cultural, athletic, and other professionals are conducted under other parts of the Hays- Fulbright program.) American senior-level (i.e., Ph. D.) scientists and technical professionals play a large role in the program. During the last five program years an average of more than 50 percent of the senior professional lecturers and researchers recommended to be sent abroad each year were social, natural, or applied scientists; the rest were scholars or professionals in the arts, humanities, and cultural fields. (See Table 2.) 2' Pursuant to a provision of the Department of Health, Education and Welfare appropriations act of 1968 (P.L. 90-132), which called for: "A comprehensive study of all currently authorized programs of the . . . Government that have to do with educational activities aimed at improved international understanding and cooperation, with the objective of determining the extent of adjustment and consolidation of these programs that is desirable in order that their objectives may be more efficiently and expeditiously accomplished . . . ." 2' The survey was conducted by means of a questionnaire sent to 44 Federal agencies; 31 responded. In addition to reporting financial and descriptive data, the agencies categorized each of their programs ac- cording to its major objectives. The resulting breakdown is: technical assistance, 56 programs; educational exchange and cooperation directed primarily to foreign nationals and countries, 14 programs; cultural exchange and presentations, 1 program; information services directed to foreign nationals, 13 programs; programs to strengthen U.S. education resources and increase manpower with international competence, 40 programs; and cooperative international activities for mutual benefit, 35 programs. (Source: U.S., De- partment of Health, Education, and Welfare. Office of Education, Institute of International Studies, In- ventory of Federal PTograms Involving Educational Activities Concerned With Improving International Under- standing and Cooperation An Inter- Agency Survey Conducted For the Congress of the United States, June 1%9, 545 pp.) 2' U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Departments of Stale, Justice, Commerce, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Bill, FY 1970: Report to Accompany H.R. 129G4, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, p. 7. ^ The House Appropriations Committee in 1989 estimated that the U.S. Government civilian exchanges programs for FY 70 would cost $377,419,000. This figure is based on materials supplied by the Department of State. The $800 million figure is taken from James M. Davis, "The U.S. Government and International Education: A Doomed Program?," Phi Delta Kappan (January 1970), p. 238. Davis based his total on com- putations using materials presented in Inventory of Federal Programs Involving Educational Activities Con- cerned with Improving International Understanding and Cooperation. . ., op. cit. The HEW study did not present any annual totals for Goverrunent-wide costs for international education activities. (889) 890 TABLE 2.-SUBJECT DISTRIBUTION OF RECOMMENDED CANDIDATES, PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY THE COM MITTEE ON THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF PERSONS, 1961-62 AND 1966-70 Program year Number of awards in all fields Number of awards in natural and applied sciences Number of awards in social sciences Percentage of all awards lor natural, applied, and social sciences 1961 to 1962 967 312 344 355 318 228 127 193 288 309 277 170 83 52 1966 to 1967 1,159 54 1967 to 1968 - 1,229 73 1968 to 1969 1,132 52 1969 to 1970 .- - 705 56 1970 to 1971 360 58 Source: This information was compiled from unpublished data supplied by the Committee on the International Exchange of Persons, Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, "Annual Report to the Board of Foreign Scholarships." Data for 1970-71 from Annual Report . . ., July 1, 1969 to June 30, 1970 (1970), p. 42; for 1959-70 from Annual Report, July 1, 1968 to June 30, 1969 (1969), Table 111; for 1968-69 from Annual Report, July 1, 1967 to June 30, 1968 (1969), Tsble Ill- data for 1967-68 from Annual Report, July 1, 1966 to June 30, 1967 (1967), Table III; and date for 1966 to 1967 from Annual Report July 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966 (1966), Table III. CIEP data should be considered the most reliable for this study since they include only senior research scholars and lecturers sent abroad in professional scholarly fields. The percentage of scientists to total American program exchanges Is lower when figured on the basis of data for total senior mutual educational and cultural exchanges as published in an- nual Department of State appropriations hearings. These sources include information on exchanges sent on some programs other than those handled by the CIEP, and are not as valid for longitudinal comparative purposes since the time periods upon which they are based are not the same and repeats occur. Department of State data, extrapolated from appropria- tions hearings, yield lower percentages: Total number Percent of Total number of science science grantees Time period of grantees grantees to total Academic years: 1966 to 1967 900 318 35 1967 to 1968 _ 724 329 45 1968 to 1969 _ 672 294 44 Program year: 1969 416 146 35 1970 507 215 42 The scientific exchanges conciiicted under the Ful bright-Hays pro- gram have not been described in detail in documents available to the public or to the Congress. The purpose here is to identify and assess the major diplomatic, administrative, and substantive considerations which impact upon them. The stucly describes the initiation and evolution of these international educational and cultural activities, and summarizes legislative and executive branch efforts to insulate program operations from undue political pressures. For instance, to attract superior grantees, the Congress gave responsibility for domestic day- to-day selection and program operations to several nongovernmental groups, funded and supervised by CU in the Department of State. Similarly, binational exchange commissions and other arrangements were initiated to encourage bilateral cooperation in selecting grantees and in determining the scope and content of country programs. However, these programs are part of overseas educational and cul- tural activities; thus overseas field administrative responsibilities were given to Cultural Affairs Officers attached to the United States Information Agency (USIA), thereby imparting to these programs a distinctly political and informational character. These divisions of responsibility may seem warranted in view of the administrative mechanics of U.S. oflicial representation abroad and the need to maintain the integrity of educational and cultural exchanges. But they have raised questions as to the impact of such arrangements on the quality and effectiveness of the program's coordination and evaluation mechanisms. 891 Moreover, the quality and quantity of scientific participation over- seas appears to be affected by changes in diplomatic objectives. In contrast with the situation in the early daj's of the program, partici- pation of scientific personnel with the highest reputation among peers appears to have decreased as the program evolved from one designed primarily to support the "unfettered" international exchange of re- search scholars and lecturers to a program designed to serve informa- tion, political, and technical assistance objectives. Scholarly require- ments for participation in the scientific and technical aspects of the Fulbright-Hays program are met in exchanges conducted with the developed countries. However, in the case of the developing countries the data appear to point to a discrepancy between the scientific, technical, and political objectives of the Fulbright-Hays program and the requirements and capabilities of scientific and teclmical scholars. The Foreign Policy Objectives oj Educational and Cultural Exchange Programs International educational exchanges tend to be initiated, justified, and programmed in terms of strengthening foreign political, cultural, and economic objectives rather than of strengthening a particular branch of knowledge. U.S. programs are no different in these objectives from those of its political allies, nor those of the Soviet Union.^° Since their inception, U.S. educational and cultural exchange pro- grams have been the subject of a persistent controversy: that is, how independent of foreign polic}^ should these exchange programs be? The legislative and administrative history of U.S. educational and cultural exchange programs indicates that they are a working compro- mise between the position of those who advocate complete inde- pendence and the view that such programs should be closely responsive to foreign policy. Many of the difficulties encountered, especially in the scientific exchanges in the Fulbright-HaA^'s program, arise from this ambivalence. Early Exchange Programs Before World War II, official educational exchange programs were small and confined primarily to Latin America.^^ During World War II, educational and cultural exchange programs were replaced by informational and propaganda efforts devoted to winning the war. Mixed educational, cultural, and informational motives continued to characterize U.S. exchange and assistance programs in the immediate post-war period. In 1945, large-scale educational, cultural, and informational activities became part of the occupation program in Germany, Austria, and Japan. In 1947 the technical assistance features of the Marshall Plan had important educational and scientific aspects. 31 Documentation on this point is supplied by Frederick C. Barghoom, The Soikt Cultural Offenshe; The Role of Cultural Diplomacy in Soviet Foreign Policy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960). For a description and review of the exchange programs, see also: Oliver J. Caldwell (Asst. Commissioner or International Education, U.S. Office of Education), "What Others are Doing, The Rising Demand for International Education," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science (May 1961), pp. 112-21. 'I Cummins E. Speakman, Jr., International Exchange in Education (New York: The Center for Applied Research in Education, Inc., 1966), pp. 31-32 and U.S. Congress, House, Comm.ittee on Education and Labor, Federal Educational Policies, Programs, and Proposals: A Survey and Handbook, Part II: Surrey of Federal Educational Activities. Prepared in the Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968, p. 8 (House Document No. 398). 892 The Point IV Program, initiated in 1950, brought "American technical know-how" to the developing countries.^- The Fiilhright Program of Overseas Fellowships The Nation's first large-scale legislative program for interna- tional educational and cultural exchange began in 1964 when Sen- ator William Fulbright sponsored an amen(hnent to the Surplus Property Act of 1944 to authorize a mutual exchange of scholars witli 22 countries, financed b}^ foreign currencies derived from the sale of surplus U.S. war materials abroad. The Fulbright program differed significant h' from previous over- seas scholarship activities. These factors continue to characterize it today. First, the program was conceived so as to minimize involve- ment with propaganda and "cultural imperialism", and to insure bilateral cooperation, by (a) requiring that the United States and each participating countr}^ sign formal exchange agreements to authorize the program, and (b) by estabhshing binational foundations or com- missions, composed equall}' of U.S. citizens (including the U.S. Ambas- sador) and foreign nationals, who wouhl assist in local program selection and administration. Second, architects of the program sought to establish an adnunistrative framework neither too de- pendent nor too independent of foreign policy by (a) placing overall administrative responsibility for the program in the Department of State, but also b}^ (b) establishing a Board of Foreign Scholarships (BFS) charged with selecting all participants and with general super- vision of the program. Responsibilit}^ for administration and execu- tion of the program was given to the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) in the Department of State, which also admin- isters other U.S. exchange-of-persons programs. CU, acting under broad policy outlines set by the Board, provides administrative staff and secretariat for the program, negotiates agreements covering edu- cational interchange with foreign governments, maintains liaison with U.S. embassies and consulates overseas, and in Washington cooperates with other U.S. Government and private agencies on particular aspects of the program.^^ According to one historian of this era: The Fulbright program . . . fitted perfectly the spirit of the times. lutoruational- minded academic and civic groups saw in it an apjjealing and practical means to promote world understanding. As hundreds of scholars began criss-crossing the ocean the very name Fulbright became a world-wide symbol (.)f mutual under- standing.^* However, after several ye&vs of operation the Fulbright program came under increasing criticism. First, some critics felt it was too limited : . . . For all its virtues, the Fulbright prograin had limitations. ... It was re- stricted to academic exchanges and it could operate only in comitries where the U.S. Government happened to own "excess foreign currencies," which excluded a good many countries. It could cover only the transportation costs of foreign 32 For a review of the evolution of American technical assistance programs, especially th« Point IV pro- gram, see: "Chapter Four: The Point IV Program: Technological Transfer As the Basis of Aid to Develop- ing Countries.," In U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Sul)comiiiittee on Science, Research and Development, Technical Information for Congress: Riport, Prepared l>y the Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 92d Cong., 1st sess., April 25, 1969, pp. 61-96. 33 TT.S., Board of Foreign Scholarships, Continuing the Commitment ... a report on Academic Exchanges: Eighth Annual Riport (October 1970), p. 19. 3< Philip II. Coombs, The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy: Educational and Cultural Affairs (Published for the Council on Foreign Relations, Harper and Row, 1964), p. 30. 893 students, not their dollar costs in the United States, which had to be raised from private sources. And eventually its reserves of foreign currencies would be ex- hausted.^5 Second, maii}'^ Members of Congress, responding to tlie growing intensity of the Cold War, wanted either to abolish the program or link it more closely to foreign propaganda and promotional activities: Many Congressmen had gone overseas in 1946 and 1947, and most came home shocked and angered by the calculated misrepresentations of the United States they had encountered and [were] deeplj- concerned by the evident lack of under- standing of American society and motives, even among good friends.'^ THE SMITH-MUNDT ACT OF 1948 After a long and heated debate on the relationship of educational exchange to foreign policy, the Congress amended the existing legis- lation bv passing the United States Information and Education (Smith-Mundt) Act of 1948, P.L. 80-402. The provisions of this Act reflected a desire to maintain a relative independence of educa- tional and cultural affairs from foreign policy. The foreign policy purpose was served by establishing an information service separate from educational activities. The Fulbright program was strengthened by- (1) authorizing some educational exchange in countries other than those whose governments had signed educational exchange agreements ; (2) enabling Fulbright scholars to receive some supplementary dollar support ; (3) requiring the State Department to use private organiza- tions wherever possible in carr^^ing out the operations and objec- tives of the program; (4) authorizing the inclusion of technical assistance activities imder the concept of educational interchange of persons, knowl- edge, and skills authorized by the program; and (5) further expanding the concept of educational exchange by authorizing the Secretary of State to support the exchange of educational materials, and to extend grants to American-sponsored schools, libraries, private universities, and other organizations to further the aims of the educational and cultural exchange programs. The act also created the presidentially-appointed U.S. Advisory Commission on Educational Exchange to appraise the effectiveness of the educational exchange program semiannually and recommend legislative improvement.^' As noted, the Congress had authorized the Fulbright program to utilize foreign currencies derived from the sale of surplus war materials. By 1954 this source of funding began to dry up and Senator Fulbright, foreseeing the need for a new source of revenue, proposed an amend- ment to the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954. The Congress passed this amendment (P.L. 83-480) thereby authorizing U.S.-owned foreign currencies derived from any source, including the sale of U.S. agricultural commodities abroad, to be used for educational exchange. " Idem., p. 30. »6 Ibid., p. 31. 8' Created by section 603 of P.L. 80-402, (62 Stat. 6). 894 During the early part of the 1950's the Fulbright program became increasingly subjected to the vagaries of international politics. Ac- cording to Philip Coombs, a former director of the cultural exchange programs of the Department of State: "In this new cold war context, the educational exchange program was soon outranked by the in- formation _ program and increasingly became its handmaiden." ^^ He continues : Emphasis shifted to grants and exchanges which could have a "quick impact." A State Department reorganization — -aimed at giving the information program greater freedom from the Department's hobbUng bureaucratic constraints — classified exchange of persons programs ... as "media services," in the same category as radio, press, and motion pictures.*^ According to Coombs, one of the most severe threats to the inde- pendence of educational and information activities came in 1953 ". . . when all overseas information activities were transferred from the State Department to a new semi-independent United States In- formation Agency." In the process, he continues, "the educational exchange programs were all but forgotten. Only by the intervention of an influential group, headed by Senator Fulbright and including Senators Mundt and Hickenlooper, were they kept from being placed under the new information agency." ^° Although the educational programs were not placed under the U.S. Information Agencv (USIA),"*^ its establishment brought about the beginning of a division of responsibilities which lends a possible political connotation to overseas administration of the program since the staff of the USIA handle overseas day-to-day administration of U.S. educational and cultural exchange programs.*^ The USIA Cultural Affairs Office (CAO), who as part of the United States Information Service (USIS) team handles these programs overseas, reports directly both to the USIA and to the Department of State. Thus, according to Speakman, the program "has two masters in Washington." *^ Origins of the Fidbrighf-Hays Act: The Need To Improve Existing Pro- grams To Meet Political and Practical Objectives In 1901 the Congress passed the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act, Public Law 87-256, approved September 21, 1961. This statute, commonly known as the Fulbright-Hays Act, is the original authorizing legislation for current educational and cultural exchange programs. The Act had wide support in the Congress; it passed by a vote of 79 to 5 in the Senate and 378 to 32 in the House. The Fulbright-Hays Act revised existing legislation by repealing and gathering under its authorit}^ the previously enacted statutes on educational and cultural exchange: the Finnish Educational Ex- change Act, the International Cultural Exchange and Trade Fair 3' Coombs, The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy, op. cit., p. 33. 3' Idem. « Idem. " Called "United States Information Service" overseas. '- Binational commissions establish annual and long-range program plans and generally have final au- thority in selecting grantees. This theme is developed below on pages 34 and 35. *' Speakman, International Exchange in Education, op. eit., pp. 35-6, citing an authoritative study on USIA and administration of the program: Charles Frankel, The Neglected Aspect of Foreign Affairs (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1965) 156 pp. 895 Participation Act, and the educational provisions of the Smith-Mundt Act.*^ The new legislation also : — made financial arrangements more flexible to support long- range binational planning and financing by permitting reserva- tion of foreign currencies in advance, dollar financing, interagency transfer of funds for programs, and the extension of support to individuals as well as to institutions; —authorized private sector evaluation research on educational and cultural exchange; — expanded the program to include U.S. and foreign participa- tion in international educational and scientific meetings and created additional centers of technical and cultural interchange, such as the East-West Center in Hawaii; and — refined and strengthened binational program planning and the role of private advisory groups in administering the program.*^ The provisions of the Fulbright-Hays Act were designed also to rectify program deficiencies described in several advisory group reports presented to the Congress and the President in 1960 and 1961.*^ These reports indicated basic difficulties with the existing legislation. One difficulty, according to Thomson and Laves, was the need to coordinate a "mass of often unrelated acts [and] to codify and am- phfy the existing mass of legislation." " A second, according to Coombs, was: . . . that the diverse educational and cultural activities were a vitally important aspect of U.S. foreign policy and should be accorded higher priority, greater support, and stronger leadership. ^^ "The reports," he said, "stressed the need for clearer policy direc- tion, better coordination, more adequate budgets, consohdation of legislation, stronger federal-private cooperation, and better collabo- ration . . ." *^ The new Act also had distinct political objectives. By 1961 bi- polarization of the world into "the Communist camp" and "the free World" had peaked; ideological conflict between the two groups of nations was reinforced by the tactics of "Cold War diplomacy." Concurrently, the emergence of the "third world" created a different set of diplomatic problems as the former colonial territories became ^'developing nations" and sought economic and pohtical ties compatible with their strong nationahsm and their need for technical assistance and a favorable trading position. To effectively meet its new inter- " Infonnational exchange provisions of the Smith-Mundt Act had previously been subsumed under the authority of the United States Information Agency, created in 1953. « U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Aflairs, Subcommittee on State Department Orgam- zation and Foreign Operations, Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961: Hearings on H.R. -5203 and H.R. 6204, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, 343 pp.; U.S^ Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Af- fairs, Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961: Report No. 1094, 87th Cong., 1st sess., August 31, 1961, 42 pp.; U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Kelations, Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act: Hearings on S. 1154, 87th Cong., 1st sess., March and April 1961, 241 pp.; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961: Report on S. 1154, 87th Cong., 1st sess., June 14, 1961, 44 pp. . A comprehensive legislative and administrative history and review of accomplishments and lumtations of the Fulbright-Hays prc^rams may be found in: Walter Johnson and Francis J. Colligan, The Fulbright Program: A History (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1965), 380 pp. The summary appearing m the text above was taken primarily from Johnson and Colligan, pp. 305-309. t, , • » »6 "Final Report of the Twenty-second American Assembly on Cultural Affairs and Foreign Relations, In The American Assembly, Columbia University, Cultural Affairs and Foreign Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1963), pp. 172-177. . . „ , ^ . , «• Charles A. Thomson and Walter H. C. Laves, "United States Cultural Relations Activities, /n David G. Scanlon and James J. Shields, eds., Problems and Prospects in International Education (New York: Colum- ibia University Teachers CoUege Press, 1968), p. 215. " Coombs, The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 44r-5. " Idem. 896 national political burdens, the United States soiis;ht to broaden and intensify its presence abroad; both educational and cultural exchanjjie, and informational activities were given imj)ortant roles to play. Reflecting this diplomatic goal, the statement of purpose of llie Fulbright-Hays Act reads: ... to enable the Government ... to increase miitua] understanding V)etween the people of the United Statei^ and the people of other countries by means of educational and cultural exchange; to strengthen the ties which unite us with other nations by demonstrating the educational and cultural interests, develop- ments, and achievements of tlie people of the United States and other nations, and the contributions being made toward a peaceful and more fruitful life for people throughout the world; to promote international cooperation for educational and cultural advancement; and thus to assist in the development of friendly sympathetic and peaceful relations . . . .^° Senator Fulbright once described its purposes: "High academic standards are important . . . bul th.e purpose of the program is not the advancement of science nor tlie promotion of scholarship. These are by-products of a program vrhose primary ami is international understanding." ^^ Recent testimony from the Department of State has amplihed this theme as the prime function of the Mutual Educa- tional and Cultural Program : Tlie development of lasting relationships between key leaders — leaders of opinion, leaders of organizations, socia.l and political decisionmaI The annual reports of the Board of Foreign Scholarships typically contain superficial comment on the quality of programs, lists of members, references to meetings, data on cost sharing agreements, and general information describing exchange by state, and tenure abroad. The Annual Reports of CU, International Exchange, contain: information on cooperating private agencies and their activities; examples of notable exchange activities; statistical profiles of longitudinal and other characteristics of exchange (for all programs ■without differentiation by type of program) ; and separate tables on exchange by country and exchange by subject category of grantee, both foreign and American. The U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs has produced re- ports treating problems in organization, administration, policy guidance, and steps needed to improve the quality of American as well as foreign grantees. These are printed as Congressional documents: A Beacon of Hope — The Exchange of Persons Programs, 1963 (first report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs); Americaii Studies Abroad, 1963; A Sequel to a Beacon of Hope, 1964, (second report); ^ Report on the Strategic Importance of Western Europe, 1964; Third Annual Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, 1965; Fourth Annual Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, 1966; Open Hearts, Open Minds: How America Welcomes Foreign Visitors, 1966; Foreign Students in the United States— A National Survey, 1966; Fifth Annual Report of the U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, 1968; The Use of U.S. Owned Excess Foreign Currencies, 1967; Government, The Universities and Inter- national Affairs: A Crisis in Identity, 1967; Is Anyone Listening, 1968 (sixth annual report): A Multitude of Counselors, 1970 (seventh annual report); Eighth Annual Report, 1971. The CIEP has done little in-depth research, but its evaluations of the day-to-day funding, selection, and operational problems useftilly point out major areas which need to be improved. The Committee's evaluations are included in its annual reports, submitted to the Board of Foreign Scholarships; reports are not presented to Congress, nor published, but they are available for public review. " Binational commissions for the prc^ram are located in: Africa: Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Tunisia; South America: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay; .Asia.- Afghanistan, Australia, Ceylon, Republic of China, India, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, Nepal, Pakistan, Philippines, Thailand; Europe: Austria, Belgium, Luxenbourg, Denmark, Firiland, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, Yugoslavia; Middle East Cyprus, Iran, Israel, Turkey, United Arab Republic. (Source: "Binational Educational Foundations and Commissions: Executive Secretaries and Addresses," issued by CU/Board of Foreign Scholarships, September 1970.) 900 on the average approximate! 3^^ 50 percent of the exchanges con- ducted annually are with European nations; — in the last several years a majority of the Americans recom- mended for Fulbright-Hays grants have been in the fields of either social sciences or natural and applied sciences; average annual figures indicate that approximately 50 percent of the grantees in these fields plan to serve in Europe. With respect to scientific and technical exchanges in the developing countries the data indicate that: — it is difficult to find qualified Americans to apply for Ful- bright-Hays awards for openings in the less developed countries (LDCs) ; much recruiting is done to find social, natural, and ap- plied scientific and technical personnel to.serve in these countries; — political considerations which underpin the technology trans- fer aspects of the program deter scientific participation ; the chang- ing emphasis from research and unfettered scholarship to technical assistance and lecturing, accompanied b}- a cut in salary and travel funds, makes it less attractive for scientists and technical personnel to serve in the LDCs; and — diplomatic considerations support the program's foreign pol- icy and international cooperation objectives, specifically its bina- tionalism, but at the same time limit scientific participation because the scope and content of scientific activities abroad are predetermined by foreign hosts who prefer exchanges of scien- tific and technical personnel with requisite language skills to provide technical assistance. Available program evaluations also indicate that senior Fulbright- Ha3's grantees judged most effective abroad are those who can interact culturally with foreign hosts and that scholars judged most prestigious and professionally competent by their peers may be less effective overseas than those judged less professionally competent. Scientists fall under these categories. These trends will be described next. DIFFICULTIES OF FINDING QUALIFIED SCIENTIFIC CANDIDATES TO SERVE IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES During the period 1966 to 1970, the CIEP recommended lecture and research awards in four subject categories, tenable in five geo- graphic areas of the world. Between 53 and 60 percent of the recom- mended awards were for the social sciences and the natural and applied sciences. During this five-3^ear period*, about 42 percent of the recom- mended awards in these two science areas were for Americans for serv- ice in Europe. A continuous decrease has taken place in research awards for these two science categories but the bulk of cuts for research awards in the social and in the natural and applied sciences since 1966 has been in the developing countries. (See Tables 3 and 4.) 901 TABLE 3.— DISTRIBUTION OF RECOMMENDED CANDIDATES BY DISCIPLINE, COMMITTEE ON THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF PERSONS Arts Humanities and education Social sciences Natural and applied sciences Re- Re- Re- Re- Lec- search Lee- search Lee- search Lee- search turers scholars t^rers scholars turers scholars turers scholars Total i970-71 program:! Africa Latin America East Asia... Europe Near East/Asia '.'. 3.. ...... 11 .. 20 .. 17 62 12 6 13 1 9 .. 17 .. 14 23 10 .. ...... 9 4 .. 37 .. 14 29 13 .. ... 25 . Total.. 3 5 122 20 73 10 97 30 360 Total, lecturers.. 295 Total, research scholars 65 1969-70 program :» Africa _ Latin America '.'. 2.'. 5 .. 3 7 " io' 1 15 .. 20 .. 44 132 29 ....... 24 2 9 .. 16 26 50 25 ...... 16 22 5 6 .. 35 .. 30 44 31 ""22" 55 . 5 - East Asia Europe Near East-Asia Total...., 17 11 240 39 126 44 146 82 705 Total, lecturers 529 Total, research scholars ... . 176 1968-69 program: 3 Africa Latin America East Asia . .... 4 10 5 ...... 33 2 31 .. 53 .. 73 143 61 ....... 77 24 11 45 38 73 39 1 1 9 51 9 14 52 50 56 35 1 . 3 . 14 . 86 . 7 . Europe... Near East/Asia.. Total 23 36 361 117 206 71 207 Ill 1,132 Total, lecturers.. 797 Total, research scholars 335 1967-68 program :< Africa 23 .. 44 70 135 72 ....... 14 116 35 12 .. 37 50 79 50 ...... 14 45 19 9 64 41 46 60 2 . 3 . 28 ., 90 . 12 . Latin America 2 .. 2 7 8 ...... 29 4 Far East Europe.. Near East/Asia Total 19 35 344 167 228 81 220 135 1,229 Total, lecturers 811 Total, research scholars 418 1966-67 program:' Africa. Latin America Far East Europe Near East/Asia. 1 .. . .. 15 2 ...... 5 20 4 21 .. 50 74 135 90 -- 18 74 11 9 .. 33 52 83 50 ...... 11 37 11 9 59 40 41 67 1 ., 2 . 33 . 81 . 11 . Total 21 31 370 105 227 61 216 128 1,159 Total, lecturers 834 Totol, research scholars 325 1 Data for 1970-71 from: Committee on International Exchange of Persons, Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, "Annual Report to the Board of Foreign Scholarships, July 1, 1959 to June 30, 1970" (1970), p. 342. 2 Data for 1969-70 from: , "Annual Report, July 1, 1968 to June 30, 1969" (1969), table III. 3 Data for 1968-69 from: , "Annual Report, July 1, 1967 to June 30, 1968" (1968), table 111. * Data for 1967-68 from: , "Annual Report, July 1, 1966 to June 30, 1967" (1967), table HI. 'Data for 1966-67 from: , "Annual Report, July 1, 1965 to June 30, 1966" (1966), table III. 902 TABLE 4.-PERCENTAGE OF AWARDS BY SUBJECT AND AREA, CANDIDATES RECOMMENDED BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE INTERNATIONAL EXCHANGE OF PERSONS A B Number of Number of awards In awards In natural and social Percent applied Percent sciences of Col. A sciences of col. B lecturing for lecturing for '6ar and research Europe and research Europe 1970 to 1971 83 32 127 43 1969 to 1970 120 60 228 43 1968 to 1969.... 277 45 318 4S i^^L*" }^^?-- :-..:.:.:::::: sog 4o 355 38 1966 to 1967 288 42 344 31 Source: Data figured from table 3 above. CIEP annual reports have consistently noted the overwhelming American interest in filling vacancies for awards in Europe, and conversely, the disinterest Americans show for serving in other areas, especially the developing countries. Excerpts of narrative descriptions of this problem, 1962 to the present, indicate that their disinterest is motivated by lack of foreign language skills; insufficient reimburse- ment; differences between host countries' and scientists' expectations about services to be performed; absence of funds for research; and unwillingness of U.S. scientists to participate in technology-assistance- oriented Fulbright-Hays activities. To overcome these problems, the CIEP has found it necessary to recruit American scientific and technical personnel, but these efforts are not always successful. A few illustrations of these problems, taken from CIEP reports, follow : 1962: [The decline in applicants for Latin America] may be in part attributed to the fact that a large percentage of the awards . . . are in the physical and natural sciences, fields in which few Spanish speaking specialists are available, [and the Congressional elimination of travel funds for dependents. CIEP added to its staff a consultant. Dr. S. S. Steinberg, Dean, College of Engineering, University of Maryland, especially to recruit in the scientific fields.] ^2 [One of the year's worst problems was in recruiting for the social and physical sciences.] The situation is nearly acute. [It is necessary to increase publicity' or to insist that binational commissions lower expectations for science and technology.] ^^ There is a dearth of applicants in social sciences and natural sciences for Africa. ^^ 1967: [It is difficult to fill vacancies in the social sciences in South America. CIEP is considering giving additional language training. They are also considering establishing an Advisory Committee for Science.]^ 1970: In Africa recruitment . . . for lectuiers . . . has long been necessary. . . . Late requests language requirements, and insufficient compensation . . . con- tribute to the difficulty .... A particularh'^ unfortunate aspect of the Africa program ... is the absence of research awards. ^^ ... The Indian program does not attract . . . social scientists [who] are likely to apply for . . . lectureships unless the host university is in a center «2 Data obtained from following report of the CIEP to the Board of Foreign Scholarships; 1/1/62 to 6/30/62, pp. 1-11. M Data obtained from following report of the CIEP to the Board of Foreign Scholarships: 6/30/62 to 12/31/62, pp. 7-9. 6« Data obtained from following report of the CIEP to the Board of Foreign Scholarships: 6/30/63 to 12/63, p. 17. «5 Data obtained from following report of the CIEP to the Board of Foreign Scholarships: 7/1/66 to 6/30/67. *> Data obtained from following report of the CIEP to the Board of Foreign Scholarships: Keport for 1970, p. 14. 903 from which they can conduct . . . studies, and the absence of research awards . . . reduces . . . applications. The absence of grants in the sciences [is a problem]. 8^ After several years of trying to conduct a "package" program for American lecturers in the sciences, the Foundation in Taipei is shifting to a more open program, . . . because U.S. matching parts of the "packages" have proved virtually impossible to find.^^ Openings in Argentina . . . require candidates able to lecture fluently in Spanish. This requirement . . . has caused the Committee often to recommend candidates who have held previous grants either in Argentina or in other countries of Latin America.^' The Discrepancy Between Foreign Policy and the Nature oj Scientific Inquiry. — A number of factors explain the low rate of U.S. scientific and technical participation in Fulbright-Hays educational exchange programs in the developing countries. One of the more important is the discrepancy between the foreign policy objectives of the program and the natiire of scientific inquiry. Foreign policy factors have influenced not only the thrust of the program, but also its content, funds available to support it, attitudes of participating scientists, and the activities of grantees while abroad. Francis Young, director of the CIEP since its inception to 1970, explains that participation rates ebb and flow in relation to the political connotation of the program. When the program was first established it supported free scholarship and educational exchange, thereby attracting an eager group of candidates: [The program] initially [emphasized] free scholarship, intellectual abihty, and an open competition. [It was] a product of the immediate post-war American idealism. . . . There were ... at the beginning no political burdens ... to carry. The "cold war" was stUl in its early stages, and what appealed . . . was the idea of converting swords into ploughshares by means of a world-wide educa- tional exchange program in which the government and the academic community worked as partners.^" Then, beginning in 1953, with, intensification of the Cold War, the program became increasingly involved with overt foreign policy goals. Scholarly research and educational activities were subordinated to the achievement of national objectives overseas, resulting in a program — . . . oriented more toward the interest of the United States and the other participating countries, as defined by their governments and their representa- tives . . . and less toward the interest of individual scholars . . . J^ Educational exchanges thereafter took on a new role "over and beyond the traditional one of personal development and the advance- ment of scholarship." Research and educational exchange were subordinated as the program began rapidly to take on "character- istics of an international extension service." ^^ The individualism of the program, its attractiveness for noted scholars, and its status and effectiveness abroad, rapidly declined as the program became more «' Ibid., p. 32. 8« Ibid., p. 15. 6« Tbid., p. 16. '• Francis A. Young, "The Conference Board of Associated Kesearch Councils in the United States: A Brief Historical Account with Special Reference to National and International Manpower Problems," Social Science Information (June 1965), p. 121. n Ibid., p. 122. " Ibid., p. 123. 904 closely linked to foreign policy considerations. Constraints imposed by these considerations, says Young, contitine to characterize the program today. He cites: ... a feeling that a program based upon the limited and transient interest of individual scholars lacked continuity of purpose and impact; an increase in cold war tensions and extension of the East-Wett conflict to the cultural and edu- cational area; [the subordination of] private interests to national needs; . . . the influence of the Point IV concept of '^technical aid;" and the need of justifying to a reluctant Congress steadily increasing expenditures on educational exchanges.'* Thereafter, "the effect of all these factors was to swing the pendulum over to the side of more explicit program objectives, more centralized planning, and more bureaucratic control." ADMINISTRATIVE OBSTACLES TO FRUITFUL SCIENTIFIC EXCHANGE Philip H. Coombs, first Assistant wSecretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, appointed duruig President Kennedy's adminis- tration said the 1950's, when most of these programs were initiated, ". . . were a period of unplanned proliferation of international educa- tional and cultural activities on all sides, and while this constituted progress it also created a heritage of problems." ^* An important ramification of this unplanned growth is that international education activities are not governed by the Government department concerned with education, but by an agency charged with designing and imple- menting foreign policy." Coombs has described the cause and effect of this choice: . . . Educational and cultural affairs had not yet come to be regarded ... as having a vital bearing on our foreign relations. They were "good things to do" but not in the same class as political, economic, and military affairs which dealt with the "practical realities" and "serious business" of foreign policy." As a result, "the exchange program was an orphan in the State Department." " Other critics of this arrangement contend that international educa- tional programs are unrealisticall}^ expected to contribute to foreign policy goals. For instance, Miriam Rooney, research professor of law stated in 1967, after returning from a year at the University of Saigon as a Fulbright professor: "We have unfortunately had to tie our cultural program to military power and might, in the interest of defense. This has affected unfavorably our cultural and intellectual impact upon the rest of the civilized world." ^^ Another scholar reports that "... cultural activities [are] regarded as nice but inconsequential, from the unreasonable expectation that they are capable of solving immediate political problems." This leads, he said, "either to naive " Ibid., pp. 122, 166. '< PhiliD H. Coombs. "The Past and Future in Perspective." American Assembly. Cultural Affairs and Foreign Relations (Washington: Columbia Books, 1968). p. 151. » The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was given increased responsibility under the International Education Act of 1966 to coordinate these activities and established the Institute of Inter- national Studies to carry out the purposes of the Act. However, the act was never funded, constricting th e Department's ability to implement it. '6 The Past and Future in Perspective, op. cit., p. 151. " Idem. " Statement of Miriam Rooney. In Allan A. Michie, ed.. Diversity and Interdependence through International Education: A report of a symposium marking the Twentieth Anniversary of the International Educational Exchange (Fulbright) Program, sponsored by the Board of Foreign Scholarships and co-sponsored by the Edward W. Hazen Foundation, The Johnson Foundation and Education and World Affairs (Education and World Affairs, 1967), p. 127. 905 prescriptions ... or recriminations because of the inability of cul- tural activities to solve problems or prevent unfavorable situations which are in fact due to other causes." ^* Still others charge that international educational and cultural programs fail to meet the needs of the developing countries. "In these lands, mutual understanding is very low on their list of priorities: freedom, power, and the benefits of industrialization are very high." ^'^ PECOMMENDATIONS TO ELEVATE THE STATUS OF EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT Constraints are imposed also by the configuration of the administra- tive apparatus which governs these programs. For instance there have been repeated recommendations that educational and cultural ex- change programs would be improved if a post of Under Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs were created to provide leadership under a clearer and more forceful mandate. Coombs suggests that: The new undersecretary would be charged with developing a unified set of policies to guide all international educational activities of the government. . . . and ensuring their proper coordination. He would include within his purview, among other things, the present confusing clutter of international scientific activities of the federal government, which todaj' tend to be treated separately from [but should be] an integral part of our educational and cultural affairs.^* The Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs commented in its Fourth report: ". . . There are under- secretaries in the economic and political spheres. . . . Educational and cultural matters can come into their symbolic place in the multi- plicity of overseas activities . . . only if the person in charge of them is at the level of Under Secretary." ^ RECOMMENDATIONS FOR OVERSEAS EDUCATIONAL AFFAIRS OFFICERS A cultural affairs officer of the United States Information Service is a member of the local binational commission and "administers the educational and cultural exchange activities of the Department of State abroad." ^ Additionally, in countries where there is no com- mission, these, cultural officers, as representatives of the Department of State, handle the local end of the educational exchange program, help process grant applications from students and other academic candidates, and give orientation and local supervision to American grantees coming to that country.** This link between Fulbright " Robert Blum, "The Flow of People and Ideas," In American Assembly, Columbia University, Cul- tural Affairs and Foreign Relations (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Inc.. 1963), p. 4. '" Richard A. Humphrey, "Cultural Communication and the New Imperative," Annualg of the Ameri- can Academy and Socibl Science (May 1961), p. 145. *' The Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy, op. clt., pp. 123-4. M Fourth Annual Report, 1967, op. cit., p. 2. 85 A Guide to U.S. Government Agencit$ Involved in International Education and Cultural Activities, op. cit. p. 13. 8* Continuing the Commitment ,op. cit., p. 19. 906 field operations and the USIA has been cited as another limitation of the program. ^^ Shortly after leaving his post as Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, Coombs wrote an evaluation of the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange activities which he had directed. Describing the incompatibilities which arise between USIA "informational activities" and CU's educational and cultiiral exchange activities, Coombs said: USIA ... is first and foremost an information agency, managed by people skilled in journalism, schooled in the psychological approach. . . . The first claim on USIA's budget and top managers is the latest crisis and each day's news. ... At the same time USIA must . . . handle educational and cultural affairs overseas . . . through a cultural affairs officer who is often torn between two Washington bosses with apparentlj' conflicting approaches, and who is subordinate to a public affairs officer whose first concern must be with USIA's information mission. . . . The "informational approach" is essentially a one-way process, legitimately preoccupied with developing sympathetic foreign attitudes. . . . Day by day it endeavors to explain these policies and actions and to put them in the best light that truth affords. It is also a competitive process, daily occupied with exposing and criticizing policies and propaganda that are hostile to the United States. The 'educational and cultural approach' is . . . also concerned with developing honest and sympathetic understanding, but it is a two way process calculated to foster mutual understanding and to benefit both parties.*' Field administration of overseas educational and cultural affairs, according to the U.S. Advisory Commission, should be handled by an Educational Affairs Officer who "represents the current dynamic movements of the U.S. educational system [and who] can ". . . deal with [American and foreign] educators on their own terms." ^^ THE AMBIGUOUS IMPACTS OF THE BINATIONAL COMMISSION Fulbright-Hays binational educational commissions have been es- tablished in 47 countries. One of their major functions is to insulate educational exchange from politics and to encourage the international and binational cooperative emphasis of the program. However, paradoxically, they have had deleterious effects on rates of scientific and technical participation in the senior Fulbright-Hays program. Commissions are composed of distinguished national educators and cultural leaders from the host country and the resident American M Possible CIA involvement has also been criticized. During the period 1964-1970, the Advisory Com- mission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs complained vociferously in its reports to the Congress about the need to insulate educational exchanges from politics and from the interference of CIA intelligence gathering activities which had impacted on these programs. (See A Beacon of Hope. Second Annual Report, 1964, p. 9.) Two special reports the Commission distributed in the mid-sixties, Research, Appraisals and Reports (1964) and Government, the Universities and International Affairs: A Crisis in Identity (1967), 18p^es, described a serious problem about USIA informational and covert CIA intelligence gather- ing involvement in international educational programs administered by the Department of State. " Chief among [its] concerns," the Commission reported "is the maintenance of the integrity of the educational and cultural exchange programs of the U.S. Government. The Commission feels strongly that the effective- ness of international educational and cultural relationships . . . depends upon free and open exchange. . . . Like most of the educational community [the Commission] was shocked by the revelation of involvement of the Central Intelligence Agency in exchange activities. . . . Government assistance to these organiza- tions could and should have been given overtly." (Fifth Annual Report, 1968, pp. 25-*.) M TTie Fourth Dimension of Foreign Policy, op. cit., pp. 122-3. " U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Fifth Annual Report, op. cit., pp. 27-8. 907 community. Typicallj- the U.S. Ambassador serves as honorary chau-man; the USIA cultural affairs oflBcer (CAO) or public affairs officer is almost always a member and sometimes executive secretary. ^^ Annual and long-range plans are formulated according to guidelines expressed bj' the BFS in its handbook, The Policy Statements oj the Board of Foreign Scholarships.^^ Program plans address: the needs and interests of the respective countries; the needs and interests developed by students, teachers, professors, and research scholars desiring to study or teach in the respective countries; and the opportunities and resources offered by the respective countries. These plans are to be coordinated with related activities of other U.S. Government and private programs in relation to the contributions that can be made to overall country program objectives. ^° In effect, this means that each commission determines and recommends the number of awards to be filled for that country, and specifies the subject speciahzation required (such as a consultant to assess re- search and development of freezing faciUties of the meat industrjO, location of the visit (such as at a university or research institute), duration of visit, and foreign language competence required. As these activities became more binational and designed to meet the science, education, and science infrastructure needs of the host country, Fulbright-Haj'-s openings were linked more closely to total long-range country planning projects, departing from the earl}- em- phasis on educational exchange in specific academic or research areas compatible with the American exchangee's requirements. Tliis arrange- ment, according to Young, forces scientific and technical personnel to accept predetermined assignments, encourages host country requirements for scholars in short supply in the United States, results in vacancies which are professionally unchallenging to U.S. persorinel, and generally discourages scientific and technical participation since scientists are more eager to conduct research programs to serve U.S. science than to provide technical assistance and training. As a con- sequence, CIEP has to engage in active recruiting for candidates to fill vacancies, a practice which results at times in the nomination of individuals who may be unsuited for the program: Specializations in high demand in the less developed countries — such as medi- cine, the natural sciences, and developmental economics — turned out to be in 8« Continuing the Commitment, op. cit., p. 19 8« Binational commissions also provide orientation and counseling to American grantees while abroad, and prepare terminal reports on grantee activities and annual reports to the Board of Foreign Scholarships. 90 U.S. Department of State, Board of Foreign Scholarships, The Policy Statements of the Board of Foreign Scholarships, July 1, 1964, section 111.21 "Determination of Fields of Activity," revised 8/18/69; 908 short supply in the United States and conversely fields in which the Lnited States has a surplus of scholars interested in teaching abroad — such as English Litera- ture, the arts and psychology — were in low demand. ... If the many American scholars who applied for Europe would have been willing to serve alternatively in the less developed countries and if the less developed countries would have been willing to accept highly quahfied American scholars in specializations in good supply there would have been, and would be now, no problem of staffing the Ful- bright Program. Unfortunately it did not, and still does not, work out that way.®' RETRENCHMENT IN FUNDING l)iiring the last few years, American programs for the support of nongovernmental scientists abroad, like mutual educational and cul- tural exchange programs generally, have been subject to funding fluctuations and retrenchment, caused by budget and balance-of- payments problems. For instance, total funds obligated for exchange of persons programs for fiscal year 1963 amounted to $56 million.'^ During fiscal years 1965 and 1966 approximately $40 million was allocated to support these exchange programs; total funds obligated for the fiscal year 1970 amounted to only $28 million. (See Table 5.) Data available specifically for support of Fulbright-Hays lecturer and research scholar awards show that whereas approximately $6.6 million was spent on Americans abroad in these categories during 1967-1968, only $3 million was spent for support of professionals in these cate- gories during the 1969-1970 program. (See Table 5.) The most important effect of these cuts is a decrease in the number of Americans sent abroad. CIEP data illustrate this decline. For example, during the years 1966-1967 and 1967-1968, the senior Ful- bright-Hays program reached a high point when 650 and 962 grants, respectively, were made. During the program years 1969-1970 and 1970-1971, only 297 and 381 grants, respectively, were offered. These figures are considerably lower even than the number of grants awarded during 1955-1956, when 411 grants were made. (See Table 5.) Research awards typically are the first area to suffer from budget cuts. In the program year 1968-1969, 140 awards were offered for research; in 1969-1970, only 44 research scholar awards were offered.^ (See Table 5.) And while research awards in the social and natural sciences have decreased in all areas of the world, the fu'st areas to suffer are countries other than Europe, which generally is recommended to receive about 75 percent of the annual research awards in these areas. (See Table 6.) »' Young, op. cit., p. 124. " U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs, Sixth Annual Report^ 1969, op. cit.. pp. 20-26. «3 "Annual Report of CIEP to BFS, July 1, 1968 to June 30, 1969," op. cit., p. 3. 909 TABLE 5.— LECTURE AND RESEARCH AWARDS AND FUNDS, SENIOR FULBRIGHT-HAYS PROGRAMS, 1954-71 • Awards Funds Support to U.S. lecturers Support to U.S. re- searchers Total funds obligated, exchange- of-persons program Lecture Research Total 1970-71 program: Africa Latin America 28 . 80 . 39 47 122 " i' 12 52 28 80 40 59 174 Near East far East Europe Total 316 65 381 $27,965,114 1959-70 program: Africa Latin America Near East Far East Europe 17 . 55 . 34 43 104 16 27 17 . 55 . 35 . 59 . 131 . Total 253 44 297 $2, 807, 485 $297, 196 24, 414, 131 1958-69 program: Africa. 30 . 114 . 91 97 . 258 . Latin America.. Near East/Asia Far East.. Europe 140 Total. 140 590 5,044,051 1, 038, 238 23. 858, 721 1957-68 program: Africa 24 . 100 . 123 . 104 . 611 . Latin America .. Near East/Asia Far East Europe Total. 962 5. 643, 413 1,025,003 33,722,523 1966-67 program: Africa Latin America Near East/Asia Far East Europe '-T"~~"~T 20 . 93 . 134 . 142 . 261 . Total 650 6, 442, 492 1,301,787 35, 678, 597 1965-66 program: Total 40 709 095 1964-65 program.. 5, 612, 287 1,076,810 40, 098, 836 Note: If no entry appears, the data were unavailable. Sources: Awards Data for 1970-71 from: Committee on International Exchange of Persons, Conference Board of Associated Research Councils, "Annual Report to the Board of Foreign Scholarships, July 1, 1969 to June 30, 1970" (1970), table II; data for 1969-70 fro.n: , "Annual Report to the Board of Foreign Scholarships, July 1, 1968 to June 30, 1969 (1969), table II ; data for 1968-69 from: , "Annual Report to the Board o1 Foreign Scholarships, July 1, 1967 to June 30, 1968" (1968), table II; data for 1967-68 from: , 'Annual Report to the Board of Foreign Scholarships "July 1,1966 to June 30, 1967" (1967), table I; data for 1956-67 fron: , "Annual Report to the Board of Foreig.i Scholarships, July 1 1965 to June 30, 1966" (1966), table II ; data for 1965-66 froTi: , "Se.ni-Annual Progress Report to the Board of Foreign Scholarships, January 1, 1965 to June 30, 1965" (19S5), table I. Funding data: Data on lecture -and research scholar funding froTi: Annual reports of the Board of Foreign scholarships: "Exchange Scholars: A New Dl.nension in Interriational Understanding," 3d annual report, October 1935; "Educational Exchanges: Ne^v Approaches to International Understanding," 5th annual report, October 1967; To.vard Mutual Under- standing: A report on Academic Exchanges," 16th annual report, October 1958; "Rsviewing the Co.n.nitment ... A Report on Acade.nic Exchanges," 7th annual report, October 1959; and "Continuing the Connitinent ... A Report on Acaden^ic Exchanges," 8th annual report, October 1970 Totsl funds obligated incluJe all exchange of persons programs, both ways, specifically including: excnanjes with 127 countries anj territories; assistance to high school exchanges; special programs for nongrant students; and volunteers to Ameri;a. It excludes aid to Anerican sponsoreJ schools abroad; cultural presentations; multilateral orgailzations activities; progran services costs; and administrative expense. Data for 1965 to 195i from: U.S. Departmjntf.fStnte, ;^urc-au of Educational And Cjltural Affairs, "Inter.iational Exchange li69," p. 27. Data for 1970 from: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, "A Statistical Profile of the U.S. Exchange Program, 1971," table 8. 910 TABLE 6.— RECOMMENDED RESEARCH AWARDS, SOCIAL SCIENCES AND NATURAL AND APPLIED SCIENCES, EUROPE AND OTHER AREAS, SENIOR FULBRIGHT-HAYS PROGRAM Total number of Total number of Total number of awards in natural Total number of av/ards in social awards in natu ral and applied awards in social sciences for and applied sciences for Year sciences Europe sc:9nces Europe 1970 to 1971. 1969 to 1970. 1968 to 1969. 1967 to 1968. 1966 to 1967. 10 9 30 25 44 22 82 55 71 51 111 86 81 45 135 90 61 37 128 81 Source: Figures taken from table 3 above. The U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educational and Cultural Affairs has repeatedly expressed concern about the adverse impacts of retrenchment on educational and cultural exchange and the Fulbright-Hays program. A detailed review of the Commission's reactions to these cuts was included in its Sixth Annual Report to the Congress (1969). "... The program [according to the Commission] has been . , . tremendously successful and is an important and significant element of American foreign relations. [However] through- out [our] studies . . . the theme of fiscal starvation recurs." ^* These cuts in the program, according to the Commission, have been un- warranted. Specifically: [There is] a 67 percent cut in the number of American grantees going overseas. This cut appears to have been made on the false premise that somehow the Ful- bright-Hays programs and the sending of American scholars, professors, teachers, students, and specialists overseas . . . contributes to the serious balance-of- payments problem facing the United States. . . . Such considerations should not have entered into the budget .... No travel restrictions ... on the U.S. citizen, nor any travel tax eventuated from [deliberations on the balance of pay- ments problem]. *s In addition, cuts in these programs weaken the binationalism underpinning the concepts and objectives of the Fulbright-Hays program : . . . One more particular cause for worry . . . has to do with the blow to . . . binationalism which has characterized the academic exchange programs since 1946. That many governments have so believed in the program that they have entered into cost-sharing agreements with this Government in order to keep the program going as our supply of foreign currencies decreases is evidence of a faith in educational exchanges which we must not betray by eliminating even some of them unilaterally.** Another of the more immediate impacts of retrenchment is the adverse effect of the cut on compensation for grantees. Young ex- plains the problem in these terms : The changes in the purposes and roles of the Fulbright exchanges were not accompanied ... by commensurate changes in the terms and conditions of the grants. In the early days of the program, if a Fulbright stipend failed to cover all the grantee's necessary expenses, it was nevertheless welcomed by a scholar eager to increase his professional skills and research production. As the awards came to offer less in the way of a professional opportunity and to require more in the way of a professional service, both the limited stipends and the predetermined assignments became less attractive to well-qualified scholars. ^^ ^ Sixth Annual Report, op. cit., pp. 20-66. M Idem. M Idem; "Young, op. cit., p. 123. 911 Accordingly, the CIEP has recommended increases in the funds available to support the program and specifically to make awards more financiall}" adequate, especially for service in the LDCs: ... It should be possible for a scholar to accept a Fulbright award for lecturing in the less developed countries without financial loss. . . . Dollar supplementation [should be increased]. To be effective, this increase should be substantial — perhaps $1000 for a nine or ten months' award. Fringe benefits to the grantees should also be increased wherever possible by such means as including in the award a foreign-currency allowance for the grantee travel in the host coimtry and sur- rounding region.** THE NEED TO MAINTAIN THE QUALITY OF AMERICAN GRANTEES Difficulties in securing candidates for LDCs have been accom- panied hy another equally significant and persistent problem — that of maintaining the high quality of American grantees sent to the develop ing countries. The CIEP explained the problem in these terms: During the first few years of the Fulbright program, its prestige was high and there was a general feeling that the quality of the grantees was good. The large number of awards offered for research and lecturing in Europe . . . dominated the early program and attracted many distinguished scholars. But as the number of awards oflfered in the less developed countries increased and finally exceeded those in Europe, more persons of modest qualifications were drawn into the program and concern began to be expressed over the quality of the American representation.'" CIEP has taken systematic steps toward achieving better standards and improving the quaUty of grantees sent abroad. First, several in-house and extramural studies were performed on the question of quality. The first of these studies, completed in the spring of 1963, compared the quaUty of American grantees sent abroad during the period 1957-58 with the quaUty of those sent abroad during 1962-63. This study revealed that the quality of the program had decreased significantly from 1957 to 1963. In the words of the CIEP: "The program simply grew faster than the manpower resources available to it, which meant that the program had to reach down to lower levels of qualifications in order to meet its requirements." ^"° The second and third studies in this series assessed the merits of procedures used by CIEP evaluation teams in predicting overseas effectiveness of applicants with actual performance in the field. ^"^ Until the mid-sixties CIEP evaluation teams rehed on the following credentials: the professional record of the applicant, the judgments of his colleagues as contained in the four required letters of reference, and evaluations of application materials. The evaluation research on these procedures revealed that the criteria of professional and scholarly competence, the factor given greatest weight by evaluation teams, had low predic- tive value for effective performance abroad. According to CIEP: There was another weakness in the traditional procedure [for evaluating ap- plicants]. It equated quality with the candidate's scholarly reputation at home rather than with his probable effectiveness abroad. Were there a close correlation between productive scholarship at home and effectiveness as a Fulbright grantee abroad, this would not matter. But experience has shown that the correlation is not very close ; on the contrar}^, many highlj'- regarded scholars of modest reputation turn in surprisingly fine performances in their overseas assignments. i^^ " "Annual Report, CIEP toBFS, 196fr-1967." op. cit., pp. 27,38-9. «» "Annual Report, CIEP to BFS, July 1, 1966 to June 30, 1967," op. cit., p. 30. "» Ibid., pages 31-32. i« The second study, published in June 1964, was prepared by Leonard Goodwin, a research associate of CIEP. Titled "American Professors in Asia," the study focused on predictions of effectiveness and actual effectiveness of American grantees in Asia. The third study was performed in-house. (Ibid., pp. 33-4) . i»2 "Annual Report, CIEP to BFS, July 1, 1967 to June 30, 1968", op. cit., p. 2. 912 Parenthetically the Committee added: "Perhaps this means that many Fulbright assignments, especially in the less developed third countries, are better filled by scholars on the second or third rather than the first level of academic distinction in the United States." ^'^ Addressing the findings of these studies, CIEP instituted new pro- cedures to elicit more information about the candidate and his overseas assignment: . . . the screening committees were asked ... to give the Fulbright applicant two ratings: (1) a professional rating reflecting professional standing in the United States, that is a traditional quality rating; and (2) an 'assignment' rating, in which a prediction is made of the candidate's probable success in carrying out his assignment abroad.'"* Nevertheless, the Committee still reports difficulties in implementing these new procedures, relating especiall}^ to vagueness in defining the criteria of personal suitability, and to problems of "invasion of privac}^," stemming from the need for reviewers to assess personal qualifications of grantees. ^"^ CIEP has developed an "up-to-date register [to] relieve one of the major . . . problems of the program. This is recruiting — the filUng of overseas openings which for one reason or another have not been responded to b}^ qualified . . . applicants." ^"^ But CIEP continues to report that recruitment may not be effective after all, since "... there are strong indications that in some fields the springs of supply are beginning to run dry." As an example: This became apparent when the Conference Board, in cooperation with the American Economic Association, recently sent a 'saturation' mailing to Spanish- speaking economists . . . advertising openings in Latin America. It was probable that virtualh^ the entire manpower potential in this field in the country was contacted. A few inquiries, but no applications were obtained from this effort.'"" "The existence of a large data bank of specific names of individuals in many classifications," CIEP reports, "will aid such searches, but not obviate them." ^°^ OTHER RECOMMENDATIONS Better Program. Planning. — During the last several years CIEP has made a number of other recommendations to overcome problems of filling vacancies. "To make the awards more meaningful educationally and more challenging professionally . . . ," the Committee recom- mended that binational commissions should undertake better program planning : This should include the appointment of additional long-range planning teams of American and foreign scholars to advise on programs with the less-developed countries . . . ; inter-agency meetings [should be held] to discuss their implications and to consider ways of implementing them. Planning without follow-up . . . is a waste of time, money and hopes. The overseas Commissions also need a greater capacity to refine and carry out long-range plans, a need which could be . . . reduced by setting up local committees of specialists ... to advise the Com- missions on interim planning and by strengthening Commission staffs . . . .'"* 103 "Annual Report, CIEP to BFS, 1966-1967". op. cit., p. 34. •o» "Annual Report, CIEP to BFS, July 1, 1967 to June 30, 1968", op. cit., p. 3. iw Idem. pp. 4-5. ">« Young, op. cit., p. 124. '""^ Young, op. cit., p. 124. los "CIEP Annual Report, FY 1970," op. cit., p. 4. '" "Annual Report, CIEP to BFS, 1966-1967," op. cit., pp. 37-8. 913 Better Information About Openings. — Binational commissions should «,lso provide U.S. candidates with better information about the •opemngs : . . . The Committee receives some requests for lecturers which do little more than identify the subject and the host institution. [Commissions should] give a clear picture of the status of the subject in the host university, the significance of the assignment, the reasons for requesting a foreign lecturer, or the opportunities for research or other forms of professional growth."" CIEP recommended to the BFS that the binational commissions should require that: Requests for lecturers . . . originate within the faculty of the host institutions and be described by the faculty member concerned . . . ; Assignment descriptions ... be written or reviewed b}'^ subject specialists and should emphasize the professional aspects which are meaningful and challenging to scholars; Assignments . . . encompass a wide diversity of grantee roles in addition to classroom teaching such as participation in faculty seminars, consulting on problems of educational development, advising on long-range program develop- ment, and preparing teaching materials; Lectureship . . . include a research component, . . . opportunity to give a research seminar, or extension of the award period to provide additional research opportunities; and Requests ... be submitted in ample time to permit extensive publicity and recruitment . . . ."' Tenure. — Frequently an American professor who goes abroad for foreign service jeopardizes his career because his university dis- criminates against overseas ser\'ice in evaluating promotion applica- tions."^ To meet this problem, the CIEP has recommended that: Experiments ... be tried . . . using Fulbright awards to support inter- institutional exchange programs and inviting colleges and universities to accept responsibility for recruiting for certain continuing lectureships in the less de- veloped countries. [More] use [should be made] of short term awards. . . . The awards offered in the less developed countries must be distributed more evenly over the various principal disciplines so as tb bring the overseas demand for American professors into closer relation to the domestic supply."^ Science and Technology Exchange Apparatus. — The CIEP has made no special recommendations for improving arrangements for exchanges •of scientific and technical personnel. Special arrangements were made to secure scientific applicants for a cooperative science education project in the United Arab Republic in 1960. The mechanism estab- lished for this program might serve as a guide to improve recruitment in the LDC's. In brief, this program incorporated the following elements: (paraphrase) — provision for a maintenance allowance and a dollar supple- ment to attract scientists and a supplement to attract scientists in the higher income brackets ; — travel for at least one dependent ; — pro\asion for compilation of detailed backgi'ound informa- tion on the state of science in the UAR, from a specially under- taken survey; "0 "Annual Report, CIEP to BFS, 1967-1968", op. cit., p. 7. 1" "Annual Report, CIEP to BFS, 1963-1967", op. cit., pp. 7-8 and p. 38. »' See C. Easton Rothwell, "Education, Foreign Policy, and International Relations," In American Assembly, Cultural A^airs and Foreign Relations (Washington, D.C.: Columbia BooliS, Publisliers, 1968) p. 124, and Coombs, The Past and Future in Perspective, op. cit., pp. 160-161. »" "Annual Report, CIEP to BFS, 1966-1967," op. cit., pp. 27, 38-39. 914 — detailed description of duties scientists would have to per- form; and — temporary increase in CIEP staff to provide a special scien- tific recruitment officer."* Conclusion The Nation's first post-WWII program to send U.S. senior scientific personnel abroad to research and lecture was the Fulbright program, inaugurated in 1946. Its basic purpose is political — to promote inter- national cooperation by familiarizing scholars of other countries with American achievements in science, education, and culture. U.S. scien- tific and technical professionals are exchanged under the provisions of the senior Fulbright-Hays program, which provides grants, travel funds, and stipends for Americans to lecture, teach, and conduct research abroad. The American scientific community has played a significant role in this program. During the last few years, scientific and technical personnel have been recommended for more than 50 percent of the lectureship and research scholar openings. The descriptive and factual history of the program illustrates several interactions between scientific exchange and diplomacy. In support of initiating and promoting exchanges, this program, like others which followed it, .has profited from State Department efforts to remove foreign administrative and diplomatic obstacles to the movement of scientists, scientific information, and equipment. As the program evolved, its cooperative aspects were expanded. Provision was made for the signing of bilateral executive agreements and joint funding; and more important, the program sought to insure bilateral cooperation by establishing overseas binational commissions to plan the content and scope of exchange. Also, in an effort to maintain the integrity of educa- tional exchange, the Congress and the State Department delegated responsibility for day-to-day selection, evaluation, and program operations to several quasi-governmental groups composed of eminent scholars. When the program was first inaugurated, U.S. scientific and technical personnel were eager to participate. But as the program evolved, expanding into the developing countries, and as it became more binational, the quality of scientific participation decreased, especially for service in the developing countries. The program history indicates that little difl&culty has arisen in filling quotas for scientific exchange in Europe, which typically receives a majority of exchanges, a majority of research awards, and a disproportionate number of all scientific and technological exchanges per year. By contrast, the quotas for scientific exchanges in other parts of the world must be filled by recruitment, in many cases with individuals whose qualifications do not match those of scholars exchanged with Europe. Difficulties in securing scientific participation for the developing countries include : — binational planning which supports cooperation, but im- poses a variety of constraints on the conduct of scientific activity, including requests for highly trained scientific specialists, some- times in short supply in the United States, and for exchanges to support technical assistance, an unattractive field for scientific scholars anxious to profit from high-quality educational inter- change or research ; lu "Semi-annual report, CIEP to B FS," January 1, 1960 to June 30, 1960, op. cit., pp. 6-7. 915 — retrenchment in program funding, causing: (1) a decrease in the availability of research scholar openings, especially in the developing countries, limiting scientific participation to teaching, an endeavor incompatible with scholarly and peer expectations; and (2) inadequate remuneration; and — possibly unfavorable political connotations deriving from USIA field administration. It was observed also that effective performance of the grantee is often more a function of his abiUty to get along in the overseas situation than of his professional standing as determined by his peers at home. The data raise the following issues: Would the quahty and effectiveness of scientific participation in the program be improved if: (1) a science advisory apparatus were established in the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs or in the Conunittee on the Exchange of Persons to provide for better coorduaation between the requirements of scientific scholarship and diplomatic objectives? (2) the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs undertook more comprehensive information-gathering on the program, and sponsored more research and evaluation to improve program operations, continuity, and long-range in-country planning? and (3) field responsibilities were shifted from the cultural affairs officer to an official more familiar with the requirements of educational and scientific exchange, such as an educational officer or science attach^? "« Another issue, more broadly associated with the general relationship between scientific exchange and diplomacy, emerges from the data: In view of the difficulties encountered in finding scientific and tech- nical personnel to serve in the developing countries, would the objec- tives of the Fulbright-Hays program m these areas be better served if special inducements were made to obtain qualified personnel willing to serve in technical assistance capacities; or if foreign government expectations for technical assistance were satisfied through other U.S. Government programs? "'A review of congressional committee hearings on the program, FY J960-rY 1970, reveals that the Congress has not been provided with complete information on difficulties the State Department encounters in conducting the senior Fulbright-Hays program. (See annual hearings of the House Committee on Appro- priations on Dept. of State Appropriations.) After the draft of this study was completed, Development Alternatives, Inc. completed a study for CU on The Senior-Fulbright PTogram and Its U.S. Domestic Impact. Many of the recommendations made in that study parallel those made here. For instance, with respect to research awards the report recommended: "that each grant given have both a clearly defined research com- ponent and teaching or seminar responsibiUties which will bring the professor into close contact with the faculty and graduate students of the host institution," and "that some joint research projects with a problem- solving orientation be initiated." Also among the re'^ommendations were the following: (paraphrase) that recipients be made aware of cultural constraints in adapting to a foreign culture; that travel funds be made available for families; that language be made a requirement for many countries; that more grants of longer tenure be awarded; that professors make pre-departure arrangements with foreign host institutions; that the role of the Binational Commissions and of the Cultural Aflairs Officer be reassessed "in light of possible alternatives or methods for improving the effectiveness of planning: that more attention be given by Bi- national Commissions to the availability of candidates in the United States; that institution-to-institution ties be developed; that the level of stii)ends be reassessed to account for the increased cost of living in many countries; that better prendeparture country orientation programs be inittated; and that grantees be given longer predeparture lead time. (Development Alternatives, Inc. The Senior FiUbright Program and Its U.S. Domestic Impact. A study prepared for CU, under contract No. 1069-387022. Project director, Charles F. Sweet. Washington, D.C.: January 1973), pp. 53-57.) Ill, National Science Foundation Programs for Americans Abroad National Science Foundation (NSF) programs in support of Ameri- cans to research, teach, or participate in other scientific activities abroad have grown in both number and importance since the Founda- tion was estaljUshed in 1950. These programs are almost ubiquitous and undoubtedly the most active of all Federal programs sponsoring U.S. senior level nongovernmental scientific and technical personnel in foreign countries. During the fiscal year 1970, 886 recipients of Foundation awards carried out activities in 75 countries for a total of 3,214 man-days. State Department programs sent 293 nongovern- mental scientists and technicians to 64 countries for only 1,871 rran- days. (See Table 7.) Americans are supported abroad under several different NSF programs which now include: (a) the administration or funding of a variety of bilateral science agreements with 17 countries, (b) support of American nongovernmental scientific participation in international scientific meetings and organizations, (c) travel abroad in large-scale cooperative research programs as part of the mission of NSF-funded national centers and major research programs^ (d) travel under research grants supported by the Research Direc- torate, and (e) educational grants supported by the Division of Graduate Education. TABLE 7— AMERICAN SENIOR-LEVEL NONGOVERNMENTAL SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNICAL PERSONNEL ABROAD, NSF AND DEPARTMENT OF STATE, FISCAL YEAR 1970 Number of countries Number of persons Number of NSF man-days Area NSF State Depart- ment NSF State Depart- ment State Depart- ment South and Latin America Eastern Europe/U.S.S.R 19 6 13 4 1 10 11 9 16 274 80 24 135 49 81 243 55 21 1 66 35 13 102 656 313 80 464 106 300 1,295 244 62 North America . 3 9 Far East and Australia 10 412 Mideast and India Africa 10 13 23a 82 Western Europe 14 832 Total. 75 64 886 293 3,214 1,871 Source: Extrapolated by author from data included in "The International Exchange Study Data Bank, 1971," op. cit^ Overview of NSF International Programs The bulk of NSF activities for Americans abroad are funded with regular dollar appropriations, and some with special foreign currency funds. In the fiscal year 1974, the Foundation's international-related expenditures totalecl approximately $118 million."^ Much of this outlay has supported international exchange. "« Including approximately $2.5 milUon in funds transferred from the Agency for International Develop- ment and the State Department. (See page 96 below.) (916) 917 When the NSF was estabhshed in 1950 it was given limited au- thority for international scientific activities, but only to support the growth of the domestic science mission. The bulk of the Foundation's, international activities was initiated before 1968, when the agency's authority was expanded to support "international science policies" on their own merits (P.L. 90-407) . As a result of this delay, program operations, administrative arrangements, and policies for governing international programs were shaped not b}^ clear-cut and explicit legislative goals or Agency objectives, either scientific or political, but by the pace of events: such as international and foreign political opportunities and initiatives, Presidential directives, recommend ations- of the Bureau of the Budget, and the Federal Council for Science and Technology, and internal program developments. The Foundation created an office for international activities in 1955; but even today this office administers only about 5 percent of NSF's. international science related activities. The rest of the Foundation's programs in this area, many of which involve exchanges of nongovern- mental personnel, are scattered throughout the Agency. Consistently categorized annual data on these programs are scarce^ obscuring a comprehensive description of their evolution and impact. There appears to be little intra-agency coordination and liaison of these activities, a situation which evokes questions as to the effectiveness of steps the agency is taking to develop "international science policies." A second issue is that exchange activities are shaped to meet criteria, imposed by the Foundation's tradition of maintaining the integrity of science, insulating it from undue political or governmental inter- ference. While obliged to report on scientific aspects of NSF-funded programs, grantees are rarely required to report on the special con- ditions of conducting foreign and international research and travel. Nor are they uniformly required to meet language or cultural criteria. While the Agency's programs meet exacting scientific cri- teria, there seems to be little attempt to evaluate systematically their impacts on foreign policy. Annual reports are required of some pro- grams, but not others; some programs are coordinated closely with the Department of State, others are not. The growing size and scope of the Foundation's international science programs raises the issue of whether NSF organization and administration, as now constituted for international science and scientific exchange activities, effectively meet these increasing mission responsibilities. The importance of this issue was underscored when, on July 1, 1973, President Nixon, in accordance with Reorganization Plan No. 1 of 1973, designated the Director of the NSF as his Science Adviser. In this capacity the Director was given responsibility for "international and scientific and technical activities [previously! performed by the Office of Science and Technology." The Director's chief "support for carrying out this responsibility will come from the Assistant Director for National and International Programs," "' under whose jurisdiction fall many of the programs discussed in this chapter. The next section of tliis chapter deals with the evolution of NSF's authority and programs for international science and the impacts of this history on the organization of programs for scientific exchange. »' Letter included in Statement of H. Guyford Stever, Director, NSF, before the Committee on Science- and Astronautics, House of Representatives, July 17, 1973. Additional information on precise duties and support comes from: U.S., National Science Foundation, "Staff Memorandum, Subject: Responsibility for International Scientific and Technical Activities Performed by OST," O/D 73-22,.Jane 30( 1973. 918 Succeeding sections describe the activities and status of the Founda- tion's programs to send scientific and technical personnel abroad. Summary observations are included in the concluding section. Slow Growth in NSF Authority for International Science As noted the Foundation's authority to support international science activities was not clearly defined until 1968, when the Congress expanded and revised the NSF enabling legislation. From 1950 to 1968, the Foundation's support of international science, including sponsorship of Americans to travel, research and study abroad, was based on broad interpretation of two provisions of the original legis- lation which limited the agency's support primarily to basic scien- tific research designed to strengthen domestic science ^^^ and to foster the interchange of scientific information between foreign and U.S. scientists."' Under this statute the Foundation was permitted to award science education grants tenable abroad; ^^° to award basic research grants tenable abroad; ^^^ to support defense related re- search; *^^ to cooperate in international scientific activities at the approval of the Secretary of State ; ^^ and to support the attendance of Americans at international scientific meetings, with the approval of the National Science Board.^^* The Foundation also had authority, under the Economy Act of 1932, as amended, to accept funds by transfer from other departments or agencies and to use them for the purposes for which they were originally appropriated. ^^^ The Agency's mandate to support international science was broadened somewhat in 1959, following launching of the Soviet Sputnik, when the Congress amended section 13 of the enabling legislation substituting "iutemational scientific activities" for the original phrase "international scientific research activities." ^^* At the same time^ the Congress expanded the Foundation's authorization to support education and training of foreign scientists in this country. Authority "to foster the interchange of scientific information among scientists of the United States and foreign countries," was broadened also following passage of the National Defense Education Act of 1958.^^^ With these actions support for the program category "inter- national scientific activities" rapidly increased, starting in 1959, and has consistently enlarged since that time. See Table 8. 118 S«c. 3 (a) (2), P.L. 81-507. 119 Sec. 3(a)(5). iM Sec. 10. 121 Sec. 11(c). 1" Sec. 11(c). iM Sec. 13(a). i2< Sec. 13(a). i2« 31 use 686. History discussed in: TT.S., Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Research and Techinlcal Programs, Federal Foreign Research Spending and the Dottar Drain: Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d sess., February 10 and 24, 1966, pp. 33-34. i2« Public Law 86-232, September 9, 1959. 1" U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research and Development, The Participation of Federal Agencies In International Scientific Programs: Report. Pre- pared by tlie Science Policy Research and Foreign Affairs Divisions, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, pp. 79-80 (which gives a history of the expansion of the Foundation's authority). 919 TABLE 8.— NSF, INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC INFORMATION EXCHANGE OR INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE ACTIVITIES, OBLIGATIONS Fiscal year Amount Fiscal year Amount 1953 $33,565 53,058 77,054 46,054 122,069 119.900 331,528 768,078 473,302 703,069 749,358 1964 estimate .. $700,000 1954 1965 estimate 800,000 1955 1966 estimate . ... 700,000 1956 1967 actual . 700,000 1957 1969 actual 1,427,120 1958 1970 actual 1,712,426 1959 1971 actual 2,179,996 I960 1972 actual 4,244,812 1961 1973 estimate 4,700,000 1962 1974 request . 6.200.000 1963 Source: Data for fiscal years 1953-65 from: U.S. Congress, House, Committeeon Science and Astronautics, "The Na- tional Science Foundation: A General Review of Its First 15 Years: Report," 1965, p. 185. Data for fiscal years 1966-73 from annual reports and authorization hearings. During the mid-1960's both the Congress and the Foundation gave critical attention to further expansion of the agency's mandate. Three areas received major concern: social science research, applied research, and international science. Three major issues were addressed with respect to international science : Firsty fragmentation of administration, support, and governance. John T. Wilson, a deputy director of the NSF, described this fragmen- tation in testimony before the Research and Technical Programs Subcommittee, House Committee on Government Operations, in 1966: Almost all units of the Foundation are to some extent involved in international activities, [which] include research support for individual scientists in foreign institutions, support of international cooperative research programs, support to U.S. institutions and indixdduals for foreign related science activities (research, science education . . . , international meetings and foreign travel, studies of foreign science resources, etc.) ; support of scientific information activities abroad, and support of science education projects in developing countries . . . i^s Second, the need for NSF to free justification for international science from its support of the domestic science mission. For example, in a special study prepared in 1965 evaluating issues relating to the Foundation's support of international science, the National Science Board, the policy advisory group of the NSF, described the Agency's limited mandate and mission as follows: The basic intent underlying the stated purpose of the NSF Act is to promote and strengthen science and science education in the United States. International activities carried out with funds appropriated to NSF must therefore be justified by their contribution toward strengthening science in the United States, or as efforts to determine what should be recommended as national policy to promote basic research and education in the sciences. '^^ Justification of these activities in terms of strengthening domestic science was no longer sufficient in a world increasingly transformed and challenged by science and technology. ^^° "A review of past and current international activities and interests," the report continued, "points up the need for the Foundation to focus more clearly on policy issues central to the current and future role of NSF in international matters." ^^^ >2« Federal Foreign Research Spending and the Dollar Drain: Hearings, op. cit., p. 35. »» U.S., National Science Foundation, International Science, "Activities and Policy Issues," typed in- house report (May 1965), p. 1. wo Ibid., pp. 4-5. i»i Ibid., p. 5. 920 Dr. Leland Haworth, Director of the NSF, described the scope of international science activities in testimony before the Subcommittee •on Science, Research, and Development of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics in 1965. According to Dr. Haworth, the Foundation's programs could be subsumed under four general headings: 1. Cooperative programs like IGY, International Year of the Quiet Sun, International Indian Ocean Expedition, and the Antarctic Program. 2. Support of research that can be done better in a particular foreign country or that can take advantage of certain geographical and environmental aspects of that area. 3. Support of science and science education in the developing countries which are in support of foreign policy objectives. The activity is normally carried out on behalf of the Agency for International Development. 4. The "gray area" where support of foreign scientific activities falls in between a normal extension of the Foundation's mission and the obvious support of foreign policy objectives. "2 , Each of these areas, the Director continued, must be considered on its own merits in terms of whether or not it should be properly a Foundation activity and if so, what the extent of the involvement should be. ^^^ Third: The broadening of NSF responsibility for formulating international science policies and for taking joint initiative with the State Department in designing programs to exploit foreign and international cooperative opportunities presented by science and technology. Testifying on this point before the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, Herman Pollack, Director, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Depart- ment of State, noted that proposed legislation — . . . reflects [the committee's interest in clarifying] a more active role for the NSF in international affairs and support of international scientific activities. "The Department of State welcomes this intent and would welcome a more active -Tole for NSF in the international field. "< Pollack suggested that the Foundation should be authorized to engage in international scientific activities for their own sake and "for reasons other than whether [they] promote , . . science or science education in the United States . . . ." An expansion of authority would enable the Foundation and the State Department to: . . . seize opportunities in the so-called gray areas which thus far have proven difficult to act upon. Thus it should make possible the inauguration of new bilateral and multilateral scientific relationships which could prove to be of overriding advantage to the Unites States. •'* Summarizing its 1965 investigations of the Foundation's international scientific activities and responsibilities, the House Subcommittee reported : National foreign policy recognizes the Nation's scientific activities as an ^important element in foreign relations. Yet the role of the NSF is still to be -crystallized.'*'* Expansion o^ NSF Authority jor International Exchange Programs Subsequently, Rep. Emilio Q. Daddario, Chairman of the Sub- committee on Science, Research and Development, introduced '" U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics. Qovernment and Science: Review of the Notional Science Foundation: Hearings, 89th Cong., 1st sess., Pt. 1, 1965, p. 787. 133 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, The National Science Foundation, Its Present and Future: Jteporl, 89th Cong., 2d sess., 1966, p. 93. '3< U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, A Bia to Amend the National Science Foundation Act of 1950: Hearings, 89th Cong., 2d •sess.. Aprill966. p. 27. I" Ibid., op. 33-34. "9 The NSF: Its Preseitt and Future, op. cit., p. 92, 921 legislation to solve these problems. His proposal, enacted in 1968, expanded the Foundation's mandate to "initiate and support specific scientific activities in connection with matters relating to international ■cooperation," and to support these activities on their ov^ti merits rather than on their need to support the growth of domestic science. ^^^ The expansion of the Foundation's mandate is reflected in its 1973 •description of the 'International Cooperative Scientific Activities" Program : (1) gain access to ideas, expertise, facilities, and methodology in other countries for application to American scientific problems and to increase the productive •capability of American scientists and institutions; (2) share expenses and talent on global problems confronting advanced nations that are amenable to scientific solutions; (3) permit U.S. ideas, plans, and programs to be presented to appro- priate international scientific meetings and bodies ; and (4) support the President's •announced "United States Foreign Policy for the 1970's," in which he stated that, "It is settled U.S. policy to encourage international cooperation in basic -science."*^* The Implications of Limited Authority As noted above, the bulk of the Foundation's international activities, and specifically those which send abroad nongovernmental scientists, began long before the Foundation was given a fully articulated man- date to govern and implement them. The evolution and character of NSF programs for the support of nongovernmental scientists abroad reflect many of the difficulties which resulted from the slow evolu- tionary growth of the Foundation's authorit}'. Although the Agency's overseas activities have increased considerably since 1968, NSF has not established a central organizational focus to provide for general coordination of the science and foreign policy aspects of the bulk of its foreign and international support activities. Programs which send Americans abroad are planned, funded, and administered by several different NSF divisions and offices. The Assistant Director ior the Directorate of National and International Programs does not have jurisdiction for implementing all of these activities. The Oflice ■of International Programs, OIP, which is under the jurisdiction of tthe Directorate, funds only about 5 percent of the Foundation's international-related activities. The OIP appears to provide some -assessment, coordination, and planning of the science and foreign policy aspects of its own nongovernmental support programs. How- ever, it is not evident that the Office of the Assistant Director for JSTational and International Programs provides effective evaluation, S3rnthesis, and priority setting for other international-related activities supported by the Directorate or by other sections of the NSF. 137 Statement of NSF in 1972 House NSF Authorization, Hearings, op. cit.: p. 344. The relevant pro-visions -of the legislation are: ". . . to initiate and support specific [and unclassified] scientific activities in connection -with matters Telating to international cooperation or national security by making contracts or other arrangements . . . '[See. 3(b)]: ■ . . , ^ "to [enter into arrangements] for the carrying on, by . . . the United States and foreign countnes, luclua- •ing other government agencies of the United States and foreign countries, of such . . . activities . . . neces- sary tocarryoutthepurposesof the Act, and at the request of the Secretary of State or . . . Defense, specific ■activities in connection ■with matters relating to international cooperation . . ." [Sec. 13(a)]; "... to cooperate in any international scientific activities consistent ■with the purposes of this act •. • • . to defray the expenses of representatives of Government agencies, and other organizations and of individual scientists . . . ; to undertake programs . . . with foreign nationals for scientific study . . . ," (Sec. 9 (3)]: "to enter into . . . arrangements ... in foreign countries ... to cooperate in international scientific activities . . . ■with the approval of the Secretary of State . . . ," [Sec. 13 (b) (1)]; to consult -with the Secretary of State in negotiations on scientific matters ■with other countries, [Sec. 13 W (2)1. _, "* U.S., National Science Foundation, Justification of Estimates of Appropriations to the Congress, FY /975, 1972,p.H-l. 922 To the extent that this omission exists, it would seem to preclude systematic evaluation, planning and priority setting of activities most relevant to U.S. scientific and foreign policy interests. As described throughout this study, American nongovernmental scientists abroad frequently are perceived as representatives of the American govern- mental or scientific community. However, because of the Foundation's tradition of insulating science from poUtics, most NSF grantees are not given intensive orientation to the cultural, social, and political factors which may impact upon their overseas performance. Similarly, many cannot understand the language of the nation they are visiting. And the absence of an NSF-wide international activities coordination mechanism probably contributes to the absence of accurate, system- atically gathered and maintained information describing the scope and impact of these activities. Generally, interpretation of the data presented evokes questions as to whether these programs might better serve their science and foreign policy objectives if they were more tightly organized and administered. The importance of this obser- vation is underscored by the Foundation's increasing programmatic responsibilities for foreign and international science. THE OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS One of the most important consequences of the slow growth of the Foundation's authority for international science is the absence of a centrahzed locus for planning, governing, and supporting international science activities. The origin of the Office of International Programs dates to 1955. During that year the Foundation established the Office for the International Geophysical Year to administer U.S. participa- tion in this international cooperative science program. ^^^ In 1959, the name of the Office was changed to the Office of Special International Programs to reflect the expansion of the Agency's programs following launch of the 1959 amendments and emphasis on support of science following the Soviet Sputnik. ^*° This office was given early responsi- bility for directly administering some international programs, for assisting in others, and for providing some liaison to the Department of State. During 1961 the Foundation redesigriated its foreign programs office, as the "Office of International Science Activities." In thelate 1960's, the name was changed again, to the "Office of International Programs" (OIP). The OIP is responsible for administering programs under the current program category, "International Cooperative Scientific Activities." It is the only Foundation office which regularly reports to the Department of State on foreign scientific activities.^*^ In addition, staff members provide liaison with professional associa- tions, the Office of the Foreign Secretary of the National Academy of Sciences, and the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs (SCI), Department of State. However, staff members of other divisions also perform these functions, from time to time if their responsibilities warrant it."^ See figure 1. i3« U.S., National Science Foundation, Annual Report, FY 1960 1961, p. 130. >" National Science Foundation. Annval Report, FY 1969, 1960, p. 126. i« Interview, Dr. Raphael RonMn, NSF, February 26, 1971. "2 Interview with Mrs. Bertha Rubinstein, Division of Social Sciences, NSF, in which she said that the Division of Social Sciences checks with the State Department before awarding funds for a potentially sensi- tive social science research project In foreign countries even though the Foundation is exempt from Govern- ment-wide guidelines to report to the Foreign Affairs Research Council before undertaking sponsorship of foreign area research. 923 NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE ACTIVITIES Organizational Relationships DIRECTOR OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL SCILNCC ACTIVITIES International International Science Pro£rams Activity: Information. Aralysis, Assistance rO DIVISIONS & OFFICES PROGRAMS Scientific Research (inci. National Labs.) Science Education Science Information cp-. ^nr "0- t INTERNATIONAL SCIENCC ACTIVITIES Pra^nmi and Ttchnieal Atsislanc* Dchanges under intergovernmen- tal agreement Cooperation . ur.der interjoverf*- mental agreement Technical assistance, AlO-funded Technical assistance, NSF-funded Information Analysis and Assistance Collection, analysis, and dissemin- ation of ir.icrn-ainn to tdCmiate international activity Support of organizations en;;aged in international cooperative sci- ence activity Studies and development of oppor- tunities for international coop- eration Department Of State OST 1 FCST Other Govern mefrt Agencies Scientife Community INTERNATIONAL COV.POStNTS OF KSf SUPPORT PROGRAMS Awards to US institutions for work done partly or wholly abroad Awards to foreign of international institutions Support cf national participation in interr.atioral programs Awards tc US fellows for study abroad Support cf foreign scientists broueht to the US Support for dissemination of for- eign science infornution Studies of foreign science rela- tions* Cognizanct, with coordination and asststaoot as rMnkad Figure 1 Source: Li.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, 1970 National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings, Vol. II, 91st Cong. 1st sess., 1969, p. 566. The OflBce of International Programs is responsible for only a very- small percentage of the Foundation's international and foreign science activities. For instance in fiscal year 1968, OIP funded about 7 percent of programs with international components: During fiscal year 1968, a total of $20 million was obligated for activities that had international components, of which $1.4 million was obligated directly through the [Office of International Programs]."^ '" U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, 1970 National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings, 91st Cong., 1st sess., Vol. n, 1969, p. 53. 924 Although NSF obHgations for international science activities have increased since that time (from $20 million in 1968 to $118 milhon in the fiscal year 1974), OIP's responsibilities for supporting these activities have decreased, relative to total expenditures, since 1968. During the fiscal year 1974, the OIP will support activities totaling $6.2 million, which is 5.2 percent of the Foundation's reported obliga- tions for programs with international implications. (See Table 9.) TABLE 9.— NSF PROGRAMS WITH INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS, FUNDING i (In millions of dollars] Fiscal year — 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 National and special programs: International biological program. 4.0 7.0 Global atmospheric research program 1.5 2.0 International decade of ocean exploration 0 15.0 Ocean sediment coring program 6.5 7.2 Polar programs 7.4 9.5 Arctic research program U.S. Antarctic research program 1973 solar eclipse 0 0 Subtotal Facilities: Cerro Tololo Other national laboratories Subtotal... 9.4 9.5 9.5 2.4 3.0 4.0 19.7 17.5 17.0 9.3 9.0 11.0 (30. 5) (29. 5) (29.0) 3.5 4.0 4.0 27.0 25.5 25.0 .1 .6 .1 19.4 40.7 71.4 69.1 70.6 1.9 .6 2.2 .75 2.5 1.1 2.7 1.2 2.6 1.2 2.5 2.95 3.6 3.9 3.8 Education j 3.5 2.0 .2 .1 .1 Science information.. 1.5 1.0 .4 .3 .3 Basic research programs 2 19.0 25.0 2 25.0 2 26.0 2 27.0 Research— RANN.. 3 2.4 3 2.7 32.7' International programs * (Office of International Pro- grams) U.7 2.2 4.2 4.7 6.2' Public Law 480 2.0 2.0 3.0 5.0 5.0' Aid transfers .6 .6 .4 .4 .2 DOStransfer« 1.2 2.5 2.5 Total 50^2 76.45 iliTs mj 118.4 1 Data for total international activities, fiscal years 1970 and 1971 are from: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on International Cooperation in Science and Space, "A General Review of International Cooperation in Science and Space: Hearings," 92d Cong., 1st sess., May 1971, p. 128. Data for 1972, 1973, and 1974 are from information supplied by Dr. E. Sohns, Office of International Programs, NSF, Jan. 17, 1973. 2 Estimated. 3 Weather modification project. < May generally be considered as supporting OIP. 5 Fiscal year 1970 data from: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science; Research, and Development, "1972 National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings," 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1971, passim; fiscal year 1971 estimated data: NSF, "Ji'stification of Estimates of Appropriations fiscal year 1&72 to the Con- gress," 19/1, p. 1-1; fiscal year 1972, 1973 and lt74 diti from: NSF, "Justification of Estimates of Appropriations fiscal year 1974 to the Congress," 1973, p. G-1. 'These sums are (or funds transferred to the Foundation by the Agency for International Development and the State Department, for respectively the Indian and educational programs and the Spanish Agreement. INCONSISTENT REPORTING HISTORY The fragmentation of the Foundation's international science activities poses a significant problem for researchers: viz., unsystematic and inconsistent reporting of funding. Throughout its history, the Agency has not reported as "international" all of its international scientific activities. These discrepancies appear in both congressional budget hearings and in Annual Reports of Grants and Awards. Further- more, the Foundation has included some programs under different. 925 program categories from one year to another making it difficult for the researchers to compile a valid history of how these programs evolved."* The NSF amendments of 1968 expanded the jurisdiction of the Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, to authorize appropriations for the NSF. In 1971 the Committee requested that the Foundation present the Congress with a line item budget."^ In response to this request the Foundation began to use a consistent format for reporting international scientific activities."^ Since the fiscal year 1971 all specifically labelled international scien- tific activities have been included in one section of the report and are differentiated by program titles corresponding to budget presentation categories. Although these changes improve the Foundation's report- ing, several major problems still remain. First, its support of co- operative science projects and international travel fall under two budget categories: International Activities and Special Foreign Currency Program. No attempt is made to explain whether activities under one categor}* also fall under the other. Second, more than 90' percent of the Foundation's international activities are administered" by divisions other than the Office of International Programs. The revised budget category, "International Cooperative Scientific Activities," reports only those progiams administered by the OIP. The Foundation does not report to Congress totals of other grants- (such as in research grants, national research centers, and education) that involve foreign or international activities carried on abroad. In 1970 the Foundation began an experimental program requiring program directors to indicate on a proposal form those grants with international implications. These categories were further subdivided into : foreign travel ; foreign citizens; operations or projects at a foreign site including cooperative projects; foreign procurement of goods or service; liaison with or support of international organizations; and participation in an international program. i« For example the agency's programs in international science were first justified in terms of supporting the growth of domestic science, thus early programs were included under either one of two program cate- gories: "Dissemination of Scientific Information: international information exchanges;" or "Science Edu- cation, international." Thus, early in the Foundation's history, travel programs and exchange programs with the USSR and Eastern Europe were included under the category of international information ex- changes, which included also translations and support for obtaining foreign science information. Sometimes the category of foreign science information also included the subcategory of participation in "international science information activities." Different figures have been given to report actual expenditures for a partic- ular program. At times the P'oundation has distinguished among participation in meetings, international travel grants, and the USSR-EE program, but not always. Similarly the U.S. -Japan Cooperative program, which like the Soviet and Eastern European program, includes exchange of personnel, was not included under the category of international information exchanges, like the Soviet program but under the support category of "Scientific Research," which included also national and international research programs. Thus annual reports of grants and awards sometimes categorized the USSR-EE program as an international cooperative activity, and other times as international information exchange. In addition, the icience edu- cation category has been used to report international activities which involved more than education, further compounding difficulties in tracing the history of programs. 145 "There are numerous reasons for instituting a line item budget for NSF at this time. The sheer size of the NSF budget, together with its expected increases in the future, warrant closer congressional control and overview." U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Authorizing AppropTiatiom to the National Science Foundation [FY 1972]: Report No. 9S-m, 92d Cong., 1st sess.. May 17, 1971, p. 63. 1" Under this new format, the category of "International Information Exchanges" is no longer used. USSR and Eastern European exchange programs are no longer listed under travel programs, they are subsumed under the category of "Cooperative Science Programs," which .includes reporting for all the bilaterals the Foundation adininisters. 926 The 1970 experiment resulted in & computer printout. No attempt was made to indicate how much of the funds in the particular grant were used for international activities. Total funds awarded which had international impUcations amounted to $56,976,783.^*^ It may be fruitful for the Foundation to continue to experiment with this reporting system and to obtain additional information on the exact nature of international impUcations of a particular award. ABSENCE OF REQUIREMENTS FOR REPORTS FROM GRANTEES Fragmentation also poses significant problems in the Foundation's development of internal policies and programs to govern these activities. Consistent with its tradition of insulating scientific support from governmental interference, NSF does not require grantees, with the exception of the travel grants program and some programs administered by OIP, to report on special foreign conditions or con- siderations impacting on scientific activities carried out under their grant. Grantees with funds tenable abroad, as data in the sections below indicate, typically are not required to meet language quaUfi- cations for service in a foreign country; nor do they usually receive a predeparture briefing on the conditions of research and other factors which might relate to their work. Similarly, while abroad, they are not required to maintain contact with representatives of either science or foreign poUcy agencies. These factors raise questions relating to: program continuity; effectiveness of planning programs for specific countries or specific areas of science; understanding of the requirements for performance of NSF grantees abroad ; and evaluation of whether foreign and international scientific activities effectively meet their scientific and diplomatic objectives. PROBLEMS RELATING TO NSF OVERSEAS SCIENCE OFFICES Another important consideration governing the evolution and administration of NSF programs in support of Americans overseas is the NSF science attach^ program. In 1961 the Foundation established an overseas office in Tokyo, as part of the American Embassy, in Japan to coordinate NSF aspects of the U.S. -Japan Cooperative Science Program.^*^ In fiscal year 1962 the Foundation estabhshed overseas offices in Paris and Rio de Janeiro. These were discontinued in 1964.^*^ During 1965, the Foundation added a science officer in San Jose, Costa Rica, wholly funded by the Agency for International Development (A.I.D.), to administer and coordinate the AID-funded program for the regional development of the universities of Central America. Currently, NSF sponsors a staff member in Christchurch, New Zealand, from October to March to serve as liaison with the NSF-sponsored research teams engaged in Antarctic research. The Foundation also has a science office in New Delhi to assist in the ad- ministration of the U.S. -Indian program for science education and retains the Tokyo office. "' Interviews, Dr. Ernest Sohns and Dr. Walter Thompson, Office of International Programs, NSF, February 1971. 1" U.S., National Science Foimdation, Annual Report, FY 1961, 1962. »« U.S., National Science Foundation, Annual Report, FY 1965, 1966, p. 14S. 927 The NSF science attache program, according to the Foundation, has promoted the success of NSF cooperative activities. For instance, in 1969 the Foundation reported: One factor which has made certain . . . cooperative activities . . . successful is the Foundation Uaison staff .... As the Foundation's international programs increase in size and scope, and as the needs of this country's scientific community to know about foreign activities grow, the Foundation will need further repre- sentation abroad. '5° Although the Foundation views the overseas offices as essential to the administration of some programs, it has not expanded these for several reasons. One of the most important is NSF's response in 1968 to a recommendation made by the Research and Technical Programs Subcommittee, House Committee on Government Opera- tions, for Federal agencies to cut back on their overseas research and science representation in an effort to assist in solving the balance-of- payments problem. ^^^ A second reason is the Foundation's apparent adherence to a set of recommendations made jointly by the Federal Council for Science and Technology and the State Department, in December 1964, which recommended that all official overseas science representation should be a part of the science attache's office in the U.S. embassy. ^^^ However, "the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, which oversees the NSF authorization, has consistently recommended that the agency strengthen its science attache program. In 1966 the Com- mitte reported : The international nature of science together with the high repute of the NSF abroad . . . suggest the possibiUty that the Foundation should have a greater role in representing American science within the community of nations. The Committee recommended that The Foundation's responsibilities [in] international science can be served considerably better through the expanded use of science attaches closely identified with the State Department, selected, funded by the Foundation and directly linked to its science information activities. '^^ No action was taken in response to these recommendations. Further- more, while both the Committee and the Foundation agree that the Department of State science attache does not serve the functions of NSF representation abroad, ^^* they have not reached agreement on a desirable configuration of expanded NSF representation. In its report on the 1971 NSF authorization, the House Committee reported that 150 1970 XSF AuthOTizati(m : Hiarings. Vol. II, op. cit., p. 571. 151 The issue of the balance of payments has significantly impacted on several major programs in support ■of sending abroad American nongovernmental scientists. The Research and Technical Programs Sub- committee, House Committee on Government Operations has looked into this question first in 1966. In 1968 the Committee recommended cuts in overseas science officers: "[In its 1966 report, the Committee ob- served that] to administer dollar-financed foreign research, the five agencies maintained 15 science offices «mploying 212 people in eight cities outside the U.S. at a cost in fiscal 1965 of .$3,033,000 Federal expendi- tures for foreign research and overseas science offices are a part of [total dollar drain] and reductions in them «an contribute significantly to the intensified Government-wide drive to achieve payments economies." M Not listed in NSF Annual Report, FY 1965., op. cit. i«« NSF, Annual Report FY 1971, op. cit., Appendix A. 929 DlSTRJBUTiON OF FUNDS AWARDED BY THE OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS ^,::- 4 ^. IN FISCAL YEAR 1971 • rntertiational Council of ■'. Scientific Unions • Selected NAS/NRC Activities • Oth^r International - Scientific Programs r^;- Bulgaria : -.-jIw -^'■•~.. -■ » ■ -^"^ j Czechoslovakia -" r J Hungary : ,V. ^; Poland :-^^ ^Romania v"-S:| \ y Yugoslavia-v-^"^ ] Figure 2. Source: U.S., National Science Foundation, Annual Report, FY 1971, 1972, p. 54. COOPERATIVE SCIENCE PROGRAM The Office of International Programs (as of 1972) administered the Cooperative Science Program, which involves bilateral agreements with Australia, the Republic of China (Taiwan, France, India, Italy, Japan, Romania, Spain, Iran, Brazil, and Argentina. The Foundation also funds the U.S. -Soviet Eastern European bilateral agreements for scientific cooperation through grants awarded to the National Acad- emy of Sciences — National Research Council, which directly adminis- ters the program. In addition, the OIP began in 1972 to administer directly some bilateral programs with countries of Eastern Europe. 930 Bilateral science agreements consist mainly of activities to exchange personnel. U.S. and foreign scientists exchanged abroad to conduct joint research, attend and chair seminars, attend meetings, and engage in other forms of information exchange. The Foundation's activities as implementing agency generally consist of funding; coor- dinating funding and programmatic elements contributed by other U.S. Agencies; and, in the case of agreements it directly administers, binational formulation of annual programs and selection and monitor- ing of U.S. scientific participation. The purposes of these agreements, according to the Foundation, are to: (1) encourage and support U.S. scientific participation in international science programs and activities that promise maximum benefits to the United States from the funds invested; (2) produce new scientific knowledge through the support of U.S. participation in cooperative efforts with foreign scientists; (3) promote shared use of unique scientific facilities in cooperating countries; and (4) strengthen national prestige and contribute to the achievement of U.S. fopign policy ob- jectives.'^o Bilateral science agreements vary considerably in their origins and scope and in their scientific and diplomatic underpinning. It is gen- erally acknowledged that most of these agreements are politically motivated. ^^^ Most of them were agreed upon soon after visits between political leaders and were intended to strengthen international rela- tions between States. However, to develop fruitful scientific programs, the agreements provide that details for cooperation are to be worked out in joint scientific/diplomatic negotiations. The agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union, and the countries of Eastern Europe, administered by the National Academy of Sciences, support scientific exchanges which could not occur in the absence of mutually agreed upon terms of reference. They support exchanges onh^ on a quid pro quo basis and thus differ sub- stantially from the less formal agreements the Foundation administers direct^. Most NSF-implemented agreements are designed to comple- ment or supplement other previous governmental and nongovern- mental scientific exchanges between the signatories. However, political and scientific purposes differ from one agreement to another. For in- stance, the bilaterals with Japan and France are based on the need to induce Americans to conduct activities in countries where they had been disinclined to go. Australian and Italian bilaterals are designed primaril}'^ to assist the foreign scientific community by providing them with a centralized research and development funding source and additional justification for conducting scientific activities in the United States. Bilaterals with the developing countries, those recently signed with Latin American States, and the agreement entered into under provisions of the expanded defense treaty with Spain, are for technical assistance. The number of bilaterals to which the United States is a signatory has been increasing significantly in recent j^ears. The increasing 160 U.S., National Science Foundation, Justification of Estimates of AppTopriations, to the Congress, Fiscal Year 1974, 1973, p. O-l. 161 See the sections below on bilaterals administered by the NSF and the NAS. Cf. also the following comment by the State Department: "... The newer [bilateral] agreements . . . have been stimulated by political events and for pohtical considerations . . . ". ("U.S. Scientific and Technological Agreements with Other Countries", International Science Notes, Published by Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Aflairs, Department of State, 25 (September 1970), p. 2.) 931 frequency of such arrangements and the nature of their orig:in3 indicate that they are becoming an unportant tool of foreign rela- tions.^^2 The Foundation has encountered difficulties in administering some of these agreements. While the agency is charged with implementing the agreements, it neither funds nor plans all activities sanctioned W them. Other Federal Agencies which fund and administer some of these agreements do not consistently report to the Foundation on their acti\'ities. The resulting inadequacy of information on such activities tends to constrain development of long-range programs. Most of the bilaterals, reflecting the absence of NSF requirements for reporting on foreign activities, lack continuity and frequently have poorly structured scientific underpinning. While all bilaterals are based on principles of mutuality, some are designed more to sup- port development of foreign science than to contribute to scientific endeavors of mutual benefit. These characteristics undermine the quality of some bilaterals and to discourage scientific participation. As in the case of some of the Fulbright-Hays activities, some of these bilaterals are oriented to technical assistance ; others, as evidenced by low rates of U.S. scientific participation, appear to provide inadequate opportunities for fruitful research and development; and most require language qualifications. The Foundation does not appear to have made a comprehensive effort to assess the utility of these arrangements for either science or diplomacy. The United States-Japan Cooperative Science Program. — The United States- Japan Cooperative Science Program was established in 1961. It is one of the oldest, most cooperative, and best organized of the U.S. bilateral science programs. The Foundation views this program as "... eminently successful in promoting the interaction between the U.S. and the Japanese scientific communities."^^ Since the program history illustrates some of the major difficulties the Foundation en- counters in planning and administering bilateral science programs, it mil be described in detail. Origin oj the United States-Japan cooperative science program. — A joint communique by Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda and President John F. Kennedy in June 1961 expressed "... their concern over the unstable aspects of the situation in Asia and agreed to hold close consultation ... to discover . . . the ways and means in which stability and well-being might be achieved in that area." They an- nounced the establishment of three joint committees to strengthen the partnership: (1) the Joint United States-Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs, estabhshed at the cabinet level ". . .to assist in achieving the objectives of . . . the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security"; (2) the Joint United States-Japan Committee on 162 The Foundation reported to the Congress, during Fiscal year 1974 authorization hearings, that it served as executive agency for bilateral agreements with 14 countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the Republic of China, France, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Romania, and Yugoslavia.) (It serves also as executive agency for cooperative science and technology programs with Spain and Iran.) It also supplies funds for NAS-administered agreements with the academies of the Soviet Union and 6 Eastern European countries. (U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research and Development 1971, National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings, 92d Cong. 2d Sess., 1973, pp. 315. 318. The Foundation reported in 1969 that it served as executive agency for agreements with 6 countries: Japan, Italy, Australia, Romania, the Republic of China, and India. It also supported NAS-administered exchanges with the academies of the Soviet Union and 4 Eastern European countries. (1970 NSF Authorization: Hearings, vol. H, op. cit., pp. 575-579.) The Foundation also provides primary government support for programs with Israel and the People's Republic of China. i^A General Review of International Cooperation in Science and Space, op. cit., p. 102. 932 Expansion of Cultural and Educational Cooperation; and (3) the Joint United States-Japan Committee to Strengthen Scientific Co- operation.^^ Pursuant to this communique the Secretary of State named a U.S. delegation of scientists and diplomats to the Joint Committee. U.S. members receive their instructions from the State Department and "are responsible to the Department for review and evaluation of scientific programs undertaken for recommendation of new areas of scientific cooperation, and for the provisions of related scientific advice." ^^® The Committee held the first of its regular annual meetings in Tokyo in 1961 ; subsequent meetings have been held alternatively in the United States and Japan. At the first meeting, the Committee reviewed and analyzed the status of scientific cooperation between the two countries and discussed fields appropriate for closer collaboration. Economic, political, and scientific considerations influenced their deliberations. Apparently, Japanese and American diplomats and scientists decided that a strengthening of cooperation in science would inject a civilian char- acter into a primarily strategic relationship, based on economic and miUtary ties. And like its European allies, Japan wanted to benefit from the scientific and technological eminence of the United States, These motivations are underscored in a statement from the Joint Committee : The United States has cooperated extensively with the nations of Europe in matters of mutual interest in the Atlantic area. . . . The Pacific area is no less important and the sharing of Japanese and American scientific knowledge and technical competence is a giant step forward in the understanding and mastery of the environment."* At the first meeting the Joint Committee adopted the following principles : — all cooperative activities must be of high quality and bene- ficial to the advancement of science ; — all cooperative efforts should contribute to the promotion of international understanding and peace; — each cooperative activit}^ should be significant from a scientific point of i-iew as a project for bilateral cooperation; —all cooperation should be performed on a basis of mutuality and equality; — at least one qualified scientist from each country . . . should participate in each cooperative project; and — scientists of each country should take part in their capacities as individuals. ^^^ Administration of the program. — At the request of the Secretary of State and the Bureau of the Budget, NSF assumed responsibility on March 20, 1962, for coordination of the scientific interests of the United States in the program. As implementing agency, the Founda- tion "is responsible for: (1) organization and support of specialized scientific panels to advise the NSF and the Joint Committee, and (2) ••* "Joint Communique Issued by the President and Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda of Japan, following discussions held in Washington, D.C., June 20-21, 1961," (Press Secretary, The White House, June 22 1961). 'M U.S., National Science Foundation, In-house limited distribution annual report of the Office of Inter- national Programs on "United States-Japan Cooperative Science Programs, FY 1963," p. 6. *•• An annual report is issued on the status of the U.S. -Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation. It is prepared by the country which hosted the annual meeting. This statement is taken from a report prepared by the Japanese delegation to the Joint Committee and approved by the U.S. delegation: The United States- Japan Committee cm Scientific Cooperatimi: The First Five Years, 1961-1966, available from NSF, p.l. >" "Status of the U.S.-Japan Cooperative Science Program ... As of March 31, 1970," p. 5. (Available from OIP, NSF.) 933 administration, coordination, and financial support of U.S. participa- tion in joint scientific activities." ^^^ The Office of International Scien- tific Affairs (now OIP) was given operating functions. This office "effects coordination with other components of the Foundation and with other agencies to ensure that scientific projects undertaken are of the highest quality and of benefit to U.S. science." ^^^ In September 1961, NSF supplemented its already existing science liaison office in the American Embassy in Tokyo, to assist in administering the U.S. segment of the program. In 1961 the Tokyo office had a staff of three Americans and three Japanese."" Two organizations were named as implementing agencies for Japan: the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science, (JSPS), and the Science and Technology Agency. As the program developed, JSPS, under the auspices of the Ministry of Education, becanie the primary agency, since its authority encompassed the major portion of the overall program activity."^ To assist in promoting joint activities the implementing agencies appointed joint advisory panels of scientists, one panel in each country for each program area. These panels and their constituent subpanels met at irregular intervals as required. In 1962 there were panels concerned with exchange of scholars, exchange of scientific informa- tion, earth sciences of the Pacific area, biological sciences, and medical sciences. In 1963, panels were added for education in the sciences and hurricane and typhoon research, and in 1966, a panel on pesticides research."^ According to the Joint Committee, "In the earl}- years of the Program, these panels played a vital role in identifjdng specific projects falling under their general area, informing other scientists about the program and encouraging their participation, and in some cases, serving as the communication link between American and Japanese scientists." "^ In 1968, the panel system was abandoned as the program gathered its own momentum and expanded into mutual areas of interest: The panel system was particularly useful to the Japanese implementing agencies since their organizations were unlike that of the NSF, where scientific staffing and review panels already existed. ... As the program . . . grew and brought more U.S. and Japanese scientists together, new cooperative projects and seminars ^vere generated by the scientists themselves, as the catalytic action of the panels was no longer critical. At its eighth meeting . . . the . . . Committee recom- mended that . . . cooperation ... be expanded to include all the natural sciences, broadly interpreted to include mathematical and engineering sciences as well as those areas of the social sciences that can be studied with the methods of natural sciences. Acting on this recommendation NSF and JSPS dissolved the panels."* At the same time, the Committee created eight categories for administration of an expanded program and recommended that the 188 "U.S.-Japan Cooperative Science Programs, FY 1963," op. cit., p. 6. i«« Idem. I'o Establishment and Operations of the NSF-Tokyo Office, In NSF, Eleverdh Annual Report, 1961, op. cit., pp. 138-139. "1 "Status of the U.S.-Japan Cooperative Science Program ... as of March 31, 1970," op. cit.: p. 6. "2 V.S.-Japan Crnimiitee on Scientific Cooperative: The First Five Years, op. cit., pp. 23-29. i'3 "Status of the U.S.-Japan Cooperative Science Program ... as of March 31, 1970," op. cit., pp. 7-8. The chairmen of some of the early panels were: Exchange of Scholars: Dr. Dael Wolfle, Dr. Detlev W. Bronk, Dr. Allan H. Brown, and Dr. Thomas Fontaine; Exchange of Scientific Information and Materials: Dr. Edwin H. Land, Dr. Emanuel R. Piore, Dr. Henry Bimbaum, Dr. Allen V. Astin; Earth Sciences of the Pacific Area: Dr. Geoffrey Keller, Dr. Roger Revelle, Dr. William W. Rubey, Dr. Thomas 0. Jones; Biological Sciences: Dr. Harve J. Carlson, Dr. Ernst Mayr, Dr. Q. E. Hilbert, Dr. Caryl Haskms, Dr. Harold J. CooUdge, Dr. David Keck; Medical Sciences: Dr. H. W. Magonu Magoun, Dr. Kenneth Endicott, Dr. Alfred GeUhom; Education in the Sciences: Dr. Mark H. Ingraham; Hurricane and Typhoon Research: Dr. Francis Reichelderier; Pesticides Research: Dr. Robert Metcalf. (U.S.-Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation: The First Five Years: 1961-1966, op. cit., pp. 23-9.) i'« Ibid., p. 8. 934 implementing agencies appoint liaison members, one from each country for each of the eight categories, to serve as an adviser to the Com- mittee.^^^ The current program encompasses visiting scientists, seminars, and cooperative research projects. Seminars. — Seminars may be held on ah}^ academic subject, but topics must "be compatible with the general purposes" of the pro- gram. According to NSF, this statement means that topics must be of particular regional interest or when "sufficient competence in the research areas exists in both countries to make a meeting mutually beneficial." ^^^ A seminar chairman proposes a topic; five to ten participants from each country are nominated. The Foundation encourages all participants to present papers; it also encourages geographic distribution of participants and recommends that younger men be nominated. The cooperative aspects of the program must be followed : A proposal should be developed jointly with a Japanese scientist and both countries must approve the topic and participants. A written report or abstract must be submitted to a professional journal: "Thus the widest possible audience will be informed of what is going on in Japan in a specific field." "'' Table 10 shows the expansion of seminar activities from 2 in 1962 to 24 in 1969 : TABLE 10.— UNITED STATES-JAPAN COOPERATIVE SCIENCE PROGRAM, EXPANSION OF SEMINAR ACTIVITIES 1962-69 Participants Participants Total participants Held in ■ United United Held in United United States States Japan Japan States Japan States Japan 1962 0 0 0 2 11 58 11 58 1963 1 7 2 6 45 63 52 65 1964... 12 93 69 11 97 132 190 201 1965 6 60. 50 22 185 267 245 317 1966 7 71 68 19 147 207 218 275 1967 14 147 120 11 82 142 229 262 1968. 13 127 101 10 83 113 210 214 1969 11 118 101 13 101 158 219 259 Total 64 623 511 94 751 1,140 1,374 1,651 Source: "Summary Record, Joint Staff Meeting, United States-Japan Cooperative Science Program," Washington, D.C., September 1969, p. 17. Visiting scientist program. — The visiting scientist program, usually exclusively funded by OIP, provides grants to U.S. scientists to research or train in a Japanese laboratory. The rationale, according to the Joint Committee, ". . . has been that Japan has long sent large numbers of research scientists to the United States for study, whereas American scientists seldom elected Japan as a site for extended research activity." ^^^ A scientist in any field is eligible; a doctoral degree is required; preference is given to young postdoctorates ; the visit should last from '" Ibid., p. 9. Liaison members, as of March 31, 1970, are: Exchange of scientists: Edward Tatum, The Rockefeller University; Education in the Sciences, Harry Kelly, Provost, North Carolina State University; Scientific and Technical Communication: Allen Astin, Former Director, NBS; Earth, Planetary and Astro- nomical Sciences: Walter Orr Roberts, President, University Corporation of Atmospheric Research; Bio- logical, Agricultural and Medical Sciences: Stanley Bennett, Professor, University of North Carolina; Mathematical, Physical and Chemical Sciences: Robert E. Marshak, Professor, University of Rochester; Engineering Sciences; John Ide, Division Director for Engineering, NSF; and Special Problems Related to the Natural Sciences: John Wilson, Vice President, The University of Chicago. (Ibid., pp. 103-104.) 17' U.S., National Science Foundation, "U.S. Japan Cooperative Science Program: Guidelines for Sub- mitting Seminar Proposals," September 17, 1969. 1" Ibid. i'8 "Status of U.S.-Japan Cooperative Science Program ... as of March 31, 1970," op. cit., p. 9. 935 six months to a year. The formal proposal must "fully describe the project, including: description of proposed work, the value of the visit to the investigator and to U.S. science, length and dates of visit, host institution, manner or report, curriculum vitae, and list of publications." A proposal should show that the applicant has been in touch with Japanese scientists with whom he wishes to work; copies of correspondence should be attached. If a U.S. scientist wishes to work in Japan and has no contacts, the OIP will assist him. Both Japan and the United States must approve the proposal. If it is approved "the visiting scientist must write a report on his visit to Japan. In addition to an account of his research activity in Japan, the report should note with whom he worked, institutions visited, travel in Japan and general comments. Publication of research results in an appropriate journal is encouraged." ^^^ Only a small number of U.S. scientists have participated in the visiting scientist program since its inception: 87 for both short- and long-tenn visits during the period 1963-1970. Forty-siK of these spent six months or longer working in a Japanese laboratory; the remaining 41 made shorter visits.^*" Although there are some in- consistencies in information reported for each year, available annual data indicate that American enthusiasm for the program may be waning. U.S. visiting scientists sent to Japan, by years from 1963 to 1969, numbered 2, 13, 32, 27, 15, 14, and 18. Durmg fiscal year 1973, 6 Americans went to Japan under the long-term visiting scientist segment of the program, and 6-8 for short-term visits. ^^^ Cooperative research. — Although the OIP implements coopera- tive research activities, under the U.S. -Japan program, it does not usually provide primar}-- support for the American portion of the program. Other NSF divisions and other Governmeiit agencies and nongovernmental organizations also fund such research. Proposals for visiting scientists and seminars are accepted in any scientific area; however, proposals for joint research projects were limited initially to the specific scientific areas of earth and atmospheric sciences of the Pacific, animal and plant geography and ecology of the Pacific area, and cancer research. In 1962, the somewhat limited areas of support in biology and medicine were enlarged; hurricane and typhoon research, and education in the sciences were added as new areas. In 1965, research on pesticides was recommended as a new area for cooperative research. ^^^ According to NSF, "162 cooperative investigations, with counter- part projects in each country, have been supported in the lifetime of the agreement." Some specific projects have been described: Noteworthy scientific advances have been achieved in geophysical studies on earthquakes, volcanoes, and in meterology, in the study of hurricanes, typhoons and cyclones. For example, U.S. and Japanese meterologists were able to track simultaneously the mesocyclone. Data collected by Japanese land-based radar were combined with American meteorological satellite data to produce a . . . S3'noptic chart of the cyclone. Combined study and surveillance of potentially destructive storms benefit both countries by providing early warning to inter- national shipping and air lanes as weU as to populations on land areas situated in the probable path of the storm.i*' 178 "Guidelines for Submitting a Proposal to the NSF for a Visiting Scientist Grant," August 1969. "" "Summary Record, Joint Staff Meeting, U.S.-Japan Cooperative Science Program, Washington, D.C., September 1969," p. 13. These data are taken from a report prepared to correspond with the Japanese fiscal year which is different from the U.S. fiscal year. NSF figures, based on the U.S. fiscal year, are incomplete; this figure is an adequate representation of the number of U.S. scientists visiting Japan under the program. '*' 1974 National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings, op. cit., p. 315. "2 "Status of United States-Japan Cooperative Science program ... as of March 31, 1970," op. cit., p. 7. '83 A General Review of International Cooperation in Science and Space, op. cit., pp. 102-105. 936 Difficulties with the program. — The current NSF contribution to the program averages approximately $500,000, down from a high of approximately $700,000 when the program first started. See Table 11, wluch also illustrates lack of consistency in reporting on the program. According to the Foundation, "some problems have arisen in the administration of the . . . program from language difficulties, different fiscal years, and different internal organizations for support of science. There has also been opposition to the program in Japan by some scientists for political rather than scientific reasons." ^^ The Joint Committee has consistently criticized the low rate of American participation : At each annual meeting the . . . Committee has urged that more American scholars and students, especially young scientists and engineers, should partici- pate . . ., [especially] for meetings and . . . the visiting scientists [program.] ^^^ The Committee also notes that the program has suffered because American scholars who come to Japan generally want to study the social sciences or humanities, topics not of special benefit or interest to Japanese science: i'< 1970 NSF authorization. Hearings, op., cit., p. 575. iM The United States-Japan CommitUe on Scientific Cooperation: The First Five Years, 1961-1966, op. cit., p. 7. 937 0) v> ^s ES 3—- zS berof Itings nited es or apan s < B^=>%-' a: C3 = E.Eoo o ^ -a o CO C3 UJ lupport g-term ants to Japan UJ c is. o Ll. O M z ''T = 5 < o z < C3 o a. o 00 < a: ui a. o o o < < a CD oi2 o fe." E o. k- O.C s > ^ Vi a> CL ra a? CO 09 cao li. O 00 z "to s ^ o CD m ■4~> ■«-• rtj 00 CO 55 ■o ^"O -a c a. » c is S-f ffl => ■? = =3 (^ _, fOO ^ OCNJ OCOCJ 00 S ^ CM CM ir> 1 r^ (^ o f— • ' •~* C\J CO 0} d> "co j2 Jo 00 • ■a ^"o w.t; S.t; S MCgCMCM c a) 9- = o^ M a. CO o 3-a o CO csT o idSoocm »^ ^^ m evj o 00<3 irTr^-'oo" CM -HO irT ^ CM o s o csjco^ in t£> r** oo o> ^ totpco

0> 9> 0> ^ 0> 0> 0> 3 E o o ^ cr> >- t • = a>co~ - -a- aj *Jci'| SoTS ES & — » ^ a> o u _-ob— ■ = < o K o c .£ *u ^ c/> > o ^ c 03 03 ra O) E X E s c o X3 3 c/> « ^ o vijz _o 3 3 < n c c o o CO "co < ■o .2 C 5 CO (A 10 a> £ Vt 0) 0 to a> •0 CO w c 0 c ^^ 0 0 0 -* E 0 CO i^ /^ c/> => 0 0 ul 3 938 The majority of Japanese faculty members coming to the United States are interested in the physical, biological, or engineering sciences, though the majority of Japanese graduate and undergraduate students in the United States are studying . . . the humanities or social sciences .... More than half of the American facultj^ members in Japan are engaged in the humanities and social ■sciences, with further emphasis on Japanese language and literature. During the period 1957-1966, the disparity has grown; the number of American scientists go- ing to Japan has barely doubled, while the increase of Japanese scientists coming to the United States has been nearly tenfold.'*® Summing up the results of the program in 1969 the Foundation j"eports : As originally conceived, this program was to be a catalyst to increase coopera- tion between scientists of the two countries, and when things were well established it was planned that the formal program would disappear. Now, however, the foreign affairs agencies of both countries wish it continued for political as well as scientific reasons. '^7 United States-Italy Cooperative Program in Science. — The Japanese program was the first of a series of bilaterals in which the NSF was committed to administer various kinds of scientific cooperation with individual nations. The other programs described below are all different in origin, purpose, scope, and administration and accordingly warrant separate brief treatment. The United States-Italy Cooperative Program in Science was initiated on June 19, 1967.^^^ It was the second bilateral science agree- ment for which the Foundation became the implementing agency. The program resulted from informal initiatives made by the National Research Council of Italy, the Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche, to NSF and subsequent consultations on diplomatic and scientific levels. '^^ The agreement provides for cooperation between mission- oriented as well as basic science support agencies; each government bears its own costs of the program; its original duration was for five years, subject to annual program planning. The agreement provides for cooperative research, seminars, and exchange of scientists. '^° It was renewed in 1972 for three years. According to an NSF official formerly in charge of the U.S. -Italy Cooperative Science Program, Italy did not have a mechanism nor special funds to support Italian-American cooperative research before inception of this agreement. One of its purposes, similar to that of the U.S. -Australian agreements, was to institutionalize a way to encourage Italian and American scientists to work together. ^^' Another was to encourage the allocation of funds by the Italian Government for such cooperation. Information is scarce about the number, subjects, and activities of the scientific exchanges which have been carried out under this program. Exchanges usually take place only in connection with -cooperative research projects, the majority of which are funded by other agencies. While the NSF must approve projects included under 186 Ibid., p. 7. >8' 1970 NSF Authorization: Hearings, Vol II. op. cit., p. 575. 188 Historical data taken from: Letter, Secretary of State Rusk to Dr. Haworth, Director, NSF, June 11, 1967; Letter Wilson, OIP to Rusk, June 13, 1967; and "U.S. Italy Cooperative-Science Program, program announcement, 1970," NSF 70-15. The agreement is formalized as TIAS 6280, 18 UST 1268. 189 Memorandum to members of the international committee of the Federal Council for Science and Tech- nology, "Subject: Executive Agency GuideUnes for U.S.-Italy Program," by Robert Fleischer, Acting head, Office of International Science Activity, April 5, 1967, including "Guidelines for the Executive Agency for the U.S.-Italy program." iw "United States-Italv Cooperative Science Program," op. cit., NSF 70-15. isi Interview with Dr. "Raphael Ronkin, February 26, 1971. 939 the program, the Foundation does not require reports from scientists supported by other agencies who might have traveled to Italy in connection with their research.^^^ Available NSF funding history indicates that the Foundation's role as well as the program itself may be waning. For instance in fiscal year 1967, the 3'ear the program began, the Foundation awarded grants totaling $551,000. During fiscal year 1971, the Foundation con- tributed $8,500 for one award for a mathematics seminar in Italy. See Table 12. In describing the progress of the program in 1969, the Foundation reported : The program is progressing smoothly, the difficulties during the first year being such minor administrative ones as developing effective communication between the Foundation and CNR and making certain that grants issued by both agencies had roughly the same starting dates and durations. So far, at the request of the Italians, only cooperative research projects are being considered under the program. They prefer to postpone consideration of visiting scientists and sci- entific meetings until a later date.**^ TABLE 12.— UNITED STATES-ITALY COOPERATIVE PROGRAIVI IN SCIENCE Number of Funds granted Other U.S. Total U.S. Total Italian Fiscal year projects by NSF funds contribution contribution 19671 1968 3 1969 5 (J) 1970S ., (2) 1971 J (2) 1 1967 data from: U.S., Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Education, Institute of International Studies, "Inventory of Federal Programs Involving Educational Activities Concerned With Improving International Under- standing and Cooperation: An Interagency Survey Conducted for the Congress of the United States," June 1969, p. 359. 2 Not available. 3 1968 data from: U.S., National Science Foundation, Office of International Programs "United States-Italy Cooperative Program in Science," internal report, 1968, pp. 5-6. Figures in parentheses from: "Fiscal Year 197C National Science Foun- dation Authorization; Hearings," op. cit., p. 575. < AEC, $152,500; Agriculture, $50,000; DOD, $204,660; NBS, $199,148; Ohio State, $10,000; University of California, $61,500. 5 1969 data from: U.S. National Science Foundation, "Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1969," 1970, p. 105. 6 1970 data from: U.S. National Science Foundation, "Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1970," 1971, p. 94. ' 1971 data from: U.S. National Science Foundation, "Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1971", 1972, p. 55. U.S.-India Program for the Exchange of Scientists and Engineers. — One of the major purposes of the program for U.S.-India Exchange of Scientists and Engineers is to "stimulate economic development through association with U.S. experts." ^^* U.S. scientists and engineers however, have not shown a high level of interest in the program. In 1966, the acting head of the Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State, requested the Foundation to support, implement, and manage the program. After scientists and diplomats in both countries had agreed on the terms of reference, a formal agreement for cooperation was concluded in New Delhi on February 14, 1967. The Foundation assumed administrative and support functions of the program March 10, 1967; responsibility was charged to the Office of International Science Activities.^ ^^ The agreement, which is reviewed annually", provides for short exchange visits of two weeks to several months. The sending country "2 1970 National Science Fmivdalion Authorization: Hearings, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 575. iw 1970 National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings, Vol. II, op. cit., p. 575. 19* "U.S. Scientific and Technological Agreements with Other Countries." International Science Note Department of State (September 25, 1970), p. 5. i»« TIAS 6299, 18 UST, 1391, 1967. 2 $551, 000 e) (2) 0) .6 174,415 4 $677, 808 (752,000) $852, 223 $883, 000 436, 233 306, 265 742, 498 C) 35, 000 (2) n 498, 544 (645, 6^8) 8,500 C) Q) (») 940 pays the external travel costs and the host country pays subsistence expenses. The National Council of Scientific and Industrial Research of India (CSIR) is the foreign counterpart organization. Both the NSF and the CSIR approve selection of individual grantees and their programs. Exchanges of senior level scientists and engineers are emphasized. The original agreement did not specify particular subjects for exchange. Subsequent activities, at least for Arnericans, have included mathematics; physical, medical, biological, engineering, and social sciences; history and philosophy of science; and interdiscipli- nar}^ areas, such as geochemistry, meteorology, and oceanography. ^^^ The Foundation announces the program to academic departments and to a selected mailing list of potentially interested individuals.^^^ U.S. appUcants are evaluated on age, occupation, pubhcations, speciaUzed subject proficiency, academic degrees, experience, language proficiency other than English, nonprofessional interests if relevant, previous visits to India, duration of proposed visit, purpose and program of visit, and statement of scientific and economic importance ' to both countries of their visit to India.^^^ The Foundation does not require that American applicants be evaluated on their ability to adapt to a foreign culture; and provides no special training or orientation for participants. After his visit, the American scientist or engineer is required to submit a report to the Foundation describing his scientific activities in India and his general reaction. The Foundation is developing plans to exchange reports with India in an effort to improve the program. The bilateral agreement provides for an annual rnaximum of exchanges totaling 800 man-days each way. Indian scientists and engineers have participated extensively in the program: in the fiscal years 1968, 1969, and 1970, visits of Indians to the U.S. totalled 186, 948, and 913 man-days respectively. Americans have not responded equally. Corresponding figures for the three years were 67, 217, and 369. (For details see Table 13). According to the Department of State, the program is beneficial primarily to Indian scientists and engineers who come to this country to ' examine industrial methods and processes." ^^^ U.S. -Australia Agreement for Scientific and Technical Cooperation. — The United States-Australia Agreement for Scientific and Technical Cooperation is similar to the U.S.-Italy Agreement: cooperative re- search is emphasized; each government bears the cost of its own participation, and no funds are allocated specifically for the program. The origins of the program date to M&j 1968 when President Lyndon B. Johnson, visiting Australia, promised Prime Minister Gorton that a U.S. scientific delegation would visit Australia to discuss and expand the existing cooperation between the American and Australian civilian scientific communities. In October of that year, an American delega- tion visited AustraHa led by Dr. Donald Hornig, the Pres dent's science adviser, and Dr. Philip Handler, Chairman of the National Science Board. After eight days of discussion the officials signed a formal agreement for scientific cooperation.^"" i»« U.S. National Science Foundation, "Exchange of Scientists and Engineers: U.S./India," program announcement, non-dated; "India-U.S. exchange of scientists: terms of reference;" and NSF, data sheet on "U.S.-India Exchange of Scientists and Engineers," prepared by DIP, January 15, 1971. iw Interview with Dr. Eaphael RonJdn, DIP, February 26, 1971. 19* "Exchange of Scientists and Engineers; U.S./India," program brochure, op. cit. iM "U.S. Scientific and Technological Agreements with Other Countries," op. clt., p. 4. :m"U.S. Australia Agreement for Scientific and Technical Cooperation," Oct. 16, 1968, TIAS 6589, 19 U ST 6714. 941 TABLE 13.— UNITED STATES-INDIA EXCHANGES OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS PROGRAM » Indians to United States Fiscal year Total number Total cost to NSF (dollars) Americans to India Total man- Total days number Total cost to NSF (dollars) (travel only) Total man- days Subject Subtotal Americans Cost (dollars) Man- days 1968. 1969. 1970. 5 6, 534 186 17 30, 178 948 12 29, 185 913 2,650 7,781 » (9, 104) 11 14,791 67 217 369 1971 *. 8 » 22,565 Physiology 1,300 27 Physiology. 1,350 40 Coastal dynamics (?) 23 Aerodynamics 1,330 60 Physics 910 22 Physics . 1,524 postponed Aerodynamics ... 1,275 30 Coal research 1,386 30 Civil engineering 1,356 52 Physics. 1,403 15 Physics 1,421 postponed Pharmacology 1,321 postponed Aerospace 1,301 120 Aerospace 1,450 32 Statistics 1,301 60 Aerodynamics.. 1,27S 27 Coal research 1,386 24 Hematology. 1,290 20 Civil engineering 1,356 38 Industrial engineering 1,287 33 1 Fiscal year 1968 to 1970 data supplied by Office of International Programs, National Science Foundation; Fiscal year 1971 data from NSF, "Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1971," op. cit., p. 55. 2 The figure from NSF, "Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1969," op. cit., p. 106. 3 Federal employees. * Two grants extended to fiscal year 1971. * For both Indians and Americans. The purposes of both Governments were : (a) to seek increased opportunities for scientists and engineers to engage in joint research projects and exchange of scientific and technical information; (b) to facilitate long and short-term visits of scholars for the purpose of research, special studies, and lectures; (c) to promote direct contact between scientific and technical institutions and workers; (d) to facilitate attendance at scientific and technical con- ferences; and (e) to exchange planning information in fields where programs of mutual interest are being pursued in both countries.^"^ The NSF was designated the U.S. executive agency; its Australian counterpart is the Department of Education and Science. Each of these Agencies jointly approves and coordinates the activities of any of its national agencies participating in the program. The duration of the agreement is five years; the executive agency in each country reviews the pace of progress "from time to time." Current memos of understanding provide for programs treating: "rangelands, chemical identification and analysis of dangerous drugs, and biomedical sciences >) 202 201 "Joint Communique issued by Hon. Malcolm Fraser, Minister for Education and Science of the Com- monwealth of Australia and Dr. Donald F. Homig, Special Assistant to the President of the U.S. for Science and Technology," foUowing discussions held in Australia, October 9-16, 1968. *2 U.S., National Science Foundation, Office of International Programs. "Program Announcement on U.S.-AustraUa Cooperative Science Program," October 1970, 1 p. 942 This agreement, like other bilaterals, is designed to supplement and strengthen existing scientific and technological cooperation between the two countries. Funds for the support of the activities of American scientists may come from any U.S. source, including the regular research support programs of the NSF. The OIP approves American proposals for cooperative research. According to the NSF program officer, the two countries require the preparation of a joint annual report, but the Foundation keeps no detailed account of activities conducted under the program. The preparation of a report is handicapped because : (1) there are no specific funds allotted by NSF for program activities ; (2) other Federal agencies fund activities under the program; (3) some cooperative U.S. -Australian activities which began before the agreement are now included in it, but others are not; and (4) scientists sponsored by the program are not required to report to the NSF on their activities. ^°^ One of the major objectives of the U.S. -Australia cooperative pro- gram is to benefit Australian science. Usuall}'^ the science, budgets of countries with which the United States has science agreements are smaller than U.S. science budgets. In addition, funding mechanisms tend to be less well established. Before inception of the U.S. -Aus- tralian program, Australia did not have a mechanism to fund the international travel of its scientists; this agreement helped institu- tionalize one.^"* Commenting on the effectiveness of the U.S. -Australia program, the State Department observes: "Thus far, except for some collaborative research in drag detection, not much has developed, the principal problem being one of funding." ^°^ NSF-sponsored activities, as of 1 December 1970, were: (1) Austra- lians working in the United States: thunderstorms, 12 months; forest fire research, 2 months; structure of the lower atmosphere, 3 months; rangelands, 1 month; photos3Tithesis, 1 month; biomedical research, 2 visits of 1 month each; and (2) Americans working in Australia: scientific ballooning, 2 months.^*^ In fiscal year 1971 the Foundation awarded one grant for the program: "$4,000 for a joint seminar on photosjTi thesis, held in Australia." ^°^ U .S .-Republic of China (Taiwan) Cooperative Science Program.— The U.S. -Republic of China Cooperative Science Program, which began in 1969, is designed, like the exchange with India, to stimulate economic development through association with U.S. experts.^"^ It is "broad and non-specific, with no large administrative over- head"; ^"^ the Taiwan Government contributes the bulk of the funding. The origin of scientific cooperation between the United States and Taiwan governments dates back to 1964, when a nongovernmental Sino-American Science Cooperation Committee was established jointly by the Academia Sinica in Taipei and the U.S. National Academy of -■<» Interview, Dr. Raphael Ronldn, February 26, 1971. 2W Idem. 205 "U.S. Scientific and Technological Agreements with Other Countries," op. cit. ^li U.S. National Science Foimdation, "U.S. -Australia Agreement for Scientific and Technical Coopera- tion: Brief R6sum6 of Activities," December 1, 1970, supplied by Raphael Ronkin, Program Officer, U.S.- Australia Agreement for Scientific and Technical Cooperation, OIP, NSF. 3ti' NSF, Annual Report. FY 1971, op. cit, p. 55. 208 "U.S. Scientific and Technological Agreements with Other Countries," op. cit., p. 5. 209 Taken from Louis Levin, Executive Associate Director, NSF, Memo on "Conversation on October 18, 1968, with Dr. Bruce BilMngs, U.S. Representative in Taiwan and John Lacey, SCI, Department of State, about U.S.-Taiwan Cooperative Agreement," October 22, 1968, supplied by NSF. 943 Sciences. Chinese initiatives to establish a governmental cooperative science program were made first in 1966 during a visit of Vice Presi- dent-Premier C. K. Yen of China to the United States. Discussions continued in Taiwan in 1967 during the visit of the President's Science Adviser. In 1968, the Department of State appointed a Special Assistant for Science and Technology at the U.S. Embass}^ in Taiwan. Shortly thereafter, the Office of International Scientific and Technolog- ical Affairs and the "China Desk," Department of State, began to negotiate with both the Taiwanese Government and the NSF on arrangements for a formal cooperative science agreement. ^^° An "Intergoverimaental agreement effected by an exchange of notes," formalized the program; it was signed January 23, 1969, in Taipei by the U.S. Ambassador to Taiwan and the Almister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of China. ^^^ NSF formally accepted responsibilit}^ for the program March 13, 1969, after it received assurance that the Chinese Government would help fund the program and that the Foundation's own financial responsibilities would be limited. ^^^ The National Science Council in Taiwan was named the foreign counterpart organization. The agreement, whose duration is open- ended, provides that each of the executive agencies coordinates and jomtl}^ approves projects carried out. Wliile the program is aimed primarily at academic scientists, governmental and industrial projects as well as those of non-profit institutions are eligible. Each Government was given the responsibility for supporting the activities of its own scientists; a provision was included for jointly supported cooperative projects. Cooperation includes all fields of science and technology, including the social sciences. Four t3'^pes of activities may be considered for U.S. scientists in the program : (1) short term visits of U.S. scientists to lecture, consult and participate in symposia, and the like; (2) long-term visits of U.S. scientists to spend from six months to one year instructing at the graduate level and conducting collaborative research in the natural sciences ; (3) cooperative research in any area of science ; and (4) seminars on any scientific subject mcluding science education.^'^ The program began in the fiscal j^ear 1970. It is small in terms both of funding and scope of activities. Grants awarded by the NSF in 1970 amounted to $105,140; and in 1971 to $79,200. The Republic of China has contributed $250,000 for the two-year period, 1970-1971. Under the long-term exchange of scientists portion of the program, four Americans went to the Repubfic of China during the fiscal year \ 210 From data sheet on "U.S. Republic of China Cooperative Science Program," prepared by NSF, January 15, 1971; Max HeUmann, Office of International Science Activities, NSF, "Diary Note: Subject: t .S.-Republic of China Cooperative Agreement," August 29, 1968; Levin, "Conversation . . . October 18, 1968, op. cit., and Internal memo, NSF from L. J. Haworth, Director, to Arthur Roe, Head, OISA, De- cember 27, 1968 (discussing proposed bilateral agreement). 2" TIAS 6639, 20 UST 374. 212 Levin, "Conversation, October 18, 1968"; op. cit.; Letter Secretary Rogers to Dr. Haworth, February 21, 1969; and Letter, Dr. Haworth to Secretary Rogers, March 13, 1969. All documents supplied by NSF. 213 Details may be found in: U.S. National Science Foundation, "United States-Republic of China Co- operative Science Program" program brochure, NSF 69-35; U.S. National Science Foundation, "U.S.- China Cooperative Science Program, Guidelines for Short-term Visiting Scientists," October 20, 1969; U.S. National Science Foundation," U.S.-China Cooperative Science Program, Guidelines for Submitting Long-term Visiting Scientists Proposals," October 29, 1969; U.S. National Science Foundation, "U.S. Republic of China Cooperative Science Program. Cooperative Research," (guidelines), no date; and U.S. National Science Foundation, "U.S.-China Cooperative Science Program, Guidelines for Submitting Seminar Proposals," November 1969. 944 1970 for a total of 65 months. Their activities were in botany, mathe- matics, marine geology, and engineering. Three of the four Americans .sent were of Chinese descent. In the fiscal year 1970, 25 Americans were sent to China under the short-term visit segment of the program. In the fiscal year 1971 the Foundation supported a total of five Americans to research and teach in Taiwan.^^* Topics were engineering, mathematics, and biochemistry. "Significant results" reported by the NSF include: "the artificial propagation of an important food fish, increased understanding of the 'bukane' disease of rice, and the discovery of new information on schistosomiasis. . , ." 215 United States-France Agreement on the Exchange of Scientists. — According to Robert F. Hull, Ofl&ce of International Programs, NSF, the United States-French Agreement on the Exchange of Scientists, reached on July 20, 1970, was motivated primarily to satisfy French scientists' desires to rectify certain imbalances in the pattern of scientific exchange between the two countries. American scientists frequently elected to research and study in French laboratories and universities, but usually only in certain disciplines, and near Paris. French scientists wanted to see a broadening of U.S. participation, to emphasize especially mathematics, physics, chemistry and engineering, and tenures in laboratories and universities located in regions other than Paris. In addition, the French scientific community wanted to develop a program which would encourage more French scientists to study and research in the United States. ^^^ The bilateral program originated during the Spring, 1968, when Dr. Maurice Levy, the newly-appointed French scientific attache to the United States, began discjssions with the NSF to establish an agreement for the exchange of scientists between the Foundation and the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS).=^i\ CNRS, similar to the NSF, is a French Government agency dealing with developing, coordinating, funding, and operating science policy functions. Negotiations continued when the President's Science Adviser met in Paris in September 1969, with the French Minister for Industrial and Scientific Development. The Minister visited the United States two months later. During this visit the offic als an- nounced appointment of coordinators for the program: for France, the Director General for Cultural and Scientific Relations and Techni- cal Assistance at the Foreign Ministry, and the Delegate- General for Scientific and Technological Research ; and for the United States, the Director of the National Bureau of Standards. During the September meeting, the representatives of both countries agreed to limit the program to an exchange of young postdoctoral scientists between the NSF and the CNRS. A draft memorandum embodying this agreement was prepared by the NSF in the Fall of 1969 and transmitted to the French Scientific Mission. Discussion continued, culminating in a memorandum signed on July 20, 1970, by 2'< Data on size and program funding from: U.S. National Science Foundation, "(Data Sheets) on U.S.- Republic of China Cooperative Science Program, FY 1970," supplied by NSF; U.S. National Science Foundation, Annual Report, FY 1970, 1971; Annual Report, FY 1971, op. cit., p. 55; and NSF, Justification of Estimates of Appropriations, FY 1973, op. cit. «5 NSF, Justification of Estimates of Appropriations, FY197S, op. cit., p. H-2. 2" Interview, Robert F. Hull, Office of International Programs, NSF, February 26, 1971. The NSF reports that the agreement was concluded "at the request of the French National Center for Scientific Re- search . . . (with the approval of the Department of State) . . . ." (.974 National Science Foundation Authorization : Hearings, op. cit., p. 356.) 21' Background material taken from: Robert F. Hull, "Memo on U.S.-France" In "Contribution to OIP Annual Report," FY 1970 (III.A.5), July 10, 1970, internal Memo, NSF, 3 pp. 945 the Director of the National Science Foundation, for the United States, And Hubert Curien director-general of the National Center for Scientific Research for France. ^^* The agreement provided for a S-j'ear program which could be renewed. Awards are made for study or work only in the mathematical, physical, chemical and engineering sciences, and in the biological sciences exclusive of medicine. ^'^ Visits typically last between five and fifteen months. E^ichange scientists and dependents receive travel funds; the host institution provides a stipend for Uving and domestic travel expenses. The NSF also furnishes institutional allowances to the U.S. host institution for French scientists. ^^° The 1970 agreement provided for support by each agency totaling the U.S. dollar equivalent of $50,000 for the academic year 1971-1972. In fiscal year 1971, the NSF awarded grants to 11 French scientists for study in the United States. Twelve American scientists received awards for studj^ in France. Total funds obligated by NSF in 1971 amounted to $113,647.^^^ Eight American scientists were supported during fiscal year 1972, as were eight French scientists.^^^ Scientific Exchanges With Romania. — ^^ A delegation from Romania, headed by Alexandru Birladeanu, Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Romania and Chairman of the Romanian National Council of Scientific Research, came to the United States on June 18, 1968, at the invitation of Dr. Donald F, Homig, President Johnson's science adviser. A joint statement ^"^ issued by Mr. Birladeanu and Dr. Hornig at the conclusion of the three-week visit referred to the exchange program which had been in effect between the two countries since 1960 and expressed an intention to expand mutually beneficial projects of scientific cooperation. In particular, both Governments sought opportunities for scientists and engineers to engage jointly in research, scientific and technical information exchange, and mutual fellowship programs. Each country agreed to encourage long- and short-term visits of scholars and specialists to each country for research, study, lectures, and attendance at scientific and technical conferences. Specific cooperative areas mentioned included: transportation, coal research, preservation of wildlife, physical standards, and the peaceful uses of atomic energy. Each government also agreed to designate a "science oflQcer" to its Embassy in the other's capital. The formal agreement for scientific cooperation was included as part of the cultural exchange agreement signed by the two countries on November 28, 1968.^^^ 218 "Memorandum of Arrangement for the Exchange of Scientists between the National Science Founda- tion of the U.S. and the National Center for Scientific Research of France," July 20, 1970. ='» Social sciences \\111 be added during the fiscal year 1974 program. {1974 NSF Authorization: Hearings, op. cit. p. 356.) 2-" Idem, and "Amiouncing the 1971-72 Program for French-U.S. Exchange of Scientists between the NSF and the CNRS," program announcement by National Science Foundation, E-70-G-17. 221 NSF, Annual Report, FY mi, op. cit., p. 55. 222 U.S. National Science Foimdation, Annual Report, FY 1972, 1973, p. S3. -^ Similar agreements were later entered into with Hungary, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. The NSF is implementing agency for these agreements under the Expanded East Europe Cooperative Science Program. There is no indication in NSF budget materials that foreign currency funds are used for these activities, although the Foundation does have a separate Special Foreign Currency Program which provides for fund- ing of scientific research with Poland and Yugoslavia. These NSF directly-administered scientific exchange programs are entirely separate from the NAS administered interacademy programs with the Eastern Euro- pean countries, which are also funded by the Foundation, using U.S. dollar funds. See the next chapter of this study. --* "Romanian scientific delegation visits the United States." OflQce of Science and Technology press release, July 8, 1968, and text of the joint statement, U.S. Department of State Bulletin, 59 (August 12, 1969 pp. 178-179. 225 U.S., National Science Foundation, Annual Report, FY 1969, 1970, p. 104, 946 This formal exchange supplements the U.S.-Romanian program for the exchange of scientists administered by the National Academy of Sciences. Under terms of the agreement, the Office of Internationa' Programs was named implementing agency for the United States, and the Romanian National Council for Scientific Research the imple- menting agency for Romania. Guidelines for content and scope were worked out by the two agencies; the formal exchange program began in fiscal year 1970. The program has not been very active. During fiscal year 1970, the Foundation supported the visits of two Americans to Romania, at a cost of $35,000. During the same period seven Romanian sci- entists spent a total of 48 man-months travelling and studying in the United States.226 A joint agreement to broaden exchanges under the program was signed on November 27, 1970, following the visits to Romania of President Nixon and Dr. Lee DuBridge, the President's Science Adviser. The new agreement also p^o^^ded for the two nations to explore the possibility of developing joint research projects in a variety of fields.^^^ In 1973 the Foundation reported to the Congress on activities under the agreement: In the last two fiscal years, 28 Romanians have visited the United States and nine Americans have traveled to Romania. The main interest on the Romanian side has been in the applied sciences, engineering, and such -speciahzed techno- logical fields as fuel technology, food processing, and textile manufacturing. The program affords an opportunity for Romanian scientists to work in U.S. labora- tories on problems of interest to researchers in both countries. U.S. scientists, who have visited Romania under this program, have worked with their Romanian colleagues on such subjects as internal combustion pollutants, coordination chemistry, polymers, nonlinear \ntegral equations, and fluid mechanics.228 United States-Spain Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation. — Authority for the United States to maintain and operate military installations in Spain, sanctioned by the Defense Agreement of 1953 ancl extensions thereof , was due to expire in late 1970. Military and political considerations on both sides of the Atlantic led the United States to seek continued use of military f aciUties in Spain and continued assist- ance to Spain "in strengthening its own defense system." Economic and political pressures within Spain and the United States motivated expansion of the military agreement into other cooperative areas including technical assistance. A new agreement providing for both military and nonmilitary cooperation was signed August 6, 1970.^^^ This agreement provides for scientific and technical cooperation; however, U.S. technical assistance to Spain, rather than bilateral cooperation, is stressed. Specifically, the agreement provides for: [Continuation and expansion of exchanges under the Fulbright program, involving exchanges of] teachers, research experts, scientists, scholars and students [in] all branches of learning, especially natural and applied sciences, economics, and the language and culture of the two countries ; ^^o [U.S. technical assistance to Spain, subject to Ck)ngressional appropriations of funds, to expand] the Spanish educational system and Spanish scientific and 226 NSF, Annual Report, FY 1970. op. cit. pp. 94-95. 22' Department of State Press Release 327, November 27, 1970, Including text of the program of exchanges in Educational, Scientific, Cultural and other fields for 1971 and 1972. 228 1974 NSF Authorization: Heariwjs, op. cit., p. 316. 229 "United States-Spain Sign Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation," statement on Joint Com- munique signed August 6, 1970, Department of State Bulletin (August 31, 1970), p. 237. 23'' Articles 4 and 5. 947 technical development [to provide for] advanced training of professors and other teaching personnel, particularly in the scientific disciplines [and] documents, equipment, and materials for research laboratories and libraries. . . ; ^3' [A special program on scientific and technical cooperation involving]: A. activities of major interest and yield; B. preparation of plans for collaboration between research centers of the two countries ; C. [programs for sending to Spain] American professors and researchers of established reputation to cooperate in the advanced training of scientific and technological researchers; and D. appro- priate administrative channels to administer programs.^^^ Four areas of scientific and technical cooperation are emphasized: civilian uses of atomic energy, space exploration, marine sciences, and medical and biological sciences. Separate chapters provide for coop- eration also in environmental and urban development and assistance in the development of Spanish agricultural programs.^^ This agreement became effective September 26, 1970, and will re- main in force for five years, when it will be subject to renewal.^* Agreements and activities subsequent to signing indicate that cooperation in science and technology, initially, will be modest. The agreement did not define the terms of financial support for civilian activities authorized by the program. However, it did specify that funding for nonmihtary program elements, which include areas other than science and technology, will be subject to annual Congressional approval. The United States committed a maximum of $3 million to support all civilian program elements in fiscal year 1971.^^^ Activities to implement the technical assistance provisions of the agreement began in the summer of 1970 when "U.S. and Spanish officials , . . visited institutions to explore the most effective possibili- ties for mutual research and scientific exchange." ^® On August 20, 1970 discussions on implementation of the science and technology aspects of the agreement were held by the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State (the agency originally in charge of writing the terms of agreement on science and technologA^, and the NSF Office of National and International Pro- grams.^^ Assistant Secretary of State John Richardson Jr. was named coordinator for use of the $3 million supplied to the Department of State for nonmilitary cooperation. NSF was asked to serve as executive agency for science and tech- nology,^* and to assist the Department of State in developing pro- gram guidelines. FY 1971 activities were limited to program develop- ment and no funds were obligated. ^^ In reporting to the Congress early in 1972 on this agreement, the Foundation said onh^ that "... funds for the continuation of the program will be transferred to the Foundation in fiscal year 1973." ^^^ Scientijic Cooperation With Brazil and Other Latin American Countries. — The United States and Brazil concluded an Agreement on Scientific Cooperation on December 1, 1971. The aim of the program, according t& th& State Department, would be to "intensify > ai Article 6. 232 Chapter lU, Scientific and Technical Cooperation, Articles 9, 10; 11, and 12. 223 Chapter TV, articles 14, 15, 16 and Chapter V, articles 17, 18, 19, and 20. »< Article 28. 235 Letter from Secretary of State William P. Rogers to Gregorio Lopez Bravo, Minister of Foreign Affairs ■of Spain, August 6, 1970. 236 "United States-Spanish Science Cooperation," International Science Notes (September 1970), p. 6. 23' "Bilateral Science Programs, U.S.-Spain," material prepared by Office of International Programs, NSF, January 15. 1971. 238 Letter from U. Alexis Johnson, Acting Secretary, Department of State to William D, McElroy, Director NSF, November 27, 1970. 239 NSF, Annual Report, FY 1971, op. cit., p. 55. 240 NSF, Justification of Estimates of Appropriations, FY 187S, op. cit., p. H-2. 948 the cooperation between the scientists of the two countries and ta« provide additional opportunities to exchange ideas, information, skills, and techniques to collaborate on problems of mutual interest, to work together in special environments, jand to utilize special facilities." 2« The duration of the agreement is five years. Executive agencies are the NSF in the United States, and the National Research Council of Brazil. It was proposed that the United States allocate $300,000 for fiscal year 1973 program operations.^^ NSF is working out details and procedures for similar agreements with Argentina and Mexico.^*^ It was estimated that $300,000 would be required for 1973 activities for each program.^** United States-Iran Program jor Scientific Cooperation. — A U.S. -Iran Program for Scientific Cooperation was agreed upon in an exchange of letters signed at Tehran on May 23 and 27, 1968. The formal agreement envisioned general scientific cooperation and exchanges of personnel and information especially in geology, nutrition, and disease. The Department of State delegated lead agency responsibility for the United States to the Smithsonian Institution. The Iranian Ministry of Science and Higher Education was named the counter- part executive agency. Under terms of the Agreement each side would bear the costs of its own participants. The duration of the original agreement was for three years. According to a later State Department evaluation of the program, "unfortunately funds have not been available even to stimulate investigation . . . ."^" In 1972 the National Science Foundation announced that it "agreed to accept Executive Agency responsibiHty for a renewed bilateral cooperative science program between the United States and the Government of Iran. The Foundation plans to support American scientific participation in about six binational seminars, twelve exchange visits of U.S. and Iranian scientists and two cooperative research projects" .^*^ OTHER PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY THE OFFICE OF INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS The Office of International Programs administers three other activities which send American nongovernmental scientists abroad. These, which will be described next, are: Planning and Developing International Science Programs, the International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis, and the Special Foreign Currency Pro- gram. U.S. Participation in Planning and Developing International Science Programs. — The only exphcit travel support activity of the Office of International Programs is a modest program in support of U.S. par- ticipation in the planning, development, organization, and coordina- tion of international scientific programs and meetings. Currently called the "Scientific Organization and Resources Program," it ^ "United States and Brazil Sign Agreement on Scientific Cooperation," LcpaTtmtnt of State Bulletin- (December 27, 1971), p. 747. ^- Taken from data supplied to FC, ICST, Subcommittee on Bilateral Relations, December 4, 1971, con- sisting of a draft catalogue of U.S. bilateral scientific agreements. 2« NSF, Justification of EHimates of Appropriations, FY 197S, op. cit., p. H-2. 2" Material supplied to IC, FCST, December 4, 1971, by State Department, op. cit. 2<» "U.S. Scientific and Technological Agreements with Other Countries," op. cit. 2<« NSF, Justification of Estimates of Appropriations, FY 1973, op. cit., p. H-60. 949 consists of annual awards to the Office of the Foreign Secretary, National Academy of Sciences, (NAS) to support NAS activities including : (1) travel expenses associated with meetings of the U.S. national committees for member unions of the International Council of Scientific Unions ; (2) funds to convene meetings of the Advisory Committee on International Organizations and Programs ; (3) support for the Academy staff involved in the activities of the national committees ; (4) funds for the payment of the U.S. dues to the ICSU and its member unions ; (5) awards for U.S. scientists to participate in decisionmaking meetings of international organizations, both governmental and nongovernmental ; (6) activities to ensure that proposals from the U.S. scientific community receive proper attention at all levels of appro- priate international scientific organizations; and (7) activities to ensure dissemination to American scientists- of information about the activities of international organiza- tions.^^ NSF's use of inconsistent categories in the collection and reporting of annual data makes it difficult to achieve an accurate and balanced overview of the Foundation's funding of this program.^** Using a broad grouping categorized as "Scientific Liaison with International Scientific Organizations and Programs/' the Foundation reports approximately $400,000 in expenditures for this program for each of the fiscal years 1966, 1967 and 1968; $173,535 for 1970; $400,000 for 1971; and $500,000 estunated for 1972.2*9 $700,000 was requested for the fiscal year 1974.^^'' Activities are administered by the Section on International Pro- grams, NAS. According to Mr. Edward Rowan, section head, the meetings are especially valuable because they provide for informal communications between scientists; they serve as trade markets for professionals wishing to switch jobs, and they also "serve to provide information on scientific activities in other countries." ^^ A useful byproduct is their contribution to "peace and understanding," since many initiatives for international scientific collaborative projects originate at these meetings. However, Rowan also stresses ^^ U.S., Congress, Hou?e, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, 1979 National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings, 92d Cong., 1st sess., 1973, p. 346; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, 1971 National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings, 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, pp. 210-211. 2<8 The Foundation awards the Academy several grants or contracts each year for participation in this program. Authorizations/appropriations hearings have not presented consistently categorized data. In order to find amounts awarded, it is necessary to pick out and collate awards listed in several places in the grants and awards books, a difficult task since the Foundation until 1971 reported support for NAS activities under a niunber of different program categories. -« The Foundation has utilized several different categories and labels to describe this program since 1960. Data for 1966, 1967, and 1968. r.re from: Inventory of Federal Programs . . ., op. cit.; Additional data are from: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations. Independent Offices Appropriations, FY 1968: Hearings, 90th Cong. 1st sess., 1967, pp. 180, 197, 227, and 421; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations, FY 1969: Hearings, 90th Cong. 2d sess., 1968, pp. 1203, 1203-1204; U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Independent Offices Appropriations, FY 1970: Hearings, 91st Cong. 1st sess., 1969, pp. 462-465; U.S., Congress, Hiouse, Committee on Appropria- tions, Independent Offices Appropriatiom, FY 1971: Hearings, 91st Cong. 2d sess., 1970, pp. 836-837; and" U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research,.. and Development: 197i National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings, op. cit., pp. 346-247. MO i97j^ National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearinga, op. cit., p. 319. »' Interview, March 16, 1971. 950 that U.S. scientists originate most of these initiatives. Scientists of other countries consequently are said to resent this American domina- tion of new initiatives. Awards for attendance at specific meetings of each of the unions adhering to the International Council of Scientific Unions, (ICSU), are typically funded by separate divisions of NSF. Mr. Rowan's office maintains some centralized reporting on these activities. (See Tables 14 and 15.) Each chairman of a delegation is required to report such details of the meeting as attendance, comments (scientific and diplomatic), activities of the U.S. delegation, and consideration of resolutions. The Academy does not give delegates pr«departure briefings on scientific or diplomatic positions. However, the State Department is interested in deliberations at these meetings and since 1950 has supported the travel of its own delegates to them.^^^ During 1967 and 1968, the Academy and members of the ICSU decided that the quality of meetings was suffering because organizing committees relied on local scientists for their arrangements. The Academy subsequently organized an ad hoc group to prepare two re- ports on their problems and status. The first report, published in 1968, offered recommendations for improving the quality and organi- zation of international scientific meetings: 1. Participation of the international sponsor in the planning of meetings. 2. Screening of the papers to be presented at meetings. 3. Recognition of the importance of informal contacts at meetings in the allot- ment of time and space for informal discussion. 4. Close attention to physical facilities and arrangements. o. Establishment by international unions of committees of past organizers who can advise current national organizing committees. 6. Adequate secretariats for organizing committees of large meetings and, in the case of the largest meetings, the services of a professional congress organizer, if one with proper qualifications is available. 7. Concentration of sessions of large meetings in one area where all are easily accessible to each other. 8. More selective sponsorship of meetings by international organizations. 9. Avoidance of unnecessary duplication by means of better communications about prospective meetings through the regular exchange of information by scientific organizations in the same general field and through better use of period- ically published lists of forthcoming meetings. 10. Financial assistance to the organizers of meetings, either through loans from a revolving fund of the sponsoring body or through the collection of a small surcharge on registration fees at the previous meeting in the series. 11. Publication of papers given at a meeting in the form of proceedings only in answer to a real need and because of clear advantage over publication in other forms. 12. Encouragement of small meetings in developing countries on subjects of special interest to the particular regions in question. 13. [Attention to adequacy or excessiveness of American participation in inter- national scientific meetings.] 14. [Encouragement of the holding of more international scientific meetings in the United States.] 253 Apparently the quality of these meetings has improved considerably following the Academy's adoption of these practices. "-' Ibid. -53 "Report of the Committee on the Quality and Organization of Internationa) Scirntific Meetings." Office of the Foreign Secretary, National. Academy of Science, June 1968 (the Noyes Report), pp. 8-9. 951 TABLE 14.— OFFICE OF THE FOREIGN SECRETARY, PARTICIPATION IN CONGRESSES AND GENERAL ASSEMBLIES OF INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC ORGANIZATIONS, 1970 NAS-NRC delegation Total U.S. participation Total participation Countries represented UICC; Cancer Microbiology I All: Astronomy. lUTAM: Theoretical and applied mechanics IMU: Mathematics. Ornithology... lUB: Biochemistry FID: Documentation . IPSO: Physical sciences of the ocean SCOR: Oceanic research lABO: Biological oceanography CMG: Marine geology. ISRM: Rock mechanics Plant protection ICSU: International Council of Scientific Unions. lUBS: Biological sciences Total 3 >2 8 4 10 1 1 3 2 2 1 I 1 2 « 1 5 9 000 6,018 300 3,000 479 2,300 37 150 500 4,500 102 850 550 3,500 22 625 105 600 6 40 2 44 100 300 37 700 50 1,728 16 125 9 93 72 33 46 2Q 39 44 49 30 33 17 22 32 22 57 44 25 55 6,315 24, 573 ' Observer. Source: Supplied by National Academy of Sciences. TABLE 15.-U.S. PARTICIPATION IN INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONGRESSES, 1960 TO 1970 Year Number of U.S. Total NAS-NRC Congresses participation participation delegation 1960 1961 1962 1%3 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 _. 1970 Total 6 2,295 7,271 274 8 4,237 13,660 lOJ 9 2,501 12, 151 61 12 2,386 14,711 25i 8 4,905 11, 874 76 8 2.721 11,379 51 16 4,155 30, 038 105- 13 3,169 14,717 94 13 4,973 14, 993 87 12 3,671 12,921 81 16 6,315 24, 573 55 121 41,328 168, 288 1,140 Source: Supplied by National Academy of Sciences. The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. — The International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis was established in Vienna in 1972. The Office of International Programs, NSF, sup- ports U.S. participation through grants awarded to NAS, the U.S. adhering agency, which selects American governmental and nongovern- mental scientific participants. Approximately $1 million (estimated) was awarded to the Academy for this purpose in both 1972 and 1973.^^* The Institute, which is nongovernmental and international, orig- inated in discussions between high-level scientific and governmental officials. ^^ President Nixon outlined the importance of U.S. participa- tion in the activity in his report to the Congress on "Foreign Policy for the 1970's: "This institution" he said "would initiall}^ bring together scholars from some eight nations of East and West to apply the most 2« Authorizing Appropriations to the NSF, FY 197S, House Report 92-977. op cit. p. 56. 255 "Origin: Ttie idea for this Institute was developed by Mc George Bundy wtiile he served in the Johnson Administration. McGeorge Bundy discussed this concept with Sir Solly Zuckerman, and Mr. D. M. Gvish- iani of the Soviet Union and other prominent officials in Western Europe. The concept was also discussed with members of Congress before officials of other countries were asked about the establishment of this kind of Institute. The Director of the Foundation has also discussed this concept with the members of both the- House and Senate Committees" (.1S72 National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings, op. cit., p. 265.) 952 sophisticated analytical tools available to the major problems of contemporary civilization." ^^^ The initial budget totaled $3 million ; the Soviet Union has pledged $1 million, "with remaining funds to be made up by the other member countries." Other participants are the United Kingdom, France, Italy, West Germany, Poland, and East Germany; Canada, Japan, and Bulgaria are considering membership. Special Foreign Currency Program. — Since 1959 the National Science Foundation has maintained a program for collecting, translating, abstracting, and disseminating foreign science information to meet the requirements of Federal agencies and the general scientific com- munity. The program makes available selected scientific and tech- nological literature produced by .foreign scientists. Funds for this program, from fiscal year 1959 to 1970, came from NSF-purchased foreign currencies. Approximately $1 million in foreign currency funding was devoted to the program from 1964 to 1970. Since the fiscal year 1970, the Foundation has been given a Special Foreign Currency appropriation, enabling the agency to utilize payments in foreign currencies which the Treasury Department has determined to be in excess of the normal requirements of the United States in certain countries.^^^ In mid-fiscal year 1971 the Foundation expanded its excess foreign currency translation program to support cooperative scientific research and related activities benefiting both United States and foreign scientists in six foreign countries: India, Morocco, Poland, Tunisia, Egypt, and Yugoslavia.^^* The Foundation subsequently extended the program to Pakistan in FY 1972 and to Burma and Guinea in FY 1973. The scientific activities supported under this program are con- sidered to be of mutual benefit to both U.S. and foreign scientific communities, but lack priority to warrant their funding from the Foundation's appropriation.^^^ The program, under the category "Scientific Research and Related Activities," encompasses four kinds of activity: (1) collaborative research undertaken by U.S. and foreign scientists ; (2) joint studies, conferences, symposia, seminars, or meetings; (3) visits of U.S. scientists to foreign institutions to teach or conduct research; and (4) travel by U.S. scientists to meetings or other scientific activities in special foreign currency countries and travel by scientists of the special foreign currency countries to the United States or elsewhere.^®" 2W In Authorizing Appropriations to the NSF, FY 197S, House Report 92-977, op. cit.; See also: 1972 NSF Authorization: Hearings, op. cit., p. 364. 2W Under authority of Section 104(b)3 of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954 258 NSF, justification of Estimates of Appropriations, FY7S, op. cit., p. P-1. "9 Idem. J'o Idem. 953 Proposals for projects under the special foreign currenc}^ program are to be initiated by both U.S. and foreign scientists and science educators. All programs would be coordinated with and have the approval of the State Department and the foreign country before they are undertaken. Funds are awarded by the separate divisions of the Foundation, not by the Office of International Programs. ^^^ Overviewing activities under the research and related activities section of the program for the first year since its inception, the Founda- tion reported : From the inauguration of the program, in mid-FY 1971, to December 31, 1971, the Foundation awarded grants for 21 cooperative research projects in Yugo- slavia, Egypt, and Poland. It also made 96 awards to American scientists to Fiinnnr* thHr ;"'tt?ndpnce at international conferences, congresses, and symposia, or their participation in the development of joint research projects to be conducted in Yugoslavia, Poland, India, Morocco, and Tunisia. Long-term projects being supported or proposed for support concern earthquake engineering, electrical engineering, environmental sciences, and other areas of science and technology of prime importance to both the foreign countries involved and the United States.262 Obligations for informational activities of the program have totaled $1,000,000 for each year from 1970 to 1974 (estunated). In fiscal year 1971, when the scientific research and related activities segment of the program began, the Foundation obligated $996,322. This figure was increased to $1,999,598 in fiscal 3'ear 1972, and to $4,000,000 estimated for the years 1973 and 1974. The total fiscal year 1974 request for this program was $5,000,000. ^^ (A detailed budget breakdown, by function, is given in Table 16.) TABLE 16.— NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, SPECIAL FOREIGN CURRENCY PROGRAM, BY FUNCTION [Thousands of dollars, equivalents) Fiscal year — foreign scientific and technological in- formation activities Research and other science activities.. Scientific research Science education International travel.. Program total Sources: Data for 1969, est., 1970, est., and 1971, est.: U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, "Inde- pendent Offices and Department of Housing and Urban Development Appropriations for 1971: Hearings, Pt. 2," 91st Cong., 2d sess., 1970, pp. 927 and 931. Data for 1971, est. and 1972, est. from: U.S. National Science Foundation, "Jus- tification of Estimates of Appropriations to the Congress, FY 1973, 1972," p. P-1. Data for 1973 and 1974 from U.S. National Science Foundation, "Justification of Estimates of Appropriations to the Congress, FY 1974," 1973, p. 0-1. Foreign currency funds obligated in the fiscal year 1972 (in dollar equivalents) range from over $1,000,000 for Yugoslavia to$ 2,517 for Pakistan and Burma. (See Table 17.) 2" Independent Offices Appropriations, FY 1970: Hearings, op. cit., p. 508. '^- NSF, Justification of Estimates of Appropriations, FY 1973, op. cit., p. P-2. '»3 Data from: U.S., National Science Foundation, Justification of Estimates of Appropriations to the Con- gress, FY197i, 1975, passim; Justification of Estimates of Appropriations . . . FY 1973, op. cit., passim; and 1974 National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings, op. cit., p. 365. 1969, actual 1970, estimated 1971, estimated 1972, estimated 1973, estimated 1974, estimated 0 0 2, 000, 000 0 1,000,000 1, 000, 000 600, 000 330, 000 70, 000 1, 000, 000 2, 000, 000 1, 200, 000 . 660, 000 . 140, 000 . 1,000,000 4, 000, 000 1,000,000 4, 000, 000 0 2, 000, 000 2, 000, 000 3, 000, 000 5, 000, 000 5, 000, 000 954 TABLE 17.— NSF, OBLIGATIONS FOR FISCAL YEAR 1972 RESEARCH, SCIENCE EDUCATION AND RELATED ACTIVITIES Country Number of projects Research Travel Foreign currency obligated (equivalent) Yugoslavia 12 41 2 41 9 9 3 3 $1, 025, 801 Morocco 1 499, 745 Poland . . . 3 193, 147 Egypt 2 139, 163 India .- . 3 110,584 Tunisia _ 2 28,641 Pakistan and Burma. . . 0 2,517 Total 123 2 108 1, 999, 598 1 $1,902,933. 2 $96,665. Sources: U.S. Congress, House Committee on Science and Astronautics Subcommittee on Science, Research, snd Development, "1974 National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings," 1973, p. 325. In 1972 the Foundation requested increased dollar authorization, in the sum of $150,000, under the support category of International Cooperative Scientific Activities to improve administration of the special foreign currency program. Only these dollar funds would be used by the Office of International Programs for : (1) indirect costs of American universities associated with the administration of projects funded with excess currency; (2) support of scientists from excess foreign currency countries in U.S. universities . . .; (3) purchase of minor pieces of equipment . . .; and (4) travel of U.S. scientists to excess currency countries which have restrictions of the use of their currency for international travel purposes (India, Burma, Guinea, Poland, and Morocco) .2** The fiscal year 1974 request totaled $200,000.2«5 Travel To Attend Scientific Meetings The NSF supports several programs awarding travel funds to U.S. scientific and technical personnel to participate in international scientific meetings or to attend scientific meetings abroad. The Office of International Programs supports two types of travel programs: (1) U.S. participation in planning and attending activities of inter- national scientific organizations, through grants awarded to the National Academy of Sciences; and (2) travel grants to individuals under terms of bilateral agreements. The NSF Research Directorate administers two types of awards: (1) travel grants to individuals to attend scientific conferences held abroad; and (2) block travel grants to professional associations, which directly select individuals to receive travel funds. Only these two Research Directorate programs wall be described in this section. The Division of Graduate Education in Science supports individuals to attend NATO Advanced Study Institutes and foreign conferences on science education. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL GRANTS PROGRAM NSF programs for U.S. participation in international scientific meetings or in meetings held abroad began in 1950 and were imple- mented initially under the Foundation's authority for science information to strengthen the base of American science.^*® Although 264 NSF, Justification of Estimates of Appropriations, FY 1973, op. cit., p. H-4. 265 1974 National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings, op. cit., p. 325. 266 The NSF enabling Act authorized and directed the Foundation "to foster the interchange of scientific information among scientists in the United States and foreign countries. . . ." Section 3(a) (5) of the NSF Act of 1950 was cited as primary justiflcation for early information activities until passage of the NSF amend- ments of 1968. 955 the Foundation's authority for such programs gradually increased,^" such activities were not clearly mandated until passage of the 1968 amendments (P.L. 90—407) which broadened the NSF's authority in this field. This slow evolution hampers evaluation of the scope and number of activities carried out in support of international travel. First, since the development and administration of the Foundation's programs were constrained by the need to support them in terms of strengthen- ing domestic science, the Foundation did not centralize administration of programs and did not keep adequate records of all travel activities. For instance, in 1953 the Foundation reported generally that "Attend- ance of American scientists at international meetings is closely re- lated to scientific information since this is an important channel for exchange of views on new scientific developments." By 1970, after passage of amending legislation, the purposes and scope of the inter- national travel grants prc^ram were considerably broadened: The International Travel Program provides for grants to U.S. scientists to (1) attend international scientific congresses and meetings; (2) obtain or exchange information on research, science education, or information relating to interna- tional scientific programs and associated activities; and (3) cooperate in inter- national scientific activities.^** Second, the Foundation utilized the only early authority it had, support for information exchange, to justify, develop, and report most other early NSF programs in international science. For instance, utilizing this authority, the Foundation developed its programs in support of translating foreign scientific information, studies of foreign science literature, support of the acquisition of foreign science studies, support for U.wS. participation in international scientific meetings, and organization and support of the Soviet and Eastern bilateral pro- grams. As a result, the Foundation's reporting for international scientific information activities, and for international travel activities under it, was not consistent either in budget presentations before the Congress or in annual reports. These problems were described in a report the Foundation prepared in 1964, entitled "Improving the Dissemination of Scientific Informa- tion." The report observed: "The Foundation's activities in the science information area [specifically referring to international scientific information exchange] are so diverse that it is difficult to classify them into a manageable number of headings . . . ." ^^^ Similar confusion holds with respect to the Foundation's inconsistent reporting in its Annual Reports, and Annual Reports of Grants and Awards. The Foundation has used different report categories in budget presentations, annual reports, and annual reports of grants and 2°' For a description of this evolution see: The National Science Foundation: A General Review of Its First 15 Years, op. cit., pp. 178-9. -■ * 197? National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings, op. cit. p. 346. ^M Cited in: The NSF: A General Review of Its First Fifteen Years, op. cit., p. 193. Specifically "The Foundation requested $700,000 for International Scientific Information Exchange in FY 1966. . . . Partial support is provided for the international travel expenses of selected U.S. and foreign scientists for attendance at international scientific conferences and meetings and for visits of U.S. scientists to foreign scientific research institutions, universities and libraries for the purpose of strengthening scientific research and education in the United States. The program also continues exchange of scientists between the U.S. and East European countries." (Ibid., pp. 192-3) 956 awards.^" The reporting situation was improved considerably in the 1971 report of grants and awards when an attempt was made to include all international and foreign science activities, separately categorized, under the heading of "National, International, Specialized Research, and Sea Grant" programs to correspond more closely with the cate- gories used in AnnimL Reports and in Congressional budget presenta- tions. The old category of "International Scientific Information Exchanges (Travel)" was dispensed with, reflecting the Foundation's enlarged mandaL3 to support international activities on their own merits. However, some inconsistency still prevails, since data pre- sented at authorizations hearings still include a heading for "Inter- national Information Activities" under "Science Information Ejcchange." Data presented below reflect the limitations of evaluating travel programs with scarce and inconsistent information on funding and activities. However, they do indicate, on the one hand, that the Foun- dation has taken several steps to cope with the increasing proliferation of international scientific meetings. The Foundation has established policies to select a small number of meetings which would be most beneficial to the American scientific community and to sponsor the travel to these meetings of younger, more culturally adaptable at- tendees rather than older, more established "scientific ehtes." On the other, available information about these programs, comments, and evaluation of mternational scientific exchange activities in general, seems to indicate that the Foundation's support of travel to inter- national scientific meetings might serve a wider range of scientific and diplomatic objectives and more continuity in planning if grantees were given predeparture briefings, if some awardees were required to be competent in foreign languages, and if more analysis were made of the travel reports grantees submit to the Foundation. The International Travel Grants Program. — The international travel grants program, funded by NSF divisions and offices other than OIP, was established in 1952. It involves two tjrpes of awards: (1) awards to individual scientists and (2) block awards to non-profit professional associations, who select grantees and disseminate travel funds to them. A standard selection and award procedure is used; each year, the individual divisions of the Foundation select certain meetiugs, in areas of particular interest to the Foundation for which participation support may be granted. Individual scientists or professional associa- tions submit application forms to each division. If funds are awarded to a professional association, the association publishes notification of the award, soliciting appUcations, in appropriate professional journals. In order to efiminate duplicate competitions the Foundation does not make awards for individual travel grants to meetings for which it has already awarded block travel funds to a professional association, 2'" For instance, in FY 1964 grants to individuals to attend scientific meetings were included under the category, "International Scientific Information Exchange (Travel)," which fell under the broad category of "Science Information Service." However, the Soviet and Eastern European exchanges program, which was handled together with travel grants in the budget presentation, was not reported under "International Scientific Information Exchange (Travel)," but under "International Science Research Activities." In FY 1966, the International Organizations and Programs Project was reported under the "International Sfiience Research Activities" category, like the Soviet and Eastern European Exchange program. In 1967, however, the Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges program was reported under "Science Information Service support." A separate category was established for "International Scientific Information Exchanges (Travel)," but support of the International Organizations and Project program was placed under a new category, "International Science Research Activities." 957 Awards are in U.S. dollars. They are generally limited to the equivalent cost of jet economy air transportation from the city of origin to the scientists' destination abroad and return. Per diem may be paid when an individual is traveling as a representative of the U.S. Government. Travel must be by U.S.-flag carriers except in special circumstances. Criteria for .evaluation of international travel grant applications vary with each NSF division. According to Dr. William Riem.er, who was in charge of the 1971 international travel grants program for the Division of Biological and Medical Sciences, usually a different staff member within each division has responsibility for program imple- mentation each year; there is no outside review of applicants' qualifi- cations. Because meetings are usually held in Europe in the summer, the Foundation prefers to support meetings held in Asia, Africa, and Latin America in the fall. Divisions vary in their preference for sup- porting large or small meetings ; some divisions prefer to support older, well-established scientists; others favor younger scientists "who do not have cultural blinders." The Foundation does maintain one official criterion for evaluation of grant applications: preference is given to individuals delivering scientific papers. Awardees are not required to have particular language qualifications. The Foundation requires recipients of individual travel awards to file an official report but onl}^ of scientific activities in which they have participated. There is no official requirement to report on the international scientific aspects of the meeting; however, each division may request its grantees to report on the number of individuals attending, the countries represented, the highlights of the program, and the general impressions of the person reporting. According to Dr. Riemer, the individual subject divisions of the Foundation review incoming reports; reports are sent only infrequently to the State Department and to the Office of International Programs, especially if the meeting was held in a country with which the United States has a bilateral scientific agreement.^^^ The Foundation's activities in support of the international travel grants program have been modest. In 1952 the Foundation awarded 23 grants totaling $17,153. Congressional action forced suspension cf the program in the mid-fifties; but the program was reinstated in 1957, probably as part of the general increase in Foundation activities in response to the launch of Sputnik. In 1957 the Foundation awarded about $120,000 for this program. Since 1960 the Foundation has awarded international travel grants to approximately 600-900 indi- viduals annually at costs totaling about $500,000 to $600,000 including awards to professional associations and to the National Academy of Sciences. (See Tables 18 and 19.) According to the Foundation, there are many problems connected with its support of international travel : The number of international scientific meetings is increasing sharplj^, perhaps too much so. It may be that some scientists spend too much of their time going to such meetings, and too Httle in their laboratories developing new results to talk about at the meetings. The problem the Foundation faces, therefore, is to pick the significant meetings to which support should be offered and then to offer support for travel expenses to the right scientists. Care is taken by the use "' Material taken from Interviewwith Dr. William Riemer, Division of Biological and Medical Sciences, NSF, March 1, 1970; NSF, "Application for International Travel Grant;" and NSF, "Instructions for In- ternational Travel Grant Applications." 958 of appropriate screening groups to ensure that brilliant and promising young scientists as well as older and more distinguished ones are enabled to attend meetings. Care must also be taken la avoid supporting so many Americans that thej^ constitute an overwhelming number of scientists in attendance at any one meeting. 2^2 TABLE 18.— NSF INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL GRANTS, NUMBER OF TRAVELERS, COST-FISCAL YEARS 1952-1973 Fiscal year 1952' 1953 2 1957(actual)3""/."--""I"IIII"I'-I-""-IIII"II-I""-II 1957 (actual)* - 1957(actual)5 1958 6... :. 1958(actual)< - 1958 (actual)' 1959 (estimated) <-.. 1961 8 1961 « - 1961 (actual) m 1963 (actual) w 1%4 (actual) 13.. 1965 (actual) 15 1965 (actual) 18 1956 (actual) '8 1966 (actual) 1' 1967 (actual) 20.. 1967 (actual) " 1968 (actual) i«. 1968 (actual) 21 1969 (actual) 2 1969 (actual) M 1970 (actual) 24.... 1971 (estimated)22 1973 (estimated)". 1 U.S., National Science Foundation, "Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1952, 1953." 2 U.S., National Science Foundation, "Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1953, 1954." 3 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, "Independent Offices Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1959; Hearings, 1958," p. 294. < Ibid., D. 344. ' U.S., National Science Foundation, "Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1957, 1958." « U.S., Congress, House, "Independent Offices Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1958: Hearings, 1957," p. 344. ' U.S., National Science Foundation, "Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1958, 1959." 8 U.S., National Science Foundation, "Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1961, 1962." » U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, "Independent Offices Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1963: Hearings, 1962," pp. 885, 895. w U.S., National Science Foundation, "Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1981, 1962." i> U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, "I ndependent Offices Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1965: Hearings, 1964," p. 800. '2 Travel, $489,258; USSR-EE, $260,100. '3 U.S., Congress, House, Committeeon Appropriations, "Independent Offices Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1966: Hearings, 1965," pp. 605, 826. n Travel, $451,113; USSR-EE, $234,622. '5 U.S., Congress, House, Committeeon Appropriations, "Independent Offices Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1967: Hearings, 1966," p. 105. 16 Ibid., p. 105. 17 Travel, $245,000; USSR-EE $234,622. 18 "Inventory of Federal Programs Involving Educational Activities," op. cit., p. 367. i» U.S., National Science Foundation, "Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1966, 1967." 2" U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Develop- ment, "The Participation of Federal Agencies In International Scientific Programs: Report of the Science Policy Research and Foreign Affairs Divisions, Library of Congress, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967," p. 85. 21 "1970 National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings, Vol. tl," op. cit., p. 580. 22 U.S., Congress, House, Committeeon Appropriations, "Independent Offices Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1971: Hearings, 1970," p. 840. 23 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Develop- ment, "1971 National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings, 1970.'' 24 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Develop- ment, "1972 National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings, 1971," p. 346. 26 U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Develop- ment, "1973 National Science Foundation Authorization: Report, 1972," p. 56. Total numtxr of travelers Total cost (dollars) Average cost (dollars) 23 54 17,153 . 33,565 . 122,069 . ""'ii8,'286'. 122,069 . ""ii3,"220".. '""566,"66d\, 473,302 .. 506,000 .. »'7IS,"3S8 "685,735 .. ""683,815".. 200 .. 205 600 200 200 .. 190 600 835 .. 539 600-800 617 539 650 745 750 660 .. 745 750 998 .. 646 800,000 . 859 .. 671 444,951 . 671 .. 429,204 . 483 .. 405, 000 .. 500. 000 .. 900-950 2'2 1970 National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearing, op. cit pp. 255-6. 959 TABLE 19.— NSF, INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL GRANTS, AMERICANS ABROAD, FISCAL YEARS 1961 AND 1970 Travel grants to individuals Travel grants to National Academy of Sciences to support attendance of Americans at meetings Travel grants to professional associations to support attendance of Americans at meetings Fiscal year Total funds awarded Funds awarded Number of trav- elers Funds awarded Number of confer- ences Funds awarded Number of confer- ences Travel of Americans to NATO Advanced Study Institutes Number of Funds trav- awarded elers Courtesy travel service adminis- trative services 19611 1970 2....: .... 606,654 295,550 .... (817,774) 230,196 3 667,774 240 104,600 397 260,140 3 169, 776 7 142, 695 11 15 30, 569 34, 743 54 . 66 "150^000 . • Data for 1961 compiled from: U.S. National Science Foundation, "llfh Annual Report, 1961", 1962, pp. 255-257, "International Science and International Science Education," and pp. 364-371, "Attendance at International Meetings." 2 Data for 1970 compiled from: U.S. National Science Foundation, "National Science Foundation Grants and Awards," 1970, 1971, pp. 90-99, "International Science Information Exchange (Travel)," and pp. 85-86, "International Coopera- tive Science Activities." 3 Total funds awarded for travel program, excluding contract for administrative services for the program total $667,774. Total funds, including $150,000 for administrative services for the program, are $817,774. National and Special Research Programs National and Special Research Programs are major, often inter- disciplinary, research efforts which relate to specific geographic areas or are of such a broad scope and magnitude that extensive coordina- tion of planning, management, funding, and logistic support are essential to insure maximum effectiveness and efficiency in program performance. Some of the programs involve extensive international coordination and cooperation with other U.S. Government agencies and foreign and international bodies for the planning and conduct of research. "In terms of men [involved] and money spent, [NSF- supported] international research programs comprise the great bulk of science-related operations of the National Science Foundation. ^^ Estimated expenditures for these programs for fiscal year 1973 exceed $60 million. (See Table 20.) Most of these programs are administered by the Assistant Director for National and International Programs. However, some of the research fiinded under the activities comes fiom support of basic research under the Research Directorate. While alluding to the international significance of these programs, the Foun- dation does not include them under the support category of "Inter- national Cooperative Science Scientific Activities," either in budget presentations before the Congress, or in Annual Reports. The Office of International Programs has no responsibility for these activities. (In comparison with the cost of these research programs, authoriza- tions for OIP activities for 1973 total $4,700,000.) 2'3 Iw^entory of Federal Programs Tnvohivg Educational Activities Concerned With Improving International Understanding and Cooperation: An interagency survey . . . , op. cit., p. 365. 960 0CDCDC3O00 cs'*a- in C3^C5000 oooooo e~) cri C5 C5 ^^ o Oi/^oinm oo .-H tM CM •i- if> o ^o fn CO oo oo oo oo K O O O < LlJ to Ul o: —I < z o < oo r-»o oo CD < E2 ra CL ^ < a>,^ o t/) z 00 -o CMr— z o QO*- O 5 0-0 0 = >s o 00 O^ — ■" "3 U *^ Q. O K TO -O ■t^ ^ (-» a> c nj o t' ' QJ O) '^- "^ :: c o o (J ''^ — 961 National and international research programs are frequently in- ternational in both scope and character. Some, such as the Antarctic Research Program and the International Year of the Quiet Sun, are undertaken in accordance with international agreements formalized in treaty obligations. Usually the programs are initiated when several governments and their scientists recognize the need for a concerted multinational effort. Typically the programs, if not formalized under bilateral or multilateral treaties, are sanctioned, coordinated, partially supported, and sometimes governed by intergovernmental science bodies or their affiliates. Programs under this category include the International Biological Program (IBP), the Global Atmospheric Research Program (GARP), the International Decade of Ocean Exploration (IDOE), and the now terminated International Indian Ocean Expedition and International Years of the Quiet Sun. NSF responsibilities for these programs take a number of forms. In some, the Foundation plays the role of lead U.S. agency to co- ordinate the funding, research, management, and information dis- semination activities of other Federal agencies, industry, universities, and non-profit research organizations. The programs are administered under complex arrangements. NSF supports the participation of the American nongovernmental community through grants and contracts awarded to academic scientists. U.S. nongovernmental scientific travel abroad under the programs consists of: — meetings to plan research projects; — attendance at international scientific conferences which treat ongoing or completed research; and — overseas research jointly with foreign scientists. Often these programs involve collaborative research among scientists of several different nations. For example, the shipboard activities conducted on board the Foundation-supported Glomar Challenger in connection with the Ocean Sediment Coring Prograrn have involved research scientists from more than 12 nations. Similarly, NSF- sponsored activities in the Antarctic encompass collaborative research between American and foreign scientists at both foreign stations and on board foreign vessels. The Global Atmospheric Research Program will involve internationall}'^ conducted experiments in the Altantic in 1974; the International Biological Program has involved parallel research studies by scientists from many different nations. Like other NSF basic research programs which involve international or foreign science activities, participants are not required to meet any special criteria. With the exception of some polar program research, the Foundation apparently does not require grantees to meet language qualifications nor to be briefed on the special conditions they might encounter in conducting research in a foreign location. The Foimdation does not require or maintain detailed reporting on the foreign activities undertaken in support of these programs; thus, there is little or no comprehensive information available to evaluate the scope and qualit}^ of participation in them by the American nongovernmental scientific community. 962 U.S. ANTARCTIC RESEARCH PROGRAM The Antarctic Research Program was funded at the level of $43.7 million est. in the fiscal year 1973.^^* As such it is the most costly of the current research programs. It will be described next to illustrate international activities subsumed under the category of national research programs. The U.S. Antarctic Research Program had its origins in the astro- nomical observations carried out in 1957-1958 under the International Geophysical Year (IGY.)"^ The U.S. Government had built a number of observatories and stations in the Antarctic to carry out obligations under the IGY. The Government decided to maintain these after completion of the IGY investigations to continue scientific investi- gations and to support patterns of international cooperative research which had been initiated during the preceding years. The Antarctic Treaty, signed in 1959 and ratified by the United States and 11 other Nations, provided that the Antarctic would be used only for peaceful purposes and that international scientific cooperation should be continued there. ^^* The National Science Foundation had served as coordinator of U.S. Antarctic programs from the end of the IGY until initiation of activities under the Treaty. Under a Bureau of the Budget directive relating to the conduct and planning of the U.S. Antarctic Research Program, the Foundation was given additional responsibility for developing, managing, and coordinating an integrated U.S. intergovernmental science program for the area. NSF continues to manage the U.S. Antarctic program. U.S. research is coordinated with that of the 11 other Treaty signa- tories through ICSU. International scientific exchanges and coopera- tive field research projects are implemented through bilateral and multilateral agreements. The Antarctic Policy Group, composed of the Secretary of State as Chairman, the Secretary of Defense, and the Director of the Na- tional Science Foundation, determines policy, approves long-range plans, and provides general guidance for the program. The NAS Cornmittee on Polar Research advises on the program, and effects contact with foreign academies and the International Council of Scientific Unions.^^ NSF-sponsored research, funded by both scientific research di- visions and the OflBce of Polar Programs, includes "... both field work . . . and study in the United States of specimens . . ; ." Support is also given for science information activities and for polar research centers. Investigations involve scientists from universities, Federal research laboratories, non-profit research institutions, and industrial research laboratories, "Approximately 200 scientists," according to the Foundation, "are in the field each austral summer:" Twenty-five to 30 scientists conduct the year round investigations at the four U.S. Stations: McMurdo, South Pole, Siple, and Palmer. Another 40-50 investi- gators and their assistants are engaged in ocean-related research aboard the research vessels Eltanin and Hero, and in the United States, data analysis and 1" ' 274 Research support totaled $24.0 million; $19.74 million was used for the purchase of three ski-equipped LC-310 airplanes for use in the Antarctic Program. {1974 National Science Foundation Authorization: Hear- ings, op. cit., pp. 167-167 and 191.) ^5 On this topic see a preceding study in this series: The Political Legacy of the International Geophysical Year. 2!6 "Twelve Nations Sign Treaty Guaranteeing Nonmilitarization of Antarctica and Freedom of Scientific Investigation," Department of State Bulletin (December 21, 1969), pp. 1-7. 2" NSF, Justification of Estimates of Appropriations, FY 1973, op. cit., pp. C-30-31. 963 interpretation, map making, specimen-sorting operations and curatorial services, and other related activities engage approximately 150 workers at any given time throughout the year.^'s In annual reports and presentations before the Congress, the Foundation has described how Antarctic research involves inter- national collaboration and exchanges of scientists. As an example,, the Foundation reports that in 1970-1971: Scientists from Argentina, Chile, the United Kingdom, the U.^.S-R. and the- United States conducted a joint expedition to Deception Island to study the results of the recent eruptions of that volcanic island. The Research vessel Hero . . . carries out research cruises in the waters of Tierra del Fuego as well as the Antarctic Peninsula. In these efforts we have Argentine and Chilean scientists aboard working with ours. The research vessel EUanin regularly accommodates Australian, French, and New Zealand researchers, as well as other foreign scientists.278 The Foundation credits the program with developing measures for the preservation of flora and fauna, tourism policies for the Antarctic, and mechanisms to disseminate information about research results. Politically, "The Antarctic Treaty has served as a model for the Treaty on Outer Space and for discussions of an international agree- ment on the use of the seabed." ^^° Table 21 gives NSF data listing Americans who visited foreign sta- tions on the Antarctic continent or foreign ships to carry out collabora- tive research with scientists from the United Kingdom, Japan, the U.S.S.R., Argentina, and France. U.S. scientists participating in the program, according tp^the NSF OflUcer for Polar Programs, are generally part of a sm'all "school" of U.S. South Polar specialists. Because of the isolation which must be endured for long periods of time, only a few individuals are interested in stud^dng the Antarctic. Potential grantees are personally interviewed before being admitted to the program. In some cases they are required to take the U.S. Navy Submarine physical and psychiatric exams to evaluate their ability to withstand the extreme conditions found in the South Polar Region .^^^ TABLE 21.— AMERICAN PARTICIPATION IN FOREIGN EXPEDITIONS IN ANTARCTICA, FUNDED BY NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION, 1960-70 Numberof Number non- Total amount of Individuals governmental grants (In dollars) Year: 1960 1 1 27,900 1961 1 0 66,960 1962.... 1 1 43,400 1963 1 1 28,400 1964.... 3 2 47,300 1965.... . .. 4 2 69,600 1966.. 3 2 52,500 1967 1 1 45,500 1968. 7 5 64,100 1969. 3 2 69,500 1970 3 2 32,800 Source: Data supplied by Office of Polar Programs, NSF. Details on project, foreign site, and name of grantee are available. 2^8 Ibid., p. C-31. 2'9 International Cooperation in Space and Science: Hearings, op. cit., pp. 117-123. 2™ 1971 National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings, op. cit., p. 196. "1 Supplied by Walter R. Seelig Associate Program Manager International and Cartographic Affairs, Office of Polar Programs, NSF, April 1, 1971. 964 Americans who are located at foreign research stations are given language training, if necessary. Their participation must be approved by the foreign host country, as in bilateral science agreements. And unique among U.S. nongovernmental scientific programs abroad is the requirement for American polar researchers to consult with the USIA to obtain informational media to show to his foreign colleagues. Reports are required on bofh technical and living conditions.^^^ National Research Centers National Research Centers have been established for research in areas of science requiring specialized facilities, equipment, staffing, and operational support beyond the capabilities of existing educational and research institutions. Federal support, according to the Founda- tion, is required because of the high initial facility and equipment costs and the need to make these facilities available on a national basis.^^ Under this program the Foundation provides support for the National Astronomy and Ionosphere Center (NAIC) at Arecibo, a center specializing in radio and radar astronomy and aeronomy; the National Radio Astronomy Center (NRAO); two optical astron- omy centers, the Kitt Peak National Observatory (KPNO), and the Cerro Tololo Inter-American Observatory (CTIO) ; and a National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR). Non-profit organizations or universities operate and manage these research centers under contract with the Foundation. (See Table 22). ' s2 Interview Seelig, op. cit.. Additional details on U.S. scientists who have served at foreign research stations in the Antarctic may be found in: "International Cooperation, 1968-1971," Antarctic Journal February U, 1971.) ^^J83 NSF, Justification of Estimates of Appropriations, FY 1973, op. cit., p. D-1. 965 en = i 2 E < E o CO a: UJ a. o z >• a: < CO o I o a: < UJ CO UJ q: < o < z E < < <= in 2 — .is <^ p o o •*- ■<5 » ^M ir> ^^ T^ 00 a> in 00 r- Si =■ CM 0O~ > « — U (U 1 i: E _ CD to .£ o i .ti 'Jo; « 2 o . > 0.030= "S52«E^ .Si < .^ S .c O U OJ k. TO o = > O OJ 1/1 E='~ " a. IS 5 CO < 3 J-O Qj5 3 (j> t_ O U O GO ^E (Q O 1^ CD o , - c = ™ 2 2 is" >» ^ — • CO J .1 - lis I to::o S m «^ E «-> CO «-• CO o: < ioi •!< <:J3So*Zi OJ ° =*^ S c ■" — — k- CO O oi 0} I— o 2 o) 2t: .= = g.S§.2 o z z CO - if = u- o '55 ^ iSS CLQ. *;< o a> :.| r^ — * 50 >- o To CO (JO &z o . • O.E e2 Z^ ooj- CO ^ '.to' f-^ = i2 r^ CO ^ .— < ro in tD ^ TO TO . r ^^^ *r -r^ CD - to TO •S J2 ir> ^3- t^ S'2 lO 03 ti -2 ^ Eo 3 to oo CC OO o q.q:i— < TO 3 ^ o) ° .52 O "^ -£"-5. — .■ ■ - 3 ,-. w t' ^-•E.itl CPMQ 2-9 O o . .— o Q. •~ *— k_ c/) 03 C3 to ° E __' *" 03 03 ^ Qj-; ^ Q.ra 03 ™5; OO^ nUjM 2 w o< is -E SCNJ trJ SCO U3 "".^ CT) UJ m to ■fr" c **- t;.2 0) -"■5 E J3 So 0 '"T ."^ TO mtD *-' Ji^CT TO to'o ja.^-D *- TO TO CQU. :=: > ^ > TO TO ii'S ■■^^ 03 ' 968 International Science Education Programs of NSF To provide a precise and accurate history of the Foundation's activities in support of "international science education" is difficult; several different offices have supported many activities for interna- tional science education or what the Foundation calls "international science education-related activities." These are reported to Congress and are programmed under a variety of different categories, including "International Science Activities." ^^^ Basically, NSF supports two types of international science educa- tion activities: (1) programs described under the category of inter- national science education, and (2) programs which enable Americans to study, research, and teach abroad as part of NSF's domestic mission. DEVELOPMENT OF SCIENCE EDUCATION IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES Support and development of programs to develop science education in foreign countries began in 1959. They have been experimental in nature, subject to the use of counterpart funds, and not fully cr^'stallized. Their initiation corresponded with congressional passage of F.L. 86-232, which broadened the Foundation's authority to participate in international scientific activities, permitting NSF to start some cooperative programs in which a two-way flow led to exchanges benefiting both American and foreign scientists. When the Foundation's programs began in 1959, they were justified under the limited Congressional mandate authorizing NSF to support science activities to strengthen American science. They were not intended prinfarily/^to support the development of science education in foreign countries. The Foundation explained this rationale in 1960: The primary objective of [the international science education activities program] is to strengthen ••eiy IJfatri^i'Yi's Mtal scientific effort through improved programs of science education by providing American scientists and educators with the opportunities to join their foreign colleagues in endeavors that may prove of great value in raising the quality of science education in the United States. At the same time these program activities may result in raising the standards of education in the sciences throughout the Free World. . . , These activities are experimental in design.^^* AID-Funded Activities. — Due to the success of NSF experiences in supporting improved methods of teaching science in the United States, the Agency for International Development (AID) and its predecessor, the International Cooperation Administration (ICA), have transferred funds to NSF to administer technical assistance and science education-oriented projects to assist in building a science infrastructure and science education base in several developing countries. Small numbers of American scientific and technical person- nel have been sent abroad under these programs. 285 Usually data describing fellowships tenable abroad are reported under the Science Education program; NATO fellowships and travel grants undpr International Science Activities (because of collateral funding); Senior Foreign Scientist Fellowships under Education; So^Tet-American exchanges und^r International Information Exchanges; travel grants to Americans under International Information Exchange (except if the awards supported travel to educational conferences); and foreign educators to the United States undf>r collateral funding or International Science Education Activities. NSF annual reports have included reports of other activities under the category of international science education. Under this category, in 1960, the Foundation reported on U.S. scientific participation in the Organisation for European Economic Co-opera- tion, (p. 134). Activities under the Lacy-Zaroubin agreement for the Soviet I^nion were included under Curricula Development Programs in the Annual Report, 1959. Translation activities were included under International Science Education in the Wfto Annual RepoH (p. 135). In the Annual Report, FY 1%6, under education-related support, the Foundation described activities under the Soviet-American exchange pro- gram, NATO Advanced Study Institutes, international travel grants, and visits of foreigners to the U.S. (p. 12fi). 286 NSF, Annual Report, 1960, op. cit., p. 134. 969 Early Foundation programs recruited U.S. scientific and technicaV experts for assignments in the countries of the Far East and Europe. These arrangements began in 1957 under terms of a participatmg agency service agreement (PASA) with funds transferred from the ICA. During the 1960s the Foundation administered two similar programs with funds transferred from AID. The NSF program for Kegional Development of the Universities of Central America was operative from 1963 to 1969; American participants numbered 23.^*' The Latin American Science Education Project involved seminars of Americans an:d Latin Americans to improve the curricula of science education. A total of 127 Americans were sent to Latin America under this program from 1966 to 1968, when the program was terminated. ^^* Cooperative Program for the Improvement of Science Education in India. — Of the three AID-funded activities, the only one which is still functioning is the Cooperative Program for the Improvement of Science Education in India.^^^ This program will he summarized. Under an agreement with the Government of India, AID began a program jointly funded with India in 1963 to improve Indian scientific and technical education. AID had let contracts to four American universities to design and administer a program to provide American consultant teachers for a program of Summer Institutes for Indian secondary school and college teachers. Dissatisfied with the results of these contracts, AID asked NSF in 1966 to assume administrative responsibihty for the program. Transfer of responsibility was designed to provide a more effective program, to broaden the availability of consultants, to provide consultants year round, and to develop follow-up programs.^^** In 1966 a series of high-level conferences of In.dian and U.S. scientists, educators, arid administrators, with NSF representation, was held to revamp the program.^^^ Under the terms of the resulting PASA Agreement, which is renewed annually, the Foundation agreed to provide U.S. scientists and engineers to staff an NSF liaison office in New Delhi, to participate in teacher training programs, or to serve as advisors for equipment, institutional, and curriculum devel- opment phases of the agreement. From 1967 to 1970, 591 American consultants participated in the program.^^^ According to Gordon Hiebert, NSF program director, the program has attracted a large number of highly quahfied individuals. Americans in the program included elementary school teachers, school administrators, high school science teachers, college professors, government and industrial scientists, and Nobel laureates. ^ Data supplied by Office of International Programs, National Science Foundation. 5*8 Data from Inventory of Federal Programs . . ., op. cit., p. 333, and interview with Dr. Duncan Clements, Office of International Programs, NSF, February 1971. 289 The NSF initiated another AID-funded program in April 1973: Scientists and Engineers in Economio Development (SEED), administered by DIP. Under NSF grants totaling $184,895, 29 American scientists and engineers will teach and conduct research in 17 countries in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and Latla America. See: NSF, "Grants To Aid Developing Countries Awarded U.S. Scientists and Engineers." NSF Press Release, April 20, 1973 (NSF 73-141). "0 U.S., National Science Foundation, "India Program." In-house memo, non-dated, p. 2. Legislative authority: P.L. 87-195, Foreign Assistance Act of September 4, 1961, as amended; additional data from Interview with Gordon Hiebert, in charge of U.S. -Indian Cooperative Program for the Improvement of Science Education in India, Office of International Programs, February 26, 1971; and "NSF Program ia India," Science Education News (May 1968). "1 Present among the American representatives were Dr. Donald Hornig, Science Advisor to the Pres- dent, and Dr. Arthur Roe, head of the Office of International Science Activities, NSF. ("U.S.-Indian Co- operation to be Expanded in Science Education," NSF News Release, May 3, 1966, NSF-€6-120.) 2« U.S., National Science Foundation, "NSF/AID India Program— Preliminary Fact Sheet," August 17, 1970, and "Cooperative Program for the Improvement of Science Education in India; Information for Consultations," Prepared by Office of International Programs, NSF, Januai-y 1970, 16 pp. 970 Participants are selected and funded according to AID administra- tive procedures. Internal NSF review committees evaluate credentials; Erospective consultants receive a low-level security check ^^^ and must e approved by the Civil Service Commission, the New Delhi office of the Agency for International Development, and the Indian Govern- ment.^^* Consultants are authorized air tickets prepaid in foreign eurrenc}^, some miscellaneous travel expenses and travel per diem, and consultant fees. The Foundation provides each consultant with a detailed information sheet containing information on travel and living conditions. Preparation for consultants includes also a 1-2 day orientation provided by the NSF/New Delhi staff. The Governments of India and the United States both contribute funds. Indian contributions are in the form of a trust fund set up by the Government. Since initiation of NSF activities in 1966 to 1970 the rupee allotment for the program has totaled the equivalent of U.S. $1,822,168; U.S. AID dollar funding from 1966 to 1971 has totalled $3,451,058.2«* The NSF believes that the program has been successful. Gordon Hiebert, NSF official in charge of administration, reports that while AID attempted to teach U.S. science in India, the Foundation has developed and taught science education uniquely related to the Indian situation, a more successful approach. Additional program accomplishments were described to the Congress in 1969: The follow-up program has the objective of improving the training of teachers of science in India, and improving the materials they use in their teaching. Cur- rent and proposed activities include: Establishing better relations between the universities and their constituent colleges (where science teachers are trained), and between the university-college system and the school system; helping Indian scientists write new textbooks in the sciences,, mathematics, and engineering; improving laboratory experiments and equipment; and making science films available. . . . Programs have been estabhshed to lielp with the preparation, design, and production of laboratory and demonstration equipment in India from indigenous materials. 2"* The Foundation has found that many of the special curricula developed for India can be usefully applied in the United States and in other countries. For instance, a special program developed to train Indip.n engineers in entrepreneurship has been adapted in several locales in this country. NSF reports also that many of the Americans who served in the Indian program have later made useful contri- butions to other AID-financed science education programs: in Nepal, administered b}^ the University of Illinois; in Afghanistan, adminis- tered by the Teachers College, Columbia University; and in Malaysia, administered by the American Association for the Advancement of Science.^^^ The American contribution to this cooperative program was cut in 1970. Budget cuts in this country forced suspension of the funding of Americans to participate in the summer institute phase of the program; Indian teachers and scientists have been given complete direction of tliis activity. Small numbers of consultants will still be recruited to assist with the curriculum development phase of operations.^^^ 2B3 Interview with Gordon Hiebert, Office of Tnternational Programs, National Science Foundation. 29< NSF, "NSF/AID Indian Program-Preliminary Fact Sheet," August 17, 1970. 295 Data supplied by Office of International Programs, NSF. "» National Science Foundation Authorization, FY 1970: Hearings, Vol. II, op^ clt., p. 582. s" Interview, op. cit. »w Idem, and NSF, Annual Report FY 1970, op. cit., p. 05. 971 NATO-FUNDED ACTIVITIES The National Science Foundation, in cooperation with the Depart- ment of State, administers two NATO civil science programs which send jun^ior and senior scientists abroad. One program is called the NATO Senior Fellowships in Science; the other is the NATO Post- doctoral Fellowship in Science. NATO Senior Fellowships in Scienee.^The primary objective of the Program wliich. began in FY 1967, is "to enable universities and nonprofit scientific research institutions in the United States to send senior staff members to study new scientific techniques and develop- ments at research and educational institutions in other NATO nations, or in countries cooperating mth NATO." ^^^ Fellowships are not awarded for support of research or advanced academic study, but only for "advanced training in new specializations, as a means of strengthening the scientific work of U.S. institutions at a graduate or advanced level." ^°° The Division of Graduate Education cooperates with the Depart- ment of State in administering the program by evaluating and selecting fellows. Nominees are evaluated by panels of scientists convened by the NSF and appointed by the National Research Council. The following criteria must be met: — fuU professional standing, — at least 5 years experience in research, teaching, or other relevant professional work, and — the linguistic abilities necessary for profitable discussion with colleagues in the country to be visited.^**^ Awards are made only in selected areas of science: mathematics, physics, medicine, biology, engineering, and social sciences; history and philosophy of sciences ; and interdisciplinary work. Tenures for NATO Senior Fellowships range from one to three months; in unusual circumstances a tenure of less than four weeks or a maximum of six months may be approved. Fellows receive a sub- sistence allowance and air tourist travel allowances. They are per- mitted to continue receiving salary or allqwances provided by the nominating institution. Awardees are required to do their scientific work in. nonprofit scientific institutions in countries, other than the United States, that are members of NATO. In 1970 these countries were: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. "Consideration will also be given to applicants who propose to conduct their fellow- ship activities in other countries that cooperate with NATO if ex- ceptional and compelling reasons warrant it." Fellows are required to submit an activities report at completion of tenure. Although the program is slowly growing, only a small number of awards ranging between 13 and 36 annually have been made since fiscal year 1967. Gross obligations, as provided by NATO head- s'' U.S., National Science Foundation, "NATO Senior Fellowships in Science," Program Brochure, 1970-71 (NSF £-70-0-7). 300 Idem. 301 Idem. 972 quarters, totaled about $37,000 in 1967, $27,000 in 1968, and $49,000 and $66,000, respectively, in 1969 and IQIO.^'^^ NATO Postdoctoral Fellowships in Science. — Under a 1959 agree- ment, NSF and the Fellowship Office of the National Research Council cooperate with the Department of State in administering the program of NATO postdoctoral fellowships in science. This pro- gram is designed to provide for "closer collaboration among the scientists of NATO countries." AppUcants must have a doctoral degree, usually received within the last five years. And they must demonstrate a special aptitude for advanced training or postdoctoral study in the following eligible fields : mathematics, physics, medicine, biology, engineering, social sciences, history, philosophy of sciences, and interdisciplinary research. As in the case of the NATO Senior Fellowship Program, fellowships are not awarded for support of work toward an advanced degree nor for i-esidency training, clinical work, or work in education or business, social work, diplomacy, history, or law.^"^ Applicants are evaluated by panels of scientists appointed by the National Research Council; final selection is made by the Founda- tion. Language skills are considered; applicants must be accepted for Study by the foreign institution before a fellowship is awarded, and applicants must sign an oath or affirmation attesting to allegiance to the United States. Special consideration is given to promoting projects involving international scientific collaboration.^*^ Postdoctoral fellowships are normally awarded for a tenure of either 9 or 12 months in a nonprofit scientific institution in a NATO member country or in a country which cooperates with NATO. Fellows are given stipends, dependency allowances, round trip air travel and a special $150 stipend. There is little public information describing activities under this program; for the fiscal years 1968 to 1970 annual awards numbered 39, 40, 45 and costs ranged from $296,000 in 1968 to $325,000 in 1970.^"^ Advanced Study Institutes. — Each year since 1959, NATO has sponsored a number of international conferences, called Advanced Study Institutes. NSF has supported the international travel of a limited number of U.S. participants to these institutes since 1960.^°* Justification for travel support is based on the U.S. national interest and emphasizes situations in which U.S. participants are "at a dis- advantage in obtaining travel support because of the distances involved." ^**^ "These meetings," according to 'the NSF, "are held during the summer for periods ranging from one to eight weeks, [and] provide exhaustive treatment of a particular scientific topic by scholars of 302 U.S., National Science Foundation, Division of Graduate Education in Science, Fiscal Year 1970 Ae- t ivUies Report, limited distribution, 1969, p. 42. Annual reports of ttie Division also give data on grantees. Subject specialization, tenure, and location of award. MS U.S. National Science Foundation, "NATO Postdoctoral Fellowships in Science," Program brochure , 1970, NSF E-70-Q-2. »M Idem. 305 Data for FY 1968 are from: U.S., National Science Foundation, Division of Graduate Education in Science, Annual Report, Fiscal Year 1968, p. 12. Data for FY 1969 are from: U.S., National Science Founda- tion, Division of Graduate Education in Science, Annual Report Fiscal Year 1S69 (1969), pp. 32-33. Data for FY 1970 are from: U.S., National Science Foundation, Division of Graduate Education in Science, Fiscal Year 1970 Activities Report, for limited distribution. (1969), pp. 42-3. Note: In each of the above instances, data are from Division flies and may not be the same as to official reporting data. 306 According to a 1970 NSF announcement: "No provision is made at the present time for travel grants to U.S. lecturers at these Institutes." Division of Graduate Education in Sciences, "National Science Foundation. NATO Travel Grants," (1970), 1 p. w Division of Graduate Education in Science, Annual Report, FY 1969, op. cit., p. 34. 973 international reputation." ^"^ The Institutes are chaired and organized by an individual scientist who has received program approval and funds from NATO. The audience normally is composed of "student participants," who typically are advanced graduate students or young postdoctorals. Announcements of NATO Advanced Study Institutes appear in appropriate professional journals. The Division of Graduate Education in Science administers the program through awards to the Directors of the Institutes who select travel grantees. NATO ASI awards normally cover only the cost of round-trip jet-economy air fare between the applicant's point of origin and the ASI. The Foundation considers the NATO ASI program to be ". . . one of the NATO's most successful cooperative scientific endeavors. [As of FY 19681 more than 3,500 scientists, now participate annually in these Institutes, and it is estimated that the proceedings of about two-thirds of the Institutes appear in book form." ^°^ The Foundation has awarded 700 travel grants for this program between the fiscal year 1960, when it began, to 1970.^^° Reporting on the program is similar in its uneven quality to NSF reporting on other exchange pro- grams; there are no readily available in -house or pubUshed data describing the number of individuals supported and amount of funds awarded each year. However, the number of awards made by the Foundation, has apparently remained stable for the last ten years: approximately 60-80 travel awards, at a cost ranging from $30-50 thousand per year. (See Table 24.) TABLE 24.— NSF-NATO TRAVEL GRANTS FOR ADVANCED STUDY INSTITUTES. Number of Number of institutes Number of NATO supported Fiscal year travelers institutes by NSF Cost 1961 i 1966 2 1967 3 1968 < 1969 5 1970« 1970'.-.- - 1 Data for fical year 1961: compiled from NSF 1961 annual report, op. cit. 2 Data for fiscal year 1966 from: "Inventory of Federal Programs Involving Educational Activities Concerned with Im- proving International Understanding and Cooperation," op. cit., p. 355. 3 Data for fiscal year 1967 from: "Inventory of Federal Programs Involving Educational Activities Concerned with Im- proving International Understanding and Cooperation," op. cit., p. 355. * Data for fiscal year 196S from: U.S. National Science Foundation, Division of Graduate Education in Science, "Annual Report, fiscal year 1968," op. cit., p. 12. > Data for fiscal year 1969 from: U.S. National Science Foundation, Division of Graduate Education in Science, "Annual Report, fiscal year 1959," op. cit., p. 34. » Data for fiscal year 1970 from: U.S. National Science Foundation, Division of Graduate Education in Science, "Activities Report, fiscal year 1970," op. cit., p. 44. , ' Data for fiscal year 1970 compiled from: U.S. National Science Foundation, "Grants and Awards, 1970, 1971," pp. 90-99, (NSF publication 71-2). Note: Division of Graduate Education reports give name of grantee, cost of grants, and' name and location of Institute. Annual reports data do not separately report awards for NATO-ASI awards. They must be found by searching through the awards generally reported for international travel. *" Inventory of Federal Programs Involoing Educational Activities Concerned with Improving Interna- iional Understanding and Cooperation op. cit., p. 355. • 309 Division of Graduate Education in Science, Annual Report, FY 19G8, op^ cit., p. 12. 310 "Questionnaire on Government Exchange Programs." Prepared by Division of Graduate Education in Science, NSF for The Exchange Study. NATO Travel Grants, Program Code No. 703, response to question 1 (1). 54 .. $30, 569 66 . 41,755 72 41, 138 77 83 46 31 42, 351 43, 657 73 37, 474 66 ...— 34.743 974 "Fellows are required to submit terminal reports . . . describing their activities and accomplishments and evaluating the program." ^^* The Foundation does not transmit these reports to other U.S. Gov- ernment agencies which maintain science programs or attaches abroad. No predeparture orientation is provided. According to the Foundation, the only significant problems faced by recipients of NATO travel grants have been in finding adequate housing while abroad."^ INTERNATIONAL TRAVEL GRANTS FOR SCIENCE EDUCATION The NSF International Travel Grants program in Science Educa- tion differs from the regular NSF International Travel Grants pro- gram in that it supports only international travel for science education.^^^ The purpose of the program "is to assist U.S. educators to enhance their capabilities to contribute to science education in the United States," Individuals or organizations are eligible to re- ceive these awards. They support U.S. attendance at international conferences of educational societies or international organizations they may also be used to support U.S. educators visiting foreign uni- versities and educational laboratories. Authorization for such grants may be made by the following agencies of the Foundation: the Office of ■ Science Information Service, International Science Activities, Computing Activities; and the following Divisions: Biological and Medical Sciences, Engineering, Mathematical, and Physical Sciences, Environmental Sciences, and Graduate Education. The Division of Graduate Education in Science administers the Program on behalf of the Foundation.^^* Any U.S. scientist, including Federal emploj^ees, mav apply directly to the Foundation for an international travel grant lor education.^^^ International travel grants applicants must "indicate how the pro- posed travel would relate to science education or to the exchange of information about science education, and how it would enhance his individual contribution to science education in the United States." The grant is limited to round-trip jet-economy air fare between the applicant's home or institution and his foreign destination; grantees are required to travel by U.S.-flag carriers.^^^ Recipients of such grants, like recipients of other NSF international travel grants, must submit a "brief fiscal report on . . . use of the grant funds and a brief narrative report describing the. accomplishments of [thel trip." ^^^ Tlie program began in 1966; it has remained a low-level activity since that time (at the level of approximately $2-3 thousand annu- ally);^'* but increases in the program in fiscal year 1970 to $13,000 indicate that it may assume 'greater importance.^' ^ From 1966 to 311 "Questionnaire on Government Exchange Programs." Prepared by Division of Graduate Education in Science, NSF, for the CU Exchanges Study (W70). 3" Idem. 313 Legislative authority: Public Law 81-507, National Science Foundation Act Of 1950, as amended, 42 use 1861-1875. 3» U.S., Nati-inal Science Foundation, "International Travel Grants for Science Education." Program announcement, May 1969. 2 p. * 316 Applications from Federal employees are considered only when: "The applicant has permission from his agency to undertake the travel; funds are not available from the agency to support the travel; and the travel Is not expected to contribute directly to the mission of the agency." ("International Travel Grants for Science Education," op. cit.) 31* Idem. 3" Idem. 318 Data for 1966, 1967 and 1968 from Inventory of Federal Programs . . . op. cit.. pp. 357-8; Data for 1969 are fr'-m NSF, Division of Graduate Education in Science, Annual Report. FY 1969, op. cit., pp. 44, H-1. 319 NSF, Division of Graduate Education in Science, "Fiscal Year 1970, Activities Report," pp. 54; G-1-3. 975 1970 the Foundation awarded approximately 50 individual travel f rants. The bulk of the conferences supported have been in Western /urope. " According to NSF, no special preparation or counseling is given to these grantees to participate in international science education meet- ings; no problems have arisen with the program; and no provisions are made for providing reports of these activities to other U.S. agencies with similar domestic or foreign missions.^^^ International Education Activities as Part of Domestic Mission U.S. scientists and technical personnel have traveled, studied, and done research abroad under provisions of the National Science Founda- tion Act of 1950, as amended, which permits the award of NSF fellow- ships for scientific study or scientific work, tenable at any appropriate nonprofit U.S. or non-profit foreign institution.^^^ Four types of fellow- ships, tenable in either this country or abroad, are available. '■'. ' • '' (1) Senior postdoctoral fellowships. — "designed for experieiiced scientists who have demonstrated marked ability and special aptitude for productive scholarship in the sciences and have achieved recognized stature in their profession;" usual tenure is 9 or 12 months, with a normal Foundation stipend of $1,250 per month, supplemented by salaried income from institutions to^ match normal salary .^^ ' j (2) Postdoctoral fellowships. — primarily for young scientists who have demonstrated special aptitude for advanced training, with a usual tenure of 9 or 12 months, and a normal stipend of' $6,500 for 12 months.324 (3) Graduate fellowships. — for study leading to master's or doctoral degree for students who have demonstrated ability and special aptitude for advanced training in the sciences; normal tenure for 9 or 12 months with a 12-month stipend ranging from $2,400 to $2,800.^^ (4) Science faculty fellowships. — to enhance the teaching capabihties of junior college, college, and university science teachers; normal tenure of 9 or 12 months, with a stipend based on normal salaried income but not to exceed $15,000 for a 12- month period. ^^^ Each of these fellowship programs is funded by the NSF Division of Graduate Education. Awards are made for study or training in mathe- matics; physical, medical, biological, engineering, and social sciences; the histor}' and philosophy of science, and interdisciplmarv science. Awards are not made in education or business fields, nor. in nistory or social work. With the exception of the graduate program, awards are not made for study leading to a higher academic degree. ^^ In:enlory 9/ Federal Programs, . . . op. rit., p. 357. 321 "Questionnaire on Goverameat Exchange Programs." PrDgram Code 711. "International Travel Grmts for Sclen e Educatiin." Prepared for CU Exchanges study. , , *» The Foundation's authority reads: "[The Foundation is directed! to award . . . scholarships and graduate fellowships for scientific study or scientific work in the mathematical, physical, medical, biological, i engineering, and other sciences at appropriate nonprofit American or non-profit foreign institutions" (Sec. 10^. Legislative authority: P.L. 81-507, National Science Foundation Act of 1950, as amended, 42 USG. 1861-1875. 323 U.S., National Science Foundation, "Senior Postdoctoral Fellowships, brochure, 1970." E-70-G-8. 32* U.S., National Science Foundation, "Postdoctoral Fellowships," brochure. 1970," E-70-G-3. 325 U.S., National Science Foundation, "Graduate Fellowships," brochure, 1970, C-70-G^. ^' U.S., National Science Foundation, "Science Faculty Fellowships for the Improvement of College Science, Mathematics, and Engineering Teaching, brochure, 1970," E-70 G-1. 976 Individuals who apply for these awards and who want to study in a foreign institution use the same application procedure ^" as for awards tenable in domestic institutions. Evaluation procedures are similar: senior postdoctoral, postdoctoral, and graduate applications are evaluated by panels convened by the National Research Council; science faculty applicants are evaluated by scientific panels appointed by the Association of American Colleges.^^^ Applicants must include "the duly executed Oath of Affirmation" required by Section 15(d) of the National Science Foundation Act of 1950. In addition, awards are subject to the geographic distribution requirements the Founda- tion imposes. Fellowship awards tenable abroad differ in three ways from those tenable domestically: grantees are also given travel expenses and a nominal stipend for equipment and research; applicants must specify what particular scientific benefits will accrue from study at a particular foreign institution, and applicants must be admitted at the foreign institution prior to applying for the award. Issues surrounding the programs for the award of NSF fellowships abroad have not been discussed in depth in either authorization or appropriations hearings or in NSF annual reports. The Foundation does include detailed information on awards for these programs in Annual Reports. (See Table 25.) Similarly, the Division of Graduate Education in Science provides statistical information in in-house annual reports. (See Table 26.) Some information on operational questions was provided by NSF in response to the State Department questionnaire on Government exchange programs. Data in these three information sources generate the following observations: — since the program began in 1952 (until 1970), the Founda- tion has awarded 2,790 fellowships wliich were used overseas for the four programs; — the majority of fellows who study abroad do so in Europe, especially the United Kingdom, followed by France, Germany, and Switzerland; — of the four programs, the one with the fewest number of fellowship holders who elect to study abroad is the graduate fellowship program, where 2 percent or fewer of grantees annually have gone abroad. — science faculty fellows average foreign study at the rate of 10 percent per year. Postdoctoral and Senior postdoctoral fellow- ship holders evidence greatest interest in foreign study. Approxi- mately one-half to one-third of postdoctoral fellows have elected to study abroad since the program began; the percentage has been decreasing in the last several years. About 75 percent of the postdoctoral fellowships awarded each year are for study abroad. 32' "The evaluation of applicants will be based on their ability as evidenced by letters of recommendations, previous scientific accomplishments and other indicators of scholarly activity, and on the proposed plan of study or reseai-ch. The appropriateness of the fellowship's institution for the proposed plan of study or research will also be considered." ^^ Applications for postdoctoral and ^aduate fellowships are made directly to the Fellowship Office of the NRC which directly administers the program. 977 TABLE 25— NSF FELLOWSHIP AWARDEES, FOREIGN TENURE Fisca 1 year- - 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1963 1S69 1970 Total Western Europe: Austria Belsium . 3 3 2 5 16 "37" 31 2 2 10 "26" 30 1 2 11 "25" 27 4 . 4 12 "38" 26 5 ..... 10 ""29 " 15 1 . 1 3 4 ""28" 21 ...... 11 9 1 ...... 30 1 . 1 3 1 . 18 12 ...... 8 . 2 . ...... 6 ■■■3" 5 . ""i4"' 8 — ... ...... 10 ..... ..... 9 ...... 2 1 . ...... 1 2 5 1 4 7 ..... 4 ..... 12 15 34 Denmark .. 10 82 Finland France - Germany.. Greece 1 . .. 28 .. 21 1 . 3 250 207 7 Iceland 1 Italy.... Netherlands Nofway Spain Sweden Switzerland .. 9 9 3 ".".""'is' 8 12 4 5 1 9 26 5 9 4 2 . 11 22 8 9 2 "Va 16 8 9 1 1 . 8 19 11 9 5 "9"' 25 76 72 24 4 88 183 England .. 62 1 . 83 . 145 1 Northern Ireland 2 . 3 . 75 ""72" ■""55" '"76" 2 Scotland J United Kingdom .. 2 6 . 275" '274" "246" 1 88 5 97 17 1,258 United Kingdom, total Eastern Europe: ... 65 89 275 274 246 1 . 89 102 80 72 55 76 1,423 1 U SS.R 2 1 7 . 1 . 1 . 9 11 6 2 1 4 1 2 5 Yucoslavis 3 North America: Canada Rermuda 2 5 14 6 64 1 Latin America: Argentina... Brazil Costa Rica . ........ 1 . 1 . ...... ...... ....... ....... 1 . ...... ..... 1 . 2 ....... ...... 2 3 1 Chile 1 ...... ...... 3 Ecuador Peru Africa ; British West Africa 1 1. 1 7 2 4 East Africa 1 Malagasy Republic Senegal.. Uganda... Union of South Africa 1 1 1 1 ...... 1 . 1 1 1 2 . 1 3 Mid-East and South Asia: India 1 ...... 7 3 1 6 1 Israel-. ___ 13 6 1 5 11 9 2 8 2 4 71 1 ■ Malaysia Turkey 1 1 1 ...... 4 1 . 3 6 ■— 2" 3 1 East Asia: Australia Japan New Zealand 5 4 1 7 1 3 8 3 3 14 3 2 7 2 4 1 11 3 1 6 3 1 6 4 78 29 21 Taiwan 1 Annual total ... 196 257 432 431 415 252 254 162 154 99 138 2,790 Source: Data figured from NSF annual reports and grants and awards books, fiscal years 1960-70. Data given by NSF differentiate between fellowship awards tor graduate, postdoctoral, senior postdoctoral and science faculty. These cate- gories are combined in this listing. Figures for United Kingdom were not reported in consistent fashion and attimeswero extrapolated and summed. Regional categories were prepared by the author. 978 TABLE 26.— NSF FELLOWSHIPS TENABLE ABROAD, FISCAL YEARS 1960-70 Number of Percent of Number of Percent of awards awards awards awards made made made made Number tenable in tenable in Number tenable in tenable in of awards foreign foreign of awards foreign foreign Fiscal year made institutions institutions Fiscal year made Institutions institutions Graduate fellow- Science faculty ships: fellowships: 1960 1, 200 24 2.0 1%0 285 22 7.7 1961 . 1, 537 20 1.3 1961 285 36 12.6 1962. 1,761 34 1.9 1962... 325 33 10.0 1963 _.. 1,880 47 2.5 1963 325 31 9.5 1964_._ 1,900 33 1.7 1964_ 325 27 8.3 1965 1,934 27 1.4 1965 325 42 13.0 1966 2,500 40 1.6 1S66.. 326 35 10.7 1967 2,450 39 1.6 1967 250 15 6.0 1968 2,500 42 1.7 1968 223 23 10.3 1969 2.500 38 1.5 1969_ _.. 212 14 6.0 1970 2,582 30 1.2 1970 212 17 8.0 Postdoctoral fellow- Senior postdoctoral ships: fellowships: 1960 180 90 50.0 1960. _ 75 62 83.0 1961 235 125 53.0 1961. 91 74 81.0 1962 245 134 55.0 1962.. 95 74 78.0 1963 245 124 51.0 1963 95 72 76.0 1964 240 110 46.0 1964. 96 76 79.0 1965 229 108 47.0 1965 98 70 71.0 1966 230 111 48.0 1966 95 70 74.0 1967 150 63 42.0 1967 65 51 78.0 1968 120 45 37.0 1968.. 55 41 74.0 1969 130 47 36.0 19691 1970 169 54 32.0 1970.. 58 36 62.0 1 No competition in 1969. Sources: Data on number of applicants and number of awards are from charts prepared by Division of Graduate Educa- tion in Science, NSF: "Distribution of Fellowship and Traineeship Awards Applied For and Offered, Fiscal Years 1952-70," prepared June 30, 1970: data on number of awards made tenable in foreign institutions are from: NSF annual reports, fiscal years 1960-70; percentages figured from data given. The numbers of awards for fellowships abroad in the four program areas has decreased since the height of the program in the mid-sixties (probably due to the balance of payments problems). Financial data are not reported separately for these awards in hearings. The only readily available information on funding for these foreign aspects of the four programs comes from the U.S. Office of Education studv, which gives the following figures for the fiscal years 1966, 1967, and 1968, respectively: $2,201,705; $1,365,866; and $1,291,000.^-^ According to NSF, fellows sent abroad under this activ- ity are not given any special "kind of preparation, counseling, orienta- tion, and language training" before departure. The only attempt made to enhance communication between participants is that "Each fellow going abroad is sent a list of all presentl)^ abroad or who will be abroad in six months. They are responsible for making their own contacts." No special follow-up is made to secure the Fellows' reac- tions to the overseas experience or to obtain information on their, foreign activities and the results of these activities while abroad. However, "fellows are required to submit terminal reports to the Foundation describing their activities and accomplishments, and evaluating the program as a whole." Apparently these reports are not used by U.S. missions abroad. Responding to specihc items in the Questionnaire, the Foundation says there are no problems in the administration" of the program; the program should be expanded considerably; the Foundation has 326 Inventory of Federal Programs . . . , op. cit., p. 351. 979 no knowledge of how the fellows' performance varies with the special conditions of the foreign country or institution. The only difficulty known to the Foundation relates to "finding adequate housing." ^^^ Conclusions: Some Illustrative Questions of Policy The bulk of the Nation's programs in support of U.S. nongovern- mental scientists abroad are supported by the NSF and are admin- istered either directly by the Foundation or by the National Academy of Sciences with NSF funds. NSF obligations for international scien- tific acti\'ities totaled approximately $118 million in fiscal year 1974; there usually is no accurate information available to estimate the total annual cost of programs which send abroad nongovernmental scientific and technical personnel; most NSF international acti^^ties involve such exchanges. These programs include: joint cooperative research; educational fellowships; research awards for domestic acti\'ities with funds available for use in foreign scientific actix^ities; technical assistance programs supported with collateral funds awarded by AID; support of scientists for travel to scientific conferences; a variety of bilateral science agreements; and NAS-administered ac- tivities, including the program of exchanges with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe; and support of U.S. participation in planning and developing international scientific meetings and programs. NSF exchange programs^ send scientists to all areas of the world ; their purposes are as widespread as their geographic distribution. Some programs support the accumulation of information to advance American science, or science for its own merits; some promote educa- tional advancement of American and foreign scholars; some facilitate international cooperative research programs; and some serve political objectives through bilateral scientific communication. These programs are increasing in number and importance, with respect to U.S. com- mitments for both science and foreign affairs. Two factors constrain NSF foreign science exchange activities: (1) the accumulated effects of the absence, until 1968, of a clearly enunci- ated mandate for engaging in foreign and international activities ; and (2) the need for the Foundation to meet requirements imposed by scientific scholarship to insulate support activities from undue political and governmental interference. ^ ■ When the Foundation was first established in 1950, the Congress did not give the agency explicit authority for foreign and international scientific activities. Most NSF programs were initiated before the Congress clarified this responsibility in 1968. Thus, they were initiated under the limited authority requiring the Foundation to support, justify, and administer foreign and international activities in teims of supporting the growth of domestic science. Probably as a result, the information presented in this chapter indicates that the Foun- dation does not seem to have developed clear-cut policies and internal program operations which provide for coordinated administration of these programs. Foreign exchange activities are scattered through- out all NSF divisions. While the Foundation established an office for foreign and international science in 1955, that office, even today, has relatively little responsibility for overseas science programs. The '^o "Questionnaire on Government-Exchange Programs. Program Code No. 701," NSF fellowship pro- grams for U.S. citizens: Senior Postdoctoral. Postdoctoral, Science Faculty, and Graduate Fellowship Programs. Division of Graduate Education in Science, February 4; 1971. 980 Office of International Programs directly administers only about 5 percent of the NSF's international and foreign science activities. It does not seem to maintain close liaison with other NSF offices which administer the bulk of these programs. There is little evidence to suggest that the Director of National and International Programs provides these coordinating functions on a continuing basis. Owing to the Foundation's need to m.eet the requirements of scientific scholarship, and as a result of the fragmentation of activities, the Foundation has not maintained consistent and appropriate records of its foreign scientific exchange programs. With the exception of the in- ternational travel program, one or two cooperative scientific projects, and some bilateral activities, the Foundation generally does not require grantees to report on international or foreign activities. Similarly, except for a small number of programs, the Foundation does not require grantees to meet any special language or other cultural qualifications for the conduct of activities overseas, nor to report to the Foundatipn on the particular implications, if any, of the conduct of these activities. Only in fiscal year 1970 did the Foundation begin to attempt to collect data, and then in onl}^ a perfunctory fashion, on overseas activities undertaken with NSF funds. Among the more important implications of these factors are the following: Since the NSF did not keep adeqirate records on nor consist- ently report to the Congress on foreign and international scientific activities, it is hard to obtain a valid picture of their scope and evolution; Fragmentation of support and administration of foreign and international scientific activities, in the absence of any explicit reporting requirements, has kept the Foundation from defining and developing a role as a lead U.S. agency in support of inter- national science and scientific exchange activities. While a number of these progi*ams very probably have advanced the cause of in- ternational science and international politics, there is little in- formation on their achievements or impacts. The absence of both data and a mechanism to plan programs on a Foundation-wide basis undermines NSF's responsibility for determining program priorities in both the short- and long-range future. Systematic determination of priorities, both within and among programs seems to be required, since the programs are both increasing and becoming more significant as tools of foreign policy. A number of NSF programs suffer from poor participation rates by U.S. scientists. These include bilateral agreements for technical as- sistance or to promote political cooperation. U.S. scientific participa- tion is circumscribed by language barriers and sometimes by insufficient scientific reward. It is conceivable that NSF could design programs which would satisfy more easily criteria for U.S. scientific participation and for country planning needed to develop the science infrastructure of developing countries. For example, the Foundation might insist on better evaluation of the experiences of the programs it supports, better reporting, improve in-house evaluation of reports and of program accomplishments and problems, and more attention to requirements for effective performance. • - 981 Programs for foreign and international science funded by the Office of International Programs and oiher Divisions of the Foundation are rapidly enlarging. In addition, the Foundation's responsibilities for foreign and international science were expanded under terms of Presi- dent Nixon's Reorganization Plan Xo. 1, which took effect on July 1, 1973. This action transfers to NSF some Executive Office functions for determining of domestic and foreign science policies and for inter- agency coordination. It also designates the Foundation's Director as the President's Science Adviser and personal representative for foreign scientific aflairs.^^^ It is an open question whether the Founda- tion's organization for foreign and international science can meet the needs imposed by these expanded responsibilities. Other specific questions might be asked : Should the Foundation enlarge its overseas science staff? Should the Foundation evaluate the merits of delegating to the NAS increasing responsibilities in international science? Should the Foimdation improve in-house reporting requirements and coordination of foreign and international activities? Should the Foundation reestablish the International Science Ad- visory Committee? Should the Foundation require more systematic evaluation of its far- flung support activities, especially in examining apparent inadequacies of some bilateral technology-assistance programs? Should the Foundation provide for more systematic coordination with the activities of the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State? 331 "Transfer of OST Functions to Director of NSF," National Science Foundation News Release (January 26, 1973), NSF 73-104. IV. UxiTED States axd Soviht-Easterx Europeax Ixter- Academy SCIEXTIFIC EXCHAXGES Introduction The United States and the Soviet Union agreed to the terms of a new bilateral accord for science and teclinology on May 24, 1972. The agreement, one of a series of four which resulted from the Wasliington- Moscow summit meetings, augmented pre\aous scientific and teclmical exchange agreements, mcluding those annexed to biennially renewed cultural relations treaties.^^- The 1972 accord created a Joint Commission on Scientific and Tech- nical Cooperation to maintain contmuing negotiations and joint program planning in order to estabUsh and guide cooperative research projects agreed to in the accord.^^^ The first meeting of the Joint Commission was held in March 1973. It was originally proposed that the President's Science Ad^'ise^ and the Office of Science and Technology, Executive Office of the President, would pro\nde U.S. achninistrative support. Under President Nixon's Reorganization Plan Xo. 1, January 1973,^^^ the Director of the Xa- tionai Science Foundation was given responsibUit}- to represent the United States on the Joint Commission. The first deputy chairman of the State Committee of the So^-iet Council of Ministers for Science and Teclinology was his counterpart at the first meeting. Due to constraints of protocol, the first deputy minister replaced the chairman of the State Committee, who was originally designated coiniterpart of the President's Science Adviser .^^'' Among the programs agreed to at the fu'st nee ting were "direct co- operation"— primarily on a Government and agency-to-agency basis — in energy-, computer applications to management, agricultural research, microbiological s^Tithesis, chemical catalysis, and water resources.^^" The 1972 accord for cooperation in science and teclinology includes pro\isions for mutually agreed upon joint cooperative research. Thus, it significantly enlarges the scope of previous scientific and technical agreements which supported primarily exchanges of personnel and information. This development and the signing of additional cooper- ative agreements in applied science and teclinology fields, in both ?32 Two accords were signed on May 23. 1972: (1) "The Agreement on Cooperation in the Field of En- vtronmeiital Protection . . ." and (.-) "The Agreement ... in the Cooperation in the Field of Medical Science snd PuMic Health. . . ." In addition to the Science and Technology Agreement, another agreement signed on May 24, was "The Agreement ... on Cooperation in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space for Peaceful Purposes. . . ." ^ "U.S. and U.S.S.R. Sign Exchange Agreement for 1972-1073," DepaTtment of State Bulletin LX^I, Xo. 1716 (Mav 1.5. li>72). pp. 707-713. including text of the agreement. 33< "Transfer of OST Fimctious to Director of XSF." XSF Xeics ReUase (January 26, 1973), NSF 73-104, 3 pages. 3W "U.3.-U.S.S.R. RandD Accord: More. But Xot Much." Science and Goremment Report (ApriW.KTZ), p. 3. On July 1. 1973 the President designated the Director of the XSF as the President's Science Adviser. It remains to be seen whether the chairman of the State Committee of the Soviet Cotmcil of Ministers for Science and Technology wiU participate in future Joint Commission meetings, even though the protocol problem has been removed. s^* "U.S. -U.S.S.R. Joint Commission Announces Approval of Action Programs for Cooperative Re- search," Xational Science Foundation News Release (March 21, 1973), 5 pp. (XSF 73-131.) (982) 983 1972 and 1973,^^'^ have led many observers to proclaim that the United States and the Soviet Union have taken a first step toward true cooperative scientific relations. At the same tune, however, the new agreements have been criticized on the grounds that their objectives caiuiot be met unless administra- tors, diplomats, and scientists overcome the financial, bureaucratic, and political hurdles which have characterized American and Soviet and Eastern European exchanges to date,^^" and unless these recent actions do, indeed, represent a real and continuing effort by the Soviets to engender mutually beneficial cooperation as implied by these apparent moves toward detente and a reordering of priorities toward cooperation with the West.^^^ Tliis section ^e^^ews the origin and evolution of the Soviet and Eastern European American inter-Academy scientific exchange agree- ments in order to give some perspective and historical background to the history, up to 1972, of the only formal program of nongovern- mental scientific exchanges between the United States and the Com- munist countries. Scope and Limitations The political estrangement between the United States and the Soviet Union after 1945 posed insurmountable difficulties for American scientists and technical personnel who wished to study, conduct re- search, and lecture in the Soviet Union and in Eastern European countries. Before 1959, Americans were not permitted to participate in any scientific activities hi the Soviet Union.^^^ All Government- s'^ As noted above, the 1972 aercements provide for ccoperation in environmental proteclion. medical science and piililic health, exploration and use of outer .<;p:ue for peaceful purposes, and sci'iK e and tech- nology. The June I'J, l'.i73 agreements augment these provisions to include cooperation expliciiy in siumes of the world ocean, acricuiiurc, and transportation. These specific lields of cooperation will i>e handled separalelv liv appropriate scientific and technical agencies in each country, cooperative res<'arch aereed to in the" Science and Technology Agreement will be under the overall administration, on the American side, of the Jcint Commission. The National Science Foundation has been given authority for haud'.nig coordination of the American aspects of the program. Until July HC3 the executive director of the Com- mission was located in tli.' Olliiv of Inlernational Scienlilic and Technologii al Affair.s, DepHrimeut of fttaie. Detail? of iinpU-mcnl.nion an- still In-ing worked out. For areas of cocDcralion see: "(.enen.l .Vgreement Between the U-iited States of .\merica and the fnion of Soviet Socialist Republics on Contacts. F.xchanees, and Cooperation in the Fields cf Science, Technologv, Education, and Cu!iu;e, June 10. l'-73." WctUv Compilation of Presidential Documents. 9. No. 2.i (1'.'73), p. 7'J6. Al.=o: "Record of the First Meeting of the U.S-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on Sciemi.'ic and Technical Cooperation," Distributed by the National Science Foundation. (1973), '.t pp. plus appendices. The 1973 agreement also included provisions to support the renewal of the specialized agreements for exchanges between (D The National Academy of Sciences o: the United States jf America and tli<- Acadoniy of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: and (-) the American Council of Learned Societies and the Acadeniv of Sciences of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. ^ rr u ^ For a review of general reactions to the accord .see: "The U.S.-Soviet Agreement in Science and Tech- nolosy." Bv Claire R. Gei.r, Science Policv Reseiuch Division, Congressional Research Servive, Library of Congress. .Multilith 72-17'.i SP. August 10. 1072. The details of the new accords were reviewed by the SiilK-ommiltee on International Science and Space. House Committee on Science and Astronautics, in nej^rines on the L'.S.-C-^.S.R. Cooperatire Agree uktUh (1'.i72), ^OS pp. and in a report i'^stied by the Sub- committee. V.fi.-L'.S.S!.R. Coopcralire Agrununls (August lii72), 28 pp. (Committee riiiit.) Dr. Philip Handler, President, National Academy of Sciences, whose OfTice of the Foreign Secretary adrr.ini.^ers the scientific and technical bilaterals under the cultural exchange agreements, reported to the Subcorn- mitt^-e on jxissible developments required to insure suece.ss of the new accord. His testimony was adapted for an aiiiele in the KAS-SRC Seirs Report (August-September 1972), "The Moscow Agretmeuts and U.S.-Soviet Scientific Re!:ition.';hips. pp. 8 )l. 33« Nicholas Wade. wTiting in Sciente magazine has called the new and "vague" 1072 agreements mere "icing on the cake of Soviet -American amity." ("Nixon-Brezhnev Summit: A New Clutch of Con.pacis, Science (July 6. 1073). pp. 38-40. An in-depth evaluation of the political and economic factors ^urrounding recent So\-iet-.\.merican expanded cooperation may be found in another study in this series: U.S.. Congress, House. Committee on Foreign Aflairs. Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scieniific Develop- ment?. V.S.-Smief Commercial Relations: The Internlay of Economics, Technology Transfer and Diplomacy, By John P. Hardt and George D. Holliday. 1973. (See vol. I. pp. 525-606.) ^'> Interview. Mr. Lawrence Mitihell. Director. USSR and East European AfTairs. OfRce of the Foreign Secretary. National Academy of Sciences, >'arch 3. 1071. Tn lOf.O Professor Robert B\-rnes rep.".rted to the Congress: "In 10.>6. the U.S. "had less than ten scholais who had spent an appreciable period of time in the Soviet Ur.ion." (U.S., Congress. Senate. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on Na- tional Secnritv and International Operations. International Xiootiation: Kichnnoe of Scholars I'ith the Sonet L'nion: Advantages and Dilemmas: Memorandum, 91st Cong., 1st sess., 1969, p. 5. [Committee Print.l 984 funded exchanges between the United ^States and the U.S.S.R. even today, unlike exchanges with countries of the non-Communist world, are conducted under formal, rigidly enforced, official cultural relations treaties and quid pro quo exchange agreements. The first of these was signed in 1959 as an inter-Academy agreement and since then has been renewed every two years and annexed to the biennially renewed Cultural Relations Treaty between the two Nations. (The \ 972-1 973 Soviet-American accords noted that inter-Academy science and tech- nology agreements were to continue and be renewed in cultural rela- tions treaties.) The 1959 agreement included provisions for the mutual exchange of a small, select number of American and Soviet scientists J. 28-625 Sp. 7 F. 112-120 46-10 nite n 26150 Echino April 8, 1974 to study and do research, but not to lecture. "The commencement of the program," according to Dr. Harrison Brown, Foreign Secretary, National Academy of Sciences, "marked the first real opening in United States-Soviet scientific relations since before World War II. . . ." ^*' Brown continues: ". . . The formal exchange program serves as an adaptive mechanism to benefit the scientists of two countries, enabling two basically incompatible systems to mesh at one small interface." ^*^ Educational exchange agreements, also part of the Cultural Re- lations Treaties, place American students and senior level scholars in universities under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Education and in research institutes other than those under the jurisdiction of the Soviet Academy of Sciences. Soviet students and scholars are placed in American universities and in selected academic research centers. The International Research and Exchanges Board (IREX), New York, administers these programs \nth. funds provided by the Government and private agencies. The majority of exchanges of American social and behavioral scientists with the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe are au- thorized by an agreement negotiated in 1966-67 providing for ex- changes administered in this country by IREX on behalf of the American Council of Learned Societies and the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union.^*^ Until 1972, American and Soviet scientific and technical exchanges in atomic energy and public health were managed under separate pro- visions of the cultural and educational exchange treaties. The Atomic Energy Commission and the Public Health Service handled funding, 3" A Ceneral Review of International Cooperation in Science and Space: Hearings, op. cit., p. 151. 3« Ibid.. D. 170. 5<3 IREX was established in 1968 by the American Council of Learned Societies and the Social Science Be.<;earch Council. Generally, IREX coordinates academic exchange activities for its 63 member universities with the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. Activities are funded by the Ford Foundation, the Bureau of International Education and Cultural Affairs, the Department of State, and participating uni- versities. Exchange activities include those authorized under agreement between the American Council of Learned Societies and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R. with the Ministry of Higher and Special- ized Secondary Education, U.S.S.R., for language study and research in psychology. IREX also administers similar programs with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia; in addition to its own programs, which include research grants in social sciences or humanities for Research on Eastern European and Baltic countries, travel grants, and grants for summer language study. Details are available In: IREX, Exchange Programs u'ith Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union: 1971-197S (New York: IREX, 1970), and NAS, Information for Prospective Applicants for Participation in the Exchange Programs between the A14S, USA and the Academies of Sciences of the USSR, Bulgaria. Czechoslovakia, Poland, Romania and the Council of the Academies of Yugoslavia in Academic Year 1971-197$ (September 1970), 4 pp. 985 selection, and administration of these activities. ^^'' (As noted above the activities previously authorized under these agreements are in- corporated into and are expanded in the 1972 and 197.3 agreements.) It is expected that appropriate Government agencies will continue to be responsible for day-to-day administration of cooperation in specific scientific and technical areas.^^^ The inter-Academy scientific exchanges, authorized in annexes to the Cultural Relations Treaties, are administered in the United States by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) and in the Soviet Union by the Soviet Academy of -Sciences. The NAS maintains a small staff to administer the program, the Section on the USSR and Eastern Europe in the Office of the Foreign Secretary. An NAS Advisory- Committee on the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe provides policy guidance. The program is funded by the Office of International Programs, National Science Foundation. Exchange agreements are negotiated on a two-year basis; renewals establish limits for specific man-months and subjects for exchange. Each country pays the transportation of its citizens to the other; the host country is responsible for living expenses, tuition, and related expenses. Foreign poUcy guidance and procedural advice are given by the Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Staff, U.S. Department of State. With the exception of other exchanges in specific fields of atomic energy and public health, the Soviet- American inter-Academy ex- change was, prior to 1972, virtually the only Government-funded program which sent "hard" non-agency senior-level scientists and technical personnel to the Soviet Union. The importance of the Inter-Academy operation has been implied in several recent studies. For instance, Professor Robert F. Byrnes has reported that data collected by the Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges staff, Department of State, demonstrate that "Almost eighty percent of the Soviet participants in the basic program administered [in Soviet- American academic exchange programsl have been scientists and engineers, while somewhat less than ten percent of the Americans have been in science or technology." ^^^ Professor Frederick C. Barg- hoorn, who conducted an in-depth survey of Soviet-American ex- changes, reported similarly: . . . the ovenvhelming majority of Soviet exchanges, especially in academic exchange programs are specialists in the natural sciences and in engineering. This concentration of scientists and engineers among the Soviet participants . . . has become even more pronounced during the last year or two. . . . Americans . . . are mainly historians, literary scholars, and social scientists.^*^ M4 Under temis of the previous agreements between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe' personnel in specific scientific and technical fields were exchanged between U.S. mission-oriented aeencie_ and their foreign counterparts. Usually these prograwis, at least on the U.S. side, involve sending Govern" mental scientific and technical personnel to the other country. The United States-Soviet Health Exchange Agreement was administered by the Coordinator, U.S. Soviet Health Exchange, Office of International Health, Public Health Service; atomic energy exchanges were handled by the Division of International Affairs, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission: and exchanges in agriculture were administered by the Foreign Agricultural Service, U.S. Department of Agilculture. W5 Interview, Dr. Norman Neureitcr, former staff member of the U.S. side of the Joint Commission, Department of State, .Tuly 1973. See also: "Record of the First Meeting of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commis- sion on Scientific and Technical Cooperation," op. cit. s^' Bvrnes, op. cit., p. 11. M' Frederick C. Barghoorn, "The Special Case of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Exchanges," International Educational ond Cultural Exchange (Fall 1969), pp. 36-7. 986 Accordinof to a 1965 Department of State report, the majority of Eastern Europeans who come to the United States on exchange programs funded by private American Foundations are in science and technology. But "such a provision . . . for return of visits of American scientists to Eastern Europe ... is not found in [these private programs]." ^** Underlying the Soviet concentration on sending large numbers of scientists and technical personnel to the United States, according to Byrnes, is a desire to profit from American scientific and technical advances: Those of the Party and the governmtnt who make the decisions . . . seek to strengthen the Soviet system and to weaken ours. Their primary concern has been to obtain scientific, technical, and miUtary information from the United States . . . [and to] strv^ngthen their economy. . . . The So\'iet Union has obtained a signifi- cant increment to its scientific and technical knowledge from these programs, from basic knowledge concerning polio vaccines, to training in econometrics, and . . . business management [and] the latest work in biochemistry. ^*9 ' The inter-Academy agreements, like all previous scientific agree- ments with the Soviet Union and both the 1972 and 1973 agreements, specify reciprocity in numbers, subjects, and duration of exchanges. This obstacle. Dr. Brown implies, limits American scientific exchange activities in the Soviet Union to fields the Soviets wish to study in the United States : "... The Soviet Academy determines fields in which it ^vishes to send scientists to the United States and . . . the individual participants are subsequently selected to correspond with the field. Thus the Soviet Academy seeks to maximize scientific benefits according to prearranged plan. ..." ^^^ But U.S. objectives, Brown continues, are to ". . . accommodate American scientists whose, research interests would be furthered by contacts in the U.S.S.R. with Soviet colleagues. These different approaches," Brown adds, "under- score the utility of the Exchange Agreement as an adaptive mechanism to enable the scientists of the two countries to engage in professional activities which would otherwise be subject to almost insuperable diflficulties." »5i Senior level programs of scientific exchange with Poland, Czecho- slovakia, and Yugoslavia are conducted on the basis of nongovern- ment Academy-to-Academy agreements, first arranged in 1966. These are less formal than activities under the comprehensive intergovern- mental cultural relations agreement with the Soviet Union. An Academy-to-Academy exchange agreement with Romania was ar- ranged on the basis of an intergovernmental exchange of notes first signed in 1960 and renewed biennially. Tliis agreement provides also for exchanges in specific fields handled b}^ other agencies, such as in atomic energy, pubUc health, housing, and transportation. Applied science and technology oriented exchanges between operating agencies s^s Letter from Herman Pollack, Acting Director, International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Depaitment of State, to Arthur Roe, Head, OfBce of International Programs, NSF, May 8, 1065 [-Hriting in support of the Foundation's funding of a program of NAS administered exchanges with the countries of Eastern Europe]. 3" Byrnes, op. cit., p. 11. This objective was underscored in a 1972 evaluation of the use of science and technology in Soviet domestic and foreign policies. "... It is clear," the study reports, "that the greater part of the Soviet eflort involving foreign science and technology continues now as in the past to be con- centrated on the acquisition of information useful to the USSR in developing its own plans." The evolu- tion of Communist Party documentation and activities in support of this goal are elaborated upwn in Mose L. Harvey, Leon Goure, and Valdimir Prokofieflf, Science and Technology as an Instrument of Soviet Pulley (With a foreward by Ambassador Foy D. Kohler) (Miami: Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, Fla., 1972), p. 95. 35" Report of the Foreign Secretary to the Annual Meetings of the National Academy of Science, April 1971 . In International Cooperation in Science and Space: Hearings, op. cit., p. 222. »n Idem. 987 in the United States and their counterparts in Eastern European countries other than Romania are arranged on the basis of inter- governmental negotiations between the agencies under the polic}' and procedural guidance of the State Department. The following pages overview the factual, financial, and adminis- trative history of exchanges . between the United States and the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. They evidence the difficulties in normalizing scientific relations between political adversaries, the very gradual expansion of the program, and the important role played by nongoverimiental scientists in assisting diplomats to overcome political obstacles. They review mutually restrictive policies and their impacts on expanding the size and scope of the programs. A summary section describes the qualified scientific and political achievements of the programs to date. This is followed by a shorter account of the still-developing scientific exchange program between the United States and the Peoples Republic of China. THE DIFFICULTIES OF CONDUCTING RESEARCH ON A COMPLEX PROGRAM The complexity of the Soviet and Eastern European exchange program precludes a comprehensive evaluation of scientific and diplomatic interactions. Dr. Harrison Brown, Foreign Secretary of NAS, whose office administers the program, reports that "It is very complex; it is perhaps the most complex program that I have ever had the honor of trying to supervise." ^^^ Our discussion in handling the . . . programs [Brown continuesl has been with the National Science Foundation, which finances the program with the State Department which has overall cognizance . . . because this is part of the intergovernmental cultural exchange agreement, with the Department of Defense, which has numerous restrictions concerning the movement of Soviet scientists in the United States, ^^s On this point, Barghoorn notes: the difficulties of obtaining informa- tion on an exchange program between two political adversaries also hamper the conduct of useful research on its accomplishments and limitations.^^ And he continues: "Anything approaching a full and systematic description or analysis of the processes and effects of U.S. -Soviet educational, scientific, artistic, and other exchanges would require studies larger in scope and more precise in method than any as yet undertaken. . . . ^^^ UNAVAILABILITY OF CONSISTENT AND RELIABLE DATA Evaluation is further hampered by the absence of reliable and public information on annual activities. The NSP", which funds these programs, is under statutor}^ obligation to report annually to the Con- gress in authorization and appropriations hearings and also in annual reports of grants awarded. However, the Foundation gives superficial details of the Soviet and Eastern European exchanges; gross financial 362.4 General Review of Iiifernational Cooperation in Science and Space: Hearings, op. cit., p. 160. 353 Barghoorn, op. cit., pp. 32-33. 3« Ibid. 355 Barghoorn enlarges on this point: "Analysis, evaluation, orindeed even simple description of communica- tions processes between the United States and the Soviet Union is likely . . . to be a . . . frustrating exercise. The diftieulties confronting tlie researcher reflect the difficulties, complexities, and frustrations inherent in the communications and exchange processes themselves. In dealing with the deUcate, often confidential information concerning personal contacts between Americans and citizens of states such as the U.S.S.R., where government tends to regard as the corr ern of the state, activities, regarded in the West as maiiily pivat", discretion is reiiuired, and of course vital information is likely to be unavailable, or in vei^y short supply." • '-iarghoorn, ibid., pp. 32-33.) 988 data; and some descriptive material citing especially meritorious activities. It has not made a systematic attempt to provide the Con- gress with a detailed summary of activities and problems culled from materials available from the National Academy of Sciences. The National Academy of Sciences is a quasi-public scientific advisory group chartered by Congress to provide advice to the Govern- ment on matters involving science, technology, research, and de- velopment. While a large portion of the Academy's activities are funded by contracts with Federal agencies, its operations and activi- ties, which reflect the need to maintain the integrity of science as incorporated in the Charter, are not subject to annual authorization and appropriations oversight. The Academy does prepare annual reports for the Congress, but these are published typically several years after completion of the fiscal year being summarized. The Academy prepares several types of in-house, unpublished ma- terial on the Soviet and Eastern European bilaterals. These documents support proposals the Academy submits to the Foundation for program funding and provide NAS members with an annual summary of the activities of the Office of the Foreign Secretary. These documents, which were used in preparing this study, are: Annual Reports of the Foreign Secretary; ^^® the Semiannual Report of Scientific Exchanges Under the 1966 Memoranda of Understanding between the National Academy of Sciences and the Academies of Eastern Europe; ^^^ data sheets giving numbers of exchanges both ways for both short- and long-term visits, 1959-1970;^^* and the Annual Proposal of the Na- tional Academy of Sciences to the National Science Foundation. ?^^ The Need for Acadsmy-to-Academy Exchanges Bilateral scientific exchange agreements between the United States and the countries of the non-Communist world are negotiated diplo- matically by the State Department and implemented by the NSF. The U.S.-Soviet agreement and the bilateral scientific agreements which were later negotiated with the Eastern European countries are handled differently.^^" These agreements, also called inter-Academy 3M Prepared for the SDring meetings of the Academy. They are mimeographed unpublished typed reports. The section treating Soviet and Eastern European exchange is usually a candid discussion of the number of exchanges both ways, efforts to solve problems of fiUing quolas, descriptions of surveys, visits and other activities undertaken bv the staff in both the United States and abroad, highlights of visits made by mem- bers of each Academy in support of removing diplomatic constraints on tlie programs, and description of facilitative services the staflf provides in support of scientific activities with the U.S.S.R. and the Eastern European count nes over and above the bilateral inter- Academy agreements. With the exception of reports prepared for inclusion in annual proposals to the NSF, this material is the only publicly available source of information on quota fulfillment and special administrative and diplomatic problems in implementing exchanges. / •''' Prepared by the Soviet and Eastern European Section of the Office of the Foreign Secretary. Reports give dafa on' American and Eastern European exchanses completed, in progress, or proposed for the curren year, including name, address, subject, duration of visit and location of visit; they include nan-ative mate- rials describing visits between members of respective academies to arrange and improve bilaterals particu- larly with respect to funding, selection of research topics, and tours of foreign scientific facilities by the staffs of both Academies. In addition, they describe some of the political and diplomatic obstacles to the conduct of exchanges. One difficulty a rasearcher encounters in assessing the dal a on exchanges included in these reports is that since visits completed, in progress, and planned are repoited, the researcher must sift through these thie"? types of data to insure that duplication is eliminated. '*' These lists are the only reliable and readily available material on exact numbers, subjecis, and durations of exchanges between the United States and the U.S.S.R. No annual data are given: instead, data are in blocks of four-year duration, making it difficult for the researcher to describe year-by-year activity and variations in activity. No information is given on the name of the grantee. '5' Includes areview of the program for both the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe similar in detail and scope to that included in the Annual Report of the Foreign Secretary to the National Academy of Sciences. 3E0 An exception to this pattern holds in the case of the bilateral agreement with Romania. The NAS directly iniplements activities with the Romanian Academy of Sciences; the NSF directly implements scientific exchariee activities with other scientific institutions in Romania. After this paper was written the NSF announced that it was also beginninsr to fund and administer programs for exchange and joint coopera- tive research, on an institution to institution basis, with also Hungiry, Czechoslovakia^ and Bulgaria. The institutions involved are primarily academic. (See: 1974 National Science Foundation Authorization: Hearings, op. cit., p. 317. 989 agreements, are administered by the National Academy of Sciences; furthermore, a large portion of the diplomatic maneuvering behind the initiation of agreements, revisions, renewals, and daily operations are handled by the NAS and its counterparts, the Soviet Academy of Sciences, and the Academies of Sciences of the Eastern European countries. Two reasons explain this difference in administration of the bilaterals with the Communist bloc. The first is political; the second reflects the locus of the conduct of scientific research in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. UnUke their American colleagues who, in visiting non-Communist countries, are free to make their own personal arrangements with their scientific counterparts for research, study, and travel, Americans visiting the Soviet Union and other Communist countries of Eastern Europe are constrained by regulations of the Departments of State and Defense in the United States and by those of the Foreign Min- istr}^ of the host countries. The activities of scientists from Com- munist countries are similarly restricted. Typically, Soviet and Amer- ican scientists in the host country are excluded from certain industrial sites and research laboratories in "sensitive" geographic locations; their length of stay and activities are limited by provisions in visas issued by the State Department or the Foreign Ministry. In the case of the Soviet Union as host, visitors from the United States are re- quired to stick, more or less, to planned itineraries with appropriate guide and interpreter accompaniment. These restrictions impose serious strains on the conduct, integrity, and independence of free scientific interchange. The origin of the Soviet-Eastern European programs illustrates the hypothesis that these strains would be mitigated if major and early precedent- breaking responsibility for program development and administration were given to scientists, and, insofar as possible, nongovernmental scien- tists, rather than exclusively to foreign policy administrators. Among the specific advantages of this arrangement are the following. Staff members of the NAS, unlike staff of the Department of State's Edu- cational and Cultural Exchange Bureau, are intimately familiar with requirements for the conduct of research and with the problems of designing potentially fruitful research proiects within the limits im- posed by political restrictions on scientific activity. Furthermore, since this staff is prestigious and nongovernmental, both sides to the agreement undoubtedly have greater confidence that the programs and the scientists exchanged under them would be as beneficial as possible to the advancement of science, the mutual detennination of priorities for exchange, and the cultivation of personal relationships so necessary for developing continuous cooperation. The NSF, as principal U.S. funding agency for scientific research and development, has a lonp- tradition of noninvolvemcnt with political activities on the grounds that such involvement might obstruct the conduct of free, unfettered scientific exchange between nations. However, the alternative of direct NSF administration of the bilaterals has been precluded by considerations governing the locus of conduct of scientific research and development in the Warsaw Pact countries. Due to the centralized nature of Communist organization and fund- 990 ing for scientific research and development,- the focus of basic research in the U.S.S.R. is in the institutes of the Soviet Academy of Sciences.^*^ The Need for Scientific Consultation in Establishing Agreements The history of the initiation and renegotiation of U.S. and U.S.S.R./ Eastern European bilateral inter-Academy scientific agreements illustrates the important role played by the two Academies in fashion- ing terms compatible with requirements for both science and politics. It demonstrates also a need for continuous negotiation between sci- entists and diplomats in efforts to enlarge the number, subject areas, and types of exchanges. Th^se topics will be addressed in the following sections. SOVIET-AMERICAN PROGRAMS The first Soviet-American program of scientific exchanges began in 1958, in the aftermath of the flight of Sputnik. At the request of the State Department,^^ these activities were implemented at first on an ad hoc, nongovernmental basis by the Academies of Science of both countries under authorization of Section IX of the Lacy-Zaroubin Agreement of January 1958, the first cultural exchange understanding between the United States and the Soviet Union.^^ In December 1958, in response to a request from NAS, the ''National Science Board ap- proved NSF 'consideration of support' to the NAS-NRC for a U.S.- U.S.S..R. interacademy exchange of scientists in the event that federal funds were required." ^^ Six months later, the Academy submitted a proposal to NSF for support for an exchange of scientists with the Soviet Union. The National Science Board approved the request in May 1959 for a two- year period. During the interval, NAS, at the request of the State Department, negotiated terms of a detailed agreement with the Soviet Academy of Sciences. It was concluded July 1959 (the Bronk-Nes- meyanov agreement). In September 1959, the NSF granted funds to the Academy for a one-year program of exchanges. This agreement was subsequently included in the new cultural relations treaty of 1960-61, signed by Llewellyn Thompson, U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, and G. A. Zhukov, Chairman of the State Committee of the U.S.S.R. for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries.^®^ The inter-Academy agreement signed in 1959 provided for a small, reciprocal two-year program of exchanges. Subsequent two-year agreements, which have been part of the broader biennially renewed '*' Brown, In: A General Review of Internaf tonal Cooperation in Science and Space, op. cit.. p. 151. On the SoviPt R and D system see; UNESCO. Science Policy and Organization of Research in the U.S.S.R. Science Pol iCD Studies and Documents No. 7 (Paris: UNESCO, 1967), 116 pp. and Orpanisation for Economic Co-oper- ation and Development, Science Policy in the U.S.S.R. (Paris: OECD, 1969), 618 pp. 3*2 Taken from materials supplied by the NSF and Draft Catalogue, supplied by Subcommittee on Bi- lateral Relations, International Committee of the Federal Council for Science and Technology, December 6, 1971. 363 The Lacy-Zaroubin agreement was the end result of three years of negotiation, begun in 19.55, to begin cultural and educational exchanges between the United States and the U.S.S.R. The history of this period was recently summarized in a Department of State pubhcation: "At the 19.55 Geneva meeting the Heads of Government of the United States, France, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union directed their Foreign Ministers to 'study measures which could bring about such freer contacts and exchanges as are to the mutual advantage of the countries and peoples involved.' The Foreign Ministers of the four countries met in Geneva in October 1955 to carry out the directive given them by the Heads of Government. On the item of increased East-West contacts, the representatives of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States' presented a proposal for 'further exchanges of perspns in the professional, cultural, scientific and technical fields' and for the beginning of 'exchanges of persons engaged in language and other area studies.' No agree- ment was reached on this or on the other two ag«nda items: European security and Germany, and disarma- ment. The final communique stated that fqrther discussion on all three topics would take place through di- plomatic channels." ("A Decade of Scholarly Exchanges v/ith the Soviet Union," FAR Horizons (July 1968), pp. .5-6.) '" Materials supplied by NSF and by the International Committee of the Federal Council for Science and Technology December 6, 1971, op. cit., passim. 3" TIAS 4362, November 21, 1959. 991 intergovernmental agreements for cultural, scientific, technical, educational and other exchanges, have continued and slowly expanded the scientific exchange program since 1959:^^® The inter- Academy exchange commenced with provision for 44 scientists of each country to visit the other for a total of 70 months over a period of 2 years, an extremely modest beginiiing which stressed short visits of 1 month. In 1962, when the program was renegotiated, the NAS took the initiative to adjust the balance away from the short survey visits in the direction of the longer research visits, for which Americans at least took their families along to participate in the new experience. In 1962 a new pattern was established which has continued more or less up to the present: 30 lecture-survey visits of 1 month; 26 research visits totalling 160 months for the biennium, with more emphasis placed on the longer research visits.'^^ The evolution 'of renegotiation of the broader cultural relations agreements under which the inter-Academy agreement is conducted slowly expanded provisions for U.S.-Soviet scientific exchanges into other areas. The 1962 agreement formalized exchanges in the humani- ties and social sciences between the American Council of Learned Societies, currently at the level of 12 scholars for 3-10 months "for the purpose of becoming acquainted with scholarly research in the fields of the humanities and social sciences as well as for conducting research in the scholarly institutions of the other side." ^^^ It provided also for summer exchanges of language teachers. A significant ex- pansion of the 1970 agreement was for the exchange of U.S. and Soviet professional and trade association delegations in 20 fields covering a variety of appHed scientific and techoical problems. The first seven fields are listed under the subheading "Man and His Environment," and include broad-based topics of major importance to an industrial society. The 13 other exchanges are on topics of more limited scope.^^^ The cultural relations agreement for 1970 and 1971 was signed in Washington on February 10, 1970. With the exception of minor changes in number and duration of exchanges, this agreement was essentially the same as the agreements between the two Academies in previous years. One significant addition was a provision for the two Governments to facilitate exchanges of professors and instructors to lecture in the natural sciences, technical sciences, and humanities, and the social sciences. The 1972-73 inter-Academy agreement, signed April 11, 1972, expanded man-months of permissible exchange to 190 each way. No specific arrangements were made for the conduct of joint symposia or scientific research; the agreement provided for the Academies to work out these details.^^° The 1972-73 agreement is summarized below (paraphrase) : 1. Number and duration of exchanges. — a. Exchanges of 12 prominent scientists, at least half of them to be members of the respective Academy, for periods up to one month to lecture, conduct seminars, or familiarize themselves with scientific research; 3" Under 6 intergovernmental agreements for scientific, technical, educational, and cultural exchanges concluded every two years between U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union or other State Department officials and their counterpart Soviet officials: TIAS 4362, 11/21/25; TIAS 5112, 3/8/62; TIAS 5582, 2/22/64; TIAS 6149, 3/19/66; TIAS 6.570, 7/15/68 and 2/10/70. 3" Brown, In: International Cooperation in Science and Space: Hearings, op. cit., p. 152. 3M "A Decade of Scholarly Exchanges with the Soviet Union," op. cit., p. 2. 3«9 "Scholarly Exchanges with the U.S.S.R.," FAR Horizons (May 1970), p. 4. Additional industrial and professional association exchanges are included in Section II of the 1970 agreement. ^'> NAS, "Annex I. Agreement on Exchange of Scientists between the National Academy of Sciences of the USA and the Academy of Sciences of the USSR in. 1972 and 1973," 2 pp. 992 b. Exchanges of a maximum of 14 scientists from each country, for one month visits for the famiharization with research; c. Exchanges of a maximum of 35 scientists, with total visits not to exceed 190 -man-months, to conduct scientific research or to pursue advanced study; visits to last from 3-10 months; 2. Nomination and selection. — Nominees to be approved by both Academies. Scientists are evaluated on education, professional employment, scientific specialization, publications, location of proposed visit, knowledge of foreign language, and title of lectures; 3. Additional exchanges. — Which permit revisions of the agreed upon terms as well as provision for visits for scientific conferences ; 4. Program review. — Both Academies are to exchange small delegations each year to review the inter-Academy exchange program "at the policy level;" 5. Financing and administrative arrangements. — The sending Academy is to provide round-trip transportation and salaries for its scientists ; the receiving Academy to provide in-country trans- portation costs, living quarters, medical expenses, special allow- ances, and reimbursement for research equipment expenses.^^^ EASTERN EUROPEAN PROGRAMS In general, inter-Academy scientific exchange programs with the Eastern European countries are carried out not under formal inter- governmental agreements but under ''Memoranda of understanding between the national academies of both countries who are parties to the bilateral agreement." ^^^ "These arrangements," according to the NAS, "are meant to augment existing scientific exchanges and con- stitute part of the continuing effort of the NAS to expand and develop contracts between American and foreign scientists." ^" One exception to the lack of intergovernmental inter-Academy agreements is the case of Romania, under which exchanges are im- plemented under a periodic exchange of diplomatic notes between the two governments. The origin and evolution of agreements with the Eastern European countries, similar to those with the U.S.S.R., underscore the important role played by the National Academy of Sciences in fashioning nonpolitical links between scientists of politically divergent cultures. Genesis of Agreements: Poland and Yugoslavia. — The genesis of formal scientific exchange agreements between the United States and the countries of Eastern Europe dates back to 1962. In September of that year, Harrison Brown, foreign Secretary of the NAS, toured the Academies of Sciences in the countries of Eastern Europe to discuss "the desirability of making it easier for American scientists and their scientists to exchange professional visits." ^^* Upon his return, the For- eign Secretary reported to the NAS Advisory Committee on the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe on the favorable reception he had "1 Idem. "2 These inter-Academy Eastern European exchange activities are separate and distinct from the programs the National Science Foundation directly administers with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Romania and Yugo- slavia. See note 360 above. ^^ National Academy of Sciences, "Information for Prospective Applicants for Participation in the Exchange Programs between the National Academy of Sciences of the USA and the Academies of Science of the USSR, Bulgaria, Crechoslovakia, Poland, Romania, and the Council of the Academies of Yugo- slavia in Academic Year 1971-1972." (Washington: National Academy of Sciences 1970), p. 1. "< Letter from Frederick Seitz, President, and Harrison Brown, Foreign Secretary, National Academy of Sciences, to Leland J. Haworth, Director, National Science Foundation, December 19, 1963, requesting financial support from the NSF for exchanges between the National Academy of Sciences and the Academies of Poland and Yugoslavia. 993 received. The Committee authorized the Foreign Secretary to in- vestigate "establishing informal exchange arrangements with in- terested academies in Eastern Europe and recommended that a beginning be made with Poland and Yugoslavia", since there already were favorable relations between U.S. scientists and scientists of these countries. ^'* Shortly thereafter, the Academy, in consultation with the NSF, prepared a draft memo of understanding to serve as a basis for the exchange arrangements. The draft was reviewed and approved by the State Department, U.S. Embassies and legations in Eastern Europe, and "other interested parts of the Government." ^^* The inter-Academy agreements concluded by the NAS and the Science Academies of Poland and Yugoslavia were designed from the start to be less formal than the scientific exchange agreement with the Soviet Union. "Our goal," wrote the NAS officials, "is to have ex- change understandings as flexible as possible." Continuing: We would like to be able to help American scientists get to Eastern Europe as they find it professionally necessary or desirable . . . without reference to a rigid number of exchange or to fields stipulated in advance. . , . There will have to be some limitation on complete freedom of action . . . because of budgetary considerations, and . . . the sensitivity of some fields. . . . The scientist and his interest will be proposed at the same time, not field first and scientist afterward as under . . . the 1962 exchange agreements, with the Soviet academy. . . .'" The NAS and the Academies of Sciences of Poland and Yugoslavia continued negotiations during later 1962 and most of 1963. In Decem- ber 1963, after it had received approval from the Governing Board of NAS, the Office of the Foreign Secretary formally requested $15,960 from the NSF to inaugurate a program of exchanges for the academic year 1963-64. NSF forwarded the proposal for review to the State Department, which subsequently approved the request "as being in the foreign policy interest of the United States ..." and asked NSF to support the NAS request.^^^ NSF approved the NAS proposal in February 1964. After exploratory visits between scientific delegations of the Academies, the NAS in 1965 received NSF approval to widen the exchange program to include Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslo- vakia.^^^ "The main purpose of the three new programs," according to the Academy, "would be essentially the same as the original two": ... to establish a working channel through each of the foreign organizations to the scientific community . . . [to] further science internationally and [toj facilitate survey and research visits of American scientists ..:.'*•' Extension of the Program: Romania and Czechoslovakia. — After receiving State Department approval NSF, in 1965, awarded $15,000 to NAS to support the visits of small American delegations to other Eastern European countries to explore establishment of formal scientific exchange activities.^*^ Formal "Inter-Academy Memoranda "5 Idem. 3" Idem. 3" Idem. "8 Letter from R. Rollefson, Director, Office of International Scientific Affairs, Department of State, to Leland J. Haworth, Director, NSF, January 22, 1964. 3" NAS-NRC, Office of the Foreign Secretary. "Proposal for Amending Task Order No. 74, to Broaden Exchanges of Scientists Beyond a Present Program for Yugoslavia and Poland to Include Romania, Hun- gary and Czechoslovakia." Sent to NSF, April 14, 1965. 380 Idem., p. 1. 38' NAS-NRC, Office of the Foreign Secretary, "Exchange of Scientists Between the National Adademy of Sciences, U.S.A. and the Academies or Research Councils of Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, Czecho- slovakia, and Hungary, for the Period September 1, 1967 to August 31, 1968." Continuation of Contract NSF, C-310, proposal submitted June 8, 1967, p. 1. Inter-Academy exchange visits made under this grant were: NAS delegation to Romania, December 1965: Hungary, May 1966; Czechoslovakia, September 1966. Delegations to the U.S.: Romanian Academy* October 1965 ;Czechoslovakian Academy, May 196C; and Yugoslovtan Academy, September 1966; 994 of Understanding on i^cientific Cooperation" were entered into with: the Council of Academies of the Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, January 1, 1966; the Pohsh Academy of Sciences, February 1, 1966; the Academy of the Socialist Republic of Romania, March 18, 1966; and the Czechoslovak Academy of Sciences, July 1, 1966. Bulgaria. — Negotiations with Bulgaria did not proceed as swiftly as those with other Eastern European countries. Discussions with the Bulgarian Academy continued over several years after Dr. Brown's initial visit to Eastern Europe in 1962.3^2 jj^ jggg^ NSF granted the NAS approval to expand activities to Bulgaria; no additional funds "«vere needed.^*^ Negotiations between the two Academies continued •during 1969 and 1970, and involved additional visits of Dr. Brown to Bulgaria in 1969 and of a delegation from the Bulgarian Academy of Sciences to the United States in May 1970. A Memorandum of Understanding on exchanges was concluded May 23, 1970.^^* Under the agreement the Academies will support visits totaling 10 man- months in the first year and 20 man-months in the second year in both directions. Specifically encouraged are short visits for lecturing, con- ducting seminars, surveying current research, and exchanging pro- fessional views. The behavioral sciences are included in the agreement. Expansion of the Program: Yugoslavia and Romania. — Exchanges with the Yugoslavian academy were conducted at only about two- fifths of the agreed-upon level of exchange for the first few years of the agreement. In 1970 the two academies agreed to try to fulfill the orig- inally established level of 40 man-months per year. At the same time, the agreement was expanded to other areas of cooperation: transporta- tion and urban affairs, environmental quahty, oceanography, science teaching, computer applications, metallurgy, petrochemicals, and electronics. A Yugoslavian scientific attache was attached to the Embassy in Washington to assist in implementing these arrangements. These decisions were formulated in response to visits of Dr. Lee DuBridge, the President's Science Adviser, to Yugoslavia, September 1969;^^^ discussions on scientific and technological cooperation be- tween President Nixon and Yugoslavia's President Tito during the former's visit to Yugoslavia in September 1970; ^^^ and the return visit of a Yugoslavian scientific delegation to the United States in October 1970.3«^ ^ ^ Exchanges between the U.S. National Academy of Sciences and the Academy of Science of Romania were formahzed in 1964 in an exchange 3«2 NAS-NRC, Office of the Foreign Secretary, "Proposal for Amending Task Order No. 74, Contract NSF C-310 Exchange of Scientists between the National Academy of Sciences. U.S.A. and the Academies or Research'Councils of Poland, Yugoslavia, Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia," to include Bulgaria, 1967 M'ldem and NSF, Correspondent approval sheet amendment to NSF C-310, Task order No. 74, Decem- ber 18, 1967, and Letter from Wilbur W. Bolton, Jr., contracting officer, NSF, to Mr. G. D. Meid, Business Manager, NAS, Task order No. 74, Amendment No. 7, February 8, 1968. 3S1 "East-Emopean Programs," In NAS-NRC, Office of the Foreign Secretary, "Proposal for Continua- tion of the Program for Exchange of Scientists Between Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Romania, and Yugoslavia for the period September 1, 1970, through August 31, 1971,' Continuation of contract NSF C-310, task order no. 39, May 28, 1970, p. 2. c . v, lo incn r 3«5 "President's Science Adviser to Visit Europe," White House Press Release, September 12, 1969, Jn. U.S. Department of State Bulletin 61 (October 20, 1969) pp. 338-9^ „ tt o t. < ..rn,^,. 386 "Joint Communique following visit of President Nixon with President Tito." U.S. Department of State Bi6«e«m 63 (November 2, 1970) p. 622. ^ „^^ ^^. ^„,,, -r, tj„ 38' "Yugoslav Scientific Delegation visits the United States," Office of Science and Technology Press Re- lease October 28, 1970. In: U.S. Department of State Bulletin 63 (December 7, 1970) pp. 698-99. On May 18 1973 the two countries signed a new agreement which provided for joint funding, paved the way for use of more excess foreign currencies, and established a Joint Commission to supervise exchanges. These provisions presumably, relate to exchanges administered by the National Science Foundation, not those admimstered by NAS with NSF funds. 995 of governmental notes concerning cultural exchange.^^^ After explora- tory visits between Academy delegations and discussions between the President's Science Adviser and the Romanian Council for Scientific Research, the program of scientific exchanges was broadened under a new agreement signed in 1968. In addition to expanding cooperative activities, the new agreement shifted principal U.S. administrative responsibility from the Office of the Foreign Secretary, NAS, to the Office of International Programs, NSF.^^^ The agreement was renewed in 1970.^^° The 1970 agreement, concluded after the visits of President Nixon and his science adviser, expanded scientific and technological exchanges and cleared the way for joint research. As before, the new agreement augments other areas of cooperation authorized under the continuing memoranda of understanding between the two countries; and like the previous program, this one is based on the principles of reciprocal financing and joint selection of research projects and exchanges. Funding and Size oj the Programs Funds for U.S. inter-Academy exchanges with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe are granted by the Office of International Programs, NSF. Congressional review of the Soviet and Eastern European ex- changes program has been handicapped by a lack of readily available and consistent data. Until 1968, when the Foundation was given an explicit mandate for international scientific and technical activities, the Foundation used different categories to report awards and fre- quently reported the data under more than one category .^^* (See Table 27.) 5S' NAS-NRC. Office of the Foreign Secretary, "Proposal for Amending Task Order No. 74, to Broaden Exchangf^s of Scientists Beyond a Present Program for the Period May 1, 1965 to August 31, 1966," contract NSF C-310, task order. April 14, 19a5, p. 2. 3*' From: U.S., National Science Foundation, "Bilateral Science Exchange Programs, Fact-sheet: U.S. Romania." Terms of the science agreement were included as part of the Cultural Relations Agreement, signed November 28, 1968. 3M Exchange of notes, 1970, at Bucharest, signed by Leonard C. Meeker, U.S. Ambassador for the United Stales, and V'asile Gliga, Deputy Minister for Foreign Aflairs, Romania. '" Data on NSF funding of these activities are found in two sources: Annual Reports and Grants and Awards honk.<;. Until the mid-1960's NSF published one report on its activities incorporating a list of grants awarded. After that the Foundation began to publish two separate reports: Annual Reports and Grants and Awards li.siing.s. The description of Soviet and Eastern European exchange activities in the Annual Report is very supcrlicial, occasionally giving numbers of exchanges and a descriptive illustration of selected ac- tivities without reports on funding. Financial data are presented in the lists of grants awarded. But owing, probably, to Ihe Foundation's ambivalent handling of international science activities until 106S, the Founda- tion did not maintain a consistent format for reporting awards to the Academy for these prograins. For in stance, in the FY 1962 and FY 1963 reports, separate entries were given for International Scieiice Activities. Soviet and Eastern European grants were listed under this category under the recipient subcategory the NAS-NRC. In FY 1964 the pattern changed somewhat. The International Scientific Activities cat rpor\ was replaced with one entitled International Scientific Information Exchange. Grants awarded were listed by state; thus, information on the U.S.-U.S.S.R./E.E. programs .appeared under the category Diftrict of Columbia, followed by recipient, the Academy listed as recipient. In FY 196.5 the pattern was changed again. Although the InteinaJional Scientilic Information Exchange category was retained the NSF began to include the category of Eastern European Exchanges uiio, with the subcategory Eastern European Programs. The FY ISoh and 1969 forms reverted back to tlie FY 1965 a]id FY 1966 patterns utilizing the broad category International .'Scien- tific Information Exchanges followed by the subcategory Eastern European Exchanges. In 1970 the NSF instituted a new format, reporting awards under the general heading International Cooperative Scieniific Activities and the subcategory Eastern European Programs. In fiscal year 1971 the Foundation changed the reporting format again and now reports grants and awards data in a form compatible with budget presenta- tion categories. The category "National, International, Specialized Research, and Sea Grants Programs" contains the subcategory "international Cooperative Science Scientific Activities," further differentiated into "Cooperative Science Progratns." The funding to NAS for the U.S.S.R./E.E. programs may be found Under the h.^iding District of Columbia. The subheading Eastern European Programs was dispensed with. (S(cNSF, .!'(«;/ ///e^, ;or/, y^'i'/'y?/, op. cit. 0.12*;.) Type.; (•! grams awarded have ;.!-o varied considerably over the j-rosram's history. In ropov'::i^ funds awarded during tlie period 1960-I'«i9, thi NSF announced two separate grams to the Academy, one for Soviet exchanges and one for Eastern European exchanges (which began in 1966). How- ever, In 1969, while two grants were announced, Soviet programs were funded separately as well as under funding given for the E. B. exchanges. The pattern was changed during the fiscal year 1970 when one grant was announced for both programs. 996 o •-• s <=> V) Ui a z <: z o X a. o CO <: o z < o CO a: o b. CO iaJ O o CO o >• < o — ■ < z o •- < z o <: o u. LU o < z o >- CD o < CO a CM CMCNJ ^C*J CNJ CMCSI CNJCSJ ^ C^^* '^ ^*^ ^^'^ o^ in o o> r^ coo CSJOC3a-)C> t£> to Or^ C3 to O^ "-^ to oo E < O ^ZL c^ OO CO CNJ •— » CM IT) CM If) o irT oo'irTo in" CO Ln-X) r-- r^ en ^^tO^CM ^-«CNJ csj CM E.2 '^ OO 3 cd'CQ O CQ DO > 3 O >-"5; o ^ a. 3^ .QO ct = CO tj , ™E ■£2 •—'3 re *" •^ a> 3 "°o c o" •2"o , ra 'to Q. C 4-' o c: ^ TO O) TO CQ E « o'C QC TO TOCO '> _TO j^- CO — O^ oore ^1 O oO E . o (Q __oo i2 - >iS cc quo: 00 t/i 3C0 CO C/5XCO ;-^tO >co 3 r) o "co E n o Se :^ TO t o o a. tJ ■5 ■- o , a. =>Q- ■o •— ^ .2 a; " c: o F TO XJ ■<= ' £•0 £ = < 0, 2 > i 1 E 0 0 z (U CO — 0 0 0 ;; CQ r ■> R 6 c q.'-^q: = £-3 E <^ ro 1 .i£S t*0 a is SS2: :/> CO CM CT>0> M_: TO^ S22 . . *^ — . - to =^co TOP^tr 2 r^*"-5 c - >> L_^* r^ C O O P3 .^* TO V> t^ > '^'^ ^ ■sS"- - ' "m TO . . . -t^ - *a> TO M - = <=> ^ /;; P £S. S — «^ 5-? , „ -O TO ^ O i : 'Scn^t-; TO c: t^^ toSS^* »;ra co=-5>:-5| to TO .. =^a= = 2o-S-otoO.| TO--is;|^| en c (rt tvi - . to cj — C; ■=; =>-2- -o: 2 § to «- u.* TO T* i; -^3 to TO */» > P^ TO _, a> (dS25o' ""^ TOU, TO to- , Oc/5 CJ'CT i/C .zTco •«" <: "Z! "2TO-gS to"" S ^ >" 2TOi2u: IB =0 . 2|S;-2| 2 TO**- -(i)' -"5-0 g.S'^iTO -n O) = TO*JtO " 2 ='o2 |p - : >-toCO u--_rTO g^ zoi^-Sco 00 «3- _ =) >- <^^ 00 IT) 0 Cl => Ol CTi Li- 0 0^ TO a> CL. 0 n 0 TO 0) TO 0 ^ O) - ^TO^S" »^ TO^- 5? en EC TO . •-= TO~£ TOZ^-'s-: d TO(."r2S •o ¥ TO_; ^- 2 E- Sg-roS:?: >-: >-Li- 997 Although these inconsistencies make it difl&cult to present a valid evolution of the programs, the available data indicate several trends. First, there has been a slow growth in the funding of the program reflective of the slow, but steady, expansion of the program itself. Second, reduced funding for the Eastern European program from fiscal year 1967 to 1968 may have been due to the fact that the first year's operations required special "seed" money as the program was getting started, or that the program was subject to retrenchment resulting from a congressionally initiated Government-wide effort to cut back funding for foreign research. Third, total funds expended for the Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges program were approximately $3.3 million to 1970. Of this sum approximately $2.7 million was allocated to the Soviet exchange program alone.^^^ (It should be noted that total funds for all segments of the program for the four fiscal years 1971-1974 are estimated at approximately $3.9 million, and are thus more than the total program costs for its first 11 years of operation.) (For detailed information on these trends, see Table 27.) Fourth, since the start of the program in 1959 until 1970, "224 American scientists [went] to the Soviet Union for visits totaling 666 months, and 234 Soviet scientists [came] to the United States for a total of 696 months." ^93 RELATIVELY HIGH COST OF THE PROGRAM The financial costs of the program are shared by the Academies. NAS provides to American participants round-trip economy trans- portation between their home and the capitals of the other countries, including transportation for accompanying members of the family if the visit is 5 months or longer. The NAS also reimburses partici- pants for salary lost because of participation in the programs up to a ceiling of $1,500 a month, plus some support for pre travel language study, and $5 per diem for most Americans in the Soviet Union. The receiving Academy is responsible for cost of transportation of partici- pants within the country in connection with scientific visits and cost of living accommodations, and it provides an allowance for meals. The receiving Academy is also responsible for medical services for participants.^®* The average combined cost for an exchange visit was $7,300 since the program began until 1970. (See Table 28.) (This includes only support supplied by the NAS to Soviets while in this country and to Americans and their families for travel, salary, per diem and administrative costs. Soviet support of Americans while in the U.S.S.R., under terms of the agreement, presumably would inflate this figure considerably.) 382 Figured from Table 27. Since separate funds were not reported for the Soviet program and the Eastern Evu-opean program in FY 1970, funds for the Soviet program were figured by extrapolating the percentage of funds for the Soviet program to total program funds for FY 1969 (80%), giving a total of funding for the Soviet program for FY 1970 of $585,732. In figuring this sum no funds given to the Soviet program in FY 1969 under the Eastern European grant were used. In addition, only the lower figure was used in figuring FY funds for the Soviet program. 3M As will be demonstrated in the next section, there is some discrepancy in reUable aimual data. This information is from Brown, In InteTnational Cooperation in Science and Space: Hearings, op. cit. p. 152. '»♦ "Proposal for the Continuation of the Program for Exchange of Scientists . . . ," May 28, 1970, op. cit., p. 6. 998 Table 28. — A Summabt op Costs, United States-Soviet Exchange Programs, Fiscal Years 1950 to 1970 Total funds, U.S.-U.S.S.R. exchange program, fiscal years 1959-70-.. $3, 337, 967 Total man-months, Americans to U.S.S.R., fiscal years 1959-70 666 Total man-months, Soviets to United States, fiscal years 1959-70-— 696 Total Americans to U.S.S.R., fiscal years 1959-70. 224 Total Soviets to United States, fiscal year 1 959-70 234 Average overall cost per exchange of visits $7, 300 (Sources: Figures from N8F and NAS data.) NAS generated budget data for the Soviet and Eastern European program for the period September 1970- August 1971 estimated a total budget (including administrative costs, overhead, costs of exchange and visiting parties) of $914,283. This estimate covers 190 man-months of visits of Americans to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and 170 man-months of visits of Soviets and Eastern Europeans to the United States. The average cost per man-month is $2,540. The average estimated cost of sending Americans to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is higher than that of sending foreigners to the United States. The NAS estimated it would receive 63 Americans for short and long term visits, at an average cost of $2,130 (based only on expenditures planned for exchanges) . It was proposed that 45 Soviets and Eastern Europeans would visit this country on short and long term visits during the same time period, at an average cost of $1,345. The Acad- emy's indirect and administrative costs in support of the program account for 25 percent of the total estimated budget.^®^ In summary, the program remains costly. The total average cost per exchange, including overhead for fiscal year 1971 was approximately $8,500 and, for 1972 approximately $7,200.2"^^ FUNDING PROBLEMS Both the Academy and the Foundation have reported problems of funding. Some of these are similar to problems which characterize other U.S. programs to send nongovernmental scientists abroad, and some are attributable to particular conditions of administering quid pro quo scientific exchange agreements between poUtical ad- versaries. Despite the fact that funding has increased with the growth of the program, both agencies report that mid- and late-1960s funding cuts, due to both balance-of-payments problems and the general retrenchment in domestic R&D funding, have adversely affected day-to-day program operations, curtailing the number of exchanges permitted and the conduct of administrative visits and arrangements to implement the program. For example : A sharp reduction of funds from the National Science Foundation . . . posed serious problems in maintaining the agreed upon level of exchange visits. This was particularly true of the Soviet program. . . .'" 'M Figured from' estimated expenditure data, and data given in Annexes 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, in NAS, "Proposal for Continuation of the Program for Exchange of Scientists " May 28, 1970^ op. cit. s"« Information for 1972 figured from data supplied in: 1974 National Science Foundation Authorization; hearings, op. cit., p. 318, and Table 27. 3»? "Report of the Foreign Secretary to the Annual Meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, April 29, 1969," p. 5. 999 . . . Because of the curtailed budget and international events, Dr. Harrison Brown, on August 29, postponed his visit to Bulgaria which had been scheduled for September 1968 to discuss development of scientific exchanges.^'* Another funding problem is the requirement, common to most exchange programs, that the American sponsoring agency, in this case the NAS, pay income taxes for foreign exchange visitors. Dr. Brown favors an amendment to the income tax law to "reduce the UabUity of foreign guests to iacome tax. The amount of taxes to which they are subject are neghgible, but bookkeeping for income tax purposes is time-consuming and expensive." ^^^ Brown estimated that it would cost the Academy $7,000 to support income tax obUgations for all Soviet and Eastern European visitors in fiscal year 1970."*°° According to a recent commentary, the costs of the new 1972 Soviet-American scientific accords will far exceed funds expended for previous scientific exchange programs. The Honorable Mc George Bundy told the House Committee on Science and Astronautics that: If we are indeed to move from the age of exchange to that of active cooperation,, there will be significant budgetary implications. . . . Active cooperation is much-, more expensive than technical and cultural exchanges. . . ."' United States-Soviet Programs: Numbers and Subjects oj Exchanges A serious obstacle to assessment of the numbers and types of exchanges conducted is the lack of readily available, comparable, and rehable data. NSF data on these programs are generally reliable but they cannot be used to evaluate trends in subjects or duration by subject. NAS data give subject and duration for each subject sum- marized for four-year periods, making it impossible to use these data to identify annual fluctuations and trends in subject and duration. ^°^ Within the limitations of available data, some general observations are offered below. SPECIFIC observations: small numbers of exchanges and. PROBLEMS IN FILLING QUOTAS IN EXCHANGES As noted above, the size and duration of visits under inter-Academy exchange programs are determined on the basis of reciprocity. Al- though the terms of exchange agreements have gradually expanded the size of the program over the years, the number of exchanges actually carried out has enlarged slowly, and in fact, seems to have stabilized in the last few years. The duration of visits, however, seems to be consistently increasing. Specifically : — compatible with the "reciprocal" provisions of the exchange agreements, approximately equal numbers and man-months of U.S. and Soviet scientists were exchanged each year, during. 1959-1970; ^^ National Academy of Sciences, Office of the Foreign Secretary, "Status Report of Scientific Exchanges tinder the 1966 Memoranda of Understanding between the National Academy of Sciences and the Academies of Sciences of Eastern Em-ope, October 1, 1968— December 31, 1968," Report No. 11, January 1, 1969. '" Brown, In: International Cooperation in Science and Space: Hearings, op. cit., p. 154. 400 "Proposal for Continuation of the Program for Exchange of Scientists . . ., May 28, 1970," op. cit., p. 7. Qj ^ CO o 00 a: < < o Q. O CO < LLl o z <£ < t- o "> c = c k. n CD a> o) o ♦- Q. ■pi aj re "-j; *^ (13 ■— re « c C C w a> I- 1 h. c 03 OJ ® re o. o re "to re UJ C So a o CVJr-CT)*- c il CO ta u "t? « CQ E < O c to ^ c <0 o UJ 0> o. o a o *i 0> '^ '^ OD bO UJ z o < o CO O (U c> CO CO o a> E < UJ OUJ c s CO tJ a> 'c CQ <0 UJ o 3 3 O v5 CO < C «'^ to It '^ <» «i o) r^o> 00 r^oo^m •» CM ID CM ooo^ CO < E re S -= c re g SiSES M O <^ 3 1004 The Impacts of Politics and Diplomacy on the Exchange Programs The administrative apparatus of the Soviet-American and Eastern European inter-Academy exchange program is designed to encourage its noninterference from pohtical factors or, at least, to capitahze on the nonpoUtical and nongovernmental character of its scientific com- ponents. Still, political factors do impact significantly on the number, content, and quality of exchanges, requiring continuing negotiations in order to meet the terms of the agreements. The most readily apparent impacts are those foreign policy events which enlarge scientific exchange, such as the detente between the United States and the Soviet Union which led to the signing of the 1972 scientific accords between Moscow and Washington; the priority President Nixon placed on establishing better scientific relations with Romania as a response to Romanian opposition to the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia;*" and expansion of the number and scope of ex- changes between Yugoslavia and the United States followdng Presi- dent Nixon's 1970 visit."^ More frequently, however, political events have had a constraining effect on activities carried out under the exchange agreements. These have included the general political chmate and ideological factors which diminish So^^et and Eastern European receptivity to exchanges, and visa and other restrictions.*'^ IMPACTS OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL EVENTS ON SOVIET AND EASTERN EUROPEAN RECEPTIVITY TO THE CONDUCT OF EXCHANGES "The main problems which our academy has experienced in its exchange program with the Soviet Academy," according to Harrison Brown, "stem from problems in the political sphere." *'* In 1968 Brown reported : In this year of sobering and divisive international events, I continue to be optimistic about the positive unifying force of international science. The influence of our common intellectual enterprise far exceeds our numbers and transcends many of the immediate problems of "foreign affairs." Nonetheless, Congressional cuts . . . have reduced . . . the role of technical assistance in the help America gives developing nations. The gold flow is severely curtailing foreign travel of scientists to international meetings. The war in Vietnam continues to cast its long, shadow over all official and unofl!icial American relations abroad.*'^ ♦" Interview with Robert F. Hull, Office of International Programs, National Science Foundation, Feb- ruary 26, 1971. ^ . . Work in Russia is frustrating and annoyingly controlled by government overseers — particularly for social scientists. . . . The more knowledgeable an exchangee is about a nonpolitical discipline, such as mathematics, the more likely «i This point was made in a recent interchange between Representative Fuqua, then chairman of the Subcommittee on International Cooperation in Science and Space, House Committee on Science and Astro- nautics, and Mr. Herman Pollack, Director, Office of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State: "Mr. Fuqua. In this cultural agreement, have our scientists been given free rein to go where they choose to or look at various matters that may be of concern from a scientific point of view? "Mr. Pollack. On the whole the answer to that is 'No.' However they are being given access to more and more of the institutions and the activities that they are interested in. There are still closed areas, there are still facilities we do not see and we, in turn, impose a comparable condition upon the Soviets in an effort to maintain a sufficient degree of reciprocity so as to keep the pressure on them to open up their facilities that our people are interested in seeing." (International Cooperation in Science and Space: Hearings, op. cit., p. 9). «2 7970 NS F Authorization, Hearings, Vol. 1, op. cit., p. 455. «3 The Participation of Federal Agencies in International Scientific Programs, op. cit., p. 38. «4 Byrnes, op. cit., p. 9. The NAS Advisory Committee on Eastern Europe has reported an instance of DoD objections to exchanges based on the sensitivity of planned research. See: "Summary Minutes of Meeting of Advisory Committee on Eastern Europe." November 17, 1962, p. 4. «' "A Decade of Scholarly Exchanges with the Soviet Union," FAR Horizons (July 1968), p. 2. 1007 he is to be able to compare notes with his Soviet colleagues. Knowledge of socio- political subjects, on the other hand, is hkely to make it difficult to establish and maintain useful relations with Soviet counterparts.^^e A quantitative indication of mutual restrictions is the number of rejections made by each country for scientific visitors proposed by the other. Apparently, more Americans than Soviets have been rejected since initiation of the exchange program. Rejected Americans gen- erally have planned to conduct actiWties in the areas of physics and mathematics. The same pattern is reflected in American rejections of Soviet visitors. According to the National Academy of Sciences, "Rarely have we been informed of the basis for rejection of American apphcants . . . .'^\ During periods of 1959-1963, 1963-1967, and 1967-1970, Soviet visitors rejected by the United States numbered respectively 2, 7, and 0; comparable Soviet rejections of American %dsitors were 0, 12, and 5."* Although scientific exchange programs do not appear to be unduly influenced by clandestine information gathering activities, it is ob- vious that these activities may influence the restrictions the host places on the activities of the foreign visitor and on the host country's attitudes toward foreign scientific visitors. In his recent review of Soviet-American exchange programs, Byrnes did not establish a link between intelUgence activities and the activities of American scholars in the Soviet Union. However, he remarked: "The CIA and FBI, which have important national responsibihties, are interested in in- formation concerning Soviet strengths and weaknesses," ^^ One possible motive behind FBI efforts in this area, according to a news re- port, is to survey Americans who have gone to the U.S.S.R. in an attempt to obtain information about whether they might have been approached for recruitment by Soviet IntelUgence Services.*^" «• Frederick Barghoorn, "U.S. Scientists in Russia," Science News 98, no. 12, p. 250. There is almost no detailed information available on Soviet formal and informal restrictions applicable to exchange pro- grams. General sources are: U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Sino-Soviet Bloc Exchanges with the Free World in 1989, 1%1, (IntelUgence Report No. 8401), 39 pp. Reprinted In: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, MxUual Ediicational and Cvitural Exchange Act: Hear- ings, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, pp. 165-209. See also: "Soviet Programs in International Education (Wash- ington: U.S. Government Printing Office), 1971, 41 pp. *w Philip Handler, "The Moscow Agreements and U.S. -Soviet Scientific Relationships," op. cit., p. 8. Dr. John Hardt reports that rejections are made especially of Russian-speaking American economists and social scientists who specialize in Soviet studies. (Interview.) «* Data extrapolated from details list provided by NAS. *2» Americans who apply for U.S. Soviet exchange programs are evaluated, according to Lawrence Mitchell, Director, U.S. Soviet Eastern European Staff, NAS, solely on the basis of their scientific qualifications are not subject to anyideologicalor political screening. (Interview March 16, 1971). I n fact although they are encouraged to have a language capability, competence in Russian is not a requirement for exchange. (Ibid.) American exchange applicants are required to submit three confidential reference forms in support of their application. No questions are asked on the form relating to political or ideological convictions of the appli- cants. However, they are evaluated on their ability to work in the foreign culture. According to the Confi- dential Reference form: "The special pressures and responsibilities imposed by the Soviet or Eastern Euro- pean environment require that the exchange participant be an exceptionally mature and emotionally stable person. In these respects, do you consider the applicant (and any dependents who might accompany him) completely qualified for an extended stay?" *» Morton Mintz, "U.S. Visitors to Soviet Union Probed by FBI," Washington Post (April 1, 1972), p. A-2. Mintz's account of FBI surveillance of Americans who have gone to the USSR is based upon information contained in an internal FBI memo, dated Nov. 17, 1969 that was stolen from the FBI oflSce in Media, Pa., 1971. Mintz reports in part: "The FBI Investigates students, teachers, and scientists who spend a month or longer in the Soviet Union. The purpose of the investigations 'Is to identify them and determine whether any ofthem have been approached for recruitment by the Soviet Intelligence Services.' ... In some eases, at least, the FBI is known to attempt to learn from returned travelers such information as the identity of Russians they met and the nature of their relationships (a Russian's request for a book could be the nucleus of a recruitment eflort, as the FBI is understood to see it), and whether the visitors while in Russia, may have been entrapped in some embarassing situation that the Soviet intelligence might try to exploit some day. ... A cursory check by The Washington Post showed that if such investigations are in fact made, it is rare for the subject to be interviewed or for him to learn of the investigation." 1008 Soviet restrictions on American exchanges, according to B}Tnes, relate to obtaining archival information, travel, "bugging" of living quarters, mail searches, and impact on interpersonal relations: American scholars . . . have great difficulties obtaining access to archives, to living sources, and to some kinds of publications. . . . Americans are seriously re- stricted in their opportunities to travel for study or study-related purposes from Moscow and Leningrad, and they ordinarily travel only in groups and accom- panied by . . . guides. Americans have come to consider the Soviet postal system as "the opened mail" and to realize that diaries have official readers. They are never certain who their Soviet friends are and which are involuntary informers or agents provoca- teurs. Some had close friends regretfully discontinue relationships because the friends were frightened by the police. . . . Some were followed . . . and all of them, and their Soviet friends came to believe that the rooms in which they lived . . . had listening devices . . . and that their telephone conversations were monitored. Many became justifiably suspicious of officials in the university . . . some of whom . . . had responsibilities to the KGB, the Soviet Secret Pohce. . . ."i Dr. Philip Handler, president of the Academy, recently sum- marized NAS perspectives on the need to remove political constraints to the exchanges programs: The ultimate goal must be the normalization of . . . exchanges with Russian and American scientists free to move back and forth working in laboratories, of their own choice without the need for formal mechanisms. . . .*^^ Pessimistically he continued: "There is no provision among the various [recently] signed [1972] agreements . . . designed to promote progress in this direction." *^^ Harrison Brown has called, for mstance, for removal of barriers to participation in activities privately spon- sored by American universities: '\ The problems of free circulation of scientists continue to vex us. In re68 two Soviet physicists were denied entry to the United States to present papers at the Fifth Symposium on Remote Sensing of the Environment, held at the University of Michigan. The meeting was open and international, and the proceedings are readily available; however, it was organized by the University of Michigan and other sponsors in this country and not by an international body.*** Also, according to Brown, the Departments of State and Defense should remove travel restrictions : We discovered that whole counties were put on the banned list by the Depart- ment of Defense, not by the Department of State. It was done on the following basis, that if there happened to be a criticial installation which the Defense De- partment did not wish Soviet scientists to get near, they would restrict access to the entire county. As a result, we could not take scientists to Muir Woods or on a hike up to Mount Tamalpais just outside of Berkeley, Cahfornia. It turned out that our national observatory at Kitt Peak was not restricted, but the road going up to Kitt Peak was, so couldn't get them there. All of Martha's Vineyard was restricted and we couldn't take them there. All of San Diego was restricted and that sort of thing makes hfe very complex.*** Another NAS objective is to facilitate Soviet entry by amending the Immigration and NationaUty Act to remove requirements that American institutions assume responsibiUty for Soviet visitors. "Such a change in law," according to Harrison Brown, "would reduce bureaucratic red tape and perhaps even hasten American visa-issuing capabilities without sacrificing legitimate considerations of national security." *^® "1 Byrnes, op. cit., pp. 10, 13, 14. 432 "The Moscow Agreement and U.S.-Soviet Scientific Relationships," op. cit., p. 8; ♦33 Idem. "♦ " Report of the Foreign Secretary to the Armual Meeting of the National Academy of Sciences, April 29, 1969," p. 4. <" Internatinnal Cooperation in Science and Space: Hearings, op. cit., pp. 160-61. «« Ibid., p. 154. 1009 In summing up the constraints imposed by diplomatic barriers, Brown sees no prospect of radical improvement in exchange programs with the Soviet and East European academies: . . . We do not foresee marked changes in the political relationships which determine the ground rules for scientific contacts. Therefore we believe that our best interests are served by seeking as normal and fruitful scientific relations in this region as are possible and . . . expanding programs gradually in accord with needs and desires of our scientists and those of the USSR and Eastern Europe.*^' Contributions of Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges to Science An objective evaluation of the impacts of Soviet and Eastern European exchange programs on the advancement of science and on international cooperative scientific relations between the United States and the Communist-bloc countries would require a compre- hensive survey of the specific activities undertaken by exchangees in the laboratory and of the quality and quantity of scientific publica- tions resulting from exchange visits. Such an undertaking is beyond the scope of this paper. And apparently no agency of the Government has ever conducted a comprehensive survey along these lines.*^* Unlike some of the bilateral scientific agreements administered by NSF, the Soviet and Eastern European bilaterals do not require separate or joint annual reports on activities. The Soviet and Eastern European Exchanges Staff, NAS, requires its grantees to report on activities undertaken while in the Soviet bloc countries. No specific reporting forms are required; thus the content and quahty of these reports probably varies, with most being limited to narrative descriptions of activities pursued and statements of problems relating to housing, accommodations, access to laboratory facilities, and the like. In view of the personal information included in these reports they are not generally made available to the public, and apparently the Academy has never pubhshed a comprehensive report on the scientific aspects of the programs.*^* The only information available on the scientific benefits of the program comes from public statements made by the President or the Foreign Secretary of the National Academy of Sciences. Summing up the general progress of the program, Dr. Handler reports: "This exchange experience to date," he remarked to the Congress, "should be regarded as an only slightly qualified success scientifically, but may also be regarded as one of the ice-breakers that paved the way for the Moscow accords." **° The "qualified scientific success" of the programs is elaborated upon in annual reports of the Office of the Foreign Secretary. According to the Academy, the "purpose of these programs is to enable American scientists to visit and conduct research in institutes of the respective Academies abroad and in other research institutions and to facilitate visits to the United States b}'' scientists of countries whose presence is particularly desired by their American colleagues." "^ "It is hard to recall in 1971 how little most of our scientists — with notable exception «? Ibid., p. 171. M8 The President's Science Adviser reviewed U.S. -Soviet scientific and technical exchange activities in an unpublished report prepared in 1972. No eSort was made to systematically evaluate the inter- Academy exchanges along these Unes. (Interview, SCI, Department of State, July, 1973.) «• Information on NAS reports reqmred obtained in interview, Mr. Lawrence Mitchell, March 16. 1971. **o "The Moscow Agreements and U.S. -Soviet Scientific Relationships," op. cit., p. 8. Harvey, et al., suggest that Soviet participation in bilateral scientific and technological agreements are designed, almost solely, to provide foreign scientific and technical information, and are of little benefit to the other country. (Science and Technology as an Instrument of Soviet Policy, op. cit. Chap. 5.) "' "Proposal for Continuation of the Program for Exchange of Scientists." op. cit., p. 1. May 28, 1970. 1010 of mathematicians and astronomers — knew about work going on in their fields in the U.S.S.R. in the year ending in 1959," Dr. Brown reports. As a result of the exchange programs, "The American and Soviet exchange scientists of today would hardly recognize their counterparts of a decade earlier, so much have important segments of each society become familiar with the science and society of the other country." ^^ Brown continues that "The effectiveness of the program is difficult to judge in any quantitative sense." But one measure of success is the development of fruitful personal and working relationships between scientists and staff of the two academies: There are clearly identifiable professional and personal relations established fcetween a limited number of scientists of the two countries. {But] in considering the benefits derived from the exchange programs with the Soviet and East Euro- pean academies, one should go beyond the profit to the individual scientist who participates. We find that the very existence of a day-to-day working relationship between our own academy and the individual ones in the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe has developed a kind of familiarity and rapport which is useful in other ways.^*^ Especially useful in this regard are the Academy visits to survey the state of science in Eastern European countries during the period 1964-1969: The NAS delegations surveyed current scientific research, identified institutions in which Americans might profitably carry out research, identified scientists of the other country who might profitably be invited to the United States, and con- sulted with appropriate officials about conditions under which the respective Academies might foster increased contacts of scientists.*** In addition to providing background information used to initiate the exchange programs with the Soviet Union, these surveys have un- doubtedly proved useful to the operations of the Academy's Advisory Committee on the U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe. This Committee, which is composed of eminent professionals in the physical, natural, and social sciences, "provides policy guidance to the administrative staff of the Section on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe through its annual meeting; it selects American scientists for participation in the exchange programs; and addresses itself to particular problems of a more general nature regarding the conduct of exchanges and provides general facOitative services to scientists seeking to go to the Warsaw Pact countries.*** Another beneficial product of the working relationship estabfished by the Soviet-American bilateral agreements, according to Brown, is support for the conduct of other professional and international co- operative scientific activities not specifically provided for in the original bilateral agreement : We find that we are able to obtain the good offices of our partner academies on behalf of American scientists travehng privately to those countries, so that they are able to enjoy access to scientists and institutions which might otherwise not be readily available to them. The relationships are useful and effective also in our international nongovernmental scientific organizations and activities. In short, our interacademy working relationships have broken down cultural and other barriers and engendered trust on all our parts so that we were able to conduct our inter- national business with greater assurance and effectiveness. We all know with whom we are dealing.*** «2 International Cooperation in Science and Space: Hearings, op.- cit., pp. 151, 152. <«Ibid., p. 152-1. "4 "Proposed for the Continuation for the Program for Exchange of Scientists, May 28, 1970," op. cit., p. . «5 NAS, "Report of Exchange Activities, May 1, 1969-April 30, 1970," op. cit., p. 4. 446 "Proposal for the Continuation of the Program for Exchange, May 28, 1970," op. cit., p. 2. 1011 There is little detailed information available about the scientific merits of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. exchange program.*^^ However, there have been a few "breakthroughs" in the opening up of access to American scientists of some new and old scientific areas formerly out of bounds. Brown is especiall^^ gratified by the placing of U.S. scientists: ... In the important Science City of the Soviet Academy near Novosibirsk and [accorded] the same professional and personal privileges as Soviet scientists, including freedom from procedural amenities that exist in older centers to the West.*« In addition to the individual visits, the exchange agreements with the Soviet Academy have provided for joint scientific symposia. Four of these have been held since inception of the exchange agreements: The first . . . was organized in the United States in the field of radio astronomy in 1961. The second, on the initiative of the Soviet Academy in the field of partial differential equations, was held in . . . 1963. A third, on the electron theory of metals . . . was . . . held in Moscow at the Soviet Academy's request in 1968. . . . This symposium generated such enthusiasm in a rapidly moving field that the participants decided to hold a successor meeting ... in New York in early 1970. We are now in the organizational phase of the next in the series, which is to be on the subject of extraterrestrial inteUigence and held at the Byurakan Astro- physical Observatory in the Armenian SST next September.^^^ Other important byproducts of these Academy-to-Academy agreements, undoutedly, are the cultural and political ramifications of exposing Soviet scientists and technical personnel to an energetic, but pluralistic, scientific R&D support pattern. As a final illustration of the benefits of the scientific exchanges Harrison Brown has .speculated that they have helped to ease inter- national tensions by faciUtating efforts to slow the arms race: ... As a result of contacts between Soviet scientists and American scientists there have been some rather extraordinary foreign policy changes. I have seen attitudes of the scientists of one country change enormously as a result of these contacts. I have seen people come to the United States who had preconceived concepts . . . which were dramatically changed during their visit. I would say that if it had not been for these contracts we would not today have a Test Ban Treaty . . . nor would we be as far along the path toward the eventual signing of the Nonproliferation Treaty; nor would we have the SALT talks . . . *^ it seems clear that the U.S. and Soviet and Eastern European inter- Academy exchange programs have contributed to an exchange of scientific information, have strengthened the establishment of cooper- ative scientific relationships, and have supported the easing of tensions by laying a groundwork for enlarged exchange activities. However, "^ Barghoorn's summary of responses he obtained from American scientists who participated in exchange programs, however, does provide some illustration of the general benefits and handicaps of the program as seen by participants: "Many exchangees presented a carefully qualified evaluation of the professional training and information benefits of exchanges. On the whole, the natural scientists appeared to think that they could learn relatively little professionally from experience in the U.S.S.R., although mathematicians were perhaps more enthusiastic, as a rule than were physicists, chemists, and biologists. However, in terms of values other than narrowly professional ones, our natural scientists were for the most part, glowingly positive in their evaluation of the benefits of U.S. -Soviet contacts. Among other things, many of oui- scien- tists and mathematicians pointed to the usefulness of establishing personal links with Soviet colleagues, among the results of which . . . were a more intimate understanding of the latter's work and the inaugura- tion of useful correspondence and exchanges of pubUcations." ("The Special Case of U.S.-U.S.S.R. Ex- changes," op. cit., p. 38.) Barghoorn's study is based on evaluation of the dimensions of communications and perceptions involved in American-Soviet exchanges of persons. Data consist of questionnaire responses from 180 persons sent abroad by the NAS and Government agencies. "8 Report to the Academy, April 29, 1969, op. cit., p. 6. *" Brown, In: International Cooperation in Science and Space: Hearings, cp. cit., p. 152. For a report on the Conference on Communication with Extraterrestrial IntelUgence, See: "Soviet-American Conference Urges Search for Other Worlds," Science (Octobers, 1971), pp. 131-2. *"> Brown, International Cooperation in Science and Space, op. cit., p. 162. 1012 several major obstacles remain to more fruitful exchange. These in- clude the needs for : more joint cooperative research,*^^ closer continuing relationships between American and Soviet scientists, continued nego- tiations to provide subjects and conditions for exchange which are conducive to participation by American scientific and technical per- sonnel, and increased competence by American scientists and techni- cians in Russian and Eastern European languages.*^^ Some Concluding Observations on Scientific Exchanges With Communist Countries The Office of the Foreign Secretary, National Academy of Sciences- National Research Council, administers the program of nongovern- mental scientific exchanges with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. These activities are formalized in a series of bilateral agreements for scientific and technical exchange provided for under biennially renewed cultural relations agreements with the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern Europe. This program, different from other NSF-funded and administered bilateral agreements, which sup- plement on-going exchanges, is the only mechanism which has per- mitted continuous exchanges of nongovernmental scientific personnel between two political adversaries. The factual, financial, and administrative history of the slow growth in exchanges between these countries illustrates several issues of the interaction between science and diplomacy in exchange programs with political adversaries: The constraints imposed by conflicting political objectives and the resulting need for continuous negotiation between quasi- governmental and prestigious scientists (the Academy staff) to supplement and assist diplomats to insure smooth program operations and expansion; *^^ The relationship between both by international political events and U.S. and Soviet domestic and foreign policies on receptivity to continued and expanded exchange; Utilization of exchange agreements in forging cultural and func- tional scientific links between ideologically disparate states ; The political and diplomatic barriers to expanding program operations with respect to: subject content, especially the social sciences; to removing defense-related geographic limitations on the conduct of research in the host country; and the need to further implement bilateral provisions for joint cooperative research and lecturing; *" The last several agreements have provided for terms of joint cooperative research to be worked out. Diflaculties in ironing out details persist. See: Annual Report of the Foreign Secretary to the NAS, April 28, 1970, op. cit., p. 6. <«2 On this point Dr. Handler reported to the Congress: "I cannot help but digress to note that there is a simple but serious deterrent to . . . amicable progress— the general ignorance of the Russian language among the American scientific and technical community. In the last two decades we have, perhaps ar- rogantly, come to assume that English is the current lingua franca of educated individuals and that our tongues will suffice in international discourse. The expanded relationships with the Soviet Union envisioned in the Moscow agreements cannot reasonably be effected on that basis alone and it will become imperative that some fraction of our young scientists acquire some reasonable degree of fluency in Russian." ( U.S.- U.S.S.R. Cooperative Agreements, Hearings, op. cit., p. 80.) Ibid., p. 2. «i See Chapter IV of this study. "2 Byrnes, op. cit., pp. 13-14. <63 Ibid., p. 10. These themes are developed in R. L. Keohane and J. S. Nye, Jr. eds. Transnational Relaiions and World Politics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972), 428 pp. <»2 Most U.S. scientific exchange programs proliferated in response to specific oppwrtunities presented by either diplomacy or science. Only a few were established under explicit congressional mandate. The latter include, for instance, the international health activities of the National Institutes of Health, authorized by the International Health Act of 1960 (PubUc Law 86-610); and the exchange programs of NASA and AEG sanctioned by formal intergovernmental agreements, some with congressionally mandated authorities. The Fulbright-Hays program was estabUshed under a mandate for advancement of cultural and educational cooperation; NSF and NAS programs were fully estabUshed and functioning long before the Congress gave the Foundation an expUcit authority to support foreign and international science for their own merits rather than primarily to enhance the domestic science base. On the need for more expUcit legislative statement of international science policy goals, Herman Pollack, ■ director, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, has "advocated a 'more adequate statement of national policy and legislative authority for international scientific ventures.' " (U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Toward a Science Policy for the U.S.: Report, October 15, 1970, p. 50, citing Pollack's testimony in hearings on National Science Policy.) Dr. Edward E. David, Jr., as President Nixon's science adviser, suggested "... that we need an inter- national science policy just as it has been suggested that we need a national science poUcy and that can only be enunciated with the aid of the Congress. If such a poUcy were put forward strongly, I believe it would have a major impact on the agencies of Government, in that they would then see it as part of their mission. I think today, because of the way our programs are structmred or not structured, very often the mission agencies do not see their role in international science cooperation as being on a par with their domestic mis- sion." \a General Review of International Cooperation in Science and Space: Hearings, op. cit., p. 7.) "3 Herman Pollack in 1965 summed up the effects of this fragmentation: ". . . The budgets of the various departments and agencies that carry scientific and technical programs are . . . built around the . . . domestic missions .... They are in the process of putting together an annual or a projected plan over several years ... in terms of priorities that are developed essentially from their perspective of the domestic considerations .... Each of these departments . . . is . . . concerned with its own responsibilities. ... It protects its own budget . . . and there is ... a mutual diffidence about not getting into the other fellow's territory. . . . There are opportunities and . . . requirements . . . where it will be desirable for the United States to pursue a scientific relationship, . . . that is neither related, perse, . . . to the priorities that have been estabUshed ... for the pursuit of domestic pm-poses or that do not fit the jurisdictional territories and boundaries tliat have been estabUshed by the nature of the U.S. Government organization. . . . Agen- cies don't feel . . . that they are authorized to spend funds available to them for this kind of activity. [And] it hadn't been anticipated in the development of their budgetary program. They have their own congressional committees to deal with, their own constituencies in the United States to take into account. , . . . If it involves more than one agency, it immediately gives rise to coordination and division of respon- sibiUty, and when you get to three or four you have all the compUcations and problems of committee manage- ment. (Government and Science: Review of the National Science Foundation, Hearing: Vol. 1, 1965, 89th Cong., 1st sess., 1965, pp. 469-470.) *" Legislative recognition of this problem was indicated in the passage of PubUc Law 92-403, August 22, 1972, which required that the Secretary of State transmit to both the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the House Foreign Affairs Committee copies of aU international agreements, other than treaties, entered into by the United States. However, these agreements are to be transmitted after the fact within 60 days after their signing; thus, intensive congressional consideration is Ukely to occur only in the most unusual •circumstances involving severe legislative-executive differences. Also, the sheer number of such agreements miUtates against their in-depth consideration by the Congress. See the extensive Usting of such agreements in: U.S., Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, Congres- Monal Oversight of Executive Agreements: Hearings on S. 5475, 92d Cong. 2d sess.. April and May 1972, •668 pp. 1026 A fourth consideration which must minimize expectations of effec- tive coordination is the unsuccessful history of actual attempts to pro- vide this function. Two agencies have had responsibility in the past for coordinating, on a government-wide basis, international science policies and exchange policies. These are the International Committee of the Federal Council for Science and Technology and the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State. THE BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL AFFAIRS The Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Department of State (SCI), was established as the Office of Inter- national Scientific and Technological Affairs in 1958 on recommenda- tion of the President's Science Advisory Committee. The Director of the Bureau ranks as an Assistant Secretary of State. SCI has several basic responsibilities: — formulation and implementation of some of the Department of State's international and foreign scientific policies and programs ; — provision of diplomatic advice and liaison to other Federal agencies with international scientific and technological programs, either directly or through its membership in (and usually chair- manship of) the International Committee of the Federal Council for Science and Technology; and — direction of the U.S. science attach^ program.*®* Activities of the Bureau have been described to the Congress only in passing in House and Senate Committee hearings on appropria- tions for the Department of State and in testimony before the Sub- committee on Science, Research and Development, House Committee on Science and Astronautics. Although no substantial in-depth eval- uation has been made of the Bureau, several critiques indicate that because of political and organizational constraints, SCI has been less than effective in coordinating U.S. science policies abroad. For in- stance, according to Roger Revelle, a widely traveled U.S. scientist, the Department of State is constrained from making initiatives in designing policies for science and technology. He continues: "one reason for this deficiency may be a feeling among the leaders of the Department that the changes brought about by these developments will be slow to take effect and can be brought into account as they emerge by conventional diplomatic means." *®® As another weakness,, Revelle notes that frequently, in the past, the holder of the Office has not been a scientist who could command credibility from scientists or who could effectively relate science to foreign policy.*®^ As a second problem, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development faults the Bureau with concern for minor tasks and deferring responsibility for guiding major international scientific and technological policies and programs to the White House, the center of effective power in foreign policymaking: The Office ... is said to be too concerned with minor tasks, to the detriment of its more fundamental functions, and to rely too much on the technical skills "« U.S., Department of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, A Guide to U.S. OovernmenV Agencies Involved in International Educational and Cultural Affairs, September 1968, p. 9. "» Revelle, "International Cooperation and the Two Faces of Science," op. cit., pp. 169-170. "' Ibid., pp. 170-171. 1027 of specialized agencies such as NASA or DoD. This dependence is alleged to limit its field of choice and compromise its authority over other agencies. Since 1957, the White House Executive Office has been responsible for the main political initiatives taken in questions of international relations of science and technology (foreign aid, disarmarnent, non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, international co-operation). *88 The Department of State recently moved to broaden the basis of formulating of policies for foreign and international science and tech- nology. The Department established a group of scientific advisers to the Department in 1968 when Dr. Gordon J. F. MacDonald was Adviser-at-Large to the Bureau of International Scientific and Tech- nological Affairs and Dr. Thomas F. Malone had responsibility for providing ad\4co on ^^'eather modification.*^^ This activity was dor- mant until 1972 when the Secretary of State announced establishment of an Ad\'isory Committee on Science and Foreign Affairs. Members were not named however, until April 1973; the delay was attributed, during an election A^ear, to "several prospective members [who] said they feared acceptance might be interpreted as an indication of sup- port for the Nixon candidacy." ^"^ The group is composed of journal- ists, scientists, and industrial researchers.^"^ THE FEDERAL COUNCIL FOR SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY The Federal Council for Science and Technology, composed of representatives of all Government agencies, was established in 1959 ". . . to promote closer cooperation among Federal agencies, to facilitate resolution of common problems, ... to improve planning and management in science and technology, and to advise and assist the President regarding Federal programs affecting more than one agenc3^" ^°^ The International Committee of the FCST (IC, FCST) was es- tablished also in 1959 to recommend "measures to promote and enhance U.S. participation in and support for international scientific activities compatible with our foreign policy." From its inception the Committee made several attempts to support interagency coordination of executive branch activities for the exchange of American scientific and technical personnel; most of these have been unsuccessful. In 1973, President Nixon, under Reorganization Plan No. 1, disbanded the Committee's parent organization, the Office of Science and Technology (OST) , and transferred many OST functions to the National Science Foundation, while at the same time designating the Director of the Foundation the President's Science Adviser. It has been reported that the Director of the Foundation reviewed FCST activities to determine which should be retained.^'^ The International "s Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Reviews of National Science Policy; United States (Paris: Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1968), p. 80, Citing Eugene B. Skolniknff, Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967). *^ "Appointment of Science Advisers to the Department of State," Department of State Press Release gOO (September 6, 1968). 5«o "State Department Sets Up Science Panel," Science and Government Report (April 15, 1973), p. 6. 501 They are: The chairman will be Herman Pollack, the State Department's Director of International Scientific and Technical Affairs. The other members are: Dean Rusk, foi-mer Secretary of State; Simon Ramo, vice chairman of TRW; John Hightower, former Associated Press State Department correspondent and now professor of journalism. University of New Mexico; Gordon J. F. MacDonald, professor of environmental studies, Dartmouth College, and chairman of the National Academy of Sciences Environmental Studies Board; Kenneth Davis, Bechtel Corp.; John Leddy, former Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; Eugene Skolnikoff, professor of political science, and head of MIT's Center for International Studies; and Lewis Branscomb, vice president, IBM. ^2 U.S. Government Organization Manual, 1970-1971 (1971), p. 543. ^ W3 "Transfer of OST Functions to Director of NSF," NSF Press Release (January 26, 1973), 3 pp. (NSF 73-104). For additional details see: Chap. II. of this study. 1028 Committee was continued, with the SCI in the Department of State given lead agency responsibility. The Director also established several support bodies which may provide some of the functions previously performed by the OST. These include an interagenc}'^ Science Policy Council and the Science and Technology PoUcy Office within the Foundation to provide for some determination and coordination of Federal science policies.^"* The problems encountered by the International Committee, FSCT, in providing for interagency coordination of programs and policies for the exchange of scientists will be elaborated upon below. It should be noted that in view of these difficulties, it remains to be seen whether the National Science Foundation and the Department of State can and will establish units to deal effectively with these same international science activities on an interagency basis. The difficulties encountered b^ the IC, FCST, involve general problems related to interagency coordination,^"^ as well as specific constraints imposed by interagency coordination of foreign science activities. For instance, a report reviewing the operations of the Office of Science and Technology, of which the IC, FCST was a part, cited lack of authority vis-a-vis the White House foreign polic}^ apparatus, and the difficulties of using an interagency device to establish policies for agency programs: In 1964 W. Murray Todd, Executive Secretary, Office of the Secretary, National Academy of Sciences, wrote in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, that the International Committee had accomplished "precious little," and that none of its chairmen had been able to make it work. In his opinion, until the Federal Council gave it some meaningful tasks, the Committee probably would continue to be a "rather blunt instrument." Another observer of science and technology in American foreign policy. Prof. Eugene Skolnikoflf . of Massachusetts Institute of Technology, suggests that expectations for the International Committee have not been met. He sees the Committee as a useful device for exchanging information on agency programs (which can be an appreciable achievement when Federal agencies operating in the same foreign country in similar scientific fields may know nothing of each other's programs) and for developing policies for a few problems. But through 1964 he believes the Committee has not been notably productive. The problems facing the Committee in achieving substantial coordination of agency programs, or in bringing up ideas for new programs to serve foreign policy objectives, or to halt or change existing international programs, are the same as those facing the Federal Council itself with the added disadvantage that Committee members have less individual authority to reach agreements or make commitments for their agencies than the principals of the Federal Council. Moreover, Professor Skolnikoff believes that the potential performance of this Committee is limited by the ability of the State Department to monitor and oversee the international and foreign scientific activities of other Government agencies.*"* The IC, FCST has made several abortive attempts to improve and coordinate governmental activities relating to foreign and inter- national exchanges. For instance, in 1959, shortly after the committee was created, the National Science Foundation and the Federal Council for Science and Technology prepared a codification in condensed form ^ "Stever Sets Up Science, Technology Policy OflBce," Science and Government Report (July 15, 1973) p. 7. *5 Tliese points were discussed in a report issued by the House Committee on Science and Astronautics., Citing FCST annual reports and critiques, the Committee noted the following difficulties: obstacles to reconciling priorities of diflerent agencies; fragmentation of congressional oversight; staffing; and the problems of determining policy on an interagency basis. The Committee also noted that ". . . Interdepartmental groups are generally more effective in ensuring more efficient use of funds at a given level than they are in developing or expanding activities or in contributing to decisions on distribution of missions among agencies." (U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Sciences and Astronautics, Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Development, Centralization of Federal Science Activities: Report, 91st Cong. 1st sess. May 29, 1969, pp. 73-75. *« U.S., Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, The Office of Science and Technology: Report, 1967, pp. 178-179. 1029 of past NSF recommendations or positions of a government-wide character.^''^ One section of that report concerned international scientific activities and exchanges: International Scientific Activities: 1. East-West Exchanges of Scientific Information. 2. Establishment of Machinery for Scientific Representation and Liaison at U.S. Embassies Abroad. 3. Exchanges of Scientists. 4. Expansion of Existing "College Contract" Programs of ICA. 5. Increased U.S. Participation in the Financial Contributions to International Scientific Organizations. 6. Increased U.S. Support of Research Overseas. 7. Admission of Alien Scientists and Science Students. 8. Foreign Science Fellowships. 9. Export of Unclassified Scientific Information. 10. U.S. Participation in the International Geophysical Year. It is difficult to determine whether these efforts at coordination had an}' impact on NSF or other agency programs for sending Americans abroad. The 1966 report, The National Science Foundation: A General Review of its First Fifteen Years, said : "No further summary of national science policies has been prepared by either NSF or OST." ^°^ In 1961 the IC, FCST at the request of the President's science ad- viser, George Kistiakowksky, "undertook to review the international scientific activities of [Federall agencies." TJie resulting report, In- ternational Scientific and Technological Activities,^^^ included a sec- tion on "The Exchange of Scientists and Engineers" which, stressing the importance and the need for dispersed authority for these pro- grams, recommended that neverless they meet five criteria. Central to the committee's oversight of these activities was a call for NSF and the State Department to provide better information on exchange activities : Coordination of exchange activities: While central direction of the exchange program is undesirable, coordination is essential. The National Science Founda- tion should assist the State Department by collecting, analyzing, and dissemi- nating data on exchange for the purpose of improving the effectiveness of the programs."^" »' "Science Policies of a Government-Wide or National Character Which Have Been Recommended by the National Science Foundation," NSF unnumbered report of April 1959. «»s Op. cit., pp. 211-13. 609 A report to FCST by Tts International Committee, June 20, 1961, 2.5 p. The report covered support of international research and development by Federal agencies, reasons for U.S. involvement in international science, and guidelines for policy and action. Its recommendations included further steps toward: (1) better information on U.S. science activities overseas, (2) evaluation of U.S. foreign science programs, (3) evaluation of scientific and technological aspects of foreign activities of U.S. agencies, (4) establishing U.S. scientific missions, (5) science and technology in technical assistance, (6) the international role of the National Science Foundation, (7) providing a non-Federal advisory input to the Federal Council, and (8) greater responsi- bilities for the State Department's Science Adviser. "0 The other points were: In order to improve the process of exchange of scientists and engineers the following guideli nes are proposed : General.— Exchanges where the primary purpose is furtherance of .scientific communication and personal understanding should be vigorously cultivated as a significant factor in furthering the concept of an "Open World." Interference for short-term political reasons should be minimized. Exchanges for technical assistance purposes.— U.S. contributions of educational and scientific assistance to the lesser developed nations must be greatly increased. Exchanges of scientists and engineers should be guided by policies which involve the political and economic considerations pertinent to the area. Need for competence and adequate duration of stay.— A primary consideration in the selection of indi- viduals who will be encouraged to participate in exchange programs is to secure persons vrith the highest levels of competence for the tasks involved. Programing should provide for exchange of adequate duration to maximize the likelihood of significant and lasting results. Action by Federal agencies.— Federal departments and agencies should stimulate increased participation of U.S . scientists in international exchange programs related to their technical areas of interest for the pur- pose of providing U.S. scientists with a firsthand acquaintance, knowledge, and understanding of foreign problems and peoples. Report reprinted in : Federal Foreign Research Spending and the Dollar Drain: Hearings, op. cit, pp. 180-181. 1030 The National Science Foundation never responded to the recom- mendation that it assist in the collection, coordination, and dissemina- tion of information about international scientific exchanges. Three years later, in 1964, the IC, FCST assisted the Department of State by developing a paper entitled U.S. Scientific and Technological Representation Overseas, to engender more effective organization of the representation of U.S. technical activities in foreign countries.^" These guidelines were designed to encourage international scientific and technological exchange programs and institute an annual review of agency programs by the Committee. The IC, FCST, has not been able to supply any information on whether the annual review was ever conducted. Another set of guidehnes was prepared in 1968 in cooperation with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, Department of State. ^'^ This set of guidelines recommended: — a systematic exchange of foreign and U.S. faculty through establishment of a program of "sister institutions" to strengthen the development of foreign faculty (p. 2) ; — that "the exchange visitor" be given "background and ex- perience pertinent to his professional activities in his country"; and — that "each agency concerned provide the IC, FCST, with an annual overall report on its exchange programs and the steps which are consistent with these Guidelines" (p. 3). The existence of these guidelines was placed on the agenda of the IC, FCST, in 1971. Herman Pollack, chairman of the committee, reported on the failure of agencies to respond: In collaboration with the Cultural Affairs Bureau (CU) of the Department of State, the International Committee established a requirement that each member agency submit an annual report on its compliance with certain guidelines for international scientific exchange programs. Since the requirement was instituted in September 1968, there has been only one such report which was made to the IC in August 1969.5'3 Mr. Pollack then recommended cancellation of the study, and sug- gested that its purposes would be served by the Department of State's then ongoing exchanges study: The Guidelines Report does not seem a-s useful as originalh- conceived. More- over it is made somewhat redundant by the ongoing comprehensive exchange study. For these reasons, I have proposed to CU and the}- have concurred that the requirement be cancelled. Unless I hear objections from the IC members, the subject requirement is herewith cancelled."'^ The CU exchanges study is classified, but reportedly its treatment of scientific exchanges was confined to the suggestion that they be re- oriented to serve the politics)! objectives of promoting the development of "leaders" favorably inclined to the United States in foreign coun- tries, an objective which diverges considerably from scientific com- munication and cooperation.''^ The Committee has been unsuccessful also in coordinating inter- national science activities of a general character to assist agencies in «" U.S.. Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology, The Role of the Federal Coun- cil for Science and Technology, Report for 1963 anc' 1964, 1^65, p. 48. "2 Federal Council for Science and Technolopy. "Policy Guidance for International Scientific Exchange Programs," Guidelines for Participating U.S. Agencies, June 1968, 4 pp. 5" .Memorandum For: Members of the Federal Council for Science and Technology International Com- mittee. Subject. Requirementfor Annual Report on Guidelines. From Herman Pollack, Chairman, Depart- ment of State, April 27, 1971. «» Idem. 51S See section I of this chapter. 1031 designing and implementing improved exchange programs, For ex- ample, in 1966 the FCST, stating that "a base of information on U.S. scientific and technological relationships abroad is needed," requested the IC to study the possibility of establishing a regular reporting mechanism.^^* However, the next year the Committee reported that a central information file on international activities was infeasible because of the many varied activities and types of data it would have to include. *^^ The IC, FCST, made another attempt beginning in 1970 to catalog U.S. Government relatioUvShips in international science and technolog}', including "an interagenc}'- review of the Federal Government's activities in international science." The objective was to inventory programs and their funding. The Committee requested agencies to supply it with : (a) Brief description of agency's international scientific programs and projects. (b) Their relation to past size during the 1960's and to the vigor, need and demand for programs. (c) . . . Missed opportunities which might have been developed under more favorable circumstances. (d) Legislative authorities and restrictions within which programs-projects are carried forward. (e) The agency [view of the] programs' utility. Identification of specific instances in which the cooperative programs with other nations have resulted in savings of time or money or in other direct benefits to the U.S. ; and (f) Observations which may serve to clarify the data given. ^'^ The general purposes of the study were to pro\ade the Federal Council for Science and Technology with data: (1) to assess the current health and vigor of the Federal agencies' inter- national science activities ; (2) to examine the assumptions under which they engage in international relationships ; (3) to consider the adequacy of their present budgets in relation to U.S. international program obligations; (4) to consider the question of whether a different or better management system for USG's international science activities is required; and (5) to judge whether more explicit Presidential guidance will be needed in the area.^i* This re\'iew was never completed. According to the IC, FCST, "preparation of the report has posed far more difficulties than had been foreseen. Among the difficulties . . . were the lack of compara- bihty between the submissions of various agencies and the strain on . . . time." Further commenting on these efforts, Pollack said: «>« U.S., Executive Office of the President, Office of Science and Technology, Federal CouncU for Scieiice and Technology: 1967 Annual Report, 1%8, p. 23. 5" Idem. »" Agenda, Meeting of International Committee of the Federal Council for Science and Technology, July 16, 1970, Point A. Discussion of FCST's request for interagency review of Federal Government's activities ininternationalscience. Prepared by Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Depait- ment of State, July 2, 1970, pp. 1-2. M» Ibid., p. 1. 1032 -'It would provide a useful first cut [at such information] or perhaps prove the entire effort impossible." ^^° On July 27, 1971, the study was reported to have gone by the wayside. The IC, FCST, also made another more recent effort to improve design and implementation of the many bilateral science agreements providing for U.S. exchange of scientists with other countries. The Committee, in January 1972, issued a catalogue of bilateral agree- ments and a set of "Guidelines for Executive and Participating Agencies in Bilateral Agreements for S and T Cooperation." These guidelines, like others that have come before it, stress the need for executive agencies to prepare annual reports on activities conducted under bilaterals and for other agencies participating in the agreement to inform the executive agency regularly of activities carried out to support these agreements. It is not known whether the agencies involved have made any systematic efforts to respond to these guidelines.^^^ A Multilateral Alternative A number of programs described above for sending abroad American nongovernment scientific personnel are authorized under bilateral scientific agreements or are oriented to technical assistance (such as the Fulbright-Hays program in the developing countries; the AID- funded, NSF-administered science education program in India; and several other NSF-administered bilateral agreements). Unlike other scientific exchange programs which are designed primarily to benefit or advance the course of American science, these are subject to opera- tional constraints, resulting from scientists' unwillingness to partici- «« "Summary Minutes of International Committee Meeting, held, March 3, 1971," Memo to members of the International Committee from Executive Secretary, Edward Malloy, Bureau of International Scientific Technological Affairs, Department of State, March 18, 1971, 5 pp. Ki The guidelines referred to follow: Guidelines for Executive and Pakticipating Agencies in Bflateral Agreements for S. & T. Cooperation iTUroduction At the time it is decided to negotiate a bilateral agreement, the Department of State, after appropriate consultation and prior agreement, will arrange for and designate an appropriate agency to be the Execu- tive Agency responsible for the implementation of the agreement. The following responsibilities will be assigned to the Executive Agency. Responsibilities of the Executive Agency 1. The Executive Agency participates with the Department of State in the negotiation of the agree- ment and provides the technical and program guidance in its drafting and execution. 2. In conjunction with other interested agencies and organizations the Executive Agency plans U.S. participation and activities in implementation of the agreement. 3. The Executive Agency provides broad coordination of the activities of participating agencies and other organizations so that agency program objectives and priorities wiU be consistent with the terms of the agreement. 4. The Executive Agency serves as the focal point for communication with its foreign Executive Agency counterpart, and helps facilitate counterpart agency approval of program activities undertaken by participating agencies and other organizations. 5. The Executive Agency makes a reasonable attempt to arrange financial support required for an appropriate level of U.S. participation and vnU, insofar as possible, seek funds to provide core support for the program. When necessary, the Executive Agency will, insofar as possible, provide "seed money" for the planning and initiation of participating agency activities. 6. With the cooperation of the participating agencies and other organizations, the Executive Agency submits an annual report to the Department of State on activities carried out under the agreement, and periodically evaluates these activities and the agreement. The Department of State will consult with the Executive Agency on courses of action to be taken, including recommending termination or con- tinuation of the agreement. Responsibilities of the Participating Agencies 1. Participating agencies will develop and provide to the Executive Agency in a timely manner program plans for participation in the agreement within the scope of their mission responsibilities. 2. Coordinating with the Executive Agency, participating agencies will develop and implement agreement activities with counterpart organizations. They will keep the Executive Agency regularly informed about the status of such activities, and will furnish the Executive Agency with such informa- tion as it may require for the purpose of preparing reports and making evaluations. 3. Participating agencies wlU, where possible, provide the financial support and staff needed to inaugurate their activities under the agreement. Subsequently they will budget for continued participa- tion in the agreement. 1033 pate in technical assistance cooperative programs or in distinctly polit- ically motivated programs devoid of a potentially fruitful scientific outcome. Another difficulty is that scientists do not possess language fluency, or cannot find the time to spend learning a foreign language well enough to work with their colleagues in other countries.^^^ The United States has no clearly defined international science policy. Nevertheless, recent and expanded encouragement of bilateral scientific agreements indicates that the executive branch views such agreements as a significant policy device and as a useful mechanism for fashioning diplomatically and scientifically useful relationships between the United States and other countries, particularly those which are technologically disadvantaged. ^^^ However, the history of recent programmatic activities for foreign and international science and technology exchanges, as developed in this study, and scholarly documents reviewing the general topic of international technological relations,^^* suggest that achievement of the complex scientific and diplomatic goals behind some of these programs might be served better by a multilateral alternative. A variety of factors, in addition to those cited above regarding the imeven quality of scientific participation in these programs, support this view. Most important is the fact that bilateral scientific and technological links alone may no longer be sufficient in a world increasingly interdependent in harnessing the fruits of science and technology and in solving the problems they generate. For instance, Victor Basiuk recently reviewed U.S. scientific programs in Europe, especially with respect to their contributions to strengthening transatlantic economic, technological, and military cooperation. He concluded that bilateral programs, notably in West- em Europe, do not effectively meet present requirements: Present American scientific and technological policy ... is largely ad hoc and unfocused. There is concentration on individual countries and programs, on 'targets of opportunity.' But there is no over-all view which would take into consideration the nature and requirements of upcoming technologies, especially their large scale and high cost. As a result, the United States has been drifting in the direction of bilateral cooperation with European rations .... This course is not adequate. To meet the requirements of the large-scale technology of the future and of the immense costs associated with it, Western Europe must develop a large market and cohesive internal institution. Compartmentalized bilateral relationships between the United States and individual Western Euro- pean nations bypass this objective.*^* "A wiser American policy," Basiuk continues, would place high priority on initiating cooperative scientific and technological programs with Western Europe as a whole, rather than with individual countries." ^^^ Basiuk concluded by saying that the absence of multi- «22 The U.S. General Accounting OflSce recently released a study on the need for improved foreign language competence among U.S. officials who serve abroad. See: U.S., Comptroller General, Need to Improve Lan- guage Training Programs and Assignments for U.S. Chvernment Personnel Overseas (Washington, Jan- uary 22, 1973), Report B-176049. «" The Department of State's list of bilateral or intergovernmental interagency agreements for scientific and technical cooperation, released December 6, 1971, numbers 23. This does not include some of the more recently concluded agreements administered by the National Science Foundation. An extensive list of other U.S. agreements for scientific and technical cooperation is included in: Congressional Oversight of Executive Agreements: Hearings, op. cit. «4 For instance see: Eugene B. Skolnikofl, The International Imperatives.of Technology: Technological Devel- opment and the International Political System, (University of California Press, Research Series No. 16, 1972), passim. M« Victor Basiuk, "Perils of the New Technology," Foreign Policy, 2 (Spring 1972), p. 67. K« Ibid., p. 66. 1034 lateral cooperative scientific relationships with Europe imperils transatlantic security: If Washington does not soon develop a concerted science and technology policy,, it is foreclosing options for the late 1970's and early 1980's in a way that almost guarantees insecurity in Europe. The enormous complexity of the task is no excuse for not addressing it. Small-scale, bilateral cooperation may postpone the peril, but it cannot in the end avert it.^^^ The Honorable Emilio Q. Daddario, former chairman of the Sub- committee on Science, Research and Development, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, has addressed the same theme, but on a broader basis: ... It has become evident that the concept of sovereignty and the traditional means of conducting relations between nations are no longer sufficient. The reason for this is that technology has largely changed the world, and in doing so it has rendered the old framework very vulnerable. Today, we are witjnessing an in- creasingly rapid compression of both time and space. . . . This has led to the con- temporary paradox whereby the human race is simultaneously becoming more unified and more fragmented. We now seem to have a dichotomy on our hands — either lasting cooperation or complete political dissolution — the potential for either being greater than in any previous period in human history .^^s Mr. Daddario suggested that the development of individual na- tional science policies is no longer sufficient to meet today's foreign policy needs. A consensus must be reached on developing policies to meet the needs of a technologically interdependent world: . . . Before there will be any real global cooperation, there must be far greater consensus on its purposes. What are these? Is it to enhance material well-being and intellectual development? Is it economic growth or a massive educational effort? Is it limited arms control or an international peace-keeping mechanisms? Is it expanded medical health care or more adequate housing? And what are the priorities? . . . How do we reach some balance between near-term localized prob- lems and long-term global problems? *29 He then went on to suggest that formulation of a consensus on international science policies might be achieved by developing a co- operative international science policy committee to provide for ex- change of information and views between developing and developed nations and to assist in formulating and broadening collaborative scientific activities. A similar proposal, which has received considera- tion by the National Academ^^ of Sciences and funding from the Na- tional Science Foundation, is to establish an International Foundation for Science to award funds for cooperative international scientific research on a multilateral ba>is. In both his second and third foreign policy addresses, President Richard M. Nixon identified international cooperation to solve global problems posed by science and technology as a major new dimension in American diplomacy. In his second address, the President stated in part : Along with its vast contribution to our well-being, technology has given us the common capability to pollute the earth's ocean and air. It has increased the in- centives for nations to assert, and attempt to enforce, territorial claims to the oceans so immoderate as to endanger the ancient right to freedom of the seas. It has brought the ability to tap — or to ravage — the resources of the seas and the ocean floor, to the vast benefit — or to the huge harm — of mankind. 6-'' Ibid., p. 68. 528 Emilio Q. Daddario, "National Science Policy — Preclude to Global Cooperation," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (June 1971), pp. 21-24. This statement was presented to the House Committee on Science and Astronautics at its 12th meeting with the Panel on Science and Technology, January 1971. M» Ibid., p. 22. 1035 These are examples of problems in which every country has a deep national interest, but which, as a practical matter, are simply not subject to satisfactory resolution by national means. They are matters on which the nations of the world must subsume their narrower interests in a broad and generous concept of the world interest.*^" In these contexts the President outUned the merits of increased bilateral cooperative relationships, as well as of current multilateral diplomatic undertakings to deal, especially with the problems of environmental quality, in such bodies as the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the United Nations, and UNESCO. The material presented in tliis paper suggests that it may be to the common advantage of science, of U.S foreign policy, and of international cooperative science policy for policymakers to •consider incorporating some U.S science and technology exchange programs into these same cooperative international mechanisms. «3» President Richard M. Nixon, "Second Annual Report to the Congress on United States Foreign Policy, February 25, 1971," In U.S., President, Public Paper) of the Presidents of the United States: Richard JNixon. 1971 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office 1972), p. 331. chapter 13 — Brain Drain: A Study of the Persistent Issue of International Scientific Mobility CONTENTS Page I. Introduction 1047 An Evolving International Issue 1047 General Characteristics of Brain Drain Issue 1048 Inherent DiflBculties and Limitations : Magnitude and Complex- ity of the Problem 1049 Deficiency of Statistical Data 1050 Problems of Interpretation 1050 Need for Research 1051 Scope and Design of the Study 1052 Emphasis on Less Developed Countries 1053 Certain Assumptions 1054 Brain Drain : Reality of Problem 1054 Positive Value of Science, Technology, and Education in Modern Civilization 1055 Inevitability of Change as Positive Value 1056 Definition of Brain Drain 1057 Internationalist and Nationalist Theory of Brain Drain — 1057 Variations on Definition 1058 Some Characteristics of Brain Drain Definitions 1059 An Approach to the Brain Drain Problem 1062 II. Brain Drain in Historical Perspective 1064 Migration in History 1064 Talent Migration in Ancient Times 1064 Among the Ancient Greeks 1065 Greek Physicians, a Special Case 1065 Alexandria of the Ptolemies 1066 Talent Migration in the Middle East and Medieval Europe 1067 In Medieval Europe 1068 Factors Producing Mobility in the Modern Age 1070 Age of Discovery 1070 Revolution in Science and Technology 1070 Industrial Revolution 1071 Immigration Into the United States 1071 Hamilton and the American Immigration Tradition 1072 Trends in 19th and Earlv 20th Century American Immigra- tion : 1073 Reverse Talent Migration 1074 Lessons of History ^^J.^ Human Mobility and the Principle of Freedom. 1075 State Policies on Migration of Scholars 1076 III. Brain Drain as a Contemporary International Problem- 1077 Trends in Migration Since World War II : A Changing World Environment 1077 Forced Migrations 1077 Tendency Toward a New Internationalism and Its Effects-- 1078 Process of Decolonization 1079 Effects of Decolonization and Brain Drain 1079 Reordering of Priorities in Immigration : Quality Over Quantity 1080 Effects of Reordering Immigration Priorities 1081 Brain Drain Flows to Western Europe 1083 Movement to Britain 108^ Movement to France 1084 Movement to West Germany 1086 (1039) 1040 III. Brain Drain as a Contemporary International Problem — Con. Some Brain Drain Pattei-ns Within British Commonwealth : Page Canada and Australia 1088 Movement From LDCs to Canada 1088 Canada's Losses to United States and Gains From the LDCs 1090 Attraction of Students to Canada 1090 Movement to Australia 1091 Migration From LDCs to Australia 1092 Attraction of Foreign Students to Australia 1094 Talent Migration to United States Since the Late 1940's 1095 UNITAR Study, 1970 : Immigration of Professional Man- power 1095 Professional Immigration to the United States. Trends Through the Fiscal Year 1970 1104 NSF "Highlights" on Immigrant Scientists and Engineers, Physicians and Surgeons. Fiscal Year 1972 1113 Immigration of M.D.'s to the United States: A Special Case 1119 Critical Views on Medical Brain Drain 1119 Essential Data From AMA's 1971 Report on FMG's 1120 Data Fi-om the Stevens- Vermeulen Study on FMG's 1125 Data on Medical Immigrants and Nonimmigrants 1125 Educational Exchange of Foreign Students and Scholars in the United States 1127 Data From "Open Doors, 1971" on Foreign Students 1127 Data From "Open Doors. 1971" on Foreign Scholars 1131 Some Tentative Generalizations on Brain Drain as a Contempo- rary Problem 1133 IV. Causes of Brain Drain : Interaction of "Push/Pull" Forces 1135 "Push" Factors in Brain Drain 1135 Economic Factors: Symptom of Underdevelopment 1135 Mismanagement of Manpower ; Misconception of Educa- tional Reform 1135 Emigration, an Escape Hatch for Elite 1137 Cultural and Intellectual Inadequacies 1138 Inadequate Scientific-Technical Infrastructure 1138 Lack of Qualified Teachers and Graduate Facilities- 1139 Weaknesses in Communications Network 1139 Push of Emigration 1140 Social Factors Causing Brain Drain 1140 Archaic Traditions as Obstacle to Progress. 1141 Social and Racial Discrimination 1141 Rejection of Innovation 1142 Prejudice Against Science and Technology 1142 Trend Toward Urbanization 1144 Compulsion to Emigrate 1145 Political Factors Causing Brain Drain : Intellectual Repres- sion 1145 Political Instability and Unrest . 1146 Governmental Indifference to Scientific Development 1147 Erosion of National Loyalties 1147 "Pull" Factors in Brain Drain 1148 Economic Factors: Vitality of the American Economy 1148 Government Supported R. & D 1149 Shortages of Scientists. Engineers, and Physicians 1150 Pull of High Salaries and Career Opportunities 1154 Revolution in World Communications 1156 A Summing Up of Economic "Pull" Forces 1157 Cultural and Intellectual "Pull" Forces in Brain Drain 1157 U.S. Drawing Power as a "Center of Excellence" 1157 Scientific-Technological Civilization : Source of "Permanent Draw" 1158 Additives to "Permanent Draw" : Acculturation. Mis- matched Training, and Donor Indifference 1160 Process of Acculturation 1160 Mismatch in Education and Training 1163 Donor Indifference 1165 1041 IV. Causes of Brain Drain: Interaction of "Push/Pull" Forces — Con. Cultural and Intellectual "Pull" Forces in Brain Drain — Con. Page The Allure of a Scientific-Technological Civilization 1166 Social "Pull" Factors : Appeal of American Social Democracy— 1166 Attraction of Urban Centers 1168 "Pull" of Social Forces 1169 "Pull" Factors in the Political Sphere : Search for Political Sta- bility and Freedom of Inquiry 1169 Official Government Encouragement 1170 Attraction of Reason 1171 Decision To Emigrate: A Combination of "Push/Pull" Factors With "Push" the Dominant Force 1171 V. Effects of Brain Drain: A Range of Possibilities 1173 Difficulties in Assessing Effects 1173 Internationalist and Nationalist Models 1174 Criterion: Needs or Demands? 1176 Effects of Brain Drain Within the LCDs : Gains and Benefits From an Educated Elite 1178 Advancement of Knowledge 1180 Question of Impairing Economic Development 1181 Emigration as an Economic and Political Asset 1181 Improved Possibilities for Social Change and Progress 1182 A Summing Up of Gains for LDCs 1183 Losses and Costs for LDCs 1183 Loss of General Professional Manpower 1183 Leadership Qualities of Emigrant Professionals 1187 Loss of Si>ecific Professional Manpower 1188 .Effects of Loss of Vital Talent 1188 Social Costs of Medical Brain Drain 1190 Loss of Students Through Nonreturn 1195 Loss of National Prestige 1196 Loss of Professional Manpower Investment 1197 Estimated Costs of Emigrant Scientists and Engineers. 1198 Estimated Costs of Emigrant Physicians 1203 Qualifying Aspects and Perceptions of LDCs Invest- ment Loss 1205 Loss Through "Mismatch" in Education and Training 1207 Genetic Loss 1208 Widening Gap Between LDCs and Advanced Countries 1210 Effects of Brain Drain Within the United States 1213 Benefits From Increased Manpower Supply of Scientists and Engineers 1213 Easing Doctor Shortage Through FMGs 1219 Doctor Shortage, a Realitv 1219 U.S. Dependency on FMGs 1221 Savings to United States From FMGs 1222 Savings in Medical School Construction 1224 Unfavorable Aspects of FMG Inflow : Threat to American Medical Standards 1226 Insufficiencies Among FMGs 1227 ECFMG Examination : FMG Criteria of Competence— 1228 FMG Competence : Performance on Examinations 1229 FMG Competence: Performance as Interns and Resi- dents 1232 FMG Competence : Some Critical Evaluations bv Ameri- can M.D.'s 1 1233 A Summing Up of Views on FMG Competence 1239 Terminating Career Expectations of American Premedical Students 1239 Admi-ssions Crisis in American Medical Schools 1240 American Medical Students Study Abroad 1241 Congressional and Administration Views on FMGs Versus USMGs 1242 Interconnection of Science, Technology. Brain Drain, and National Policy 1246 1042 Page \1. Brain Drain : Present and Future Trends ; Remedies 1248 Present and Future Trends in Brain Drain to the United States 1248 Beginning Trend of Outflow of Scientists and Engineers From United States 1248 Reason for Brain Drain Downturn and Outflow From United States 1250 FMGs, an Exception to the General Trend 1252 Continuing Brain Drain From LDCs 1253 Remedies for Brain Drain 1254 Diminishing "Push" Factors : Closing Development Gap— 1254 Creating Scientific-Technological Infrastructure : Rela- tionship to Development 1255 Building Trained Professional Manpower Resources-- 1258 Establishing Educational Base in Science and Tech- nology 1258 Role of Basic Research 1259 Linkage Among Academia, Government, and Economic Sector 1260 Developing the Scientific Spirit 1260 Value of Communications 1261 Establishing "Centers of Excellence" 1263 Imi)eratives of National Science Policy 1265 Persisting Difficulties and Dilemmas 1266 Economic Deficiencies 1266 Problems in Institution-Building 1267 Difiiculty in Transforming Traditional Societies 1267 Dilemma of Human Rights and Inequality 1268 Remedies by Diminishing the "Pull" Factors in Brain Drain__ 1271 Expansion of American Medical Schools 1271 Efficiency in Medical Manpower Management 1272 Renewal of American Commitment to International De- velopment 1273 Remedy Through Development Assistance 1273 Role of Multinational Corporations (MNCs) in Devel- opment 1274 Persisting Difficulties and Dilemmas : Declining Interest in Foreign Aid 1276 Declining Interest in Brain Drain as a Foreign Policy Issue 1276 Dilemma in Restricting Immigration 1277 Paradox of Education in Nation-Building Process 1278 Paradox of Advanced Scientific-Technological Civiliza- tions 1278 Brain Drain : "One of the Major Challenges of Mankind" 1279 VII. Implications of Brain Drain for American Foreign Policy 1280 Areas of Institutional Involvement 1280 Congressional Involvement in the Brain Drain Issue 1280 Senate and House Action in the Mid-1960s 1280 Congressional Inaction on Brain Drain 1281 Reason for Inaction ; Contradiction in National Pur- poses 1281 Aspects of Executive Branch Involvement 1283 Controllers Within Executive Branch : Justice, State, HEW, Labor 1283 Major Role Played by State Department 1283 Declining Interest in Executive Branch Since Late 1960s 1284 Educational Institutions, Associations, and the Private Sector 1286 Brain Drain Phenomenon : A Hidden Foreign Policy Prob- lem 1287 Brain Drain in the Matrix of American Foreign Policy 1287 1043 YII. Implications gOf Brain Drain for American Foreign Policy — Con. Brain Drain in the Matrix of American Foreign Policy — Con. Page American Attitude Toward the LDCs 1288 The Executive Branch on Development Policy 1288 The Congress on Development Policy 1289 Development Policy in Practice 1290 Brain Drain as a Force Undermining Development Policy : Judgments of the Past 1291 Views of the House Government Operations Committee, 1968 1291 Criticisms by Senator Mondale 1292 Qualifying Views of State Department ; Contrasting View of AID 1292 From the Perspective of Academia 1293 FMGs as "Reverse Foreign Aid" 1295 Experience During Fi-scal Years 1971 and 1972 1296 Declining Interest in Foreign Aid and Development 1297 Question of Commitment to LDCs ; American Responsibil- ity and National Interest 1298 Widening Gap Between Advanced and Developing Countries 1299 Effects of Development Gap on Foreign Policy : Confronta- tion Between Rich and Poor 1303 Instability: Source of Conflict and Tension 1304 Algerian Conference of Nonaligned LDCs 130-i Brain Drain : Source of Grievances and Complaints 1305 Political Realitv : Confrontation Between Rich and Poor '_ 1306 "World Comi>etition for Vital Mineral Resources in Short Supply 1306 World Mineral Resources in the LDCs 1306 Growing United States Dependency on Mineral Imports 1307 Potentialities for Conflict 1309 Call for Policy Reappraisal 1310 Development Gap, Brain Drain, and Interdependence: Interacting Forces Within a National Mood of With- drawal 1312 VIII. Brain Drain: A Force in History, Science, Technology, and Diplomacy 1314 Brain Drain as an Historical Phenomenon 3314 Relevance of Brain Drain as a Problem of the Contemporary Era 1315 Brain Drain at the Juncture of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy 1316 TABLES 1. Immigrants Admitted into Canada by Country of Last Permanent Residence and Occupation, 1962-67 1089 2. Immigrants Admitted into Canada by Country of Origin and Occupa- tion Over the Period 1964-67 1089 3. Overseas-Born Professional Workers Residing in Australia in 1966, by Birthplace and Occupation 1093 4. Immigration from the LDCs to Australia, 1959-68 1093 5. Immigrants Admitted Into the United States by Country of Origin and Occupation From the Year Ended June 30, 1962, to the Year Ended June 30. 1967 1095 6. Immigrants Admitted Into the United States by Country of Origin and Occupation 1097 7. Immigration into the United States of Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians, Fiscal Years 1956, 1962-67 : A. Analysis of Immigration Into the United States of Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians, Fiscal Years 1956, 1962-67 1103 B. Immigration Into the United States of Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians, Fiscal Years 1956, 1962-67 1103 1044 7. Immigration into the United States of Scientists, Engineers, and Ptiysicians, Fiscal Years 1956, 1962-67— Continued C. Percentage Sliare of Developing Countries in Immigration Into the Unitetl States of Scientists, Engineers, and Pliysi- -Page cians. Fiscal Years 1956, 1962-67 1103 8. Immigrant Scientists, Engineers, Physicians, and Surgeons, Fiscal Years 1949-70 1108 9. Scientists, Engineers, Physicians, and Surgeons Who Changed From Nonimmigrant Status to Immigrant Status in Fiscal Year 1970, by Year of Nonimmigrant Entry and by Occupational Group 1109 10. Scientists, Engineers, Physicians, and Surgeons Adjusted to Immigrant Status, by Status at Entry and by Country or Region of Birth, Fiscal Year 1970 1109 11. Scientists and Engineers Admitted to the United States as Nonimmi- grants, by Category and Region of Last Permanent Residence, Fiscal Years 1965-70 1110 12. Physicians and Surgeons Admitted to the United States as Nonimmi- grants, by Category and Region of Last Permanent Residence, Fiscal Years 1965-70 1111 13. Scientists, Engineers, Physicians, and Surgeons Admitted to the United States as Immigrants, by Country or Region of Birth, Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972 1115 14. Foreign Medical Graduates in the United States by Country of Grad- uation and Country of Birth. December 31, 1970 1121 15. Foreign Physicians and Surgeons Admitted to the United States, Fiscal Years 1953-70 1123 16. Percent Distribution of Physicians and Surgeons Admitted to the United States as Immigrants by Country or Region of Last Perma- nent Residence 1957, 1965, and 1971 1124 17. Migration of Physicians From Selected Countries, Fiscal Year 1971 1124 18. Physicians and Surgeons Admitted to the United States as Immigrants by Country or Region of Last Permanent Residence, Fiscal Years 1953-71 -1 1124 19. Immigrants and Exchange Visitors. All Occupations and Physicians, by Major Region of Origin, Fiscal Year 1971 1126 20. Comparison of Foreign Physicians Admitted to the United States With Number of U.S. Medical Graduates, 1962-71 1127 21. Foreign Countries With More Than 1,000 Students in the United States, 1970-71 1130 22. Foreign Countries With More Than 100 Scholars in the United States, 1970-71 ---.- 1132 23. Estimated Educational Cost to Sending Nations of Immigrant Sci- entists, Engineers, Physicians, and Surgeons Entering United States From LDCs as Immigrants, Fiscal Year 1971 1201 24. Estimated Educational Cost to Sending Nations of Immigrant Sci- entists, Engineers. Physicians, and Surgeons Entering United States From LDCs as Immigrants, Fi-scal Year 1972 1201 25. Estimated Educational Cost to Sending Nations of Immigrant Sci- entists, Engineers, Physicians, and Surgeons Entering United States From LDCs as Immigrants, Fiscal Years 1971 and 1972 1-0- ''O Estimated Savings to the United States in Educational Costs of Immi- grant Scientists and Engineers From LDCs, Fiscal Years 1971 and f972 _ 1-^^ 27. Estimate Savings to the United States in Educational Costs of Immi- grant Scientists, Engineers, Physicians, and Surgeons Entering United States From LDCs as Immigrants^ Fiscal Year 1971 ----- 1^16 28. Estimated Savings to the United States in Educational Costs of Immi- grant Scientists, Engineers, Physicians, and Surgeons Entering United States From LDCs as Immigrants, ^'f^^^J^^^^'l.^^ ';------} ^-^' 29. Total Estimatessential for the long-term needs of national development, constitutes a "brain drain.'-' Extensive materials on brain drain have been examined in the prep- aration of this study, notably those published by the U.S. Congress, the various agencies of the U^^.S. Government, the L'nited Nations, and numerous independent scholars and research groups. Though brain drain is an historical phenomenon dating back to the ancient Greeks, in its present form it has become a problem unique to the modern eia of science and technology. It has been in the immediate ])ast, and reinains (though loss visibly), a troubling issue in this Nation's diplomacy. An Erol r'dic] Intenwi'ion-ol Issue On ]May 12. lOfi-l. President Mwalimu Julius K. Nyerere of Tangan- yika told the Parliament on the occasion of introducing his develop- ment plan to the nation : Some of our citizens will have large amounts of money spent on their education, while others have none. Those who receive the privilege tlierefore have a duty to repay the sacrifices which others have made. They are like the man who has been' given all the food available in a starving village in order that he may have strength to bring supi>lies back from a distant place. If he takes this food and does not bring help to his brothers, he is a traitor. Similarly, if any of the young men and women who are given education by the i>eople of this Republic adopt attitudes of superiority, or fail to use their knowledge to help the development of this country, then they are betraying our Union.^ Tn a s]>oecli at the Fourth Rehovoth Conference in August 1967, Israeli ^Minister of Health Yissrael Barzilai publicly agreed with the statement of Britain's Health Minister Sir Kenneth Robinson that ho was not pi'epared to "invest thousands of pounds sterling in a medical student only to increase the membership of the American Medical Association." ^ 1 t^iuit''il III, Trcilcrltk Il.arlilsoii. "IVfiblcms of Dcvcloplnir lUtrlnT IMruatlnn in tho .N'cwly I iiM'lopl iiL' ('(.niilrli's," U.S. Cnnurc-s, House, Coininlt tee on iMUirntlon jind Liilmr, Inlciiiitlioiiiil I'diii niton: J'ngl, PrvHint, I'idIiIiiiix unci I'roMiirits. I'rcimrcd by (tip 'I'li^k I'ofcc on IntiTn.itldniil Kdupiitlon, 89tli ^(ln^^, 2(1 soss., lOfiO, pi>. 471 472. (llcreal tiT cllfd iiH, Silrctnl Kiadinya on Intcfnationat Education, House Coininlttce on Education nnd r,al)or, l!l(;(V) - Ilaridd M:irKiillc.s, M.D. and Lucille .Stuplicnson Bloch. Fnrcii/n MriUral Ornduntm in the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University rruss, I'JO'J). pp. vll-vlll. Note : This chapter was prepared In 1974 by Joseph G. Whelau. (1047) 1048 Referring; to the loss of physicians from the loss developed to the developed countries, oi:e Pennsylvania educator wrote in 19G8: "This country is simply stealing talent, and stealing it from countries that can least afford it." ^ And on Januiuy 31, 1960, The Christian Science Monitor edito- rialized: "With one hand the United States is giving [foreign] coun- tries millions to develop themselves. And with the other it is casually taking awa,y the Seed corn of future leaders in natural science, health, and technical knowledge. These are even more precious to the country than food or machinery." * These selected statem.ents refer to what has become commonly termed the "brain drain." This issue, according to Herbert G. Grubel, a student of tlie brain drain, had "penetrated public and official con- sciousness in many parts of the world more quickly and deeply than most other problems in the post-Avar world." ■' GrubeFs statement ap- pears to be no exaggeration. By the mid-196fJ's, the brain drain had indeed become a dominant problem in international relations. Serious concern had been mani- fested among the donor nations of Western Europe and in the under- developed areas, that is, the losers of professional manpower, and in the United States, the principal gainer. Highly charged with emotion, the brain drain issue became the subject of sharp discussion in the United Nations, in other international and regional organizations, and throughout the world scientific community. ]\Iuch of the criticism was directed against the United States. Such criticism provoked searching inquiries into the problem by the U.S. Congress, the executive branch, and m^any professional scientific organizations such as the National Science Foundation. Subsequent commentary and debate produced a vast literature on the brain drain. General Characteristics of Brain Drain Issue In large measure the brain drain issue is three-dimensional : It is a manpower problem in that it deals with the migration of talented people, and, therefore, affects patterns of growth in both advanced and developing countries; it is a development problem in that it deprives the developing nations of much needed human capital for achieving their major national goal, namely, modernization; finally, it is a prob- lem in science and technology in that it relates directly to the manage- meilt of resources and the building of infrastructure for modern in- dustrial societies. In brief, the brain drain is a manpov.-er problem within the context of international development, national growth, and national techno- logical culture. As such it represents something of a unity of forces in which education, science, and technology converge in the processes of national development and in the general course of economic and social progress. Critical to national growth in both advanced and de- ^ Quoted in U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Research and Technical Programs Subcommittee, The Brain Drain of Scientists, Engineers, and Physi- cians from the Developing Countries into the United States. Hearings, 90th Cong., 2d sess., Jan. 23, 1968, p. 39. (Hereafter cited as, Hearings, House Government Operations Committee, Brain Drain, 1968.) * Quoted in. Walter Adams, "Talent That Won't Stay Put," Population Bulletin 25, No. 3 (June 1969), p. 60. /Herbert G. Grubel, "The Reduction of the Brain Drain: Problems and Policies," Minerva, 6, No. 4 (Summer 19G8), p. 541. 1049 veloping countries are the size and quality of a nation's stock of trained specialists and high-level scientific manpower and its capacity to en- large this supply to satisfy demand. Accordingly, the principal con- cerns of the advanced countries, like the United States, are not eco- nomic development per se but rather rates of growth and innovation, assurances of a large and expanding supply of skilled people, and assistance in launching and sustaining the technology-intensive enter- prises upon which national standing and power increasingly depend. In contrast, the principal concern of developing nations is of the most elemental type that hinges upon resolving the human resources problem and closing the gap between national goals and the supply of skilled manpower. The manpoAver needs of both developed and developing countries conflict on this vital and fundamental issue.*' Thus tlie brain drain deals with the migration of people, attitudes of nations and governments, the status of development in the prein- dustrial and postindustrial stages of national growth, and science and technology as instrumentalities for modernization. It impiriges on for- eign policy not so much as a specific issue in state-to-state relations but rather as a generalized, all-embracing problem that affects the growth and maturation, or retardation and decline of nations. Inherent Difficulties and Limitations : Magnitude and Complexity of the Prohlein The magnitude and complexity of the brain drain issue inevitably create many difficulties and impose many limitations. This is a global problem. It concerns Asia, Africa, Latin America, and Europe. It is also a sociological problem. It concerns man and society in varying stages of development. Both are strung out upon a chain of human ad- vancement reaching from the economic and social level of primitive Africa to that of the advanced level of the industrial West.^ It con-- cerns the interaction of traditional cultures with the forces of modern- ization and the effect of that interaction upon changing values in changing societies. It is also a problem in human psychology. It con- cerns people moving within and betvreen changing national environ- ments. Movement of persons into modern incTustrial societies from those less developed raises questions about individual goals and expec- tations in life, the value of loyalty to the nation and its culture, and the extent of one's personal interests and life goals paralleling those of the nation-state. Speaking of an approach to solving the brain drain problem, Dr. Charles V. Kidd, a long-time student of science policy and science advisor to President Lyndon B. Johnson, characterized the issue as ". . . not a problem to be solved, but a situation to be adapted to. And we are dealing with a process, I think, and not an event." ^ Much of the difficulty in dealing with the brain drain stems from the elements of controversy that it has provoked. There are first of all disagreements as to the relative harm or loss which developing coun- 8 The Council on International Educational and Cultural Affairs of the U.S. Govern- ment, The International Migration of Talent and Skills. Proceedings of a workshop and conference. Charles Frankel, Assistant Secretary of State, Chairman, Washington. U.S. Department of State, October 1966, pp. 1-2. (Hereafter cited as. Proceedings of Work- shop on the International Migration of Talent and Skills, October 1966.) ■' James A. Perkins elaborates on this aspect of the brain drain problem in, "Foreign Aid and the Brain Drain," Foreign Affairs (July 1966), pp. 60S-612. * Hearings, House Government Operations Committee, Brain Drain, 1968, p. 81. 1050 tries may suffer when a number of their educated elite migrate. Then there is the matter of equity among nations, or even by implication the moral question, if the wealthier nations of the world appear to be capitalizing on the scarce human resources of the underprivileged nations. Many Americans responded to this problem from a sense of national guilt. There are also the political implications of whether to permit the free movement of persons throughout the world, or whether to restrict such movement to some degree. This question raises such key issues as those of national loyalties, world-mindedness, and the uses of knowledge, all of which impinge directly upon the universal perspective of the modern man of science.^ DEFICIENCY OF STATISTICAL DATA The complexity of the brain drain issue is compounded by the lack of accurate, comprehensive, and rationally structured statistics on the flow of professional and highly skilled manpower. Nearly every dis- cussion of the brain drain published and examined during the past decade stressed the absence of reliable statistics. The U.S. Immigra- tion Service and the National Science Foundation are unique in pro- viding data allowing some qualified judgments on the flow of profes- sional manpower into the United States. Among the LDCs reliable and comprehensive statistics are virtually nonexistent.^" In George B. Baldwin's view, they ranged from "unsatisfactory to hopeless." ^^ Except for the United States, the advanced countries have also been remiss. "Even a country which claims to be badly hurt by the brain drain, the United Kingdom," wrote Alessandro Sil], "has virtually no statistics to offer except those furnished by the American immigra- tion service." ^^ PROBLEMS or INTERPRETATION Varying interpretations given to available statistics add to the com- plexity— indeed confusion — in attempting to analyze the brain drain problem. Students of the brain drain are divided on the meaning of the available data. "Nothing is more central to the study of profes- sional migration and its presumed values," wrote Gregory Henderson in his UNITAK study, "than the determination of what the available statistics mean and what they do not mean. Agreement on this deter- mination is not wide." ^^ Problems arise from the nature of immigration statistics. Migra- tion is not a static phenomenon. Men move in and out, but statistics » Steven E. Deutsch, International Education and Exchange: A Sociological Analysis (Cleveland: Case Western Reserve University Press, 1970), p. 27. i« Hla Myint of tlie London School of Economics gave the following appraisal of sta- tistics on migration from the LDCs : "Although some attempts have been made to assess the magnitude of the brain drain from the underdeveloped countries into the United States, it is fair to say we have no reliable statistical information about the total numbers involved in the brain drain from the underdeveloped countries to the advanced countries as a whole." (Hla Mvint. "The Underdeveloped Countries : A Less Alarmist View." In Walter Adams, The Brain Drain (New York: Macmillan. 1968), p. 2.33. 11 George B. Baldwin, "Brain drain or overflow?" Foreign Affairs (January 1970), p. .359. y .y V J /, 12 Alessandro Silj, "Should Europe Recall Its Scientists?" European Community, no. 127 (September 1969), p. 6. " Gregory Henderson. Emigration of Ilighhi-SkiUed Manpower from the Developing Countries. United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). New York, 1970, p. 10. y >, , 1051 often freeze movement without recording return flows. Definitions of professional categories differ. Statistics do not express the exactitudes wliich they purport, according to Henderson, but rather indicate gen- eral orders of magnitude and trends. These and many other factors add to the difficulty of interpreting migration statistics. Faced with the uncertainties of statistical data some students of the brain drain fall back upon general impressions derived from a variety of sources. Hla Myint thus explained his position : "All we can do is to try to piece together a general picture from the sketchy and impressionistic information available on the subject." ^* Others like George B. Baldwin degrade the value of statistics, deny that there is a brain drain, and argue a case for semantics. "But even good statistics are of little use," he said, "unless one knows what one is trying to measure. And in the brain-drain debate there is much ambiguity as to who is a 'brain' and what is a 'drain.' " ^= NEED FOR RESEARCH To fill the gaps of information, students of the brain drain have universally stressed the need for more research. Social scientists custo- marily admit ignorance and plead for additional research, wrote Steven Deutsch. "When it comes to the 'brain drain,' " he said, "there is indeed a great deal of ignorance and a real need for research." ^^ "We do need more facts about the brain drain," Dr. Donald F. Hornig, science adviser to President. Johnson, told members of the Senate Im- migration and Naturalization Subcommittee. "It is not so much de- tailed statistics, but a better picture of what the problem is." ^' Much has been published in the past decade, improving somewhat on the insufficiency of data. This may have illuminated certain aspects of the problem, but it has not appreciably reduced its complexities. The observations of Dr. Charles Frankel, Assistant Secretary of State in the Johnson Administration and professor of philosophy at Columbia "Mylnt, op. cit., p. 233. 15 Baldwin, op. cit., pp. 359-360. Writing In 1970, Mr. Baldwin declared that "today we know much more about the international migration of professional manpower than we did five, four or even three years ago. But the 'more' we know Is mainly facts, and not all that many ; men still have difficulty saying what the facts mean and deciding whether or not the brain drain constitutes a problem of 'disturbing dimensions' — as the Pearson Commission called it." (p. 358.) In Senate hearings on the migration of talent. Senator Hiram L. Fong (D-Hawaii), observing that Americans go abroad for a temporary purpose and then return whereas people coming to America usually remain, asked Under Secretary of State Eugene V. Rostow whether "statistically it has been proven that we have taken too many of these skilled people from these countries." Mr. Rostow replied : "I don't think so. I, haven't seen that case yet, either for the developed countries or for the less developed countries. There is a much bigger bulge from some of the countries than from others, at least in the less developed parts of the world. But I don't think the case can be made that we have taken too many. . . ." (U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on the Judiciary. Sub- committee on Immigration and Naturalization, International Migration of Talent and Skills, hearings, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, p. 12. (Hereafter cited as Hearings, Senate Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and SkillSj 1967.) 18 Deutsch, op. cit, p. 31. 1' Hearings, Senate Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1967, p. 110. Dr. Hornig said : "Better information on the international movement of highly trained people is badly needed. It is ironic that we have kept detailed statistics for decades on shipments of coffee, cocoa beans, steel and cotton, but we have only general approximations to the current flows of human beings." He felt that the reason for this paucity of data is the fact that only recently have science and technology been recognized as major factors affecting national development and international trade. Also there has been a corresponding tardy recognition of the significance of scientists and engineers to national well-being. Finally, the significance of the quality of the work force has until recently not been sufficiently recognized by economists, (p. 106.) 1052 University, are instructive. Referring- to a report on the brain drain by the Interagency Council on International P^ducational and Cultural AfTairs of which he was chairman, Dr. Frankel explained that it con- tained "as many questions as answers. It suggests some ideas about how to think about the problem; it does not offer any grand formula for solving the problem easily or quickly." And he added: ''To my mind, any reasonable man who devotes time to thinking about the issues raised by the so-called 'brain drain' will discover that they are thorny and difficult." ^* Scope and Design of the Study This study is not a history of the brain drain nor a statistical anal- ysis of talent migration. Neither is it a history of U.S. foreign polic}?^, administrative action, and institutional involvement, nor a detailed commentary on the conduct of American diplomacy concerning this problem. Rather, it is an attempt to determine the larger meaning of the brain drain issue, and to explore its many facets as a problem that on the surface ai^pears to have only an indirect bearing on American foreign policy, but in the long term could prove to be a matter of significant national concern. One result of the exploration is to show hoAv a nation whose strength, power, prestige, and authority derive largely from the successful application of science and technology can liave-an unintended disrupting effect upon those less privileged nations which are striving toward modernity. Every effort has been made in this study to simplify the complexities of this problem, illuminate its obscurities, and create at least an understanding of its interacting role between American diplomacy and science and technology. This study minimizes statistical compilations. Wliere possible statis- tics showing patterns of migration are given to suggest the existence of this problem and to indicate in a general way its parameters. It seeks to answer such questions as : What is the brain drain ? Is this a problem peculiar to contemporary society or does it liave roots in history ? What are the trends and patterns in the brain drain since the end of World War II ? Kow does the United States fit into this evolv- ing phenomenon ? What are the causes of the brain drain ? What are the "push" factors in countries of origin and the "pull" factors in countries of destination? What are the effects of the brain drain in both the losing and gaining countries? Does it impair development processes among the LDCs? What are the implications of the brain drain. for American foreign policy? Does it work at cross-purposes with American programs of international development? What are the areas of institutional involvement? Are tliere remedies for the brain drain ? And, finally, what are the trends for the future ? Is this a durable problem for the United States, or is it only transitory ? In attempting to respond to these questions, concrete examples are cited to illustrate the particular points under discussion. Yet caution has been exercised in not generalizing too broadly from specific cases. Admittedly, questions bearing directly on stages of development, on the "effective demand" rather than just the "need" for skills, and on divers manpower and education policies, all on a global scale, com- "ibld., p. 13. 1053 plicate this problem and render generalization difficult ; but acceptable risks must be taken if the data are to be at all relevant and meaningful. EMPHASIS ox LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES This study emphasizes brain drain as it affects the "Less Developed Countries" (LDCs) ; only in a tangential way does it deal with the impact of brain drain upon losers among the advanced nations. In the LDCs the brain drain issue has its most serious consequences ; here tlie intervention of science, technology, and diplomacy is most viable. ^^ Advanced nations have the infrastructure and national base for re- plenishing the supply of lost scientists and engineers and the resources, political and economic, for counteracting their outflow. Theirs is a bearable los?; it is potentially recoverable. Such is not the case with LDCs. Their loss is sometimes irreparable. As a preliminary report of UNESCO on the problem of talent migration observed, "While many developed countries are also affected by the 'brain drain,' it is the developing countries which are hardest hit by its consequences." ^° For the United States this aspect of the problem has special relevance because this Nation has become the primary force attracting talent from the LDCs. "The United States has become a graduate school for much of the developing Avorld." wrote John R. Niland in his study on the Asian engineering brain drain, "but as growing numbers of for- eign students seek higher degrees at American universities, so too do growing numbers of them avoid or postpone return to the home count i-y." ^^ It is not surprising, therefore, that the adverse effects of the brain drain provoked sharp criticism among the LDCs, most of whom had only in recent years emerged from their colonial relationship with the "West. In the General Assembly of the United Nations they accused the West of transferring its exploitive urges from physical to human resources. The representative from Dahomey called it an "odious bleeding" of Africa, a continuation of the slave trade. The Assembly '» The report of the State Department's workshop and conference on International migration of skills explained its priority interest in the LDCs In this way : "Finally, as some noted, a concern with the 'brain drain' and nonreturn should be restricted to migration from underdeveloped countries to the developed ones ; It Is here that the enormous existing disparities in rewards and resources between the two make cooperative actions both vital and defensible in terms of the developed countries' own long-range interests." (Proceedings of Workshop on the International Migration of Talent and Skills, October 196C, p. 9.) -"United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, The Prohlem of Emigration of Scientists and Technologists, General Appraisal of the Phenomenon. Pre- liminary report. Prepared at the request of the Advisory Committee of the Economic and Social Council on the Application of Science and Technology to Development, Paris, Feb. 29, 19G8, p. 11. (Hereafter cited as, UNESCO, Preliminary Report on Emigration of Scientists and Technologists, 19GS.) Senator Walter F. Moiidale gave this explanation of the Imbalance of effects : "From some European countries, particularly Britain, the brain drain is very substantial. But Is well within the means of these countries to provide the incentives which vv'ould reduce the flow, or at least compete for talent, particularly In the strength- ened European Common Market nations." "But developing nations," he continued, "cannot compote in salaries and material benefits. And any student or trainee in this country soon learns to appreciate those rewards. . . ." The Senator explained the essence of the problem for the LDCs In these words : "Furthermore, these nations cannot now create the kinds of institutions and the kinds of opportunities which will attract and retain the very best of their native talent. They cannot, that is, unless they have outside help." (A speech delivered by Senator Mondale at the University of Minnesota on Apr. 14, 1967, in Congressional Record, May 15, 1967, p. S6858.) ^ .Tohn R. Niland. The Asian Engineering Brain Drain (Lexington, Mass. : Heath, 1970), p. xlii. 1054 responded by passing a resolution conceding the seriousness of the problem and expressing grave concern.^^ Certain Assumptions The complexities of the brain drain make it a nebulous subject upon which to base a study. To give some structure to the problem, certain assumptions have to be made, and the first is, that the problem exists. BRAIN DRAIN : REALITY OF PROBLEM Such an assumption needs to be made explicit because some stu- dents of the brain drain deny that it does exist. If this were the case, then the purposes of this study would be meaningless. George Baldwin asserts, for example, that professional migration from the LDCs ap- pears not to be a drain but an overflow. ^^ Howard J. Caquelin believes that the problem has been exaggerated. "The hullabaloo about the 'brain drain' is getting rather threadbare,'' he said. "Only the centers of attraction have changed from ancient Takahasila in India to the Middle East to Rennaissance Europe, and, more recently to the United States . . . the drained have always complained." -* Henry Fairlie states categorically, "There is no brain drain." -^ Others disagree. H. V. Hodson, Provost of the Ditchley Founda- tion which sponsored a conference on the brain drain and the LDCs, prefaced the report of the conference with the conclusion that there are two things about the brain drain "that are reasonably certain in the contemporary world. They are, first that its scale alone now makes it a substantial economic and social issue for many countries, both as importers and as exporters of 'brains,' and that in the over-all balance a net export lies with the less-developed and a net import with the most-advanced countries." ^^ Philip H. Coombs, Director of UNESCO's International Institute for Educational Planning in Paris, acknowledged 'the absence of suffi- cient data to see the whole brain drain picture clearly, but he asserted, "There is enough indicative evidence to warrant serious concern." ^^ George Seltzer, Professor of Economics at the University of Minne- sota, conceded the vast divergencies of views dictated by subjective considerations, but he considered the brain drain a "problem" because : 1. It is creating international ill-will ; 2. It is perverting specific international programs for aid and technical assist- ance: 22Nurl Eren, "Supply, Demand, and the Brain Drain," Saturday Review, (Aug. 2, 1969), p. 10. Anwar Koraltem and Mldhat Hamdi, officials in the UAR's Ministry of Education, gave the following Interpretation of the brain dr.iln : "The United Arab Republic is of tlie opinion that the "brain drain' processes are immoral processes which impair nation-building efforts in developing countries by depriving tliem of the required human experience and thus hamper their march towards progress. The United Arab Republic also has the conviction that the 'brain drain' policy adopted by certain advanced countries to drain qualified elements from developing countries is against the principles and purposes of international cooperation." (Quoted in, UNESCO, Preliminary Report on Emigration of Scientists and Technologists, 196S, p. 8, fl. 1.) ^ Baldwin, op. clt.. p. 359. =* Quoted in, George Seltzer. "Brain Drain: What Should and Can Be Done?" Inter- national Development. 1966. Edited by, H. W. Singer, Nicolas de Kun and Abbas Oroobadi (Doblis Ferry, N.Y. : Oceana, 1967), p. 55. K Ibid. -■8 Ditchley Foundation. Report of a Conference at Ditchley Park. Feb. 16-19, 1968. International Migration of Talent From and to the Less Developed Countries. Rapporteur, C. H. G. 01dh;>m. Ditchley Parle. England, 1968. p. 5. "^ Philip H. Coombs, "Brain Drain from Developing Countries," International Develop- vicnt (1966), p. 00. 1055 3. It is a barrier to socio-economic development in selected areas ; 4. It is diverting attention — when used as a self-serving slogan — from condi- tions that require urgent action.^ Similar recognition of the problem is apparent in the 1968 report of the House Government Operations Committee on the "Scientific Brain Drain from the Developing Countries." Among its findings was this : "While the immigration may not harm development in the short run, it will have serious adverse consequences in the long run." ^^ Finally, the most current assessment by the United Nations (Janu- ary 18, 1974) contained an outright statement that brain drain is a problem. Secretary General Kurt Waldheim acknowledged in his re- port the difficulties in measuring the precise magnitude of the outflow. And immigration statistics of the United States, the United Kingdom, and Canada, he said, provide only minimum figures for evaluating the brain drain. But even "these minimum figures indicate that the net outflow of trained personnel from developing to developed countries is significant enough to justify the international concern and to war- rant the formulation and implementation of policies to reduce, if not to stop, this net outflow." 30 POSITIVE VALUE OF SCIEXCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND EDUCATION IN MODERN CrV'ILIZATION A second assumption is acceptance of the belief that modern indus- trial civilization based on science and technolog}', as it has developed in the United States and other industrial areas of the world, is gen- erally a positive good, thus a desirable value, and accordingly a desira- ble goal for a nation to achieve. Inherent in this view is the further assumption as to the positive value of education as an essential instrument for development and achieving modernity. Commentators on the brain drain like Dr. Frankel recognize the dilemma of the United States, being at once a "graduate school for the LDCs" and a magnet attracting the educated elite as nonreturnees, but assuming the overriding value of education, they maintain, like Dr. Kidd, that "it would be out of perspective to view the training of students in this country as anything but a large, positive gain to the world." ^^ Accordingly, it is further assumed that the educated class in the LDCs represents a national elite and as such represents an investment =8 Seltzer, op. clt., p. 56. ^ . ™U.S Congress House, Committee on Government Operations, Scientific Brnin Drnin from tlie Developing Countries. Twenty-third report, 90th Cong., 2cl sess., 19fi8, n. 5. (Hereafter cited as. Report, House Government Operations Committee, Scientific Brain Drain from the LDCs, 1968.) 30 United Nations, Committee on Science and Technology for Development, Ovfflow of Trained Personnel from Developing to Developed Countries, Report of the Secretary General. New York, United Nations, 1974, p. 6.15. (United Nations. E/C. 8/21. Jan. 18, 1974. ) In introducing the Secretary General's report to the Committee on Science and Tech- nologv for Developmenf. Rajiiikant C. Desai. acting Director of the Office for Science and Technology, noted that the United Nations had been dealing with the brain drain problem for a number of years. The subject, he said, had caused understandable anxiety among the developing countries which feared the loss of their professional manpower to the advanced countries. Accordingly, the subject had aroused concern within the United Nations legislative bodies. Debate on this matter within the Committee elicited varying degrees of attitudes, but the Canadian delegate expressed a common theme when he said that brain drain was "a real problem for developing countries." (United Nations, Office of Public Information, Press Section Committee on Science and Technology, . . . Begins Debate on "Brnin Drain," New York, United Nations, 1974, 6 p. United Nations Document, Press Release TEC/233, Mar. 25, 1974.) „ ^. 31 Hearings, House Government Operations Committee, Brain Drain, 1968, p. 44. 1056 in a country's natural resources. Thus, whether or not a trained pro- fessional may be a surplus commodity in his field and leaves the country does not alter the fundamental fact that his emigration rep- resents a loss. This assumption takes on a more general view of trained manpower in that the lost contribution of the departed professional to a nation is judged to be much broader than just his contribution in the particular area of his speciality. He is part of a larger developing infrastructure of a national elite, a vital human resource, that is neces- sary for development. Without these assumptions on the positive value and desirability of. science, technology, and education, the LDCs would be assigned to perpetual underdevelopment, the advanced nations would accord- ingly be divested of any responsibility, and the brain drain would be a non subject for study. INEVITABILITY OF CHANGE AS POSITIVE VALUE The inevitability of change as a positive good in development — a force to be harnessed to constructive ends — is a final assumption in this study. In its project on the international migration of high-level manpower and the impact on development, the Committee on Interna- tional !Migration of Talent (CIMT) described this concept of change in the developmental process as a commitment to the idea — an "im- mensely powerful force," it said — ". . . that people are not fated to live and die as their ancestors have lived and died, the idea that nature can be controlled and used, the idea that physical suffering and early death are not the inevitable lot of humans." ^^ Costs of change in the LDCs can be high, as CIMT wrote, "in terms of conflict within and among individuals and in terms of the loss of traditional values that tend to elevate the individual and hold society together." ^" But poorer countries of the world appear to have opted for moderni- zation, whatever values may be eroded and whatever the difficulties encountered. Gunnar Myrdal described the process this way as it ap- plied to Asia: "The South Asian countries, and particularly the poorer among them, have passed the point of no return. Given the present and foreseeable rate of population growth, the choice of re- maining traditional societies is no longer open." ^* What is implied in this assumption on the inevitability and desira- bility of change is a furthering of the 19th century idea of progress and the advancement of the 20th century spirit of scientism ; for this type of change projects an outlook that accents the positive in the ex- pectations of man and society. In tliis process, the economic and social development, including the institutions, values, and cultural traits that are necessary to and a part of development toward modernity, seem more likely to occur as a consequence of examples set by the advanced countries.^^ It is this interaction between the developing and advanced countries so central to the development process that generates the idea =- The Committee on the International Migration of Talent. Tlie International Migra- tion of High-Levol Manpower: Its Impact on the Development Process. Published in cooperation with Education and World Affairs (New York: Praeger, 1970), p. 679. (Here- after cited as CIMT study.) ^ Ibid, p. 679. ^ Ibid., p. G80. 3= Ibid., p. G79. 1057 of progress among the LDCs but ironicalU' produces conditions for brain drain. Definition of Brain Drain The phenomenon known as "brain drain" is rooted in antiquity, but the phrase itself was coined in a 1962 report by the British Royal So- ciety which inc{uired into the emigration of engineers, scientists, and technicians from Britain to North America. ^"^ The term has been widely used in the United States, particularly in the lOGO's, to refer to immi- gration into the United States of highly trained scientists and profes- sionals from all countries. Migration of talent seems to embrace an idea that is common in all variant definitions. Though students of the brain drain problem disagree widely on its definition, they generally concur on the emotionalism that it generates. The term is "loaded anJi pejorative," wrote Dr. Walter Adams, Eco- nomics Professor at ]Michigan State University and a prominent scholar of the brain drain, "leading those who use it to think automati- cally of a loss of vital resources without compensation." Illustrations remforce this mental habit, purporting to show that "human capital is flowing out of economies where it can make the greatest contribution and into economies already well-stocked with trained scientific and administrative personnel.^' In such a melodramatic view, he noted, the United States is characterized as "the greatest villain." Overlooked is the fact that large numbers of skilled people migrate to countries other than the United States." INTERNATIONALIST AND NATIONALIST THEORY OF BRAIN DRAIN In general, students of the brain drain define the problem from either the internationalist or the nationalist perspective. Harry G. Johnson of the London School of Economics professes to adopt "a cosmopolitan liberal position," that is, the internationalist stance. He regards nationalism as "one of the less pleasant vices in which man- kind indulges itself, or as one of the characteristics of childish imma- turity out of which I hope the people of the world will ultimately grow." Accordingly, he begins with the assumptions, (1) that the in- ternational circulation of human capital is a beneficial process since it reflects "the free choices of the individuals who choose to migrate," and (2) that "any argument to the contrary needs very careful scru- tiny and documentation before it can be accepted." ^^ Advocates of the internationalist view tend to downgrade the nega- tive effects on development of the migration of highly skilled profes- sional manpower, and as evidence to buttress their case point to the pioneering work of such "immigrants" to America as Einstein and Fermi that benefited all mankind. Henry Fairlie expressed this point of view in a comment on the British brain drain : "There is no brain M Walter Adams, "Talent That Won't Stay Put," p. 59. 37 Ibid., pp. 61-62. In describing the emotionalism generated by this problem Philip H. Coombs wrote : "The 'brain drain' label itself, ... is emotionally loaded — like piracy, theft and rape — and thus carries its own answer. It implies that the f.nilure of any student from a develop- ing country to go home when his studies are finished is ipso facto a bad thing and somehow is immoral. Many people in fact believe this. Their writings encourage us to approach the matter with a large guilt complex." (Op. eit.. p. 59.) 38 Harry G. Johnson, "In Search of an Analytical Framework : An 'Internationalist Model,' " In Adams, The Brain Drain, p. 70. 1058 drain. Tliere are a number of scientists who are taking; what appear to tliem to be better jobs that do not hapj:)en to be in the United King- dom. The first thin^ to realize is that it is quite legitimate for them to do this ... it is also proper. . . . The world of scholarship is the last which should allow social^ political or nationalist considerations to be paramount." ^^ The internationalists' criterion in defining brain drain is. whether the individual scientist performs a greater service to humanity by leaving his native country or in remaining or returning home. Ulti- mately, they argue, the losing country can gain if he has greater op- portunity abroad for exercising his skills and talents and realizing his professional soals. Germany, for example— as indeed all of man- kind— has benefited from the work of Wernher von Braun and the other German space scientists who came to the United States after World War II. Their contributions virtually assured America's suc- cess in space exploration. In contrast, the nationalist view defines brain drain from a far more narrowly circumscribed perspective. The principal criterion is service to the nation. When Sir Kenneth Robinson complained of the medical brain drain to the United States, he was more concerned with satisfy- ing Britain's health needs than either "swelling the membership" of the American Medical Association (AMA) or conceivably serving the larger interests of humanity. The nationalist view, however, has greater relevance for the LDCs, for it is many of them who pay the highest social cost for the loss of skilled manpower. Accordingly, they perceive this problem more directly in terms of how it impairs their national welfare and development and not how it serves the aggregate welfare of the world. The nonreturn of a single Nigerian medical graduate from postgraduate training in an advanced country is con- sidered a serious loss to the health needs of that much deprived na- tion and accordingly constitutes a drain on its high-level manpower resources.**' VARIATIONS ON DEFINITION There are perha]os as many variations on the definition of brain drain as there are situations to which it is applied. It is a term, wrote Dr. Harold Margulies and Lucille Stephenson Bloch in their study on foreign medical graduates (FMGs), which "time has proved to be more convenient than descriptive. It implies more than it says and disguises what should be made more apparent."*^ For them, a "rela- tively tasteless" translation of brain drain is "loss of human capital investments." and a less inclusive term is "migration of talented or highly skilled individuals." A brief economic definition is "rational allocation of scarce resources," that is, the most economically efficient use of manpower. For those deeply, and at times emotionally, con- cerned about the issues provoked by brain drain, Margulies and Bloch write, "it is the unwarranted and undesirable loss of urgentlv needed, highly educated individuals from poor countries to more fortunate countries like ours which could get along very well without them." ^^ 39 ( 40 ■ ' Onoted in. Seltzer, op. clt., p. 55. 'For a filscussion of the nationalist view, see, Don Patlnliin, "A 'Nationalist' Model, In Af^nms!. The Krain Drain, pr>. 02-]fl8. *^ Margulies and Bloch, op. cit., p. 78 «ibid. 1059 Dr. Frankel defined brain drain as "the flow of skilled and talented people to our country from other countries," and as "the circulation of brains." *^ "It is a contemporary manifestation of a phenomenon common to all modernization," he"^said, "—the movement of people away from the poorer and more isolated places towards the metro- politan centers of the world." "* Dr. Kidd defined brain drain as "an index of the structural mal- adjustments in both the 'sending' and 'receiving' countries." For the latter it indicates an inelastic supply of certain talents and skills "based in part on the monopolistic entry restrictions which are allowed to operate in the professional sector of the economy." For the "send- ing" nations, it may be the index of retarded development or under- development. "In all cases." he continued, "the brain drain is simply the symptom of the disease rather than the disease itself. . . ." *^ Claire Xader, a political scientist at Oak Ridge National Labora- tory, defined brain drain in terms of crises in technical leadership; as she'said, it "refers to damage to a nation's brain power and potential leadership resources." Developing countries, whose trained elite such as scientists, engineers, and physicians migrate to the advanced nations of the West, face a situation, 'she explained, "which is intensified by unused, underused, misused, or missing talent and skills within these countries." Both the consequences of migratory phenomena and the pattern of using specialized talents within a country, she concluded, contribute to "maturing crises in technical leadership." *^ SOME CHARACTERISTICS OF BRAIN DRAIN DEFINITIONS Difficulty in defining "brain drain" adds to the complexities referred to above in analyzing this problem. Yet, as the variations on defi- nitions suggest, characteristics in the problem magnify the task of definition. Diversity in stages of development among the LDCs creates differ- ing criteria for defining what is meant by brain drain. Critics have charged the United States with drawing off from poor countries human resources urgently needed for their development. Simplistic, dramatic, easily understood, and politically appealing, this stereo- typed description of talent migration is inapplicable to many disad- vantaged LDCs and oversimplified with respect to all. Both the Philip- pines Eepublic and Nigeria are considered developing countries; yet the pace and character of development in each of them differ widely. Diversity rather than uniformity seems to be the rule rather than the exception. Perhaps one of the most comprehensive statements on di- *■ Abiliil Said. Brain Drain: The Developing Countrie. Baldwin, op. clt., p. 362. 61 Baldwin, op. clt., pp. 362-363. 1062 Even considerations on tlie critical elite deal only with part of the definitional problem. Another part, not quite as dramatic but signifi- cant nonetheless for development in the LDCs, is the loss of middle- level personnel, that is, the electricians, welders, and other skilled craftsmen so important in building a modern society. While this study concentrates on high-level manpower, still the drain of middle-level talent constitutes a serious and virtually unaccountable loss.^" IMiddle- level skills are in short supply nearly everywhere and existing second- ary and vocational education still inadequately produce such skills.^^ Yet in the LDCs middle-level skills, vitally needed for any industrial- izing or institutionalizing initiative, quite often are in scarcer supply relative to dernand than high-level skills. Developed countries appear to require about 50 percent more middle-level than high-level skills. Ironically, some ordinary middle-level skills are often relatively rare in the LDCs. India, overflowing with civil engineers, has a serious shortage of electricians.^* Korea had a core-group of newly trained nuclear physicists for creating a scientific research base in the nation but lacked the welders to build the nec- essary scientific apparatus. Developed countries have more middle- level personnel and require more and at a faster rate than do the LDCs.^^.Thus the migration of middle-level talent, usually not con- sidered in studies on brain drain, contributes to the drain and conse- quently can impair development. AN APPROACH TO THE BRAIN DRAIN PROBLEM Given the complexities and difficulties in defining talent migration, it is understandable why some students of this phenomenon take seri- ous exception to the commonly applied term, "brain drain." Such a term, imprecise and emotional, tends to prejudge the issue. Use of this "descriptive shorthand," says Richard A. Humphrey, Director, Com- mission on International Education of the American Council on Edu- cation, is "unfortunate," because it implies "purposive exploitation." To the extent that it does, it casts an "emotional aura" over the search for facts.^*^ Acknowledging these attitudes and inherent definitional difficulties, this study makes no attempt to formulate a general, comprehensive definition of "brain drain" that can apply to all cases. It does, however, attempt a more narrowly circumscribed definition. Since the study focuses mainly on loss of professional manpower from the LDCs, 52 The high-level manpower category is generally defined to mean "professional, techni- cal and kindred workers" (PTK). The International Labour Office gave this definition : "Workers in this major group conduct research and apply In a professional capacity scientific knowledge and methods to a variety of technological, economic, social, indus- trial and governmental problems, carry out technical tasks auxiliary to scientific research, development and practice, and perform religious, educational, legal, artistic and literary functions. Those classified In this major group perform tasks which usually require training in a specific scientific or other professional field, at a university, technical institute or similar establishment or which require creative ability in literature or art or talent in entertaining." Many countries make slight variations In this category. (In- ternational Labour Office. International standard classification of occupations. Geneva, 1958. Ib Henderson, Emigration of High-Skilled Manpower from the Developing Coun- tries, UNITAR, pp. 4-5.) 63 Ibid., p. 50. " Ibid., pp. 50-51. 65 Ibid., p. 52. ^Hearings, Senate Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1967, p. 133. 1063 "brain drain" is, therefore, generally intended to mean in this study the loss of an educated elite that is required to satisfy the needs for national development, particularly in the long-run.. Beyond this, use of the term is a matter of convenient identification of a subject already widely known under that label. In describing the conditions of bram drain, the study attempts to provide a reasonable statistical basis on migration flows and patterns for analyzing the problem and where possible to support generalizations with specific cases. By ne- cessity, certain assumptions have been made. Also by necessity the study relies upon what are at best impressionistic views derived from the many sources examined. Finally, international development is a v-ast and variegated subject embracing a wide range of problems and issues. This study, while acknowledging this diversity, examines the problem principally from the perspective of brain drain and the pri- mary role of trained manpower in development. II. Braix Drain in Historical Perspective Huma]i mobility is a fact of history, and for modern man, particu- larly in free societies, it is a wivy of life. Today's world is one of quick- ening movement, characterized by constantly shifting populations. At a time of technological change and rapid; inexpensive transporta- tion, mobility has tended to become the rule rather than the exception, and to change one's liome or even country is for many persons a com- monplace event. The struggle for success, advancement, and even life it- self is often inextricably woven into the reality of movement, whether in the sometimes frenetic atmosphere of today's Jet Set living and playing on several continents, or in the more sober sphere of the scien- tist responding to the allure of better research surroundings, or of the businessman operating in an enlarged global sphere of national and multinational cor]3orations. Migration in History Since the beginning of time, man has been on the move, searching for many things — wealth, power, survival, adventure, f reedoin, peace, education, progress. Indeed, history is largely a record of human mi- gration : the exodus of Hebrews from Egypt, the earliest recorded mass migration; the movement of Phoenicians, Greeks, and Etruscans into the Mediterranean basin establishing ancient civilization; the spread- ing influence of the Greeks, and Eomans; the migration of Germanic peoples into the Roman Empire to form a new base for Western Civili- zation ; the world of the 7th-8th century Arabs stretching from south- ern France in the West to the Indus Valley in the East ; the overseas migration of some 60 million Europeans from the Age of Discovery to the eve of AVorld War II. which had the effect of "Europeanizing" the Western and much of the Eastern Hemisphere — all massive move- ments of people that have constituted the historical record of mankind. Within recorded history human migrations have transformed na- tions and continents and the racial, ethnic, linguistic, and cultural composition of their inhabitants. They have often sown the seeds of civilization and in many instances proved to be a primary source of human progress, for above all else man is a carrier of knowledge and potentially an instrument of positive and creative change. Talent Migration in Ancient Times Brain drain is a distinctive and irtextricable part of the human migration process: it connotes the loss of an elite; it means talent migration. Lord Hailsham may have been the first contemporary per- son to bring prominence to the term when he used it some years ago in a statement to the House of Lords complaining about the drain of British brains to the United States. But its origins are rooted in antiquity, specifically around 150 A.D. when Atheneus, an ancient Greek writer, wrote of "the drain of Greek brains to Alexandria." '^^ BTS n Dedijer, "Early Migration," In Adams, The Brain Drain, p. 16. (1064) IOCdo The brain drain process, as distinct from the term, predates Athen- eus' reference by several centuries. However, only the most indirect kind of historical evidence exists on the migration of scientists until the birth of Ionian science soon after 600 B.C. To be sure, science had developed in the ancient civilizations of Sumeria, Babylonia, and Egypt. But with the exception of the Egyptian Imhothep (c. 2500 B.C.) there are no recorded names of scientists. According to the prac- tice of the time, scientists and scholai-s did not sign their tablets or papyri, nor did they reference the previous work of their colleagues. Furthermore, nothing is knoAvn of their scientific institutions, that is, their organizational structure, staffing, and support. Thus, the migra- tion of scientists during these earlier civilizations cannot be substan- tiated by historical evidence.^* AMONG THE ANCIENT GREEKS The mobility of scientists and other men of learning in classical Greece is recorded in written history. Plato, for example, had traveled extensively in Greece, Italy, and Egypt before settling down to open his Academy in Athens. A systematic analysis of selected samples of 60 foremost Greek scientists has shown that despite the difficulty of travel 45 of them migrated or were said to have migrated as students, teachers, scholars, and researchers. Athens was the "pull" factor attracting scholars in the ancient world until about 300 B.C. Plato had established his academy in 388 B.C., and Aristotle the Lyceum in 335 B.C.^^ Both institutions, com- parable in purpose and functions with the modern-day university and research institute, became the most eminent seats of learning in an- cient Greece. A measure of the impact of Plato and his academy is seen by the fact that all of the most important mathematical works of the 4th century were done by professional colleagues or students of Plato. Moreover, Aristotle, along with Plato one of the world's greatest thinkers, was one of his students at the academy.®" GREEK PHYSICIANS, A SPECIAL CASE A special case of mobilit}' and talent migration in ancient Greece is that of the physicians. Most doctors were itinerant physicians who moved about the Greek world dispensing their professional skills much like any traveling American businessman of today. Larger communi- ties were anxious to have a permanent resident physician of their own. In order to attract a doctor they particularly wanted, the community authorities created their own "pull" factor in a manner, at least in principle, similar to the bidding of American industry for the services of foreign scientists and technicians or the search of American hos- pitals for the services of foreign medical graduates (FMGs). They would offer the itinerant doctor an appointment as municipal physi- cian; he would be paid an annual salary which was raised through a special tax ; in addition to salary he was allowed to accept fees from patients of financial means. That the practice was commonplace rather 68 Ibid., pp. 12-13. « Ibid., pp. 13-14. _. *> George Sarton, Introduction to the History of Science. Published for the Carnegie Institution of Washington. (Baltimore: Williams & Wilklns. 1927), chapters V and VL 106G than exceptional is shown by the historical evidence that Democedes of Croton was the municipal doctor in Aegina and by the scholarly judfifment of Dr. Henry E. Sigerist, an historian of medicine, that no doubt most of the larger Greek cities had their publicly ai:)pointed doc- tors from the sixth century B.C.^^ From the fourth century B.C., Greek physicians began to immi- grate into Rome. Most were adventurers, and at first were strongly resented by Romans. In Rome^ the first physicians were slaves and the level of medical knowledge very primitive. The superior ability of the Greeks was soon recognized. As the special needs of the empire mounted, resentment softened and "pull" factors were created to in- crease the inflow of Greek doctors. Rome's frequent wars created an increasing demand for many army surgeons. Accordingly, the policy towards foreign physicians was moderated and eventually changed entirely. Special inducements were granted to attract as many Greek physicians as possible. In 46 B.C., «Tulius Caesar extended the highly valued right of Roman citizenship to all free-born Greek physicians residing on Roman territory. Doctors were free from taxation, spared the obligations of military service and public office, and were not re- quired to accept lodgers. In brief, the Romans created powerful in- centives to stimulate the immigration of doctors from Greece.^-^ ALEXANDRIA OF THE PTOLEMIES Around 300 B.C., the center of learning and scholarship shifted from Athens to Alexandria. This transfer came about as the result of conscious government polic,y. Aware of the pi-actical as well as the esthetic vahie of learning, the first king of the Ptolemaic dynasty and his successors determined to establish Hellenic culture in Egypt to surpass Athens itself. This policy was to be maintained by successive rulers for hundreds of years.'^^ As the location of this new center of learning the Ptolemies picked Alexandria, then a newly built city on the site of an Egyptian fishing village. Using the resources of tlie state, they set out to make Alexan- dria the center of science, philosophy, scholarship, and art of the known world. To accomplish this task, they used their great wealth and exerted their powerful influence in transferring from Athens to Alexandria everything that could advance their purposes: books, in- struments, organizational and institutional patterns, and above all manpower.*^* As brain drainers of the ancient world, the Ptolemies seemed to have outdistanced even the Greeks of Athens. Manpower problems for the new center were solved in the course of time by importing hundreds of scholars from abroad : philosophers, mathematicians, physicians, botanists, zoologists, astronomers, astrologers, philologists, historians of literature, geographers, artists, and poets. And these "in-house schol- ars" were supplemented by a constant stream of visiting scientists io«i?*'I!'"^ ^- ^o?,^i*S*V,^*'^- ^ Ifi^iory of Medicine. (New York: Oxford University Press. lyt*!), V. J, pp. oun— oil. vA^*xt^^^k'^""^^*'"^',HP,- ^^ ^^"'^ ^- Sigerist an the History of. Medicine. (New York : MD publications. 1960), p 7. v i . y «3 Dedljer, op. cit., p. 14. «* Ibid. 10G7 attracted, some historians say, even more by Ptoleniaic gold and generosity than by the center's extensive research facilities. In the beginning Ptolemy I persuaded Demetrios of Phaleron, a Greek statesman and student of Aristotle, and Straton, the physicist, to come to Alexandria. In addition to acting as advisors on government science policy, both held other prestigious posts : Demetrios became the first director of the newly formed library and museum, and Straton became the tutor of Ptolemy II. (Straton later returned to Athens, having been retrieved by the Greeks with an offer to head the Lyceum.) The research facilities that the Ptolemies built were extraordinary for the time; apparently neither expense nor effort was spared. The museum and library resembled present day government research in- stitutes or university graduate schools. The museum, built within the palace compound, consisted of astronomical observatories with bronze instruments, laboratories and dissecting rooms, botanical and zoologi- cal gardens, lecture and seminar rooms, dining halls, dormitories, temples, and library buildings. The entire complex represented an enormous investment in gold and human effort. The library, said to have been started with books Demetrios had brought from Aristotle's library in Athens, grew to an impressive collection of some 500,000 to 700,000 volumes, all classified and catalogued. Besides what has been described as the "congenial and stimulating atmosphere" and excellent j-esearch facilities, the Ptolemies underwrote the costs in room and board for their scholars as well as providing generous salaries. What was produced in Alexandria is a matter of historical record. It is said that most of the best works in science and philosophy fi om 800 B.C. to 500 A.D., having a bearing on present developments in these fields, could be traced to Alexandria. Among the intellectual products of its institutions are the steam engine (Hero) , the hydraulic screw (Archimedes), plane geometry (Euclid), conies (Apollonios), the Copernican theory of the solar system (Aristarchos), nnd the ac- curate measurement of the Earth's circumference (Eratosthenes). But most important for the purposes of this study, as Stevan Dedi- jer wrote : "All the brains producing them in Alexandria seem to have come from somewhere else." Included among those scholars drained from other lands are eight directors of the library-museum who have been identified in the institution's 800-year history. Very few native Egyptians or even Alexandria-born Greeks are among the names of known scholars and scientists.^^ Talent Migration in the Middle East and Medieval Europe Historians of science record instances of government policies de- signed to attract foreign scientists in states contemporaneous with Alexandria, in late Antiquity, and during the golden age of Islam. Kiiig Husraw Anusirwan, a Persian King with pronounced pro-Greek tendencies, systematically gathered scholars, physicians, and scientists to the observatory, medical schools, a^d lectiire halls of the university he had established at Gundi Sapur in East Persia. Constriction of in- «5Ibid., pp. 15-16. Xenophon Leon Messinesl makes this Judgment on the value of these scholars and the museum : "The facilities offered by the Museum . . . and the induce- ment of higher emoluments offered by the Ptolemies gradually attracted the greatest scientists so that the Museum soon became th€> cJUlef repositpry of knowledge and seat of learning of the ancient world." Xenophon Leon ' Messinesi, Meet the Ancient Oreeka, (Caldwell, Idaho : Caxton Printers, 1959), p. 176. 106S tellectual freedom, historically a prime cause for the migration of scholars, provided a unique recruiting opportunity. A number of schol- ars emigrated at the King's invitation when in 529 A.D. Justinian, attempting to protect Christianity, forbade the teaching of non- Christian pa^an philosophies at the Academy of Athens, closed its doors, and dispersed the staff. Best known among the emigrating scholars and scientists were Damasius and Simplicius.^^ Science historians have also recorded instances of foreign recruit- ment by the great Caliphs from the Abbasid dynasty during the eighth and ninth centuries. As in so many cases before and since, the opening of a new center of learning provided the motivation for migration. The Caliphs, along with lesser royalty and other wealthy Arabs, vigor- ously supported the development of Arab science. In 766 A.D., Caliph Al-Mansur made Baghdad a center of Arab learning, immediately attracting Jewish, Syrian, and Persian scholars with his princely stipends. Mathematicians from Tashkent in Central Asia, astronomers from the Ganges valley in India; pliilosophers, architects, and physi- cians from Rome, Athens, and Alexandria were attracted by the offer of high honors and high salaries to work in the new city. Tabit ben Qurra and Al-Battani, two of the greatest Arab astronomers and mathematicians, left their star- worshipping sect of Sabians to join the Arab scholars at Baghdad. Hardly 10 years after the founding of Baghdad, a Hindu presented the Caliph an astronomical treatise entitled "A. Siddhanta" which was immediately translated into Arabic."^ IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE Scattered evidence exists showing that the 8th to 11th century European scholars migrated and governing authorities established policies to attract them. A considerable literature is available to illus- trate Charlemagne's interest in science and scholarship, his policies in education, and his efforts to attract scholars to his schools and court. The Benedictine Age, when the center of gravity in learning was shift- ing from the Arab countries to Southern Europe, is similarly rich in evidences of the mobility of intellectuals. Not until the rise of the great European universities, however, is there an abundance of direct evi- dence to be found in original state documents, contemporary writings and biographical data showing state policies either to encourage or frustrate talent migration.^* The universities were the principal centers for producing and trans- mitting science and scholarship between the end of the Benedictine Age and the scientific revolution of the I7th century. Newly formed scientific societies carried the major burden thereafter. European universities flourished during the 12th to the 16th centur- ies. By mid-13th century there were nine in Italy, five in France, two in England, and four in Spain. By the end of the 15th century there were 80 major universities throughout Europe. Student bodies were drawn from Europe as a whole, and the best universities ranged in •« Dedijer, op. clt., p. 17. *" Ibid., pp. 17-18, and Eren, op. clt., p. 12. >•« Dedijer, op. clt., p. 18. 1069 enrollment from 6,000 to 7,000 for Paris and Bologna, 3,000 for Ox- ford, 1,500 for Prague, and 900 for Vienna. All developed withm the- f ramework of a commonly shared intellectual world : a common Latin language and Catholic faith, and a general cultural unity which created a universality that facilitated migration. The universities were truly cosmopolitan; students and scholars crossed political boundaries with no sense that they were compromising national loyalities. During this period preceding the political fragmentation of Europe, loyalties were city or regionally oriented and not directed towards a national state.^^ In general, the migration of scholars and students during the Mid- dle Ages was commonplace. At the Universities of Bologna and Paris, for example, foreigners seemed to constitute the majority of the stu- dent body. There were, however, extreme cases of migrations when whole or parts of university faculties with students would move from one city or region to another. The University of Bologna was the cen- ter of many conflicts with city authorities. Faculty and students, some- times at the invitation of competing cities, departed to set up another university elsewhere. The universities of Arezzo (1215) , Padua (1222) , Vercelli (1228), Siena (1246), Pisa (1343), and Florence (1349) were founded as a result of migration or secession of the whole or parts of the faculty of the University of Bologna. All told, Bologna experi- enced 15 such migrations.™ Other great European universities such as Cambridge and Leipzig were founded under similar conditions of disaffection by faculty and students from the parent university. Authorities in one city often negotiated directly with discontented faculty and students, offering alluring emoluments in order to effect a transfer. In 1321, the dissatisfied faculty at Bologna was the target for the appeals of authorities in all surrounding cities. Florence lost in its bidding to Siena. Kingdoms made open invitations to discontented faculties. At the time of the "Great Dispersion" of the University of Paris in 1229, King Henry III of England published a letter inviting masters and scholars of the university "to transfer yourselves to our kingdom of England and to abide there for the sake of study." He pledged to assign them to "whatever boroughs and villages you choose and we will provide for your liberty and tranquillity in every convenient way pleasing to God and satisfactory to you." ^^ Authorities took punitive actions to prevent the migration of schol- ars and students. Laws were promulgated and decrees proclaimed bar- ring migration, even in some cases under pain of death. Bologna au- thorities resorted to such drastic measures but none of the statutes proved effective.'^^ Causes for talent migration in the Middle Ages are similar in many respects to those causing brain drain today. Probably they can be summed up as follows : Offers of more money, better working condi- tions, greater intellectual freedom, and, in some cases, relief from re- strictions by governing authorities; absence of barriers to mobility; •9 Ibid., pp. 19-21. ■"> Ibid., p. 23. •n Ibid., p. 25. " Ibid., p. 23. 1070 appeals of ])rcsfiiro and academic excellence: international chai'acter of science and scholarship ; sliared values among scholars and students. Fa-'fcrs Producing Moh'dity in the Modem Age The leap of Western man from the Medieval to the Modei'ii Age was made possible by the impact of three major historical developments, namely, the Age of Discovery, the scientific revolution and rise of modciii technology, and the Industrial Ivovolution."-' All tlirce devel- opjDcnts, occurring more or less simultaneously and interacting in con- cert with one another, contributed to quickening the mobility of modern r.ian. AGE OF DISCONT.RY Tiie Ago of Discovery opened up the world to "Westein man. Xo longi^r were the horizons of his thought and activity coiihned to the nairow limits of the ISIediterranean basin or the West European })oninsula. Asia, Africa, the Americas, and Oceania now beci'.me new fields foi' absorbing his energies; and as discoverers, colonizers, or l)ermanent emigiants, migrating Europeans covered the earth. j^y the early liOth century the idea of Europe became globalized as tlie impress of European culture and civilization was made on vir- tually every corner of the earth and as imperial and colonial connec- tions wei-e established with Europe as the metropolitan center. A relationship had been created during the Age of Discovery that was to last for the next 500 years. As a result, Europe achieved a i^osition of wealth, ]jower, influence, progress, and preeminence heretofore un- known to man. I'lnis, from the Age of Discovery came a new mobility for modern man. Unlike .Vristotle. whose ancient world was bounded by the limits of tl\e Greek city-state, and Abelard, who functioned v.ithin the narrow limits of Medieval Western Europe, the scientist and scholar of the Modern Age has had the world for his stage. REVOLUTION IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY The re\(^lution in science and technology was another force con- tiibuting to the mobility of modern man. I-^xpansion of scientific knowledge created a new world of learning. It ex]xinded the hoii- zons of liis thought, opened up new' areas of inquiry for his intel- lectual energies, and provided him new opportunities in the search for knowledge. As the study of science progressed, the parochialism of the medieval scholastic tradition gave way to a new universalism that fos- tered among scientists both a new spirit of freedom of inquiry and a spirit of internationalism. Taught by their profession to think in cos- mic dimensions, scientists seemed better able to view the jDursuit and accumulation of knowledge as a task of all men in all lands without the restraining influence of nationalism or national boundaries. Tycho Brahe, the Danish astronomer, well expressed these sentiments in 1597 when he said of the independence and universal outlook of the scien- '= See The Evolution of International Technology, an earlier study In the present series hy Dr. Franklin P. HiKklle, for an overview of this siibjpft. (U.S. Conpress. Hnnse, Onni- mlttpp on Foreijrn AtValrs. The Evolution, of International Technology, in the series, Science. Teohnolopy, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcommittee on Na- tional Security PoUcy and Scientific Developments, by Dr. Franl^lln P. Huddle. Senior Specialist In Science and Technology, Science Policy Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1970, 70 ijp- (See vol. II, pp. 607-680.) 1071 tist : "And when statesmen or others worry him too much, then he should leave with his possessions. . . . With a firm and steadfast mind one should hold under all conditions that everywhere the earth is below and the sky above, and to the energetic man, every region is his fatherland." "'' As it will be seen in the course of this study, this cast of mind values the primacy of science and in its unique way has facilitated the mobility of scientists in the Modem Age. Human mobility has been quickened by the practical achievements of modern technology. Science and technology have revolutionized communications and transportation. In the 19th century, Europeans immigrating to America could cross the Atlantic by ship in 1 to 2 weeks and at what was to them great expense. Time and costs of travel have now been reduced drastically. Once a privilege reserved for the wealthy, intercontinental travel in the Jet Age is within reach of most levels of society — European tours by high school seniors are now a commonplace; and what had once taken 1 to 2 weeks can be accom- plished in a matter of hours. Distance and cost are thus no barriers to the Filipino doctor or Latin American engineer who may want to try his luck in America. INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION The Industrial Revolution was more than a technological revolu- tion ; it was also a social revolution that contributed considerably to human mobility in the modern era. The Industrial Revolution pro- duced, perhaps, the greatest "pull" factor of all for immigration by creating a labor market. It is axiomatic that agrarian societies tend to be static ; industrial societies, dynamic. The catalyst for social change in the latter comes largely from the need for labor and the desire of restless masses of people to satisfy this need. Movement from farm to city, from south to north, has become a traditional pattern of human migration. Attracted by the "pull" of developing industry, millions of Europeans came to America in the 19th century. Similarly attracted by the "pull" of American aerospace industries, thousands of latter- tlay Europeans, scientists and technicians, made the same journey in the 1960's. Imimgration Into the United States Historically, Colonial America, later the United States, combined the three developments of the Modern Age that accelerated human mobility : It was a most valued colonial possession in the Age of Dis- covery ; it succeeded in establishing a civilization based essentially on science and technology during the "Age of Reason;" and it now epitomizes the Industrial Revolution at its most advanced stage. Human mobility is, therefore, at the roots of the American experience, and perhaps nowhere has its value been more persuasively expressed than by Alexander Hamilton, the ardent advocate of an industrial and mercantile America. Adam Smith once observed that human baggage is the most im- mobile of all. Something must act upon that "baggage" to make it move. It has been held by many observers that migration is catalyzed by two forces moving in one direction, namely, an extraordinary "pull" from abroad or "push" from at home. The cause of mobility '^* Quoted in, Margulles and Bloch, op. clt, p. 59. 1072 lies in some structural maladjustment that creates an imbalance in equilibrium in the countries of emigration or immigration or both.^^ HAMILTON AND THE AMERICAN IMMIGRATION TRADITION Alexander Hamilton understood the interaction of these forces ; and he understood particularly the "pull" factors existing in the newly independent United States, unencumbered by the restricting influences of the European guild system for attracting much-needed European labor. Accordingly, in his "Report on Manufactures," Hamilton made a strong case for officially promoting the immigration of professionals and skilled craftsmen from Europe. Acknowledging the innate con- servatism of man, Hamilton echoed Adam Smith's theme on man's inclination toward immobility when he wrote : "Men reluctantly quit one course of occupation and livelihood for another, unless invited to it by very apparent and proximate advantages." Hamilton believed that America offered such "powerful inducements" in economic gain, politi- cal equality, and religious freedom that "manufacturers . . . would probably flock from Europe to the United States to pursue their own trades or professions, if they were once made sensible of the advantages they would enjoy, and were inspired with an assurance of encourage- ment and employment. . . ." This was the "natural inference" that Hamilton drew from an historical experience that encouraged emigra- tion of "a large proportion of ingenious and valuable workmen, in different arts and trades, who, by expatriating from Europe, [had] improved their own condition, and added to the industry and wealth of the United States." ^« In 1791, Hamilton was reaffirming in principle what had been a reality for almost 2 centuries. Since the 17th century, North America had been attracting some of Europe's most energetic and talented people — scholars, professionals, artisans, and farmers ; the trans- At- lantic talent migration continues to this day. Immigration is a deep- rooted American tradition in a nation of immigrants. In one sense only time separates the Pilgrim Fathers from the most recent refugees from Cuba: Essentially, both shared common goals and purposes, hopes and expectations, failures and successes. From the beginning the principle of immigration has been accepted by Americans as virtually a natural right of man, despite the periodic rise of popular anti-immigrant feeling in the Nation's history. This ideological conviction, combined wdth the desire for political and re- ligious freedom and expectations of greater economic, cultural, and social prospects, created what Dr. Luis Giorgi, President of the Pan- American Federation of Engineering Societies, has termed a "perma- nent draw" of people from less advantaged societies.'^'' Dr. Frankel put the brain drain in the same perspective, describing it historically as a universal phenomenon, a movement from poor to ■^5 Walter Adams and Joel B. Dirlam, "An Agenda for Action," In Adams, The Brain Drain, p. 247. ■^8 Jacob E. Cooke, ed., The Reports of Alexander Hamilton: Report on Manufactures. Dec 5, 1791 (New York: Harper & Row, 1964), pp. 131-132. 143. "" Luis Giorgi, Extent, Nature and Causes of the Loss of Scientists and Engineers in Latin America Through Migration to More Advanced Countries, In, UNESCO. Final Report of the Conference on the Application of Science and Technology to the Develop- ment of Latin America, Santiago, Chile, Sept. 13-22, 1965, p. 174. (Document 2.2.9) (Guide lines for the Application of Science and Technology to Latin American Develop- ment.) 1073 rich countries, from south to north, from traditional to industrial societies. Advanced industrial societies like those in Europe and the United States, he said, have recruited manpower to perform what he tei;^ed "the dirty work of society." Through the workings of the social process, particularly through education, the descendants of these immigrants in America "have regularly come to advance themselves." That was the background of most Americans, including his own : "the products of people — brainy people, obviously — who have been drained away from poorer sections of the world." "If there had been no brain drain in the past," Dr. Frankel declared, "we wouldn't be here, and the country wouldn't be what it is today. So it is not in this sense a new problem." ^^ TRENDS IN 19TH AND EARLY 20TH CENTURY AMERICAN IMMIGRATION Perhaps Emma Lazarus' inscription on the Statue of Liberty de- scribes as well as any historical source the general character of Ameri- can immigration prior to the 1920's: "Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses . . . the wretched refuse of your teeming shore . . . the homeless, tempest-tost. . . ." For the immigrants of this period were by and large the economically poor, the socially outcast, and the politically deprived of Europe. And, they were overwhelm- ingly unskilled, that is, unskilled laborers as distinct from those who in recent decades would qualify as professional and technical workers. ^'^ As late as 1907-23, only 2.6 percent of 6,905,000 immigrants to the United States were in professional categories, an average of Ts Proceedings of Workshop on the Talents and Skills (October 1966), p. 78. Dr. FrankeTs correlation of immigration with America's greatness reflected thoughts expressed by ■another New Yorker of a much earlier time, William Henry Seward. As a New York State Senator, a two-term Governor of New York, a U.S. Senator from New York for a decade, and Secretary of State during the Lincoln-Johnson Administrations, Seward ob- served four decades of American growth and well understood the role of immigration In that growth. Immigration was a basic Ingredient in his philosophy of American expan- sionism : It provided free labor to contain the expanding slavocracy of the South and to build what he termed the "American empire." To Seward, immigration was "an Im- portant and rapidly-increasing element of national strength and greatness." He en- couraged immigration as farsighted and humane, and "liberal naturalization" as "an element of empire." One of the greatest sources of "unappropriated wealth" to the Nation, he said, was the restless stream of immigrants, the "builders of nations," who were to provide the free labor for the developing American economy. According to Seward, "labor is constantly in demand" and the "incalculable surplus labor of the European states." together with European investment capital, brought wealth to the Nation and thus constitute "an element of national greatness." To develop this potential for empire to the fullest, he declared, "requires that we welcome immigrants among ourselves, or speed them on their way to a western destination." In Seward's social philosophy immigra- tion, imperial greatness, civilization, and prosress were inter-related. To him, immigration and expansion were "the main and inseparable elements of civilization on the American continent" and "all attempts will fail to suppress or stifle either of these invigorating forces." These were not idle philosophical speculations ; Seward as Secretary of State pressed vigorously for the conclusion of naturalization treaties with the various European states during the post-Civil War period, and remarked in an Instruction to the American Minister at Paris, then negotiating with the French for such a treaty, what was the core of his philosophy of immigration : "Freedom of emigration and of naturaliz.ition Is one of the greatest elements of mo-iern progress and civilization." (.Joseph G. Whe'an, William Henry Seward, Expansionist (Rochester, N.Y. : University of Rochester, 1959), pp. 24-27. Unpublished doctoral dissertation.) "^ Dr. Franklin P. Huddle, the Director of this research series on science and diplomacy, evprpssed views on the matter of "unskilled" immigrants that deserve snecial attention. He wrote : "I think a distinction is needed here. The 19th Century immigrants were not so much unskilled as possessed of non-relevant skills. Granted they were not persons of letters. But the peasant skills in European agriculture were inappropriate to American ecology and abundance of land, as well as the emphasis on capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive agricultTire. Similarly, European industry emphasized labor-intensive prac- tices. Immigrants skilled in iron founding, shoe-making, and clothing manufacture according to European practice had to learn new kinds of skill here. In these same trades. Some immigrants, to be sure, may have been marginal labor. But the initiative required to emigrate provided a kind of test of superiority, especially when coupled with the push factor of a highly rigid socio-economic hierarchy precluding upward mobility in their homeland, against which the more dynamic members were likely to rebel." 1074 10,560 per year, whereas 51 percent were industrial and agricultural laborers.^° Characteristic of many of the immigrants in the 1890's among the unskilled was that of a young Irish boy who at 14 earned his passage (£5) by tarring an English Lord's deer park in County Kildai'G and upon landing at Castle Garden, N.Y., then the prinei'pal port of entry for European immigrants, headed for Coudersport, Pa., where he began life in America as a child laborer in a tannery.^^ Unskilled workers were the norm of immigration during the 19th and early 20th centuries ; not until after World War II, when the man- powei- needs of the Nation shifted, were restrictions placed on the un- skilled and encouragement given to selected professionals in the pro- fessional, technical, and kindred (PTK) category.*- And, not until then did the brain drain problem emerge as an international issue. REVERSE TALENT MIGRATION A feature of human mobility in the American experience later to be repeated elsewhere is scattered evidence of a reverse talent migra- tion. Like the Saudi Arabian or African student of the 1960's, their counterparts from a rough-hewed, developing America were often tempted by the allure of a superior European cultural environment. Other Americans left for political reasons. In its early history the Massachusetts Bay Colony experienced a severe loss of its Harvard graduates. Eleven of the first 20 alumni im- miofrated to England and remained there permanently.®^ Perhaps the most drastic loss of a leadership elite occurred during the American Revolution when American Loyalists were dispossessed of their property and fled with their sympathies to British Canada or Mother England. It has been impossible to determine how many de- parted, but the number has been estimated as high as 100,000. That this represented a substantial brain drain was indicated by the colonial his- torians Barck a,nd Lefler who observed that their departure deprived tlie United States of a "goodly percentage" of the wealthy and cul- tured classes.®* Students are particularly vulnerable to brain drain, as this study Avill later demonstrate, and Amei'ican students of the past have not been immune to the temptation of benefits of living in a more advanced society. Dr. A. B. Zahlan, a physicist at the American University of Beirut in Lebanon, has been working on a study of students from the United States who went to Europe for their education between 1800 and 1900. The study remains in the primary stage, but Dr. Zahlan lias accumulated sufficient evidence to conclude that "a significant fraction of these American students , never returned home, but remained in Europe." Erom this past American and the current Arab experience, Dr. Zahlan generalize'^ : "There is a perennial risk that anybody who «> Hpnderson, op. cit.. p. 2, and Brinley Thomas, "'Modern' Migration,"' In Adams, The Brain Drain, chapter 3 and p. 33. ^ MS diary of Richard J. Whelan, October 1890. ^ IMd.. pp. 29-33. and HohdersOn. op. cit, pp. ti!-3. s^Thomai^ D. Dublin, "The Migration of Phvsiciaus to the United States," The New Ennland Jovrtwl of Medicine (Anr. 20. 1972). p. 875. *^ Oscar T. Barck. Jr., and Hugli Talmadge Lefler, Colonial America (New Yorlt : Mac- mlllan. 1968). p. 651. 1075 loaves his countiy to study in a more advanced community will never leturn to his country, and there is nothing we can do about it." *^ Lessons of History IMigration is a natural plienomenon, and human histor}', as Dr. Adams wrote, "is inseparably bound up with migrations great and small." ^"^ And why it has been so was well described in a London Journal of 1722 in these few simple words: "Men Avill naturally fly from danger to security, from poverty to plenty, and from a life of misery to a life of felicity. . . ." ^^ Scientists and scholars are a mobile people, particularly in the ISIod- ern Age, and one of the salient features of migrations as an historical phenomenon is the frequency' with which exceptional people, elites in any society, possessed of above average talents, strength and courage, suffering sometunes no more discontent than the stay-at-homes, had, in Dr. Adams' words, "the heart to brave new worlds." "From earliest times," he observed, "those with get-up-and-go got up and went." In a still more sprightly colloquial vein, nonetheless to the point, Robert C. Cook, a long-time student of demography, gave this succinct ex- planation of the historical process of migrating intellectuals : "Lots of bright people come from Ozark Junction — and the brighter they are the faster the}- come." ^ HUMAN MOBILITY AND THE PRINCIPLE OF FREEDOM Linkage between human mobility and the principle of freedom is another aspect of migration revealed in history that has particular relevance to the problems of migration today. Freedom of movement for the individual, whether it be a foreign student entering Plato's xVcademy, a dispossessed French scholar responding to King Henry's invitation to teach in England, or a skilled European craftsman im- migrating to America in response to Hamilton's urgings, is the act of exercising one of the first principles of democracy, namelj' , the right of self-determination. In explaining policy solutions to the contemporary brain drain prob- lem, L'nder Secretaiy of State Eugene V. Rostow clearly linked mo- bility of scholars with the principle of freedom. Citing the historic example of Erasmus in the 16th century and that of Einstein, Fermi, and "Whitehead in the 20th, all of whom chose to teach in other lands, and noting the oOO-year-old tradition of Americans studying abroad and foreign students studying here. Dr. Rostow stated categorically, "these movements of students and scholars are an indispensable aspect of freedom." In one sense, he said, "the universities of the w^orld con- stitute a single community, helping to bind the human family to- gether." Arguing against solutions for brain drain that would "repudi- ate our own history," he urged that policies should be avoided that "would weaken that tradition, the yeast of the bread of liberty." ^^ '^'^ Nader and Znhlan, op. cit.. p. 490. 8' Aflams, "Talent That Won't Stay Put," p. 59. 8- Ibid. ^ Robert C. Cook, "The 'Brain Drain' : Pact or Fiction?" Population Bulletin, v. 25 (June 1960), p. 1. *» Hearings, Senate Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1967, p. 4. 1076 STATE POLICIES ON MIGRATION OF SCHOLARS Finally, history reveals that states have adopted policies in the past either to stimulate or prevent the migration of scholars. The social value that states placed on science is the index for determining the intensity with which such policies were applied.^" Science policy is not, therefore, a 20th century development. Nor is the relationship among science, diplomacy, and political power some- thing new. During Islam's Golden Age the Caliphs clearly perceived this relationship when they established their empire, as most assuredly did Hamilton when he sketched out a design for American industrial strength as a vital component of its power and security.^^ eoDedijer, op. cit., p. 28. ^ Hamilton wrote : "Not only the wealth, but the Independence and security of a Country, appear to be materially connected with the prosperity of manufactures. Every nation, with a view to those great objects, ought to endeavour to possess within Itself all the essentials of national supply. These comprise the means of Subsistence, habitation, clothing, and defence." And he added : "The possession of these is necessary to the perfection of the body politic ; to the safety as well as to the welfare of the society ; the want of either Is the want of an Important Organ of political life and Motion ; and in the various crises which await a state it must severely feel the effects of any such deficiency. The extreme embarrassments of the United States during the late War, from an incapacity of supplying themselves, are still matter of keen recollection : A future war might be expected again to exemplify the mischiefs and dangers of a situation to which that incapacity is still in too great a degree applicable, unless changed by timely and vigorous exertion. To effect this change, as fast as shall be prudent, merits all the attention and all the Zeal of our Public Councils ; 'tis the next great work to be accomplished." (Cooke, Hamilton's Report on Manufactures, pp. 161- 162.) Among the expedients he proposed to effect this grand design were the attracting of skilled labor and capital from Europe. III. Brain Drain as a Contemporary International Problem: Brain drain, as a contemporary international problem, has its roots in the profound changes in the political structure of international rela- tions that have been brought about as a consequence of World AVar II. These changes were to have a direct bearing on patterns of migration in the postwar era. Trends in Migration Since World War II : A Changing World Envi- ronment The distribution of world power shifted from the main actors in world affairs during the 1^30's to those who had previously played only limited roles. Destruction of the wartime Axis Powers, combined with the voluntary and involuntary liquidation of the British, French, Dutch, and later Belgian imperial systems, created vast power vacuums in the world. New states and new constellations of power emerged to fill these power vacuums, radically changing the alignment of world forces. A new era of bipolarity and global confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States was also an era in which through the processes of decolonization the LDCs in Asia and Africa were for the first time to play a prominent role in contemporary world affairs. FORCED migrations Human mobility was a marked characteristic of this new era, but unfortunately much of this mobility was in the form, of forced migra- tions. Programs of repatriation or settlement of those dislocated by World War II, and population transfers resulting from the creation of newly independent states or the outbreak of wars, involved mil- lions of people. Migrations on this vast scale tended to overshadow the normal free movement of peoples. The turbulence of the era is seen in the statistics. After World War II, 18,000,000 people were up- rooted by the partition of India and Pakistan; West Germany ac- cepted 12,000,000 refugees dislocated during the war ; Japan resettled 6.300.000; South Korea absorbed 4,000.000 and Hong Kong 1.800.000. In Israel, 1,000,000 Jews found refuge in a new homeland, while more than 1.000,000 Palestinian Arabs fled the country. Ultimately, the In- ternational Refugee Organization and Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration settled 1,300,000 refugees overseas. These statistics do not include the movement of people in the Soviet and Chinese areas, but even this limited survey produces a total of 45.000.000 forced emigrants. Thits in one decade the number of people compelled to move across frontiers was equal to the entire movement of free emigrants across the Atlantic in the century ending in 1913.^^ »2 Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1973, v. 15, p. 422. (1077) 1078 TENDENCY TOWARD A NEW INTERNATIONAMSM AND ITS EFFECTS Forced migrations, though a dominant and often dramatic develop- ment in the early postwar era, were followed by acceleratinog flows of free emigrants, sm.aller in number and different in kind. This new migration was responsive to an evolving tendency in the world toward a new internationalism. In the political sphere, what has been called the "globalization" of politics proceeded as the Cold War expanded in dimension and as the United Nations gave organizational structure to world politics, con- tributing to this ncAv feeling of internationalism. As never before, peoples began to think and act more consciously within a global con- text rather than strictly within one defined by narrowly circumscribed national borders. In some respects this newly acquired habit tended to facilitate the migration of free peoples. In the economic sphere, the trend toward closer integration of the world economy fortified this tendency toward a new internationalism, which in turn had an effect on emigration. Proceeding rapidly since World War IT. the integration of the world economy is now more evident in such developments as the reduction of barriers to interna- tional trade, increasing integration of national capital markets of the advanced countries into a world capital market, the growth of direct foreign investment in modern technology from country to country, the modernization of traditional class- and status-oriented societies into less personal, more mobile and flexible modes of interpersonal relationships conducive to economic efficiency. As a result, the market for educated professional people, like that for commodities, has become increasingly internationah rather than a national, with corresponding economic pressures toward the equalization of prices for professional work throughout the international economy.^^ In this way the eco- nomic aspects of the new internationalism helj^ed create prime con- ditions for brain drain. Contributing to the integration of the world economy which pro- duced tliis special effect on emigration are two main forces in the mod- ern world of today: the worldwide spread of the Industrial Revolu- tion, and the movement of advanced Western societies into the post- industrial era. Both forces have created special needs, particularly a need for talent. Affecting this need have been such phenomena in the postwar era as : — The great upsurge in world education, augmenting substan- tially the talent market; — The movement, internally as well as externally, towards ur- ban and metropolitan centers which industrialization has fed (in 1961-62, 80 percent of the world's researchers were concentrated in five countries : the United States, Soviet Union, Britain, Ger- many and France) ; ^* — Far-reaching improvements in transportation and communi- cations, facilitating mobility and making information on job op- portunities readily available ; "3 .Tohnson. cv>. clt.. pp. 89-90. w Charles Iffland and Henri Rieben. "The Multilateral Aspects: The U.S., Europe, and the 'Poorer' Xatlons," In Adams, The Brain Drain, chapter 4, p. 50. 1079 — 'The standardization of professional training, easing lateral movement across national boundaries ; and — Official encouragement of preference provisions, work per- mits, and other provisions in state-regulated immigration laws designed to attract talent from this new world market. With such phenomena in mind, Dr. Adams observed, "today, as never before, there is a 'common market' for brainpower which transcends national boundaries." ^^ This "common market"' of manpower is the seminal source for brain drain. PROCESS OF DECOLONIZATION Decolonization, a second major trend in the postwar world, has had a fundamental impact upon emigration during this period. Inadver- tently, this process has had perhaps the most serious consequences for the brain drain problem. Decolonization, spurred on by movements for national indepen- dence, formally broke the imperial link connecting the Afro-Asian colonial territories with the metropolitan states of Europe. The full dimension of this process can be seen by the statistical fact that during the 20 years from 1944 to early 1964, 52 nations of the world, almost entirely from the Afro-Asian area, established their independence. Xumbering 1,005,931,000 people and occupying 11,537.599 square miles of territory, these nations constituted 31.63 percent of the world's population (at mid-1963) and 21.19 percent of the total area of the world, excluding Antarctica.^® In a very real sense the emerging Afro- Asian nations constituted a "third world," EFFECTS OF DECOLONIZATION AND BRAIN DRAIN The brain drain problem, at least its most serious manifestations, has its roots largely in the emigration of professionals from the former colonial areas of Asia and Africa : here is where the majority of LDCs are located, and it is emigration from the LDCs that creates the most serious concern for brain drain.'-'' Independence proved to be only a formal act, because in j^ractice the former colonial areas continued to maintain ties in varying degrees of closeness with the former imperial centers. In fact, a fairly well demarcated pattern of emigration has taken shape from the former colonial areas to the imperial centers. By virtue of the former colonial- imperial link the emigrant moves into what he believes to be familiar circles. This familiarity eases the burden of transition between two essentially different cultures. The imperial tradition may also en- gender a belief that by migrating to the imperial center, the former colonial is moving up into a superior and more exciting culture.^^ The attraction is often so alluring that the former colonial remains, to the loss of his developing native country. esjbid., p. 3. ■"' l".S. Con,l^•es^=. Senate. Committee on Aeronautical anri Space Sciences, Soviet Space Programs, 1962-65: Goals and Purposes, Achievements, Plans, and International Implica- tions, 89th Cong., 2d sess.. 1966, p. 21. (Committee print) •" Don Patinkin, "A 'Nationalist' Model," In Adams, The Brain Drain, pp. 92-93. »s Johnson, op. cit., p. 71. 1080 This particular form of brain drain arises from apparent contradic- tions in policies among the former imperial powers. Through pro- grams of foreign aid, they want to assist their former wards into modernity, but such efforts are often offset by the movement of "human capital" in the opposite direction. Concern for this problem has increased with a growing awareness that development cannot be effectively stimulated simply by the flow of money to the LDCs and that an equally vital role must be played by local people with skills and expertise to carry out development programs.®^ The United States becomes involved in this problem in that former colonials immigrate to the United States through the former imperial centers in Europe ; they come directly from their native country ; and the United States has been a long-time advocate and practitioner of foreign aid as a means of development. Thus, within the LDCs, brain drain and de- velopment conjoin and interact in Avhat can be self-defeating ways. What makes this matter particularly important for international relations today is that the LDCs constitute a vast configuration of political power; they have a voice; and they make knov/n their com- plaints. No longer are they willing to remain silent while their inter- ests are being ignored. As Prof. Don Patinkin of Jerusalem's Hebrew University has said : "They complain — and the international situation is such that their complaints are of concern to the major powers.'' ^°^ REORDERING OF PRIORITIES IN IMMIGRATION : QUALITY OVER QUANTITY A third component affecting general postwar trends in migrations is the reordering of priorities in immigration by establishing the cri- terion of quality over quantity for admission. Li the 19th century and through the early 1920's, international mi- gration was relatively unrestricted. Scholars migrated largely as in- dividuals ; the movement was not then, as now, a continual flow. As noted in the preceding chapter, unskilled persons for the most part comprised this early migration, and generally the process was bene- ficial for both the sending and receiving countries. In the last half century, particularly during the last two decades, migration has been more rapid and widespread than in previous times. But the explosion in world population, the development of nationalism and ethnic con- sciousness in a number of countries and the impact of expanding world economies created a tendency to restrict migration with the result that the process has become more selective regarding levels of education and training of the immigrant. As a report of the U.N. Secretary Gen- eral said on the outflow of trained personnel from the LDCs, "tliere is a universal preference for the highly trained, the elite immi- grant. . . .^°^ In contrast with the early period of virtually open and unrestricted immigration, most receiving nations, like the United States (1952 and 1965), United Kingdom (1962 and 1965), Canada (1967), and Aus- tralia (1958 and 1966), have introduced laws or regulations establish- es Patlnkln, op. Cit., p. 93. 100 Ibid. i«i United Nations, General Assembly, Outflow of Trained Personnel from Developing Countries, Report of the Secretary General, New York, 196S, p. 7. (United Nations Docu- ment: A/7294, Nov. 5, 1968, 23d sess. General Assembly). 1081 ing quality as the criterion. Preference in all categories is given to professionals and skilled craftsmen. The United States, Canada, and Australia have also relaxed restrictions on the immigration of non-Europeans who fall into the newly defined preferential cate- gories.^"^ EFFECTS OF REORDERING IMMIGRATION PRIORITIES As will be seen later on in the study, the effects of this reordering of immigration priorities have been far-reaching, particularly with re- spect to the brain drain problem as it. has affected many LDCs. First of all, the elitist criteria of quality and selectivity invited emigration of the professionals, the intellectuals, and the skilled. "It is no longer the call to 'Give me your tired, your poor, your huddled masses,' " said Dr. James A. Perkins, President of Cornell University. "Now we ask for your alert, your privileged, your brainy, ycmr talented. Our ma- chines can do the menial work. Today the emphasis is on technical skill, sophisticated training and adaptability to modern society." ^°^ These new criteria, along with the lowering of racial restrictions in the advanced countries, provided a special appeal to the LDCs. Para- doxically, attempts to right an injustice of discriminatory quota sys- tems created a new and unintended problem : a powerful incentive was now given to the professionals in the LDCs to emigrate and thus de- prive their developing countries of much needed professional man- power. A survey of professional emigration from Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey showed that 50 percent of all their scientists trained abroad did not return home. Another showed that Argentina lost 5,000 engi- neers through emigration in recent years."* And 58 percent of those emigrating from the United Arab Republic (U.A.R.) were scientists; 70 percent held Ph. D. degrees."^ Nonreturning students create the most serious professional man- power leakage. According to a United Nations manpower report, the number of foreign students studying in advanced countries has shown a "steep annual increase." In 1967, it said, 100,262 foreign students were enrolled in American institutions of higher learning; an esti- mated 70 percent were from the LDCs."^ According to estimates by Prof. Robert Myers of the University of Chicago, described by Dr. John C. Shearer, Director, Manpower Research and Training Center at Oklahoma State University, as the "best overall measures of the foreign student brain drain," the overall nonreturn rate is between 15 and 25 percent rather than the semiofficial 8 to 10 percent frequently quoted."^ Leakage among nonreturning doctoral students has ranged from a high of 90 percent for Taiwan to a low of l-l percent for Pakistan.^8 i»2ibid., p. 9. Also, Brinley Thomas, "Modern Migration," In Adams, The Brain Drain, chapter 3, p. 29. 103 Perkins, op. clt.. p. 617. 10* Eugene B. Skolnilcoflf, Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass. : M.I.T. Press, 1967), p. 92. ^05 Said, op. cit., p. 6. 1^ Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from the LDCs, Nov. 5, 1968, p. 30. If" Hearings, House Government Operations Committee, Brain Drain, 1968, p. 17. "8 Ibid. 1082 A second effect of the shifting immigration criteria was to generate competition among the advanced countries for professional and skilled manpower. Expansion of industry, particularly in the developed coun- tries, created a particular need for professional manpower. Accord- ingly, the professional has become a new commodity sought competi- tively in the world market. With the demand inci-easing considerably and the supply often lagging behind, especially in the medical, engi- neering, and scientific professions, there was created, in the words of •the U.N. brain drain study, "keen international competition" in these fields.^"^ Secretary of State Dean Rusk expressed the American view this way : "We are in the international market of brains" ; while Canada's Jean Marchand, Minister of Manpower and Immigration, explained his country's view : "The high cost of training professional and skilled people — engineers, doctors, skilled technicians, etc. — is a measure of the benefit derived upon [their] arrival in Canada. . . . Other countries are ift competition with us for immigrants." ^^° Finally, the change in criteria has had the effect of inducing mobil- ity among tlie professionals and immobility among the unskilled of the world. No longer an open invitation to any wishful immigrant, immi- gration today, having become an important and selective part of state policies to build and sustain economies, favors the talented and rejects the unskilled. Now the immigrant must be an immediate, tangible asset, not a burden. American immigration statistics bear out this tendency. Between 1900 nnd World War I, about 1 percent of immi- grants were professionals; this percentage gradually increased to about 3 percent in the last 5 years before 1930. Before 1900 an even smaller proportion were professionals, usually well imder 1 percent. (During the 5-year period 1891-1895, only 0.59 percent of the 2,123,879 immigrants, or 12,545, were professionals.) The proportion of immi- grant professionals increased sharply from 3.12 percent in 1926-30 to 5.53 percent in 1931-35 and 8.47 percent in 1936-40. This was the period of great inflows of prominent scientists and scholars, men like Einstein and Fermi, fleeing the tyranny then engulfing Europe. Im- mediately after World AVar II the proportion of immigrant profes- sionals decreased from a wartime level of 10.5 percent in 1941-45 to 7.4 percent in 1946-50. This percentage declined further to 6.66 percent in 1951-55 but began a sharp upward swing in 1956-60 that still con- tinues. In 1956-60, 7.79 percent or 111,193 of the total 1,427,841 immi- grants were professionals. In 1961-65, the percentage jumped to 9.01 percent or 130,641 of the total of 1.450,312. During 1966-70 the per- centage increased to 11.06 percent or 207,022 of the total of 1,871,365 incoming immigrants. This period reflects the changes made in the 1965 Immigration and Nationality Act. The immediate effects were to increase the inflow of pi'ofessionals from 9.7 percent in the fiscal year 1965 to 11.5 percent in the fiscal year 1967, the first year when the law came into effect. The second effect was the increase in Asian profes- sionals from 7.2 percent in 1965 to 29.7 percent in 1967 and on to 52.9 percent in 1970. Concluding an analysis of these trends in immigrant professionals, Judith Fortney, a researcher with the Center for the inn Rpnnrt of U.N Secret.iry General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, 19fi8. n. n. 1=0 Quoted In, Ibid., p. 10. 1083 Study of Aging and Human Development at Duke University, observed : Thus the prosent era is characterized by a sustained high level of immigra- tion— between 350,000 and 400,000 a year, a relatively high proportion of which are professional and technical workers. The most vmique characteristic of this period, however, is the high level of immigration from Asia and the high quality of immigrants from that region. Although in absolute numbers immigration from Africa reuyiins small, its relative increase has been substantial, and its quality high. . . . more" than one-fourth of Asian immigrants and more than one-third of African immigrants are profes.sional workers, compared with less than one-tenth for other regions. ... of the nine countries sending more than one thousand immigrants in the professional category, two-thirds are developing countries.^'' Thus, professionals have become increasingly mobile, notably from the LDCs, Avhile the common laborer has been increasingly reduced to immobility. As the U.N. brain drain study described human mobility in the postwar era, "the new migration is no longer characterized by the movement of talented persons as isolated individuals, but as a steadil}' increasing flow of highly trained persons." ^^^ Brain Drain Flows to Western Europe Chief responsibility for the brain drain had been placed solely upon the United States in the mid-1960's. Further studies revealed, how- ever, new evidence that suggests what Nuri Eren, Turkey's deputy ambassador to the United Nations, termed, "universal culpability." All the great industrial powers of the West were shown to have been acting as centers of attraction for scientists, engineers, doctors, and other PTKs — not only the United States but Great Britain, France, Germany, Canada, and Australia.^" In varying degrees these coun- tries were the principal gainers in the brain drain, while such LDCs as India, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, Philippine Islands, Taiwan, Korea, Columbia, and Argentina were prominent losers."* Thus the LDCs paid part of the price for manpower benefits accrued to the expanding industrial societies of the world. MOVEMENT TO BRITAIN Britain's former imperial connections acted as a conduit for the in- flow of large-scale immigration from the Commonwealth."^ Brain drain losses sufi^ered by the departure of Britisli professionals to North America were thus largely recouped by this counterflow from the former Asian and African colonies. According to an official British report, Britain lost 47,000 professionals during 1965, but 42,000 of these members of the managerial, professional, administrative, and technical elite were replaced from inflows elsewhere."^ In 1967, the ^'1 .TiKiitli Fortney, "Immlsrant Professionals — ^A Brief Hlstoricil Survey." International MUjrnlioii Review, v. 6 (Spring 1972), p. 57. The data above are taken from this article, pp. ."0-0.3. "= Reiort of U.N. Secretary General, Outflorc of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, lOfiS. pp. 7-8. "3 Eren. op. clt., p. 10. "* CIMT study, pp. 671-672. Dr. Adams divided brain drain countries in four categories. Advanced countries witii a large net Inflow (U..S. and Australia) ; advanced countries with a large net inflow (United Kingdom and Canada) ; advanced countries with a large net outflow (Norway, Netherlands and Switzerland) ; and LDCs with a large net outflow ((;rpp;p. Iran, Turkey, Taiwan, Korea, India and several others.) Adams, "Talent That Wont Stay Put," pp. 69-70. "'.Johnson, op. clt., pp. 71-72. =" Hearings, Senate Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1907, p. 75. 1084 British Minister of Technology estimated that from 1958 to 1963, ex- chiding students returning home, 19,000 British and Commonwealth scientists and engineers left the country, but the loss was nearly offset by a counterflow of 15,000 from abroad."^ Significantly, nine-tenths of the members of the Commonwealth fall within the underdeveloped category.^^8 What Britain has gained by this inflow from the develop- ing Commonwealth countries is revealing. Dr. James A. Perkins states frankly that Britain was "inadvertently bleeding the Commonwealth of its most highly trained men." "^ Medicine was the major field for brain drain to Britain ; fewer scientific and engineering personnel were absorbed by Britain compared with the United States and Canada.^^" According to Nuri Eren, socialized medicine "would have been im- possible without the inflow of foreign trained doctors and nurses. The foreign-born and trained constituted more than one-third of the health personnel in Britain." ^^^ Official British statistics indicate that 43.9 percent of the junior medical staff of Britain's National Health Serv- ice was of foreign origin.^"- Moreover, despite programs of aid and technical cooperation to the Commonwealth, Britain has more special- ists of all kinds from all the Commonwealth countries, including more than 4,000 doctors, than there are British specialists in those countries.^2^ Another indicator of the high intensity of absorption from the Commonwealth is the immicrration of nurses. Between 25 and 40 percent of all 256,000 nurses working in the British National Health Service were born outside the British Isles, almost 75 percent in the developing Commonwealth countries.^^* Nonreturn of foreign students from the Commonwealth has added to the plus side of Britain's brain drain equation. In 1967, Britain had 73,000 foreign students of whom 54,000 came from the LDCs. Betw^een the academic years 1959-60 and 1962-63, students from the new Commonwealth countries increased 40.6 percent; the following year students from East and West Africa alone numbered 15,000. How many of these students remained in Britain cannot be determined pre- cisely, but it is estimated that students remaining permanently or semi- permanently abroad following the end of their formal studies have been increasing at a compound rate of 20 percent per annum, and in the case of LDC students, at a rate still higher.^^^ MOVEMENT TO FRANCE Statistics are inadequate to determine the extent of brain drain to France, It is known, however, that 6 million of France's 50 million population are foreign and that one-fourth of these come from the de- veloping countries of the French Union. The foreign population rose 40 percent during the period 1962-67 ; that for France proper rose 6 percent. Most of the foreign population is unskilled. Among senior I" Thomas, op. clt., p. 35. "8 The Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 13, 1973, p. 3. "« Perkins, op. clt., p. 617. 123 Henderson, op. clt., p. 28. i2iBren, op. clt., p. 11. '^ Adams, op. clt., p. 2. '-^ Iffland and Rieben, op. clt., p. 50. "* Henderson, op. clt., pp. 58-59. This section of Mr. Henderson's study contains a wealth of statistics on all aspects of medical brain drain to Britain from the Commonwealth countries. '25 Henderson, op. clt., p. 72. 1085 professionals 3.6 percent or 27,320 are foreigners, and of these, na- tionals of former African colonies, Departments, and Mandated Ter- ritories (Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Africa and the Malagasy States, etc.) numbered 2,280 or 8.3 percent of the foreign total. Moreover, in 1962, 1,060 foreigners were recorded as occupying intermediate medi- cal and social services positions.^^® Almost all French statistics on migration are known to be, in Mr. Henderson's words, '"severe understatements" since large proportions of professionals are from the former colonies and are not considered "foreigners" for statistical purposes. Statistics from individual or- ganizations like the National Centre for Scientific Research, 42 per- cent of whose 631 foreign researchers came from the LDCs, give some indication of the actual size of talent migration to France.^^^ According to a special tabulation provided by La Direction de la Population et des Migrations du Ministere des Affaires Sociales of Paris, new working licenses issued to foreign professionals, that is, en- gineers, natural scientists, physicians, and professors, over the period 1962-66 totaled 1,869. Europe, including Greece and Turkey, contrib- uted 285 ; Asia, 954 ; South America, 314 ; and Africa, 316. By far the greatest percentage of these professionals were engineers and all were from developing countries,^^^ Mr. Henderson cautioned, however, that these figures represented a "considerable" understatement.^^® Still, the statistics, however imperfect, reaffirm the generalizations that brain drain flows to Europe are often along the imperial-colonial pattern, though this pattern seems to apply less to France than to Britain, while the developing countries often pay the highest price. A measure of this price is evident in the case of Cameroon. Fifty of the 62 Cameroonian medical doctors practicing outside Cameroon were practicing in France. In 1965-66, there were 164 doctors practicing in Cameroon of whom 113 were expatriates or presumably nationals of other countries. Thus, there were more Cameroonian physicians prac- ticing outside Cameroon than inside and as many practicing in France as in Cameroon. On the basis of the 1970 estimated population for the Republic of Cameroon of some 5,836,000, this would allow a ratio of one native Cameroonian doctor for every 115,000. Analogous situa- tions can be found in Algeria : some 300 Algerian medical doctors are practicing in France, Morocco, and Togo.^''° As in the case of the other major receiving countries, foreign stu- dents studying in France are also a potential source for brain drain. In the late 1960's, France had 40,000 foreign students, the largest en- rollment on the European continent. Nearly 30,000 came from the LDCs."^ Statistics provided by the French Ministery of Education indicated that in 1966-67 there were 24,410 foreign students in France. Of this total there were 11,824 from the LDCs in Asia (4,704) , Africa (6.800) , and South America (320) ."^ Statistics on nonreturnees are not available, but some surveys have been made that provide at least data for tentative judgments. A sur- "o Henderson, op. clt., pp. 36-37. li^Ibid. 1^ Table V, ibid., pp. 173-174. i2»Ibld., p. 37. ""Thid., p. 38. i« Ibid. p. 37. ^ Ibid., pp. 175-176. 1086 vev in 1905 claimed tliat 12,000 sub-Saharan African student's re- mained in P" ranee witli their families; 11,000 more were still pursuing; their studies.^^^ According^ to one French researcher, it was generally Icnown to be a considerable problem that 62 percent of the students from Africa, Asia, and the Antilles studied science, medicine, den- tistry, and pliarmacy, the occupations most susceptible to bi-ain drain, Avhile those from the more industrialized countries studied mostly French literature and culture in order to teach in their countries. . Among 80 students interviewed at the Faculte des Sciences in Paris in. 1967. 69 percent of Vietnamese wanted to remain in France ; 25 pei*- cent were undecided. The North Africans were divided equally: half wanted to stay, half to return. Among Africans, 15 percent preferred France, 52 percent wanted to return home, and 33 percent were un- decided. In another survey conducted by an African among African students, 61 percent indicated a wish to study in France even if their courses had been available in Africa. Expressions of this sort are not evidence of brain drain per se, but they are part of an attitude, reaf- firmed in American, surveys, that frequently lead to it.^^* mo\t:ment to west Germany According to Baldwin, "In Europe many more countries have not suffered from a brain drain than have." He cites the examples of France, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, West Germany, Spain, Italy, and Yugoslavia. In the Far East, Japan has also been spared higli-level talent losses. Norway and Switzerland, he declared, have lost "quite substantial proportions'' of their annual output of professional talent to North America."^ Special political and ideological conditions exist- ing in the Soviet bloc have prevented it from being a contender in the world competition for professional manpower. With regard to West Germany, Eugene B. Skolnikoff indicates that it has suffered brain drain losses. Some 5 percent of all German grad- uates in science, he wrote, emigrate each year.^^'' Whatever losses West Germany may have suffered, apparently, they have been compensated in some measure by counterflows from other directions. According to Nuri Eren, Norway and Sweden have lost many of their "brightest stars" to Germany.^" Mr. Eren acknowledged the absence of quanti- tative innnigration data in estimating the weight of imported talent iM Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, 19fiS. D. 32. "< Henderson, op. cit., pp. 37-38. ^ , , ^ , ^ , 1^ Baldwin, op. dt., p. 359. Japan has not been entirely spared from high-level brain drain losses as Baldwin indicates. On Apr. 11, 1974, the writer attended a meeting- of the National Press Club where In conversation with Mr. Kinjl Kawamura. Chief of the Ameri- can General Bureau, The Asahi Shimbun Newspaper, the brain drain problem was dis- cussed. Mr. Kawamura agreed that Jap-an may not be a prime loser of talent, but still it has lost key professionals. He cited the case of a Japanese scientist, Leona Ezakl, who had won a Nobel Prize for developing an advanced electronic element important in computer technology. It was discovered that Mr. Ezakl was In New York working for IBM where he preferred to remain rather than return to Japan. The principal reason for this decision, along with the high salary and prestige, was the desire to stay in research, having avail- able the advanced computer facilities of IBM. In Janan. a man of his rank would have to move into management, and this he did not wish to do. Mr. Kawamura also indicated that tliere were a number of Jananese M.D.s at the National Institutes of Health who also did not want to return home. Again availability of advanced research facilities was the major reason for their decision. One of the medical scientists had made the important discovery of a cancer virus affecting the liver. Mr. Kawamura observed that Japan had lost "a nation- al asset" when this scientist decided to stay in the United States. "« Skolnikoff, op. cit. p. 92. "' Eren, op. cit.. p. 11, 1087 in Western Europe, but he added : "We know indirectly that the great German expansion has attracted engineers and scientists from the Middle East." ^^^ Mr. Henderson supported this assertion with the statei^ient that many foreign physicians and nurses "are known to be practising'' in West Germany, though precise statistics were not avail- able."« "Judging by the fact that some 962 of the 2,000 Turkish doctors working abroad are in Germany . . . ," he said, "such numbers may be large." i*o Apparently, West Germany has replenished some of its brain drain losses from the thousands of foreign students who have gone there for undergraduate and graduate work and upon completion of their studies opted for permanent residency. The brain drain report of the' U.N. Secretary General states : "Germany has become a major trainer of students from developing countries. It has been suggested that many of these students have sought permanent residence in the coun- try and that some have succeeded." ^" According to the same report, "numbers of students from developing countries are known to stay in Germany as medical doctors.*' "- Statistics on the increasing number of foreign students studying in West Germany are impressive. In 1965, West Germany had a])proxi- mately. 31.000 foreign students, a substantial increase from the esti- mated 100 in 1950.^^^ Conceivably, West Germany has a sizeable per- centage of the 18,000 students from the Middle East who go to Europe to study, two-thirds of whom are undergraduates and thus especially vulnerable to nonreturn.^" In 1968-69,^221 students froui Lebanon alone went to Germany for study. ^-^ Presumably it was such patterns of migration that led Henderson to observe: "Xumbers of former students from Near Eastern countries, of whom there are many m Germany, have gone into private business," and thus, it could be con- cluded, are lost for the development purposes of their own country. ^^'^ Sketchy statistics on nonreturnee students, coupled with the judg- ments of seasoned observers and the assumption of' a 20 per- cent loss among foreign students, indicate that the loss may not be insignificant to the LDCs who seek development as a national goaL^-'" 138 Ibid. i3» Henderson, op. cit., p. 8. iioibid.. p. 39. "1 Report of U.N. Secretary General, Oiitfloic of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, 1968, p. 21. 1*2 Ibid., p. 32. i«Ibid., p. 31. 1" Zahlan, Science and Technology in Developing Countries, p. 306. i*5lTnited Nations. Economic and Social Council, Outflow of Trained Personnel from Developing to Developed Countries, Report of the Secretary General, New York. June 9, 1970, p. 54. (Document E/4S20, 49th sess.) Hereafter cited as. "Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from Developing to Developed Countries, June 9, 1970." i*« Henderson, op. cit., p. 39. I*'' A unique deyelopnient in recent European migration has been the outward moyement of Yugoslav workers. West European countries, especially West Germany, haye benefited greatly by the outflow of Yugoslay workers. It is estimated that about 1,000.000 Yugoslay.s, or 10 percent of the country's adult population, are employed abroad, mostly in West Ger- many and other West European countries. So great has been the outflow of manpower that Y'ugoslavla drafted legislation to bring the moyement under tight control. Restrictions were expected to affect engineers, and similar experts, skilled workers, and men of military age. Though Yugoslayi.a's balance of payments has improved with the nearly $1 billion a year sent home by the Yugoslav workers, still the social and political costs have prompted legisla- tive action. The problem of how to employ the workers abroad in Yugoslavia remains, how- ever. In May 1973, for example, about 400.000 people were looklns: for emplo.vnient. (Ray- mond H. Anderson. "Belgrade to Curb Worker Outflow/' The 2,'ew York Times, June 3, 1973, p. 5.) 1088 Some Brain Drain Patterns Within British Comrrionwealth : Canada and Australia Like the United States, Canada strongly attracts professional man- power from Western Europe, the Commonwealth, and the JjDCs. According to Nuri Eren, Canada, along with the United States, is in the "forefront" of nations engaged in the global exchange of pro- fessional manpower.^*^ The magnitude of inflow of PTKs (Professional, Technical and Kindred Workers) into Canada is impressive. During the period 1946-65, 1,314,878 workers immigrated to Canada. Of this total , 145.501 were PTKs. This figure constituted 11.1 percent of the total of immigrant workers. In 1965, this percentage of professionals jumped to 22.4 percent."^ During the period 1962-68, an aggregate of 1.207.582 immigrated into Canada. Of this total, 130,217 were PTKs.^^" Britain has been a substantial donor to Canada's professional man- power pool. It is estimated that between 1962 and 1965 the number of PTKs emigrating from the United Kingdom to Canada increased from 3,116 to 5,997.«i MOVEMENT FROM LDC's TO CANADA Canada has also drawn heavily on professional manpower from the developing countries. This is a matter of necessity. Traditionally Europe had been Canada's main source of immigration. The same is true of Australia. But in recent decades it has become increas- ingly more diflGlcult to get professionals and skilled workers from Europe. Consequently, Canada has had to draw upon and absorb professionals from the LDCs. This shift in emphasis is borne out by statistics. The percentage of professionals immigrating into Canada from countries other than the United States, the United Kingdom, and the chief European sources increased from 7.2 percent in 1946 to 27.6 percent in 1963. In 1967, 37 percent of Canada's professional immigrants came from outside the United States and Europe. Between 1946 and 1963, the rate of immigration for skilled occupations in- creased dramatically from 8.5 percent to 36.3 percent.^''^ Tables 1 and 2 provide a profile of heavy donors to Canada's profes- sional population from the LDCs. i« Eren, op. clt.. p. 11. According to Mr. Eren, 1,500 of Canada's 24,000 physicians have been trained abroad. "8 Thomas, op. clt., p. 33. 1^ Henderson, op. cit., p. 178 (table VIII). 1" Thomas, op. cit., p. 36. For a stiidv on the emigration of British scientists, see Jamea A. Wilson. "The Emigration of British Scientists," J/jnerra, v. 5. (Autum 1966). pp. 20- 29. Accordlne to a report of an ad hoc committee of the Roval Society, the annual rate of permanent emigration of recent Ph. D.s had risen to about 12 percent of the total output in the fields Included in the survey. The committee determined that by 1961, about 140 were departing per annum, with 60 entering the United States, 20 going to Canada. 35 to other Commonwealth countries and 25 to all other countries. They concluded further that the outward flow of recent Ph. D.s had Increased by a factor of about three In the decade 19.52-fil. The report covered S.S."?? out of Pn estimated 9.700 rec'nients of Ph. D. degrees in science ; 1.136 of these emigrated permanently during the decade. In addition, 389 scientists on the staffs of universities and certain research institutions emigrated during the same period. During the period 1957-61, 1,053 recent Ph. D.s emigrated on a "mostly temporary" basis, of whom 545 returner'. 14.'? had not returnerl. nnd the location of 365 was unknown. The overall average loss during the decade from 1952 to 1961 was about 16 percent of the Ph. D.s and scientific staff members of universities and research institutions In the various fields of science. Approximately half emigrated to the United States (pp. 21-22). 1^- Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs. Nov. 5, 1968, p. 16. 1089 TABLE 1.— IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED INTO CANADA, BY COUNTRY OF LAST PERM ANENT RESIDENCE AND OCCUPATION, 1962-67 i Country Total immi- grants (1962-66) (1%7) 1962-66 Total immi- grant workers Profes- sional and tech- nical workers (1967) Engi- neers All for 1962-66 Natural scien- tists Physi- cians Profes- sional nurses Argentina 1,837 (544) 731 114 (58) 16 5 22 7 Brazil 2,019 (715) 885 137 (45) 34 3 8 1 Ceylon 387 (112) 188 66 (35) 10 2 1 3 China (including Taiwan) 4,898 (6,409) 1,859 1,075 (1,376) 208 65 88 238 Egypt 7,888 (1,728) 3,150 913 (309) 116 68 100 7 Greece 25,707(10,650) 15,171 435 (177) 36 30 38 31 Hong Kong (1962-65 only) „. 11,789 2,991 848 190 63 77 143 India 6,894 (3,966) 3,243 1,967 (1,213) 408 206 164 150 Israel 4,427 (2,345) 2,165 428 (262) 100 24 33 26 Lebanon 2,597 (1,096) 1,223 244 (165) 19 8 41 10 Mexico 645 (318) 209 75 (31) 14 4 19 . 3 Pakistan...: 1,447 (648) 772 477 (233) 144 52 37 7 Syria 266 (192) 158 37 (36) 5 2 9 2 Turkey 1,578 (488) 687 314 (109) 23 12 115 11 > Calendar years. Source: Gregory Henderson, "Emigration of Highly Skilled Manpower From the Developing Countries," United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UN ITAR) (New York, 1970), p. 171. TABLE 2.— IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED INTO CANADA, BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND OCCUPATION, OVER THE PERIOD 1964-67 1 l%4-66 Profes- sional All for 1962-66 Total immi- Total immi- and tech- Natural Profes- grants grant nical Engi- scien- Physi- sional Country (1964-66) (1967) workers workers (1967) neers tists cians nurses Algeria 21 (15) 11 5 (3) 1 2 . Burma ' 66 0} (105) 28 19 (20) (18) 4 3 7 f Chile.. 213 167 33 12 4 3 2 Colombia 200 (87) 93 41 5 2 11 .. Indonesia 33 11) 19 13 (6) 3 2 1 2 Iran 293 (136) 147 93 (49) 17 15 33 3 Iraq 152 (102) (166) 81 33 (16) 13 8 2 .. Jordan 256 149 35 (23) . 3 2 4 Kenya... 309 (239) 140 80 (61) 10 9 4 1 Malaysia 298 (199) 144 102 (66) (48) 13 20 8 21 Morocco .... 2,151 (547) 1,506 119 4 13 5 2 Peru 177 (78) 73 30 (24) 8 3 5 5 Philippines .... 4,378 (2, 994) 3,746 3,266 (2,022) 237 202 221 1,902 Taiwan 500 . 280 238 . 45 31 27 30 Tunisia .. 54 (12) (101) (374) 20 102 5 10 (3)... i" l' 2 2 1 Uruguay 258 1 Venezuela 963 418 44 (24) 11 6 1 1 > Calendar years. Source: Gregory Henderson, "Emmigration of Highly Skilled Manpower From the Developing Countries," United Nations Institute for Training and Reseatch(UNITAR)(New York, 1970), p. 172. Egypt, Greece, India, Pakistan, Turkey, Iran, Kenya, Malaysia, Morocco, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Venezuela rank high among the contributors.^^^ Statistics on the proportion of PTKs from the LDCs out of the total immigrants with occupation going to Canada during the period 1962-66 fill out the profile showing the heavy burden borne by the LDCs. Selective percentages for the years 1964^66 are as follows: 163 Henderson, op. cit., pp. 171-172. (Table III and Table IV.) 1090 Burma. 67.9 percent; Indonesia, 68.4 percent; Iran, 63.3 percent; Iraq, 40.7 percent; JNIalaysia, 70.8 percent; Phi]ip])ines, 87.2 percent; Colombia. 44.1 percent ; Peru, 41.9 percent : and Kenya, 57.1 percent. For the period 1962-66, India is listed with 60.7 percent and Egypt Avith 29 percent.^^* Canada's losses to united states axd gains from the ldc's Like the TTnited Kii'io-dom, Canada has a heavy two-way traffic of migrants, and what it loses in one quarter, it srains in another. In the decade 1950-60, Canada lost 42,000 PTKs to' the United States, but at the same time it p-ained double this number from other countries, mostly ftom the LDCs.^^^ Thus the pattern of immi ards an increasing reliance on the skilled from developing countries is strong." ^*^^ MOVEMENT TO AUSTRALIA Australia probably ranks next to Canada as a major importer of human capital within the British Commonwealth. Unlike Canada, which must over-import to compensate for losses of professional man- power to its neighbor to the south, Australia is an independent destina- tion and the outward flow is negligible. Free from the special influence of the United States because of its geographic location, Australia's pattern of immigration and rate of absorption are regarded as "more normal." '^^'^ Australia's total imn^igration of workers during the period 1949 to mid- 1966 was 1,098,567. This figure compares favorably in magni- tude with Canada's 1,314,878 for 1946-65. Australia's percentage of PTKs is, however, lower. In that 17i/^ year period Australia accepted 90,438 PTKs representing 8.2 percent of professionals from the total of immigrant workers; the corresponding figure for Canada was 11.1 percent. "The percentage of PTKs from the total worker immigrant '5f Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, 1968, p. 82. i"» Baldwin, op. clt., p. 361. i«i Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outfloic of Trained Personnel from Developing to Developed Countries, June 9, 1970, p. 54 (Table 4). "■2 Ibid., p. 9. !«! Baldwin, op. cit., p. 3.59. "'Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, 196S, p. Ifi. To Illustrate Canada's pain in international brain drain exchanges. Alessandro Silj cites Louis Parai as estimating that the InimlgratioTi of human capital to Canada in the decade in.".3-63 represented a total value of about $37 million, counting the costs of edu- catine e.nch emigrant in his native country. (Silj, op. cit., p. 6.) "= Thomas, op. cit., p. 37. 1092 figure for Australia in 1965 was 9.5 percent; for Canada, 22.4 percent.^*'® In his survey of Australian immigration, Mr. Henderson notes that the pattern remains more firmly European-directed than oriented towards the LDCs, though in recent years this pattern has been chang- ing. For the financial year 1966-67, a total of 138,676 immigrants arrived in Australia; 76,496 came from the United Kingdom and Ireland; 75,514 were born there."'^ Most of Australia's immigration tends to consist of craftsmen. Between 1949 and 1960, Australia absorbed 185,544 skilled craftsmen or about 16,860 a year."® The European orientation of Australia's immigration is evident in the following statistics on the origin of immigrants during 1947-61 : United Kingdom and its Dominions, 32 percent ; North Europe, 18 per- cent; East Europe, 20 percent; South Europe, 27 percent; and the rest of the world, 3 percent. Except for Greece (9,826) and Yugo- slavia (5,664), the developing countries played a small role in Aus- tralia's total immigration during that period. Those coming from South Europe were mostly craftsmen or unskilled labor. Moreover, among professionals, 14.115 of the 29,568 overseas-born professionals in the 1966 census were born in the United Kingdom ; and 22 percent of Australia's male professional manpower were born overseas."® MIGRATION FROM LDC'S TO AUSTRALIA Australia's exclusive dependency on immigration from the so-called "white" developed countries has changed gradually since the late 1950's. Legislation has progressively opened up the country to non- Europeans. Thus a trend has been established of gradually increasing immigration from Asia, especially from India and Pakistan, and among ethnic Chinese from several Asian countries. This changing character of Australian immigration is seen in Table 3 on overseas- born professional workers residing in Australia in 1966 by birthplace and occupation. ..^ . Australia does not break down its immigration statistics by natioiw ality, but the 1966 census shows a high proportion of professionals among Asian immigrants. For India and Indonesia the figure is 10 percent, and for Malaysia, 27 percent. Thus, a far higher proportion (12.3 percent in 1961) of those Australian residents born outside Australia were professionals than those born inside the country (4 per- cent) or of those born in Europe (ranging from 0.5 to 9.8 percent). Only one-third (34.7 percent) of the non-European foreign born were craftsmen or, to use Henderson's term, "operatives," while from Europe there were nearly two-thirds. Percentages of "administrative" per- sonnel were also higher (11 percent from the non-European foreign born) than there were for Australian- or European-born persons. 170 i8« Ibid., p. 33. 1"" Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Not. 5. 1968. pp. 16-17, and Henderson, op. cit., p. 21. iM Thomas, op. cit., p. 37. 169 Henderson, op. cit., p. 21. i™ibid., p. 24. 1093 TABLE 3.— OVERSEAS-BORN PROFESSIONAL WORKERS RESIDING AND OCCUPATION IN AUSTRALIA IN 1%6, BY BIRTHPLACE India Birthplace Indo- nesia Malay- sia Philip- pines Singa- pore PaKi- stan Ceylon China Hong Kong Architects, engineers, and surveyors.. 201 Chemists, physicists, geologists, and natural scientists. _. 87 Biologists, veterinarians, agronomists, and scientists 27 Medical practitioners and dentists 85 Nurses. _ ._ ..- 16 Other professional medical workers. .. 9 Teachers _ 272 All professionals 681 All occupations .- 6,669 Percent professionals to total 10. 2 Female professionals 596 Female all occupations 2, 818 Percent professional females to total.. 21.2 97 36 173 47 10 53 13 18 18 40 18 213 51 94 22 32 12 1 7 1 8 8 3 26 118 5 47 7 41 76 65 7 19 5 4 1 3 17 11 8 16 2 8 3 1 27 13 83 82 7 23 19 68 79 38 289 467 34 155 57 179 471 246 2,729 1,727 270 . 894 505 2,097 7,952 1,373 10.6 27 12.6 17.3 13.3 8.5 5.9 17.9 182 306 81 113 29 147 94 94 1,015 654 206 371 148 1,002 415 415 17.9 46.8 39.3 30.5 19.6 14.7 22.7 22.7 Source- Gregory Henderson, "Emigration of Highly Skilled Manpow/er From the Developing Countries," United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR)(Nevi/ York, 1970), p. 23. That immigration to Australia from the LDCs has increased in recent years is shown by the statistics in Table 4. Thus, Henderson generalizes, new arrivals from the LDCs to Aus- tralia were about three times the number in 1968 as during the decade ending in 1968. Since 1947, permanent residents of Asian descent have more than quadrupled from 25,000 to 101,387 at the time of the 1966 census, while the total Australian population increased 62.5 percent.^^^ In the light of these data, Henderson concludes that professional emigration from the LDCs to Australia, mostly from Asia, remains "fairly modest." Yet the increase since its beginning in the late 1950's has been considerable. The demand for services is there, and the rate of professional immigration among Asians is high — in some cases, the highest among all nations whose nationals immigrate to Australia. Thus, Mr. Hendersop concludes, "it seems likely that the present trend will increase as Australia's 12 million population climbs, partly through swelling immigration, toward the 20 million that economists say are needed' for proper expansion and development of that continent." ^'^ TABLE 4.— IMMIGRATION FROM THE LDCS TO AUSTRALIA, 1959-68 Total settler arrivals, January 1959 to December 1968 Ceylon India Malaysia Pakistan Singapore.-. Burmese Chinese Filipino Indonesian.. Turkish Total. 1, 149 002 850 238 468 007 451 614 139 679 Average yearly arrivals, 1959-68 415 500 85 24 47 101 145 61 14 168 Settler arrivals, calendar year 1968 838 2,100 230 87 148 272 480 127 41 641 11,497 1,560 4,944 Source- Gregory Henderson, "Em^rzXhn of Highly Skilled Manpower From the Developing Countries," United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) (New York, 1970), p. 24. 1094 ATTRACTION OF FOREIGN STUDENTS TO AUSTRALIA Australia has also attracted foreign students, mostly from Asian LDCs, who decided to stay on after receiving their education rather than return home. However, data are scarce. According to Mr. Bald- wan, Australia had only a negligible number of foreign students dur- ing the period 1954-60.^'^ Perhaps the most authoritative statement on student nonreturnees (and the only one cited in the data examined) came from Australian's Minister of Immigration, who in 1966 referred to estimates that 20 percent of 12,000 foreign Asian students in Australia wished to remain in the country.^^* That the 20 percent figure continues to be a valid basis for judging brain drain to Australia is verified by the complaint of Singapore's Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew at the Commonwealth Conference in Ottawa during September 1973. The Prime Minister used the con- ference as a forum to accuse Australia of fostering a "brain drain." Since Australia had adopted more liberal immigration policies toward Asians, he said, some of Singapore's most brilliant students were being enticed to quit their country and settle permanently in Australia. Australia's Prime Minister Gough Whitlam rejected the charge: and in a statement released later in Canberra, ''an aggrieved Immigration Minister," Al Grassby, according to the press report, said that Lee Kuan Yew Avas "up a gumtree," meaning, misinformed in his allegations. Whether Australia's actions are deliberate in encouraging Singapore students to remain permanently may be an open question, but figures available indicate that of 3,652 Singapore students studying in Aus- tralian universities since 1969, as many as 730 failed to return home after graduation. Singapore's sensitivity on this matter arises from its concern for future economic planning which depends heavily on a steady supply of highly trained professionals in such fields as science, technology, and engineering. Talented students are sent to Australia and ^CAV Zealand to gain the training not yet available in Singapore. Reasons given for einigration from Singapore are its compulsory mili- tary service laws, higher salaries in Australia, shortage of housing in Singapore, and attraction to Australia's life-style. In general, these reasons fit into the pattern of causes for emigration which is examined in another chapter. Before leaving Ottawa, Prime Minister Lee was given assurances by Mr. Whitlam that if Singapore decided to bring its students home, the Australian Government would not stand in the way. But, as the press report said and will be explained later on in this study, "it is hard to see how the students can be forced to return against their will." 1'^ ^ To sum up Australia's brain drain experience, despite incomplete data in certain categories, it is evident that Australia, like other inter- mediate and advanced countries, has in recent years drawn consider- ably on the LDCs, particularly those in Asia, to satisfy its professional "3 Baldwin, op. cit., p. 361 flf 2 1968 "p^32* *** ^"^^ ^^"^^^'■y General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs, N^^. 5, ^clice'I^'o^ll^.^^^^^^ Charged-Singapore 'Brain Drain'." The Christian 1095 manpower needs. Moreover, civen the perceptible trends in the future, this reliance on the Asian LDCs is expected not only to continue but to increase as Australia's development needs magnify. Talent Migration to the United States Since tM Late lOJ^O's Sources on the brain drain problem emphasize either directly or by implication that the United States is a mecca for migrating scientists, engineers, physicians, and other professionals. Dr. Zbigniew Brzezin- ski of Columbia University described this phenomenon in these words : "America's professional attraction for the global scientific elite is without historic precedent in either scale or scope." ^~^ The vast dimen- sion and complexities of this phenomenon are revealed in the mass of statistics published by the United States, some pertinent examples of which are reproduced in Tables 5, 6 and 7. They are also evident in the many evaluative statements by students of specific aspects of the problem. For instance, Dr. Perkins concluded that collectively the statistics and studies on the brain drain present a "somber pic- ture," particularly for the LDCs.^^^ UNITAR STUDY, 19 70 : IMMIGRATION OF PROFESSIOXAL MANPOWER Viewing postwar immigration into the United States in the large, it is possible to identify two general trends: (1) a large and rapid in- crease in the immigration of PTKs in general, and (2) a steep rise in the immigration of professionals from the LDCs, particulaily after the mid-1960*s. In his study on the emigration of high-level manpower from the LDCs prepared under the auspices of the United Nations In- stitute for Training and Research (LTNITAR), Gregory Henderson gives the following explanation of these trends based on statistical data drawn from official American sources. ' TABLE 5.— IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED INTO THE UNITED STATES BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND OCCUPATION FROM THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1962, TO THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1967 Profes- Immi- sional, grants technical Total with and Profes- immi- occupa- kindled Engi- Natural Soci 1 Physi- sicnal Country of origin grants admitted tion workers neers scientists scientists cians 1 nurses (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) Europe: Greece 39,608 Turkey (Europe and Asia).. 7, 808 Asia: Burma NA China (including Taiwan).. 51, 218 Hong Kong... 11,942 India 10,034 Indonesia 6,056 Iran. 5,363 Iraq 3,128 Israel 6,694 Jordan (including Arab Pales- tine). 5,880 See footnotes at end of table. 12,006 3,455 NA 23, 291 1,666 6,121 2,634 3,074 1,434 2,304 2,508 2,068 1,518 NA 7,343 814 5,078 680 1,564 608 1, 201 636 323 327 40 1,406 478 2,141 25 369 122 371 79 150 2 31 10 619 189 624 14 85 52 130 38 26 16 4 72 17 78 4 18 3 48 180 319 13 99 83 174 5 311 33 174 18 83 34 3 112 127 34 4 52 10 153 17 1™ Zbigniew Brzezinski, Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technetronic Era, (Naw York : ViklDR. 1970), p. 30. »" Perkins, op. cit., p. 617. 1096 TABLE 5.— IMMIGRANTS ADMITTED INTO THE UNITED STATES BY COUNTRY OF ORIGIN AND OCCUPATION FROM THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1962, TO THE YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1967— Continued Country of origin Profes- Immi- sional. Total grants technical immi- with and grants occupa- kindred admitted tion workers (1) (2) (3) Engi- Natural Social neers scientists scientists (4) (5) (6) Physi- cians> (7) Profes- sional nurses (8) Asia— Continued Korea.. 15,093 2,529 1,895 293 Lebanon 2,981 1,359 517 177 Malaysia 3311 3 165 3 75 35 Pakistan « 993 < 681 < 546 119 Philippines 30,149 10,384 5,421 434 Syrian Arab Republic '1,613 » 794 5 311 83 Thailand... NA NA NA 28 Vietnam... 6 765 « 168 114 27 North America: Mexico 269,014 90,941 3,628 328 Dominican Republic 60,344 26,468 2,094 168 Haiti 16,232 8,130 1,988 78 Costa Rica. 11,558 5,682 .803 59 El Salvador 8,896 4,538 634 21 Guatemala 8,269 4,286 722 33 Honduras 10,297 5,039 760 42 Nicaragua 7,089 8,011 376 24 Panama... 11,235 4,471 527 40 Other West Indies ...:. 1, 127 South America: Argentina 27,738 12,745 4,226 516 Bolivia.... '2,319 M,014 7 362 57 Brazil 12,891 5,389 1,539 251 Chile 7,767 3,142 912 136 Colombia 45,515 16,924 3,924 383 Ecuador 21,984 8,897 1,646 78 Paraguay NA NA NA 8 Peru 12,877 4,894 1,229 144 Uruguay... NA NA NA 28 Venezuela 5,788 1,450 650 211 Africa: Algeria s918 »418 »98 4 Ethiopia. NA NA NA 9 Ghana NA NA NA 12 Kenya NA NA NA 18 Morocco. 1,894 747 183 14 Nigeria.... Ml? 8255 »131 31 Tunisia »392 « 145 »23 »1 United Arab Republic 6,285 2,998 1,181 89 Total, above develop- ing countries 749,355 291,157 58,044 10,787 All countries 1, 863, 980 818, 660 180,877 27,877 226 71 163 61 71 11 89 62 26 23 27 18 45 4 33 6 187 36 1,158 793 23 3 24 26 4 3 40 152 6 3 3 15 176 48 559 248 49 11 235 160 34 10 114 161 26 »3 32 132 20 3 27 99 11 5 30 103 J 18 24 32 83 13 21 32 44 7 4 25 60 388 74 1,184 1,733 213 43 742 186 23 7 101 40 106 23 168 95 44 2 13 50 81 137 71 601 234 41 9 84 132 8 21 27 2 10 30 13 195 114 4 (2) 20 13 72 20 125 60 1 (?) 5 1 21 n 14 1 6 2 9 10 4 2 3 4 3 (^) 9 9 9 22 29 34 5 21 6 2 57 13 91 15 3,978 811 7,475 5,606 10,686 1,895 14,029 23,886 1 Physicians include surgeons, and each occupation includes professors and instructors. 2 1962 through 1966 only. 3 1965 only. * 1966 and 1967 only. » From 1963 through 1967 only. 8 1966 and 1967 only. ' 1965, 1966, and 1967 only. » 1964 through 1966 only. • 1962, 1963, and 1964 only. Note: The figures in column (1) and column (3) have been compiled from the figures given in the 1st and 2d columns of table 8, the "Annual Reports" (Department of Justice, Immigration, and Naturalization Service, Washington, D.C.) for the years 1962 through 1967 inclusive. Those in column (2) have been calculated by subtractintg the figures on "House- wives, children and others with no reported occupation" of the same source from the corresponding figures in our column (1). Columns (4) through (8) have been compiled from the corresponding data in appendix A, tables I through V in the "Staff Study" of the Research and Technical Programs Subcommittee, House of Representatives, July 1967. Source: Gregory Henderson, "Emigration of Highly Skilled Manpower From the Developing Countries," United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), New York, 1970, pp. 166-169. 1097 3 PT U ID O -* o o >• Jj S. 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Si « Eo-S - S. c sii :£gS I'll 03 "O = w © O o en c oO £: TO; 9> .2 S » w CO 2 £■= ra.c o — ZiS -Of a> caO^ f m:=> Q) »-*0 .- » c ^"^ CO So: SPS 00.5 c TO 2 , . S CO co^o g < o C/9 Doa3 sse >-S Sp'^- ' ^ >- — 3 c; S^_^ CO c ^ ^ c ^ a> o o CO (B :: oj • • ^5 -= "U 5 - 3 . -a 5 0) ^to J; * O^ ca ■E.^to S £ ™ ® 00^ S o> S oo™33t: CO — '^o^^^oi 2 3- ■ooo"^co£""_o^:_ *?u-)to Eir)^fcNj'*n c w ^co-x> oc£>u:>u7 5: — o (^ ^H -> Ik -4 .M -H h- 2 o £<£ 1099 In 1947, Henderson points out, only 2,382 natural scientists, engi- neers, physicians, or surgeons immigrated to the United States. Data on national origins are not available in existing records; however, it can be assumed that since the immigration patterns then prevailing were European-oriented, only a few hundred (possibly 300-400) at most came from the LDCs. By 1965, "Immigrants with Occupations" had increased twofold from the figure for 1947, but PTKs had nearly tripled, increasing from 10,891 to 28,790, and moving from 16 per- cent to 22 percent of all "Immigrants with Occupations." By 1968, the PTKs had increased nearly fivefold, reaching a figure of 48,753 and constituting 23 percent of all "Immigrants with Occuptions." In 1969, for the first time in recent years, they declined in num- bers to 39,980. Among these PTKs, the engineers, scientists, and medi- cal personnel by 1965 had reached 11,749, or almost a fivefold increase. From this level, these categories increased to 11,449 in 1966, 20,760 in 1967, and 25,317 in the fiscal year ending June 30, 1968."^ A parallel trend in this rapid increase of professional immigration is the even more rapid rate of increase in professionals entering from the LDCs. (For a graphic illustration of this development, see Fig- ures 1, 2 and 3. For statistical data on this matter, see Table 7.) Mr. Henderson explains that from the 300-400 level assumed above for 1947, the immigration of professionals from the LDCs increased in the following magnitude: to 2,231 in 1956 (about 25 percent of all 8,539 engineers, scientists, and medical personnel immigrating that year) ; to 3,604 in 1965 (about 30 percent) ; to 5,440 in 1966 (about 40 per- cent) ; to 10,254 in 1967 (50 percent) ; to 13,221 in 1968 (52 percent), that is, numerically more than 33 times the estimated figure for 1947 and nearly 6 times the entrants for 1956. The trend towards increased immigration of professionals from the LDCs, in Henderson's judg- ment, was expected to continue.^^® ^'* Henderson, op. clL, p. 29. i» Ibid., p. 30. 1100 Figure 1 Annual Number of ''Professional, Technical and Kindred Workers" Immigrating into the United States by Region of Origin, 1952 - 1969 22,000 20,000 18,000 — 16,000 14,000 i- V 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 — 1967 1968 1969 (23,710) (28,715)(28,391) / ^\ EUROPE AND OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTIRESk SfcTEZi 1>^ /C*** SOUTH AMERICA^ AFRICAI ^ 1952|'53 '54 '55 '56 '57 '58 '59 '60 '61 '62 '63 '64 '65 '66 '67 '68 '69 Source: Gregory Hentievson, Emigration of Highly-Skilled Manpower from the Developing Countries, United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), New York, 1970. P. 196. (U.S. Annual Immigration Reports, 1952-1969.) 1101 Figure 2 Percentage of "Professional, Technical and Kindred Workers" Out of Immigrants with Occupation Admitted into the United States by Region of Origin, 1952 - 1969 70 60 50 40 30 A /\ ASIA EXCEPT JAPAN \' 20 I I /, ^^* > # W SOUTH AMERICAa 'AFRICA ♦ ^* EUROPE AND OTHER DEVELOPED COUNTRIES! ^>y 10 ALL COUNTRIES' ^s * NORTH AMERICA EXCEPT CANADA I I I I I 1 '1 I 1952 '53 '54 '55 '56 '57 '58 '59 '60 '61 '62 '63 '64 '65 '66 '67 '68 '69 Sou rce : Gregory Henderson , Emigration of Highly-Skilled Manpower from the Developing Countries, United Nations Institute for T: fining and Research (UNITAR), New York, 1970. p. 197. (The Annual Reports, 1952-1967.) 1102 Figure 3 Percentage of 'Trofessional, Technical and Kindred Workers'' Out of Total Immigrants into the United States by Region of Origin, 1952 - 1969 % 32 30 28 26 24 22 20 18 16 14 12 10 r — ASIA EXCEPT JAPAN SOUTH AMERICAl AFRICA) \\ N\ / / / / / / \ / V />cr 'NORTH AMERICA EXCEPT CANADA 2 — 1952 '53 '54 '55 '56 '57 '58 '59 '60 '61 '62 '63 '64 '65 '66 '67 '68 '69 Source: Gregory Hen6er%on, Emigration of Highly-Skilled Manpower from the Developing Countries, United Nations Institute for Training and Research lUNITAR), New York, 1970. p. 198. (The Annual Reports, 1952 1967, of U.S. Immigration, cited from S. Watanabe, Economic Branch, ILO, Geneva, "Brain Drain from Developing to Developed Countries", April 1968.) 1103 TABLE?.— IMMIGRATION INTO THE UNITED STATES OFSCIENTISTS, ENGINEERS, AND PHYSICIANS, FISCAL YEARS 1956, 1962-67. A.-ANALYSIS OF IMMIGRATION INTO THE UNITED STATES OF SCIENTISTS, ENGINEERS, AND PHYSICIANS, FISCAL YEARS 1956, 1962-67 Total Scientists Engineers Physicians Hscal Index Index Index Index year Number (195C 1=100) Number (1956 i=100) Number (1956 i=100) Number (1956=100) 1956 5, 373 100.0 1,022 100.0 2,804 100.0 1, 547 100. 0 1962 5, 956 110.8 1,104 108.0 2,940 104.8 1.912 123.6 1963 7,896 147.0 1,612 157.7 4,014 143.2 2, 270 146. 7 1964 7, 810 145.4 1,676 164.0 3,725 132.8 2,409 155.7 1965 7, 198 134.0 1,549 151.6 3,455 123.2 2,194 141.8 1966 9,534 177.4 1,852 181.2 4,921 175.5 2, 761 178. 5 1967 15,272 284.2 2,893 283.1 8,822 314.6 3, 557 229. 9 Note: Developed countries include the European countries, Canada, Japan, South Africa, Australia, and New Zealand. Developing countries are all other countries. B.— IMMIGRATION INTO THE UNITED STATES OFSCIENTISTS, ENGINEERS, AND PHYSICIANS, FISCAL YEARS 1956, 1962-67 Total, all countries Developed countries Developing countries Percent Percent Percent Fiscal year Number of total Number of total Number of total 1956 5, 373 100 3,604 67.1 1,769 32.9 1962 5,956 100 3,573 60.0 2,383 40.0 1963 7,896 100 4,534 57.4 3,362 42.6 1964 7, 810 100 4,607 59.0 3,203 41.0 1965 7, 198 100 4,548 63.2 2,650 36.8 1966 9, 534 100 5,144 54.0 4,390 46.0 1967 15, 272 100 7,359 48.2 7,913 51.8 C— PERCENTAGE SHARE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN IMMIGRATION INTO UNITED STATES OF SCIENTISTS ENGINEERS. AND PHYSICIANS, FISCAL YEARS 1956, 1962-67 Fiscal year Total, 3 groups Scientists Engineers Physicians 1956. 1962. 1963. 1964. 1965. 1966. 1967. 32.9 34.9 25.4 45.2 40.0 26.9 33.5 57.6 42.6 .'4.9 40.9 51.0 41.0 32.6 36.8 53.3 36.8 27.0 30.4 53.8 46.0 41.2 40.9 58.5 51.8 50.9 47,9 62.2 Source: U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Governent Operations, Hearing, "The Brain Drain of Scientists, Engineers, and Physicia-s from the Developing Countries into the United States," Before the Subcommittee on Research and Technical Programs, 90th Cong., 2d sess., 1968, p. 2. In giving further statistical support for the shifting trend in pro- fessional immigration to the United States from the LDCs, Mr. Hen- derson points out that the number of immigrating scientists and engineers born in Europe (presumably for 1969) declined almost to half while those born in Asia rose from 4,400 to 5,300. Those born in Africa increased by 56 percent over the number in 1968. Of 2,756 physicians, 1,600 came from Asia alone. The proportion of engineers, scientists, and medical personnel immigrating from the LDCs in 1969, he indicates, was about 60 percent or more. Entry of PTKs from the 1104 LDCs in 1968 occurred at about twice the rate of such entries during the seven preceding years. Moreover, Henderson observes, scientists, engineers, and medical personnel among the immigrants from the LDCs in 1967 and 1968 totaled more than half the 40,000 fellowships granted since World War II by the United Nations Development Program and its predecessors to nations of low-income countries to study abroad for essential occupations at home, and more than those who had been trained at home during an average year for that period.^^° Within these overall percentages, Mr. Henderson continues, the immigration of scientists to the United States from the LDCs rose nearly 10 times and that of engineers nearly 6 times between 1956 and 1967 with further increases by 1968. A number of individual countries showed an even more striking increase. The immigration of engineers, scientists, and medical personnel from China (Taiwan) rose from 47 in 1956 to 1,321 in 1967; in the case of India from 100 to 1,415; and in that of the Philippines from 90 to 1,066 in 1967 and 3,153 in 1968. As a region, Africa began to show a remarkable increase. In 1969, Africa surpassed South America in professional migration for the first time and did so almost two to one. Thus, Henderson sums up, scientists from the LDCs made up an increasing part of the total American immigration. Moreover, in 1967, they constituted about 13 percent of the addition to the ranks of Amer- ican scientists. Engineers from the LDCs constituted about 8 percent of the annual additions to the supply of American engineers. The total figure for engineers emigrating from the LDCs was placed at 4,229, that is, 28 percent larger in number than the total increase of 3,305 American engineers in 1967.^^^ PROFESSIONAL IMMIGRATION TO THE UNITED STATES, TRENDS THROUGH THE FISCAL YEAR 19 70 Recently published data by the National Science Foundation on the immigration of scientists, engineers, and physicians from abroad re- affirm the continued increase in the immigration of professionals and the continued regional shift to the LDCs as the source of growing im- migration. (See Figures 4 and 5, and Table 8.) The NSF report en- titled, "Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians from Abroad: Trends through Fiscal Year 1970," highlights its compilation of statistical data and interpretive analysis with these generalizations.^^^ i«> Ibid., p. 30. laibld., p. 31. ^^ National Science Foundation, Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians from Abroad: Trends through Fiscal Year 1970, 1972, pp. vl-vll. (Surveys of Science Resources Series, NSF 72-312). (Hereafter cited as, NSF, Survey of Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians from Abroad, 1972.) 1105 Figure 4 tv. Immigrant scientists, engineers, and physicians admitted to the United States by coun^ of last residence, FY 1970 Scientists and Engineers 13.300 KOREA 2% GERMANY PHILIPPINES CANADA TAIWAN PHILIPPINES INDIA CANADA KOREA Physicians 3.200 CUBA 2% GERMANY 2% UK. Source: National Science Foundation, Scientists. Engineers, and Physicians from Abroad: Trends Through Fiscal Year 1970, 1972, p. 3. (From data of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice.) 1106 Figure 5 Immigrant scientists and engineers^ by region of last permanent residence FY 1965-70 (Thousands) 20,000 10,000 8,000 7,000 eixn 6,000 4,000 3.000 ^jaoo 900 800 700 800 eoo 400 300 200 100 50 M&*A,dBkM^ai«iIfi •''--''-^"--'^'- Total, All Areas '«»«i„ i.^*" "• — South America ^ ^^ •*'«^-" ^ — W y y y- y^ — Africa ^^ V v All Other ./ 1966 1966 1967 1968 1989 1970 Source: National Science Foundation, Scientists. Engineers, and Physicians from Abroad; Trends Through Fiscal Year 1970, 1972, p. 2. (From data of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice.) 1107 The first major category of the survey pertains to immigrant scien- tists and engineers admitted to the United States. In the fiscal year 1970, 13,300 entered the United States, a record for the past 20 years. This figure represented an increase by one;third more than in 1969 and two and one-half times the number in 1965. Preliminary data avail- able for fiscal year 1971 show 13,100 immigrant scientists and engi- neers. The figure for physicians also increased, but less dramatically, from 2,000 in 1965 to nearly 3,000 yearly in the next 5 years. Increases over the 1965 levels occurred as a result of amendments to the immi- gration law made effective in October 1965. The contributions of inmiigrant natural scientists and engineers are seen in the fact that they equal 20 percent of the net addition to science and engineering employment since 1965, up from less than 10 percent in the period 1950-64. The data also snow a decided shift towards the LDCs of Asia. More than half of the immigrant scientists and engineers in 1970, an un- precedented 7,500, had last resided in Asia. In 1965, the last year under the old immigration law, only 10 percent of a much smaller number were from Asia. The increment of 2,900 Indian scientists and engi- neers for 1970 was substantial. Indians were the largest number ad- mitted from any country over the last 20 years, as were the nearly 800 physicians from the Philippines in both 1969 and 1970. The stress on Asia is also seen in the statistics indicating that, among the 3,800 im- migrant scientists and engineers in 1970 who had been born in one country and last resided elsewhere before entering the United States, there were 740 born in mainland China, 360 in Pakistan, and 620 in India.^*^ >»lbld., p. 4. 956 413 NA 1,148 1,279 766 NA 1,848 1,591 507 NA 1.387 2,399 805 245 1,201 2,064 654 148 845 2,400 800 136 1,040 2,071 791 140 1,046 2,804 986 162 1,388 4,547 1,345 154 1,990 4,032 1,212 136 1,934 3,950 1,188 152 1,630 3,354 1,043 153 1,574 2,890 1,102 179 1,683 2,940 1,165 192 1,797 4,014 1,688 231 2,093 3,725 1,754 283 2,249 3,446 1,597 302 2.012 4,915 1,949 341 2,549 8,821 3,158 544 3.325 9, 313 3,110 550 3,060 7,150 2,601 504 2,7E6 9,305 3.264 768 3,155 1108 TABLE 8.-IMMIGRANT SCIENTISTS, ENGINEERS, PHYSICIANS, AND SURGEONS. FISCAL YEARS 1949-70 Total Physicians scientists and Natural Social and Fiscal year engineers Engineers < scientists > scientists > surgeons 1949 > 1, 369 1950 3 2,045 1951 «2.098 1952.... 3.449 1953 2.866 1954 3.336 1955 3,002 1956 3,952 1957 6,046 1958 5, 380 1959 5,290 1960 : 4, 550 1961 4, 171 1962 4,297 1963 5,933 1964 5,762 1%5 5, 345 1966 7,205 1967 12, 523 1968 12,973 1%9 10, 255 1970 13.337 1 Includes professors and instructors. 3 Total excludes a small number of social scientists for whom data are not available. Source: National Science Foundation, "Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians From Abroad: Trends Through Fiscal Year 1970." (Washington. 1972), p. 1. (Based on data of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice.) Many immigrants in this category fulfill the immigration require- ment by taking up the required 2-year residency in Canada or else- where other than their place of birth before reentering the United States. Data for 1970, for example, reveal that Canada was by far the major "way-station" for those born in one country and last resident in another. There were 1,000 such persons. Among this group were 260 born in India, 150 in United Kingdom, and 110 in Eastern Europe. Thus, the statistics for "way-stations" such as Canada and the United Kingdom — both regarded in this study as advanced countries — may include a substantial number of Asians, Africans, and others from the LDCs who are not accounted for in the statistics for the country of emigration according to nationality. The 260 professionals born in India may hence be carried on immigration statistics as coming from "Canada," not "India." NSF data for the fiscal year 1972 reveal that some 55 percent (243 of 439) of immigrant FMGs reporting Canada as the last place of permanent residence were actually from Asia; 92 or 21 percent were from India alone. Similarly, 69 percent (251 of 364) of those from the United Kingdom listed their country of birth as an Asian country : 179 or 49 percent were from India, and 12 percent from Africa, primarily Egypt. The inflows from the LDCs, therefore, may be considerably more than what is sometimes actually recorded. This fact should be kept in mind throughout this study when considering the drain-oflf of scientists, engineers, physicians, and surgeons from the LDCs, particularly in instances where differenti- ation between place of "last permanent residence" and "country or region of birth" is ambiguous. 1109 TABLE 9.— SCIENTISTS, ENGINEERS, PHYSICIANS, AND SURGEONS WHO CHANGED FROM NONIMMIGRANT STATUS TO IMM IGRANT STATUS IN FISCAL YEAR 1970, BY YEAR OF NON IMM IGRANT ENTRY AND BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUP Year of nonimmigrant entry Scientists and engineers Physicians Total Engineers Scientists and surgeons Adjusted to immigrant Year of entry: Before i960 1960-64 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 5,470 3,636 1,834 890 105 50 55 SO 1,250 718 532 362 637 383 254 72 890 638 252 84 1, 107 839 268 103 985 677 308 132 456 300 156 86 40 31 9 1 Source: National Science Foundation, "Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians From Abroad: Trends Through Year 1970, "1972, p. 7. (Based on data of the ImmigrationandNaturalizationService, U.S. Department of Justice.) Fiscal TABLE 10.— SCIENTISTS, ENGINEERS, PHYSICIANS, AND SURGEONS ADJUSTED TO IMMIGRANT STATUS, BY STATUS AT ENTRY AND BY COUNTRY OR REGION OF BIRTH, FISCAL YEAR 1970 Occupation and status All countries Europe North and Central Asia America South America Africa All others Scientists and engineers 13, 337 Adjustment of status. 5,470 As percent of total 41.0 Engineers 9,305 Adjustment of status 3,636 As percent of total 39.1 Natural scientists 3,264 Adjustment of status 1,463 As percent of total 44.8 Social scientists 768 Adjustment of status 371 As percent of total 48.3 Physicians and surgeons 3, 155 Adjustment of status 890 As percent of total 28.2 2,908 8,294 807 4,382 27.8 52.8 2,000 5,990 558 2,936 27.9 49.0 702 1,899 192 1,172 27.4 61.7 206 405 57 274 27.7 67.7 550 1,942 126 679 22.9 35.0 655 236 1,107 137 45 1 189 46 6.9 .4 17.1 33.6 387 158 702 68 20 1 99 22 5.2 .6 14.1 32.4 193 57 352 61 18 .... 59 22 9.3 .... 16.8 S3 36.1 75 21 8 7 .... 31 2 9.3 58. 5 254 25.0 236 148 25 43 .... 39 3 18.2 .... 15.4 12.0 Note: Data Include professors and instructors. Source: National Science Foundation, 'Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians From Abroad: Trends Through Fiscal Year 1970" 1972, p. 7 (based on daU of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice). 1110 TABLE 11.— SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES AS NONIMMIGRANTS, BY CATEGORY AND REGION OF UST PERMANENT RESIDENCE,' FISCAL YEARS 1965 '-70 Region of last permanent residence ~ North and All All Central South other Nonimmigrant category regions Europe Asia America America Africa areas 1970 Total nonimmigrants 6,050 2,701 1,259 1,049 671 183 187 Exchange visitors 4,228 1,982 907 412 605 166 156 Other nonimmigrants' 1,822 719 352 637 66 17 31 1969 =^==^== Total nonimmigrants 5,362 2,446 1,313 788 460 182 173 Exchange visitors 3,975 1,787 1,175 342 379 163 129 Other nonimmigrants' 1,387 659 138 446 81 19 44 1968 Total nonimmigrants 5.633 2,591 1,568 707 395 185 187 Exchange visitors 4,130 1,839 1,258 367 347 180 139 Other nonimmigrants' 1,503 752 310 340 48 5 48 1967 Total nonimmigrants 5,379 2,494 1,350 697 424 244 170 Exchange visitors 4,141 1,820 1,210 383 360 235 133 Other nonimmigrants' 1,238 674 140 314 64 9 37 1966 Total nonimmigrants 5,457 2,291 1,451 673 457 («) « 585 Exchange visitors 4,335 1,859 1,164 364 412 (*) « 536 Other nonimmigrants' 1,122 432 287 309 45 49 1965 Total nonimmigrants 5,323 2,133 1,458 770 440 348 174 Exchange visitors 4,214 1,677 1,294 379 390 327 147 Other nonimmigrants' 1,109 456 164 391 50 21 27 • 1 yr. or more. ) Although data for 1965 are available only on a calendar year basis, they appear to be largely consistent with what fiscal year data could be expected to show. ' Includes temporary worl 1 yr. or more. ^ ■_ » > Although data for 1965 are available only on a calendar year basis, they appear to be largely consistent with what fiscal year data could be expected to show. . « Includes temporary workers of distinguished merit and ability, temporary workers performing services unavailable in the United States, and industrial trainees. * Data for Africa, not separately available, included with all other areas. Source: National Science Foundation, Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians From Abroad: Trends Through Fiscal Year 1970," 1972, p. 12 (based on data of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice). The inflow of nonimmigrant scientists and engineers, the next major category and to be distinguished from the immigrant, for 1970 was 6,100, an increase from 5,300 in 1965. (See Tables 9-12.) Of these, 4,000 to 4,300 yearly were exchange visitors. The remainder were tem- porary workers performing services unavailable in the United States, workers of distinguished merit and ability, and industrial trainees. 1112 Within this nonimmigrant category, foreign science and engineering students rose from 56,800 in 1967 to 72,100 in 1970. Foreign medical students numbered 2,000 to 2,100 yearly. Again, stress on Asia as a manpower source is evident : More than 50 percent of the science and engineering students and about 40 percent of the medical students come from Asian countries. Another significant indicator within the nonimmigrant category is the number of foreign (that is, non-U.S. citizen) recipients of doc- torates in science and engineering from universities in the United States. The number within this category increased 222 percent between 1960 rind 1970, from 1,000 to 3,000 yearly. (American citizens receiving simil.ir advanced degrees increased at a lesser magnitude of 182 per- cent, from 5,100 to 14,300.) Over the same period, the numbe^-s of foreign holders of the Ph. D. in science and engineering inter ding to re-nain in the United States for postdoctoral work and study ia- creas id from 50 percent to 59 percent of the annual total of fo 'ci'rn recipients of American doctorates. The increased emphasis on Asia is again reflected in the geographic distribution of the doctorates. Reci ■ )ients from Asia increased from 44 percent to 49 percent of the total. China and India accounted for about 70 percent of this increase. The European recipients, while increasing in numbers, remained at about 12 percent of the total for both years.^** What is significant about these statistics in the nonimmigrant cate- gory is that here lies a potential source for brain drain through the international educational route. Substantial numbers in this category adjust their status from alien to immigrant and thus gain permanent residency. In the fiscal year 1965, before the revised immigration law of 1965 took effect, fewer than 600 of the 5,300 immigrant scientists and engin£ers were former nonimmigrant visa holders. In 1966, the change-of-status group accounted for most of the increase in science- engineer immigrants, that is, 1,700 of 1,900. The number of changes- in-status increased even more in succeeding years, totaling 5,500 by 1970. In that year, they accounted for 61 percent of the increase in immigrant scientists and engineers over that for 1965. (See Tables 9-11.) i«= Moreover, persons from the LDCs of Asia are more likely to take advantage of this route. According to the NSF study, the bulk of the change-of-status scientists and engineers in 1969 and 1970, as in pre- vious years, were from Asia. Asians numbered 2,900 in 1969, and in- creased to 4,400 in 1970. In 1969, former nonimmigrants from Europe numbered only 470 and then increased in 1970 to 810. Both regions combined were the source of more than 90 percent of change-of-status scientists and engineers. And for both regions, students were by far the largest of the groups of former nonimmigrants. Asia also accounted for by far the largest proportion of the change-of-status physicians with 80 percent in 1969 and 76 percent in 1970. In addition, substantial percentages of scientists, engineers and physicians from LDCs other than those in Asia adjusted to immigrant status in the fical year 1970. Of a total of 1,107 African scientists and engineers, 189 (or 17.1 per- cent) adjusted their status. Of the 137 cited in the "All others" cate- !»♦ Ibid., p. 15. 1* Ibid., p. 6. 1113 gory, that is, except Europe, Asia, North and Central America, South America and Africa, 46 (or 33.6 percent) adjusted their status.^^^ A final category highlighted in the NSF study that provides further evidence of the magnitude of talent migration to the United States is that of foreign-born scientists in this country. About 22,900 or 8 per- cent of all scientists in the National Register of Scientific and Techni- cal personnel in 1970 (total registry, 270,000) had been born abroad and had also received their secondary education abroad. Nearly 63 percent held Ph. D.s and about one-half were in research and develop- ment, including R. & D. management. (Only 39 percent of the Ameri- can-born scientists had Ph. D.s.) Europe is strongly represented in the Register with 9,700 scientists, owing to the preeminence of the European orientation of immigra- tion in the early postwar years. Though fewer in number, those from Asia still are a substantial representation of 6,600. North and Central America have 3,300. (Presumably mostly Canadians.) Nearly two- thirds of the Europeans held doctorates, while over three-fifths of the Asians and North and Central Americans held doctorates.^®^ Other regions of the world than Asia falling within the LDC cate- gory are also represented in the NSF statistics on foreign-born scien- tists in the 1970 Register. Africa is listed with a total of 596 scientists at all degree levels, that is. Ph. D., M.A., and baccalaureate; South America with 556 ; North and Central America lumped together with 3,277 (presumably the largest percentage is from Canada) ; and other areas of the world, 2,165.^®^ Thus, National Science Foundation data on the migration of scien- tists, engineers and physicians to the United States through fiscal year 1970 corroborate the judgments of those who contend that professional immigration to the United States is increasing and that nations of the LDCs are making a progressively greater contribution to that increase. NSF "highlights" ON IMMIGRANT SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS, PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS, EISCAL TEAR 19 72 On August 20, 1973, the National Science Foundation published an analysis of data on immigrant scientists, engineers, physicians, and surgeons for the fiscal year 1972.^^^ According to the report, 11,300 immigrant scientists and engineers were admitted to the United States in the fiscal year 1972, 14 percent below the 13,100 in the fiscal year 1971 and still further below the 13,300 that entered in 1970. Reflected in the 1972 figures was a reduction in numbers for almost all countries in both Eastern and Western Hemispheres. (See Figure 6 and Table 13.) The 7,100 immigrant physicians and surgeons entering in 1972 was the largest inflow in the past two decades. In 1972, 5,700 entered. Figures for 1971 and 1972 contrast sharply with the earlier yearly in- flows of no more than 3,300. All regions of the world contributed to this increase for 1972, particularly the LDCs.^^ iM Ibid., p. 7. ' ^ Ibid., pp. 17-19. "8 Ibid. ^" National Science Foundation, Science Resources Studies Highlights, Immigrant Scien- tists and Engineers Decline in Fiscal Year 1972, Physicians Increase Sharply, Aug. 20, 1973, 4 pp. (Prepared In Manpower Utilization Studies Group, Division of Science Resources studies). Hereafter cited as, NSF, Highlights, August 197 S. i» Ibid., p. 1. 1114 Figure 6 Immigrant Scientists, Engineers, Physicians, and Surgeons, by Broad Occupational Grojp^ FY 1967 -1972 (Thousands) 10,000 9,000 8,000 7,000 6,000 5,000 4,000 3,000 2,000 1.000 7- PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS 1967 '68 '69 '70 '71 '72 Source: National Science Foundation, Science Resources Studies Highlights, Immigrant ScientisK and Engineers Decline in FY 1972, Physicians Increase Sharply.Augtjst 70, 1973, p. 1. (From data of the Immigration and Naturalization Service, U.S. Department of Justice.) 1115 o z < < o CD u. O z o q: a: o ee. I- z O o >- < CO < < I- (/O o CO ^ v> c c c (Q ra o :^ s> to k- o c CO « il s o < C3 C/5 CO Z < CO >- ILI LU z C9 co o CD < ii-5 z- :§1 CMOfO.-" oi r^ CO o CMCSJ O) OCvJ 00 ^coco forncNJ to csiin CM coin oom eg ooo 0> E ^a>oo CO m oor-.. «0OO CO m •* CO r-oo CO CM mm to CO CslOO .—■CM OCSJ t£0O UJ f OO f UJUO I » Z 00 ■o !5 ^m ^ ooo to ^•ooco o^ ^ CSJ 00 ^4 ^.4 CO CO CO oo OO r^ IT) CM OOO) (f (O CO^ CO mco coi— « ^ CM wi Or*. CD*-* oo^ toto ^ o* ^- o» CO* ^ r^ r-> o^ .^ OCM ^m 91 CM in fo CM CT» oocM<'<£ ino n> TO wLU si 3f a.Q.c £3 ^c r^CM ooo CO CM LLl ex o E E . (/I E .£ t •D « 3 55 O O 0) Excludes Canadian medical graduates in the United States. Source: J. N. Haug, and B. C. Martin, "Foreign Medical Graduates in the United States, 1970." (Chicago American Medical Association, 1971), pp. 292-293 (special statistical series; Center for Health Services Research and Development). 845 1 0) 1,040 1 1,046 1,388 1,990 (,») 1,934 (i'l ij) 1,630 v/ 1,574 8 i>) 1,683 {'i\ 1.797 ^*} ii'l 2,093 1 1^1 2,249 2,012 s 2,549 474 347 3,325 841 417 3,060 652 308 2,755 576 333 3,155 890 505 1123 TABLE 15.— FOREIGN PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES, FISCAL YEARS 1953-70 Physicians and Nonimmigrant Exchange visitor surgeons admitted physicians and physicians and to the United States surgeons adjusted surgeons adjusted Year^ as immigrants to immigrant status to immigrant status 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1%4 1965 1966 1967 1968 1969 1970 > The 1st column indicates all such immigrants by year since 1953. The 2d column is the yearly total of all foreign physi- cians changed from nonimmigrant to immigrant status during each year since 1965, the earliest year for which such data areavailabTe. These numbers are also part of the yearly immigrant totals of the 1st column. The 3rd column shows those changing from exchange visitor— the largest nomimmigrant category— to immigrant status (also since 1965). These num- bers are also part of the totals in the 1st and 2d columns. ) Not available. Source: Rosemary Stevens, and Joan Vermeuien, "Foreign Trained Physicians and American Medicine," U.S. Depart- ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, Bureau of Health Manpower Education, Division of Manpower Intelligence, June 1972, p. 98. (National Science Foundation, from data of the I mmigration and Naturalization Service.) The LDCs of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are heavily repre- sented in the AMA statistics on FMGs for 1970. (See Tables 14, 16, and 18.) Africa is listed with 1,126 (2 percent) , Asia, 21,002 (36.7 per- cent), and Latin America 9,929 (17.4 percent). Altogether the LDCs representing an FMG population of 32,157 of the total 57,217 or 56.1 percent. European FMGs number 24,756 (43.3 percent), and those from Oceania, 404 (0.7 percent). High on the list of countries from the LDCs are the Philippines with 7,352 ; India, 3,957 ; South Korea, 2,095 ; Mexico, 1,831 ; Iran, 1,631, anci Thailand, 1,098. Those foreign countries where English is the predominant language were represented by only 4,377 FMGs or 7.6 percent of the t()tal FMG population."*^ The language factor is important in considerations of competence and abil- ity to pass the ECFMG examination. a» Ibid., p. 5. 1124 TABLE 16.— PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES AS IMMIGRANTS BY COUNTRY OR REGION OF UST PERMANENT RESIDENCE, 1957, 1965, AND 1971 Fiscal year— Country or region 1957 1965 1971 Asia ^ 7.8 10.2 18.9 10.0 5.5 17.3 7.3 20.9 9.9 66.6 Canada 12.9 8.2 Cuba 10.0 1.7 Mexico 4.8 .5 South America 11.5 4.7 United Kingdom 7.1 4.7 Other Europe... 36.6 8.0 Other 9.3 5.6 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 Number 1,990 2,012 5,756 Source: Rosemary Stevens and Joan Vermeulen, "Foreign Trained Physicians and American Medicine," U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Bureau of Health Manpower Education, Division of Manpower Intelligence, June 1972 p. 100. TABLE 17.— MIGRATION OF PHYSICIANS FROM SELECTED COUNTRIES. FISCAL YEAR 1971 Country Immigrants Exchange visitors Total Argentina Brazil Canada Germany India Iran Jamaica Japan Korea Mexico Pakistan.. Peru Philippines Taiwan Thailand United Kingdom. 45 125 170 17 103 120 474 311 785 62 183 245 821 692 1,513 251 150 401 21 205 226 31 189 220 965 38 1,003 28 183 211 104 162 266 20 106 126 980 385 1,365 199 41 240 91 213 304 268 157 425 Source: Rosemary Stevens, and Joan Vermeulen, "Foreign Trained Physicians and American Medicine," U.S. Depart- ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, Bureau of Health Manpower Education, Division of Manpower Intelligence, June 1972. p. 102. (U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service.) TABLE 18.— PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES AS IMMIGRANTS BY COUNTRY OR REGION OF LAST PERMANENT RESIDENCE, FISCAL YEARS 195^71 Fiscal year United Kingdom Other Europe Canada Mexico Cuba South America Asia Other Total 1953. 1954. 1955. 1956. 1957. 1958. 1959_ 1960_ 1961. 1962. 1963. 1964. 1%5. 1966. 1967. 1968. 1969. 1970. 1971. 66 299 130 40 58 ... 252 845 66 373 116 60 90 ... 335 1,010 62 417 128 63 92 ... 284 1,046 76 513 729 151 256 93 95 112 443 186 1,388 142 199 228 155 1,990 189 592 218 57 86 285 316 191 1,934 147 579 210 44 77 227 207 139 1,630 125 425 245 66 94 256 244 119 1,574 140 413 287 64 94 208 269 208 1,683 119 383 280 70 120 298 265 262 1,797 154 421 467 97 156 327 260 211 2,093 165 458 440 77 229 454 204 222 2,249 147 421 380 110 201 348 205 200 2,012 187 483 393 119 150 355 588 277 2,552 206 5% 449 86 162 358 1,175 294 3,326 18b 481 314 55 215 345 1.277 256 3,128 140 426 236 32 54 172 1,448 248 2,756 192 436 240 29 52 161 1,7M 304 3,158 268 461 474 28 95 269 3,836 325 5,756 Source: Rosemary Stevens, and Joan Vermeulen, "Foreign Trained Physicians and American Medicine," U.S. Depart- ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, Bureau of Health Manpower Education, Division of Manpower Intelligence, June 1972. p. 99. (U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service.) 1125 DATA FROM THE STEV'ENS-VT.RMEULEN STUDY ON FMG's The growing prevalence of FMGs in American medicine, notably from the LDCs, is apparent in the many evaluative judgments made in the Stevens- Vermeulen study. For example, one of every six M.D.s now practicing in the United States is a graduate of a foreign medical school; if Canadian graduates are included, the proportion rises to almost one-fifth.206 i^joj-e foreign physicians (10,540) were admitted to the United States in 1971 than were graduated from American medical schools (8,974) in the same year. (See Table 20.) There is now one FMG to every two graduates of American schools serving in hospital house staffs in approved graduate educational positions. About one-half of the candidates for state licensing examinations are now FMGs ; in some States it is as high as 75 percent.^'o' Almost 20,000 FMGs were in graduate educational positions in American hospitals and universities in 1970-71. Of these about 3,000 were interns, 13,000 residents and 3,000 in other traditional training positions.^^^ In 1950- 51, FMGs represented only 10 percent of interns and 9 percent of residents in U.S. hospitals. The figures for 1970-71 were 29 percent and 33 percent respectivelv.-"^ Finally, the dominant trend is clearly toward more FMGs from'^the LDCs. The majority of ECFMG cer- tificates (granted after passing the required examination in order to practice) now being granted to foreign medical graduates are from the LDCs. The largest single group awarded in 1970 was to graduates from schools in India (791) ; others with large numbers represented were the Philippines (366), Korea (229), and Egypt (228). ^^ DATA ON MEDICAL IMMIGRANTS AND NONIMMIGRANTS As noted above, FMGs, along with their fellow scientists and engi- neers, enter the United States under two categories, namely, immigrant and nonimmigrant. The latter includes exchange visitors, scholars, and foreign students. The status of nonimmigrant can be adjusted to per- manent residence after a 2-year interval of residing outside the United States. After April 1970, this requirement could be waived if the At- torney General found that it would impose undue hardship on the alien or his family or if the foreign country of the alien's nationality or last residence states in writing it would not object to such a waiver.^^^ In the fiscal year 1970, 3,200 foreign physicians were admitted to the United States as immigrants. (See Table 8 and Figure 4.) A record 1,700 were from this continent. Preliminary data for 1971 shows a fig- ure of 5,700, well above the prior record of 3,300 in 1967. The LDCs were strongly represented in this category, with 41 percent of the total 2^ Ibid., p. 96. 2"" Stevens and Vermeulen. op. cit., p. xi and p. 96. Also, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, Oversight of HEW Health Programs, Hearing before the Subcommittee on Public Health and Environment, 93d Cong., 1st sess., 1973, p. 55. (Hereafter cited as, Hearings, House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, Over- sight of HEW Health Programx, 1973.) ^"^ Stevens and Vermeulen, op. cit., p. 6. aoeibid., p. 6. 210 Ibid., pp. 33-34. -" NSF, Survey of Scientists, Engineers , and Physicians from Abroad, 1972, p. 16. 1126 3,200, and perhaps higher if the 43 percent designating "all other" were broken down and specific countries identified individually. The Philippines was first with 780 immigrant physicians, a figure exceeded only by the 790 in 1969."2 A considerable number of change-of-status foreign physicians, 890 or 28.2 percent, are also included in the total immigrant figure of 3,200 for fiscal year 1970. (See Table 10.) Nearly 75 percent of the former nonimmigrant physicians since 1966 had originally entered the United States before that year. Again the largest proportion in the ad- justed status category came from the LDCs : Asia with 679 or 76 per- cent, a slight drop from the 80 percent in 1969 ; Africa with 39 ; and North and Central America, 43, probably mostly from Canada.^" In the nonimmigrant category, the figure for foreign physicians to- taled 5,400 in 1970, an increase over the 1969 figure of 4,800. Of these, 93 to 96 percent yearly were exchange visitors. (See Tables 12 and 19.) Again the inflow from the LDCs was significant. Asia advanced from 2,200 in 1965 to 3,300 in 1968, and then dropped to 2,300 in 1970. In- creases from Africa followed a steady upward line : 84 in 1965, 101 in 1967, 126 in 1968, 119 in 1969, and 150 in 1970. South America followed a less consistent pattern but in 1970 showed a considerable increase over 1965 : 182 in 1965, 212 in 1966, 208 in 1967, 370 in 1968, 363 in 1969, and 451 in 1970."* Thus, recent data on the medical brain drain reveal that the United States is a prime and increasing recipient of foreign physicians; that the LDCs are increasingly becoming the greatest source of supply ; and that these trends seem to be firmly established. TABLE 19.-IMMIGRANTS AND EXCHANGE VISITORS, ALL OCCUPATIONS AND PHYSICIANS BY MAJOR REGION OF ORIGIN, FISCAL YEAR 1971 Total Physicians Geographical region immigrants: Africa Asia Europe... North America. South America. Oceania Total Exchange visitors: Africa Asia. Europe North America South America Oceania Total 53,393 100.0 4,783 100.0 Source: Rosemary Stevens, and Joan Vermeulen, "Foreign Trained Physicians and American Medicine," U.S. Depart- ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, Bureau of Health Manpower Education, Division of Manpower Intelligence, June 1972. p. 101. (U.S. Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service.) Number Percent Number Percent 5,844 1.6 168 2.9 97,196 26.2 3,836 66.6 92, 375 24.9 729 12.7 149, 002 40.2 728 12.6 22, 678 6.1 269 4.7 3,383 .9 26 .5 370, 478 100.0 5,756 100.0 2,808 5.3 143 3.0 12,622 23.6 2,226 46.5 26, 537 49.7 934 19.5 3,901 7.3 874 18.3 6,182 11.6 549 11.5 1,343 2.5 58 1.2 21^ Ibid., p. 3. 2»3lbid., pp. 3-4. 2" Ibid., pp. 11-12. 1127 TABLE 20.-COMPARISON OF FOREIGN PHYSICIANS ADMITTED TO THE UNITED STATES WITH NUMBER OF U.S_ MEDICAL GRADUATES 1962-71 Fore ign physicians Exchange U.S. Year ending June 30 immigrants visitors Total graduates 1962 --- 1,797 3,970 4,637 5,767 6,730 7,168 1963 2,093 7,264 1964 2,249 4,518 6,767 7,336 1965 2,012 4,160 6,172 7,409 1966 _ 2,552 4,370 6,922 7,574 1967 3,326 5,204 8,530 7,743 1968 3,128 5,701 8,829 7,973 1969 2,756 4,460 7,216 8,059 1970 _ 3,158 5,008 8,166 8,367 1971 5,756 4,784 10, 540 8,974 Total 28,827 46,812 75, 639 77, 867 Source: Rosemary Stevens and Joan Vermeulen, "Foreign Trained Physicians and American Medicine," U.S. Depart- ment of Health, Education, and Welfare, Bureau of Health Manpower Education, Division of Manpower Intelligence, June 1972, p. 96. (DEW Publication No. NIH 73-325.) (Figures on immigrants and exchange visitors are from the U.S. Depart- ment of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service. Figures of U.S. graduates from "Medical Education in the United States," Journal of the American Medical Association, 218, 1971, 1221.) Educational Exchange of Foreign Students and Scholars in the United States An area for potential brain drain is through the educational ex- change of foreign students and scholars. An indication of U.S. leader- ship in advocating international educational exchange is contained in the report "Open Doors, 1971" issued by the Institute of International Education (HE), a private organization dedicated to international educational exchange. ^^^ This report states that in 1970-71 there were 144,708 foreign students reported to be enrolled in United States in- stitutions of higher learning. This jfigure is 9,749 more than the 1969- 70 total of 134,959, an increase of 7 percent. "Thus," says the report, "the pattern of annual increases in the number of foreign students in the United States remains unbroken." ^^^ DATA FROM "OPEN DOORS, 197l" ON FOREIGN STUDENTS "While the overall total of foreign students increased, notably by in- creased enrollment from the LDCs, the numbers from Europe, Can- ada, and Oceania declined. (For trends in the migration of foreign students to the United States during 1953-71, see Fi^re 8.) In these years for tlie first time since 1959-60, these categories showed a de- crease in absolute numbers. However, student enrollment from the other areas increased. In relation to the total number of students, the 2" Institute of International Education, Open Doors, 1971: Report on International Exchange (New York: September 1971), 82 pp. (Hereafter cited as Open Doors, 1971.) 218 Ibid., p. 3. 1128 Figure 8 Foreign Students in tlie U.S., 1953 - 1971 55,000 50,000 — 45,000 — 40,000 — 35,000 — 30,000 — 25,000 20,000 — 15,000 — 10,000 5,000 1 • • / • * / * — • / • • / • • / - / * • / t 1 / / » * / 0° ./- ooooooo 000000000000°° NEAR AND MIDDLE EAS' FAR EAST . 7 '""""""ooooooooc ■-■""■''afric / / / - LATIN AMERICA o ^ ^^ >'>°°° ^^V^-.»"^ NORTH AMERICA — - ^^^ OCEANIA -•••rrTT" i...-t-T' i954'55 '56 '57 '58 '59 '60 '61 '62 '63 '64 '65 '66 '67 '68 '69 '70 '71 FISCAL YEAR Source: Institute of International Education, Open Doors, 1971: Report on International Exchange, New York, Sept. 1971, p. 11. 1129 proportion coming from different regions of the world, according to the report, were the same as they had been in the past 5 years, namely, 37 percent from the Far East, 20 percent from Latin America, 13 percent from Europe, 12 percent from the Near and Middle East, 9 percent from North America, 6 percent from Africa, and 1 percent from Oceania. ^^^ Table 21 lists those foreign countries which had more than 1,000 students in the United States during 1970-71. "What is significant about these data is that with few exceptions the LDCs are most strongly represented, having a total student enrollment of 84,755. The figure would be larger if the many small countries with fewer than 1,000 students were taken into account. In compiling its 1970-71 report, the HE surveyed 2,729 institutions. Of those polled, 789, or 29 percent, did not reply. Other difficulties were noted. Accordingly, the HE suggests a word of caution, but insists that the statistics "are never exaggerated or inflated." ^^^ Two sets of data important for the purposes of this study are those relating to intentions as to future plans. There are two indicators of future intentions : the type of visas held by the students, and their answer to the HE questionnaire when specifically asked if they intended to stay in the United States. According to the HE report, 18.5 percent of all the responding foreign students, or 26,732, indicated that they held immigrant visas, that is, they had been granted permission to apply for permanent citizenship. The others were as follows : 51 percent had F, or student, visas; 9 percent had J, or exchange-visitor, visas; and 5 percent had other types of nonimmigrant visas. No answer was given in the questionnaire by 24,978 students, that is, 17 percent. The largest proportion of the immigrant visa holders, 33 percent, came from Latin America; 25 percent from the Far East; 21 percent from Europe; 3 percent from Africa ; 6 percent from the Near and Middle East ; 7 per- cent from North America; and 1 percent from Oceania.^^^ Thus, at least potentially some 67 percent of the respondent students from regions of the world designated as LDCs declared by choice of visa their intention of staying in the L^nited States. In response to the specific question regarding future residency in the United States, only 11 percent answered in the affirmative. The HE report reasoned that since 18.5 percent were immigrant visa hold- ers, this affirmative answer from only 11 percent suggested that either (1) a number came to the United States on this type of visa because it was easily available and not because they intended to immigrate, or (2) that a large proportion of the 38 percent of the students who did not answer this question at all, in fact, intended to remain in the United States. According to the survey, 33 percent said they did not intend to remain in the United States, and 18 percent reported that they were undecided.^ 220 217 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 218 Ibid., p. 3. 219 Ibid., p. 8. 220 The HE report explained that the high proportion of non-response to this question as well as to those concerning length of stay and sources of support (18 percent) could be attributed to the fact that a third of the institutions surveyed responded to the question- naires with lists of data compiled from registration information. These lists, the report states, do not normally include information specifically designed for foreign students, such as, auration of stay, intention of remaining and source of support (p. 9). 1130 TABLE 21— FOREIGN COUNTRIES WITH MORE THAN 1,000 STUDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES, 1970-71 Number Country Canada - -- India ._. - - China, Republic of. Hong Kong - Cuba — Iran — Thailand - .- Japan. United Kingdom... Korea, Republic of China, Unspecified > Philippines _ Mexico. Germany, Federal Republic of Israel. Nigeria — Colombia Pakistan _ France Greece.. Venezuela Jamaica Brazil Peru -- Turkey Italy _ Lebanon Vietnam, Republic of. United Arab Republic _ Australia.- > This category consists of those whose country of citizenship was given as China. (In many cases, these students are residents of countries other than the Republic of China.) Source: Institute of International Education. "Open Doors, 1971: Report on International Exchange," New York, Septem- ber 1971, p. 4. How many of these students would actually remain in the United States cannot be determined with absolute accuracy from the available data. Aspects of the problem as it bears on adjusted immigration status are, however, discussed above on pages 66-67 and 70-71. If the assumption of 20 percent loss through foreign students can be accepted as valid, it is reasonable to estimate that some 29,000 of the total 144,708 could be expected to remain in the United States. The figure would be still higher (perhaps some 49,000) if the 18.5 percent immigrant visa holders (26,732) could be assumed to remain as their visa indicates and if 20 percent of the remaining total of foreign stu- dents (22,595) were combined with it. 1970-71 1969-70 12, 595 13,318 12, 523 11,327 9,219 8,566 9,040 7,202 7, 435 4,487 6, 402 5,175 5,627 4,372 4, 350 4,156 3, 859 4,216 3, 857 3,991 3, 105 3,463 2.759 2,782 2,689 2,501 2,521 2,634 2, 361 2,288 2, 333 1,851 2,190 2,045 2,001 1.576 1,994 1,977 1,968 1,811 1,863 1,722 1,557 1,353 1,473 1,349 1, 422 1,307 1, 420 1,309 1,235 1,174 1,210 1,020 1, 198 993 1, 103 1,015 1,045 1,077 221 '^Tal K. Oh, Associate Professor of Management in the School of Business Administra- tion and Economics at California State University, Fullerton, made a study of brain drain from Asia using an extensive survey among all students from 6 Asian nationality groups on the campuses of the University of Wisconsin at Madison and the University of Minne- sota at Mlnneapolis-St. Paul In the spring semester of 1968. The groups surveyed were from China, Hong Kong, Formosa, Japan, Korea, and India. Of the 100,262 foreign students in the United States during the academic year 1967-68, there were 12,244 Chinese (including those from Formosa and Hong Kong), 7,518 Indians, 3,768 Japanese, and 3,218 Korean.s — all of whom accounted for 26 percent of the total. Except for the Japanese, estimates of nonreturnees among these groups tend to be particularly high. ("Push" factors are not very prominent in Japan which ranks among the great industrial powers of the world.) Usable returns from those surveyed numbered 657. Among the respondents were 127 Chinese, 79 residents of Hong Kong, 49 Japanese, 72 Koreans, 248 Indians, and 82 Formosans. Undergraduates numbered 98, MA candidates 231, and Ph. D. candidates 297. On the basis of this data, and assuming that the sample Is representative and that the current causal factors remain constant, Professor Oh reached the following conclusions : 1131 DATA FROM "oPEN DOORS, 197l" ON FOREIGN SCHOLARS Foreign scholars in the United States add to potential brain drain through educational exchange. For the year 1971, the HE reported a total of 12,047 foreign scholars in the United States, a 5 percent de- crease from the 12,659 for 1970. (For a list of foreign countries with more than 100 scholars in the United States during 1970-71, see Table 22.) The economic pinch on the campuses and among private grant sponsors, in addition to the decline in government funding for international education, were believed to be largely responsible for the decline. The sharpest numerical decline occurred in the Far East where 3,519 scholars were reported, about 400 fewer than in 1970. A very slight decline was registered for Latin America with 869, 8 less than in 1970. There were 5,218 scholars from Europe, about 140 fewer than in 1970, and 655 from North America, about 23 less than the year before. Only two regions had an increase in scholars, the Near and Middle East with 816, an increase of 3, and Africa with 398, an increase of 9.^^^ (1) If the brain drain Is considered to be composed of those who do not leave the United States immediately after graduation, the non-return rate for the survey nationalities as a whole is 77.8%. (2) If the brain drain is considered to be composed only of those who acquire immi- grant visas, the non- return rate for the survey nationalities as a whole is 38.6% (3) If a compromise between the definitions in (1) and (2) above is considered a workable and meaningful definition of the brain drain, the non-return rate for the total sample is 58.2%. To summarize, the survey indicates that, under a continuation of the socioeconomic conditions of the 1960's in Asia and the United States, nearly 60% of the Asian students entering the United States will remain for some significant amount of time after graduation. But findings from parts of the study not reported here indicate that, should the labor market balance change significantly, this rate would change with It. (Tai K. Oh, "A New Estimate of the Student Brain Drain from Asia," International Migration Revi&w 7 [winter 1973], pp. 449-456.) A survey of brain drain from Africa by Man Singh Das of Northern Illinois University presents a contrasting experience of African students In the United States during the fall of 1968. Man Singh Das concludes that "no such phenomenon operates in Africa as the migration of professionals has little ill effect on the economic development of African nations," (p. 81). He defines brain drain in these restrictive terms: ". . . if the migration of persons ... is dysfunctional for the sending country (for example, Egypt) in the sense that It retards the development of a society, but functional for the receiving country (for example, the United States) as well as for the individuals concerned, the phenomenon may approoriately be characterized as brain drain." (p. 77). "The problem of brain drain for Africa," he concludes, "is a doubtful one from the outset in view of the great majority of students (84 percent) who plan to return home," (p. 77). On the basis of a sample con- sisting of 372 male students. Man Singh Das reports that 84 percent planned to return home while 16 percent wished to remain in the United States. It is not known whether they did return. Man Singh Das, "Brain Drain Controversy and African Scholars," Studies in Comparative International Development 9 (Spring 1974), pp. 74-83.) 222 Ibid., pp. 11-12. 1132 Table 22. — Foreign Countries With More Than 100 Scholars in the United States, 1970-1971 COUNTRY United Kingdom Number of Foreign Scholars Japan India Germany, Fed. Rep. of Canada France 529 ■■■■■■ 4.4% Australia 428 ■■■■■■ 3.6% Israel 390aaHHi3.2% 'China, Unspecified 286i^Hi 2.4% Italy 282 ilHHi 2.3% China, Rep. of 243 ■■■ 2.0% Switzerland 236 ■■■ 2.0% Czechoslovakia 180 MB 1.5% Korea, Rep. of 180 ■■ 1.5% Spain 172 IH 1.4% Argentina 171 ■■ 1.4% Netherlands 162 i» 1.3% Sweden 147" 1.2% Brazil 136 ■1.1% United Arab Rep. 135 ■ 1.1% Philippines 132 ■ 1.1% Belgium 126 ■ 1.0% Poland 124 ■ 1.0% Yugoslavia 1131.9% Austria 112 ■ .9% Turkey 112 1 .9% Pakistan 107 ■ .9% Greece , 104 1 .9% Mexico 101 > .8% 13.2% This category consists of those whose country of citizenship was given as "China." (In many cases, these scholars are resident* of countries other than the Republic of China.) Source : Institute of International Education, Open Doors, 1971: Report on International Exchange (New York : September 1971), p. 2. 1133 According to the HE, the proportion of the total number of schol- ars from Europe shows a pattern of slow and uneven increase, while that from the Far East has declined. In 1965-66, 40 percent of the scholars were from Europe and 35 percent from the Far East, a ratio that had persisted during the preceding 4 years. In 1966-67, the proportion from Europe began to grow, unevenly, and that from the Far East to decline, to the 1971 ratio of 43 percent to 29 percent. Viewed in the long-term perspective, however, this ratio shows a slow change of direction toward the Far East. In 1954—55, the proportion was 53 percent from Europe and only 20 percent from the Far East. The proportions reported from other regions of the world in 1970-71 were the same, or no more than a 1 percent differential, as in the pre- vious year; Latin America, 7 percent; Near and Middle East, 7 per- cent ; North America, 5 percent ; Oceania, 4 percent ; and Africa, 3 per- cent. There were 29 countries that had more than 100 scholars in the United States, totaling 10,278. About one-third of this number (3,263) were from the LDCs. India ranked third on the list with 1,116 scholars. According to the HE report, there were no significant variations in the ranking on this list from that of the previous year."3 Thus, data on foreign scholars in the United States show the grow- ing prominence of the LDCs in U.S. programs of international ex- change. In some instances this trend is demonstrated by numerical increases as in the case of the Near and Middle East. But most importantly, it is demonstrated in the proportional increases that have been occurring in recent years in the direction of the LDCs and accord- ingly narrowing the gap between the source countries of Europe and those of the Far East and other LDC regions of the world. That there is substantial brain drain of foreign scholars is evident from the data presented above on pages 66-67 and 70-71 drawn from the National Science Foundation reports of 1972 and 1973 on scientists, engineers, and physicians from abroad. Some Tentative Getieralizations on Brain Drain as a Contemjyorary Prohlem From the material presented above on the brain drain as a con- temporary international problem, a series of tentative generalizations can be drawn: 1. A changing world environment occurring over the past three decades has created unique political and economic conditions for brain drain to flourish as a contemporary international phe- nomenon. 2. The political aspects of the brain drain problem are rooted in this changing world environment, specifically, in the processes of decolonization that has produced a "Third AVorld" of inde- pendent states in Asia and Africa. 3. The economic aspects of the problem derive from the nature of an evolving and globalizing industrial revolution with parallel developments in the world of science and technology. This dual phenomenon has created an expanding world economy, stimulated the universalization of knowledge, and generated a competition 223 Ibid., p. 12. In compiling the report on foreign scholars, the HE polled 2,372 U.S. institutions. Sixty-one percent responded. Of the respondents, 580 reported foreign scholars and 856 reported no foreign scholars ; 936 did not reply, (p. 18) 1134 of needs and demands, priorities and goals between the advanced industrial societies and the LDCs: the former seek expanding markets and resources, human and material, for enlarging their industrial systems; the latter seek development and moderniza- tion of their undeveloped or developing countries. One of the primary objects of the competition is to secure trained professional manpower needed by both. 4. By reordering immigration priorities to stress quality over quantity and by enlarging incentives, the advanced industrial societies have been able to draw heavily on the LDCs for their professional manpower requirements, seemingly to the detriment of the latter. 5. In this competition for trained manpower, most advanced industrial societies bear "universal culpability" for brain drain from the LDCs. The data suggest that the United States, long the mecca of world immigration, has been a prime beneficiary ; though the number of immigrant scientists and engineers has declined in 1972, the inflow of foreign physicians and surgeons continues on a steady upward trend. IV. Causes of Brain Drain : Interaction of "Push/Pull" Forces Why professional and highly skilled persons emigrate on the order of magnitude described above is a basic question to be addressed in this study. To arrive at the answer would be to clarify responsi- bility, suggest policy directions, and elucidate more sharply the re- lationship between brain drain and foreign policy. To cite Adam Smith again, since human baggage is the most im- mobile of all, the causes of professional migration are reduced to the interaction of "push/pull" forces that produce movement : the "push" force comes from the country of origin, the "pull" force from abroad. Generally, structural maladjustment and inner disequilibrium in the country of emigration or immigration, or both, activate these forces and ultimately produce brain drain."* Specifically, the movement occurs when maladjustments and disequilibria are manifested in a nation's economic, cultural and intellectual, social and political realms. "Pi^^" Factors in Brain Drain Examination of the "push" factors in brain drain fall naturally into four major categories: The economic, cultural and intellectual, social, and political. Each element contributes in its own special way to "pushing" the discontented professional into migration. ECONOMIC factors: symptom of underdevelopment Brain drain, particularly as it relates to the LDCs, derives from structural maladjustments in the economies of the developing coun- tries. An undesirable byproduct of unbalanced national development, brain drain has its root cause in the larger problems of economic development. It is a symptom more than a cause of underdevelop- ment. Briefly, brain drain can be a consequence of a forced march from a starting point of underdevelopment to what is ultimately expected to be a goal of economic modernity.""' 225 mismanagement of manpower; misconception of educational REFORM The basic problem of underdevelopment is compounded by mis- management in manpower resources and a misconception of the pur- pose of educational reform. Coming into the contemporary world from a colonial heritage, most LDCs took on many of the values, attitudes, 22' Hearings, House Government Operations Committee, Brain Drain, 1968, p. 54. (Adams testimony) 225 Ideas for this section are drawn from virtually all of the major sources on the brain drain used In this study and cited In the previous chapters. Special attention Is directed to the CIMT study, pp. 679-689 ; Adams and Dlrlam, op. clt., pp. 254-56 ; Henderson, op. clt., pp. 87-94 ; Mylnt, op. clt., pp. 238-40 ; and Adam's testimony in Hearings, House Govern- ment Operations Committee, Brain Drain, 1968, pp. 57-58. (1135) 1136 habits, and institutional forms of the old imperial order. One value most appealing to the new leaderships was belief in the regenerative power of educational reform as a means to speed modernization. As admirers of liberal democratic ideas which ascribed to education a power to transform man's environment, they sought material salvation through education. The defect of their approach lay in their failure to master concepts of orderly and rationalized manpower manage- ment. Pursuing illusions of prestige and other false goals hanging over from the colonial past, the LDCs created educational systems largely for the sake of education, essentially unplanned (at least in a sufficiently rational way), and most important, unrelated to the larger goals of national development. The result was predictable. A surplus of an educated elite was created, notably at the university level. Graduates could not be ab- sorbed by the underdeveloped economies. Thus in July 1965 The London Times could report that 40 percent of the engineers trained in Burma in 1961 had not found employment in engineering 18 months later. Graduates of Khartoum University in the Sudan engaged in a near-riotous siege of their Government as pressure to provide them with jobs. A household survey in the Philippines in the early sixties disclosed 35,000 college gradr.ates without jobs. In Thailand, more than 1,000 candidates, including university graduates, could be expected to appear for three clerical posts in the government. According to an- other report, a 1961 census in India revealed that 10.4 percent of all scientific and technical personnel were unemployed, and 18.6 percent were employed outside the occupations for which they were trained. ^^^ The persistent surplus of an educated elite is shown by the report in The Washington Post on January 21, 1973, stating that neither gov- ernment nor industry in India can absorb even half of the 600,000 graduates each year who move into the job market.^^^ Educational reform fulfilled manpower demands during the transi- tion from colonial status to independence, but the systems have con- tinued to turn out students, many poorly trained, at a progressively increasing rate (10 percent a year) often far beyond the absorptive capacity of the nations' economies. This dilemma of overproduction and underabsorption has often been compounded by the tendency to- ward indiscriminately stressing in education of quantity over quality, thereby creating a mismatch in manpower supply to demand. Follow- ing the tradition of educational preferences held by the former colonial mentors and often those traditions existing in their own societies, many students pursued the law and the humanities, liberal arts and medi- cine; they shunned the more practical related studies of science, en- gineering, agronomy, and the other technical arts so crucial for na- tional development. As a result, an imbalance was created in their nations' educational structures, adding to the accumulating surplus of educated talent. Specialists on brain drain refer to this waste of talent as "overflows," An example of this waste is seen in the case of the Philippines where in 1967, 70 percent of all registered scientific and professional people were reported to be in the medical field. According =2« Adams and Dlrlam, op. cit. Brain Drain, p. 251. =21 Lewis M. Simons, "India's Colleges Slide Into Choas," The Waahinaton Post, Jan. 21, 1973, p. 05. 1137 to Dr. Pacifico Marcos, President of the Philippine Medical Associa- tion, only half of the 28,000 registered medical doctors were in active practice. The Philippines' seven medical schools were then graduating 1,200 medical doctors a year, but only 800 were actually able to go into active practice.^^* The Philippines, therefore, suffers from both a surplus in medical personnel and an insufficiency in other science and technical related fields.229 Yet, a paradox seems to exist in this situation of apparent man- power plenty in the LDCs : The demands may seem to have been met, as evidenced by the surplus, but not necessarily the needs of the LDCs. Indeed, here seems to be the crux of the brain drain problem. As Gregory Henderson explained, the principal general cause of the brain drain seems to lie in the inability of the LDCs to create an ejfective demand for professionals despite the presence of an almost unlimited need. All other causes are subsumed under this anomaly.^^" EMIGRATIOX, AN ESCAPE HATCH FOR ELITE If the results of manpower mismanagement and the misconception of educational reform were predictable, so were the secondary conse- quences. In time many LDCs accumulated unmanageable surpluses of educated elites, discontented, unemployed, sometimes unemployable, perhaps more often underemployed. Caught in a scissors of exploding populations and limited economic resources, their economies could not expand at a rate sufficient to absorb the surplus. Avenues for indi- vidual progress were closed off by limited jobs and restricted career opportunities. A catalog of economic and social problems for this elite inevitably accumulated from this depressing situation: low salaries, unpleasant working conditions, limited chance for professional ad- vancement, demoralization, frustration, discontentment. Then there were the further burdens of lost prestige and personal dignity that come with rejection. For the educated professional the "job" is his profession, his way of life. Deprivation of the opportunity to pursue professional goals can create within him a devastating spiritual void. Lane Kirkland of the AFL-CIO described the feeling in these brusque terms: "The job is still the secret to a guy's general happiness and attitude. If you like your work, you're happy. If you don't, you're miserable." Albert Camus put it more poetically : "Without work all life goes rotten. But when work is soulless, life stifles and dies." ^^^ Faced with this hard reality, the superfluous educated man in the LDCs has two options. He can stay home, living and working beneath his potentialities and possibilities at a subprofessional level. Or he can emigrate to an advanced country in the West, notably the United States — and to a new world of opportunity and professional fulfill- 228 Harold E. Howland, Brain Brain: As it Affects the Philippines. Foreign Service Institute, Department of State. 9th Session, Senior Seminar In Foreign Policy, Washington, D.C., 1967, p. 4. 229 Amador Muriel, "Brain Drain in the Philippines : A Case Study," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (September 1970), pp. 38-39. 230 Henderson, op. cit., p. 146. 231 Quoted in, "The Worker's Day" (editorial), The Washington Post, Sept. 3. 1973, p. A26. 1138 ment. For the discontented educated elite, emigration is an escape hatch to a new and successful life; his discontentment provides the necessary "push." Cultural and Intellectual Inadequacies Thus it appears that migration is more an effect than a cause of underdevelopment and that underdevelopment is the seminal source of brain drain. Even in countries adversely affected by migration, other factors generally far outweigh the effects of migration.^^^ Among the serious economic factors are one-crop economies, shortages of capital and foreign exchange, economic instability and inflation, re- source scarcity and shortcomings in management — all indicators of underdevelopment that contribute to the "push" of outward migra- tion. Likewise in the cultural and intellectual realm, arrested tech- nological development and scientific stagnation, common characteris- tics of the LDCs, "push" trained manpower into migration. For it is axiomatic that economic resources and trained manpower are neces- sary ingredients to creating the essential cadres of talent that in turn can construct a viable scientific-technological infrastructure. INADEQUATE SCIENTinC-TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE Lacking in most LDCs are the elementary necessities for the de- velopment of science and technology : adequate government funding for research, institutions to carry on research, a sufficiency of labora- tories and equipment, journals and learned societies to disseminate findings, and most important, a scientific tradition, "Only a compar- atively small number of governments of developing countries allo- cate substantial funds for research," said the report of the U.N. Sec- retary Genera] on brain drain. "Even among the twenty or thirty na- tions who do research, sharply different levels of expenditure, plant, equipment, and professional opportunity occur. These differences are a factor leading to brain drain even among these countries." ^^^ A UNITAR study on brain drain from Lebanon expressed a view applicable to many other LDCs: "A major reason for the loss of the best talents in the country is the lack of facilities for research in the institutions." And speaking of the Arab world generally the report said: "Extensive interviews with a -wide variety of people indicate that the main reason why Arab natural scientists emigrate is because of the conditions in Arab national universities, such as lack of research facilities." "* With reference to Cameroon the report stated that facilities for training and research in the higher institutions of learning were ex- tremely limited. As evidence it cited the fact that there was still no de- partment or college of medicine. i^! CIMT Studv, p. 670. ^ ^^„ ^. 233 Report of tl.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, 1968. p. 38 :68. »* United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR). The Brain Dram from Five Developing Countries: Cameroon, Colombia. Lebanon, the Philippines, Trinidad and Tobago, (New Yorlj : 1971), pp. 86 and 91. fUNITAR Research Report No. 15). Here- after cited as, UNITAR, Brain Drain from Five LDCs, 1971. 1139 LACK OF QUALIFIED TEACHERS AND GRADUATE FACILITIES Failure of the educational systems in many LDCs to develop quali- fied teachers in science and the technical arts, a rare commodity, com- pounds the larger institutional problem. A further deficiency is that graduate training, so vital to developing a national scientific infra- structure, has not been adequately developed. Prof. A. B. Zahlan, Chairman of the Department of Physics at the American University of Beirut, explained the virtual nonexistence of graduate schools in the Middle East in a way that might be applicable for many other undeveloped areas: "It has been generally assumed that backward countries could get along with rudimentary educational institutions, and that the only source of advanced training for citizens of develop- ing countries should be the institutions of advanced countries." ^^^ Graduate training of Greek students is almost exclusively carried on abroad. Greece does not have a fully integrated training cycle for the formation of a professional class.^^^ And according to Habib Naficy, Minister for Curtural Affairs at the Iranian Embassy in Washington, with eight universities in Iran "it is still impossible to provide the higher education training demanded by qualified graduates." ^^^ By failing to develop graduate facilities, the LDC is thus placed in double jeopardy : the possibilities of creating the core talent for scientific development are further reduced, and the student going abroad be- comes vulnerable to brain drain. Added to the failure in developing graduate training are the nega- tive characteristics of LDC academic institutions. The structure of intellectual and educational institutions in many LDCs is rigid, tradi- tion-oriented, and compartmentalized, having the effect, as Dr. Frankel said, of "frustrating the innovator." ^^^ This faulty educa- tional structure adds to the problem of upward mobility for young, ambitious scholars who are trying to establish an academic career for themselves. WEAKNESSES IN COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK Finally, the absence of a network of communication contributes to intellectual stagnation in the LDCs. Academic publications, confer- ences, and seminars among scholars, important appurtenances to the scholarly life often taken for granted in the advanced countries of the West, are uncommon in the LDCs. Yet they are a vital source of group communication, interaction, and cross-fertilization. They provide the sta^e for the exchange of ideas, the testing of hypotheses, the dissemi- nation of newly acquired knowledge, and the creating of an intellec- tual environment of challenge and response, that dialectic so necessary for the advance of scholarship and learning. 2»5 Quoted In, Said, op. cit., p. 14. ^^ George Coutsoumarls, "Greece," In Adams, Brain Drain, chapter 11, p. 172. 237 Habib Naficy, " 'Brain Drain' : The Case of Iranian Non-Returnees," International Development, 1966 (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y. : Oceana, 1967), pp. 66-67. 23* Hearings, Senate Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1968, p. 22. 1140 These are missing in the LDCs. As Pakistan's leading physicist, Dr. Abdus Salam, explained in describing the rationale for the Inter- national Center for Theoretical Physics at Trieste, Italy, men of genius in the LDCs tend to go into mathematics and theoretical physics be- cause their countries lack facilities for other kinds of research. Such gifted men, he said, sooner or later are drawn to great centers of learn- mg in the West or in the Soviet Union. Some never return home; others after reaching first rank return home, but find themselves ut- terly isolated. Before the Trieste Center was established, he continued, this small group of men was too small to form a critical mass. There were no good libraries, and there was inadequate communication with similar scientific groups abroad. "There was no criticism of what they were doing. New ideas reached them too slowly," he went on. "Their work fell back within the grooves of what they were doing before they left." These men were isolated, Dr. Salam declared, and he added, "isolation in theoretical physics as in most fields of intellectual work is death." 239 PUSH or EMIGRATION Such conditions prevailing within many LDCs, as described above, can create intellectual decay and ultimately fossilization in the sciences and other fast-moving disciplines. The growth of a scientific spirit is arrested by the forces of mediocrity. Stagnation sets in, and is per- petuated by isolation from the mainstream of the international com- munication, one of the main contributors of brain drain.^^" Frustra- tion and dissatisfaction build within the intellectual community, for as Dr. Frankel said in explaining why highly trained people leave their own countries, "The scale of intellectual and cultural life is too small. It does not satisfy the need of professional and scientific people, and of teachers and intellectual leaders, for broad contacts and for opportunities for important work." ^*^ As a result of the interaction of these forces, scientific and techno- logical development in the LDCs is impaired, perhaps even consigned to a chronic state without hope or expectation of reaching the "take- off" stage to modernity. And as a consequence, scientists, engineers, physicians, and surgeons, representing a form of human capital which is universally marketable, are "pushed" by these internal forces into going elsewhere. Social Factors Causing Brain Drain Social pressures generated within the LDCs add considerable force to the "push" of outward migration of professionals. Traditions, drawn from a nation's historical past and reinforced by the legacy of the colonial experience, can be an obstacle to social change within the LDCs. Past customs, habits, and values, deeply engrained in tradi- tional societies, are difficult to change, much less expunge, yet many conflict with the requirements of modernization and impose a special burden on the progressive forces. 23» Walter Sullivan, "Center for Physics In Trieste Tries To Checli Brain Drain from Third World," The New York Times, Nov. 23, 1969, p. 82. ««Dr. Michael J. Moravcsik, physicist. Director of the Institute of Theoretical Science at the University of Oregon, and a student of brain drain, writes : "The problem of Isolation must be faced also because it is one of the main contributors of the brain drain." Communi- cations Among Scientists and Its Implications to Developing Countries (May 1970, p. 4). 2*1 Hearings, Senate Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1968, p. 22. 1141 ARCHAIC TRADITIONS AS OBSTACLE TO PROGRESS Traditions and customs often rigidify the social structures of tra- ditional societies, perpetuating inherited class barriers, reinforcing the inequities of social and economic discrimination, and infusing the social order with mediocrity, bureaucratism, and nepotism. Educa- tional institutions, as noted above, suffer from this disability. But what is more important, this spirit can permeate the whole of society. Inherited social status, family position, and political connections, rather than individual talent and capability, and the importance of particular jobs for the task of nation-building, become the criteria for holding professional positions, structuring salary scales, and creat- ing social status and prestige. Such a dislocation of talent, rewards, and status in society effectively excludes the talented young intellec- tual from playing a proper and positive role in his society. In the case of India, V. M. Dandekar, Director of the Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Poona, India, observed that this was a "disease" underlying the entire brain drain phenomenon. As a result, the intellectual classes of India are alienated totally from the rest of society and anything but an intellectual life has developed within the ranks of the intellectuals. And he concludes with this severe judg- ment: "These ranks have been infiltrated by wrong persons with wrong aptitudes and wrong motivations, and bureaucracy, servility, frustration, and resentment permeate the intellectual life in the coun- try. These conditions keep the young talented persons away from their home." "2 SOCIAL AND RACIAL DISCRIMINATION One of the most serious social aspects of traditional societies that contributes to the "push" factor is discrimination. (Many LDCs fall into the "traditional" category.) Eigidly established class and racial barriers bar the gifted professionals from positions commensurate with their talent. The Chinese in Malaya, the Asians in Kenya, and the Tamils in Ceylon are adversely affected by discriminatory attitudes and legislation.-^^ Qualified native Cameroonians are often denied jobs that go to employees of foreign organizations, thus closing off career prospects for native professional cadres and forcing them to go elsewhere.2** Speaking of discrimination in Africa, K. K. A. Gardiner, Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Com- mission for Africa, applied to Nigeria a principle that has universal relevance: "Given the general scarcity of nation-building talent, a country like Nigeria cannot indulge in the luxury of differentiating between Ibos, Hausas, and Yorubas in the selection of advancement of personnel." -*^ Dr. William C. Johnstone of Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies recounts the experience of 2i/^ years in Burma in setting up an international relations program at the University of ^2 V. M. Dandekar, "India," In Adams, Brain Drain, pp. 228-229. Dr. Adams discusses the social aspects of brain drain in, Hearings, House Government Operations Committee, Brain Drain, 1968, pp. 55-56. See also, CIMT stud.v. pp. 710-712. 2^^ Report Ditchley Park Conference on Brain Drain, 1968. p. 15. 2" UNITAR, Braiti Drain from Five LDCs. 1971, p. 122. 2« Adams and Dirlam, op. cit, p. 260. Advertisements of job opportunities placed in The Nev York Times during April 1974 by the Nigerian delegation currently attempting to retrieve lost professional talent carries the statement familiar to Americans but also par- ticularly relevant to Nigerians, "An Equal Opportunity Employer." 1142 Rangoon. To his surprise he found a clerk in one of Rangoon's main hotels who had an M.A. from the University of Chicago under Quincy Wright and was "a very competent teacher." He also discovered an- other young man with an M.A. from the University of Southern Cali- fornia, interested in radio and electronics, who was working with a private firm. The university needed the skills of the international rela- tions specialist, he said, and the government "certainly needed the skills of somebody in electronics." But, according to Dr. Johnstone, "Both were barred from any kind of government jobs because they were Karens, Shans ; not Burmese." And he added, "This is a factor which I think is true in many countries." ^*® REJECTION or IXXOVATIOX Resistance to innovation is another social aspect of traditional societies that adds to the "push" factor of outward migration. Innova- tion is a necessary ingredient of modernization. It often requires a different perception of the roles played by scientists, engineers, tech- nologists, and other educated professionals. It commonly requires acceptance of radical economic and technological changes and the realization that the ever-accelerating rate of these changes are creating a new class or a new elite of human capital. This emerging scientific- technical-managerial elite refuses to accept traditional values and established power relationships and has acquired values and traditions of its own that transcend national boundaries. Characteristically it is ambitious, able, impatient ; and what is most important, it is a mobile class which threatens the stability, inertia, and conservatism of tra- ditional societies. It insists on a broad stage for its activities and searches out the social environment receptive to innovation. Not all traditional societies of the LDCs are prepared to accept this principle of change, and accordingly push their talent into emigration, for as Dr. Adams observed, "In order to retain such manpoAver, a society must be prepared for constant self-renewal — for permanent self- transformation." 2*^ PREJLT)ICE AGAINST SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY What makes many traditional societies unreceptive to changes re- quired for modernization today is a prejudice against science and tech- nology in favor of jurisprudence, the humanities, and liberal arts. This prejudice permeates such societies and their culture ; it has a spoiling effect on the development of the scientific spirit; it produces values and priorities that frequently conflict with the requirements of a modern industrial order; and it pushes the scientist and technologist into emigration. For denial of status and prestige, which is the main point here, carries with it tangible social, political, and economic dis- abilities, the most important being the inability of the scientist and technologist to function as respected professionals with power and influence in their own country. =** Department of State, Proceedings of Workshop on the International Migration of Talent and Skills, October 1966, p. 116. 2" Hearings, House, Government Operations Committee, Brain Drain, 1968, p. 57. 1143 In Hispanic cultures, notably in Latin America, science and tech- nology are not held in high esteem. Scientists, engineers, and other technologists do not enjoy the prestige and recognition extended to those in the "liberal" professions. Indeed, the dominant elites are inclined to place a low value on science and technology as degrading.^^^ As the report of the Pan American Health Organization on brain drain from Latin America said : "The most fundamental problem con- fronting the development of science — including biomedical science — in Latin America relates not to any specific deficiency but to a complex of social attitudes that result in a nonscientific or an antiscientific attitude on the part of the population generally and often on the part of political leaders as well." "*® Without status and prestige, Latin American scientists and tech- nologists are excluded from participation in government activities and in other areas of national life where they could contribute to national development.^^" A more tangible consequence of this prejudice is a failure by govern- ments and societies to give scientists and technologists adequate sup- port for carrying on their work. Studies on the state of science and technology in Latin America invariably emphasize the failure of ade- quate funding. Other countries hold similar prejudices, and the effects are predict- able. The lack of proper status and adequate recognition for scientists and technologists is a factor in compelling Africans with initiative and special aptitude to emigrate to France and Britain.^" Korea, Taiwan and South Vietnam hold similar misplaced values.^^^ Even Britain shares this prejudice, which has been a factor in pushing its scientists and technologists into migration to North America.^^^ In the Philip- pines the same is true. The medical profession is the most prestigious of all. This is an established national tradition. And parents will make great sacrifices to put their children through medical school.^^* Conse- quently, the Philippines produce an enormous surplus of doctors, while the disciplines of science and technology, so necessary for balanced na- tional development but held in low esteem, are virtually ignored. 2« Skolnlkoflf, op. cit., pp. 200-201. 2" Pan American Health Organization, Migration of Health Personnel, Scientists, and Enffineers from Latin America (Washington: September 1966), p. 48. (Scientific publica- tion No. 142.) Hereafter cited as, Report on Brain Drain from Latin America, Pan American Health Organization, 1966. 23* Ismael Escobar of the Inter-American Development Bank observed at a conference on science and technology meeting in Santiago, Chile : "As a result of exclusion from govern- mental bodies and foreign affairs, scientists are unable to contribute to such great socio- economic movements as Latin American unity, the trend towards reglonallzation and eco- nomic, educational and scientific integration." United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Final Report of the Conference on the Application of Science and Technology to the Development of Latin America, Organized by UNESCO with the coopera- tion of the Economic Commission for Latin America, Santiago, Chile, Sept. 13-22. 1965. p. 168. Hereafter cited as, UNESCO, Final Report of Conference on. the Application of Science and Technology to the Development of Latin America, 1965. 2«i R. K. A. Gardiner, "Africa," In, Adams, chapter 13, pp. 197-198. -82 Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel From LDCs, Nov. 5, 1968, p. 46.86. ^ss James A. Wilson cited the following as a cause for emigration: "That scientific research as such is not respected ; that scientists are not welcomed into general industrial management ; that the rewards in Britain go to the liberal-arts trained Oxbridge and Eton types." (The value pattern of productive scientists, as reflected In the contemporary "brain-drain" from Britain to North America. Project on, "The impact of American values of the current revolution in science and technology," conducted at the University of Pittsburgh, September 1965, p. 6. Preliminary draft.) ^"Howland, op. cit., p. 4. 1144 TREND TOWARD URBANIZATION Another social factor that creates "push" conditions for professional manpower in the LDCs is the world trend toward urbanization. In- variably, intellectuals concentrate in cities. Cities are centers of wealth, opportunity, and intellectual intercourse. Educational and cultural institutions, hospitals, seats of governments, and major industries are generally located in urban areas. Life is also more comfortable in the cities than in many rural areas. Intellectuals can, moreover, share com- mon professional interests with friends and colleagues living in close proximity with one another in an urban environment.^^^ A special problem arises in the LDCs where the surplus educated elite are concentrated in urban areas. Unable to be absorbed into the economy, this elite represents, at least potentially, a social hazard for the country and an opportunity for brain drain to the advanced coun- tries, because they are usually unemployed or underemployed. This elite shuns the countryside where in some professions, such as medicine, a need exists. According to Dr. Marcos, in Manila there is one doctor for every 671 persons; in rural areas the ratio is 1 for every 5,000.^^^ Yet, the Philippines has a surplus of doctors. Of a total of 28,000 M.D.s, one-half practice in Manila and other cities, one-fourth are not practicing at all, and the other fourth immigrate to the United States.^^^ In India, another country with a surplus of M.D.s, 60 percent of the rural clinics in East Punjab are without doctors.^^* The same is true of Bolivia where 51 percent of its annual output of M.D.s applied for immigration to the United States in 1965, at a time when most of the country's rural areas were inadequately served by doctors.^^" (The habit of concentrating in the great metropolitan areas continues after foreign medical graduates (FMGs) come to the United States. They shun the rural areas where the medical need is great and settle in the large cities. In 1970, 90.8 percent of all FMGs were located in 300 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas, a percentage that has remained constant since 1963.) ^so Urbanization in the LDCs with the problems it creates for the edu- cated elite, particularly that of their allocation for optimal social use, and the special preference of this elite for city life as opposed to the country, creates "push"' conditions for the dispossessed and discon- tended intellectual. If there is a way out through emigration to an advanced country, he will take it if he can. The CIMT study stated the problem and its resolution very succinctly: "People [i.e. profes- sionals] prefer to remain in cities, even if they are unemployed. If these unemployed or underemployed people are given a choice of migrating to rural areas in the country or of migrating to another country, they tend to choose the latter." -^^ ^ CIMT Study, p. 683. 2*9 Rowland, op. cit., p. 4. =»7 1>ublln, op. cit.. p. 875. ''ss Report, Ditchley Park Conference on Brain Drain, 1968^ p. 16. 2^ Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, 1968, p. 45.85. 2«o AMA, FMG Study. 1971, pp. 13-14. ^^ CIMT Study, p. 683. The Ditchley Conference report made a similar observation : "Many doctors and other professionally qualified people prefer to emigrate rather than work in rural areas." (p. 16). 1145 CX)MPULSION TO EMIGRATE By nature, traditional societies in the LDCs work at cross-purposes with the spirit of the scientific-technological age and accordingly cre- ate conditions that generate brain drain. Institutions, like society it- self, rigidly structured and closed to innovation, become both the per- petuator and protector of socially archaic, outmoded values. Political power tends to remain with the keepers of the status quo, unshared with the innovators, thus raising the threshold of change and modernization. Processes of societal and intellectual calcification prevent upward mobility of the young and ambitious, frustrate intel- lectual growth, depress the spirit of scientism, reduce the horizons of action and expectation among the scientific-technological intelligentsia, and impose a negative attitude toward the role of science and the science-oriented man in modern society. Demoralized and uncertain about his future and that of his country and pushed by forces of so- cial obscurantism into a choice, the intellectual finds escape in immi- gration to the advanced technological societies of the West.^®^ Political Factors Causing Brain Brain: Intellectual Repression Oppression, instability and unrest, governmental indifference to scientific development, and erosion of loyalties among nationals are political elements that push professional manpower into migration. Science and technology can flourish within totalitarian systems, but seem most ideally to flourish in a free environment unhindered and unimpeded where freedom of thought and inquii-y, so necessary to the pursuit of the scientific method, are given full reign. Failure to achieve this ideal often pushes scientists and other professionals into migra- tion. Others suffering direct political persecution seek the same way out, for political tyranny and politically inspired anti-intellectualism can destroy the scientific spirit. Classic cases of men who suffered for their beliefs and emigrated, are those of Einstein, Enrico Fermi, and numerous other scientists, includ- ing Nobel laureates Born, Debye, Chain, Krebs, Lipmann, Loevi, von Hess, Perutz, and Schroedinger, who fled Germany and Austria dur- ing the Nazi period.^®^ Less prominent are the thousands of profes- sionals who fled Cuba and other Communist dominanted lands in the postwar period. During 1960-61 alone, 1,360 doctors immigrated to the United States from Castro's Cuba. This figure comprised one- fourth of Cuba's medical manpower and represented an output of 3 years of its faculty of medicine. Two months after the Soviet bloc in- vasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, some 1,500 refugees had been processed by the U.S. Consulate in Vienna for immigration to the United States. Many of these refugees were professionals.^®* During January to June 1973, 115 doctors fled Communist East Germany to West Germany in search of freedom and higher incomes, much to the displeasure of the Honecker regime, which needed the manpower and deplored the loss of a substantial investment.^®^ From ^^ Some scientists and engineers In advanced countries are also Influenced by this psy- chological mood of uncertainty about the future of their country and thus choose to emi- grate. This attitude was expressed In the following statement by the British Council of Engineering Institutions which, taken with the lower prestige factor of scientists and engineers In British society, acts as a precondition for emigration : "The lack of faith on the part of its young men In the future of the United Kingdom as a technological power Is a serious threat to the country's future." (Quoted In, Sllj, op. clt, p. 9.) ** Adams and Dlrlam, op. clt., p. 259. »* Adams, "Talent That Won't Stay Put," p. 73. »6 The Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 11, 1973, p. 8. 1146 January 1972, when restrictions on East-West contacts were eased in the GDK, until September 1973 some 3,000 East German physicians, scientists, and technologists fled to West Germany, according to an authoritative East German source.^®® Under pressures of harsh discrimination, some Jews from the Soviet scientific community and many from other sectors of the intelligentsia, probably numbering in the thousands, have been permitted to emigrate to Israel in recent years. Others like Zhores A. Medvedev, the noted Soviet geneticist and civil rights dissident writer, have lost their citizenship while abroad, and still others like Andrei Sakharov, Rus- sia's world renowned physicist and father of the Soviet H-bomb, suffer serious personal and professional deprivations and are objects of harsh regime attacks. From time to time, scientific communities in Latin America, particularly in Brazil and Argentina, have been targets of direct political attacks and outright persecution by hostile political regimes. Emigration of valuable faculty members and de- struction of scientific centers long in building have often resulted.^^^ POLITICAL INSTABIIJTY AND UNREST Political instability and unrest are disruptive to orderly national life and unsettling to professionals. Pushed by forces of political adversity, they often seek tranquility in other lands. In generalizing on the reasons for such behavior. Dr. Kidd explained that this factor is one of a number of "push" forces "inherent in the process of development itself." ^^^ Instability is a common characteristic of political life in those LDCs that are in the early stages of modernization coupled with new responsibilities of self-government. Many emerging nations, faced' with so many new challenges all at once, proved to be incapable of orderly transition from colonialism to independence. Institutions often hastily grafted on the body politic from essentially alien cul- tures could not withstand the burdens of self-rule. Universities have been especially vulnerable to the adverse effects of unrest issuing from these conditions. Often politicized to the ex- treme, they tend to become enmeshed in the conflicts for power. Po- litical unrest among university students may result in frequent strikes and sporadic mob violence which makes normal academic life im- possible. ^^^ Continued residence under such political conditions is sometimes uncongenial, if not dangerous, for academic professionals, particularly those who believe that the university is a marketplace for the free exchange of ideas and that scholars have a right and obliga- tion to examine and discuss all problems no matter how contemporary or relevant to conditions at home.^^" =«« Journal of Joseph G. Whelan, Notebook No. 3, Sept. 25, 1973, pp. 166-175. ^ For a discussion of experiences In Brazil and Argentina, see H. Movses Nussenzvelg, 'Migration of Scientists from Latin America," Science, 165 (Sept. 26, "1969) pp. 1328- 1332. Mr. Charles V. Kldd of the Executive Office of Science and Technology made the following all-lncluslve judgment on the cause of brain drain from Argentina : "In Argentina. I would venture the guess that the structural problems, the nature of the unlversitv the antiquated university structure, and the political situation, the heritage of Peron — all put together are the primary reasons for migration from Argentina." (Hearings, Senate Judici- ary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1968, p. 84.) »* Hearings, Senate, Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1968, p. 80. ^isMylnt, op. clt., pp. 243-244. 270 Melvln J. Fox, "Some Pluses and Minuses of the Brain Drain," In, International Devel- opment, 1966, op. clt., p. 74. 1147 Unrest and instability can drive professionals into migration. As physicist A. B. Zahlan of the American University of Beirut observed, "Today, political instability may be the greatest factor behind migra- tion because there are other 'stable' countries to which scientists can go." 2" Generalizing on the consequences of adverse political developments, including instability and unrest, and their relevance to brain drain, the CIMT study stated : "These movements have generally resulted in losses of large numbers of highly trained people who might otherwise have made a substantial contribution to the development of their own society." ^^^ GOVERXMENTAL INDIFFERENCE TO SCIENTIFIC DEVELOPMENT Governmental indifference to scientific development, science policy, research support, and the role of scientists in society provides moti- vation for many scientists and engineers to emigrate. This "push" fac- tor is closely related to the low prestige accorded science and technol- ogy in some parts of the Third World. Assigned a low priority in a nation's value system, scientists and engineers suffer deprivations ac- cordingly in the allocation of resources, in the shortfall of rewards, and in minimal participation in national development. The predictable consequence is emigration. "Among research scien- tists" in Africa, wrote R. K. A. Gardiner, "a sense of dissatisfaction with an attitude of indifference which prevents their ideas from being put into practice, provides a powerful urge to go elsewhere." "^ Prof. Amador Muriel portrays graphically the impoverished and primitive state of Philippine science and then concludes: "As in all other pro- fessions, the chief motive for emigration is poor working conditions bred by government apathy and corruption." ^^* A UNESCO study on science and technology in Latin American development attributed one of the "most evident" "push" factors for emigration to the ". . . absence of a national policy for science and technology which would ensure that adequate means are provided for scientific work and that it is properly related to the country's general development." =^" EROSION OF NATIONAL LOYALTIES Less directly related to the impact of political acts of governments in "pushing" professionals into migration, but nonetheless a power- 2n Science and technology In developing countries. Nader and Zahlan, op. clt., p. 491. Professor Nader added this explanation : "The problem of political instability In relation to developing scientific institutions beconnes important because there are other places In the world to which scientists from developing countries can go. Moreover, those who do not leave are prevented or hindered by political upheavals from developing the kind of support system for science which I have outlined. If a developing country aims at having a flourish- ing network of scientifically trained persons making various contributions In support of scientific activities, including research, then this network has to be protected from political disorders. The International political situation of today is quite diflferent from that which prevailed when England and Italy were developing their scientific institutions." !"2 CIMT study, p. 695. Lafi Ibrahim Jaafarl, a Ph. D. from Iowa State University, con- cluded in a study on Palestinian and Jordanian Arab brain drain to the United States that, "Political instability at home is not the primary reason why students come to the United States to study, but it is one of the major reasons why they do not return." (The Brain Drain to the United States : The Migration of Jordanian and Palestinian Professionals and students," Journal of Palestine Studies, 3 (Autumn 1973), p. 123.) 2" Gardiner, op. cit., p. 198. 27* Muriel, op. clt., p. 39. ^ ^ ,. '"^ UNESCO, Final Report of the Conference on the Application of Science and i ecn- nology to th( Development of Latin America, 1965, p. 30. 1148 ful and pervasive force, is the erosion of national loyalties that eases transition to life in a new land. Various elements contribute to the erosion of national loyalties. The universality of science usually creates a binding sense of brotherhood am'ong like-minded world scientists. From this unique relationship there often develops a kind of transcendent loyalty that eases com- munication and interaction, and creates conditions for developing larger and more universal values than those restricted to national frontiers. Saleh Ambah of Saudi Arabia's College of Petroleum and Minerals explained : "The higher an individual moves in the technical and professional scale, the greater his mobility and the less the differ- ences which are attributable to national culture." ^^^ Expatriation frequently comes with long exposure to other lands and cultures, especially among foreign students who come to advanced countries at a young age and after a period of time find their sense of national loyalty substantially diluted. Reflection on conditions and career possibilities at home can provide the necessary "push" to effect the final break. For Christian Arabs who admire Western culture, such transitions are not difficult. Nor is it difficult for students in Britain from the Commonwealth LDCs as well as from more prosper- ous Australia, New Zealand, and Canada to transfer loyalties in re- sponse to the sociological and cultural attractions of the "mother coun- try" that overcome loyalty to their native country.^^^ Then there are those like the "too many trained" Cameroonians who, in the words of the UNITAR study, "lack a strong sense of nationalism and respon- sibility toward the development of the country" and find changing allegiance to France or some other advanced country no great wrench- ing experienced^* ^'■PulV Factors in Brain Drain "Pull" factors are the converse of "push" factors : combined, they stimulate brain drain. The "pull" factors, like those providing* the "push" of migration, lend themselves to the convenient economic, cultural and intellectual, social, and political categories. ECONOMIC factors: vitality or TIIE AMERICAN ECONOMY By far the most powerful "pull" factor is the economic strength of the advanced receiving countries, particularly the United States. America's scientific-technological civilization, the main source of its economic prowess, attracts talented if less affluent professionals from abroad. The growth of American power in the decades since the close of World War II has been phenomenal. The principal base for this power was the Nation's economic vitality. Economic growth was the natural result of a combination of favorable conditions existing in the United States: an abundance of resources, human and material; mastery of advanced techniques of production, distribution and marketing; com- mitment to universal education ; and possession of a national and his- !"« Saleh Ambah, "The Role of the College of Petroleum and Minerals In the Industrial- ization of Saudi Arabia," Tn Nader and Zahlan, op. clt., p. 253. *" Mvint, op. clt. p. 237. =f™ UNITAR, Brain Drain From Five LDCs, 1971, p. 122. 1149 toric commitment to industrialism. As the Cold War gained momen- tum, the Nation's economy was gradually adapted to meet growing foreign policy and defense requirements. Defense and space, high priority needs in foreign policy, absorbed much of the vast energies of the expanding American economy. Growth was stimulated by mas- sive support from the Federal Government, not only in direct outlays of funds for defense and space, but what is more important for con- siderations on brain drain, in the form of research and development in science and technology. R. & D. became one of the main catalysts for brain drain of professionals from abroad. GOVERNMENT SUPPORTED R. & D. Data on the extent of federally supported R. & D. in the 1960's are impressive. The total expenditure on R. & D. in U.S. industry rose from $7,731 million in 1957 to $14,197 million in 1965 ; 55 percent of it came from Federal funds. In 1965, the number of federally financed R. & D. scientists and engineers totaled 162,000, or nearly half of all such personnel (346,000) in industry. The Department of Defense supported 59 percent and the National Aeronautics and Space Admin- istration 30 percent of all R. & D. scientists and engineers employed in Federal projects."^ During the years of 1958-66, the expansion of the Nation's science and engineering manpower was dramatic. The number of R. & D. sci- entists and engineers in industry increased by 47 percent from 243,800 in January 1958 to 358,900 in 1966. In the same period industrial R. & D. funds increased by 84 percent. During this period R. & D. scientists and engineers increased markedly in two industries closely related to defense and aerospace: 43,300, or 90 percent, in electrical equipment and communications, and 42,100, or 72 percent, in aircraft and missiles. Federal financing was proportionately largest in these industries, 63 percent and 88 percent respectively. "It is a striking fact," wrote Brinley Thomas, an economics professor at the University of Wales, "that no less than 74 percent of all-industry growth in em- ployment of R. & D. scientists and engineers in the last 8 years occurred in these two industries, largely governed by the defense and space programs of the Federal Government." '^^° In 1966, the air- craft and missile industry alone employed 28 percent of all R. & D. scientists and engineers.^^ Comparative figures on United States and West European R. & D. underscore the intensity of the American commitment to science and technology. Spending in 1969 for R. & D. amounted to about $24 bil- lion annually in the United States, more than two-thirds of which was federally financed. Western Europe with a much larger population, spent only $6 billion annually. And though the population of Britain, France, West Germany, Belgium, and The Netherlands totalled nearly that of the United States, these countries put only about half as many scientists, engineers and technicians in R. & D. : the United States em- ployed 1.2 million ; the five West European nations, 519,000.2«2 ="* Thomas, oo. cit., pp. 40-^41. 280 Ibid., pp. 41-42. 281 Ibid., p. 42. «2 Adams. Talent That Won't Stay Put, p. 77. 1150 Expenditures in R. & D. on this scale enhanced the technological predominance of the United States in the world.^*^ Parallel increases in Federal expenditures, though not on the same scale, were made in the Nation's health services during the postwar decades as economic and social pressures stimulated a governmental response to the grow- ing health needs of the American people. The combination of both created unique conditions to drain talent from many countries into the United States.^** SHORTAGES OF SCIENTISTS, ENGINEERS, AND PHYSICIANS American preeminence in science and technology would have been sufficient to attract manpower from abroad. Disadvantaged profes- sionals from the LDCs and even the dissatisfied from the advanced countries of Europe, "pushed" by multiple forces within their own lands, would find the American environment appealing and profes- sionally satisfying. But added economic incentive was given to this natural attraction by the disequilibrium in the supply and demand of certain categories of professional manpower. ^^^ As Dr. Kidd observed, "scientists and engineers are in chronically short supply in tech- nologically advanced countries." ^^^ This was true of the United States ; it was also true of other advanced countries.^*^ Expansion of American science and technology along with the ex- pansion of the Nation's health services created a demand for man- power that the American educational system could not satisfy. Over- supply, especially in the LDCs, and undersupply in the United States created a natural "pull" interaction, to the advantage of the United States, but a marked disadvantage to the LDCs. As Dr. Kidd notes : "Highly trained people are difficult to produce, and importation of brains is less expensive than tl^e expansion of uni- versities. The attainment of important national goals is made easier by immigration." ^^^ In brief, economic disequilibrium in supply and demand creates the "pull" and immigration provides the means. Perhaps the largest contributor to the economic "pull" factor in the United States, in addition to the undersupply of scientists and engi- »8* British Prime Minister Wilson gave this explanation for United States leadership : "America's technological dominance In so many parts of the worid derives from the original opportunities presented by her own wide, dynamic open market ; it derives too from the fact that her Industries are sufficiently developed and massive, sufficiently free from undue fragmentation, to enable her to reap the advantages of large-scale production which mod- ern technology demands. ... So It must be for us." (EFTA Reporter, Jan. 9, 1967, quoted In Hearings, House, Government Operations Committee. Brain Drain, 1968. p. 59). *8* Dr. Frankel gave the following explanation for U.S. Government responsibility for brain drain : "Finally, It Is important. In the Interests of accuracy, to recall that United States Government funds may have an indirect and unintended impact on the 'brain drain'. We do not know the figures, which by their very essence would be hard to get at. Undoubtedly, however, foreigners do come to our country, and occupy positions in labora- tories, hospitals, universities, and the like — positions that exist because the United States Government, through Its general assistance to research, development and educational activities in the national interest, has provided financial resources. In this sense, there Is probably an indirect Government contribution to the 'brain drain'. But the extent of this contribution is naturally hard to measure, and its significance Is even harder to appraise" (Hearings. Senate Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1968, p. 17.) *» Mylnt. OD. clt.. p. 236. „ ^ s** UNESCO, Final Report on the Conference * Stevens-Vermeulen, op. clt., p. xil. =«5 Thomas, op. clt., p. 40. *^Eren, op. clt., p. 11. -.r.^I^^P"'"* °^ ^■^- Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, 1968, op. 35.60—61. *» The New York Times, Feb. 17, 1974, p. 8. 1155 States three-fourths of them earned over $400 a month, and 40 per- cent earned over $800 a month.^"" Even among advanced countries, American salaries attract the less advantaged professional. Starting salaries of most professional cate- gories in the United States are three times higher than in Britain. Estimates for other countries confirm the wide salary differential."" And as in the case of Britain, Netherlands, and Sweden, low salaries paid to scientists and engineers are correlated with the greatest "drain" of professional manpower.^" This differential in salaries as Adams and Dirlam observed, "is an inevitable magnet for migra- tion." "== Salary and the high standard of living that it can provide the itinerant professional in the United States exert, as Dr. Giorgi wrote, "a permanent draw." ^^^ Current data from the National Science Foundation corroborate these observations on salary and living standard as a substantial "pull" factor in professional immigration. A sample survey in mid-1970 of some 8,000 alien scientists and engineers who were admitted into the United States between February 1964 and January 1969 and who were reported as permanent U.S. residents in January 1961, revealed that "most often" (between 60-70 percent) they were "seeking a higher standard of living." It was also found that about 90 percent earned more than $10,000 yearly and 9 percent more than $20,000. According to the survey, about one-half said that their current salary was at least 200 percent greater than those abroad. On the basis of this survey, NSF concluded : Immigration of scientists and engineers leads to greatly increased income, more intellectual freedom, and opportunities for these personnel to advance them- selves and their families professionally and personally.*^* Closely related to the salary factor in attracting professional man- power is that of career opportunity often denied scientists, engineers, and other professionals in their own country. The lure of a promising career in American industry, the universities, the medical establish- ment, and even the Government is compelling to the economically disadvantaged and professionally dispossessed. As Stevens and Ver- muelen said, FMGs have "virtually unlimited opportunities to prac- tice medicine in major cities" of America.^^^ Few Saudi Arabian stu- =*» Hearings, Senate Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1968. p. 79. ^0 Adams and Dirlam, op. clt., p. 248. ^ Sllj. op. clt., p. 9. 312 Adams and Dirlam, op. cit., d. 248. "3 UNESCO, Final Report of the Conference on the Application of Science and Technol- ogy to the Development of Latin America, 1965, p. 174. DeTocquevllle understood the nature of this "permanent draw" early in the American experience. After his visit to the United States, he wrote in his "Democracy in America" published in 1832 : "To build a house, to run a ship, to manufacture an object, or to pro- duce w'Jeat, the American people always found a way to use half the manpower needed in Europe. Hence, salaries are twice as high and this in turn draws large groups of Immi- grants." (Quoted by Dr. Kldd in Hearings, House Government Operations Committee, Brain Drain, 1968, p. 49. ) ^, ... ^ 31* National Science Foundation, Immigrant Scientists and Engineers in the United States: A Study of Characteristics and Attitudes, 1973, pp. vi-vlii. NSF 73-302. (Here- after cited as, "NSF, Study of Characteristics and Attitudes of Immigrant Scientists and Engineers in the U.S., 1973.") 31" Stevens and Vermeulen, op. cit., p. xll. 1156 dents emigrate, according to the UNITAR study, "probably because they are offered excellent professional opportunities in their own coun- try." "The chief reason for emigration in the Arab world," the study noted, "is the inability to find an adequate job" ^^® The same is true of other areas of the world. In 1966 Dr. Dael L. Wolfle, then Executive Officer of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, referred to this more or less universal truth at a State Department workshop on international migration. In explaining both internal and external brain drain, he said : "We talk of this as a brain drain when it comes across national boundaries, but the reasons for move- ment . . . are likely to be much the same. They are reasons of oppor- tunity. They are reasons of positions offered." ^" But the pull of immigration to the United States is not necessarily left to chance. In competing in the world labor market for highly skilled manpower, American business firms, especially those with over- seas connections, actively recruit. Universities have found foreign stu- dents a rich field for recruitment for permanent staff, for ongoing positions, and for research. Hospitals and other health services institu- tions have similarly found a rich field among foreign medical gradu- ates. Published announcements on career opportunities in the press and professional journals and even recruiting visits to foreign coun- tries are not uncommon practices."* REVOLUTION IN WORLD COMMUNICATIONS The revolution in modern communications is a final "pull" factor in the economics of professional migration. This revolution created an individual mobility unprecedented in the history of mankind. Com- munications specialists like Marshall McLuhan now speak of the world as a "global village" and a "contracting planet." ^^^ Expansion of the world's educational systems, responding more to popular demands than to immediate needs, combined with this revolution in communi- cations to foster a universalization of knowledge. These forces encour- aged the development of transnational communities of professional 3i« UNITAR, Brain Drain From Five LDCs, 1971, p. 91. Lafi Ibrahim Jaafarl discovered from a survey of Palestinian and Jordanian students and professionals residing in the United States that the initial motivation for education In the United States changed from "becoming of more benefit to my country" to "improving job opportunities." In the United states where there is a "better professional environment" most of the respondents felt that the career opportunities were greater. Hence, the rationale for immigration. Forty-five percent of the respondents were planning to remain in the United States either temporarily or permanently. (Jaafarl, op. cit., pp. 123 and 125.) ^^ Department of State, Proceedings oS Workshop on the International Migration of Talent and Skills, October 1966, p. 138. ^* Aspects of the recruiting activities of American business and universities is discussed by Rev. William J. Gibbons, S.J. director, Scientific Manpower Survey, Fordham University, In Hearings, House Government Operations Committee, Brain Drain, 1968, pp. 4, 6-7. See also the example inserted in the testimony of Dr. Donald F. Hornlg in, Hearings, Senate Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1968, p. 103. An an- nouncement in the New Scientist, an English publication, on Nov. 17, 1966 noted the arrival of a recruiting team from America to discuss new job opportunities in the United States for qualified British engineers and scientists. It went on to say : "Employers will pay the full fare to the States for you, your family and belongings — probably offer you an advanced study course — give you staff support and facilities you never had before, and do their best to make you feel at home. The powerful American economy offers terrific prospects for tech- nical people at all levels of experience. Major long-term projects opening up are creating countless new opportunities. Back orders alone run into billions of dollars. The profes- sional's role in research, development and manufacture is highly valued in the USA. Employ- ers are more willing than ever to hire a man for his potential and give him lots of respon- sibility fast." ^"Robert Leestma, "OE's Institute of International Studies," American Education (May 1969), (HEW reprint pp. 5-8). 1157 men. And these communities enabled the most isolated professional in the LDCs to know and to move wherever opportunities beckoned. A "common market" for brainpower developed, transcending na- tional boundaries. Improved transportation and communication, the global flow and accessibility of market information, increased indi- vidual mobility, the universalizing of knowledge, standardizing of professional training, and rationalizing of the mechanism for allocat- ing talent — all interacted to aid the "pull" forces in the international movement of brains and talent. A SUMMIXG UP OF ECONOMIC "pULL" FORCES Realities of American economic strength have been a compelling force in pulling the disadvantaged scientist, technologist, and physi- cian into the path of immigration. Promise of continued economic growth as the world's greatest industrial power, evidence of a con- tinued Government commitment to R. & D., and undersupply of pro- fessional manpower created a natural attraction. High salaries, career opportunities, and prospects for improved present and future living standards added vital economic incentives. The revolution in com- munications, like a "want ad" in a local newspaper, brought these opportunities to the attention of professionals in the most remote parts of Africa, Asia, and Latin America. With the conveniences and cheap- ness of modern transportation, they could come, and did come, to America. Cultural and Intellectual '"''PulV Forces in Brain Drain An advanced scientific-technological civilization in the West is a powerful cultural and intellectual force attracting skilled manpower into migration. This is especially true of the United States, the center of scientific and technological power in the world today. U.S. DRAWING POWER AS A "CENTER OF EXCELLENCE" The United States is a "center of excellence," a term used by stu- dents of brain drain to define ideal conditions for scientific develop- ment. All components of these conditions that are lacking in the LDCs and often wanting in many advanced countries of the West are amply supplied in the United States: economic resources and research sup- port ; universities and scientific institutions ; laboratories and experi- mental centers ; great teachers ; a communication network connecting all professional organizations into a composite grid; a cooperative spirit among the scientific institutions, industry and government — in brief, the total infrastructure for the development of science and technology. Matching these practical assets in importance is the all-pervading scientific spirit in this country that places a high value on science and technology and assigns their development a top-ranking priority in the Nation's hierarchy of goals. This spirit of scientism is responsible for creating the organizational structure of science in the United States and it has fostered an intellectual atmosphere that favors experimenta- tion and innovation. Americans accept science and technology as a 1158 normal part of their national life. A group of experts associated with OECD concluded a 1968 report on American scientific policies with a judgment that supports and gives historical perspective to this gen- eralization. American scientific and technical enterprise, they de- clared, is deeply rooted in American tradition and history and from the beginning of the republic has been one of the mainsprings of American society.^^" Thus, the combination of resources, infrastructure and scientific spirit has made the United States the leader of world science and technology .^^^ International recognition of American leadership is manifest in practical achievements in science, technology, and medi- cine and also in the form of prestigious awards, such as Nobel Prizes, won by Americans.^^^ It was this intellectual climate and the accompanying rewards for creative attainments that produced a magnetic "pull" so powerful that Professor Brzezinski could conclude : "America's professional at- traction for the global scientific elite is without historic precedent in either scale or scope." ^^^ SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL CIVILIZATION : SOURCE OF "PERMA.NENT DRAW" The West's scientific-technological civilization, particularly that of the United States, exerts a "permanent draw," stimulating the move- ment of scientists, engineers, and physicians from the LDCs and less advanced countries to the more advanced. For the United States the "pull" of its unique civilization has been compelling. Sources on brain drain reiterate themes already discussed in show- ing the allure of industrial America. A discontented former American student from Taiwan, suffering from insuflficient reference material and a lack of stimulation from professional colleagues in Taipei, asked a former professor to find employment for him in the United States, preferably in a metropolitan area. He complained that a 320 Brzezinski, op. clt., pp. 28-29. Professor Brzezinski quotes from the OECD report : "Since the first hours of the Republic, the right of citizens to the 'pursuit of happiness,' formulated In the Declaration of Independence, has been one of the mainsprings of American society ; it Is also the foundation of a social policy inspired by the prospect of new benefits Issued from the scientific and technical enterprise. How can one fall to hope that these benefits, which have In fact contributed so much to national defense or the race for world prestige, will make an essential contribution to the achievement of other great national goals? It is this propulsion which has given science, the mother of knowledge, the appear- ance of a veritable national resource. The enterprise is Indissolubly linked to the goals of American society, which Is trying to build its future on the progress of science and tech- nology. In this capacity, this society as a whole is a consumer of scientific knowledge, which is used for diverse ends : in the last century, to increase agricultural productivity and to facilitate territorial development, and then to back the national defense effort, to safeguard public health and to explore space. These are activities which have an Impact on the destiny of the whole nation, and it seems natural that all skills should be mobilized to cooperate. In this way industry and the universities and private organizations are associated with the Government project." (Conclusion of a report prepared by the Secretariat of the OECD, January 1968, as quoted by The New York Times, Jan. 13. 1968, p. 10). ^ E. Flore, Vice President and Chief Scientist of IBM has stated : "The United States has become the Intellectual renter of the world — the center of the arts, the sciences, and economics." ("Towards the Year 2000," Daedalus (Summer 1967), p. 958, quoted in, Brze- zinski, op. cit., p. 30.) =22 For data on America's Innovating performance as reported by the OECD analysts and other evidence of American supremacy in science, see Brzezinski, op. clt., p. 28. The Ameri- can scientific establishment, for example, claims leadership in pure science and als^o In the field of mathematics. In noting the marked preponderance of the United States in Nobel Prizes in Physics, Chemistry and Medicine, Prof. Brzezinski states : ". . . between the years 1901 and 1939 the United States and Canada won 13 prizes, while France, Germany, Italy, Benelux, and the United Kingdom won a total of 82, Scandinavia won 8, the US.S.R. won 4, and Japan won none. Between 1940 and 1967 the respective figures were 42, 50, 6, 8, and 2." (Ibid.) 323 Ibid., p. 30. 1159 "longer stay would mean a more complete fossilization of my career." ^^* A medical doctor from Greece declared that money was not the main inducement to practice in New York City rather than Thessaloniki. Being able to work in the Cornell Medical Center enabled him to progress in the study of medicine and gave him "the satisfaction of associating with advanced people" in his profession.^^^ A young nuclear scientist from another Mediterranean country had been offered a leading scientific post in his country's major university with a compensating salary. He chose to remain in the United States. Having research facilities and logistical support in the United States had great appeal, but "a more important consideration" to him was the fear of isolation. Even if I were assured of all these facilities, I would still be wary to return. I would be afraid of being isolated from the scientific world. Here, I am at the hub of things. There, I would be confined to an ivory tower.**' Perhaps an English scientist best summed up the magnetic appeal of the American scientific-technological civilization for all profes- sional manpower when he said : "This is where the action is . . . this country is the one which is going to be the leader of our own particu- lar civilization, as far as we can see, for at least the rest of the cen- tury. And if you happen to like being in the central part, by God, you come here."^" A striking effect of the "pull" quality of the United States has been the attraction of foreign students and scholars to American academic institutions and, in the case of FMGs, to U.S. medical facilities. Many LDCs, especially in the Middle East, lacking graduate facilities, rely upon those in the advanced countries."* As Prof. John R. Niland of Cornell University wrote, "American universities have become the linchpin of higher learning for much of the developing world." ^^^ Symptomatic of the pull of American academic institutions in the early 1960's are the following statistics : 44 percent of the Pakistani students studying at institutions of higher learning in 15 foreign countries were studying in the United States; 59 percent of the In- dians; 32 percent of the Indonesians; 56 percent of the Burmese; 90 percent of the Filipinos ; 64 percent of the Thais ; and 26 percent of the Ceylonese.^'^" Superior training available at American universities attracts foreign students, and what Professor Zahlan said of the Mid- dle Eastern student could be said of others from the LDCs: "To a student at AUB [American University of Beirut] or Cairo, the aura of Harvard, Princeton, and Cambridge infuses all foreign institu- tions. These graduate schools thus exert a powerful attractive force." ^^^ 3-* Charles P. Kindleberger, "Study Abroad and Emigration," In Adams. Brain Drain, p. 151. 22= Eren, op. clt., p. 11. 339 Ibid., pp. 11-12. „,„, 3'TXigei Hawkes, "The Scientific Mercenaries," Science Journal, 6 (September 1970), p. 26. ^^Said, op. cit., p. 14. , ^. 329 John R. Niland, Foreign Manpower Trained in the United States: Policy Implications of Non-Return, Industrial Relations Research Association, 23d annual meeting, Dec. 28-29, 1970, p. 296. „ . , , 3=oGunnar Myrdal, Agion Drama (N.Y. : Pantheon, 1968), p. 1773, cited from Brzezinski, op. cit., p. 30. , ^ „ 331 A. B. Zahlan, "Problems of Educational Manpower and Institutional Development, In, Nader and Zahlan, Science and Technology in Developing Countries, p. 311. 1160 Once under the influence of the American scientific and technological environment many students will not return home. As Mr. Henderson observed, "scientific studies have . . . become for many a device not for development but for immigration." ^^^ And the temporary visas, especially student visas, that gave access to American academic institutions become "launching pads for im- migration." ^^^ The "pull" of American academic institutions is evident by the fact that an estimated 20 percent of foreign students will not return, and those from the LDCs exceed 35 percent.^^* To cite a specific case, some 50 percent of Iranian students of moderate wealth and in- fluence studying in the United States do not return home.^^^ Accord- ing to a more recent source, more than 70 percent of all professionals immigrating from Taiwan, Korea, India, and Iran are nonreturning students.^^'^ FMGs among foreign exchange scholars are most vulnerable to the "permanent draw" of the American scientific environment. Plentiful opportunities to work with the most sophisticated medical equipment and in the most advanced medical facilities in the world, potentialities for advanced study far exceeding any prospects at home, and virtually unlimited opportunities to practice medicine in the metropolitan areas of the country, have proved to be an open invitation to permanent residency. A medical degree, unlike many other professional creden- tials, commands international recognition : it is transnational and thus transferable. And as Stevens and Vermeulen observed, "emigration is a real career alternative," ^^^ particularly when the allure of America is so inviting. ADDITIVES TO "PERMANENT DRAW" : ACCtTLTURATION, MISMATCHED TRAINING, AND DONOR INDIFFERENCE Decision to immigrate permanently, though taken as a voluntary act after residency in the United States or some other advanced country in the West, may be influenced by a variety of cultural and intellectual "pull" forces. Three specific elements in the receiving countries often affecting the decision are : the processes of acculturation, mismatch in education and training, and donor indifference to the returnee. P,rocess of Acculturation. — Acculturation processes often be^in before the emigrant leaves his country. Many from the LDCs, like those from the Middle East, the British Commonwealth, French Un- ion, and the Philippines, are preconditioned by their innate admira- tion of Western culture. Often their own cultures, especially in pat- terns of education, have become infused with that of the former co- lonial power, creating an easy transition from one world to another, s^ Selected Readings on International Education, House, Committee on Education and Labor, 1966, p. 350. ^^su.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, The Brain Drain into the United States of Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians, a stai study for the Research and Technical Programs Subcommittee, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, p. 15. (Committee print) (Hereifter cited as. StaflF s''''r|v. Hous° Government Operations Committee, Brain Drain into the United States of Scientists, Engineers and Physicians, 1967.) ^ Niland, "Foreign Manpower Trained in the United States," p. 296. See also, John R. Niland, "A Human Capital Model for Brain Drain of Foreign Manpower Trained in the United States," Journal of Economic Issues 5 (September 1971), pp. 70-71, fif. 5. '^ Naficy, op. cit., p. 67. «« Fortney, op. dt., p. 57. s*^ Stevens and Vermeulen, op. cit., p. 75. 1161 and also suggesting the idea of moving from an inferior to a superior cultural environment. These attitudes give prestige to study abroad and thus add to the forces of attraction. As V. M. Dandekar described the Indian experience: "The attitude is historical in origin and is a direct consequence of a century and a half of British rule in India. It has been very deeply drilled into the Indian mind through a direct and visible demonstration of the superiority of such education and training." ^^® Finally, the emigrating professional wants to emigrate; it is his free decision, and this psychologically induces a positive pre- disposition towards the culture he is entering. Total immersion of the immigrant professional in the environment of the advanced Western country hastens the processes of accultura- tion. Students from the LDCs coming to the United States fall under tlie dual influence of the total society as well as of the academic curric- ulum. Studies made of foreign students in American universities indi-- cate a favorable interaction with Americans, suggesting the general- ization that a favorable attitude towards American society exists.^^^ Witliin this larger social context is the academic curriculum. The foreign student enters an educational system designed primarily for the needs of American society, not that of the Asian, African, or Latin American from whence he came. Accommodations are made to some degree by offering special courses, but most foreign students must fit into the design of the American curriculum. ^^° Studies in science and technology present a special case. Science has important international characteristics and even supranational poten- tialities and tendencies that produce a unique cosmopolitan outlook. But science is not value f I'ee and technology is even less so. The most abstract a;id theoretical sciences are imbedded in particular cultures and languages from which they cannot be excised. "Both science and technology,"' wrote Prof. Dwight Waldo of Syracuse University's Maxwell School, "are intertwined at their margins not simply with nationalism, but with transnational value-systems represented by languages, ideologies and religions." '" Accordingly, the education of a scholar or scientist in a particular foreign culture, the American, for example, niay make him unfit as a creative element in another culture ; most assuredly it makes him vulnerable to brain drain. Success for the student is often measured by the extent of his commitment, adapta- tion, and absorption into his studies. This attitude acts as a catalyzing agent in the social processes of acculturation. Thus the foreign student, particularly of science and technology, comes under a dual influence : that of the American value system both in education and in society as a whole which can erode his own national 3=»8 Dandekar, op. clt, p. 209. 3^ In a summary of findings on a fitudy of foreign students, Steven E. Dentsch concluded : "To generalize from the research data, the college and university students who come to this country from abroad are mostly male graduate students from the loss develoried nations In the world. Two-fifths are self-supporting. One-quarter of the students are In engineering with the same proportion in the natural and physical sciences. Foreign students Interact with Americans to a significant degree ; one-third" live with Americans. The great majority of foreign students are satisfied with their opportunities for meeting Aiiieri<'ans, vftlcctlng their visiting of American homes, dating, and other forms of social Interaction."' (Deutsch, op. clt., pp. 178-179.) 310 Testimony of Dr. Kldd, in, Hearings, House, Government Operations Coinmittce, Brain Drain, lOfiS, p. 50. 3ii Dwk'lit Waldo, "Planning and Administration for Viable Policies: The Perspective of Official Responsibility," In Nader and Zalilan, Science and Technology in Developing Coun- tries, p. 401. V 1162 cultural loyalties, replacino; tliosc Avith tlio Amorican; and that of the value system lield by the woi'M scientific coinmniiity. The effects of each can be alienation from his own nati\e cnlture. Professor Zahlan poses the basic question: "An advanced country such as the United Slates, desirous of landine: a man on tlie moon by 1970, must neces- sarily have a value system that makes specialization in space tech- nology a most desirable activity. "Will a younjx Turk, Efryptian, or I*ersian who is exposed from 4 to 10 years to this intense propap:anda have an inclination to join a faculty of a university of Erzerum, Asnt of all those witli collearticiiiarl.v true that the young scientist grows up with two sets of loyalties. He is loyal to the region or the nation or the home country in which he lived, in whidi he was Itorn and grew up. He is tied to it by reasons of language, religion, culture and family. He grows up also in the scientific community in which he learns that the great figures of the field come from many countries. It is likely that the teachers under whom he learns his science come from many countries. As he gets into active work, he liecomes friendly with colleagues from other ct)untries, and his community in a real sense is an International one. And so lie is likely to move at different stages in his career. And this is not only a movement across borders, it is a problem of movement within borders." (Department of State, rroceedhigx of Workshop on the International Migration of Talent and Skills, October 1966, p. 138.) 3*' Comments by Albert G. Sims, Vice I're.sldent, College Entrance Exnminntinn Hnnrd New York, .N.V.. 1 1( piirtiiii'iit uf State, I'riicciilinqx of W'orl.Dhup on the J iitcrnutidnnl M i'/nit inn of Tnlint and Shilh, October I'JtiO, p. 117. ■•"« KliidlcbcrgiT, oil. (It., p. i;v,). •■"■'■ I Irarliigs House, Covernment Ctperattons, Urain Drain, l!)Oft. p, 4. **• Nllatid, i'oriiqn Mimponcr Trainid in the United Statin, p. .'iOl. Amung the reasons why foreign stuiletits riiualn so long overse.is are tlie need to learn a foreign hingunge, failure to obtain nilnlmuiii academic stnnd.irdH for university admission, lnade(|uato knowl- edge of academic rroulrements of courses for which they enndl ; InsuOlclent funds, (•iardlner, op. (it., p. Ut5. ) In some Inst.nnces .\frlinii students have remained as long an ir» years or more overseas to obtain academic or profes'-l > f *^ Hearings, House, Government Operations Committee, Brain Drain, p. 89. 1164 only a small part of the problem, though gearing training to develop- ment would help. But the problem itself derives from qualitative dis- parities in civilizations. What happens is that the student in science, technology, or medi- cine coming to the United States acquires some kinds of knowledge that is largely nontransferable to his own country. And the further he advances in education the wider the nontransferability gap be- comes. At some point in the process the student exceeds in education and training the practical needs of his country : either he cannot be absorbed into the economy at the level for which he has been trained, or there is no place for his specialized knowledge. As a result he becomes a frustrated, marginal professional whose only escape is to return to America, if he has gone home, or never to leave in the first place. What often occurs was described by Iran's Under Secretary for Vo- cational and Technical Training : "We have been sending our students with great hope to highly industrialized countries to make them middle-level technicians. But unfortunately even these boys return with Ph. D. degrees which they cannot use." ^^^ And it might be added that probably many of "these boys" have taken the option of im- migrating to the United States. Dr. Amador Muriel, former physics instructor at the University of the Philippines and in 1970 a research associate with NASA's Insti- tute for Space Studies, gave the following case history that illustrates the point more graphically : Eduardo Padlan is a young promising crystallographer who got his doctorate from Johns Hoplcins University in 1968. He is now back at Johns Hopkins, continuing his researcli in crystallography after spending one disappointing year in the Philippines. Padlan typifies young Filipino phy.sicists who come to the United States to train. All are eager to go back. Some return home, then come back to the United States. . . . ^* Medicine seems to be the most visible field for mismatch. The LDCs and advanced countries have two different sets of health prob- lems: the former focuses on infectious disease, rural poverty, pre- ventive care, and a youthful population; the latter on chronic dis- sease, urban affluence, specialized treatment, and problems of the aged. The LDC needs the general practitioner and public health pro- fessional; the advanced countries produce specialized physicians and a health care system stressing specialized forms of treatment. Medical education in the United States is typically urbanized, specialized, and hospital-based. It is designed to serve the needs of industrial America, not underdeveloped Asia, Africa, or Latin America. According to Dr. Kelley West, the LDCs need physicians who can design and supervise programs stressing preventive, diagnostic, and therapeutic measures for communities. Bacterial, parasitic, and nutritional dis- €ases have the greatest significance in developing countries. How- ever, foreign students in American medical schools will most likely not learn about the treatment of malaria, malnutrition, amoebiasis, schistosomiasis, and leprosy; but may well learn to diagnose and ^^ Quoted in Henderson op. cit., p. 57. 352 Muriel, op. clt., p. 08. Nurl Eren cites the case of Korean students: "Of the 390 Koreans who earned doctorate degrees In the United States, only sixty-four have returned. Many of them remained because there was no outlet for the employment of their advanced training at home." (Eren, op. cit, p. 12.) 1165 manage coronary disease, which is not yet a major medical concern in the LDCs.^^^ In short, FMGs coming to the United States entor a system that is not suited to the needs of their countries. The system itself creates mis- match conditions and accordingly contributes to "permanent draw." But the situation is further exacerbated by the tendency of FMGs in residency positions to enter specialized fields of anesthesiology, pa- thology, physical medicine, radiology, and psychiatry — all of which have limited appeal to American medical graduates. Data drawn from the AMA's study on FMGs for 1970 gives the following figures and percentages of FMGs (excluding Canadians) in these specialities as of December 31, 1970: anesthesiology, 3,304 (or 30.4 percent of the total physicians in this category) ; radiology, 1,952 (14.6 percent) ; pathology, 3,132 (30.5 percent) ; physical medicine, 501 (33.9 per- cent) ; and psychiatry, 5,025 (23.8 percent). ^^* Apparently with these statistics in mind. Stevens and Vermeulen concluded : "Indeed, the pos- sibility exists that at the conclusion of their experience many foreign physicians will no longer, either professionally or culturally, be able to fit into their own countries." ^" But the FMGs have what statistics indicate to be an irresistible option, namely, immigration. Donor Indifference. — The final factor creating a "permanent draw" attitude in the cultural-intellectual sphere is donor indifference to stu- dent returnees. With few exceptions developing countries lack ade- quate arrangements for informing their overseas students about em- ployment opportunities, development needs, programs, and trends at home. Such official indifference can breed alienation. Often an unde- sirable gap exists between the government-sponsored student returnee who may be automatically placed upon return and the private student, who may be potentially a very valuable asset, but who is likely to be met with indifference when it comes to employment possibilities. Re- turnees often may be led to believe that their countries devalue their training as an asset to be used in development. Underemployment often results. Such discouraging experiences of official indifferences can ef- fect other students abroad. As the U.N. study on brain drain said, ''When these returnees then re-emigrate permanently to the country of training, their personal tales of discouraging employment experience may have an effect on the return plans of fellow nationals studying abroad." ^^® Official indifference of donor nations can also be demonstrated by restrictions placed on career choices of returnee students by outright discriminatory regulations. A case in point is that of Malaysia. In 1966, the Malaysian Government ruled that only doctors who graduated from American medical schools in universities that were members of the Association of American Universities would be allowed to stand for civil service examinations for the Public Health Service of Malay- sia. This rule meant that graduates from Jolms Hopkins, for example, would be accepted, but those from 41 other medical schools in the United States could not practice in Malaysia.^" Such manifested in- difference to career possibilities by governments would presumably be 3^ Nader, Science and Technology in Developing Countries^ p. 456, ^* Stevens and Vermeulen, op. cit.. p. 153. 3^ Ibid., p. xvl. »^ Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, 1968, p. 38. '^ Department of State. Proceedings of Workshop on the International Migration of Talent and Skills, October 1966, p. 88. 1166 sufficient to encourage any excluded Malaysian FMG in the United States to establish permanent residency in this country. In the present international environment of intense competition for professional man- power, the United States welcomes such talent. THE ALLURE OF A SCIEXTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL CI\aLIZATI0N In the cultural and intellectual sphere, the reality of U.S. pre-emi- nence in science, technology, and medicine creates forces of "permanent draw." attracting students and scholars, scientists, engineers, and phy- sicians from all over the world. The LDCs are now the main target of attraction. Preconditioned by the desire to come to America and to learn, they become caught up in the processes of acculturation that transform' values, attitudes, and national loyalties. Influenced by the inevitable effects of mismatch in training that result from disparities in civilizations, they find resolution of their dilemma in permanent residency. Donor indifference to their future opportunities and career possibilities reinforces the decision to immigrate. Social '•''PuW Factors: Appeal of American Social Democracy American social democracy has a special appeal for the discontented professional abroad. Despite its imperfections, the American social order offers the professional such important values as freedom of so- cial choice and prospects for social mobility. Unlike the rigidly struc- tured, traditionally oriented social systems existing in many LDCs and even in some advanced countries, the United States offers upward mobility for the professional who has marketable talent, well con- ceived career plans, and willingness to work hard. The driving force within the American social order has been a spirit of freedom and equality of opportunity. And upon this concept a national tradition has developed that values pragmatism and experimentalism, and ac- cepts as a guiding social principle the belief that a person's worth to society is determined less by inherited social position than by ability and performance. The frontier tradition in American history em- bodied tliis concept in the simple question, "AVliat can you do?" The Nation's experience in immigration strengthened this tradition and created an historical record that is visible proof to contemporary man. To European or Asian professionals who feel held down by their traditional societies, the spirit of freedom and equality of opportunity in America has great appeal. "Probably one is more free in this coun- try than one is in Europe," said one British scientist, "and it is the essential freedom that is so attractive about this country." And a Ger- man scientist made a similar observation on the social and political aspects of the American environment : "In this country there are fewer restrictions. ... I find more possibilities of creating my style of life, and not being narrowed down." ^^^ America provides a wide latitude for upward social mobility based on merit and success. Talent and achievement are respected values, whatever the age of the professional. Responsibilities are given to the young, and the rewards come quickly. "Unlike Europe," wrote Ale- sandro Silj, "the American system rewards talented young people well. Careers advance faster, initiative is welcomed, age and seniority "^ Quoted In, Hawkes, op. cit., p. 25. 1167 are not prime factors." ^^^ In the developing countries where the patri- archical tradition is strong, a premium is put on age. Age is the crite- rion of professional competence and wisdom, and young people, how- ever well trained or qualitied, find it difficult or impossible to have their talents recognized as readily as in the United States or certain other Western countries. What may ordinarily be a traditional generational conflict can be further exacerbated by student training abroad and re- entry efforts after years of absence at a higher level of expectation when entry at a much lower level would conform to established tra- dition.^*^" Prestige can be acquired quickly in America by foreign scientists, engineei-s, and physicians. In some instances foreign birth can enlarge rather than diminish that prestige. Careers in these fields of study command respect in America in contrast with some other countries and cultures, so that even moderate success can open the way for achieving prestige and social status. Another aspect of America's social egalitarianism that acts as a "pull" force is the incidence of marriage of foreign students, scholars, and other professionals with American citizens. Marriage between, for example, some traditionalist-oriented Middle Eastern men and American girls can make it impossible for them to return home and reenter their traditionalist societies.^" British scientists with Ameri- can wives have been especially vulnerable to brain drain. Accord- ing to one study of the correlation between marriage to North Americans and brain drain to North America, a large majority (92 percent) of the British scientists with North American wives were ^"Silj, op. clt., p. 9. The following might be considered a classic example of the sort of the cast were stars from the Metropolitan Opera and two leading British opera singers. They were supported by a chorus of some 40 singers and a full orchestra of symphonic pro- portions. The Opera House at the Kennedy Center was filled to capacity. The conductor of this very difficult and substantial ensemble elfort was James Conlon, a 23-year-old graduate from Juilliard. Mr. Richard D. Fletcher, music critic of The Christian (fcience Monitor made this comment on his professional competence : "The Verdi score 'Macbeth' has never sounded more vigorous to my ears, largely due to the phenomenal gifts of young James Conlon, surely destined to become one of our greatest opera conductors." (The Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 29, 1973, p. 12.) *» Fox, op. cit., p. 74. For experiences in India, see Dandekar, op. clt., pp. 205-206. Dandekar quotes Sunidar Suri, an Indian scholar who studied in the West, returned to India and then left in dissatisfaction : "It Is my disillusionment with my peers In India that made of me an Intellectual refugee. ... I intend to stay in and continue to teach in Germany, the U.S.A., or Canada or Britain or some other western country, or Australia or New Zealand. I have no intention at present of returning to India to take up a permanent or long- term academic research or any other position there." Surl went on to say : "I am a drained brain." An Italian physicist recounted his experience : "I had no opportunities, at least my future didn't look very bright. Older professor types never gave people any responsibilities. They would just give them fellowships and say you can study in the library, don't bother me for a couple of years ... a young person had no idea what his real worth was ... in America instead I found that they do give you responsibilities and of course you can flog them or you can find out yourself what yon are." (Quoted in, Hawkes, op. cit., p. 24) "The reason I left home," said a mechanical engineer, "was not to come to America, but to leave Greece. Greece for an 18-year-old person is not the best country to be in — Greece is a wonderful country if vou are 45 or 50. Here I feel quite happy because I am 35 and I couldn't think of any'otheV country in the world where I would like to be, being 35." (Quoted in, Hawkes, op. cit.. p. 24.) T-. .. 3" Said discusses the problem of intermarriage and notes the complications Middle East- ern students can create for themselves by marriage to American girls. (Said, op. clt., pp. 15 and 17.) Habib Naficy attributes marriage between Iranian students and American girls as a cause of brain drain. He writes : "Moral Indebtedness to the American wives who have supported their husbands' study in the United States and do not want to leave (fre- quently spurious inasmuch as the husband's gloomy view of life in Iran is usually the basis of Information upon wliich the American wife forms her own attitude.)" (Isaficy, op. cit., pp. 68-69.) IW"^ going to remain, but only 65.5 percent with British wives intended to become permanent North American residents.^*^^ This study regarded the marriage factor in brain drain as being "very important." ^^ American acceptance of student failure without serious social stigma encourages nonreturn among foreign students who have failed their studies. The foreign student often carries a heavy burden, not only in studies, but as Professor Kindleberger said in the "hopes of his uni- versity, family, and government." ^®* In some societies failure brings disgrace, and some students are unwilling to go home. According to Habib Naficy, 90 percent of Iranian student failures in the United States will "try b}'^ every means to remain in the United States rather than return to their families in Iran with such loss of face." ^^^ Pro- fessor Kindleberger mentioned the extreme case of a Chinese student failure who lived in the church tower on the Michigan University campus for a year and a half .^^'^ ATTRACTION OF URBAN CENTERS The social effects of urbanization act as another force pulling emi- grant professionals to the urban centers of the United States and the West. Cities are centers of culture, learning, economic activity, and social intercourse. The dynamics of urban life sets the tone, pace, and style of American life ; rather than turning off the emigrant profes- sionals these qualities have had the reverse effect of attracting them. A specific case in point is that of the FMGs who concentrate in Ameri- can cities and metropolitan areas rather than serving the needs of rural and medically disadvantaged America. (Some New York City hospitals are said to be staffed almost entirely with FMGs.) And so it is with other professionals. Emigrant scientists, engineers, and physicians would seem to agree with their British colleagues who preferred stimulation to congeniality, change to stability, and chal- lenge to relative tranquility. Accordingly, they found in the North American urban-oriented environment a "lusty competition" in pro- fessional and economic activities that was both appealing and satisfying.3^^ Qualities like these are distinct characteristics of urban America, and along with the spirit of social and political egalitarianism and aggressive individualism create a special appeal to the urban-oriented intellectual immigrant. References to the all-inclusive term "American life-style," meaning the social and economic character of American life, recur in brain drain literature, and perhaps this expression best epitomizes the appeal of American urban life.^*^^ "Listen, this is a different world, with different concepts," said one Middle Easterner '*2 James A. Wilson and Jerry Gaston, "New Light on the Brain Drain," New Scientist 43. (July 31, 1969), p. 236. 3«3 Ibid., p. 236. 2** Kindleberger, op. clt., p. 140. 3M Naficy, op. clt., p. 67. 3'"' Kindleberger, op. cit.. p. 140. ^s'' Wilson, op. cit., p. 28. 368 Professor Nilan writes : "Long range or permanent nonreturnees . . . are more attracted by the absolute level of salaries offered in the United States, and the general life-style available." ("Foreign Manpower Trained in the United States," p. 302.) 1169 in contrasting life in America ^Yith that in the Arab world.^'^^ Exposed to the social dynamics of American urban life and the spirit of egal- itarianism, emigrant professionals are induced, as one Korean Ph. D. candidate put it, "to reconsider their own philosophy of life." ^^° As Abdul Said, a Saudi Arabian Graduate student at the University of Kansas, observed : In a social situation in which the "individual's needs are gaining priority over the feelings of sacrifice and commit- ment to one's nation," the .transition is easy from emigrant to immigrant.^^^ "pull" of social forces The appeal of American social democracy holds a prominent place among the "pull" forces in brain drain to the United States. Unlike the archaic, rigidly structured social orders of traditional societies, Amer- ica presents to immigrant professionals an open and fluid society where upward mobility is easy and the criteria for access to social status are ability and performance. Responsibility is often given to the young professional, and rewards come quickly to the successful. Prestige is an added reward in this society that places a high value on science, technology, and medicine. Dynamics of urban life combine with the egalitarianism of the American social order to produce a life-style uniquely attractive to many immigrant professionals. '"'"PulV Factors in the Political Sphere : Search for Political Stahility and Freedom of Inquiry Political stability probably ranks with freedom of inquiry as a fac- tor attracting emigrant professionals to the United States and other Western countries. Established democratic institutions foster orderly processes of government, promise personal safety, and in general pro- duce a climate of physical and psychological serenity that encourages intellectual pursuits. "First and foremost" among the reasons why the great majority of Arab scholars are attracted to the West, according to Michael W. Suleiman, "is the desire for peace of mind for the indi- vidual and his family." This quality he finds within the political sys- tems of the United States and the West. Mr. Suleiman goes on to ex- plain : "In practical terms, it means the absence of violence or threat of violence, be it physical or psychological. Insecurity, harassment, uncertainty as to what will happen next, political instability — all these are components of an anxiety syndrome that is mentally and physically debilitating." To escape this "syndrome," he continues, "many edu- cated Arabs have chosen to reside in the West primarily to enjoy the luxury of a happy and productive life unencumbered by worries over personal safety." ^^^ Students, scholars, and other professionals from the politically tur- bulent areas of developing Asia, Africa, and Latin America, the major sources of brain drain, find refuge in the stable democracies of the 3^» Said, OD. clt., p. 15. 3^0 Ibid., p. 10. 3^1 Ibid., p. 17. 3"2 Michael W. Suleiman, "The Repatriation of Arab Elites," Middle East Forum 67 (Autumn and Winter 1971). p. 74. 1170 West. Many, like the Cubans, never return ; others, like many Afri- cans, wait for favorable political chanfjes, but meanwhile become en- gaged by the benign influence of their democratic host country."^ Advanced Western societies provide a political climate where free- dom of inquirv can flourish. This freedom is vital to the survival of the research scientist and other intellectuals; it is a "pull" factor in immigration. Historically, the democratic concept of intellectual free- dom has been a powerful magnetic force attracting emigrant profes- sionals. In times of persecution and political stress, the United States, Britain, France, and now West Germany and Austria, have become havens of refuge for those who insist upon intellectual freedom in pur- suit of their professions. OFFICIAL GOVERNMENT ENCOURAGEMENT Governments of advanced countries contribute to the "pull" factor in the political sphere by adopting policies specifically designed to en- courage immigration. Competing on the world market for skilled man- power, these countries have reformulated their immigration policies for the stated purpose of attracting scientists, engineers, physicians, and other emigrant professionals. In the case of the United States, legislative provisions waive some of the requirements in special cases of need and otherwise ease the adjustment to immigrant status. Dr. Frankel conceded that American nnmigration laws and regulations stimulated harmful flows of manpower from the LDCs. He told the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturalization that "there is ... a prima facie case for the proposition that our new immigra- tion policies may aggravate the problems of many countries that are seeking to progress, and that need leaders and trained people to show the way." ^'* Less direct, but still meaningful, are the K. & D. programs sponsored by the U.S. Government that have directly or indirectly generated forces of attraction for emigrant professionals whose talents in fields of science, technology, medicine, and health are thus made readily marketable. As shown above, programs in educational exchange have also set up magnetic waves of attraction. Though many of these pro- grams were conceived in a spirit of altruism, wath the intention of assisting disadvantaged peoples and nations, the effects have been to encourage immigration. 3"3 David Dickinson Henrv, Director, International Office, Harvard University, gave the following description of what often takes place among African students: ". . • ^"n'e returned home to welcoming governments and sure jobs. Others, the victims of harsh political change In their own countries, are still waiting here or In Africa or elsewhere in the personal limbo of the political refugee. They long for the day when their talents and training may be put to use — the Ibos whose homes had been In Western Nigeria, the Asians from East Africa, the Rhodesians — but that day has not yet arrived." (Hearings. Senate, Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 19ns p 122.) ' 374 Hearings Senate, Judiciary Committee, International Mipration of Talent and Skilli, 1908 p 17. A unioue example' of special efforts by the United States to encourage the immigration of skilled manpower was "Operation Paperclip." This was the designation given to the exercise designed to bring into the country 475 former German scientists at the end of the war in Europe. One of the scientists observed : "It might not be an exaggeration to sav that the Paperclip program was the first in American history wliere an entire group of Immigrants were far above averace in their intellectual capacity and mental heritage." Clarence G. Lasby, Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold "War, (New York: Atheneum, 1971), p. 271. 1171 ATTRACTION OF REASON By offering a working environment of political stability and intel- lectual freedom, by creating incentives through government sponsored programs, and by facilitating entry into the country through specifi- cally designed legislation, the United States and other advanced coun- tries create a powerful "pull" force in the political sphere that attracts the oppressed and disadvantaged, but willing and rriobile, emigrant professional. In large measure, this force constitutes an appeal to reason. Decision To Emigrate: A Comhination of '"'"Push/PuW Factors With '"'•Push'''' the Dominant Force The decision to emigrate is a highly personal act. The rationale can be simple, like that of the scientist who preferred the United States because "the physical range between me and my mother-in-law is ideal'*; or of the French engineer at MIT who immigrated because he "had little inclination to fight the Algerian War" and because he "wanted to see the Grand Canyon and New York"; or the Dutch sci- entist who found it difficult to explain his motivation, except that it was "simply because we were curious and there was an opportunity to come, so we came." ^" But more likely the rationale is very complex and is generally affected by comparative considerations of "push/pull" factors de- scribed above. Enrique Oteiza of the Instituto Torcuato Di Telia at Buenos Aires described the process this way: "It is the comparison of the potential migrant's situation in his country of origin with the situation of persons with similar qualifications in the country of desti- nation that enters into his decision." ^'® "Push/pull" factors thus intertwine. Conditions at home, ordinarily accepted as inevitable, become intolerable when elsewhere in the same field the situation by contrast is better. In a world environment of rapidly improving communications, transportation, and awareness, a comparative analysis can be made of coexisting realities and a decision reached. The determining factor is reward — to the individual, in terms of economic, cultural-intellectual, social, and sometimes political bene- fit. Moral issues tend not to intrude strongly if at all, nor is the decision necessarily perceived as a political act.^'" In the present state of world development, the advanced countries offer the highest rewards. W. M. Besterman, a specialist on manjjower problems, speaks of the "unfortunate discrepancy" that often exists between the marginal social product of a skilled worker's labor and the rewards for it. "In the developing countries," he continues, "the marginal social product is great but the rewards are often Ioav; in the advanced countries, the marginal social product is relatively small but the rewards are great." He then concludes : "JNIigration flow is . . . ^= Hawkes, op. clt., p. 24. ^« Otelza, op. cit., p. 126. ^'' James A. Wilson discusses the moral and political aspect of the decision In his article on the emigration of British scientists. The "vast majority" of 85 percent of scientists surveyed denied any sense of guilt about leaving the United Kingdom. Nor did they perceive their decision as a political act. (p. 27) 1172 toward countries where individual rewards are greatest rather than to countries where needs are most acute." ^'® Accordingly, as most students of brain drain hold, the "push" factors predominate in decisions to leave the developing countries, the advanced countries play the primary role of providing an alter- native.^"^ Leslie Aldridge Westoff, co-author of a work on world demography, summarized vividly the comparative considerations of "push/pull" factors and the rationale for immigrating in the following hypothetical but representative case of an Iranian FMG : It has probably never occurred to the Iranian peasant to be psychoanalyzed. He is concerned with healing his sores and breaks so he can keep working. But the Iranian doctor does not want to heal sores out in the villages. It is more attractive to come to the United States, marry an American woman and get a visa to stay. Here his salary is in still-beautiful dollars, more negotiable than the pint of sheep's milk the peasant might pay him for setting a broken leg. As he prospers, the needs of the wretched peasant back home can disappear from memory surprisingly quickly,^ *^ Quoted In Henderson, op. cit, p. 87. 379 Ibid, p. 146. 3» Leslie Aldridge Westoff, "A Nation of Immigrants : Should We Pull Up the Gang- plank ?" The New York Times Magazine, Sept. 16, 1973, p. 80. V. Effects of Brain Drain: A Range of Possibilities The complexities of brain drain as a general problem in contem- porary affairs become more apparent when considering the possible effects. "Wide disparities among nations frustrate attempts at con- structing clear-cut categories that might permit reasonably accurate analysis. DiffiGulties in Assessing Effects Political, social, cultural, and economic conditions, and levels of development — factors that fundamentally determine migration — vary in every nation and in every region of the world. Similarly variable are the state of science and technology and development of education. By nature the subject matter is elusive and unstructurable. In addition to this complexity is the fact that statistics on depart- ures tell only part of the story. The statistical approach or a cost- benefit, "balance of payments" approach, establishing a ledger of losses and gains, fails to take into account the many intangibles, such as negative and positive effects on prestige and morale within respec- tive scientific cadres and communities.^^^ Losses and gains are often concealed or intermixed, further complicating the problem of attempt- ing to isolate one from the other and drawing up a neat balance sheet in the manner of an accountant.^^^ As Dr. Frankel explained, the im- pact of the brain drain on other countries "varies widely." Even from the point of view of other countries [he continued] it cannot be assumed that the "brain drain" is invariably a problem calling for a remedy. To say that a skilled person has come to our country is not necessarily to say that some other country has suffered a loss. We do not know if his skills were needed or whether, if needed, they would actually have been used. The impact on each country has to be considered on a case-by-case basis. Indeed, even the types of skills that should be counted as part of a "drain" will be different from country to country, and from one time to another.*** Nor is the problem made any less complicated when, as in this study, stress is given mainly to the LDCs in the belief that they experience the greatest outflow of skilled manpower and seemingly experience, therefore, the greatest loss, in contrast with the advanced countries 2^ Rev. William J. Gibbons discusses this aspect of brain drain In, Hearings, House Government Operations Committee, Brain Drain, 1968, pp. 9-10. **2 A report of the U.N. Secretary General on brain drain said : "It would appear from the evidence in the various studies that in no country can the outflow of trained personnel be regarded as having an entirely beneficial or entirely adverse effect. There are funda- mental differences between countries and groups of countries, and between professions and occupations as well as differences with regard to the dimensions of the problem, the available local resources and potential to solve it and the approaches required in each case to remedy the situation." United Nations Economic and Social Council, "Outflow of Trained Personnel from Developing to Developed Countries," Report of the Secretary General, Jan. 27, 1971, 9 pp. (United Nations Economic and Social Council. E/4820, Summary.) '^ Hearings, Senate Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1968, p. 14. (1173) 1174 whicli have recuperative energies sufficient to reconstitute manpower losses.^^* These complexities seem to justify the assessment of Gregory Hen- derson, who declared : "In valuing or even assuming 'loss' to develop- ment and to developing countries the analyst thus faces an essentially unstatistical, unmeasurable problem which lies close to the actual core of development as a process: different expectations concerning the problem-solving capability of the trained or educated man when faced with the environment of development." ^^^ INTERNATIONALIST AND NATIONALIST MODELS Literature on brain drain provides a full range of views as to whether talent migration is a positive or negative force for donor and receiving nations and for the world as a whole, but without resolving the question. The most prominent division among analysts for anal- ysis, in what Professor Niland terms this "most disputed of areas," is in two models, the "internationalist" and the "nationalist." ^^^ The internationalist model is essentially universalist. It views talent migration in global dimensions, judging its effects against the criterion of whether it adds to the economic and social welfare of the world at large. This view perceives brain drain in the context of the operations of the international market for one particular factor in production, namely, human capital. Such capital, according to this view, will tend to move to those regions and occupations where its productivity is high and away from those where it is low. So long as human capital is free to seek its highest reward, that is, an income equal to the value of its marginal product, and bears the cost of its own movement, it will auto- matically tend to flow to areas where its contribution is the largest and where it can do the most good. The calculus of the marketplace thus distributes advantages in all directions, though not necessarily on an equal basis.^^^ Advocates of the internationalist view assert that the migration of talent enhances the value and increases the output of the world econ- omy but does not necessarily impair that of the donor nation. Indeed, migration can be advantageous to both the donor and receiving coun- tries. As Philip H, Coombs wrote: ". . . we can cite cases — even of Nobel prize winners — who by not going home were enabled, with the 3^' A report of the U.N. Rpcretary Gpneral on brain drain from the LDCs stated : "On the basis of the available statistics it would seem that the balance of trained manpower exchange between developed and developing countries, in numbers at least, may be adverse to the latter. ... At the same time It is most difficult, if not impossible, to evaluate this exchange in terms of the quality of manpower." (Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, 19fi8, p. 22.) The report of the House Government Operations on brain drain stated : "Advanced coun- tries may suffer flights of talent, but they usually have the advantage of large reserves. Also, they possess financial and other resources with which they can offset outflow by attracting back migrants, by draining talent from others, or by Increasing domestic supply." (Report, House Government Operations Committee, /Scientific Brain nrain from tne LiDCs, 1968, p. 5.) H. G. .Johnson suggests that no loss occurs to advanced countries as a result of migrations among themselves : "This analysis suggests that international migration of educated pro- fessional people, at least among the advanced countries. Is extremely unlikely to prodnco world losses, and is on the contrary likely to produce substantial Increases in potential world economic welfare." (Johnson, op. clt., p. 80.) s*^ Henderson, op. clt., p. 150. »8e Niland. op. clt., p. 7. 'w'H. G. Johnson gives the most complete explanation of the Internationalist model. In, Adams, Brain Drain, chapter 5. Dr. Adams summarizes the essence of this model on p. 4. Professor Niland gives a more complete summary in his Asian Engineering Brain Dram, pp. 7-9. 1175 / I '( ' aid of advanced laboratory equipment in a richer nation, to make major scientific discoveries or technical advances which will ulti- mately benefit all nations, their own included." ^®^ Accordingly, internationalists, like Prof. H. C. Johnson, mini- mize the possibilities of loss to the LDCs in talent migration. Indeed, they contend that even the possibility of world loss is "highly ques- tionable." ^^^ Development is an integrated process, Johnson explains, both of accumulating capital in the broad sense (that is, material, hu- man, and intellectual) and of evolving a culture that places a high premium on the efficient use of such capital and promotes the habit of constantly seeking to improve the efficiency of its use. In his view, de- velopment "is not likely to be promoted by concentrating attention and economic policy on the accumulation of one type of capital on the assumption that all else will follow." ^^° In contrast, advocates of the nationalist position, probably repre- senting without exception all of the LDCs, view talent migration within a much narrower frame of reference, specifically, the nation- state. For them the nation-state is the basic political unit in interna- tional affairs, deserving the highest priority and accordingly super- seding all others including internationalists' concerns for the world economy. They regard certain levels of human capital as indispensa- l^le to the nation's economic development. Should the nation fall below this minimum through emigration, they see the consequences not merely as raising the marginal productivity of the remaining Imman capital, but rather of jeopardizing the growth potential of the nation.^^^ For the nationalist, losses are far less tolerable and acceptable than what the internationalist would allow. Loss of key skills that may trigger cumulative "external" effects in other sectors of the society dis- turbs them. Loss of high-level professional manpower, trained as a public investment, is looked upon as a "gift" — some say "unrequited gift" — from the LDC donor nations to the advanced countries.^^^ Consequently, the effects of talent migration are felt very personally by adherents of the nationalist view. They resent the flight of scien- tists, engineers, physicians, and other professional talent which they regard as indispensable to their nation's economic development. From their perspective, absence from the country deprives the nation of an expected and deserved manpower contribution. A genius whose work benefits all mankind is recognized as an exception, but they ask, as did Professor Shearer: "What about the hundreds of thousands of nongenius doctors, nurses, engineers — the people who make the wheels 3^ Coombs, p. clt., p. 61. aw Johnson, op. cit., p. 86. 3"> Ibl<1. Harold E. Rowland gave the following Internationalist view of brain drain to the ITnlted States : "Let us not condemn ourselves and our institutions for providing for foreign scientists, doctors, and students an atmosphere of free inquiry for study and research which may, one day, well enrich not only America but the world. All humanity benefits when an Italian, an Englishman, or an Indian researcher unravels one of nature's mysteries In an American laboratory. What appears in the short run to be a brain drain from a country — and therefore its loss- — may be. In truth, one of that country's unique contributions to the world's cultural common market. The brain drain from one country today may well be the brain gain of the world of tomorrow." (Quoted in, Deutsch, op. cit., p. 31.) In arguing for the importance of student exchange. Under Secretary of State Rostow appealed to the internationalist view when he said : "In one sense, the universities of the world constitute a single community, helping to bind the human family together." (Hear- ings. Senate Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1968, p. 4.) ^1 Adsms, oo. cit., pp. 4-5. »>2 1bld., p. 5. 1176 turn and can build roads at liome in the jungles, rather than work for the Ohio Highway Commission ?" ^^^ CRITERION : NEEDS OR DEMANDS ? The internationalist and nationalist models create polar opposite positions and thus offer no solution to this very complex problem. Still, they establish some criteria as a guide to analysis. Another criterion suggested in the literature for judging the effects of brain drain, and, indeed, for determining whether brain drain exists at all, is the re- lationship of brain drain to a nation's needs and demands. The heart of the brain drain dilemma lies in this relationship be- tween needs and demands. Briefly, in manpower terminology "needs" mean the number of persons required to attain some agreed national goal ; demands mean the existing number of jobs filled and unfilled. ^^* If a nation's needs are defined in terms of a national goal to raise development levels, then the needs or requirements of the LDCs for a variety of professional and skilled services are very great.^^^ To achieve desirable development goals, the LDCs Tieed doctors, engi- neers, lawyers, agricultural extension agents, plant geneticists, econ- omists, science teachers for secondary schools, and all other kinds of skilled manpower for nation-building. From this perspective, short- ages in such manpower are highly visible and failure to have adequate supply can have serious negative effects. {In this study the criterion for "need" is defined in terms of developmental requirements.) However, structural maladjustments that produce brain drain are readily apparent when the problem is viewed from the demand side. Briefly, the demand is insufficient to justify existing manpower re- sources ; the developing economy cannot absorb them. The LDCs, even with aid, cannot support the employment of specialists and profes- sionals so that they can effectively administer the needs of the nation and also obtain a satisfying return on their educational investments. The gap between need and effective economic demand reflects a lack of purchasing power, inadequate mobility of professional labor within the country, or the insufficiency of labor or capital. This gap consti- tutes a serious development problem and rather than narrowing seems to be widening.^^* ^3 Department of State, Proceedings of Workshoj) on the International Migration of Talent and Skills, October 1966, p. 20. The report of the U.N. Secretary General on brain drain from the LDCs elaborated on this Important distinction : "Many high-ranking scientists. Including Nobel Prize winners, were probably to achieve eminence only by emigrating. The question, however, arises as to the extent to which this argument applies in relation to present migration. Of the 10,506 professional immigrants Into the United States from developing countries In 1967, only 1,472 were natural scientists. As in all professional categories, these represent higher and lower levels of occupation. Tlie argu- ment would apply with little force to the majority with lower level skills and It Is there- fore unlikely that It applies to more than a very small minority of the present professtonal migration." (Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs,. Nov. 5. 1968. p. 47.) «** Alice W. ShurclliT, "Manipulating Demand and Supply of Hlgh-Level Manpower," International Lahor Review 101, (February 1970), p. 133. 3f^s Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, 1968, p. 42.78. ="* Ibid. According to 1966 estimates by J. G. Scovllle of tbe International Labor Organ- ization, the net requirements for manpower In professional occupations In developing countries between 1970-1980 will be 16.9 million, compared with 5.3 million In the previous decade. Some earlier projections and estimates, according to the U.N. report on brain drain, have been In various categories still higher. The report adds that brain drain raises tbe question as to whether professionals In such numbers can be absorbed. 1177 An example of the needs-demands issue is that of the situation in Istanbul, Turkey. The demand for physicians is so low in Istanbul that the average M.D. sees fewer than 40 patients a week and cannot earn an acceptable livelihood. Yet, the need, if defined in terms of bringing health care in Istanbul up to European urban standards, is such that all physicians working to capacity would hardly begin to meet it.^^' Such disparities in demands and needs are not uncommon in the LCDs. Thus the seriousness of brain drain lies within the eye of the be- holder. Viewed from the LDC perspective of need, the effects are seri- ous because the leadership in the developing country perceives the larger requirements of developing and nation-building. Viewed from the demand side, commensurate with the interests of the advanced countries, the effects are not serious : Brain drain is an asset, relieving the LDCs of surplus manpower which are regarded as a wasteful ex- penditure of human i-esources. What appears to be brain drain, as George Baldwin wrote, is really "overflow," and emigration of a sur- plus elite becomes a safety valve for unwanted but unavoidable social pressures. The essence of the differing perspectives seems to rest on the question of whether or not the viewer takes the long-term or short-term view of development. For the short-term, demand-oriented viewer, brain drain can have only positive effects. As Mr. Baldwin said : "Clearly the latter [that is, the economy's effective demand] is the more rele- vant and realistic test to apply." ^°^ But for the long-term viewer from tiie need-oriented perspectij^e, brain drain can have serious negative effects, specifically, impairing future development. As Deena R. Khatkhate, an Adviser in India's Central Banking Service, explained : The Phenomenon of brain drain is a consequence partly of the prevailing tendency in some of the less developed countries to overproduce graduates and partly of the social inertia in these societies preventing a full use of the available trained manpower. Unavoidable though it is, it may not . . . be harmful, at any rate in the long run, as it hastens the social, psychological, and attitudinal changes in the economies of the emigrating countries which can be conducive to more productive use of skilled manpower and other resources.'"* Supporters of the long-term need perspective would further point out that a manpower reserve force of professionals of which Khatkhate speaks, even though underemployed and overtrained, constitutes a reserve pool for the future if and when demand may increase with progress in development. In cases in which a surplus of a particular profession exists — for example, medical doctors in the Philippines and India— the reduction of the "pull" factor in the United States by building sufficient medical schools, thus satisfying domestic needs and demands with American manpower, would compel readjustments in the Filipino and Indian manpower market. In this case the market it- self would have its own corrective mechanism — and remedy for med- ical brain drain. For the Filipino and Indian doctor (in-being or aspiring), closed off from access to the American market, would prob- 3»7 Shurclifif, op. dt., p. 1.^3. 3f« Baldwin, op. clt., p. 362. 390 Deena R. Khatkhate, "The Brain Drain as a Social Safety Valve," Finance and Devel- opment (March 1970), p. 39. <17-4no O - 77 - 37 1178 ably have two real options: either to adjust his career plans so that he would have a marketable profession (for example, engineering, agronomy, or some other career essential for nation-building), or to leave the urban centei-s and practice in the countryside where medical need is great and where he can fulfill his career expectations as a doctor. (In recent years such a shift in career plans has occurred in the American professional manpower market. With the decline in de- mand for engineers, many engineering students and graduates shifted to the medical field where demands and needs were greater and career prospects brighter. Many unemployed space scientists and engineers have also been "retooled" for other careers.) In this way, therefore, reduction of "pull" factors in the receiving country can act as a positive influence on the labor market in the sending LDC : It can contribute to reducing brain drain and to aiding long-term development, at least potentially, by closing off opportuni- ties in the advanced country and by compelling acceptance of a new reality, a new set of options within the LDC. What ultimately makes the need-demand issue significant in con- siderations on brain drain is that the issue exposes the riddle of devel- opment, namely, how to create an effective demand in the LDCs that in turn will stimulate sufficient creative forces to satisfy the nation's needs, for, in circular fashion, the needs of society are satisfied only by creating demands, and demands are created by raising the level of development. Efforts of Brian Drain Within the LDCs : Gains and Benefits From an Educated Elite Returning foreign students and scholars of the LDCs' trained in the LTnited States and other advanced countries of the AVest, have con- tributed a great deal to the development of their countries. In accent- ing the positive values of talent migration, some American observers have gone so far as to deny any serious negative effects, and to assert that the study of foreign students in the LTnited States even contrib- utes to a diminution of brain drain.*°° Despite increasing emigration, the foreign educated have also been increasingly returning home, and accordingly have aided the flow of knowledge, techniques, science, and <"^ Dr. Frankol pointed out that In fiscal yoar 1966 only one-Rlxth of the total of sklllpd persons who immigrated — 30,039 — were temporary visitors (students, exchanges, etc.) who had adjusted their status to that of Immigrants. And he added : "Indeed, study by for- eigners in this country, far from increasing the 'brain drain,' probably contributes to its diminution. The overwhelming number of the people who are trained here return home to help the development of their own countries. They thus help to alleviate the conditions that are the fundamental reasons for emigration from their countries." (Hearings, Senate Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1968, p. 14.) Under Secretary of State Rostow stated with regard to the increase in immigrants from Asia : ". . . there" Is no evidence . . . that such increases have been dramatic, or that the number of students, scientists, scholars, and other professional men who come as visitors, and are given permission to remain as permanent Immigrants is causing a significant drain of talents and skills to the United States from other countries." He went on to explain further: "It is questionable, in any event, whether visitors from other countries form a significant part of whatever 'brain drain' to the United States there may be. . . . Most of the men and women trained here, sooner or later, return to their homes to take a leading part in building strong Institutions there. They have a much better knowledge, a more intimate knowledge of the United States than most of their countrymen, and most of them remain for the rest of their lives among our best friends abroad. Their experience here as students or as workers in one or another of our intellectual industries makes a vital contribution to every aspect of the development of their own countries." (Ibid., p. 5.) 1179 administration from developed to developing countries. Henderson has described this inflow as ''inestimable in its value." *" Speaking for Iran, Habib Naficy said : ". . . it is certainly beyond any argument that the modernization process could not have been sus- tained without the work of Western-trained Iranians, however signifi- cant may have been the contributions to this process by outsiders work- ing in the country and the modernizing influence of other factors." *°* That other Middle Eastern countries have also benefited from Amer- ican education is shown by the success of some student returnees who with maturity moved on to leadership positions. Ahmad Zaki al- Yamani, who at 42 years old is one of Saudi Arabia's leading political figures, studied law at Harvard Univ^ersity. As Minister of Petroleum Affairs, Sheik Yamani is the principal negotiator for Saudi Arabia and the other Arab countries wdth the West over the future of the Middle East's oil resources. For 13 years an adviser to King Faisal, Yamani is also the main force behind Saudi Arabia's modernization. He is assisted by Hisham Xazir, an economist wdth a Master's Degree from the University of California at Los Angeles, who heads the country's planning organization, and by Dr. Bakr Bakr, Dean of Petroleum College. Dr. Bakr is a graduate petroleum engineer from the University of Texas and a graduate from the Stanford Graduate School of Business ; he also holds a doctorate in quantitative analysis and management from the University of Southern California.*"^ Another case of an Arab LDCs benefiting from a student returnee is that of Mahmud Sulayman al-Maghribi, a leading figure in Libya's revolutionary government. A Ph. D. from George Washington Uni- versity, al-Maghribi became a leader of the Libyan oil workers' union, a petroleum lawyer for ESSO, and held such leading positions in the Qaddafi government as Prime Minister, principal oil negotiator for Libya, and the Libyan Ambassador to the United Nations.*"* The United States has played a primary role in educating many of the young Arab oil elite. William F. Penniman, a petroleum consult- ant, recalled for the House Foreign Affairs Committee in hearings on Middle East negotiations in May 1973, that on one occasion he had participated in oil negotiations with the Kuwaitis, five of whom had <"! Henderson, op. cit., p. 127. Dr. Charles V. Kldd, expressed the following views on this matter that are held by many students of brain drain : "Advanced training in advanced countries by students from less-developed countries Is on balance an indispensable means for supplying trained talents to the less-advanced countries." After describing the rlslcs to the LDCs and the estimated losses of some 10 percent, he concluded : "All In all, the price paid by less-developed countries In terms of migration of students does not seem excessive." (Hearings, House Government Operations Committee, Brain Drain, 1968. p. 50.) That Norway, a victim of brain drain, has gained substantially through the American educational exchange program, was evident in the roster of "Leading Former Fulbrlghters" whose names and occupations were appended to a letter from U.S. Ambassador to Is'orway Thomas R. Byrne to Senator J. William Fulbright (D-Arlj.) dated Oct. 3. 1973, and inserted In the Congressional Record. Among those "former Fulbrlghters" who returned home to contribute their talents to Norway after receiving advanced education in the United States rather than remain in this country are Members of Parliament, cabinet officials, leaders in Norway's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and other government departments, leaders in Indus- try, publishing, education, medicine and law. The list reads liice a veritable "Who's Who In Norway." (See, Educational exchange program. In Remarks by J. William Fulbright, Congressional Record, Nov. 15. 1973. pp. S20442-S20443.) • *"^ Mr. Naficy goes on to cite the negative effects. See. Naficy. op. cit.. p. 69. *«3.Tuan De Onis, "Mastery Over World Oil Supply Shifts to Producing Countries," The Xeiv York Times, Apr. 11. 1973. pp. 1 and 2S. .uador have suffered heavy losses. Others like Brazil, Peru, and Venezuela have not been so adversely affected. In between, however, are the many who have paid some price for the loss of high-level manpower, vary- ing in degree, but, in Gregory Henderson's words, "still painful" to experience.^^° LOSS OF GF.XERAL PROFESSIOXAL MANPOWER Running through the literature on brain drain is the dominant theme that all LDC losers, great and small, share a common loss of an elite human resource that is important for development. The UXESCO report on the application of science and technology to development in Latin America described the relationship betw^een this resource and development in these words : The possibilities for the development of any country depend to a great extent on the human resources available in that country. In fact the human element is at the same time the origin, the actor, and the end of all activity. Its impor- tance is therefore greater than that of any other single vital element for development.*-! <, Senate Judiciary Committee. International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1968, p. 43.) In a study of brain drain of Palestinian and Jordanian Arabs to the United States, Lafl Ibrahim Jaafarl concluded : "The Middle East homeland can only suffer from the continuous drain upon its pool of potentially highly qualified manpower. In the long run. whatever regime may be in power, only a scientifically and technologically trained body of national residents will be able to engage In the necessary development of the region." "(Jaafarl, op. clt.. p. 129.) That the Arabs are becoming increasingly concerned about the loss of professional talent to the West was revealed by a study recently published in Commerce du Levant of Beirut. According to the study, the Arab world Is one of the areas suffering most severely from brain drain to the industrialized West. It showed that between 1962-1968, 37.60.S Arab "brains" emigrated to the United States, which attracted the largest number. Of those, 6,560 were technicians, 1,283 were qualified engineers, 481 biologists, 483 doctors, 202 nurses, and 79 socio'oglsts. The major sources were Jordan (9,548), Egvpt (9,315), Lebanon (8,191), Iraq r4.192). Morocco (2,473), and Syria f2,406). Another 15, 207 emigrated to Canada between 1962-1967, and France, the leading European recipient, accepted 456 Arab specialists be- tween 1962-1966. (Middle East Economic Digest 18 (Jan. 18. 1974) p. 88.) 428 CIMT studv. p. 691. ♦Mbid.. p. 690. *'" Dr. Daniel Bell, professor of sociology at Harvard TTnlverslty. gave the following appraisal of the value of talent In modernization : ". . . It means that the health and strength of the Intellectual community is not only a matter of a general concern to society, but a necessity In the organization of change. It means the sources of Innova- tion in the society come from the Intellectual institutions, the universities, the research institutes, the research corporations. It means moreover that the scarcest resource to the society is essentially talent for human capital In the words of the economists) and the husbanding of human capital, the Identification of talent is a much more different cycle than that of financial capital." fDanlel Bell, "The Management of Information and Knowledge," Jn, U.S. Congress, House. Committee on Science and Astronautics, The Manarrement of Information and Knoieledpe, 1970. d. 15.) In the United Nations' most current appraisal of brain drain from the LDCs (.Tan. 18, 1974K Secretary General Waldhelm gave the following assessment of the loss of pro- fessional talent and its impact upon development : "34. The financial loss suffered by a developing country due to the outflow of trained personnel Is "nly the visible tip of the Iceberg. The effects unon the process of develop- ment are as important, if not more so. The capacity of developing countries to acliieve the progress associated with development depends upon the existence of structures within which this progress can take place and upon the existence of trained persons who can organize these structures and play key leadership roles within them. The structures Include government, industries, agriculture and the social services : the trained persons Include engineers, scientists, teachers, doctors and nurses. These persons can function only In the context of organized structures. Conversely, the structures are useless without the trained personnel to make them run. Wlien therefore these trained personnel emigrate, the operation of the structures is seriously disrupted unless replacements are found from a 1187 Leadership Qualities of Emigrant Professionals.— -T\m characteris- tics of emigrant professionals suggest leadership qualities that are gen- erally found in ruling elites throughout the world. They are the talented of the LDCs, the highly educated, trained in leading profes- sions, and generally possessing dynamic personal traits. More assertive and adventurous than those remaining behind, they are less likely to endure sacrifices at home and are more inclined to accept attractive new challenges. "These migrants take from their home countries ancil- lary contributions that are not adequately measured by counting mi- grants," concluded the CIMT study. "The ferment is lessened when these people move. The quality of leadership may decline." *^^ Professor Moravcsik pursued the same line of argument in disput- ing the Baldwin thesis that the migration of the critical elite would be Toughly proportional to the total number of professional migrants. lie recounted his observations from personal experience that "it is often exactly the most talented, and the most aggressive that leave the country." In the highly competitive international market, "nat- urally the best people get picked up first." ISIoreover, the "most ag- gressive and management-wise, most adroit individuals also have a higher chance of success in acquiring for themselves a suitable position abroad." Thus, Moravcsik concludes : "the fraction of the professional personnel that migrates abroad represents, from the point of view of future developments of science and technology, a rather crucial ele- ment in quality, even though perhaps not in quantity." ^^^ And then there is the age factor. The emigrant professional departs as a young adult at a time in life when his potentialities both profes- sionally and as a general contributor to society are just being realized. This is an incalculable loss to the LDCs. Approprimately 50 percent of all FMGs coming to the United States since the 1960's have been less than 40 years old.*^^ In 1970, nearly one-half (49 percent) of the sci- entists and engineers immigrating to the United States were under 30 ; another 46 percent were between 30 to 44. The youngest came from the LDCs of Asia and Africa, which together accounted for 64 percent of the total inflow in 1970. Of the Asians, 54 percent were under 30 ; of the Africans, 52 percent were under 30.*^* continuing pool of similarly trained persons. The loss of such leaders therefore causes serious damage to programmes of development. "35. The nature of the damage varies with the category of personnel emigrating from t'le developing country. The loss of scientists and engineers impairs the capability of the country to adapt and absorb current technologies as well as to innovate new technologies. The loss of educators affects the training of new personnel, and the loss of physicians and nurses adversely affects the health services. In all these cases, the effects arise because the outflow of trained personnel reduces the nationally important cadre of people vital to industrial, agricultural, governmental, university and medical leadership." (United Nations, Committee on Science and Technology for Development, Outflow of Trained Personnel from Developinp to Developed Countries, Report of the Secretary General. New York, United Nations, 1974. pp. 11.34-12.35 United Nations Document E/C.8/21. Jan. 18, 1974.) "1 CIMT study, p. 695. Senator Mondale remarked : "The?e skilled professional men are almost ideally the type of people needed in the developing nations to bring political stability as well." Trained and skilled in their own professions, to be sure, they are also the kind of people who can provide indispensable leadership in the critical area of political development of these nations." (Hearings, Senate Judiciary Committee. International Mioration of Talent and Skills, 1968, p. 96.) *^ Michael J. Moravcsik, "Communication Among Scientists and Its Implications to Developing Countries," Article based on a lecture delivered at the Research and Develop- ment Management Seminar organized and sponsored by the Scientific and Technical Re- search Council of Turkey in cooperation with the Technical Assistance Programme of the Orsranization for Economic Cooperation and Development, held in Istanbul, May 1970, n. •">. "SAMA. FMG Study, 1971, p. 7. The percentage for 1963 was 50.7 percent, for 1967, 51.8 percent. *"NSF, Survey of Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians from Abroad, 1972, p. 9. 1188 LOSS OF SPECIFIC PROFESSIONAL MANPOWER Within this generalized professional elite is the specialized profes- sional, the scientist, engineer, and physician, those who in conjunction with specialists in other fields constitute the vital human resources for development. It is this group that provides the kinetic energy for in- stitutional change and national development. It is widely observed, and in any case virtually self-evident, that without this essential core of talent progress can be arrested. Effects of Loss of Vital Talent. — It is commonplace that future technological development in the world depends on scientific and en- gineering manpower. Scientists are the pointmen for the advancement of knowledge ; engineers, as a nation's problem solvers, translate that newly acquired knowledge into practical use.*^' But, as Dr. Steven Dedijer, a Yugoslav scientist, observed, world science and technology are already concentrated in the advanced countries. The LDCs are the dispossessed. Between 15 and 30 of the 120 countries in the world, with less than one-third of its population, possess practically all its science, spend 95 percent of the world's research and development funds, and gain most of the benefits therefrom. Some 100 of the world's nations, he said, have "either in an absolute or in a relative but very significant sense, no science." *^® And the needs of the advanced countries are growing, thus magnify- ing the imbalance in technical manpower resources. Future projections of American requirements, for example, suggest that shortage rather than surplus of technical manpower may characterize this century from the late 1970's or early 1980's on.*" To satisfy these needs, the ad- vanced countries complement their own indigenous stock with emi- grants from the LDCs. Yet, the LDCs cannot afford this "unrequited gift" of technical manpower, as some specialists term brain drain, because it jeopardizes their essential human resources for development. Professor Moravcsik explained the relationship between science and development in these few words : "Excellence in science is mainly based on excellence in sci- entific manpower, just as manpower is the key to almost any other type of undertaking also." *^^ And with equal brevity he and Prof. Francis E. Dart explained the effect of this loss in technical manpower on development : "Shortage of adequately trained manpower is one of the most important obstacles in the development of the emerging countries. In fact, many believe that as far as the development of sci- ence is concerned, it is the most important obstacle." *^^ Dr. Kidd *M U.S. Congresi?, Honsp, Committer on Science and Astronautics, Report on the Na- tional Science Board, The Role of Engineers and Scientists in a National Policy for Technologu, f)2d Cone., 2d ses.s., 1972. pp. 9-10. (House doc. No. 92-281.) (Hereafter cited as. Report of the National Science Board, 1972.) «■"' Quoted In Henderson, "Foreign Students: Exchange or Immigration?" Selected Readings on Internatioiud Education, House Committee on Education and Labor, 1966, p. .S.50. *'■'' Report of the National Science Board, 1972. p. 22. ■"■^ >foravcsik, Basic Scienti^c Research in Developinq Countries, n. 4. *^» Francis E. Dart, and Michael J. Moravcsik, The Physics Interview Project, University of Oregon, Eugene Oreg., r>. 1. (tvpescrlpt, undated) The final renort of the UNESCO conference at Santiago, Chile made the same general observation : "The International conferences held to study the conditions necessary for sneedlng up the economic and social development of underdeveloped countries have unanimouslv recognized that the shortage of adequately trained sclentiflf' and tee'inleal personnel is one of the main obstacles to the carrying out of anv development plan." (UNESCO. Final Report of the Conference on the Application of Science and Technology to the Development of Latin America, 1965, p. 27.) 1189 termed the loss of highly trained scientists from the LDCs a "national catastrophe." "This movement," he said, "constitutes in effect, an irre- placeable loss of a most valuable resource available to developing na- tions— scientific and technological brain power." ^^^ What is most significant about brain drain as a negative force in de- velopment is that the number of scientists, engineers, physicians, and other professionals who make up this key talent resource is not very great. Effects must, therefore, be measured against qualitative rather than quantitative criteria. The CIMT study estimated that in the 1960's worldwide migration from the LDCs to the advanced countries was around 300,000 a year. About 15 percent of this total, or 50,000, were estimated to have had professional or technical training. By applying a strict criterion of value to development the number could be reduced to 25,000. Assuming that 1 in 10 had exceptional ability, then the core loss was between 3,000 to 5,000 a year, but these were persons with the highest ability and training. The loss of this vital cadre of talent, the study concluded, "can be particularly harmful" to development be- cause it is this exceptional group that can contribute the most.**^ Statistics on the migration of scientists, engineers, and physicians from the LDCs to the United States suggest that losses among the especially talented of some countries are probably not an exceptional occurrence and perhaps increase proportionately with the increase in immigration.^^^ Such losses are, however, difficult to document, and most students of brain drain seem to approach this problem with cau- tion, at best generalizing on the degree of loss or just recording statis- tics and percentages on immigrant professionals that in themselves imply or infer the dimension of loss."^ That losses to this elite are in- <«> Quoted In, United Nations Educational. Scientific and Cultural Organization, The ProNem of Emigration of Scientists and Technologists, Preliminary report prepared at the request of the Advisory Committee of the Economic and Social Council on the Appli- cation of Science and Technology to Development, Paris, Feb. 29, 1968. p. 12. (Hereafter cited as, UNESCO, Problem of Emigration of Scientists and Technologists, February The late Lloyd V. Berkner, Director of the Graduate Research Center of the South- west gave the following appraisal of the relationship between Intellectual power and development: "Only those regions will be economically healthy that have the Intellectual power to exploit the new science and the consequent industry. Most certainly, those regions that fail intellectually will fail economically and become chronically poor and colonial to the Intellectuallv advanced regions. This Is the social certainty that the technological revolution of our century has made clear." (Quoted in, UNESCO. Final Report of the Conference on the Application of Science and Technology to the Development of Latin America, 1965, p. 181.) ^ , , x • . , *ii CIMT study p. 671. The UNESCO report on development in Latin America made the following observations on the effect of scientific and technological brain-drain from Latin America : "The most serious consequence of this constant drain Is evident in the (lifficultv — and, in some cases, the impossibility— of ensuring the training, in each branch of science and technologj', of the critical mass of specialists and research workers capable of producing a real impact on the community. Society does not take account of science as it does not 'see results', and science, in turn, is bereft of the resources and support of society. A posslblv paradoxical result of this situation is to be seen in the fact that Latin American countries have to seek experts from the very countries to which their own scientists and experts emigrate, and often in the same fields." (UNESCO, Final Report of the Conference on the Application of Science and Technology to the Develop- ment of Latin America, 1965, pp. 29-30. • . . ^ ^ *. <'2 Mr. Baldwin discusses the loss of what he terms "key men," which he places at about 5-10 percent of all professional migrants. He notes the difficulty in assessing such losses, particularly in establishing criteria. "No one has made such studies on more than a casual basis and It seems very Improbable that anyone will," he wrote. Accordingly, he assumes that migration of the critical elite would be "roughly proportional to the total number of professional migrants." Losses of key men have risen with the rise In total migration, he said, but adds that these losses are considerably offset by the rapidly growing supply of key men being generated by expanding education at home and abroad. (Baldwin, op. cit.. pp. 362-63.) , „ „„^ „, . *« Professor Skolnikoff cited the case of only 5 percent of the 2,000 Taiwanese a year returning from graduate study abroad. The absolute numbers involved are relatively small compared to emigration from scientifically advanced countries, but he noted that the loss of even a few highly trained personnel can have more serious effects on a less-aevelopea nation's scientific and industrial activities." Professor Skolnikoff acknowledged that the significance of this loss to a small struggling nation is hard to evaluate, but noted that elements of loss had to remain "open questions." (Skolnikoff, op. cit., p. 95.) 1190 curred in the LDCs is evident in studies on brain drain from Latin America and the Middle East. A report by the Pan American Health Organization discussed the function of the vital cadres of talent for de- velopment and the difficulties generated for Latin American countries by the loss of this elite ; and then made the following generalization : "informed people in virtually every Latin American country can name persons of outstanding talent who have migrated to the United States. The numbers vary from country to country and they are small, but they constitute a serious blow to development." *" The UNITAR study on brain drain from Lebanon asserts cate- gorically that losses iii the Middle East have adversely affected the development of its universities. According to the study, 70 percent of the scienti<=ts from the area who have studied in Europe and North America emigrate. It concludes : "This outflow of highly trained per- sonnel has retarded the development of the universities in this area over the last 10 years." "^ This conclusion infers that the cadre of vital manpower has "been impaired and development as a whole thereby impeded.**^ Social Costs of Medical Brain Drain.— Th^ social costs of emigrat- ing physicians from the LDCs constitute a long-term negative factor in development. Unprovable in an absolute sense, this loss can be measured partly by the ratio of M.D.s-to-population and by consider- ing social needs rather than demand. Doctor-to-population ratios illuminate the disparity of medical care in the LDCs and the advanced countries, and point to the conclusion that the LDCs suffer adversely from medical brain drain. In the United States, the heaviest user of FMGs from the LDCs, the ratio nationally is about 1.7 doctors for every 1,000 inhabitants. In New York State, which has the highest concentration of FMGs, the ratio *" PAHO, Migration of Health Personnel, Scientist-i , and Engineers from Latin America, 19C6 p. 8. The report stated : "The problem cannot be assessed statistically, and there Is no point In attemptinic to do so. The critical fact Is that the dimension of quality must be borne explicitly in mind when statistics are examined." A case In point is the migration of 700 Argentine engineers to the United States over the period 1951-1961. This number, the report stated, equaled 8 percent of the total number of new engineers graduating over that 10-year period, (p. 4.) Luis Giorgi estimates that Latin America loses 8 percent of the annual number or graduates in the scientific and engineering professions as a result of brain drain. He placed the cost at about $14 million per year, that is. direct cost of training those emigrants, but he added : "If account is taken of all the many consequences — almost impossible to evaluate in figures — the loss is very much greater." Presumably, he was suggesting losses to development. (See, UNESCO, Final Report of the Conference on the Application of Science and Technology to the Development of Latin America, 1965, ' Losses of the critical elite seemed to be inferred In data presented to the House Government Operations Committee during its study on brain drain. The Committee's study cited the case of the Dominican Republic which sent the United States 78 physicians In 1962 yet this figure constituted a third of the country's additions to manpower stock In thnt year. Moreover, 44 emigrating Dominican engineers were more than two-thirds of the country's new graduates. Chile's 18 engineers immigrating to the United States were equivalent "of a fifth of its additions through new graduates. With regard to Israel the study noted that Israel's 30 physicians were "an astounding 41.7 percent of its additions to the physician population of the country." (Staff study. House Government Operations Committee. Brain Drain into the United States of 'Scientists, Engineers and Physicians, ^^44s'uNlTAR, Brain Drain from Five LDCs, 1971, p. 84. In the period 1962-1967. 2,229 Lebanese professionals were admitted to the United States. <*« The report on the Ditchlev Park Conference stated that several speakers had difficulty putting quantitative value to ail economic factors in brain drain and the other non-economic factors which are also important. The report said : "The real loss to the community is the loss of leadership which highlv qualified manpower represents. One example was given of a school for technicians in Pakistan which was delayed for 4 years due to the migration of one man. The influence of Homl Bhabha on the development of Indian science was cited as an example of the effect of a man of international stature who did not migrate." (Report, Ditchley Park Conference on Brain Z>rai»J, 1968, p. 13.) 1191 is 1.9 doctors for every 1.000 residents. In some areas of the country the ratio is lower. The basic Federal Government criterion is^one ]M.D. for every 1,500.'**^ The doctor-to-population ratio for other advanced nations is also high. In 1960, Austria had 560 inhabitants for every doctor; Belgiiftn, 700 ; West Germany, 650 ; Italy, 610 ; and France, 840."« The ratio for the LDCs is in sharp contrast with those from the advanced countries. In 1960, the doctor-inhabitant ratio in the LDCs of Africa was one M.D. for every 10,100 inhabitants; Asia, 5,700; and North and South America, excluding the United States and Canada, I'SOO.''*^ ^ . , , . LDCs with the lowest ratios were Burma with 11,«00 inhabitants for every M.D.; India, 5,800; Iran. 3,220; Indonesia, 35,000; Haiti, 15,000; Ecuador, 5,100; Bolivia, 3,680; Ethiopia, 69.000; Ghana, 21,000; Nigeria, 32,000; Tunisia, 9,400; Pakistan, 6,400; Thailand, 8,600; Korea, 2,850; China (Taiwan), 2,420; Colombia, 2,470; Peru, 2.230."^° . ^ The above ratios do not necessarily reflect the actual ratios for specific areas within the LDCs. In rural areas the ratio is much lower than in the urban areas where physician concentration is the highest. Sources on brain drain combine ratios in unique ways that show the actual situation and suggest the pressing needs of the LDCs. "We have 1,250 doctors for 25.4 million people in East Java," explained Dr. Wog- sokusumo Bahrawi, who directs health care in East Java, Indonesia. "That sounds like one doctor for every 20,000 people, but it's a dis- tortion because most of them are in big cities. So really, in rural areas, there is only one doctor for every 180,000 people." *^^ Closer scrutiny of ratios for the Philippine Islands reveals a similar imbalance. Manila has a ratio of 1 phj'sician for 671 people. In the rural areas the ratio lowers to 1 for every 4,979; and for Southern Mindanao, the ratio drops still further to 1 for every 10,700.*^- Similar imbalances would no doubt be revealed if the ratios for other heavy losers in medical brain drain among the LDCs were broken down regionally or accord- ing to specific areas. Undoubtedly the imbalance would be accentuated still more sharply if only native doctors were counted in ratios rather than including *" The New York Times, June 15, 1973, p. 33 and Mav 27, 1972, p. E16. For a discussion of the influx of FMGs into the United States, see Chapter II. According to Margulles and Bloch, in 1969 approximately 75 percent of the FMGs came from the LDCs of Africa, Asia and Latin America, (p. 9) In many instances the LDCs with the lowest ratios are the highest contributors. Of the 14, S2S FMG trainees (residents and interns) in the United States at the close of 1967, four-fifths came from 15 countries and 56 percent came from 6 developing Asian nations : I'hilippines (25.5 percent) ; India (11.9 percent) ; Korea (6.8 percent) : Iran (4.4 percent) ; Thailand (4.4 percent) and Taiwan (3.1 percent). See below for the ratios of M.D.s-to-inhabitants. (Henderson, op. cit., p. 63.) "« Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outfloic of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, 1968, Table III. pp. 70-71. "" Ibid., p. 40. In commenting on the shortage of physicians and health workers In Africa. Prof. Cnaire Nader referred to Dr. Alfred Quenum, African regional director of the World Health Organization, and his statement that in Africa the ratio was one M.D. for 25,000 to 50,000 persons and this includes foreign physicians and missionaries. (Nader, Technical Experts in Developing Countries, pp. 455-456.) <5o Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, 1968. Table III, pp. 68-71. <5i The New York Times, Mar. 21, 1973, p. 12. In underscoring the Inadequacy of health care, the reporter, writing from Triwung Kidal, Indonesia, observed : "There Is a good chance that no one In this village will see a doctor this year. It Is almost certain that no one will appear to teach the people about the virtues of sanitation and hygiene." *^ UNITAR, Brain Drain from Five LDCs, 1971, p. 103. 1192 those who are expatriates and missionaries from the advanced coun- tries of the West. The correlation of the imbalance in ratios of doctors-to-population with apparent and declared social needs throws further light on medical manpower deficiencies in the LDCs and the negative impact of medical brain drain. That the medical needs of the LDCs are not adequately satisfied is evident by the accumulated cases in the brain drain literature. In 1963, Nigeria graduated 19 M.D.s from its one medical school ; during the same year, 16 Nigerian doctors were work- ing in American hospitals,*^^ in effect a net gain for Nigeria of only three physicians. To comprehend the full meaning of these statistics, it is important to bear in mind that in 1960 Nigeria had a total of only 1 ,777 doctors, or a ratio of 1 doctor for every 32,000.'*^* In the case of Cameroon between 1961 and 1968, about 38 qualified Cameroonian pro- fessionals remained in the United States. Of these professionals, nine were medical scientists.*^^ At first glance this figure may seem insig- nificant, but it is substantial when placed in the context of need : Only 47 native Cameroonian doctors were said to be practicing in their country to serve a population of some 5.8 million — a ratio of 1 for every 123,000.*=^ Similar cases have been recorded for Asia. In India, 60 percent of the rural clinics in East Punjab (pop. 13.5 million) and presumably elsewhere are unmanned by doctors, while nearly 10 percent of India's medical doctors are working in foreign countries, mainly the United States and the United Kingdom.*^^ On August 15, 1974, a report from New Delhi appearing in The Christian Science Monitor disclosed that recently 125 students graduated from a medical college in Gujarat, north of Bombay, India; 85 of them promptly chartered a bus and arrived several days later at the U.S. consulate in Bombay to apply for visas. On one occasion, virtually the entire first graduating class of a new medical school in Chiengmai, Thailand, chartered an airplane and flew off to the United States.*^^ Thailand has a doctor-to-population ratio of 1 for every 8,600.*^^ Moreover, one-fourth of Thailand's 4,000 ^ Testimony of Senator Mondale. Hearings, Senate Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1908, p. 87. *^ Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outfloto of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Now 5, 1968, p. 70. ^^UNITAR. Brain Drain from Five LDCs, 1971, p. 117. Sixteen were engineers, 3 natural scientists, and 10 social scientists. 45« Eren, op. cit., p. 10. One hundred were working in France. The small medical cadre in Cameroon is evident by the few students studying abroad in 1969 : Canada. 9; France, 44; and the United States, 16. (UNITAR, Brain drain from five LDCs, 1971, p. 162.) Cameroon has no medical school at its Federal University. Founded In 1962, the university has faculties in law and economics, humanities, and science with a teaching staff of 260 and a student body of 3,277. The university library has only 40,000 volumes. In 1972, the university began postgraduate courses. In 1969, the University Center of Healtii Sciences was opened, and at the present time has 27 teachers and 132 students. Thus, It would seem that Cameroon has the barest minimum of an institutional Infrastructure for learning and must send its students abroad for any advanced training. By the same token it can least afford the loss of any of its overseas intelligentsia, for it is axiomatic in brain drain from the LDCs that the narrower the professional manpower base, the greater the loss to the nation. Loss of a physician from an advanced country would have little negative impact on medical services, but the same loss in Cameroon where the need is great and the ratio very low could be devastating. For Information on advanced education in Cameroon, see World of Learning, 1072-73 (London; Europa Pub- lications Ltd., 1972), V. 1, p. 217. <5- iveport. Ditchleti Park Conference on Brain Drain, 1068. p. 16, and Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outfloio of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5. 1968, p. 40.74. Punjab hns 768 medical institutions, includinc: 117 hospitals. 3 Avuyvedlc hospitals, 126 primary health centres and 522 dispensaries. The Stateman's Year-book, 1972-73 (London : Macmillan-St. Martin's, 1972). p. 378. ««* Dublin, op. cit., p. 875. <5» Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. "^ 1968, 1 . 68. 1193 doctors are now in the United States ; yet, according to Stevens and Vermeulen, outside Bangkok, physician services are "woefully inade- quate." And they add, "There are more Thai graduates in New York than there are serving Thailand's rural population of 28 million." *'^° A somewhat similar story could be told of Korean M.D.'s. Between 1962-68, 1,914 Korean doctors came to the United States, but only 49 had returned by early 1969. Between 45-60 percent of the graduates of Korea's 11 medical schools find employment abroad. Meanwhile, only 1,000 doctors are practicing in rural areas where about half (some 15 million) of the South Korean population lives, or by including some small towns and a slightly different doctor definition, 5,400 doc- tors for a population of 20 million.'*^^ Much the same could be said for Iran, Lebanon, and Turkey. There are more American-trained Iranian doctors in New York than all of Iran, yet Iran has a doctor- to-population ratio of only 1 for every 3,220.*^^ In appraising medical brain drain from Lebanon, the UNITAR stud}- declared : . The need for medical personnel has become even greater with the rapid popu- lation increase. The loss of physicians with residency training has seriously af- fected the health service as well as the establishment of new medical schools. Hence, the outflow to the United States of eighty-nine physicians and surgeons, twelve dentists and sixty-two nurses over a five-year period has had a great ef- fect on the health system.*" Lebanon has a doctor-to-population ratio of 1 for 1,320.*^* In Latin America, the essentials are the same ; only variations here and there. The Pan American Health Organization study (PAHO) provides abundant evidence to show the negative effect of medical brain drain on Latin America, though it varies from country to coun- try. Quantitative losses, the report states, are "highly significant but not catastrophic." ^^^ Every year an estimated 300 medical doctors emi- grate to the United States from Latin America, representing about 8 percent of the annual output of all medical schools. The social loss is magnified by the fact that 25 percent of those emigrating are potential scientists and professors, that is, the builders of a nation's scientific in- frastructure. According to a survey by PAHO, "The academicians in the United States who are Latin American graduates believe that their countries are losing some of their best phvsicians through migration to the United States." *«« Most students of brain drain seem to concur in the judgment that the LDCs suffer serious social and economic losses from medical brain drain. Dr. ^Margulies told the House Government Operations Com- mittee : There is no way to estimate the costs just as there are no hard facts on the size or character of the brain drain. Certainly, for some countries the costs are heavy, particularly when they include the loss of talented leaders and the assump- **> Stevens and Vermeulen, op. cit, pp. 49-50. «i Henderson, op. cit., p. 63. ^ , ^ r t^« x- ^ *82 Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained, Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, 1968, p. 68. ^ ... According to Stevens and Vermeulen, Iran produces 600 medical graduates a year. At least 100 or each of the graduating classes from 1960 through 1969 are now in the United states. Many, if not most, they said, will remain ; in 1970 alone, 806 Iranian medical graduates took the American licensing examinations (p. 50). «3 UNITAR, Brain Drain from Five LDCs, 1971, p. 91. ,„„ »r ~ *•* Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, *^'Repori on Brain Drain from Latin America, Pan American Health Organization, 1966, p. 34. » *3« TK(^ pT,. 34 and 17. 1194 tion of Western values which are inappropriate to local problems. Physicians are lost at the very time they can be most useful but after they have been expensively educated. The short-term effects are measured-by preventable disease and death, the long-term by retarded development of institutions and health services, both highly undesirable."' In their study on FMGs, Margulies and Bloch summarize the posi- tive aspects of the inflow, but render this critical judgment : While these and other events were occurring, no one was measuring the results. There seems to have been a benevolent assumption that nobility of purpose leads inevitably to a happy ending. What did happen has now become evident, even with some of the information still lacking. The United States has been siphoning off medical manpower from areas of the world which can least afford such losses, returning to them physicians with inapplicable skills and doubtful professional careers at home.*"* In their U.S. Government-sponsored study, Stevens and Vermeulen concluded : . . . the majority of foreign medical graduates in internship and residency positions in this country — whatever their initial intentions — elect to remain in the United States. Thus, this country is the recipient of substantial "reverse foreign aid." The United States is reaping the rewards of investments made by other countries in the education of physicians, and those countries i^ve suffering a long-term loss of physician services."" Awareness of the price paid by the LDCs for medical brain drain is often expressed in terms of moral guilt. For Dr. G. Halsey Hunt, who found this dependency a "depressing and liumbling experience" and in the long run completely untenable, it "ill becomes us to depend indefinitely on other countries for the production of medical man- power to provide services to American patients." *'° For Dr. Irene Butter of the University of Michigan's School of Public Health, "A permanent loss of doctors from the poorest to the richest nations is the most disturbing aspect of the medical brain drain." *''^ And Pro- fessor H. ISIyint, who tended to minimize the effects of brain drain, acknowledged that, From the welfare point of view, the migration of doctors from the underde- veloped countries, where the ratio of doctors to the total population i.s so low, to the advanced countries where the doctors are relatively more numerous, is the most disconcerting aspect of the brain drain, whatever its effect or lack of effect on the economic development of the underdeveloped countries.*" Thus, the imbalance in doctor-to-population ratios indicates that the LDCs may have an oversupply of physicians to meet the demands of urban dwellers — or at least of those with money to pay for physicians' "'.Margulies to Mrs. Edna Gass, Jan. 19, 1968, In Hearings, House Government Oper- ations Committee, Brain Drain, 1968, p. 91. *^ Margulies and Block, op. clt., p. 86. The authors noted that the 40 Nlcaraguan physi- cians in the United States approximate the total medical school output of Nicaragua for 2 years, and that the 328 physicians for the Dominican Republic represent their medical school output for 4 years. "If the United States lost 60.000 of its own medical graduates to other countries, the equivalent of Iran's or Thailand's loss to this country, for even brief assignments," they wrote, "there would be widespread cries of shock and outrage. If wo added to that migration the repatriation of all FMGs now in this countrv, the total number of physicians remaining would be reduced from ,300,000 to 200.000. Even so, we would still have 1 physician for every 1,000 people, an enviable goal for the less developed countries." (pp. 80-81.) ^'^ Stevens and Vermeulen, op. cit., p. xl. «™ Department of State, Proceedings of Workshop on the International Migration of Talent and Skills, October 1966, pp. 126-127. *" Butter, op. cit., p. 23. <'2Myint, op. cit., p. 235. 1195 servicps — but the social needs of the country as a whole for such serv- ices, described by the CI^SIT study as "overwhelming," are clearly not satisfied. From this perspective of need the flight of' M.D.'s from the LDCs to the advanced countries may be seen more as brain drain than overflow.*^^ Loss of Students Through Nonreturn. — Depletion of reserve profes- sional manpower resources in the LDCs can result from loss of students studying in the United States and other advanced countries. Data on tliis aspect of brain drain are discussed above in chapter II. Briefly, the United States educates approximately one-fourth of tlie foreign students who study abroad.'*^* Estimates of student nonreturn vary. Officially, the U.S. Government has cited 8.8. percent.^ '^ A United Nations study on brain drain states that in 1967 tlie overall rate of student nonreturnees from both developed and developing countries from the United States was bet\veen 15 and 25 .percent. The percentage for Asians students, which constitutes approximately one- third of all foreign students in the United States, was 30 percent.*^*' Estimates for specific countries have been higher. Of the 7,913 sci- entists, engineers, and physicians immigrating into the United States from tlie LDCs in 1967, 3,772, or 48 percent, had originally entered the country as students with declared intentions of obtaining education or training and then returning home. The high overall 48 percent average ratio of student to total scientific immigration conceals even higher ratios for individual countries, namel}', 89 percent for Taiwan ; 80 percent for Korea ; 78 percent for India ; and 71 percent for Iran.^^^ Among nonreturnees it was further estimated that *' an alarmino; 51 I^ercent" of foreign recipients of Ph. D.'s planned to remain in the United States and "an even more alarming 60 percent" intended to take jobs in this country.*'^ Whatever the variables in numbers and percentages and however valid the purposes of international educational exchange, the fact remains that a high percentage of foreign students, notably from the LDCs, remain in the United States, and, thus deprive their countries of important manpower resources, real or potential.*'^ This depriva- tion is felt most keenly when countries have schemes of planned devel- opment and the flow of manpower has to be orchestrated according to I)rearranged plans."*^" «" CIMT study, p. 698. The LDCs also pay a hlph cost in the loss of tralnpd nurses and mldwlves who play an important role in health care. It is estimated tliat between 25-40 percent of all 256,000 nur.^es worlvinK In the Britisli National Health Service were born outside the Britisli Isles, almost 75 percent in developing Commonwealth countries. About 43 percent of the midwives practicing in England and Wales were born outside the \].K. (For details on nurses and mldwlves from the LDCs see Henderson, op. cit., pp. 5S-60.) 474 Testimony of Reverend Gibbons, In, Hearings, House, Government Operations Com- mittee. Brain Drain, 1968, p. 11. *'^ Hearings, Senate Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1968, pp. 91-92. *'« Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, 1968, p. 32.58. *" Report, House Government Operations Committee, Scientific Brain Drain from the LDCs, 1968, p. 7. *"Ibid., p. 8. *~^ Professor Patinkin explained this point : "It Is frequently Impossible to detect the outstanding scholars at a young age. Hence the loss involved in the flow of young Ph. D.'s abroad is greater than usually considered : for it decreases the probability that the country in question will really have the pick of its people." (Patinkin. op. cit.," p. 103.) *^ Professor Gardiner discusses various aspects of this matter as it applies to Africa. (Gardiner, op. cit., p. 196.) 1196 The cost of manpower loss increases when the country has to meet its manpower demands by drawing on foreign resources. A case in point is Iran. In 1966, according to Habib Naficy, there were some 6,000 paid foreign experts working in a variety of fields and positions and also hundreds of foreign experts who were "graciously" sent to Iran by the Peace Corps and different technical assistance agencies. "Their places could be taken by qualified Iranians who have not returned," said Mr. Naficy ; "the brain drain of young Iranians is, indeed, a very real problem." ^^^ In such instances the LDC suffers a dual loss. Yet, the LDCs, like those in Africa which have limited advanced training facilities for their nationals, must accept great risks in losing an estimated 20 per- cent or more of their students sent abroad for advanced study.*^^ Loss of National Prestige. — Finally, the LDCs suffer a loss of na- tional prestige when their professional elite leaves the country for residency in the advanced West. Prestige is a difficult factor to measure in international politics. Though intangible and elusive, it is nonethe- less a reality ; it is recognized as such, and does affect a nation's stand- ing in the world community. This effect is particularly strong in the LDCs where the search for a new national identity generates a special awareness of value and worth in the eyes of other nation-states. "The natural scientist is one of the most sought-after people in the world," wrote Dr. James A. Wilson, a social psychologist at the Uni- versity of Pittsburgh, and Jerry Gaston, a sociologist at the Southern Illinois University. "It is widely believed that he represents a cur- rency which can be translated into domestic and international wealth and prestige." Though difficult, if not impossible, to put a figure on losses caused by the migration of scientists (and for that matter other components of the professional elite), such migration, they said, "does impoverish the source country appreciably." They explained: "The prestige of a nation's scientific establishment tends to be weakened by extensive, permanent migration, although the relationship which con- nects prestige, emigration, and the 'base number' of scientists in that countrjT^ is far from clear." *^^ Not all students agree with this view. Jagdish Bhagwati, an Indian intellectual who after years of residency abroad returned home but commutes between both worlds, contended that Indians working abroad are enhancing the prestige and reputation of their country. In arguing for an open door policy on education and work abroad, he said: "The work of many mathematicians, physicists, statisticians, and economists at foreign universities while they are working abroad, *8i Naficy, op. clt, p. 70. 482 That Africans are aware of these risks Is shown In the final report of the Organiza- tion of African Unity (OAU) conference in Nairobi during July 1968. The report acknowledged that there were only three or so universities where postgraduate studies were given. These Institutions were very expensive to establish, and, the candidates usually available in each state were few in number. Otherwise, all postgraduate studies were taken outside Africa. The OAU reviewed this problem and decided in the Interests of Member States that centers of excellence be established In Africa to serve postgraduate needs. (Organization of African Unity, UNESCO, Final Report: Conference on Education, and Scientific and Technical Training in Relation to Development in Africa, Nairobi, Julv 16-27. 1968, p. 60.) **3 Wilson and Gaston, op. clt, p. 234. 1197 has in many cases transformed our reputation abroad, which was pre- viously low in academic circles. This itself is prestigious." *^* Professor Dandekar took the opposite point of view: "Bhagwait knows better," he replied in rebuttal, "and knows it too well that what- ever the prestige of the individual Indian scientists abroad may be, it is the scientists working in their own countries, often anonymously, in poor conditions, improvising with native genius to overcome several handicaps in resources and equipment, who are bringing effective pres- tige to their countries in the world community." *^^ What Dandekar seems to be implying is that the greatest prestige is institutional, not individual: prestige is to be gained not through the individual who succeeds abroad but rather in the success of native scientific institutions and the scientific community that he helps to create and represents. Loss of this prestige-producing potentiality can be a serious, but incalculable, blow to the LDCs. LOSS OF PROFESSIONAL MANPOW^ER IN\TESTMENT Assessment of investment costs is perhaps the most difficult task in judging effects of brain drain on the LDCs. Emigration statistics can- not tell the full story of costs: they provide a factual framework for analysis, but they neither define migration as a problem nor explain the effects on development. Migrating professionals have a value in themselves. Whatever that value may be, it is added to the receiving country, and correspondingly withdrawn from the sending country. On the surface this is a simple, commonsense judgment. But that value is not so easily determined. It varies widely in both time and place, es- pecially in science and technology, with their unique transnational characteristics. Accordingly, no agreed totals of economic costs and prices have yet been fixed to migration, nor in view of its complexities does it seem likely that this can ever be done.*®^ How is it possible to measure the "externalities" of the educated per- son, that is, his total value as a human being to society ? Loss of new knowledge or improved methods of production and management is a matter upon which a priori reasoning, as Professor Johnson states, "can throw no light," and thus provides no realistic means for measur- ing loss.*^^ Students of brain drain, like Eeverend Gibbons, must gen- eralize on economic and social costs in a diffuse and impressionistic way — "In a modernizing society or economy, it scarcely is a propitious beginning to have large percentages of the more trained minds move abroad and to abandon the task of handing on the torch of learning to their compatriots. The assumed net loss will be, under such circum- stances, presumably greater than the dollar cost of having trained the individuals who migrate." *^^ Or they attempt to put some quantitative value on advanced education of the migrant professional, hoping in *<*< Quoted In, Dandekar, op. clt., p. 227. *K Ibid., p. 227. *^ Gregory Henderson discusses this problem In UNITAR's, Emigration of Highly- Skilled Manpower from the Developing Countries, 1970. pp. Ib-lc. *" Johnson, op. clt., pp. 84-85. *"» Hearings, House Government Operations Committee, Brain Drain, 1968. p. 8. 1198 this way at least to fix some measure of cost to the sending nation, however imprecise.^^^ Estimated Costs of Emigrant Scientists and PJngineers. — The House Government Operations Subcommittee for Research and Technical Programs, the United Nations, the Pan American Health Organiza- tion, and others have tried to estimate the costs of emigration of scientists and engineers from the LDCs to the United States and other advanced countries of the AVest. (Estimates have been based on the narrow consideration of limited educational costs; not taken into account are the investments of people and capital in the LDCs from outside private and public sources.) Taking Dr. Kidd's figure of $20,000 as a minimum cost per person in education and training in the LDCs, the House Government Oper- ations Committee study calculated that the 4.390 scientists, engineers, and physicians emigrating from the LDCs in fiscal year 196(5 repre- sented a "contiibution" of some $88 million to the United States.*^" Applying the same figure of $20,000 to the 1967 scientific immigration to the United States of 7,913 persons, the Committee's report stated, results in an investment loss of 1 year of more than $150 million by the LDCs."^ Estimates by the United Nations indicate a substantial financial loss in educational investment to the LDCs through brain drain to the West. According to a report of the Secretary General, dated 1968, the cost to the LDCs of educating professionals who emigrated to the United States from the LDCs since World War II (using the base figure of $20,000 per person) would be on the order of slightly over «" James A. Wilson cites the following economic cost to the British In their brain drain of scientists to North An)erica : "There is the loss of the actual products of the research of the lost scientists ; and with these, the profits that could have been gained to the British economj'. The worst has already happened — not once but many times : British institutions have had to pav licensing fees and such upon patented techniques produced by British scien- tists abroad." (The Value Pattern of Productive Scientists, as Reflected in the Contemporary "Brain Drain" from Britain to North America, op. cit., p. 6.) The British experience could be very well duplicated among the LDCs. For an elaborate economic analysis of the costs of nonreturning foreign students, see, Herbert (1. Grubel. "Nonreturning Foreign Students and the Cost of Student Exchange," International Educational and Cultural Exchange. U.S. Advisory Commission on Interna- tional Educational and Cultural Affairs (Spring 1966), pp. 20-23. Grubel argues from the internationalist perspective, minimizes the costs of student nonreturn and concludes : "The analysis and computation in this paper lead to the following conclusions. . . . Since it is difficult to establish a valid argument about reductions in the welfare of people In the coun- try from which a person emigrates, there exists a strong presumption that the nonreturn of foreign students increases, overall world welfare. . . ." (p. 29.) Professor John C. Shearer of Pennsvlvania State University takes Issue with Grubel in his article, "In Defense of Traditional Views of the 'Brain Drain' Problem," International Educational and Cultural Exchange, U.S. Advisory Commission on International Educa- tional and Cultural Affairs (Fall 1966), pp. 17-25. Shearer makes a point-by-point refuta- tion of Grubel's article, the main thrust of which Is to underscore the high social and economic costs to the sending countries. Dr. Thomas F. Jones. President of the University of South Carolina, argued In favor of foreign students remaining in the United States and at one point in his argument addressed himself to the matter of costs of Investment in human resources. He believed that It was reasonable to hold the view that the resource belongs to each country In proportion to the part developed in the respective country. Thus, he argued, the United States "can claim major interest in a person who obtains a B.S. :n a developing country (.SISO.OOO human resource) and spends 4 vears getting a doctorate in the United States ($.SRO,OnO total human resource, or an increase of $200,000). This argument is further enhanced by the fact that engineering graduate students, including those from abroad, are almost always supported bv the host institution through teaching or research grant funds — domestic funds." (Thomas F. Jones. "Should the Foreign Engineering Student Return to His Native Land to Practice His Profession?" In. Selected Readings on International Education, House Committee on Education and Labor. 1966, p. .S65.) (jritics of this noint of view might point out that both the individual and the institution are beneficiaries of teaching and research grants. <»» Staff study. House Government Operations Committee, Brain Drain into the United States of Scientists, Engineers and Phvsicians, 1967, p. 7. <»i Report House Government Operations Committee, Scientific Brain Drain from the LDCs, 1968, p. 5. 1199 $4 billion, an annual average of over $45 million a year. Its value in terms of American education, the report said, "would be still higher." While the value of professionals absorbed into all other industrialized countries was "even less known," the report stated that taken together, '4t may approach" the American figure. The report continued : In developed economies, the cost of educating a professional is a very small percentage of the value of this output over twenty-five man years of his working life. Hence the projected value of such immigrant professionals to the countries to which they go would be several times greater than the value of their educa- tion. To this, the value of sub-professional skills must be added. Thus it is possible that the above evaluation, with all the reservations which must be made about it, is an underestimation.*'^ In citing the particular case of India, the Secretary General's report declared that the aggregate costs of education lost to India due to emigration of professionals to Canada, France, and the United States (before 1966) "would have been over many years in excess of $1.7 million per annum." Assuming that India lost the equivalent in cost of a degree for each of the professionals lost to the United States in 1967, as well as nurses lost to the United States and other countries, the total loss for that year in educational costs alone would be about $5.5 million. "Compared with Africa and Latin America," the report stated, "Indian costs would appear to be exceptionally low." *^^ In his UNITAR study on emigration of professionals from the LDCs, Gregory Henderson cites other specific cases of investment loss in education through brain drain. Putting a value of $20,000 on a Turkish university graduate in 1965, Turkey's annual loss of 575 pro- fessionals is estimated to cost $11,555,000 or 2-3 percent of total capital formation annually in the educational system.^^* Colombia's average annual loss in educational expenses for emigrat- ing professionals from 1955-68 was estimated (on a basis of $10,000 per person) to be on the order of $25 million, plus $4,958,000 for inter- mediate personnel. For these professionals who emigrated, "educa- tional expenses for 14 years to 1968," he said, "were equivalent to con- siderably more than the sum allocated for educational expenses in the national budget for 1969." In addition, the amounts consumed in for- eign exchange by those students abroad who failed to return w^ere $57,100,000 in foreign exchange for the 14-year period.*^^ Henderson also cites the case of Cameroon, which sponsors about 250 persons for higher education in France each year. About one-third fail to return, causing an estimated loss in supporting costs alone of $7 million a year.*'"^ The June 1970 report of the Secretary General on the outflow of trained personnel from the LDCs to the developed countries further documents the loss in educational investment. In the case of Lebanon, the overall costs of those emigrating in 1967 after receiving elementary education or secondary and university training was estimated at $40 million annually. The loss to Jordan was placed at about 66 percent of this figure. For Cameroon, the loss incurred by the emigration of <92 Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outffoic of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, 19fi8. pD. 48.9.^ and 49.94. «MIhid.. n. 4.3.82. *»♦ Henderson, op. cit., p. 116. «»5 Ibid., p. 117. ^s" Ibid., p. 117. Henderson makes other projections on pp. 118-119. 1200 middle- and high-level personnel to France alone was estimated at CFAF520,497,506 ($2,081,990) for 1967-69. Colombia incurred a loss of investment for middle-level cadres as high as $14.7 million and over $164 million for high-level personnel between 1955 and 1968. In Trinidad and Tobago, an estimated $21.2 million was lost in 1968 be- cause of the drain of qualified and skilled manpower.*^^ UNITAR's study on brain drain from five developing countries records a total estimated cost in education to the Philippines for the loss of emigrating professionals to the United States at $5,238,300 for 1967, $1,488,300 for migrating physicians and $3,750,000 for all other professionals.*^^ From the 85 professionals who migrated to the United States in 1967, Lebanon suffered a total loss estimated at $1.5 million. The annual outflow of capital from Lebanon invested in education and training was placed at $40 million.■*^^ Latin America has incurred substantial losses in educational invest- ment because of the migration of professionals to the United States. A report published by the Pan American Health Organization esti- mates that about 4,000 university-educated persons emigrated to the United States from Latin America during 1960-65. About three- fourths, or some 3,000, w^ere believed to be permanent immigrants. Placing the cost of training one person at a "conservatively estimated" figure of $20,000, the loss of the 3,000 measured solely in terms of edu- cation cost is about $60 million for the 5 years.'^°° Dr. Luis Giorgi, President of the Pan-American Federation of Engineering Societies, observed in a report to a UNESCO-sponsored conference that Latin America loses the equivalent of approximately 8 percent of the annual number of graduates in the higher levels of the scientific and engineering professions. He estimates that an average of 404 engineers and 144 scientists emigrate from Latin America an- nually. Migration at this rate costs the Latin American countries about $14 million a year, that is, in direct costs of training, $10 million for engineers and $4 million for scientists. The loss would be "very much greater", he said, if all the other many consequences, almost impossible to quantify, were taken into account. Dr. Giorgi estimates that Latin America has a total of 95,000 engineers and that it costs $20,000- $30,000 to train an engineer in Latin America.^"^ Dr. Kidd calculates that about 3,000 university-trained scientists, engineers and physicians migrated permanently to the L^nited States from all Latin America during 1961 through 1965, or an average of 600 a year. This estimate takes into account a 25 percent return rate from the total of 4,000. Assuming the costs of education "conserva- tively" at $20,000, Dr. Kidd measures the loss to Latin America in educational costs alone at around an average of $12 million a year.^''^ *»' Report of TJ.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from Developing to Developed Countries, June 9, 1970, p. 23. *08UN1TAR, Brain Drain from Five LDCs, 1971, p. 160. *^ Ibid., pp. 87-88. B'x' Report on Brain Drain from Latin America, Pan American Health Organization, 1966, p. 6. „ ^ ^^ UNESCO, Final Report of the Conference on the Application of Science and Tech- nology to the Development of Latin America, 1965, pp. 172 and 180. 502 But the real costs, Dr. Kidd said, are higher and the losses relate primarily to the loss of the "crucial few highly qualified professional people — particularly university teachers and investigators." "It is the loss of these people in my judgment," he said, "rather than absolute numbers, which generates a problem in Latin America." (Hearings, Senate Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1968, pp. 76- 77.) 1201 TABLE 23.-ESTIMATED EDUCATIONAL COST TO SENDING NATIONS OF IMMIGRANT SCIENTISTS, ENGINEERS, PHYSICIANS, AND SURGEONS ENTERING UNITED STATES FROM LDC'S AS IMMIGRANTS, FISCAL YEAR 1971 Area Estimated Estimated Scientists/ educational Physicians/ educational engineers cost surgeons cost Total scientists/ engineers/ physicians/ surgeons Total educational cost All countries All LDCs' West Europe: Greece , Latin America' Asia Near and Middle East. Far East China India Korea Pakistan Philippines.. Other Africa.- Egypt Other... All other areas 13,102 $262,040,000 5,743 $114,960,000 11,102 222, 040, 000 5,213 104, 260, 000 165 3, 300, 000 52 1, 040, 000 836 16, 720, 000 542 10, 840, 000 9,423 188, 460, 000 4,380 87, 600, 000 602 12, 040, 000 434 8, 680, 000 8,821 176, 420, 000 3,946 78, 920, 000 897 17, 940, 000 207 4, 140, 000 4,226 84, 520, 000 1,057 21,140,000 450 9, 000, 000 999 19, 980, 000 630 12, 600, 000 161 3, 220, 000 1,528 30, 560, 000 1,040 20, 800, 000 1,090 21,800,000 482 9, 640, 000 589 11,780,000 222 4, 440, 000 387 7, 740, 000 146 2, 920, 000 202 4, 040, 000 76 1,520,000 89 1, 780, 000 17 340, 000 18, 850 $377, 000, 000 16,315 217 1,378 13, 803 1,036 12, 767 1,104 5,283 1,449 791 2,568 1, 572 811 533 278 106 326, 300, 000 4, 340, 000 27, 560, 000 276, 060, 000 20, 720, 000 255, 340, 000 22, 080, 000 105, 660, 000 28, 980, 000 15, 820, 000 51, 360, 000 31,440,000 16, 220, 000 10, 660, 000 5, 560, 000 2, 120, 000 ' LDCs are intended to include the following countries and areas listed in the NSF report: Greece, North and Central America (excluding Canada), South America, Asia, Africa, and "All other areas." 2 Latin America is intended to include those areas listed in the NSF report as North and Central America (excluding Canada) and South America. The statistical data in this table on number of immigrants are drawn from, NSF, "Highlights, Immigrant Scientists and Engineers, Aug. 20, 1973,' ' p. 2. This table uses the figure of $20,000 as the cost of education per person. This figure was used 7 years ago (in 1%7) by Dr. Kidd and the House Government Operations Committee. Some sources say the estimate is high; others say it is conservative. Thus, the estimate ought to be regarded as only an approximation of cost to the sending nations. The table is based upon 2 assumptions, (1) that the $20,000 of education cost per person is a reasonable estimate; and (2) that those professionals entering as immigrants are remaining and establishing permanent residency. TABLE 24.— ESTIMATED EDUCATIONAL COST TO SENDING NATIONS OF IMMIGRANT SCIENTISTS, ENGINEERS, PHYSICIANS, AND SURGEONS ENTERING UNITED STATES FROM LDC'S AS IMMIGRANTS, FISCAL YEAR 1972 Area Scientists/ engineers Estimated educational cost Physicians/ surgeons Estimated educational cost ■ Total scieniists/ engineers/ physicians/ surgeons Total educational cost All countries 11,323 $226, 460, 000 7,143 $142, 860,D00 18,466 $369, 320, 000 All LDCs" .....J...... West Europe: Greece Latin America 2, ... 9,550 114 756 8,155 556 7,599 660 3,557 546 491 1,540 795 433 239 194 92 191,009,550 2, 280, 000 15,120,000 163, 100, 000 11,120,000 151,980,000 13, 200, 000 71,340,000 10, 920, 000 9, 820, 000 30, 800, 000 15,900,000 8. 660, 000 4,780,000 3, 880, 000 1, 840, 000 6,462 76 523 5,558 683 4,875 274 1,802 810 260 831 898 259 115 144 46 129, 240, 000 1,520,000 10, 460, 000 111,160,000 13,660,000 97, 500, 000 5, 480, 000 36, 040, 000 16, 200, 000 5, 200, 000 16,620,000 17,960,000 5, 180, 000 2, 300, 000 2, 880, 000 920, 000 16, 012 190 1,279 13,713 1,239 12, 474 934 5,369 1,356 751 2,371 1,693 692 354 338 138 320, 240, 000 3, 800, 000 25, 580, 000 Asia Near and Middle East Far East China . . 274, 260, 000 24, 780, 000 249, 480, 000 18,680,000 India Korea— Pakistan Philippines. 107, 380, 000 27, 120, 000 15, 020, 000 47, 420, 000 Other Africa 33, 860, 000 13, 840, 000 Egypt Oiher . 7, 080, 000 6, 760, 000 All other areas.. 2, 760, 000 > LDCs are intended to include the following countries and areas listed in the NSF report: Greece, North and Central America (excluding Canada), South America, Asia, Africa, and "All other areas." ' Latin America is intended to include those areas listed in the NSF report as North and Central America (excluding Canada) and South America. The statistical data in this table on number of immigrants are drawn from, NSF, "Highlights, Immigrant Scientists and Engineers, Aug. 20, 1973," p. 2. This table uses the figure of $20,000 as the cost of education per person. This figure was used 7 years ago (in 1967) by Dr. Kidd and the House Government Operations Committee. Some sources say that the estimate is high; others say it is conservative. Thus, the estimate ought to be regarded as only an approximation of cost to the sending nations. The table is based upon 2 assumptions, (1) that the $20,000 of education cost per person is a reasonable estimate; and (2) that those professionals entering as immigrants are remaining and establishing permanent residency. 1202 TABLE 25.-ESTI MATED EDUCATIONAL COST TO SENDING NATIONS OF IMMIGRANT SCIENTISTS, ENGINEERS, PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS ENTERING UNITED STATES FROM LDC'S AS IMMIGRANTS FISCAL YEAR 1971 AND 1972 Area Total fiscal years 1971 Fiscal ) ^ear 1971 Fiscal year 1972 and 1972 Scientists/ Scientists/ Scientists/ engineers/ engineers/ engineers/ physicians/ Educational physicians/ Educational physicians/ Educational surgeons cost surgeons cost surgeons cost 18, 850 $377, 000, 000 18, 466 $369, 320, 000 37,316 $746, 320, 000 16,315 326, 300, 000 16,012 320, 240, 000 32, 327 646, 540, 000 217 4, 340, 000 190 3, 800, 000 407 8, 140, 000 1,378 27, 560, 000 1.279 25, 580, 000 2,657 53, 140, 000 13, 803 276, 060, 000 13,713 274, 260, 000 27,516 550, 320, 000 1,036 20,720,000 1,239 24, 780, 000 2,275 26, 852, 000 12, 767 255, 340, 000 12,474 249. 480, 000 25, 241 504, 820, 000 1,104 22, 080, 000 934 18, 680, 000 2,038 40, 760, 000 5, 283 105,660,000 5.369 107, 380, 000 10, 652 213,040,000 1,449 28, 980, 000 1.356 27, 120, 000 2,805 56, 100, 000 791 15,820,000 751 15,020,000 1,542 30, 840, 000 2, 568 51,360,000 2.371 47, 420, 000 4,939 98, 780, 000 1,572 31, 440, 000 1,693 33, 860, 000 3.265 65, 300, 000 811 16,220,000 692 13, 840, 000 1,503 30, 060. 000 533 10. 660, 000 354 7, 080. 000 887 17.740,000 278 5. 560, 000 338 6, 760. 000 616 12, 320, 000 106 2,120,000 138 2. 760, 000 244 4, 880, 000 All countries All LDCsi West Europe: Greece Latin America^ Asia Near and Middle East. Far East China India Korea Pakistan. • Philippines Other Africa Egypt , Other All other areas > LDCs are intended to include the following countries and areas listed in the NSF report: Greece, North and Centra America (excluding Canada), South America, Asia, Africa, and "All other areas." 2 Latin America is intended to include those areas listed in the NSF report as North and Central America (excluding Canada) and South America. The statistical data in this table on number of immigrants are drav/n from, NSF, "Highlights, Immigrant Scientists and Engineers, Aug. 20, 1973,* ' p. 2. This table uses the figure of $20,000 as the cost of education per person. This figure was used 7 years ago (in 1967) by Dr. Kidd and the House Government Operations Committee. Some sources say the estimate is high; others say it is conservative. Thus, the estimate ought to be regarded as only an approximation of cost to the sending nation?. The table is based upon 2 assumptions, (1) that the $20,010 of education cost per person is a reasonable estimate; and (2) that those professionals entering as immigrants are remaining and establishing permanent residency. In recent years educational losses to tlie LDCs from the emigration of professionals have continued on an upward swiiif;^. The most recent NSF data on the admission of scientists and engineers (physicians will be considered below) indicates that some 11,102 entered the United States from the LDCs as immigrants in the fiscal year 1971. (See Table 23.) This total figure represents 165 from Greece; 836 from Latin America; 9,423 from Asia; 589 from Africa; and 89 from other areas of the world. Excluded in these figures are immigrants from what appeared to be the developed countries of Western and Eastern Europe and Canada. By taking Dr. Kidd's 1967 conservative estimate of $20,000 per person, the total educational cost to the LDCs for the fiscal year 1971, assuming that these immigrants remain, is $222,040,000. (See Table 23.) The total educational cost, including physicians and surgeons, is $326,300,000. For Latin America, the cost for 836 immi- grant scientists and engineers totals $16,720,000; the total cost includ- ing physicians and surgeons is $27,560,000. For Asia, the educational cost for the 9,423 immigrant scientists and engineers amounts to $188,460,000; including physicians and surgeons brings the total to $276,060,000. India's 4,226 immigrant scientists and engineers cost an estimated $84,520,000; including physicians and surgeons brings the total to $105,660,000. The cost of 1,528 immigrant scientists and engi- neers from the Philippines comes to an estimated $30,560,000, and including the physicians and surgeons increases the costs to $51,360,000. 1203 And Africa's 589 immigrant scientists and engineers cost some $11,780,000, and including physicians and surgeons increases educa- tional costs to $16,220,000. Estimates of educational costs to the LDCs for the fiscal year 1972 are similarly considerable. In the fiscal year 1972, 9,550 immigrant scientists and engineers entered the United States from all LDCs. (See Table 24.) The estimated educational cost is $191,009,550. Total edu- cational costs, including physicians and surgeons and using the same assumptions as noted above, is $820,240,000. This total figure repre- sents 114 from Greece; 756 from Latin America; 8,155 from Asia; 433 from Africa ; and 92 from all other areas in the world. Excluded from these figures are immigrants from what appeared to be the developed countries in Western and Eastern Europe and Canada. Individual costs remain high. For Latin America, the cost for 756 immigrant scientists and engineers totals $15,120,000, and including physicians and surgeons brings the total cost to $25,580,000. For Asia, the educa- tional cost for 8,155 immigrant scientists and engineers amounts to $163,100,000; including physicians and surgeons increases costs to $274,260,000. India's 3,567 immigrant scientists and engineers cost an estimated $71,340,000; including physicians and surgeons brings the total to an estimated $107,380,000. The cost of 1,540 immigrant sci- entists and engineers from the Philippines comes to an estimated $30,560,000, and including physicians and surgeons increases costs to $47,420,000. And Africa's 433 immigrant scientists and engineers cost some $8,660,000, while including physicians and surgeons brings the total to $13,840,000. The combined estimated educational cost to sending nations of im- migrant scientists, engineers, physicians, and surgeons entering the United States in the fiscal years 1971 and 1972 clearly indicates that the LDC contribution is considerable. The total for 1971 and 1972 ajnounts to an estimated $646,540,000 for the incoming 32,327 sci- entists, engineers, physicians, and surgeons from the LDCs. (See Table 25.) This estimate is based on the same assumptions as noted above. Those coming from Latin America (2,657) cost an estimated $53,140,000. However, the bulk came from Asia, 27,516 at an estimated cost of $550,320,000 ; and specifically the Far East, 25,241 at an esti- mated cost of $504,820,000. India's 10,652 cost an estimated $213,040,000; Korea's 2,805, cost $56,100,000; Pakistan's 1,542, $30,840,000 ; and the estimated educational cost of some 4,939 incoming Filipinos amounted to $98,780,000. Africa's incoming 1,503 scientists, engineers, physicians, and surgeons cost an estimated $30,060,000. The figure on educational costs to the sending LDCs would be much higher if costs for primary and secondary education, and for M.D.s under- graduate training, were included in the computation. Estimated Costs of Emigrant Physicians. — Emigration of physi- cians from the LDCs to the United States and other advanced coun- tries represents a substantial loss in educational investment. Some of the estimates cited above include physicians. Other estimates have been made, focusing specifically on the loss of educational investment through medical brain drain. Many of these estimates are structured so as to indicate or imply the value of replacing this imported pro- fessional manpower into the United States. 1204 The National Advisory Commission on Health Manpower appointed by President Johnson in 1965 made an estimate of comparable costs for the United States to replace FMGs who had been licensed during 1961 and 1965. The estimated minimal cost was said to be somewhere between $855 and $925 million.s"^ At a conference on brain drain sponsored by the State Department in 1966, Dr. Kelly West discussed the role of FMGs in American medi- cal research, noting particularly the fact that about three-fourths came from the LDCs and that their immigration accounted for 18 percent of annual additions to American manpower. To underscore the heavy U.S. dependency on FMGs, he stated that to produce the professional manpower equivalent in this country from native stock the United States would have had to build and operate about 12 medical schools at an operating cost of some $8 million a year for each medical center. "In other words," he said, "the value of this migration may be esti- mated at something of the order to us of $100 million per year, which exceeds somewhat the total value of our foreign aid in the medical field." ^"'^ In 1969, Dr. West was quoted as saying that the annual immigra- tion rate of M.D.s exceeded 2,000, that these immigrants constitute about 16 percent of the entries into the American medical profession, and that it would require 16 new medical schools to produce the equiv- alent number of M.D.s now supplied by imported manpower. ^''^ The PAHO report also portrayed investment losses to Latin America in terms of costs to the United States in producing the equivalent manpower resource. The report noted that every year some 300 physicians emigrate from Latin America to the United States. This number, it said, is equivalent to the annual output of three large American medical schools and would cost at least $60 mil- lion to build three teaching medical centers and more than $15 mil- lion a year to operate them. "In these terms," the report concludes, "the value of the physicians coming to the United States is roughly equal to that of all U.S. medical assistance to Latin America." ^°^ Stevens and Vermeulen make similar parallel comparisons in their study on FMGs in the United States in an effort to indicate invest- ment losses to the LDCs. In 1971, India lost 821 physicians who estab- lished permanent residence in the United States. This was the equiva- lent of graduates from 8 or 10 American medical schools.^"' They also cited a United Nations study which calculated that the Philippines contributed $1.5 million to the U.S. economy annually, the estimated annual cost of a loss of one-fourth of all physicians. An Indian study estimated that the long term capital investment of a donor country in 1,000 M.D. emigrants (rather less than the number of Indian M.D.s entering the United States in 1971) is as much as $35 million, taking into account their economic potential.^''^ ^' Stevens and Vermeulen, op. clt., p. 68. ^ Department of State, Proceedings of Workshop on the International Miffration of Talent and Skills, October 1966, p. 40. 606 Adams, Talent That Won't Stay Put, p. 79. 609 Report on Brain Drain from Latin America. Pan American Health Organization, 1966, p. 16. Dr. Kldd discusses the loss to Latin America In Hearings, Senate Judiciary Committee, International migration of talent and skills, 1968, p. 77. 607 Stevens and Vermeulen. op. clt., p. 70. 608 Ibid., p. 8. 1205 Educational investment losses to the LDCs resulting from emi- grating physicians continue to be heavy. The most recent NSF data on the admission of immigrant physicians and surgeons indicate that 5,213 entered the United States from all LDCs in the fiscal year 1971. (See Table 23.) The total figure represents 52 from Greece; 542 from Latin America ; 4,380 from Asia ; 222 from Africa ; and 17 from other areas of the world. Excluded from these figures were im- migrant M.D.s from what appeared to be the developed areas of West- ern and Eastern Europe and Canada. By taking Dr. Kidd's estimate of $20,000 per person, the total educational cost to the LDCs for 1971, again assuming that the immigrants remain as permanent residents, is $104,260,000. The cost of Latin America's 542 M.D.s comes to an esti- mated $10,840,000. The 4,380 M.D.s entering from Asia cost an esti- mated $87,600,000. India's 1,057 entering physicians cost $21,140,000; Korea's 999 cost $19,980,000; and the Philippines' 1,040 cost an esti- mated $20,800,000. And the cost of Africa's 222 entering physicians comes to $4,440,000. In the fiscal year 1972, entering immigrant physicians and surgeons increased in number to 6,462, representing an estimated educational in- vestment loss of $129,240,000. (See Table 24.) Latin America's 523 im- migrant M.D.s represents a loss of $10,460,000. Asia's 5,558 entering M.D.s represents an estimated loss of $111,160,000. India incurred a loss of $36,040,000 in educational investment for its entering 1,802 physicians. The cost to Korea of its entering 810 M.D.s amounted to $16,200,000. The 260 M.D.s from Pakistan cost an estimated $5,200,000. The Philippines incurred a loss of $16,620,000 in educational costs for its 831 entering M.D.s. And Africa's 259 immigrating M.D.s came to a $5,180,000 estimated educational loss. The combined estimated educational cost to the LDCs for the fiscal years 1971 and 1972 is substantial : the total of 11,675 physicians and surgeons cost an estimated $233,500,000. Asia carried the major burden of cost with an estiniated $198,760,000 for 10,938 incoming M.D.s. India, the largest individual contributor, among all nations, suffered an estimated $57,180,000 loss in educational investment costs from its 2,859 M.D.s immigrating to the United States. These estimates of educational costs to the LDCs for training FMGs would be substantially higher if costs in primary and secondary edu- cation and undergraduate training were included in the computation. Qualifying Aspects and Perceptions of LDCs'' Investment Loss. — Estimates of investment costs and losses to the LDCs unavoidably lack precision. Some of the immigrant professionals entering the United States and recorded in the above NSF statistics may not establish per- manent residency, and hence will not constitute a permanent invest- ment loss in education. The estimate of $20,000 in education cost per individual may also be excessive for some areas of the world; yet if total education costs, including primary, secondary, undergraduate, and graduate schools, are taken into account, it may be too low, as would certainly be the case for the United States. (A recent report by the Association of American Medical Schools estimates that it costs between $16,300 to $26,400 a year to educate a medical student in the United States ; on the average the cost to the student is about $2,200 1206 a year in tuition, roughly $600 in laboratory and other fees, and at least $1,800 a year for living expenses, making a total of $4,600.) ^°^ By including value of future earnings foregone and potential con- tribution to national development, losses would understandably multi- ply manyfold, far beyond strictly the educational costs. Yet, there appear to be some offsetting factors ; but even they must be qualified. One is the remittances from emigrants residing abroad. Lebanese send home between $130 million and $200 million annually, an amount esti- mated to be between 10 and 15 percent of its gross national product. Remittances by Filipinos abroad amounted to $102 million for the period January 1955 and July 1969."° For Cameroon, an estimated $13,812 was remitted during 1965-67."^ Figures on remittances do not, however, classify emigrants accord- ing to unskilled and professionals. Thus, for even those countries where figures are available, they do not accurately reflect the true picture.^^^ Moreover, laws in receiving countries like the United States encourage the immigration of relatives of permanent immigrants, including not only wives and children but frequently parents and other relatives. And, as the U.N. report said : "This would mean, in effect, the reten- tion in the developed country of the funds formerly remitted." ^" The same ambiguity is evident in the apparent offsetting factors of American medical students studying abroad. One survey indicated that 2,343 Americans were studying in 16 foreign medical schools. Mexico seems to be the only country generally classified as "develop- ing" where substantial numbers of American students attend medical school. In 1969, there were an estimated 572 American students en- rolled. For these schools, the presence of American students represents, in Stevens and Vermeulen's words, "substantial benefits," particularly in terms of American fees from dollar incomes.^" Yet, by accepting American medical students they forego places for nationals and thus sacrifice a long-term future investment. Stevens and Vermeulen con- clude that each of these schools, for the most part government sub- sidized, was "making a substantial contribution to American medical education (or, assuming that many of the Americans did not complete the courses, was wasting part of its resources)." ^^^ However complex and ambiguous it may be to assess investment costs and losses to the LDCs, the judgment of Stevens and Vermeulen on the extraordinary inflow of FMGs into the United States from the LDCs supports a commonly held belief among students of brain drain that ". . . this country is the recipient of substantial 'reverse foreign aid.' The United States is reaping the rewards of investments made by other countries in the education of physicians, and those countries are suffering a long-term loss of physician services." ^^* 609 The Nero York Times, Oct. 11, 1973, p. 7. MO Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outfloic of Trained Personnel from Developing to Developed Countries, June 9, 1970, p. 33. su UNITAR, Brain Drain from Five LDCs, 1971, p. 119. ^2 Henderson, op. clt., p. 120. ■"^ For example, 8,907 such "preference relatives" were adjusted to permanent status In the United States in 1967 alone and several thousand more appear to have entered as rela- tives under other categories. (Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Per- sonnel from LDCs. Nov. 5, 1968, p. 46.88.) °* Stevens and Vermeulen, op. clt., p. 21. "6 Ibid., p. 22. 6i« Ibid., p. xl. 1207 The LDCs bear the investment cost of trained manpower that bene- fits the advanced countries. And they can least afford it. Without large talent reserves, without money and institutional resources for attract- ing foreign talent, and faced with competing demands for public and private investments, the LDCs, especially the poorer ones, are not likely to assign a first priority to enlarging domestic output of profes- sionals requiring long and costly training. In such cases, therefore, as the House Government Operations Subcommittee brain drain study concludes, "departure of professionals like scientists, engineers, and physicians is often an 'unrequited' export — an involuntary gift of val- uable resources to other countries." =^' And this "involuntary gift" of manpower, most often produced at government expense and thus much public sacrifice, is in most cases an irremediable loss. The first effect of this loss is to impair national progress and development. As Habib Xaficy pointed out : . . . brain drain is a direct threat to the prospects of the country's continued progress. The non-returnees represent a tremendous loss of time and money (invested since birth) in terms of the country's available resources. As a unit necessary to the national development, the highly skilled manpower leaked away in the brain drain means an altogether irreplaceable loss which cannot be compensated some other way. ^" LOSS THROUGH "mISMATCH" IN EDUCATION AND TRAINING Mismatching advanced education and training with needs has often had detrimental effects which resulted in serious losses to the LDCs. The developing countries lose if the returning professional is unable to match his advanced training with national requirements; finding himself a marginal or superfluous man, he becomes unhappy, and frus- trated, and decides to emigrate permanently.'^^^ And they lose also if the returning professional, overtrained and unsuited to the needs of his environment, moves into activities irrelevant to the basic needs of national development. Scientific and technological priorities of the developed countries differ from those of the LDCs, so that scientists and engineers from the LDCs trained in the former are often unable to make an optimum con- tribution in their own developing countries. LDC scientists, specialized in essentially esoteric fields or committed to irrelevant lines of re- search, thereby become unserviceable for other research efforts which might be more immediately helpful for national development. The withdrawal of talent from the national pool in this way obstructs advanced planning for education and training, designed with the requirements of national development in mind, and deters the develop- "' Report, Houpe Government Operations Committee, Scientific Brain Drain from the LDCs, 1968, p. 5. ^ . . , 518 Xaficy, op. clt., pp. 69-70. The U.N. Secretary General also made the point of loss In government Investment In the study on brain drain : "The migration of trained per- sonnel means' the loss to the country of Its expenditure on the person's education and other services provided without the prospect of receiving the benefits of his services. A large part of the cost of education in developing countries Is government-subsidized. Higher education . provided by new nations tends to be costly because of the high cost Involved In equipment, books and teaching staff." (Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, 1968, p. 43.) Bi» Ell Glnzberg of Columbia Unlver.sity discusses this problem of mismatch in a letter to Congressman Henry S. Reuss. In Hearings, House Government Operations Committee, Brain Drain, 1968, p. 89. 1208 ment of techniques and knowledge for exploiting the natural resources of the LDCs, a body of knowledge not necessarily purchasable abroad."" In all cases, the LDC loses. LDCs also incur losses from the pursuit of unrealistic and irrelevant priorities, more suited to advanced countries than to those at the developing stage. In "too many instances," writes Professor Nader, poor LDCs follow the style and content of science and technology found in the advanced countries and become caught up in the "scientiSc fashions" of the times to the detriment of the priorities and needs of their own countries. Professor Nader cites the case of Pakistan, which for over 5 years had devoted 10 times more money to nuclear research than to applied research for the production and manufacture of jute or for the exploitation of Pakistan's large fishing resources, even though both resources earned over $300 million in foreign exchange. Pro- ponents of nuclear research on the Planning Commission (presumably native scientists trained in the West) argued successfully that nuclear research and its many actual and potential peaceful uses were the "wave of the future" and that participation in the race of con- temporary science and technology compelled funding of nuclear re- search. (It is possible that this apparent misdirection of scientific effort may be intensified as a response to the achievement of a nuclear capability by the Government of India.) For such mismatched allo- cation of resources the developing country can lose, for as Dr. Nader commented disapprovingly : Apparently, these advocates were more vocal and better trained than investiga- tors in less eye-catching subjects, such as suitable varieties of crops, of industrial and agricultural technology, or fishery resources from which fish protein con- centrate can be obtained, or other subjects more directly relevant at the present time to the potential growth of the country .^-'^ Loss to the LDCs through mismatched medical training is another aspect of this same problem. Dr. Kelly M. West once observed in a study of FMG researchers at the National Institutes of Health that the training of FMGrS from the LDGs was directed away from areas of high priority for their countries, even if they did return home. In- stead of their going into public health practice and rural health pro- grams, the most pressing needs of the LDCs, he said, they would most likely remain in research (or presumably go into urban practice). Ac- cording to Stevens and Vermeulen (writing 6 years later), "these ob- servations are still valid." ^^^ GENETIC LOSS Unique among the negative effects of brain drain on the LDCs are the possible genetic implications. The question is raised as to whether the flight of a high percentage of a nation's intellectual elite could cause a genetic deterioration of the population. If true, then progress and national development could be deterred. Prof. Richard Lynh, a member of the Economic and Social Research Institute at Dublin, Ireland, explores the question of possible genetic «» Nader, Science and Technology in Developing Countries. 1969, p. 453. ^ n)ld., p. 452. '^ Stevens and Vermeulen, op. clt., p. 15. 1209 effects of a prolonged brain drain from England, citing historical ex- amples to buttress his case.®^^ Dr. Lynn begins his argmnent with an assertion that intelligence is principally determined by inheritance and notes previous investigations to document his point. He correlates the production of intelligent children with intelligent people, observing that environmental advantages of intelligent parents reinforce the genetic effects. This suggests to Lynn that "if intelligent people emi- grate in large numbers there is likely to be a diminution in the num- ber of intelligent children born into the next generation." Professor Lynn also states that intelligence is closely associated with a person's occupation. People in professional and executive occupa- tions generally have IQs between 120 and 160, and h6 asserts that "it is doubtful whether it would be possible to do most professional or executive jobs with an IQ of less than around 115." According to. Lynn, 1^5 is about the level at which British children pass the 11-plus examination, and about 20 percent of the population have IQs above this figure. He cites examples of psychological studies made, correlat- ing IQs and occupation, and concludes that this close correlation can be used as a reasonably reliable index of intelligence. And this index in turn allows some estimate of intelligence loss in brain drain. Lynn cites emigration figures from Britain to show that there is a "fairly substantial bias towards the more intelligent" — 24 percent, but he be- lieves this to be on the low side. The significance of this loss can be measured by the fact that the numbers of highly able people leaving Britain is about 15-30 percent of the annual output from the uni- versities. While it would be "hazardous" to estimate "too precisely" the effect of this loss on the genetic quality of the population. Professor Lynn nonetheless, contends that "there seems a high probability that it will be substantial." He proceeds to explain the phenomenon of "regression to the mean" and notes that Britain was losing substantial numbers of both types of family from which highly intelligent children were bom. "The implication seems to be," writes Lynn, "that the genetic quality of the population is likely to deteriorate." Never had there been such a mass migration of talented people across national frontiers as occurred in the postwar decades, Lynn con- tinues. And he proceeds to cite historical cases in which emigration of intellectual elites have had "severely damaging effects." He cites the destruction of Constantinople in 1453 and the "ensuing exodus of scholars to the West" which had "effectively ended 1,000 years of civil- ization and brought corresponding benefits to western Europe." The expulsion of the Jews and Moors from Spain at the end of the 15th century, the "backbone of the trading community," had "severely detrimental effects on the commercial strength of the country." And he cites the recent case in which Germany's scientific achievements had been impaired by the loss of a large number of able scientists who fled during the Hitlerian period. Still it is doubtful, he says, whether there is any historical parallel to the scale of the present brain drain. s» Richard Lynn, "Genetic Implications of the Brain Drain," New Scientist 41 (Mar. 20, 1969), pp. 622-625. 1210 He examines the case of brain drain within and from Scotland and correlates this process with its subsequent decline in achievements to illustrate his thesis, adding that Britains should regard Scotland as a warning. "The deterioration it has suffered in both cultural achieve- ment and economic prosperity," he concludes, "could well be due to a prolonged brain drain, and the next victim could be Britain as a whole." It is not the purpose here to judge the validity of this thesis, but only to admit the question and to suggest the following generalization : If the case of Britain, which by virtue df strong and long established institutions and traditions has enormous recuperative powers, could be judged to be so adversely affected by the brain drain of its intellec- tual elite, how much more seriously affected might be the LDCs which Jack these regenerative powers ? WIDENING GAP BETWEEN LDC's AND ADVANCED COUNTRIES Perhaps more plausible than genetic degeneration as a negative effect of brain drain is the disputed assertion that brain drain from the LDCs widens the gap of development between the developing and advanced countries. Internationalists among brain drain specialists minimize, and some even deny, the negative impact of the gap on development. Perceiving criteria for judging the welfare of the developing countries in the larger context, of world welfare, they tend to concern themselves more with the latter at the expense of the former. For Professor Johnson, development is an integrated process of accumulating material, human, and intellectual capital and evolv- ing a culture that promotes its efficient use. To assert that there is a simple and quick road to development, as he seems to imply brain drain critics contend, by substituting human for material capital as a crucial element in the developing process, is to resurrect a myth.^^* Professor Grubel states categorically that "research has thus far failed to pro- duce reliable estimates of the number of persons in the brain drain flows, nor has it yielded meaningful empirical measures of the welfare losses of the population in the losing countries." ^^^ The migration of highly skilled persons to the United States, he contends, "only rarely reduces the welfare of individuals remaining in the emigrant's native country and often may even increase it." "*' And Baldwin, viewing the problem from the internationalist perspective of overflow rather than brain drain, concludes an analysis of Indian manpower: "There is practically no one, in India or outside, who feels that India's economic growth is being held back because the country has lost educated man- power." ^^^ Other specialists contend, with varying force, that brain drain does indeed impair progress in the developing countries and that it «24 Johnson, op. clt., p. 86. „ „ ._, ^ t. ,. . ,. =25 Herbert G. Grubel, "The Reduction of the Brain Drain : Problems and Policies, Jfmervo 6. No. 4, (Summer lfl68). p. 558. ' ^ „ ^ ^. ^ ^ ^ x. ,. ok 528 Grubel, "Nonreturnlng Foreign Students and the Cost of Student Exchange, p. 25. 5^7 Mr. Baldwin continues : "Indeed, government officials have more than once said they hoped tiiat educated Indians In large numbers would not return, since the country has no way of putting them to work." (Baldwin, op. clt., p. 365.) 1211 does widen the gap of development between the LDCs and the ad- vanced countries.^^® Perhaps the most judicious assessment appears in the CIMT study. The authors of this study state outright that they had "uncovered no cases where retardation of development could be unequivocally traced to migration of exceptional people," and concluded that the assertion by "careful observers" that "it is impossible to prove losses of exceptional people have in fact inhibited development" was correct. Nevertheless, "such assertions are inherently unprovable, and inability to produce examples does not mean that serious adverse effects have not been produced by migration." Accordingly, an answer must be sought, they say, "in judgment rather than proof," and it was their judgment that "a continuing loss of intelligent and highly trained people is likely to have adverse effects on national development " "^ The same judgment was made by the UNESCO-sponsored confer- ence in 1965 on the application of science and technology to develop- ment in Latin America. The report of the conference connected the expansion of scientific and technological manpower with national de- velopment and implied that loss of this manpower impairs develop- ment and widens the gap between the less developed and the advanced countries. Speaking generally, the report stated that international con- ferences "held to study the conditions necessary for speeding up the economic and social development of underdeveloped countries have unanimously recognized that the shortage of adequately trained sci- entific and technical personnel is one of the main obstacles to the carry- ing out of any development plan." "° ^■'^ The following are a selection of assessments on this matter : Dr. Perkins quotes approvingly the statement of Professor John C. Shearer in which he concluded that the movement of high-level human resources "may, to a great extent, account for the persistent and ever-widening gaps between rich and poor areas." (Perkins, op. cit., p. 618.) I'rofessor Seltzer urges that brain drain be considered a problem because "it is a barrier to socio-economic development in selected areas." (Seltzer, op. cit., p. 56.) In the preface to the Ditchley Park Conference report on brain drain, the Provost of Dltchley expressed the view that on balance a net export of "brains" lies with the LDCs and a net import with the most advanced countries. This would imply, he said, that the im- balance was "a factor enlarging still more the gap between rich and poor." The acknowledged aim of the United States, Britain, and all "responsible nations" was, he declared, "to strive to narrow that gap." (Report, Ditchley Park Conference on Brain Drain, 1968, p. 5 ) Senator Mondale observed that while the loss of students may not be the most important element of brain drain, still "it would be a serious mistake to conclude that it does not make a substantial contribution to the 'talent gap' between the rich and poor nations." (Hearings, Senate Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, p. 92.) A UNESCO report observed regarding the relationship between brain drain, development, and economic Independence : "By adding to the imbalance In the distribution of the world's scientific resources, the 'brain drain" helps to accentuate the dependence of the developing countries on the advanced ones ; the increase in the technological gap between these two groups of countries create, for the under-privileged countries additional obstacles to pro- gress towards national economic independence, and it can be the cause of tensions and con- flict between the loser and winner countries." (UNESCO, Problem of Emigration of Scientists and Technologists, February 1968, p. 20.) The report of the U.N. Secretary General on brain drain observed that trained and edu- cated men have come to be regarded universally as "a vital component of development." "Should the present trends in the outflow of trained personnel continue," he said, "the results might adversely affect development in the developing countries." (Report of the U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, 1968, p. 5.5.) Gregory Henderson offered the cautious assessment that migration "may not be one of the more major causes of under-development or of presentlv widening gaps between rich and poor countries ; yet it certainly contributes to such gaps, probablv to an appreciable, though minority, extent." (Henderson, Emigration of Highly -Skilled Manpower from the Develop- ing Countries, 1970, p. 136.) 528 CIMT studv p. 692. ^ UNESCO, Final Report of the Conference on the Application of Science and Tech- nology to the Development of Latin America, 1965, p. 27. 1212 The conference report expanded on this theme. Science and tech- nology were considered the key to development, but the "constant drain" of native scientists and technologists creates "the most serious consequence" which is "evident in the difficulty — and, in some cases the impossibility — of ensuring the training, in each branch of science and technology, ... of specialists and research workers capable of producing a real impact on the community." ^^^ Eduardo Frei Montalva, then President of Chile, explained. "No one can help but be aware that tl\e development of contemporary civili- zation depends on science and technology," he began his opening ad- dress to the conference. He continued : ". . . countries not involved in this process of research or unable to perceive and adapt it to their own reality are irrevocably doomed." President Frei pointed out the con- nection between the advance of knowledge and advances in the human condition, and the cause-and-effect relationship and the process of acceleration in applying new discoveries and their impact on the life of man. He emphasized the requirements of building a scientific-tech- nological infrastructure and then came directly to the point of the negative impact of brain drain on development: "Hence, while it is true that all mankind benefits from the immense progress that science and technology have bestowed on man, it is no less evident that the differences between highly developed and developing peoples, instead of diminishing — as apparently might be thought — are increasing con- siderably with the increase in knowledge and the power it brings with it." Chilean and North American pioneers used the same wagon to conquer their frontiers, he went on to illustrate his point, but today Americans construct space-ships, while Chileans could barely turn out a small range of minor items of machinery at high cost and of indiffer- ent quality. "This is why," he continued, "we can say that the gap be- tween the highly developed and the developing countries lies not so much in economic and financial resources as in human resources, which are quantitatively and qualitatively conditioned by the education we are able to ^ve them." It was not just a question of eliminating il- literacy, he insisted, "but of producing generations equipped and able to accede to that higher knowledge that today marks the limits of the superiority and inferiority of strength and weakness." ^^^ If these and other observations made in the conference report are indicative of prevailing attitudes, then it is apparent that Latin Amer- icans perceive brain drain as a formidable barrier to national progress, as deterring development, and thus as widening the gap with the ad- vanced countries. Critics of brain drain who maintam the same gen- eral stance would no doubt apply similar judgments to other develop- ing areas of the world.^^^ "ai Ibid., pp. 29-30. 532 Ibid., p. 67. "3 For specific cases of Injury to Latin American countries by talent migration, see the Pan American Health Organization, Report on Brain Drain from Latin America, 1966, pp. 12-14. The LDCs are not the only countries concerned about technological and developmental gaps. Professor Adams writes : "Even the Industrialized nations of Western Europe fear a widening technological gap between themselves and the United States, which will condemn them to dependency on patent licenses, or product and processes hand-me- downs." (Adams, op. clt., pp. 3-4.) On another occasion Adams referred to British Prime Minister Wilson's concern for the Impact of American technological predominance on Europe and his warning that continued nationalistic policies would lead to an "Industrial helotry" under which Europe would produce only the conventional apparatus of a modern economy while relying on the United States for the products of the sophisticated, science- 1213 Effects of Brain Drain Within the United States "Without foreign scientists and engineers, American technology and economy would not be what they are today." So wrote Alessandro Silj in 1969.^^* Perhaps this brief statement best sums up the enormous contribution of foreign scientists and engineers to the United States in recent years. Data presented above on the number of immigrant sci- entists and engineers from both the advanced countries and the LDCs and evidence of their strong representation in the American scientific- engineering establishment, correlated with vast outlays in research and development for defense and space, and the success achieved in those areas of national endeavor, suggest the validity of this judgment. Clearly, these immigrant professionals provided much of the under- pinnings of U.S. economic expansion and development in this coun- try's defense-space establishment in the postwar era. BENEFITS FROM INCREASED MANPOWER SUPPLY OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS Savings to the United States from this vast professional resource are suggested in the above references on cost in education and training to the LDCs. These data are complemented by estimates contained in various sources on brain drain. Gregory Henderson calculated an average educational cost per professional at some $10,000. He acknowl- edged that the figure was low but reasoned that it would allow for the contributions which advanced countries made to the more expen- sive portions of the education undertaken. On this basis, he estimated the educational value contributed by developing nations to the 75,000- based industries which will "call the Industrial tune in the 1970's and 1980's." (Adams, "Talent That Won't Stay Put," 1969, p. 77.) Such statements as these as well as many others on this subject suggest that fear of "falling behind' or "never catching up" In a highly competitive world lies at the heart of brain drain concerns. A unique reaction to brain drain and Its Impact on development is the case of East Germany. After January 1972, when restrictions on East-West contacts were eased in the GDR, some 3,000 East German scientists, engineers, and physicians fled to West Germany, according to an authoritative East German source. The source explained that this departure of talent had adversely affected the "most vulnerable parts of the GDR economy" and that "something will have to be done" since the economy is "the main instrument for establishing economic unity with the East," that Is, the Soviet bloc. The source, ordinarily dignified, affable and composed, became visibly upset when dis- cussing this matter because brain drain from the GDR meant for him the loss of "workers In key positions" and accordingly would impair the nation's economic develop- ment. (Journal Entry by Joseph G. Whelan. Notebook No. 3, Sept. 25, 1973, pp. 166-175.) In his survey of Jordanian and Palestinian professionals and students In the United states, Lafi Ibrahim Jaafari noted that 74 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement that "the departure of high level personnel will decrease the welfare of home countries and retard their development, thereby frustrating the International efforts to narrow the gap between the richer and poorer countries." The majority also realized the help that they were denying to their country by not returning. (Jaafari, op. cit., p. 125.) ^■" Silj, op. clt., p. 10. Recently Leslie Aldridge Westoff made a similar assessment : "There is little doubt that the foreign brains we've hired have helped put America on top in many ways — atomic science, space technology, medicine, engineering and so on. (Among American Nobel Prize winners, 41 percent were foreign-born, and one quarter of the National Academy of Science members were also born abroad.)" (Westoff, op. clt-, p. 80.) A mid-1970 survey by the National Science Foundation of some 8,000 alien scientists and engineers who were permanent U.S. residents In January 1969 reported that over one-half were in research (31 percent) or development (20 percent), compared with a 34 percent rate for the United States. Abroad, only 38 percent had been Involved In R. & D. activities. The survey also reported that private Industry employed 77 percent of the Immigrant scientists and engineers, and colleges and universities about 13 percent. These sectors accounted for about 70 percent and 14 percent respectively of all scientists and engineers in the United States. Finally. 28 percent of the Immigrants held doctoral degrees and another 29 percent had masters degrees. Only about 10 percent of all scientists and engineers in the United States have doctoral degrees and 20 percent have masters degrees. Furthermore, about one In five were enrolled in full- or part-time graduate training at the university level. Of those enrolled, over one-quarter sought Ph. D.s, nearly one-half masters degrees, and 10 percent sought professional degrees or postdoctoral training. (NSF, Study of Characteristics and Attitudes of Immigrant Scientists and Engi- neers in the U.S., 1973, p. vli.) 1214 odd scientists, engineers, and medical personnel entering the United States from 1953-69 to be on the order of $750 million or $132 million in the fiscal year 1968 alone. He also calculated that the value of those going to the other advanced countries taken altogether might reach or exceed this figure. By taking the $20,000 estimated average educa- tional cost per professional suggested by Dr. Kidd and used by the House Government Ope^^ations Committee, the total figure, accord- ing to Mr. Henderson, would reach or exceed $1 billion for the total inflow from the developing countries to the United States. Former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Harold Howland estimated that the inflow of the nearly 100,000 scientists and engineers constituted "at least $4 billion" in savings to the United States in total educational costs.^^^ Henderson observed that costs of educating professionals in the United States are much higher than the conservative estimates given per person. Even putting the cost in the area of $20,000-$4:0,000 during the years concerned, such costs, he noted, would be "on the order of upwards of $2-$3 billion." For 1968 alone, they would be on the order of magnitude of half a billion dollars.^^® Tables 26 through 29 provide data that give some impression of the magnitude of estimated educational savings to the United States from immigrant scientists, engineers, physicians, and surgeons entering the country from the LDCs. Again, these tables assume that the incoming immigrants will remain and they are computed on various estimated costs of education in this country. Not included in the computation are costs of primary and secondary education and undergraduate training for FMGs. Their inclusion would add substantially to the saving. In the fiscal years 1971 and 1972, 20,652 scientists and engineers entered from the LDCs at an estimated educational saving to the United States of $749,254,560. The Far East was the largest contributor with 16,420 entering at a saving of an estimated $595,717,600. (See Table 26.) The total estimated sa\angs to the United States in educational costs of the 32,327 immigrant scientists, engineers, physicians, and surgeons enter- ing the country from the LDCs in the fiscal years 1971 and 1972 amounts to $1,718,279,560. (See Table 29.) The Far East was the high- est contributor with its 25,241 entering immigrants ; the total estimated educational savings for the United States is $1,327,860,600. India ranks first among all countries with 10.652 entering, thus saving the United States an estimated $520,027,040 in educational costs. K3= Henderson, op. clt., pp. 131-132. 6» Ibid. 1215 TABLE 26.-ESTIMATED SAVINGS TO THE UNITED STATES IN EDUCATIONAL COSTS OF IMMIGRANT SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS FROM LDC'S, FISCAL YEAR 1971 AND FISCAL YEAR 1972 Fiscal year 1971 Fiscal year 1972 Total Area Scientist/ engineer Estimated educational savings Scientist/ engineer Estimated educational savings ' Scientist/ engineer Estimated educational savings All countries . ... 13,102 $475, 340, 560 402, 780, 560 5, 986, 200 44, 588, 120 341, 866, 440 11,323 9,550 114 756 8.155 $410, 798, 440 346, 474, 000 4, 135, 920 27, 427, 680 295, 863, 400 24, 425 20,652 279 1,592 17, 578 $886, 139, 000 All LDCsJ West Europe: Greece Latin America'. Asia - --- ... 11,102 165 836 ... 9,423 749, 254, 560 14, 258, 040 57, 757, 760 637, 729, 840 Near and Middle East._.. Far East 602 8,821 21,840,560 320, 025, 880 556 7,599 20,171,680 275,691,720 1,158 16, 420 42,012,240 595,717,600 China.. India 897 4, 226 32, 543, 160 153, 319, 280 16, 326, 000 22, 856, 400 55, 435, 840 39, 545, 200 660 3,567 546 491 1,540 795 23, 944, 800 129, 410, 760 19, 808, 880 17,813,480 55,871,200 28,842,600 1,557 7,793 996 1,121 3,068 1,885 56, 487, 960 282, 730. 040 Korea Pakistan Philippines Other 450 630 1,523 1,090 36,134,880 40, 669, 880 111,307,040 68, 387, 000 Africa 589 21,368,920 433 15, 709, 240 1,022 37, 078, 160 Egypt Other.... 387 202 14, 040, 360 7, 328, 560 239 194 8, 670, 920 7, 038, 320 626 396 22,711,280 14, 366, 880 All other areas 89 3, 228, 920 92 3, 337, 760 181 6, 566, 680 ' This table uses the figure $9,070 as representing an approximation of the annual average cost per student. The figure, relating specifically to esiimated real costs of higher education for the year 1971-72, was computed by Howard R. Bowen and Paul Servells in a study published by the American Association for Higher Education. In presenting the data, the authors state: "These estimates are crude and should be used only to indicate rough orders of magnitude. Even so, the table shows how heavily the real costs of higher education bear upon students and their families." (Howard R. Bowen, and Paul Servelle, "Who Benefits From Higher Education— and Who Should Pay?" Prepared by the ERIC Clearinghouse on Higher Education, George Washington University (Washington, D.C., American Association for Higher Education, 1972), pp. 31-33. The figure on educational savings was computed on a basis of 4 years using the estimate of $9,070 as represent- ing the annual average cost per student. 2 LDCs are intended to include the following countries and areas listed in the NSF report: Greece, North and Central America (excluding Canada), South America, Asia, Africa, and "All other areas." 3 Latin America is intended to include those areas listed in the NSF report as North and Central America (excluding Can- ada) and South America. The statistical data in this table on number of immigrants is drawn from, NSF, "Highlights, Immigrant Scientists and Engineers," Aug. 20, 1973, p. 2. 1216 TABLE 27— ESTIMATED SAVINGS TO THE UNITED STATES IN EDUCATIONAL COSTS OF IMMIGRANT SCIENTISTS, ENGINEERS, PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS ENTERING UNITED STATES FROM LDC'S AS IMMIGRANTS, FISCAL YEAR 1971 Scientist/ engineer Estimated educational savings » Physician/ surgeon Estimated educational savings' Total Area Scientist/ engineer/ physician/ surgeon Estimated educational savings All countries 13, 102 11, 102 165 836 9,423 $475, 340, 560 402, 780, 560 5, 986, 200 44, 588, 120 341,866,440 5,748 5,213 52 542 4,380 $477, 084, 000 432, 679, 000 4, 316, 000 44, 986, 000 363, 540, 000 18, 850 16,315 217 1,378 13, 803 $952, 424, 560 All LDCS3.... West Europe: Greece Latin America < Asia 835, 459, 560 10, 302, 200 89, 574, 120 705,406,440 Near and Middle East Far East 602 8,821 21, 840, 560. 320, 025, 880 434 3,946 36, C22, 000 327, 518, 000 1,036 12, 767 57, 862, 560 647. 543, 880 China India ■ Korea... Pakistan Philippines Other 897 4,226 450 630 1,528 1,090 32, 543, 160 153, 319, 280 16, 326, 000 22, 856, 400 55, 435, 840 39, 545, 200 207 1,057 999 161 1,040 482 17,181,000 87, 731, 000 82, 917, 000 13, 280, 000 86, 320, 000 40, 006, 000 1,104 5,283 1,449 791 2,568 1.572 49, 724. 160 241. 050. 280 99, 243, 000 36, 136, 400 141.755,840 79, 551, 200 Africa 589 21, 368, 920 222 18,426,000 811 39, 794. 920 ^^l:::::::::::::: 387 202 14, 040, 360 7, 328, 560 146 76 12,118,000 6, 308, 000 533 278 26, 158. 360 13, 363. 560 All other areas 89 3, 228, 920 17 1,411,000 106 4, 639, 920 1 This table uses the figure $9,070 as representing an approximation of the annual average cost per student. The figure relating specifically to estimated real costs of higher education for the year 1971-72, was computed by Hovsord R. Bowen and Paul Servelle in a study published by the American Association for Higher Education. In presenting the data, the authors state: "These estimates are crude and should be used only to indicate rough orders of magnitude. Even so, the table shows how heavily the real costs of higher education bear upon studentsandthelrfamilies." (Howard R. Bowen, and Paul Servelle. "Who Benefits From Kigher Education — and WhoShould Pay? "Prepared by the ERIC Clearinghouse on Higher Education. George Washington University (Washington, D.C.: American Association for Higher Education. 1972), pp. 31-33.) The figure on educational savings was computed on a basis of 4 years using the estimate of $9,070 as representing the annual average cost per student. ^ Total savings is arrived at by using the estimated figure of $83,000 per person for educational costs of a physician. CitedinHenderson, "Emigration of Highly Skilled Manpower From the Developing Countries," 1970, p. 132. Mr. Henderson cites this figure for surgeons who are, as he says, "the most expensive." However, the figure of $83,000 per person is not excessively high as Mr. Henderson suggests. According to a recent report by the AAMC, the annual cost per medical student in the undergraduate medical educational program leading to the M.D. degree is estimated to range from a low of $16,300 to a high of $26,400. Over 4 years this would amount to $65,200 and $105,600 respectively. The average total annual cost from 12 selected schools amounts to $21,350 per student, or a 4-year total of $85,400. The estimate, figured in 1972 dollars, was based upon a study of the 12 medical schools. The components used in computing costs were: instruction, research, clinical activity, other administrative, scholarly, and professional activities. The report indicated that even this figure represents only a part of the total cost of preparing a physician for Independent practice. (Association of American Medical Colleges, Report of the Committee on the Financing of Medical Education, "Undergraduate Medical Education: Elements— Objectives— Costs." (AAMC. 1973). pp. 1-2.) > LDC's are understood to mean the following areas and countries listed in table L of NSF "Highlights:" Greece, North and Central America (excluding Canada). South America, Asia, Africa, and "All other areas." * Latin America is understood to mean those areas and countries listed in table of NSF "Highlights" as North and Central America (excluding Canada) and South America. The statistical data in this table relating to the number of Immigrants and areas are drawn from, NSF, "Highlights, Im- migrant Scientists and Engineers," Aug. 20, 1973, p. 2. 1217 TABiE 28.— ESTIMATED SAVINGS TO THE UNITED STATES IN EDUCATIONAL COSTS OF IMMIGRANT SCIENTISTS ENGINEERS, PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS ENTERING UNITED STATES FROM LDC'S AS IMMIGRANTS, FISCAL YEAR 1972 Scientist/ engineer Estimated educational savings ' Physician/ surgeon Estimated educational savings ' Total Area Scientist/ engineer/ physician/ surgeon Estimated educational savings All countries All LDCs3 West Europe: Greece Latin America *. Asia 11,323 9,550 114 756 8,155 $410,798,440 346, 474, 000 4, 135, 920 27, 427, 680 295, 863, 400 7,143 6,462 76 523 5,558 $592, 869, 000 536, 346, 000 6, 308, 334 43, 409. 000 461,314,000 18,466 16,012 190 1,279 13,713 $1,003,667,440 882, 820, 000 10, 444, 254 70, 836, 580 757,177,400 Near and Middle East.. Far East 556 7,599 20,171,680 275,691,720 683 4,875 56, 689, 000 404, 625, 000 1,239 12,474 76, 860, 680 680,316,720 China.... India.. Korea Pakistan Philippines Other 660 3,567 546 491 1,540 795 23, 944, 800 129,410,760 19, 808, 880 17, 813, 480 55,871,200 28, 842, 600 274 1,802 810 260 831 898 22, 742, 000 149, 566, 000 67, 230, 000 21, 580, 000 68, 973, 000 74, 534, 000 934 5,369 1,356 751 2,371 1,693 46, 686, 800 278, 976, 760 87, 038, 880 39, 393, 480 124, 844, 200 103, 376, 600 Africa 433 15,709,240 259 21,497,000 692 37, 206, 240 Egypt 239 194 8. 670, 920 7, 038, 320 115 144 9, 54S. 000 11,952,000 354 338 18,215,920 Other 18, 990, 320 All other areas 92 3, 337, 760 46 3, 818, 000 138 7, 155, 760 ' This table uses the figure $9,070 as representing an approximation of the annual average cost per student. The figure relating specifically to estimated real costs of higher education for the year 1971-72, was computed by Howard R. Bowen and Paul Servelle in a study published by the American Association for Higher Education. In presenting the data, the authors state: "These estimates are crude and should be used only to indicate rough orders of magnitude. Even so, the table shows how heavily the real costs of higher education bear upon students and their families." (Howard R. Bowen, and Paul Servelle, "Who Benefits from Higher Education— and Who Should Pay?" Prepared by the ERIC Clearinghouse on Higher Education, George Washington University (Washington, D.C. : American Association for Higher Education, 1972), pp. 31-33.) The figure on educational savings was computed on a basis of 4 years using the estimate of $9,070 as representing the annual average cost per student, 2 Total savings is arrived at by using the estimated figure of $83,000 per person for educational costs of a physician. Cited in Henderson, "Emigration of Highly Skilled Manpower from the Developing Countries," 1970, p. 132. Mr. Henderson cites this figure for surgeons who are, as he says, "the most expensive." However, the hgure of of $83,000 per person is not excessively high as Mr. Henderson suggests. According to a recent report by the AAMC, the annual cost per medical student in the undergraduate medical educational program leading to the M.D. degree is estimated to range from a low of $16,300 to a high of $26,400. Over 4 years this would amount to $65,200 and $105,600 respectively. The average total annual cost from 12 selected schools amounts to $21,350 per student, or a 4-year total of $85,400. The estimate, figured in 1972 dollars, was based upon a study of the 12 medical schools. The components used in computing costs were: instruction, research, clinical activity, other administrative, scholarly, and professional activities. The report indicated that even this figure represents only a part of the total cost of preparing a physician for independent practice. (Association of American Medical Colleges, Report of the Committee on the Financing of Medical Education, "IJndergraduate Medical Education: Elements— Objectives— Costs." (AAMC, 1973), p. 1-2.) 3 LDCs are understood to mean the following areas and countries listed in table 1 of NSF "Highlights": Greece, North and Central America (excluding Canada), South America, Asia, Africa, and "All other areas." * Latin America is understood to mean those areas and countries listed in table of NSF "Highlights" as North and Central America (excluding Canada) and South America. The statistical data in this table relating to the number of immigrants and areas are drawn from, NSF "Highlights Im- migrant Scientists and Engineers." Aug. 20, 1973, p. 2. 1218 TABLE 29.— TOTAL ESTIMATED SAVINGS TO THE UNITED STATES IN EDUCATIONAL COSTS OF IMMIGRANT SCIENTISTS, ENGINEERS, PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS ENTERING UNITED STATES FROM LDC'S AS IMMIGRANTS - FISCAL YEAR 1971 AND FISCAL YEAR 1972 Fiscal year 1971 Fiscal year 1972 Total Fiscal years 1971 and 1972 Scientists/ engineers/ physicians/ surgeons Scientists/ Estimated engineers/ educational physicians/ savings > surgeons Scientists/ Estimated engineers/ educational physicians/ savings surgeons Estimated educational savings All countries. 18,850 $952,424,560 18,466 $1,003,667,440 37,316 $1,956,092,000 All LDCs2 16,315 835,459,560 16,012 882,820,000 32,327 1,718,279,560 West Europe: Greece 217 10,302,200 190 10,444,254 407 20,746,454 Latin America' 1,378 89,574,120 1,279 70,836,680 2,657 160,410,800 Asia --- 13,803 705,406,440 13,713 757,177,400 27,516 1,462,583,840 Near and Middle East 1,036 57,862,560 1,239 76,860,680 2,275 134,723,240 FarEast 12,767 647,543,880 12,474 680,316,720 25,241 1,327,860,600 China 1.104 49,724,160 934 46,686,800 2,038 %, 410, 960 India- 5,283 241,050,280 5,369 278,976.760 10,652 520,027,040 Korea 1,449 99,243,000 1,336 87,038,880 2,805 186,281,880 Pakistan 791 36,136,400 751 39,393,480 1,542 75,529,880 Philippines 2,568 141,755,840 2,371 124,844,200 4,939 266,600,040 Other 1,572 79,551,200 1,693 103,376,600 3,265 182,927,800 Africa Egypt Other All other areas. 106 4,639,920 138 7,155,760 244 11,795,680 811 39,794,920 692 37, 206, 240 1,503 77,001,160 533 26, 158, 360 13, 363, 560 354 338 18,215,920 18, 990, 320 887 616 44, 374, 280 278 32, 353, 880 • The figure for the estimated educational savings for immigrant scientists .engineers, physicians ani surgeons is corn- computed on the basis of $9,070 as representing an approximation of the annual average cost per student and $83,000 per person for medical undergraduate school costs for 4 years of training. The $9,070 figure, relating specifically to esti- mated real costs of higher education for the year 1971-72, was computed by How/ard R. Bowen and Paul Servelle in a study published by the American Association for Higher Education. In presentmg the data, the authors state: "These estimates are crude and should be used only to indicate rough orders of magnitude. Even so, the table shovi^s how heavily the real costs of higher education bear upon students and their families." Howard R. Bowen, and Paul Servelle, "Who Benefits from Higher Education— and Who Should Pay?" Prepared by the ERIC Clearinghouse on Higher Education, George Wash- ington University (Washington. DC: American Association for Higher Education, 1972), pp. 31-33.) The estimated figure o' $83,000 per person for educational costs of a physician was cited in Henderson, "Emigration of Highly Skilled Manpower from the Developing Countries," 1970, p. 132. Mr. Henderson cites this figures for surgeons who are, as he says, "the most expensive." However, the figure of $83,000 per person is not excessively high as Mr. "Hen- derson suggests. According to a recent report by the AAMC, the annual cost per medical student in the undergraduate medi- cal educational program leading to the M.O. degree is estimated to range from a low of $16,300 to a high of $26,400. Over 4 years this would amount to $65,200 and $105,600 respectively. The average total annual cost from a selected 12 schools amounts to $21,350 per student, or a 4-year total of $85,400. The estimate, figured in 1972 dollars, was based upon a study of 12 medical schools. The components used in computing costs were, instruction, research, clinical activity, other admini- istrative, scholarly, and professional activities. The report indicated that even this figure represents only a part of the total cost of preparing a physician for independent practice. (Association of American Medical Colleges, Report of the Committee on the Financing of Medical Education, "Undergraduate Medical Education: Elements— Objectives— Costs," (AAMC, 1973, pp. 12.) ■ LOCs are understood to mean the following areas and countries listed in table 1 of NSF "Highlights:" Greece, North and Central America (excluding Canada), South America, Asia, Africa, and "All other areas." 3 Latin America is understood to mean those areas and countries listed in table 1 of NSF "Highlights" as North and Cen- tral America (excluding Canada) and South America. The statistical data in this tabl; relating to the number of immigrants and areas are drawn from, NSF. "High- lights. Immigrant Scientists and Engineers." Aug. 20, 1973. p. 2. ynaccoiintecl for in these estimates of cost savings in education is the "immeasiuable benefit," as Melvin J. Fox, associate director of the Ford Foundation, termed it, that accrued to the United States from programs of international educational exchange.^^^ These pro- grams virtually revolutionized American advanced education; they contributed enormously to the development of area studies in Ameri- ^^" Fox, op. clt.. p. 75. Fox elahoratp.s on the multlfaceted benefits accruing to the United States from its participation in educational exchange. 1219 can universities; they broadened the horizons of American students and educators studyincr abroad who were brought into direct contact with other cultures and other civilizations : they opened up the Ameri- can educational environment to new and enriching influences from in- coming foreign students ; they provided the means for encouraging the inflow of young, energetic, new citizens whose potentialities were yet to be realized as researchers, educators, and professional workers in other fields; and, not least of all, they fostered a spirit of internation- alism within a new generation of Americans. Nor do these estimates take into account the contributions of the many thousands of immigrant professionals, ranging from the Ger- man-born space scientist Wernher Von Braun and the Nobel Prize nominee and Cuban refugee pediatric cardiologist Augustin Castel- lanos, to those many unknown scientists and engineers working in this country's research laboratories, striving to achieve its national pur- poses and to advance the frontiers of knowledge. Such contributions and benefits are of a magnitude that is indeed "immeasurable," but they are nevertheless real, and this country is much the greater and the richer for them. EASING DOCTOR SHORTAGE THROUGH FMG's Benefits to the Ignited States from FMGs derive mainly from their role in easing the doctor shortage. As noted above, for many years the United States has failed to produce sufficient numbers of doctors to meet the rising national demand of health care. Tables 30 and fSl, re- produced from Rashi Fein's study for the Brookings Institution on the doctor shortage, provide historical perspective on this problem.^^^ Doctor Shortage^ a Reality. — With probably few exceptions, sources on medical brain drain maintain that there is a doctor shortage in the United States. Most frequently cited are the Public Health Service figures of an estimated shortage of 50,000 physicians, 150,000 nurses, and more than 250,000 allied health care.^^^ The Department of Labor reported a shortage in 1966 of 100,000 physicians in the United States. Data from the Public Plealth Service indicate a need for 400,000 physicians by 1975, approximately 110,000 more than there were in 1968. Other sources, including Rashi Fein, perceive a present shortage that will worsen in the future.^*" Stevens and Vermeulen note that shortages in hospital staffing are "critical," and they cite the Ameri- can Hospital Association which, in collaboration with Government agencies, estimates that American hospitals are currently short 10,000 physicians, the addition needed to provide optimal patient care.'*^ ^"* Rashi Fein. The Doctor Shortage: An Economic Diagnosis, (Washington : Brookings Institution. 1967). p. 199. ^^ Sen. Edmund S. Muskie (D-Me.) cited these figures In an address to the National Kldnev Foundation. {New York Times, Nov. 22. 1970. p. 40.) s'o Marculles and Bloch, op. clt.. pp. 22-23. The Preamble to an Act passed In 1972 setting up nine Federall.v sponsored medical schools referred to a shortace of 48.000 doctors and over 2.50.000 allied health and other medical personnel. {Washington Star-Daily News, Nov. 23. 1972. p. B-5. ) The same press report cites Richard I. Johnson, a health care man- agement consultant, as setting the shortage at about 130.000 today and projecting l!?0,000 by 1980. 5" Stevens and Vermeulen, op. clt., pp. 24 and 25. 1220 TABLE 30.-DOCTORS OF MEDICINE AND RATE PER 100,000 POPULATION, JULY I, SELECTED YEARS' Number of Number per 100,000 Number of Numbe r per 100,000 Year physicians < population > Year physicians ' population 3 1900 119,749 157 1936 165, 163 129 1906.. 134,688 158 1942.. 180, 496 134 1910 135, 000 146 1949... 201.277 135 1916 145,241 142 1955 218.061 132 1921 145,404 134 1957... 226,625 132 1927 149, 521 126 1959 236. 089 133 1931 156,406 126 1962.. 257,035 136 I See text for differences between table 1 1 1-1 and table 1 1 1-3. 5 Excludes June graduates of the year concerned, s Population base includes Armeo Forces overseas. Source: Rashi Fein, "The Doctor Shortage: An Economic Diagnosis" (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 66. (Data through 1957 from U.S. Public Health Service, Health manpower source book, sec. 9, Phvsicians, dentists and pro- fessional nurses (1959), p. 9. Data for 1959 and 1962 from ibid., Sec. 14, Medical specialists (1962), p. 3.> TABLE 31.- -MEDICAL SCHOOLS AND GRADUATES, SELECTED YEARS, 1880-1966 Nun iber of Number of Number of Number of Year medical schools graduates Year medical schools graduates 1880 100 3,241 1930. 76 1,565 1890 133 4,454 1935. 77 5,101 1900 160 5,214 1940. 77 5,097 1902 160 5,009 1945. 77 5,136 1904. 160 5,747 1950. 79 5,553 1906 162 5.364 1955. 81 6,977 1908 151 4,741 1960- 85 7,081 1910 131 4,440 1962. 87 7,168 1915 % 3,536 1964. 87 7,336 1920... 85 3,047 1%6. 88 7,574 1925.. 80 3,974 Source: Rashi Fein, "The Doctor Shortage: An Economic Diagnosis" (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1967), p. 67. (Data for years up to and including 1935 from R. G. LeIand, Distribution of physicians in the United States (American Medical Association, 1936), p. 2; for later years from "Journal of the American Medical Association," vol. 198, No. 8 (Nov. 21, 1966), p. 88.) The decline in the number of medical schools during 1910-15 is attributed to the raising of standards after publication of the Flexner report in 1910. See Fein's explanation on pp. 65-67. There are 140 counties in the United States which have no physicians engaged in rendering patient care. The vast majority (108) are in the West. The 140 counties cover 138,463 square miles, or approxi- mately 3.9 percent of the total land area of the United States. Almost one-half million (497,000) people or 0.2 percent of the total U.S. poj^u- lation reside in these counties.^" In general, low-income, inner-city areas have relatively fewer physicians than the suburbs, the rural areas less than urban, and the pcJorer States less than the wealthier.^^^ Such shortages are apparent to the casual reader of Sunday's edition of The Neio York Times, which invariably carries one-to-two full page advertisements on medical and hospital employment opportunities.^"* Thus the United States is a debtor nation in terms of its current supply of M.D.s, and the evidence suggests that the doctor shortage will persist. This view is held by most specialists on health matters de- spite a national program to increase student enrollment in existing medical schools, establish new medical schools, and accelerate the rate of graduation of physicians. This deficit is filled by FMGs largely B«G A Roback, Distribution of Physicians in the U.S.. 1972, Departnjent of Survey Re'search Center for Health Services Research and Development. American Medical Associa- "-•^onir^elfiS'lllelwSf^SeTvlcr^i'cfc^^^^^ Report on National Health Insurance. ^^L l^^^for' example, The New York Times, Oct. 14. 1973, pp. lOE-llB. 1221 from the LDCs, and accumulated evidence seems to corroborate the judgment of Dr. Thomas D. Dublin that, "with the floodgates now open for the mass migration of physicians, particularly from the lesser to the more highly developed countries of the world, a long time may elapse before this flow is stopped, or reversed. Up to 100,000 physicians may now be migrating annually. . . ." ^*^ U.S. Dependency on FMGs. — As the statistical data presented in Chapter II indicated, the United States is a prime receiver of emigrat- ing physicians : it depends upon FMGs to meet demand, and this de- pendency is increasing. In 1959, there were 20,575 FMGs in the United States, or 8.5 percent of the 241,036 total number of physicians; in December 1970, there were 63,391 FMGs identified in the latest AMA census. Another 10,000 or more are believed to be unregistered. The proportion of FMGs more than doubled by 1970 to almost one in five of the 334,028 listed doctors. In the lli/^-year interval, the total number of M.D.s in the United States increased by 39 percent ; the number of M.D.s receiving their basic medical training outside the United States more than tripled. During the 3-year period 1968-70, the proportion of newly licensed FMGs rose to more than 29 percent of the total. In 1970, the net increase in physician population was 9,102 ; one-third, or 3,016, were newly licensed FMGs — the figure would be 3,208 if Ca- nadian medical graduates were included.^*® In recent years the annual inflow of FMGs has matched and then exceeded the number of graduates from American medical schools. In 1969, 7,216 FMGs entered the country; 8,059 American medical stu- dents were graduated. In 1970, 8,166 FMGs entered ; 8,367 American students were graduated. In 1971, the figures were 10,540 and 8,974 respectively. During the total period 1962-71, 75,639 FMGs entered the country ; 77,867 American medical students were graduated.^*^ That FMGs contribute a great deal to American health care is evident in data presented in the studies by Stevens and Vermeulen, Margulies and Bloch, and the AMA in its 1970 report on FMG«. The benefits accrued to the United States are apparent in the statistics. In citing American dependency on FMGs for hospital staffing, Stevens and Vermeulen note that as of December 1970, 28,000 of the 63,000 FMGs were working full-time in American hospitals as interns, res- idents, or full-time staff. While constituting less than one-fifth of the total number of M.D.s in the country, they provide about a third of all physicians in hospital-based practice. In anesthesiology, nearly one- half of the 2,700 full-time hospital physicians, including interns and residents, are FMGs."^ -pj^g ^^i^ ^f FMGs in internship and residency programs during the last two decades has increased enormously. In 1950-51 FMGs represented only 10 percent of interns and 9 percent of residents in American hospitals; in 1970-71, there were 29 percent and 33 percent respectively.^*^ FMG contribution to American medical care extends beyond the hospitals. More than 20,000 were in office-based practice in 1970; more than 4,000 were in medical teaching or research ; and 1,200 in adminis- ^^ Dublin, op. clt., p. 870. «« Ibid., p. 871. "^ Stevens and Vermeulen, op. cit, p. 96. 6*8 Stevens and Vermeulen, op. cit., p. 1. B« Ibid., p. 6. 1222 trationr*^° FMGs are also strongly represented in the field of psychia- try. The AMA/FMG study lists 1,934 FMGs as having received an American Specialty Board certification in Psychiatry and Nenrol- ogy.=5i According to Dr. E, Fuller Torrey and Dr. Kobert L. Taylor, officials of the National Institute of Mental Health, an estimated 34 percent or 1,370 out of 4,040 psychiatric residencies in 1970 were filled by FMGs. They also estimated that 3,100 foreign-trained, unlicensed M.D.s form the bulk of psychiatric staff at state mental hospitals, pris- ons, and institutions for the mentally retarded.^^^ At least quantitatively in terms of reducing the medical manpower deficit, it appears that the United States has gained much from the work of the FMGs. Margulies and Bloch give the following assess- ment of their general contribution to American health care: "This country has received from other countries many outstanding teachers and research scientists who have contributed notably to our society and its institutions. Other FMGs have been of great service to the communities in which they practice medicine." ^^^ Savings to United States fi^oni FMGs. — In terms of cash savings, FMG« have made a considerable contribution to the United States. Attempts have been made at a rough evaluation of savings in educa- tional costs. Such costs to the LDCs, noted above, give some insight into this matter. Generalizing on the role of the FMG in the American health system, Stevens and Vermeulen state categorically that whatever the justifica- tion for their use, "the cold fact" remains that 63,391 of the 334,028 physicians in the United States in 1970 received their primary medi- cal education outside the United States. "This education," they write, "represents a huge gain to this country in terms of value received for medical education." ^^* Those authors do not attempt to calculate over- all cash savings to the American people, but specifically with regard to hospital functions, they estimate that FMGs "are contributing work worth at least $125 million a year to patients in American hos- pitals." =^^ Assuming that the educational cost of a M.D. in the United States is at an estimated figure of $83,000 per person, the total F^MG popula- tion as of December 1970 of 63,391 represents a theoretical savings, if the equivalent number had been produced from native stock, of roughly $5,261,453,000. (See Table 32.) The estimated figure of $83,- 000 is not excessively high, as Henderson implies. According to an October 1973 report of AAMC, the average annual cost of under- graduate medical education is $21,350 per student, or a 4-vear total of $85,400."^ 660 Ibid., p. 14. 651 AMA. FMO Study, 1971, p. 11. 652 Stuart Auerbach, "Allen Psychiatrists lilt as 'Cheap Labor' In U.S.," The Washington Post, May 2, 1972. p. Al. 663 Margulies and Bloch, op. clt., p. vl. 66* Stevens and Vermeulen, op. dt, p. 19. 655 Ibid., p. 9. 5M Henderson. Emigration of Highly Skilled Manpower from the Developing Countries, 1970, p. 132. Mr. Henderson writes : "Costs of educating professionals in the United States are, of course, very much higher [than the $20,000 figure given by the House Government Operations Committee on the investment cost in education per professional in the LDCs], mounting, in the case of surgeons (the most expensive), up to $83,000 per person." Sources examined on brain drain generally do not explain the criteria for arriving at such base figures. It cannot be determined whether estimated costs include total cost of education from primary and secondary schools through college and medical school and whether they include also costs beyond strictly tuition and living expenses to the student. The figure of $83,000 per person is not, however, too high as Mr. Henderson suggests. According to a recent report by the AAMC, the annual cost per medical student in the 1223 (Figures on estimated savings in educational costs from incoming FMGs cited here take into account only the 4-year undergraduate training program in medical school; they do not include 4 years of premodical work a student must complete prior to entering medical school. Nor do they include costs in primary and secondary education. Accordingly, the figures given here would be nuich higher if such costs were included.) Estimated savings for the total FMG inflow from the LDCs in 1971 (5,213), with similar assumptions made in tables 23 to 28 on edu- cation costs and losses is $432,679,000; and for the fiscal year 1972 (6,462), $536,346,000. Estimated savings from Latin America's 542 entering FMGs in the fiscal year 1971 is $44,986,000. and from the Far East, $327,518,000 for its entering 3,946 FMGs. India, the highest donor, contributed a saving of some $87,731,000 for its 1.057 entering FMGs, and the Philippines second with 1,040 saved the United States in educational costs an estimated $86,320,000. (See Table 32.) In the fiscal year 1972, the estimated savings in educational costs increased. The estimate for the 6,462 entering FMGs from all LDCs amounts to $536,346,000. Of this total, Latin America contributed 523 FMGs, an estimated saving of $43,409,000. Again, the Far East ranked first among the areas of the world with 4,875 FMGs entering, thus permitting a saving in educational costs of $404,625,00.0. India had the greatest number of any country, accounting for an entry of 1,802 FMGs at an estimated saving in educational costs to the United States of $149,566,000. ( See Table 33. ) The combined savings to tlie United States in educational costs of immigrant F]MGs from the LDCs for the fiscal years 1971 and 1972 is considerable and emphasizes the high degree of American depend- ency on the LDCs. In the fiscal years 1971-72, 11,675 FMGs entered as immigrants at a total estimated savings in educational costs of $969,025,000. Latin America contributed 1,065 FMGs at a total saving to this country of $88,395,000. The greatest number came from the Far East : 8,821 at a saving of an estimated $732,143,000. India con- tributed more than any other country, a total of 2,859 F^NIGs for both years, at a savings to the United States estimated at $237,297,000. Ranking second among the highest contributors is the Philippines with 1,871 FMGs entering in both yeai-s at a savings in educational costs to this country of an estimated $155,293,000. Gregory Henderson states that assuming the cost of training profes- sionals in the United States is within the $20,000-$40.000 range, "dur- ing the years concerned" (presumably 1953-69), "such costs would be on the order of upwards of $2-$3 billion." For the 1968 inflow alone, he said, "they would be on the order of half a billion dollars." undergraduate medical edueatlonal program leading to the M.D. degree Is estimated to range from a low of $10,300 to a high of $26,400. Over 4 years this would amount to $65,200 and $105,600 respectively. The average total annual cost from a selected 12 schools amounts to $21,350 per student, or a 4-year total of $85,400. The estimate, figured in 1972 dollars, is based upon a study of 12 medical schools. The components used in computing costs are, instruction, research, clinical activity, other administrative, scholarly, and professional activities. The report says that the cost of undergraduate medical educa- tion "represents only a part of the total cost of preparing a physician. A period of gradunte medical education is required for the further development of the knowledge and skills acquired as a medical student to qualify the physician for the independent practice of medicine. There is also a need for continuing education to keep the practicing physician abreast of the day-to-day developments in medicine." The report goes on to express the need for support for the total cost of programs essential to continuing the educational process. (Association of American Medical Colleges, Report of the Committee on the Financing of Medical Education, Undergraduate Medical Education: Elements — Objec- tives— Costs. (AAMC. 1973), pp. 1-2.) 1224 The education within the United States of the 28,000 medical doctors from the LDCs, he indicated, "would have cost at least U.S.$li^ billion." Henderson quotes Harold Howland, former Deputy Assist- ant Secretary of State, as estimating the imported scientists and engineers at nearly 100,000 and estimating also "at least $4 billion the saving to the United States in total educational costs." Mr. Henderson continues : The above concerns only value at the moment of entering a career in a devel- oped country. The value which the professional migrant adds during a full career in a developed country at the salary and production levels of developed countries would be, of course, greatly larger, perhaps on the order of twenty times or more the figures for the U.S. value of the education at the time of entering the job and certainly in tens of billions of dollars for the United States and in the billions of dollars for other developed countries."^' Savings in Medical School Construction. — As noted earlier in the study, various sources attempt to give some idea of educational savings to the United States by estimating the equivalent number of medical schools needed to educate from native stock a given number of incom- ing FMGs. Dr. Kelly West said in 1966 that FMGs accounted for 18 percent of the annual additions of American manpower. In terms of cost, he said, the United States would have to build and operate about 12 new medical schools, at an operating cost of some $8 million dollars per year per medical center. "In other words," he noted, "the value of this migration may be estimated at something of the order to us of $100 million per year. . . ." ^^^ The PAHO report of 1966 on brain drain from Latin America declared that every year about 300 physicians migrated to the United States from Latin America. This number, it said, is equivalent to the annual output of three large American medical schools. It would cost at least $60 million to build three teaching medical schools, and, it added, more than $15 million to operate them.^^^ In a recent article, Leslie Westoff writes, "It has no doubt been more economical in the short run to import doctors than to build the 35 or more medical schools we need, each costing $20 million and $5 million a year to maintain," "^^ Tables 32 and 33 offer some rough estimates of the number of medi- cal schools that would have to be built in order to train from native stock the equivalent number of FMGs entering the country in the fiscal years 1971 and 1972. No attempt has been made to estimate costs of the medical schools either in construction or operation. (However, Mar- gulies and Bloch, writing in 1969, estimate the cost of constructing one new medical school to be at least $50 million and the annual operating cost of a medical school at an average of $3.8 million.) ^^^ ^^Ibid., p. 32. Mr. Henderson adds In a footnote: "Such figures will seem more modest when it is recalled that the invention of power steering alone by a single, not very well- known (native) American inventor Is credited with having added $5 billion to the U.S. economy." 5M Department of State, Proceedings of Workshop on the International Migration of Talent and Skills, October 1966, p. 40. In an article published in 1969, Professor Adams quotes Dr. West as saying that there was evidence that the annual immigration of phy- sicians exceeded 2,000. These immigrants, he added, constituted about 16 percent of the entries into the American medical profession, and noted that it would require 16 new medical schools to produce the physicians now supplied by imported manpower. (Adams, "Talent That Won't Stay Put," p. 79.) ^^ Report on Brain Drain from Latin America. Pan American Health Organization, 1966, p. 16. The same data were presented by Dr. Kldd in Hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee. See International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1968, p. 77. Beo Westoff. op. clt.. p. 80. s«i Margulies and Bloch, op. cit., p. 75. 1225 However imprecise these estimates may be, they provide at least a rough order of magnitude of estimated savings to the American people. Roughly, an additional 18.2 medical schools would have to be constructed in order to accpmmodate in domestic manpower the equivalent of 6,462 FMGs entering the United States from the LDCs in the fiscal year 1972; 5.1 would have to be built to acc6mmodate the equivalent number in native stock of 1,802 FMGs from India alone. Undoubtedly, FMGs make a substantial contribution to the U.S. health system, saving the American people enormous outlays in funds that would have to be expended to eradicate the medical manpower deficit and to maintain health care at present standards. So great has this dependency upon the LDCs for medical manpower become that the authors of the CIMT study conclude : "Large parts of the hospital systems of both the United Kingdom and the United States would collapse if migration of physicians from less developed countries were suddenly to cease." ^"^ 6«2 CIMT study, p. 696. TABLE 32.— ESTIMATED SAVINGS TO THE UNITED STATES IN EDUCATIONAL COSTS OF IMMIGRANT FMG'S FROM LDCS, FISCAL YEAR 1971 Area Total numberi Total estimated savings 3 Equivalent number of medical schools * FMG population, December 1970 All countries All LDCs < :.... West Europe: Greece Latin America'... Asia Near and Middle East Far East '. -.T.-.r*- ^ China .■ '.... India Korea..., Pakistan.. Philippines Other ..... Africa Egypt..... Other All other areas 63,391 5,748 5,213 52 542 4, 380 $5, 261, 453, 000 477, 084, COO 432, 679, 000 4,316,000 44, 986, 000 363, 540, OCO 434 3,946 207 1,057 999 161 1,040 482 36, 022, OCO 327, 518, 000 17,181,000 87,731,000 82,917,000 13, 280, 000 86, 320, 000 40, 0t6, OCO 179.0 16.2 14.7 .1 1.5 12.4 1.2. n.i .6 3.0 2.8 .4 2.9 1.4 222 18,426,000 .6 146 12, 118, 000 6, 308, 000 .4 76 .4 17 1,411,000 .05 ' The source for the total number of FMG's entering the United States is the National Science Foundation's "Highlights of Aug. 20, 1973" (NSF 73-311), p. 2. The figure for the total FMG population comes from the AMA's "FMG Study for 1970." ' Total savings is arrived at by using the estimated figure of $83,000 per person for educational costs of a physician. Cited in Henderson, "Emigration of Highly .Skilled Manpovver from the Developing Countries," 1970, p. 132. Mr. Henderson cites this figure for surgeons who are, as he says, "the most expensive." Hov^rever, the figure of $83,000 per person is not excessively high as Mr, Henderson suggests'. According to a recent report by the AAMC, the annual cost per n.edical student in the undergraduate medical educational program leading to the M.D. degree is estimated to range from a tow of $',6,309 to a high of $26,400. Over 4 years this would amount to $55,200 and $105,600 respectively. The average total annual cost from 12 selected schools amounts to $21,350 per student, or a 4-year total of $85,400. The estimate, figured in 1972 dollars,, was based upon a study of the 12 medical schools. The components used in computing costs ware, instruction, research, clinical activity, other administrative, scholarly, and professional activities. The report indicated that even this figure represents only a part of the total cost of preparing a physician for independent practice. (Association of American Medicaf Colleges. Report of the Committee on the Financing of Medical Education, "Undergraduate Medical Education: Elements — Objectives— Costs." (AAMC, 1973), pp. 1-2.) ' The equivalent number of medical schools category has been arrived at by dividing 354, the average number of students per American medical school, into the total numbsr of entering FMG's. This figure was computed in accordance with datai in the 1971-72 catalog of the Association of American Medical Colleges, which indicates that there were 109 medicaS schools in the United States and Puerto Rico listed as accepting applications for classes (p. 67) and that the total enrollment of American citizens for 1969-70 was 37,690 (p. 63). « LDCs are understood to mean the following areas and countries listed in table 1 of NSF "Highlights": Greece, Northi and Central America (excluding Canada), South America, Asia, Africa, and "All other areas." » Latin America is understood to mean those areas and countries listed in table 1 of NSF "Highlights"' as Nbnth aruS Central America (excluding Canada) and South America. 97-400 O - 77 - 40 1226 TABLE 33.— ESTIMATED SAVINGS TO THE UNITED STATES IN EDUCATIONAL COSTS OF IMMIGRANT FMG'S FROM LDC'S. FISCAL YEAR 1972 Area Total number ' Total estimated savings > Equivalent number of medical schools ' FMG population, December 1970 All countries. AHLDCs* West Europe: Greece Latin America' Asia: Near and Middle East Far East China India ,. Korea Pakistan.. Philippines Other Africa Egypt : Other Ail other areas 63, 391 7,143 6,462 76 523 5,558 $5,261,453,000 592, 869, 000 536, 364, 000 6, 3C8, 334 43, 409, 000 461,314,000 179.0 20.0 18.2 .2 1.5 15.7 683 56, 689, 000 404, 625, 000 1.9 4, 875 13.8 274 22, 742, 000 149, 566, 000 67, 230, 000 21,580,000 68, 973, 000 74, 534, 000 .8 1,802 5.1 810 2.3 260 .7 831 2.3 898 2.5 259 21, 497, 000 .7 115 9, 545, 000 11, 952, OCO .3 144 .4 46 3, 818, OCO .1 • The source for the total number of FMGs entering the United States is the National Science Foundation's "Highlights of Aug. 20, 1973" (NSF 73-311), p. 2. The figure for the total FMG population comes from the AMA's "FMG Study for 1970.'^ » Total savings is arrived at by using the estimated figure of $83,000 per person for educational costs of a physician. Cited in Henderson, "Emigration of Highly Sl. 91. A similar judgment is rendered in the MargiiUes-Bloch study : "The United States gets a phvslcian who has been educated in a medicnl school which does not meet our standards, trained in hospitals here that have done little to correct his deficiencies and who finally leaves the hospital \^•illing but still doubtfully prepared to practice medicine somewhere in this country." (p. 40) -^ „„ «-, For other judgments on the quality of FMGs. see Stevens and Vermeulen. The Ques- tion of Competence," op. clt.. pp. 41-47. Tliey reach the following skeptical conclusion: "In summary, hard data about the actual performance and role of the foreign pnysiclan In different educational and specialty milieus are marked chiefly by their absence." They make a special plea for lurther research on this problem. 1234 think, are not the equivalent of our own physicians. And it is not like we have more of a kind; we do not have. We are getting a double standard. And I think this is something we need to recognize." ^^* The Association of American Medical Colleges, in a recent task force report, reiterated the concerns of Dr. Sprague about the emergence of a double standard in American medicine. The task force declared: In reality, there is no examination available for measuring professional com- petence. Hence we are faced with dual standards for admission and are condoning the evolution of a dual system of graduate medical education. Currently a Tittle over one-half of the physicians entering the American system are products of accredited United States medical schools, while the balance for the most part represents products of unaccredited education systems. This double standard results in wide disparity in the quality of physicians admitted to deliver care in the United States. It undermines the process of quality medical education in this country and ultimately poses a threat to the quality of care delivered to the people."* That the emergence of this double standard has had an adverse effect on American health care is particularly evident in the fields of psy- chiatry and anesthesiology, both of which have high concentrations of FMGrs. According to Dr. E. Fuller Torrey, special assistant to the Director of the National Institute of Mental Health for International Activities, and Dr. Robert L. Taylor, who is on the staff of NIMH's psychiatric training branch, an estimated 3,100 foreign trained, unli- censed physicians form the bulk of the psychiatric staff at State mental hospitals, prisons and institutions for the mentally retarded. An AMA spokesman has estimated that the number was more like 7,500. Both officials told the annual meeting of the American Psychiatric Asso- ciation meeting in Dallas in May 1972 that these FMGs are a form of "cheap labor." Most American psychiatrists, they said, shun jobs in these institutions. But, they said, the FMG psychiatrists were no sub- stitute. Many have had little or no psychiatric training in their foreign medical schools ; they often have a poor command of English, if any at all, and have little understanding of American culture. "Imagine the difficulty, for instance, of a psychiatric resident from Korea," they "">* Hearings, House, Government Operations Committee, Brain Drain, 1968, p. 86 Dr. Dublin noted that FMGs coming to the United States "bring with them an educa- tional background considerably different and often technically Inferior to that provided in medical schools here" (p. 8X2) and seemed to Imply the posslbllltv of a threat to the "maintenance of high standards of medical practice In this country" by attributing equivalency of medical education obtained In any medical school in the world (p. 875). Dr. Fein Indicated that the primary purpose of Internship and residency was education. Foreign Interns and residents, "generally not as well trained," were recruited, he said, "primarily for service." And he adds : "Thus it is the very sick hospitalized patient who is often cared for by the poorly trained physician." Thus he concludes : "It is clear that American medicine cannot easily .iustlfy dual standards. Yet dual standard exists." (Fein, op. cit., pp. 86-87.) Professor Adams concludes that medical brain drain, 60 percent of which comes from the LDCs, "may have caused a deterioration in U.S. medical standards." He quotes from a study by the Adlal Stevenson Institute which implies this conclusion : "We have not faced up to the problem of our own health manpower shortage. Good medical schools have refused to lower admission standards. Supposedly this protects the quality of the profession, but in fact the shortage is filled by poorlv-tralned FMGs." (Adams, "Talent That Won't Stay Put," p. 79.) Professor Butter makes the same point: "The brain drain of physicians has also had a significant Impact on medical care In the United States. It is commonly believed that foreign medical graduates (FMGs) are not as professionally competent as American medical graduates. Thus, the large number of FMGs In the United States (one out of every six physicians) has led to the fear that the quality of medical care in America Is being seriously lowered." (Butter, op. eit., p. 18.) ^ Association of American Medical Colleges, Report of Task Force on FMGs, Mar. 22, 1974, p. 6. Quoted in. Sen. Edward M. Kennedy, Remarks In the Senate. Congressional Record, June 5, 1974, p. S9680. 1235 said, "trying to assess the mental problems of a drug-using American adolescent who is undergoing an existential crisis." According to the doctors, an estimated 34 percent (1,370 out of 4,040) of all psychiatric residencies in 1970 were filled by FMGs, mostly from the LDCs— Philippines (149), India (136), Korea (107), Cuba (95), Argentina (55), Columbia (46), Iran (39), Mexico (25), Egypt (19) and Pakistan (19). "This list," they indicated, "corre- sponds with the frequently cited estimate that 85 percent of our im- ported medical manpower comes from underdeveloped countries." It was also pointed out that of the 186 residency programs that were active during 1970 for psychiatrists, 28 were completely filled by FMGs. In fact, there were more psychiatric residents in American hos- pitals who were graduates from the medical schools of the University of Havana (77) or from the University of Santo Tomas in Manila (74) than were graduates of any American or Canadian medical school (5). The doctors also revealed that many of the 3,100 unlicensed FMGs at mental hospitals, prison psychiatric wards, and institutions for the mentally retarded were unable to pass their State Boards. But they were able to practice medicine under special permits allowing them to work only in State institutions. Pressures are now being brought to bear to create more loopholes for the unlicensed FMG. According to Dr. Torrey and Dr. Taylor, all but seven States have loopholes in their licensing laws that permit such temporary licensing. In New York and Ohio, 40 percent of the M.D.s in State mental hospitals are un- licensed; in West Virginia more than 90 percent are unlicensed; in Maryland, 77 percent of psychiatric residents in State mental hos- pitals are FMGs ; in Virginia's Central State Hospital, all the psychi- atric residents are FMGs. Dr. Torrey and Dr. Taylor examined the question of competence. They noted that the majority of foreign medical schools offered "little or no psychiatric teaching to medical students." Upon graduating and arriving in the United States for a psychiatric residency, these doctors have "less knowledge of psychiatry than most American trainees at the same level." After pointing out the difficulties of "catching up" owing to work pressure, Dr. Torrey and Dr. Taylor examined the other criterion of competence, the ECFMG examination. "Looking specifically at the pass rate for the eight foreign medical schools that contributed the greatest number of residents to American psychiatry in 1970," they said, "only two attained the worldwide average of 40 percent or higher." The two medical schools contributing the most psychiatric residents, the University of Havana and the University of Sai;ito Tomas, had pass rates of only 20 and 13 percent respectively. The same poor showing was made in the State Board licensure examinations. The graduates of these two schools, they said, "scored below the average pass'^ate of 63 percent for all foreign medical grad- uates," which in turn is considerably below the 91 percent for USMGs. Four FMGs, they reported, actually failed State Board examinations for the 13th time during 1970. "Between failures," the doctors pointed 1236 out, "such individuals may remain employed in State hospitals in most States on temporary permits." That It'MGs have a negative effect on the field of American psychia- try seems fairly evident by the judgments of Dr. Torrey and Dr. Tay- lor. As they told the Dallas meeting of the American Psychiatric Asso- ciation : "Patients who cannot afford private psychiatric care are more likely to be treated by foreign trained psychiatrists. The outcome is poorer quality psychiatric care." ^^^ However, Mr. Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Health, Educa- tion and Welfare, would dispute this assessment by Drs. Torrey and Taylor. In an appearance before the House Subcommittee on Public Health and Environment of the Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee on March 1, 1973, Mr. Weinberger was questioned on the qualifications of unlicensed FMGs who work in State mental hos- pitals. He responded : . . . generally speaking and in view of the uniformity of qualification stand- ards throughout the country, I would personally feel- that no foreign doctor is going to treat patients unless he has the necessary qualifications and unless the public is fully protected by having his services. I am not aware of any States which allow untrained, unqualified people to work in their mental institutions. If there are such States, I would certainly think the States would want to move rapidly to correct it.^"" Special problems having potentially adverse effects on American health care have arisen in the field of anesthesiology. This field has a high concentration of FMGs. In December 1970, the AMA recorded a total of 10,860 anesthesiologists. Canadian medical graduates practic- ing in the United States were not included among FMGs in this AMA tabulation. Of the total 10,860 anesthesiologists, 3,304 or 30.4 percent were FlMGs. The tabulation was broken down to show the percentage of FMGs within the various categories of activity, i.e., office-based practice, hospital-based interns and residents, fulltime hospital staff, and teaching and research. Of the total 7,379 anesthesiologists in office- based practice, 1,697 or 23 percent were FMGs; of the 1,408 hospital- based interns and residents, 744 or .52.8 percent were FMGs ; of the 1,326 serving as full-time hospital staff, 609 or 45.9 percent were FMGs ; of the total 588 in teaching and research, 221 or 37.6 percent were FMGs ; and, finally, of the total 159 cited as being in a category "other" than those specifically designated, 33 or 20.8 percent were FMGs.''^ Illustrative of the type of problems that can arise in anesthesiology were revealed in Ronald Kessler's article on the Washington Hospital Center, A staff writer for The Washington Post^ Mr. Kessler wrote a series of investigative articles on the Center in the fall of 1972, one of which dealt with "Accidents in Anesthesia." Kessler explained the function of the anesthesiologist and proceeded to record problems ^9»The data In this section are drawn from a report in The Wa-thington Post of May 2, 1972, p. Al, by Stuart Auerbach entitled, "Alien Psychiatrists Hit as 'Cheap Labor' in U.S.", and also from a more complete study by Dr. Torrey and Dr. Taylor appearing in the April 1973 issue of the American Journal of Psychiatry under the title, "Cheap Labor from Poor Nations." Sen. Edmund S. IMusliie (D-Me.) inserted this article, along with other material, in the Congressional Record, Feb. 7 1974, pp. S1468-1472, under the title, "Our Dependence on Foreigu Trained Ph.ysicians : Is It Fair?" ^^ Hearings, House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, Overgight of HEW Health Programs, 1973, p. 58. ^8 Stevens and Vermeulen, op. cit., p 153. 1237 arising at the Center rel5nng upon interviews with some of the physi- cians nnd surgeons for his data.'®® Talks with a number of physicians and surgeons, according to Kessler, "reveal a widespread lack of faith in the skill of some — but not all — of the anesthesiologists who work at the center." Some of the doctors said that they would go to other hospitals in such medical Centers as Boston before allowing. themselves to be put to sleep at the Center, and others said they would enter the hospital center for an operation only if a certain anesthesiologist were selected in advance. "I was very scared when my daughter came up for routine surgery (at the Center) last spring," confided Dr. Kicliard C. Reba, chief of the center's nuclear medicine department. Dr. Reba consented to sur- gery for his daughter only when the surgeon assured him he used only a certain two of the hospital's anesthesiologists. "Most of them (the anesthesiologists) don't know what they're doing," he said. Dr. P. J. Lowenthal, chief of the Center's anesthesiology department, dis- counted such criticism. However, Dr. Ernest A. Gould, a trustee of the Center and former chief of the medical staff and chief of surgery until 1970, said he would only allow four of the more than 20 anesthesiologists at the Center to give him anesthesia if he had to undergo an operation. (Apparently, a high percentage if not all of the anesthesiologists are Asian FMGs.) Kessler continued to paraphrase Dr. Gould : "Even if it were an emer- gency, he says, he wouldn't allow two of the anesthesiologists (one of whom has recently left the hospital) to go near him, nor would he allow them in the operating room with him while he is performing surgery." Dr. Gould noted that he was similarly selective in the anesthesiologists he used, but he acknowledged that many surgeons at the Center took those assigned. He explained that breathing or heart beat is stopped by anesthesia in about 1 in every 2,500 operations at the Center and about '30 percent of these arrests result in death. He estimated about five anes- thesia deaths a year at the Center. Dr. Solomon N. Albert, anesthesiolo- gist at the Center, responded when asked about these figures : "Let him document it." When asked about the death rate, Dr. Albert said : "I don't know it offhand. It isn't so much." One problem in anesthesiology, said Samuel Scrivener, Jr., president of the Center, who expressed concern about the. state of the specialty at the Center, was, in Kessler's words, "that many anesthesiologists trained in foreign countries can't speak English well." This is particu- larly true of Koreans, said Dr. Gould, while some anesthesiologists from Japan speak English well. Dr. (jould noted that instant com- munication between anesthesiologist and surgeon are essential throughout an operation. Referring to the language problem. Dr. Gould said, "If the question requires a 'yes' or 'no' answer, they're OK, "»» Mr. Kessler explained the vital function of tiie anesthesiologist : "During an opera- tion, the anesthesiologist generally regulates the flow of anesthetic liquid or gas entering the patient, increasing it when the surgeon wants the muscles relaxed and reducing it when the patient needs time to recover from a critical slirgical maneuver. In addition, the anesthesiologist regulates the supply of oxygen to the patient and watches his bodily signs for any danger signal. A moment's delay in reacting to a problem or a slip of the hand on the valves regulating the chemicals, can cause immediate death, brain damage, or paralysis." 1238 but if it involves an explanation, they need help." Mr. Kessler noted the problem of lawsuits that worry the Center's oJEcials, examined the salary structure and method of payment for services, and concluded with an acknowledgment by Dr. Albert that the problem in anesthesi- ology was not method of payment, but, in Kessler's words, "the lack of good anesthesiologists." ®°° Tangentially related to the matter of competence is the practice of some hospitals in appointing FMGs to hospital positions without ECFMG certification to graduate educational programs. "Repeated episodes" of such improprieties have been reported by the Council on Medical Education, to the extent that it felt compelled to issue warn- ing to hospitals, State medical societies, and State licensure boards.*"* Such action was taken as evidence of "a significant effort" to circum- vent the ECFMG. Presumably situations like this arise from the heavy demands placed upon hospital administrators and the objections of many to restrictions placed on whom they could appoint to "house staff positions. As one New York hospital administrator said of the certi- 600 Ronald Kessler, "The Hospital Business— IV. . . . Accidents In Anesthesia" The \Vashtnffton Post, Nov. 1, 1972, p. Al. Rep. James W. Svmlngton (D-Mo ) raised the tjuestion of linguistic competence of FMGs and their cultural Incompatabllltv with Ameri- cans, in hearings on the oversight of HEW programs. The problem of the FMGs he said, must be considered In the light of the barefoot doctor of China who grows up in his community and knows how to deal with the people and in the light of the complaints of the black American community. I don't know whether you heard these complaints but they are to the effect that so often the poor go -to the hospital where they are treated by men who cannot even understand their language and that they are being treated by people with absolutely no understanding of their cultural background." Mr. Weinberger replied : "... I see nothing inherently wrong with the utUizatlon of foreign trained doctors if they are qualified and if they can fulfill the need In a particular area. While It may be ideal to have someone treating patients with the precise ethnic social and cultural background of all these patients, I don't think we are close to appropchlng that and I am not sure It is all that good an idea anyway." (Hearings, House, Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, Oversight of HEW Health Proprams, 1973 p 56 ) «"i Stevens and Vermeulen. op. clt., p. 34. That the use of unlicensed FMGs is a fairly wide practice was Indicated in a study published on June 20. 1974 in the New England Journal of Medicine. Undertaken at the request of the Educational Council for Foreign Medical Graduates, the study was directed by Dr. Robert J. Weiss of Harvard Univer.sity with the a-ssistanoe of his professional colleaeues. Dr. Joel C. Klelnman, Dr. Ursula C. Brandt, Dr. Jacob J. Feldman. and Dr. Alms C. McGulnnes. The report, which was based on a survey of 4,035 FMGs now working in the United States, stated that a growing "medical underground" of thousands of foreign-trained doctors were practicing medicine without licenses and often without supervision in many American hospitals. These uncertified doctors, most of whom either failed to pass or have not 3et taken the necessary American licensure examinations are, according to the report, making crucial diagnostic ahd therapeutic decisions affecting t 'e outcomes of patients' Illnesses. Though many of the doctors were offlclallv hired as laboratory tech- nicians or assistants in various lower-level Jobs categories, they often assumed responsi- bility, the report s.'ild, for patient care, without consulting licensed phvsicians. The ques- tion of leg.ality of this practice was not examined by the authors of the report, but as the press account said, "the findings are likely to arouse debate on whether the doctors or the hospital oflScials who accede to the practice as a way of coping with a doctor shortage are legally liable." In an interview Dr. Weiss said that the "medical underground" consisted of M.D s lacking American credentials who, though called X-ray technicians, laboratory assistants, or by some other title in their job description, actually act Independentlv as physicians. Some perform surgery in the operating room or In the- emergency ward ; others give anesthesia: many practice psychiatry; some read X rays. "A few look under a micro- scope at biopsy specimens in pathology laboratories to distinguish between cancers and benign tumors, for example," and. as the press report stated, "determine what course the surgeon must take while the patient is anesthetized on the operating table " Dr. Weiss said that he became interested in studying the FMG problem after other 'wealth specialists detected a gap in the AMA's listing of physicians. Doctors with partial licenses, he said, were not recorded in a systematic wav and that the AMA had no way of learning the names of FMGs unless they entered formal training programs. To emphasize his point. Dr. Weiss said that when calling one noncertlfied doctor in North Carolina, the person answering the phone replied that the doctor was busy caring for patients in his oflBce. AMA records cited by the Harvard research team showed at least lO.onn unlicensed physicians working in the health field In 1971. The precise number of FMGs practicing without license or examination certificates Is unknown. (Lawrence K. Altman. "Many Foreign Physicians in U.S. Found Unlicensed," The New York Times, June 20. 1974. p. 1) 1239 fying process of the ECFMG examination: "The ECFMG should simply publish the results and let the hospital decide whether it wants a man who got a score of, say, 50. In my opinion, it's better to have a poorly trained intern than no intern at all." ^"^ A Stimvming Up of Views on FMG CompeteTwe. — In sum, the com- petence of FMGs is questioned by American doctors, some of whom are prominent figures in the medical profession. Concern has been ex- pressed for the development of what Dr. Sprague feared might be a double standard in medicine, a situation that contains at least a poten- tial threat to the heretofore high standards of American medicine. '\\Tiatever the reason, recent evidence shows that the confidence of the American people in the medical profession has declined sharply over the past 6 to 7 years.*"^ On the other hand. Secretary of HEW Weinberger defended the competence of FMGs and favorably assessed their impact on Ameri- can health care. He told the House Subcommittee on Public Health and Environment, "I don't have any feeling that they [FMGs] should take the place of anyone else," i.e. USMGs. He contended that FMGs are not "necessarily . . . any better than anybody else but they are an available source and they are being utilized." Nor did he accept the proposition that utilizing FMGs "necessarily means that we are sub- jecting our people to any less good care or that we are engaged in any practice that is morally reprehensible." *°* TERMIIsrATING CAREER EXPECTATIONS OF AMERICAN PREMEDICAL STUDENTS Except for occasional Congressional comment, much of the litera- ture on medical brain drain views the problem from the perspective of the FMG. Virtually no attention has been given to -its negative effects on the career expectations of qualified American premedical students. Sources generally refer to the doctor shortage and cite vari- • ous problems arising from the inflow of FMGs who are expected to reduce that shortage, but they fail to consider the qualified American premedical students who in effect are denied medical careers by two interacting forces, namely, the short supply in American medical schools and the extensive inflow in FMGs to relieve the doctor shortage. "^ Ibid p. 29. The director of a Paterson, N.J. hospital expressed similar views: "It's easy to sit behind a desk In Chicago and frame ideals about quality of care. But a sup- posedly nonqualified doctor can put on a tourniquet and give the usual drugs and plasma for shock to tide the patient over until an American trained doctor gets there. And thfit's better than having the patient die." (p. 30). •03 On Dec. 9, 1973, Louis Harris published a poll that attempted to ascertain the confidence of Americans "in the people who are running" such major institutions in American life as medicine, higher education, military, media, Congress, etc. Gradations of opinion were classified as "a great deal, only some, or hardly any confidence." In the poll medicine was rated as the highest institution In which there was "a great deal of confidence," 57 percent (In 1972, It was 48 percent) ; the Federal Executive Branch was rated lowest with 19 percent (In 1972, it was 27 percent). But the 57 percent for medicine represents a substantial drop from the 1966 figure of 72 percent (the Federal Executive Branch had a 41 percent rating In 1966). Thus Mr. Harris concludes: "Basically, by any standard there has been a fall in respect and confidence in the people running almost every major U.S. institution compared with 1966, when we first measured it." (The Wash- ington Post, Dec. 9, 1973, p. L8, and Louis Harris, Confidence and Concern : Citizens View American Government, In remarks of Sen, Edmund S. Muskle (D-Me,), Cons;re»sional i^ewr'/. Dec. 3, 1973, pD. S21704-S21706. ) •0* Hearings, House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, Overtight of HBW Health Programs, 1973, pp. 53-54. 1240 Only the study by Dr. Fein on the doctor shortage raises, as he phrased it, "the question of the right of qualified students to pursue studies in the fields that interest them." Medicine, he noted, was one of few fields where supply was restricted at the point of entry into the educational system rather than into the profession. "Even if pro- fessional licensing arrangements are justified in order to assure qual- ity," he observed, "it is quite another matter to prevent students from pursuing medical education if they so desire and are qualified." ^°= Admissions Crisis in American Medical Schools. — In June 1971, Senator Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) spoke on the Senate floor of the "crisis in admissions to American medical schools," observing that it "has reached major proportions." ^^^ Kecent data revealed that the ex- tent of this problem has not been exaggerated. In 1970-71, 24,987 Americans applied to U.S. medical schools ; to total of 148,787 appli- cations were submitted ; of this number, 11,500 were accepted.^^'' In 1971-72, 29,172 Americans filed a total of 210,943 applications for 12,361 places in American medical school freshman classes.®"^ (In the fiscal year 1971, 5,748 foreign-trained physicians and surgeons entered the United States as immigrants, the, overwhelming percentage from the LDCs.) In 1972-73, according to AAMC estimates, there were 37,000 individuals filing 250,000 applications ; 13,570 were enrolled in medical schools.®"^ (In the fiscal year 1972, 7,143 FMGs entered the United States as immigrants, a sharp increase over the fiscal year 1971, again the overwhelming percentage w^as from the LDCs.) AAMC estimates that in 1973-74, 40,000 American aspirants to medi- cal school will be filing some 288,000 applications to fill 13,822 open- ings. AAMC also estimates that in 1974-75, there will be 43,000 indi- viduals filing application ; 322,500 applications will be filed for ac- ceptance to fill some 14,300 openings in freshman classes in American medical schools.^" This anomaly of a growing number of medical school aspirants for a restricted number of openings, in an environment of a prolonged and aggravated doctor shortage, and coincidental with an increased inflow of foreign trained doctors, is becoming increasingly apparent in the medical profession and in the Congress. Dr. Robert A. Chase of Stanford University told the October 1973 meeting of the American College of Surgeons that it was "a national shame" that the United States did not have space for those students who wanted to attend medical school.^" And the American Medical Association itself asked in a recent editorial reviewing American medical education, "Isn't there something awry when the United States must depend on the immigration of graduates of foreign medical schools for its supply of physicians, while at the same time United States schools are forced to turn away qualified applicants?" ^^^ What adds to this anomaly is «f» Fein, op. cit., p. 144. «o« Congressional Record, June 18, 1971. p. S9423. e<" Stpv<>ns and Vermeiilen, op. clt., p. 165. «09 AAMC, Medical School Requirements, 197i-75 (Washington: 1973), p. 16. «» Ibid. oio Ibid. on "Doctor Immigration Is Termed Harmful in U.S. and Abroad," The New York Times, Oct. 17, 1973. p. 25. ei^ Quoted in Lawrence K. Altman, "Doctors Influx Backed by A.M.A.," The New York Times, Oct. 23. 1973. p. ». 1241 the point made by JAMA, namely, that perhaps a great percentage of those turned away from American medical schools are highly quali- fied students from some of the best American colleges and universities. According to Stevens and Vermeulen, "paradoxically, many of these unsuccessful applicants have a much better basic premedical educa- tion than many foreign medical graduates who are imported from ..abroad as interns." ®^^ American Medical Students Study Abroad. — As an alternative, many unsuccessful American pre-med applicants go-abroad to study at an estimated rate of 500 per year, and if they successfully com]:)lete their Avork, return home as FMGs, and thereupon face many of the professional problems attendant with that group. The numbers study- ing abroad vary. In October 1969, an estimated 2,343 Americans at- tended 16 medical schools in Mexico, Spain, Italy, Switzerland, and Belgium; in the same year 162 were graduated from those schools.*'" Apparently, no American students were studying in the United King- dom Avhere a common language would have eased the burden of study. And apparently few Americans are accepted in Canadian medical schools, although the United States imports a substantial number of Canadian M.D.s — some 362 in the fiscal year 1972 alone. Americans seemed to be accepted only in schools on the European continent and in Mexico, some of which fall far short of America's high standards. There, they face many difficulties, not the least of which is the language barrier. The attrition rate is high — only about one-fourth complete the required study.®^* «'•■' Stevens and Vermeulen, op. cit., p. 19. The quality of education In South Asia, a major source of professional emigration to the United States, has been judged harshly by some observers. Joseph Lelyveld wrote of India : "At a generous estimate, perhaps 5 percent of the mass of Indian students in Institutions of higher education are receiving decent training by recognizable world st.inlari:;-. ... In most places acidomic st-mdards l>ive fallen so low that tliev c;in hardly be said to have survived." ("India's Students Demand — A Safe Job In the 'Estab- lishuipnt." The New York Times Magazine, May 12, 1968, p. 53. Quoted In, Brzezinski, op. cit.. p. 44.) This condition is by no means limited to India. Gunnar Myrdal stated in his monumental work on Asian development : "Teaching In South Asian schools at all levels tends to discourage independent thinking and the growth of that inquisitive and experimental bent of mind that is so essential for development." (p. 1645) "The South Asian peoples are not merely being insufficiently educated : they are being mlseducated on & huge scale." (p. 1649) In a "Summary of Policy Conclusions," Myrdal wrote: "It would appear more justifiable to halt the increase in, or even to contract, enrollment in secondary and tertiary schools. The enormous amount of miseducatlon at these levels is caused not •only by the scarcity of properly trained teachers and generally low quality standards, but by the wrong orientation of schooling. More students should choose technical and pro- fessional schools for their advanced education ; all schooling at the secondary and tertiary levels should be modernized to Include more technical nud scientific subiects, with erenter emphasis on manual work experience." (pp. 1816-1817) (Asian Drama: An Inquiry into the Poverty of Nations (New York : Twentieth Century Fund, 1968), v. 3.) Two American college educators who for many years observed the adjustment of Filipino hcp.ll : ppisonnel to tiie Anitri-ican environii'cnt tnid the writer tliat what would (nialify f'^r a dentist in the Philippines would he the eoulvalent to an American dental assi';tant and that college-level science courses in the Philippines corresponded more closely to those given at the secondary level in this country. The problem of stan'iar''s and de- ficiencies in native training became evident when immigrant Filipino nurses found diffi- culty in coping with science courses given at American colleges and in passing the New York State Board examinations. "♦ Ibid., p. 169. But even this alternative of study In Europe is diminishing. Cpen admissions policies that in the past permitted ready access of American medical students to the universities of Western Europe have been sharply restricted. Astonished to find that foreign students, more than half of them American, constituted up to 17 percent of their enrollment, medical faculties in Europe have Imposed a series of quotas on foreign admissions. Beginning in the fall of 1974, for example, medical schools in France will reduce the proportion of foreign enrolled students from 15 to 5 percent. More serious for American aspirants is a new decree that French schools will consider only students who can produce evidence of acceptance in a medical school in their own country. (Newstreek, July 8. 1974. p. 49. The remainder of the article discusses the American role in Mexico's University of Guadalajara.) «» Dublin, op. cit.. p. 871. 1242 "It's a bad price to pay," said John Wilson, one of 1,046 American medical students enrolled in 1971 at the University Autonomous of Guadalajara, Mexico, in acknowledging the difficulties they faced, "but at least it's an opportunity. We were all forced down here. We're the system's rejects, the dedicated fools who want to study medicine regardless." ^^^ Ironically, the largest "American" medical school is not in the United States but at Guadalajara, Mexico, which in 1974 enrolled 1,734 American students in its medical school. These students are potential USFMGs. Professors at some of the leading American medical schools have become concerned about the low quality of instruction that these young Americans receive. At least as a partial remedy they have estab- lished an unofficial program in which they devote part of their time teaching at Guadalajara. The rationale for this new program seems to spring largely from a professional desire to protect American medi- cal standards which are affected upon the return of USFMGs. As one medical professor, a participant, said : "We have to face the reality that these students will come back to the United States to practice." ®^^ Congressional and Administration Views on FMGs Versus USMGs, It is on this question of FMGs versus USMGs that the views of the administration and some Members of Congress conflict sharply. The administration sees the utilization of FMGs as an expedient for cop- ing with the Nation's pressing medical demands. Thus, as Secretary Wemberger told the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Sub- «« John Peterson, "Our Doctors in Mexico." National Observer (June 14, 1971) In Conf/ressional Record, June 18, 1971, p. S9423. For a general discussion of the USFMGs, see the Stevens and Vermeulen study. Lynette Goodstine, of Manchester, Conn., a second-year student at Louvain University in Belgium explained what appears to be the attitude of many young Americans studying abroad : "Anyone who comes here has to be motivated. You have to learn a new language, the school is constant hard work, and it's diflBcult to get back into the States to practice." (Time, Apr. 16, 1973, p. 64.) «i'''In an attempt to Improve the level of training of the growing ranks of American medical students in Mexico, professors from U.S. medical schools are going to Mexico to give lectures and demonstrations for the American students. The professors, representing such specialized fields as cardiology, hematology, orthopedics, dermatology, among others, are collaborating with the Autonomous University of Guadalajara, a private school witli 1,734 American students making it the largest "American" medical school In the world. The first group of professors were seven cardiologists from Boston University. They rpturnerl recently. One of the group. Dr. H. Emerson Thomas Jr., came away with admira-' tion for these potential USFMGs. "They are just eager and hungry for Information," he said. "You walk into a lecture hall and immediately things quiet down — they are ready for business." Dr. Louis W. Sullivan, a hematologist at Boston University is going to Mexico in April. The purpose of this academic medical venture is to improve the level of training of the American students. As Dr. Sullivan said, "We have to face the reality that these students will come back to the United States to practice." More than 50 American doctors are to go to Mexico on an unofficial basis from Boston University, Western Reserve, Harvard, the New Jersey College of Medicine, Baylor, Tufts, and the Universities of Minnesota, Florida, Southern California and Massachusetts. They were invited by Dr. William D'Angels, director of medicine at Queens Medical Center in Xew York, who is on leave to serve as acting director for clinical sciences at Guadalajara. The professors spend their mornings doing bedside clinical instruction and the afternoons lecturing. An assessment of Guadalajara was given by Dr. Robert J. Weiss, an expert on medical manpower at Harvard. He visited the university last summer, but he Is not connected with the new program. According to the press, he "painted a grim picture of well-motivated young Americans struggling against a language barrier and chafing under a faculty that forbids long hair, beards and dissent." Dr. Weiss and others agree that the main problem is that the clinical training at Guadalajara does not meet American standards and that the students often have difRculty passing qualifying examinations in the United States. Dr. Weiss doubted that the new program could make up for these deficiencies. This situation, the press report noted, underscores "one of the biggest problems In American medical care today : Even though there Is an acute shortage of physicians, particularly in small towns, thousands of qualified Americans must go abroad to school while foreign doctors are Imported to relieve the shortage." Of the 42,000 Americans apply- ing to American medical schools last fall, only one-third were accepted. It has been estimated the half of those rejected were qualified. (Robert Reinhold. "Professors Go to Mexico to Train U.S. Students Rejected by Domestic Medical Schools," The New York Times, Mar. 12, 1974, p 15.) 1243 committee on Public Health and Environment in March 1973, "I don't think in and of itself [that] is necessarily a bad thing." However, Rep. William R. Roy (D-Kans.), a physician, faculty member of the Kansas University Medical Center, prominent leader in the Kansas Medical Society, and member of the Institute of Medi- cine of the National Academy of Sciences, disputed this evaluation, saying, "May I suggest to you it is a bad thing," and for these reasons : "No. 1, we have young men and women — probably twice to three times as many — who cannot get in medical schools, who the medical schools admit are qualified; and that No. 2. we are stealing these physicians f rorn other nations around the world who need them desperately." Dr. Roy asked : "Now will you explain to me why it is not a bad thing when we license over 12,000 foreign physicians ? " Mr. Weinberger, who professed not to have "any feeling" that FMGs "should take the place of anyone else," defended the use of FMGs on grounds that they satisfied the Nation's need for medical personnel. He insisted that this practice did not mean that "we are subjecting our people to any less good care or that we are engaged in any practice that is morally reprehensible." ^^® In the course of the hearing Secretary Weinberger revealed that he did not know how many FMGs were in the American medical com- munity, nor was he was aware of the fact that in 1971 the United States licensed more FMGs than domestically trained physicians.^^^ Concern in the House of Representatives for the inadequacies of the Nation's health services, particularly the growing prominence of FMGs, appeared to reach a new level when on April 25, 1974, Repre- sentative Roy introduced H.R. 14357, the National Health Services Manpower Act of 1974. This legislation was designed to rectify man- power shortages in the health professions. It included proposals along the lines of those presented by Senator Kennedy on June 5, 1974 (see below p. 198) that among other things would increase the Nation's manpower resources in health services, reduce the number of post- graduate trainee positions available for FMGs and thus limit their inflow, improve the distribution of health services, and increase Fed- eral Government support for health training programs.^^" *s Hearings, House. Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, Oversight of HEW Health Programs, 1973, pp. 53-54. Rep. Tim Lee Carter (R-Ky.) also took Issue with Mr. Weinberger, noting particikarly the need to train American doctors. He expressed gratitude for the FMGs in his area — "there are many of them— some Chinese and Koreans and a few Cubans." But he added : "At the same time I feel that we owe It to our country to do as much as we can to assure that the students are able to go to medical school or to malvc it possible for them to go to school. We need as many American phy.siclans as possible. We want to reach our quota In them I would suggest, Mr. Secretary." (p. 59.) Representative Symington was also concerned about the future of Americans who were aspiring to be doctors but were being frustrated by the massive inflow of FMGs and by the failure of adequate medical facilities. In an exchange with Mr. Weinberger, Mr. Symington asi^ed if he would deny that FMGs were being taljen Into the U.S. against the wishes of their governments and "certainly against the needs of their people?" Mr. Wein- berger responded with a question : "Well, is the suggestion, Congressman, to say we will turn them back and say, 'We will not permit you to practice in this country despite your own wishes?'" But, the Congressman retorted: "I would like to see the resources of the United States which are being used one way or the other used to bring the most effective medical attention using American citizens to the service of the American people. The dollar amounts that you spend on medical training in this country will stay roughly the same but we encourage the medical schools to enroll more people, and it is more and more difficult for the Americans to compete In their own system to the point where they have lost half of the new market to foreign doctors." (p 57.) «« Ibid., pp. 5.5 and 53. ' <•" Reg. William R. Roy, "Health Services," Remarks in the House, Congressional Record, Apr. 2.0, 1974, pp. H3270-H3284. On May 9, 1974. Rep. Paul Rogers (D-Fla), Chairman of the Public Health and Environment- Subcommittee of the House Interstate and Foreign Commerce Committee, also Introduced a medical manpower bill designed to Increase federal support for the training of doctors and other health professionals (H.R. 14721). (Congressional Record, May 9, 1974, p. H3767.) 1244 The clash of Congressional and Executive Branch views is also evi- dent in the Senate. On June 5, 1974, Senator Jacob Javits (R-N.Y,) sharply criticized the administration's position on the use of FMGs to alleviate the doctor shortage, giving particular emphasis to the insufficient number of medical schools and inadequate Federal government support for "desperately needed medical, dental, nursing, iind other health profession schools." I am convinced, he said, that where there is an actual shortage of, for example, 30,000 physicians, based on the empirical data, exclusive of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare's unconscionable reliance upon noncitizen foreign medical graduates — FMG's — to provide medical manpower, Congress should make every approp.ri- -ate effort to increase our Nation's medical schools capacity to increase enroll- ment and train qualified Americans to become physicians.*-^ Senator Kennedy followed with a comprehensive critique of the administration's health manpower policies by way of explaining, as he said, two "far-reaching health manpower proposals" he was intro- ducing for Senate action in July.®^^ The Senator pointed out the dis- parity in views on the doctor shortage, citing the familiar 50,000 figure, the Hansen study of 6 major projections during the years 1959-67 «2^ Sen. Jacob K. Javits, Remarks in the Senate. Congreseional Record, June 5, 1974, pp. S9670-S9672. Senator Javits inserted in the record an exchange of corre- spondence with Secretary Weinberger. In his letter of Jan. 17, 1974, the Senator asked for statistical data and analyses upon which HEW relied for their published statements to the effect that the physician shortage will soon be eliminated. "I understand," he wrotp, "that this statement is based upon the assumption that our country will continue to rely upon the utilization of FMG's . . . rather than educating and training the requisite . number of qualified Americans to achieve the goal of eliminating the physician shortage without the 'brain drain' on countries which ought not to be submitted to it. I believe it would be contrary to our nation's ethics to follow such a procedure. I can find no reasonable Intellectual or philosophical rationale for this nation to support the 'brain drain' — take desperately needed medical manpower from underdeveloped, impoverished nations less fortunate than ours to meet our own needs for physicians." Not receiving a response, Senator Javits wrote a follow-up letter on Apr. 10, 1974, pointing out the urgency of this request for legislation then under consideration, and re- stating the essence of his inquiry. "As you know," he wrote, "I find it almost degrading for onr nation to take desperately needed medical manpower from developing nations with desperate health and economic problems to meet our nation's physician shortage. More- over, I believe that so long as foreign medical graduates are used to alleviate our medical manpower shortage, our nation will continue to be dependent on this source and that this is improper and deplorable." On Apr. 15, 1974, Secretary Weinberger finally responded after a delay of 2 months. He noted that the current output capacity (enrollment) of health professional schools has increased significantly over the past decade (e.g. first-year places in U.S. medical schools increased by 65 percent). The rate of those entering the field, he said, Is much greater than those leaving and as a result "we can expect by 1985, 50 percent more M.D.s, 40 percent more dentists, and 60 percent more registered nurses than in 1970." He defended the administration's position on the use of FMGs, arguing that it was unrealistic to assume that their influx can be entirely eliminated and indicating that physician supply projec- tions were based on a "rather conservative assumption" regarding their Inflow. "The projections for 1984 indicated that the total supply of physicians will range between 495.000 and 520,000. These estimates "are based on "the assumption that the net annual increase to total supply attributed to FMGs will range between 3,500 and 5.500 per year. This range represents between 50 percent and 80 percent of the number that were probably added during 1972." The Secretary exi)lalned his position on the use of FMGs, already- described above; indicated administration efforts to urge the return of needed FMGs; elab- orated on the "push" factors causing FMG migration ; acknowledged the concern of the medical profession for possible "inferior" services provided by FMGs ; and indicated an awareness of policy implications surrounding the FMG issue notably the matter of qualifying examinations. «22 Edward M. Kennedy, Remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, June 5, 1974, pp. S9677-S9704. Mr. Kennedy introduced the Health Professions Educational Assistanre Act of 1974 and the Nurse Training Act of 1974. He also submitted amendments S. 3.iS5 and S. 3586 to the Public Health Service Act relating to health professions trninir.nr programs. Cosponsors of the leirislation v,-ere Senators Javits, Warren G. Masnuson \D\Vash.), Jennings Randolph (D-W. Va.), Claiborne Pell (D-R.I.), William D. Hathaway ^D-Me.), and Dick Clark (D-Ia.). 1245 showing estimates ranging from a surplus of 21,700 to a deficit of 65,000 by 1975, and the'^HEW estimate that by 1980 physician supply would be adequate perhaps even in surplus. Mr. Kennedy rejected outright the "notion that this Nation magically has enough health professionals, though it may have enough of certain kinds of health professionals.'" Nor would he accept the "notion that the time has come for the Federal Government to phase out its support for these institutions and their students." Such a policy on the eve of enacting national health insurance, he declared, "is irresponsible." A central issue under consideration, Mr. Kennedy continued, was the "Nation's growing reliance" upon FlVlGs "who are too frequently licensed to practice their profession when they are not adequately qualified." The effect of this inflow of foreign medical man-power has been to produce "a dual class system of health care in the Nation" through defective licensing and certification procedures. (The other points discussed were the matter of maldistribution of health man- power, the excess of medical specialists, and the insufficiency of pri- mary care doctors.) Mr. Kennedy presented data, appearing in this study, on such mat- ters as the growing number of FjMGs, questions of their professional (Uialifications, and corrpctive action in the entire health care field through wide-ranging Federal Government support of the Nation's liealth professions. "The numbpr of FMGs entering the United States each year is growing, not leveling or tapering off," the Senator said. Some experts estimate that in the near future FMGs will constitute approximately one-third of all physicians practicing in the United States. "This is an intolerable situation which must be considered carefully," Mr. Kennedy exclaimed. To underscore the anomalj^ of this practice, the Senator stated that "less than half the number of individuals applying to U.S. medical schools are accepted for enroll- ment." In the academic year 1972-73, only 38 percent of those apply- ing were admitted. "Increasing numbers of U.S. citizens rejected by U.S. medical schools," he declared, "are turning to foreign medical schools." An estimated 6,000 Americans were now studying medicine abroad. (Among the corrective measures proposed by Senator Kennedy, in addition to those designed generally to remedy the Nation's health manpower problems, were : (1. to establish national standards for licensure, thus maintaining the traditionally high standards of American medical and dental quali- fications; and (2. to limit the number of postgraduate trainee positions to 110 percent of the number of graduates from U.S. medical and osteopathic schools in any year, insuring a limited and appropriate balance of postgraduate training positions in the various medical specialty and subspecialty areas, nationwide and regionally. The net effect would be to limit to 10 percent the postgraduate positions available for FMGs, who now comprise 30 percent of the M.D.s in postgraduate training, presumably with the expectation of reducing their inflow.) Thus, qualified American premedical students are denied the pursuit of one of the most prestigious careers American society has to offer and,. 1246 ironically, one in which society's needs are the greatest.®^^ Closed out at home, they have the alternatives of moving into other career direc- tions or going abroad to study and obtain, if successful, an inferior medical degree with uncertain prospects as a USFMG. In this environ- ment of declining expectation for young Americans aspiring to be physicians, some Members of Congress are beginning to question pub- licly the premise of the administration's policy on the utilization of FMGs. Interconnection of Science^ Technology^ Brain Drain^ and National Policy However difficult it may be to measure the effects of this admittedly "unmeasurable problem" of brain drain, still there are certain inescap- able realities suggesting that the problem does exist and that it is large. The "internationalist" and "nationalist" models are convenient analyti- cal devices; they provide insights that permit some grasp on these realities, but they yield no absolute answers. Nor does evaluation of demands and needs give grounds for a conclusive, incontestable judg- ment— what is one man's demand is another man's need. Still, they, too, can provide insights and some understanding. That brain drain has positive and negative effects for both the LDCs and the United States there would seem to be little doubt. Certain facts are self-evident. The LDCs benefit from a returning educated elite; they share in the advancement of world knowledge in which their gifted nationals working in advanced countries can participate in creating; economic development may not necessarily be deterred, according to some observers; emigration can produce economic and political side-effects favorable to the problem-laden, pressure-filled LDCs; and as a result of a combination of all these factors, possibil- ities for social change and progress can be improved. Yet these gains appear to be more than counterbalanced by serious losses in the professional manpower that could provide the nation with human resources necessary for present and future development but are now denied. Through the loss of these natural resources a nation's intellectual infrastructure can be eroded and weakened; social costs of medical brain drain can be very high, perhaps too high for the general welfare of the medically underprivileged LDC ; nonreturning students can reduce the professional reserves necessary for the future ; donor nations can sacrifice certain elements of national prestige, per- haps not vital but still important to the upward-striving LDC ; costs to the donor LDCs from the loss of professional manpower invest- ments can be exceedingly high, however imprecise the method for measuring them and whatever compensating effects various offsetting factors may have ; loss through mismatched training, possible genetic oi^ The continuing high prestige of the medical profession Is Illustrated by a Gallup Poll published In December 1973. The poll confirmed a finding of surveys taken over a period of more than two decades that "medicine Is the top choice among all adults as the best profession for a young man." Three persons In 10 surveyed, I.e., 28 percent, cited medicine as the most preferable career — hence the most prestigious. In 1950. medicine was first choice with 29 percent. Variations during the intervening 23 yeara were minor. (The Washington Post, Dec. 2, 1973, p. A17.) 1247 degeneration, and the widening gap between the LDCs and advanced countries through brain drain complete the catalog of possible nega- tive effects of brain drain on the LDCs. The United States and other Western advanced countries gain enormously because of the inflow of professional manpower from the LDCs. The inflow of scienrtists and engineers, first from the advanced countries of the West and later proportionately greater from the LDCs, has contributed to enhancing American possibilities of main- taining world economic and political primacy in the last quarter of a century. The inflow of FMGrs, mainly from the LDCs in recent years, enable the LTnited States to reduce the gap in the doctor shortage and to pursue the Nation's goals of expanding health care, apparently with some success. But this success seems to have been achieved at the price of exposing the American people to what some brain draih specialists and physicians perceive to be a threat of lowering the high standards of medical care by filling the ranks of the American medical profes- sion with FMGs of seemingly doubtful competence, and of terminat- ing career expectations of qualified American premedical students by failing to provide sufficient medical schools to meet both the growing health demands and needs of the American people. Thus, the effects of brain drain seem to fall into a range of possi- bilities that may vary by degree of relevancy and intensity, but they are nevertheless realities. Created by multiple, interacting forces within the area of science and technology, these effects intrude upon the Nation's domestic policy and make their presence known in many ways. But it is likely that their greatest impact may be in the realm of American foreign policy, for it is in this realm that science, tech- nology, brain drain, and national policy interconnect in a way that can produce serious implications for the foreign policy goals of this Nation. VI. Brain Drain: Present and FuTuiiE Trends; Remedies Brain drain, a lively foreign policy issue nearly a decade ago, re- mains today a persistent, though less visible, problem for the present and the future. Present and Future Trends in Brain Drain to the United States Three major trends are perceptible in brain drain : ( 1) The inflow of immigrant scientists and engineers declined in the fiscal year 1972; but (2) that of physicians and surgeons has increased; while (3) there is scattered, but inconclusive, evidence suggesting that there may be the beginning of a trend towards outflow of scientists and engi- neers from the United States. The first two trends intersect. According to recent National Science Foundation data on professional immigration, 11,300 immigrant sci- entists and engineers were admitted to the United States in the fiscal year 1972, a number 14 percent below the 13,100 in the fiscal year 1971. The 7,100 immigrant physicians and surgeons admitted in the fiscal year 1972 were not only the largest influx of M.D.s over the past two decades but confirmed a steep upward trend evident in physician-sur- geon inflows since 1970. 624 BEGINNING TREND OF OUTFLOW OF SCIENTISTS AND ENGINEERS FROM UNITED STATES Changing market conditions in manpower supply, among other fac- tors, have arrested the heretofore unimpeded inflow of scientists and engineers of recent years into the United States and has actually cre- ated a reversal of brain drain. Professionals have been leaving this country and going to other lands. "Pull" factors have become trans- formed into "push" factors. Indicators of the changing trend in brain drain became visible in the late 1960's. An appraisal in Bvshess V/eek of October 10, 1970, began : "Suddenly, the United States is no longer a mecca for world scientists. Immigration of technically trained people has dropped sharply .... and many foreign nationals living here are hankering to leave. Moreover, increasing numbers of American scientists and engineers would like to live abroad." '^^^ Traditionally, thousands of young Canadians came every year to the United States for graduate study; they would stay on to work; but now, the report said, "com- paratively few remain." In 1969, fewer than 500 Canadian scientists and engineers immigrated to the United States, about half the 1968 figure, A survey of 1,200 scientists from West Germany now in the r.r>4 xsp Highliphts, August 1973, p. 1. «=s i?j,.sj,ie.ss Week (Oct. 10, 1970). Reproduced In, Intercidtural Education 2 (Decem- ber 1970), pp. 11-12. (1248) 1249 XTnited States revealed that one-third wanted to return home. Many British scientists and engineers were also anxious to return. Accord- ing to J. Michael Lock, scientific counselor at the British Embassy, -about 300 to 400 were seeking jobs in Britain each year. Both England and West Germany instituted programs to retrieve their lost pro- fessionals.*'^^ West Germany's Der Spiegel reported in 1970 that the brain drain process ". . . was not an irreversbile one. The scientists are returning home." Triumphant tones have been heard in a number of West German institutes : "They are all coming back now." "By no means all of them," reported Der Spiegel. "But hundreds are." And it con- cluded : "The great exodus is now moving from West to East." ^-^ Unique in this exodus eastward are the many thousands of highly -skilled American technicians and scientists who immigrated to Israel after the Six Day War of 1967. The figure 3,000 is given. Little noticed, this pool of technological talent, according to Peter Grose of The Neio York Times ^ "is quietly emerging as one of Israel's most important national assets for developing the country's long-range potential." ^^^ A 1973 study by the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education •confirmed earlier evidence of brain drain reversal. The inflow has been arrested, the study reported, and a reversal appeared to be underway. A recent survey found, for example, that 5 to 10 percent of the new doctors of science and engineering, most of whom were foreign stu- dents, planned to work in a foreign country." A great number of Ph. D.s have emigrated from the United States to Canada. Teachers have also been emigrating to West Germany and Australia.*'-^ How the downturn and reversal of brain drain affects scientists and engineers of the LDCs cannot be determined and thus can only be a matter of conjecture. Existing "push" factors at home would con- tinue to discourage returnees from the United States. There may be ■exceptions, as in the case of Argentina where improved working con- ditions have attracted some returnees. According to physicist Carlos Mailman, President of the Bariloche Foundation, a state-supported research center in Argentina, "We have more applications from Ar- gentines working abroad than we can fill.^^° Changing market conditions in U.S. manpower supply may now ■deter initial immigration of scientists and engineers from the LDCs. Restrictions on immigrating scientists and engineers have been tight- ened. They are now required to get Department of Labor certification before immigrant status is granted. Under recent revisions of regula- «-' "Bringing Back the Brains to Britain," Anglo Americnn Trade News (January 1970), «!" "Why the U.S. is Losing Its Brains : Close-Up of a New Phenomenon, the Reverse Braln-Drain." Der Spiegel, translated and reproduced in, Atlas, Jan. 20, 1971, pp. 34-36. For a discussion of the flow of brains back to Europe and the European job market, see, Clyde H. Farnsworth, "Europe's Technicians in a Job Scramble," The New York Times, Mar. 13. 1973, p. 1 „ „ ,_ „o «2« Peter Grose, "Israel Attracting U.S. Scientific Talent," The New York Times, Feb. 28, 1972, p. 2. «» "Carnegie Studv Sees Brain Drain Shift Away from U.S.," Science &. Government i?epor« (Apr. 15, 1973). "30 Dr. ]Mallmann continued : "Those who come here are attracted by working conditions. The income maximizers still go abroad, but it is .iust as well that they do." See. Lewis H. Diuffuid, "Research Foundation Reverses Brain-Drain," The Washington Post, Apr. 12, 1973, p. K2. 1250 tions this is not easy.®" Accordingly, this requirement, which is re- lated to the declining job market, would affect inflows from the LDCs. These factors, along with the existing ceiling placed on immigration from the Western Hemisphere, have no doubt affected the recent slow- down in the exodus of scientists and engineers from Latin America. (The Western Hemisi)here has an annual ceiling of 120,000 immi- grants; the current waiting list is about 200,000.) Similar effects can be expected in other parts of the developing world.®^^ REASON FOR BRAIN DRAIN DOWNTURN AND OUTFLOW FROM UNITED STATES The reason for the domestic downturn and reversal in the brain drain of scientists and engineers is the changing market conditions in manpower supply. In the last few years the supply has exceeded the demand. Thus in the early 1970s the "pull" factor of an available manpower market with an abundance of professional opportunity has been transformed into a "push" factor of underemployment and unemployment. This reversal is generally attributed to, (1) the cutback of Federal Government spending in defense and the aerospace fields; and (2) the growing surplus of an American educated elite. Termination of the war in Vietnam and conclusion of the Apollo program, both of which required vast outlays in expenditures, combined with a national mood of withdrawal from global involvement, the decompression of the Cold War, an apparently rising spirit of detente with the Soviet "iThe Interaction between the job market and Immigration regulations was revealed by a new directive announced by Immigration Commissioner Leonard F. Chapman, Jr., on Apr. 19, 1974, relating to foreign student summer employment. The Commissioner directed that henceforth foreign students seeking summer employment will have to obtain permission from the Immigration and Naturalization Service rather than from school officials. According to Chapman, the decision was intended to protect summer job oppor- tunities for American youth, including Vietnam veterans and members of minority groups. "For several years." Chapman declared, "the Manpower Administration has advised us that unemployment among American youth is of such magnitude that summer employment of aliens Is depriving young Americans of needed employment opportunities." The un- employment rate among youth exceeded the national average. Mr. Chapman emphasized, however, that foreign students. In needing employment for economic reasons due to unfore- seen circumstances arising after their entry Into the United States, may continue to apply to the Service for work permission at any time. Such students were not limited to summer wofk. Upon graduation they may also apply to the Service for approval to engage in practical training related to their course of study, Mr. Chapman said. The State Department had been consulted on this matter and expressed the view that Important foreign policy benefits were to be gained by the United States from the presence of foreign students In this country. But, Chapman said, "In balancing the labor market impact against the foreign relations aspects. I have concluded that protection of job opportunities for young Americans, Including minority youth and Vietnam veterans. Is the paramount consideration at this time." CDepartment of Justice, Press Release, Apr 19, 1974. 2 p.) ■ For the purposes of this study It Is important to note that concern for brain drain through international student programs was not the declared purpose of this new restric- tion but rather the tightening job market for summer employment. Yet, the effect of the new regulation could reduce the inflow of foreign students. Arthur Rodbell, executive director of the National Student Lobby, protested the INS action, disputed the assertion that foreign students were taking jobs from Americana, and claimed that there was "overwhelming evidence" that many foreign students will not be able to return to their campuses next fall if they cannot get summer jobs. Their failure to continue, he said, would co<:t American colleges $1.5 million In tuition. (Donald P. Baker, "U.S. Gets Tough on .Tobe for Aliens," The Washinffton Post. May 19. 1974, p. B3.) "* Dr. Amador Muriel suggests that Filipino scientists and engineers may have to return home whatever their personal preferences : "Considering the trend in the United States and Europe today — the decrease In science expenditures and the emphasis on other aspects of life such as the environment and social nroblems — the reasons for leaving may no longer be sufficient to encourage emigration. Filipino physicists in training may be forced to go back to their country as jobs become harder to find In the United States." (Muriel, op. cit., p. 39.) 1251 Union, and a shifting national emphasis on domestic economic and social concerns, to bring about an overall retrenchment in the Nation's defense, aerospace, and foreign policy commitments. As a result, funds for R. & D. were drastically reduced. Depression in the defense-aero- space professional job market, economic inflation, and sharp econo- mies in universities with the loss of Government-sponsored programs resulted. As a consequence aerospace scientists and engineers became underemployed or unemployed, and researchers in defense- aerospace related fields at the universities found themselves to be marginal men without a program or a job. Thousands of researchers, professors, sci- entists, and engineers flooded a manpower market that was quickly transformed from a seller's to a buyer's market. The second cause of the arrest. and reversal of brain drain among scientists and engineers is the growing surplus of newly produced American talent. In the past 25 years, the number of institutions granting Ph.D.s, has doubled, enrollment quadrupled to more than 900,000, and the annual number of doctorates grown sevenfold to more than 30,000.®^^ In the 11-year post-Sputnik period between 1959 and 1970 alone the annual growth of advanced degrees increased from 9,000 to 29,300.^2* This enormous growth of educated manpower coin- cided with the Nation's enlarged commitment in defense, aerospace and foreign policy. Now that retrenchment has set in, the Nation is left with a sizeable surplus of trained manpower. Cutbacks in R. & D. and defense have reduced both academic and nonacademic job opportunities. In the words of The Economist^ "The possession of a Ph. D. is no longer a sure passport to a good job." ®'^ What makes the job market particularly "bleak" for the professional (to quote a term frequently used to describe conditions in the 1970's) is the conviction that the oversupply of Ph. D.s, visible to some ob- servers in the early 1970's, will become particularly marked late in the decade. As Chancellor Allan M. Cartter of New York University wrote : We have created a graduate education and research establishment in American universities that is about 30 to 50 percent larger than we shall effectively use in the 1970's and early 1980's and the growth process continues in many sectors. The readjustment to the real demands of the next 15 years is boimd to be painful.*" • •••••• In the coming decade, it seems likely that only about one doctorate in four will find suitable academic employment, and in the 1980s it could be less than one in ten.**' Thus, the United States has an overabundance of home-grown talent that, according to projections, will persist through the next decade. The effects of this development, intensified by some Federal retrench- ment in defense, aerospace, and foreign policy, have produced funda- "s^ Fred M. Hechinger "Graduate Schools : Power of Choice to Students," The New York Times, Mar. 18, 1973, p: E7. «3* "Pity the Ph. Ds," The Economist (Jan. 20, 1973), p. 25. "^ Ibid. «» Allan M. Cartter, "Scientific Manpower for 1970-85," Science 172 (Apr. 9, 1971), p. 132. *^ Ibid., p. 136. 1252 mental changes in the professional manpower market, braking the in-bound brain drain and in some instances even reversing it.*^^^ Social, political, and cultural factors have also entered into the de- cision of some scientists and engineers to return home from the United States. Sources revealed that returnees were going only to Europe and not to the LDCs. These motivating perceptions can be summed up briefly : dissatisfaction with American culture and the European's sense of cultural isolatipn in what they perceive to be a highly ma- terialistic country; social upheaval in the Nation and unsettled con- ditions in the universities; what some describe as the "brutalizing" aspects of American urban life; threat of the draft when conscription was possible ; improved conditions in Europe, particularly in some of the West German universities; disenchantment with the American political environment ; and for American Jews, a deep sense of ideal- ism attracting them to Israel.*^^^ fmg's, an exception to the general trend Although reduction and reversal of brain drain in the last 2 fiscal 3'ears occurred among scientists and engineers, no such reverse occurred among physicians and surgeons. Their numbers increased, and the future inflow seems assured for some time to come. The ''push/pull" factors operate at maximum efficiency in the case of medical brain drain. This is the reason why FMGs flow into the United States in ever-increasing numbers. In the LDCs, the prime source of medical emigrants, the "push" of oversupply and underde- mand (as distinct from need), along with the other causal factors de- scribed above, provides continuing momentum for medical migration to the United States. In the United States as the prime goal of medical inmiigrants, 1 he "pull" of the asserted doctor shortage is attributed to failure to build sufficient American medical schools to meet the growing demand for doctors in the Nation's expanding health services and to *^ In an essay on American education. Time made the" following observations on future problems of underenij)lo.vment : "The shape of the economy today argues in less theoretical terms for an open-minded attitude toward learning such skills as welding and carpentry instead of, or along with, philosophy and history. The Bureau of Labor Statistics i:as fwtiniated that only 20% of the jobs in t'le 1970s will require education beyond high sclio'il. Yet the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education forecast last week that two- thirds of America's high school graduates will be continuing their schooling. Already, according to the commission, nearly 30 9c of male graduates of 4-year colleges are in bliip-collar, sales and clerical jobs. There seems likely to be even more serious under- employment of talent in tlie future. In fact, the U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare projects that over the next decade an average of 2^i people will be com- peting for everv job that actuailv requires a college education." f'Second Thoughts About V.nn — III: What the Schools Cannot Do," Time (Apr. 16. 1973). p. 80.) *-^ A British scientist gave as a renson : "We didn't want our children to grow up in the violent American atmosphere"; (Business Week, Oct. 10, 1970). A West German pro- fessor was returning because he now believed reform was possible ; a zoologist returned after 7 years residence in the TJnited States because "the working conditions are better here" ; a tenured professor was going to the University of Munich because "my offer . . . was excellent in all respects including salary" ; a professor of medicine returned because, "Life in America is hard" ; returnees do not want "to expose their children to the brutaliz- ing conditions of life in large American cities, and they are tired of hearing their wives complain about being isolated. in the culturally destitute small towns and suburbs"; the "big complaint . . . was the growing paucity of research. funds" ; Der Spiegel concludes: 'jThis bleak picture of the Americrm situation is no exaggeratioj. J^he Cooperative College '^ ■ ' " ... - - ^^^ sor ibt _ _ that -draws people here." (The New York Times, Feb. 28, 1972, p. 2.) 1253 the inefficient use of health manpower already available. 'WTiatever the causes, the quick absorption of FMGs provides.the sustained magnetic force attracting medical manpower readily available in the markets of theLDCs. . . ^ Until something is done to alter this "push/pull" relationship be- tween the sending LDCs and the receiving United States, little change can be expected in this medical inflow. As long ago as 1966, Dr. G. Halsoy Hunt informed the Federation of State Medical Boards of the United States that "barring world catastrophe the foreign medical graduate will be a major fact of American hospital and medical life for many years to come." ^*° And as recently as June 1972, Stevens and Vermeulcn wi ote : The influx of foreign trained physicians is primarily a market response to a shortage of physicians in the United States. While there is a continuing demand for additional "physicians, most notably for hospital house staffs, economics alone would suggest a continuing flow of doctors, particularly from countries with rela- tively low income levels for professionals and limited openings for medical practice."^ "Wliat virtually assures continuous medical inflow is not just the favorable balance of "push/pull" factors but U.S. practice in encourag- ing— indeed facilitating — medical immigration. Stevens and Vermeu- len made this point when they observed: "At present, vrith the new immigration laws and current Congressional attitudes both encoura^^- ing an influx of foreign trained physicians, one can expect more physi- cians to come intending to practice." For those continuing to come as interns and residents, they said, the new laws "facilitate their remain- ing here after training." ^*^ CONTINUIXG BRAIN DRAIN FROM LDC's Historically, brain drain has demonstrated its durability as a natural, human phenomenon : It has been a fact of man's life, at least since the beginning of recorded history, and it is more likely to evolve into a higher form through the impact of forces released in the indus- trial age than to dissolve. The essential cause of brain drain is dis- parity in development among nations. In the present era this means disparity in economic development. It is axiomatic that investment in human resources is necessary, indeed vital, for economic develop- ment. Yet in the absence of world economic homogeneity, the move- ment of people between the "have-not" and "have" nations is inevita- ble, and it is necessary.^*^ Highly skilled people naturally seek higher rewards and greater opportunities for their talents and labor. In the present era, the growing gap in development between rich and poor stimulates this flow of talent and provides the essential life-sustaining element to brain drain that makes it a continuing international prob- lem. The conclusions reached by Gregory Henderson in his UNITAR study on brain drain from the LDCs elucidate this relationship be- ^^ Quoted In, Nader and Zahlan, Science and Technology in Developing Countries, 1969, p. 45.S. «" Stevens and Vermeulen, op. clt., p. xll. «2 Ibid., pp. xvl-xvl. «*3 Deutsch, op, cit. p. 42. 1254 tween the pace of economic development and the durability of brain drain as a phenomenon and an issue : . . . there seems every likeliljood that, in the long run, at least, the migration of professionals out of developing countries will grow. In the short run, reduc- tions in American support for research and other economic adversities may reduce the movement temporarily, as it has, overall, for the United States and Canada in 1969. But experience has shown that smaller developed nations often export more of their professionals than developing nations do. As more people in developing nations are trained to have more qualifications, more will wish to and be able to migrate. Such migration will co-exist with considerable economic development. It may also co-exist with lengthening gaps between developed and developing nations. Brain drain from developing to developed nations is likely to continue its present trend of replacing gradually the older brain drain from smaller to larger developed countries."* These conclusions are consistent with those of other students of brain drain. Dr. Luis Giorgi believed it "most likely" that brain drain "will continue indefinitely." Writing nearly a decade ago, he pre- dicted that this "migratory phenomenon . . . will get worse" if means are not taken to induce professionals to remain home. Thus he reached the conclusion on prospects for brain drain that the experience of the last decade has proved to be true, namely, (1) "the migration of sci- entists and engineers from developing to more advanced countries will probably continue indefinitely"; and (2) "this migration will probably increase unless effective steps are taken to control and reduce it."«« Remedies for Brain Drain "Effective steps" to moderate brain drain (short of total arrestment) fall naturally within the relationship between the causal "push/pull" factors. If the disharmonies creating the "push" from the sending LDCs and the "pull" from the advanced receiving nations are cor- rected, then the contending forces are neutralized and brain drain can no longer be a viable problem. Eliminate the causes and the effects dissolve. Virtually every commentary and analysis on brain drain presents a set of remedies, some exceedingly detailed arid programmatic, as in the works by UNITAR, Gregory Henderson, Dr. Adams, Dr. Niland, the authors of the CIMT study, the various official materials published by the State Department and the Congress ; and others generalized and suggestive. There is an understandable sameness about the remedies. The problem is universal; the ingredients are fairly uniform; and while remedies may vary from case-to-case, certain principles apply generally. DIMINISHING "push" FACTORS : CLOSING DEVELOPMENT GAP Students of brain drain tend to attribute brain drain to deficiencies within the LDCs. They concur also in the belief that the first priority for remedy is economic development. Brain drain is a symptom of un- "< Henderson, op. clt., p. 149. MS UNESCO, Final Report of the Conference on the Application o/ Science and Tech- nology to th^. Development of Latin America, 1965, pp. 181-182. A report on brain drain from Latin America in April 1973 said, "Despite a recent slow-down In the exodus be- cause openlncs in the United States were scarcer, Latin experts foresee no general solution in the coming years." (The Washington Post, Apr, 12, 1973, p, K2,) 1255 derdevelopment : it is not a cause but a component of the deeper dis- equalizing process that broadens and perpetuates the development gap between rich and poor. Dr. Hornig's analysis in 1968, still valid, ad- vances the essential truth that the remedy lies in development. "The problem of migration," he told the Senate Judiciary' Committee in 1968, "should be viewed not in isolation, nor as a primary problem. It should be viewed as a symptom of the basic problems of national de- velopment, and as a guide to problems that should be attacked at the source." 6*6 Economic development is the principal instrumentality for modern- ization : * — It has the basic components that insure material success and progress in a scientific-technological age ; — It creates the means for satisfjdng manpower demands and needs for society ; — It enhances a developing nation's capacity to absorb surplus professional manpower, and thus break the "vicious circle" in the disequalizing process that is responsible for generating, aggra- vating and perpetuating the development gap between rich and poor; — It stimulates the rational use of resources, human and ma- terial, and by necessity allows their allocation for building a scientific-technological infrastructure for improving the work- ing environment of the scientists, technologists, and other pro- fessionals who contribute concretely to nation-building; — It encourages the development of a national science policy that combines the community of scientists and technologists with that of the political and economic leaders and integrates tlieir purposes into a single overall planning goal, namely, develop- ment of the nation ; — It can contribute to altering national values and traditions so that science and technology can be respected and appreciated for their real worth and accordingly assigned the prestige they deserve as vital elements in nation-building; — It stimulates the spirit of science so necessary in this modern age; — It can correlate the educational needs of the nation with the principles of nation-building and thus induce rationality in the development of trained human resources so that the balanced needs of a developing industrial and agricultural economy can be achieved ; and — It can create the rewards and incentives that are so necessary in attracting and retaining professional manpower. CHEATING SCIENTIFIC-TECHNOLOGICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: RELATIONSHIP TO DEVELOPMENT Essential to the task of development, and thus of remedying brain drain from the LDCs, is building a scientific-technological infra- structure within the developing nations. Science and technology are vital instruments for development in the modern age. They generate the scientific spirit so important in transforming national habits, atti- **<= Hearings, Senate, Judiciary Committee, Intematio-nal Migration of Talent and Sliills, 1968. p. 105. 1256 tudes, and traditions and in developing a national commitment to sci- ence and technology. Through scientific and technological institutions,, the needed manpower is trained for running the machinery and orga- nizing the productive resources of a modern industrial society. Science and technology enable a nation to utilize its material resources in cre- ating the goods and services to meet the demands of a new era. Finally, the application of human intelligence to material resources through which economic and social progress can be achieved is made possible by science and technology. Homi Bhabha, director of Bombay's Tata Institute and the -'most dynamic figure" in Indian science, stressed, perhaps overstressed the relationship between science and technology and development as seen from the LDC's perspective when he said : What the developed countries have and the underdeveloped lack is modern science and an economy based on modern technology. The problem of developing the underdeveloi>ed countries is therefore the problem of establishing modern science in them and transforming their economy to one based on modern science and technology.*"' The task of creating a scientific-technological infrastructure in the LDCs is difficult. Yet it is one in which the (American) National Acad- emy of Sciences, in cooperation with the U.S. Agency for Interna- tional Development and indigenous scientific communities, has taken an active and vigorous interest since the late 1950's. Kequirements vaiy among the LDCs which have emerged at differing stages of national development and have moved at an uneven pace towards modernity. 8 " E R Piore "Science In the Post-Industrial Era," Science in Human Affairs, Pro ceedings of the Academy of Political Science, Columbia University. New York 38 (April ^^Sources tii brain drain abound In statements of this nature. One that is rarticularly comprehensive was made by Ward Morehouse, Director of the Center for Ipternational Pro-ra^s and Comnarative Studies of the State Education Department, University of t!ie State of New York. Professor Morehouse began an article on the role of science ana technoloKV in development with the«e comments : "VVe cannot avoid t^e realization," C. P. Snow once observed "thrit applied science has made it possible to remove unnecessary suffering from a billion individual lives— to "remove suffering of a kind, which In our own privileged society, we have largely forgotten . . It does not require one additional scientific discovery, though new scientific discoveries must help us. It depends on the spread of the scienttjic revolution all over the toorld. There is no other way." ' , ^ . ^ . .,„„i„„„ If C P Snow is right, the potential importance of modern science and technology in t'^e develonmcnt process can hardlv he overstated. No less a commanding figure In modern history than the late Jawaharlal Nehru of India, concerned as he was with guiding the destinier, of one of the major less developed socleiies in the contemporary world once observed about India : "I do not see any way out of our vicious circle of poverty except by utilizing the new sources of power science has placed at our ^ M^'^'^Nehru was not alone among political leaders of the less developed countries of "the world in recoL'nizing t'-:e enormous potentia' of modern science and technology in achievement of their economic and social goals. Virtually every political leader of a developing countrv at one time or another has made similar pronouncements. The propo-itlon thn niodern science and technology constitute a potential salvntion for less developed societies is reflected in the allocation of resources for development throughout .A.'^ia Africa and Latin America where national develo-Mnent plans Include the promotion of science and technology in a variety of forms. While t ere may be ';ome who will argue that the resources allocated for this area of activity of such high potential are too limited, the fact remains that science .and technology are f-on-^ide-ed to be Integral pirts of almost all national development programs. (Ward Morehouse, "The Role of Science and Technology In Development : A Terra Incoenita of Public Policy," Infcrnational Development Rciieio 1 (19/0), p. 1!).) ^''''^^^lll^^W^^.X or 'ncrer^sed nwarere., ar^on-r LnCs of the need for mo.iernlzin'T through technology is that of Saudi Arabia. Sheikh Ahmed Yamani, Saudi Arabia s oil Minister and chief" negotiator for fie Arabs in the 1973-74 oil crisis, has profosseri goals of modernizing his country through industrialization. In its drive for modernization. 'I'l'idl Arabia has engnced manv American scientists and engineers to help inilld nie infrastructure of technology. For decades Saudi Arabian technological students, Including Yamani were trained in American universities. Saudi Arabia's long-ranse goals were made ve'^v clea" br Yamani when he was recentlv asked how the West, politics aside, could get Sa"'/'M Arabia to snnplv world oil demand. Yam.ani answered : "That is very slmnle. Tn-lus- tvializp Saudi Arabia. 'Then we will give you as much oil as you need." ( '.\rabs Outline Several Methods How West Can Resupply Oil," The Christian Sctence Momtor, Dec. 11, 1 0T "^ — O ^ " On b'aTance it ought to be pointed out that science and technology are critical elements in development but not necessarily the only ones. Development Is considerably more com- plex than these statements would imply. 1257 For example, the problems facing the poorest African LDC emerging from colonialism without benefit of having available the most rudi^ mentary forms of scientific and technical training are far different from those of some Latin American country, like Mexico which may be regarded as a developing nation but which has made great material progress and, moreover, has one of the finest and oldest universities in the Western Hemisphere, the University of Mexico. However variable conditions in the LDCs may be, to build a scien- tific-technological infrastructure requires : — Material resources and proper funding support for carrying on research ; — An educational system, soundly rooted in the sciences, that can produce trained professional manpower and provide the necessary "critical mass'' for progress in science research ; — A commitment by the government and people to science and technology' as a problem-solving and creative element in society ; — A network of internal and external communications within the community of world science to insure currency in scientific developments and permit indigenous science to flourish ; and — A close working interrelationship within the triad that can insure national development, namely, the scientific and techno- logical community, the government, and the main sectors of the national economy. Dr. Michael J. Moravcsik, Director of the Institute of Theoretical Pliysics at the University of Oregon, and a long-time student of scien- tific brain drain from the LDCs, has concentrated on this corrective aspect of brain drain, that is, the building of a scientific-technological infrastructure. Some of the salient points on this complex subject, stressed in both his published and unpublished studies, are cited here, along with commentaries from other sources.^*^ <"* Both the published and unpublished works are cited here for the convenience of the reader. Dr. Moravcsik made his unpublished studies available to Mr. Warren R. Johnston, A.ssoclate Director of this series on "Science, Teclinology, and American Diplomacy." "Technical Assistance and Fundamental Research In Underdeveloped Countries," Minerva 2 f Winter, 1964), pp. 198-209. "Some Practical SuRCOstions for the Improvement of Science In Developing Countries," Mineri^a 4 (1966), pp. 382-390. "The Physicist Interviewing Project," with Francis E. Dart, Department of Physics, University of Oregon, undated. 5 pp. (unpublished). "The Physics Graduate Student in the United States : A Guide for Prospective Foreign Students," with Francis E. Dart, Department of Physics, University of Oregon, December 1969,10pp. (unpublished). "Reflections on National Laboratories, BMHetw of the Atomic Scientists, (February 1970), pp. 11-].'). "Communication Among Scientists and Its Implications to Developing Countries." Lecture delivered at the Research and Development Management Seminar, Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey, in cooperation with the Technical Assistance Proerramme, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Istanbul, May 1970, 21 pp. (unpublished). "Basic Scientific Research In Developing Nations," based on lecture given at the Seminar on Research and Development Management. Scientific and Technical Research Council of Turkey, in cooperation with the Technical Assistance Programme of the Organi- zation of Economic Cooperation and Development, Istanbul, May 1970, 22 pp. (unpub- lished). "Education and Research in Scientifically Developing Countries," based on a lecture delivered at the Research and Development Management Seminar. Scientific and Technical Researc'i Council of Turkey, Technical Assistance Program of the Organization for Eco- nomic Cooperation and Development, Istanbul, May 1970, 26 pp. (unpublished). "How to Help with Modest Resouri^es?" Lecture delivered at the meeting of the British Association, Durham, England, Sept. 7, 1970, 19 pp. (unpublished) "A Chance to Close the Gap?" Feb. .5, 1971. 7 pp. (unpublished). "CoVimunication in the Worldwide Scientific Community." based on lectnrp given at the All-Pakistan Science Conference, University of Islamabad, Pakistan, 1973, 12 pp. (unnubllshed). The reader's attention Is also called to the work edited by Nader and Zahlan entitled, ffrienee and Technolopy in Developinp Covntries, and referred to elsewhere in this study. While the book focuses mainly on the Middle East, much of the subject matter does have '■"^evance to LDCs In general. 97-400 O - 77 - 42 1258 Building Trained Professional Manpower Eesources.— -Above all else, a sound scientific-technical infrastructure requires trained profes- sional manpower. Professor Moravcsik cited this requirement as "one of the most important elements" in building a scientific environment : In science and much of technology, productivity per capita is the dominant factor in success, and to increase that, one needs highly trained, competent re- searchers, teachers, and technicians. Furthermore, since science and technology often progress through "breakthroughs", and these breakthroughs are due to ' the efforts of a very few people at the apex of scientific or technological creativ- ity, there must be great emphasis on the quality of manpovi^er as well as on the quantity. Second best in science and technology is often only tenth best when it is converted into its effect on the economic development of a country.**" Lacking an adequate supply of trained professional manpower, an infrastructure cannot take form, and development cannot be advanced. But the lack of trained scientific manpower is one of the most serious deficiencies in the LDCs. According to Professors Moravcsik and Dart, the "shortage of adequately trained manpower is one of the most im- portant obstacles in the development of the emerging countries. In fact, many believe that as far as the development of science is con- cerned, it is the most important obstacle." ^^° In most LDCs scientific manpower is "minuscule, fragmented, not always well trained, and lacks the critical mass and coherence to be effective." ^^^ These authors suggest that "one of the most valuable forms of help . . . that the more developed countries can offer, is assistance in training personnel." ^^^ Establishing Educational Base in Science and Technology. — To es- tablish a solid educational base is another requirement in building the infrastructure of science and technology in the LDCs. Professor Moravcsik believes that in principle indigenous scientific education at all levels is "absolutely essential in every country that contemplates any kind of scientific or technological activity." The alternative would be reliance on training abroad of all or most scientific and technical personnel. In the long run, this would be "impossible, and hence a development of indigenous education is a necessity." ^^^ Indigenous education has the potential value of designing training programs that are geared to the practical needs of the LDCs and cor- related with their research and development requirements. Though often flawed by an excess of educational formalism in methods of teaching to the neglect of problem-solving, indigenous education can develop "schools" of research and establish a larger scientific and tech- nological tradition.^^* However, until the LDCs succeed in establishing a self-contained educational system through graduate school, they are obliged to rely on the advanced countries to train their professionals. There are in- herent risks in such foreign study : it is necessary to match training abroad with development needs, select students carefully to insure re- turn, maintain contacts with them while abroad, and facilitate their employment on returning home.^^^ 8'» Moravcsik. "A Chance to Close the Gap?" p. 2. <^ Dart and Moravcsik, "Physics Interviewing Project," p. 1. 051 Moravcsik, "A Chance to Close the Gap ?" p. 3. 962 Dart and Moravcsik. "Physics Interviewing Project," p. 1. «53 Moravcsik, "Education and Kesearch in Scientifically Developing Countries," p. 1. <^ Ibid., pp. 3-5. «=* Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCs, Nov. 5, 1968, p. 56.121. 1259 Role of Basic Research. — Another contributing element in building a scientific infrastructure in the LDCs is emphasis on basic research, an essential basis of technological development. The LDCs are de- ficient in this area of scientific activity. Professor Moravcsik disagrees with those who assume that basic research is an ''unjustifiable luxury" for the LDCs. "A somewhat more searching investigation," he w rites, '"will . . . support the contention that the underdeveloped countries must begin without delay to develop their scientific resources in the direction of fundamental research." ^^° The reason for this conclusion lies in Moravcsik's belief that '*the fundamental science of today is the applied science of tomorrow and because the educational process in science is a long process." °^" Assignment of importance to indigenous basic research in the LDCs rests on the conviction that it : — Establishes the essential base upon vrhich is built the applied science and practical technology ; — Contributes to strengthening the scientific tradition and. fur- thering the appreciation of science in national development; — Provides the training ground for science administrators, those with the competence to be the decisionmakers for national science and development policy ; — Trains young professionals in the skills necessary for applied science and technological imiovation ; - — Increases the motivation of the country toward acceptance of technological innovation (which traditional cultures tend to resist) ; and — Builds a network of communication for the diffusion of new scientific ideas ; and as "one of the most sublime proving grounds for the human mind", success in basic research serves as a "source of great encouragement and high morale in the newly developing countries." ^^® Of course, as with most hypotheses concerning the development process, the value of a basic research program can be overstressed. The precise point in the development cycle at which the social yield of basic research activity is maximum would be difficult to determine. Also difficult is the determination of how much of an LDCs meagre re- sources to allocate to basic research. Clearly, the activity, carefully se- lected and stably supported, yields many values. And fortunate for this role of basic research in the infrastructure of the developing coun- tries is that the costs, per researcher, of such research tends to be quite modest in most branches of science, as compared with costs of applied research and development. «« Moravcsik, "Technical Assistance and Fundamental Research In Underdeveloped Coun- tries," p. 198. itists and Engineers in the U.S., 1973, p. vii.) 1266 1. Realization by the African governments of the need to establish short- and long-term economic development programmes. 2. Recognition by those governments of the need to establish scientific research and industrial research programmes, both short term and long term. 3. Recognition by the governments of their responsibility for the organization of scientific research and for the encouragement of research by creating an atmosphere favourable to it. 4. Recognition by scientists of their responsibilities towards their own coun- tries. Respect for academic freedom and the right to a free choice of methods and techniques are vitally important to the activities of research workers who, however, in choosing their subject of research, must keep in mind the needs of their respective countries. 5. Recognition of the need to establish a proper balance between fundamental and applied research. The African countries are aware of the importance of fundamental research and oriented research, knowing that their development is indispensable to progress in applied research and that they constitute the base of the pyramid of research activities. 6. Recognition of the need for scientific collaboration, at both the regional and the continental levels, in order to solve common problems. 7. Recognition of the need to establish at the highest level a body that will be responsbile for the elaboration of the national scientific policy and the coordi- nation of research activities. The structure of such bodies will vary from country to country according to the prevailing structures and conditions in each. 8. Recognition of the need for studies and research on natural resources and the co-ordination of the activities of the bodies responsible for them. 9. Recognition of the need to train a suflScient number of research personnel as rapidly as possible, and recognition of the essential role of the universities in this regard. 10. Recognition of the need to include in all national budgets a special chapter for scientific and technical research.**^ PERSISTING DIFFICULTIES AND DILEMMAS Reducing the development gap by creating a scientific-technological infrastructure would appreciably diminish the "push" factors in brain drain from the LDCs. Economic development, rationally planned, en- ergetically carried out, and successful in its designs and purposes, could create market conditions for engaging the services of any sur- plus professional manpower. A developing science and technology, flourishing in this environment, could also provide the instrumental- ities for accelerating the pace of development and transforming tra- ditional, static societies into dynamic modern states. But there are persisting difficulties that reduce the scale of probable success; they derive from three sources: economic deficiencies, prob- lems in institution-building, and inherent difficulties in the changing of attitudes of traditional societies. Economic Deficiencies. — As shown in the next chapter on the for- eign policy implications of brain drain, the developm.ent gap between the LDCs and advanced countries is widening, not diminishing. Yet success in reducing brain drain depends upon quickening the pace of economic development and reducing this gap. Ironically, the acute energy crisis in early 1974, generated by the Arab countries of the Middle East, themselves LDCs, aggravated the chronic economic situa- tion in the LDCs throughout the world — particularly in the case of ««i United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Outline of a Plan for Scientific Research and Training in Africa, International Conference on the Organiza- tion of Research and Training in Africa in Relation to the Study. Conservation and Utiliza- tion of Natural Resources, Lagos, Nigeria, July 28 t(» Aug. 6, 1964, pp. 10-11. 1267 India; — and dimmed still further tlieir prospects for economic progress.*^*^ Problems in Institution- Building. — Furthermore, the long-term solution to brain drain, as Dr. Frankel, Prof. William C. Theisenhusen of the University of Wisconsin's Land Tenure Center, and other development specialists have concluded, must lie in institution-build- ing in the LDCs.*^^^ Yet, this is a long, arduous process. Success can come only with patience, energy, and determination from both the LDCs and the assisting advanced countries, and within a continuing relationship of cooperation and interdependence. For success requires, in effect, compressing centuries of Western development into a short time-span to alter alien cultures rigid with traditionalism and the values of an earlier and unsympathetic age.*^^* And as Caryl P. Has- kins, educator, research scientist, and President of the Carnegie Insti- tution, wrote : "For the developing countries, the time dimension in an already scientifically sophisticated outer world is precariously narrow, and the challenge even more formidable." ^^'^ Dl-fjiculty in Trouris forming TraditionM Societies. — Added to the problem of institution-building is the far more profound problem of transforming man himself, that is, trying to induce traditional, static societies, some quite primitive, to accept societal change as a fact of life, to believe in man's power to institute change, to accept man's instrumentalities for bringing about change, and to v/ant to partici- pate in seeking the goals and achieving the aspirations of modern man. In brief, the problem is that of uprooting one set of traditional cultural values and replacing them with another. This is a difficult assignment. As anthropologist B. Malinowski wrote a quarter of a century ago in a paper on native education in Africa : "To educate a primitive community out of its culture and to make it adopt integrally that of a much more highly differentiated society is a gigantic task." '^^^ Yet, this is what modernization means : "S3 Indian dependency on oil and the shortfalls brought on by the Arab oil embargo affects seriously the production of fertilizer which is badly needed in agriculture. Observers now use such terms as "disaster" in discussing the turn of events In India. United States Ambassador to India Daniel P. Moynihan told the House Foreign Affairs Committee : "We expect a 25 percent shortfall In fertilizer, and that means famine." (See Lewis M. Simons, "India Staggers as Oil Scarcity Saps Economy," The Washington Post, Jan. 30, 1974, p. A6 and p. A8. ) Similar comments have been made about the impact on the African States of the sharp increases In petroleum prices. 833 yqt Thelsenhusen's discussion of this problem, see, Hearings, House Government Opera- tions Committee, Brain Drain, 1968, pp. 25-26. 8s* In one paragraph Jacques Barzun, philosopher and historian at Columbia University, summed up those forces that contributed to the development of science in the Western world : "The rapid conquest of the Western mind by science after the mid-nineteenth century — I mean science as the exclusive form of truth — was aided by a number of other great changes going on at the same time : the secularization of life, which had begun with the Reformation ; the urbanization and mobilization of men since the industrial revolution, which was technological and not scientific ; and, finally, the rise of the individual and the mass against authority — an impulse we find variously expressed In such movements as democracy, utilitarianism, positivism, statistics, and (to use a single general term) the sociological outlook. "Science as an institution is therefore a new structure supported by several older and very solid buttresses . . ." (Jacques Barzun, "Science as a Social Institution," Proceed- ings of the Academy of Political Science, Columbia University, 28 (April 1966), pp. 123- 124). Agenda for Some Thinking," Selected Readings on International Education, House Com- mittee on Education and Labor, li966, p. 418. «« Quoted In. Sir Eric Ashby, "What Role for the University? Universities for Export: 885 Haskins, op. cit., p. 239. 1268 it means a radical transformation of society and man's outlook towards society: it means virtually a reconstitution of his whole being — cultural, psychological, social, and even religious.''^^ To quote further from Caryl Haskins : "Only in a cultural climate where the fundamental drives of curiosity and of the love of discov- ery for its own sake are understood and cultivated can a true science flourish." ^^^ Such a climate must be created in the LDCs if science and technology are to take root and flourish and development is to occur. For it is not just a matter of asking, "How can the people of techni- cally less advanced countries learn the modern techniques?" Rather it is to ask, "Will they learn them, and how can they be induced to want to learn them ? " ^^^ Dilemma of Human Rights and Inequality. — These difficulties are compounded by dilemmas that seem to defy resolution. One dilemma centers on human rights; the other on inequality in human existence. The first concerns rights of the individual as opposed to rights of the state, obligations of the individual to himself as a free human being as opposed to obligations assumed as a member of a community and state. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in article 13, para- graph 2 proclaims the principle of freedom of emigration ; ^^° article 23 paragraph 1 reinforces this principle by proclaiming the right to work, to "free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against unemployment." Yet article 29 lays down the principle of obligations to the community and state and recognition of certain limitations on the exercise of individual rights and freedoms, including those related to the general w^elf are in a demo- "**" Claire Nader observed that, "the education of the general population whose support, in the end, will be needed in order for modern science and Its applications to root in a society Is all important." After elaborating on the importance of educating the public in the value of science and technology. Professor Nader quotes an African zoologist who be- lieved that this did not go far enough. What is instructive in his comments is the depth of the cultural changes that are needed In LDCs In order for science to flourish. He wrote : ... if we wish the African to embrace more science than merely technology then we must reach the basic root of the problem, his monistic world-view, and modify it In a manner In which he can begin to regard Nature apart from himself or other beings. The rewriting and remodelling of teaching materials which have been success- ful in the West or in the East is not enough. We will have to begin from the beginning, with the help of African social scientists and philosophers. This should be the founda- tion of any new science policy for Africa. (Nader, "Technical Experts In Developing Countries," Science and Technology in Develop- ing Countries, pp. 467-4<)8.) For other aspects of the problem of transforming man's outlook on society, particularly In the context of building an environment of science and technology, see Gerald Sykes, "The Mental Renulrements for Modern Power." Science and Technology in Developing Countries, pp. 5.53-5.59. In one Instance he speaks of "desacrallzation". that is, "a removal of the sacred as an unconscious factor in one's mental processes." "New habits of desacrallzation," he writes, "made science possih'e." *'' Haskins, op. cit.. p. 244. Dr. Haskins continues : "Paradoxically, it Is only when such a science becomes deeply rooted as an element of high culture that a progressively innova- tive technology can be maintained over long periods, fusing eventually into the close part- nership with which we are familiar today. And even when attained, that partnership can never be taken for granted. The maintenance of Its health and vigor requires constant attention." "■"^Ward Hunt Goodenoutrh, Cooperation in Change: An Anthropological Approach to Communitt/ Development (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1963), pp. 36-37. ero "Everyone has the right to leave any country. Including his own, and to return to his country." This right Is an extension of the right in paragraph 1 of the same article which states: "Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residencp within the borders of each State." The Secretary General's report, explains : "The first may very well be regarded as the right of personal self-determination and would involve consideration of a number of related rights of the individual, such as the right to liberty (article 3). Freedom of movement or locomotion Is a constitutional element of personal liberty." 1269 cratic society.^^^ Reconciliation of the two principles creates a grave dilemma for both the individual and for the state. At the heart of the dilemma is the fundamental question of principle : whether the state exists for the individual or the individual for the state. It is thus a question of primacy of the individual or the state. The CIMT study group supports the validity of the democratic princi- ple asserting primacy of individual rights over those of the state.^^^ The Soviet Union, at another point in the political spectrum, reverses priorities of principles: the state is the first principle of existence; thus emigration is not a right of the individual but a privilege granted by the state. (A person cannot emigrate from the Soviet Union without approval of the central government, as is currently being demonstrated in the case of Soviet Jews wishing to emigrate. The same requirement existed during Czarist times. Even within the Soviet Union move- ment of persons is controlled by a strictly enforced internal passport sj^stem.) The People's Republic of China, like the Soviet Union, has no brain drain problem. Guided by similarly restrictive political prin- ciples, it, too, rigidly controls the outward movement of its peoples.®^^ Yet democratically inclined states are often faced with the dilemma of enforcing their rights over those of the individual. Both India and Ceylon, for example, have taken steps to restrict emigration, appar- ently with mixed results.*^^* The fact of the matter is that the practice of genuine democracy and the coercive act of denying the right of emigration are principles in contradiction. For this reason the LDCs «wi Article 29 reads : "(1) Everyone has duties to the community In which alone the free and full develop- ment of his personality is possible. "(2) In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society." (United Nations Yearbook, 19J,8-19J,.9. United Nations Publication. Sales no.: 50.1.11, p. 537.) (Cited in. Report of U.N. Secretary General, Outflow of Trained Personnel from LDCa, Nov. 5, 1968, pp. 11-13.) «™ The study states : "So far as control is concerned, any less developed country has the legal power to forbid Its citizens to migrate if it believes that such a measure will be to the benefit of the state. This Is one way to cope with whatever problems migration may generate. However, our view is that the state exists to help the individual, rather than the reverse." (The CIMT study, p. 701.) •93 The Soviet attitude toward brain drain Is evident in their refusal to permit the unrestricted emigration of Soviet Jews, many of whom are scientists and reside in Moscow, Leningrad, and other important scientific centers in the RSFSR. The following is an analysis of recent Soviet statistics on scientific manpower and the possible Impact of the emigration of Soviet Jewish scientists on the Soviet economy. The Soviet attitude toward brain drain from the U.S.S.R. can be inferred by the small number of Soviet Jewish sci- entists who have been permitted to emigrate : "It is not only Important to look at the declining share of scientists (nnuchnype rabotniki) enumerated as Jews according to official Soviet statistics, but also their geographic dis- tribution as particularly related to the alleged brain drain of the Soviet Jewish emigra- tion. According to Statlsticheskoye upravleniya goroda Moskvy, Moskva v tsifrakh (1966— ifnoga.). Kratkiy gtatisticheskiu sbomik (Moscow in Figures, 1966-1970. A Short Statis- tical Collection), Moscow: Statistika, 1972, p. 140, the number of Jewish scientists in Moscow city on January 1. 1971 amounted to 25,023. Dividing this number (25,023) by the total number of scientific personnel at the end of 1970 (64,392), It becomes evident that almost 40 percent (or 38.9 percent, to be more precise) resided In Moscow. If one assumes that there are perhaps another 10.000 Jewish scientists in Leningrad and another 5.000 in Novosibirsk and all other locations In the R.S.F.S.R., then in 1970 this republic would account for some 40,000 Jewish scientists, or almost two-thirds of the 64,392 enumerated. Also, according to various sources, only 1,000 persons (men. women, and children) out of the 61,000 who were allowed to emigrate from the Soviet Union through the end of 1972 previously resided in the R.S.F.S.R. Thus, very, very few of the Jewish scientists were permitted to emigrate and the impact of the emigration. I.e.. the brain drain, on the Soviet economy remains minimal." (A "note" to be published In a forthcoming Issue of, Bulletin of The Association for Comparative Economic Studies, Bloomlngton, Ind., 1974.) 8f^ The Indian Government attempted to stop the outflow of phvsiclans, apparently un- successfully, by prohibiting the further administration of the ECFMG examination on its territory in 1967. Ceylon, faced with the threat of a major outbreak of polio In 1971, was forced to take emergency measures to stop the emigration of M.D.s, Including the denial of exit permits for those leaving for employment abroad. (Stevens and Vermeulen, op. cit., p. 70.) 1270 that profess to be democracies, like India, are placed in the *jravest dilemma, in attempting to prevent brain drain by coercive adminis- trative actions. To worsen their dilemma, the enforcing of restraints on individual movement, especially of professionals, tends to reduce the produc- tivity of those who are compelled by choice to stay at home. As Dr. Giorgi said : ". . . coercive measures a government may adopt will be useless if the scientist and engineer is discontented at home ; his useful- ness will undoubtedly diminish, or disappear altogether." "Intelli- gence, imagination, and insight," he continued, "flourish only when the intelligence can devote himself in peace and quiet to his scientific or technological research, never when he is forced to work against his Avill." C95 For this pragmatic reason, the CIMT study concludes, "re- strictive measures are of dubious value." *'"« Still, the dilemma persists as a basic consideration for those attempting to remedy the "push" of emigrating professionals from the LDCs. Much the same can be said for the dilemma of inequality that is inherent in human existence. What makes the solution of brain drain so extraordinarily difficult is that the essence of brain drain is inequal- ity, especially economic inequality : it is a problem that arises out of the poverty of the poor and the dispossessed of the world; it is rooted in the lack, or uneven pace, of development of nations ; and so long as inequality exists (and history is on the side of the pessimists) the emi- gration of talent will always take place. That is why brain drain is more an historical process than an historical event* The ideal cor- rective would appear to lie in raising the level of development of all nations to one of common acceptance and general satisfaction, and thus to encourage talented people to be satisfied with their lot and stay home or equalize exchange. But this is Utopian; it is not possible. Nor is it possible uo transform societies so radically that they can correct all the internal causes of brain drain. The division between rich and poor IS expanding, not contracting, not only globally but as Robert S. McKamara, President of the World Bank pointed out, even within the LDCs themselves.^^^ Thus, the dilemma of inequality in human existence persists. Yet Dr. Kidd, drawing a parallel between the life of nations and the life of individuals, offers what seems to be at least the beginning of a resolution of this dilemma. Solutions of brain drain are not to be found in expecting to create an ideal state of affairs where all parties, that is, the countries and the individuals, will be "relaxed and happy." It is, he implies, rather to accept the inequality of nations, their lack of or unequal pace of development, and the problems issuing there- from, as a fact of life, and to consider brain drain as a "chronic dis- 803 T,i commenting on the prevention of emifrration. Dr. Giorrt observed : "The problem IS not easy. States must reckon with individual freedom which, in free countries sooner ??TvT^ln<^^*^S™^^, l^^ deciding factor in determining where a man may travel and live." ;« *ir V. • ^*""' Report of the Conference on the Application of Science and Technology to the Development of Latin America, 1965, p 182 ) ^^^l1?>'^PnHL°*^?^V™^^°^..^T <=oercion. Dr. Giorgi quoted approvingly from an article by a o-^ln^V^i "^^'^^ ^l'''*'^ '1°^ ^°'^^'^ Riquelme Perez : ". . . we are against negative measures, to"««%n^.ii ?^"^*^^ ^.^ emigrate or reducing the number of years for certain courses the L^^r.^rnhiit, «^^ attractive to do the same courses abroad. These are no solution for tion." (p ^85) ^^° °°^ frustration and. very probably, increased emigra- e»«The"ciMT study, p. 702 Gr:up,'^N?aiSUentaS"pr24; mtii I>P^ ^"''' '' '''''''''''' "' *^^ ^''''^ ^"^"^ 1271 order for which no cure exists and not as an acute disorder for which a specific remedy exists." And he offers this encouragement : As with many chronic disorders, "it is possible to take measures which permit normal development and normal life." ^^^ The dilemma of inequality may, therefore, persist in the natural order of life, but mediating certain "ciironic disorders," such as brain drain, may not be entirely beyond the rational management of man. Remedies hy Diminishing the '"'"PulV Factors in Brain Drain Remedies for brain drain do not rest entirely upon the LDCs ; the advanced countries, particularly the United States, can take some measures to diminish the "pull" factors in .brain drain and lessen the burden thrust upon the LDCs. EXPANSION OF AMERICAN MEDICAL SCHOOLS Medical brain drain offers a promising potential area for remedial action. A decade ago when the problem was far less acute than it is today, American students of brain drain and development specialists strongly urged the United States to expand its medical school facili- ties, and to train a sufficient number of doctors to meet present and fu- ture manpower demands (the shortage is generally placed at about 50,000 doctors) . These two actions could go far toward ending Ameri- can dependency on FMGs from the LDCs. 699 sss Hearings, Senate Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1968, p. 80. B* Dr. G. Halsey Hunt testified before the House Government Operations Committee : "The long-range solution of the brain drain problem In medicine will require the develop- ment of new medical schools In the United States, and the enlarging of some of the present schools, to provide a much greater output of U.S. physicians than we now have." (Hearings, House, Government Operations Committee, Brain Drain, 1968, p. 68.) Dr. Charles C. Sprague told the same commJttee : "I do feel . . . that It should be our national purpose to ultimately meet our own needs In terms of educating an adequate number of physicians. Now, obviously, there is a transition period, but I do not feel that we should look forever to the developing countries for a continuing source of manpower in the physician field." (p. 63) In a list of recommendations for the Committee, Dr. Sprague cited the following : "7. We must assume the responsibility for training sufficient kinds and numbers of health personnel to answer the needs of our people and not rely on other nations as we are presently doing." (p. 67.) Dr. Adams told the Committee: "... I think this Immigration of medical doctors from abroad is a reflection of the fact that as a nation we have not produced enough medical talent. The specific policy conclusions to be drawn from that is to increase the number of American medical graduates. And that will automatically reduce the number of people 'imported' from abroad." (p. 88.) Dr. Frankel told the Senate Judiciary Committee : "On our side, at home, we can take action to train more Americans to fill the positions now filled by foreigners. An effort to increase the number of United States medical schools, for example, would be the best long- range approach to helping other countries retain the services of their own native physi- cians." (Hearings, Senate, Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 19QS. r>. 21.) . ^ .^ ^ ^ , .^ no ^ Finally, the House Government Operations Committee recommended In Its 23rd report on "Scientific brain drain from the developing countries" : "To reduce with greater speed the present growing dependence of the United States on foreign medical manpovjer — l)oth practitioners and trainees — the committee urgently recommends further Federal and private efforts to increase the output and efficient utilisation of U.S. physicians." (Report, House, Government Operations Committee, Scientific Brain Drain from the LDCs, 1968, Prof Herbert Grubel made the following observation in the State Department workshop on international migration : "I would like to make a suggestion on how to solve the problem of foreign medical personnel coming to the United States, and that is that the American Medical Association release some of the grip that it has on the quantity of students who are being trained to enter the medical profession. I think that the Influence that the AMA has had in this has been recognized widely." (Department of State, Proceedings of Work- shop on the International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1968. p. 143.) _ The Hon. Paul H. Douglas, former U.S. Senator from Illinois, made a similar comment in the Preface of the book "Brain drain" on the need to expand medical training facilities as a remedy for medical brain drain : "The American Medical Association should cease Its advocacv of excessively restrictive practices as regards entrance to the profession tnus diminishing the numbers of doctors to be imported from abroad.' (Adams, Brain Drain, p. xiii.) 1272 EFFICIENCY IN MEDICAL MANPOWER MANAGEMENT Another kind of reform urjj;ed by students of U.S. medical care delivery systems is the heightened rationalization in medical man- power planning, particularly the more efficient use of paramedical personnel to relieve doctors of routine tasks that could be done by semiprofessionals specifically trained for that purpose. (An example is the training of peacetime prototypes of the medical corpsmen used so successfully in the military service during World War II, the Korean War and the Vietnam War. Apparently the doctor's assistant programs, operating in many medical facilities in the country, is structured along these lines. )^'^° With a satisfied American medical manpower market, it is rea- soned, the "pull" force attracting FMGs to the United States will diminish. FMGs will then be constrained to work in their own coun- tries and meet its needs, which are by all accounts overwhelming. Given a freely operating manpower market, surplus professionals and professional trainees will be impelled to restiiicture their career plans, rethink their career expectations, and accordingly move into areas where the demands and needs of their countries are the greatest and for them the most professionally satisfying and profitable. Other remedies for medical brain drain have been suggested by various sources including the Panel on FMGs of the National Ad- visory Commission on Health Manpower. But these remedies appear to overlook the more fundamental supply-demand problem that gov- erns the American marketplace for medical manpower, the main source generating the flow of immigrant FMGs; they focus rather on the more superficial, administrative features of the problem, such as, FMG qualifications and changes in visa policies requiring return on completion of training.""^ Professor Deutsch put this problem of remedies in proper balance when he wrote of the essential importance of diminishing the "pull" factors of brain drain : The problem ... is not only one of preventing the "brain drain" by providing incentives for foreign students and experts to return to their home countries, but also of increasing human-resource development in the United States so as to reduce this country's need to attract talent and skills from the other nations of the world.'"^ In brief, the remedy for medical brain drain lies in human-resource development in the United States. In the case of the inflow of scientists ^^ Dr. Hunt observed In his testimony to the House Government Operations Committee: "The long-range solution of the brain drain problem in medicine . . . will also require the development, as Dr. Sprague suggested, of methods of greater utilization of paramedical personnel to relieve the doctors of some of the things that they are now doing." (Hearings, House, Government Operations Committee, Brain Drain, 1968. p. 68.) Dr. Hunt referrernprl to Assist Devolnpinp: CoiintriP'. Relntins: to Profposionnl Pprsons and Skilled Specialists," Remarks In the Senate, Congressional Record, Oct. 13, 1966, pp. E26196-E26499. 1281 study. '^^ Apparently, this study was never undertaken.'^^^ (The Ste- vens and Vermeulen study on FAIGs, sponsored by HEW, seemed more concerned about accommodathi<2: F^lGs in this country than with encouraging their return home.) '-'^ In 1967, the Senate Subcommittee on Immigration and Naturaliza- tion of the Committee on the Judiciary held extensive hearings on the ''International Migration of Talent and Skills." Concurrently, the Subcommittee on Research and Technical Programs of the House Committee on Government Operations undertook an intensive study, highly commended by brain drain specialists, entitled, "The Brain I')rain into the United States of Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians." In 1968. the subcommittee held extensive hearings on "The Brain Drain of Scientists, Engineers, and Physicians from the Developing Countries to the United States." "° Congressional Inaction on Brain Drain. — Nothing came of these congressional efforts. Concern for the issue subsequently subsided. In the summer of 1968, Professor Grubel, speaking of official Govern- ment response to what was being widely characterized as the alarm- ing brain drain problem, expressed astonishment that "so few govern- ment policies to stop this drain have been promulgated in the less developed countries and practically none has reached the legislative stage in the developed countries." "^ In 1970, ^Mr. Baldwin observed, "Neither the executive nor the legislative branch of the U.S. Govern- ment has felt it necessarv to do anvthing to reduce immicration by tightening direct controls." He added in passing that, "The one con- gressional subcommittee that conducted staff' studies of the problem in recent years made several recommendations, not one of which aroused any interest in Congress." ^^- Today, as stated above, there seems to be little or no publicly expressed congressional interest in brain drain beyond isolated references to the internal implications of the FMG inflow."^ Reason for Inaction : Contradiction in National Purposes. — Con- gressional interest in brain drain has thus been slight. Brain drain ■•• Ibiii.. p. 2655S. Also Public Law 89-69S— Oct. 29. 196(1, p. 1072 (SO Stat.) Titlp III. '=^U.S. Conpress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Legislation on Foreign Rela- tions, 93d Cong. 1st sess.. 1973, pp. 570-571. '2* Stevens and Vermeulen, op. clt.. Chapter 4. 130 Professor Adams said of the Subcommittee study : "I think I can speak for all the panelists in stating this consensus, whatever their views of the executive branch or the State Department : I think all of them would applaud heartily the fine staff report that this committee put out on the brain drain in the first session of this Congress which to my knowledge is the greatest contribution made to an understanding of the problem to d-itp." (Hearings, House Government (~)peratlons Committee, Brain Drain, 190,8, p. SI.) Both the Senate and House publications on brain drain have been frequently cited In brain drain literature. '31 Griihel. Reduction of the Brain Drain : Problems and Policies." p. 541. '^ Baldwin, op. cit.. pp. 369-370. • '^ In an address given before the American Immigration and Citizenship Conference on N'ov. 2, 1973 entitled, "New Goals of U.S. Immigration Policy," Rep. Joshua Eilberg (D-Pa.)^ Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, discussed current concerns of Congress. Brain drain was not mentioned. Indeed, Interest in Congress and in the Administration on the entire matter of immigration seems at a low ebb. In referring to needed revisions In Titles II and III of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Mr. Eilberg observed : "The most serious obstacle facing us in this task is no loneer the prejudice responsible for the perpetua- tion of the national origins quota system for four decades, but apathy. The present Admin- istration has shown very little interest in the sub.iect of immigration, and the Senate appears virtually unaware of its existence. House-passed Immigration legislation died at the end of the 92nd Congress, and no Senate action has been taken to date during this Congress on any immigration leirlslation passed by the House, with the exception of private bills." (.toshua Elilberg. "New Goals of T^S. Immigration PoUev." In ETten^^lon of Remarks of Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Congressional Record, Nov. 27. 1973, pp. E7522-E7523.) 1282 had never been a great national issue— not- even a national issue- perhaps because the United States gained and other countries suffered the losses. But a more decisive reason is that the issue itself is set in the context of a paradox : the Nation is committed to the principle of liberalized immigration policies and to the principle of international education exchange; both would conflict with any administrative policies that could be designed to reverse the flow of emigrating pro-, fessionals. . ,-, t i j -4. ' The Nation maintains a commitment to liberalized and more equita- ble immigration laws. This commitment was spelled out in the revised immigration law of 1965 which eliminated the discriminatory national origins quota system and which has since been refined through lib- eralizing immigration regulations. However, the United States does exercise its right to establish priorities for admission, for example, of scarce professionals, and to limit immigration, but without resort- ing to discriminatorv devices based on nationality. For example, ian annual ceiling of 120^000 was placed on immigration from the Western Hemisphere with no preference system or previous- country limit. The Nation also maintains a com.mitment to the principle of inter- national educational exchange."* This commitment, which is rooted in the Nation's history, was given new life in the Fulbright Amend- ments to the Surplus 'Property Act of 1944; it was expanded in the U.S. Information and Education Exchange Act of 1948 ; and it was subsequently refined by administrative regulations and such laws_ as the Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 1961, which were intended to accommodate the exchange and inflow of students and visiting scholars. With the adverse effects of brain drain in mind, amendments were made to legislation on educational exchange pro- grams to encourage the return of students and scholars. National commitments in immigration and education exchange and the laws and regulations they generated work at cross-purposes with efforts to correct, much less reverse, brain drain, for they stimulate the inflow of professionals by providing convenient legal and administra- tive mechanisms that encourage exchange and accommodate profes- sionals seeking entry. Gregory Henderson summed up the para- dox in these words : This change [revising the immigration quota system] sounds most reasonable. Yet it will greatly increase the already painful draining away to ourselves of the very skills needed by the emerging nations in order to better themselves. For prominent among the nations whose quotas have until now been insufficient are those very lesser developed nations we have sought to aid. Addedly painful has been the fact that this drainage has, up to the present, been serious but has been effected under the . . . [beneficent] name of "international exchange." "° •734 por a study of the overseas activities of nongovernmental American scientists and technical porsorinal In majf)r programs of the Federal Government, see U.S. Concress, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. f^cientista Abroad; An Examination of Major Programs for Nongovernmental Scientific Exchange. Prepared for the Subcommittee on National Securltv Policy and Scientific Developments by Genevieve J. Knezo, Analyst in Science and Teehnolocy, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Serv- ice, lyihrary of Cnnsress. (As part of an extended study of the Interactions of science and technology' with United States foreign policy), 1974, 163 pp. (Committee print) T" Henderson, "Foreign Students: Exchange or Immigration, p. 348. Stevens and Ver- meulen have written convincingly of the paradox inherent in creating programs "nominally for educational exchange, whose purposes were vague, and which had become a prime ve- hicle for the importation of physicians to the United States." (See Stevens and Vermeulen, op. elt., p. 64, and Chapter 3 for a discussion of International exchange and immigration.) 1283 ASPECTS OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH INVOLVEMENT In the Executive Branch the brain drain problem touches many de- partments and agencies. The division between the managers or con^ troUers and the users is clearly visible. The Department of Defense, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and the Depart- ment of Health, Education and Welfare probably rank among the leading users of foreign scientists, engineers, and doctors, particularly in their research and development activities. (And as noted above, state institutions concerned with mental health depend heavily upon FMGs for staffing. Other state and local government operated facili- ties concerned with health care such as municipal hospitals also draw upon FMGs for staff.) Controllers Within Executive Branch: Justice, State, HEW, Labor. — The principal controlling agencies are the Departments of Justice, State, HEW, and Labor. They are the primary agencies charged with enforcing the immigration law. Hence, they have had to live with the brain drain problem since it emerged in the early 1960's. The major enforcement responsibilities under the immigration law and implementing procedures are assigned to the Attorney General.^^^ The Attorney General discharges these responsibilities through the Immigration and Naturalization Service, a bureau of the Department of Justice. The second enforcement authority is the Secretary of State, acting through the Department of State's Visa Office and Consuls sta- tioned abroad. These officials determine the admissibility of aliens seeking entry and issue visas to those found eligible. Theirs is a pre- liminary determination ; the immigration officer at port of entry in the United States has veto authority. The Public Health Service of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare is responsible for the physical and mental examination of entering immigrants. Finally, the Department of Labor, acting through its Bureau of Employment Security, must certify that American workers are unable to perform the tasks of those aliens entering to work, except certain relatives of American citizens or of lawful resident aliens, and that their entry will not adversely affect wages and working conditions in the United States. Because of the doctor shortage, FMGs receive virtually blanket certification. All that the Department of Labor requires of an FMG seeking a preferential immigration visa is that he present an ECFMG certificate or other proof of eligibility for appointment to the staff of a hospital in the United States.'^^^ Major Role Played hy State DeipaHment. — The major burden of responding to critics of the brain drain problem has fallen upon the Department of State which is responsible for those subordinate agen- cies and operating programs which have proved to be conduits for brain drain. Loss of talent is clearly evident in programs relating to the international exchange of students and scholars, and to a lesser '36 This section draws upon, Charles Gordon and Harrv N. Rosenfield, Immigration and Procedure, (New York: Banks, 1970), v. 1, pp. 1-33-36. Laio , . Banks. 1970>. v. 1. nn. l-.^3-3R. w Dublin, op. cit., p. 875. 1284 extent in the case of the Agency for International Development's technical assistance programs.'''^ In the mid-1960's Dr. Charles Frankel, Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs, in his capacity as chairman of the Interagency Council on International Educational and Cul- tural Affairs, was 'the principal spokesman for the administration on brain drain matters. Formed in 1964 to improve coordination of Government educational and cultural programs which were inter- national in purpose and impact, the Interagency Council was com- posed of representatives from AID, the Defense Department, Peace Corps, HEW, Bureau of the Budget, and the Smithsonian Institu- tion, in liaison wnth the Federal Council on Science and Technology. Other agencies worked with the Interagency Council when problems arose relating to their interest. '^^ The Interagency Council made a significant contribution to the literature on brain drain with the publication of its proceedings of a workshop and conference on "The International Migration of Talent and Skills," held in October 1966. The present study has drawn heav- ily upon the work of this conference. Declining Interest in Executive Branch Since Late 19G0''s. — Interest in the State Department seemed to wane after 1968 with the diminish- ing interest in the brain drain problem in Congress and apparently elsewhere in the Western w^orld. Reduction of immigration by tight- ening direct controls was not considered to be imperative. Perhaps, Mr. Baldwin best expressed the view of the Johnson Administration on brain drain when he summarized the official position set forth by Dr. Frankel : In sum, Frankel objected to all the major specific changes that had been proposed [in regard to immigration legislation] and came forward with no new •ones of his own. The main "causes" of emigration from developing countries, he felt, lay in the "push" factors found in those countries, and the most im- portant thing the United States could do to help was to continue and to expand its foreign assistance for the institution-building, particularly the building of research and educational institutions capable of attracting and holding profes- sional people. As for the special problem of medical doctors, Mr. Frankel acknowledged that the United States should indeed expand its own training programs.''*'' The present administration has shown little interest in immigra- tion as a whole, much less in the specific problem of brain drain. If the judgment of Rep. Joshua Eilberg, Chairman of the House 738 Staff studv. House Government Operations Committee, Brain Drain Into the United States of Sci^tists, Engineers, and Physiciana. 1967. p. 15. The State Department has tended to minimize the extent of brain drain through Government-sponsored programs. For a discussion of AID'S assistance programs In scientific fields, see U.S. Congress. House, Committee on Science and Astronautics. Subcommittee on Science, Research and Develop- ment, The participation of Federal Agencies in International Scientific Programs, Report, 90th Cong., 1st sess., 1967, pp. 40-42. (Committee print). The report noted that m fiscal year 19fi4, 965 foreign educators were trained in the United States under AID auspices and 299 American professional experts were working abroad. ?109 niUllon was committed in the field of education in fiscal year 1966. (p. 41.) "»Dr. Franliel discusses the organization and functions of the Interagency Council in, Hearings, Senate Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1968, p. l.S. 'lo Baldwin, op. clt., pp. 369-370. 1285 Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law, is correct, namely, that the attitude toward immigration is one of apathy, then it seems that official concern for brain drain has reached its nadir.'" Certainly the comments by Secre- tary Weinberger noted in the preceding chapters reveal a certain insensitivity to the brain drain issue in' the administration. An indicator of current State Department interest in the brain drain problem is the address by Alan A. Reich, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs, to the 70th Annual Convention on Medical Education of the AMA in Chicago on February 1, 1974. In the address, entitled, ''International Understanding and Foreign Medical Graduates," Mr. Keich discussed the problem of FMGs within the larger context of what the State Department calls "meaningful people-to-people interchange," that is, international exchange and com- munications as an instrument of American diplomacy. Mr. Reich cited three major problems relating to FMGs and the possible impact on international understanding: (1) The "so-called 'brain drain' or loss of much-needed medical manpower in other countries to the United States"; (2) the failure of exchange visitor physicians to return home after training in this country; and (3) "our failure to provide many foreign medical graduates in the United States with proper orienta- tion, exposure to the American way of life, and meaningful cross- cultural experiences with Americans." Loss of medical manpower, Reich declared, stemmed from the fail- ure of many countries of origin to provide adequate incentives to re- tain their doctors or to have them return home after training abroad. As for the United States, he said, "We do not seek to entice medical manpower from other countries or to deprive them of this much- needed human resource." Justification for admission of FMGs to the United States as immigrants is based on the principle of freedom of movement and the failure of the donor countries to control the outflow or rectify the conditions that create it. As Mr. Reich said : ". . . with the receiving country not opposing the entry of doctors and their own countries not providing adequate encouragement for them to practice at home, it is difficult to reduce the number of foreign physicians tak- ing up attractive positions in the United States and other developed nations." This problem, Reich stated, "creates embarrassment" for the U.S. Government, and he acknowledged that this Government was "cooperating with other concerned governments in an attempt to alle- viate the problem." In discussing problems arising from the exchange visitor programs, Mr. Reich emphasized that this program was not designed to fill staffing needs of U.S. institutions, nor was it intended to be used "as a springboard for immigration to the United States." Rather it was designed to improve and strengthen U.S. diplomacy by promoting better mutual understanding and two-way communication between Americans and other peoples of the world. Reich implied that the purposes of the program had been misused. The "fallout" rate for M.D.s from the exchange visitor program, he noted, over the 4-year '" Eilberg, "New Goals of U.S. Immigration Policy," p. E7523. 1286 period 1967-70 had been 11 percent, as compared with only 3 percent of all exchange visitors. "We consider the 11% rate high but not alarming," he said. However, the foreign residence requirement was relaxed m April 1970, and the "fallout rate," especially among physi- cians, "increased dramatically." In 1972, he said, the United States put into effect a "skills list," specifying skills critical to each country. He hoped that cooperative efforts between the United States and other nations in adhering to the "skills list" requirements would result in a reduction in the number of adjustment cases. In the future, he said, most FMGs would be subject to the 2-year foreign residence require- ment upon completing their training programs. Finally, Mr. Reich discussed the problem of accommodating the FMG to the American environment, citing particularly the lack of hospitality and appreciation of Americans for their presence. Reich suggested a 10-point program for rectifying this problem of accom- modation and concluded with a statement on the obligations of Ameri- cans to the FMGs, particularly the fact that "they all are important to us in helping to build the human foundations of the structure of peace." ^*^ It is significant for the purposes of this study to note that nothing was said in this speech about the obligations of American institutions to cope with the doctor shortage through the use of American man- power, and about the rights of American premedical students to a reasonable expectation of fulfilling career goals. Nor was there any reference to remedies for the medical brain drain problem at the source where lay the greatest potentiality for difficulties in U.S. for- eign relations. Rather the stress was on administrative measures for control, and on the obligations of Americans to accommodate the FMG to the American social environment. EDUCATTONAL INSTITUTIONS, ASSOCIATIONS, AND THE PRIVATE SECTOR Educational institutions and professional associations such as the AMA and the AHA (American Hospital Association) are heavy users of foreign professional manpower flowing into this country. Also among the heavy users are the many scientifically and technologically oriented research and development enterprises in the Nation's private sector. Data presented in the preceding sections of this study suggest that in varying degrees the brain drain problem has directly and indirectly involved these nongovernmental sectors of American life. In certain areas the involvement is deeper than in others. The medical profession is becoming increasingly dependent upon FMGs to take up the grow- ing slack in its own production of doctors and to meet the demands of the Nation's expanding health care. With the cutback in defense and space related research and development, the demand for scientists and engineers has dropped. The decline is reflected in the most recent NSF data on the inflows of scientists and engineers in the fiscal year 1972. But international student exchange continues on an expanding scale, ■^"Alan A. Reich, "International Understanding and Foreign Medical Graduates," In Remarks of Robert McClory, Congressional Record, Mar. 12, 1974, pp. E1339-E1341. 1287 with the result that the Nation's colleges and universities will no doubt continue to play a primary role in the education of foreign stu- dents. And if past experience can be any reliable guide, international student exchange will continue to be a serious source of bram drainJ*^ BRAIN DRAIN PHENOMENON I A HIDDEN FOREIGN POLICY PROBLEM Thus the brain drain phenomenon has touched many parts of American Government and society. Involvement has depended upon the particular relationship of the controllers and the users with the incoming professionals. Awareness of foreign policy problems aris- ing from brain drain has not gone much, beyond this triangular relationship. In this sense, brain drain is a hidden problem for American foreign policy. And though expressed concern may have diminished in the past decade, the problem persists, along with the conditions that pro- duced it, while the consequences appear to be worsening because the problem is no longer between the United States and the developed industrial nations of the West. Bather it is between the United States and the emer^ng LDCs. An unequal relationship has evolved. The gap between rich and poor has been widening, not closing. The poor continue to subsidize the rich with expensively produced professional manpower. Brain Drain in the Matrix of American Foreign Policy Brain drain and development converge in the matrix of American foreign policy to form a complex of opposites. Brain drain, one of many essential elements in the international development process, is a low visibility problem that comes and goes with the rise and fall of complaints by donor nations and concern by the receiving nations. Yet it is a durable problem that relates directly to development, and accordingly poses the essential question of the American stance to- wards the developing countries. For brain drain and development are principles in contradiction: one cannot have it both ways — an LDC cannot develop without an educated elite. The contradiction is compounded by" the inability of the United States, despite its current mood of withdrawal, to escape involve- ment with the LDCs. The LDCs have the greatest concentration of the world's population and natural resources; they are a resource- base and market for the advanced industrial states; they are the international trouble spots, real and potential, in a delicately balanced world political system. ''*^ International student exchange Is about to get a substantial thrust forward in a cooperative effort to be undertaken by Georgetown University in conjunction with the West German Government. Under the proposed plan Georgetown is prepared to bring about 500 German students to the United States next summer and spread them among 25 colleges and universities from coast to coast for a year's trial run. If the idea proves workable, it Is possible that as many as 30,000 young Germans may be studying in America annually. The idea is based on the law of supply and demand. American enrollments have been declining ; the current openings are estimated to number some 300,000. Competition for available openings in West German universities is so intense that almost 50,000 quali- fied applicants are turned away yearly. The Germans reason that the cost of education abroad would be considerably less than building equivalent educational facilities In Germany. For the American^, the plan enables its colleges and universities to use their facilities to maximum efficiency. Unmentioned in the press coverage is the vulnerability of the West Germans to brain drain. (John M. Goshko, "German University Plan May In- volve Georgetown," The Washington Post, Sept. 16, 1973, p. Al.) 1288 AMERICAN ATTITUDE TOWARD THE LDC S The principal indicator of concern by the United States for the LDCs is its attitude towards foreign aid and international develop- ment. The depth and durability of this commitment is apparent by the fact that between the fiscal years 1946 and 1972 the United States ex- pended over $173 billion in foreign aid/** The Executive Branch on Development Policy. — All administra- tions have reaffirmed this commitment to foreign aid and international development. The present administration has been no less emphatic in reaffirming this important foreign policy principle. In his report to Congress in February 1972, President Nixon said that the goals of the administration for 1972 would be to . . . Work toward an improved foreign assistance program which will merit increased domestic support and will enable us to adequately contribute, along with other industrialized nations, to an international assistance effort which will ensure that the development progress made in the 1950's and 1960's can continue in this decade.'" A year later the President told Congress There has been a growing tendency to question our commitment to help devel- oping nations. Attracted to rapid solutions and under-estimating the time and effort needed to stimulate development, Americans are frustrated by the slow pace of visible progress. But, our future economic and political needs will be far better served by actively cooperating with the developing countries for our mutual benefit than by neglecting their needs. We must pursue a realistic policy of development assistance and find better ways of dealing with the trade and monetary interests of developing nations.'** Secretary of State William P. Rogers reiterated the administration's commitment. In his 1972 foreign policy report to the Congress, the Secretary declared: It is now clear that present efforts to help the less developed world cannot reduce the gap between rich and poor nations. But we must seek at least to help them achieve a more equitable sharing in the progress occurring in the develop- ing world, giving special attention to the poorest countries. Working from the base that was built over the last decade, a greater effort must be made to solve the problems arising from extreme poverty, overpopulation, poor health condi- tions, and limited education opportunities which affect most directly the lives of the majority of the developing world's population.'*' That the administration has appreciated the connection between science and technology, development, and foreign policy is evident in the remarks by Secretary Rogers on January 26, 1971, to the 12th meeting of the panel on science and technology of the House Com- mittee on Science and Astronautics. "The United States Government is very conscious of the opportunities for economic development that -'**■ Agency for International Development, Statistics and Reports Division, Office of Finan- cial Management, V.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Orga- nizations: Obligations and Loan Authorizations, July 1, 19i5-June 30, 1972, Washington, May 1073. p. C. (Hereafter cited as, AID, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants, 197.S. ) 'i Hnn.m.f^ -i79 i 1298 rich nations of the world were devoting to foreign assistance only half of the 0.7 percent of their GNP that the United Nations had proposed as a proper allocation. The United States in particular was "laggard" : the percentage of its GNP allocated to foreign aid was expected to shrink to 0.24 by 1975."* In June 1973, Robert R. Bowie of the Harvard University Center for International Affairs pointed out that the LDCs have become the "forgotten men" of U.S. foreign policy. He noted that U.S. foreign assistance had dropped to a low of three- tenths of 1 percent of its GNP, ranking 12th among the rich nations on this scale.'^^^ Foreign policy specialists attribute this declining interest in inter- national development to disillusionment growing out of the frustra- tions of the Vietnam War, to the mood of withdrawal gripping the Nation in the aftermath of Vietnam, in reaction to two decades of Avhat many believe to be overcommitment in foreign affairs, to the bal- ance of payments crises, doubts as to the efficacy of foreign aid, increas- ing domestic economic problems, and finally to the weakening of the Cold War spirit which had previously provided a substantial motiva- tion for foreign aid. This declining interest in development coincides Avith the continu- ing brain drain, now almost entirely from the LDCs. Inflows of sci- entists and engineers are decreasing, but the decline in this area is offset by a marked increase in the medical inflow\ The downtrend in development and the sustained brain drain both contradict the prin- ciple of development, defeat the declared national purposes of assist- ance to the LDCs, and — many observers contend — contribute to poten- tially dangerous political consequences for the future. QUESTION OF COMMITMENT TO LDC's ; AMERICAN RESPONSIBILITY AND NATIONAL INTEREST The interaction between brain drain and development in U.S. for- eign policy, as well as the contradiction now evident between policy intentions and actual performance in foreign assistance, raise a basic question about the Nation's commitment to the LDCs. For in the long run, and in some cases the short, the developing countries suffer ad- versely from the drain-off of professional manpower, and this loss of an educated elite in turn impairs the development that United States proposes to advance. Students of brain drain state that the United States has assumed a responsibility toward the LDCs in accepting their professionals.^^'' Perhaps the greatest responsibility this Nation assumes, they would argue, is to insure their return home after training so that they can carry on the tasks of nation-building. At this juncture responsibility becomes a national interest for the United States. As Dr. Frankel told the Senate Judiciary Committee in 1968 : . . . the "brain drain" is an important problem because it raises, in the most dramatic form, the question of the liind of world in which the United States wants "< Harrv B. Ellis, "Foreign Aid Falls to Filter to Poor," The Chri^tw.,, Science Monitor, Dec. 15, 1972, p. 10. "™ Robert R. Bowie, "Forgotten Men of U.S. Foreign Policy," The Christian Science Mon- itor. June 27, 1973, p. 14. "8 pqj. example, Stevens and Vermeulen spoke of "the formidable international respon- sibilities imposed on the United States by the annual appearance of 10,000 physicians from countries with a vast range of languages and cultures, many of which have totally Inadequate health services." (p. 76) 1299 to live a generation, or even a half generation from now. Over the long run we cannot stand the burden of a world in which most people and most countries will have inadequate intellectual resources and leadership of their own, and will have to lean on us and one or two other giants for their own well-being. This is why the brain drain is an important matter, and why it behooves us to seek aflSrmative measures to alleviate it.^^^ Widening Gap Between Advanced and Developing Countries. — But a more profound national interest is involved than ]ust the burden of dependency : it is the potential consequences for the United States of a continued widening gap between the advanced and developing coun- tries. An underlying assumption of arguments by brain drain critics is that failure to halt the migration of professionals from the LDCs can only widen this gap. Development specialists warn that despite decades of development assistance the gap between rich and poor, rather than narrowing, has indeed been widening. Therein lies the potential dan- ger, they say, for future U.S. foreign policy, and the vital connection between brain drain and foreign policy. The argument is posed in general rather than specific terms. It goes something like this : as the development gap widens, tensions increase between the rich and poor nations — the "global cities" versus the "global ghettoes" ; the rich become richer, the poor poorer ; social and economic progress among the LDCs become arrested; frustration, anxiety, and despair set in as hopes and expectations diminish ; bitter- ness and resentment are directed towards the rich and often against competing neighbors among the poor; global instability results; the United States, as the world's richest nation, cannot avoid being en- meshed in the international troubles that flow from these economic conditions. Among development specialists it is virtually a self-evi- dent truth that growing impoverishment of the Third World has po- tentially adverse consequences for American diplomacy.^^^ Secretary of State Henry Kissinger said as much when he told the special session of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in April 1974 on the matter of raw materials and development : On behalf of President Nixon, I pledge the United States to a major effort in support of development. My country dedicates itself to this enterprise 'because our children — yours and ours — must not live in a world of brtttal inequality, because peace cannot be maintained unless all share in its benefits, and because "^Hearings, Senai^, Judiciary Committee, International Migration of Talent and Skills, 1968, p. 22. Dr. Frankel has also defined the problem in moral terms. In an address to the State Department-sponsored conference on the imijrration of talents and skills, he said : "First of all," It [brain drain] has been defined differently because our moral standards have changed. We no longer think that the manpower of the rest of the world Is a resource for the enrichment of the already rich societies. We regard this as a problem, not just an opportunity. We take It as a sign of our defect and not a sign of the manifest opportu- nities we open up to people elsewhere in the world." (Department of State. Proceedings of Workshop on the International Migration of Talent and Skills, October 1966, p. 78.) ^* The potentially explosive nature of the LDCs was demonstrated by David Wood In a study entitled, "Conflict in the Twentieth Century." He noted that the majority of con- flicts during the post-1945 years to 1967 had taken place in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia — the so-called Third World. He cited a list of 80 conflicts. A large number of them followed on or had been associated with the breakup of colonial empires and the sub- sequent emergence of new states which are often small, poor, and Insecure. All but eight of these 80 conflicts Involved Third World participants on both sides. (Adelphi Papers. .Tune 1968, p. 19. Cited in, BrzezinskI, op. clt., p. 7.) Since 1967, major wars have erupted In Nigeria, between India and Pakistan, and in October 1973 between the Arabs and Israelis. The United States has been Involved directly In many of these upheavals within the less developed areas of the world, most notably Southeast A^ia (Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos) and the Middle East, where even today it finds itself deeply entangled. 1300 America has never believed that the values of justice, well-being, and human dignity could be realized by one nation alone."® That the rich are getting richer and the poor poorer is not an un- proven hypothesis but rather a commonphice. The cartoon by LePelley in The Christian Science Monitor of October 4, 1973, entitled "Quo Vadis?" graphically portrays the essence of the problem. Western progress, depicted as a fleet of fast-flying jet planes, leaves behind the "Less Developed Countries," depicted as a bedraggled, emaciated, barefoot figure in tattered robes. The vast distance in space between the two, the speed of the jets and the immobility of the figure, suggests a mood of hopelessness for the LDC who, as the symbolic figure, is left behind and plaintively asks with out-stretched arms. "Where are you going?" What is shown graphically by LePelley is demonstrated sta- tistically in Figure 9 and Table 37 on the development gap. Literature on development and brain drain stress this disparity between the developing and the advanced countries as a matter of fact. In 1966, Gregory Henderson told the State Department-sponsored conference on the migration of talents and skills : . . . Setting aside the migration of talent from Britain, Germany, etc., and concentrating on that from the far more defenseless developing countries, no value with which the "brain drain" is concerned exceeds the developmental. The facts need little rehearsal. Secretary-General U Thant, Mr. Paul Hoffman, the chiefs of many governments including our own, have given persuasive, shock- ing evidence of the growing gap between rich and poor in the world. Half the world has per capita income of $100 or under where we have $3,000. Five percent of the world's nations have 95% of its science, the rest have as good as no science at all. Some .30,000 people die in the poor nations every day of preventable causes. There seems no end to the statistics of development gap horror.'** TABLE 37.— THE DEVELOPMENT GAP Developing Developed Indicator countries countries United States Per capita GNP Population (millions, mid-1971)_ Population growth rate (percent).. Literacy (percent) Protein consumption (g'ams per person per day) Calorie consumption (per day) Life expectancy (vears) Infant mortality (death per thousand live births) People per physician _ _. Per capita power consumption (annual kilowatt-hours output perperson) 220 5,140 8,000 Source: Based on U.S. Agency for International Development, "Development and Humanitarian Assistance, Fiscal Year 1973 Program Presentation to the Congress," p. B-1; and U.S. Agency for International Development, "Selected Economic Data for the Less Developed Countries," June 1972, p. 8. (Reproduced from Robert E. Hunter, project director, "The United States and the Developing World: Agenda for Action," 1973 (Washington: D.C., Overseas Development Council, 1973), p. 123. $230 $3, 085 $4, 756 1,850 664 207 2.6 1.1 1.1 40 97 98 54 97 2,180 3,030 3,300 52 71 70 110 21 3,400 700 620 •"8 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Media Services, Challenges of Interdependence. Address by Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger before the Sixth Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly. Washington, Apr. 15, 1974, p. 3. (Italics added.) , For a discussion of the interrelationship between the widening development gap and prospects for international peace and stability, see Brzezlnslil's, Between Two Ages: Ameri- ca's Role in the Technetronic Era, Chapter 3 entitled, "Global Ghettos." Brzezinslii warns that the Third World confronts "the specter of insatiable aspirations." With the spread of education and communications, "passive resignation may give way to active explosions of undirected anger." (pp. 35-36) He predicts that "feelings of intensive resentment will most likely grow as the gap widens." Less developed areas containing the majority of the world's population and experiencing at best only partially effective progress will by the year 2000 "in all liljelihood be the centers of volatile political activity, resentment, tension, and extremism." (p. 50.) .,.,...•.« '80 Department of State, Proceedings of Workshop on the International Migration oj Talent and Skills, October 1966, pp. 120-121. 1301 Figure 9 Gross National T>roduct for Developed and Developing Countries, 1960-2000 (in billions of U.S. dollars, 1971) 10,000 8,000- 6,000 4,000- 2,000 Developed Countries 1960 1970 2000 Source: Figures for 1960 through 1980 are based on Bureau of Intelligence and Research, Department of State, The World's Product at the Turn of the Decade; Recessional, September 12, 1972, Projections for 1990 and 2000 were arrived at by computing annual growth at 5 percent for developed countries and 6 percent for developing countries. Reproduced from, Robert E. Hunter, Project Director, The United States and the Developing World; Agenda for Action, 1973 (Washington, D.C.; Overseas Development Council, 1973), p. 124. In 1970, Mr. McXamara gave this appraisal of present and future disparity in economic development to the Columbia University Con- ference on International Economic Development : The gap between the per capita incomes of the rich nations and the poor nations is widening rather than narrowing, bo.th relatively and absolutely. At the extremes that gap is already more than $3,000. Present projections indicate it may well widen to $9,000 by the end of the century. In the year 2000, per capita income in the United States is expected to be approximately $10,000; in Brazil, $.jOO ; and in India, $200.'" On December 23, 1973, James P. Sterba of The New York Times gave this end-of-the-year view of development in an article entitled, ^Robert S. McNamara, Hevieto (1970). p. 6. •The True Dimension of the Task," International Development 1302 "There are more poor in the world than ever: The United States now contributes less, others more, but to no avail" : The aid people tried for a quarter of a century. They spent billions of dollars. They accomplished some remarkable feats. But they failed over -all. Afi 1973 ends, the world looks like this : There are 3.8 billion people on earth, give or take 200 million because the computations are often vague. Of the total, about 30 percent, those who live in North America, Europe, the Soviet Union and Japan, are rich. They earn generally more than $3,000 a year, or $8.21 a day. They con.sume 92 percent of the world's energy (the United States alone takes a third) and most of the other mineral wealth. The other 70 percent of the world's population, those who have to get by on ... 65 cents a day, divide the remaining 8 percent of the world's energy and its leftover minerals.™" The economic consequences of the 1973-74 energy crisis has wid- ened still further the gap between rich and poor. Caught up in a cross- fire of rising prices for energy and growing food shortages, many LDCs are experiencing a deepening economic crisis. Predictions have already been made by responsible American officials of a possible fam- ine in the offing in India. In March 1974, the Overseas Development Council forecast the possibility of some 30 poor nations with 900 mil- lion people facing economic collapse unless assistance was forthcom- ing. The nations cited are in tropical Africa. Southeast Asia, and Latin America and include Chile, India, Banghidesh. Uruguay, and possibly the Philippines. According to James P. Grant of ODC, the poorest nations need an additional $3 billion annually to cover in- creased prices for food, fertilizer, and fuel, India may be one of the hardest hit nations as the result of the energy crisis and food short- ages.^^^ In the United Nations, Secretary General Kurt Waldheim called for immediate assistance for countries threatened by economic disaster. "The fate of millions of people," he told the opening special session of the General Assembly on April 24, "may Avell depend, within the next few months on what this special session does, or does not do." ^«* These appraisals, and others of a similarly pessimistic nature, sug- gest that the world's future, at least in the next three decades, seems bleak : the gap in need and plenty can be expected to continue widen- ing; prospects for escape seem not to be very promising. A scenario, constructed on Gunnar Myrdal's 1958 theory of "circular causation" that sketches out a continuing downward spiral in development among the LDCs and a corresponding widening gap with the advanced coun- ™2 The New York Times, Dec. 23, 1973, p. E3. '83 The Christkin Science Monitor, Mar. 6. 1974, p. 3B. For the American response at this special U.N. session, see the address by Secretary of State Kissinger entitled, "Challenges of Interdependence." (op. cit.). For a summary and analysis of the session, see, Barbara Ward's commentary published in The Economist (May 18, 1974), pp. 65-73. Miss Ward observed that when the session closed on May 2. "it left behind the feeling that possibly something new had taken place." Secretary of State Kissinger, she wrote, called the session part of an "unprecedented agenda of global consultations in 1974" which implied "a collective deci- sion to elevate our concern for man's elementary well-being to the highest level." Mr. Ivor Richard. Britain's chief representative at the United Nations, put it rather more simply : "Things will never be the same again.'' (p. 65.) T8* The New York Times, Apr. 25, 1974, p. 10. 1303 tries unless development aid breaks the cycle, has thus become a reality in the 1970'sJ^^ One immediate effect of this phenomenon is that it creates a dynamic interaction which appears to make the brain drain virtually inevitable. The argument, placed in the context of develop- ment economics, goes like this. The widening gap in incomes of the LDCs and advanced countries is reflected in the corresponding gap in salary levels of skilled occupations. As shown above in the discussion of economic causes of brain drain, this gap in income and salary exerts a general economic pull, attracting the best brains from the former to the latter, and thus, in the words of Prof. Hla Myint, "set up a dy- namic cumulatively disequalising process or a 'vicious circle' which aggravates the economic gap between the two types of country." '^® The development gap perpetuates brain drain; brain drain prevents the establishing of a scientific-technological base ; without this base development is impaired ; the gap continues to widen — and so the cycle continues. Thus brain drain can be a critical link in the development process, and this process is surely impaired by the outflow of the professional elite from the LDCs. The report of the House Government Operations Committee on brain drain came directly to the point when it said: The root of the concern is the inadequacj- of trained manpower in the develop- ing countries despite pressing needs for a great variety of skills, talents, and capacities for taking the initiative which development requires. The loss by these countries of scientists and other professionals to the United States reduces trained manpower where it is scarcest and most needed and augments it where it is most abundant. This can only widen the technological and economic gap be- tween the richest country in the world and the poorest ones.''*' EFFECTS OF DEVELOPMENT GAP ON FOREIGN POLICY : CONFRONTATION BETWEEN RICH AND POOR The development gap between the rich and poor countries constitutes a potential threat to U.S. national security. This threat arises from '85 The theory of "circular causation" is discussed in Gunnar Myrdal's Rich Lands and Poor (New York : Harper, 1958). It is summarized in. Robert Ellsworth Elder, The Policy Machine: The Department of State and American Foreign Policy (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, I960), p. 42. This theory holds that an underdeveloped area has low standards of living which result in a poorly educated and relatively unhealthy work force, as well as little working capital for investment. Because of the character of the labor force, production is low, and producing units already in a country may eventually move to a more favorable location. This process further lowers the living standard, the level of education and health, and results in even less Investment capital. Myrdal calls this the "backwash effect." On the other hand, a country with a relatively high standard of living caji maintain or improve its educated and healthy labor force, increasing production, bringing additional funds for Investment, and causing additional producing units to enter the area. Myrdal calls this the "spread effect." Thus, in the first case, conditions hecome progressively poorer ; and in tlie second, they become richer. According to Professor Elder, Myrdal would be likely to advocate an econ- omic development policy for the United States toward the LDCs which would enable them to turn the corner from regression to progress, from the "backwash effect" to the "spread effect." He concludes : "A policy without sufficient Impact to accomplish this goal could never really be successful in making it possible for an underdeveloped country to 'go it alone.' " Lafi Ibrahim Jaafarl seemed, to express the essence of this theory of "circular causation" in concrete terms In his survey of Palestinian and Jordanian Arab professionals and students who are residing in the United States. Jaafarl concluded : "In overall perspective, the respondents tended to bear out the statement that the 'brain drain' is not only a cause but an effect of sociological, economic and governmental underdevelopment within the Middle East." (Jaafarl, op. clt., p. 125.) '8« Myint, op. cit., p. 236. r ^^^^'z?'"*' House, Government Operations Committee, Scientific Brain Drain from the LDCs, 1968, p. 1. The Ditchley Park Conference Report said that the loss of professional manpower from tlie LDCs "would Imply that it was a factor enlarging still more the gap between rich and poor, whereas to strive to narrow that gap Is an acknowledged aim of the United States, Britain and indeed all responsible nations." (p. 5.) President Perkins ap- provingly quotes John C. Shearer : "The movement of high-level human resources may, to a great extent, account for the persistent and ever widening gaps between the rich and poor areas." (op. clt.. p. 618.) 1304 two sources: (1) the increased likelihood of confrontation between rich and poor caused by political, economic, and social differences ; and (2) world competition for vital mineral resources, the main sources of which are largely located in the LDCs. Instahility : Source of Conflict and 2'ension. — President Nixon ex- pressed an oft-repeated truth voiced by foreign policy specialists and students of development when he said in his 1973 foreign policy report to the Congress : ". . . an increased pace of development is essential. Unless substantial progress occurs — through efforts by developed and developing nations alike — the stability of many countries and regions can be jeopardized as essential needs of people go unsatisfied." ^®^ In the mid-1960's, Dr. Kidd had warned : "If the gap does not narrow over the long run, the prospect of reduction of world tensions is dim." ^^^ In an appearance before House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on the occasion of a review of national security policy, Mr. Robert R. Nathan, a consultant economist and development specialist, warned of the con- sequences for American security if the aggravated ills of the LDCs were not attended to. Alluding to the outbursts of racial violence in the United States against historic injustices long ignored, he went on to observe that Americans had learned that "great and growing gaps between the haves and have-nots are not conducive to happy and secure relationships among individuals or communities or groups within our own society." The Nation had responded belatedly, he said, to that "relative insecurity." He then warned : . .-. if gaps persist and increase, as they tend to grow in absolute terms be- tween the advanced nations such as the United States and the less developed nations, we will have a very distressing element of insecurity and there may come a time when American embassies and consulates and American ships and airplanes and American tourists may not be secure in any of the nations in the less developed world where there is terrible privation.'™*' In a lecture not many months later Mr. Charles W. Yost, a veteran American diplomat and foreign policy analyst for The Christian Science Monitor^ deplored what he saw as a tendency in the Nixon Administration to downgrade the LDCs and the North-South prob- lems and to become excessively preoccupied with relations between East and West. Ignoring the LDCs, he warned, would allow animosi- ties to build up and situations to emerge that could lead to tensions and wars bound to involve the United States. Yost expressed concern over the disproportion in priorities and the dismal prospects for the future if present policy of ignoring the LDCs continued.^®^ Algerian Conference of Nonaligned LDCs. — That these warnings had substance and that the feelings against the advanced countries do, indeed, run deep in the LDCs is evident by the proceedings of the Fourth Conference of Non- Aligned Nations meeting in Algiers dur- ing September 1973. Delegates from 76 LDCs, representing the "over- whelming majority of mankind," as Algerian President Houari Boumedienne said, conferred for 5 days. The proclaimed "Spirit of Algiers" was in reality a spirit of confrontation. President Boume- dienne made this clear when in an opening speech he outlined a plan 788 President Nixon's Foreign Policy Report to Congress, 1973, p. 141. ■^89 UNESCO, Final Report of the Conference on the Application of Science and Technology to the Development of Latin America, 1965, n. 184. ■^ Hearing-Symposium, House Foreign Affairs Committee, National Security Policy and the Changing World Power Alignment, 1972, p. 202. '1 Lecture in Washington, D.C., Jan. 25, 1973. 1305 for a new world order in which the rich of the earth would no longer be able to dictate their wishes to the poor. The tone of hostility toward the advanced industrial nations that permeated the conference was shown by such slogans as, "Joint Action Against jNlultinational Corpo- rations," "Economic Liberation," "Non-Alignment, a Commitment to Just Causes," "Down with Racism and Apartheid," "Down with Im- perialist Monopolies," and "Down with Foreign Military Bases." The transcendent grievance was, however, the widening gap in develop- ment between the LDCs and the advanced industrial states. As the Reuter correspondent reported from Algiers, "the main binding link between the participants was the feeling that they were being left behind in the prosperity race led by the big industrialized countries." ^®^ Brain Drain : Source of Grievances and Complaints. — Press cover- age at Algiers did not mention brain drain as a deterrent to develop- ment. But it has been a subject of complaint in the past, and among LDCs most seriously affected, like India, brain drain remains a sore and lively issue in relations with the LTnited States. As long ago as 1966, Assistant Secretary of State Frankel called brain dram "an issue which is one of the steady, trying, troublesome diplomatic issues confronted by your government. Many other coun- tries raise the problem of brain drain with us steadily." ^^^ In the United Nations, delegates from the LDCs accused the West of transferring its exploitative urges from physical to human re- sources. On one occasion the representative from Dahomey called it an "odious bleeding" of Africa, a continuation of the slave trade. The General Assembly, where the presence of the LDCs is most forcefully felt, passed a resolution acknowledging the seriousness of the problem and expressing grave concern.'^^* In 1966, the Iranian Minister in charge of Cultural Affairs at Iran's Embassy in Washington complained to American foreign student ad- visors about the drain-off of Iranian students (some 60 percent) study- ing in the United States. "Our government," he wrote, "is now thor- oughly alarmed at the very high casualty rate of these skilled young people and is pressing us to take effective counter-measures." ^®^ So concerned has the Indian Government become about the loss of its doctors that it has taken administrative action to discourage emi- gration. For example, the United States has been prohibited from al- lowing prospective Indian FMGs to take the ECFMG examination at its embassy and consulates in India.' In recent years, the State Department has become more sensitive to the complaints of the LDCs, and apparently complaints have con- tinued to be registered. Stevens and Vermeulen observed that with the present foreign policy attitudes of "low profile" in foreign affairs, coupled with the "pricking of the myth of omnicompetence," foreign governments, heretofore inclined to acquiesce quietly and without pro- test, have become "less likely to accept in silence" the loss of some of their best professionals.'^*^" They pointed out that one of the underlying ■^2 A 76-Nation Summit, The Christian Science Monitor (editorial), Sept. 11, 1973, p. 18. """ Department of State, Proceedings of Workshop on the International Migration of Talent and Skills, October 1966. p. 79. ■^Eren, op. clt., p. 10. "s Quoted in. Said, op. clt., p. 7. ™9 Stevens and Vermeulen, op. clt., pp. xli-xill. 97-400 O - 77 - 45 1306 pressures for change in American policy towards FMGs comes from "a growing clamor by foreign governments and international private groups (including groups in the Philippines, India, Thailand, and Korea) over the loss of physicians to the United States," ^^^ As re- cently as September 1973, Leslie Aldridge Westoff reported that a sign that brain drain was becoming "increasingly serious is the pres- sure put on our State Department by about 80 countries which have asked that we send students skilled in essential fields back home when their programs are over, and not encourage them to study sophisticated subjects, such as psychiatry, for which there is not yet a need where they come from." ^®^ Finally, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Educa- tional and Cultural Affairs Alan Reich acknowledged publicly in February 1974 that "at times this problem creates embarrassment for the United States Government." '^^ Political Reality : Confrontation Between Rich and Poor. — Thus, confrontation between rich and poor is a reality in relations between the advanced industrial countries and the LDCs. The ingredients are present for heightening rather than reducing prospects for even more serious confrontations. Success of the oil embargo in the wake of the October 1973 Arab-Israeli war that spawned a worldwide energy crisis with far-reaching implications seemed to be a storm signal to the great industrial powers of a newly gained negotiating strength for the LDCs in an evolving world of interdependence. WORLD COMPETITION FOR VITAL MINERAL RESOURCES IN SHORT SUPPLY A related threat to American national security issuing from the development gap is the world competition for vital mineral resources in short supply. The main sources of these minerals are largely located in the Ll)Cs.«"° World Mineral Resources in the LDCs. — LDC predominance in possessing the world's minerals is a fact of nature that the industrial nations are rapidly becoming aware of, and movements toward devel- oping cartel-relationships among the LDCs indicate the political pur- ■ ■"" Ibid. p. 89. ■'« Westoff. op. clt., pp. 79-80. '» Congressional Record, Mar. 12. 1974. p. E1340. «*> The energy crisis of 1973-1974 made Americans conscious of the uncertain supply of many resources, materials, and commodities vital to national needs. This concern was reflected in the Congress. On Feb. 19. 1974. Senate Majority leader Mike Mansfield (D-Mont. ) and Senate Minority leader Hugh Scott (R-Fa.) corresponded with the President on this matter. They suggested the creation of a Legislative-Executive Branch mechanism in conjunction with representatives of Industry, labor, and other areas of national life "for the purpose of thinking through our national needs, not only as they confront us. today, but as they are likely to be five, ten or more years hence and how they are best to be met." The President reacted favorably to the suggestion and proposed a meeting with leaders of the Executive Branch. On Apr. 9, 1974. the Senate Democratic Policy Com- mittee adopted a resolution incorporating the Ideas set forth In this exchange of corre- spondence. (Mike Mansfield, "A Proposal for a New Approach on Economic Foresight," Remarks in the Senate, Congressional Record, Apr. 11, 1974. pp. S5744-S5745. ) That there Is an urgency to studv and future planning in the materials field was indi- cated by Dr. Franklin P. Huddle, Senior Specialist In the Science Policy Research Division of the Congressional Research Service, in a study prepared In 1972 for the House Com- mittee on Science and Astronautics. Dr. Huddle wrote : "The question is not whether the United States could pursue a policy of self-sufficiency In materials without total economic collapse. It could. But not without painful readjustments, severe Inflation, and an In- estimable erosion of Individual freedom of choice and standards of living. In the past, such sacrifices have been observed in nations only under the powerful motivation of war for survival." (U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Science and Astronautics, Industrial Ma- terials: Technological Problems * Carroll Kilpatrlck, "Arab Example Worries Officials : Crisis in Minerals Is Feared," The Washington Post, Jan. 14, 1974, p. Al. 800 Ibid. 1308 are expected to increase from $8 billion in 1970 to more than $31 billion by 1985."° U.S. dependence on foreign imports of materials, many of which are from the LDCs, is impressive. Table 38 gives the percentage of U.S. mineral requirements imported during 1972 and the source countries, while Table 39 shows the changing import requirements of the United States in the mineral and materials field. Table 38. — Percentage of U.S. Mineral Requirements Imported During 1972 PLATINUM GROUP METALS MICA i*-^> CHROMIUM STRONTIUM COBALT TANTALUM ALUMINUM i<»»»™<.ii MANGANESE FLUORINE TITANIUM I'laiM ASBESTOS TIN BISMUTH NICKEL COLUMBIUM ANTIMONY GOLD POTASSIUM MERCURY ZINC SILVER BARIUM GYPSUM SELENIUM TELLURIUM VANADIUM PETROLEUM l.n<: Hm ClQl IRON LEAD CADMIUM COPPER TITANIUM (onn.i.i RARE EARTHS PUMICE SALT CEMENT MAGNESIUM |no~nMIJ<>a>>:.MC>»QKO»J lEM^w^?i»ow«^M■^^:■^:^^:^M^.w:^>:wJu■ I Hi-:-!»flfl6ficaj!Bs«sX-x-x<-»>x««-x-: MSMaMMM«.^^Ama.U.VAW.^AW.VWW KxuoM.-^-^-.vj^-j.'.-.-.-.'^.y.yy.-Mn BfinfinniV-jinMWVJ'JWAVAVW.vm MMMMMMMWHMBMMMH f.WJ.V.'XfAW/.V.V.V^fJX KMAi^-^Mi^.-X.'.'.-.-.-J^'.'M uawwwWiW.vwnV'ifta B6MaflWM-:-^ww.'.m.'w IWWHKWSgS^ ZBssszsmmmaa nzsssssmmzzsa Mvuwww.iCTimm :XESZ5^!^^B i^^ssmaga iuw^.v.wiwa OE^ssssssssa =Ezzsssasa ZEOsss^sg """W"WWU wwuww-'" DBS8SS1 zssaa -naaaog jssa 39 ira OD 1(X)% 75% SW 25% ,k MAJOR FOREIGN SOURCES UK. USSR. SOUTH AFRICA. CANADA, JAPAN. NORWAY INDIA. BRAZIL. MALAGASY USSR. SOUTH AFRICA. TURKEY MEXICO. SPAIN ZAIRE. BELGIUM. LUXEMBOURG. FINLAND. CANADA. NORWAY NIGERIA. CANADA. ZAIRE JAMAICA. SURINAM CANADA. AUSTRALIA BRAZIL, GABON, SOUTH AFRICA. ZAIRE MEXICO. SPAIN. ITALY. SOUTH AFRICA AUSTRALIA CANADA. SOUTH AFRICA MALAYSIA. THAILAND. BOLIVIA MEXICO. JAPAN. PERU. UK. KOREA CANADA. NORWAY BRAZIL. NIGERIA. MALAGASY. THAILAND SOUTH AFRICA. MEXICO. UK. BOLIVIA CANADA. SWITZERLAND. USSR CANADA CANADA. MEXICO CANADA. MEXICO. PERU CANADA. PERU. MEXICO. HONDURAS. AUSTRALIA PERU. IRELAND. MEXICO. GREECE CANADA. MEXICO. JAMAICA CANADA. JAPAN. MEXICO. UK PERU. CANADA SOUTH AFRICA. CHILE. USSR CENTRAL & SOUTH AMERICA . CANADA. MIDDLE EAST CANADA. VENEZUELA, JAPAN. COMMON MARKET lEECI CANADA. AUSTRALIA. PERU. MEXICO MEXICO. AUSTRAL! A. BELGIUM. LUXEMBOURG. CANADA. PERU CANADA. PERU. CHILE CANADA. AUSTRALIA AUSTRALIA. MALAYSIA. INDIA GREECE. ITALY CANADA.MExrCO. BAHAMAS CANADA. BAHAMAS, NORWAY GREECE. IRELAND CANADA WEST GERMANY. FRANCE CANADA. MEXICO. ITALY. PORTUGAL «fff J^ ? P^® International Scope of the Materials System," Figure 2.32. The United !n Pnnnt'^"'"*^'^ var.ving amounts of metal, nonmetalllc, and fuel minerals from more than i.f °,"ffl*"^^. 7 ^•If'^L"* *^^ ^'^''^'^ *° 19^2. No major nation of the world is completely U 4 n^nfr''.*minf^i^. ^^ minerals required to sustain an Industrialized economy Turce^ U.S. Department of Interior, Bureau of Mines. 1973. (Reproduced from- National Com ^nfl°Lpor^" ms'p 2.25:)"^^'"'''*' ""''^^ '''"' '""^ Environment Today and Tomorrow : «" Secretary of State Rogers. Foreign Policy Report to Congress of 1972, 1973, p. 43. 1309 TABLE 39.— CHANGING IMPORT REQUIREMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES [Net Imports as percent of domestic use] Net' imports (percent) - 1950 1960 1970 Ferrous metals: Iron ore 5 25 30 Chromium. 100 94 100 Cobalt ".. 92 75 96 Columbium 100 100 100 Manganese 77 92 94 Nickel 99 88 91 Tungsten 80 40 Q) Vanadium (') 41 1 Nonferrous metals: Aluminum (bauxite).. 71 77 86 Beryllium 89 96 w Copper 35 9 8 Lead _ 59 59 40 Net' imports (percent) 1950 1960 1970 Nonferrous metals— Continued Magnesium 0 10 Mercury 92 36 38 Platinum 91 95 98 Tin 100 100 100 Titanium 32 30 47 Zinc.-.- 37 54 60 Other basic materials: Petroleum... 8 17 22 Natural gas 0 13 Uranium 47 0 Timber products* 11 11 8 Natural rubber 100 100 100 ' Net imports include semirefined forms (e.g. ferromanganese). 2 Stockpile transactions distort proportions. 3 Withheld for disclosure reasons. * Net imports in 1972 are up 50 percent from 1970. Source: Interim report (April 1972) National Commission on Materials Policy and Minerals Yearbook, Bureau of Mines (Reproduced from : National Commission on Materials Policy, "Materials Needs and the Environment Today and Tomorrow Final Report," 1973 p. 2.23.) Dependence on this scale for foreign supplies of minerals illustrates U.S. vulnerability to pressures from the source countries. This vul- nerability is increased by the fact that 15 of the 26 companies from the advanced industrial countries involved in the foreign extraction and production of oil, copper, aluminum, and nickel have their head- quarters in the United States.^^^ Nationalization, or threat of nationalization, is always the ultimate recourse in a changing bargaining relationship, and for the United States the cost could be considerable. U.S. corporations have invested some $30 billion in LDCs and these investments are growing at about 10 percent a year.*^^ "Confiscation of its investments in the Third World," Mr. Bergsten states, "could thus create major costs for the United States." Much of this investment, he went on, is in raw materials; so "Third World action could affect the United States doubly (as it already has in oil) by both raising our costs and reducing our earnings." ^^^ Thus de- pedency inevitably creates vulnerability. Pote7itialities for ConfAct. — The potentialities for conflict between the United States and the LDCs seem to issue from three sources : (1) The inherent U.S. dependency on foreign supply. ("For the United States," the Minerals Policy report said, "self-suffi- ciency is technically possible at times, but economically unfeasible and diplomatically unacceptable at others.") (2) The fact that the United States has the highest per capita demand for materials, while the rate of demand is increasing more rapidly in the rest of the world so that mineral specialists now speak of a "global minerals shortage" ; and (3) The growing awareness among the LDCs that they possess unique marketable resources will tend to lessen their fears of ex- ploitation and encourage a practical bargaining attitude.^" «i National Commission on Materials Policy, Final Report 1973, pp. 9-11. ^^ Secretary of State Roger's Foreign Policy Report t€ Congress of 1972, 1973, p. 43. *" Bergsten, op. cit., p. 112. SI* National Commis.sion on Materials Policy, Final Report, 1973, p. 4B-13, and The Washington Post, Jan. 14, 1974, p. Al. 1310 The combination of these three factors has created a situation in the minerals field akin to the 1973-74 crisis in oil. The LDCs have power- ful bargaining leverage, as the Arabs have already demonstrated. Ap- plied in the minerals field this leverage could have far-reaching adverse economic and political consequences for the industrial nations. The oil situation, Bergsten wrote, is the "prototype" : "Oil may be merely the start." ^'^ "We are not in a minerals crisis at the moment," said Dr. John D. Morgan, Jr., Acting Director of the Bureau of Mines, "but we must take cautionary action to avoid being in one a short distance down the road." What worries U.S. officials is that a cartel of nations having control over the bulk of supplies of a given mineral will, indeed, follow the Arab example, and, as one press report put it, "try to blackmail the rest of the world." *^^ It goes without saying, therefore, that the politics and economics of a "global minerals shortage" can create grave new problems between the United States and the LDCs, for as Secretary Rogers said, the United States has a "clear interest in facilitating the flow of resources to the developing world." ^" Thus the impending minerals shortage is pregnant with possibilities for conflict between the LDCs and the ad- vanced industrial countries. Mr. Bergsten, sharply criticizing the administration and Congress for failing to take greater interest in the LDCs, urged establishing a policy framework that would depress con- flict, and offered this estimate of the consequences of pursuing a policy of confrontation with the developing countries : ... it is no longer clear that the United States would emerge "the winner" in confrontation with the Third World. Even if it was economically irrational for other countries to trigger such confrontations, however, this by no means rules them out. Individual LDC governments might be forced into such a posture by internal political imperatives even if the outcome were unfavorable to their "true" national interest. But the main point is that the United States would suffer sig- nificant costs even if, in some sense, it "won" a confrontation — by substituting high-cost shale oil for lower-cost Persian Gulf crude, or South Carolina cotton goods for Korean synthetics. In the long run, there will be no winners. Since the policy framework of U.S. relations with the Third World is likely to go far in determining whether such events occur, or even threat to occur, U.S. interests would be greatly served by creating a framework in which they will not occur.*^* Call for Policy Reappraisal. — Development specialists seem agreed on a policy of interdependence as a means for reducing the develop- ment gap and for achieving the Nation's best interests. The inequities and injustices issuing from the development gap, along with one of its causes, brain drain, have long provoked the LDCs. But it has also pricked the conscience of Americans and inspired demands among political leaders and foreign policy specialists for reappraisals of policy and corrective action. Underlying the expressions of moral in- dignation and recommended responses are assumptions that "national security interest" and "self-interest" could be achieved by recognizing and acting on the principle of the interdependence of nations. Profes- sor Robert R. Bowie of Harvard has warned that the waning of con- 816 Bergsten, op. cit., p. 110. «8 The Washington Post, Jan. 14, 1974, p. Al. «^ Secretary of State Roger's Foreign Policy Report to Congress of 1972, 1973, p. 43. *i^ Bergsten, op. clt., p. 116. In this same article, Mr. Bergsten wrote: "The United States Is the least responsive to Third World needs of any Industrallzed country at this time. U.S. help Is small in quantity, and getting smaller. Its quality Is declining. It often runs directly counter to the central objectives of the LDCs just outlined. It lags far behind the policies of Europe and Japan. The Administration and Congress must share in the indictment." (Bergsten, op. clt. p. 104.) 1311 cern for the LDCs is "extremely shortsighted," It is not feasible, he said, "to develop a peaceful order for an interdependent world while ignoring one-half of it." "The urgent necessity," he continued, "is to reappraise U.S. interests in the developing nations and its relations with them." ^^^ A similar urgency was evident in the Overseas Development Coun- cil's study, "The United States and the Developing World: Agenda for Action," published in 1973. In an introduction the Rev. Theodore M. Hesburgh, C.S.C., President of Notre Dame, emphasized the im- peratives of self-interest that were to be achieved in a world of grow- ing interdependence of nations. Stressing the moral approach that permeates the entire study, and the value of interdependence. Father Hesburgh wrote : . . . the United States has a new and broader self-interest that can be secured only if it is merged with growing regard for a global interest. This global inter- est must also include a greater concern for social justice among nations an,d peoples. There are practical reasons for this, based on the desire of rich countries to secure more cooperation from the poor in meeting common problems. But there is also our membership in one human family. We now have greater awareness of the problems facing people everywhere, especially people who are poor ; and there is increasing opportunity for people rich and poor to do something about these problems.** Nearly a decade ago Senator Mondale in a speech on the floor of the Senate made much the same appeal for a reappraisal of policy, but with one significant difference : he correlated the problem of develop- ment directly with brain drain. ^^^ The United States may gain in the short run, he said, but the brain drain to the United States "threatens one of the paramount longrun objectives of American foreign policy — progress in underdeveloped lands." Quoting from the Montreal speech of Secretary of Defense McNamara that world security and U.S. security depended upon development of the LDCs, the Senator stated that, "Since the brain drain threatens development, it is ultimately a threat to the security of our own land." He was "troubled" by the one-way flow of brains from the poorest nations of the world to the richest, some having the finest educational institutions. He was also concerned that this country was "following a continuing policy of draining professional manpower from countries whose rapid develop- ment is strongly in our national interest." Laying out a program for corrective action, the Senator went on to urge the importance of bal- ance. He emphasized the valuable contribution of immigrants from all continents to the Nation's life. But he warned that "if we would build a world where our children can live in peace and freedom, devel- opment of poor nations must likewise receive high priority in our national policies." The Senator concluded with a prediction of what he hoped could be avoided : "The gap between rich and poor will con- tinue to widen, and hopes for lasting peace will vanish for our century." «« The Christian Science Monitor, June 27, 1973, p. 14. 820 Robert E. Hunter, project director. The United States and the Developing World: Agenda for Action, 1973, Washington, D.C., Overseas Development Council, February 1973, pp. 2-3. Harry B. Ellis summarizes some of the main points In the study. See, "Rich Nations Warned Poor Must Catch Up," The Christian Science Monitor, Feb. 22, 1973, p. 11. Mr. Ellis concludes : "Much of this has been said before. What is new is the stress on self- interest on the part of the United States, caught up in a world of growing Interdependence. ^ Sen. Walter F. Mondale. "The Brain Drain from Developing Countries," Remarks In the Senate, Congressional Record, Aug. 31, 1966, pp. 21477-21480. 1312 DEVELOPMENT GAP, BRAIN DRAIN AND INTERDEPENDENCE: INTERACTING FORCES WITHIN A NATIONAL, MOOD OF WITHDRAWAL Eight years later the development gap has in fact widened; and brain drain, though now a foreign policy of low visibility, constitutes an even greater threat to the educated elite of the LDCs and accord- ingly to progress towards their development. Added to these factors are the indifference and apathy v.'hich characterize the Nation's response to development problems that specialists insist can be man- aged only within the framework of an actively pursued policy of interdependence. As Secretary Kissinger told the special session of the United Nations General Assembly meeting in April 1974 on problems of raw materials and development, "We in this Assembly must come to grips with the fact of our interdependence. . . . economics, technology, and the sweep of human values impose a recognition of our interdependence and of the necessity of our collaboration." ^" But the prevailing national mood of withdrawal from what many students of American foreign policy have perceived to be excessive global commitments is incompatible with the requirements of a vigor- ously pursued policy of interdependence.^^s To a great extent this «2a Kissinger, "Challenges of Interdependence," p. 2. «»The direction of U.S. foreign policy at least in the immediate future will be deter- mined largely by the attitudes of the American people. Surveys of American public opinion made in the winter and spring of 1974 reinforce the belief that their attitudes are changing increasingly from internationalist to Isolationist. It is said that isolationism in this country has more than doubled in the last two years and that during the same period interna- tionalist views among Americans have dropped 15 percent to a post-1945 low. "There has been a pronounced tendency to turn Inward, the survey said, because of what was termed the "shattering" effect of the American experience in Vietnam on beliefs in "U.S. pre- dominance in power" and, more important, because of preoccupation with increasing domestic problems. The surveys were planned, financed, and analyzed by Potomac Associates, Inc., and the polling was done by the Gallup organization. One of the survcs relates to testing internationalist attitudes, the other to testing "hopes and fears" of Americans. The inter- nationalist survey was to be published in June 1974 in a book entitled, "A Nation Observed : Perspectives on America's World Role," edited by Donald R. Lesh ; the other survey was to be published in the fall as the second in a series of books called, "State of the Nation," edited by William Watts and Lloyd A. Free. The poll on international views revealed that "total isolationists" increased from 9 percent of a sample polled in 1972 to 21 percent interviewed in 1974. "Total interna- tionalists" declined from 56 percent in 1972 to 41 percent in 1974. An essay based on the international poll revealed among other things that 42 percent of Americans, against 43 percent who disagree, feel that it is no longer important for the United States to be No. 1, that is, "the world's most powerful nation." Most Americans see U.S. power declining as other nations Improve their power positions ; most said they would be satisfied with "essential equivalence" with the Soviet Union. More than half of those surveyed (excluding those expressing no opinion) believed that too much was being spent on defense; 15 per- cent advocated an increase in military expenditures. And a majority of Americans would disapprove of the United States going to the defense of Japan ; only 48 percent would approve the use of military force to help Western Europe. A chart of internationalist-Isolationist trends showed a steady decline in Internationalist feelings — 65 percent in 1964, 59 percent in 1968, 56 percent in 1972, and then the sharp drop to 41 percent in 1974. On the other hand, isolationism held constant from 8 percent in 1964 to 9 percent in 1968 and again 9 percent in 1972 before rising to 21 percent in 1974. The last question in the survey was presented as a proposition : "We shouldn t think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems and building up our strength and prosperity here at home." The survey showed that 77 per- cent agreed with this statement, as against 14 percent who disagreed, and 9 percent who offered no opinion. The 77 percent in agreement contrasted with 55 percent in 1964, 60 percent in 1968, and 7.3 percent in 1972. This growing isolationist spirit was reflected throughout the entire population but was most advanced in rural areas and small communities, the Midwest and West, and among the voung. A striking decline in internationalism occurred among people under 30 years of age^71 percent in 1964 to 42 percent in 1974, a decrease of 29 percent. Mr. Free, a polling specialist and editor of one of the books to be published, concludes his analysis of findings with this warning : "The only prediction that I feel can be made with some confidence is that the greatest complications in international relations over the next decade are likely to stem from violations of expectations ; of what our allies, friends, competitors, and former adversaries expect of the United States, and what Americans expect of themselves and the world as a whole." (Leslie H. Gelb, "Polls Find U.S. Isolationism on Rise, Hope at Ebb, The New York Times, June 16, 1974, p. 3.) 1313 mood, along with other forces noted above, accounts for the declining U.S. interest in international development. Nevertheless, it is possible that a new balance in the foreign policy posture of the Nation may be struck as it recovers from the frustrations of Vietnam and fears of economic instability, and succeeds in resolving some of its more press- ing internal problems so long left unattended and others that now seem to threaten its prestige and integrity in the eyes of the world. As the requirements of interdependence press in upon the Nation's security interests, a rational policy choice may compel reengagement on the broader scene of international development. Meanwhile, as this study points out, the Nation is not without recourse in providing at least some remedies for the brain drain. By taking remedial action a con- tribution, however modest, could be made to aid progress toward development in the most seriously affected LDCs while at the same time advancing the economic and military security of the United States. VIII. Brain Drain: A Force in History, Science, Technology, AND Diplomacy A subject so universal, so wide-ranging in its implications, and so multi faceted, as brain drain defies simple summation. Three trans- cending themes deserve special emphasis for the purposes of this study. They are : ( 1 ) That brain drain is an historical phenomenon with a past, a present, and a future ; (2) That brain drain, as a problem, has special relevance for the modern scientific-technological age ; and (3) That the brain drain problem, lying as it does at the junc- ture of science, technology, and American diplomacy, reveals and is symptomatic of a deeper and far more serious problem : that of this Nation's relations with the LDCs and its foreign policy stance respecting the larger issue of international development as re- lated to U.S. economic health and national security. Brain Drain as an Historical Phenomenon Migration is a natural phenomenon in the history of mankind, and brain drain is one of its unique manifestations. Aii integral part of historical development, brain drain is a process, not an event. It has a past, a present, and a future; the direction of its flow depends upon historical forces that determine the rise and fall of nations, and the ebb and flow of their wealth and power. Scientists and scholars, doc- tors, and other intellectuals going to Athens, Rome, and Alexandria in the Ancient World ; to Bagdad, Bologna, London, and Paris in the Middle Ages ; to France, England, and Germany in the 19th and early 20th centuries; and to the United States in the 20th — were drawn along a magnetic course whose center of attraction was power, wealth, and civilization. A widely accepted principle provided a rational basis for this talent migration throughout history : the principle of self-determination. Without the exercise of this human right there could not have been mobility in the past, nor could there be in the present and future. Motivated by powerful economic, social, intellectual, and political forces, talent migrates to seek its greatest reward. Now, as throughout history, state policies contribute to this flow of talent from nation to nation. The value placed on the acquisition of science and knowledge determines the intensity in applying these policies. Science policy is thus a durable phenomenon in the history of mankind, as indeed is the perception among nation-states of the interrelationship among science, diplomacy, and the acquisition of political power. A persisting awareness of the value of technology and its handmaiden, science, as instrumentalities of progress, politics, and power continues into the contemporary era. (1314) 1315 Relevance of Brain Drain as a Problem of the Contemporary Era The relevance of brain drain as a problem of unique dimensions in the modern era derives from a combination of intellectual, economic, social, political, and diplomatic factors that are themselves rooted in the reality of contemporary scientific-technological civilization. Sci- ence, technology, and economics catalyze the normal forces producing brain drain ; they quicken the process ; they complicate the solution. Yet science and technology do not function in a vacuum ; they evolve in a world environment that has shown marked changes over the past three decades. Unique political and economic conditions created by these changes have encouraged brain drain to flourish as a contempo- rary international phenomenon. The political aspects of the brain drain problem are rooted in the processes of decolonization that have pro- duced a "Third World" of independent states in Asia and Africa. The economic aspects derive from the nature of an evolving and increas- ingly globalizing industrial revolution with parallel developments in the world of science and technology. This revolution has created an expanding world economy, stimulated the universalization of knowl- edge, and generated competing needs and demands, priorities and goals, between the advanced industrial societies and the emerging LDCs. The former seek expanding markets and resources, human and material, for sustaining and enlarging their industrial systems; the latter seek development and modernization of their undeveloped and developing economies so that they can assume positions of some worth in the society of nations. Both are motivated by the imperatives of want; their competitive energies are directed toward the acquisition , of trained professional manpower, a common need for a common pur- pose— development and growth. But the advanced industrial countries possess most of the advan- tages in this competition for human resources; the LDCs have few. Structural maladjustments and inner disequilibria in the country of emigration or immigration, or both, activate "push/pull" forces that inevitably produce brain drain flows from the less developed to the advanced nations. And it is the LDCs which suffer most from disloca- tions that set into operation these brain drain forces. Added incen- tives are often created by state policies that reorder immigration priorities to stress quality over quantity, and that grant other allure- ments at the disposal of the wealthy to induce immigration. The LDCs cannot compete ; the odds are against them. Hence for this drain-off of trained manpower it seems an inescapable conclusion that the most advanced societies bear "universal culpability." The United States, long the mecca of world immigration, has been one of the prime bene- ficiaries ; and though, after nearly a quarter century of massive inflows of professionals, the number of immigrant scientists and engineers declined somewhat from 1972 on, the inflow of foreign physicians and surgeons continues on a steady upward trend. What aggravates the situation for the LDCs is that for nearly a decade the losses of profes- sional immigrants to the United States have been shifting increasingly from the advanced to the emerging countries ; in recent years flows of professionals have been almost entirely from the latter. In the long view of human experience, the brain drain problem can thus be seen as an historical reality, perhaps an historical inevitabil- 1316 ity_but one of unique proportions in the contemporary era. Forces of progress and poverty are in contention; professional trained man- power is the object of struggle. Causes of this problem lie deep in the nature of scientific-technological civilization and m the nature ot newly developing and aspiring societies in the Third World. H^ttects are virtually predetermined by forces turned loose in the struggle tor international development : the gap between rich and poor widens dan- gerously and the potentialities for tension and conflict between ad- vanced and developing societies magnifies. And though the United States may be the gainer in the drain-off of professional manpower from the LDCs, the gains may prove to be more apparent than real as the potential power of the LDCs is brought to bear on the interna- tional scene. For while the effects of the brain drain problem intrude on the Nation's domestic policy and make their presence known m many ways, it is in the realm of foreign policy where science, tech- nology, brain drain, and national policy interconnect in a way that can produce serious implications for the foreign policy goals of this Nation. These implications include economic dislocations, denial of overseas markets, tensions with the "Third World," the withholding of needed raw materials, and eventually a global compartmentaliza- tion of a "Spaceship" that needs to unite to survive. Brain Drain at the Juncture of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy Brain drain is a symptom of underdevelopment; solutions lie largely in the realm of international development; the most essential mecha- nism is nation-building through science and technology. As a foreign policy problem, therefore, brain drain raises the basic question of this* Nation's stance towards international development. Brain drain is essentialljr a foreign policy problem of low visibil- ity ; but even so, it is a testing ground for the vitality of a policy of much larger significance, namely, the Nation's commitment to develop- ment. Solutions for brain drain may be the primary responsibility of the LDCs. particularly the task of institution-building and establish- ing an intrastructure of science and technology as the basis for mod- ernization, but solutions can nfiither be devised nor development goals achieved without assistance from the advanced countries like the United States. Success in diminishing the "push" factors in brain drain and in resolving the dilemma of development by transforming needs into demands would seem to rest upon acceptance of the principle of interdependence as a contemporary fact of life in international affairs. That the United States has an interest in international development on humanitarian grounds goes without saying ; it is a long-established tradition in this Nation's diplomatic history. But development special- ists, among others, urge a more hard-headed appraisal of the national interest, one that requires, out of national interest, rejuvenation and reaffirmation of the Nation's commitment to development. The case is made, in short, from the position of political realism. It would seem beyond dispute that the LDCs, long the cockpit of international ten- sion and conflict in which the United States has not been able to stand aside uninvolved, hold the potentialities for even deeper and rnore dan- gerous involvement. War in South and Southeast Asia, recurring crises 1317 in the Middle East, famine and tribal strife in Africa, are only recent illustrations of the problems that have been shaking the foundations of this volatile, troubled Third World. Economic development, it is argued, offers perhaps the best prospects for peace and stability. Thus the increasingly compelling requirements of political interdependence bind all nations, advanced and underdeveloped, in a common search for peace through economic development. American dependence on mineral resources largely under the con- trol of the LDCs, as development specialists are quick to indicate, points to a new vulnerability for the United States. Awareness of this problem comes at the height of the current energy crisis and suggests what may be a scenario for things to come with Rowing cartelization of world mineral resources and growing consciousness of increased leverage among the LDCs to be used against the advanced industrial nations. Reasons of self-interest appear to warrant a reappraisal of the Nation's posture towards the LDCs and the affirmation of a policy of interdependence. Counterforces hinder solutions to brain drain through economic de- velopment. A mood of withdrawal from extended — possibly over- extended— foreign policy commitments seems to have enveloped the Nation in the post-Vietnam era. Reinforced by other powerful forces, termed isolationist by some observers, this mood has had the effect of restricting foreign policy initiatives and inducing a cautious attitude among lawmakers toward reaffirming traditional but far-reaching foreign policy commitments. Apathy and indifference toward eco- nomic development (and also immigration) is reflected in the attitude and posture of the administration; and thus far in the 1970's the Congress, preoccupied with other pressing matters such as the energy and constitutional crises, has seemed unaware that a problem exists. Persisting difficulties, dilemmas, and paradoxes, make unlikely a long-term, much less a short-term, "solution" of brain drain. The LDCs must cope with severe economic deficiencies, now worsened by the petroleum pricing policies of the Mid-East — yet to do so is the first requirement of development. They are faced with seemingly in- soluble problems in institution-building and in modernizing their tra- ditional societies. They cannot avoid the perplexing dilemma posed by adherence to democratic principles of human rights, while taking measures to check emigration ; nor can they avoid the dilemma inher- ent in the natural inequalities of opportunity among peoples and nation-states. On its part the United States is thrust into the position of coping with declining interest among the American people in international development and with what the present study has found to be a vir- tually nonexistent present concern for brain drain as a foreign policy issue. It is faced with the dilemma posed by restricting immigration selectively, while seeking the right balance of adherence to the demo- cratic principle of free movement of people. It seems to have no other course than to come to terms with the paradox presented by potential loss through brain drain in educating the untrained in the nation- building process, and also with the further paradox inherent in the "permanent draw" of the disadvantaged to an advanced scientific- technological civilization. 1318 In the face of many perplexing ambiguities and conflicting trends, perhaps the most that can be expected atthe present juncture in U.S. foreign policy is that brain drain and the larger problem of interna- tional development be placed on the agenda of matters to be attended to when the Nation has recovered its balance, slowed its retreat from international involvement, and is prepared to resume a larger, and some would say a more creative, role in world affairs. This course, re- q[uiring a vision of the future and a reassessment of this Nation's place in it, would seem to be unavoidable, one dictated by self-interest, not a matter of moral conscience or mere national preference. For in the judgment of students of development and brain drain, one of the major challenges to mankind remains the challenge of finding ways to put the LDCs on a course leading to a self-reinforcing upward spiral of social and economic progress. The ultimate goal of this endeavor would be a world in balance, with economic and social opportunity within the grasp of all inhabitants and a sense of hope in all nations. chapter 14 — Science and Technology in the Department of State: Bringing Technical Content Into Diplomatic Policy and Operations CONTENTS Page I. Introduction 1325 Science, Technology, and the Growth of Interdependence 1325 Goals of Technologj- Diplomacy 1826 Statement of the Problem of Technical Diplomacy 1327 Institutional Effects of Technological Change 1328 Changed Role of the Department of State 1328 Scope and Limitations of the Study 1329 Some Necessary Definitions of Terms 1330 Some Issues To Be Explored 1332 Uniqueness Versus Commonality of Problems 1332 Specialist Versus Generalist 1332 Present Versus Future Orientation 1333 Diplomacy of Science Versu>s Diplomacy of Technologj' 1333 Policy Versus Operations in the Department of State 1334 II. Emergence of Science and Technology as Major Factors in Di- plomacy 1335 Postwar Elevation of Science and Technologj' 1336 London Science Office 1337 Wartime Problems of the Department of State 1337 Experiment of the Department of State in the Diplomacy of Science 1337 Output of the London Office 1338 Problems in Recruiting Scientists 1339 Assessment of the State Science Experiment 1340 The Berkner Report on Science and Foreign Relations 1341 Berkner Design for Science Office 1344 The Plan for Scientific Attaches 1345 Effects of the Berkner Report 1346 III. Implementation of the Berkner Report: 1951-1965 1348 Brief Tenure of the Office lo48 Reactivation of the Program After Sputnik 1349 The Impact of Sputnik 1350 Pressure for Expanded Science Function 1351 Response by the State Department 1352 Assessment of Early SCI Performance 1353 Need for Attention to Technology -'^2^ In.sistence on Scientific Eminence ^^^5 Further Reviews of Science in State 1355 Unsuccessful Quest for New Science Director 1356 IV. Growth of the Science Office, 1966-1974 1358 Endorsement of Science Program by Secretaries of State 1358 Evolution of SCI ; Expanded Duties 1359 1361 1362 1362 1362 Exposition by Pollack of SCI's Role Continued Growth During the Nixon Presidency__- Advisory Committees Advisory Concentration in State SCI Efforts to Bridge State With the Science Community 1364 Growth of the State Science Office 136o Functions and Ta.sks of SCI by 1974 1366 Contributions to Policy Planning 13G6 Relations With Other Coimtries 130' Coordination of U.S. Technical Mission Agencies 1367 (1321) 97-400 O - 77 - 46 1322 IV. Growth of the Science Office, 1966-1974— Continued Functions and Taslvs of SCI by 1974 — Continued Page Management and Dissemination of Technical Information- 1367 Facilitating the Work of Scientists 1368 Increasing "Technical Literacy" in the Department of State 1308 Administrative Chores 1368 Organization of the Bureau of Oceans and International En- vironmental and Scientific Affairs 1369 Prospects and Plans for New Bureau 1370 The Inspector General's Assessment of SCI ]372 Importance of the Function 1372 Weaknesses of SCI 1374 Strengths of SCI 1374 Recommendations of the Report 1375 V. Scientific Diplomacy 1376 Early Stirrings: Ad Hoc Scientific Attach^ 1376 Nongovernmental Scientific Attaches in World War I 1377 Early Origins of World War I Scientific Attache Program__ 1378 Overseas Operations _ 1379 The Years 1919-39 1380 Developments After World War II 1381 Post-Sputnik Scientific Attach^ Expansion 1382 The Question of Length of Tenure of the Scientific Attache- l:j8o Qualifications of Scientists as Diplomats 1384 Expanding Functions of Scientific Attachfe 1386 Brief Survey of the Contemporary Role of the Science Attache- 1387 Questionnaire for U.S. Scientific Attaclies 1387 Illustrative Products of Scientific Attaches 3389 Abstracts of Attach^ Reports 1389 The Importance of Coupling 1391 Present Status and Emphasis on Science in U.S. Embassies 1393 Possible Modifications 1395 VI. Emergence of the Bilateral Science Agreement 1396 Evolution and Multiplication of Science Bilaterals 1396 The United States-France Program of Scientific and Tech- nological Cooperation 1398 The U.S.-U.S.S.R. Science Bilateral 1398 Proliferation of Agreements 1400 Purposes, Advantages, and Disadvantages of Bilaterals 1402 Advantages 1402 Disadvantages 1403 Tangible Returns From Cooperative Bilateral Research and Development 1404 Proliferation of Bilateral Programs 1407 The Joint Commissions 1407 Efforts to Coordinate Bilateral Science Agreements 1408 The Need for Further Rationalization and Coordination of Bilaterals 1410 VII. Science, Technology-, and the Foreign-Policy-Making Process, 1411 Inherent Incompleteness of State Department Mission 1411 Minority Partner in Overseas Operations 1411 Policy Planning Organization and Reorganization 1412 The Nature of the Foreign Policy Planning Process 1415 Importance of Science and Technology for Foreign Policy Planning 1416 Policy Planning Staff. Departmental "Think Tank" 1418 Present Organization and Functions of the Policy Planning Staff 1420 Relations Between OES and Policy Planning Staff 1422 Future Policy Impacts of Science and Technology 1423 Some Concluding Observations on Policy 1425 VIII. Opportunities for Expanded Technical Expertise in State 1427 Need for an Inventory of Opportunities 1428 The Regional Bureaus 1428 1323 VIII. Opportunities for Expanded Technical Expertise in State — Con. Need for an Inventory of Opportunities— Con. Special Case of Bureau of International Organization Paee Affairs 1429 Science and Technology in the Functional Bureaus 1430 Scientific and Technological Potential of the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs 1430 Importance of the Relationship of Technology With Economics 1432 The Foreign Information Function and Technological Change — 1436 IXR Organizational Uncertainties 1438 Technical Literacy in the Foreign Service; the Institute 1440 The Specialist-Generalist Issue 1441 Efforts To Increase Technical Interest in State 14-J3 Origins and Purposes of the Foreign Service Institute 1443 Options for Increasing the Technical Content of the FSI Curriculum 1446 Some Possible Purposes of Expanded Departmental Attention to Science and Technology 1448 IX. Congressional Concern With Science in the Department of State — 1450 Congressional Contract To Study Science Impacts on Foreign Policy 1450 Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on Scientific Diplomacy 1451 Early Congressional Look at Organization for Interna- tional Science Policy Coordination 1452 Congressional Actions To Strengthen Diplomatic Resources in Science 1453 Congressional Reviews of Trends in International Science and Technology 1454 Investigation of Changes in the Diplomatic Environment-^ 1455 Diplomatic Uses and Effects of Science and Technology... 1457 Draft Science Policy Bill 1461 Broad Congressional Interest in Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy 1462 Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy 1464 Growth of International Technological Concerns of Congress.. 1464 Topics Examined by the Committee on International Relations 1465 Topics Examined by the House Committee on Science and Technology 1465 Observations on the Annual Programs of the International Relations and Science and Technology Committees 1465 Implications for the Congress of Science in State 1466 A Congressional Policy Planning Staff 1467 The Problem of Credibility 1468 X. Science and Technology in Future American Diplomacy 1469 Major Challenges to Future U.S. Diplomacy 1469 Some Informal Departmental Views 1470 Science as Cause and Cure 1472 Interconnectedness of Diplomatic Problems of the Future 1473 Revitalizing the Department of State for Initiative and Leader- ship 1474 Proposals To Strengthen Technical Diplomatic Machinery 1476 The Strengthening of 10 1476 Strengthening the Presidential Policy System in Non- military Areas '_ 1477 A Stronger Policy Planning Mechanism in the Department of State 1477 Strengthening the Functional Bureaus 1478 Foreign Service Officer Training 1479 Technology Transfer and the Multinational Corporation 1479 Continuing Importance and Increasing Scope of International Basic Science 1483 Nongovernmental Preferences of Scientists 1485 Sources of Foreign Policy Initiatives in Science and Technology. 1487 1324 Page XI. Summary and Concluding Observations 1490 Distinctive Position of the Department of State 1490 Staffing the State Department for Technological Diplomacy 1491 Options To Increase Technical Literacy 1492 Strengthening Field Staffs 1492 Differing Treatment of Scientific and Technological Matters— 1493 The Science Role 1493 The Technological Role 1493 Coordination of Foreign Activities of U.S. Technical Mission Agencies 1495 State and Presidential Policymaking in Science 1497 Congressional Institutions for Technical Foreign Policy Plan- ning 1500 Congressional Research Service 1500 Office of Technology Assessment 1501 Joint Committee on National Security Affairs 1502 A Congressional Office 1503 A Concluding Comment 1503 TABLES 1. Political, Economic, Military, and Scientific Personnel in U.S. Em- bassies. 19 Selected Countries 1394 2. Science and Technology Counselors and Attaches and Fisheries Attaches at U.S. Missions Abroad 1394 3. U.S. Bilateral Science Programs, January 1975 1401 4. Bilateral Science and Technology Agreements Managed by NSF 1409 5. National Security Council Staff Positions 1421 6. Members of the Policy Planning Staff Concerned With "Science and Technology Related" Problems 1421 7. Composition of a Sample U.S. Mission 1427 8. FSOs by Educational Major 1441 9. Average Age by Grade of Specialists and Generalists, June 30, 1962 1441 10. Foreign Service Institute Course Syllabus : Science, Technology and Foreign Affairs , 1445 11. An I'nofficial Listing of "Science and Technology Based Foreign Policy Issues'" Prepared in 1972 1471 FIGURES 1. Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs Organization Chart 1373 2. Matrix Analysis of Technological Interrelations 1474 CHAPTER 14— SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE: BRINGING TECHNICAL CON- TENT INTO DIPLOMATIC POLICY AND OPERATIONS I. T.NTUODUCTIOX Tliis is the coiuliulinjj: ^iib-iaiitivc study in tli(> >(M-ios on "Science, 'iVchnoloiry, and American Diplomacy." It identifies and e.\!imin(>s thos(! elements of the Department of State where science and tedi- nolofiy int(>fact with diplomat} . 'J'he i)urpo-t> of the study is to iHs- cover leirislative opj)oit unities to stivnirthen the Department's ir- soui'ces (a) to cany out those of its diplomatic functions that iiave a substantial technical content, and (b) to extend the reach of it^ policy ])laiminir in diplomatic trends and conct^rns that are o;ravely intlueneed l)y the rush of technoloa/>o/i» and Forniin Policy (Now York: lInr|>or and lliolhpis (or tlio Council on Kort'lgn lidntlons, l'J.>7), pp. 3-4. A conciiiriiiK opinion comes from the discipline of psycliology: If coercion tins p:issrd the llniils of ullllty as a innuis for adjiistlnp dlfToro'iccs ainouR states, means nm.sl lie funnd In limit llie nsi- of foicc and, sinnilliinconsly, to snbslitule otlior ways of exer- cIsliiK inllneni-e. Tlie discovi i y tli.il artion ioaj73), p. 40. (\'ivian J{ohrl\\edK<' is a psychologist and Uryunt Wcdije is u physician.) NOTE : This chapter was prepared in 1975 by Franklin P. Huddle. (1325) 1326 No nation has been more extensively altered technologically in cul- ture or economics than has the United States, as measured by: — The substitution of machine power for manual power in homes and work places; — The move from field, forest, and mine to offices and service occupations; — Personal transportation, communications networks, and computer services; and — Consumption of fossil fuels and industrial materials. By these means also, the United States has increased the dependence on supplies of industrial and energ}'^ materials froni foreign sources, while other nations have increased their dependence on the United States in the need for food, educational facilities, technical assistance, and economic stabilit}^ As a consequence of technology, the United States has led the world in bringing about a global structure of inter- national interdependence. The multinational corporation is a com- mercial manifestation of this development; and the worldwide accept- ance of the products of U.S. science and invention is a technical mani- festation of the same. In his nationally televised "State of the World" address before a joint session of Congress on April 10, 1975, President Gerald R. Ford identified technology as presenting "a vast new agenda of issues in an interdependent world." He called on technology to close the food- population gap, urged cooperation among nations in developing the world's ocean resources, spoke of the need to create new world institu- tions and practices in trade, finance, and raw materials, and declared that among the areas for U.S. leadership was the harnessing of tech- nology to the service of mankind while protecting the environment. It is "our goal in this new era," he said, to reconcile the "interests and the aspirations of the developed and developing nations ... in a manner that is both realistic and humane." Goals of Technological Diplomacy The conduct of diplomacy involves a balancing of competition and cooperation, of competing national aspirations and shared international concerns. To the extent that the balance tilts toward international cooperation the prospect is one of peace; a tilt in the other direction leads to the prospect of tension and conflict. This is, of course, an oversimplification; competition in trade, athletics, and scientific achievement implies an extensive degree of cooperation among com- petitoi's. One aim of diplomacy would seem to be to confine competition to these kinds of competitive-cooperative endeav^or, while resolving diplomatically the issues arising out of such competition. In calibrating kinds of human endeavor as to their relative propen- sity for generating conflict, a distinction can be made between science and technology. Science, the pursuit of knowledge, is almost inherently international. Technology, on the other hand, is more closely bound to national power and interest. In the words of a prominent technologist : World leadership and technological leadership are inseparable. A third-rate tech- nological nation is a third-rate power, politicallj^ economically, and socially. . . . If we lose our national resolve to keep our position on the pinnacle of technology, the historical role of the United States can only go downhill.^ 2 U.S. Conaress, Senate, Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, Hearings to inquire into the state of the aerospace industry, its importance in achieving the goals set forth in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, and the relevance cf those goals to our nation's future, 93d Cong., 1st .^ess., Sep*- tember 26 and 27. 1973, pp. 202-203. Statement by Dr. Wernher von Braun, vice-president, engineering and development, Fairchild Industries, Inc. 1327 This view, expressed by a man long active in the space program and in private industry, is echoed in the academic community: Since the end of World War II, the world economy has undergone a major transformation. . . . The effects of the contemporary technological revolution upon economic and commercial activities have been of primary importance. [And later on, in the same article.] To b, degree perhaps unparalleled in the past, economic and technological considerations will shape the ways in which political interests and confUcts seek their expression and work themselves out. In a world where nuclear weaponry has inhibited the use of military power and where social and economic demands play an inordinate role in the political life, the choice, success, or failure of a nation's technological strategy will influence in large measure its place in the international pecking order and its capacity to solve its domestic problems.' Statement of the Problem of Technical Diplomacy The main hj^pothesis of the present study is- that science and technology are in fact important and perhaps separable ingredients of diplomacy, and that they warrant explicit organizational provision in the Department of State and in the conduct of U.S. diplomacy. The problem, then, is to characterize the elements of U.S. foreign policy and the elements of both science and technology that interact most strongly with it, and to examine legislative or organizational options to strengthen the performance of the Department of State in the design and conduct of U.S. diplomacy. This main proposition suggests a number of apparent requirements. For example : — The need to organize the Department of State most effectively to exploit selectively the unique strength of the United States in both its science and its technolog}^; — The need for the Department of State to anticipate the need for, and to initiate, action — especially future-oriented action — in these fields, rather than responding to foreign pressures; — The need to understand the processes by which technological innovations, and their wide use, produce changes in the dip- lomatic environment ; — The need to increase the technical sophistication of the practi- tioners of diplomacy at all levels and in most — if not all — organizational units ; — The need to translate the generalized and normative goals of American foreign policy into operational goals to which American technological superiority can effectively contribute ; — The need to establish a closer functional relationship between the specific and concrete goals of foreign policy and domestic programs of science and technology and to enlist the communities of science and technology in support of these foreign pohcy goals; and lastly, — The need for a close relationship in diplomatic policy planning involving the White House, the Executive Office of the President, the Department of State, and Government agencies having international technical missions. The role of the Department of State in the formulation and imple- mentation of foreign poUcy is a central variable: strong Presidents take up diplomacy as a personal task, while leaving the chores and less interesting initiatives to the Department; conversely, some strong ' Robert Gilpin, "Technological Strategies and National Purpose," Science, July 31, 1970, pp. 441. 448. The author is professor of politics and international affairs, and faculty associate, Center of International Studies, Princeton University. 1328 Secretaries of State may occupy a commanding position in the formula- tion of diplomatic policy, while sparing less attention for the mundane administrative chores of running a department; either way, the interest of a strong diplomatic leader in science and technology as ingredients of diplomacy may or may not be strong. Institutional Effects of Technological Change World leadership of the United States, political and technological, during and after World War II, brought with it a vast increase in international involvement of many Federal departments and agencies. During the 19th century, the brunt of foreign contacts was borne by the Department of State, and the burden was not onerous. How- ever, today most major Federal departments and agencies have an "international" division, bureau, or office. Most of the attention of these units is addressed to matters of international science or tech- nolog\. In view of the fact that technology brought about most of these institutional changes, it is not surprising that the bulk of the foreign contacts of U.S. agencies have a technological content. In its role as coordinator of these foreign contacts, the Department of State is mainly concerned with their political consequences. Yet political and technical causes and consequences tend to be intertwined, and there is inescapably a technical element in the political and diplomatic coordination of foreign technical contacts. Changed Role of the Department of State At the same time, technology has brought about a marked altera- tion in the structure and mission of the Department of State. Tradi- tional isolationism in the 19th century left the Department with little to do: negotiating commercial treaties, facilitating foreign travel of U.S. nationals, and resolving a few maritime disputes. "... A Chief Clerk with seven subordinates served John Quincy Adams; and the staff of the Department of State numbered less than a hundred as late as the turn of the century." [Continues this author] There was a true continuity in the Department of State's business. For the most part, it handled a steady flow of two-way com- munications concerning the commercial and other private problems in which American citizens traveling or conducting business abroad became involved; and it noted and filed the endless flow of dispatches forwarded by those on foreign service, describing the state of things in the parts of the world to which they were assigned. Down to the First World War [and even to 1939], the great acts of foreign policy — the issues which get into the books on diplomatic history — were so few and ifar between that they were handled personally by the Secretary of State, usually in intimate consultation with the President; or they were directly handled by the President himself.* Even in its traditional roles, the Department of State has enor- mously increased the volume of its business. As new nations emerge, there is the requirement that American interests be represented there by a formal mission and frequently by consular offices as well. The flood of incoming correspondence from these offices needs to be proc- essed by geographic and functional bureaus in Washington. The pro- liferating agencies of the United Nations require both representation and attention. A long list of new contacts abroad, many of them * W. W. Rostow, The United Stales in the World Arena: An Essay in Recent Historv (New York: Harper & Row, I960), pp. 20-30. 1329 teclinological in mission or concern, have also been added to this busi- ness. For a few random samples : Foreign aid Multinational corporations Military deployments (in extent and purposes) Intelligence Treaty organizations Bilateral science and technology agreements Peace Corps Exchange students Foreign oflaces of U.S. agencies USIS offices Research offices of U.S. agencies abroad Astronomical and weather observatories Foreign procurement offices Space and communications stations Agricultural inspection stations Oceanic research vessels Scope and Limitations of the Study These studies of "Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy" aim to identify some of the main areas of congressional concern under this title. This study focuses on the Department of State as the operational and policy center of U.S. diplomatic involvement with the rest of the world. The study is concerned with elements of the Depart- ment that deal, or that might deal, with scientific or technological events and trends with international implications. The study examines the organizational elements of the Department other than arms control (the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency), foreign assistance (U.S. Agency for International Development), and overseas information (U.S. Information Agencj^. Of primary interest in the study are: — The core science and technology unit of the Department, recently renamed the "Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs." (With so cumbersome a title, it is understandable that the term "and Technological" was omitted, but the present scheme of organization shows that it is implicit. Its code designation in the Department is "OES".) ; — The system of science attaches in U.S. Embassies abroad; — The Bureau for International Organizations; — The functional bureaus generally; and —The Policy Planning Staff. Collectively, these units provide liaison on scientific matters to other governments, service U.S. representatives to international organiza- tions, coordinate foreign activities of U.S. technical agencies, provide support for U.S. activity in bilateral agreements, participate in inter- national technical conferences, contribute to policy formulation in the National Security Council, prepare speech drafts for the President and the Secretary of State on international technical matters, and identify priority technical problems and issues for diplomatic preparation and treatment. Several other elements in the Department could contribute to its capability in these functions, but do not appear to have realized their potential. One of these is the Foreign Service Institute, charged with 1330 performing; the inliouse training function for the Foreign Service. In 19G4, the Institute had underway an ambitious program in science and technology, but it has gradually dwindled away. Another eleuK nt witli some promise is the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. Here, too, a small elfort in science policy analysis was tcntativel}' begun and then abandoned in a time of departmental retrenchment. The many other agencies involved in international technical pro- grams will be discussed onh' as they relate to the Department of State. No comparisons will be drawn between the U.S. Depart iiient of State and comparable institutions of other governments, although this would probably be an instructive exercise. The approach taken here will be to describe first the evolution of the present structure of State Department science and technology activi- ties and then to consider the functioning, the strengths aral weaknesses, and the future prospects, of these activities. Inferences can sometimes be (h'aw 11 as to possibilities of legislative action to eliminate weaknesses and exploit opportunities. Some Necessary Definitions of Terms Up to this point in the series the i)idividual papers have dealt es- sentially with mission-oi'iented subjects. Except for the International Geophysical Year (IGY) study,'' the papers have emphasized issues of api)lied research and tecluiology. These helds proihice most of the isr,ucs that require diplomatic resolution. However, tlie present study proposes to deal with the entire spectrum of science and teclmology. Since one possible question concerns the desirability of organizing separately tlie in-litutions for diplomatic handling of different parts of the science-technology spectrum, the terms should be defined that mark off the divisions of the specti"um.° For purpcj^es of this study, then, Science is defined as any systematic activitx' to discover facts and lelationship in some discrete category of the physical world, liesearcli is an indeterminate term because it can apply equally to science and teclmology, or to the manij)ulation of literature. In technical fields, basic research is "scientific" w idle applied research is associated with "tlevelopment" as a kind of technological activit}'. Put simply, basic resf\arcli or "science" seeks knowledge; applied research and development seek useful options; and technolcgy puts these options to productive uses. Another way of explaining these terms in the present context is that science ascertains what is theoretically possible; teclmology deter- mines what is feasible and economically practicable; and politics rules on what is publicly acceptable. For convenience, the terms "scienti- fic" and "technological" are sometimes lumped together under the more general term "technical" in this stud3\ Teclmology transfer is a process b\^ which a given technique (i.e., technolog3') is substantiall>" moved from one set of users to another. ■'• U.S. ronprr=«, linns'", f'ommit'op on Foreign Affairs, T}te Poli'ical Legacy of the JhlfTnati'mal eico- phijsiyil Yenr, in the sori-";. Science, Technology, and American Diploniacy. prepared for tne Subooiniiiitlee on National Security I'oiicy und Scieutiric Develuiiments. by Harold Builis. Analyst in Scie'ic' a;id Tech- nology. Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Con- gress. See vol. I, pp. 293-360. ' For a ninie i xtendod treatment of the leniis used in this section see: U.S. Conf^ress, TIon.se, Committee on Science and Astronautics, bcitnce Policy: A Working Glossary, 93d Cousi., 1st sess., l'J73, 'J'J pp. (.Commii- tee print.) 1331 Technology forecasting is an emerging set of techniques for estimating probable future changes m specific applications of science and tech- nology, including both what and when. Discussions of international science and technology tend to assess relative levels of accomplishment among nations. National achieve- ment in science is measured in such terms as outstanding discoveries, Nobel prizes awarded, funds available for scientific research, and numbers of persons awarded highest academic degrees in scientific fields. On the other hand, technological level is measured by a nation's gross national product and its rate of growth, military potency, achievements in such difficult fields as space and atomic energy, the productivity of industry, numbers of patents awarded its nationals, number of graduate engineers, and — speaking internationally — a favorable balance of royalties received over royalties paid and con- tributions of industry to balance of payments. Distmctions can also be drawn between the "community of science" and the "community of technology." A later section will discuss the character and structure of the community of science. Traditionally cooperative, international, highly discipline-oriented, this community characteristically exchanges information, judges the excellence of the work of its own members, discipline by discipline, and tends to coalesce in specialized research centers. The "community of tech- nology" is much less coherent, if indeed it is a "community" at all. In the United States, most of its members serve private industry. Although technical societies are common, with perhaps several million members, and technical journals disclose a great deal of tech- nical mformation, the most valuable infoimation tends to be withheld from publication. International associations of engineers are neither very large nor very active. In drawing this distinction between scientists and teclmologists, the national role of the scientist should not be neglected. Despite the many international attachments, scientists are commoiJy aware of and tend to serve their own coiuitry's interests. Technologists also may divide .their attention between national and international interests, although their international affiliations tend to be more commercial than intellectual. It is commonly held that the main means of international transfer of technology is the multinational corporation. The extent to which the patent system of the United States effects technology" transfer is somewhat controversial because what is disclosed in a patent may be less useful than what is withheld (i.e., "trade secrets"). J^ is common for American corporations to have a hierarchy of "security classifi- cations" of their technology ranging from "company private," "proprietary," "company confidential," to "company secret." One last distinction should be made between science and technology: the amount of money invested. Few fields of science involve large costs, and in these (for example, large particle accelerators, astronomi- cal observatories, seabed drilling, Antarctic expeditions, space explora- tion, and weather studies), the bulk of the outlay is for the technology used in the research. Because of these high costs, there has been a grov/ing tendency for scientists of several nations to work in multi- national research teams sharing costly facilities. However, apart from these "big science" fields, costs of technological development 1332 tend to be larger by orders of magnitude than the investment in the scientific discovery on which a new technology is based. It is a commonplace observation that science provides the "seedbed" of technology, and to some extent this is true. But a great deal of technology evolved almost independently of science — for example, the processing of steel, copper, and aluminum; vulcanizing of rubber; and many of the early American inventions in agricultural implements and machinery. It might also be said that technology is the "seedbed" of science, in that the successful development of a new technique raises questions that only science can i;inswer, and whenever science departs from theory for experiment it must resort to technology for its instruments. The point is that while science and , technology interact at many points and merge into each other, it is possible that they can be differentiated and separate!}' treated. Some Issues To Be Explored Under the broad question of how to mobilize the resources of the Department of State in the uses of science and technology' for U.S. diplomatic goals, five subordinate issues warrant consideration. These are: (1) the ad hoc approach of diplomacy versus the systems approach of technology; (2) the issue of specialist versus generalist; (3) the issue of emphasizing present problems versus planning for a longer range future; (4) the issue of distinguishing the diplomatic impacts of science versus those of technology; and (5) the issue of emphasizing policy versus operations. UNIQUENESS VERSUS COMMONALITY OF PROBLEMS Some critics allege that every diplomatic problem tends to be approached as unique, and that therefore no orderly, systematic diplomatic method is acceptable to the practitioners. To the extent that this is so, it is presumably because the main preoccupation of diplomacy is with a complex, infinitely varied process of accommoda- tions between people — people of ^videly differing cultures — rather than with the relatively straightforward process of accommodation between man and nature or man and machine. The scientist or engi- neer, by contrast, seeks to find simplifying common elements and workable general methodologies to help solve his problems in a uni- verse that he recognizes as dynamic and ever-changing. Such general- izations, of course, are at best approximate and partial. Yet to the extent thatrthey are valid they suggest a problem of communication and an obstacle to cooperation between the technical and the diplo- matic communities. SPECIALIST VERSUS GENERALIST A persistent issue in the manning of the U.S. Foreign Service is whether to emphasize recruitment of persons with special expertise or persons having a broad, general education with presumed adapt- ability. The issue is many-sided: what specialties are most needed? Can they be recruited and trained up to the necessary level? Should promotion be arbitrarily given equally as between specialists and 1333 ^eneralists? Might specialists be brought into the Service at appro- priate levels as needed, on a teraporar}^ basis? Is it fair to specialists to convert them into generalists in order for them to merit progress lip the promotion ladder? Can the Foreign Service Officer be both? There appears to be merit in the contention that the Foreign Service Officer needs to know quite a lot to qualify, and to learn a lot more to succeed. To expect him to be both broad and deep, adaptable and authoritatively knowledgeable, is asking a good deal. PRESENT VERSUS FUTURE ORIENTATION Another allegation is that the- U.S. diplomatic community tends to take problems as they arise, and has difficulty in projecting future problems or opportunities. Schools of international affairs have developed no diplomatic literature or predictive techniques that compare w4th the extensive speculative literature of science and technology, all the way from Steinmetz's forecasts of the early 1920s to contemporary "Delphi" projects. The predictive' power of tech- nology forecasting is significant and growing. But even though there is an abundance of observations of the ways in which technological change has altered the world of diplomacy in recent years, there are few responsible attempts to derive from present-day technology forecasts an idea of how the anticipated technological changes will modify the future diplomatic world. Further, the Uterature on the specifics of diplomatic adaptation to technology-induced changes in the diplomatic world is singularly bleak. DIPLOMACY OF SCIENCE VERSUS DIPLOMACY OF TECHNOLOGY An issue that has not really surfaced in the Department of State is that of distinguishing the diplomatic impacts of science from those of technology. In the definitions presented above, a number of distinc- tions were drawn between science and technology. From the point of view of the diplomat, some of these distinctions may be useful. For example, the diplomat has learned that he can make extensive use of the international orientation and cooperativeness of the scientist to help bridge across national cultural differences. The diplomatic impacts of science seem to be mainly in human relations and largely intra- disciplinary.'' On the other hand, the diplomatic impacts of technology are more profound and broader: military weaponry and arms control, technical assistance and technology transfers, international standards, mineral resource exploitation and control, competition in computers, international communications and air transportation systems, patent policy, economic growth, energy embargoes, the green revolution in plant genetics, chemical fertilizers and pesticides, and many other problems and opportunities in technological diplomacy come to mind. One possible difference between science and technology — in terms of diplomatic impact — concerns timing and predictability. Since tech- nology is usually based on known scientific phenomena, its impacts tend to be more predictable and on a somewhat shorter time scale than those of scientific discovery. On this basis, diplomatic attention ' That is to say, the high energy physicists, geneticists, geophysicists, solid state scientists, and practi- tioners of aU the myriad of other sub-disciplines of the sciences communicate freely across national bound- aries— f)erhaps more freely than across disciplinary boundaries or from the field of science to the "other culture." 1334 to technological trends would seem to be a rewarding; exercise in policy planning. On the other hand, the bridging effect of international scientific cooperation also offers opportunities for diplomatic exploitation. POLICY VERSUS OPERATIONS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE One issue that appears to be inherent across the entire spectrum of the responsibilities and missions of the Department of State is that of policy versus operations. Ever since World War II, the Department has been caught up in an enormous volume of da3-to-day operations: — Foreign travel of U.S. nationals; — Trade problems; — Exchange students; — Foreign aid; — Telling the American story abroad ; * — Assisting other Federal agencies with overseas missions, — Greatly expanded consulate system; — Increased size and number of embassies ; — Great array of U.N. and other international activities; — Digesting incoming flow of cables ; — Increased number of contacts with new countries; and — U.S. leadership in making these contacts of increasing mo- ment. Operations inherently impose insistent demands for immediate attention while planning for the longer term future can always be put off. The planning may be more important, but operations tend to be more urgent. In principle, operational chores ought to be handled at the lowest possible level m the administrative hierarchy, but diplomatic errors at this level tend to generate headaches higher up. (An injudicious postcard can turn into an international incident.) Yet, urgent opera- tional demands on staff attention can distract attention from the thinking-through of big problems, the planning of large new initiatives, and the sorting-out of uncommon subtleties. This unresolved adminis- trative issue will become increasingly nagging as short-term problems of science and technology multiply, while at the same time the oppor- tunities for large initiatives tend to be neglected for want of staff time and attention. ir. Emergence of Sciexc e and Te(hnolo(;v as Major Factors IN Diplomacy !ii tlio CJiiiv yr>;ii-^ of llio Kei)ii])lir, scionco and tcclinolojry were (juiic fio>ol\- intoiTolaletl with Ajncrican diplomacy. RoproMMitiiiii; I he icvcltiiis: colonic^ in Paris, B(Mijainiii Franklin as bolii scientist and !('( liiiolooist won rosjKvl on this account. Wlicn tho first ])atent h!W wa-^ a(iopted in 1790, its designated achninistrator was thi' iir>t Secret ai-y ol" State, Tl)onias Jefferson, himself a technologisr of note. Siinihirlv, tlie U.S. Mint (who>e first director was the (Hstinguished American astrononier. David Rittenhonse), and the first efforts to estabhsh a bureau of weight-, and measures, were associated with tlie Department of State. It was an intei-e-ting feature of the eariy 19th century lliat wars did nut foreclos(! international sr-ienfiflc a(;tivit\-. Frankhn wrote? a ciicuhir letter to all navid commandeis in 1779 lecommeiuHng that they give safe passage to "'tliat ipo^t celel)raled Navigator and Discoverer Captain Cook." Biiti>h scientist-^ lecimcd in Paris (huing the war tliat foHowed the I'rencii Kevohilion. Tlu'ougliout the Wav of 1812, Ferdinand Rudolph Ifas-^ler ]-einaine{. Jfowevor, after tlie pre-idency of John Quincy Adams, interactions of (li))lomat^ — and Government officials generally — with s<;ienee and lechnoiogy appear to have diminished. Jn the main, the modern concei-n of the Department of State with science and technology dates from the close of World War J I. It wa^, from lieic in 194G that the Ache^on-T^ilienthal Rejjort ** was drafted, proposing a diplomatic initiative to bring tlic newly developed technology of atomic energy under international control. Atomic energy, though a major factor, was only one of a number of de\('lopments that called attention to the postv»"ar imjiortance for diplonuu y of science and technology. For example, consider the follow- ing summarv: — A major element of the newly created United Nations Organization was the creation of subordinate international institutions with a large content of science and technology (the World Health Organization; the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; tlic Food and Agricultiu'c Organization; and. others); — There was the recognition of the need to restore tlic global network of scientific societies, disrupted ])y war, that offered many positive values of international cominuni(;alion; *U.S. Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Biruch Plnti: U.S. Diplomacy Enters The Nuclear Age, in the series. Science, Technology, and American Diplomac.v. prepared for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments, by Leneice N. Wu, Analyst in International Relations, Foreign Affairs Division. Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1972. (See vol. I, pp. 53-122.) The Committee that prepared the Acheson-Lilienthal Report was appointed by James F. Byrnes, Secretary of State ; it was chaired by Dean Acheson, Assistant Secretary. (1335) 1336 — There was an early recognition of the need to mobilize technology to repair war damage and to restore the economies of devastated nations of Europe, and to afford an avenue for economic development of poor countries elsewhere; — There was the recognition of the many important contribu- tions of scientists to the U.S. war effort, under the leadership of Vannevar Bush as Director of the wartime Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), and the expectation that a great impetus in industrial technology would follow the close of the war; and — Less evident, but still consequential, was the concept that national excellence in science and technology was a form of demonstration of national power and world influence.^ Postwar Elevation of Science and Technology Faith in the contributions of science and technology to national well being, which had waned during the Great Depression of the 1930s, appeared to have been restored by the demonstrated wartime accom- plishments in technology. A remarkable ferment was evident in scientific and technological agencies and their associated communities in the National Capital immediately after World War II. The activity centered on the highly dramatic issue of what to do about the "Man- hattan District" that had produced the atomic bomb. But the transi- tion of this wartime arrangement into the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission was accompanied by revelations of the "now it can be told" variety from many other sources. The War Department released details about its secret proximit}^ fuze. The Department of the Navy disclosed its radar achievements. The Senate Mobilization Subcom- mittee held lengthy hearings on 'U.S. science at war, and entertained proposals for a permanent postwar science establishment. (These eventuated in 1950 in the National Science Foundation.) The Office of Naval Research (ONR) was stimulated to undertake an impressive expansion in the sponsorship of basic research. The report by Vannevar Bush and his associates in OSRD ^° calling for a national research foundation was followed in 1947 by the report of John R. Steelman to President Truman on national science policy." Bush himself was brought into the Pentagon in early 1947 to chair a new Research and Development Board to sustain in peacetime some of the wartime cooperation between academic science and the military services. An important feature of much of this activity was the emphasis on "science" by scientists whose labors during the war had been mainly in technological development. The atomic scientists were able to cite the complex interaction of basic science with technology in their urgent program, but most of the other technical achievements of the war had resulted from the successful conversion of laboratory scientists into technologists. At the close of the war they desired to return to basic • As Secretary Kissinger has written: "The impact of Sputnik, after all, had little to do with its strategic importance. President Eisenhower's constant claim that space was militarily insignificant — even if correct — missed the crucial point. To many of the new nations Soviet supremacy in space may have the kind of attraction Western technological mastery had in the late nineteenth century." In The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy (New York: Doubleday, Anchor Edition, 1962) , p. 334. 1" U.S. Office of Scientific Research and Development, Science, the Endless Frontier, a report to the Presi- dent on a program for postwar scientific research, by Vannevar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Development (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1945; National Science Foundation, reprinted Julv 1960'), 220 pp. See especially pp. 34-40. " U.S. President's Scientific Research Board, Science and Public Policy, 5 vols., a report to the Pre.sident by John R. Steelman, Chaiiman (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1947), see vol. I, p. viii. 1337 research and justified future public support for this activit}" on the grounds of their past technological successes and expectation of future technological development from future basic research. LONDON SCIENCE OFFICE Particular emphasis in both the Bush and Steelman reports had been placed on the importance of restoring the international flow of scientific information and contacts that the war hatl interrupted. One channel for this flow was the London office of ONR. This office, still in active operation in 1975, had been established in 1941 to maintain scientific liaison with the British mifitar}^ research installations. By 1947 its scope was still largely in "classified" subjects. To develop a flow of scientific and technological information for industrial use, the Depart- ment of Commerce sent John C. Green with a substantial technical team to gather up as much information as possible from captured German files, photo-reproduced materials collected by the British Intelligence Objectives Subcommittee, and British scientific papers then being declassified. Green's time was divided between service in London and with Gen. Lucius Clay, head of the U.S. occupation force in Germany in an organization under the acronym of "FIAT." Here, 600 subject area specialists, supported by German scientists, were gathering information on German industrial technology. A separate team, Project ALSOS, was sent by the Manhattan District to assess the state of German progress in nuclear energy development and other matters of technological interest. WARTIME PROBLEMS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE During the war the Department of State had experienced con- siderable difficulty in finding an appropriate role for its staff in the face of all the "emergency" agencies operating abroad. A critical assess- ment of State's problem was offered in a histor}- of war agency ad- ministration prepared in 1964 by the Bureau of the Budget: The inabilitj' of the Department of State to deal \Tgorousl}^ and aggressive! j' with the economic and cultural problems of foreign affairs in total war contributed to the creation of special emergency agencies to deal w-ith some aspects of foreign relations. This inability of the Department was due largely to the dominance of the foreign-service tradition, procedure, and tempo. The Department was not equipped with the technical personnel, or with the experience necessary for the day-by-day activities in such fields as export control, preclusive buying, the busi- ness details of lend-lease, and the conduct of psychological warfare. For these and other reasons, the emergency agencies sought to operate directly with only the unavoidable minimum of control by the Department of State. A prime difficulty was in distinguishing between policy and operations, and "it seems from the evidence available that the Department never clearly understood its role as coordinator and policy guide." ^^ Experiment oj the Department oj State in the Diplomacy of Science A first effort by the Department of State to become involved in the emerging field of "Government science" began to take shape in 1947. Apparently with the encouragement of President Truman, the Department proposed to set up at the U.S. Embassy in London an •2 U.S. Bureau of the Budget, War Records Section, The United States at War; Development and Admin- istration of the War Prooram by the Federal Government, prepared under the auspices of the Committee of Records of War Administration (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June 19, 1946). pp. 407-408. 97-400 O - 77 - 47 1338 office paralleling one that the British had maintained in Washington since 1940. Its purpose was "to expedite the interchange of basic scientific information" by assigning to it distinguished scientists from this country.'^ The plan initialh^ called for the establishment of a permanent "United States Mission on Science and Technology" of five officers (i.e., Foreign Service officers) and two clerical personnel. Chief of the Mission would be Dr. Earl A. Evans, Jr., professor and chairman of the department of biochemistry of the University of Chicago. He was to be supported by Mr. Ervin Anderson, of the International Re- sources Division of the Department of State who had been active in the "development of the economic offices science and technology program." ** The new mission would replace Green's group, located in the Embassy but reporting to the Department of Commerce. (This mission had been transferred to the Department of State and Foreign Service the previous year — December 15, 1946— by Secretary Averell Harriman, when he replaced Secretary Henr^- Wallace as head of the Department of Commerce; apparently it had remained inactive throughout 1947.) The new mission started bravely enough. It had been designed b3'- an interagenc}' committee under the chairmanship of the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, and composed of representa- tives of the Departments of Army, Nav}', Commerce, Agriculture, and Interior, and of the Federal Security Agency, the Research and Development Board, and the National Academy of Sciences. This committee would continue, it was understood, in a backstopping role as "parent of the mission in all substantive matters. . . ." The "mission" had received support and endorsement from .such members of the scientific community as Dr. Bush; Dr. Steelman; Dr. Frank Jewett; and Dr. Merle A. Tuve and Mr. Paul A. Shearer of the Carnegie Institution of Washington. The Secretar^^ of State had also obtained assurances of support for the mission in correspondence from four members of the cabinet. In notifying the Embassy in London of the program, the Secretary of State in a memorandum of October 22, 1947, indicated that the mission would be "permanently attached to the Embassy." A later memorandum, December 26, from the Acting Secretary of State, explained that to "make it clear that the group vmder Dr. Evans is an integral part of the Embassy staff and is not operating as an independ- ent organization," he was designated "Chief Scientific Officer." To differentiate the new arrangement from the previous "Mission for the Exchange of Industrial Technology" (the Commerce Department's science office, which had also been attached to the Embassy), its functions were explicitly directed toward the expediting of the flow to the United States of basic scientific information. OUTPUT OF THE LONDON OFFICE Dr. Evans began his tour of duty in London during Christmas week, 1947. Two months later he rendered a first report of accomplishment. '3 U.S. Department of State, Memorandum, no. 506, from Acting Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge of tlie American Mission in London, December 26, 1947, p. 2. " U.S. Department of State, Memorandum, no. 425, from Secretary of State to the Officer in Charge of the American Mission in London, October 22, 1947, p. 2. Also, background supplied by interview with John C. Green. 1339 His long-term staff of four professionals and two secretarial personnel was in operation, and two short-term scientists were expected early in March. Contacts had been established with 40 senior scientists and science administrators in England. In addition: (a) a report was in preparation on the structure of British science in universities, government, and industry; (b) special reports were in preparation on the current status of British research in organic chemistry, bio- chemistry, surgery, and metabolic diseases; (c) arrangements were being made to supply the U.S. Information Service library in London with current U.S. scientific publications; (d) attention was being given to exchanges of science students; (e) various requests had been received for him to participate in British science functions; (f) dis- cussions were in progress wdth the Dutch Embassy in London regarding enlargement of Dutch scientific representation in Washington; and (g) cordial working relationsliips had been established with the ONR London office. On November 8, 1948, Dr. Evans submitted his first annual report. In it he recapitulated the rationale for setting up his office. (It was based on the propositions that scientific research and technological application were an essential factor in the economy' of any nation and that the formulation of foreign policy required an on-site mechanism to acquire expert information for this purpose.) The report listed the many "despatches" generated from the new office and oft'ered a num- ber of recommendations to strengthen the operation. In particular, Evans suggested the need for an "office or officer at a high level in the State Department to bring together all the activities of all its scientific and technological experts." Such an office, he suggested, could direct information to appropriate users, analyze it, and give guidance to the various (hypothetical) field offices.' He also suggested that when short-term scientists had completed their tours in embassies abroad they be detailed (or called back) to serve in the proposed home office, or as members of an advisory committee to that office, or for additional tours abroad. Dr. Evans urged establishment of posts similar to his own in embassies in other Western European countries. And, signif- icantly, he urged that the emphasis of the London office be changed from basic science to industrial technology, as being of more immediate value. PROBLEMS IX RECRUITING SCIENTISTS jMeanwhile, back in the Department of State, the flood of cor- respondence associated with' finding -outstanding scientists for short- term and long-term appointments for this small offi.ce, confirming their qualifications, their recruitment, and arranging for their travel, was becoming onerous. There were many applicants who had to be tactfully turned SLway, and many regretful refusals from desired candidates. When his year was up in London, Evans was replaced b}^ W. R. Woolrich, dean of engineering at the Universit}" of Texas, who had already served for 6 months under Evans. Woolrich, in a "semi-annual" report, April 5, 1949, repeated the recommendations of his predecessor, urged that scientists be "briefed" before going to their posts, and complained that for much of the year the "scientific personnel of this office was reduced ... to the Chief of the Section and the essential secretarial assistance. . . ." Moreover, he said, "It is most confusing to both the personnel and to the British scientists to 1340 have an indefinite policy of procedure for the Scientific Ofiice." He urged that the office be given "more permanent status," suggesting a keen sense of insecurity which his staffing problems seemed to justify. Assessment of the State Science Experiment This first essay of the Department of State into the interaction of diplomacy with science and technology, despite the apparently strong initial support it had received, must be accounted a failure. There were many reasons for this : There was no continuity in the relationship between the backstop- ping committee and the team in the field. There was no committee secretariat to ensure that reports were directed to the appropriate members, and there was no "feedback" to show Evans and his team that anybody was listening. It is not known whether the committee ever met to consider the progress of the team in the field, or gave it guidance, but the chances are that it did not. The needs of the people or institutions the team was supposed to be serving were apparently never communicated or ascertained. The burden of staff recruitment was altogether disproportionate to the size of the staff and its produc- tivity. The utility of the reports generated by the team was doubtful; there is no evidence that any action resulted from them, either as use- ful information or as inputs to policy analysis. The dwindling size of the enterprise suggests that it was not especially useful to the Em- bassy either. WhUe the team was evidently able to establish cordial relationships at high levels in the host country, the achievement is not impressive because failure would have been most remarkable under the circumstances. However, no durable relationships or arrangements appear to have been established. The asserted lack of preparation of the London science team was certainly a factor. But it was symptomatic of a more fundamental weakness: what sort of briefing would be useful to equip a team of narrowly specialized scientists whose mission was so indeterminate? A sampling of the technical reports from the London science office shows some of the difficulties. The writers were not sure what their readership was. Some reports describe the broad structure of the British science establishment but in vague and imprecise language. Other reports present a mi.xture of scientific detail (unreadable outside of the discipline) combined with broad general discussion of technologi- cal applications, educational arrangements, research facilities and funding, and details of legislation. Conceivably the identification of re- search centers and the direction of their research programs might have been used to establish contacts with U.S. investigators in like fields. Discussion of research organization might have been of interest to U.S. research administrators. But how these reports could have been used in the formulation or conduct of foreign policy in the Department of State is difficult to understand. The purpose of this rather detailed criticism of a small diplomatic experiment nearly three decades old is not to criticize those involved but to make expHcit the problem. The scientists who urged and manned the experiment appeared to assume that the mere presence of highly quahfied scientists in a diplomatic setting would be beneficial. It is this assumption — that discovering facts is meritorious — that governs all science. The earUer activity of John Green had been ex- plicitly to transmit to the United States large volumes of documents 1341 containing mainly technological information. But neither the expertise possessed nor the information accumulated by the Scientific Officer in the London office of the Department of State was useful to the parent organization. There was no strategy to use the expertise and there was no procedure to assure use of the information. The diplomats had at hand the technical expertise but they did not know how to use it and the scientists did not know how to be used. Their activities did not appear to be relevant to the diplomatic problems of the day; no effort was exerted to show how they could be relevant ; no preparation was undertaken to assure that they would be relevant. The Berkner Report on Science and Foreign Relations Shortly after the close of World War II, President Truman had turned to former President Herbert Hoover for advice in undertaking a postwar reorganization of the executive branch. The proliferation of agencies and functions had made the bureaucracy virtually unman- ageable and the Hoover Commission received a broad charter to recommend its consolidation. With particular respect to the State Department, the Commission transmitted to the Congress, Febru- ar}^ 18, 1949,'^ its report on "Foreign Affairs." The report took note of the rapid increase in the size of the Department and of the pro- liferation of overseas responsibilities of other agencies: In the Presidency new factors affecting the conduct of foreign affairs include the Chief of Staff to the President and statutory interdepartmental bodies such as the National Security Council. The State Department itself, in terms of appro- priations, is 12 times larger and, in terms of personnel, almost 5 times larger in 1948 than it was in 1938. In the interdepartmental field there are more than 30 committees concerned with economic, social, military, and other aspects of foreign affairs. Of 59 major departments and agencies in the executive branch, at least 46 are drawn into foreign affairs to a greater or lesser extent. Certain units are deeply involved, such as the National Military Establishment in connection with the administration of occupied areas abroad, the Economic Cooperation Adminis- tration in connection with the financial assistance overseas, the Treasury Depart- ment in international financial matters, and the Commerce Department in connection with export control. Finallj', Congressional participation in the conduct of foreign affairs has become^ particularly evident in the enhancement of the role of the House of Representatives in connection with appropriations for foreign programs. '6 Neither the report nor an accompanying Task Force Report on the same subject dealt explicitly with the role of the Department of State in science and technology. However, in a letter to Mr. Hoover in comment on the Task Force Report, Henr}' h. Stimson, who had served as Hoover's Secretary of State, highlighted the growing impor- tance for diplomacy of science and technology and their products. He wrote : . . . The world today is faced with two great challenges. Can it keep the peace, and can it build a secure foundation for ordered freedom? We have reached a stage in history when it is absolutely vital that we meet both of these challenges success- fully. The scourge of war has now acquired an expanding destructive power enormously greater than ever before. We must have peace. At the same time mankind cannot and will not abandon its long upward struggle toward freedom and the good life. Challenges to freedom continue, and the tension between free societies and their opponents must be recognized as a grave threat to peace. In such circumstances, the conduct of American foreign policy takes on a new order of importance. " Pursuant to Public Law 80-162, approved July 7, 1947, setting up the "Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government". '• U.S., The Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, Budgeting and Accounting: A Report to the Congress, Rept. No. 7, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing OflSce, February 1949), p. 4. 1342 The great scientific and industrial revolution of the nineteenth century pro- foundly affected both the nature and effect of war and the hope for human progress toward freedom from want. . . . During the nineteenth century our Nation, and many other nations too, were absorbed in the pursuit of this great new opportunity. . . . During this century the- people of the United States treated their foreign affairs as a minor problem. . . . For we had grasped only one-half of the meaning of the industrial revolution. The progress of science and invention brought with it a vastly increased inter- dependence among the nations of the world. The civilization it created was brittle, for the same science and invention which had produced new riches had produced at the same time a wholl}'^ new power of destruction. . . . . . . We must recognize, therefore, that as a participating member of the world community, in time of peace as in time of peril, the United States must continue to play a major part. . . . ... I urge upon the Commission the absolutely critical importance of leaving nothing undone that may make us better able to ward off the danger of catastrophe, and to bring nearer, in so far as in us lies, the lasting peace which all manl^ind demands. . . . *' Out of the deliberations of the various task forces, staffs, and steering groups serving the Hoover Commission a recommendation emerged that the Department of State needed a capability to evaluate the foreign policy aspects of scientific activities.^* Apparently in response to the thinking communicated by unpub- lished papers of the Hoover Commission, the Secretary of State on October 4, 1949, appointed Llo3^d V, Berkner as Special Consultant to advise him on : 1. Responsibilities and functions of the Department in formu- lating and implementing international aspects of national science policy; 2. How these responsibilities and functions should be assigned within the Department; 3. Staffing; 4. Interagency relations' of the Department (with emphasis on science and intelligence) ; and 5. Functions, staffing, and operational methods in science and technology missions overseas. ^^ At the same time the Secretary appointed a Departmental vSteering Committee on International Science Policy. This committee agreed that the broad objective of the study would be: To develop deta,iled recommendations on the most effective means of utilizing the functions and facilities of the Department for meeting the needs of United States science and for strengthening national security to the end that the Dc- 1^ Letter from Henry L. Stimson to Herbert Hoover, November 22, 1948, in The Organization of the Govern- ment for the Conduct of Foreign Affairs: A report ivith recommendations, prepared for the Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, by Harvey H. Bundy and James Grafton Rogers (Washinsrton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Ollice, 1949), p. x. '8 In the report, U.S. Department of State, Science and Forcinn Relations: International Flow of Scientific and Technological Information, General Foreign Policy Series, no. 3860, May 1950 (hereafter called the Berkner Report), it was explained that the "Steering Committee of Reorganization Task Force No. 2" had reported. May 2, 1949, that: The Department is dealing on the one hand with foreign policy matters which have a great effect upon United States scientific policy and on the other hand with international scienti c activities which have an impact on foreign policy. These matters are being liandled at various points without adequate scientific evaluation. . . . We believe that the extent of the Department's responsibility for international scientific matters requires top policy consideration and the aid of professional scienti ''c judgment, and cannot properly be detennined in the course of a necessarily hurried review of the Department's organizations, (p. 1)" Also, subsequently, a "special Department of State Task Force" reviewing the "separate and detailed con- sideration of the interdeijendence of science and foreign relations" had recommended that: A scientist of national repute should be asked by the Department to serve as a temporary consul- tant to analyze and submit recommendations on (a) the role of the Department in national scienti ('C policy and activities, and their interrelationships with foreign policy, and (b) appropriate organiza- tion and staffing required to carry out its respontibility. (p. 15) i» Berkner Report, p. 16. 1343 partment may fulfill adequately its role with respect to the international aspects of science.-" The report itself defined the objective of U.vS. international science policy as being: . . . The furtherance of understanding and cooperation among the nations of the world, . . . promotion of scientific progress and the benefits to be derived therefrom, and . . . maintenance of that measure of security of the free peoples of the world required for the continuance of their intellectual, material, and political freedom.2' Benefits of the proposed international science policy were con- sidered to be: — Effective influence on the preservation of an international environment of freedom; —Growth and progress of science and technology; — Economic welfare; and — Security "of free peoples everywhere." ^^ The report attached principal importance to the desirabilit}'' of an international flow of scientific and technological information. Five chapters (pp. 25-85) were addressed to this subject. Only four chapters (pp. 86-114) dealt with the relation of science and technology to the formulation of foreign policy, a science advisory unit in the Depart- ment, interagency coordination, and the design of overseas science missions. The chapter of the Berkner Report on "The Role of Science in the Formulation of Foreign Policy" identified this role as twofold: (1) how to use diplomacy to further science, and (2) how diplomats could use science and technology to solve world problems.^^ It concluded : . . . That consideration of the natural sciences and technology is often lacking within the Department of wState. This lack appears to stem from a failure of communication channels between many areas of the Department and United States science and technologj-, both government and private, arising from a lack of consciousness of the bearing of science on the problems at hand. It is true that science contributed to many of the operations of the Department, but it has generally been on an ad hoc basis. This is not enough. For science to be properly efifective in its influence, accepted procedures must be established to assure that the scientific and technological aspects of each proVjlem are continously considered, both from the point of view of science itself, and of equal importance, from the point of view of the relation of the scientific to the other aspects, political, social, and economic.^^ There were three deficiencies in the Department's expertise in science and technology: First, insufficient scientific competence is presently available within the Depart- ment to insure rapid, accurate selection of the type and source of scientific assistance required in the formulation of foreign polic^^ Current procedures for the utilization of, outside scientific consultants are based on random personal contacts between the Department and outside agencies or upon complete reliance on the advice of representatives of government agencies. The selection procedure is neither sj-stematic nor reliable and is susceptible of serious errors of judgment. Nor is this assistance immediately available. Second, there is no mechanism for keeping the Department apprised of the implications of its actions as the\^ affect science, and consequently it may fail to call for competent technical advice when needed. For example, the success of a recent international high altitude biology conference in Peru was jeopardized by 20 Ibid. 21 Ibid., p. 19. 22 Ibid., pp. 20-21. 23 Berkner Report, p. 86-87. » Ibid., p. 87. 1344 delayed action on the part of the Department in naming an official United States delegation. Lack of official United States recognition could have seriously affected Peruvian Government support of this research. In addition, such failure could impair international scientific relations and good will. Third, departmental non-scientific personnel are substantially insulated from the scientific community. Much closer relations with this important element of the community would appear productive on many scores. The Department will become aware of the aid that the scientist can render on the one hand, and on the other can make the scientist more keenly aware of the fundamental issues that enter into the administration of policy .^^ The proposed solution was to establish a small science staff in the Department of State "at the policy level." This staff, said the report, should serve: — To appl}^ "highly competent scientific and technological judgment and guidance ... in [the] formulation of foreign policy"; — To serve as "advisory body in the day-to-day operations of the Department to assure . . . due consideration fof] scientific and technological aspects of these operations"; — To represent the Department "from the point of view of science on interdepartmental committees"; and — To enlist the cooperation of "government and private science in assisting the Department in carrying out its full responsibilities in the field of international relations." ^® The report also suggested periodic use of preeminent scientists as "top level advisers" on major problems (and that they be periodically briefed on the international situation). The report completed its policy discussion with the suggestion that extraordinary effort was needed to assure the availability of scientists with diplomatic ex- perience, commanding the confidence of colleagues in both fields. A separate chapter of the report, "State Department Organization for Science," offered a plan for an operational office that overlapped somewhat the policy office just described.^' In the discussion preceding the prescriptive conclusion, two alternatives were offered: (1) a "Science Office," or (2) "a scattering of men of scientific training throughout the operating units of the Department." The report opted for the first but not without some internal inconsistency: in the discussion preceding the conclusion the staff function was stressed, while the functions actually proposed were largely operational. BERKNER DESIGN FOR SCIENCE OFFICE Thus, the report recommended (paraphrase) : 1. Creation of a science office at the policy level, charged with staff functions. 2. The office to be headed by a science adviser, appointed as Special Assistant to the Under Secretary of State. Staff would in- clude a deputy; three scientists (phj^sical, life, and engineering); a scientific and technological information branch; and liaison oflBcers from "political, economic, and public affairs of the Department, and from other government agencies having international interests in science and technology." 25 Berkner Report, p. 89. 2« Ibid., pp. 91-92. " In fact, it was not clear whether what was being proposed was two offices or one. 1345 3. The science office would: (a) Support science missions abroad (i.e., recruit, brief, and back- stop science attaches, and help them program their activities; promote international exchanges of information and scientists; and maintain registries of scientists and scientific activities in foreign countries) ; (b) Provide liaison with domestic scientific activities (i.e., serve as point of access in the Department of State fox U.S. scientists; relate to U.S. scientists and scientific institutions; identify main issues and represent "science" in policy councils; assure appropriate repre- sentation of the United States in scientific meetings abroad and help arrange similar meetings in the United States; and generally support international science and U.S. objectives); (c) Review and advise on policy and administrative decisions as they relate to or affect science and technology (i.e., seek ways for science and technology to interact \vith diplomacy to benefit U.S. objectives; shed light on the impact of diplomatic decisions on science and technology; assure competent scientific and technological advice on diplomatic policv issues ; coordinate the scientific and technological input to program planning; and provide access for the Department to best scientific and technological advice on policy issues) ; and (d) Evaluate effectiveness of programs and policy in the light of progress and potentialities of science and technology. 4. Other elements of the Department should consult the office on scientific and technological matters. 5. Other elements of the Department, while consulting with the Science Office, should retain responsibility for action on scientific and technological issues.^* In sum, under Berkner's plan, the State Department's Science Office would keep track of other agency progi^ms relating to overseas technology. Formalized advisory procedures would be set up. Closer liaison would be estabhshed with persons with higher technical quali- fications. The nongovernmental science community would be involved in the Government process more extensively, with particular emphasis on the National Research Council. Close liaison would be especially important between the Department of State and the newly created National Science Foundation.^^ THE PLAN FOR SCIENTIFIC ATTACHES The report addressed at some length (pp. 103-114) the question of placing scientific and technological expertise in U.S. embassies abroad. It concluded that the London Mission under Dr. Evans had been rendered less effective by "a limited budget, inadequate supporting operations at home, and insufficient weight assigned in the Department to the importance of scientific and technical implica- tions in foreign pohcy." w Berkner Report, pp. 03-98. » Ibid., pp. 101-102. 1346 Among tlie problems and issues in the design of an overseas science and technology mission were : — Defining the functions of the mission; — Regional versus country contacts; — Maintenance of office continuity; — Preserving contacts with the home office ; — Maintenance of up-to-dateness of resident scientists; — Assurance of prestige and a voice within the Embassy; — Matching size of delegation to level of activity in the country; — Assuring uses of information obtained; and — Use of Foreign Service personnel versus appointment of scientists. There was no discussion of the distinction between "scientific" and "technological" activities abroad, although this had been a feature of the reports of Evans and his successor. However, the text of the Berkner Report made clear that the subject being addressed was "science" with technolog}^ as an incidental adjunct. The report concluded that overseas missions should include science stafTs administered by the Department and backstaffed in Washing- ton. Needs of other agencies should be met b^^ the Department, although funded by the using agencies. The personnel should be part of the Foreign Service, with the rank of attache and should be highly qualified scientists. Appointments should be for 2 years, broken by at least one Adsit home for consultation. These officers should have nine functions: (1) reporting science trends, (2) assistance in the exchange and evaluation of scientific and technological information, (3) assistance in the exchange of scientific personnel, (4) mutual assistance in procurement of scientific materials, (5) aid to U.S. scientific groups abroad, (6) representation of U.S. science at foreign meetings, (7) scientific adA^ice and coordination with the Em- bassy staff, (8) arrangements for international collaboration on scientific projects, and (9) "general promotion of better understanding and closer relations between United States and foreign science." Two kinds of science missions were envisioned : (a) larger staffs serving as "centers for investigations" on a regional basis (e.g., London-Western Europe; Johannesburg-South Africa; Rio de Janeiro- South America; Sydney- or Canberra-Australia); (b) single country staffs (two or three scientists) constituting representation to the one country (nine were suggested). The report also took note of the fact that there were already two U.S. science offices in London, one operated by the Department of State and the other b}'^ the Office of Naval Research. It proposed their merger into one State Department office.^" EFFECTS OF THE BERKNER REPORT The detailed description of the Berkner Report has been presented here because for more than a decade it prescribed the organizational framework and philosophic concept of science and technology in the 3» However, this recommendation was not adopted. The ONR London office still exists. Its functions are essentially to serve as a scientific window on Western Europe and to coordinate NATO research in naval matters. It is staffed by 8-10 civilian scientists serving, usually, for two years, and a like number of uaval officers. The civilian role is scientific information exchange, technical overview, aad special topical reports. Emphasis is on highly qualified scientists able to contribute to technical exchanges, to avoid the appearance of "intelligence" gathering. (Source: conversation with Dr. Russell C. Drew, formerly director of the ONR office and cturently director of the Science and Technology Policy Office.) 1347 Department of State. The durable effect of this report was beneficial in a number of ways: (1) It emphasized the importance of science for diplomacy. (2) It identified important functions of a scientific apparatus as a component of the U.S. diplomatic apparatus. (3) It prescribed the necessary mteraction of overseas scientific attaches with a strong backstopping unit at home. (4) It addressed the need for coordination of the State scientific office with other agencies with scientific functions. (5) It called attention to the importance of the U.S. nongovern- mental scientific community for the Department of State — and vice versa. On the other hand, the report had a number of adverse conse- quences : (1) The array of proposed functions for science attaches was unrealistically wade in scope, without establishing priorities of emphasis. (2) The important distinction between science as somewhat interr national, and technology as more closely related to national policy and objectives, was neglected; similarly the heavy emphasis on science and the interchange of scientific information obscured the larger importance of technology for diplomacy and on the role of techno- logical analj'^sis as an input to foreign policy formulation. (3) No assessment was presented of potential scientific and techno- logical interests of the Department of State in the geographic and economic bureaus, in State Intelligence and Research, in the in-house educational activities of the Department, and especially in the PoHcy Planning Staff. (4) The relationship of the proposed new scientific organization to the White House and the National Security Council was not discussed. 111. Implementation of the Berkner Report: 1951-1965 The Berkner Report of June 1950 on Science and Foreign Relations recommended creation of a science staff in the Department of State, headed by a scientific adviser who would be Special Assistant to the Under Secretar>^ He would also be supported by science staffs in certain overseas missions, integrated into the Foreign Service. Ac- cordingly, the following February, Dr. Joseph B. Koepfii, of California Institute of Technology and at one time Dr. Evans' deputy at the London science mission (1947-1948), was appointed Science Adviser and Special Assistant. Dr. J. W. Joyce, who served as chairman of the Department committee that had helped Berkner prepare the report, was made his deputy. A number of other scientists were invited to serve on Dr. Koepfli's staff in Washington and others were assigned to embassies abroad.^^ As Dr. Koepfli and his associates were getting underway with their new assignment, an inventory of the State Department's numerous scientific interests included the folloAAdng items : — Fundmg of U.S. memberships in 14 international organiza tions with a scientific content; — Support for international conferences (140 in 1950) ; — Participation in programs for international exchanges of scientific personnel (23,179 persons in 1950) and assistance to non-governmental organizations for this purpose ; — Assistance in exchanges of scientific publications; — Preparation and distribution abroad of scientific newsletters (circulation 78,000) ; — Distribution abroad of scientific films in the Department's collection; and — Science programs on the Voice of America. Somewhat optimistically, this report in 1951 observed. "As the world's outstanding user of science, the United States not only profits from but positively depends upon active international cooperation in science. Such cooperation is a national interest of highest magnitude, a major concern of foreign policy, a continuing preoccupation of the Department of State." ^^ BrieJ Tenure of the Office During its brief period of operation, this first "Office of the Science Adviser" does not appear to have scored any noteworthy successes. Presumably, most of the 30 months of Dr. Koepfli's tenure were con- sumed in organization and recruitment. While it may also have pur- veyed to other units and agencies "advice and assistance on foreign relations questions in which scientific factors were intert\vined," the need for this service does not seem to have become insatiable. 3i Under this original program "more than 14 American scientists served at various posts abroad for an average period of 15 months as members of the U.S. Foreign Service Reserve. ..." (U.S. Department of State, The Science Adviser of the Department of State, Department and Foreign Series, no. 9/, FubUcalion no. 7056, November 1960, which supplied some of the background of this part of the study.) 32 Gerhard .T. Drechsler, "The U.S. State Department and World Science," Bulletin of the Atomic Scien- tists 7, No. 4 (April 1951), pp. 121-122. (1348) 1349 Unfortunately, the advent of this new program was soon followed b}'^ a departmental retrenchment. As a Department publication in 1960 delicately expressed it: "Despite its successful operation, how- ever, the program was curtailed after a few 3^ears because of a number of factors, of which undoubtedly the most important was the compet- ing demands of other departmental activities for their share of a hmited budget." Wlien Dr. Koepfii returned to California Institute of Technology, July 1953, Dr. Joyce became "Acting" until he resigned in February 1^54, and Walter M. Rudolph, a Foreign Affairs Officer, took over. The attaches (in London, Paris, and Stockholm) were re- placed with other scientists and a fourth was named to the Embassy in Tokyo, but at the end of 1955 the scientific attache program was completely terminated. Reassessing in 1967 this dechne of State Department interest, Eugene B. Skolnikoff attributed it mainly to the fact that "under pressure to cut back the leaders of the Department did not feel they were sacrificing a needed or important function." ^^ Reactivation oi the Program After Sputnik By 1956 the State Department science organization had dwindled to a caretaker Foreign Service Officer, Walter M. Rudolph (an economist), supported by tv/o secretaries. Of this situation Chemical and Engineering News, in a staff article, protested: Science today has an even greater impact on society than it did when State first recognized it. To let the science function die now, say the scientists, would be next to criminal and an enormous waste of their time and the taxpaj^ers' money. The course of events mystifies them.^* An editorial comment by Dael Wolfle in Science magazine took the same line. He rejected a proposal by the second Hoover Commission that v/ould have transferred the science attaches (of whom by Febru- ary 1956 there were none in the field) to the Central Intelligence Agency. Science, he said, should be considered along with all the other elements that were involved in foreign pohcy. "Whenever scientific and technologic elements are significant for foreign relations," he wrote, "they should be brought to the attention of the embassies and the Department of State and be weighed with pohtical, economic, and other relevant factors." ^^ Rudolph himself v/ent into print, early in 1957, to make a mild appeal for support. Identified as "Assistant to the Science Adviser" (a vacant office), he noted that his Department " — specifically the Office of the Science Adviser — [had been asked by the National Academy of Sciences] to serve on the U.S.-IGY National Committee as ex officio member." He promised that "As the IGY planning proceeds, the Department \vi\\ continue its liaison with the . . . Com- mittee to insure the reconciliation between its scientific activities and our foreign policy objectives." ^® Apparently, appeals of this sort had some effect. "Following a review of the Department's science program, the decision was made in the 53 Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Science, Technology, and American Foreign Policy (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1967), p. 257. (Hereafter, SkolnikofE). 34 "What's Happened to Science in State?" Chemical and Engineering News, January 9, 1956, p. 115. « Dael Wolfle, "The State Department's Opportunity in Science," Science, February 10, 1956, editorial page. 36 Walter M. Rudolph, "The Mutual Influence of Scientific Activities and Foreign Relations," [Journal of Chemical Education 34, no. 3 (March 1957), p. 110. 1350 Slimmer of 1957 that the growing importance of scientific develop- ments as an element in formulating foreign policy and carrying on relations with other governments called for a new emphasis in this field." " THE IMPACT OF SPUTNIK However, the trauma of Sputnik, in October of that y^r, galvanized the Department into action. According to Skolnikoiff: Sputnik . . . was the turning point. With the reaction to the Russian achieve- ment came the realization that, had there been adequate coupling of science and technology with foreign policy formulation, the United States might have been able to avoid a humiliating and dangerous incident in its history .^^ Accordingly, in January 1958 at the suggestion of Dr. James R. Killian, Jr. — who had been named Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology — Secretary Dulles reestablished his science office, naming it ''Science Adviser to the Department of State," and appointed to the post Dr. Wallace R. Erode, associate director of the National Bureau of Standards. During World War II, Erode had served as OSRD scientific liaison in London and later Paris. He remained in the State Department position until September 1960. An enthusiastic article in the Foreign Service Journal ^' greeted Dr. Brode's appointment. It noted that Dr. Erode was president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science and a member of the National Academy of Sciences. It noted the expressions of professional and editorial approval of his selection. And it described the role he and his associates would play in the Department: Assist other Federal agencies and private groups . . . encourage our own scientists during their initial participation in such new groups as the International Rocket Society and a new society of bio-chemists . . . work on the Law of the Seas . . . cooperation with Mexico and Canada in scientific research in the field of contamination ... air and water pollution . . . the International Geophysical Year . . . meteorological progress . . . technical provisions in treaties and inter- governmental agreements covering such items as ship and plane travel and naviga- tional equipment . . . radio and radar communications and other advances in the field of electronics work in close partnership with the military . . . space and space control . . . (possibly) an international Science for Peace program. Like his predecessor, Dr. Erode spent most of his time in oflBce re- cruiting and organizing. The expansion came at a time when science budgets everywhere were rising rapidly, and Brode's insistence on "top-level scientists" made recruitment difficult in a time of scientific manpower shortage.*" Upon his retirement in 1960 he was followed by •^ Science Adviser of the Department of State, p. 8. M Skoloikofl, op. oit., p. 257. However, the issue is by no means clearcut. The Soviet sputnik had been put up by a military booster. The U.S. program to put a satellite into orbit was relying on a"Vanguard" system managed by the Navy but with no military significance. The TOY program in the United States was represented as pure science and accordingly totally visible, hence without the use of secret hardware. It is not evident that the Department of State could have influenced a departure from this principle, or that It could have been persuaded by a vigorous science ofHce to do so, or that such a science office would have desired it, or that the science commimity that would have been its prime constitutency would have sup- ported such an effort to persuade. However, it is more probable that a science office could have alerted the Department to the need for countermeasures in anticipation of the Soviet success; the Soviet satellite pro- gram was no -secret and its use of military hardware heightened the probability of its succeeding. Much could have been done to lessen the shock of the Soviet success, and to prepare a more measured U.S. response. " C. Edward Clark, "Science and Diplomacy," Foreign Service Journal 35 (April 1958), pp. 31-34. A career Foreign Service officer and later an Ambassador, Clark was then executive assistant to the Assistant Secretary of State for Administration. "According to Skolnikofl, op. cit., p. 258: The emphasis of the office during Dr. Brode's tenure and, i ndeed, during the tenure of his succes- sors, was again on international scientific activities. Disarmament, space, and atomic energy were handled by another office: the Secretary's Special Assistant, at that time Mr. Pliilip Farley. Other policy areas such as military policy, foreign aid, international organization, or information activities were all but ignored, or the technical inputs were provided by the White House science office. 1351 Dr. Walter G. Whitman, who had chaired the department of chemical engineering at MIT, and the Research and Development Board of the Department of Defense. An assessment of the work of the office under Dr. Whitman con- cluded that he had performed "brilliantly" in mending relations between the Department and U.S. scientists over such issues as participation in international organizations with some members not recognized by the United States. (However, the assessment con- tinued, "... There was much more to be done and the Science Adviser's Office was not doing it-")*^ PRESSURE FOR EXPANDED SCIENCE FUNCTION Secretary Dulles had shown little interest in the diplomatic role of science and technology, and during his tenure the Department's science office had not flourished despite the man\' activities subsumed under the IGY which were generating pressures for the revival of the office. His successor, Christian Herter, told a Senate subcommittee that "I think there will be a gradual development in this field." This observation was in response to a question by Senator Henry M. Jack- son, who had expressed the "feelmg that science and technology has become a very important element in your work" and had asked the Secretary's opinion as to the "need for raising the prestige and status of the scientific advice within the Department of State." *^ An appeal for a strong science program in the Department of State was expressed by James R. Killian, Jr., long a leading presidential adviser on science. In a speech delivered in New York, December 13, 1960, and reproduced in Science January 6, 1961, he advanced an 11-point program for "enhancing the contributions of science and engineering to the formulation of sound foreign policy and to Free World Strength." His program — (1) Recognize and stress the contributions which science can make to peace and encourage scientific activities abroad — as, for example, the betterment of health, the improvement of agriculture, and basic research — which are manifestly peace- ful and benign. (2) Encourage more the IGY type of programs which are managed by non- political, private scientific organizations. (3) Encourage more international conferences such as the Conference on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy. Specifically support the proposed U.N. con- ferences on the peaceful uses of outer space and on technical aid. (4) Despite aggravations and diflBculties, continue to encourage exchange of scientific personnel between East and West. Reduce petty restrictions on scientists invited to the United States. (5) Undertake periodically a thorough review of our technical aid policies and programs to insure that they are well adapted to the countries the}' are intended to help. Seek the advice of knowledgeable scientists and engineers in conducting these reviews and strive for programs which bring the benefits of science in all its phases to less-favored countries. (6) Provide in Washington a mechanism for coordinating research programs and other scientific activities which government agencies sponsor abroad and make sure that our ambassadors have the opportunity, in each country where such work is conducted, to coordinate it locally. (7) Widen the role of the science adviser to the Secretary of State and continue to build strength in the corps of science attaches. Give this science adviser a role to play in strengthening the competence of t^e State Department to deal «' Skolnikoff, op. cit., p. 259. « U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, National Policy Machinery Subcom- mittee, Organizing for National SemrUy, Vol. 1, Hearings, 87th Cong., 1961, p. 706. Statement of Hon. Christian A. Herter, Secretary of State. 1352 with the technical aspects of arms limitation. Support the continuation of NATO's science advisory services. (8) Encourage regional programs to strengthen science not only in Europe but in other parts of the world. Science lends itself well to international efforts. CERN is an example. (9) Encourage international efforts to develop more engineer-managers or project engineers who can direct the successful development of intricate engi- neering systems, who can deal with new orders of reliabiHty, who can bring "Wisdom and social foresight to the difficult task of handling technological change so that it benefits and does not hurt people, and who can mobilize technology ■with this in mind to increase productivity. (10) Do not misuse science and technology by distorting them for propaganda purposes. We will build greater prestige in the long run by insuring the quality, vigor, and integrity of cur science and technologj'. We gain prestige by being better in more areas. (11) Encourage more scientists and engineers to prepare themselves for foreign service and for advisory and administrative responsibilities in government. En- courage universities to establish programs to educate scientists having this orientation. . . .*^ At the close of Dr. Whitman's tenure, Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, sought the advice of Dr. Jerome Wiesner, the President's Science Adviser, on the reconstitution of the science office in State. What should be its mission and how should it be staffed? The matter was referred to a panel of the President's Science Advisory Committee (PS AC). The report of the "Science and Foreign Affairs Panel," endorsed by PSAC, went to the Department of State in March 1962, and after some modification was promulgated (and the officer's appointment announced) in September 1962." The thrust of the recommendations was that the status of the office should be elevated, the scientific functions emphasized, and the related functions of space and atomic energy consolidated within it. The office would combine operational and staff policy duties. RESPONSE BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT Thus, in September 1962, Dr. Ragnar Rollefson, professor of physics at the University of Wisconsin, was named to succeed Whit- man and at the same time the title was changed to "Director of Inter- national Scientific Affairs." His rank and duties were spelled out in a Foreign Affairs Manual Circular, "Director of International Scientific Affairs," (No. 84, Sept. 14, 1962.) The Director would be "a principal officer of the Department \^^th rank administratively equivalent to a bureau head." He would "serve as adviser to the Secretary and the Department on scientific and technological matters. ..." His principal functions would be : a. Participate actively in general foreign pohcy development, ensuring that appropriate consideration is given to scientific and technological factors. b. Advise and assist the Secretar}^ of State and other Department officers in reaching decisions on matters having scientific and technological implications. c. Participate in policy planning for and provide guidance to U.S. international science activities. d. Work with the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, regional bureaus, and other appropriate elements in formulating policy and planning programs for scientific exchange. <5 i- "villian. Chairman of the Corporation of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, first presented chis p'nn at the Silver Stein Award Dfnner of the MIT Club of New York. Subsequently it appeared under the tit. ' lakiiig Science a Vital Force in Foreign Policy," Science, January 6, 1961, pp. 24-25. A conaensation of the speech also appeared in the Christian Science Monitor, December 21, 1960. " SkoluikoS, op. cit., pp. 259-260. 1353 e. Recommend activities to further U.S. foreign policy objectives in the field of science and technology. f. Provide guidance to the science attaches developed in collaboration with other Department elements, particularly the regional bureaus. g. Serve as the point of coordination within the Department and between the Department and other organizations, governmental and non-governmental, on matters concerned with science and technology, including the non-military uses of atomic energy and outer space. h. Represent the Department on appropriate interdepartmental committees. ISA [later changed to SCI] will be staffed to enable the Director to carry out the above functions, and to provide professional staff support to other bureaus and offices of the Department on all scientific and technological matters. According to one Washington observer, the Kennedy Administra- tion exerted some pressure to strengthen the State Department's science office by the 1962 reorganization into the "Office of Inter- national Scientific Affairs." However, he went on to note the "incredi- bly uneven" results of injecting scientists into a diplomatic environ- ment for which some were and others were not prepared. Even so, Dr. Rollefson was insistent that the "State Department's science program requires people with thorough scientific training." *^ Dr. Rollefson's tenure ran from September 1962 to September 1964. He came to the Department to head a largely "paper" organization; he continued the work of his predecessors in providing a bridge to the scientific communit}'^ but apparently broke no new ground. His deputy, Dr. Edwin M. J. Kretzman, earlier professor of political science at Bro^vn University and a career Foreign Service officer, after Rollefson's departure, served as "acting." He was credited with several innovations during this period: the introduction of a "science course" at the Foreign Service Institute *^ and the organization of a series of "science luncheons" of the Secretary of State. Wlien he retired, in December 1964, he was replaced by another Foreign Service Officer, Herman Pollack, as "acting." The search continued for several 3'ears for an "outstanding scientist" to take the post, but even though the "Office" was made a "Bureau" in April 1965, and its Director "equivalent" to an Assistant Secretary, there were no takers. Before discussing the development of the new Bureau under Herman Pollack's direction, it is useful to consider why the Office of Science Adviser up to July 1967 had been only marginally effective.*^ ASSESSMENT OF EARLY SCI PERFORMANCE In September 1966, Prof, Eugene Skolnikoff assessed the effec- tiveness of the State Department's science office as one of "poor performance." There was no question, he said, I ut that the function of "providing scientific inputs in the policy process" was needed. Given stronger leadership it could have performed better. Substitution of an "outside group of consultants" was no answer because they would lack "the close tie to operating needs" and "effective points of contact." (They could, however, be useful in conjunction with a central « Daniel S. Greenberg. " Science and Foreign Aflairs: New Effort Under Way to Enlarge Role of Scientists in Policy Planning," Science, October 12, 1962, pp. 122-124. ** See p. 120 and thereafter. *'' The time sequence: Pollack had joined the office in September 1964 as deputy director, became acting director January 1965, and was appointed director in July 1967. His deputy was the late Dr. J. Wallace Joyce, followed by Dr. John Granger. Pollack retired in July 1974, and Granger continued as "acting" until after the reconstitution of the office, October 15, 1974, as the "Bureau of Oceans and International Environ- mental and Scientific Aflairs." 97-400 O - 77 - 48 1354 oflfice.) Nor would it serve better to diffuse scientific specialists throughout the bureaus of the Department having scientific concerns, although, again, this arrangement might usefully be coupled with a strong central science office. He suggested also that Foreign Service officers could receive specific training for "science affairs competence." What, he asked, were the functions of the office? They were at three levels: participation in policy making, operational responsibilities, and bridging from State to the science community. The latter two were easy, inescapable, and excessively time-consuming; the first — help in policymaking — was "broadest, hardest, and most important." It was the key job. It meant that the office should be not only on call but prepared to take the initiative "when opportunities are seen for using science and technology to advance political objectives." It should be highly selective in the issues it studied. It could tap the reservoir of expertise in the "outside" science community. The Science Officer needed the rank of Assistant vSecretary, but more importantly such leadership qualities as "scientific stature," skill in technology fore- casting relative to foreign policy, a competence for representing the State Department's interest in domestic scientific and technological developments, and "concern for the general abilit}^ of Foreign Service officers to deal with the day-to-day interactions between science, technology, and foreign policy." ''* NEED FOR ATTENTION TO TECHNOLOGY One of the problems of the State Department's science office that persisted during this period was the constraining effect of focusing heavily on science to the neglect of technology. For example, a study of the international role of Federal agencies, conducted by the Inter- national Committee of the Federal Council for Science and Tech- nology (FCST), June 20, 1961, began by noting the "revolutionary influence" of "science and its application in technology" and the need for taking these into account in U.S. foreign poUcy. But the aspects addressed in the report were mainly in science : international scientific organizations, support of research abroad, participation in inter- national meetings and exchange of persons, and the "image of U.S. science abroad." Consideration of technology was limited to its role in foreign aid. On the other hand. Burton M. Sapin, wi-iting in 1966, expressed hope that the expanded responsibiUties of the office would "provide an opportunity ... to enter into some of the main currents of foreign policymaking and play a more vigorous and influential role in the Department." He conceded that in the past its general orienta- tion had been "toward the research activities of the scientific com- munity, primarily the physical and biological sciences, and the various ways in which these affected and were affected by foreign policy." It had had "very little to do with the major problems stemming from the convergence of foreign policy, militar}^ policy, and scientific and technological advance. . . ." *^ <" Skolnikoff. op. cit., pp. 265-278. « Burton M. Sapin. The Making of United Stales Foreign Policy (Washington, D.C. : The Brookings Institu- tion, 1966') pp. 228-231. The author noted also, p. 227, that the President's Science Adviser and OST had helped oflset the science gap in the Department of State. 1355 Other assessments available to the author suggest that the role of the science office was not fully appreciated or accepted at this time by other bureaus of the Department. Moreover, the specifica- tions for the "Director" were exacting: not only should he be an outstanding scientist, but also sophisticated in international relations and diplornacv, aggressive and knowledgeable in administration, and skilled in bureaucratic maneuver. INSISTENCE ox SCIENTIFIC EMINENCE During the years between 1950 and 1965 the emphasis was on recruitment of a "top flight scientist" to run the oflSce. The science community generally insisted that the incumbent should be given a high enough rank so that he would automatically command "political clout" in the Department matching his "scientific clout" in the community. (It is not evident that any "clout" automatically accom- panies rank; the clout comes from the skill with which the rank is exercised.) However, the insistence on high rank and scientific achieve- ment combined to make recruitment difficult, and the results fell short of expectation. From the Berkner Report on, the arguments in favor of a strong "science" oflBce in the Department of State were persuasive in force and impressive in scope. But the actual product never came close to justifying the claims, and the resources allocated to the effort were meagre and sporadic. Possibly almost as large an effort was devoted to recruitment as to execution.^" FURTHER REVIEWS OF SCIENCE IN STATE Shortly after Dr. Rollefson returned to the Universit}^ of Wisconsin, a seminal critique appeared in the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists. Au- thored by W. Murray- Todd of the Foreign Office of the National Academy of Sciences, it suggested that a time of "changing of the guard" was also an opportune moment to take stock. He noted that the 1962 change in title of the office had served to decide a persistent controversy over its function and purpose. ^' The issue was: "Should the incumbent preside over scientific polic}^ matters as the personal ad- viser to the SecretarA^ of State and hopefully to the Assistant Secre- taries, or should he administer the scientific attache apparatus, pro- vide guidance on matters of international scientific policy, and co- ordinate the multiplicity of international scientific commitments of agencies of the U.S. government?" The change in title pointed in the latter direction. At this time (December 1964) the office consisted of 21 officers, 15 clerical personnel, 15 overseas attaches, and six deputy attaches. *> According to the recollection of Professor Dean Rusk of the School of Law, University of Georgia: In the mid-60s we tried very hard to find an internationally recognized scientist to head up SCI. For a variety of reasons we failed in our recruitment effort but not through lack of trying. We turned to Herman Pollack who had a real talent for calling upon outside help in the scientific community and for injecting scientific dimensions into policy studies. My own view is that the Department of State .'should have a good scientist or scientists in such places as the Policy Planning Staff, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and with special groups dealing with such questions as the Environment, Hunger, the Law of the Sea, etc. These might be based in the new Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs but spend much of their time outside the Biueau — somewhat as does the Legal Adviser's Office. I am quite stn-e that the Department should not attempt to staff itself with top peisonnel from all fields of science and technology— but it should have people who know where to go for the best scientific advice possible on given problems. (Dean Rusk, Professor of International Law, University of Geoi^ia School of Law, to Franklin Huddle, March 18. 1975.) " W. Murray Todd, "Science in the State Department," Bulletin of the Atomic ScierUistg 20, no. 10 (Decem- ber 1964), pp. 27-29. 1356 Among the questions raised by Todd were: Should the office be headed by a bona fide scientist or by a Foreign Service officer? The responsibihty was a divided one : to maintain communication with the scientific community and to "nurture a chmate of confidence and influence within the Department of State." There were impressive reasons in support of both courses. Todd also noted that 'Tortunately, for the last several years the office has had as deputy directors Foreign Service officers who understand the subtleties of both the scientific and Foreign Service attitudes." But as to the principal officer, in Todd's opinion : The acceptability of the director to the scientific community is clearly a matter of the highest import, both to that community and the State Department. It is vital for the scientific commimity to recognize, however, that the director's ef- fectiveness is directly proportional to the confidence he instills in the Secretary of State and the officers of the Foreign Service. He must be an eloquent spokesman both to and for the American scientific community. As a member of the Depart- ment of State his first responsibility is the foreign policy of the United States. The strong likelihood that the next director will be drawn from the ranks of the scientists is largely a measure of the success of past incumbents in being diplomats among scientists and scientists among diplomats. The proprietary interest of the U.S. scientific community in the healthy growth of scientifii; institutions in the Federal Government is generally reflected in the numerous articles in Science magazine, the organ of the American Association for the Advancement of Science. The decision of the Department of State in May 1965 to change the title of the office from "International Scientific Afl'airs" to "Inter- national Scientific and Technological Affairs" was reported without comment. ^^ The main, thrust of the report was that the Department had attempted to make the office more attractive by making it explicitly equivalent in "rank and authority" to that of an Assistant Secretary. The article also noted that at that time the office was headed by Mr. Herman Pollack (acting). He was identified as "a career officer with long experience in administration, but no scientific training." Another article in Science in 1966 took note of State's inability to fill its "top scientific job" and suggested that the role of this office had not been well defined. It was not clear whether the science director was an administrator of the considerable science functions (attache program, international organizations, etc.) or "policy adviser and scientist-diplomat." As a result — The scientific community has not rallied energetically to the aid of State, perhaps because of a feeling that science has, up to now at least, not been taken seriously in Foggy Bottom. It is probably true that in international matters scientists have preferred to work through the National Academy of Sciences, which the scientists regard as their own and as essentially nongovernmental despite the federal source of most of its funds.** UNSUCCESSFUL QUEST FOR NEW SCIENCE DIRECTOR As time went on and the Office remained under Herman Pollack ("acting"), the concern of the science community deepened. An article in Science by Skolnikoff in November 1966 repeated the suggestion ■ 52 "State Department: Rank, Authority of Science Office is Emphasized," Science, May 9, 1965, p. 776. K John Walsh, "International Science Activities: Some New Vistas Open," Science, June 17, 19C6, pp. 1605-1607. 1357 that State's inability to recruit a bona fide scientist for the post lay- in failing to define properly the role of the ofl&ce." In his view : The most important function of the science adviser can be summed up simply, if academically, as ensuring that the relevant scientific and technological a-^pects of central issues of foreign policy are integrated in policy deliberations. For an astonishing range of policy concerns these aspects are of critical importance to the choices facing the policy makers. And for those foreign policj^ issues of the greatest interest, these technical aspects are not simply background facts to be provided by an "expert." Instead, representing them effectively in the policy process requires good scientific judgment, involves estimates of future develop- ments in both science and technology, and, most important, demands a thorough appreciation of the ways in which the technological alternatives may depend on and interact with the political alternatives. ISIoreover, science and technology are also available to the policy maker as new instruments of poUcy — instruments that can be used appropriately only when there is adequate understanding of their special characteristics and of the relationshij) between those characteristics and policy objectives. ' He warned that: The Secretary of State's role as chief foreign policy adviser to the President will, in fact, be' increasingly in jeopardy if the Department under him. continues to be deficient in effective technical-political competence while the issues v.ith which it must deal involve ever more sophisticated scientific and technological elements. The Department's policy role in arms control, weaponry transactions, space, and atomic energy required at least a degree of technical skill to ask the right questions of mission agencies to provide a diplomatic input to Presidential decisions. Even in domestic scientific matters, there was a role for the De- partment. In particular, there was the need — ... to estimate the future, to examine the ways in which international relations and perhaps the international political system will be altered as science and tech- nology continue their explosive advance, and to explore the likely changes in what constitutes the "national interest." ** By tliis time the question began to be asked as to whether it was realistic to expect to find and recruit a willing, outstanding scientist with diplomatic and administrative skills. It was still "desirable." But as SkolnikofT put it : Lastlj% need the science adviser be a scientist? If one looks only to the nature of the required "technical" inputs into policy, the answer is preferably, but not necessarily, for those inputs require as much understanding of the political side of an issue as of the technical. With good technical associates, and experience in dealing with technical questions, a nonscientist could provide the bridge. How- ever, he vv-ould have to surround himself with individuals with good technical judgment, and this would not be easy.^B And in point of fact, "scientific stature will not make any dift"erence whatever unless the science adviser has the basic ability to relate science and technology to foreign policy matters and the force and energy to make his views knovv-n and felt within the Department." M Eufrene B. Skolnikoff, "Scientific Advice in the State Department," Science, November 25, 1966, p. 980. M Ibid., p. 983. M Ibid., p. 984. IV. Growth of the Science Office, 1966-1974 The various obstacles that had retarded development of the science office of the Department of State were overcome in part by the activity and accomplishments of the office during the directorate of Herman Pollack, a career Foreign Service officer with no pretensions to scientific preeminence but with considerable administrative experience and flexibility. During these years the office expanded in personnel, increased in effectiveness and impact, and somewhat bettered its acceptance by other elements of the Department. However, while it undertook many experiments in bringing science understanding into the Department there were few unqualified successes. It was never adequately manned to perform both operational and staff policy functions. It became overloaded with operational chores and tended to neglect other commitments. The differing intellectual demands of science policy and technology policy, and the differing administrative requirements of science programs and technological programs, made it difficult to allocate effort to deal with these four functions in a balanced way. Still, these are criticisms of a dynamically evolving function in a Department and an administrative environment that tended to resist change and new directions of growth. Endorsement oj Science Program by Secretaries of State Secretary Rusk appears to have appreciated quite fully the im- portance of science and technology for diplomacy. He was receptive to the communications from the office, gave nian3'^ speeches to public groups and much testimony to congressional committees stressing the importance of science and technology for diplomacy, and responded generously to proposals for innovative approaches to the problem of making State science conscious. However, in general the Foreign Service tended to be unresponsive. Assignments to SCI were not usuall}'- welcome, liaison between SCI and the geographic bureaus was not close, and the function was not highly regarded as a ladder to promotion or an interesting career.^'^ Secretary William P. Rogers, who took office in 1969, similarly appealed the cause of science and technology as a major concern of his Department. In a number of speeches within the Department and to congressional audiences he called for staff expertise in such techno- logical problems as the nuclear nonproliferation treaty, Intelsat, and the control of the seabed; and pledged that "Our basic goal is to put science and technology at the service of human — and humane — ends.^* " These impressionistic observations aie gleaned from many conversations with Foreign Service officers, comments in the literature, and statistics of age in grade. For example, the 610 page study carried out under the direction of the Deputy Under Secretary of State for Administration (U.S. Department of State, Diplomacy for the 70s, A Pre gram of Management Reform for the Department of State, Department and Foreign Service Series, no. 143, Publication no. 85.51, December 1970) gave only one-half page to science; it said in effect science was important for diplomacy, reporting should be a two-way proposition, and field officers need not be trained scientists (p. 491). " For example, his remarks to the Scientific Attaches, January 29, 1970 and his address, "U.S. Foreign Policy in a Technological Age" in U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Inter- national Science Policy, proceedings before the Committee of the Panel on Science and Technology, Twelfth Meeting, January 2&-28, 1971, pp. 2-8. (1358) 1359 Secretary Henry A, Kissinger has also expressed concern for the Tole of science and teclinology in his Department. His most explicit statement of the theme was contained in his first speech as Secretary of State, before the United Nations General Assembly, September 24, 1973, when he addressed the delegates as — . . . members of a community drawn by modern science, technology, and new forms of communication into a proximity for which we are still politically un- prepared. Technology daily outstrips the ability of our institutions to cope with its fruits. Our political imagination must catch up with our scientific vision. And later, before the special session of that body, April 15, 1974: ". . - Science and technolog}^ are becoming our most precious resource." With this receptive leadership and recognition the science ojffice in the Department of State during the years from about 1966 on was increasingly active. Principal tasks of the Bureau during these years, included : — Testimony before numerous committees of Congress; — Backstopping and annual briefing sessions for U.S. scientific attaches ; — Preparation of numerous policy memoranda to the Secretary ; — Participation in studies under the aegis of the National Security Council; — Management of the International Science and Technology Committee (formerly under the Federal Council for Science and Technology, but now delegated to the Department of State) ; — Providing a central advisory service for the Department of State on issues with scientific and technological content; — Attendance at international scientific conferences ; — Assistance in negotiating bilateral agreements and subsec^uent follow-on implementation; — Providing input to international programs of other agencies — the National Science Foundation, U.S. Atomic Energy Commis- sion, Department of the Treasury, and others; — Supporting U.S. delegations at U.N. agencies, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and others; — Various expedients to increase the technical competence of the Foreign Service ; and — Publication of literature and speeches describmg State De- partment science activities. Evolution of SCI; Expanded Duties After Dr. Rollefson left the Department, and first Kretzman and then Pollack took over as "acting," a vigorous search turned up no acceptable and willing replacement. Accordingly, Pollack was desig- nated Director of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, July 14, 1967. His previous service as deputy and acting executive director of the_ prestigious Bureau of European Affairs (EUR) and as Deput}^ Assistant Secretary for Personnel, a point of bureacratic influence, significantly contributed to his effectiveness in his new post. He was reconfirmed in it September 18, 1969, and remained there until he resigned August 15, 1974. In this post his task was — ... to advise and assist the Secretary in his consideration of scientific and technological factors affecting foreign policy, to coordinate and provide guidance to the international scientific and technological activities of the Government, 1360 to represent the Department in appropriate international cooperative programs in science and technology and to direct the Scientific Attache program.*' When the new Director took office, he assumed charge of a staflF of 32 persons in Washington, phis 22 scientific attaches or deputies (12 in Europe). The home office was organized into three sections: Atomic Energy, Outer Space, and General Science. Functions of the office were described in a departmental statement in 1966 as follows: (1) Providing advice to the State Department and Foreign Service on the re- lationship of science and technology to international relations and foreign policy developments ; (2) Providing evaluation of scientific matters related to the peaceful uses of atomic energy and outer space and other science matters involved in international affairs; (3) Participating in foreign policy decisionmaking to assure consideration of scientific and technological factors; and (4) Maintaining liaison with Federal agencies engaged in the administration of scientific programs and with private groups engaged in international science activities, for the purpose of providing foreign policy guidance; recommending the initiation of cooperative scientific and technological activities to advance foreign policy objectives; and obtaining information of the status of Internationa scientific and technological activities.^" The growth in resources and influence of the office during these years was attributable to the combination of a vigorous and sophisti- cated Foreign Service officer as leader, a general governmental interest in the strengthening of science and technology programs, the need in many technical activities for State Department help and intervention abroad, a growing interest of the Congress, and a series of sympathetic Secretaries of State. A tabulation of the (mainly operational) tasks within the office in mid-1966 would include the following: General — Administer foreign policy aspects of "certaui" bilateral science agreements; — Coordinate briefing programs to improve departmental understanding of major scientific and technological developments (e.g., desalinization, high altitude photography, remote sensing devices) ; — Motivate interdepartmental exchanges of personnel for training purposes; — Assistance to Foreign Service Institute in presenting Foreign Service courses in science, technology, and foreign affairs; — Coordinate international scientific activities of other agen- cies; and —Chair and staff International Committee for Science and Technology of the Federal Council for Science and Technology. Atomic Energy Section — Assist on matters relating to peaceful uses of atomic energy ; — Help negotiate bilateral agreements for cooperation (36 countries) ; M U.S. Department of State, Press Release, No. 270, "Appointment of Herman Pollack as Director of International Scientific and Technological Afiairs," September 18, 1969. . «> Statement submitted bv Department of State in U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, The Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations for 1967. Hearings, S9th Cong., 2d sess., February 15, 1966, p. 42. 1361 — Assistance on such projects as desalinization, nuclear ship propulsion, peaceful nuclear explosions (Plowshare); and — Cooperation with Euratom. Outer Space Section — Recovery of astronauts landing on foreign soil; — Negotiate agreements for space cooperation; — Participate in United Nations Outer Space Committee; and — Assist in U.S.-U.S.S.R. space cooperation program. General Science Section — Participate in international environmental (ocean and atmospheric) science programs; — Maintain relations with other offices and agencies with science programs; — Present policy advice and assistance concerning technological matters; and — Maintain "geographic" officers in science. Exposition by Pollack oj SCFs Role On May 17, 1967, shortly before his appointment as Director of SCI, Pollack in a formal address described "the present and future importance of the interaction between science and foreign affairs, the attitude of the Department of State on the subject, and the administrative response ... to the challenge of science in foreign affairs." ®^ There was a technological revolution underway, he said, that was without precedent in its combination of "scale, pace, and impact on the affairs of men." In less than 10 3^ears man had progressed from a first satellite to working weather and communications satellites. He foresaw "natural-resource sensing" in the future. Nuclear power, desalinization, weather modification, computer technology, changes in military hardware, supertankers of 500,000 tons, were at hand or near. All of these technological innovations implied work for the Depart- ment of wState: nuclear safeguards, changed national and international patterns of energy usage, easing of international tensions over alloca- tion of scarce water, agreements on space and weather modification, agreements on uses of the ocean and the seabed, resolution of "brain drain" and "technology gap" issues, and policies in response to the changed vulnerability of nations to the new weapons. Thus: . . . Not only do scientific and technological developments affect the basic geopolitical-economic considerations which underlie foreign policy decisions, but they become increasinglj^ the very subject of international negotiations. They are providing a host of new problems, with awesome potential for the disadvantage of the amity of nations. On the other hand, their beneficial potential, imagina- tively and effectively employed, could have immense favorable impact on the chmate of international relations over the next century or more. Numerous international agencies and agreements had appeared in response to the onrush of technological innovation: International Atomic Energy Agency, World Health Organization, Intergovern- mental Oceanographic Commission, U.S. agreements mth Japan and " Herman Pollack, "Science, Foreign Affairs, and the State Department," Department of State Bulletin, June 19, 1967, pp. 910-917. Kepriated in U.S. Department of State, Department and Foreign Service Series, no. 13'J, Publication, no. 82C1, July 1967. 1362 Germany. Many present and future concerns required "worldwide integrated action": . . . Such immediate problems as population pressures, protection of basic food crops and the development of new sources of food, and water management re- quire a joint approach now. For the the future, international action will be needed in disease control, resource exploitation and conservation, weather modification and control, and in the search for new energy sources. For the far future, mastery of and competence in the ocean depths and outer space will require a massive, sustained, and cooperative effort. Then Pollack w^ent on to describe the organizational response of the Department of State to these challenges — the role of SCI, the scientific attaches, relationsliips with other scientific and technical agencies, and science training in the Department. But there remained a persistent problem : We have found that scientists, like many others, frequentl}'^ lack an awarene.ss of the realities of world politics and, correspondingly, foreign affairs .specialists are frequently resistant to the acquisition of knowledge about scientific and technical developments applicable to foreign affairs. I don't mean to be dis- paraging toward either group — after all, some of my best friends are scientists, and I must live with the diplomats. The challenge is, in part, to our educational systems. He quoted a statement by Secretary Rusk that: "For any American involved in public affairs today, scientific literacy is a must; and that is particularly so in foreign affairs. We are firmly convinced that the Foreign Service officer should be familiar with the ways, the concepts, and the purposes of science." And he called for the next generation of Foreign Service officers to add "scientific literacy to the wide range of skills and knowledge already required in their profession." Continued Growth During the Nixon Presidency The influence of SCI continued to grow when the new Republican administration took office in 1969. During the first 2 years, bilateral science agreements were developed wdth Irance, Spain, Romania, the U.S.S.R., and Taiwan China. Technical assistance programs were being formulated in cooperation with the Organization of American States. Programs were under study for Africa. A new AID Office for Science and Technology was organized. vSCT participated in a joint United States-Canadian Conference on Arctic Research. The use of Public Law 480 funds for science programs in several countries w^as under study. Early in 1971, William P. Rogers, who succeeded Rusk as Secretary of State, told a House Committee that "This administration is adapting American foreign polic}^ to the fact that never before have the global characteristics of science and technology held so many consequences for so man}^ people." He spoke of the vanishing re- sources of petroleum and metals, of environmental quality, satellite technology, seabed resource development, nuclear benefits and dan- gers, and the need for international cooperation to exchange scientific knowledge and technological capability."^ ADVISORY COMMITTEES When the Federal Council for Science and Technology (FCST) was first organized, in 195S, one of the first subordinate elements '2 William P. Rogers, "U.S. Foreign Policy in A Technological Age," in Proceedings, Panel on Science and Technology, Twelfth Meeting, Inter national Science Policy, pp. 2-8. 1363 cieatcd iindor it uas the Iiitcinational C'oniniittco. At about the same time, tlie Ficsident had created tlie President's Seienee Advisory ("ommittee (PSAC), and under tliis grou]) liad been or:iitmt'nt of State was reprpseuted by SCI, AID, and VSTA; otlifr depiitments represented were A^'riculiurc, Connnerce, Defense, HEW, HUD, and Transportation. The Ollie-- uf the President was represented from 0MB and OST. Ir.dependent agencies represented were AEC, N'SI''. and NASA. Also included were the Library of Congress and the quasi-poveriinienial Smithsonian Iiisiilntion and the Na- tional Aeademy of Sciences. A more extended account of the FCST Iinernadonal Conmitiee is presented ill I'.S. Conjrress, House, Committee on Foreijin Affairs, U.S. Scioitists .Abroad: An Eiamiuaiion of .\Jojot Proy rams fir Nongoiirnintn'al ScienH/ic KxcUnngr, ii\ the series Science, Technolopy. and American Diplo- macy, prepared by Gencvi?ve J. Knezo, Analyst in Science and Technology, Science Policy Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, April 1074. See vol. II, pp. 865-1035. 1364 tional responsibilities, transferred the jurisdiction over the Inter- national Committee from FCST to the Department of State.^^ The FCST committee had been involving itself in a wide scope of interests but rarely in great depth. Perhaps its principal function — like that of most FCST committees — was that of an interagency in- formation exchange. This function, sometimes referred to facetiously as "the chowder and marching society," has a practical value when a number of agencies are engaging in related or parallel functions. On the other hand, it is difficult for essentially voluntary interagency coordinating committees to undertake large studies or surveys, par- ticularly on a sustained basis, unless the White House is closely related to the enterprise. With the termination of PSAC and its International Panel, and with the transfer of the International Committee of FCST to SCI, the committee became in effect the residual claimant to both planning and operational coordinating functions but without inter- agency and Executive Office support. This, at least, was the status of the Interagency Committee on International Science and Technology at the point when SCI turned into the "Bureau of Oceans and Inter- national Environmental and Scientific Affairs." SCI Efforts To Bridge State With the Science Community Among the initiatives undertaken by SCI to bring a fuller apprecia- tion of science and technology into the Department of State were — — Science luncheons at which leading scientists lectured to senior officers of the Department ;^^ — Science lectures to broader audiences;^* — Annual briefing sessions of science attaches to review new trends in U.S. science and technology; — A "Scholar/Diplomats Seminar," that exposed eight younger professors to problems of diplomacy ;^^ and — A seminar course on science and technology at the Foreign Service Institute.^" A related activity w^as the organization of a nongovernmental "Department of State Advisory Committee on Science and Foreign Affairs." This committee, announced by Secretarv Rogers Febru- ary 23, 1972, held its first meeting July 13-14, 1973^ held its latest of four meetings, July 13-14, 1974; and expired in early 1975. The con- cept of such an advisory committee to tap a wider range of opinion and thoaight in the scientific and technological community had long been advocated. It was to have four objectives: (1) to advise on tech- nically related problems of foreign policy, (2) to advise on long-term 6' However, the responsibility for "international scientific and technical activities performed by OST' was transferred by Dr. Stever, June 30, 1973, to the Director of NSF— and by him to the Assistant Director for National and International Programs. These activities included: — Serving as a focal point for selecting cooperative programs with the international science community and participating in international programs in which civilian science and technology are vital elements. — Facilitating the flow of people and exchanging of ideas to aid in achieving the foreign affairs and trade objectives of the United States. " These had been initiated by Kretzman and were continued by Pollack with the support of Secretary Rusk. " The first of these wore presided over by the Secretary and heard a presentation by Dr. Rene Jules Dubos on "The Human Landscape," December 9, 1969. ^3 This item and the one preceding were reported in U.S. Department of State, International Science Notes, no. 3n (June 1973) , pp. 13-15. item 8. The item expressed regret that the meetings with science attaches were attended from the Department by only staff members of SCI. '" Two experimental four-week seminar courses were held in 19C.5, with support of the Ford Foundation, and sul^sequently training programs were continued at FSI on a semiannual basis. However, the course in the latter part of 1974, by tlien reduced to one week, was cancelled for want of students. See U.S. Depart- ment of State, Inteniatiaial Science Notes, no. 12 (January 1966), p. 5, item 5. 1365 trends that presaged diplomatic impacts; (3) to advise on the inter- national control of technolog}^, and (4) to advise on departmental management in international scientific and technological affairs. During its brief period of activity the Advisory Committee appears to have served a useful purpose in providing an "outside" view of four technological problem areas of concern to U.S. foreign polic}'. Four subcommittees were formed dealing with (1) the control and manage- ment of the export of technology, (2) international aspects of uranium enrichment (as nuclear fuel), (3) the collection and distribution of information produced b}* the Earth Resources SatelHte, and (4) weather and climate modification. Principal emphasis was given to items (1) and (3). Perhaps the most important contribution that this committee could make, if revived, would be by serving as a two-way communication link between the technical and policy groups in State and the broad technical community at large, while at the same time giving committee members a continuing education in diplomatic science policy problems and issues. The Advisory Committee had been selected with attention to the need for a very wide array of disciplines and professional experience ^^ and could usefully bring their varied experience to the Bureau on demand. Dr. Lewis Branscomb who had been a member of the Advisory committee gave it as his opinion that the committee had served a useful purpose during its short life. Its "mixed" composition — includ- ing both scientists and non-scientists — had helped SCI to deal with issues that began as technological but always went bejond technology to social, economic, and political areas. It provided an independent point of view on such subjects as bilateral science negotiations, inter- national technology transfer, use of Public Law 480 funds, and prob- lems of food. He offered two criticisms: that the Committee had insufficient contact with principal policy officials in other agencies with international science and technology missions, and that the Depart- ment of State had no funds with which to assure that other agencies fulfilled diplomatic commitments engaged in by State on their behalf."^ Growth of the State Science Office Programs goals of the State science office were described by Mr. Pollack in a prepared statement to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in April 1973."^ Said the statement: "SCI's basic mission is to promote the effective utilization international!}' of U.S. capabilities in science and technology to advance our national interests and to strengthen our international economic, political, and cultural rela- tionships." To carr}" out this mission there were four program goals: (1) Promote Constructive Utilization of the Peaceftil Benefits of Science and Technology to Advance U.S. Interests and to Strengthen U.S. Policy Relation- ships while Forestalling the Diversion of Such Technology to Military or Other Programs Inimical to Those Interests. ■' The Committee was chaired by Mr. Pollack. Its members were: Dean Rusk, former Secretary of State; Simon Ramo, vice chairman of TRW; John Hightower, former Associated Press State Department correspondent and now professor of journalism, University of New Mexico; Gordon J. F. MacDonald, professor of environmental studies, Dartmouth College, and chairman of the National Academy of Sciences Environmental Studies Board; Kenneth Davis, Bechtel Corp.; John Leddy, former Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs; Eugene SkolnikofiE, professor of political science, and head of M.I.T.'s Center for International Studies; and Lewis Branscomb, vice president of IBM and formerly Director of the National Bureau of Standards. '2 In a telephone conversation with the author March 17, 1975. '3 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Department of State AppropriatioTis Authoriza- tiom, Fiscal Year 1974, Hearings, 93d Cong., 1st sess., April 3, 4, 30, 1973, pp.'527-529. He asked for $1.7 miUion for salaries for a staff of 50, plus operating expenses of $364,000 for the fiscal year 1974. 1366 (2) Establish and Retain U.S. Influence in International Scientific, Technologi- cal and Environmental Programs and Organizations to Promote U.S. Political or Economic Interests. (3) Ensure that the International Activities for U.S. Scientific, Technological and Environmental Agencies are Conducted with Full Knowledge of, and in Consonance with, U.S. Foreign Policy Interests. (4) Identify Foreign Policy Issues Emerging from Scientific and Technological Developments, Direct the Focus Within the Department to Deal with These Issues, and Provide Foreign Policy Decision Makers with Appropriate Policy Analyses and Recommendations for Decision. The statement then provided a quantitative analysis of some of SCI's operational tasks: The workload associated with pursuing these goals and objectives continues to grow. The quickening pace of international cooperation in science and tech- nology is indicated by the fact that there are now eighteen bilateral agreements for general cooperation in science and technologj''. SCI negotiated eight of these agreements alone during the past year and a half. During this same period the U.S. has been host to five formal ministerial delegations and even more informal ministerial level visits. These groups looked to the Department of State for statements and interpretations on U.S. policy on technical subjects. Responsibility for organization of these visits also fall on SCI. In addition, there are innumerable high-level individual visitors whose visits and consultations require detailed coordination and briefings. In the past year, we also prepared major statements of policy on a wide range of issues such as remote sensing of the earth, space launch assistance, export of technology, post- Apollo cooperation, the environment, ocean dumping, endangered species, etc. Pollack concluded by predicting a major expansion in both duties and manpower requirements for the future : In the past, the Department's concern w^ith activities and problems dealing with science and technology have been somewhat limited. Such a situation no longer exists. S&T have significantly augmented the business of the Department of State. The great change which is occurring is altering the very structure of society and relationships among nations and is moving at a pace which challenges present policies and institutions. Functions and Tasks of SCI by 1974 The following is a listing of the jobs that the State Department science office appeared to be responsible for executing at the time it was being consolidated with offices of Oceans and Environmental Affairs, as of October 1974. (The list was compiled on the basis of a review of SCI publications of recent date.) These fall roughly into seven categories, about as follows: CONTRIBUTIONS TO POLICY PLANNING In this category are activities that relate to U.S. decisionmaking in the foreign policy field. They include: —Preparing quick responses to emergency questions involving science, technology, and diplomacy; — Responding to requests for technical assistance from policy- oriented levels in the Department of State; — Providing technical input on behalf of the Department of State to matters before the National Security Council; — Analyzing the contributions of U.S. and world basic science to U.S. diplomatic objectives; — Identifying major technological developments of highest significance for diplomacy, present and future, and preparing and bringing to the attention of high-level decisionmakers the in-depth analysis of such developments; 1367 — Preparing broader surveys of ongoing technology, and assess- ing the general trend of the interactions of technology with diplomacy; — Securing policy-oriented inputs from the U.S. technological community, including the funding of analytical, historical, and policy studies in the area of diplomatic problems involving science and technology; — Designing diplomatic initiatives involving technical matters; and — Providing input in congressional hearings and assisting in deliberation on legislative issues invohong the interaction of science or technology with U.S. diplomatic objectives. RELATIONS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES In this category are included the functions of negotiation of agree- ments, maintenance of the scientific attache system, and other support functions. They include: — Conducting international negotiations on technical matters and bilateral agreements on behalf of the U.S. Government; — Providing staff assistance to accompany and backstop senior U.S. Government officials in negotiating agreements with foreign governments that involve technical substance; — Coordinating the development and negotiation of bilateral technical agreements; and — Monitoring and supporting follow-up actions to implement bilateral technical agreements. COORDINATION OF U.S. TECHNICAL MISSION AGENCIES 111 this categor}' are included the functions of planning and sup- porting joint programs, and assisting other agencies in arranging for foreign contacts and the like. They include: — Providing secretariat and staff support for interagency committees involved in international technical matters; — Providing assistance to U.S. agencies whose technological programs involve international cooperation; — Generally coordinating international contacts on tech- nological matters and programs of U.S. mission agencies; and — Assessing and supporting appropriations for U.S. agencies whose technical programs are supportive of U.S. diplomatic objectives, and for programs of international technical agencies supportive of U.S. diplomatic objectives. MANAGEMENT AND DISSEMINATION OF TECHNICAL INFORMATION In this category are activities that serve generally to facilitate the flow of technical information to users in the United States. They include : — Facilitating the development of international exchanges of scientific information; — Directing the flow of technical information transmitted from U.S. embassies; 1368 — Assuring that information accumulated by U.S. scientists abroad flows widely to the U.S. science community; and — Improving the efficiency of use of scientific information from translated books and reports, especially from the "difficult" languages (e.g., Cliinese, Japanese, Hungarian). FACILITATING THE WORK OF SCIENTISTS In this category are included actions to help scientists from the United States make contact w^ith appropriate foreign scientists, and easing travel problems. They include : — Assisting U.S. scientists in international matters of scientific organization, conferences, and the like; — Coordinating the policy aspects of the basic scientific con- tacts of other U.S. agencies abroad ; and — Facilitating the international exchange of scientific personnel and monitoring it to anticipate and alleviate such problems as "brain drain." INCREASING "TECHNICAL LITERACY" IN THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE In this category' are included actions to provide informational material to increase the visibility to State Department officials and others of technical interactions with diplomacy. They include : — Preparing and updating educational inaterials needed in training and retraining Foreign Service officers, the U.S. scientific and technological communities, and others whose work involves the interactions of science and technology with diplomacy; — Promoting technical sensitivity and perception in the Foreign Service; and — Accjuainting the U.S. public with the importance of tech- nical matters for U.S. national and diplomatic objectives. ADMINISTRATIVE CHORES In this category are included various detailed activities of a non- policy nature. They include : — Recruiting, training, and retraining personnel for service as science officers or technolog}^ officers in U.S. embassies; —Providing close support for U.S. science officers in U.S. embassies ; — Maintaining facilitative contacts with science officers of foreign governments in Washington; and — ^Assuring adequate U.S. participation in United Nations and regional international organizational affairs ; It would not be easy to identify which of these jobs could most readily be dispensed with, but there seem to be quite a number of them. They evolved as the office grew over the years, and certainly they are not all of equal importance. The problem of allocating re- sources among them is rendered the more difficult because in general the urgent tasks received priority attention while the longer range policy-oriented studies were performed on an "as time permits" basis. It is possible that a sharper focus of the effort in the future might enhance the net utility of the office with only minor cost in services. 1369 The growth of the staff of the State science office is indicated by the growth in its appropriations: from $558,430 in 1965 to $933,782 in 1970, to an estimated $2,439,400 in 1975 (all fiscal years).'* By Febru- ary 5, 1975, the Washington staff numbered 98, as compared with about 40-odd in 1965. The question is worth exploring as to how many people are needed to manage the science and technology aspects of U.S. foreign policy in the Department of State. If the Bureau is expected to continue to conduct both policy anal3^ses and international operations it would appear to be seriously undermanned, in view of the expanding requirements on it. If it can divest itself of operational responsibilities, these would need to be provided for somewhere else, but the Bureau could manage without expansion, or even contract somewhat if (a) heavy emphasis was placed on high quality profes- sional personnel, and (b) great restraint was exercised in the selection of issues for analysis. Organization of the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific- A;ff airs A new page in the story of science in the State Department was written by the Congress in 1973. Two legislative proposals had been introduced in the first session of the 93d Congress, one by Senator Claiborne Pell to create a "Bureau of Oceans" and anotlicr by Senator Howard Baker to create a "Bureau of International Environmental Matters." During hearings in the Foreign Relations Committee on H.R. 7645, Department of State Appropriations Act of 1973, it was agreed that both measures should be combined into a general action : to create wit'.iin the Department a "Bureau of Oceans and Interna- tional Environmental and Scientific Affairs" (OES), headed by an Assistant Secretary responsible for "matters relating to oceans, environmental, scientific, fisheries, wildlife, and conservation affairs." '''' The new bureau, it was understood, would incorporate the functions of SCI. A State Department directive circular dated October 8, 1974, announced that the change specified in the 1973 law would become effective October 14, and that the scope of the new bureau would include matters relating to international scientific, technological, environmental, weather, oceans, atmosphere, fisheries, wildlife, con- servation, health, population, and related subjects. In addition, the scope of its "technological matters" was to include "atomic energy and energy related research and development, space technology, and other advanced technological developments, except those which are primarily defense related." All personnel and functions of SCI, and the other two offices,'* were transferred to the new Bureau. '< For 1965 figure see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Departments of SWe. Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Appropriations for 1967. Hearings, 8'Jth Cong., 2d sess., 1966, p. 41. For 1970 figure see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations. Departments of State, Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies, Appropriations for 1972. Hearings, 92d Coug., 1st sess., 1971, p. 42. For 1975 figure see U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Appropriations, State, Justice, Commerce, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations, Fiscal Year 1976, part 2. Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, p. 1486. " U.S. Congress, House, Conference Report, Eeport no. 93-367, July 10, 1973, text appears p. 3, and expla- nation p. 13. The Act was approved as Public Law 93-126, October 18, 1973. ■6 These were the Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary for Fisheries and Wildlife and Coordinator of Ocean Affairs (S/FW-COA) and the Office of the Special Assistant to tlie Secretary for Population Matters (S/PM). 1370 The circular defined six functions for the new Bureau (paraphrase) : (a) "Primary responsibihty for the development of compre- hensive and coherent U.S. poUcies in the areas where it has been assigned functional responsibility and for advising the Secretary on the functional and technical considerations arising in its areas of responsibihty as they relate to the formulation and implementa- tion of foreign policy;" (b) Analysis and evaluation of relevant policies and programs of international agencies and bilateral activities to assure their compatibility with U.S. objectives; (c) Liaison with other U.S. agencies and the private sector on relevant matters to provide policy guidance; advice and support as appropriate on these matters to other personnel of the Department ; (d) Recruitment assistance for the Department and for attend- ance at relevant international meetings ; (e) "Represents the Department, with the assistance of other concerned bureaus and offices, in international negotiations and on interagency policj^ groups and committees concerned with • subject matter for which it has primary responsibility. Develops U.S. substantive positions and strategy in dealing with these matters when considered within international organizations and bilateral programs;" and (f) "Heads or participates, as appropriate, on U.S. delegations to international conferences and negotiations concerned with sub- ject matter within the bureau's area of responsibihty." Prospects and Plans jor the New Bureau Chosen to serve as the first head of the newly created Bureau was Dr. Dixy Lee Ray, former Chairman of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission. Dr. Ray upon confirmation, took office as Assistant Secretary for Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs January 30, 1975. Her appointment was greeted by Scien.ce magazine as a challenge to her "bureaucratic skills" as well as a test of the interest of the Sccretar}^ of State and his senior associates in "up- grading science in the State Department and . . . making it an efl'ective ingredient in foreign relations."^' There were obvious questions as to the extent of support that the new bureau would receive from the Secretary of State, the relationships to be established with other bureaus of the Department, and the rapport with the National Science Foundation, its National and International Division, and the new Science and Technology Pohcy Office, among other interested agencies. Internally, the new Assistant Secretary would also have the op- portunity to chart a number of new courses. For example, how would she respond to the Inspector General's report and recommendations (described below) ? More specifically, what trends and directions would she chart for the expanded Bureau Avith respect to: Operations versus staff polic}^ analysis? Science versus technology? " Robert Gillette, "Ray's Shift to State Department Will Test Kissinger's Interest in Science," Science, November 15, 1974, pp. 612-613. 1371 Concentration of attention to science and technology matters in OES versus diffusion throughout the Department of State? Emphasis on recruiting speciaUsts or training generaHsts? (Relations with the Foreign Service Institute?) The building of an OES data base and research capability or en- couragement of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to do so, with imputs from the science attaches? The development of in-house policy analj^sis capability, or reliance on advisory committee and contract studies, or both? Encouragement of bilateral or multilateral science and technology relations, or both, or neither? Policy regarding use and development of the attache system — fewer and larger teams or wider coverage? What services to be ex- pected from them? What arrangements to enhance the use of their product in the U.S.? The allocation of emphasis as between the established functions of SCI and the mission functions of oceans, environment, and popula- tion matters stressed by Members of the Senate? As this study was being uTitten, Dr. Ray was too recently in the post to have determined what shape her organization would eventually take, or what program priorities would be adopted. It is probable that her initial concern would be to meld the added new elements into the core group represented by the former SCI. By early April, conversations with staff members of OES gave an indication that consideration was being given to establishment of some kind of a small reserved staff or longer range policy analysis within the Bureau. It would be interesting to see whether the think- ing in OES is that such an activity might serve to answer the kind of criticism expressed in a 1972 analysis by Howard Margolis of the Institute for Defense Analyses. He observed that "there seems to be no one dealing with policy in the department whose standing depends substantially on his ability to make and provide his principal with a line of argument to effectively defend judgments on the relationship of technical considerations to larger political issues." Parentheticall.y he noted that "the most likely exception" was the "Science Bureau" but that it did not have access at that time to "high policy areas to which technical arguments are likel}^ to be relevant. . . ." So he concluded : Consequently there is, I believe, no one at State who has the combination of access to high policy levels, interest in policy questions, and a particular stake and interest in how technical arguments bear on such questions. But it is only that sort of person who is likelj^ to be in the position of credibly telling senior State officials when and why the technical assessments they take for granted maj'' be unsound, or when and why the assessments they are inclined to dismiss as inconsequential really are important. This has, I think, the effect of weakening State's capacity as an organization to adequatelj^ assess some policy issues, and it weakens State's ability to play a leading role in advocating its view on any policy issue on which other agencies can bring technical arguments to bear.'* " Howard Margolis, N'otis on. Technical Advice and Political Issues, Paper P-841, International and Social Studies Division, Institute for Defense Analyses, April 1972, p. 63. 1372 See the accompanying tentative organization chart (figure 1, p. 49) for a description of the way in which it was proposed — as of May 21, 1975 — that the elements of OES were to be assembled. The Inspector General's Assessment of SCI At about the time the Congress was deliberating the question of reorganizing SCI, the Office of the Inspector General of the Depart- ment of State was completing a study in de])th of the State Depart- ment's science office. The study culminated in an internal inspection report, "Science, Technology, and the Environment in the Conduct of Foreign Relations," in September 1973. The substance of the report was in four categories: (1) importance of the function for the mission of the Department, (2) weaknesses in the present system, (3) strengths of the present sj^stem, and (4) recommendations for improvements. IMPORTANCE OF THE FUNCTION The report identified five reasons why the Department ought to involve itself in science and technology : 1. International science and technology was a vehicle of co- operation to enhance U.S. foreign relations. 2. With respect to both economic health and military security, science and technology were yielding developments that were significantly altering U.S. bilateral and multilateral relations. 3. Legal obligations required the Department to deal in techni- cal subjects. 4. The foreign technical activities of other U.S. agencies affected the Nation's relations abroad. 5. The Department was called on to assist U.S. technical agencies with overseas support, guidance, and cooperation. 1373 < z z c z <; Z < K O O c K c o 1 J f-i ■/) O -u +-> c: 0) o '.:; P -!-> -!-> 4-H r3 'r-i !.: w t< ■!-> rq O tH ■Si U ►-] z . J-' n ri r; t/1 <; t/) ■y^ O -IJ o .-- ■-. ' < •.^ i:: ci •^1 D vJ rt O >-< !-. -) rt +^ i-i rt a .H ■rH :i: r3 I-I :^ u r-l O :/) < o • > ^^ ■« b r. !- (-5 u o < •c/o n n n tj O t. t' z t; H-t o • tc z -< X o ij X !-. • H -d cd rt ■M fH i-< <-' ■;--> ic! z (U )- d s O N ti •H s 0) O !- ■■3 z o .-J o O LO O es X a O > X +J o U z •H c; '^ K ^-1 o pi J LO o J- <; fn -H •^ Z PI '-/i o c Ifl r-< l-H < P-, -«i 1 G- i-< w o '-< *-:-■ •H ^ O i:! 1-1 ID M "■H <:.<)• tl "H -J r: :j < v: ra (.:: 1 3 ..':; rH O 3 rt r;. K o t^:; O [jq .^3 !^ tfl o -.H a •;j ri O X -H -H PJ ►-^ -i-^ . In '^ ^ o li o o •3 +-> -H r-< C ■(-> rt o rt (^ S i- O 'J •(-> . cc t: Lo '.U 1-; <; -H p: c; r-« i^ -.H f^ = ^:^ ■CJ ^ < r-t <; X Lh o r-» •H. O rH •d O Ul fu ■-H O 'n or. a «-• a o pq or. w. C -H T3 •H tfl r-H C X O p: .-H 'r-i c3 rt rt rH C -^ ■P.< t:; X cl- do u o C rH 4-> rt o a > a •< o t/l t/) o 1-' •r, ';h -O <.i -< (U O X-H rt >, I-. .H ,--• ^J r3 rX i/» .-ZS •!-> Ph M rx, o -• O It CTJ O U 'J'M o 1- m CO .J <: s. '0 o ■!-> >..H f i (0 o I'J I-I p! !^-( ,■ •> o .c o I/-! C U t^ •rH rH GJ Ir-i tfl t-i (d (/; !-. J H < vj X X CJ ^J) >,.H !-, i: s' •> U O (/) o ;t ;5 c; {-■ !-i p.X ► •'•H X a> rt K-^ n J-. -d »« o r; 'i-i 'M v3 < ^H o ^J '-0 4-> r:: 'ij ^< rH (^ r; -H o ^-> rt rt ;r; (/) <+-! • H ',-. rH CK • 10 O ;3 < < in 'i-{ <-> < r:: i:; r-* X ;j o Cl X :- ;^ ■:■> -.-H <-> a r, <-> J-> ■J ■(-> o ^ '71 o^ o ;-i »H "•.H O f-i -H 3 '^ Q 'J > r-H r-* c; i: O t-j oo ;u. r-i m p: -(-> 03 jj^ c o vu i^ o CJ>I ^ -> o f^ Ifl • H • -1 '^ t/1 rH ■J-. O o c ; t/: '-H -H < !- • X -h u ■n ;:•_ o fi. -H ;- O !-t rt o • n u -^3 'H ,c o p: CH E- CO rt •< 1374 It concluded that science and technology were inherently interna- tional in scope and impact, that they would grow in importance for diplomacy, and that programs of the Department in these areas needed to be executed vigorously and effectively. It also noted that dissolution of the President's Office of Science and Technology was generally recognized as imposing an added burden of responsibility on SCI. The four goals suggested by Mr. Pollack in his recent testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (see p. 41) were noted with approval. Clearly the Department of State needed a vigorous focal point for science and technolog}^, especially for inter- agency cooperation, policy development, and interpretation of technological issues and options. WEAKNESSES OF SCI The IG report identified weaknesses to be corrected, as well as strengths to be commended. Among the former were: — Too remote relations with client activities in the Department; — The need for more in-depth analyses of policy issues; — A lack of continuity ("short institutional memory") because of personnel mobility; — Poor communication with the private sector on matters of mutual interest (incomplete, untimely, frustrating, poor chan- nels, key policy lacking) ; — More bilateral and other tasks were started than could be managed; some were kept alive to avoid termination re- percussions ; — SCI was weak in staffing — personnel review and long-range planning were needed ; — Problem areas were well identified but priorities of effort were neglected; — Liaison with other agencies on foreign technical matters was weak; — The series of departmental science lectures had been excellent but there had been too few of them ; — Attaches needed more guidance on top priority problems and departmental needs for information ; and — There was evidence of a lack of confidence in SCI elsewhere in the Department. STRENGTHS OF SCI Among the favorable comments offered in the report were : — The shift in emphasis of attaches from science to technology; — Management of U.S. participation in the Stockholm en- vironmental conference; Development of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. science cooperation secretariat; — A study of technology transfer ; — Negotiation of the Great Lakes water qualit}" agreements; — Service of atomic agreements; — Work in weather modification polic3\ — On meeting the obligations of law and follow-up on Presi- dential statements SCI rated a "very good"; 1375 — In identifying future technical issues for the Secretary, SCI was "excellent"; and — Definition of authority and responsibility were adequate. RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE REPORT In conclusion, the report proposed a number of ways in which SCI service to the Department could be improved. For example: — Increased consultation with poUcy-oriented departmental clients to ascertain their needs more precisely and to meet them more fully; — The use of former science attaches in other bureaus, and designation of science officers elsewhere in the Department; also, designation of geographical oflicers in SCI as point of contact for other bureaus; — Collation of U.S. poHcy in science and technology with that in key countries; — Select a small number of priority analyses in depth (one or two a year for two future years) and carry them out fully; — Perform an annual review with departmental clients served by SCI; — Make more systematic use of the departmental Science and Technology Advisory Committee to perform poUcy studies, identify program gaps, and serve as an information and recruit- ment channel; and — In general, to emphasize more strongly the policy analysis function, and reduce the allocation of effort to operational tasks. V. Scientific Diplomacy The rise of the United States to mihtary, technological, and diplomatic preeminence may have diminished somewhat the apparent need for U.S. scientists to be posted around the world to secure knowl- edge, establish contacts, and promote the flow of "brains" to this country. It is possible that the move to establish systematic scientific representation in U.S. embassies abroad came too late to be fully useful. However, this section of the stud}^ recounting the erratic history of the use of U.S. scientific attaches, suggests that with certain modifications in emphasis these offi^cials can be much more important in the future than they have been permitted to be in the past. Early Stirrings: Ad Hoc Scientific Attache As near as can be determined, the first person to serve in a U.S. embassv and be called "scientific attache" was Charles Wardell Stiles (1867-1941).^^ He served in the Embassy in Berlin 1898-1899 as a zoologist "especially accustomed to the use of the Microscope." His mission was to ease German restrictions on the importation of pork products from the United States. The problem was trichinosis. The United States had instituted microscopic inspection of pork products for export but local governmental levels in Germany were insisting on reinspection and obstructing sales of U.S. pork in a lucrative market. Accordingly Ambassador Andrew D. White wrote to Secretary of State John Sherman asking for "one or more experts fit to deal with the whole subject . . .," and the Department of Agriculture, in turn, was approached to provide the required expertise. "The State Depart- ment [then] commissioned Stiles as Agricultural and Scientific Attache to the United States Embassy in Berlin." Stiles had excellent quali- fications for the assignment. He had connections \\dth a number of European scientific societies, had been U.S. delegate to the Inter- national Zoological Congress, and was secretary of the International Commission on Zoological Nomei'iclature. In the Department of Agri- culture, after taking his doctorate at Leipzig, he had specialized in helminthology and thus spoke with authority on the subject of animal parasites. At the Embassy he was referred to as "our scientific attache." His work "involved more areas of science than those ordinarily associated w^th agriculture." Thus, in the judgment of this source, "White had good reason to use the term scientific attache." Even so, it represented "something of an innovation in America's handling of its international scientific affairs." As part of the growing maturity of United States society and the increasing vigor of its intellectual institutions, American science was rapidly expanding in size and complexity in the post-Civil War decades. Up to this point diplomatic activities which were scientific in nature had usually been taken care of bj'' the ministers or consuls themselves, with occasional matters handled directly by 79 The source for this account of early scientific diplomacy is James H. Cassedy, "Applied Microscopy and American Pork Diplomacy: Charles Wardell Stiles in Germany 1898-1899," his 62, No. 211, Part I (Spring 1971), pp. 5-20. (1376) 1377 Washington or by designated scientific organizations or individuals. However, until late in the nineteenth century, the American government had but few substantial scientific problems or formal continuing scientific relationships with other countries. The main official science activities were those occasioned by participation in the work of ad hoc international commissions or by the need to have delegates at international congresses. The lack of international scientific involvement was fortunate, for chiefs of mission w^ho had scientific backgrounds or interests were few. Before 1800, it is true, the American diplomatic corps had included several representatives — Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, Dr. Arthur Lee, John Quincy Adams, and Dr. Edward Stevens — who had medical competence or general interest in science. During the nineteenth century, the pioneer ecologist and etymologist George P. Marsh served some twenty-five years prior to 1881 as envoy to Turkey and Italy, while the chemist Henri Enri was United States consul in Basle during Grant's presidency, and the physician Nathaniel Niles served in various European posts from 1830 to 1850. But such men were exceptions. American diplomats then were drawn conspicuously from the ranks of poets, lawyers, educators, and historians. Andrew D. White was himself an historian and educator, but he also had a strong appreciation of the scientific ideas and forces of his time. Now, as ambassador, he acted as something of a midwife in assisting one phase of America's emerging scientific internationalism.*" Toward the conclusion of Stiles' mission, Ambassador White wrote Secretary of State John Hay that "Stiles is exceedingly valuable to us." It was "absolutely necessary" that he stsy on to help look out for American interests. One consequence of Stiles' scientific work in Germany was that officials of the Department of Agriculture came to realize that "having an 'agricultural attache' was highly useful to the Department." And, according to this source ". . . The success of Stiles' assignment ultimately led the department to designate attaches to other countries and, in the 1930s, to operate its own Foreign Agricultural Service." By 1975 there were 58 agricultural attaches serving in U.S. embassies and a total of about 112 professional staff in the Foreign Agricultural Service of the Department of Agriculture. Nongovernmental Scientific Attaches in World War I ^^ The necessity for close technical cooperation among allies in wartime led in both World Wars I and II to the establishment of U.S. scientific/ technological missions to European countries. During the first World War, U.S. participation lasted only from April 1917 to November 1918. Nevertheless, three scientific missions were estabhshed — in London, Paris, and Rome. Almost entirely mihtary in function and scope, the program was viewed at the time of its termination as something of continuing value. "The War," said the (unpublished) Final Report of the Research Information Service (p. 37), "has demonstrated the importance of science and of scientific research to the national [securitj^l and therefore the importance of keeping in touch with scientific and technical developments in other countries and of promoting cooperation as well as of avoiding duplication of effort." The report continued: "Surely no more effective way of ful- filhng this purpose can be devised than the appointment of scientific »" Ibid., p. 11. Other examples of scientific diplomats, as cited in The Science Adviser of the Department of State (op. cit., p. 4), were Joel R. Poinsett, the first American Minister to Mexico, Interested in military science and archeology, as well as the "naturalist who introduced the poinsettia from Mexico" and Ephraim George Squier, who also saw diplomatic service in Latin America, and was a distinguished archeologist. More recent examples were: Dr. James B. Conant. scientist and educator and former U.S. Ambassador to Germany, and Carl W. Strom, former professor of mathematics who served, as of 1960, as Ambassador to Bolivia. 8' This section is based on information from unpublished correspondence and manuscripts in the Archives of the National Academy of Sciences, particularly a final report. Research Information Service, Foreign Service, 1918-1919," and an interview with the late Warren Jay Vinton, a junior member of the science team In Paris, on his personal recollections of this activity. 1378 attaches at our principal embassies to continue and extend the work carried on for 17 months by the Research Information Service." The report then quoted a recommendation by the "International Research Council," of delegates from national academies of the Allied Powers, at its first meeting in Paris (no date), as follows: The International Research Council, assembled in Paris and attended by delegates of the national academies of sciences of Belgium, Brazil, the United States, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, Poland, Portugal, Rumania, and Serbia, has the honor to request the Governments of these countries to appoint permanQnt scientific attaches to their principal embassies. The function of the scientific attaches shall be to collect and forward information regarding scientific and technical matters, and to insure the continuity of the relations established during the war by the various scientific and technical missions. Other benefits of the scientific attache concept suggested in the report were: representation of U.S. scientific and technical interests, attending scientific meetings, keeping in touch with the progress of research, providing a base for U.S. scientists abroad, responding to substantial inquiries, and promoting international cooperation in research. EARLY ORIGINS OF WORLD W^AR I SCIENTIFIC ATTACH^ PROGRAM Immediately after U.S. entry into the war, an ''American Com- mittee dealing with Inventions" wrote the British Comptroller of Munitions Inventions, offering support. A reply to this communication was drafted by the Comptroller, May 15, 1917.^^ The following day Dr. R. T. Glazebrook, to whom the Comptroller's letter was ad- dressed, passed it on to Sir Ernest Rutherford, asking him to take it with him to America. Apparently this exchange stimulated thought on both sides of the Atlantic as to the value of closer cooperation in technology to advance the war effort. The next item of correspondence was a letter from the British War Mission in Washington to the Research Council of the Council of National Defense, October 22, 1917, suggesting that "about 20 scien- tific men from American universities" be sent to England to work in defense research laboratories. After a good deal of milling around, the various boards, committees, and military liaison groups — formal and informal — appear to have given the British proposal their blessing and the last item in the sequence is an announcement by the National Research Council (NRC), March 15, 1918, formally establishing the Research Information Committee, with a Washington head- quarters office and branch offices in London and Paris (Rome was added later). There would be a Scientific Attache in each of the foreign offices, along with a military and naval attach^ or deputy. It was clear that the functions of these foreign units were closely war-related and operational. They were: M All we know of this gentleman is that his signature Is undecipherable. However, the list of Inventions he asked the Americans to provide was impressive: (1) A pipe-pushing device which will ensure the maintenance of the required direction. (2) A substitute for lead antimony alloy for shrapnel bullets, the alloy consisting of 7 parts of lead and 1 of antimony and the number of bullets being 41 to the lb. (3) A means of dissipating gas clouds. (4) Predicting apparatus for A.A. gunnery. (5) Means for removing wire entanglements otherwise than by firing at them. (6) A short-base height-finder for anti-aircraft use. (7) Trench signalling apparatus for signalling back to the trenches from an advanced position. (8) Message carrying rockets. (9) Trench signalling apparatus for the transmission of messages which cannot be tapped. (10) Apparatus for detecting the approach of aircraft by sound. (11) Apparatus for the acoustic detection of hostile mining activities. (12) Armour-piercing bullet for use against tanks. 1379 (a) The development of contact with all important research laboratories or agencies, governmental or private; the compila- tion of problems and subjects under investigation; and the col- lection and compilation of the results attained. (b) The classification, organization, and preparation of such information for transmission to the Research Information Com- mittee in Washington. (c) The maintenance of continuous contact with work of the offices of Military and Naval Attaches in order that all duplica- tion of work or crossing of effort may be avoided, with the consequent waste of time and energy and the confusion resulting from crossed or duplicated effort. (d) To serve as an immediate auxiliary to the oflSces of the Military and Naval Attaches in the collection, analysis, and compilation of scientific, technical, and industrial research information. (e) To serve as an agency at the immediate service of the Commander in Chief of the Military or Naval Forces in Europe for the collection and analysis of scientific and technical research information, and as an auxiliary to such direct military and naval agencies as may be in use for the purpose. (f) To serve as centers of distribution to the American expedi- tionary forces in France and to the American naval force in European waters of scientific and technical research information, originating in the United States and transmitted through the Research Information Committee in Washington. (g) To serve as centers of distribution to our Allies in Europe of scientific, technical, and industrial research information originat- ing in the United States and transmitted through the Research Information Committee in Washington. (h) The maintenance of the necessary contact between the offices in Paris and London in order that provision may be made for the direct and prompt interchange of important scientific and technical information. ^ • (i) To aid research workers, or collectors of scientific, technical, and industrial information from the United States, when prop- erly accredited from the Research Information Committee m Washington, in best achieving theu' several and particular purposes. OVERSEAS OPERATIONS Before the final action of the NRC, its Military Committee had created a Research Information Committee, December 3, 1917, and given it marching orders; these were referred by NRC to the (official governmental) Council of National Defense, which approved the proj- ect December 12, appropriated $38,000 for the first year of operation and appointed Dr. H. A. Bumstead and W. F. Durand to London and Paris respectively as "Scientific Attaches." ^ M It Is not clear what, if any, role the Department of State had in all this. It was Mr. Vinton's recollection that attach^ commissions from the Department were given to principals and lesser ranks to the supporting staffs. However, his own claim for pension rights for service during this period were— he said— disallowed by the Civil Service Commission. The State Department has no record of attache commissions for members of the Research Information Committee serving overseas. However, a typewritten note, unsigned and undated, attached to the Academy copv of the Final Report of the Research Information Service carried the notation that Professor George Ellery Hale hacj "pushed very hard to get the title 'Scientific Attachfe' for the men, hoping to acquire for them and science the same status as military attaches." It added that he had been gratified by his success in doing so. (However, the unknown author admitted that "I cannot, at the moment, locate any supporting documents. . . .") 1380 Apparently the scientific attaches had close personal relations ^^ with the military services throughout. They were provided with mili- tary quarters, transportation, furniture, and facilities. The total budget for the three offices plus the Washington headquarters, from February 1, 1918 to June 30, 1919 was "about $60,000." ^' Clearly the costs were nominal, and it is to be inferred that the attaches paid part of their costs out of their own resources plus a good deal of scrounging. The primary function of the scientific attaches was to collect or produce scientific reports for use in the United States. They sent home 1,650 such reports, mainly on aircraft and submarine matters (plus 86 on metallurgy, 19 on radio, 33 on gas engines, 30 medical, and 29 on photography). They also transmitted to the host countries upwards of 800 reports generated in the United States. Requests for information went in both du'ections by letter and cable (200 from London, 140 to London). The report of the Research Information Service attached particular importance to the assistance of the scientific attaches in organizing the International Research Council and the Scientific Unions, and most of all to "the promotion of cooperation, mutual confidence, and good will among the Allies." In summary, it can be concluded that the World W^ar I system of scientific attaches was ad hoc, entirel}' operational,^^ and with a great deal of cornercutting. There was a war on. However: "On June 30, 1919, the government funds which had supported the Service, lapsed and the Service had to be discontinued. Arrangements were made at the various offices for attending to unfinished business; then the files were stored and the offices closed, it is hoped merely temporarily." THE YEARS 1919-1939 Considerable private activity in the interaction of the world scientific community occurred in the interval between 1919 and 1939: the growth of the international scientific unions, exchanges of academic '< According to the final report: The fact that Admiral Sims was an old friend of Dr. Durand's. a former classmate at the Naval Academy, and shipmate on the first cruise after graduat'on, led him to take the wannest interest in the Information Service and in the purposes for which it was established. He at once arranged to give Dr. Bumstead an office in his headquarters in London and to provide for the Paris office in a similar manner. By his kindness. Dr. Bum.stead was ' hus settled in a comfortable office with all necessary furniture and facilities, only 2 days after his arrival in London, and was enabled to begin work promptly and without friction. Without this help the difficulty of securing a suitable office and furniture would have caused great delay and involved nmch waste of efTort. 85 It is amusing to note that in both 1918 and 1919 all field offices underspent their appropriations while lit both years the Washington office went over its budget slightly. s' In the final report, the functions of the three foreign offices are described in more explicit and straight- forward terms than in the original NRC charter. There were eight of these, as follows: (1) To establish and maintain effective contact with as many research laboratories and organizations as possible. (2) To collect or comp'le and transmit promptlt; reports of the work of these laboratories and organiza- tions, especially those regarding methods and devices under development, whether promising or not. (3) To distribute each report received from overseas to those individuals and organizations who should receive the information it contains. (4) To transmit requests for special information and to secure special information requested from over- seas. (.5) To cooperate with any existing agencies for collecting information in such a way as to prevent duplication. (6) To facilitate the work of special inves'igntors by furnishing them with available information, and by guiding them to the proper sou'ces a id by suppl>ing introductions. (7) To maintain a file of the reports collected and an index to make the information contained readily available. (8) To cover matters no one else was looking after, act as financial agent and otherwise be as useful as possible. 1381 personnel, and the emergence of multinational corporations and foreign affiliates serving their various purposes in the exchange of scientific information and transfer of technology. With the outbreak of World War II, and even before, the influx of refugee scientists to tlie United States provided abundant if unsystematic information about the status of research and development abroad. There did not occur, however, any strong movement toward establishment of the kind of sj^stem of scientific attaches envisioned in the National Research Council report following World War I. Developments After World War II Creation of a system of science officers abroad was proposed in the report Science, The Endless Frontier, prepared at the request of Pres- ident Franklin Roosevelt by a team of scientists in the Office of Scientific Research and Development, and submitted in 1945 to President Truman. It suggested that, as an experiment, scientific at- taches be assigned to serve at selected U.S. Embassies." The first experiment of this kind was undertaken 2 years later at the U.S. Embassy in London, where Dr. Earl A. Evans, Jr. assumed charge of a science office in 1947.^^ During this same year, a report (Science and Public Policy) by the President's Scientific Research Board, chaired by Dr. John R. Steelman, recommended that "appropriate develop- ment of . . . scientific foreign service be considered an essential part of the national science progiam." ^^ An explicit statement calling for establishment of this kind of system had been made in one of Evans' reports from London in 1948. Specifi- cally, he had recommended: The experiment that has been started in Great Britain should obviously be extended to other European countries. It would be unnece.ssary, however, to set up scientific offices in every one of the European countries. It would be more economical and convenient if officers wei'e assigned from London to a nun^bcr of other European areas: one man assigned to the Scandinavian countries, a second to Paris, Italy and German}^, and a third to Switzerland would, at present, give an adequate survey of the scientific and technological activities in these area^. In each instance an officer would have assigned to him, for the necessary period, specialists in any particular scientific area that was of especial or immediate significance. ^° The Berkner Report (see pp. 17-22) gave considerable attention to the role of scientific attaches in U.S. Embassies as the principal means of effecting the collection and exchange of scientific information that was the primar}' preoccupation of the report. It called for a mixed strategy of large, regional science offices, at principal embassies, indi- vidual science attaches with small staffs at other embassies, and scientifically literate individuals (with science doctorates) to serve as points of contact in a third set of embassies of smaller countries. The implementation of the Berkner plan in 1951 began with the appoint- ment of Dr. Joseph B. Koepfli, who had served in London under Evans, to head up the home office in the Department of State. He *' U.S. Offiw of Scientific Research and Development, "Report of the Committee en Science and th« Piiblic Welfare," appendix 3 to Science: T.te Eitdless Frontier, a report to the President on a prog:rain for postwar scientilic research, by N'aniievar Bush, Director of the Office of Scientific Research and Develop- ment (Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printiiig Office, 'uly 191.5'), p. 108. ** See pp. 13-17 for an account of the evolution of the experimental London office and preceding activity under the direction of Tohn C. Green of the Depaitment of Commerce. *9 U.S. President's Scientific Research Board, "A Program for the Nation," V^ol. 1 of Science aui PubUe PoVcv, a report to the President by John R. Steelman, Chairman (VVaihington, D.C.: U.S. GovwnmeHt Printine Office. August 1917), p. 40. «> Earl A. Evans, Jr., Firxt Annual Report of the Chief of the S:ie^tijic Section, Embassy of the United States of America, London, England (1948), transmittal memo no. 2220, p. 5. 1382 established a number of science missions (London, Paris, Stockholm, Tokyo), and from 1951 until this initial program was suspended at the end of 1955, more than 14 U.S. scientists served abroad for periods averaging 15 months. Post-Sputnik Scientific Attache Expansion When the Department of State reactivated its science program under the leadership of Dr. Wallace R. Erode, in January 1958, it was made clear that the Department proposed to reactivate 'its system of foreign science missions as well; an intensive effort was begun to recruit for this purpose and "In December the Department's overseas Science Office Program was firmly reestablished with the appointment of seven distinguished American scientists to serve as scientific attaches at U.S. Embassies in Europe and the Far East. An additional group of seven scientists was appointed in February 1960, and the area coverage was extended to South Asia and Latm J^merica." ^^ By the time Dr. Erode had completed his tour of duty 14 scientists ^srere accredited "attaches" in 9 (of 10 authorized) embassies in Europe, Asia, and Latin America. They represented the fields of phj'sical science (physics, chemistry), life and biological science (zoology, bacteriology, biophysics, genetics), earth science (geophysics, oceanography), and technology (engineering, electronics). Some of them operated out of one embassy to cover activities in several adjacent countries as regional attaches. By this time also (1960), it was clear that the collecting of foreign scientific information was no longer the sole function of the scientific attach^ as it had been in 1917-1919, nor even the primary function, as in 1950. The State Department ^^ now saw the functions of the attache about as follows: — Advise and assist ambassador and other embassy officials on scientific developments and matters in which his expertise can be usefully appHed; — Evaluate the influence of various basic and applied scientific developments on U.S. pohcy; — Report on major developments in organization and changes in leadership in the science community; — ^Facilitate the flow of information and persons in scientific fields ; — Represent the U.S. science community to the counterpart groups and institutions in the country to which he is assigned (speak at or attend conferences and academic gatherings); and — Assist U.S. agencies with overseas science interests. By 1960, the Department was considering "a new procedure de- signed to provide certain scientific reporting services at posts which do not require the assignment of a full-fledged scientific attache." This plan "would be achieved by building up within the regular Foreign Service a corps of officers who have had an educational background or experience in various fields of science which would equip them to report on scientific developments abroad as they relate •1 The Science Adviser of the Department of State, op. clt., pp. 19-22. •> The Science Adviser of the Department of State, op. clt., pp. 17-23. 1383 to U.S. policy." ^^ However, the Department publication added; ". . . The major work of that program will continue, necessaril}-, to be borne b}' highly qualified professional scientists such as those whO' have been recruited in the past." THE QUESTION OF LENGTH OF TENURE OF THE SCIENTIFIC ATTACH^- Throughout most of the history of scientific attaches from 1898 on, the concept was that very senior scientists would be borrowed for diplomatic service for periods of ("not to exceed") 2 years. They would then be restored to their laboratories. It was held that only scientists with outstanding professional reputations could properly represent the United States to the foreign science community, and play a proper diplomatic role. It was also discovered that most of these "highl}^ quahfied scientists" were reluctant to leave the scientific for the diplomatic environment for extended periods because in doing so they would forfeit their close knowledge of research at home. Even less desirable was^the prospect of relinquishing permanently a scientific career for one as a diplomat. Yet, as the Department had discovered in 1948-49, and again in 1951-56, was to discover still again in the decade of the 1960s, recruitment of linguistically competent, senior scientists in mid-career for 2 -year tours of duty abroad was a partic- ularly difficult administrative burden.^* A recognition of the problems on the other side of the question was expressed in an editorial comment by editor Dael Wolfle, in Science, in 1960. He pointed out that "In the 18 months since the first attaches reached their posts, much of their time has gone into learning how to work most usefully." The longer they stayed, apparently, the greater the sense of accomplishment. Accordingly, Wolfle suggested the need to "work out long-term staffing policies." . , . The well-selected amateurs in diplomacy we now use have dedication, knowledge of American scientific activities, and considerable acquaintance with the language, customs, and scientific activities of the countries in which they work. Ideally, they should also have a greater understanding of national policy and of Department of State procedures and problems. By way of solution he suggested that it would be possible to "com- bine the advantages of an amateur with those of a professional . . . by making periodic foreign service a recognized part of the career pattern of appropriate scientists and science administrators. . . ." ^* Other criticisms of the system were offered by Daniel S. Greenberg in 1962. He asserted that "if the State Department finds it difficult to adapt itself to scientists, the scientists, with few exceptions, find it even more difficult to adapt themselves to the State Department." To secure "widely recognized" scientists, which the prevaiUng concept required, the practice was to recruit scientists about to retire from their universit}' connections. However, the language qualification narrowed the choice severely. According to Greenberg, in a statement describing an aspiration rather than a general level of achievement: The attache is provided with a deputy (usually his junior by a generation) with training in a discipline different from his own. Attache and deputy have then M Ibid. " In the earlier part of the attachfi program an effort had been made to match the special expertise or discipline of the appointees to the country to which they were posted. However, this further exacting speci- fication proved to be unrealistically hard to meet and was dropped. " Dael Wolfle, " Science Ambassadors," Science, July 29, 1960, p. 267. 1384 been dispatched to the embassy with virtually no instructions but to make them- selves useful to the diplomatic mission and to report back to Washington whenever they come across something they consider worth reporting. The results, said Greenberg, were "incredibly uneven." (He had visited attaches in Rome, Bonn, Stockholm, Paris, and London.) He cited one case of a man who did not know what he was supposed to do or whether he was giving satisfaction — a man who had previously taken no interest in politics or international affairs. At the other extreme, Edgar L. Piret, previously professor of chemical engineering at the University of Minnesota, had established close and useful relationship ^dth Ambassador (formerly General) James M. Gavin in Paris. ("Within the State Department," said Greenberg, "Piret's reports on French science developments and their relation to American foreign policy are considered models of the peculiar art of scientific- diplomatic reporting.") ^ QuaUfications of Scientists as Diplomats It would appear that in addition to the requirements for scientific preeminence and language proficiency the scientific attache needed the personality to establish good working relations with senior peoj^le at the embass}^ where he served, an appreciation of what information would be useful to the Department, the ability to express himself effectively in his reports, and — perhaps most important of all— an encyclopedic knowledge of political and international developments relating to science and technolog}^ and vice versa. The difficulty in meeting all these requu-ements for short-term representatives abroad is evident. Nevertheless, the program continued to grow. By June 1963 the Department was able to report: Five attaches — two physicists, a chemist, a biochemist, and a physiologist — were appointed in 1962. Two of them became our first scientific attaches at Karachi and Tel Aviv. In all, 15 scientific attaches are today serving at 12 U.S. missions overseas. By the summer of 1963, the State Department will have on assignment 22 attaches serving in 16 missions overseas. It is hoped that in 1964 an additional attache will be added in Warsaw.*" Two years later, in 1965, there were 23 scientific attaches serving in 17 embassies and an additional number of Foreign Service officers "especially designated" to tend to scientific problems. ^^ In 1969 these "especially designated" Foreign Service officers numbered 99, and supplemented the 17 scientific attaches. In 1972, there were 24 scientific attaches in 18 embassies plus one each at the OECD mission in Paris and the U.S. mission to UNESCO. In 1974 the number went to 25. However, it is understood that by 1975 the "especially desig- nated" Foreign Service science officer plan had been largely abandoned. •• Daiiiel S. Greenberg. ' ' Science and Foreign Affairs: New Effort Under Way to Enlarge Role of Scientists In Policy Planning," Science, October 12, 1962, p. 1-23. Dr. Piret was elevated to the rank of "Counselor of Embassy for Scienti.'ic Affairs" November 8, 1967. " U.S. Department of State, International Scientific Affairs. Department and Foreign Service Series, no. 117, Publication no. 7550, June 1963. (Reprint from 152 page report Department of State I9GS.) By contrast, the overseas staff of the Foreign Agricultural Service (which had been returned from State to the Department of Agricultuie in 1954) numbered in 1962 80-85 officers, 30-40 locally recruited staff, and a total of 270 clerical and professional people abroad. "All told, the Service employed 693 Americans at home and abroad in June 1962. and 137 foreign nationals at overseas posts." Source: Robert E. Elder, Over- seas Rl presentation and Services for Federal Domestic Aqencies, Foreign Affairs Persoimel Study no. 2 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965), p. 14. <« Wi.:i;:m H. Taft III, "The United States Scientific Attach^ Program," Department of State Bulletin, January 25, 1965, p. 113. & . j- / 1385 To build a strong overseas scientific staff to meet U.S. needs for policy inputs, scientific representation, and early warning of significant technological trends and important scientific discoveries is a challeng- ing personnel problem. Traditionally the persons sought are recognized scientists with language proficiency. The language requirement nar- rows the field of choice, and may be less relevant for scientists in view of the fact that English is probably the closest to a universal language of scientists. The requirement for "recognized scientists" tends to limit the time span the recruit is prepared to devote away from his research, in order to perform in an environment that takes considerable time to master. In addition, the more eminent the scientist the more likely he is to have narrowed his field of specializa- tion and thus the fewer people he can communicate with in his own field. A study by the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, in 1959, identified five key elements that determined which people were most likely to succeed in per- forming effectively overseas. These elements were: 1. Technical skill: The versatility and willingness to improvise that requires lioth a thorough knowledge of a specialized field, but the attitude toward it of a general practitioner rather than a narrow specialist. 2. Belief in mission: A dedication to his work regardless of geography that enables a man to survive repeated frustrations and still retain a zest for the job. 3. Cultural empathy: The curiosity to study and the skill to perceive the inner logic and coherence of the other fellow's way of thinking; and the restraint not to judge it as bad just becau.se it is different from the American way. 4. A sense for politics: The sensitivity to see oneself as a "political man" whose -action (or inaction) affects the power structure around him; the ability to do one's work despite being conspicuously the object of curiosity, envy, or opprobrium; and the understanding of American civiliZjg,tion that qualifies a man to represent not only himself, but the culture and society from which he comes. 5. Organization ability: A tolerance for large-scale orgarization and an under- standing of complicated headquarters-field relationships ; and a special talent for building social institutions and teaching others to manage them.** On these five general requirements were superimposed a long list of other special requirements for scientific members of overseas staffs. Thus, a document prepared by SCI (in 1967?) defined the requirements of scientific attaches in the following way: Candidates for the Scientific Attache Program should be able scientists who have mature insights into and understanding of international relations. They should have broad and responsible experience which would enable them to: rec- ognize the relationship of science and technology to political and economic developments both at home and abroad; and understand the role of science and technology in the decisionmaking process on matters of international political and economic consequence. Thus, not only is a high degree of technical sophistica- tion required, but also a catholicitj* of interest and appreciation for the complexity of the issues which face the United States in its international relations. Candidates should be scientists of recognized competence based on responsible levels of performance in the academic world, in industry or in government science. Prior foreign experience should include close and understanding associations with foreign scientists and institutions and with international scientific activities, as well as with the culture of the area to which they may be assigned. The personahty of the candidates should be such that it will not only elicit ■cooperation but will command the respect" and attention of the non-scientists with whom they must deal and work in the accomphshing of their missions. M U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Operational Aspects of United States Foreign Policy, a study prepared by Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and Public Affairs, Syracuse University, 86th Cong., 1st sess., November 11, 1959, pp. 58-59. (As quoted in Arthur G. Jones, Tlie Eiolution of Personnel Systems for U.S. Foreign Affairs: A History of Reform Efforts, Foreign Affairs Persoiuiel Study no. 1 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965), pp. 127-128. 97-400 O - 77 - 50 1386 In those countries where ability in the language is essential to the eflfectiveness of the work of the Attach^, command of the language is a requirement. Expanding Functions of Scientific Attaches Beginning with the function of collecting scientific information, and expanding to an array of policy analysis and reporting functions, the system of scientific attaches continued to enlarge in scope. By 1967, SCI had identified eight major missions that the attach^ was ex- pected to execute. He was to have the requisite prestige to provide entree to governmental and scientific leaders. He was to establish a good working relationship with the Ambassador to facilitate the flow of acceptable support on substantive matters involving science and technology. Countries where attaches were deployed would be those in which developments in science and technology were germane to U.S. foreign policy, or those in which U.S. foreign policy called for assistance to the nation in developing a native capability in science and technology. Within this framework the attach^, would have "the following duties and responsibilities" : 1. Participates in the development of policy by bringing to bear on the problems confronting the Mission to which he is assigned the perspective and insights of a scientist through evaluation and guidance on the scientific and technical aspects of such problems. 2. Recommends areas of activity in the scientific and technical fields which will assist the Embassy in its conduct of U.S. relations in that country. Such recommendations include analysis of the technical implications involved; possible actions for broadening the area of associations of the Embassj'' which can con- tribute to international understanding; interpretation and evaluation of the interaction of science and technology with local political, economic, military and commercial developments in that country; and providing assistance in the correct and adequate presentation of U.S. scientific and technological developments and interests. Help to identify areas of bilateral cooperation in the fieMs of science and technology which can contribute to closer association and collaboration. 3. Coordinates the activities of the technical representatives of other U.S. agencies at the Embassies on U.S. scientific and technological programs and activities in that country in order to provide them with adequate foreign policy guidance and to ensure their full participation in the objectives of the U.S. Mission. The Attach^ and the other agency representatives work as a science team so as to make a maximum contribution to the mission of the post and to the objectives of U.S. science. 4. Serves as point of liaison with, and provides foreign policy advice and guid- ance to U.S. scientific missions in the country of assignment and visiting U.S. scientists. Arranges appropriate briefings and visits with Embassy personnel. 5. Studies in depth and prepares analytical and evaluative reports on significant scientific and technological developments, and on the organization or administra- tion of science. Provides reports required by standard reporting requirements, ad hoc request from the Department of State or those prompted by his own awareness for matters which should be the concern of the Department and the scientific agencies of the Government. 6. Represents the Ambassador to the foreign scientific community as a means for broadening the area of association for the Embassy, for explaining U.S. policies, for encouraging broader areas of cooperation and exchange in scientific and technological information and activities and to explore ways of developing meaningful dialogue which can contribute to understanding between that country and the United States. This involves visits to universities, scientific institutes and laboratories, and with individual scientists and technologists in the discussion of mutual problems and concerns. 7. Represents the Ambassador, the Department, and other agencies at scientific and technological meetings, conferences, ceremonies and similar activities. Ar- ranges the Ambassador's participation where appropriate and assists in the preparation of statements to be given before such scientific groups. 8. Analyzes and reports on scientific and technological developments in nearby countries, when so assigned. Maintains liaison and working relationships with 1387 Foreign Service Officers at such posts who are assigned continuing responsibiUty for scientific and technological matters. Provides them with technical advice and guidance as necessarj'.""" Briej Survey of the Contemporary Role of the Science Attache Iq an ejffort to establish how the attache system works in practice, the author provided a questionnaire to the attaches on the occasion of their return for their annual meeting in Washington. The arrange- ment was that responses by individual attaches would be consolidated by SCI into a single reply which would be provided to the Congres- sional Research Service on an informal basis. It is believed that the responses, provided to the author on November 19, 1974, are suffi- ciently instructive to warrant inclusion in this study, along with the questions that prompted them. Accordingly they are presented here, as follows: QUESTIONNAIRE FOR U.S. SCIENTIFIC ATTACHES /. What is the "critical mass" of a science staff in an embassy f Varies with the size of the Embassy and the scope of the programs which the Counselor or Attach^ is involved in. At the smaller posts an'Attache and a secre- tary suffices. At the larger posts where the involvement of the Attach^ in the policy issues concerning the Embassy is quite broad then the ideal size and make- up of the staff would be an Attache, an assistant, an American secretary and a local assistant. i°' S. What are the program priorities? Program priorities are determined by current government to government foreign policy relationships having significant S&T content. Consequently these are more technology oriented and differ from country to country. There is little involvement with the basic sciences or basic scientific research unless problems occur which may be resolved through Embassy intervention. Higher priority is given to policy contacts which usually involve ministry officials rather than academic representatives. Lower priority is given to "scientific" visits. 3. What contacts does the science attache have with the U.S. science community, apart from the occasional facilitating of contacts and travel in the country? Again depending upon the country of assignment, contact with the U.S. scientific community is through visitors. In the more developed countries i.e. Europe, there is a continuous stream of U.S. scientific visitors both government and academic. In the developing world or in less traveled areas the contact is usually through U.S. government science officials visiting the country. Direct contact with the U.S. community is usually left to visits to the U.S. for home leave or during the annual conference for the Scientific Attaches. 4. How much opportunity is there for laboratory visits or professional contacts in the host community? This is sporadic depending on workload and opportunities provided by visitors. When workload slackens, laboratory or university visits are scheduled. '»» U.S. Department of State, Funcfioiis of Scientific Attaches, prepared by the Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, January 1967, pp. 2-3. "" On this point Herman Pollack observes: In every function, there is inevitably bread and butter work to be performed. Every attachfi and counsellor needs an American or local assistant or two for this purpose alone. Otherwise, a senior, highly trained man is wasting part of his time. The size and configuration of a science office is a function of time and place. On the whole, every attache or counsellor needs a junior assistant for the bread and butter work that must be done. Then the situation will vary with the size and importance of the science and technology activity in the country. Thus Paris, Bonn and Tokyo would naturally require and do have larger staff than Tel Aviv, Buenos Aires or Tehran. Speaking generally, the entire attache program could make good use of an additional 10 positions, but I do not believe that any single post is hurting critically for man- power. 'ery useful in handling such requests. The Attache does not ordinarily have bibliographies or an ex- 1389 tensive library. Generally he does have some information such as press releases, news and publication reports from a number of U.S. agencies, and key S&T reports issued by U.S. agencies and Congressional committees. All U.S. technical agencies are encouraged to include the Science Attaches on their mailing lists for pubUcations and reports. Illustrative Products of Scientific Attaches The principle that now appears to govern the role of the U.S. scientific attache is that events, actions, and trends in science and technology that are important for U.S. foreign poHcy should be identified, described, and evaluated in reports back to the Department of State in Washington. Here they are disseminated to elements of the Department ^vith a presumed interest in them, and, where ap- propriate, are also passed along to other interested agencies. Often the originating attache will suggest which other agencies would be likely to be interested in a particular report. Following are 10 brief abstracts of actual reports from scientific attaches that provide a fair sampling of their work. ABSTRACTS OF ATTACH^ REPORTS 1. Report from Bonn, May 2, 1973, 8 pages. This was the third report on budget proposals of the Federal Republic of Germany, previous reports having been submitted November 24, 1971 and January 4, 1972. The report noted an increased emphasis on the "Quality of life" and a 41-percent increase in expendi- tures for "new technologies." Details were supplied as to proposed distribution of funds among major progranis, trends, and status of the planned program. 2. Report from Ottawa, August 11, 1973, 15 pages. Subject: "Organization of Canadian Ministry of State for Science and Technology — Part I." Suggested recipients of the report included NSF, NAS, NBS, USAEC, DOD, NIH, NOAA, Interior, Commerce, and others. Report provided an overview of the new ministry, its objectives, program, and organization. Also included were organization chart, statement of functions of subordinate elements, and biographical statements of principal oflEicers. 3. Report from Rome, October 21, 1974, 1 page. Subject: "Satellite Launch from San Marco Range." Brief technical description and note on benefit of the demonstration in terms of recognition of U.S. technical achievements. 4. Report from Tokyo, October 1, 1974, 4 pages. Subject: "GOJ R&D Budget Request for FY 1975." Described and analyzed the budget request, identifying key items. (However, neglected to call attention to a $10 million increase in proposed funding of research and development of pattern information processing, an area which the Japanese have decided to emphasize.) 5. Report from Paris, October 22, 1974, 3 pages. Subject: "Solar Energy for Heating and Cooling of Buildings, a View from Odeillo, October 1974." 1390 Summarized views of national representatives (Greece, Germany, Holland, France, Denmark, Australia, Great Britain) to a solar energy conference, and noted the technical problems of a proposal for a "zero energy house" as being thermal storage capacity, insula- tion, and climatic differences among nations. Conclusion: solar energy is not important as an early prospect. 6. Report from Tokyo, November 18, 1974, 3 pages. Subject: "Space Cooperation: GOJ Requests for Export Approval for Improved N-Rocket Items." An update on the state of negotiations for U.S. assistance to the Japanese space program, explaining the rationale of a counterpro- posal to an earlier U.S. offer. 7. Report from Rome, November 21, 1974, 3 pages. Subject: "First Report on Science and Technology Research in Energy in Italy." Described reports of six working groups under the Ministry for Scientific Research on program directions in: "primary conventional sources (including nuclear energy)", "non-conventional primary sources," "transport, transmission, and storage," "large utiUzations," "small utilizations," and "regulation problems." Suggested, among other items, generation of hydrogen fuel at nuclear sites. 8. Report from Tel Aviv, December 13, 1974, 4 pages. Subject: "Absorption of Immigrant Scientists." Unrestricted immigration adds congestion to Israeli science job market. 300-400 annually. Job placement "disappointing." Problems and plans for the future described. 9. Report from New Delhi, February 11, 1974, 10 pages, (Suggested recipients included Department of Health, Education, and Welfare; Public Health Service; National Institutes of Health; Food and Drug Administration; National Science Foundation; and others.) Subject: "Summary and Analysis, draft fifth 5-year plan (1974-79) : Health, Family Welfare Planning, and Nutrition." The purpose of the report was to summarize and analyze the draft plan. It was explained that "A delineation of possible areas of U.S./ Indo cooperation in these fields during the next 5 years will follow as a separate airgram." 10. Suggestion from French scientific counselor for an intensification of U.S. -French scientific cooperation under the bilateral agree- ment of November 1969. The occasion of the bilateral agreement was the meeting of United States and French Presidents at Martinique. The suggestion was coupled with a report summarizing activity currently underway pursu- ant to the 1969 agreement. (No date) (This particular report was re- cast by SCI staff as an agenda item for consideration by a bilateral agreements subcommittee of the Interagency Committee on Inter- national Science and Technology.) 1391 THE IMPORTANCE OF COUPLING A heavy burden of responsibility rests on the attache to spend his time wisely. How can he be reasonably sure that his reports are useful back home? What "feedback" does he get that directs his attention to pertinent items? What "feedback" does the State Department itself receive from the other agencies, presumed interested, to which these reports are forwarded? While time did not permit full exploration of this question, a few comments can be made. First, SCI over the past decade made a positive effort to bring all attaches back to Washington annually for a 1-week briefing on scientific, technological, and political-economic developments in this country. Here they heard lectures and talks by the Secretary of State, White House officials, and various officers of the Department; they met with appropriate congressional committee members and staffs in technical sessions and receptions; they held question-and-answer workshops. ^"^ In 1968, an assessment by Daniel S. Greenberg suggested that the utility of attache reports was uneven: ". . . It is difficult to determine the role plaj^ed by the science attaches, who are now posted at some 20 U.S. embassies around the world. Some convey the impression of being resigned to writing reports that are never heeded, even if read, and also of being somewhat out of things at the embassies in which they serve. Others, however, sound as though they feel themselves to be in the tliick of important affairs, with an opportunity to move matters as they believe they should be moved." ^^^ Inescapably, the qualit}^ of personnel will vary, as will also the range of opportunities for useful scientific and technological reports and services within the country to which they are posted. (Even more variable was the extent to which Foreign Service officers "who were "especially designated" as science officers responded to their assigned task, which was "in addition to their other duties." ^°*) Perhaps most variable of all is the relationship between the Ambassador and his scientific attache. Much depends on the importance the principal officer of the embassy, the personal representative of the President in the country, assigns to science and technology as essential ingredients of diplomacy. It would be of interest to learn how much preparation new ambassadorial appointees receive on this subject before taking up their posts, and indeed how much sophistication or even awareness the "K For example, the annual meeting in 1966, held for one week- in November, brought 14 of the 17 attaches to Washington. They met with Vice President Humphrey who stressed the importance of science and technology for diplomacy; they heard discussions on the "technological gap," international cooperation In oceanography and space, political security aspects of nuclear power, and the "Water for Peace" program. ("Scientific Attaches Gather for Annual Conference," Department of State Newsletter, no. 68 (December 1966), p. 15.) It should be noted that recent meetings ol the attaches have become very intensive and systematic. A later meeting, the week of January 26, 1970, included sessions with the Secretary of State, the President's Science Adviser, the President of the National Academy of Sciences, a full day with the House Committee on Science and Astronautics; meetings with senior officers of the Departments of Commerce, Transporta- tion, and HEW; a tour of National Bureau of Standards facihties and a lecture by the Director of NBS; and lectures by State Department officers on AID, Space, Oceans, Environment, Population, Export Controls, and the use of Public Law 480 funds. 'M Daniel S. Greenberg, "Science Attaches: U.S. Aides Meet to Report on International Scene," Science, September 13, 1968. p. 1116. 101 For an example of one Foreign Service officer who became interested in this assignment see: Bryan R. Frisbie, "A Science Liaison Officer Discusses His Work," Department of State News Letter, no. 89 (September 1968), pp. 40-41. The article appears to offer a case for extending the full attache system to many additional embassies, in view of the wide range of significant scientific activities that enlisted the author's attention; 1392 appointee has in the impacts of technological trends on the relations among nations. The classic instance of Ambassador Gavin's relation- ship with Dr. Piret demonstrates the kind of useful teamwork that can be achieved with a technically sophisticated Ambassador.***' It is also to the point to ask the extent to which the Ambassador and his ad- ministrative officials are willing and able to provide the scientific attach^ with the personnel and other resources he needs, or even to urge the appointment of an attach^ where none exists. The contemporary assessments of the role of the scientific attache, both from observers with broad experience in the science-diplomacy interface, illustrate the difficulty of finding qualified personnel for overseas science posts. According to the view of David Beckler (As- sistant to the President, National Academy of Sciences), the attache needs to have a grasp of the broad implications for the United States of science — and especially technology — in the host country: The role of the science attach^ has largely been passive — to respond to detailed requests and to make contacts for and assist visiting U.S. delegations. The passive nature of the science attach^ role has been dictated in large measure by the limited staff and administrative resources at his disposal. There is little time for thoughtful assessment, appraisal, and initiative on his part, being submerged in day-to-day detail which cannot be avoided or delegated. I believe the caliber of most of our science attaches would permit them to perform a valuable creative role: a. to assess the implications for the U.S. government of important changes and direc- tions in policies affecting the development and use of science and technology in the affairs of the foreign government; and b. to identify ways to stimulate, rein- force, reinvigorate, and expedite bilateral arrangements with the U.S. involving science and technology. To serve the U.S. needs, the science attach^ must, in reality, become a technology attach 6, looking at technological developments in relation to the country objec- tives and to U.S. objectives.'"* In comment on the same point, Dr. Harvey Brooks (Division of Engineering and Applied Physics and the Kennedy School of Govern- ment, Harvard University), attaches importance to the personal role and contacts of the attache, but without diminishing the importance of his scientific role : I think [writes Dean Brooks] all the functions of the science attach^ you mention are important. I would probably rate them in the order: personal contacts, obser- vation of major trends, information exchange, policy analysis, long range fore- casts. I think the role of the science attach^ should be more that of a true science and technology adviser to the Ambassador than has been the case in the past. The size and configuration of the Embassy science staff is less important than the personality and leadership of the Science Attach^ himself. He should be a person who knows the local language and has good contacts in the local scientific community, and at the same time, good connections with the governmental science establishments in the U.S. He should be an individual with considerable political "savvy" and experience, as well as scientific stature — a difficult com- bination. A possible expedient to ease the total burden on the individual attache, Dr. Brooks suggests, might be the use of supporting personnel ">» Before Lt. Gen. Tames Gavin was named Ambassador to France, he had directed the research and devplopment program of the Department of the Army, and upon retirement was named president of the private research and development company Arthur D. Little, Inc. His receptivity to scientific counsel as an Ambassador was unusually high. 108 Beckler to Huddle, March 5, 1975. 1393 from the home office to shoulder part of the load in short-term emergencies : I would hope that the staff of the S. and T. office in State could include some people who could be assigned on a temporary basis to a particular science attache when there was an unusual work load. For example, Jack Tech, our science attach^ in Moscow was ridiculoush^ overloaded during the early days of the US-USSR scientific exchanges. There should have been a way of providing him with extra help. There ought to be a way special situations like that could be handled without a permanent staff build-up in the Embassy."" Present Status and Emphasis on Science in U.S. Embassies It would seem desirable to maintain field staff competence in some proportion .to the diplomatic importance of the expertise. In the 128 countries where the United States maintains diplomatic relations it is not, of course, to be expected that special expertise would be uni- versalh^ required in science and technology. On the other hand, it Vv^ould seem desirable as a matter of principle to maintain a continuity of expertise in ever}^ countr}' where substantial scientific levels of achievement exist (e.g. the United Kingdom, Fr^mce, German}' , Italy, Canada, Switzerland^ Sweden, U.S.S.R., etc.). It would also be rea- sonable to expect that scientific representation would be useful in the major and most populous nations if only to formulate policy as these nations advance (e.g., India, Brazil, Indonesia, Nigeria, etc.). In still other countries the availabihty of a U.S. scientific attache might be considered a diplomatic way of "showdng the flag," or of coordinating technical assistance, U.S. training programs, and personnel exchanges. Science and technology have been de-cribed by three successive Secretaries of State as preeminent elements of dip^omac3^ The inter- action of science and technology with political affairs has undeniable force in the modern world. The predictive power of technological analysis would seem to be comparable to that of economics. The social impact of technology is approaching that of military potency, under the "nuclear umbrella." Then, how does the manpower allocation to political, economic, and military aspects of diplomacy in U.S. Embas- sies compare with the allocation to science and technologj-? "SYhat proportion of professional-level personnel is allocated overseas to this important field? An examination of the Foreign Service List (Revised Nov. 30, 1974) of the U.S. Embassy personnel in major countries (including all those to which a U.S. science officer is sent) reveals that in these embassies about one-third of professional personnel are political officers, one-third are economic and commercial officers, and a little less than 30% are militar}^ officers; scientific and technological officers are about 4%. If all professional personnel in all embassies are considered, the science contingent would be less than 1 percent. (In the analysis, the execu- tive staff, administrative staff, consulate offices, and agricultural, AID and USIA contingents were omitted.) (See Table 1.) (A roster of Science and Technology Counselors and Attaches, and Fisheries Attaches assigned to U.S. Missions abroad is also provided as Table 2.) "7 Brooks to Huddle, February 10, 1975. 1394 TABLE l.-POLITICAL, ECONOMIC. MILITARY. AND SCIENTIFIC PERSONNEL IN U.S. EMBASSIES. 19 SELECTED COUNTRIES' Selected countries Economic and Physical Political commercial Military science officers officers attaches officers Argentina.. Australia Brazil Canada France - Germany (Bonn) India. Indonesia - Israel Italy Japan •--. Mexico - -. Poland - South Africa - Sweden Thailand Union of Soviet Socialist Republics. United Kingdom Yugoslavia 11 6 5 1 2 3 5 0 10 6 6 Q 4 4 3 1 10 13 11 3 12 12 7 1 9 9 6 0 8 10 9 0 4 4 5 1 11 9 8 1 12 12 5 1 10 8 5 1 3 5 1 1 3 3 5 0 5 4 6 1 13 8 6 0 8 5 12 3 9 13 19 1 4 6 3 1 1 Source: Foreign Service list (revised, Nov. 30, 1974), Department of State, publication 7802. The method employed wastocountpolitical, economic, military, and science officers in the selected countries, excluding persons in the executive staffs, administration, consular and subordinate offices, and agricultural (FAS), U.S. AID, and USIA(USIS) contingents. Only professionnl personnel v;ore counted. Countries selected were those 13 which had science officers in the U.S. embassy, plus 6 other major countries. Too much should not be inferred from this table. Its purpose is to show that the manpower allocation to "science" is comparatively modest, even to countries where scientific and technological developments are of particular concern for U.S. foreign policy. Table 2. — Science and Technology Counselors and AtlachSs and Fisheries AliachSs at U.S. Missions Abroad Embassy or Mission and tlieir Principals and Deputies Europe : Belgrade — William Mills Bucharest — Sidney Smith i Bonn— Dr. Clyde L. McClelland 2 Copenhagen — Salvatore Di Palma ^ London — Dr. John Hulm Madrid — Dr. Duncan Clement Moscow — Dr. Egon Loebner, John K. Ward Ottawa — Miller Hudson ^ Paris — William Salmon, 2 Edward Malloy, Michael Coogan Rome — John Mannielio Stockholm — Dr. Ernest Sohns U.S. Mission OECD Pari.s — Dr. Arnold Kramish Warsaw — Allen Greenberg Geneva — Gordon D. Cartwright * Latin America: Buenos Aires — Robert Wilcox 2 Mexico City — Dr. Andre C. Simonpietri,^ George H. Rees ^ Rio de Janeiro — Dr. Robert Goeckermann East Asia and Pacific: Taipei — Dr. Chester Clark Tokyo — Myron Kratzer,^ Douglas McNeal, Keith Brouillard (pending) * Near East and South Asia: New Delhi— Dr. William W. Williams,^ Mr. Clifford Metzner Tehran — -Dr. Albert Chapman Tel Aviv— Dr. Herman (I^hinn Africa: Casablanca — Norman L. Pease' ' NSF Representative also serves as Science and Technology Attache, 2 Counselor of Embassy for Scientific and Technological Affairs. 3 Fisheries Attache. < NOAA Representative also serves as Science and Technology Attaehg. Source: U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and ScientifiG Affairs, January 24, 1975. 1395 In the U.S. delegations to the United Nations, Organization of American States, International Atomic Energy Agency, North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and UNESCO, political officers numbered 24» economic officers 14, and science personnel 4. POSSIBLE MODIFICATIONS If the policy is adhered to of recruiting only senior-level scientists with language facility, serving for 2-year tours of duty, it is likely that the manpower percentile allocation for science expertise will never be much increased over present levels. In view of the sustained growth in importance of technology as a primary force influencing changes in national strength and international relations of countries^ as well as the sustained growth in international contacts and pro- grams of scientists, the need for formal nation-to-nation contact on scientific and technological matters seems likely to grow in scope and importance. In order to facilitate recruitment and improve the product of the personnel in this field, several alternatives might be worth con- sideration: relaxing the initial language requirement, extending the duration of the duty tour, opening recruitment to senior-level tech- nologists as well as scientists, taking account of the availability of persons trained in "science policy" as well as those in the disciplines of science, expanded programs of training of political and economic officers in science and technology polic}^, and recruitment of generalist Foreign. Service candidates with substantial academic credits in the physical or biological sciences. It would seem to be less essentia] that "scientific" attaches be scientists than that they be competent in assessing the interactions of science and technology with diplomacy. It is also to be recognized that communication across the disci- plinary boundaries of individual sciences can be as difficult as over- coming language barriers; the increasingly specialized vocabularies and expertise of scientific subdisciplines is worsening the problem. Technologists tend to be more generalist than specialist in their training, but neither scientific nor engineering disciplines are an ideal foundation for diplomatic relationships. The task of scientific and technological representation in the diplomatic environment may indeed require a team effort, rather than an attempt to find an array of usually disparate skills in single individuals. VI. Emergence of the Bilateral Science Agreement Tho Departmont of State has a mfijor role in a new dimension of it of Piimc Minister Ikeda to President John F. Kennedy in U)G1, a U.S. -Japan Committee on Scientific Cooperation was organized to "review aiul direct a program of cooperative research, scientific seminars, and direct coli".boraiion" (i.e., a program in whi.h U.S. scientist-;, U.S.- suppoi'ted, work in Japanese laboratories but not vice versa). The scope of the program wouJd include: exchange of scientists; science educa- tion; scieniiiic and technical communications; earth and astronomical sciences; agri(,'ultural and life sciences; physical sciences and mathe- matics; engineering sciences; and such special problems as typhoons, earth({uakos, and other natm'al catastrophic phenomena. The program was expanded in 196;^ by a second agreement calling for a "U.S.-Jap;in Cooperative Program on Natural Rcsouices Develoi)ment" and again in 1965 by the "t'.S.-Japan Cooperative Medical Program." The U.S. administration of the first is by the National Science Foundation, the second by the U.S. Department of the Interior, and the third by the U.S. National Institutes of Health in the Department of Health, Afcording lo an item in a publication of the Dppavtniont of Stato (U.S. Dopartmont of State. "U.S. iilific and Tedinological Agreements with Otlier Countries," International Scknci Xotcs, no. 2-) (Septeni- 108 Srie ber l!i70), p. 2.) did not appear so desirable to others for assoeialion as it has sinre become. Furlherniore the ad- vaniases of association were not Kenerally reco^ini/.able to U.S. scienli.sts after the liolocaust of World War II, and the U.S. Government was not well organized to play its pait. The article goes on to note (p. 3) that "Exeejiling for the moment the biennially renewat)lo exchange program with the U.S.S.R., which embraces more than science, the first chronologically of the new scientific agreements is the I'. S. -Japan ('ooi)erative Science I'rogr.am." U.S. -Soviet scientific personnel exchange-; begari in l'.t.^',t and were renewed bieimially since than unil.r terms of cultural relations agreements. With the excef)lion of government to government exchanges in public health and atomic energy, the rest of .social and physical sciences exchanges weie cariied out l)y nongovern- nienlal agencies with government sui)poit. The l'.i72 agreement differs from previous agreements since it provides for cooiierative research between eovernnicnt aeencies in specified areas. For a complete back- ground see section IV. United States .and Soviet and Eastern Eurojiean Inter-.Xcademy Sci- entific Exchanges, in : U.S. Congress, House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments. U.S. Scioiti.'itu Abroad: An Ex- amination of Major Programs for Xon(/orer)imental Scientific Kxchamje, prepared by Gene- vieve J. Knezo, Science Policy Research Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, April 1974. See vol. II, pp. 982-1013. (1396) 1397 Education, and Welfare. The science office of the Department of State exercises a general monitoring function of all three programs and the U.S. Scientific Attache in Tok^'o is required to maintain a watching brief at the other end. The scope of the second program with Japan includes exchange of research information at periodic meetings of panels of United States and Japanese scientists on : 1. Desalting 2. Air Pollution 3. Water Pollution 4. Energy 5. Forage Seeds 6. Toxic Micro-(3rganisms 7. Mycoplasmosis 8. National Park Management 9. Wind and Seismic Effects 10. Diving Physiology and Technology 11. Protein Resources 12. Marine Resources and Engineering Coordination Committee 13. Marine Mining 14. Marine Facilities 15. Marine Communication and Electronics 16. Marine Environmental Observation and Forecasting 17. Marine Geology 18. Seabottom Survey 19. Aquaculture 20. Forest Resources Inventory ^^ A three-man team was appointed by John Ingersoll, Acting Under Secretary of State, July 26, 1974, to undertake a comprehensive review of the entire U.S.-Japanese science bilateral. Persons ser^^ng on this team are: Dr. Keith Glennan, earlier Administrator of NASA, Dr. Edward David, former science adviser to President Nixon, and Robert Hiatt, president of the University of Alaska. The findings of this surve}^ are expected to be returned to the Department of State around the end of 1975. An assessment of this bilateral by the National Science Founda- tion in 1973 described it as being "highly successful in bringing scientists of the two countries together to work on mutual problems." It had maintained an annual level of about 50 "active cooperative research projects," 25 seminars to exchange scientific information on specific topics, 6 long-term U.S. scientist visits to Japan and 6 to 8 exchanges of "eminent" lecturers on scientific subjects."" The undoubted diplomatic and scientific success of this first bi- lateral led to a long succession of others until by 1975 there were some 28 different programs on the books. In the discussion that fol- lows, two of the principal programs — with France and the U.S.S.R. — are discussed. If* Ibid., p. 3. r, ■ ^ . ,■ ""US Congress, House, Comrnttee on Science and Astronautics, 1974 N'ational Science Foundation Authorization, 93rd Cong., 1st sess., Februaiy 27, 28, March 1, 6-8, 1973, p. 315. In comment on NSF's role in International science bilaterals. Pollack says: NSF is par excellence this government's science agency. It is logical and natural that it should be exDected to carry the princioal respoiisibility for intergovernmental relations in Science. Indeed, tlie Department of State has looked to the NSF to become the "executive agent", i.e. the respon- sible action center, for nunieious intergovenmiental agreements. In my view the NSF has re- spoi'ded niagnificentlv. The principal problems that have arisen have related to the lack of partic- ipation of other agencies in intergovernmental programs for which the NSF is the executive agent. (Pollack to Huddle, March 25, 1975.) 1398 THE UNITED STATES-FRANCE PROGRAM OF SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL COOPERATION A somewhat different scheme of cooperation was developed betweem the United States and France on the occasion of conversations between; President Nixon and President de Gaulle in Paris in early 1969. Subsequently further discussion took place between M. Francois X. Ortoli, French Minister for Industrial and Scientific Development, and Dr. Lee A. DuBridge, the U.S. President's Science Adviser, in Paris and Washington. These resulted in a Joint Statement on Franco- American Scientific and Technical Cooperation, November 25, 1969. Dr. Allen V. Astin, retired Director of the National Bureau of Stand- ards, was appointed by the Department of State to coordinate the U.S. side of the program. It operated without a formal agreement, apparently at the request of the French negotiators. This program is quite w^idespread in scope. According to the first status report by Coordinator Astin, March 20, 1970, it involved, participation by the following U.S. agencies : Atomic Energy Commission Department of Agriculture Department of Commerce: Envhonmental Science Services Administration National Bureau of Standards Department of Defense Department of Health, Education, and Welfare: Environmental Health Service National Institutes of Health National Library of Medicine Department of Housing and Urban Development Department of the Interior: Bureau of Commercial Fisheries Bureau of Mines Bureau of Reclamation Federal Water Pollution Control Administration Geological Survey Department of Justice: Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs National Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice Department of Transportation National Aeronautics and Space Administration National Science Foundation Smithsonian Institution Veterans Administration THE F.S.-U.S.S.R. SCIENCE BILATERAL Probably the most elaborate bilateral science program evolved out of the agreement between the United States and the U.S.S.R., at Mos- cow May 24, 1972. The elaborate scope of this bilateral is attributable to the mutual effort of the two countries toward a political detente, a thawing of the "Cold War," as well as to the strong shared interest in science and the particular desire of the So\aet Union to raise the- 1399 technological level of its industry."^ A summary of the eight articles -of the agreement is as follows : 1. Mutual pledge of scientific and technical cooperation for "mutual benefit, equality, and reciprocity." 2. Objective: combine efforts of "their scientists and special- ists" in solving major problems to benefit scientific and tech- nological progress, both countries, and mankind. 3. Scope of the agreement to encompass: — Exchanges of scientists and specialists; — Exchanges of scientific information; —-Joint programs of basic and applied science; — Institutional research cooperation; — Joint conferences and courses ; — Help in establishing commercial contacts ; and — Other forms of scientific cooperation as maj^ be mutually agreed, 4. Facilitate institutional and commercial contacts and co- operation pursuant to law. 5. Costs of each participating country borne by that country. 6. Not to preclude other scientific and technological agreements. 7. "For the implementation of this Agreement there shall be established a U.S.-U.S.S.R. Joint Commission on Scientific Cooperation. Meetings will be convened not less than once a year in Washington and Moscow, alternately." The Commission to develop a program of cooperation, assign implementing re- sponsibilities, and create subordinate working bodies. Respective executive agents and organizational details specified. 8. Consultation and program changes between meetings provided for. The first meeting of the Joint Commission was held in Washington March 19-21, 1973. It reviewed results of supplementary agreements (1) "On Exchanges and Cooperation in the Fields of Science, Tech- nology, Education, Culture, and Other Areas" for 1972-1973, signed April 11, 1972; (2) "Between the U.S. National Academy of Science and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences" for 1972-1973, signed April 11, 1972; (3) "Between the American Council of Learned Societies and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences" for 1972-1973, signed April 11, 1972; and (4) "the Memorandum on Cooperation in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy between the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and the U.S.S.R. State Committee on the Utilization of Atomic Energy for 1972-1973," signed September 28, 1972. It was also noted that in July 1972, six areas of mutual interest had been identified for the program: energy research and development, application of computers to management, agricultural research, water resources, chemical catalysis, and "production of substances employing microbiological means" (i.e., technological uses of mi- crobes). During the rest of 1972, six joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. working groups developed and reported substantial papers outlining proposed research, development, and organizational plans in these six areas. An assessment of the U.S.-U.S.S.R. bilateral program was under- taken by the General Accounting Office during 1974. Results of the "'• On this last element, see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay of Economics, Technology Transfer, and Diplomacy, in the series Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared by John P. Hardt, Senior Specialist in Soviet Economics and George D. HoUiday, Research Analyst in Economics, Economics Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, June 1973. See vol. I, pp. 525-606. 1400 study were reported to the Congress, January 8, 1975. In its report GAO remarked on the protracted period of time required for "nego- tiating meetings for working out frameworks for cooperation." Ex- change of information had been "Umited and of little technical benefit to the United States." Exchanges of scientists and technicians were "just beginning to materialize." Time lags were attributed to "poor communications, differing priorities, misunderstandings, and security considerations." Problems of "funding, language translating facilities, and travel costs of visiting scientists should have been resolved during this period but were not." Accordingly, GAO recommended that the "coordinators for the environmental protection and science and technology agreements . . . formulate and execute improved plans which will: — "Identify topics for early development into specific coopera- tive programs; — "Assess the number of potential projects that can be efficiently managed; — "Insure that projects of priority interest are adequately supported and vigorously pursued by the responsible agencies or institutions; — "Emphasize the need to progress from merely exchanging visits to real cooperative efforts; — "Require participating agencies to identify all costs associated with the program; —"Determine the long-range funding and personnel require- ments of the agreements; and — "Arrange the necessary Russian language training and trans- lating facilities to meet the needs raised by the agreements." "^ GAO also recommended that the Congress "should consider the desirability of an annual progress report on each agreement," and consider monitoring ])rogram execution. It might also consider the desirability of specifically funding the agreements and observed : We are concerned that the present diffused funding of the programs under these agreements makes congressional overview and control difficult and could result in significant commitments prior to congressional authorization of funds. ''^ PROLIFERATION OF AGREEMENTS It appears that from about 1966 on, President Johnson and then President Nixon regarded the bilateral science agreement as a fre- quently useful instrument of diplomacy. It was something tangible that could be announced in a joint communique on the occasion of meetings of Heads of State, something constructive and noncontro- versial, offering a promise of continuing benefit to both parties. At any rate^ agreements continued to mount up : 1961 Japan 1966 Germany 1966 India 1967 Italy 1968 Iran »2 U.S. General Accounting Office of the Comptroller General, A Progress Report on United States-Soviet Union Cooper aiit^ Programs (January 1975), p. iii. '" Ibid., p. 43. 1401 1968 Australia 1968 Romania 1969 China (Taiwan) 1969 France (no formal agreement) 1970 Spain By early 1975 there were upwards of 28 bilateral agreements or understandings of one sort or another in the fields of science and tech- nology. (See Table 3.) An analysis of these b}' OES proposed two categories of programs: (1) those pursuant to formal government-to- government agreements, and (2) those evolved by mutual agreement in a less formal way. Each category was further subdivided. In the first category, eight bilaterals (with Australia, Argentina, Brazil, Taiwan, Itaty, New Zealand, Romania, and Spain) involve a general agreement but with no joint implementing commission. Another nine (with India, Iran, Israel, Egypt, Mexico, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Yugoslavia, and U.S.S.R.) are pursuant to a government-to-govern- ment agreement, implemented by a joint commission. In the second category, are bilaterals with "structured science and technology cooperative programs." Of these, four (Japan, France, Federal Republic of Germany, and Canada) are with countries in which "significant scientific relationships" exist, supplementing private industry which is the "main channel of techriological rela- tions." The remaining seven (Morocco, Tunisia, Sri Lanka, Burma, Pakistan, Guinea, and the Peoples Republic of China) are less salient ,^ funded — except for China — with Public Law 480 funds.'^* Table 3. — U.S. Bilateral Science Programs, January 1975 (List supplied hyi Department of State) INTERGOVERNMENTAL BILATERAL S&T STRUCTURED S&T COOPERATIVE AGREEMENT PROGRAM Italy Japan (1) Australia France Argentina Germany Brazil Morocco (4) Republic of China Tunisia (4) Mexico (1) Sri Lanka (4) New Zealand Canada Yugoslavia (1, 4) Burma (4) Romania People's Republic of China (2) Poland (1, 4) Pakistan (4) USSR (1) Guinea (4) Spain (2) Israel (1, 3, 4) Iran (1) Egypt (1, 4) Saudi Arabia (1) India (1, 4, 5) 1— Joint Commissions or Committees and similar arrangements. 2 — S&T activities and exchanges in context of cultural, educational, or other cooperative programs. 3— U.S. -Israel Binational Science Foundation. 4 — Public Law 480 programs. 5— U.S.-India Scientists Exchange Program. "< U.S. Department of State. "U.S. Scientific and Technological Relationships with Other Nations," International Science Notes, no. 33 (January 1975), pp. 12-14. In addition to these more general bilateral science agreements, there are also a great many other agreements of narrower scope directly involving individual U.S. departments and agencies in cooperation with their counterparts in other countries. These should be- recognized as an important feature in relation to the subject matter of this chapter, but their total scope and diplomatic importance are not assessed in the present study. 1402 Purposes, Advantages, and Disadvantages of BilateraZs SCI analyzed the purposes and advantages of bilateral science pro- grams in 1970. In general the diplomatic purpose was to provide tangible evidence of rapport between the two participating countries, especially on the occasion of a meeting of their political leaders. A further diplomatic purpose was to increase the interaction among their peoples in a professional and noncontroversial field. It was ob- served,'however, that the political purposes of such programs are unlikely to be well served unless there are substantial scientific benefits to be shared. And the Inspector General's report on SCI, cited earlier, notes that discarding worn out bilateral science agreements is politi- cally awkward. The scientific purposes were to exploit the principle of pooled expertise and exchange of knowledge. ADVANTAGES Among the "built-in advantages" of "scientific and technological agreements" as seen by SCI were the following: a. Provides an impetus for cooperation. — A governmental agreement stimulates and encourages cooperation which might otherwise never occur. It focuses atten- tion on and publicizes the opportunities for collaboration. Some cooperation with a country probably will take place spontaneously. This is largely a random, hap- hazard process depending upon accidental coincidence of interests, acquaintance- ship, etc. An international agreement forces a more searching and systematic review of potential cooperation. Generally speaking, the success of an agreement can be measured roughly by the new collaboration it stimulates beyond that already taking place. b. Gives local scientists greater prestige. — A formal agreement calls the attention of governmental officials to the scientific community. The participation of local scientists as equal partners with outstanding scientists of other countries pro- vides a visibility and a stature not previously enjoyed. c. Increases likelihood of local support. — Closely related to h above, is the in- creased financial support from local governmental agencies engendered by an agreement. An agreement represents a commitment by the government to hold up its end of the bargain. If the scientists cannot perform their agreed portion with existing support, this provides powerful leverage on the government for additional assistance. d. Facilitates exchange of personnel and information. — Although exchanges of this type are possible informally, a formal agreement provides a useful mechanism for more extensive exchange. In fact, provision for exchange of persons and infor- mation is an integral part — and one of the most effective features — of all agree- ments now operating. e. Allows simpler and more expeditious exchange of materials and equipment. — Cooperative research between countries inevitably involves shipments of speci- mens, laboratory equipment, instruments, etc. Agreements facilitate such ex- changes by simplifying and standardizing customs clearance and related diflSculties."* One particular diplomatic virtue of the bilateral science program was identified by Secretary Rogers, January 26, 1971, in a keynote address to the 12th meeting of the Panel on Science and Astronautics of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics. It was the "general policy of this Administration," he said, "to permit the exchange of unclassified scientific and technical information with the scientists and institutions of any countr}', regardless oj the state of our diplomatic relations with that country.^' (Emphasis supplied.) He went on to identify bilateral scientific agreements as the vehicle for such ex- "« U.S. Department of State, "U.S. Scientific and Technological Agreements wltli Other Countries," International Science Notes, no. 25 (September 1970), pp. 2-3. 1403 changes. The implication, of course, was that the bilateral science agreement could be an opening wedge to the restoration of normal ■ diplomatic relations with otherwise unrecognized states. DISADVANTAGES The philosopher, asked by a friend how his wife was, replied: "Compared with whom?" In like manner, bilateral science agreements need to be assessed in comparison with some other organizational arrangement for accomplishing their purposes. For example, the close and rewarding relationship on science matters between the United States and the United Kingdom does not appear to require any formal method or institution for general coordination. At the other extreme, a bilateral science agreement with Nepal would not be likely to be of great significance to either country. Compared with multilateral science arrangements, bilaterals involve larger funding in relation to the level of scientific effort because only two countries share the costs. However, political complications of multilateral programs are likely to be more exacting. When a large number of bilaterals are in force, each involving many U.S. mission-oriented agencies, the administrative management func- tion becomes quite difficult and even recordkeeping is not easy. Compared with U.S. science programs using foreign scientists re- cruited on a personal basis as needed for theu' special expertise, the bilateral is probably a more expensive and cumbersome method of sponsoring research. In particular cases, bilaterals have been initiated in a burst of diplomatic enthusiasm only to have it appear subsequently that there was no solid scientific basis for joint action, with the result that the agreement withered but v/ithout being crisply terminated because of the diplomatic repercussions abrogation would invite. Even with some potentially useful agreements, it is possible that a decline in interest would accompany loss of funding support, or other more pressing problems would divert interest and support. In' short, to be diplo- matically as well as scientifically useful, the science bilateral needs to have a solid technical justification, and sustained technical and admin- istrative support on both sides One difficulty was invited by the Department of State by regarding the bilateral science agreement or program as an appropriate subject for experimentation. The 28-odd arrangements now in force did not come about as a consequence of a deliberate determination that these were the best places to have such arrangements, that all were meri- torious and any others would be less so. Nor was there a conscious effort to design an optimal plan that could generally be followed in each case, with only minor modifications. Planning and priorities appear to have played little role in these decisions; instead, an ad hoc approach was followed, and the designs of the agreements evolved out of the circumstances at the time. It should also be noted that to justify the experimental nature of the design variation requires that information be dra\NTi from the experi- ment. Which designs work best and wh}'? What criteria of effective- ness have been established? What principles can be adduced? If additional bilateral science programs are proposed, by what criteria will they be evaluated and how should they be designed for optimal 1404 effect? Tf there are variations in existins: programs, should they be reviewed and revised to enhance their effectiveness? If there are inac- tive or unrewarding programs, should they be rebuilt, renegotiated, or termuiated, or allowed to drag on? One problem is that of the "ratchet effect" — the ease with which new agreements can be made, and tlie innnediate short-term benefits they yiekl, as against the difficulty of funding and maintaining all of these commitments, plus the dii)lomatic awkwardness that results from their termination. In this connection, the report of the Inspector General "^ noted the ]>roblem of "short institutional memory" attributable to SCI as an agency with considerable jiersonnel mobility. Under these conditions, it would seem important that the learning jjrocess in experiments in scientific diplomacy be thoroughly documented as they proceed, to inform later generations of diplomats and administrators. In fact, emphasis on (locumentation of all |)arts of the science and technology function in the Department of State would seem essential. Tangible lidtims From Cooperative Bilateral Uesearch and Development A siu'vey of benefits of cooperative science programs was summarized in a short public; relea^e by the Department of State in March 1974. Infoiination supplied by the various ])articipating agencies of the U.S. Government turned up "almost 200" s|)cciric cases in which international scientific coo|)eiation had produced "tangible benefits for this country." Excerpts from this summar}' report follow; Our wide-rnnging and highly successful cooperative programs with Japan furnish a good example of cost savings. American researchers had concluded that inang.nnese oxides might be useful agents for absorbing sulfur dioxide fumes re- leased into the atmosphere when coal is burned. A research project to determine their absorptive qualities was planned. But American scientists, attending a joint meeting in Japan, as part 0;f the U.S. -Japan Natural Resources Program learned that the studies the United States was about to undertake had already been made in Japan. The U.S. project was dropped, and we were saved an esti- mated :>100,000 to $1.")0,000 — as against the $2,.')00 in air fare for the American scientists attt>nding the Japan meeting. A visit by U.S. Bureau of Mines researchers to the United Kindgom's National Coal Board laboratories saved as much as $1 million in unnecessary research and devekipment tasks. For example, we would have needed at least $250,000 to develop indepondentl}' information acquired from the British about coal gasi- fication an imj)ortant area of research in dealing with the energy shortage. Our government .also has saved about $S million each year through the data received from other countries participating in the Worldwide Cooperative Net- work of Solar .\ctivity. This infornuition has made a vital contribution to the safety t)f our space i)rogram. Without the international data collection network, we would have had to obtain the data by using our own resources. The United States and the Federal Republic of Germany have agreed to share the costs of III'JLIOS, a major, highlj' sophisticated program for gathering information about the Sun. In 1974 and 197.'), the United States will launch toward the Sun two German built and financed satellites incorporating both American and German experiments. The (Germans will pay for over half the ecst of the program, expected to total more than $lo.> million. A major example of cost sharing is the decision of nine European governments to design, develop, and bi;ild the first Space Lab module which will become an integral part of the U.S. Space Shuttle system. The cost of this European con- tribution will be about SSOO-SS.JO million. Agreements on this cooperation were ■concluded in September 1973, and work on the module is now underwa}'. "0 See page 1372. 1405 A new type of cost-sharing arrangement^ — the binational science foundation — niaj- he used more and more to finance cooperative research programs. The first institution of this kind, a United States-Israel Binational Science Foundation, was established in the fall of 1972. Both countries are contributing the equivalent of $30 million in Israeli pounds lor the foundation's endowment; Israel will pa}'- interest on the endowment to provide the foundation its basic operating income. The foundation will sponsor research on problems of interest to the two nations. The U.S. Bureau of Mines and the National Coal Board of the United Kingdom cooperated on a study of fluidized bed techniques to burn coal. (This is a process in which coal is burned more efficientlj- and so has economic and environmental advantages.) Having agreed on a divi.sion of labor the Bureau of Mines saved about $300,000 during a 2-year period alone by not having to perform research tasks carried out by the British. Foreign scientists supported by their own countries have performed 89 inves- tigations of the soil and rock samples the Apollo spacecraft brought from the Moon. Since the American scientists receive an average of $60,000 per investiga- tion, the participation of foreign scientists and laboratories has saved American taxpa3'ers more than $5 million. Glomar Challenger, a vessel supported by the National Science Foundation, collects core samples from the ocean floor. Teams of scientists serving 2-month tours on the vessel, analyze the cores initially and produce information of great geological value. To date, about 100 foreign scientists, supported by their own governments or laboratories, have taken part in the program. They have made up about one-third of the total membership of these scientific teams. The Soviet Union agreed to contribute the equivalent of $1 million annually to the deep sea drilling program, and contributions from other nations are anticipated. American researchers, studying the behavior of materials at high temperatures, have used the solar furnace at Odeillo, in the French Pyrenees. This solar furnace, the largest in the world, uses a series of large mirrors and lenses to focus on the Sun's rays to produce intense heat levels for experimental purposes. We are using the French facility on a reimbursable basis. The French have placed at our disposal two unique wind tvmnels and a large rotating table. The ta})le is used f(jr studying tidal effects. In this fashion we have been invited to use facilities which would have cost millions of dollars to duplicate. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration's (NASA) use of the Italian-built San Marco platform off the east coast of Africa is another illustration of savings through facilities sharing. From Cape Canaveral an expensive fuel consuming "dog-leg" maneuver is required to launch a satellite into equatorial orbit, but a smaller, less costly launcher can put payloads of comparable weight directh' into equatorial orbit from the San Marco platform. NASA has used the platform on a cost reimbursable basis for this purpose, thus achieving substantial savings. Foreign germ plasms raised crop yields by millions of dollars in the United States. A variety of Argentine peanut introduced in the United States about a decade ago increased yields by about S9 million annually. The Argentine germ plasm was later used to breed new peanut varieties of even greater yield. Today about 85 percent of the peanuts grown in the United States are types either developed abroad or types with foreign germ plasm in their pedigrees. A Turkish variety of hard red wheat was used for breeding purposes in the United States because of its resistance to various forms of stem rust and bunt disease. In Montana alone the Turkish germ plasm has prevented wheat crop losses of $2 to $3 million annually. Agriculture Department researchers have developed an experimental vaccine against [hoof-and-mouth] disease. Initial field tests carried out by U.S. and Latin American scientists at an international laboratory in Brazil showed the vaccine was promising. It is now undergoing additional field tests to confirm its worth and to establish how often cattle must be inoculated. Because hoof-and-mouth disease does not exist in the United States, field tests on this scale could not be performed here. So we arranged to conduct the tests in Argentina and Brazil, where the disease is prevalent. If the vaccine proves successful, these two nations will have made an indispensable contribution. No longer would hoof-and-mouth disease threaten U.S. cattle raisers with possible losses amounting to billions of dollars over the years. 1406 • Polish and Yugoslav scientists cooperating with our Agriculture Department and supported with the equivalent of about $80,000 in U.S.-owned foreign currencies have made important contributions to our understanding of how to cope with the cereal leaf beetle. Yugoslavia is now the main source of the control parasites being introduced into the United States. Agriculture Department researchers believe the parasites will end the cereal leaf beetle problem in 3 to 5 years. It has been estimated that without the parasite American farmers eventually might have had to spend $60-$ 100 million annually on pesticides to keep the beetle in check. An agreement expected to be signed before the end of 1973 by the Department of Transportation and the Ministry of Transport of Italy is expected to produce this kind of indirect economic benefit. Under the agreement the Italians will give us data from their ongoing SLIM project — a program of research and develop- ment on a single-sided linear induction motor. This extremely advanced experi- mental motor has the theoretical potential to propel tracked air-cushioned trains or magnetically levitated trains at 300 to 400 miles an hour. In return for access to Itahan work on this motor we will make available to Itahan researchers the facihties of our High Speed Ground Test Center at Pueblo, Colorado. It will enable them to develop experimental data which cannot be secured through their own facility. The United States had been planning to start a research pro- gram on this tyi)e of motor in about 2 years. The agreement with Italy will save us at least 2 years in developing essential data on the possibilities of this type of motor. Equally important, the data secured should help us aim our research in the most promising directions. About 1 million Americans suffer from Parkinson's Disease, a potentially dis- abling neurological disorder. Its treatment was largely ineffective until 1967, when the combined efforts of Austrian, Canadian,- Chilean, Swedish, Swiss, and American scientists created L-DOPA, a drug permitting the first effective treat- ment of this malady. About three-quarters of those Americans afflicted with Parkinson's Disease can now look forward to fully productive lives under con- tinuing L-DOPA therapy. The treatment of amputees constitutes a little-known example of how Americans have benefited from cooperative international medical research. Fitting prosthetic devices has always been a long, painful process. But Polish researchers supported by our Department of Health, Education and Welfare developed new procedures to permit fitting immediately after surgery. The result: amputees return to productive pursuits an average of 8 months sooner. More than 75,000 Americans have already been helped by this dramatic advance in physical rehabilitation techniques. As part of its program to reduce traffic fatalities, our government has entered into agreements with the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, France, Sweden, and Japan to exchange information on the design, construction, and evaluation of experimental safety vehicles (ESV). These cars range in size and weight from small economy models to full-size sedans. Four vehicles already have been built abroad imder this program, and another four are being developed. An ESV built by Fiat was recently sent to our Department of Transportation for testing. It is expected that other vehicles will be made available to us. . Meanwhile, we receive the data produced by the development and testing of these foreign-built vehicles, just as the other nations receive informa- tion relating to the ESV's built for the U.S. Government by American auto makers. The Department of Transportation estimates that the foreign countries participat- ing in the ESV program have already invested more than $100 million. The difference between what happened when a hurricane struck Corpus Christi, Texas, in 1919 and the hurricane which hit the city in 1970 dramatically illustrates the importance of early warning. The 1919 storm struck with almost no advance warning, killing 284 persons. Corpus Christi at that time had a population of 11,000. In 1970 there was considerable advance warning before Hurricane Celia struck, and only 13 persons died, even though the city's population has increased tenfold. It is conservatively estimated that the early warning sj'stem resulting from cooperation between our weather service and those of Latin American and Caribbean countries saved about 2,000 fives during Celia.i" 1" U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Affairs, Internatinnal Scientific Cooperation— A Summary of Tangible Benefits, General Foreign Policy Series, no. 285, Publication no. 8760, March 1974, pp. 3-6, 8-12. 1407 Prolijeratloa of Bilateral Programs The niiineroiis bilateral science and technology arrangements to wliich the United States is a party pose substantial j)roblems of administrative coordination. Undoubtedly, a well planned and stoutly implemenied cooperative science program yields both technical and di])lomatic benefits to the participants. However, as bilateral commit- ments increase in numbers, with more and more U.S. agencies called upon to participate, many problems arise; e.g., coordinating all these diffused activities, funding conferences and travel, detailing personnel to plan and staff a myriad of operations here and abroad, and relating each separate set of bilateral ])rograms to the particular (and shared) di]»iomatic and technical purposes for which it is intended. A number of "bilateral science and technology agreements" are managed by the National Science Foimdation. (See Table 4.) Otlier less formal relationships also exist at varying levels of intensity with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Venezuela, and Guatemala. NSF also funds international activities of the National Academy of Sciences."^ THE JOINT COMMISSIONS More recently, further cooperative devices called "joint commis- sions" have come into play. A letter from the Department of State to Congressman Lee H. Hamilton, December 31, 1974, listed six "bilateral commissions" as having been organized or agreed to in 1974. These were "at the cabinet level," and were with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Jordan, Israel, India, and Iran. Other proposed commissions are cur- rently under study. The letter describes the commissions as "diverse in character and . . . tailored to the particular interests and require- ments of each partner." A general intent common to all agreements is "a mutual desire to develop a special relationship which goes beyond normal diplomatic discourse." With certain of these countries, we have long enjoyed close and friendlj' ties; we want to strengthen them. With other countries, we want to move to a new- relationship of greater amity and greater maturity. We intend under these com- missions to encourage connections between all elements of our society and theirs, while broadening cooperation in such fields as cultural exchange, economic and social development, and science and technology. i^' The letter transmitted a "summary of Joint Commission Activities During 1974," indicating that some of these Commissions were still in theprocess of development. Excerpts from the summary follow: "« National Science Foundation, Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1974. The objectives of these programs, as described by NSF, ere: To improve coordination among Federal and private scientific and technical information services; To conduct an annual assessment of the health of the scientific and technical information enterprise in the United States; To arrange for the dissemination of the results of research supported by the Science Information Activities program; To increase benefits from United States participation in international science information activities. While administratively complex, the NSF-managed agreements do not entail very heavy management costs. The 1976 budget authorization recommendation for this activity was $8 million mainly for "coopera- tive research projects, seminars, and exchanges of scientists with 19 countries." (These inc'uded the 14 bilaterals managed by NSF, cooperative activities with 5 other countries, and support for the NAS inter- national program.) (Source: U.S. Congress, House, Conmiittee on Science and Technology, Authorizing Appropriations to the National Science Foundation, House Report No. 94-66, 94th Cong., 1st sess., March 14, 1975, pp. 121-123.) II* U.S. Congress, House, Congressicmal Record, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, 6, p. E148. 1408 Saudi Arabia The joint statement of June 8, 1974 establishing two bilateral commissions discusses the aims of the two governments. Under the Joint Commission on Economic Cooperation several dozen technical experts have gone to >Saudi Arabia to assess the situation, investigate areas in which economic cooperation would be useful, and discuss possiljle programs with thf Saudi Government. The joint working groups estaljlished under the commission have all met at least once to examine the same questions on a broad basis. Both governments are now reviewing the experience gained during the past 6 months and digesting the rejjorts of individual experts and teams. A preparatory meeting will take ]jlace January 5-(), 197-"i, in Riyadh to review developments jointly, and lay the groundwork for the first meeting of the Joint Commission in February. It is expected that technical advice provided by the U.S. Government to the Saudi Arabian Government will be on a fullv reimbursable basis. Egypt The texts of the joint communiques of June 14 and August 19, 1974, discuss in considerable detail the work program of the Joint Commission and the aims of the two governments. The results of the Joint Commission meetings held in June and August were reviewed in the-ie conummiquos. Passage oi the Foreign Assistance Act in December 1974 provides the basis for funding a number of the activities planned the auspices of the Joint Commission. Jordan The Joint Commission has formalized and consolidated the close cooperation which has characterized U.S. -Jordanian relations. Both security and economic considerations fall within the scope of the Joint Commission's responsiljilities. We do not expect the Joint Commission to change the character of our relations, but it will strengthen them along the existing lines. Israel Th*^ subcommission formed under the auspices of the Joint Conmiission all have an economic orientation, and have each met once or twice during the past few months. The work of the .subconmiission shares a common aim; to broaden to the private sector already close U.S. -Israel economic relations. The first meeting of the Joint Commission is scheduled to be held January 27-28, 197.J, in \Vashingt<.in. India The text of the October 28, 1974, agreement establishing the U.S. -India Joint Commission discusses the purposes of the two governments. Meetings are expected to be held as follows: January 20-21, Washington: Economic and Commercial Subcommission. January 27-29, Washington: Scientific and Technological Subcommission. February S-f), New Delhi: Educational and Cultural Subcimimission. March, Washington: Joint Commission meeting. Iran Through the Joint Commission we seek to enter into a partnership of equals across a broad spectrum of activities. It is expected that technical assistance pro- vided by the United States Government to Iran under the auspices of the Joint Commission will be on a fully reimbursable basis. The five or more committees formed under the Joint Commission are expected to hold their first meetings during January and Februarv, looking toward a meeting of the Joint Commission in March. '=» Efforts To Coordinate Bilatej^al Science Agreements Under the guidance of the Bureau of Science and Technology, Dei)artment of State, an effort was made in 1972 to rationahze and systematize the management and operation of the various bilaterals. At that time (Jan. 27, 1972) "Guidehnes for Executive and Partici- pating Agencies in Bilateral Agreements for S&T Cooperation" >*o Ibid. 1409 were promulgated by the International Committee of tlie Federal Council for Science and Technology. The following i)ro visions were set forth in the guidelines: RESPONSIBILITIKS OF TH?: EXECUTIVE AGENCY 1. The Executive Agency participatCR with the Department of State in the negotiation of the agreement and provides the technical and program guidance in its drafting and execution. 2. In conjr.nction with other interested acencies and organizations the Excu- tive Agency plans U.S. participation and activities in implementation of the agree- ment. 3. The Executive Agency i)rovid»s Inroad coordination of the acti\ities of par- ticipating agencir's and other organizations so that agency program objectives and priorities will be consistent with the terms of the agreeinent. 4. The Executive Agency serves as the focal point for conuuunication with its foreign Exrcutive Agency counterpart, and helps facilitate counterjiart agency approval of program activities undertaken by parti<"ipati:ig agencies and othtr organizations. .5. The Executive Agency makes a reasonable attempt to arrange financial support required for an ai:)propriate level of U.S. participation and will, insofar as possible, seek funds to provide core support for the program. When necessary, the Executive Agency will, insofar as possible, provide "seed money" for the plan- ning and initiation of participating agency activities. 6. With the cooperation of the particii)ating agencies and other organizations, the Executive Agency submits an annual report to the Department of State on activities carried out under the agreement, and periodically ex-aluates these activi- ties and the agreement. The Department of State will consi.lt v.ith the Executive Agency on courses of action to be taken, including recommending termination or continuation of the agreement. RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE PARTICIPATING AGENCIES 1. Participating agencies will develop and provide to the Executive Agency in a timely manner program j 'laiis for participation in the agreement within the scope of their m.ission responsibilities. 2. Coordinating with the Executive Agency, ixirticiuating agencies will develop and implement agreement activities with counterpart organizations. They wil, keep the Executive Agency regularly informed al)out the status of such activitiesl and will furnish ihe Executive Agency with such information as it may require for the i.'urpose of preparing reoorts and making evaluations. 3. Participating agencies will, where possible, provide the financial support and staff needed to inaugurate their activities under the agreement. Subsequently they will budget for continued participation in the agreement. TABLE 4.— BILATERAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY AGREEMENTS MANAGED BY NSF (Number of approved activities fiscal year 1974] Visiting scientists Cooperative- research Country United States Fo.eign Seminars piojects Argentina --- 2 -._ Australia 5 7 1 Brazil - 7 1 9 Republic of China 12-- -- 4 6 France --- 16 13 1 Hunudiy - 6 2 1 5- IndiL. ._ ___- 14 18 -. Italy_ 8 4 24 Japan 8 28 Z9 Mexico --- 9 ' New Zealand -- - - Romania 13 17 2 13 Spain - - - 5 18 United Soviet Socialist Republic 2 65 Total- - - 100 50 54 178 Source: National Science Foundation, "24th Annual Report for Fiscal Year 1974" (January 1975), p. 62. 1410 THE NEED FOR FURTHER RATIONALIZATION AND COORDINATION OF BILATERALS So numerous have these agreements become, and so diffused the responsibilities for cooperative overseas programs of U.S. agencies, that the time seems appropriate for a general review of the mechanism of bilateral science and technology cooperation. Agreements are easy to make, cost!}' and time-consuming to implement, difficult to keep track of, duplicative in effects, and painful to terminate. Federal agencies find themselves committed to programs abroad for which no funds can be obtained for support. Expectations are likely to run ahead of performance. In some cases, of course, there are tangible economic benefits in terms of dollar saving from joint or collaborative researches, valuable results, and shared facilities. But only b}^ a vigorous and competent management, supplied on an overall basis by the executive branch, can these agreements ulti- mately be assured of yielding more good than harm. Only if programs are carefully planned, on a joint basis, toward explicit and useful tasks, with assured leadership, personnel, and funding, can the product justify the effort. It is understood that a review of this general problem was underway in the Executive Office of the President, under the general supervision of the Under Secretaries Committee of the Na- tional Security Council, early in 1975. It is possible that further congressional attention to this matter might also be appropriate. VII. Science, Technology, and the Foreign-Policy-Making Process Up to this point in the study the emphasis has been on the opera- tional aspects of science and technology in the Department of State. The purpose of this chapter is to explore a few of the many problems of policy planning and decisionmaking, as these relate to the subject of the study. To lay the groundwork for the discussion, a brief digres- sion into the mechanisms of international policymaking may be helpful. Inherent Incompleteness of State Department Mission As the late Dean Acheson pointed out, the Supreme Court has ruled, aiid the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1800 reported: The President alone has the power to represent the Nation, to negotiate treaties, and to decide when to do so and upon what subjects^ Accordingly, "neither the Constitution nor the law binds the President to monogamous cohabitation with the Secretary and Department of State in the conduct of foreign affairs." *^^ Acheson traced the influence of the Department through the 19th Century ("not much to do"), through the period of the 1920s when the Secre- tary was given a "free hand" ("not * * * much improvement"), neglect during the Roosevelt years ("horse and buggy"), a brief period of effectiveness under Secretary Marshall ("sound enough to provide policy through the next administration and beyond"), "purges" under Secretary Dulles (leaving "more form than substance"), neglect again under President Kennedy ("no professional depart- mental staff could be trusted"). The substance of the recital is that the role of the Secretary and the Department of State are determined by the interests and style of the President, and the nature of the international problems that confront him. Also, the distinction between "an adviser at the elbow" of the President and a "minister of foreign affairs" m6ans that they can seldom be one and the same person.*^^ MINORITY partner IN OVERSEAS OPERATIONS The other gap in the mission of the Secretary of State is the in- completeness of his jurisdiction over U.S. foreign operations and contacts. As one analyst has observed: "when the main mgredients of an agenda [in diplomatic negotiations] are military, economic, financial, technological, or legal, the harassed generalists of the Depai'tment can usually contribute so little in the way of substance that they are hopelessly dependent on the experts of other depart- ments." However, the principal limitation is the Department's "lack of control over the overseas programs and activities that are now the real instruments of policy execution." In fact: Since the end of World War II, the deployment overseas of large United States land, sea, and air forces has been both a major instrument of policy implementa- tion and a source of involvement in foreign international affairs. Our military and economic assistance programs — now chiefly centered in the less developed '21 Dean Acheson, "Eclipse of the State Department," Foreign Affairs 49, no. 4 (July 1971), pp. 593-594. 122 Tl->irl nn c.i^7~(MU 122 Ibid., pp. 5C7-€04. (I4in 1412 countries — are also important arms of policy and sources of overseas involve- ment . ... At least two other agencies — Defense and CIA — are fully the equals of State in power and influence, not only within the Executive Branch but on Capitol Hill; while AID, USIA, and the Disarmament Agency, although nominally part of State, are in fact semi-autonomous organizations, with separate budgets, personnel hierarchies, and top-level management by energetic, independently- minded political appointees. And, concludes the anal.yst: "The truth is that the growing complexity of the international environment renders not only the State Depart- ment but c^er}" other single agency of government incapable of coping with the full range of international problems."'^ Policy Planning Organization and Reorganization Considerable effort has been expended since 1950 to strengthen the resources and influence of the Department of State in diplomatic policy planning, decisionmaking, and policy implementation. One of the most successful of these, in the opinion of Dean Acheson, was the postwar reorganization by General Marshall: "Lines of command were clarified and the Under Secretary made chief of staff; line duties separated from staff duties; supervision was made effective through the Central Secretariat; planning — looking around, ahead, and behind — confided to a competent staff; research and intelligence centralized," ^^* During the administrations of President Eisenhower, John Foster Dulles as Secretary of State made a determined effort to free himself from the details of management and to free his Department from the obligations of operational functions. At the same time an elaborate policy structure was erected within the National Security Council to massage as thoroughly as possible the issues that were to go to the President. As President Kennedy prepared to take office, an extended study was underway by the Subcommittee on National Policy Ma- chinery of the Committee on Government Operations under the chair- manship of Senator Henry M. Jackson. Under the general heading of "Organizing for National Security," the subcommittee issued a series of reports that repeatedly called for a strengthening of the policy planning resources of the Department of State.'" In his final state- '23 Charles Maecliling, Jr., "Our Foreign Affairs Establishment: The Need for Reform," The Virginia QnaTterly Revino 45, no. 2 (Spring 1969), pp. 200-202. i2< Acheson, "Eclipse of the State Department," Foreign Affairs, p. 601. 126 For example, in the Committee Pnnt, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, The National Security Council, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., November 12, 1960, p. 9: The Secretary of State is crucial to the successful operation of the Council. Other officials, partic- ularly the Secretary of Defense, play important parts. But the President must rely mainly upon the Secretary of State for the initial synthesis of the political, military, economic, and other elements which go into the making of a coherent national strategy. He must also be mainly responsible for bringing to the President proposals for major new departures in national poUcy. And in a second staff study, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Super-Cabinet Officers and Superstaffs, 86th Cong., 2nd sess., November 16, 1960, p. 9: If the President is to ask more, and to get more, from the Secretary of State, the Secretary must be better staffed to offer policy guidance and initiatives across the whole span of national security problems. This does not mean a larger Department of State; it may well mean a smaller one. But it does mean a Department competently staffed with generaUsts, economists, and military and sci- entific experts to support the Secretary in understanding and following aU fields falling within his broad concern. Again, in a third staff study, U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, The Secretary of State and the N'ational Security Policy Process, 87th Cong., 1st sess., January 28, 1961, p. 8: State does not require large staffs of "house technicians" in every narrow specialty bearing upon foreign policy. But the Secretary does need, in his own family, more first rate experts in economics, science and technology, intelligence, and military matters who can interpret their specialities in terms of his needs. . . . State's need for broadened staff competence is perhaps most acute in the area of military and scientific-technical problems. . . . If competently manned to lake into account the entire range of the problems of our foreign rela- tions, the Planning Staff can give the Secretary continuing counsel on basic strategic policy not likely to be provided by other parts of the depaitment. 1413 ment, Senator Jackson declared that "No task is more urgent than improving the effectiveness of the Department of State." In our system, there can be no satisfactory substitute for a Secretary of State willing and able to exercise hi? leadership across the full range of national security matters, as they relate to foreign poliC3^ The Secretary, assisted by his Depart- ment, must bear the chief responsibilit}^ for bringing new policy initiatives to the President's desk, and for overseeing and coordinating our manifold foreign policy activities on the President's behalf. State is not doing enough in asserting its leadership across the whole front of foreign policy. Neither is it doing enough in staffing itself for such leadership. State needs more respect for comprehensive forward planning. The Department as a whole attaches too little importance to looking ahead in foreign policj% and is too wedded to a philosophy of reacting to problems as they arise. The Policy Planning Council is not now in the mainstream of policymaking. State needs more officials who are good executive managers — and who are broadly experienced in dealing with the full range of national security problems which now engage the Department. The administration of foreign policy has become "big business." This places a high premium on the ability to manage large scale enterprises — to make decisions promptly and decisively, to delegate, and to monitor. This need for "take charge" men is particularly urgent down through the Assistant Secretary level and at our large missions abroad. Round pegs in square holes are a luxury we cannot aflford.^^e An appeal for a more active role in the strategic diplomatic use of science and technology was voiced in 1965 by Dr. Killian in an address to the first science seminar held by the Foreign Service Institute. He said : All of us^whethcr we be in the scientific, academic, or government communi- ties in this country and abroad — are still in the kindergarten stage in really under- standing how to use science and technology in foreign affairs. There is the diplo- matic opportunity to grasp a powerful new lever to advance our national interest in the world arena. The United States has exceptional technical resources that are understood all over the world, both by advanced peoples and by less-advanced peoples. This scientific and technological strength is among the most conspicuous, most admired, and most persuasive features of the American landscape — more so, to other peoples, than even our cherished democratic system. In this striking fact, in the worldwide appreciation of the quality of our science and technology and the education which supports it, lies a unique diplomatic opportunity, if we can but cultivate the complicated skills and understanding required to exploit it, and create the conditions where these skills are really utilized in agencies concerned with affairs abroad. The power of our science and technology to serve national goals also presents to the State Department a compelling reason to pursue policies designed to maintain and augment this quality.i^' However, by 1969, a critic observed from a review of contemporary literature that: "As President Kennedy became disenchanted with the State Department, he relied increasingly on his owti staff for coordina- tion in selected policy areas." According to this source: The Kennedy regime overloaded the small White House staff, drawing both President and staff into detailed and distracting administration, without com- pensating progress in the establishment cf guidelines for lower-echelon action. Agency resources were ignored or underutilized. Crisis management was impaired as the Kennedy system experienced difficulty in responding to more than one sensi- tive area at a time, a problem that became acute under the Johnson Administra- tion as the Vietnam War grew progressively intractable. '^^ Reorganization of the Foreign Service to meet the demands of modern diplomacy has been a favorite sport for a long time. There 125 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, Organhing for National Security: Final Statement of Senator Henry M. Jackson, Chairman, 87th Cong., 1st sess., November 15, 1961, p. 4. (Committee print.) '" J. R. Killian, Jr., "Science in the State Department: A Practical Imperative," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists 21 . no. 5 (May 19&5) , p. 13. i-s Edward A. Kolodziej, "The National Security Council: Innovations and Implications," Public Admin- istration Review 29, no. 6 (November/December 1969), p. 578. 1414 have been about 12 such actions smce World War 11.^^^ The problem is a doubly intractable one : with the support of his staff the Secretary of State must somehow deliver credible advice to the President on high policy under the scrutiny of the Secretary of Defense and his staff, the other members, of the National Security Council, and the President's own White House staff; he must also exercise policy coordination of the overseas activities of nearly 20 departments and agencies. The literature is replete with criticisms of the performance of the Depart- ment of State in both directions, and with suggestions for further reorganization to set things right. Much of the attention is directed toward the Policy Planning Staff. Writing in 1964, Roger Hilsman was critical of the track record of the Policy Planning Staff. New and better knowledge is needed, but how can it be developed? Certainly the attempts to institutionalize the effort within government have not been very fruitful. It was this need for knowledge and foresight, according to Dean Acheson, that led General Marshall when he was Secretary of State to establish in 1947 the Policy Planning Staff, a group of about a dozen top-level specialists under an assistant secretary. But in practice, the Policy Planning Staff did not work out to be the panacea some had hoped for. It proved to be a useful pool of talent that could be tapped in time of crisis. ... Its members have also contributed "think- piece" memoranda, which have been neither better nor worse, on the average, than similar thoughtful memoranda written in the action bureaus, in the intelli- gence agencies or by outside scholars and writers. But none of this, no matter how well done, fulfills the concept of a "planning" staff, and yet beyond this the Policy Planning Staff has done very little. To Hilsman, "long range planning in foreign affairs" was not drawing blueprints for future operations but "anatyzing the nature of the prob- lem and making broad strategic choices for dealing with it." It was distinguished from short-range planning — "working out the moves and countermoves in the midst of an ongoing situation." Both of these, he said, "are at the political heart of policymaking." More- over, for good and sufficient reasons policy is the product of a political process rather than one of pure logic in a vacuum. Accordingly, attempts at institutionalizing the complete process are likely to fail. "New and better knowledge" can have many sources but the process of applying it to foreign policymaking is a "groping effort at under- standing the nature of the evolving world around us." But important though the results of these kinds of effort might be in the long nm, the immediate results would not be any very dramatic improvement in United States foreign policy. The making of foreign policy is a groping effort at understanding the nature of the evolving world around us. It is a painful sorting out of our own goals and purposes. It is a tentative, incremental experimenta- tion with various means for achieving these purposes. It is an unremitting argu- ment and debate among various constituencies about aU of these questions and an attempt to build a consensus on how the United States as the United States should decide on these questions and what action it should take. And none of these several activities is the kind that wiU yield to organizational or institutional gimmicks.''" '^« Ibid., p. COl. ■30 Roger Hilsman, To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of John F. Kennedy (New York: Dell Publishing Co., A Delta Book, I'J&l), pp. 566-568. However Hilsman also observes (p. 18): So whether one thinks a certain organizational arrangement is "good" or "bad" depends on what one thinks of the kind of policy it facilitates. And this, too, has its repercussions. We have said that policy-making is essentially a political process, by which the multiplicity of goals and values in a free and diverse society are reconciled and the debate over means and ends is distilled into a politi- cally viable consensus on a workable poUcy. But if some organizational arrangements faciUtate certain kinds of policy and other arrangements facilitate other kinds, then organization is also politics in still another guise— which accounts for the passion that men so often bring to procedural and organizational matters. 1415 The problem with foreign poHcy is like Mark Twain's remark about the dictionary — "interesting reading but kind of various." All kinds of missions interact. Policy merges with operations. Short-range policies tend to shape and prejudge long-range policies. Long-range studies have important bearing on short-range policy decisions. Politi- cal questions merge with economics — and equally with technology. Effective foreign policy depends on the capacity to predict events in the social affairs of men, and a better capacity to predict would moan better and more effective foreign policy. But more is required than simple factual information.'*' It would seem that forecasting the future diplomatic environment and its problems is vastly more than political divination: the arcane art of sorting out human motivations is often furthered b}^ asking the economic question — who benefits? Another area with great predictive power is technology, which determines what is or is becoming techni- cally practicable. A policy planning staff needs to be able to combine expertise in these three areas of politics, economics, and technology. Most problems of foreign policy involve all three. The Nature oj ike Foreign Policy Planning Process Taken as a whole, long-range pohcy planning appears to consist of an iterative set of steps leading to decisionmaking on specific issues to achieve progress toward national goals in the face of the prevailing circumstances and \\Tthin the limits of available resources. The process is iterative because some information is needed to identify the issues to be analyzed, and the analysis of issues requires further information. However, in general the information reeds consist of at least the following: — An understanding of the total decisionmaking process involved ; — A formulation of relevant national goals; — A characterization of present and probable future prevailing circumstances; — The relation of the issue in question to all of these ; and — An elaboration of the factors that defhie the changing nature of the issue. The decision process itself seems to involve— apart from the con- tinumg review of the information inputs: — Selection of a salient issue for analysis on the basis of general criteria of importance and probable future urgency; — Integration of the parts of the information available bearing on the issue and the search for further information; — Analysis of the information to identify the decisive elements; — Formulation of alternative possible courses of action; — The ordering of the information in relation to the alternatives; — Evaluation and comparison of alternatives as to probable costs and benefits, technical feasibilit} , and political accepta- biUty; and —Selection of one or more preferred alternatives for further analysis and presentation to the ultimate decisionmaker. 131 Ibid., p. 565. 1416 To comluct the slratoo;ic j)lannino^ to design the future diplomatic [)Osture of the United States in the face of the numerous challenges of global technology *^- would seem to require a staff capability in either the White House, or the Office of the Secretary of State, or both, with the following characteristics: 1. Ivnowledge about technological trends to obtain early knowledge of what is likely to be technically feasible and also diplomatically imi)ortant. 2. Enough technical sophistication to identify aspects of an ongoing development (i.e., the diplomatic counterpart of "technology assessment") to determine what might be done to enhance beneficial diplomatio consequences or minimize adverse di])lomatic consequences. 3. An early understanding of specific items of new teclmology (wherever developed) that has a probability of perturbing the international balance of power, destabilizing local societies, or introducing significant economic developments. 4. An ai)preciation of the possibilities of beneficially reacting to foreseen technological developments by diplomatic means. Clearly, ])olicy planning requires a wide variet}' of information flows, and the skills of a well-informed generalist, and the inmiediate availabiUty of a technically competent interpreter of the scientific or technological content of the information. Ever since World War II technology has been of increasing impor- tance for U.S. diplomacy. How important is it today for the future dil)lomatic posture of the United States? Importance oi Science and Technology for Foreign Policy Planning What proportion of the really important diplomatic issues that have arisen since 1945 have a significant technological content? Actually, it is not easy to find very many that are not somehow involved with technology — issues that come to mind might include: Nuclear weapons control, tests and nuclear power development; Military hardware and its deployment; S[)ace, tracking, communications, observation, and sharing; Foreign aid and technical assistance; Technologv transfer; Food; Pollution and environmental issues; Antarctic exploration; World heallh and disease control; and International air transport. A panel of the I'nited Nations Association of the United States of America, '^^ in 1973, identified "10 basic issues of a global character '■-' The liistorical diplomatic importance of toclniology was explored in an earlier study in the series. See; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The Evolution of International Technology, in the scries, Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcommittee on National Se- curity Pohcy and Scientific Developments by Dr. Franklin 1'. Huddle, Senior Specialist in Science and TechnoloRV, Science Policy Division, Congressional Kesearch Service, Library of Congress, 1970. See vol. JT, pp. 607-680. 'MThe Panel was chaired by Howard C. Petersen, Chairman of the Board, The Fidelity Bank, Phila- delphia, and its 21 members included: David E. Bell, Executive Vice Presideiit, The Ford Foundation; Kichard Newell Cooper, Provost, Yale University, and Frank Altschul, Professor of International Eco- nomics, Formerly. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for International Monetary Affairs; Thomas L. Hughes, President, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Formerly, Assistant Secretary of State; Oeorge B. Kistiakowsky, Professor Emeritus, Harvard University, Formerly, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, and Member, President's Science Advisory Committee; Francis O. Wilcox, Dean, School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Formerly, Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization AfTairs; Adam Yarmolinsky, Ralph Waldo Emerson University Professor, University of Massachusetts, Formerly Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs. The report of llie panel was titled Foreian Policy Decision Making: The Xeiv Dimensions (New York: U.N. Association of the U.S.A., May 1973), 108 pp. 1417 which the Panel considers of central importance." All but item 6 were directly technological in character, and the exception had numerous technological implications. The 10 items were: 1. The depletion of and the need to conserve critical natural resources — in- cluding the question of future sources of energy. 2. The developing competition for the resources of the oceans and the t3'pe of international regulation of access and competition which will be required. 3. The possibilities of weather modification and inadvertent climate modifica- tion as these bear on the ecological system, including agricultural production and human settlements 4. The implications of world population growth — from 1.6 billion in 1900 to an anticipated 6.5 billion by the year 2000. 5. The widening economic gap between the developed and the less developed countries — under the impact of a science and technology centered principally in the industrial areas 6. The unresolved trade, tariff, and balance of payments questions, and the urgency of creating an improved international monetary system. 7. The implications for the international community — both the developed and the less developed countries — of the growth of multinational corporations, and the need for the development of international guidelines. 8. The impact of instant international communications and the international implications of direct broadcasting from satellites into home receivers. 9. The need for strategic and conventional arms agreements as a basis for bringing escalating national defense budgets under some form of control and reducing the dangers of nuclear and non-nuclear war. 10. The urgent need to build into the proliferating international institutional structure new measures for the settlement of disputes and conflicts which are likely to arise over the type of issues outlined above — as a means of moving toward a more stable international system.^^* It is hard to know how literalh* to read the various statements by a succession of Secretaries of State and their subordmates when they periodically assert the importance of science and technology for diplomacy. The roster of problems, issues, and instances that can be collected from such statements is impressive. But the effort to marshal the Department's resources to deal with this array of business does not seem commensurate with the demand. Proposals to strengthen the polic}' plamiing resources of the De- partment are numerous. Some students propose to place the science and technology- part of the pohcy planning function in the science office. Skolnikoff, for one, urges this, although he also suggests at one point that the function would be "possibly working in conjunction M-ith the Policy Plamiing Council, wliich would be the logical first I'ecipient for the information." ^^^ Writing in 1969, Edward J. Kolodziej saw the position of the Secretary of State as weakened by the reactivation of the National Security Council (NSC) by President Nixon. At the same time the enlargement of the planning staff (or as it was then called, the "Plan- ning and Coordination Staff") might buttress the Department but complicate the Secretary's relations with the Under Secretary. As he said : While the institutional position of the Secretary of State appears to be decreas- ing, that of the Under secretary of State may be increasing. The recent reorgani- zation of the State Department Policy Planning Council [in July 1969], renamed the Planning and Coordination Staff, and its expansion from approximately 15 to 20 members suggests this possible development. The staff will be loosely divided into two groups for planning and operations, roughly reflecting the distinction i3« United Nations Association of the United States of America, National Policy Panel, Foreign Policy Decision Making: The New Dimensions (New York: U.N. Association of the U.S.A., May 1973), pp. lo-lb. i» Skolnikoff, op. cit., pp. 273-281, and especially p. 275. 1418 already institutionalized in the NSC system. While the new organ will report directly to the Secretary of State, the largest beneficiary is the Under Secretary, who is afforded increased staff assistance to oversee State Department operations and to keep pace with matters coming before the Review Group and the Under Secretaries Committee. The Planning and Coordination Staff is to serve the Sev- enth Floor of the Department of State. Its participation in foreign and security policy can be expected, correspondingly, to be initially shaped and guided by State Department, rather than by NSC system pressures. Its work has already been placed under tighter State Department control. The access of the NCS staff and the President's Special Assistant to the papers of the Planning and Coordination Staff formally passes through the State Department. The more direct access characterizing the initial practices of the NSC system has now been curtailed to some degree. These changes tend to reinforce the autonomy of the State Department although how much they will buttress its apparently sagging institutional position in the NSC system is difficult to predict at the moment.'^^ Other students have suggested reducing the size of the pUmning staff and bringing it into closer association with the Secretary, or transferring the function to an interdepartmental or White House Policy Council. All these suggestions, and the periodic changes in the planning staff" itself, suggest that the Department and its friends have not yet reached a consensus on how the planning staff' should be organized, where its product should be directed, or what its product should be. In view of the growing volume of scientific and techno- logical issues in the portfolio of diplomatic business, resolution of the matter of a well conceived and accepted policy planning staff has bearing on the subject of this stud3^ Policy Planning Staff, Departmental "Think Tank" When it was first created in 1947, by Secretar}- Marshall, the Policy Planning Staff was assigned five functions: 1. Formulating and developing, for the consideration and approval of appropriate officials of the department, long-term programs for the achievement of U.S. foreign policy objectives. 2. Anticipating problems which the department may encounter in the discharge of its mission. 3. Undertaking studies and preparing reports on broad po- litical-military problems. 4. Examining problems and developments affecting U.S. foreign policy in order to evaluate the adequacy of current policy and making advisory recommendations on them. 5. Coordinating planning activities within the Department of State. By 1960 the policy planning institution was 1.3 years old. At this time an assessment by a group at the Brookings Institution v^as critical of the planning apparatus that had evolved over these years. Too many people wanted to influence the planning. Planners were discouraged from challenging prevailing doctrine. Speech writing and the NSC paper mill consumed time and energy. The Brookings study, performed at the request of the Senate Committee on Foreign Rela- tions, saw the policy planning task as one of "looking ahead to identify major problems, to appraise alternative approaches, and to recommend preferred courses of action." The rapidity of change in the world environment made the task more difficult. The concept had always '3« Kolodziej,"The National Security Council," Public Administration Review, p. 580. 1419 been that of a small, highly qualified staff of advisers to the Secretary. However, their very quality occasioned diffusion of their resources: While the performance and influence of the staff have varied considerably, certain difficultie.-^ hav^e plagued it through most of its existence. As a small group of able officers, its members are frequently drafted for operational duties, such as writing speeches and current policy statements. Such activities can be useful in keeping the staff in touch with current affairs, but they have considerably reduced the time available for thoughtful consideration of longer range problems, as have the burdens involved in servicing the Department of State's participation in the National Security Council. Thus the Policy Planning Staff devotes only a limited portion of its limited resources to the task of long-term, broadly focused consideration of major foreign policy problems. Yet it continues to be, on the whole, a competent group of officials respect^^d within the Department. Its papers do not usually have wide circulation in the Department, but there are established contacts with the various regional and other bureaus. It has a good working relationship with the Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. There are also continuing, informal contacts with the Joint Stafif and the Office of International Security Affairs in the Depart- ment of Defense. . . . * * * * * • * * Clearly, many officials involved in the foreign policy process already engage in considerable long-range thinking. Much of it is unsystematic and unsustained; nevertheless, intelligent policymaking in the present obviously rests on assump- tions, whether implicit or explicit, about the future. The question now being asked is whether this kind of analysis can and should be improved in both quality and quantity. Many policymakers, and many outside the policy process, feel that the fairly general projections that they make into the future represent about as much as can usefully be done. They point out that some modest contingency planning has already been done. But they feel that the scope, dynamism, and complexity of the factors that comprise international affairs are so great that it is difficult to look very far ahead with anj'^ useful degree of precision. •" During the Kenned}' years, the Policy Planning Staff was changed to a Council and its functions were prescribed as follows (paraphrase) : To advise and assist the Secretary and other senior officials in evaluating current foreign policy, in the formulation of long-range policies, and in the coordination of planning activities of the Department with other interested departments and agencies. '^^ A rather critical account of the planning staff's operations in the 1960s complained that "concern for current events was virtualh'^ exclusive." Excerpts: It always worked on the most important problems of the moment, but planning, prediction, and a true concern for the significance of long-range developments were honored rhetorically and ignored in practice, (p. 459) ******* Dean Rusk, either because of his low regard for the staff or because of traditional views about how the Department should function, turned only to his geographical and functional bureaus for policy advice, (p. 459) ******* As timed passed, however, it gradually lost its direct relationship with the Secretary of State, and came into increasing conflict with the operating bureaus of the Department. The reputation and influence of the Staff, especially under its last two directors in the 1960s, gradually sank, and its disappearance in 1969 was "^ H. Field Haviland, Jr., with the collaboration of 11 others, The Formulation and Administration of United States Foreign Policy, a report for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1960), pp. 97-98, 100. 138 U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State Organizational Manual (also known as Foreign Affairs Manual), March 14, 1967, p. FAM 210, item 1. 1420 scarcely noticed, (p. 450) (It was incorporated at that time as a planning and coordinating staff in the Office of the Secretary') ******* The impact of long-range planning staff, in the short run, must come from ques- tions about the ideas and assumptions that guide the policymaker; and in the long run, from its ability to discuss probable boundaries of the emerging international sj'Stem, as well as the possible consequences of short-run actions, (p. 462) The conclusion of this analysis is not sanguine about the future of foreign policy planning. It is unlikel}^ to succeed because those in power do not believe in it. Thus: We must be pessimistic about the possibility of change. . . . The creation of a long-range planning staff committed to taking the future seriously could be an important innovation. It would add new and different voices to a political process that has lost direction, self-confidence, and, most critically, its sense of legitimacy. Nevertheless, even if this planning staff was created, it would be naive to assume that it, or any other institution, which is merely added to the old political system, could have a fundamental impact on how we conduct our political affairs. Institutional reform is not bj' itself sufficient to Create basic change unless it is accompanied by changes in professional belief S3stems. New institutions must be staffed by men who understand and believe in their purposes. For that to happen, we must change the minds of practitioners who believe that planning is a waste of time and of theorists who believe that involvement in practical affairs is sinful.'^* A more optimistic view is that human performance and human relations are always more important than organizational boxes and flow charts. Planning is likely to continue, whether or not there is a congestion of other duties, or explicitly assigned functions. The prob- lem is to assure that broad-gauge thinking and its product are reason- ably concentrated and that decision makers give them access. It is also important that the policy planners have time to think, that they are in good communication with specialists whose expertise is per- tinent, and that they do not ignore the intellectual explorations of the academic community. Present Organization and Functions of the Policy Planning Staf The frequently voiced criticism that the Department of State was excluded from the main stream of foreign policy and national .security policy during the early 1960s w^as answered — at least on paper — by the President's action, wSeptember 22, 1973, appointing Dr. Henry Kissinger Secretary of the Department while retaining the title of Assistant to the President for National Security' Affairs. Assignment as Secretary gave him the resources of a large field staff, regional and functional bureaus, and the Policy' Planning Staff; he could take the experience and special knowledge of a large team of Assistant Secre- taries, the most recentl}^ created being the head of the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. As Presidential assistant he had direct contact with the Chief Executive and other members of his advisory staff in the White House as well as lateral assistance from the several White House Councils, and was himself the Director of the National Security Council staff numbering about 70. (See Table 5.) As either Secretars' or Assistant to the Presi- dent, he had access to the resources of the Central Intelligence Agency and other elements of the intelligence community. 13" Robert L. Rothsteiii, "Planning in Foreign Affairs," Policy Sciences 4 (1973), p. 464. 1421 TABLE 5— NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF POSITIONS 1974 zctual 1975 estimate 1976 estimate GS-18 - 4.4 4 GS-17 : - 4 7 7 GS-16 - -.. 3 1 1 GS-15 - ....^. 8 6 6 GS-14 9 5 6 GS-13 iL 4 2 2 GS-12.... . 4 4 4 GS-11 ..■..: - :..... J ... 6 ' 3 3 GS-10.. ....... ..........:....'.'..i.-... ,4' 5 5 GS-9.-iw. j-.--....i..ii.- — ■.j..,tL.,.^. — k — :-.~ i-.^.. ,...-.... .12 , 16 16 GS-8.. ...:...-•.....,._..,...„ ..-,...-.; ..S:... 9 . 6 6 GS-T..,..:.^:.;......v..:..3:-^:-:.:.i:l-:— i.:.:— 1- « ■'** --7^ -T 6S-€.....j..-l-.:.....-..u.^:;.C:«.';.:..^Li:iLi:.-„^..i-.:u ■ .. 5.' : -.-I •:. A. 6ST5.;u....^..J-,^,.-i^.-J..^.._..vV^-^ ,.-..-,.-... . ■ ■ ,^3., .. ...,,, 3 / _ , .. 2 Tqtal permanent positions 79 72 ■' . 72- Unfilled positions, 'June 36.-.: ^.....=.-.'...w-.i.'.ii.L.^ji.:*i^-i.'- • -10.; • r-2 ' . "^2 Total p«rm8nentfmplpymeni end of yeaf...Il.-..--.-^------- ■6f • ■' ' 70 Tfr Source: The budget of the U.S. Government Hscal y«ar 197E, appendix. ' The contsQfcts betweeil th^ White Htoiise syBtem ftnd the/Departinent of State have. :bee«fUrtheiv strengthened bv' the composition, formal assignments, aiid informal contacts Unking the Policy Planning Staff with the National Security Council. Thus, Wreatham E. Gathright of the Staff is staff director of the Under Secretaries Committee of NSC. Winston Lord, director of the Policy Planning Staff, chairs the NSC Contingency Planning Working Group. And in general, all members of the staff relate closely to the NSC staff and contribute to its operational programs. Lord and one of his two deputies (Samuel W. Lewis) served under Secretary Kissinger on the NSC staff, and the other deputy (Reginald Bartholomew), was director of policy plans and NSC affairs in the Department of Defense. The Policy Planning Staff, currently numbering about 30, finds itself involved in an extensive array of scientific and technological problems, issues, and fields of concern. The principal member of the staff for scientific and technological affairs is Mr. Gathright, but at least eight other staff members have technical assignments as a part of their work (see Table 6). -^ Table 6. — Members of the Policy Planning Staff Concerned With "Science and Technology Related" Problems ' Michael H. Armacost — Japan. Harry C. Blaney — Law of the Sea, environment, population, energy. ■ Luigi Einaudi — Latin America. ' Charles R. Frank — economic problems of Less Developed Countries. Wreatham E. Gathright — general overview; technology policy; outer space; environmental modification; U.S. -Soviet agreements; nuclear tests; arms control. ^ Jerome H. Kahan and Jan KaUcki — nuclear energy, non-proliferation. C. William Kontos — development, Joint Cooperation Commissions (Middle East/South Asia), U.N. Robert H. Morris — food, energy, taw materials. Charles Zemach — SALT, arms control. • Source: Department of State. An enthusiastic endorsement of the "new" Policy Planning Staff is offered by James Reston in the New lork Times. His coJumn, re- 1422 produced in the Congressional Record, February 19, 1975, at the request of Senator llibicoff , concludes as follows : This is a quite different Policy Planning Staff from the days of George Kennan. Like everything else now, it is much bigger — around thirty members as compared ^ith Kennan's eight or ten — and dealing with many more things. It has experts on air power (Lt. Col. B. Conn Anderson, Jr., West Point, age 41, professor at the Air Force Academy and the National War College) ; advisors on science (Harry C. Blaney, age 36, Allegheny College, London School of Economics, former assistant to Pat Moynihan in the White House); information officers (Douglas Pike, age 50, California, former P.R. officer in Vietnam). You name it and Policy Planning now has it, and it's so large that Mr. Kis- singer, who hates big meetings, seldom meets with it. But he has changed in the last few months. He now has breakfast at the State Department at 7:30 in the morning, and has a staff meeting once or twice a week, when he's around, with his Under Secretaries and Assistant Secretaries, and Winston Lord, his Policy Plan- ning Director. The talent has been here at State for more than a generation, unused and uninspired. Mr. Kissinger has been very tough on it, hut he has nourished it and brought it alive again, and in the end, this may be one of his most important achievements."' Relations Between OES and Policy Planning Stajff The new Assistant Secretary heading the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs moved into an office in the Department of State in February 1975 while this study was in preparation. She was altogether too recently in the assignment to have plotted a course or made the many administrative decisions as to staff, program emphasis, appropriate role for the scientific attache system, and the like. It was evident from a discussion with her that she expected to play a strong positive role in shaping the new bureau and melding together its previously separate elements like oceans and fisheries, population, and environment with atomic energy (nonmilitary aspects) and science and technology. She is confident of a participatory share in departmental policymaking, along with the other Assistant Secretaries heading the geographic and functional bureaus, as first-line advisers to the Secretary. Her jurisdiction would be science and technology and related matters.'*' It mil be important for the effectiveness of planning of the De- partment's scientific and technological affairs that the new Bureau establish a good working relationship with the Policy Planning Staff, and that both units not become enmeshed in operational details and short-term problems. With particular reference to the Planning Staff, much of the criticim over the years has addressed the dilemma pre- sented by competitive uses of the staff to plan ahead and to deal with immediate crises. Conceived as a small group of highlv qualified foreign policy anal^^sts to do unstructured thinking ahea5, the staff also constituted an mvaluable and rare resource to be tapped in current emergencies. Since emergencies were not postponable, and usually landed on the President's desk, the request for diversion of staff attention from longer range to immediate problem was likely to be irresistible. As a general proposition, operational problems take precedence over planning. '«« James Reston, "The Policy Planners," New York Timet, Febraary 19, 1975. p. 35. (Reprinted in U.S. Congress, Senate. CongrmionalBecord. 94th Cong., 1st sess-j 1975^ 121. p. 2126. (Daily edltlonl) 1*1 Conversation with Dr. Dixy Lee Kay, * ebrua 1423 SiiTxilarly ^vith the science office iii State: tlie problem of keeping track of 28 bilateral science programs, supporting the science aspects of an uncountable variety of multilateral science activities, assisting in further negotiations, coordinating and backstopping 30 scientific attaches or deputies in 23 countries or missions, and supporting or analyzing the budgets of various departments and agencies engaged in overseas scientific and technological activities, leaves little time for meditative planning and analysis. It is possible that for precisely the same reason that the Policy Planning Staff was conceived as an insu- lated group of knowledgeable and intelligent planners, a small insu- lated planning group in OES might serve as a source of fact, analysis^ trends, and technology forecasts to support the work of the Policy Planning Staff. Broad experience, high intellectual quality, diplomatic training, and extensive relationships with the U.S. scientific and tech- nological communities would appear to be minimum requirements for such a staff. Future Policy Impacts of Science and Technology To what extent are future problems and opportunities of U.S. diplomacy likely to involve science and technolog}'^? A recent study by a policy panel of the United Nations Association of the United States^*^ called attention to the radical alteration in "traditional patterns of international relations" brought about by developments in the application of science and technology. In particular: Developments in science and technology have become in many cases the basis of political power struggles. National power is constantly being deployed to achieve larger shares of the benefits of such new technologies as remote sensing of the earth's resources and recovery of mineral wealth from the world's seabeds. Where the use of internationally traded resources is at stake, some industrial states are seeking new technologies that will permit self-sufficiency, while many countries hope to use boycotts and cartels as a form of coercion for both economic and political ends. And, scientific research and development for military purposes continue to be a high priority for many nations. According to one estimate, military efforts account currently for about 40 percent of total world research and development expenditures, or nearly $25 billion, which might otherwise be available for non-military purposes. While advances in science and technology obviously have contributed both directly and indirectly to the world's problems, on balance they have made — and will continue to make — major contributions to the resolution of those problems. Alleviation of the world food problem depends importantly on scientific and technical advances which will make possible greater agricultural productivity in the developing world. The development of new types of energy sources is an essential element in relieving the problems resulting from geographically con- centrated and ultimately finite supplies of petroleum. It is important that the capabilities — ^as well as the consequences — of science and technology be examined more carefully than they have been in the past, and in the broadest possible framework, if science and technology are to be applied effectively to benefit mankind as a whole. "^ '*2 The panel on Science and Technology in an Age of Interdependence, was chaired by Franklin A. Lindsay, president of Itek Corporation. Among its 23 members were: William O. Baker, President, Bel! Telephone Laboratories, Inc.; Harvey Brooks, Dean of Engineering and Applied Physics, Harvard University; Dr. Harold Brown, President, California Institute of Technology; John H. Knowles, M.D., President, The Rockefeller Foundation; Eugene B. Skolnikoff, Professor of Political Science, Director, Center, for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Carroll L. Wilson, Mitsui Prof'jssor in Prob- lems of Contemporary Technology, Sloan School of Management, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. As cited in United Nations Association of the United States of America, National PoUcy Panel, Science and Technology in an Era of Interdependence (New York: U.N. Association of the U.S.A., January 1975), pp. 2-3. '« Ibid., p. 18. 1424 There have been numerous evidences in recent years that the White House and the Secretary of State appreciate the need for injecting technical expertise into the foreign pohcy process. The report of the President to the Congress, May 3, 1973, identified a number of "global challenges of peace." Foremost were problems relating "the Oceans" not only to questions of historic freedom of the seas and rights of passage but also to such technologically connected matters as depletion of fish, oceanic pollution, and seabed mineral resource development. Problems of outer space, "economic and scientific inter- dependence," various kinds of technology-related terrorism, drug con- trol, population growth, energy, environmental protection, and impact of domestic environmental controls on international trade were also cited."* In a series of speeches and statements, Secretary Kissinger has underscored the future importance of science and technolog}^ for diplomacy. In his first speech as Secretary, he told the United Nations General Assembly, September 24, 1973, that the world had been drawn together by "modern science, technology, and new forms of communication into a proximity for which we are still unprepared." Technology [said the Secretary] dailj* outstrips the ability of our institutions to cope with its fruits. Our political imagination must catch up with out scientific vision. At the Washington Energy Conference, February 11, 1974, the Secretary attached importance to science and technology as one of seven areas of international cooperation to assure "abundant energy at reasonable cost to meet the entire world's requirement for economic growth and human need." Said Dr. Kissinger: New technologies, and not only new explorations, can provide us with new sources of energy. Many of our countries are launching large new programs. (U.S. plans called for $11 billion in public and $12.5 billion in private outlays for this purpose.] But we have no monopolj- on the most advanced and promising ap- proaches. It is to our mutual benefit to coordinate and combine our efiForts. Thus, the United States is prepared to make a major contribution of its most advanced energy research and development to a broad program of international cooperation in energy. Before the Sixth Special Session of the U.N. General Assembly in New York, April 15, 1974, the Secretary proposed a "global agenda," made possible by technology, to — — Achieve an expanding supply of energy; — Enable an escape from the "c3xle of raw material surplus and shortage" ; — Balance food and population; — Buoy the poorest nations; — Exploit fully "our most precious resource" of science and technology to overcome "a global economy of scarcity"; and — Sustain industrial civilization and growth by a workable trade, monetary, and investment system. With particular reference to science and technolog}", he said: "No human activit}" is less national in character than the field of science." (And also) "No development effort offers more hope than joint tech- nical and scientific cooperation." '** Richard Nixon, U.S. Forcion Policy for the lOJO'g: Shaping a Durable Peace, a report to the Congress by .the President of the United Stales, May, 3, l'J73, pp. 216-229. 1425 INIan's technical genius [he continued] has given us labor-saving technology, healthier populations, and the green revolution. But it has also produced a technology that consumes resources at an ever-expanding rate; a population explosion which presses against the earth's finite living space; and an agriculture, increasingly dependent on the products of industrj'. Let us now apply science to the problems which science has helped to create. On April 20, the Secretary told the General Assembly- of the Or- ganization of American States (OAS) in Atlanta, Georgia, that the United States was "prepared to link its technology with the resources and capital of the hemisphere's oil producers to help them expand their production and diversify tlieir economies." The United States, he went on, '"will give high priorit}' to linking our technological skills with the raw materials and capital of oil producing countries to en- courage the development of new fertilizer capacity." A program to increase hemispheric food production, he proposed, "should encom- pass research, the appUcation of science and technology, and the intensified application of foreign and domestic resources." He also favored the "transfer of science and technology" by both private and public means. An article in Science Cjuoted R. Mark Palmer, identified as "Kis- singer speechwriter," to the effect that the Secretary "thinks that Americans' ability to contribute money and run the world in the old-fashioned way of the 1950s and 196bs is now over. What we can contribute — and what the world wants — is our technological capa- bilities." "Kissinger aides" were reported as stressing that the pro- posals in the April 15 speech would be implemented; and Palmer again: "The Secretary" took the speech ver}- seriously and he hopes the scientific community will take it seriously." The article continued: Before leaving on his latest trip to the Middle East, Kissinger directed Winston Lord, director of the State Department planning and coordination staff [i.e., Policy Planning Staff] and one of his few close associates, to develop a strategy for following up on the initiatives proposed in the speech, including these related to science and technology'. Lord declines to say what actions are envisaged, and it is too early to say whether there will be major budget or program changes. According to the Science article, the ideas for initiatives were gathered by the speechwriter not from (the then) SCI, but "from within and outside the State Department." And — "Kissinger's interest in science and technolog}' lies chiefly in its effects on diplomacy and is shaped by the study of nuclear weapons problems on which he spent much of his academic career." ^*^ Some Concluding Observations on Policy During at least the next 2 j'ears, the organizational framework for policy in the interaction of diplomac}^ with science and technology appears to be established, assuming present incumbencies continue. The President, as always, has constitutional jurisdiction over all negotiations. He has the support of a Special Assistant for National Security Affairs who is also Secretary of State. The National Security Council supports the Special Assistant and the State Department supports the Secretary. Senior planning people in the Department interact functionally with the NSC committees and staff. A new "5 Nicholas Wade, "Kissinger on Science: Making the Linkage with Diplomacy," Science, May 17, 1074, pp. 780-781. 1426 Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs has been created, headed by an Assistant Secretary, supported by a substantial staff (larger than NSC's) in Washington and in a co- ordinate relationship with 30 scientific attaches and deputies in 23 countries or missions. How well the Secretar^VSpecial Assistant will be able to orchestrate this team remains to be seen. Another imponderable is the direction to be selected and the receptivity to be achieved by the new Assistant Secretary. The scientific and technological roles of other organizational ele- ments of the Department, next to be discussed, also relate to the policy role of the Secretary. Particular question is raised with respect to the Bureau of International Organizations (10) and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR), as well as the Foreign Service Institute. Relationships of all these elements not only to each other but also to the policy groups of other departments with international missions (such as the Departments of Treasury, Commerce, Agriculture, In- terior, HEW, HUD, Transportation, Labor, and most of all Defense) and agencies (chiefly CIA, NSF, NASA, the Council of Environmental Quality, and the new Energy Agenc}^ have largely been established but every new tension abroad is likely to heighten the tensions among these agencies at home. In virtually every case, science and technology are likely to be an important ingredient in the foreign policy issues that are the substance of these interactions. Finally, the relationship of the foreign policy apparatus to the committees of Congress, and particularly those with both diplomatic and scientific/technological interests'needs to be explored. In the last analysis, this relationship and the problems and opportunities it implies for the congressional policymaking and oversight responsibili- ties, may well turn out to be a major consideration under the heading of Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy. VIII. Opp(5rtunities for Expanded Technical ExPEPtTisE in State Science and technology are ingredients of the State Department's business at man}^ other points besides the science office, the pohcy staff, and the scientific attache S3^stem; A brief survey' of these other elements is offered here. The sparcity of the literature and the indica- tions from conversations with departmental personnel suggest that in these other parts of the Department a relatively low priority of attention is assigned by them to science and technology. For example, little effort is made to recruit physical scientists into the P^oreign Service. The principal fields of expertise are political and economic. A ''sample" U.S. overseas mission, in 1969, contained no persons explicith' charged with scientific liaison or technological trend analj^sis. (See Table 7). The Inspector General's report on SCI (see pp. 48-51) made reference to the general departmental want of confidence in its science office, the poor liaison between technical and diplomatic personnel, and the general neglect of science and technology through- out the Department. (See also footnote 57, page 34.) Table 7. — Composilion of a sample U.S. Mission * Executive Section: Service Attaches: Chief of ^lission Defense Attache (and Armj^ At- Deputy Chief of Mission tache) Executive Assistant Assistant Army Attache PoHtical Section: Naval Attache Counselor for Political Affairs Assistant Naval Attache 5 Political Officers Air Attache Labor Attache Assistant Air Attache Economic Section: Foreign Agricultural Service (FAS): Counselor for Economic Affairs Agricultural Attache 4 Economic Officers Assistant Agricultural Attache Commercial Attache United States Information Service 2 Commercial Officers (USIS) : Petroleum Attache Counselor for PubUc Affairs Financial Attache Executive Officer Transportation & Communications Information Officer Officer Assistant Information Officer Consular Section: Assistant Information Officer Consul General (Labor) 5 Consular Officers Cultural Affairs Officer Visa Assistant 3 Assistant Cultural Affairs Officers Consular Assistant Public Affairs Trainee Administrative Section: Director, Binational Center Counselor for Administration Director of Courses, Binational Administrative Officer Center General Services Assistants Agencv for International Development Personnel Officer (AID): Budget & Fiscal Officer AID Representative Disbursing Officer Controller Communications and Records Su- Program Officer pervisor Programs Analysis Officer Communications and Records Clerk Development Officer Telecommunications Specialist Manpower Adviser Security Officer Agricultural Credit Adviser See footnote at end of table. (1427) 1428 Table 7. — Composition of a sample U.S. Mission'^ — Continued Ag<'ncv for International Development JNIilitarv Assistance Advisory Group (AI b)— Continued (M AAG) : Industrial Officer Commander of Group Sociologist Chief Administrative Officer Puolic Affairs Adviser - Chief, Joint Plans and Operations Chief PuV)lic Safety Adviser 3 Officer Advisers ' Deputy Chief Public Safety Adviser Chief, Army Section 6 Public Safety Advisers 12 Officer Advisers General Engineer Chief, Navy Section Auditor 8 Officer Advisers Peace Corps: " Chief, Air Force Section Peace Corps Representative 6 Officer Advisers Deputy Peace Corps Representative Chief, National Guard Adviser 8 Associate Representatives 3 Officer Advisers 3 Physicians ' Source: W. Wendell Blancke, Tke Foreign Senice of the United States (Washington: Frederick Praeger, Publishers, 1969), pp. 93-91. Needjor an Inventory of Opportunities In an address to the scientific attaches, meeting in Washington for their annvial briefing on domestic trends and international develop- ments, Secretary Rogers, January 29, 1970, said: It would be foolhardy in this day and age to set political objectives without an accounting of the technical realities — or to approach technological problems with- out regard to their political and social implications. [And in particular:] The con- duct of our foreign affairs — the formulation of our policies and goals — must reflect the .sometimes complex, sometimes subtle, but persistent influence and interaction of science and technology on the affairs of man. The Secretary suggested that in view of these interrelations, ". . . in forging the capability of the State Department to deal with the prob- lems of the 1970s, the professional corps of the Foreign Service and the Department must develop the capacity to keep abreast of these de- velopments and the skills necessary to cope with them." '*^ Where might this "capacity" be appropriate? THE REGIONAL BUREAUS The scope of responsibility of the regional bureaus ^^' is generally to provide assistance in the direction, coordination, and supervision of State Department and interdepartmental activities in the designated region, and for the general conduct of U.S. foreign relations with countries in the region. It backstops the U.S. Embassies in the region and directs their management and administration. Generall}', such bureaus have special advisers on public affairs, labor, economics, political-military, regional planning, and U.N. affairs. There do not, however, appear to be any special advisers on science and technology, a circumstance that might wa-rrant consideration, especially in view of the elevated status of the Bureau of Oceans and Environmental and Scientific Affairs. The special activities, needs, and relationships Avith the United States in science and technology tend to differ radically from region to region. For example, the highly developed science and technology of '<» Remarks by the Secretary of State on the occasion of meeting with the Scientiilc Attachfis, Januar> 20, 1970, p. 5. (Copy of the address supplied bv the Department of State.) H7 These are the Bureaus of African Affairs, European Affairs, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Inter- American Affairs, and Near Eastern and South Asian ASairs. 1429 the nations in the region for which the Bureau of European Affairs (EUR) has jurisdiction involves not only more concentrated but also more sophisticated technical matters than does the Bureau of African Affairs. The former has a share of responsibility for NATO and OECD matters and also educational and cultural exchanges with the U.S.S.R. Shared interests of EUR ^^^tll OES would appear to be extensive and functional. Secretary Kissinger's pledge of mutual science and tech- nolog}" programs with other hemispheric nations v/ovtld also seem to imply an enlargement in the planning and operational concerns of the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs on technical matters. However, as a practical matter, every region in the Department's organizational scheme has substantial concern with science and tech- nology at some level of sophistication and development. The less- developed nations seek help in organizing institutions and in planning programs; the more-developed nations are more interested in ex- changes of information and personnel. Both situations imply activity and the rising rate of technological change since World War II imphes an increase in the technological ingredient of regional diplomacy. SPECIAL CASE OF BUREAU OF IXTERXATIOXAL ORGANIZATION AFFAIRS The Bureau of International Organization Affairs (10) appears to have some of the characteristics of both the regional and the func- tional bureaus.^** It is in general the channel between the U.S. Govern- ment and international organizations and conferences. These include the United Nations and the associated organizations within the U.N. family— UNESCO, World Health Organization, and others. How- ever, with respect to the fields of science and technology its role ap- pears to be primarily organizational and administrative more than substantive. That is, 10 recruits U.S. personnel to staff U.N. agencies, coordinates U.S. participation in international conferences, defends and administers appropriations for U.N. activities (scientific or other), and "formulates and coordinates United States foreign policies on . . . scientific . . . matters under consideration by the U.N., other inter- national organizations and afhUates thereof not specifically assigned to other areas of the Department." ^*^ There is in 10 a small science and technology unit, designated as lO/SCT, consisting of three professional officers. These perform the 10 functions in relation to the International Atomic Energy Agency, the U.N. Science Ofl&ce, the U.N. Environmental Program, and the World Meteorological Organization; other elements in 10 are con- cerned with health (World Health Organization), transport and communications, and UNESCO affairs. On this point Herman Pollack comments: In my view the existing arrangement for relationships between the United States and the UN technical agencies is fundamentally sound. Under it the basic responsibihty for the technical relationship lies with the mission agency while the political, parliamentarian and administrative relationship is with the Depart- ment of State. It is in the area of coordination as among UN technical programs and in oversight that United States performance is weak. Improvement will »8 As one interested party observed: "The Bureau of International Orgamzation has [some] functions analogous to those of the geographic bureaus and others analogous to those of the functional bureaus. Source: John Keppel, " Undersecretary for Functional Affairs," Foreign Service Journal 46 (March 196y), 51. 1" U.S. Department of State, U.S. Department of State Organizational Manual, 1967, p. FAM 340. P. 51. 1430 roquirp that this woaknoss be rocognized and tliat nianixiwor in numbers and quaHty sufficient for an adequate response be ])ro\id(d. At the present time I believe there are 24 manyears of officer jjersoniiel availa))le in the J^epartnient of State to work on UN science and technology programs. This is sui)plemented liy several officers detailed to the State Department bv the mission agencies. The nian]K)\ver available is entirely insufficient to get on t'lj) of the problem."''' It is possible that the cooi-dinatioTi of both bilateral and inulti- latoral science and teclmology relationshij)s in the Department of State suffers from beins: separately managed in two different biu'eaiis, and further subdivided within each btu'eau. It wotdd, of coiu'se, be unreasonable to expect (he Department to build its organizational structiu'e around one function or set of functions like those of science and technolog3^ But the present diffusion and division of responsibil- ity seems to invite review. Science and Technology in the Functional Bureaus As distinguished from the regional bureaus of the Department of State there are eight or more bureaus which have missions to perform, rather than geographic areas to serve. These functional bureaus ^'^ to greater or less degree have responsibilities or fimctions in science and technology. Thus, the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs (CU) has an interest in international exchanges of persons and information, the "Brain Drain," '""^ educational assistance, and conferences on these and related subjects. The Bureau of Politico- Military Affairs is concerned with arms transactions, arms control, and other international security matters. The Bureau of Public Affairs is responsible for telling the stor}- of the Department, including its concerns with science and techno log3\'''^ However, in two of the functional bureaus the relationship to scientific and technological matters would seem to be extensive and important. These are the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB) and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR). SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL POTENTIAL OF THE BUREAU OF ECONOMIC AND BUSINESS AFFAIRS Under the rubric of "economic and business affairs" in the Depart- ment of State are gathered a great man}' of the functional responsibili- ties of international relations that closely involve science and especially technology. The "job description" of the Assistant Secretary who directs this Bureau emphasizes his role in trade and commercial i«» Pollack to Huddle, March 25, 197.0. '51 Theso arc: the Bureaus of Politico-Military Affairs, Congressional Relations, the a'rcady discussed OE.S arid lO, IiitcUif-'cnce and Research, F-conoinic and Business Affairs, Public Affairs, arid Educational and CuUural Affairs., as well as several adniiiiistrative and services buieau^. '■« .-See: Ti.S. Congress, IIou.se. Committee on Foreiprn Affairs, Jiraiii Innin: A Slvd'j nfthe Persistent Issue of lulerr.ational Scientitic Mntiilitij, in the series Science, 'i echnolo<:y, and American Uiiilon-.acy, prepari'd for the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scienlilic Developments by Or. .Toseph Ci. Whelaii, Senior Specialiri in International Affairs, Foreign Affairs Uivi-iuri, Congressional Kescaich Service, Library of Congress, 1974. See vol. II, pp. 1037-1.31S. _ ' in Per exaniple, tlieliistoricaraccounl oftTie science oTflce anfTscfenlihc Attach? program, Science Adt iser 0/ tlie DejiuTtmtnt of State, op. cit., was prefiared with the assistance of this Bureau. 1431 negotiations, extension of credit, and the flow to the United States of information on multilateral economic and commercial matters. ^^ The Assistant Secretary has five deputies, charged respectively ■with international trade policy, transportation and communications, international finance and development, international resources and food policy, and commercial affairs and business activities. Under one or another of the offices of these Deputy Assistant Secretaries are such technical functions as — East-West Trade (including "Battle Act") Aviation Negotiations Aviation Programs and Policy International Communications Policy Maritime Affairs Tropical Products Industrial and Strategic Materials ^ Fibers and Textiles Food Policy and Programs Food for Freedom Fuels and Energy While there are ob\Tious economic implications in all these functions, there are also many scientific and technological aspects. A substantial technical input would certainly be essential in the development of "policy recommendations" and "approved policy programs" for which these organizational elements are responsible. There are, of course, several ways of ensuring such technical input: by including in the staffs of these organizations persons with technical as well as economic expertise, by close liaison with OES, by callmg upon other Federal agencies for assistance to supplement in-house expertise, and by enlisting consultants and advisers from outside the Government on an ad hoc basis. All these expedients are appropriate even if the mission is limited to reactive responses to new develop- ments. But if creativity in policy is to be achieved, a strong techni- cal capabilit3^ is needed on a continuing basis, closel}^ integrated with the political and economic expertise for negotiation, assessment, and trade analysis. Forecasts of technological change, for example, are likety lo be more reliable in the short run (2 to 5 years) than economic forecasts, simply because the conversion of a new industrial technology into practice takes time and thus gives advance signals. (For a concrete illustration, the 1975 application of British and French airlines for approval of Concorde landings at J. F. Kennedy and Dulles airports could have been forecast in 1968.) »** The text of this section in the Foreign Affairs Manual reads as follows (FAM 310) : Formulates and implements policy regarding foreign economic matters and trade promotion and business services of an interregional nature and, in this connection, negotiates agreements; serves as Deputy Administrator for the Mutual Defense Assistance Control Act (Battle Act); participates in the selection of officers to senior economic and commercial positions abroad; is responsible for Departmental guidance and representation with respect to U.S. and other public international lending institutions; is responsible for all Departmental activities necessary to advise and assist the Office of the Special Representative for Trade Negotiations in carrying out the trade agreements program under the Trade Expansion Act of 1962; and insures, in coordination with the assistant secretaries of the regional bureaus, the provision of an adequate, regular flow of information concern- ing the U.S. Government's multilateral economic and commercial policies, policy deliberations, legislative developments, and diplomatic exchanges, especially on matters that may result in negotiations and representations abroad. (Sept. 4, 1974.) 1432 IMPORTANCE OP THE RELATIONSHIP OF TECHNOLOGY WITH ECONOMICS Considerations germane to the Bureau of Economic and Business Affairs (EB) would seem to include such matters as the multinational corporation and technolog}^ transfer, materials shortages and negotia- tions to ease them, cooperation in international fuel and energy pro- grams, the use of the technological base to characterize national economies, and economic-technological initiatives on a multilateral The importance of science and technology in the economic affairs of State was highhghted in 1973 by William J. Casey, Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs.'^, While granting the importance of productivity, quality, price, exchange rates, and trade barriers, he said, "today we consider none of these more important than sup- porting science to nourish technology and enlisting our technology to pay our way in the world and to meet the world's development and environmental needs." As examples, he cited a $2.8 billion net surplus in royalty and fee earnings from foreign subsidiaries and licensees. The United States, he said, has an "enormous economic stake in science and technology." As we look ahead we can see that the outflow of dollars necessary to bring in from abroad the fuel and the raw materials needed to keep our plants and house- holds going and to maintain our living standards will grow sharply. Under Secretarj^ Casey foresaw "forces and programs which will put still heavier responsibilities on our high technology industries and our engineering and managerial skills." He went on — We find our chief competitors, Japan and the European Community, with more or less conscious plans to shift labor intensive, energy intensive and fuel intensive industries beyond their boundaries — to Taiwan, Korea, Southeast Asia, Latin America and Africa. At the same time, we see them developing policies to sub- sidize and otherwise promote the development of high technology industries at home — aircraft, computers, jiuclear power, communications equipment and so on. Many of our own corporations find it necessary to shift labor intensive industries to Latin America and Asia in order to meet world competition. At the same time, the Soviet Union and the oil rich Persian Gulf States are seeking to attract industries which find a significant economic advantage in cheap hydro-electric power and proximity to raw materials which they have to import in order to manufacture in the United States. These are fundamental economic forces which are loose in the world. We will have to adjust to them, and we will have to look to science and technology to fill the gap in our employment and national earning power which seems likely to arise from these forces. As this implies, our position in the world economy hinges on: — the export of products incorporating advanced technology; — the international diffusion of advanced technology; and — the introduction within the U.S. of technological advances whose effects will reach beyond the domestic economy. However, the main thrust of Mr. Casey's address concerned the transfer of U.S. technology to foreign countries or foreign industry. A case in point was the increased activity in the U.S.S.R. to encourage the importation of U.S. technology. His Department's concern was that this transfer be in "conformance with U.S. national interests." He did not elaborate very far on what these interests were, and explained that: One of the difficulties we face in the broad area of attitudes and policies re- garding the international transfer of technology is specifying the national interests iMWilliam J. Casey, Under Secretary of State for Economin Affairs, "Science, Technology and World Economics Affairs," an address before the Induitrial Research Institute, Cliic^o, October 17, 1973. 1433 involved — which nrc frequently conflicting — and establishing their appropriate priorities. We must, of course, protect our national security. Where our proper course lies as regards our industrial competitiveness in the world market has been widely debated. We do not believe in prc)tectionism as the basis for continued U.S. leadership in advanced technology. You know, better than most, that con- tinued technological leadership in a dynamic economy rests on our own innovative capabilitie , and not on attempts to weaken or limit the technological enterprise of other nations. When the benefits of our own enterprise are made available to others, we do ask that the quid pro quo include an ai>propriate financial recompense for the R&D investments, public and private, which we have made. This is essential to our continued innovative efforts."* Historically, the Department of State has not been e.specially alert to the opportunities for technological diplomacy. As Dean Acheson pointed out, one of the most coherent programs of postwar diplomac}' since 1950 was initiated outside of the Department and accepted only reluctantly within it. Wrote Acheson: The State Department was slow in realizing the importance of Point Four and in getting a program in motion. Technological help for developing countries had for some time been a feature of the good-neighbor policy in the western hemi- sphere. The idea of expounding it on a worldwide l^asis originated with ClarTc Clifford, then Counsel to the President, who included it in a draft of the inaugural address sent to Acting Secretary [of State] Robert Lovett and Paul Nitze of the Policy Planning Stafl'. They were neither enthusiastic nor impressed with its utility. Nevertheless, it went into the inaugural address and became much talked about. [And, he remarked later] Although the program continued to do a creditable job, it remained the Cinderella of the foreign aid family.'" In their joint examination of "Science Advice in the Wliite House," Eugene B. Skolnikoff and Harvey Brooks called attention to the need for a stronger scientific unit in the Department of State and a stronger scientific advisory mechanism in the White House, to construct n forward-looking international policy for science and technology. When one looks at the entire federal R&D budget [they wrote], a curious fact emerges. A substantial portion of that budget, well more than half, is committed to missions which have strong foreign policy motivations and rei)ercu.ssions: primarily the Department uf Defense, some of the APX\ and some of NASA. A good portion of the rest goes for work in subjects that will aflFect foreign jjolicy quite directly: agriculture, energy, oceanography, foreign trade, and population to mentif)n just a few. However, given this strong foreign policy motivation for federal R&D, the Department of State, the one department of government most concerned with foreign policy below the President, has essentially no voice in the allocation of thf>se R&D resources. Instead, other departments and agencies rely on their own interpretation of what serves foreign policy goals in setting their R&D objectives. The President and Executive Office agencies (NSC and 0MB) oversee the process, but only in the most general terms. The Department of State merely has to cope with the consequences. '^^ i« This issup of U.S. national intniests in U.S.-U.S.S.R. trade was examined in some depth by Dr. John Uardt in a study for this series. See: U.S. Congress, Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S.-Soviet Commercial Relations: The Interplay ofEconoviics. Techvedogy Transfer, and Diplomacy, in the series, Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared for the Subcommittee on National Securityj'olicy and Scientific Developments, by John Pi Hardt and George D. Holliday, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 1973. See vol. I, pp. .52.5-606. I" Dean Acheson. Present at the Creation, Mu Years in the State Department (New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 1969), pp. 265-266. For an extended discussion of the Point IV Program see: U.S. Congress, C ommittee on Scit-nce and Astronautics, Technical Information for Congress, prepared bv tlie Science Policy Keseaich Division. Congressional Research Service. Library of Congress, April 1.5. 1971."Tommittee print.) t-ee especially p. 7.5: " To begin with the program was not recognized as involving scientific problems at all. .Much of the debberation centered on political, economic, and miUtarv considerations such as the need to contain comiTiumsm. the need to expand U.S. markets, and the development of secure sources of .strategic materials. 'Capital for inve.<:tment rather than technology was the main item of export considered.) ^M tugene B. Skolnikoff and Harvey Brooks, "Science Advice in the White House.'— Continuation of » Debate, Science, January 10, 1975, p. 40. 1434 Writing in 1970, Robert Gilpin, professor of politics and interna- tional affairs at the Princeton University Center of International Studies, called attention to the "major transformation" that the world economy had undergone. Of primary importance were the "effects of tlie contemporary technological revolution upon economic and commercial activities. ..." Most noteworthy in their economic ef- fects were advances in air and sea transportation, electronic communi- cations, the emergence of a global market, and — "most significant of all, the unprecedented innovation of new products and cost-reducing industrial processes, which has profoundly altered the relationship between technology and economics." Three major interrelated economic consequences have flowed from these de- velopments. The first, ... is the increased interdependence among national economies and the consequent greater sensitivity of foreign trade to changes in economic conditions. The second is the enhanced role of technological innovation in economic growth and competition. The third is the rapid expansion abroad of the corporations, primarily American, that are best equipped to take advantage of the new conditions of the world economy. These developments have in turn produced in all major industrial nations a concern that they will be left behind and they must formulate appropriate strategies to adapt their economi&s to the im- peratives of economic growth and competition.'** The author went on to describe three national strategies of tech- nology for economic objectives, and then concluded: "... To a degree perhaps unparalleled in the past, economic and technological considerations will shape the ways in which political interests and con- flicts seek their expression and work themselves out." In a world where nuclear weaponry has inhibited the use of military power and where social and economic demands play an inordinate role in political life, the choice, success, or failure of a nation's technological strategy will influence in large measure its place in the international pecking order and its capacity to solve its domestic problems.'^" The necessity for combining expertise in technology analj^sis with skill in economic analysis appears to be especially strong in the field of foreign relations. An increasingly popular view is that the "technology tail is already wagging the polic}^ dog." More explicitly: In the coming decade the new technology and how it is used will affect the dis- tribution of power among nations. In developing his anal3'^sis from this theme, Victor Basiuk identified consequences of the foreseen "rapid, accelerating technological change" as being large benefits and political power to leading innovators among nations, and increased impacts and "social discontmuities." He called for "a timely appreciation of the emerging problems and a conscious effort to plan ahead and frame policies to deal with them." ^^^ An effort to approach quantitatively and explicitly the kind of forecasting effort urged by Basiuk was demonstrated by the National Science Board in its report for 1973. Among the economic-technological findings of that report, in a section on "indicator highlights" for the "international position of U.S. science and technology," the Board found that: The proportion of the gross national product (GNP) spent for research and development (R&D) between 1963-71 dechned in the United States, France, 1" Robert Gilpin, "Technological Strategies and National Purposes," Science, July 31, 1970, p. 441. i«o Ibid., p. 448. i»i Victor Basiuk, " Perils of the New Technology," Foreign Policy 2 (Spring 1971), pp. 51-53. 1435 and the United Kingdom but increased in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.), Japan, and West Germany. By 1971, U.S. expenditures for R&D were 2.6 percent of GNP, as compared with an estimated 3.0 percent for the U.S.S.R. approximately 2.0 percent for the United Kingdom and West Germany, and 1.8 percent for both Japan and France. The United States had a favorable but declining "patent balance" (patents of United States versus foreign origin awarded in each, country) between 1966 and 1970; the dechne was due to a reduced number of patents of U.S. origin in France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom, combined with increased U.S. patents of Japanese origin. Starting from a higher base, increases in labor productivity in U.S. manufac- turing industries between 1960-71 were the lowest of all countries — 39 percent — compared with 210 percent for Japan, 86 percent for West Germany, 81 percent for France, and 50 percent for the United Kingdom. Productivity gains in the United States offset increased labor costs until the mid-196Cs but rose less rapidly, than such costs during the 1966-71 period. The United States had an increasingly favorable position in the sale of "tech- nical know-how" — patents, techniques, "formulas, franchises, and manufacturing rights — during 1960-71; Japan was the major purchaser of U.S. "know-how," surpassing all of Western Europe after 1967. The favorable U.S. balance of trade in technology-intensive products grew throughout 1960-71, but was increasingly negative in nontechnologj^-intensive areas. Within the technology-intensive areas, products v/ith the fastest rising trade surplus are aircraft, computers, and plastics. Product areas in which the growth of imports exceeds exports include office machinery, chemical elements and compounds, medicinal products, and telecomm.unication apparatus. The favorable trade balance of the United States in high technology' products rested primarily on purchases bj' developing nations (55 percent in 1971) and countries of Western Europe. A deficit balance with Japan, developed in the mid-i960s and continuing to grow through 1971, exists in electrical machinery, scientific and professional instruments, and nonelectrical machinerj'.'"^ One broad technological trend adversely affecting the U.S. position in international trade was identified in 1971 by Peter G. Peterson, while Assistant to the President for International Economic Affairs. He pointed out that the United States is "tending to become an increasingly service-oriented economy." While fears of a decline in U.S. manufacturing were "highl}'^ exaggerated," nevertheless, "the kinds of services which make up the bulk of the service sector are certainly less 'tradeable' than new manufactured goods and raw materials . . . ." And between 1950 and 1971 the national output in services had risen from 30 to 42 percent. Meanwhile "our exports have become inadequate to pay for our imports." It should be noted that this observation was made before the oil embargo of 1974 and the subsequent sharp increase in the price of imported petroleum. Even then, Our imports have been rising not only in response to our consumer appetites, but because our industry buys an increasing share of its raw materials abroad. Our imports of crude oil, iron ore and copper are growing and we import most or all of our natural rubber, tin, nickel and chrome. Long-range projections indicate that bj^ the year 2000 we will import 30% to 509c of our mineral requirements, including oil. In doing so, we will be competing in world markets with other industralized nations, such as Japan, which are even more dependent on imported raw materials than we are.''^ The scope of the technology-economics interface has been suggested by Dr. Leo S. Packer, director of the office of technology policy and '«- National Science Foundation, National Science Board, Science Indicators 1972 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), pp. 2-3. '« Peter G. Peterson, A Foreign Economic Perspective, vol. 1 of The United Slates in the Changing World Economy (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 11. 1436 space affairs in OES. In many important areas, he said, such as "space, defense, energy, environment, health, industrial development, trade, food, and so on," most of the action related to technology. "That is where the stick}' pioblems are." The United States was still the most affluent country in the world, with the "largest reservoir of technology" but this- position was eroding, and the trend called for "a more realistic understanding of our national interest." And then he asked: "Who defines our national interest, how is it defined, and in what time scale are we operating?" Among the questions that fol- lowed from this basic inquiry were, accordmg to Packer : For example, how do you balance short-term economic gains against long-term competitive risks? How do j'ou weigh the anger and possible retaliation of a foreign countrj^? How do you account for intense competition for the business by foreign industries? How do you consider the capacity of the overseas customer to assimilate the technology transfer to our later disadvantage? How do you deal with foreign customers who want an independent R&D capability rather than products? How should go\'ernment provide useful guidance and help to U.S. industry? How do you measure the existing technology gap in a specific technology area? What are the probable rates of progress in the U.S. and overseas and what will the future trend be in the technology gap? What should our attitude be toward exporting management and systems integration skills? How can we encourage the import of certain commerciallj^ valuable technologies developed in Japan, USSR, Europe and elsewhere? What are the risks of technology diversion t« undesired militar}' use or to third parties? What are the comparative risks of transferring various embodiments of technology by different modes of transfer? To what extent does U.S. government action actually control the diffusion of technology and what is the likely impact of possible actions? i^* These were only a few of the important questions (clearly both economic and technological) that needed to be asked and answered. But, he added: "I cannot, unfortunately, assure j^ou that these and other questions are now being asked and answered in a comprehensive, s^^stematic, and objective manner." While the predictive power of technology analysis warrants attention in the area of international economics, the utility of such analysis should not be regarded as solely for long-range forecasting of future developments. Indeed, it is possible that technological events are moving so rapidly that only short-range forecasting is practicable on this basis. Fifteen years ago, George Kistiakowsky warned that "What is new today is the rapidity with which the developments of science are altering the human condition, the rapidity with which policy, particularly foreign policy, must adjust to the changes being wrought by the pace of scientific advance." ^^^ Similar observations have been repeatedly offered in more recent years by Secretaries of State, the Director of SCI, and others. The thrust of this point is that a close interaction would be appropriate in the Department of State between officials engaged in economic analysis, those concerned with techno- logical trends, and those conducting policy anal3'sis and planning. The Foreign Information Function and Technological Change In the Department of State a counterpart to the military function of general staff intelligence ("G-2") was established b}^ General Marshall "< Leo S. Packer, "Technology Export and Foreign Affairs." a talk delivered at the banquet of the 1974 Tactical Missiles Conference, sponsored jointly by the American Institute of Astronautics and Aeronautics and The American Defense Preparedness Association, May 1, 1974, pp. 5-6. (Furnished by the Office of Technology Policy and Space Affairs, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs, U.S. Department of State.) '«5 G. B. Kistiakowsky, "Science and Foreign Affairs," Science, April 8, 1960, p. 1020. 1437 during his term as Secretary. This was the Bureau of IntelUgence and Research (INR). In the U.S. Government Manual, the function of this unit is described as follows: The Bureau of Intelligence and Research coordinates programs of intelligence, research, and analysis for the Department and for other Federal agencies, and produces intelligence studies and current intelligence analyses essential to foreign policy determination and execution. In addition, the Bureau, through its Office of External Research, maintains liaison with cultural and educational institutions and with other Federal agencies on a wide range of matters relating to government contractual and private foreign affairs research. '^* The history of INR appears to have followed a somewhat similar course to that of SCI: initial growth, sharp cutback at the end of the 1950s, then growth again. However, during the past decade (1965-75) the office has declined slightly in numbers from 370 to about 330. An account of INRs functions and products, in 1965, distinguished between its management of information and that of the "policy" bureaus of the Department. Said the article: . . . The authorities have ever since World War II felt the need for a specialized center which should devote itself exclusively to the internal and external implica- tions of the Department's enormous appetite for sound, pertinent, and absorbable information. This center is the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR).*" It has essentially three functions: (1) to handle the "whole mass of incoming information from all parts of the world, . . . S3'stematically in selecting and analyzing the material which can be of use"; (2) to provide a parallel source of information "conditioned by the particular qualities of research work" as distinguished from information supplied by bureaus "whose central focus is formulation of polic}'"; and (3) to concentrate "in a coherent group of experts' hands the staff work necessary to assist the Secretary of State in his relations with the Government's intelligence network and ail its complex technological and operational processes." In sum: Thus INR is the organization specially assigned within the Department to supply information of particular kinds tailored for specific needs, to provide a professional researcher's view of events abroad, and to insure that the Department both benefits fully by and does its duty toward the intelligence community. The outer limits of the Bureau's activity- are marked in one direction by the tradition that it does not itself form foreign policy in the way that policy bureaus invent and plan courses of action for the United States. On the other hand, it differs from other components of the intelligence community in having no field force, in relying for collection on Foreign Service reporting and on the work of its fellow intelligence agencies. ^^* The staff of INR is about evenly divided between FSO's and Civil Service personnel. From time to time, persons are taken onto the staff with physical science, engineering, and other technical back- grounds, but no systematic effort has been made to accumulate or concentrate a "science and technology" capability as such. Around 1970, apparently, some consideration was given to the creation of a science and technology office in INR, and the idea got "» Office of the Federal Register, National Archives and Records Service, General Services Administra- tion. United States Government Manual (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing OflBce, July 1974), p. 351. '" Allan Evans, " Research in Action: The Department of State's Bureau of Intelligence and Research," Department of State Bulletin, August 30, 196-3, p. 359. "s Ibid., pp. 360-361. 1438 as far as to be incorporated in the Foreign Affairs Manual of the Department, Avith the following "job descriptions": DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR FUNCTIONAL RESEARCH (INR/dFR) a. Directs a program for the production of intelligence and research reports and estimates on functional subjects pertinent to the formulation and execution of foreign policy. b. Supervises the work of the offices within the Bureau dealing with strategic, political-military, and specialized interregional political affairs; economic affairs; science affairs; and geographic affairs. ASSISTANT DEPUTY DIRECTOR FOR SCIENCE AFFAIRS (INR/DFR/SA) a. Maintains liaison with other agencies on research dealing with the impact on foreign policy of both substantive and institutional developments in non- military science and technology, including environmental affairs; and prepares studies and reports on these subjects. b. Advises the Director and other senior officials on new analytical methods, particularly quantitative techniques, applicable to research in international relations. c. Participates in the preparation of reports and estimates on special topics concerned with foreign affairs. '^^ However, the science element was never staffed and the parent office was abolished in 1974 as a part of a reorganization of INR that was still in progress in earl}'^ 1975. INR ORGANIZATIONAL UNCERTAINTIES Several uncertainties persist in this question of the role of INR in science, technology, and intelligence generally. As the State Depart- ment element of the intelligence community, INR would seem to be confronted by the complications of the dual role of Mr. Kissinger as both Secretary of State and Director of the NSC staff — in this latter capacity the official to which the Central Intelligence Agency reports. However, INR could still serve usefully as the bridge between CIA and policy'' elements of State. Another question is whether INR ought to involve itself more extensively in substantive matters of science and technology, perhaps including augmentation of staff and establishment of a technological data base, analytical capability, and organizational point of contact.''*^ Can information about science and technology be compartmented within the alread}'^ existing OES, or is it so pervasivelj'^ and intimately a part of the Department's business— and so significant an influence upon the diplomatic environment — that it needs attention in both areas? During the past 15 years the State Department's science office was competing for resources with the well-established regional and functional bureaus. It alwaA^s needed more "job slots" tlian the Department was prepared to allocate to it. However, the elevation by Congress of the office to full bureau status under a statutory Assistant Secretary provides an occasion for a reassessment of the "9 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Affairs Man.ual, October 5, 1972, FAM 333 and 333.1. 1'" However, on this point Professor Rusk writes: I do not believe that INR should try to staff itself for a comprehensive eflort in the fields of science and technology. I have long felt that the U.S. Government as a whole should be better organized to collect and evaluate information in these fields. The sheer scale of the effort required calls for a gov- ernment-wide plan. INR should be a part, but only a part, of that total effort. (Rusk to Huddle, March 18, 1975.) 1439 relationship between OES, as the departmental center for science and technolog3% and the regional and functional bureaus. The question is whether there are functions of these latter bureaus that warrant in- bureau staffing to give express attention to the scientific and tech- nological content of developments abroad. In the particular case of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) a useful purpose might be served by reconsidering a decision made over the past several years to minimize the organizational emphasis on functional elements and to concentrate more emphasis on regional or geographic elements. The role of OES is centered on policy formulation; that of INR could be on data review and analysis; that of 10 and CU could address multilateral coordination with the sup- port of other mission agencies; and that of the regional bureaus could include coordination of bilateral and other regional science and tech- nology ai-rangements — supported by OES and appropriate mission agencies. Science and technolog}' have so profound an impact on present diplomacy, and prospectively on future diplomatic problems and opportunities, that what is needed is not only a central point for science and technology in the Department of State but also a general and widespread competence to deal with scientific and technological issues and impacts. The diplomat, as several Secretaries of State have pointed out, must today be technically ''literate." The technically- oriented people in OES need to be in close contact with technically- oriented people in the other functional and policymaking elements of the Department. Herman Pollack has given considerable thought to this issue and offers the following commentary : I believe that any officer dealing with foreign policy — or for that matter with any significant aspect of public policy generally — should be "technically literate". At the very minimum, he must have enough grasp of the technical implications of a subject to be aware of when he needs professional technical support. Prefer- ably, he should have sufficienth'- strong technical comprehension to be able to follow and understand a professional discussion of the technical aspects of a problem. Just as a Secretary of State cannot perform eflfectively without under- standing international economics, so today he cannot be fuUj'^ effective if he is tech- nically innocent. This is perhaps most obvious in nuclear and space matters because of their security significance, but it is just as pertinent in energy, food, industrial policy and other areas. A concentration of expertise in a functional office is not alone a sufficient answer. That must be blended, with widespread sophistication in science and technology among the policy officers of the Department of State. That sophistication does not exist today. I hold the institutions of higher learning principally responsible. Their programs of instruction do not reflect the scientific revolution that we all assert is taking place in our presence. The computer, electronic, nuclear and space ages, to mention a few of the key ones, do not yet show up in the typical liberal arts program. Therefore the new classes of Foreign Service officers arrive tech- nically unsophisticated and the burden of training is transferred to the State Department. The Department's response cannot by any standards be considered successful. Foreign Service Institute courses, college assignments, exchange programs with technical agencies. Secretary's Science Luncheons, Secretary's Science Lectures, Foreign Service recruiting in technical faculties have all been tried, but never on a scale or with the priority necessary to produce a marked impact. It may take another Sputnik to shock the JJ.S. into effective action. There has to be developed, it seems to me, a national will to move forward to the scientific and technological realities of the 1970s. This would lead to a fundamental change in the educational curriculum and to high priorities within the State Department to programs designed to equip its officers to deal with those realities. "^ "1 PoUack to Huddle, March 25, 1975. 1440 Technical Literacy in the Foreign Service; the Institute At least two different levels of technical knowledge have been pro- posed for incorporation in the Foreign Service. One level, of which much was made in the Berkner Report, and strongly endorsed a decade later by Dr. Rollefson as director of the science office of the State Department,^^^ is that of an outstanding, or at least highly qualified, scientist. The other level is that described by Secretary Rusk: . . . The Foreign Service officer should be familiar with the ways, the concepts, and the purposes of science. He should understand the sources of our technological civilization. He should be able to grasp the social and economic implications of current scientific discoveries and engineering accomplishments.''^ Specifications for the two degrees of technical literacy that ought to be found in the Foreign Service were suggested in 1960 by Dr. George B. Kistiakowsky, Special Assistant to President Eisenhower for Science and Technology, He urged the recruitment, first, of scientists "continually aware that the scientific community must accept its appropriate share of the responsibility for the intelligent and successful resolution of the challenges facing the world." However — Another kind of individual must be recruited, too — an individual with training in science in addition to the usual disciplines of the foreign service. [Merely to obtain technical advice for policymaking] does not fill today's requirements for a continuing and intimate involvement in the policymaking process of competent people who understand science and its significance to policy, and who could there- fore work effectively with the practicing scientists supplying the specialized ad hoc studies. The purpose in combining these two kinds of scientific sophistication, he explained, was that "to integrate the scientific with the political, economic, military, and other factors that make up foreign policy operations requires, above all, competent people who understand the relationship of science to these other factors." Dr. Kistiakowsky had two solutions to this problem. First, more science and engineering graduates might be attracted "for regular careers in the Foreign Service and in our other overseas programs." But, in addition: I believe we must also provide a better scientific background for nonscientists in the international affairs field, and that this, perhaps, is the most important measure of all. Essential to these efforts is the development of an academic field of teaching and research in the interrelationship of science and foreign affairs, in order to provide education in and better understanding of the underlying significance and opportunities of this relationship."* Five years after Dr. Kistiakowsky 's article appeared, a survey by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace showed that the number of FSOs with advanced training in the physical, biological, and other sciences was still minuscule. Those with training in history (705), political science (571), international relations (543), and eco- nomics (383) constituted 60 percent (2,202 of 3,670) of the Foreign Service officer persomiel. Physical scientists numbered 52 or 1.4 per- cent. Those with training in biological sciences, mathematics, and medicine were grouped in a category of "miscellaneous." (See Table 8.) 1" Daniel S. Greenberg, "Science and Foreign Afiairs: New Effort Under Way to Enlarge Role of Scien- tists in Policy Planning," Science, October 12, 1962, p. 124. 1^3 Dean Rusk, Keynote Address, 8th Annual Meeting of the Panel on Science and Technology, of the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, January 24, 1967. 1'* George B. Kistiakowsky, "Science and Foreign Afiairs," Science, April 8, 1960, p. 1023. 1441 At the level of the masters degree the percentage in the four main categories of training rose to 75 percent. And of the 193 FSOs Avith the doctorate, 147 (76.2 percent) were in the four main categories, with onJj' one FSO holding the doctorate in each of the fields of agriculture and biological sciences, and two in the ph} sicai sciences."^ TABLE 8.— FSOs BY EDUCATIONAL MAJOR ' Educational major Number Percent Accounting _ Business administration... Economics Education ^ Engineering English History... Humanities International relations... Language _ Law.. Physical sciences Political science Public administration Social sciences Miscellaneous 2 Not designated Total 3,670 100.0 1 Source: John E. Harr, "The Anatomy of the Foreign Service: A Statistical Profile," Foreign Affairs Personnel Study No. 4 (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965), p. 14. 2 Includes advertising, agriculture, biological sciences, geography, home economics, industrial relations/labor, interna- tional trade, mathematics, medicine, liberal arts. THE SPECIALIST-GENERALIST ISSUE Related to this subject is an issue that has perenniallj^ troubled the Foreign Service. It is the question of specialist versus generalist. The traditional attitude of the Foreign Service toward the specialist is illustrated by the testimony of George F. Kennan, former Director of the Policy Planning Staff and U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R., in 1964. He said: "I think the Service should not include people who, while they may be technical experts in some specific field, lack the broader background of education and character necessary for foreign service work generall3\" ^'^ Mr. Kennan's view appears to be reflected in the career histories of FSOs generally. A 1965 study of this subject found that specialists in the Service rose in rank more slowl^^ than did generalists; according to this stud}^: TABLE 9.— AVERAGE AGE BY GRADE OF SPECIALISTS AND GENERALISTS, JUNE 30, 1962 128 3.5 148 4.0 383 10.4 48 1.3 65 1.8 155 4.3 705 19.2 174 4.7 543 14.8 149 4.1 124 3.4 52 1.4 571 15.6 38 1.0 83 2.3 266 7.2 38 1.0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Total Generalists 50.4 51.0 47.5 49.4 44.4 47.0 41.3 45.1 41.9 45.8 38.5 .... 44.2 Specialists 46.3 .... 46.6 "Those who enter [the Foreign Service] by the examination route, become generalists, and ultimately link political w^ork with an area "5 John E. Harr, The Anatomy of the Foreign Service— A Statistical Profile, Foreign Affairs Personnel Study No. 4 (New York: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1965), pp. 14-16. '"' U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Government Operations, National Policy Machinery Sub- committee, Organizing for National Security, vol. 1, Heanngs, 87th Cong., 1st sess., 1961, p. 805. 1442 specialty have the greatest possibilitj' of achievmg high rank at a relatively young age." Functional specialists may be promoted but "they must wait longer." ^" One solution to the specialist-generalist issue in the Foreign Service was offered in a 1960 study by the Brookings Institution."^ It proposed a more flexible, mixed strategy in recognition that the generalist was the "backbone" of the Service while specialists were needed in var3dng numbers for different fields of concentration. The plan had six elements : (1) There should be continuing review of present and future requirements, and of methods to meet those needs. (2) Foreign Service examinations should be designed so that potential gener- alists will not be penalized, but with an opportunity for a limited number of specialists to be selected each year through similar but somewhat differently organized examinations. If the Foreign Service is to staff a wide range of opera- tional and specialized program posts in the future, it cannot hope to select talented young blood to fill these positions by a single examination. (3) Specialists should be developed within the Foreign Service wherever possible, and inservice training should be provided to retool and maintain ex- pertise during a specialist's career. (4) Personnel assigned to specialist positions should be given longer tours of dutv where this seems necessary and feasible. (5) Opportunities for service at the rank of Career Minister should be available in many special fields with no prejudice against promotion of specialists to this rank. (6) Lateral entry into the Foreign Service or appointments in the Foreign Service Reserve should be made as necessary, but should not be regarded as the major means of acquiring specialists. Requirements for such lateral entry should be "flexible and realistic, free of unnecessary limitations. The point of the foregoing is that entrants to the Foreign Service tend to be selected for nontechnical qualifications, and rewarded for avoiding specialization. Expertise in scientific and technological subjects does not appear to be perceived as beneficial, and these subjects do not appear to have attracted interest. One call for an increased injection of specialized expertise into the U.S. diplomatic apparatus has come from the Foreign Service com- munity itself. In ^n "Open Letter to the Director General of the Foreign Service," in 1969, Lannon Walker, chairman of the board of the American Foreign Service Association called attention to the increasing complexity of the diplomatic process resulting from tech- nology. He noted that the solution had been to summon experts and create new agencies, which had resulted in fragmentation of knowl- edge and responsibility. Said Walker: As the United States has moved from consultation on major problems of traditional diplomacy to a foreign policy which now includes internal financial policies, military technology, the ocean beds, and the movement of agricultural commodities through novel mechanism — and will soon include supersonic "booms," the multinational corporation, and growing uses of atomic energy — our response has been to call in the experts, and to create new agencies to meet new problems. The result has been a fragmentation of knowledge and responsibility which has clogged our own governmental processes and confused our friends abroad. His solution was to preserve within the Foreign Service a strong cadre of generalists. However, he said: "The association believes that I" John E. Harr, The Development of Careers in the Foreign Service, Foreign Affairs Personnel Study No. 3 (New York: Carn^ie Endowment for International Peace, 1965), pp. 71-73. '™ H. Field Haviland, Jr., The Formulation and Administration of United States Foreign Policy, a report on Foreign Relations of the United States Senate (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1960), p. 131. 1443 increasingly the successful generalists will be officers who have acquired wider scope after having mastered a specialty." ^''^ EFFORTS TO INCREASE TECHNICAL INTEREST IN STATE During the years 1965-1967 a variety of efforts were made to increase the level of attention to science and technology in the Foreign Service. The emphasis, of course, was on the importance of technological development for foreign policy. A series of courses in science and science policy were initiated by the Foreign Service Institute, with the assistance of SCI. A program to exchange State personnel for training purposes with personnel from the Department of Commerce, the Atomic Energy Commission, NSF, and NASA was initiated in 1966. A series of "Secretary's Science Luncheons" were held during these years, and in 1966 a series of four "Secretary's Science Briefings" were scheduled. '** This range of expedients had a variety of purposes. It was intended to increase the visibility and perceived importance of science and technology for the Foreign Service. There were educational benefits in that a few technologies with significant impacts on U.S. foreign relations were exposed to diplomatic scrutiny. Exchanges of personnel would improve State's relations with the technical agencies as well as improving State's understanding of the international problems of these agencies. It was also possible that an increased awareness of the scientific and technical content of modem diplomacy would percolate throughout the diplomatic corps. However, a more systematic edu- cational effort toward some of these purposes had a mixed success. This was the attempt to introduce a scientific and technological content into the curriculum of the Foreign Service Institute (FSl). ORIGINS AND PURPOSES OF THE FOREIGN SERVICE INSTITUTE Authorization for FSI was provided in the Foreign Service Act of 1946 to furnish "training and instruction to officers and employees of the Service and of the Department and to other officers and em- ployees of the Government for whom training and instruction in the field of foreign relations is necessary, and in order to promote and foster programs of study incidental to such training. . . . " isi The Foreign Service Institute is explicitly to provide inhouse training to State Department personnel to enable them to carry out their duties. Thus, training is provided in 46 languages, in orientation for new employees, consular training, upgrading courses for executive, administrative, and clerical personnel, and preparatory training for Foreign Service families going overseas. Attention is also given to communication skills. A senior seminar in foreign policy runs from 1" Lannon Walker, "Toward A Modern Personnel System," Foreign Service Journal 46 (August 1969), p. 48. «» Of the "science luncheons," Professor Dean Rusk of tha School of Law, University of Georgia, recalls: During my period as Secretary of State, I held a number of luncheons for 15 or so senior officers of the Department of State at which one or another top scientist would talk to us about the "cutting edges" of his own science, where he and his colleagues were going, and what problems we could expect in terms of our foreign relations. I found these meetings of very great interest. (Rusk to Huddle, March 18, 1975.) 181 United States Code, Title 22, sec. 1041 (Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1971), pre- pared by the Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives. 1444 September to June, and six foreign affairs executive seminars are held annually, running 6 weeks each. For purposes of the present study the interest is particularly in the courses of "economic and commercial training" and "political train- ing." Most of the scientific and technological education provided by FSI is under these two headings. For example, the subject of tech- nology transfer by multinational corporations might be taken up in a "workshop on international business/commercial activities." The relationship of technology to U.S. exports could be a subject of the senior trade expansion seminar. However, in general, the scientific content of economics courses is muted. In the category of political training are a number of other courses, all 1-week, with scientific content: Science, technology, and foreign affairs Psychological dimensions of diplomacy Computers and foreign affairs World resources Of these, the course most directly on the topic is Science, Tech- nology, and Foreign Affairs. This course has had an interesting history that may be instructive as to the problem of injecting scientific and technological content into the FSI curriculum. The course was first developed as a 4-week seminar, January 11 to February 5, in 1965. In transmitting a report on this seminar to the Secretary, June 1, 1965, George A. Morgan, director of FSI, described the "months of planning" for the seminar, the "gratifying" attendance, the "impres- sive array of speakers," the funding support by the Ford Foundation, and the leadership in assembling the program. ^^^ This, he said, was a "pioneering effort to explore how science and technology contribute to the development and execution of our foreign policy." Director Morgan expressed the hope that this effort — . . . will help to create within government, the scientific community, universities and industry an interest in considering more broadly and in greater depth the interactions between science and technology and foreign policy. In particular we hope that our experiment will prove useful to academic institutions in developing instruction and research in this uncharted interdisciplinary area linking the physi- cal and social sciences and foreign affairs. For this reason this report has been pre- pared for general distribution.'*^ The seminar itself was a substantial effort, attended by 22 partici- pants (including 13 from State and related agencies), with 37 prepared papers by such leading science statesmen as Dr. Killian, Dr. Hornig, Chairman George Miller of the House Science and Astronautics Committee, and President Seitz and Foreign Secretary Brown of the National Academy of Sciences. (See the accompanying course syllabus for an outline of the course.) A large bibliography was published for the seminar, and — according to the report — the "reference material and assigned readings were considered too extensive to study during the progress of the course." Clearly, there was much more material than could be crammed into a 4-week period. (See table 10.) The participants recognized the problem of a tradeoff between length of 182 Those thus cited were: Dr. E. M. J. Kretzman, formerly Acting Director of the Office of International Scientific Affairs of the Department of State, and his staff; Dr. Irwin Tobin of the Office of Science and Tech- nology; Professor Carroll Wilson and Mr. Eugene B. Skolnikofl of M.I.T.; and Mr. Christopher Wright, Executive Director of the Council for Atomic Age Studies at Columbia University. 183 U.S. Department of State, Foreign Service Institute, Science, Technology, and Foreign Affairs, report on seminar held from January 11 to February 5, 1965 at the Foreign Service Institute, prepared by L. F. Audrieth, and H. I. Chinn, letter of transmittal from George A. Morgan, Director FSI, to Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Jime 1, 1965. 1445 time tliat senior officers conld be spared from their regular duties to take the course and the time required to deliver to the participants a useful amount of information service. Table 10. — Foreigrn Service Institute Course Syllabus : Science, Technology and Foreign Affairs^ (Idealized Syllabus) A. INTRODUCTORY PRESENTATIONS 1. Seminar objectives. 2. Principles and concepts relating to the effect of science and technology upon national and foreign policy; background literature and reference sources. 3. Scientific discoveries and technological innovations and their effect upon the social, economic and political development of nations; historical approach. 4. Science and technology as factors in the development of national policies in the Western world, the Iron Curtain countries, and the emerging or developing areas of the world; science and technology as related to U.S. national and foreign policies. 5. Foreign policy issues classified on the basis of their scientific and technical inputs; policies for the advancement of science; science and technology as political parameters; the "case" approach. • B. THE SCIENTIST AND THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD: DEFINITIONS Attitudes and characteristics of scientists and the scientific community ; science and society; the scientist in politics; the scientist and national policy-making. C. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE UNITED STATES 1. Organization of U.S. science and technology; international operations and interests of various departments, agencies and organizations within the Govern- ment and outside of Government : a. Federal government — ^Presidential offices; congressional committees; departmental in-house and extramural activities; independent agencies. b. Quasi-governmental organizations. c. Industry. d. Miscellaneous — professional societies; foundations; academic institutions. 2. Science in the Department of State; activities and functions of SCI and other bureaus and offices with scientific and/or technological interests. D. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ON THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL OBJECTIVES, RESPONSIBILITIES AND PROBLEMS (WITH SPECIAL EMPHASIS ON U.S. INTERESTS) 1. Intergovernmental — international; regional. 2. Nongovernmental scientific organizations. E. INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC PROJECTS — U.S. PARTICIPATION 1. IGY, Antarctica, Space, Atomic Energy, etc. 2. Research areas and disciplines of worldwide interest and/or those neces- sitating international cooperation to assure scientific progress; for example, oceanography, hydrology, biology, meteorology, fall-out, air pollution, water pollution (detergents), saline water conversion, arid zone projects, food, health, medicine, pharmacology, etc. F. GROUP PROJECTS AND CASE STUDIES (Assigned to working groups of two to five seminar participants, constituting position papers for presentation and discussion during the closing days of the seminar) . 1. UN Conference. 2. US/USSR Space Cooperation. 3. Scientific Choice. 4. Exploitation of Mineral Resources Under the Seas. 5. Deterioration of Peanut Crops Resulting in Growth of Carcinogenic Fungi Dangerous to Man. 6. UN Environmental Pollution Control. 7. The Brain Drain. See footnote at end of table. 1446 Table 10.— -Sciewce, Technology and Foreign Affairs^ — Continued G. FIELD TRIPS AND VISITS 1. National -Institutes of Healths . . ,- - < - 2. E. I. DuPont de Nemours and Company, Wilmington, Delaware. 3. Agricultural Research Center, BeltsviUe, Maryland. 4. Goddard Space Flight Center; . * H. ADVANCES IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY 1. See Item G. 2. General lectures. I L. F. Audrieth and H. T. Chinn, Science, Technddgy and foreign Affairs, report on the seminar held at the Foreign Service Institute, January 11 to February 5, 1965, pp. 21-22. The following year, the course was substantially reduced in scope, duration, and attendance. It went from 4 to 2 weeks, and eventually became a 1-week course given once yearly. The course was scheduled to be given the first week in December 1974, but when only two applications were received from cahdidat/C students the course was cancelled. Apparently there was thereafter some question as to ■v^ether the course should be dropped for want of interest. rt::- ^ ...... OPTIONS FOR INCREASING THE TECHNICAL CONTENT OF THE FSI CtJRRlCULUM The purpose of the Institute is to enlarge the professional skills of diplomatic personnel. There appears to be a consensus that one of the requisite skills has to do with technical or scientific "literacy." Broadly defined, this skill implies a familiarity with science, its institutions and practitioners, and technological applications important for U.S. foreign relations. The evidence is that a major attempt was made in 1965 to present "a training program in FSI to meet this need, but that the level of effort declined, the response of candidate students diminished, and the substantive content of the training fell away. This decline in emphasis and effectiveness occurred at a time when the impact and pace of technological change were both accelerating and the need for scientific and technological literacy among the FSOs was increasing. There appear to be four problems that remain unsolved in this matter: (1) The defining of what precisely is needed by the FSO in the way of scientific and technological familiarity for diplomatic service; (2) the development of curricula, course work, and training materials to meet the FSOs need; (3) the convincing of the FSOs and their superiors of the need for them to spare adequate time and effort to acquire the needed training; and (4) the maintenance of an up-to-date program of high utility, attractiveness, and acceptability to sustain it over the future. Possible solutions to this set of problems, could include the following: — Development of a set of simulated but realistic, technical- diplomatic problems to be undertaken by a seminar study team; — Establishment of a relationship between the FSI and the Policy Planning Staff to enrich the curriculum; 1447 — Contracting Avdth a qualified research institution to define the FSO need for technical information and to design wa3's of meeting the need; — Stronger support by higher level officers of the Dei)artment; — Increased emphasis on general technical knowledge in initial qualifying examinations for admission to the Foreign Service ; — A series of assessments of the comparative predictive power of economic statistics and technological trend analysis, for use in regional studies; — Increased use of technological inputs b}' INR, and OES, to the work of the functional bureaus and the Polic\^ Planning Staff; and — Arrangements for the continuing education of students, after taking an FSI science policy course, through continued mailings of reports on science and technology trends of significance for diplomacy. Dean Harvey Brooks of the Department of Applied Physics, Har- vard Universit}^, would stress the problem-solving approach sug- gested in some of these options. He writes: Insofar as an attempt is made to impart technical literacy to FSOs, it should be i.ssue-oriented rather than discipline oriented. But I think that State needs both specialists and technically literate generalist FSOs who can coniuiunicate with the specialists and feel comfortable in making use of the technical expertise of others.'^* Similarl}", David Beckler, long associated mth the Office of Science and Technology (OST) and earlier with the Department of State, suggests that "science literacy" should be a logical outcome of practical issue-oriented study courses in FSI : In-house policy training at the Foreign Service Institute. — I am not an enthusiast for special lectures or courses aimed at developing scientific and technical "literacy" on the part of the Foreign Service officers. On the other hand, many, if not all, of the matters of direct concern to them at the Institute have a scientific or technological dimension. This dimension needs to be developed and elaborated in the context of the overall issues whether they be foreign trade, relationships between the U.S. and developing countries, environment, population, energy, etc. It is important to weave this perspective into the Foreign Service Institute program. Special study materials should be developed for this purpose. In this way, the Foreign Service officers can become interested in and familiar with the nature and implications of science and technology for their future work.' *^ There are, however, inherent limitations on what the FSI can do to inculcate scientific and technological expertise in the FS. In par- ticular, the individual officer must somehow be motivated to absorb what the FSI has to offer, to combine it with knowledge fiom other sources, and to appl}^ it within his terms of reference. A recent article by James N. Cortada, dean of the FSI School of Professional Studies and consultant A. Guy Hope of the Maxwell Graduate School, Syracuse Universit}'', describes this problem thus : It is the philosophy of the Institute that, regardless of how carefully developed training programs may be, they must complement, not substitute for, professional experience under competent and conscientious superiors. Only to the extent that i9< Brooks to Huddle, Februarj' 10, 1975. '85 Beckler to Huddle, .March 5, 1975. Mi-. Beckler is now serving as Assistant to the President, National Academy of Sciences, 1448 supervisors in the foreign Service, in the Department of State, and in related foreign affairs agencies are conscious of their responsibilities for personnel de- velopment can short- or long-term training succeed. Programs with a formal training content can only act as catalytic agents to assist officers who are moti- vated to improve their skills and understanding of the complex tasks of a modern foreign policy establishment. The developmental job is up to the people who are doing the work and to those who supervise their activities and careers. '^^ One thing seems evident. Unless Foreign Service officers clearly identify "technical expertise" as an essential item in the diplomatic tool kit, and a faculty associated with promotion to senior policy- making status, this quality is unlikely to be vigorously sought. Only when language facility became a defined requirement for advancement in the Foreign Service was it a major element of in-house training. One interesting suggestion was advanced by Under Secretary Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, in 1967. To meet the need for FSOs "not just versed in foreign affairs but versed as well in the intricacies of American government and political life," he proposed that FS per- sonnel be afforded an opportunity "to work in and with other govern- mental and private agencies concerned with the foreign and domestic problems of the United States." Examples were: a congressional com- mittee staff, another executive agency, in journalism, with a founda- tion, school, or private business, but returning thereafter to the Department of State. Such an arrangement, he said, would — . . . Provide a cross-fertilization of views and ideas. It would introduce into the Service a greater variety of specialized professional skills and talents. And it would increase the independence of Foreign Service oflBcers. With a widened professional experience, they would be able to move out of or stay in the service as they see fit."^ Another possibility is the use of postdoctoral interns from the university community to serve in OES, and in the functional and regional bureaus. Such interns could perhaps retain their academic affiliations during such service. In the Department they could provide a source of technical expertise, and upon their return to academic careers they could increase the awareness there of the diplomatic aspects of technical matters. Construction of "bridges" between the diplomatic and technical academic community is desirable, as well as the enhancement of technical expertise in the diplomatic community. Some Possible Purposes of Expanded Departmental Attention to Science and Technology The essence of the foregoing chapter of this study is not that the Department of State has failed to recognize its responsibilities for relating science and technology to diplomacy. The attempt was made, but circumstances and competing demands on departmental resources stood in the way. Some specific projects and programs did peter out, others never got off the ground. Thus the need for a scientific and technological competence, spread throughout the Department of State, is great and increasing; what appears to be required is not some vast shake-up but a carefully managed, gradual, but steady growth in technical sophistication, a heightened visibility of technological i8« James N. Cortada and A. Guy Hope, " The Foreign Service Institute: Patterns of Professional Develop- ment," Department of State Bulletin, February 6, 1967, p. 223. 19' Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, "Administration of Foreign Policy," Department of State News Letter, No. 79 (November 1%7), p. 5. 1449 content of diplomacy throughout. This appreciation should encompass both the positive and negative impacts of technology on diplomacy, and be perceived in both the regional and functional bureaus. There needs to be a deeper appreciation of the relationship between U.S. technological developments and the U.S. international posture, and of the potential contributions to U.S. diplomacy of foreseeable future technological developments. The heart of science and technology is invention and change. The problem is to relate this force for change to diplomacy. It implies for the diplomatic process the encouragement of creativeness and increased receptivity toward innovation. More particularly, the rate of technological change and its impacts on the diplomatic environment call for a strengthened ability of the functional bureaus to perceive and interpret these changes and impacts, around the world, and for an increased alertness to the predictive power of technology analysis and forecasting. IX. Congressional Concern With Science in the Department OF State One student has observed: "Significantly, it was Congress and not the State Department or the White House that first saw the broad impHcations of science's penetration into all segments of foreign policy.'^* This awareness took the form of a study planned by the staff of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in 1958 and com- missioned from Stanford Research Institute (SRI) January 24, 1959. It was scheduled for delivery in 6 months and called for ". . . an imaginative but scientificalh^ sound examination of possible scientific developments during the next decade, with an estimate of the impact of such developments on foreign relations." Congressional Contract To Study Science Impacts on Foreign Policy The contractor v/as asked to identify possible favorable and un- favorable impacts of scientific developments on U.S. foreign policy and to forecast future foreign policy problems resulting from such developments. Among the examples suggested were nuclear modifica- tion of geography, weather modification, increased pollution, popula- tion control, new food and energy sources, exploitation of seabed minerals, uses of outer space, and communication technologies. The SRI report ^^^ offered three main conclusions: 1. Scientific developments in the next decade will give rise to or intensify many problenis that must engage the attention of foreign policy planners. Scientific developments will also help solve foreign policy problems. But the outlook is that the progress of science and technology will do more to create or intensify than to ameliorate such problems, unless deliberate policy measures are taken. 2. The national interest requires a more conscious direction of scientific activitj'^ in waj's likely to assist in the achievement of America's international goals. The security and well-being of the United States call for a reappraisal of present allocations of scientific and technological effort with a view to directing more effort toward nonmilitary foreign policy challenges. 3. Foreign policy planning of the broadest kind, making use of the best scientific assistance, will be a critical requirement in the years ahead. This planning should include continual review of prospective scientific developments and their signifi- cance for international relations. Science, said the report, had produced a global environment of political and economic interdependence, shifts in national power- relationships and the relative importance of geographic areas (e.g. petroleum-bearing areas of the Middle East). "Scientific progress itself has become a matter of concern to foreign policymakers, be- cause of its important relation to military power, to economic relation- ships, and to a nation's prestige." And, finalh^ it had affected the instruments and methods of foreign policy through rapid travel and instant communications. "B}^ far the most important channel through 188 Donald W. Cox, America's New Policy Makers: The Scientists' Rise to Power (New York: Chilton Com- pany, Chilton Books, 1964), n. 8 i. '8' Stanford Research Institute, Possible NonmilitaTy Scientific Developments and Their Potential Impact, on Foreign Policy Problems of the Uiiitei Slates fJuly 1959), printed in: U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Foreign Policy: Compilation of Studies Nos. 1-8, Both Cong., 2nd sess., September 1960, pp. 99-198. (Committee print.) (1450) 1451 which science has influenced the problems of foreign poUcy is tech- nology." The report continued: Science was not to be confounded with technology; the time lags in converting scientific discoveries into widely applied technologies had been greatly reduced; accordingly, there was a need to reduce the time lag between the diplomatic impact of a new technology and the diplomatic response to that impact. Wliile the report dealt mainly with the diplomatic problems created b,y present and future science and technology, it also suggested the possibility that technical initiatives could advance U.S. diplomatic goals. Some efforts were assertedly already undervv^a}^ But on the whole [said the Report] the extent to which science is conscioiisly being called upon to improve the formulation or execution of our foreign policy is quite small compared with the conscious use of science in connection with military, industrial, agricultural, and medical problems, particularly small when one consid- ers the urgent need to find new approaches to foreign policy problems. '^^ The Report suggested that the committee review this situation. It also proposed three steps (paraphrase) : 1 . Identification of, and action on, foreign polic}^ problems that research and development initiatives could alleviate; 2. Stepped-up effort in basic research judged beneficial to U.S. foreign policy formulation and execution; and 3. New steps devised and taken to exploit the "bridge" effect of science, that links scientists across national boundaries. ^^' A number of examples were suggested in each of these areas, some of which have since been initiated (e.g.. World Weather Watch and International Biological Program). Others still invite attention (e.g., "an international translation and information retrieval center"). FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE HEARING ON SCIENTIFIC DIPLOMACY Following receipt of the SRI study on "Possible Nonmilitary Scientific Developments and Their Potential Impact on Foreign Policy Pioblems of the United States," the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations held open hearings on the report, January 28, 1960. Howevei, these hearings added little to the information before the committee. Speaking for the Institute, President E. Finley Carter urged more science initiatives for social purposes on a global basis, expanded research in polic}' sciences in the Department of State, more science in foreign assistance programs, and more support for U.S. participation in international meetings and conferences. There was, he said a role for the Congress here; ... If science is to contribute, there must be hard, realistic thinking, by both scientists and Government people, and there must be money and leadership av'ailable. As members of Government, concerned with the overall directions of the United States in foreign affairs, we look to you in the Congress, and to the executive branch, to provide the leadership and the support necessarj^ to en- courage more effective application of science to the problems of human welfare and human understanding. ^^^ Carter was followed as a witness by Dr. Wallace R. Brode, science adviser, Department of State, who agreed that "It is impossible to dissociate those developments in science and technology which affect 190 Stanford Research Institute, Possible Nonmilitary Scientific Developments, op. cit., p. 183. >»' Ibid., p. 1^4. 192 U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Foreign Policy, Hearings, Part I, 86th Cong., 2d sess., January 28, 19bO, pp. 2-7. 1452 our national policy from those which form our foreign policy." He quoted from an earlier address he had made as president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science: "A national science policy is needed for a wise and rational distribution of scientific activities, so that space, defense, education, atomic energy, oceanogra- phy, and medical research are not bidding against each other for limited available support." However, he took exception to Dr. Carter's expressed concern that the Department of State was not a "major recipient" of research funds, because in his view the Department was "not an operating agency in science, but rather a coordinating and assessing agency." He said: Our modest program in science coverage in the Department of State is directed primarily toward the policy influence of scientific developments. We expect the major needs of American industry and applied governmental agencies to be met by specialists from these areas, or supported by these areas and coordinated through the science attach^ of the Embassy in accordance with the coordinating function which the President has directed to be exercised by our Ambassadors. The coordination authority which the Department has in respect to foreign science programs of U.S. agencies abroad can provide a useful means of directing such activities in the support of our foreign policy and the flow of scientific information. Dr. Erode asserted that "It must be obvious that there is an im- portant place for science in our foreign policy planning." Nevertheless his view of the requirements of the Department to provide this function was not expansive: "Relatively speaking, our needs are modest and our entire program for a number of years to come would not envisage, with our present responsibilities, more than 25 scien- tists. As science grows in importance it may well follow that our science program in the Department may expand in area and subjectwise." ^^^ Although the importance for American diplomacy of science and technology was abundantly documented by the SRI study and confirmed by Dr. Brode's testimony, no congressional action was taken in view of the Department's apparent satisfaction with the status quo. EARLY CONGRESSIONAL LOOK AT ORGANIZATION FOR INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE POLICY COORDINATION An expression of interest came November 9, 1962, from the House Committee on Science and Astronautics (changed to Science and Technology, effective January 1975). The committee reviewed, in a very brief (6 page) staff study, the need for "coordination of foreign scientific policy," traced the evolution of the scientific attache pro- gram and SCI, and proposed that the committee "within the limits of its jurisdiction, periodically review the coordination of national scientific and technological policies and programs with respect not only to such matters as effectiveness, adequacy, and cost," but to such questions as the following: How can the United States best incorporate scientific and technological factors in making its national decisions, including foreign policy? Under what circumstances does international scientific and technological cooperation serve the national interest? >M Ibid., pp. 7-14. 1453 What factors favor international cooperation in science and technology? What factors hinder such cooperation? How can the United States best use its scientific and technological resources in support of its national decisions, including its foreign policy? ^^ The congressional interest in the broad subject of science and technology aspects of foreign policy thereafter appears to have fol- lowed, in apjDroximate order of emphasis, four sets of considerations, as follows: 1. The strengthening of the science office and other elements in the Department of State to deal with all these matters. 2. Broad reviews of global trends in social, economic, military, and technical development as background for more specific legislative initiatives; 3. National science and technology policy, with international aspects as an essential element; and 4. Specific international issues with substantial scientific or technological content. In the discussion that follows, these will be taken up in order, with the last of the four items considered in a later chapter. Congressional Actions To Strengthen Diplomatic Resources in Science The many reorganizations of the Department of State following World War II, and the many reports and studies of waj^s to improve the Department's organization have, of course, been subjected to congressional scrutiny in funding authorization and appropriations hearings. In general, however, the Congress has elected not to pre- scribe organizational forms or adjustments, but has relied on the Department to maintain the modernity of its structure. One notable exception to this principle was the action in 1973 (see page 45) to create a new Assistant Secretary of State and a new con- solidated Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs. This action apparently had the threefold purpose of (a) requiring intensified attention to the diplomatic importance of the oceans and the environment in a technological setting, (b) con- solidating in one organization a number of diplomatic functions with a substantial technical content, and (c) providing statutory emphasis to the State Department science office as a legitimate copartner with the ranking regional and functional Assistant Secretaries in the policy- making hierarchy of the Department. In its new form, OES today presents one organization that covers oceans, environment, non- military atomic energy, population matters, bilateral science agree- ments, technology, and basic science generally. Welding these ele- ments into a coherent pattern seems to present a formidable as well as important task. It is likely to be one that will take time and effort. In the meantime, the roles of other elements of the Department in science and technology may also warrant congressional consideration. Such considerations as the following might come under review: 1. Technical and policy aspects, as opposed to funding, of U.S. participation in international scientific and technological agency activities. (How might U.S. expertise be mobilized to enhance the total effectiveness of U.N. associated agencies concerned with "< U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Coordination of Foreign Scientific Policy, Staff study, 87th Cong., 2d sess., November 9, 1962, p. 6. (Committee print.) 1454 medicine and health, atomic energ}^, natural resources, the world environment, economic and industrial development, population problems, food and agriculture, communications, technology transfer, scientific information management, and other inter- national concerns? Here the coordinating responsibility is shared between OES and a small scientific unit in the Bureau of Inter- national Organizations Affairs.) 2. The close interactions between technology and economics, as these affect the foreign economic policy of the United States. (How can the predictive power of technology analj'sis be applied to the making of global economic forecasts? What beneficial effects on U.S. international trade does technology offer, and how can these be secured? What is the role of the multinational corporation in effecting international transfers of technology, and what policy controls and guidances should be involved to constrain or direct this growing presence? What are the economic consequences of mineral shortages and possible cartel actions; and what U.S. policies could be devised to cope with these?) 3. The pervasive importance of the information function in the design and execution of U.S. foreign policy. (How can the enor- mous number of bits of seemingly unrelated information about scientific discoveries, new applications of scientific principles, and the myriad of industrial and commercial ventures to ex- ploit technology in foreign countries be assembled and analyzed, and translated into comprehensive statements of national and global trends? Is there a role here for the Bureau of Intelligence and Research?) 4. The need for an enhanced awareness of Foreign Service personnel as to the growing importance of the scientific and technological element of the totality of factors which comprise diplomacy. (How is the Foreign Service motivated to acquire these skills? Where in the regional bureau structure would they be most useful? What kind of inhouse arrangement would best provide training in them? How can "science in diplomacj''" be exploited throughout U.S. foreign relations management, as contrasted with "diplomacy in science"? What role might the Foreign Service Institute play in this situation?) 5. The scientific and technological personnel in world deploy- ment as an element of the total foreign policy establishment. (In what countries should there be scientific and technological offices? How much emphasis should there be on science and how much on technology? What would be the ideal composition of the office of a foreign attache? Should these offices be replaced or supplemented by regional science offices? Is there a need for science officers of the Foreign Service in embassies without a full-time scientific attache?) Congressional Reviews of Trends in. International Science and Technology Two broad approaches appear to characterize congressional atten- tion to the interaction of science and technologj^ with American diplomacy. One of these has stressed the role of science and technology; the other, the diplomatic consequences. Thus, Congressman Emilio Q. Daddario, addressing a Panel on Science and Teclmolog}' convened i' " 1455 V ^ b}' tHe House Coiximittee on Science and Astronautics in 1967, spoke of a "new determination on the part of the, Congress of the United States to take part in, the international interchange of science and, technology, and to help shape its influence on world affairs." ^^^. At a hearing before a subcommittee! of the House Foreign Attairs Com- mittee in 1969, the subcommittee chairman, Clement J. Zablocki, stressed the other side of the relationship: "If the quality of our strategic thought and th€ efl'ectiyeness of our strategic poUcies are to remain high, their constant review is necessary in the hght of strides in science and techi;\ology.'* It was therefore necessary for Members of Congress to have "a deeper appreciation of the ways in which scien- tific progress may shape strategic thinking and foreign policy in the days to come." ^^® . . , ./ It is beyond the scope of this study to trace all the different staff studies and reports, hearings and i,ndiyidual commentaries on broad scientific and technological trends affecting the sweep of U.S. foreign policy. However, two examples are offered to approaches by congres- sional committees to assess (a) the present and future' diplomatic environment largely created by modern technology, or (b) the present and prospective trends in science and technology that produce pro- found unpacts on the diplomatic envii'onment. INVESTIGATION OF CHANGES IN THE DIPLOMATIC ENVIRONMENT In 1969 an investigation was begun by the Subcommittee on Na- tional Security Policy and Scientific Developments of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs into the relationships between national strategy and science, broadly defined. The emphasis of this first inves- tigation was heavily on the technology of weaponry and its diplomatic consequences. However, late in the hearing the concluding witness, the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, U. AJexis Johnson, broadened the scope of the discussion when he said : Another set of questions relevant to national security concerns the role tech- nological change plays in the relationship between ourselves and others. How do technological developments help to strengthen the ties with others in the free world? How do these developments divide? ^" A further set of hearings in 1972, carefully structured, addressed the broader scope of "National Security Policy and the Changing World Power Alignment." These hearings explored: — Strategic and General Considerations; — National Security Policy: the Exercise of Alilitary Power; — The Economics of National Security; — Tliird World Development: Tribulations, Challenges, and Prospects ; — Domestic Requirements of a Successful National Security Pohcy ; — The Tasks — and the Alternatives — in Preventing World War III; and — The View from the State Department. i»« U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Qovernznenl, Science, and Inter national Policy, proceedings ttefSre the' Committee of the Pafiel on Science and Technology, Eighth Meetitiji Jan- uary 24-26, 1%7, p. le. ..".;♦ i" U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, National Security Policy and* Scientific De- velopments Subcommittee, Strategy and Scienu: Toward a National Security Policy for the 1970s, Hearings 91st Cong., 1st sess., March 1969, p. 2. i" Ibid., p. 237. 1456 The theme of technological impacts was never far from center stage in these hearings, which ranged widely i ver the military, economic, foreign aid, and even sociological considerations. Among the ques- tions posed in the outline of the hearings '^^ were the following: [How can national strategy be designed so as to avoid] overwhelming tech- nological influences in an increasingly complex world? How to control and direct technology and who controls the controllers? Will [the United States] be able to continue to export technology . . . ? Issues raised by participants included the "growing worldwide concern with the allocation of the planet's resources" (p. 7), the rise of the multinational corporation (p. 18), the general movement toward a global economy of interdependence with respect to both resource depletion and environmental protection (pp. 31, 34), and the "single community" of Western science and technology (p. 45). In this hearing again, Secretary Johnson was the concluding witness. He spoke of the "economic side of diplomacy" as presenting "the most intractable problems for the future" : I expect [said the Secretary] that economic considerations may dominate foreign policy over the next two decades, as security concerns have dominated the last two. Technology is hurrying us into the future at a rate that neither our under- standing nor our institutions, including our diplomatic ones, seem able to compre- hend or cope with.'»» The impressive scope of this hearing was reflected in a subcommittee report containing an "agenda for congressional consideration and action" which appeared October 25, 1972. After reviewing the findings of the Hearing-SjTnposium, it proposed . . . that the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and other appropriate committees of the Congress should : (1) Hold annual hearings on the foreign poUcy reports to the Congress of the President and the Secretary of State as well as on the foreign policy implications of the economic report to the President and the President's message on the state of the world. (2) Establish machinery and procedures for systematically and periodically assessing the long-term foreign policy goals and programs of the United States; for example, by the creation of a high-level advisory panel composed of public officials and private persons, and/or by systematic and lieriodic review through congressional hearings. (3) Hold hearings and/or establish advisory panels which would: (a) develop criteria to determine more clearly what constitute the vital security interests of the United States; (b) establish guidelines to determine what commitments must be based on treaties and what role executive agreements can and should play; (c) set criteria to guide the conduct of foreign policy in such traditional fields as the protection of American citizens, property, and investment abroad; freedom of the seas, and access to markets and sources of raw materials ; (d) examine the decision-making process in foreign affairs, particularly the roles of the Secretary of State and the National Security Council as well as the potential roles of the Cabinet and other executive agencies con- cerned with domestic affairs; (e) examine the extent to which social science research can be more effec- tively utilized in guiding the formulation and execution of U.S. poUcy toward the other nations and cultures of the world; 'w U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, National Security Policy and Scientific Develop- ments Subcommittee, National Security Policy and the Changing World Power Alignment, Hearing-Sympos- ium, 92d Cong.. 2d sess., Mav 24, 1972, p. 1. «a /6W., August 8, 1972, p. 368. 1457 (f) conduct periodic reviews of the security, political, and economic implications of U.S. foreign bases, including the sharing of bases and costs with our allies. (4) Request the Office of Management and Budget to prepare foreign expendi- ture budgets in terms of balance of payment implications. (5) Enact legislation to require the Central Intelligence Agency and the intelli- gence staffs of other executive departments and agencies to report their relevant studies and intelligence assessments to appropriate congressional committees in executive session and to qualified staff members. (6) Hold hearings on the various efforts of all government agencies and depart- ments involved in the development of programs dealing with the protection of the international environment and natural resources. (7) Encourage by every means possible pubhc discussion of foreign policy questions.^"" As extensive as these recommendations were, an observation by one of the first witnesses ki the hearing, Professor Robert A. Scalapino of University of California at Berkeley, suggested the need for still further congressional inquiry and action. He said in his prepared statement: No current body, however, exists which by virtue of its structure and personnel can address itself systematically and regularly to the most fundamental issues concerning foreign policy objectives and strategy in such a fashion as to involve the Congress and the public as well as the national administration. In my opinion, it is time to give this matter the most serious consideration.^"! DIPLOMATIC USES AND EFFECTS OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY A 10-year sequence of studies of the components and consequences of science and technology policy culminated in 1975 in the offering of a legislative proposal for a national policy and implementing institutions in this area. Explicit attention was given to the diplomatic aspects of this policy. The investigation was conducted by the House Committee on Science and Astronautics, and began with two contract studies by the National Academy of Sciences into Basic Research and National Goals (contracted for in 1963 and reported in March 1965) and Applied Science and Technological Progress (reported in May 1967). The first of these studies led to the adoption of its theme for the seventh annual meeting of the committee's Advisory Panel on Science and Technology.^*'- The keynote address at this 3-day seminar, by Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey, strongly accented the inter- national aspects of science and technology, as did the prepared remarks of Lord Snow of the United Kingdom Ministry of Technology, Dr. Roger Revelle, director of the Harvard University Center of Popu- lation Studies, and others. The following year (January 24-26, 1967) the Panel took up the topic of "Government, Science, and International Policy." Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, in his keynote address described in detail the attention being given in his Department to science policy and declared: The political significance of strong national programs in science and technology expands steadily. PoUtical-scientific areas such as disarmament, nuclear safe- 200 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, National Security Policy and Scientific De- velopment Subcommittee, National Security Policy and the Changing World Power Alignment, Report, 92d Cong., 2d sess., October 25, 1972, p. 20. (Committee print.) 2<" Hearing-Symposium, House Foreign Aflalrs Committee, National Security Policy, May 24, 1972, p. 22. 202 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Government, Science, and Public Policy, proceedings before the Committee of the Panel on Science and Technology, Seventh Meeting, January 25-27, 1966, 198 p. 1458 guards, ocean exploitation, space technology and communications, and water management are areas in which the natural and social sciences meet, and they offer major opportunities for international programs. Wider use of forums, such as this today, to bring the international problems of science and technologj^ before learned men from both broad areas can assist in finding the solutions. As to our approach to this kind of international cooperation, my points were thi-ee. We can make better use of new techniques for technological forecasting as an input to foreign policy judgments. New understandings and mutual respect between the physical sciences and the social sciences are prerequisites if the gap between them is to be completely closed. We must have programs of international scientific and technical cooperation on two levels: with the advanced nations in understanding and controlling the total environment; and with those nations in assisting the material progress of the developing nations. Our future no longer stands in the wings. Alan's needs and his competence have both reached dimensions which can no longer be ignored. The scientific revolution has arrived — live, and in color. W'e cannot clearly foresee the advances, discoveries and innovations which lie ahead, but the uses .to which we put the new knowledge in our human relationships may well be critical.^^^ A feature of this conference was the presence of six foreign guest panehsts who described science organization and issues in theii' coun- tries (Brazil, Switzerland, Netherlands, Japan, Norway, and India), Again in 1968 the theme of the Panel was international — Applied Science and the World Economy — with four papers by foreign guest speakers;^"* the keynote address was delivered b}^ George D. Woods, president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop- ment, The thrust of this meeting was the strengthening of the world economy. As Barbara Ward summed up the problem : We shall not reverse this trend by inaction. On the contrarj^, drift is carrying us on towards the rapids. Our need is rather, as Mr. George Woods has proposed, to call on the best expert advice to advise our governments and help them work out the implications of the world's dilemmas, to assess the scale of necessary action, weed out the failures, underline the successes and devise a joint strategy for the future modernization and progress of our interdependent world. Only if we are ready for something like the sustained practice of welfare and justice we accept inside our domestic economy, are we likely to make much progress in the larger task of modernizing and domesticating the whole planet. Yet if we cannot do so, we must face the fact that the technology, which might have united and enriched our world, is much more likely to blow it up.^"^ The Committee's Subcommittee on Science, Research, and Develop- ment in 1970 ne.xt addressed the question of National Science Policy in an extensive set of hearings.^*"^ While the main attention of wit- nesses was addressed to the funding of U.S. science, the reduction in m.ilitary expenditures for basic research, and support for science education, a number of statements by ^\dtnesses called attention to the international aspects of U.S. science policy.^*^^ The strongest statem.ent on this subject was in a letter received by Chairman Daddario of the subcommittee from Charles A. Lindbergh, who wrote in part: ... I think that the survival or the breakdown of our western civilization is likely to depend on how intelligently we appl}' its science and technology to 2M Panel on Science and Technology, Eighth Meeting, Oovernment, Science, and International Policy, p. 7. 2"^ These were: Dr. Alexander King, Director for Scientiiic Affairs, Organization for Economic Coopera- tion and Development, France; Dr. Jorge A. Sabato, Technology Manager, National Commission for Atomic Energy, Argentina; Lady Jackson (Barbara Ward), Foreign Affairs Editor, "The Economist," England; Dr. O. M. Solandt, Chairman, Science Council of Canada. 2f5 U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Applied Science and H'orld Economy, a compilation of papers prepared for the Panel on Scienc3 and Technology, Ninth Meeting, February 1968, p. 19. (Committee print.) ^i* U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Science, Research, and Development Subcommittee, Naticnal Science Policy, Hearings, yist Cong., 2nd sess., July 7, 8, 21, 22, 23, 28, 29; August 4, 5, 11, 12, 13; September 15-17, 1970. 963 p. M' Among these were President Ruben F. Mettler of TRW, Inc., p. 539: Professor W. Albert Noyes of the University of Texas at Austin, p. 623; and Professor Eugene B. Skolnikofl of M.I.T., p. 683. 1459 our human environment within the next decade. If we can cope with the problems our unprecedented knowledge has created, we can do so onlj' by properly using the tools of that knowledge. No previous civilization has had either our knowlege or our tools. It seems to me that in this fact we have remaining some hope that we can avoid following the path of breakdown that history suggests is inevitable for every civilization. -"s The final panel meeting on the subject — International Science Policy— w&s held Janiiar}/ 26-28, 197 1.'"-' The ke^^note address was was delivered by William P. Rogers, Secretary of State who said : Our basic goal is to put science and technology at the service of human — and humane — ends. In our foreign policy we are taking three major steps to achieve this goal: 1. We are increasing our emphasis on science and technology in our aid to developing countries. 2. We are encouraging an international effort to preserve the quality of the world's environment, and 3. We are seeking greater international cooperation to enhance the benefits of technology and to curb its danger.^io At this conference Franklin A. Long, du-ector of the Cornell Uni- versity program on Science, Technology, and Societ}-, proposed the creation of a congressional joint committee which would be the counterpart of the National Securit}^ Council, with similar scope. *T would hope," said Long, "that the interpretation of national secu- rity by the new committee would be broad enough to include a study of nonmilitary alternatives as well as of military programs and to include a study of the impact of internal U.S. programs as well as of international needs and goals." ^^^ One of the participants in the conference was Emilio Q. Daddario, who had left the Congress and was senior vice president of Gulf and Western Precision Engineering Compan3^ He called attention to the coherence of the successive panels. I'he "central question" was "how science can best be employed for the benefit of all mankind." New approaches and mechanisms were needed for broader international scientific and political cooperation. And it was necessary "to integrate more completely our own national science activities vnih those of other nations." ^^^ One such mechanism, he suggested, might be a series of regional "international science policy committees" to "de- velop more fully the multilateral approach to scientific cooperation." 2M Hrai-ings, House Committee on Science and Astronautics, National Science Policy, p. 4. (The complete letter appears in the Appendix, p. 92y.) 2"* Guest panelists included: Dr. Viktor A. Ambartsumian (U.S.S.R.), President, International Council of Scientific Unions, Rome, Italy, and President, Academy of Sciences of the Armenian SSR, Yerevan. U.S.S.R. Hon. Staffan Biu-enstam Linder (Sweden), Member of Parliament, Stockholm, Sweden. Capt. Jacques Yves Cousteau (France), Centie d'Etudes Marines Avancees, Marseilles, France. Hon. Emiiio Q. Daddario, Senior Vice President, Gulf & Western Precision Engineering Company, Manchester, Conn. Hon. Allister Grosart (Canada), Special Committee on Science Policy, The Senate of Canada, Ottawa, Canada. Dr. Franklin A. Long, Director, Program on Science, Technology, and Society, Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y. Prof. Thomas Odhiambo (Kenya), Director, The International Centre of Insect Physiology and Ecology, Nairobi, Kenya. Mr. Herman Pollack, Director, Bureau of International Scientific and Technological Afiair.s, Department of State, Washiiifjton, D.C. Or. Walter Orr Roberts, President, University Corporation for Atmospheric Research, Boulder, Colo. Prof. A!idus Salani (Pakistan), Director, International Centre of Theoretical Physics, Trieste, Italy. Dr. James D. Watson, Professor of Biochemistry, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. Mr. James E. Webb, Treasurer, National Academy of Public Administration, Washington, D.C. (As cited in, U.S. Congiess, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, International Science Policy, proceedings before the Conmiittee ol the Panel on Science and Technology, Twellih Meeting, January 26-28, 1!)7I. p. iv.) 2'» Proceedings, Panel on Science and Technology, Twelfth Meeting, InteTnalional Science Policy" p. 4. "1 Ibid., p. 71. 212 Ibid., pp. 165-172. 1460 However, a necessary first step was the formulation of national science policy. Another speaker, James E. Webb, formerly Administrator of NASA, calJed attention to the fact that "others are at work in these fields." He cited the initial report of the present series, Toward a New Diplo- macy in a Scientific Age, quoted its thesis,^^^ and observed: Now, Mr. Moderator, I refer to this report by this sister committee as only one indication, which I am sure is welcome to the chairman of this committee, that just as this committee is reaching out for a better understanding of the interna- tional opportunities inherent in science, so is the Committee on Foreign Affairs reaching out to better understand the implications of science for diplomacy. Now, perhaps the identification of international science policy and practical ways to make it effective might be pursued further and then maybe some form of joint effort of these two committees might be worth consideration. In any event, this action by the Foreign Affairs Committee shows the growing recognition in Congress, and elsewhere, that no area of international concern can be oblivious to the need for a further strengthening of the scientific underpinning on which so much of modern life rests; and it seems to me that one essential ingredient of an international science policy is how we can learn from our experience to enable leaders of many nations to work within their own nations to improve their own scientific competence and relate it to engineering development that follows it, relate it to public policy, project approval, allocation of resources.*" The most recent development in the sequence followed by what is now the Science and Technology Committee ^^^ was a series of hearings in 1973 and 1974 on Federal Pohcy, Plans, and Organization for Sci- ence and Technology, leading to introduction of a national science policy bill ^^® March 6, 1975. In the hearings, a number of witnesses took positions on the need for an international science and technology policy. For example, Elmer Staats, Comptroller General of the United States, saw a large component of "international relations" in science policy at the Presidential level of decisionmaking. He said, in his prepared statement : There seems to be little doubt that the all pervasive impact of science and technology on national security, quality of hfe, the economy, and international relations is. so important that Presidential decisions regarding national policy, strategy, and tactics must have the benefit of the best advice available. The National Academy Committee base their recommendations on this fact. In mat- ters such as arms control and international safeguards; national security and defense posture; foreign relations and sharing of technological resources with other nations; potential critical shortages of energy, materials, and food; environ- mental protection, the economy, objective, thoughtful and imaginative advice from the science community is absolutely vital.^'^ Dr. Patrick E. Haggerty, chairman of the board of Texas Instru- ments, Inc., proposed as one element of a "national development act of 1976" the statement of an explicit objective: "To seek improvement in the standard of living (with full implications of quality of life) of the world's peoples by joining in cooperative agreement and efforts »" Ibid., pp. 179-180. The quotation was: Science and technology have effected changes in the substantive tasks of foreign policy, in the methodology of diplomacy, in the management of information on which diplomacy is based, in the intellectual training of diplomats, in the range of present options of negotiations, and In the pros- pects of future evolution of diplomacy, foreign policy objectives, and the internatiooal political system. 2'< Ibid., p. 180. 2" The name of the Committee was changed from Science and Astronautics effective with the beginning of the 94th Congress. 2i« H.R. 4461, "National Science Policy and Organization Act of 1975," introduced by Chairman Olin E. Teague, of the Committee, and co-sponsored by Charles A. Mosher, Banking Minority Member. »" U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Science and Astronautics, Federal Policy, Plans, and Organization Jor Science and Technology, Part II. Hearings, 93d Cong., 2d sess., June 20, 2^27; July 9-11 16, 18, 1974, pp. 140-141. 1461 with other nations, especial!}'' those whose political and economic philosophies are compatible, which will advance the policies expressed in this Act throughout the world." Purposes to be served would include the enhancement of free trade, travel and commerce, assurance of sound international currencies, minimization of environmental pollution, improvement of the health and protection of the safety of all peoples, fullest utiUzation and conservation of the resources of all nations, and encouragement of competitive enterprise (including multinational corporations) to fulfill needs for goods and services.^'^ Dr. Roger Revelle, as president of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, urged that "scientific and technical informa- tion must be one component in the broader context of policymaking in the field of international affairs." He continued: The feasibility and time horizon of developments in industrial technology, com- munications, agriculture, sateUile reconnaissance, detection of nuclear explosions, ocean petroleum and minerals production, new weapons systems, etc. must be taken into account in foreign pohcy. Similarly, the quality and quantity of fuel and metal reserves in different countries and regions, the land, water and energy resources available for agricultural production, the potential yields of the ocean fisheries, and estimates of national technological capabilities are important con- siderations in international policymaking. One aim of a National pohcy for Science and Technology should be to ensure that the best scientific and technical information is fully utilized in making and implementing the nation^s foreign policies. The nation's unique scientific and technical capabUities shoiild be an instrument and an object of foreign policy. Attention should be paid to means of increasing imports and exports of technology, and to the "balance of trade" in technical exchange with other countries. International cooperation and cost-sharing in scientific research and technical development should be encouraged and tech- nology transfer as a major element of assistance programs for less developed countries should be facihtated. International constraints on oceanic, atmospheric and space research should be avoided."' DRAFT SCIENCE POLICY BILL The bin H.R. 4461 presented a plan for an Advisor}' Council in the Executive Office of the President, and a Department of Research and Technology Operations, charged with furthering a science policy delineated in title I of the bill. This title contained (section 101(a)(1)) the finding of Congress that "the general welfare, the economic growth and stability of the Nation, its security, the efficient utilization and conservation of the Nation's resources, and the promotion of the progress of science and the useful arts, upon which the very functioning of government and society depend, require the vigorous and perceptive employment of national science and technology." Goals of the pohcy included (section 101(b)(1)) "demonstrating world leadership by enlarging the contributions of American science and technology to the knowledge of man and his universe." Two of the five policy principles in the bill, items 3 and 5 of section 102(a), had explicit foreign policy implications : Item (3) : The mobilization of science and technology to further United States diplomatic objectives and assure the adequacy and effective global allocation of 218 Ibid., p. 256. 2''* Ibid., p. 413. In his retiring presidential addre.ss delivered at the AAAS meeting in New York City on January 29, 1975, Dr. Revelle said "Science unifies men." One aim of a "National Science Policy for Science and Technology," in his opinion, "should be that the best scientific and technical information is fully utilized in making and implementing the nation's foreign policy, and that our unique scientific and technical capabilities are both an instrument and an object of foreign policy." (Roger Revelle, "The Scientist and the Politician," Science, March 21, 1975, p. 1105.) 1462 raw materials, food, and energj', while maintaining a proper balance, in tlie de- velopment and export of technology, between aid to lagging foreign economies and maintenance of an equitable balance in world trade; and Iteni (5) : The encouragement of pcrson-to-person and other interchange of scientific information in the national and the world scientific communities. In introducing the measure, Representative Teague described it as "a product of the most tliorough congressional scrutin}" yet accorded to the focused issue of pohc}^ and planning by the Federal Govern- ment as to its OA\Ti role in handling science and technology." Even so, it was not "cast in concrete" but was "offered for discussion and critique." He expected, he said, the measure to be the subject of further hearings during the 94th Congress."*' The bill was referred jointly to the Committees on Science and Technology and Government Operations. Broad Congressional Interest in Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy ^'^^ An interest in both international affairs and science and tech- nology—approached from differing vantage points— is evidenced by both the Committee on International Relations (formerly Foreign Affairs) ^^^ and the Committee on Science and Technology (formerly Science and Astronautics), as well as by the Senate- Committee on Foreign Relations. Both House and Senate Committees on Appropria- tions, both Armed Services Committees, and the Senate Committee on Aeronautical and Space Sciences, also are concerned with these com- bined topics. Other committees with at least some actual or potential interest in these matters might include: the Senate Committees on Banking, Commerce, Finance, Government Operations, and Judi- ciary; the House Committees on Banking, Government Operations, Judiciary, Mei chant Marine and Fisheries, and Ways and Means. Other committees might also conceivably develop interests that relate to these combined fields of interest. More to the point, the basic structure of the U.S. resources, econoni}', educational systems, culture, and society are all germane to the U.S. diplomatic posture. U.S. science and technology have bearing on the strength of this basic structure. Just as the Department of State has a legitimate interest in domestic science and technology as the basis of U.S. world influence, so also do committees of Congress with diplomatic concerns have a potential interest in the contributions of science and technology to their subject matter. Thus a further question arises as to the actual and potential role of the Department of State in providing information to the Congress about the external world in its relation to these con- tributions and their significance to the United States. On this subject, U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, told the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments that "our national interest is in the international environment" and that technology had outrun the 220 U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Record, 94th Cong., 1st sess., 1975, 121, p. 1432-1435. (Daily edition.) 22' A list of principal Committees having diplomatic interests was supplied by the Foreign Affairs Division, and a list of principal Committees having science and technology interests was supplied by Mauree Ayton of the Science Policy Research Division; the conunenlary in this section concerns committees that appear on both lists. 222 Tlie new name became effective March 19, 1975. 1463 institutions to deal with it. ThroughQut his testimony he offered many useful comments relevant to this study. For example : Virtually every important field of human endeavor is now the subject of a cooperative, and, by and large, constructive, examination on an international scale, (p. 370) The number of our critical national needs which can only be met through inter- national action and cooperation is continuing to grow. (p. 370) Let me stress that I am not saying these problems are made easier by coopera- tion between nations. I am sajing that there is — literally — no other way to solve them. (p. 370) By definition, these activities cut across the responsibilities of many agencies of government and of our civil life. We have dope remarkably well in dealing with manj- of the problems, considering the jerry-Huilt machinery we are using. But we cannot, in the future, leave the solution of these important problems to a process of muddling through, (p. 370) I think you have found here that almost e\ery committee of the Congress has some concern with some aspect of foreign affairs. Thus, I think this has been a natural development and in many ways we welcome it. It complicates life, of course. The more people involved, the more interests you havt to take into ac- count. That obviously makes things more complicated, (pp. 372-373) ^^^ ' A continuing analysis, for congressional purposes, of the subject matter of this hearing would seem to be an essential input to the deliberations of the Congress in its foreign policy role. As Secretary Johnson made clear in the hearing, the existing organization of effort in both the legislative and executive branches was inappropriate to the needs of coherent and integrated policjtnaking in the international sphere. At the conclusion of his testimony, the following colloquy occurred between Secretary Johnson and Chaiiman Zablocki : Mr. ZAnLocKi. On page 370, you make a statement that intrigues me after these sessions of hearing about the efforts of our country in international relations and the many problems involved>i The first full paragraph on that page of your statement refers to what the President called the new dimension of diplomacy and, quoting from that paragraph, it states, ' ; ■ In the years to come, our Government's performance on' thej56, problems will be a very lafge factor in the way our people view their Government. Thiis is what troubles me, your next sentence: ' And we are not well organised for it.^?* , . Why aren't we well organized for it? What rnust we do to be better organized? Mr. Johnson. Well, we are not organized for it because the executive and the Congress historically are organized to deal with the' problems as they were pre- sented for us from our early daj^s. We dealt with agriculture as agriculture, with interior as interior, dealt with commerce as commerce. We were org^vnized along, shall I say, functional lines and'in this new dimension of quality of life, if you will, pollution, preservation of natural resources, in these areas, these areas cut across these traditional functional lines and when it comes to something like energy, we have the Interior Department dealing with one aspect of oil, the oil business ; we have got the Federal Power Commission dealing with gas ; we have got various rate commissions dealing with electricity; we have got somebody else dealing with coal; we have got the Department of Transportation dealing with pollution of auto engines. SM Hearlng-SjTnposium, House Foreign Affairs Committee, National Security Policy, August 8, 1972, pp. 370, 372-373. «« An effort to Strengthen the House arrangements for dealing with complex interdisciplinary matters was made in Hquse Resolution 988, adopted October 8, 1974, which provides in part: Committee Reform Amendments of 1974 • . Sec. 5(c) In carrjing outr paragraphs (a) and (b) with respect to any matter, the Speaker may refer the matter simultaneously to two or more committees for concurrent consideration or considera- tion in sequence (subject to appropriate time limitatioas in the case of any committee after the first), or divide the matter into two or more parts (reflecting different subjects or jurisdictions) and refer each such part to a different committee, or refer the matter to a special ad hoc committee appointed by the Speaker with the approval of the House (from the members of the committees having legislative jurisdiction) for the specific purpose of considering that matter and report to the -House thereon, or make such other provision as may be considered appropriate. 1464 This question of energy, conservation of energy, pollution from energy, cuts across large numbers of departments and agencies and a large number of com- mittees in the Congress here, as well. We aren't equipped to deal with these things within the framework that has now emerged. These are new frameworks that have emerged here that were unknown at the time that both the Congress and the executive were organizing themselves. We have established, the President established, the Environmental Protection Agency and the Council on Environment, Judge Train's organization, in an attempt to bring these together. What I am saying is by no means criticism of them or what has been done, but it seems to me we need both the Congress and the executive to have some new approaches on how we organize ourselves to deal with these things more effectively.^ Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy An initiative of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, ac- cepted with qualifications by the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, was the creation of a commission to focus and coordinate decision- making relating to the use of U.S. resources by foreign affairs agencies. The Commission was established pursuant to the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972 (Public Law 92-352, approved July 13, 1972). The purpose of the Commission is stated in section 601 of title VI to be to ", . . submit findings and recommendations to provide a more effective system for the formulation and execution of the Nation's foreign policy," The original reporting date for the Commission yvas to be July 30, 1974; this date was subsequently extended to June 30, 1975, by the Department of State Authorization Act of 1973. One feature of the Commission's staff activity is a collection of studies of the scientific and technological aspects of foreign policy. In view of the recent addition of Vice President Rockefeller to the membership of the Commission,^^^ it is expected that some of the previous studies of the Vice President's own Commission on Critical Choices for the United States may be made available to the new Commission. Accordingly, the report scheduled for the close of the fiscal year 1975 should have bearing on the subject matter of this study, even though its scope is much broader. Growth of 'International Technological Concerns of Congress Specific subjects of congressional committee investigation and analysis in international affairs are tending increasingly to involve scientific and technological aspects. Illustrations for this discussion are drawn from the agendas of the Committees on Foreign Affairs and on Science and Astronautics during the 92d and 93d Congresses. The former committee approached scientific and technological matters in relation to its concerns with U.S. diplomacy; the latter committee approached diplomatic matters in relation to its concerns with U.S. science and technology. / M' Hearing-Symposium, House Foreign Affairs Committee, National Security Policy, pp. 390-391. M' The chairman of the Commission is Robert D. Murphy, formerly Ambassador, and currently honorary chairman of Corning Glass Company. Other members of the Commission are, in addition to Vice President Rockefeller: Senator Mike Mansfield; Senator James B. Pearson; Representative Clement J. Zablocki; Representative William Broomfield; Mrs. Charles W. Engelhard, chairman of Engelhard Industries; Frank C. P. McGlinn, executive vice president, Fidelity Bank, Philadelphia; Dr. Stanley P. Wagner, presi- dent, Grand Valley State College, Allendale, Michigan; William J. Casey, president and chairpian of the Export-Import Bank; and Dr. David Abshire, chairman, Center of Strategic and International Studies, Georgetown University. 1465 TOPICS EXAMINED BY THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS ^^ A major component of foreign aid programs is technological. Annual reviews of the budget requests from U.S. AID are conducted by the House Committee on International Relations. The committee also exercises a continuing surveillance over arms control matters and the operation of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. In addition, the subject of Law of the Sea, and the related question of peaceful uses of the seabed arose in the 92d Congress and continued to be a subject of interest in the 93d. A separate question that arose in the 92d Congress and was resolved in that period was the action to create an International Agency for Research on Cancer. A substantial increase in scientific and technological subjects under study by the committee was evident in the 93d Congress. Action was taken on the United Nations Environmental Program Act of 1973, and on U.S. Participation in the International Ocean Exposition of 1975. The committee also reviewed U.S. chemical warfare policies, the world food situation, nuclear agreements with Egypt and Israel, the question of excluding imports of chromite from Rhodesia, the international implications of the energy crisis, the flooding of the Great Lakes, the status of the Gorgas Memorial Institute of Tropical and Preventive Medicine, drougkt in the African Sahel, the African Development Bank, the energy crisis in Asia, military uses of weather modification, and global scarcities of commodities. TOPICS EXAMINED BY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY From, its focus on Government science, the Committee on Science and Technology annually reviews the budgets of the National Science Foundation and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, both of which agencies have substantial foreign programs. In addition, the committee during the 92d Congress took up the topics of inter- national environmental science, a detailed review of international cooperation in science and space by NASA and the U.S.-U.S.S.R. cooperative space agreement. The committee also examined the issue of U.S. adoption of the metric system and began a study of science policy education in the United States and Canada. In the 93d Congress, the committee dealt with such topics as the Earth Resources Satellite System, U.S.-U.S.S.R. advanced technology transfer, the Appolo-Soyez joint program, international science and technology transfer, and the International Conference of States on the Distribution of Programme-Carrying Signals Transmitted by Satellite, at Brussels in 1974. In addition the committee held a joint briefing with the scientific attaches of the Department of State, May 22, 1974, on the occasion of their annual home visit and training period. OBSERVATIONS ON THE ANNUAL PROGRAMS OF THE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY COMMITTEES Both committees included in their programs a range of subject matter that included both broad policy investigations, continuing 227 Those listed are in addition to the dozen subjects considered in depth in the Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy series of which tlie present study is a part. Titles of the individual studies are listed on pages vil-vlll. 1466 oversight of agencies under their jurisdictions, and specific legislative issues of immediate current concern. Both committees have recruited able staffs, and both appear to have made effective use of the Con- gressional Research Service. However, a large effort is involved in the review of broad policy, in the selection of appropriate witnesses and consultants, in planning and structuring symposia and hearings, and in distilling the essentials from the testimony and prepared statements. The value of these reviews seems compelling, but the limitations of member time and staff resources may prevent wider use of them. Among the possibilities to enlarge the utility or increase the scope or frequency of such reviews might be the following: —Enlist the Foreign Service Institute to manage occasional seminars and prepare reports on them ; — Arrange briefings by selected members of the Policy Planning Staff; — Contract studies on subjects of continuing interest to the committees, acting individually or jointly; — Construct a library of policy studies of enduring value for joint use by the two committees; — Publish sets of invited papers with staff or CRS commentary ; — Have CRS conduct an annual seminar series on foreign policy issues ; and — Make more use of the scientific attaches as policy informa- tion sources, aside from home leave, through invited reports and special studies to meet committee needs. Implications for the Congress of Science in State The cultural and organizational situation in the Department of State with respect to science and technology presents the Congress with two relateil problems. One is the need of Congress for informa- tion and analysis. The Congress, speaking broadly, needs to know what is going on in order to decide what to instruct the executive branch to do about it. The interactions of science and technology with diplomacy are demonstrably of commanding importance. But the Congress is faced with difficulties in securing information and analyses in this field because of the persistent cultural lag in technical literacy and a lack of organizational coherence and discipline of the Depart- ment, which is after all the main source of diplomatic information for Congress. The second problem is how to strengthen the resources of the Department of State to collect, analyze, and report to the Congress on the technical aspects of diplomacy. Recent events suggest that reform is already underway. But it is also possible that further con- gressional encouragement might be found necessary. As time goes on, it is to be hoped, the departmental deficiencies will be corrected. But pending such correction and even after, it would seem desirable for the Congress to strengthen its own arrangements for information anal^'sis and filter, and option identification and evaluation. The past structure and staffing of congressional committees, as Secretary Johnson has pointed out, has tended to compartmentalize problems in the same way that they are divided up in the Department of State.^^* Similarly, the political realities — like the diplomatic reali- "' On February 3, 1575. Chairman Thomas E. Morgan announced a rporganization of the subeomniittees of the House Forcien Affairs (now fnlernational Relations) Committee, designed to improve the Com- mittee's ability to deal \\-\X\\ international problems. The principal change was to assign all subcommittees according to functional topics. Earlier five of the subcommittees had covered geographic areas corresponding to the five regional bureaus of the Department of State. 1467 ties — compel priority attention to short-range problems and issues, while -tending to defer attention to longer term trends, problems, and opportunities. A third similarity is the tendency in both diplomatic and political institutions toward a high degree of personal mobihty and a correspondingly short "institutional memory." A CONGRESSIONAL POLICY PLANNING STAFF Accordingl}^, it seems reasonable that the many recommendations which have been made for a strong and technologically sophisticated policy planning staff in the Department of State might be allowed to suggest a corresponding need in the congressional environment. Such a mechanism or institution, capable of assessing prospective future trends at a reasonable confidence level, might help the Congress to design preventive actions in advance of crises. Examples of the kinds of ser\4ces that might usefully be performed ^^^thin such an institution might be: — Sustained monitoring of executive branch compliance with congressional intent in the area of scientific and technological impacts on foreign policy and international relations — and vice versa; — Assessing the present and forecasting the future diplomatic environment as changes occur in response to the global spread of technological innovation: — Assessing the secondar}^ impacts and interrelationships of "international" technological issues; — Examining the adequacy of U.S. "international" institutions in the face of changes in the diplomatic environment resulting from the global spread of technological innovation; -—Structuring and making coherent the array of foreign policy interactions with science and technology ; and — Maintaining a continuity of foreign policy expertise, an ex- tended institutional memory, and an assistance cadre for major studies for "international" committees concerned with S&T questions, S&T committees concerned with foreign policy ques-. tions, and committees monitoring major technological missions with significant internatiopal implications. One possible legislative approach i§ suggested by a proposed bill "to establish a Joint Committee on National Security. "^^^ In intro- ducing the proposal, Air. Zablocki said it, was intended "•: . . to address itself in a more comprehensive waj^ to a thorough and ongoing analysis and evaluation of pur national security policies and goals." It is abundantly clear that the cbhtinuing diminution of Congress' role in foreign policy is a direct result of this communication breakdown. For too many years the Executive has failed to share with Congress the kind of adequate in- formation needed in matters involving national securitj^. In short, there is no proper and adequate forum for a regular and frank exchange between the Congress and the Executive on the vital issues afifecting our national security .^^^ However, the joint committee called for under the bill would not "usurp tie legislative or investigative functions of any present com- mittees" but would "supplement and coordinate their efforts in a more comprehensive and effective framework." It would also facilitate 22S Such a bill was introduced as H.R. 54, Januaiy 14, 1975, by Congressman Clement J. Zablocki, Chair- man of the Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scientific Developments. A similar measure, S. 99, was offered in the Senate by Hubert H. Humphrey, January 16. «» U.S. Congress, House, Congressional Ricord, 94th Cong., ist sess., 1975 ,121, p. 39. (Daily edition.) 1468 "proper and meaningful consultation" between the legislative and executive branches of government. An idea of the possible scope of the "national security," as it might concern such a joint committee, serving as a congressional instrument for continuous foreign policy planning and review, is suggested by a speech by Senator Mark O. Hatfield ^^* who explained to a congres- sional audience that it was a "prevalent and frequent mistake" to equate it with military might. Potency of arms was "a component, but only one component, of what constitutes, in reality, our 'national security'." There is [said Senator Hatfield] one central truth we must realize: Protecting and preserving the life of citizens in America is directly dependent upon the conditions that will preserve and nurture life throughout the world. This increases as we realize the finite limitations to the resources necessary to preserve life. In an ultimate but very real way, the conditions for securing life here in America are dependent upon conditions and resources for sustaining life everywhere. We are tied together with mankind in a single destiny.^'^ Thus, the Senator continued, it was becoming evident that "the forces shaping our Nation's and the world's real security go far beyond what can even be insured by treaties and arms." He cited the "growing global interdependence of the world," "United States dependence on the mineral resources of the poor countries," and relative consumption of resources by rich and poor countries. And he declared; There is no problem faced by this world more likely to breed instability and conflict, threatening our security and that of the entire world in the years ahead, than the disparity in distribution of food and basic resources for sustaining life.'''' THE PROBLEM OF CREDIBILITY One problem that all institutions concerned with policy analysis encounter is in being believed by those who make decisions on policy issues. There are repeated instances of studies that clearly identified a future danger, or the need to prevent a future crisis, and were neglected until the event occurred. Unfortunately, there are also repeated instances of forecasts of disaster that didn't happen after all. It is worth noting, however, that the confidence level of any technology forecast rises not merely when it is accepted by more critics but when it is subjected to deeper and more comprehensive analysis. But while the confidence level of a study may improve with effort, it is less likely that its political acceptability or credibility will be correspondingly enhanced. Guidance on this problem calls for much further study. A related problem is that of distinguishing between technical and normative advice. Professor Rusk, with reference to his own experience as Secretary of State, observes: There is one question on which high policy officers need more help. When is a scientist talking science and when is he talking politics cloaked in scientific terminology? A friend once said of Einstein, "he was a genius in mathematical physics, an amateur in music and a baby in politics." I myself have received "scientific" advice which was merely the political advice of a scientist. Obviously, a scientist is as entitled to political views as is the nearest taxi driver. Perhaps each high policy officerlought to have, or have access to, someone he can trust to help him sort wheat from chafif.^^* MI U.S. Congress, House, Congrasional Record, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 1974, 120, p. E6365. (Daily edition.) MS Ibid. 233 Ibid., p. E6366. »< Rusk to Huddle, March 18, 1975. X. Science and Technology in Future American Diplomacy Mobilization of U.S. political and executive resources is called for not only to respond to the technological challenges of future di- plomacy but to design initiatives to shape the future world toward U.S. purposes and goals. Among the evident challenges facing this Nation in the future are the growing interdependence among the countries of the world for resources, energy, and technological skill; the increasing interconnectedness of the major technological issues at hand; the spread and linkages of worldwide economic institutions, multilateral and nongovernmental — all in a world in which a bipolar structure is increasingly modified by the emergence of a "Third World" of less developed nations with shared aspirations for growth and development. In all of these diplomatic problems and oppor- tunities, the factors of technology and its scientific underpinning are evident. The salient questions that grow out of this review of the diplomatic scene in the years ahead appear to be : Where in the U.S. Government is there an institution charged with responsibility for surveying on a continuing basis the totality of trends and prospects of the consequences for U.S. diplomacy that grow out of world technological change? Where are these findings translated into requirements upon U.S. diplomacy? What kinds of expertise are needed for such surveys and for the definition of the diplomatic re- quirements? How complete is the set of U.S. institutions needed to collect, assess, analyze, and structure the information to build into a data base for surveying future technological trends and their con- sequences for U.S. diplomacy? Where are innovative strategies to be sought, conceived, and studied? How does the world system of basic science communities relate to U.S. diplomacy? What major tech- nological trends and needs of diplomatic consequence are already evident and how are they interrelated? What congressional options are available to strengthen the legislative role in this sphere? Major Challenges to Future U.S. Diplomacy The technological content is already clearly evident in may of the foremost problems of U.S. foreign policy in 1975. While it has often been observed that the Department of State as principal institution for U.S. foreign policy has no supporting lobby, the domestic impact of some international technological developments is large enough to suggest the possibility that in time a domestic diplomatic constituency may appear. Some examples of diplomatic problems and concerns expressed in unpublished staff papers of the Department of State are excerpted in the following paragraphs. As they do not necessarily reflect coordinated and oflicial positions they are not documented but stand on their own merits. The point is that at least some senior people in the De- partment concerned h'old the views expressed. (1469) 1470 SOME INFORMAL DEPARTMENTAL VIEWS — Technological advance has become the basis for national security, for the international economy, and for national prestige. — Technology has become thoroughly internationalized — and is likely to aggravate the difficulty of international political and economic relations and to disrupt long-standing international arrangements. — The very future of mankind will depend on the management of such fundamental issues as population, food, the depletion of nonrenewable resources, and the ecological threat of waste and pollution. — There is a serious bureaucratic lag in the ability to deal with these problems, not only in the Department of State but in the U.S. Government as a whole. — The spread of nuclear weapons and the concurrent acceptance of international nuclear safeguards involve a significant degree of strain on the historic concept of national sovereignty. Other strains on national sovereignty are implicit in the spread of the multinational corporations with their largely uninhibited ability to shift technologies, capital, and employment from country to country, in the overflights of reconnaissance satellites, in the apparently advancing ability to influence the weather and redirect storms, and in the foreseen linkage of the world banking and commerce systems through satellite communications, com- puters, and data banks. • . ■ — On the other hand, technology also goes hand in hand with increasing nationalism. National technology programs and strategies are evolving in Japan, France, and England. Inter- national cooperative ventures in technology are being subordi- nated to narrower considerations of national interest. Control of the flow of industrial materials is being subjected to policy considerations of national technological advantage. — The multilateral programs of the United Nations in science and technology, extensive and diverse, are supported in a major way by the United States, but do not yield benefits to this country commensurate with the level of their U.S. support. Similarly, there is no coherent doctrine governing bilateral science agreements of the United States with other nations, and U.S. benefits from these agreements are not maximized. —-In the special field of world health research, U.S. competence offers an opportunity' of contributing in wa^s that greatly benefit U.S. foreign policy objectives. But these efforts are uncoordinated, diffused, and insufficiently rewarding to this country. — Decisions on technical matters, taken early in their develop- ment, may determine their ultimate impact on foreign affairs, but an early input b}^ the Department of State is seldom pro- vided for. — A tabulation of "science and technolog}^ based foreign policy issues" prepared several 3'ears ago in the Department shows the breadth of the technical activities that impinge on diplomacy. (See the accompanying list, Table 11.) 1471 Table 11. — An Unofficial Listing of "Science and Technology Based Foreign Policy Issues" Prepared in 1972 I. Energy and Other Resources Problems (a) Expanding energy consumption 1. Uranium enrichment 2. Gaseous diffusion and centrifuge development 3. Peaceful nuclear explosions 4. Safe shipment of radioactive materials 5. Safeguards 6. Security concerns (b) Waste disposal problems 1. Radioactive wastes 2. Toxic wastes 3. Waste policies and the oceans (c) Environmental pollution (d) Desalting technologj' (e) Oil and mineral extraction from the ocean (f) International cooperation in "big science" II. Space and the Atmospheric Sciehces (a) Political issues relating to space technologies 1. Weather research and data collection 2. Cost/benefit analysis of weather control 3. Multinational programs to control storms 4. Technical assistance to less developed countries faced with drought 5. Agreements on prevention of injurious techniques of weather modification III. Environment and Health (a) Post-Stockholm Environmental Policies 1. Development of coordinated U.N. capacity for research, monitoring, and information exchange 2. Priority projects for support by U.N. environmental fund 3. Fund's relation to economic emphasis of less developed countries (b) Regional action on the environment 1. Harmonizing U.S. with OECD in development of code on pollution control and cost allocations, early warning sys- tems, and identification of chemicals adversely affecting the environment 2. Trade problems in implementing recommendations on environmental regulation 3. Environmental dialog of Eastern with Western Europe 4. Canadian and Mexican border problems of environment 5. Environmental problems encountered by U.S. AID 6. Collaborative research with Japan and Western Europe (c) U.S. international health policy 1. Pesticides and food production 2. Fish protein concentrate 3. Narcotics and dangerous drugs 4. Technologies for following raw materials movements 5. U.S. organization for coordinating international programs 6. International Cancer Act collaboration 7. Management of anti-cancer drugs 8. Use of Fort Dietrick as international cancer research center IV. Advanced Technology Problems (a) Problems of capitalization of large programs (b) Multinational corporations (c) Overseas licensing of U.S. technologies (d) Technology transfers to Communist countries (e) Reciprocity in technology transfers (f) Technology transfers under AID programs 1472 Table 11, — An Unofficial Listing of "Science and Technology Based Foreign Policy Issues" Prepared in i972— Continued V. Bilateral and Multilateral Scientific Program (a) Relationships with Communist regimes 1. Reassessment of technology transfer policies \ 2. Exchanges outside of formal agreements 3. Flexibility to meet a range of technological and less sophisti- cated scientific interests ^ 4. Special problems of China '^ \ / 5. Taiwan exchange continuity (b) Relationships with non-Communist world 1. Multilateral versus bilateral program development 2. Continuity and refinement of Special Foreign Currency Program 3. Arctic concerns of science and technology 4. S & T relations with less developed countries 5. Post-AID relations with developing countries 6. Cooperation with U.N. programs of S & T 7. Vietnam science and technology relations 8. Arab/Israeli science and technology concerns SCIENCE AS CAUSE AND CURE The dual nature of the impact of technology on foreign relations has been described in a 1975 report by a national policy panel of the United Nations Association which noted both beneficial and adverse consequences to be considered: Developments in science and technology have become in many cases the basis of political power struggles. National power is constantly being deployed to achieve larger shares of the benefits of such new technologies as remote sensing of the earth's resources and recovery of mineral wealth from the world's seabeds. Where the use of internationally traded resources is at stake, some industrial states are seeking new technologies that will permit self-sufficiency, while many countries hope to use boycotts and cartels as a form of coercion for both economic and political ends. And, scientific research and development for military purposes continue to be a high priority for many nations. According to one estimate, military efforts account currently for about 40 percent of total world research and development expenditures, or nearly $25 billion, which might otherwise be available for non-military purposes. While advances in science and technology obviously have contributed both directly and indirectly to the world's problems, on balance they have made — and will continue to make — major contributions to the resolution of those problems. Alleviation of the world food problem depends importantly on scientific and technical advances which will make possible greater agricultural productivity in the developing world. The development of new types of energy sources is an essential element in relieving the problems resulting from geographically con- centrated and ultimately finite supplies of petroleum. It is important that the capabilities — as well as the consequences — of science and technology be examined more carefully than they have been in the past, and in the broadest possible framework, if science and technology are to be applied effectively to benefit mankind as a whole.^^^ The report singled out the world food situation and its relationship to world population pressure, population and health, energy, nonfuel mineral resources, and environment as five areas requiring priority attention for U.N. action. The panel urged that the United States 2M United Nations Association of the United States of America, National Policy Panel, Science and Technology in an Era of Inter dependenu (New York: U.N. Association of the U.S.A., January 1975), p. 18. 1473 . . . assert a leadership role in the U.N. and other multilateral institutions. We think it is of prime importance for the U.S. to reassess the tone of its current activity in these organizations and to reexamine the way the government is organized to participate in them. We also believe that a major effort should be undertaken within the government to review those problem areas in which new or strengthened institutional arrangements might be required and to formulate appropriate proposals for international consideration.^^* In particular, said the Panel, "The U.S. Government must give much higher priority to mobilizing its scientific and technological resources for dealing with material scarcities. At the same time, external economic incentives must be provided to reinforce the commitment to conservation." ^" The U.N. panel report took notice of the interrelated nature of the international issues raised bj^ developments in science and technology. A review of the international issues whiqh have been raised by developments in science and technology indicates that these problems have become increasingly complex and interrelated, just as the interdependencies among nations have grown. In the ongoing law-of-the-sea negotiations, there are interactions among such di- verse issues as management of ocean fisheries, which are an essential component of the world's protein supply, and transit through international waters, a question of strategic interest to the major maritime powers. The worldwide rise in oil prices has meant higher cost for fertilizers and for the crops to which they are applied, as well as higher gasoUne prices. And advances in the atmospheric sciences can lead not only to better forecasting but eventually to large-scale weather and climate modificaaon. Such capabilities could in turn serve activities as diverse as air transport and agriculture. Because of their complexity it is difficult to treat these issues as separate prob- lems, or even to categorize them as primarily scientific, economic or political. They are issues which do not respect the standard patterns of international affairs and have already begun to transform relationships among the nations of the world.2^* Interconnectedness of Diplomatic Problems of the Future A feature of the world scene of today is the complex way in which so many of the great global problems intersect. Materials shortages raise questions of political jurisdiction over the deep seabed. World food shortages relate to fertilizer supply, which is tied to energy and petro- leum, materials cartelization, weather modification, and water supply. Energy relates to petroleum and world distribution of coal, but also to nuclear power generation, which involves international technology transfer, the environment, nuclear safeguards, and safe disposal of nuclear wastes. Space utilization involves searches for materials, global communications, detection of agricultural blights, and information management. In fact, directly or indirectly, most of the large tech- nological issues facing the world of the future in 1975 appear to be closely interconnected. (See the accompanying matrix analysis in Figure 2 of the more obvious interrelationships among these issues.) a« Ibid., pp. 78-79. M' Ibid., p. 80. 2M Ibid., p. 23. 1474 FIGURE 2.— MATRIX ANALYSIS OF TECHNOLOGICAL INTERRELATIONS S! c a> E c o in 1 E a> CO .2 S o a. 0} E c o IS CO 1 5 c ex. a. o E a> > ■c o O Q. ex f= LU c UJ o c £ Z o a. O 00 3 00 ^ ^ ^ Energy... X X Y X Y X Y X Y X Y X Y X X X X Y X Y X Y Environment Y Y X X Fertilizers... X X X X X X X X Y X X X X X X Food X X Y X Y X Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y X Information systems X X X X X X X Y X X X Y Y Y Materials... X X X Y X Y X Y X Y X X Y X X Y X -— X Y X Y Nuclear power X Oceans Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y y Y Petroleum X Y X Y X Y X Y X X X Y ? X Y Y X X X X X X Population X Seabed.. X X X X X Y X X Y X X Y X X X Y X X Y X Supertanilaling to international c()Oi)eration or national security by niakinp; contracts or other anancenients f including grants, loans, and other forms of assistance) for the conduct of such scientific activities. Such activities when initiatpd or supported pur,=uant to requests made by the Secretary of State or the Secretary of Defense shall be financed solely from funds transferred to the Foundation l).v the request ins Secretary as provided in section 15(g), and any suc.h activities shall be unclassified and shall be identified by the Foundation as being undertaken at the request of the appropriate Secretary. !57 Sep especially: U.S. Congress, House, Conimittee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. Scientists Abroad: An Exami- nalion of Major Programs for Nongovernmental Scientific Exchange, in the series Science, Technology, and American Diplomacy, prepared by Genevieve J. Knezo, Analyst in Science and Technology, Science Policy Division, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, April 1974. See vol. II, pp. 865-1035. I 1485 NONGOVERNMENTAL PREFERENCES OF SCIENTISTS Except in times of war emergenc}-, scientists have generally tended to prefer to develop their own forms of cooperation, usually on a person-to-person basis. -The chief role of organizations of scientists has been to facilitate information evaluation and exchange. Herman I. Chinn stresses this preference for apolitical relationships among scientists; Scientists generally prefer informal co-operation among themselves with a minimum of governmental involvement. The active investigators within a partic- ular specialty are usually v.-ell known to each other. The}- have ample o]jpor- tunilies to discuss mutual problems and to arrange suitable co-operative measures. Such direct, informal dealings avoid the administrative and "l)ureaucratic" prticedures often resulting from more formal arrangements. Although effective administration should facilitate the scientific effort, it frequently has the opposite effect. Reports, meetings and other requirements consume time that might be more profitably spent in the laboratory. There is the danger that administrative decisions may influence the scientific objectives. More seriously, some scientists fear that involvement with an official program may compromise their scientific integrity by subverting scientific considerations to political ends. Finally, a formal co-operative program introduces certain restraints in the type, duration and form of co-operation. Informal arrangements provide greater flexiljilitj- and can be more easily altered, discontinued or expanded as the occasion demands.^^" However, the international relations among scientists have in- creasingly become institutionalized. Partly because of the growth in such "big science" programs as the IGY, space research, large scale weather studies, and the like, scientific activities are becoming global in scope and in organizational form.-^^ According to Roger Revelle : The supra-national values that guide scientists in their search for truth conflict at times with the foreign policies of nations; resolution of these conflicts calls for a high order of statesmanship. Cooperation in scientific truth-seeking can be a powerful tool for building international understanding onlj- if its cohesive force is aided by national attitudes, policies, and actions. In the search for truth, a structure of world-wide working relationships among scientists is essential in such major areas of inquiry as geophysics, meteorology, oceanography, animal and human ecology, astrophysics, and public health. These sciences take most meaningful form only on a global framework. Hurricanes, droughts, and pestilence know no national boundaries."^^" Professor Revelle suggests the the Department of State has neglected tb.c "immediate cultural values of American science for our relations witli other countries." He saw such useful diplomatic gains to be achieved in this direction as the following: Science ... is a form of art, and one in which the X'nited States now leads the world. By encouraging and promoting the widesb possible range of international activities for American science, the Department could greatly foster acceptance of -'" Ufnuaii I. Cliinn, "IiUernatioual Scientific Co-operation," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists '2r>, no. 9 (Xov,.mt.or l!i6H). p. 34. -• Thus, the "larpest, most complex, and most comprehensive international scientific undertaking" ever carried on' in pea.-etime— the International Geophysical Year— is testimony to the aliilities of scientists to ortianizo on a prand scale, pivea a purpose and an occasion. Not only was the I(i Y mainly developed and ma'iawd hy I he scientists themselves, rather than by their governments: it established patterns of coopera- tion for later government-to-government efforts and relationships, including the negotiation of treaties. See: U.S. Cnngress, Itouse, Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on National Security Policy and Scic'itific Oevelopments, Ttie Political Ltgacy (fttie Intemntionnl (;enf)tiije white cr black; the rest would be various shades of grey. Governmental organizations, here and abroad, tend to keep these two areas together. (Witness recent developments at NSF.) If the two were separated at State, there would be double representation to meetings, dual schedules of appointments for visitors, etc. Moreover, I don't see any advantage to be gained that could not be obtained as readily within a single organization.^" Coordination of Foreign Activities oj U.S. Technical Mission Agencies In three distinct types of activity the prop;rams of U.S. agencies with technical missions can exert impacts on U.S. diplomac}-. The question is: what roles should the Department of State play in co- ordinating, assisting, or policy formation, toward each type of ac- tivity. The three types arc: (1) U.S. agency participation in bilateral, multilateral, or other overseas research and development; (2) ac- tivities by foreign governments as a part of domestic programs of U.S. agencies: and (3) domestic programs of U.S. agencies that impact on U.S. diplomacy, or that have potential for future impacts, bene- ficial or injurious. It is difficult to identify all the different elements in the Department of State with various degrees of responsibility for one or more of the^e three types of aclivit3\ E.xcept in rare instances, the third type appears to be essentially neglected as a subject for diplomatic atten- tion. No instances were tiu'ned up in which the Department played a noticeably active role in congressional hearings or elsewhere to advance a domestic research and development program of another agency for diplomatic benefit, or to oppose one to prevent diplomatic disadvantage. ^^-^ Similarly with the role of foreign officials, or persons, working in the United States in collaboration with U.S. personnel on mission agency programs: such activities appear to be conducted mainly- on an ad hoc basis, without much concern on the part of the State Department. In the first type, that of U.S. overseas R&D programs, some degree of coordination is exercised, but not across-the-board. Information is sparce concerning exchanges of persons funded by the U.S. Govern- ment;-"^ funding requests for U.N. technical agencies with U.S. agency participation do not gcnerall}' entail technical reviews of costs ''- Poriack to Tlurlille, Marcli 2.'), 1075. 2"3 However, as Mr. Bccklor points out, there have boen a number of domestic U.S. programs that have furthered U.S. diplomacy. He notes: They include the outer space initiatives (particularly E RTS and joint dockinsi) and atomic energy cooperation, the openinsof the Fort Dietrick facility to international cooperation in canesr research, and the recent energy R&D initiatives, among others. . . . (Recklor to Huddle, April 3, Ut7.i.) ^* See : Foreign Affairs Committee, U.S. Scienti-sts Abroad: An Examination of Major Programs for Nongovernmental Scientific Exchange, op. cit. (Vol. II, pp. 865-1035.) 1496 and benefits;"^ on the other hand, there is substantial participation by the Department of State in coordinating bilateral science programs, and in assisting in arrangements for overseas space tracking stations and other remote scientific deployments. In summar}^ the primary emphasis of the Department in these categories appears to be operational rather than pohcy-oriented. Under these conditions, it would be unhkely to expect the Department to propose new diplomatic initiatives to advance U.S. diplomatic objectives when these involve overseas (or domestic) research and development activities of other agencies. An assessment by the Na- tional Academy of Sciences of the "complex" policy process for "international aspects of programs in which science and technology are closely involved" observes that "many of the subjects relevant to science and technology receive little leadership or effective guidance until they reach crisis proportions or cause major political problems." (In the assessment quoted here, no reference was made to initiatives, and only the monitoring function was discussed.) Accordingly, the report recommended as one of the functions of a proposed Council for Science and Technology, in the Executive Office of the President, a "strong coupling" between this Council and the Department of State, in consultation with the National Securit}^ Council. Said the report : That coupling would enable the council to provide in international matters the early warning and coordinated attention to crisis management and selective 2'i On this point Dean Brooks comments: Although I see its disadvantages I do not see how State can avoid being the coordinator and defender of the U.N. agency budgets. This is because the relative emphasis on the various U.N. specialized agencies is a ciuestion of U.S. foreign policy, and consequently State must have a hand in determing the overall priorities. The real problem is, I think, that U.N. affairs generally are accorded too low a priority within State, and within the Government as a whole. The reasons are under- standable, but 1 think not correct, especially insofar as they pertain to the specialized agencies. We are going to have to come to terms with the multilateral mode of dealing with the world, unsatis- factory as the present mechanisms are. I do not think the situation is helped by the U.S. signalling its generally low opinion of U.N. agencies to the world. Our policy should be to constantly seek ways to make them work better, and keep them as non-political as jsossible. If the U.N. agency budgets were coordinated and defended by the relevant U.S. specialized agencies, our national posture with respect to the U.N. would be even more uncoordinated than at present, a step in the wrong direction. I do not see why State could not make better use of the assistance of the si)ecialized agencies in defending U.N. budget contribution^, but the process should be orchestrated by State. (Brooks to Huddle, February 10, 1975.) In response to a question as to "state and agency relationships to U.N. organizations," Mr. Beckler con- sidered it "one of the most di IRcult and troublesome problems in delivering on our commitments and realiz- ing the opportunities for science and technology to contribute to our foreign policy objectives." He continued: The government's scientific and technical resources and capabilities reside in substantive mission • departments and agencies that, for the most part, have neither the statutory mandate nor the budgets to caiTy out international cooperative actiyities. The Department of State has the mission but lacks both the technical capabilities and the financial resources. For this reason, the U.S. now finds itself overcommitted in ability to provide scienti "c and technical follow-through of major initiatives by the President and Secretary of State expressed in the U.N. and bilateral agreements. How to redress this imbalance requires special study. My preference is to seek legislative authority and budgets for the operating departments and agencies to engage in international activities as an integral part of their missions under the general policy purview of the Department of State. Your questions fi.il to point up an equally troublesome problem of coordination within the- De- partment of State. Typically, IQ concerns itself with the funding and operation of U.N. agencies, regional desks such as ARA with the substantive work of those agencies, and the Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs with the science and technology aspects. Innovative procedures and organizational arrangements need to be instituted to facilitate a coherent and coordinated approach so that the expertise of the Department can be marshalled in support of the Secretary. One possible mechanism for doing this would be to strengthen the Policy Planning Staff so that it could operate in the mode of the NSC staff— formally delning the terms of reference for studies of major issues (in the name of the Secretary) and assigning responsibilities within the Department for the conduct of the studies, drawing where necessary on outside contributions. Through such mechanism, the issues and the pros and cons of alternative approaches could systematically be developed and placed before the Secretary. Although this may now be done to a limited extent, the process could be institutionalized with advantage and offers the possibility of generating more guidance and leadership from the top of the Department. (Beckler to Huddle, March 5, 1975.) 1497 program development that have been suggested here as among the principal functions of the council. It would enable the council to intervene, side by side with those within the Department of State responsible for scientific affairs, at the points where policy is actively determined, particularly where Presidential initiatives or interests are immediately involved.^'s State and Presidential Policymaking in Science The combined role of Dr. Kissinger as Secretary of State and Special Assistant for National Security Affairs ties the Department more closely to the National Security Council, and to Presidential policymaking generally. On the other hand, the action by President Nixon in eliminating the Presidential Office of Science Adviser and the Office of Science and Technology (OST), and in transferring the function to the Director of NSF,^" niay have had adverse effects on science policymaking in State. In particular, it eliminated a point of access and a source of support and stimulus useful to the State science office. At the same time it increased the responsibility of SCI/OES for coordinating interagency science policy in the international field. (For example, the FCST international committee was transferred to SCI shortly after the PSAC international committee was dissolved along with OST. These actions left SCI, along with a small Science and Technology Policy Office (STPO), formed to assist the NSF Director in his Presidential advisory role, as the residual claimants to the function of international science and technology policy planning and coordination.) Dean Brooks (Dr. Harvey Brooks, dean, Division of Engineering and Applied Physics and the Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University), indeed, sees difficulties both domestic and foreign, in the removal of the science advisor}' function from close proximity to the White House: I think the difficulties with the transfer of the science office to NSF are probably greater in domestic than in foreign policy, but there is no question that there are universal difficulties in confusing the roles of operating and policy organizations. It is true that the NSF Directors wears an independent "hat" in his advisory role, but that fiction will be maintained with increasing difficulty as time goes on. As Skolnikoff and I state in our Science ai"ticle, a science and technologj' policy office in State needs a counterpart in the Executive Office which can channel its recommendations and policy perspectives directly to the Presdient. The removal of the science advisory mechanism to NSF has left a vacuum of independent 2" National Academy of Sciences, ad hoc Committee on Science and Technology, Science and Technology in Presidential Policymaking: A Proposal (Wasliington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, June 1974), p. 45. ^ These actions were accomplished in Reorganization Plan No. 1,^ January 26, 1973, and became effective July 1, 1973. The action also eliminated the President's Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) and trans- ferred the Federal Council for Science and Technology to NSF jurisdiction. An assessment of the three-way interaction among SCI-NSF-NSC after Reorganization Plan No. 1 be- came effective is offered by Pollack as follows: The transfer of the Presidential science and technology machinery to the Director of NSF was interpreted in the Department of State as a weakening of the White House role which, in interna- tional scientific matters, had previously been rather strong. Witness the Hornig, DuBridge and David foreign trips for example. As a consequence of the shift the Department of State science and technology activity did attempt to be more assertive in exercising inter-departmental leadership and in managing relationships with foreign science and technology leadership. However, the absence of a White House official identified with science and technology and the somewhat ambivalent status of the head of NSF did weaken the U.S. in its international scientific relationships. In this day and age, there is a need for a clearly recognized leader of science within the government structure to order affairs within the government for international relations and other purposes as well. As for relations on science and technology matters between the State Department and the Na- tional Security Council, the President's Science Adviser and his staff were usually a third party to the relationship. Under the present arrangement neither the Director of NSF or his staff has served in that capacity except on a few issues. The State Department and the NSC staff were left to their own devices and as a consequence the cooperation between them deepened, perhaps of necessity. Of coiuse, it was helpful to have NSC and the State Department headed by the same man.