J. Prouofet

New York

1838

SELECTIONS

FROM

GERMAN LITERATURE.

BY

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PROFESSORS, THEOL. SEM. ANDOVER.

ANDOVER:

PUBLISHED BY GOULD, NEWMAN AND SAXTON.

NEW YORK:

CORNER OF FULTON AND NASSAU STS.

1839.

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ERRATA.

Want of room prevents an intended notice of several errors, some of them errors of the press, on pp. 115, 116, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 133, 135, 141, 146, 159, 163. After carefully comparing pp. 115—170 with the original, the translator discovered that, in his wish to give a free version, he had deviated, in several sentences, too far from the text; not far enough however to affect *materially* the train of thought. The errors may be easily detected. Page 123, line 9 from bottom, read *inrite*, for *smite*. Page 205, line 7, from bottom, read "judge at Halle, but now supreme judge."

INTRODUCTION.

THERE are two great tendencies in human nature of which Plato and Aristotle are commonly regarded as the representatives. One of these tendencies or characteristics is indicated, in its various forms, by the epithets speculative, theoretical, ideal, abstract, doctrinal, subjective. The terms which are employed in describing the other tendency are practical, experimental, concrete, actual, objective.

Plato, though not deficient in acuteness and subtlety, was meditative and profound. As the author of the celebrated ideal philosophy, he supposed that certain ideas existed in the Divine mind from eternity, to which God gave a figure or form when he created the world. He ascribed a Divine original to the human soul. True happiness, according to Plato, consists in the investigation of truth and in the subjection of the passions. Virtue is the perfection and health of the soul. It is manifested in the various forms of wisdom, righteousness, temperance, valor. Plato had a living power of imagination, a loftiness of thought, together with the ability to clothe his conceptions in the noblest and most beautiful forms. Under his pen the most abstract ideas assumed the character of life and reality. Spirit, vigor, warmth pervade his writings.[1]

[1] See Schöll, Geschichte der Griech. Litt. I. 480. The moral character of Plato's great master is yet occasionally assailed with considerable violence. The charges against Socrates originated partly from calumny, which is always thrown out by the vicious against those who are more virtuous than themselves; and partly from a misapprehension of some Socratico-Platonic expressions. For instance, when Socrates said, in his last moments, that he "owed a cock to Æsculapius," any one, who regards his well known habit of irony, may suppose that he was not in earnest; that he understood by Æsculapius *health*, and intimated by this form of expression that he had almost recovered from his long disease. In respect to another charge—that of sensuality—we have the explicit testimony of Xenophon, that physical love was directly excluded by Socrates. Alcibiades, in Plato's Dialogue, declares that Socrates was unsusceptible of every lower kind of love, being devoted to spiritual love alone. If Socrates had been

Aristotle is the father of natural history. The philosophical terminology and many of the existing scientific definitions are traced to his pen. He formed a system of logic with wonderful completeness, and also gave fundamental laws to rhetoric and poetry. Psychology owes to him its philosophical form. His style of writing is simple and exact. He never sacrifices sense to sound. He discards the fable, the allegory and the various figures of speech in which Plato abounds. He is always serene, tranquil, modest, though occasionally obscure in consequence of his brevity, or his use of uncommon words. He founded his system on reason and experiment, entirely rejecting the aid of the imagination. He embraced all the branches of human knowledge which were attainable in his time, and gave to them order and a scientific form. He had collected so large a library that Plato named his dwelling, "the house of the reader." It has been said, probably with truth, that in the quality of mere dry intellect, Aristotle is at the head of the race.

Plato is the leader of another series. In imagination, feeling, originality, in what may be termed the spiritual powers, he is among the greatest of the children of men—the Homer of philosophers. "Plato," says Goethe, "is, in relation to this world, like a blessed spirit, who chooses for a time to take up his abode here. His object is not so much to become acquainted with the world as kindly to communicate to it that which he brings with him, and which is so necessary to it. He mounts upward, with longing to partake again of his original. All that he utters has reference to one single principle—perfect, good, true, beautiful; the love of which he studies to enkindle in every bosom. Whatever of earthly science he acquires in particulars, melts, yea we might say, evaporates in his method, in his discourse. Aristotle, on the contrary, is, in relation to the world, like a man, a master-builder. He is once here, and he must work and build. He inquires about the soil; but no further than till he finds a firm foundation. From that point to the centre of the earth, all the rest is indifferent to him. He marks out a vast circuit

guilty in this particular, would not Aristophanes have trumpeted it? Before we believe all which has been uttered against some of the best men of antiquity, we want better authority than the story-teller Athenaeus. We do not vindicate everything which Socrates did or said. We may contend that he would not be admitted into virtuous society now. But would many of the pious patriarchs of Scripture on the same principle? See Tholuck in Bibl. Repos. II. 453, and Schweighäuser. XII. 161.

for his building, collects his materials from every quarter, arranges them, piles them one upon another, and thus rises in regular pyramidical form into the air; while Plato shoots up towards heaven like an obelisk, yea like a pointed flame."[1]

These eminent Greeks are not without their representatives at the present day. Plato reäppears in the German; Aristotle in the Anglo-Saxon. The former lives in an ideal realm. He is given to speculation. He is lost in the depths of his own spirit. Nothing is profound or subjective enough for him. The Oriental mysticism is seen again in the centre of Europe. The Gnostic finds a home on the banks of the Elbe. The German is not satisfied with the obvious meaning of a proposition. He must look behind or below it for something more fundamental, for something wrapped in deeper mystery. In struggling to reach a lofty and unattainable ideal, he will have nothing to do with the actual and possible. Plain sense, obvious truth, are cast out as too vulgar. A personal God, with definite, individual attributes is not to his taste. He meditates and conjectures till he loses himself in barren generalities or pantheistic dreams. In his exclusive tendency he perverts Plato himself. That great thinker did not overlook practical utility. His repeated and hazardous journies into Sicily, as well as many other events of his life, are a proof of his attention to the actual condition of his fellow creatures. His aim was the completeness, the symmetry, the perfection of the human soul. He abhorred everything partial or exclusive. Dr. Ritter terms his republic a 'University.' Still the general position is undoubtedly true that the Germans are the disciples of the Academy. Their faults are of the ideal kind. Their mistakes are not those of action. Of the errors of the experimentalist they are guiltless.[2]

On the other hand, the Englishman and American are thoroughly *Peripatetic;* they are ever in motion. They are undoubting believers in the sensible world. In rejecting its existence, Berkeley has hardly a living disciple. In demolishing his system, Dr. Reid performed a work of supererogation. Nothing could be more harmless than Berkeley's notion. The corn law or the woollen trade have

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[1] Goethe, Farbenlehre II. 140. Bibl. Repos. III. 687.

[2] Of course the general tendency, the national characteristic is here described. Prominent exceptions doubtless exist. Of this the Memoirs of the Berlin Academy are a sufficient proof.

infinitely greater charms for the countrymen of the Minute Philosopher than the soul of man. The latter cannot be weighed on a counter, or be shipped off to the Baltic by steam. No men make better surveyors of land than the Anglo-Saxons; none can steer a ship like them. In the physical world, from Spitzbergen to the utmost South, they are lords of the ascendant. This practical, Aristotelian tendency pervades all things, science, jurisprudence, politics, education, religion. Everywhere the questions are sounding, Where has he been? Whither is he bound? What is the value of that article? Which school-book or school-teacher or minister is the cheapest? We have heard even of clergymen who estimated the conversion of a congregation of immortal souls at so much a head—who were willing to assess a sort of poll-tax on salvation. In science we have no great discoverers. We have practical philosophers—scientific explorers—men who can divide off and parcel out to good advantage the treasures which have been accumulated in past times. It is no disproof of our general position that many eminent names might be mentioned in physical science. We love the outward. Our home is in the visible.

Here and there, indeed, an individual may be found who is weary of this ceaseless stir, of this insane eagerness after the perishable and the transient. His ears are pained by the incessant clamors of buyers and sellers. He longs for repose, for calm meditation, for a secure retreat from his jostling and inquisitive contemporaries. Such men, however, are few and far between. The tendency to bustle and agitation, to digging and hoarding is widely predominant. The epithets acute, practical, quick-witted, impatient, sharp-sighted, delineate the Saxon races on the two continents, or rather on the four continents, and the islands of almost every sea.

In thus characterizing the English mind, we only repeat the general verdict of intelligent Englishmen. "Our *utilitarian practicality*," says a late writer, "is a theme that has often been discussed. It is impossible to contrast the condition of any one branch of science or literature in England with its condition on the continent, and especially in Germany, without becoming sensible of the all-pervading influence of this tendency of the British character."[1] "Whatever the causes may be," says the Bishop of London, "the fact cannot be denied, that we have comparatively few really classical

[1] For. Quart. Rev. No. 41. p. 238.

scholars, few who enter deeply into the study of the Greek language, into the examination of its structure, of its formations, of its analogies."[1]

An interesting question here arises. What occasions this marked difference between the Germans and the English? They were originally one. They belong to the same stock, and their languages to the same family. They are alike in the substantial qualities of mental and moral character. Why the prominent existing dissimilarity? England has not been always what she is now. Once the English spirit deeply sympathized with the Platonic. A long roll of revered names might be unfolded that all of us have been wont to love and admire.

A principal cause is unquestionably geographical position. Great Britain is an island, and she has immense colonial possessions in every quarter of the earth. The United States have a very extended sea-coast, with numerous harbors and large rivers. We have thus every incitement to spread ourselves over a large surface. The call to physical effort is loud and unceasing. On the contrary the Germans are shut up in the centre of Europe. Almost everything has conspired to keep them at home. We are the couriers and the carriers of the whole earth. The Germans are the purveyors of mind. They carry on a commerce of intellect. They are psychological adventurers. While we are making ships, they are manufacturing theories. While we are harpooning the monster of the northern ocean, they are defining the limits of old and new Platonism, or demonstrating that the chorus in the Agamemnon of Æschylus consisted of twelve old men, and not of fifteen.

Another cause is found in the nature of the governments. The British government has been for a long time essentially republican. Freedom of thought and of speech is unfettered. The political world has opened a thousand avenues for practical effort which have been eagerly entered. "A few minor minds may peck with laudable industry at the luxuriant fruitage of German erudition; but our great intellects, our original discoverers, our secret miners and public heaven-stormers are all in the senate."[2] It is not necessary to say how different is the state of things in Germany. An iron-handed government there controls everything. Liberty means what the royal vocabulary makes it mean. There are no Burkes nor Chat-

[1] London Quart. Rev. No. 101. [2] For. Quart. Rev.

hams. There is no Junius nor Wilkes to set at defiance the powers that be. The great engine of freedom—the newspaper press—is an insignificant affair. The mind is necessarily turned inward. Meditation, reverie, or prying investigations into old and distant objects become a fixed habit. One mode of action being effectually barricaded, the soul breaks out with violence into another.

An additional occasion of the difference in question lies in the antagonist systems of philosophy. In the British world, Bacon, Locke and Paley have long been the masters. The end which Bacon proposed to himself was fruit; it was the relief of man's estate; it was to enrich human life with new inventions and powers. *Philanthropy*, he says, was so fixed in his mind that it could not be removed. Wherever Locke has been read, men have not fallen into the errors of the Middle Ages. He has promoted anything rather than the building of cloisters or the re-publication of Plato. The influence of Paley, perhaps, has been equally great with that of Locke; it certainly has been entirely correspondent. The Germans, however, have launched forth to the other extreme. It is said that Kant's system is in ruins; but Kant's influence is not. Other systems, it has been observed, have rolled over his, and have been themselves in turn displaced. Yet all these systems have conspired to one general effect. They have all been at antipodes to Locke and Paley, they have all made war upon the sensual and the outward. The basis of every theory has been laid upon the internal and the independent powers of the human soul. Hence the German language is so rich in all the terms which are applied to spiritual phenomena.

Another powerful cause is the modern revival of Christianity and the awakened spirit of missionary enterprise which have pervaded England and the United States far more than they have Germany. Multitudes are running to and fro. Almost every land is beginning to feel the practical beneficence of those who speak the English tongue. While the Germans are speculating nobly, and erecting monuments to their patient industry, to their vast and learned research, to their metaphysical acumen, the Englishman and American may point for their memorials to Howard's grave at Cherson, and further on to Martyn's at Tocat; to the raised letters which are giving eyes to the blind—to the Bible Society, sublimer than all the proud achievements of the scholars who rise up by thousands in the universities of the continent.

We may remark, however, that there is no good reason for these two diametrically opposite tendencies. Men were not made merely for action or speculation. In following either course exclusively, they sin against the nature which God has given them. We have no cause to laugh at the airy course of the spiritual philosopher. We need not shrug our shoulders in proud self-complacency when we talk of German mysticism. We are not called upon to identify every form of nonsense, which appears among us, with the name of transcendentalism. We are not authorized to term every outbreak of error in Saxony or Switzerland with the imposing title of the newest fashion in German theology.[1] We may well spare such demonstrations of our ignorance and self-conceit. On the other hand, the Germans might well copy our excellent practical habits. An infusion into the German mind of the old, sound, substantial English sense would be of inestimable worth. They ought to read Dr. Dwight's Sermons, and the works of Dr. Paley. They should become familiar with such men as Thomas Scott and Claudius Buchanan. John Newton's Letters and Cowper's poetry would do good service among the followers of Fichte and Hegel. They say that we are incapable of understanding their writings, that we scorn that which we have not mind enough to understand. With equal truth, we might affirm that they do not understand us. They have cultivated one tendency to such an extent, that they cannot see the substantial excellencies of a writer like Dr. Paley. If we have neglected the reason and the imagination, they have undervalued the sense and the practical understanding.

It is the wisdom, therefore, of both parties to adopt a more enlarged course of thinking and action. It would do our young scholars no harm to read the Dialogues of Plato—not so much for any philosophical theory which they contain, not so much for the sake of any immediate practical utility, as to become familiar with the accurate distinctions which he makes on the great questions in morals and religion that he discusses, and especially to become imbued with his noble spirit—to partake in his lofty aspirations, and to be thankful for that better light that we enjoy, but which was denied him. There is much in German literature of the highest value which we might well transfer to our language. How little we know of the great geography of Ritter? How contented are our bookmakers to go on year by year copying Malte Brun? What do we

[1] See a late Letter of Dr. Malan of Geneva.

know of the profound historians Leo, Luden, Schlösser, Wachler, Ranke, Von Hammer—none of them neologists? A long list of writers in other departments we might name, but it is unnecessary.

In the preceding considerations, one reason may be discovered for the appearance of the present volume.[1] The translators have cherished the hope that something might be done to break down the wall of national prejudice, and to correct an exclusive tendency which cannot but be injurious. They have wished to contribute something to aid the better feeling, which is beginning to spring up between those who speak the German and the English tongues, and to promote that brotherly intercourse which is so becoming and which may be made so useful to both parties.

There are several additional considerations, which have influenced the translators of the present volume, in thus appearing before the public. One of these is, the well known tendency of acquaintance with foreign authors to enlarge and liberalize the mind. The man who never travelled out of his native county, is apt to be a man of prejudices. A new language is to the inward being what a new eye is to the outward; one sees with it what he could not have seen without it; and by examining such developments of humanity as are not found among his own kindred, he learns to value substance more, and form less. Creatures of custom as we are, we are prone to look upon everything habitual as right of course, and everything uncommon as wrong. Unfashionable is another name for monstrous. When a blind adherence to the standard of present fashion is limited to matters of secular concern, it narrows the mind; but when it extends to theology, it cripples the very sentiments which should be most expanded. It makes men partizans, when they ought to be philanthropists. The Bible is one of the freest books ever written. Its style is as unlike that of our scholastic systems, as the costume of the oriental is unlike the pinching garb of the Englishman. It never intended that men should abridge its freeness, and press it forcibly into the mould of any human compend. We approve of

[1] We may here mention that another volume is in the course of translation which will be entirely devoted to Plato and Aristotle. It will include the Life of Aristotle by Dr. A. Stahr of Halle, and a Comparison of Platonism with Christianity by Prof. Baur of Tübingen. It will also contain an estimate of the character of both these philosophers, with illustrations from the recent commentators upon their writings.

creeds: they are useful, needful; but there is a difference—is there not—between respecting and adoring them. We prefer to see men shaping their creeds so as to suit the Bible, rather than to see them shaping the Bible so as to suit their creeds. There is reason to fear, that while the language of our confessions of faith is in some cases too pliant, bending to interpretations that are subversive of each other, it is in other cases too stiff and strait; giving no heed to some valuable modifications of thought, which reason approves, and allowing no place for some statements of inspiration, which always look somewhat strange alongside of the creed, and which can be disposed of the most satisfactorily by the divine who is most of a lawyer. It is to be feared, for instance, that some special pleading is required for such an explanation of Matt. 11: 21. Luke 10: 13, as will make them harmonize with the inflexible language of certain compends in reference to the doctrine of human passivity in regeneration. It is to be feared, that there is a scholastic mode of stating the doctrine of the saints' perseverance, which can be shown to be in keeping with the inspired entreaties against apostasy, by none but very ingenious and witty men. It is to be apprehended, that many, influenced more by the narrowness of a creed than the freeness of the Bible, when they repeat such passages as Heb. 6: 4—6. 10: 26—32. 2 Pet. 2: 20—22, secretly look upon them as a kind of manœuvre, rather than as an expression of honest fear. Has not the reader himself been haunted with something like this suspicion of artifice, even when he dared not breathe it to his own conscience? and have not these passages, when invested with certain technical explanations, seemed to be in a strait-jacket, or at least not exactly at their ease?

Now in measuring our faith by the symbols of any single sect, we are often obliged to cut off some positive instructions, direct or indirect, of the Bible. Robert Hall's Preface to Antinomianism Unmasked, contains several invaluable hints on this topic. "When religious parties have been long formed," he says, "a certain technical phraseology, invented to designate more exactly the peculiarities of the respective systems, naturally grows up. What custom has sanctioned, in process of time becomes law; and the slightest deviation from the consecrated diction comes to be viewed with suspicion and alarm. Now the technical language, appropriated to the expression of the Calvinistic system in its nicer shades, however justifiable in itself,

has, by its perpetual recurrence, narrowed the vocabulary of religion, and rendered obsolete many modes of expression which the sacred writers indulge without scruple. The latitude, with which they express themselves on various subjects, has been gradually relinquished; a scrupulous and systematic cast of diction has succeeded to the manly freedom and noble negligence they were accustomed to display; and many expressions, employed without hesitation in Scripture, are rarely found, except in the direct form of quotation, in the mouth of a modern Calvinist. In addition to this, nothing is more usual than for the zealous abettors of a system, with the best intentions, to magnify the importance of its peculiar tenets by hyperbolical exaggerations, calculated to identify them with the fundamental articles of faith. Thus the Calvinistic doctrines[1] have often been denominated by divines of deservedly high reputation, *the doctrines of grace;* implying, not merely their truth, but that they constitute the very essence and marrow of the gospel. Hence persons of little reflection have been tempted to conclude, that the zealous inculcation of these, comprehends nearly the whole system of revealed truth; or as much of it, at least, as is of vital importance; and that no danger whatever can result from giving them the greatest possible prominence. But the transition from a partial exhibition of truth to the adoption of positive error is a most natural one; and he who commences with consigning certain important doctrines to oblivion will generally end in perverting or denying them."[2]

Now there is a strong tendency in the members of every sect, to narrow down their views to the standard of a sectarian creed. Hence the necessity that good men of different denominations should have frequent interchange of thought and feeling. And there is a strong tendency in the inhabitants of one land to exalt certain terms, which their fathers used, into tests of orthodoxy, and to circumscribe the teachings of the Bible, within a few national shibboleths. Hence the importance of looking away from our own land, and seeing phases that truth assumes elsewhere. We shall thus find, that modes of exhibition, which we have thought essential to a sound theology, are discountenanced by sound theologians who live under

[1] [The "Calvinistic doctrines" are here spoken of as distinguished from the Lutheran, or other evangelical systems.—Eds.]

[2] See Hall's Works, Vol. II. pp. 458—466. See also Cecil's Remains, p. 191, Andover Ed.

other skies; and that modes which we have always regarded as precursors, if not representatives of fatal error, are regarded by them as the safeguards of truth. We are alarmed at their peculiarities, and they are equally alarmed at ours. We are wondering at them, and they are amazed at our wonder. All this is a lesson to us. It teaches us, that the spirit of truth will live, when any particular body of it has died. It teaches us, that no mere modes are the articles of a standing or a falling church. It teaches us, that wise men and good men have philosophized differently, and yet have had one Lord, one faith, one baptism. We learn from it, that those two disciples of the Wittemberg reformer were more earnest in contending for the faith, than wise in determining what it was, when they began to beat each other, because one avowed himself a Martinist, while his combatant had been brought up a Lutheran. We learn from it, that if men will unite in one theology, they may be allowed to come to it through whatever by-paths of philosophy seem best to them. It is well, if we be full-grown, to see as many different faces as we can; to hear as many different voices; so we shall learn that humanity is everywhere one and the same, though its aspects are often various. Men from the northward will believe that water freezes, though the king of Siam may declare such belief heretical. As men do not look alike, nor talk alike, so they do not, in all respects, philosophize alike. They never have, and perhaps never will. So long as their temperaments vary, there will be variety in their theorizings. It is an old "dilemma" of the schoolmen, "there are two things which we ought not to fret about; what we can help, and what we can not:" now we think that mere speculative, as distinct from theological differences, come under the latter "conditional," and it seems idle then to go to exscinding our brethren on account of them. A wise Christian will devote his energies to make all men unite in fundamental doctrine; and will not be afraid of the world's coming to an end, because men, who agree in faith, differ on its philosophical relations. We believe that some among us are troubled over much about the speculative notions of the day. It is well to be cautious—not so well to be in a fright. It is a good thing to give heed lest the spirit of our religion be circumscribed or expelled; but it is needless to raise a panic because one man prefers this mode and another that of explaining the one faith. Let not the grasshopper become a burden to us, while we are so young as a people. No

greater evil has come upon us than has come upon other lands, and other ages. And yet the world moves on, as it did aforetime. We desire that men may be more true to their nature, as beings of "large discourse, looking before and after," and neither blown about by every wind of doctrine, nor fear-stricken as though some strange thing had happened, when the mind springs one of its artificial bars. Let us see what has been thought and said in other days, and we shall have the health-giving assurance, that truth will live on, though we cannot keep it always decked out, as Turretin or Gomar may have prescribed. Let us see how men, good and true, are now speculating in foreign climes, and we shall be convinced, that the sky does not close in with the earth four or five miles from the spot where we happen to stand, however central that spot may be. There are things in the world that we have never yet heard of. Then is it not well to have a mind capacious enough and liberal enough to examine, without dismal forebodings, a form of philosophy, even though it may not have been laid down in the standards? Is it not well to keep our balance, like the town clerk of Ephesus, and the doctor of the law before the Sanhedrim?[1] We should be glad to count up the instances, that have come to our knowledge, of sanguine men, who, at a period of peculiar religious encouragement, have seen evidences of the immediate approach of the Millennium; and the instances of melancholy men, who, at a period of peculiar religious conflict, have had no doubt, that it was the last letting loose of evil. We wish that all men of such "quick inference" would remember, that what is usual in one sphere is not therefore a universal law; and that what is *new* to them, be it in theology or philosophy, may be old and even stale to more knowing men than they. We are not sure that the present volume contains a single thought, of any importance, which is not already familiar to the reader; but it perhaps contains some new modifications of thought, which will deepen the impression, that the great realities of our religion may consist with diversified modes; that we are bound to cleave by all means to the realities, and to be neither indifferent nor bigoted about the modes.[2]

[1] Acts 19: 35—41. 5: 34—39.

[2] "We may notice," says Prof. Robinson, "as a happy trait in the character of German Christians, the absence of a censorious spirit. There are indeed, in that country as well as in others, those who esteem it their duty

Another consideration which has induced the translators to present this volume to the public, is the fact that German theological researches afford a striking illustration of the power of truth. The concurrence of distinct testimonies furnishes an argument, additional to that derived from either of the testimonies themselves, in favor of the fact attested; and when the witnesses have had no communion or acquaintance with each other, especially when they are so diverse in character as to be repulsive to each other, their agreement gives a new proof of the fact on which they agree. That Jew and Gentile, learned and unlearned, bond and free, have united in their admiration of the character of our Saviour, is a collateral argument in favor of that character; just as when connoisseurs and novices, in fair weather and in foul, standing on a higher and on a lower point of observation, have united in their admiration of a picture or a monument, we feel an increased assurance that the work of art is modeled after a true standard. Our confidence in evangelical doctrine does not depend on human authority, and yet we feel the more confidence in it when the Aristotelian and the Platonist bow down before it, and when, though each of them censures the other, they both do reverence to the teachings of Jesus. We feel, at such a time, that these teachings take deep hold of the elements of the human mind. We feel that divine truth is magnetic, and whenever factitious prejudices do not hold back, it draws all intellects unto it. When we survey the English and the German schools, we find that many, who started in seemingly opposite directions, have met at last on the same ground; that though the processes are different, the results are often the same; and if both schools should follow the advice given to an English jurist, to state their opinions, but not their reasons for them, many who seem to differ now, would be found

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to watch over the spiritual, as well as temporal concerns of their neighbors, and to make their own views and opinions the standard to which all others should conform. But as a general fact, this is not the character of Christians in Germany. If a brother agrees with them in essentials, they are willing to bear and to forbear with him in regard to other matters; and by the exhibition of meekness and gentleness seek rather to win him over upon minor points, than by disapprobation and censure drive him to a greater distance from them. They abstain from 'judging one another, remembering that the kingdom of God is not meat and drink, but righteousness and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost.' Indeed this would seem to be the true christian tolerance." Bib. Repos. Vol. 1. pp. 446—7.

essentially to agree. Americans have defended the evangelical system after a simple view of it; they have founded it on the principles of common sense, and the plain meaning of the Bible. The Germans have taken a more complex view of it; they have compared it with what they call a more spiritual philosophy; they have tested it by a more scholar-like interpretation, and the result has been that many of them have ended their circuit at our own goal. We have condemned them as too visionary; they have condemned us as too empirical; but the high and the low have met together in the belief, that what we technically call the evangelical system is, in its main features, the very system believed and taught by the apostles. Said one of their most orthodox commentators, after reading Dwight's Theology, "If this is the reasoning of a leader in the American church, what must the people be!" and yet the conclusions at which that leader arrived, and the spiritual state of that people, are essentially the same to which this critic is endeavoring to raise his own countrymen. Now we rightfully derive an argument in favor of our decisions of common sense, from the fact of their agreement with the results of German dialectics. It is often asked, what one important truth has been exhibited in this or that German treatise, which has not been explained, in a simpler and clearer style, by our New England divines? Suppose that we answer, not one; suppose that we admit that Twesten on Sin, for example, proves laboriously and yet darkly, nothing more than some of our own preachers have made clear to men, women, and children. What then? Is there no value in a new way of maintaining an old truth? Is there no satisfaction in seeing a recondite philosophy, and a historical investigation, lend their aid to what we have believed simply because we knew it to be true? It may indeed be replied to the above, that the advocates of error in our land may plead, in *their* favor, a like agreement with many German divines. But to this it may be briefly rejoined, that while we must assign some special cause for water's flowing up hill, we need not, for its flowing down.

Again, we have adopted our theological opinions with but little opposition from others. The evangelical divines of Germany have adopted and sustained theirs, after a contesting of every inch of ground. They have fought for every Greek particle and every illative conjunction. Their faith has gone through the burning fiery furnace, and has come out whole. Fires that we have known little

about, have purified their gold, which is of the same temper with ours. From its passing through such an ordeal, we prize it the more highly. It should seem that whatever can be done for the downfall of our religion, has been done in vain.

Si Pergama dextrâ
Defendi possent, etiam hâc defensa fuissent.

Though German skepticism may shake our confidence for a moment, it will be the means of strengthening it at the last. Rational faith is that which can "give a reason" for its existence, and is able to "convince gainsayers." That belief, which has never encountered one rough blast, is apt to be of hot-bed growth, sickly, ready to die. It is apt to afford pretext for the sarcasm of Hume, that "our most holy religion is founded on faith, not on reason." Not that every mind should be recklessly exposed to the attacks of the infidel; what we contend for is, that as many as can bear it should see the triumphs of evangelical doctrine over its cunningest foes.

Still further, many of those who have espoused the evangelical system in Germany, have done it after a vigorous contest in their own minds. Their early prejudices, the fashions of the day, the pride of learning, the whole system of their education, have been like a torrent bearing them on to infidelity. But they have struggled hard for the truth; they have worked their way into it against all these hindrances. It is not exactly so, however; truth has struggled hard with them; it has dragged them along, while they have been wrestling to get free; and it has brought them out into a safe place, in spite of themselves. In their child-like frankness of manner, some of them avow, to-day, their wish and their hope to prove this doctrine true, and to prove that false; and to-morrow they come in sad-hearted; they cannot succeed in their essayings. They have done their best; but the evidence is against them. Now the doctrine, which they wish to prove, is what we call heretical; that which they have tried in vain to disprove, is what we call evangelical. They have thus paid a homage to truth which we love to see. The history of Tholuck's mind, in reference to the doctrine of eternal punishment, is one illustration of this power in the principles of the Gospel to bind the reason to them, so long as the reason does not belie its name.[1] We legitimately confide more in the decisions

[1] A similar remark, with some modifications, may be made in respect to Schleiermacher's change of opinion on less essential points.

of a man who has been led by argument against his will, than of one who was "born into" his present faith, or has been allured into it by the smiles of fashion, or prejudice, or interest.

But once more: a large number of German theologians deny the divine authority of the Bible. This is true at the present moment, though the tendency of their minds is in a process of change for the better, and the day is not far distant, we believe, when the results of all their speculation will be, a general acquiescence in the fundamental truths of religion. But even now, these ministers of the New Testament, which they regard as of like authority with the Memorabilia of Xenophon, these doctors of divinity, who believe in no other God than the universe itself, are paying daily contributions to the cause of sound principle. They are free-born men; they are partial to none of the sects, but look with pity on all; they care not what the Bible teaches, whether this or that, for they are not going to be swayed by its decisions; and yet out of mere curiosity and in the spirit of antiquarian research, they apply their critical acumen to unfold its real meaning. In this state of freedom from hopes and fears, unshackled by creeds, unbiassed by sectarian predilections, they come to the conclusion that the Bible teaches, for substance, just what our Puritan fathers have said that it teaches. They declare, that if they believed the Bible, they would also believe in the correlative doctrines of depravity, regeneration and atonement; and that no man can be consistent with himself, who thinks that book to be inspired, and at the same time rejects the main peculiarities of the Lutheran or Calvinistic symbols. They declare their conviction, then, that the only alternative is, infidelity or orthodoxy. We feel strengthened by the judgment of these great men. There are but few among us, who are willing to abandon the orthodox faith for the infidel. It is doing less violence to the moral feelings to repose in some convenient arbor midway between the two. If there be found no such resting place, we have respect enough for the sensibilities of man, to believe that some, at least, will choose what they now regard as too rigid, rather than what all experience proves licentious.[1]

Another consideration, influencing the translators of the present volume, has been the fact, that our community have seen fewer specimens than would be useful, of the religious sentiment of the Ger-

[1] For an illustration of some of the preceding remarks, see pages 293—298 of this volume; and also the two translations from Rückert.

mans. The name of Germany has been often associated with coldness of feeling. It is not thought to be the land of warm-hearted and of free-hearted friends. Much study is thought to have frozen up the fountains of emotion there, and to have made men little else than dry plodding scholars, seldom refreshed with an outflow from the heart. It is needless to say that this estimate of the sensibility of the Germans is unjust. Their frankness and fulness of feeling is what we should do well to imitate. We come the nearer to withered trees. What one of them has said of the English, he would also apply to us; "In the pulpit they are all head, and no heart." The history of the German mind furnishes a good illustration of the truth, that intellectual excitement need not absorb the affections; that on the other hand, it may quicken and strengthen them. Such is the relation between the different provinces of our intellectual being, that improvement in one province, tends to improvement in another, and if the ideas are clear and bright, the feelings may be the more lively and deep. This tendency is indeed often resisted; the reverse often seems to be the fact. Good men have sometimes avoided "much study," through fear of becoming skeletons in their religious as well as physical nature. But they have mistaken a perversion for a law. Where is there more severity of mental discipline, than among the German scholars? From childhood upward their intellect is rigorously tasked; and yet they live long and happily; their feelings, instead of being compressed, have free vent; and the fault to be found with their expressions of sentiment is, not so much that they are unnaturally cold, as that they are unnaturally extravagant. There is often a mawkishness in the sentimentalism of the Germans, which would not exist if they were more practical men; still there is often a depth in it which is rarely equalled among us. They regard our manifestations of religious feeling as torpid; if we were more familiar with theirs, we should oftener regard them as rhapsodical. We think of a neological preacher as an impersonation of frigid intellect; and yet his mode of composing and delivering his sermons is often more like that of our fanatics, than like that of our judicious divines. He is kindled into fervor by moonbeams. When this constitutional sensibility is sanctified, it has some new, interesting features. Its characteristics are like those of the pious monks, who were so much the more intimate with their Saviour, as they were cloistered from the world;

not so healthy in their devotions as they were earnest; not working with their hands for the welfare of the church, not going about doing good, but still their life hid with Christ in God. It may not be uninteresting, then, to see such specimens of the religious sentiment among the Germans, as are exhibited in some portions of this volume. Certainly it will not be unprofitable, if we learn from them the consistency between severe thought and fervid affections; and if we try to sympathize with their warm gushing expressions of trust and love. Let us divest ourselves, for the moment, of national partialities, and open our hearts to the influence of a piety that has grown up on an uncongenial soil, amid tares and thorns. We shall see that the spirit of the Gospel is essentially the same, with whatever robes it may be invested; that good men, everywhere and at all times, have the same joys and sorrows, hopes and fears. We shall be more inclined, perhaps, to look upon the whole christian church as a brotherhood; arrayed in vestments of different hue, their individuality marked by dissimilar features, but the same blood flowing in the veins of all, and the pulse beating with the same life. The voice of the American and that of the German are unlike in compass and are on different keys; but the gutturals of the one and the sibilants of the other make pleasant concord in the songs of Zion.

Intimately connected with the preceding, is another consideration which has actuated the translators of this volume. It is the desire which has been often felt, to see in an English dress, more specimens of the German style of preaching. The discourses of Krummacher have been recently well received in Great Britain and America, but, apart from these, little has been known among us of the mode in which German theology has affected the ministrations of the pulpit. It might perhaps have been more useful to select, for this volume, sermons from various authors, instead of selecting them all from one. But as the evangelical portion of our countrymen have felt a peculiar interest in Prof. Tholuck, it has been thought advisable to select from him alone. The translator is not ignorant, that the discourses here presented have deficiencies and faults;[1] that their author indulges too much in antithesis, in forced comparison, in exuberance of even good metaphor, and in various peculiarities that offend a correct taste. If a critic wishes to illustrate certain infelicities of

[1] The faults of Tholuck's style of writing are alluded to in Note A to the first Article in this volume, and on pp. 220, 221, 222, 224, and others.

style, he will find undoubted specimens of them in the sermons of Prof. Tholuck. These sermons were not designed to be models of fine writing, but to do good to the men who heard them. Had their author adhered more closely to the canons of true rhetoric, he had done more wisely, but then he would not have been Tholuck; and, as it is, we are disposed to derive as much pleasure as we can from his excellences, and to apologize, as far as candor will allow, for his faults.

We think that candor will admit various apologies. In the first place, Tholuck's reading has been too multifarious to permit that diligent study of models, which is essential to a finished style. Secondly, his attention has been so much directed to the writings of Jewish Rabbins, and to the finical compositions of the middle ages, that we could not expect his taste to remain unvitiated. It is the man of one choice book, who, in some respects, is the least liable to injure his sensibilities to the beautiful: it is the man of many books, and particularly of such as are written with the monastic pruriency of imagination, who is most in danger of mistaking an artificial heat, for the glow of life. Thirdly, the mind of Tholuck is too excitable and his avocations are too numerous, to allow such a severe recension of his first draughts, as is necessary for chaste and correct writing. Fourthly, he wrote for the Germans and not for the Americans. We always do injustice to an author, by comparing his efforts with our standard rather than his own. Who does not admire the discourses of Jeremy Taylor, and John Howe? and yet what would be thought of a preacher, at the present time, who should write precisely after their model? What would be thought of a poet, who should employ nowadays, the same similes which Homer, or Virgil, or Shakspeare employed? What would become of the eloquence of Burke, if his speeches were delivered, in his own way, to an inland congregation of our countrymen? We are not intending to compare Tholuck with these men; but simply to say, that we always wrong a speaker or writer, when we overlook the standard which he had in mind; and imagine a different class of hearers or readers in his view, from those whom he actually addressed. We should always regard with some forbearance the errors of an author, when he has adopted them in sympathy with the public taste, and when in despite of them he exerts a marked influence over mind.

In addition to these palliative circumstances, some of which are

peculiar to Tholuck, there are others which are common to him and his countrymen, and may be therefore more properly noticed hereafter. We would not, however, be disposed to regard Tholuck as a mere subject for an apology. The excellences of his style of preaching cannot be so appropriately mentioned here, as in a subsequent part of the volume; and they are therefore considered somewhat fully in our Sketch of his Life and Character.[1] We think in the first place, that his excellences overbalance his faults. Strange indeed would it be, if a scholar of his varied acquisition, and a Christian of his living enthusiasm, should not express himself in the pulpit so as to do more good than hurt. But in the second place, even if it were otherwise, we should regard his discourses with interest as intellectual phenomena, as exhibiting the workings of a confessedly superior mind, and the tastes of a people, who in the words of Jean Paul, "hold the empire of the air." It cannot certainly be a fruitless occupation to analyze the discourses of a man, who, though trained in the Academy, is yet a favorite minister with the peasants, is often met by them in his walks and thanked for the spiritual blessings which have flowed from his sermons; who is also a favorite preacher with the students at the University, with some of the Rationalists even, and is often the means of winning them to the simplicity of the christian faith. They will sometimes hiss or murmur in the Lecture-Room, when he impugns some assertion of Gesenius, but on the next Sabbath, they will throng around his pulpit. German reviewers of his discourses, though they condemn some of his peculiar traits, award him a high meed of praise; and if we must adopt a modified eulogium, we yet may be interested in seeing what they so much admire. A reviewer in the Studien und Kritiken for 1835, says of him, Ubi plurima nitent, haud ego paucis offendar maculis; and even Bretschneider, notwithstanding his neological predilections, speaks of the fifth sermon in this volume, the very one which we should deem most obnoxious to his censure, as a clear proof of Tholuck's power over mind.

In the third place, we think that Dr. Tholuck's sermons will suggest some important queries in relation to the style of preaching prevalent in our own land. His excellences are those in which we are most deficient, and many of his faults are but his beauties carried too far. It may be well for us to compare our style of

[1] See pages 220—226 and several passages in the notes, pp. 170—185.

preaching with his, and see the different results which flow from our different intellectual training. We shall doubtless find much that is flattering to us; but let us not be reluctant to acknowledge our imperfections. The preaching of New England is perhaps, all things considered, superior to that of any other country. But we should not be the wise men we pretend to be, could we derive no benefit from a comparison of our homiletics with that of men whose intellect has been more severely tasked than ours, and who have let their imagination go more free.

It may be worth an inquiry, whether there is not sometimes a want of just proportion in our exercises of the sanctuary. Is there not a prevalent idea that *edification* embraces nothing but *intellectual* improvement? Is there not a tendency to let argument feed on worship? to abridge the singing and the prayer, so as to accommodate a lengthened discussion? to make the sermon too much of an absorbent, and to give logic the sceptre in the house of devotion? The sermons of Tholuck err on the side of brevity; do not ours sometimes err on the side of length and monopoly? His error is greater than ours, as deficiency is always worse than redundancy; we should be sorry to exchange our "metaphysics" for his want of it; still should not the smaller error be corrected? and if there be a desire to deliver "great sermons," should they be allowed to become great by swallowing up the exercises which are more distinctively devotional?

Again, are not our preachers too often fettered by professional rules? Do they give their mind free play? Do they not lose their personal identity, and merge themselves into one standard character; no one being a man really, but every one an impersonation of the rules; every one standing, writing, speaking *just so*, on penalty of being "rather a singular man for a preacher." How little of *home* in the pulpit; of a real, natural breathing, and *living* there! How much of the realist's idea of man; every body in general, nobody in particular. Have not rules come to be our masters, instead of being our servants? It is as useful to have rules as creeds; but let them be incorporated into the life, and not remain as "dried preparations." It is well and best, that the preacher be as one "set apart" in the pulpit; but why need he cease to speak like a fellow being, of like sympathies with his hearers; and why cease to be himself? It may be that Tholuck carries his humanity, and his

freedom from rule too far; "his specific difference" is sometimes too apparent; but his license is no excuse for our thraldom; and we may perhaps learn from him, as well as others like him, how goodly it is for one who has the preacher's high office, to manifest a kindred feeling with his race; to show that he is a husband, and father, and brother, notwithstanding his dignity, and that a warm heart beats under the sacred gown.[1]

Still further, is there not too great fondness, in many of our preachers, for the abstract forms of statement? Is not the pronoun "it" introduced, when you or he would be more tangible, and expressive. While we estimate above all price our doctrinal instructions, may they not be communicated to the popular mind with more clearness, and even with more fulness, if we will clothe them in

[1] The following is the substance of an extract, from Tholuck's Preface to the New Edition of his Sermons, pp. ix, x.

For the successful discharge of his office among the higher classes, it is desirable that the minister have the greatest possible cultivation of mind and the most extensive views. "At a time when Shakspeare is a more decisive authority for many than Paul, and a distich of Goethe is a stronger proof-text than the whole Epistle to the Romans and Galatians, a minister, who would produce an effect upon his congregation, must not be unacquainted with their standard-authors. If in any situation the remark of the apostle may be repeated, "All things are yours," it may be repeated here also. An English preacher was found, of a Saturday, reading Gibbon, and in reply to a question he said, "If I am Christ's, then is Gibbon mine, and the wheat-field which also brings forth fruit for Christ." In this respect the preacher of our times will receive injury from the old rules which have been prescribed, and which seem unable to draw the boundary-line strictly enough between the life and the pulpit. Hence his sermon appears to the learned like pedantry; like an Egyptian mummy;—it is like dried sweetmeats in a glass jar. "He even used the word Russia in the pulpit," was the recent complaint of a nice critic. In opposition to such prudish purifiers of the language, one might prescribe with Harms, "let the preacher speak negligently and incorrectly."—If we would bring our educated men near to the pulpit, we must frequently direct their minds to that province in which their own life is passed. Paul who quotes Aratus in Athens, and Epimenides before the Cretans, will afford us a screen, if the pulpit censors complain of us and condemn us. There is another advantage to be gained by this style. It increases confidence in the *person* of the preacher. He no longer seems to be (merely) a man of consecrated *caste*, who speaks from the school; all see that he himself has gone through with the afflictions of a hard, long life. We no longer feel as if the mere preacher were addressing us, but also the *man*."

words, which if less classical and refined, are yet more congenial with popular usage. It is a favorite strain of remark with Tholuck, that the sermon should "spring from the congregation, not from without the congregation;" that it should be "the product of his mother-wit," rather than of his dialectics; that "truth will often abide in the highest garret of the hearer's mind, without entering into the dwelling-room of the affections;" that "there is a way from the heart to the head, as well as a way from the head to the heart;" and that, though in the physical kingdom the light goes faster than the sound, yet in the spiritual, the feeling is often excited, before any direct appeal is made to the intellect.[1] "William Humboldt," he says in his characteristic way,[2] "styled eloquence the attaching of a composition to the life of the people. How much fresher would our discourses be, if we knew how to knit them properly with that which is before the eyes of all, and in the thoughts of all. Who has not already remarked, how often the eyes of the congregation, which had been moving to and fro, from right to left, would begin to direct themselves in a straight line to the pulpit, and how still all would become, as soon as the discourse passed from generals to particulars; to such matters of fact as were commonly known? The preacher then should illustrate his theme in such a style as the sound, unvitiated community employ; that is, the concrete.—When, for example, Luther wishes to show what the words in Matt. 5: 21 seq. mean, and to prove that even the feeling, which may lead to the death-blow, is ground of condemnation, what compressed power is in his style! What accommodation to the people, in contemplating so high a sentiment! "Thinkest thou," he asks, "that Christ speaks only of the fist, when he says thou shalt not kill? What is the meaning of *thou?* Not barely thy hand or thy foot, thy tongue or any other single member of thy body; but all that thou art, in body and in soul. Just so, if I say to any one, thou shalt not do this, I mean, not with the fist, but with the whole person."

We do not wish to deny that Tholuck's brightness often becomes a glare; yet even this may suggest that our occasional darkness should become light. But whatever may be said of the rhetorical character of these discourses, we hope that the pious feeling which is breathed in them, may impart warmth to the reader's heart; and also that the exhibitions of sacred truth, which are given in various

[1] See Pref. to New Ed. of Serm. pp. 50, 51. [2] See Ib. p. 48, 49.

parts of this volume, may exert their appropriate influence upon his moral sensibilities. He will find here but little exhortation to piety; and piety is a feeling which does not come by barely soliciting it. It comes, if it come at all, by a meditation on its appropriate objects. Men love, not merely because they are entreated to do so, but by beholding an object of love. And it has been a prominent aim of the translators, to present such themes for religious thought, as shall elicit the feelings of devotion, and give nourishment to the meditative spirit.

The translators may be permitted to say, that they have had in mind, in their selections, not so much the learned scholar, as the great mass of the intelligent and educated community. They could have easily selected articles of a higher character, in respect to learning and profoundness of investigation, than some of those which have been chosen. They wished, however, to benefit a larger class than would be attracted by mere erudition or by abstruse researches. This general design has led the translators to annex some illustrative notes, which would not be needed by the advanced scholar.[1] For the same reason, references to books, quotations from foreign languages, and parenthetical clauses have been frequently transferred from the text to the bottom of the page. These quotations have generally, also, been translated.

A word in respect to the execution of the work. "There are two methods in which a translator may proceed. One is, to give simply the sense of the original in the translator's own language and style; in this way the reader obtains the thoughts of the original author, but gains no acquaintance with his style and manner as a writer. The other mode is to translate the language of the original, as well as express the thoughts; so that the writer himself, in his peculiar modes of thought and expression, may be placed before the reader. In lighter works, the former method may be sufficient; in more important ones the latter is alone admissible. Indeed, so much often depends on the shaping of the thought and the coloring of the expression, that justice cannot be done to a writer in any other way."[2]

[1] For instance, the testimonies concerning our Lord by Josephus, Tacitus, etc. on pp. 459—461.

[2] Bib. Repos. IV. 241. There is still another mode in which translations have been attempted, i. e. the merely verbal. It is a translation of words, and of nothing else. Of this class, Dobson's Translation of Schleiermacher's

"There are two maxims of translation," says a great German critic; "the one requires that the author belonging to a foreign nation be brought to us in such a manner that we may regard him as our own; the other, on the contrary, demands of us that we transport ourselves over to him, and adopt his situation, his mode of speaking, his peculiarities. The advantages of both are sufficiently known to all instructed persons, from masterly examples."

The translators of the present volume have attempted a medium between these two modes. The nature of the undertaking, in their opinion, demanded such a course. They have endeavored, on the one hand, to make a readable book. It is intended mainly for those who are not familiar with the modes of thought and of expression which prevail in Germany, and who would throw down in disgust a translation that was an exact copy of the original. Accordingly, long and involved sentences have been frequently broken up. In some cases the translators have been compelled to express by circumlocution, that which in the original is indicated by a single compound word. There are instances, where a literal translation would convey no sense whatever to an English reader. In such instances a slight paraphrase has been unavoidable. Those only can understand the embarrassments of the case who have themselves attempted a similar labor. On the other hand, the translators have not felt themselves authorized to adopt a perfectly free English version. They have wished to preserve, as far as was consistent with perspicuity, the manner of the original. Such writers as Rückert and Ullmann have peculiarities which ought not to be wholly merged or disguised. The refined reasoning which is found in some parts of their writings requires that their mode of expression should be preserved. A perfectly Anglo-Saxon sentence would obliterate a delicate shade of thought. It is better sometimes to offend a critical English ear than to sacrifice the sense of an author. There are instances, in the present volume, of long and somewhat intricate sen-

Introductions to the Dialogues of Plato is a specimen. Not a few of the sentences are absolutely unintelligible. The original not being at hand, we have been compelled to copy a few sentences from Mr. Dobson's work. They may be found on pp. 377, 378, 379 of the present volume. We have ventured to alter the form of the sentences somewhat. We fear, however, that the reader will still find difficulty in understanding them. It ought to be said in justification of Mr. Dobson, that his author is extremely complicated in his modes of thought and style.

tences, which were thought to be necessary in order to preserve the full meaning of the original. The German particles, like those of the Greek, not unfrequently connect the clauses of a compound proposition in such a manner as to render a division into independent sentences impracticable. The editors of this volume can only say, that they have endeavored to make it acceptable to a class of readers, whose wants have not hitherto been consulted in translations from the German.[1]

The translators embrace this opportunity to repeat a remark which is made several times in the sequel, that they are not to be considered as responsible for particular opinions of the authors whom they have translated, nor for the mode in which a thought may be clothed. They believe that the general impression of the book will be salutary, and that all the articles, taken as a whole, will have a favorable intellectual and moral influence. Still not a few things might be specified which indicate lax or erroneous habits of thinking on the part of the authors. Such they would entirely disclaim. Rückert, for instance, as is remarked on another page, treats the inspired writers with a freedom which is wholly unjustifiable. His Commentary too often betrays a want of reverence for those whom the Holy Spirit infallibly secured from error. We have occasionally inserted notes, where an objectionable sentiment or mode of expression occurs. It must not be inferred, however, that we approve in every case where we are silent. All which is necessary is that the reader should be aware of the characteristics of his author, so that he may make all suitable allowances and exceptions. Rückert is apparently a conscientious believer in the evangelical system, and has, as we should infer from his writings, suffered not a little on account of the honest and bold avowal of his religious convictions. We cannot but admire the simplicity and straight-forwardness of his course. His guiding principle of exposition is: "Employ all the proper means in your power to ascertain the true sense of the writer; give him nothing of thine; take from him nothing that is his. Never inquire what he ought to say; never be afraid of what he does say."[2] We may also add in this connection that we do not

[1] The part which the translators have respectively performed in the present volume is indicated by the initials of their names in the table of contents.

[2] See p. 293 seq.

vouch for the truth of any of the hypotheses of Lange in the article on the Resurrection of the Body.[1]

We may likewise remark that we do not consider ourselves responsible for the offences against good taste which may be found in this volume. It should be recollected that the Germans do not pay that regard to the canons of rhetoric which we consider to be indispensable. They have no separate department for it in their schools and universities. Their language also is of such a nature as scarcely to allow an undeviating system of rules. Every writer suits his own judgment or convenience in this respect. The language is so ductile, so susceptible of being compounded, as to render a fixed standard of it hardly practicable. This accounts, in part, both for the want of good taste in German treatises, and for the difficulties of rendering them into good English. At the same time, this circumstance imparts a freshness and vigor to the German style. It effectually breaks up a dull uniformity. An author is a representative of himself, not of an undeviating method, or of a national taste. In German writers there is idiosyncrasy, there are marked individual peculiarities. The elasticity and freedom of thought manifest on literary and philosophical subjects seem to be in proportion to the constraint which exists in political matters.

In conclusion, the translators would express their grateful acknowledgements to Professor Stuart for his valuable advice and assistance in repeated instances. They are under special obligations to Professor Sears of Newton, who has permitted them to have free access to his excellent library, and who has generously aided them by his extensive information and by his familiar acquaintance with the German language.

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[1] See the Note on pp. 303, 304.

LIFE, CHARACTER, AND STYLE OF PAUL.

BY

DR. A. THOLUCK.

REMARKS ON THE

LIFE, CHARACTER, AND STYLE OF THE APOSTLE PAUL.

DESIGNED AS AN

INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE PAULINE EPISTLES.[1]

CHAPTER I.

EARLY LIFE OF THE APOSTLE.

Importance of this investigation.—Time of Paul's earliest residence at Jerusalem.—Object of it.—His education in Greek Literature.—Quotations from the Greek Poets.—His Greek chirography.

THAT part of the life of Paul, which is delineated in the book of Acts, and which relates to his agency, during the later periods of his life, in preaching the Gospel, has been fully exhibited in modern works as in those of Hemsen and Neander.[2] Neander in particular has examined the subject, with constant reference to the results, which flow from it, for the interpretation of the sacred writings. The events which occurred in the life of Paul before his conversion, and the circumstances of his early training have not been investigated with equal accuracy. Such an investigation, however, is needed by the interpreter of Paul's Epistles, because, by means of it, the whole image of the man is made to stand out so much the

[1] See Note A. at the close of this Treatise.

[2] [Life of Paul, by Hemsen, and History of the Establishment, and Progress of the Christian Church, by Neander. Hemsen's account of Paul's early life is inserted at the end of this Treatise.—TR.]

more visibly before the eye, and very many of his peculiar characteristics are so much the more easily explained.

In reference to the education of the apostle, the first question of importance is, at what period of his life did he go to reside at Jerusalem. Eichhorn and Hemsen suppose, that he did not go to reside there until the thirtieth year of his age. As at the time of the martyrdom of Stephen, he was still called "a young man,"[1] and as this designation supposes that he might then have been in his thirtieth year, but could not have exceeded it;[2] so it must be maintained, according to these writers, that he went to Jerusalem but a short time before this martyrdom, and also that very little could be said concerning any influence which he had then received from the school at Jerusalem, and from Gamaliel. But how can we adopt this opinion, when the apostle, in opposition to it, utters these words, "*Born* indeed in Tarsus, a city in Cilicia, yet *brought up*, *ἀνατεθραμμένος*, in *this* city at the feet of Gamaliel."[3] It follows by necessity from this passage, that the apostle went to the capital city in the period of his boyhood. How early in his boyhood, cannot be determined. Certainly, however, too early a date must not be assigned, as Jerusalem furnished no special opportunity for the education of children. Neither in their capital city, nor generally among the Jews, do schools for boys and children appear to have been in existence at that time. They were first established shortly before the destruction of Jerusalem by Jeschu Ben Gamla. The training of lads was, until this period, a private business, and committed to parents and friends. We may therefore fix the date of Paul's first journey to Jerusalem, at that period of his youth, when the Rabbinical system of education began. In all probability Paul was sent to the capital for this particular object, to be educated by a Rabbi. The assertion of Strabo, that the inhabitants of Tarsus were, as a general thing, led by their love of learning to foreign cities for the completing of their education, has no proper reference to Paul and to his countrymen generally, but only to the Greeks.

[1] Acts 7: 58.

[2] Zell, in his Observations on Aristotle's Ethics, Vol. II. p. 14, having occasion to explain the wide extent of the phrase *νέος παῖς*, makes the following good remark, "The ancients extended the period of youth too far; we transgress the laws of nature, in making this period too short."

[3] See Paul's speech recorded in Acts 22. 3.

The study of the Mishna is said to have been commenced at the tenth year of the child; at his thirteenth year he became a subject of the law, or in their phraseology, a son of the law. Accordingly we may determine, that Paul went to reside in Jerusalem, at some period between the tenth and thirteenth year of his life. And as, on this computation, he remained somewhere about twenty years under the guidance of the teachers in the capital, and especially of Gamaliel, the influence of this education upon his character must have been important.

Before Paul went to Jerusalem, while in his earliest boyhood, we cannot suppose that he received any education, save that derived from the study of the Old Testament. This study is said in a passage of the Talmud[1] to have commenced as early as the fifth year of the child. The expression, also "From a child thou hast known the Holy Scriptures,"[2] shows that pious parents among the Jews instructed the minds of their children, at a very early age, in the sacred writings. The strictest class prescribed, that the child, as soon as it could speak, should learn the "Hear, oh Israel," etc.[3] The apostle did not probably receive, at this earliest period of his youth, an education in Grecian literature. Even if it be granted, that his Hellenistic parents were, in this respect, less strict than others, still such an education did not by any means belong to so early a period of life.

The question is here to be answered, how those three citations, which we find in Paul, from the Greek poets, are to be regarded.[4] It is now supposed, generally, that they were learned from social intercourse, and not from his personal reading. In regard to the quotation from Menander and Epimenides, this is altogether probable;

[1] In Pirke Aroth. Ch. 5. § 21, Jehuda Ben Thema prescribes, "At five years of age let children begin the Scripture; at ten, the Mishna; at thirteen be subjects of the law." If this appointment seems to assign too early a period of life for such a study, it must be remembered that the Orientals come to maturity earlier than we do, and that the thirteenth year among them corresponds at least with the fifteenth among us. On this account, the same passage in the Talmud, which has been alluded to above, designates the eighteenth year as the one for marriage.

[2] 2 Tim. 3: 15.

[3] See the Treatise of Dassow, entitled, The Hebrew Infant liberally educated. Wittemb. 1714.

[4] See Note B, at the close of this Treatise

but not so in regard to that from Aratus. That passage is quoted precisely according to the text;[1] and from its own nature it appears much less probable, than in the case of the other two, that it was introduced as a proverb into ordinary intercourse. Add to this the fact, that Aratus was a Cilician; so that, while Paul was residing in his native province, the works of the poet might very easily have fallen into his hands. We may therefore, perhaps with good reason, suppose that the apostle, when at a later period of his life he again took up his abode in Cilicia, became acquainted with this passage by his own perusal of Aratus. Why should we hesitate to believe, that this man, made free as he was by the Spirit of Christ from the prejudices of the Jews, having an eye so freely open to everything that concerned humanity, and especially to everything that stood related to his office; that this man, during his residence of almost thirty years among the Hellenists, should now and then have opened and read one of their books? This supposition will appear still more probable, if we consider, what we shall prove hereafter, that even Paul's Jewish teacher was not averse to Grecian culture.[2]

The idea, that the apostle had such an intimate acquaintance with the literature of Greece, would have indeed the less probability, if it were correct, as many assert, that he never was really master of the Greek chirography. This assertion is founded on Gal. 6: 11.[3]

We would not, it is true, directly assert with Neander,[4] that the interpretation which Winer, Rückert, Usteri give of that passage, introduces into it an idea which is unworthy of the apostle, but the interpretation appears to us unintelligible. The large size and misshapen form, which Paul gave to the Greek letters, is mentioned on the supposition of those interpreters, for the purpose of showing that the chirography occasioned him trouble; that, notwithstanding the trouble, he had written; and this fact would be good evidence of his love to the church. But if the apostle designed barely to express this thought, 'you see my love to you, that, notwithstanding I am

[1] The passage from Aratus, as is well known, corresponds with that of Paul even to the γὰρ; thus, τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν, while for example the parallel passage in Cleanthes runs thus, ἐκ σοῦ γὰρ γένος ἐσμέν.

[2] See note C, at the close of this Treatise.

[3] "Ye see how large a letter I have written unto you, with mine own hand."—Engl. Tr.

[4] Age of the Apostles, Part I. p. 255.

able to write only in an unformed hand, I have yet written to you,' then he expressed himself very obscurely and ineptly, when he said, "you see with what long letters I have written to you with my own hand." We wonder how Usteri could have called this interpretation the most natural.

When we compare together the words of the apostle in Gal. 6: 1, "you see πηλίκοις ὑμῖν γράμμασιν I have written to you with mine own hand," and the words in 2 Thess. 3: 17, "the salutation of Paul with mine own hand, which is the token in every epistle; so I write," should not the first thought that rises in our minds be, that Paul had the same reason for mentioning, in the former passage, the style of his chirography, that he had for mentioning the same in the latter? If we may take πηλίκος in the sense of ποῖος, the passage is easily explained, and the one is in all respects parallel with the other. That this interpretation is absolutely inadmissible, cannot be easily maintained. According to the Greek grammarians,[1] πηλίκον stands also for ποῖον. So likewise in all languages, the significations of the interrogative pronouns run into one another. Even the Latin style of the second (or silver) age admitted the word quanti instead of quot. However we need not by any means suppose, that πηλίκον expressed, in this passage, a quality that was altogether indeterminate. If the great size of his alphabetic characters were a distinguishing mark of the hand-writing of Paul, then the expression may involve a reference to this mark. 'You see with what characters, that is, with what large letters, I have written to you with mine own hand; from this circumstance you may know that this letter is genuine.'[2]

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[1] See Etymologicum Magnum.

[2] See note D, at the close of this Treatise.

CHAPTER II.

EARLY LIFE OF THE APOSTLE.

Influence of the instruction which Paul received in the Jewish schools.—His familiarity with the Jewish Scriptures.—Mode in which he was taught to study them.—Effect of this mode.—Resemblance between Paul and Hamann.—Socratic exercises in the Jewish schools; their influence.—Character of the Jewish teachers, particularly of Gamaliel.

Let us now inquire into the influence of the instruction, which the apostle received in the capital city.

What was taught in the kind of schools in which he received his education?[1] The instruction of the doctors of the law, and Gamaliel was one of these,[2] consisted exclusively in the interpreting of the Scriptures. The object of this interpretation was, partly, to develop from the inspired word the prescriptions of ecclesiastical law; and partly, to connect with biblical interpretation various kinds of instruction in ethical science. The former of these systems of instruction was called the Halache; the latter was called the Agadda. As even at the present day in the academies called Medresschs, the young men among the Mohammedans are instructed in the Koran, that they may be qualified both for teachers of religion, and for lawyers; so likewise the young men among the Jews were instructed in the rules for the allegorical interpretation of the Scriptures, adopted by the Rabbins.[3] We must not, however, conceive of this biblical interpretation, as the individual work of the Rabbi who was instructing at any particular period. It consisted rather, for the most part, in the traditions of past history, respecting the opinions and instructions of celebrated Rabbins upon the inspired word.

How much the education of the apostle availed for giving him a comprehensive knowledge of the Bible, we perceive in his remarkably copious and ready use of all parts of the sacred writings, and in the additional fact that he ordinarily quotes from memory. Koppe, who regards the Epistle to the Hebrews as the production of Paul, has collected eighty-eight quotations from the Old Testament, of

[1] See note E, at the close of this Treatise. [2] Acts 5: 34.

[3] [Botte Hamedrasch der Rabbinen. For an explanation of the Midrasch, or Midras, see Lightfoot's Works, Vol. XII. p. 96.—Tr.]

which it is thought probable that at least forty-nine were cited from memory. Koppe is also inclined to the opinion, and so likewise are more recent interpreters, as Bleek,[1] and more especially Schulz,[2] that every one of Paul's citations, without an exception, is made from memory. Bleek has also shown more clearly than any other, that often the apostle's memory referred not to the text of the Septuagint, but to that of the original Hebrew. This opinion receives probability from the fact that we find it confirmed in the case of John, Matthew, and other writers of the New Testament.[3] That Paul was well acquainted with the Jewish traditions is evident from many passages in his writings, as for example 2 Tim. 3: 8.

The instructions, however, which were derived from the passages of Scripture produced for examination in the Jewish schools, were derived in such a way, as to increase profoundness of thought in minds which were capable of it; but more especially to increase mental acumen. Very easily, also, there would be called forth a trifling and pragmatical inquisitiveness, that would press single letters in all ways. Resemblances in words, the order in which passages of the Bible should follow each other, the nature of particular letters, alphabetical alterations, the Greek punctuation of the Targum, the sound and signification of similar words from the Aramaean and Arabic, must have served as the points to which the instructions from the Bible were attached. "But this freedom of investigation would neither falsify the Scripture, nor take away its appropriate meaning; because these exercises were adopted for the sake of free discussion, not of a blind law. The more extensive the field, that each man had for mental exercise in discussing the sacred books at the Agadda, so much the less authority could be yielded to the word of a single individual. The Agadda, therefore, had no binding authority at all, either for interpretation, or for practice."[4]

Most commonly, the meaning of the sacred Scriptures was investigated in four different ways. The first related to the simple historical meaning of words; the second to the higher sense, which was intended by the writers themselves, as in parables, prophetic visions, etc.; the third to the higher sense, which the writers them-

[1] See Bleek's Introduction to the Epistle to the Hebrews, p. 343.

[2] See the Halle Literary Journal, 1829, No. 104.

[3] See the discussion of this subject in Eichhorn's Bibliothek, Vol. II.

[4] Zung on the Religious Discourses of the Jews. Berlin, 1832. p. 327.

selves did not intend, but which seems to have been intimated by the Spirit of God; and the fourth, to the felicitous combination of some one truth with a passage of Scripture, so as to manifest the intimate union and the relation of dependence, subsisting between the former and the latter.[1] In the treatment of the sacred writings, it was esteemed the most important excellence to make use of the greatest possible subtlety, and thereby to give them the greatest possible copiousness of meaning. The later Rabbins boasted that they were מדקדק, that is, they exhibited subtlety in the interpretation of the Scriptures.[2] So likewise Josephus[3] asserts, that only one thing was prized by the Jews as it should be, and that is, the man who is able to interpret rightly the *δύναμις* of the Scriptures. "They accord wisdom to him only who clearly understands the law, and is able to interpret the power of the sacred writings." This whole method of interpretation is among us decidedly and rightly condemned, on account of its extravagances. The more disproportionately the whole spiritual life of the Jews was confined to one code of but limited extent, and to its traditional interpretation, and the more a pressing of the letter was resorted to for filling up what was wanting in the spirit, so much the more did their interpretation of the Bible become a caricature.

There are two things, however, which we must not forget. One has been noticed above, that these subtle interpretations never in any way made pretensions to restore the real meaning of the author, but claimed to be allowed merely as ingenious fancies. To such fancies we may properly apply the remark of Cicero, "it is the part of an ingenious man to be able so to turn the force of a word, as to give it a different meaning from what others assign to it." The other thought is, that though monstrous and ridiculous specimens of translating and interpreting language are found in the works of most Rabbins, there are yet various exceptions. By some this method of interpreting is employed in a manner no less profound and indicative

[1] The first of these modes was expressed by פָּשׁוּט, the second by סוד, the third by דְּרַשׁ, the fourth by דְּמִיז. The whole four are ordinarily expressed by the abbreviation פַּרְדֵּס, paradise.

[2] What Rabbi Joshua Levita, in his ספר עולם תליכות, says concerning the manner, in which the Jewish literati labored in the interpretation of Scripture, is very characteristic of the mental habits of the older Rabbins.

[3] See his Antiquities, l. xx. c. xi.

of genius, than is done by Hamann,[1] who, in the same way as the steel upon flintstone, strikes directly upon every passage of Scripture, so as to bring from it sparks of fire. Attend for example to the following remark from him, which while it throws out highly significant allusions on all sides, expresses, at the same time, in a manner indicative of profound investigation, a thought to which we also would subscribe.[2] "Because Moses," he says, "places the life in the *blood*, all genuine Rabbins are struck with horror at the *spirit* and *life* in the prophets; and are therefore led to sacrifice *the strict meaning of words*, as the only darling son was sacrificed ἐν παραβολῇ, Heb. 11: 19, and they convert into *blood* the streams of eastern wisdom."[3]

Shall we now say, that the influence of this mode of education on the mind of the apostle is manifest? Certainly every reader of the Pauline Epistles can adduce many passages in which he thinks himself able to perceive such an influence. Moreover, if we will once attend to the fact, that the characteristics just described, predominated in the writings and schools of those Jewish literati, then the influence of the apostle's early education will appear to be the key to the mode in which he treats the Old Testament. It will also be the key to the subtlety which he exhibits in many other respects.

We have besides no inclination to oppose the idea of such an influence. If in one man, James for instance, the operation of the more ascetic features of Pharisaism is conspicuous, why should not the operation of that biblical learning, which the Pharisees possessed, be conspicuous in Paul?[4] The apostles, so far as the form is con-

[1] See Note F, at the close of the Treatise.

[2] [The analysis of this singularly figurative passage seems to be the following. 'Because Moses places the life of an animal in the blood, which may be shed, all genuine Rabbins are struck with horror at the spiritual life which is found in the prophetical writings, and therefore wish to destroy it. As Isaac was sacrificed figuratively, (ἐν παραβολῇ), so these Rabbins sacrifice the strict meaning of words by resorting to allegory; and as the *life* of these passages is thus taken away, the wise instructions of the Orientals appear, under the Rabbinical commentary, to be but puerile trifling. The streams of wisdom are made dark with *blood*,' as so much blood has been shed, i. e. life of style destroyed by false interpretation. There seems to be a play upon the word, blood, throughout the passage.—Tr.]

[3] See Note G, at the close of the Treatise.

[4] Schneckenburger, in the treatise entitled, "Were the Pharisees Religious Philosophers, or Ascetics," has made the assertion that, as Pharisees,

cerned in which they stated heavenly truth, stand in intimate historical connection with their times and their people. Yet we cannot, like several modern theologians, rest contented with merely this remark. From what we already know, we find ourselves compelled, by the relation in which the apostles stood to the christian system of faith, a relation in which the Lord himself had placed them, as the preachers of his word, as those who were commissioned to succeed him, and to carry on his own work; we find ourselves compelled to deny that there was any such influence of temporary and national forms, as to modify the substance of their doctrine. Indeed the decisions on this subject, may be established not barely a priori, but in view of that which lies actually before us in the apostolical writings. With our eye fixed, then, on these writings, we maintain, that the subtle methods of interpretation which we find in the Jewish schools, and which the apostle had there appropriated to himself, were employed by him in such a way, that the true idea can in no passage be mistaken. This is the fact, although, according to the historical connection in which the passages occur in the Old Testament, only a single point is given, that can furnish support for the inference which the apostle has derived from them. But should it not be the direct object of the pure interpretation of the Old Testament, to display the *full picture* that, in its first rudiments, was *faintly* represented in the preparative economy? The manner which Paul adopted, may indeed be exhibited, most happily, in cases where he has nothing to do with the interpretation of the written code, but with the record which is inscribed upon the heart of every man. When Paul infers from the inscription on the altar, "to the unknown God,"[1] that the heathen acknowledged their ignorance of the true God, it cannot be proved that such an acknowledgement lies in the express terms of that inscription. If, however, the heathen, besides the names of thousands of divinities, had also an idea of divinely operating powers, for which they had no name; and if to these unknown powers they erected altars, do they not thereby, in the reason of the

they were mere ascetics. But this assertion is not entirely correct; for the above mentioned acute discrimination in interpreting the law was found in their schools. It is only correct, so far as the philosophy of religion, if we choose to retain this phrase, was not absolutely requisite in order to become a Pharisee.

[1] Acts 17. 23.

thing, make a confession that their knowledge of God is defective? And has not the apostle, with the noblest and the most profound wisdom, made use of this very point, for the purpose of attaching to it such evidence, as would show to the heathen, what is the view and the longing of their inward souls? Now the education, which the apostle received at the Pharisaical school of Jerusalem, must have aided him in this kind of acute and profound interpretation, after he had been once enlightened by the Spirit. Hamann also interpreted Rabbinically, if you please so to speak, and he not only interpreted the Bible in this way, but also the works of genius of all men and all times. But who has not pursued, with astonishment and with true instruction, those hints, among which every block of marble becomes a statue of Memnon? Wherever in fact the luminary of Jesus rises, there many phenomena of nature and of the history of man, which otherwise had remained forever dumb, begin to be heard. In this also the remark holds true, (that is made in Note G), one must know how to interrogate, (or he cannot receive an answer).

We are not obliged, however, to look around us for other men, possessing merely human greatness, by whose authority we may defend the method adopted by Paul. Does not Christ follow essentially the same usage, as for instance in Luke 20: 37, Mark 9: 13? In reference to these passages, indeed, we are to hold fast the theological distinction between him and his apostles, that he had an insight which they had not, into the historical relations of the inspired passages, which were quoted. The proof of this statement, to which many are disinclined to give their assent, does not belong to this place.

The Jewish system of instruction gave keenness to the pupil's mind in another way. The instruction was not given in the form of oral lectures but catechetically, and so that not merely the teacher proposed questions to the scholars, but the scholars to the teachers, and to the remaining fellow pupils. We have an instance of this in the scene of the child Jesus in the temple.[1] And this mode of

[1] Frequently in the Talmud is it said of the pupils, "they proposed to him the question," or "he proposed to him the question." The answers are designated by the word מתיבי "they replied." Even yet the Jews call such Socratic exercises, Kaschen, from קָשֶׁה difficult. To such questions, if the solution cannot be found, the abbreviation תיקו is applied, which is the same as to say, "The Tishbite (Elias) will solve the difficulties and questions."

teaching was not confined merely to the rules for allegorical interpretation laid down in the Midras, but even the discourses in the synagogue might be interrupted by questions, or when the discourses were concluded, the hearer might propose some difficult inquiries, as is done even at the present day in the Jewish synagogue. A complete system of Rabbinical dialectics was formed in this way; and we need but a moderate acquaintance with the Talmudic writings, to be convinced of the great error into which Eichhorn fell, when he supposed that the dialectics of the apostle must have proceeded from the schools of heathen philosophers. So far from this, the apostle's logic bears, throughout, the impress of Judaism. This is indicated by many things, particularly by his abrupt mode of expressing himself.[1] In general, also, the antithetic and piquant style of instruction that he adopted, may be ascribed to the influence of his Jewish culture.

This Rabbinical education however, as has been already expressed, had not the same character in all schools. It depended essentially upon the peculiar mental habit of the instructor. Even in the first centuries after Christ, as well as in later periods, we find three classes of Jewish teachers. The first class had an inclination to the spiritless and literal; the second class to a freer and more soul-moving style, like that of the Old Testament, a style in which the interest in the moral was predominant; and the third adopted the style of mystical *theosophy*.[2] We always conceive of a Jewish scribe, as one who adheres to the dead letter, and who is also, probably, a hypocrite. The opposite might be learned, with sufficient clearness, from Nicodemus and Joseph of Arimathea. That the Pharisees are not all to be regarded as hypocrites, is evident from that well known passage in the Talmud, in Tractate Sota, which introduces seven classes of Pharisees. Five of these are hypocritical; while of the sixth it is said, they are Pharisees from love to the recompense of God;[3] and of the seventh, they are Pharisees from the fear of God.[4]

[1] "His method of discussion," remarks Michaelis, very correctly, in his Introduction, Part 1, p. 165, "has very often that Jewish brevity, which leaves the reader many things to supply of himself, and which we see in the Talmud." We are initiated into the principles of this logic, and especially its terms, by Bashuysen, in his Clavis Talmudica Maxima, Panoviae 1714. With this also may be connected Buxtorf's Abbreviaturae.

[2] See Note H, at the close. [3] מאהבה. [4] מיראה.

To this is added, in the same place, "Be not afraid of the Pharisees, nor of those who are not Pharisees, but of those who are disguised so as to be like the Pharisees."

The narratives of the Jews inform us of several distinguished Israelites, who lived about the time of Christ, and possessed true virtue and piety. Of the Cabbalistic school were Honias Ben Hacana and Hanan Ben Dosa; of the school of the Pharisees were Jonathan Ben Saccai, Simeon Ben Hillel, Gamaliel the Elder, who was teacher of the apostle, and his son Rabbi Simeon.[1] We must suppose, indeed, that this very Gamaliel had distinguished himself by pure virtue and piety, as he stood so high among the people, although he did not adopt the principles of narrow-hearted Pharisaism. In the Acts of the Apostles it is said,[2] that he was "had in reputation among all the people." According to the accounts in the Talmud, which agree with this, he was called "the glory of the law," and they have the saying, "since Rabbi Gamaliel died, the glory of the law has ceased."[3] If we may credit the account in Tractate Gittin, Fol. 36: 2, this estimable man had gained even the esteem of Titus. There are various features of his conduct, that show how free he was from the ordinary narrow-heartedness of the Pharisees. He had on his seal a small image, which would have been rejected without doubt by the Pharisees generally. The Talmud mentions concerning him, that he took an especial pleasure in the beauties of nature, a trait which is likewise contrary to the bigoted spirit of Pharisaism. He studied Greek authors, and his freedom of spirit went so far, that he did not hesitate while at Ptolemais, to bathe in an apartment where stood a statue to Venus. Being asked by a heathen, how he could reconcile this with his law, he gave the liberal and sensible answer: "The bath was here before the statue; the bath was not made for the service of the goddess, but the statue was made for the bath." The style in which we hear him speak before the Sanhedrim concerning the course to be taken with the germinating Christian religion, agrees remarkably with these features of his character. His expression, in this case, is indeed one which could not be expected from the mouth of an ordinary Pharisee.

Now, such learned men among the Jews, as possess this enlarged

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[1] See Note I, at the close.

[2] Acts 5: 34.

[3] See Note K, at the close.

mental character are usually the authors of beautiful moral sentences or treatises. The style too, in which they interpret the Old Testament, is very diverse from the insipid style of the mere literal interpreters. Certainly then we may suppose, that such instruction exerted a wholesome influence upon the susceptible heart of young Paul. Religion was exhibited to him, not merely as a matter of dead speculation, but as a concern of the life. According to that interpretation of 2 Tim. 1: 3 which we believe to be the correct one, Paul testifies that his ancestors practised the devout worship of God, and that they transmitted their religious influence to him. That he had preserved this pious sentiment in its purity, that he had served God according to the best of his knowledge through his whole life, that he had surpassed his contemporaries in zeal for religion, is evident from Acts 26: 4, 5. 22: 3. 23: 1. Gal. 1: 14. More than all other passages, Rom. vii. shows him to have been a Jew, who not merely bore piety upon the lips, but earnestly proposed to himself the laborious acquisition of a pure and unstained manner of life.

CHAPTER III.

CHARACTER OF THE APOSTLE.

Doctrine of Temperaments.—Physical Temperament of Paul; of ecclesiastical reformers generally.—Influence of the apostle's temperament upon his mental and religious character. His strictness; persecuting spirit.—Comparison between him and Luther.—Penetration, comprehensive views, logical reasoning, ardor, vigor, urbanity, affection, tenderness of Paul.

A correct view of the peculiarities belonging to the constitution and temperament of the apostle, is desirable for all those who undertake the interpretation of his writings. There are many, who are displeased with the employment of the usual names of the temperaments on this subject, as offensive ideas are included under these designations, in their popular and unscientific use. This use fixes itself on barely a single meaning, which is made disagreeably prominent. It is even held, in opposition to remarks upon the temperament of the apostles, that an accurate division of the temperaments has never been made. This, however, cannot induce us

to abstain from the current terminology on this subject. We are of the opinion, that the so-called four temperaments designate the four fundamental peculiarities in the nature of man, as composed of soul and body. We think the idea which Heinroth[1] has given of them in his Anthropology, to be a most excellent one. The representation of Heinroth, which exhibits in so able a manner, the connection between the temperaments and the various national characters, religious dispositions, and studies in the arts, convinces the mind at once, that the old fourfold division of these temperaments has not been made arbitrarily. We presuppose in our present remarks an acquaintance with the section, that is now referred to, in Heinroth's Anthropology.[2]

"We see in Paul," says Hug, "a temperament entirely choleric." In this decision we acquiesce only half-way. We think that the peculiarities of the melancholic temperament are found in the apostle in an equal degree with those of the choleric. The melancholic temperament is everywhere characterized by this, that instead of dissipating the mind through the world that is without, it brings the mind back to the inner world, to the depths of its own bosom. On this account, there is connected with it, if not a gloomy yet a prevailing serious view of things. Not dissipated by the variety of objects in the world, the mind directs itself to the essential interests of human life, and therefore a habit of speculation, ordinarily in the form of theosophy, and also a religious feeling, are in general found to be intimately connected with this temperament. The choleric disposition directs the mind especially to the world without; not as the sanguine for the purpose of receiving, but for the purpose of communicating; not of enjoying the world and mankind, but of operating upon them and of governing them. The melancholic temperament, operating without a mixture of the others, has produced those men, who, in their eminent degree of love to God, have occupied the solitary cell, and there consumed themselves with sorrow and fervid passion in the capacity of religious mystics. The choleric temperament has produced those heroes in the history of

[1] See Note L, at the close of this Treatise.

[2] As early a writer as Albert Durer, described the apostles according to their temperaments. Paul is described as melancholic, John as sanguine, etc. A treatise on the temperaments of the writers of the New Testament by Gregory is found in the Thesaurus novus, Vol. II. Amsterdam.

the world, who, on the broad theatre of the same, have ruled and transformed nations and ages. From the union of the one with the other have proceeded religious reformers. The religious reformer must have looked deeply into his own heart. He must understand what is an inward life. He must also in an equal degree desire to procure currency among his brethren, for that which he had experienced to be truth within his own soul.

The characters of those men who have been reformers in the church, bear a strong resemblance to each other. In every one of them there was the united operation of both these temperaments. Let Paul, Augustine, and Luther be compared together.[1] We here include, of course, under the term reformers, not barely such men as, while they were alive, have made their influence visible in great circles, but also the men whose spiritual preëminence has continued even for centuries after they were removed from the theatre of action.

The decided religious tendency of the apostle, conjoined with that energy of execution, which is peculiar to the choleric temperament, we first discern in the fact, that he attached himself to that religious party among his people, which was considered the most decided, and was the most rigorous. He himself appealed to this circumstance, in his defence before Agrippa.[2] He there says that he had

[1] It is worthy of remark, that while in other instances the corporeal form, as the shadow of the spirit, bears a resemblance to the mental character, those strong-minded men who have altered the world's history, have fully as often been diminutive as athletic in their outward structure. Notwithstanding all the internal resemblance between Luther and Paul, they must in their external appearance have been altogether dissimilar. They were dissimilar not barely in respect to the whole figure, which in the case of Paul was diminutive, 2 Cor. 10: 10, but also in respect to their utterance, as we may learn from the verse just cited, and in respect to physiognomy, if we may trust the description which is given of Paul in the dialogue of Philopatris, in the time of Julian. This speaks of him as "the Galilean with the bald head and the aquiline nose." Even the antiquated Vassari, in his memoir of Brunelleschi, the man who constructed the celebrated arch in the cupola at Florence, an architect gigantic in his works, though not in his form, makes the interesting remark, 'Many are created with small stature and diminutive features, who have such greatness of mind, and such inconceivable, indomitable energy of heart, that they will never give themselves rest, unless they commence undertakings, which are difficult and almost impossible, and finish them, to the wonder of all who behold.'

[2] Acts 26: 5.

attached himself to the most exact sect; and after he had chosen this as his party, he surpassed in zeal most of his contemporaries. When the religion of his fathers was brought into peril by the Christians, he devoted himself to the service of the high council, for the purpose of crushing the new sect. At first he persecuted them at Jerusalem, yea he compelled them to utter blasphemies against the crucified Messiah. As he had not done enough at the capital to gratify his rage, he hastened to Damascus.[1]

The contradiction which appears in this respect between the apostle's zeal and the tranquil character of his teacher Gamaliel, may surprise us. Men, however, who have a character like that of Paul, are also independent. If in Gamaliel, whom we may more properly compare with Erasmus, we could suppose that there existed the delicate introverted mind of Staupitz (Luther's instructor,) then we should see in the relation of our German reformer to this his teacher, a representative of Paul and *his* teacher. The general current of Luther's life presents very many points of comparison with Paul. As long as he was in the way of the law, he exhibited the same earnestness of conflict, as we see described in the seventh of Romans; afterwards he exhibited the same bold freedom which appears in Paul.

If we wish to determine what are the principal characteristics of the converted apostle, as they are exhibited in his writings and speeches, our examination will especially exhibit the following. With deep penetration, as it may be expected of one accustomed to an inward life, he seized hold of those religious truths, which had been communicated to him by the Revelation of the Lord. No one can fail to observe the rich speculative contents of his Epistles, and the great difference which appears in this respect, between him on the one hand, and Peter and James on the other. John indeed touches upon subjects like those of Paul, for John also is speculative.[2] While, however, with John all religious knowledge goes into the form of a few antitheses, relating indeed to the infinite, such antitheses as light and darkness, life and death, love and hatred, the children of God and the children of the devil, remaining in Christ and living without him; the view of Paul embraces in its full con-

[1] Acts. 26: 10—12.

[2] [Speculative; interested in meditating on things above the sphere of sense; accustomed to investigate spiritual subjects.—Tr.]

nection the eternal decree of God, which has been kept secret from the foundation of the earth; which was signified by the prophets, which in Christ Jesus was manifested in the world, and which, since it has been exhibited to mankind, has made known even to the spirits in heaven, the manifold wisdom of God.[1]

That venerable German metaphysician, who in his retirement prepared, a number of years ago, a christian philosophy, and gave to this new form of his system the name of the "historical philosophy," had then in view, as we may say, for his precursor and exemplar, the apostle to the Gentiles. In Paul's model-system of doctrine there is laid down a philosophy of the history of the world. He everywhere proceeds on the ground of the eternal plan of God, in which Christ is the central-point, and at the same time the key to the mysteries of the past and the future. "Before the foundation of the world was laid, we were chosen in Christ."[2] Before the fall of Adam therefore Christ was constituted the τέλος of the history of man; the *prae* of time expresses also a *prae* of relation. At the definite period which had been determined by God, "in the fulness of time," this being on whom the history of the world revolves was introduced among men.[3] And in some passages, Paul, looking forward and backward, gives the destination of both heathenism and Judaism in reference to this turning point of history.[4] In the eleventh of Romans he lifts the veil, which conceals the future progress of the race in this life, and lets the consideration of the whole temporal development of the great divisions of this race, as this development relates to the kingdom of God, terminate in the expression, "Of him and through him and to him are all things."[5] In the 15th chapter of 1 Corinthians, however, the view of Paul is raised above the future periods of the present life, into a futurity still more remote, beyond the boundaries of time; and he concludes this view in the twenty eighth verse, with the sentence, "So shall God be all in all."

As it is only this apostle who makes use of the expression, condensing into three words time and eternity, "Of him, and to him, and through him (εἰς αὐτον, into him) are all things,"[6] so it is only

[1] Rom. 6: 25, 26. Ephes. 1: 9—12. 3: 8—11. [2] Eph. 1: 4.

[3] Gal. 4: 4. 1 Tim. 2: 6. Titus 1: 3.

[4] Acts 17: 26, 27. Rom. i. Gal. 3: 24. Rom. vii. [5] Rom. 11: 36.

[6] "Thou, with whom all good things end and begin," is an expression of Dante, addressed to Jehovah, in imitation of the above quoted passage of

this apostle, before whose eye, as he glances at the central point of the world's development, there is always spread out the beginning and the end of this development.

The mode of considering a subject, adopted by Paul, differs moreover from the mode adopted by John in the following respect. All antitheses, as generally all single topics, whose limits run into one another as John looks upon them, appear to Paul definitely separated from one another. As the form of his discourses, so likewise his train of thought moves on dialectically. Paul therefore has been at all times the favorite author of the *thinking*, as John has been of the *feeling* Christian.

Further, the prominent quality in the writings of Paul is ardor and power. As was said of Luther's style, so it may be said of Paul's, it is a continual battle (Schlacht).[1] In the letters which were written from imprisonment, when he bore the chains upon his hands, in what a glowing style does every word speak forth his longing,

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the apostle. Out of Paul's writings there is only one expression, which accords with this passage. That is found in Heb. 2: 10. But this epistle has, in other respects, the character of a work belonging to a disciple of Paul. Moreover, the δι' οὗ in that passage deviates from the style of Paul. The remarkable εἰς αὐτόν, from which originated Augustine's immortal expression, "Thou, God, hast made us for thee, therefore our heart is not at rest, until it rest in thee," is also found in Acts 17: 26, 27.

[Tholuck means, probably, that the idea which he would attach to the phrase εἰς αὐτόν, is also expressed in this passage from Acts; and particularly in the words, "that they should seek the Lord," tend to him, and "find him," come near him, so that they may spiritually live and move and have their being in him. The idea of a general *union* with God is a favorite one with Tholuck.—Tr.]

[1] The first judgment, that is known to us, concerning the character of the style of Paul, was contained in the lost work of Irenaeus, "On the Pauline Inversions," where with entire correctness he pronounced the ground of them to be, "the rapidity of his speech and the vehemence of his spirit;" Adv. Haer. 3. 7. The ancient heathens, in their judgment upon a work of art, scarcely ever took notice of the subjective sentiment and cast of mind, under the influence of which the work was produced. They abstained from this, in order that the work may have more the appearance of a gift from the divine power. But christian authors have very early pronounced their opinion on the internal peculiarities of the sacred penmen. In this fact then may be found an objection, unknown to many of them, against the mode of representing inspiration as something purely passive. (See Lardner's Works, II. 176, 495, 573. 4. IV. 479, 480. VII. 429—437.)

that the gospel may run and have free course!—and yet how different is his ardor of spirit from that of an enthusiast! It is characteristic of the apostle, that amid the glowing of his inflamed soul, he is never deficient in the regulating power of discreet reflection. What regard he pays in his discourses and letters, to the variety of relations and circumstances! What a contrast between his style of remark at Jerusalem, and at Athens; to the Galatians, and before king Agrippa, and Felix the Governor! Even gracefulness and urbanity of manner are not wanting in these discourses; as, for example, when he closes an address with the words, "I wish in short that not only thou, but all who hear me this day, were such as I am, these bonds excepted."[1] What heedfulness and delicacy in the treatment of different mental conditions are exhibited in the first and second epistle to the Corinthians! The consideration of all this is certainly sufficient to refute those false imputations, that account for the conversion of Paul, the very occurrence on which the whole active efficiency of his life was founded, by representing it as a dream in his mid-day sleep, or as a fanatical vision. Truly the sober and humble demeanor of the apostle does not accord with the characteristics of a visionary!

As the third fundamental feature in the picture of Paul's character after he was converted, we must mention, love. The natural disposition of the bilious man prompts him to govern; to govern, even if he must trample on one half of the race, so that the other may obey him. Nothing is more opposed to the bent of his mind, than for him tenderly to spare what belongs to others. But where, in all history, can be found the example of a great and powerful spirit, which has been more skilled than Paul in becoming all things to all men? With what winning tenderness does he treat the Corinthians, to whom he had so much reason, as he himself expresses it, for coming with a rod! In view of such expressions, as 2 Cor. 2: 5, 7, 9, 10, we might almost say with Erasmus, that the apostle's tender love amounted to a "pious flattery" and "sacred adulation,"[2] if we did not know from other sources, how far a mind, that was truly softened with the love of Christ, would give up and subordinate its own interests. So likewise might we go through the epistle to Philemon, and point out, in almost every word and sentence, the tender refinement of that affection, which the holy man himself de-

[1] Acts 26: 29.

[2] Pia vafrities, sancta adulatio.

scribes with the words, "it is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own." If he only is possessed of true greatness, who can also condescend to what is small, then there is no better spectacle of greatness than is to be seen in a Luther, as after all his thunderings against the emperor and the pope, he exhibits himself like a child in his letter to his little John.[1] And we firmly believe that Paul himself would be capable of the same exhibition of character. At least the impression is a similar one, which is made by the reading of his epistle to Philemon, after we have read his epistle to the Romans, or his speech at Athens.

CHAPTER IV.

STYLE OF THE APOSTLE.

Paul's style of writing different from that of the other apostles; but not so different as might have been expected.—Difficulties in reference to the style of the Epistle to the Hebrews.—Style of Paul's speeches.—His ability to write in classic Greek.—Copiousness of his style.—His frequent use of the paronomasia.—Character of this figure.—Authority for it.—Objections against it.

We come next to speak of the style of the apostle. It is generally acknowledged how much more of a master he was of the Greek idiom, than his fellow apostles were. One thing however in relation to this subject is surprising, that between him who spent the earliest period of his life in a Greek city, who doubtless spoke Greek from childhood up, and his companions in office, who either never traveled beyond the boundaries of Palestine at all, or not until they went as apostles,—it is surprising, I say, that between him and them, the distinction does not appear much greater than it does. Should we not expect from Paul, that he would adopt such a style, in some respects, as the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews has done?[2] A perfect accuracy in the use of the Greek can be ex-

[1] See note M, at the close.

[2] [Tholuck as is well known, supposes that Paul was not the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews.—Tr.]

pected, indeed, from no Israelite, however long he may have dwelt in the society of the Grecians.

We may perhaps make an exception here in favor of such liberally educated Alexandrines as Aristobulus, and the translator of the Proverbs in the Septuagint. Even Josephus complains that "his early habits of speech forbade exactness in the expression of the Greek;"[1] and in the preparation of his Greek writings, he availed himself of the aid of foreigners in respect to the style. But at least, must not Paul have greatly excelled James, who, as it seems, having grown up as a genuine Pharisee, never went beyond the boundaries of Palestine.

From the comparison of Paul with his fellow-apostles, two things, as it occurs to us, may be learned with tolerable certainty. One, relating especially to James, in less degree also to John and Peter, is this; we must recede from the prevailing belief that the Greek language was not at all, or in very few instances spoken by the inhabitants of Palestine. If we refuse to abandon this view, which may elsewhere, moreover, be shown to be false, then in opposition to all christian antiquity, we must come at last to the conclusion, that no one of the Jameses known to us, was the author of what is called the epistle of James. This conclusion has recently been avowed even by so cautious a critic as Schott, and has been supported entirely by considerations drawn from style.[2] The other infer-

[1] Antiquities, B. XX. c. XI.

[2] [The question whether the Aramaean or the Greek language was exclusively spoken in Palestine in the time of Christ has been long and earnestly discussed. A brief history of the discussion, and a view of its importance, are given by Prof. Robinson in Bib. Repos Vol I. pp. 309—317. See likewise the essay of H. F. Pfannkuche, on the general prevalence of the Aramaean language in Palestine, and the article of Hug on the general use of the Greek; the former in Bib. Repos. Vol. I. pp. 317—363, the latter in Vol. I. pp. 530—551, and also in Fosdick's Translation of Hug's Introduction, pp. 326—340. Father Simon, says Prof. Robinson, "shows conclusively, that the Jews in Palestine did speak the Chaldee or Aramaean language; but at the same time, although a warm advocate for the Hebrew original of Matthew, he admits that Greek was spoken in Palestine, and takes indeed the position, which probably most at the present day will be ready to adopt after reading Hug's essay, viz., *That the two languages were both current at the same time in Palestine, during the age of Christ and the Apostles.*" "Hug shows, irrefragably as it would seem, that the Greek had obtained such a footing in Palestine, as to place it at least nearly on an equality with the

ence derived from this comparison, and relating to Paul, is this; we must suppose that the imperfection of his Greek style had not its origin in an impossibility of writing better, so much as in a want of care. That the apostle could use the Greek idiom with skill, whenever there was need of his doing so, may be proved conclusively from the epistle to the Hebrews, if that be supposed to be the work of Paul, or from the last part of the book of Acts, if we be allowed to appeal to the speeches there inserted. These speeches are perhaps distinguished above every other portion of the New Testament for elegance of Greek style. We do not, however, conceal the uncertainty of this argument. Grant even that no other reason prevented us from considering the apostle to the heathen, as the author of the epistle to the Hebrews, what could well be alleged as a reason why the apostle, who writes to the tastefully educated Corinthians in the style that was easy to him, should, in an epistle to the Christians in Palestine, make use of an elegant idiom? If the use of the Chaldee idiom was so agreeable to the inhabitants of Palestine that a tumultuous assembly, when they heard Paul speak in this idiom, became still,[1] why should not the apostle, who in things lawful so willingly became all things to all men, have preferred the Chaldaic dialect, in an epistle which he wrote directly to a community in Palestine? Those who defend the Pauline origin of the epistle to the Hebrews, have not as yet succeeded in removing this difficulty. This one thing indeed they are able to show, that an epistle in Greek might have been understood by a community in Palestine.[2] But this fact does by no means justify an author in selecting the Greek language, when he was equally skilled in the peculiar language of the province to which he wrote.

The argument drawn from the speeches in the Acts of the Apostles would have greater weight than the preceding, if we were only certain, that the speeches which are interwoven with that work, and particularly the speeches of Peter and Paul, are to be looked upon

Aramaean in respect to general prevalence." Bib. Repos. Vol. I. pp. 313, 317.—Tr.]

[1] Acts 22: 2.

[2] [The objection against the Pauline origin of the Epistle to the Hebrews, on the ground of its closer conformity to the Greek idiom than the acknowledged epistles of Paul, is met, by Prof. Stuart, by denying the fact. See his Comm. on Hebrews, §32. p. 235—248.—Tr.]

as the exact report of the apostle's words. Seyler indeed has recently, in his essay on the speeches and epistles of Peter, in the first number of the Studien und Kritiken for 1832, expressed his conviction, that Peter's speech was reported by the author of the book of Acts, with a nicety, which passed over not even a particle, not even a δέ. As, however, Dr. Seyler has reserved the proof of this position to a future time, we cannot judge of his reasons. It seems to us surprising at the first view, and worthy of our attention, that the speeches which are found in the former part of the Acts of the Apostles, and indeed not merely those of Peter but those of Paul also,[1] bear, in a striking degree, so much more of the Hebrew coloring, than those found in the latter part. We are compelled to explain this by the fact, that the former speeches were delivered over to Luke in writing, as he was not present to hear them; while the latter, which he heard himself, were re-written by him with freedom. The agreement of the diction with that of Luke is an argument for this supposition. If this view is correct, then the appeal to the speeches of Paul in the Acts of the Apostles loses its authority.

Although therefore we abandon these direct arguments, still we may, as we think, admit that the apostle to the Gentiles could, when it was necessary for him to do so, write in the pure Greek style. We regard the opinion, which Michaelis has expressed in his Introduction,[2] to be in the highest degree apposite. "Paul is distinguished," he says, "from all the other New Testament writers. Instances of Hebraism enough, instances of carelessness enough, are to be found in him, yet not the short verse-measure of the Hebrew style, but on the whole more of the Greek construction. Still he is careless, like one who understands the language, but spends no labor at all upon his diction; like one who thinks barely of his subject, and is transported by an overflow of thoughts, and at the same time by emotion and occasionally by genius. That the best Greek expressions are equally familiar to him with the Hebrew is evident. They are interchanged as the former or the latter occur first to his mind. The Greek language is at his service, even in expressing the liveliest and most delicate satire; but he does not avoid the under-current of Hebraism, and has no wish at all to write with purity or with beauty."

If, on the one hand, there is in the style of Paul more of the Greek coloring, and if it is adopted more involuntarily, than is the

[1] See Chap. 13.

[2] Edition 4, Part 1. p. 117.

case with the other apostles, inasmuch as dialectic discussion very naturally made his style periodic,[1] so on the other hand, the want of periodic structure is not the effect of a deficiency in acquaintance with the language, so much as the effect of the apostle's character, and this has already been described. There is indeed for his mode of thinking, as of writing no more fitting image than the flood, where one wave overtops another. The frequently recurring οὐ μόνον δέ and μᾶλλον δέ is the swelling of the wave.[2] Let one only consider how Paul, at the beginning of the epistle to the Romans, never satisfies himself, but adds accessory ideas to every principal word. This is visible in the most characteristic way in the first chapter of his epistle to the Ephesians. Where thought presses upon thought, one feeling upon another, there it is not easily conceivable that regularly constructed parentheses,[3] like those which are presented in the epistle to the Hebrews, and which are the result of calm reflection, should be employed. In such cases the anacoluthon is intro-

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[1] Lücke, in the second edition of his Comment. on John, Vol. I. p. 129, makes very correct remarks on this subject. I here select the passage, because it expresses at the same time the view above given of the relation between John and Paul.

"The chief distinction," he says, "between Paul and John lies in the individuality of the two writers. As Paul thinks logically, syllogistically, and besides, in his Epistles, explains the subject-matter of the Gospel in a didactic form, so he writes in the periodic style; but with the periodic and dialectic mode of writing, the Greek peculiarities likewise the more decidedly present themselves. John is almost the opposite of this. As in his mental character he is inclined to the synthetic, rather than to the analytic method; as he is inclined to what is called the intuition of the spirit, rather than to the logical discussion; so likewise in his style of composition he is more simple (than Paul). He is so in his Epistles, and likewise in his Gospel. In the latter, moreover, the historical subject-matter makes a difference between him and his fellow-apostle. His thoughts are arranged, with greater regularity than Paul's; one might almost say that they follow each other in the order of parallelism. The Hebraistic element is therefore visible, both in his mode of representation, and his choice of language; and it is, at least inwardly, the pervading element of his style."

[2] See for example, Rom. 5: 3, 11. 8: 23, and 34. 10: 14 and 15.

[3] [On the parenthetical character of the style of Paul's epistles generally, and of the epistle to the Hebrews in particular, see Stuart's Comm. on Heb. § 22, especially p. 14.—Tr.]

duced;[1] the oratio variata[2] also; the siopesis[3] and the laconic.[4] The same fervor of spirit is discernible in those words, frequently introduced, which are compounded with ὑπέρ, as ὑπερλίαν, ὑπερνικάω, ὑπερπερισσεύω, ὑπερπλεονάζω; in the oft repeated use of πᾶς[5] and in other developments. We might hold it scarcely possible, for Paul to make use of such calm and dispassionate forms of speech, as the epistle to the Hebrews everywhere exhibits.[6] Even through the drapery of Luke, the discourses of this apostle, as recorded in the Acts, exhibit the vigorous formation of his style.

That with the apostle's numerous Hebraisms, he had at command no small part of the treasures of the Greek language, is evident from his great variety of particles; his significant variation of prepositions, which he knows how to employ so as to be a true means of conveying thought; his copious use of synonyms; his great variety of expressions for one and the same object; his employment of rare words, and partly of words coined by himself; his rich participial constructions, but especially his copious fulness of paronomasia in all its forms; the antanaklasis, parachesis, annominatio.[7] Without directing the mind expressly to this subject, one cannot imagine how frequently the apostle uses the paronomasia. For managing the figure in a free and spirited way, however, an unembarrassed use of the language is indispensable. Examine the euphonious paronomasia in 1 Tim. 3: 16, ἐφανερώθη--ἐδικαιώθη; also in Eph. 3: 6, συγκληρονόμα καὶ σύσσωμα καὶ συμμέτοχα; likewise in 2 Cor. 8: 22, ἐν πολλοῖς πολλάκις σπουδαῖον; and in 9: 8, ἵνα ἐν παντὶ πάντοτε πᾶσαν αὐτάρκειαν ἔχητε. See also in Rom. 1: 29, and 31, the words πορνείᾳ, πονηρίᾳ; φθόνου, φόνου, ἀσυνέτους, ἀσυνθέτους, ἀστόργους, ἀσπόνδους, etc. Especially see those numerous examples, in which the resemblance in the sound in connection at the same time with resemblance or contrast in the sense, becomes in the highest degree significant. In the epistle to the Romans, for example, we have the

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[1] See for example Rom. 2: 17, 21. 5: 12, 15, 9: 23.

[2] See instance in Rom. 12: 1 and 2.

[3] See example in Rom. 7: 25.

[4] See Rom. 11: 18. 2 Cor. 6: 13.

[5] See Col. 1: 9—11, 28.

[6] See Heb. 6: 1—3. 11: 32.

[7] The use of the same word in different senses; of different words resembling each other in sound; of pun.

words ἐκ πίστεως εἰς πίστιν in 1: 17; and in 1: 20, the words τὰ ἀόραια τοῦ θεοῦ καθορᾶται; and in 1: 28, καθὼς οὐκ ἐδοκίμασαν-- παρέδωκεν αὐτοὺς εἰς ἀδόκιμον νοῦν. Other instances of the same figure are found in Rom. 2: 1. 4: 15. 15: 16, and 19; and also in Rom. 3: 27, 7: 23, and 8: 2, where the term νόμος is used with varied applications. To these numerous other examples might be added from the remaining epistles. Such an accumulation of this figure needs perhaps an apology. There may be some who will agree in opinion with Basilius Faber, when he says, in his Thesaurus, under the word paronomasia, that "in jocular and light compositions nothing can be more grateful than this figure; but in serious discourse nothing is more improper, especially if it be frequently repeated." In order to perceive the incorrectness of this remark, however, one need only be reminded of some instances of paronomasia, that have been famed throughout the world. Such are that in Ovid, "orbis in urbe fuit;" and that in Schiller, "die Welt-geschichte ist das Weltgericht." "Even in philosophy," says Herder, "happy expressions of this kind are of great force. They fasten in the soul, even by a word, the distinction or the resemblance that is remarked. Here also Luther and Hamann present numerous instances parallel with those of the apostle. We need nothing more however than to refer to that paronomasia which has affected the history of the whole world; the paronomasia employed by the Redeemer himself, in the sixteenth of Matthew, where he calls Peter, the πέτρα, on which his church was built.[1]

It cannot by any means be inferred from the use of these puns by Paul, that reflection had triumphed over feeling in his mind, as Les-

[1] [For a much larger number of instances in which this figure is used by the writers of the New Testament, especially by Paul, by the writers of the Old Testament also, by classical authors, and even by the Saviour himself, see Winer's Grammar of the New Testament, § 49, and Stuart's Hebrew Grammar, 3d Ed. § 571, and the works referred to in them. Perhaps the paronomasia employed by the Saviour in Matt. 8: 22 has been, in a moral point of view, nearly as much entitled to the epithet, welt-historische, as that in Matt. 16: 18 to which Tholuck refers.—The very frequent use of the paronomasia and the like figures by the sacred penmen, is a proof that their writings are genuine Oriental productions; that the Spirit, who indited *for* men, adapted himself not only *to* men in general, but in an especial manner to the communities who were originally addressed; and that the Bible was not designed to teach men rhetoric, more than to teach them astronomy or metaphysics.—Tr.]

sing says that the introduction of wit always indicates the want of excited feeling. This is the fact only when the wit seems to have been sought after. Such forms of the paronomasia as betray a previous effort for them; the anagram for instance, and the repetition in one sentence of the last word in the preceding,[1] are never found in the apostle's composition. It is well known that, for example, the *sarcasm* is introduced by men of spirit on occasions of the most highly excited feeling. It is thus used by Paul in Phil. 3: 2, *κατατομή—περιτομή*; and in 1 Tim. 6: 5, *παραδιατριβάς—διατριβαί*. And so, on the other hand, the tenderest emotions of love call forth from him a play upon words. An instance of it is the play upon the name of Onesimus in the eleventh verse of Philemon, *τὸν ποτέ σοι ἄχρηστον, νυνὶ δὲ σοὶ καὶ ἐμοὶ εὔχρηστον*.[2] Another illustration of the same is that excellent proverb in Rom. 13: 8, "Be in debt to no man, except in love."

SUPPLEMENT TO THE PRECEDING TREATISE,

Respecting the early life of Paul, compiled from various works, but principally from Hemsen's Der Apostel Paulus. pp. 1—10.

Name of the Apostle. Paul received from his parents the name שָׁאוּל Saul. Neander states as a conjecture, that this name was derived from שָׁאַל to ask, and signified that Saul was a long-desired, first-born son, a child of prayers. Why and when the name Saul was changed into Paul is doubtful. The Jews, when among the Heathen, often altered their Hebrew names, and sometimes entirely dropped them. Thus Dosthai was changed into Dositheus, Jesus into Jason, Tarphon into Trypho, Silas into Sylvanus; and Onias was

[1] *Ἀναγραμματισμοί* and *ἐπαναστροφαί*.

[2] [*Ὀνήσιμος*, being derived from *ὀνίημι*, would of course have about the same meaning with *εὔχρηστον*. Another instance of paronomasia on the same name, is in the twentieth verse of the same epistle; *Ναί, ἀδελφέ, ἐγώ σου ὀναίμην ἐν κυρίῳ*. Some of the instances of paronomasia, collected by commentators from the writings of Paul, give no evidence of having been *designed* by him. Others were doubtless designed. "In the discourses of Jesus," says Winer, "which were spoken in the Syro Chaldaic, there were probably many examples of paronomasia, which would of course be entirely lost in a Greek translation."—Tr.]

dropped for Menelaus, Hillel for Pollio, Joakim for Alcimus, Joannes for Hyrcanus: see Grot. ad. Act. xiii. 9. Whether Paul conformed to this custom, or whether, as other converted Jews did, he changed his name at the same time with his faith, cannot be determined. Ammon on Rom 1: 1, supposes the latter to be the fact. Jerome, Catal. C. 5. supposes that he changed his name as soon as he had been made the instrument of converting Sergius Paulus, the Proconsul of Cyprus: Acts 13: 6—12. This is mere conjecture. Chrysost., On the Change of Men's Names, states various reasons for the change of Saul into Paul. He rejects the idea that the etymology of the words determined the change; that the word Saul was derived from σαλεῦειν and designated a persecutor, and the word Paul from παύσασθαι and designated a protector, defender of the church. He seems to think that the Holy Spirit gave a new name to Paul, so that He might signify his authority over the converted man; just as a master gives a new name to a slave whom he purchases. The name is a sign of ownership. He supposes that Paul did not change his name immediately after his conversion, because by so early a change, it would not be so extensively known that he was the same Saul who once persecuted the church. Neander says, that Saul was the Hebrew, and Paul the Hellenistic name; Lightfoot, that he was called Saul as a Jew and Paul as a Gentile, particularly as the apostle to the Gentiles: Light. Works, VIII. pp. 462, 463. XII. p. 456.

Family connections of the Apostle. His parents were descendants of Abraham, of the tribe of Benjamin, Phil. 3: 5. Rom. 11: 1. 'His father was a Pharisee, Acts 23: 6. 26: 5. Phil. 3: 5. He had a sister whose son was a Christian, and a discreet person, and very useful to his uncle Paul when a prisoner at Jerusalem, Acts 23: 16—22. This nephew's conduct cannot be thought of without admiration and gratitude. Some others of his relatives are mentioned by him in his epistle to the Romans, who also were believers in Jesus, and several of them had been so before himself; which may be reckoned a proof of the virtue and piety of this family. Their names are Andronicus and Junias, whom he calls 'his kinsmen.' By the words συγγενεῖς μου, Rom. 16: 7, he must mean something more than 'his countrymen.' He speaks in the like manner of Herodian, v. 11, and also of Lucius, Jason and Sosipater, v. 21.' Lardner, Works, Vol. V. p. 473. Tholuck on Rom. 16: 7 says, "Συγγενῆς may designate these individuals as the apostle's relatives, and may also merely denote that they were of Jewish extraction. The latter is the more probable. See vs. 11 and 21, and also Rom. 9: 3." See also Wahl's Lexicon on the word συγγενῆς.

Birth-place of the Apostle. Jerome says, Catal. c. 5, "Paul was of the tribe of Benjamin, and of the city of Gischala, in Galilee. When this city was taken by the Romans, he removed with his parents to Tarsus in Cilicia." This assertion is directly opposed to the account in Acts 22: 3, that he was "born in Tarsus in Cilicia." See also

Acts 9: 11. 21: 39. Tarsus was a great and populous city, situated in a fruitful plain, through which flowed the river Cydnus. It was the birth-place of many distinguished Greek scholars. The inhabitants applied with great assiduity to science, and were considered, in the time of Christ, as the most cultivated of the Greeks, as their city was the most richly provided with literary institutions. Winer's Real. It was declared a free city by Augustus, and endowed with especial privileges. Dio Chrys. Tarsica post. 11. 36. Appian de Bel. Civ. L. V. p. 275, etc. Plin. Nat. Hist. V. 27. 22. Amm. Marcell. IV. 8.

Time of the Apostle's Birth and Conversion. According to an ancient but unauthorized account, Paul was born in the second year after Christ. This account is found in the Oratio de Petro et Paulo, Opp. Chrysost. Vol. VIII. The account however has nothing improbable in itself, since Paul is described as a young man at the time of his first persecution against the Christians, Acts 7: 57. 'In the epistle to Philemon,' says Lardner, 'written about the year 62, the apostle calls himself, v. 9, "Paul the aged." This I think must lead us to suppose, that he was then sixty years old, or not much less.—He seems to have arrived at years of discretion when he was converted, for he appears to have been one of the principal agents in the persecution of believers after the death of Stephen; to have been entrusted by the Jewish rulers with authority to carry it on, Acts 26: 10, and to have had officers under him. All this shows the regard that was paid to him.' Works, Vol. V. pp. 486, 7. The supposition of Hemsen, Neander and Hug seems the most probable, that Paul's conversion occurred in A. D. 36. Usher and Pearson however suppose it to have occurred in 35; Basnage, Michaelis, Heinrichs, Köhler and Schott in 37; Eichhorn in 37 or 38; De Wette in 35 or 38; and others still in 31, 33, 34, 39, 40, 41, or 42.

Free citizenship of the Apostle. That Paul was a freeborn Roman citizen is certain. It is a conjecture of some that his ancestors obtained their free citizenship by their services to the empire during the civil wars with the Jews. But of this there is no evidence; see Grotius upon Acts 22: 28. Deyling endeavors to show that Paul's parents probably purchased the privilege of Roman freedom. But nothing can be certainly known about the mode in which they obtained it. The fact only is plain. See Acts 22: 28.

Trade of the Apostle. "What is commanded of a father towards his son? (asks a Talmudic writer.) To circumcise him, to redeem him, to teach him the law, to teach him a trade, etc. R. Judah saith he that teacheth not his son a trade, does as if he taught him to be a thief. Rabban Gamaliel saith, He that hath a trade in his hand, to what is he like? He is like to a vineyard that is fenced. So some of the great wise men of Israel had been cutters of wood. Rabban Jochanan Ben Zaccai, that was vice-president of the Sanhedrim, was a merchant four years, and then he fell to the study of the law." "Rabbi Judah, the great cabbalist, bore the name and trade of Hhajat, a shoemaker or tailor." Lightfoot, Vol. III. pp. 227, 228. VIII. p. 131.

According to (this) old Jewish custom which was well nigh as binding as law, Paul learned a trade, that of a maker of tent-cloth. Michaelis (Intro. Vol. II. p. 1338, Edit. 4,) represents Paul as a machine-maker. A passage in Julius Pollux led him into this singular mistake: see Hug's Introduction, Part II. § 86. The Fathers supposed Paul to be a worker on leather, or a tent-maker. Chrysostom says, "By his trade he was employed upon skins." The fact that war-tents were made of leather, induced the old writers to suppose that Paul worked on this material. The probability is, that as a kind of shagged, rough-haired goat was very common in Cilicia, and as the hair of this animal was manufactured into a thick coarse cloth, and as this manufacture may have been very common in Paul's native province, he therefore selected it as his employment. The cloth thus manufactured was called *cilicia*. It was used for the covering of tents in war, and upon ships; also for shepherds' tents, especially in Syria and on the Euphrates. It is not to be supposed however that Paul never made tent-cloth except from materials procured in his native region. On this supposition, it is difficult to understand how he could have worked at his trade, in all places which he visited. He doubtless used other materials besides the κιλίκια for the manufacture of tent-cloth. That he sometimes worked at his trade after he became an apostle, is evident from Acts 18: 3, and probable from Acts 20: 34.

Learning of the Apostle. Strabo, Geogr. 1. XIV., says that "the inhabitants of Tarsus were so zealous in the pursuits of philosophy and the whole circle of Greek study, that they surpassed even the Athenians and Alexandrians, and indeed the citizens of every other place which can be mentioned, in which schools and lectures of philosophers and rhetoricians were established." Hence some have supposed that the apostle must have been a very learned man. But such an inference from such premises is unwarranted. First, the Hellenistic Jews kept themselves at a great distance from the Greeks. It is true that Philo and Josephus made considerable advancement in Grecian literature, but they were exceptions from the general rule. In the case of Paul, too, there is a peculiar improbability of any very intimate connection with the Greeks, as he belonged to a family of very rigid pharisaical principles. But secondly, Paul was sent away from the influences of Tarsus when he was between 10 and 13 years of age, according to Tholuck, and remained at Jerusalem until he was 30 or 33. He made great proficiency, however, in Jewish literature, and was distinguished for talents and eloquence. He was supposed at Lystra to be the god of oratory. "I regard Paul," says Hug, "as a master of eloquence, and should even like to compare him in this respect with celebrated men of ancient times; e. g. with Isocrates whose letters to Demonicus and some of those to Nicocles bear considerable resemblance to Paul's in design and purport." "The simile 1 Cor. 12: 14 seq. resembles that of Menenius Agrippa, and is even more elegant and expressive."

Dionysius Longinus thus speaks of the eloquence of Paul: "The following men are the boast of all eloquence, and of Grecian genius, viz. Demosthenes, Lysias, Æschines, Hyperides, Isaeus, Anarchus or Demosthenes Crithinus, Isocrates, and Antiphon; to whom may be added Paul of Tarsus, who was the first, within my knowledge, that did not make use of demonstration," who made use of persuasion and pathos rather than argument. See Hug's Introduction, Fosdick's Trans. pp. 508—10.

Natural disposition of the Apostle. That he was by nature impetuous and intolerant is evident from Acts 7: 58. 8: 1—4. 9: 1. 11: 1, 2. 22: 4 seq. This makes his subsequent tenderness so much the more remarkable; see Acts 20: 17 seq. It is to be remembered, however, that he obtained his early information about the christian religion from the Jewish teachers; and even if he resided at Jerusalem during the Saviour's public ministry, he was probably kept secluded, like the other Jewish pupils, from intercourse with those friendly to Jesus,[1] and must have formed erroneous conceptions of Christianity. This, in connection with his zeal for Judaism, is some apology for his persecuting spirit. His whole history shows that he was naturally independent, decided in his convictions and feelings, prone to extremes, fitted to be a leader in whatever cause he espoused, and capable, when sanctified, of rendering eminent services to the cause of humanity.—Tr.

NOTES BY THE TRANSLATOR.

NOTE A, p. 31.

This treatise is taken from the Theologische Studien und Kritiken, Vol. VIII. pp. 364—393. It is understood to contain the substance of part of Tholuck's Introduction to the new edition, which he is now preparing, of his Comm. on the Romans. It will be found to be a condensed summary of the literature on Paul's early life and character, to be eminently *suggestive* (if this word may be allowed) in its style, and to afford rich material for inferences and reflections. Its phraseology is characteristic of its author. The remarks at the close on paronomasia will serve to account for Tholuck's frequent use of it in his own style. In his Preface to the new edition of his Sermons, page 27, he says: "The style of writing which we demand is the figurative, the sententious, the enigmatical. This style, in a greater or less degree, runs through all the writings of the Old and New Testaments." In conformity with such principles, the division of the first sermon translated

[1] Paul says, 1 Cor. 9: 1. 2 Cor. 5: 16, that he had seen Christ. This expression, however, does not warrant the belief that he saw Christ before his crucifixion, but, according to Neander and Hemsen, may refer to the event mentioned in Acts 9: 3, etc.

in this volume is thus expressed in the original: "Und zwar bedürfen wir es *erstens* als einen *Spiegel* der Tugend, die uns *fehlt; Zweitens* als einen *Riegel* der Sünde, die uns *quält;* und *drittens* als ein *Siegel* des Gnadenweges, den wir *erwählt.*" The translator has not endeavored to accommodate his version to these peculiarities of Tholuck, further than strict fidelity seemed to require. In some few instances he has endeavored to *mitigate* what he could not properly omit. Thus the first three lines on page 39 are expressed in the original in the following manner: "Hamann who in this identical way strikes upon every flint-stone of scripture with his spirit of fire (or fiery mind), so that sparks fly out." A few, and but a few similar changes occur in the translation of the sermons.

NOTE B, p. 33.

These three citations are, the first in Acts 17: 28. supposed by some to be from the Phaenomena of Aratus, fifth line, by others from the Hymn to Jupiter by Cleanthes, fourth line; the second in 1 Cor. 15: 33, supposed by some to be from Euripides, by others, as Jerome and Eusebius, to be from the Thais of Menander; the third in Titus 1: 12, supposed by Chrysostom and others to be from Epimenides, by Theodoret, and others from Callimachus. The passage in Titus is ascribed by Paul to one of the poets, *τις,* but that in Acts to more than one, *τινες*: this has led some to suppose that the apostle intended to refer to both poets, and perhaps also to Pindar, who has a similar expression. It would certainly be natural for him to quote from Aratus, as this poet was a Cilician; it would also be natural for him to quote from Cleanthes, because this poet had resided at Athens, and Paul was now addressing an Athenian audience. As both the passages are near the beginning of the two poems, they would both probably be well known to his hearers.—It has been well remarked, however, by Henke, that the question whether Paul was or was not well versed in Greek literature, is not to be determined by his number of quotations from the Greek authors; but by the general structure of his style, by his mode of argumentation, and by the whole arrangement of his thoughts. See Henke's Trans. of Paley's Hor. Paul., Remarks, pp. 449—457. "In his mode of presenting subjects," says Neander, Hist. Plant. and Prog., "the Jewish element of his education manifestly shows itself predominant. His peculiar dialectics he acquired not in the Greek but in the Jewish school." See also Fosdick's Trans. of Hug's Introd. pp. 511, 512.

NOTE C, p. 34.

The feelings or at least the professions of the Jews in reference to the acquisition of foreign languages seem to have been different at different periods. Josephus says, Ant. B. XX. Ch. XI, "Those of my own nation freely acknowledge, that I far exceed them in the learning belonging to the Jews. I have also taken great pains to acquire the learning of the Greeks; and I understand the elements of the Greek language, although I have so long

been accustomed to speak the Jewish, that I cannot pronounce Greek with sufficient exactness. For my own countrymen do not encourage those that learn the languages of many nations, because they look upon this sort of accomplishment as common not only to freemen but also to slaves, such as please to acquire it. But they pronounce him to be a wise man who is fully acquainted with our laws, and is able to interpret their meaning," etc. On the other hand, some of the Talmudists abounded in professions of skill in foreign tongues. Rabbi Jochanan, in the Gemara Babylonia, says: "None are chosen into the Sanhedrim, but men of uncommon stature, of wisdom, of beautiful countenance; old men skilled in magic and legerdemain, who are also acquainted with seventy different languages." The same is also frequently repeated in the Gemara. Maimonides says: "None were admitted, either into the superior or inferior Sanhedrim (by which is meant the Sanhedrim consisting of seventy-one or two members, and that of twenty-three), but wise men distinguished for their acquaintance with legal discipline, men of various science, and by no means ignorant of the arts, of medicine, arithmetic, the motions of the heavenly bodies; men of skill in legerdemain, divination also and magic, etc., so that they might be prepared for passing judgment on all the subjects usually brought before them." The phrase, seventy languages, was probably intended to designate all the languages which could have been of use to the Council in determining causes which were submitted to their decision. Of what use a knowledge of foreign languages would be in determining forensic cases, may be seen by reflecting on the number of men, speaking different tongues, who visited Jerusalem. See Acts 2: 8 seq. See on the general subject, Selden de Synedriis Vet. Ebr. Lib. II. Cap. 9.

NOTE D, p. 35.

The following is Winer's Comment on Gal. 6: 11. "You see, quantas, i. e. quam longas literas, (how long a letter, see Acts 28: 21; Xenoph. Hell. 1. 1. 15), I have written to you; how copiously I have written. So Grotius, Callixtus, Baumgarten, Koppe, Schott, Stolz. His reason for calling this letter a *long* letter, (whereas it is considerably shorter than the epistles to the Romans and Corinthians), is to be explained by the circumstance added, that he wrote it with *his own hand*. Paul had not much skill and practice in chirography. On this account he dictated most of his epistles; (merely adding his signature with a salutation or blessing; see Rom. 16: 22. 1 Cor. 16: 21. 2 Thess. 3: 17, 18. Col. 4: 18. See also a consideration of the supposed effect of writing by amanuenses on the apostle's style, in Henke's Transl. of Paley's Hor. Paul. pp. 419—421.—Tr.) Chrysostom has well remarked, 'Paul gives us to understand, in this passage, nothing else than that he wrote the whole epistle; and this was a special sign of its genuineness. In other epistles, however, he dictated, and an amanuensis wrote.' The sense of the passage is, therefore, 'You will wonder at this long letter written by my own hand; since I am not easily persuaded, in

other cases, to write a single word myself. You will therefore perceive how great is my concern for your welfare, and how much I am willing to labor for your rescue from present danger.' (Flatt, on this passage, says, "The Galatians might therefore look upon it, as a special proof of his attachment to them, that he wrote with his own hand. He tells them, how highly they should prize this letter from him, and how much he loved them. 'Perhaps,' says Morus, 'Paul added these words because his epistle contained some severe remarks, which he wished them to know had not come under the improper notice of an amanuensis."—Tr.) Theodoret, Jerome, Theophylact, Heinsius, and others interpret differently. They suppose that Paul referred to the length and the crudeness of his alphabetic characters. Jerome says, 'Paulus Hebraeus erat, et Graecas literas nesciebat, et quia necessitas expetebat, ut manu sua epistolam scriberet contra consuetudinem, *curros tramites literarum vix magnis apicibus exprimebat.' Such a reference as this however seems to be inconsistent, for its want of dignity, with the severe mental habit of the apostle.*"

It would seem from the above, that Tholuck's reference on p. 34 to Winer, suggests an incorrect idea of Winer's interpretation of the passage. Some interpreters, who suppose that Paul alluded to his ungraceful chirography, connect the eleventh verse with those that succeed it, and give the following paraphrase of his words: "Marvel not at the unformed style of my hand-writing. I have no desire to gain applause for any human skill. Those who would lead you into evil may seek to obtain praise for their external accomplishments, but I will glory in nothing, save the calamities which I suffer for the cause of Christ." See Koppe on Gal. 6: 11. Grotius follows Jerome, in supposing that the apostle meant to speak only of the verses following the eleventh, as those which he wrote with his own hand; and thus to imply that the greater part of the epistle had been dictated to an amanuensis. "The sense would therefore be, 'Now, after you have read the principal part of my epistle, which is written in a character sufficiently graceful and elegant, you see that an appendix has been added with mine own hand, in a character much more unformed.' But the word ἔγραψα seems to me to indicate that which had been written, and not that which the apostle was intending to write." Rosenmüller on Gal. 6: 11. Henke supposes that Paul must have referred merely to this appendix, as in his own hand-writing; otherwise the style of the epistle would have been different from that of the epistles which he dictated. Observations on Paley's Hor. Paul. pp. 420, 421.

The common interpretation of the passage, that Paul referred merely to the fact of his writing the epistle himself, and not to the style of his chirography, rests in part on the principle, that "words which properly express magnitude may be also employed to express multitude;" and therefore πηλίκοις γράμμασιν may mean "with how many letters," instead of "with what large letters." (Flatt's Comm.) It is also contended, that the plural of γράμμα is often used to signify an epistle, see Acts 28: 21, and therefore πηλίκοις γράμμασιν may signify directly, "what a large or long epistle." (Winer.)

NOTE E, p. 36.

Jewish Schools. The priests and Levites are sometimes called teachers of the Jewish people; but they were not, under the Mosaic dispensation, teachers of schools. The prophets, more nearly than the priests, resembled clergymen at the present day. At stated seasons, as the exigency of the times required, they became *teachers*, instructors *extraordinary*. The school of Samuel is supposed by Eichhorn to have been merely a thing of accident or inclination; by Rosenmüller, an institution for national culture, (he compares Samuel with Orpheus); by Nachtigall, a political institution; by De Wette, a school probably for the education of prophetic poets or speakers. See 1 Sam. 10: 5—11. 19: 18—24. 2 Kings 4: 23.

Synagogues were sometimes called schools by the Jews. Care was taken, however, to make a distinction between the synagogues and the schools properly so called, the מִדְרָשִׁים or higher schools. In these the Talmud was read, while the Law merely was read in the synagogues; and the Talmud was supposed to be much superior to the Law. During the reign of Antiochus Epiphanes, there were no buildings for the synagogues *in Palestine*, though there were in *foreign* countries.[1] They were first erected in Palestine under the Maccabean princes. They were built in imitation of the temple. In the centre of the synagogue-court was a chapel, supported by four columns, in which, on an elevation prepared for it, was placed the Book of the Law, rolled up. This, on the appointed days, was publicly read. The uppermost seats in the synagogue, i. e. those which were nearest the chapel where the sacred books were kept, were esteemed peculiarly honorable, Matt. 23: 6. James 2: 3.—There was a school in every town, where children were taught to read the law. If any town neglected to establish such a school, the inhabitants were excommunicated till one was provided. The students were termed sons or children. The teachers, at least some of them, had private lecture-rooms; but they also taught and disputed in synagogues, in temples, and wherever they could find an audience. The method of instruction was the same with that which prevailed among the Greeks. Any disciple, who chose, might propose questions, upon which it was the duty of the teachers to remark and give their opinions, Luke 2: 46. The teachers were not invested with their functions by any formal act of the church or of the civil authority. They were self-constituted. They received no other salary than a voluntary present from the disciples, a kind of *honorarium*, 1 Tim. 5: 17. They acquired a subsistence in the main by the exercise of some art or handicraft. According to the Talmudists, they were bound to abstain from all conversation with women, and to refuse to sit at table with the lower class of people, Matt. 9: 11. John 4: 27. The subjects on which they taught were numerous, commonly intricate, and frequently very trifling. There are numerous examples of these subjects in the Talmud.

The 'Midrashoth' were a kind of divinity schools, in which the law was

[1] Joseph. Jewish War, III. 33.

expounded. Such were the schools of Hillel and Gamaliel; also, those which were subsequently established at Jabneh, Tsipporis, Tiberias, Magdala, Caesarea, etc. Rabbi Jochanan, who compiled the Jerusalem Talmud, was president of one of these schools eighty years.

The whole Sanhedrim, in its sessions, was the great school of the nation, as well as the highest judicatory. It set forth the sense of the law, especially in practical matters, and expounded Moses with such authority, that its word was not to be resisted or even questioned. A school was maintained wherever the Sanhedrim had held its session.

A sort of academic degree was conferred on the pupils in the Jewish seminaries, which, after the destruction of Jerusalem, were established at Babylon and Tiberias. The candidate was examined both in respect to his moral and literary character. Having passed his examination satisfactorily, he ascended an elevated seat, Matt. 23: 2; a writing tablet was then presented to him, to signify that he should write down his acquisitions, since they might escape from his memory, and unless they were written down, would be lost. A key was presented to signify, that he might now open the treasures of knowledge, Luke 11: 52. Hands were laid upon him; a custom derived from Num. 27: 28. A certain authority was conferred on him, probably to be exercised over his own disciples. Finally, he was saluted with the title of *Rabbi*, or *Master*.[1]

NOTE F, p. 39.

John George Hamann was born at Königsberg, A. D. 1730. He travelled considerably in his native country; was private tutor in several places; finally received an office in the customs at Königsberg, and in the following year, 1788, died at Münster. He published several works, indicating a humorous and very eccentric turn of mind. There is in some respects a resemblance between them and the writings of Jacob Böhmen. They attracted but little attention at first; but were afterwards noticed with approbation by Herder, Jacobi, Goethe, Jean Paul Richter, and other writers of the like character. They were republished at Leipsic in 1821—1825. Hamann called himself, and is called by others, the northern magian. See an extended notice of him in the Supplement to the Germ. Cons. Lex.

NOTE G, p. 39.

The following note is appended by Tholuck to the extract which he gives from Hamann.

"The attention of recent writers has been called to the resemblance between Paul and Hamann. There is here, indeed, in respect to richness of sentiment, well nigh more than a resemblance. Both authors are fruit-trees, whose branches, down to the smallest twig, glisten with fruits and blossoms. Many, however, will doubtless be of a different opinion, for since writers

[1] See Jahn's Archaeology 1st ed., 117, 436, 468; also Lightfoot's Works, III. 397. V. 42. X. 75, 174, etc.

like these, as nature herself is said to do, answer only as much as you ask of them, you must therefore learn how to interrogate them. Their works are Gothic edifices, which to a wide extent over city and country ravish the eye, and, as you advance the nearer to them, every concealed angle holds your attention for hours, and discovers to you the painter who produces master-pieces, even when he daubs with the pencil. Is there not, for example, in every word of the passage quoted on p.39, from the northern magian, music and indeed a key-note to the *great word?* But that Hamann *sought after this*, will be asserted only by such an one, as must *hunt* for the spirit before it will run into his hands. Next to Hamann, the great poet of the Divine Comedy presents a parallel to the apostle. This parallel, however, is less exact than the former; because with Dante reflection predominates more, and the abundance of allusions is not so involuntary as with the apostle and the magian of the north. That wonderful mixture of dry Aristotelian logic with the deepest mysticism, which is found in the Orientals, and in the Western mystics of the middle ages, is exhibited by such poets as Dante and Calderon in allegories, hints, learned reflections, which appear cold to us. Judging by my own feeling, this altogether peculiar characteristic of cool reflection is found in no passage of Scripture, not in the epistle to the Hebrews. Even the allegories in the New Testament proceed in my judgment, from intuition, (from poetical inspiration), more than from the calculating understanding. This, I think, can be made evident. Inasmuch then as Dante possesses such intuition in rich measure, he presents a fertile subject of comparison, in this respect, with Hamann and Paul," etc.

NOTE H, p. 42.

The following definition of Theosophy is from Bretschneider's Entwickelung, pp. 23, 24.

"Theosophy, (*Θεόσοφος*, rerum divinarum gnarus), is the vain persuasion that one has the power of acquiring, by peculiar means, an immediate knowledge of God and of the world of spirits, and of living in immediate connection with them. As a science, it is the instruction on the especial means for securing this result. Theosophy is distinguished from theology in the following particulars. First, theology makes use of no means to obtain a definite knowledge of the spiritual world, but such as are communicated to all men; or it is content with a *discursive* knowledge of the spiritual world; such knowledge as the reason derives from its own principles and from experience. Theosophy, on the other hand, seeks or pretends to have an immediate intuitive knowledge of the invisible, and believes that it has mysterious means for obtaining it which are given to but few. Secondly, theology terminates in promoting the moral connection of man with the invisible world, in promoting a holy life; but theosophy follows also after earthly and selfish ends, as the philosopher's stone, etc."

A less distinctive meaning of theosophy is, an acquaintance with the spiritual world, particularly with God; and such a pretension to familiarity with invisible objects as is associated with fanaticism.

NOTE I, p. 43.

Gamaliel.—The Jews, in imitation of the Greeks, had their seven wise men, who were called Rabboni, Rabban, רַבָּן. Of this number were Hillel, Simeon and Gamaliel. According to the Jewish writers, Gamaliel was the son of Simeon and the grand-son of Hillel. Josephus mentions two learned men, viz., Sameas and Pollio, who flourished thirty-four years B. C. If these are the same with the Shammai and Hillel of the Talmud, then, as is supposed by many, Shammai or Sameas is the same with the Simeon, who is mentioned, Luke 2: 25—35; and his son Gamaliel, so celebrated in the Talmud, is the same with the Gamaliel, mentioned in Acts 5: 34, 22: 3.

Hillel was one of the most distinguished among the Jewish doctors for birth, family, learning, and authority. The Rabbins relate that he was descended from Abital, one of the wives of David. He is said to have lived in Babylon forty years; he then studied the law forty years in Jerusalem, and was finally president of the Sanhedrim forty years more. He died when our Saviour was about twelve years old. He had eighty distinguished scholars. One of them was Jonathan Ben Uzziel, the Chaldee paraphrast. Many nice questions were discussed in his school.

The name of his son, Simeon, is not mentioned in the Mishna, or in the codes of the Jewish traditions. It is conjectured by some that his regard for Christianity—(on the ground that he is the same mentioned by Luke)—made him indifferent toward the traditions. He is reported to have begun his presidentship of the Sanhedrim, when our Saviour was about thirteen years old. He was the first of the seven who were dignified with the title *Rabban.*

His son, Rabban Gamaliel, the apostle's teacher, is stated to have been the president of the Council when Christ was arraigned. He lived twenty-two years after that event, and died eighteen years before the destruction of Jerusalem. Onkelos, the Targumist of the law, is said to have burned seventy pounds of frankincense for him at his death. Among the sayings ascribed to Gamaliel, is the following: "Procure thyself a tutor, and get thee out of doubting, and do not multiply to pay thy tithes by conjecture."

From the narrative in Acts V., Gamaliel appears to have been a prudent and sagacious counsellor. He neither decides against the doctrine of the apostles, nor gives a verdict in its favor. He does not know exactly what judgment to pass upon the new phenomenon. He would, therefore, defer a final opinion till the nature of Christianity was more fully exhibited. Had he been convinced of its pernicious character, he would have advised its suppression. Had he decided in favor of its useful tendencies, he would have embraced it. It is conjectured by some that he gave his conciliatory advice, because he saw that the Sadducees were greatly inflamed against the apostles. The report that he actually became a Christian seems to have no foundation. There is no evidence but that he lived and died a firm Jew. Notwithstanding his liberality in the affair of the apostles, the Rabbins report, that he ordained and published a prayer which was termed, ברכת מינים,

'the prayer against heretics,' meaning by that term, Christians. The prayer was in fact composed by Samuel the Small, but it was approved by Gamaliel. He also ordered that it should be constantly used in the Jewish Synagogues.

This distinguished teacher was sometimes termed, 'Rabban Gamaliel the Old,' either because he was the first of that name, or because he lived to a great age. His son, Rabban Simeon, was slain at the destruction of Jerusalem. Simeon's son and successor was Rabban Gamaliel of Jabneh. With the grand-son of this last Gamaliel, who also bore the same name, the title 'Rabban,' and the Sanhedrim itself expired.[1]

NOTE K, p. 43.

In explaining the phrase in Luke 2: 46, which represents Christ as *sitting* among the doctors, whereas the ordinary posture of a learner was *standing*, Lightfoot quotes the following passage from Megilah, fol. 21. 1. "The Rabbins have a tradition, that from the days of Moses to Rabban Gamaliel, they were instructed in the law standing. But when Rabban Gamaliel died, the world languished, so that they learned the law sitting. Whence also that tradition, that since the death of Rabban Gamaliel, the glory of the law was eclipsed." See Lightfoot's Works, vol. VII. pp. 44—48. Similar expressions of praise are often found in the Talmudic writings. Thus: "When Rabbi Meir died, there were none left to instruct men in wise parables." "When Simeon, son of Gamaliel, died, there came locusts, and calamities were increased. When Rabbi Akiba died, the glory of the law vanished away. Upon the death of Gamaliel the Aged, the honor of the law vanished, and there was an end to purity and sanctimony. When Rabbi Ishmael, son of Babi, died, the splendor of the priesthood was tarnished. When Rabbi (Judah) died, there was no more any modesty or fear of transgression." See Lardner's Works, Vol. VI. p. 511.

NOTE L, p. 45.

The following is a condensed view of the temperaments, so far as is necessary for elucidating the remarks of Tholuck. It is taken from Heinroth's Anthropologie, Absch. 5. § 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82.—There is in the constitution either great power of feeling and power of action, both in equal degree; or a prominent power of feeling with but little power of action; or a predominant power of action with but little power of feeling; or an equally small degree of both. Accordingly, the temperament which contains great susceptibility with great power of action is called choleric, or warm-blooded; that which has a predominant sensibility with but little power of execution, we call sanguine or quick-blooded; that which has a predominance of the active power with but little sensibility, we call the melancholic or slow-blooded; and that which has an equally small degree of susceptibility and of executive power, we call phlegmatic or cold-blooded.

[1] See Lightfoot's Works, III. 188, 189, VIII. 81, 392, IX. 345, 346, X. 34. Lardner's Works, Lond. Ed. 1831, I. 309, 310, VI. 511, 514. Upham's Jahn's Archaeology, p. 116, Olshausen Comm. on Acts II. 630.

The choleric temperament is also called the nervous, as it depends upon a high degree of susceptibility in the cerebral and nervous system, and also a high degree of muscular power, derived from the connection formed by the spinal marrow, between the brain and the muscles. The sanguine temperament is also called the arterial; because it depends upon a predominance of activity in the arteries and lungs. The melancholic temperament is also called the venous, because it depends upon a predominant influence of the veins and liver. The phlegmatic temperament is also called the lymphatic, because it depends upon the peculiar power of the lymphatic and glandular system. The choleric temperament, (which is the same with what is often called the bilious), inclines its possessor to outward activity, the melancholic to inward; the sanguine to enjoyment, the phlegmatic to rest.

The man of choleric temperament has excitability, but is not easily irritated; not moved by little things, but by great influences only; is strong and constant in love, but not sensual; hates as vehemently as he loves, burns with indignation against his foe, and is willing to sacrifice his life for his friend; is fond of fame, dominion, outward magnificence, but not of mere show; loves liberty, slavery being death to him; is in the highest degree enthusiastic; is grave but not demure; serene but not mirthful; has a taste for the grand in nature and art; has a keen, penetrating mind, as well as eye; his ideas are rapid, various, sound, distinct and well arranged; he is fond of the great and the perfect in the arts, of the practical in the sciences; his will is quick, strong, persevering; himself, his own I, is the object for which he acts. He is free from the vices that especially imply weakness, as hypocrisy, lying, defamation; he is magnanimous, and has the virtues of a hero; but is also capable of being a despot. This temperament is more commonly found in men than women; in mature life than in youth. It was the temperament of the ancient Romans, and is now that of the modern Spaniards and Italians.

The man of melancholic temperament is indifferent to the outward world, and carries his world deeply hidden within himself; is inclined to sorrow, despondency, suspicion, ill-will, misanthropy; has an inclination to solitude, an aversion to noisy sports, joyous society; no special predilection for freedom; loves the elevated, the awful, the gloomy in art and nature; is fond of letting his thoughts dwell in a world of spirits and phantasms; loves profound thought, radical investigation, speculative rather than practical science; is apt to adhere to a one-sided view of things; is industrious, persevering, tenacious; aims after inward refinement and perfection; is still, cautious and apprehensive; fond of the sombre, grotesque, monstrous; insensible to his own outward wants, or those of others, but is consumed with deep inward sorrow; inclined to self-mortification, self-torment, the life of an anchorite; is withal equable in feeling and conduct. This is the temperament of men rather than women, and of the later rather than the earlier life. Among the ancients, the inhabitants of the Indies were melancholic; at the present day among cultivated Europeans, the English are so. While the choleric writes in a clear and precise style, the melan-

cholic prefers an obscure philosophical style. The choleric belongs to the Socratic school, the melancholic to the Stoical; the former is predisposed in favor of the Protestant religion, the latter of the Catholic; the former manifests his degeneracy by fanaticism, the latter, by mysticism.

NOTE M, p. 51.

The following letter, referred to also in Tholuck's Pref. to new ed. of Sermons, p. 45, is found in Luther's Works, Vol. V. pp. 18, 19. John Luther was the eldest son of the reformer, was born in 1526, and was therefore four years old when this letter was written.

"Grace and peace in Christ, my dearly beloved little son. I am glad to know that you are learning well and that you say your prayers So do, my little son, and persevere; and when I come home I will bring with me a present from the annual fair. I know of a pleasant and beautiful garden into which many children go, where they have golden little coats, and gather pretty apples under the trees, and pears and cherries and plums, (Pflaumen) and yellow plums, (Spillen); where they sing, leap, and are merry; where they also have beautiful little horses with golden bridles and silver saddles. When I asked the man that owned the garden, 'Whose are these children?' he said, 'they are the children that love to pray and to learn, and are pious.'

Then I said, 'Dear Sir, I also have a son; he is called Johnny Luther (Hänsichen Luther). May he not come into the garden, that he may eat such beautiful apples and pears, and may ride such a little horse, and play with these children?' Then the man said, 'If he loves to pray and to learn and is pious, he shall also come into the garden; Philip too and little James; and if they all come together, then may they have likewise whistles, kettle-drums, lutes and harps; they may dance also and shoot with little cross-bows.'

Then he showed me a beautiful green grass-plot in the garden, prepared for dancing, where hang nothing but golden fifes, drums, and elegant silver cross-bows But it was now early, and the children had not yet eaten. Therefore I could not wait for the dancing, and I said to the man, 'Ah, dear Sir, I will instantly go away, and write about all of this to my little son John; that he may pray earnestly and learn well and be pious, so that he also may come into this garden;—but he has an aunt Magdalene, may he bring her with him?' Then said the man,—'So shall it be: go and write to him with confidence.' Therefore, dear little John, learn and pray with delight, and tell Philip and James too that they must learn and pray; so you shall come with one another into the garden.—With this I commend you to Almighty God,—and give my love to aunt Magdalene; give her a kiss for me. Your affectionate father,

In the year 1530. MARTIN LUTHER.

THE

FRIENDSHIP OF JONATHAN AND DAVID.

BY

PROFESSOR FREDERICK KÖSTER.

10

THE TRAGICAL QUALITY

IN THE HISTORY OF THE

FRIENDSHIP OF JONATHAN AND DAVID.[1]

THERE are few characters in the Old Testament which are delineated in a light so advantageous and so worthy of love as that of Jonathan, the brave son of king Saul. An intimate friendship requires, by its very nature, that every strong and noble feeling in man should be mingled with it. We accordingly observe that all the virtues of Jonathan were concentrated and pictured in his friendship for David. Hence Jonathan and David rightfully take the first place in the distinguished instances of friendship handed down to us from antiquity. The bewitching charm which surrounds the history of this friendship consists, perhaps, very much in the circumstance, that the dark, back ground in which it is invested, makes it appear but the more touching. The picture of so fine a sensibility, and of such a heroic and virtuous companionship, in a troubled and confused period, refreshes us like a star in a gloomy night; and it is clearly the design of the historian, in interweaving this picture, to place in stronger relief the exasperated, suspicious and hateful feelings of king Saul—contrasted with the transparent and lovely character of his son. But the story of Jonathan's friendship strongly attracts our attention and sympathy, in consequence of its *tragical course*. This point, hitherto but little considered, I may be here allowed to illustrate at some length. Many single portions of the narrative are exhibited in a better light and with greater prominence, from the circumstance that our historian, with all apparent simplicity, delineates human manners as few writers do. It is wonderful, how often, by a single word or by the position of a word, he indicates the finest traits in character.

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[1] See Note at the end of this Article.

The history is tragical, since, either in itself or in its consequences, it so exhibits important events, that our sympathy is awakened, and our sensibility deeply excited. An action is strongly characterized as tragical, when, though never fully accomplished, it exhibits a vehement struggle after something good, lofty and noble, developed by a complication of circumstances, involving a severe struggle between inclination and duty, or between two conflicting inclinations. How much all this entered into Jonathan's history, may be seen by the following observations.

1. The friendship of Jonathan is not only in its origin, generous in the highest degree, but it springs up suddenly, as if by a stroke of enchantment. When David, the shepherd's heroic son, was returning from the slaughter of the giant Goliath, bearing in his hand the head of his enemy, and was introduced to Saul by his general, Abner, then, as it appears from 1 Sam. 18: 1, compared with 20: 17, "the soul of Jonathan was knit with the soul of David, and he loved him as his own soul, and he made a covenant with him." How touchingly do these words delineate the nature of true friendship, as well as that delicate connection between two persons, (compare Gen. 44: 30), whereby they melt, as it were, into one! But such friendship is wont to be awakened, as certainly in the present case, in a manner one knows not how. Some occurrence at a particular juncture reveals unexpectedly that oneness of inclination and action which lies at the foundation of the friendship. David had slain the champion of the Philistines, those hereditary enemies of Israel, with whom Jonathan also was constantly contending, and from whom he had, on one occasion, borne off a splendid trophy, 1 Sam. xiv. The courage and the modesty, the gallantry and the caution which David had shown in this encounter, were the very same qualities which pervaded Jonathan's great soul. He, consequently, did not think of the difference between a king's son and an unknown shepherd's boy. No vestige of envy lest David should divest him of his military glory found a place in his heart. Involuntarily and irresistibly he felt himself drawn to the youthful hero. This moment determined forever the direction of his feelings.

2. We may have observed, that friendship has rarely, on both sides, an equal degree of vehemence. In the case of one of two friends, there will be more of a disposition to communicate and to make sacrifices, regardless of self; while the other, on the contrary,

will be rather in the attitude of him who receives and acknowledges favors. Such is the fact in the present instance. David's friendship was as sincere, but it was less glowing than that of Jonathan. His spirit, born for dominion, was struggling upward, and did not permit itself to be ruled by any single passion. Large plans for the future, and thirst for glory and for exploits occupied his mind. He must have felt, indeed, highly honored by the proposition made by the king's son; heartily he must have returned his affection; still he had room in his soul for something else. The friendship of Jonathan made him courageous under the calamities of his adventurous course; but, in addition, he restlessly followed his widely extended enterprises. Jonathan, on the other hand, felt himself to be thenceforth merely in David, and he lived, as it were, only for David. Even at the outset, he gave his friend every thing which he had at hand, in order to bind himself to him in the most intimate manner. He tendered his mantle, his coat and his girdle—also his sword and his bow, without once reflecting, that the son of Jesse could give him nothing in return. Willingly he acknowledged David's superiority, and when he knew that the throne, of which he was the heir, was destined for David, 1 Sam. 28: 30, 23, 18, even this could not make him faithless. He was ready to do everything for his friend, 20: 4—everything, and to offer up life itself. Hence, he subsequently gave him information not only of the plots of his father, but defended him also, in repeated instances, against Saul's aspersions and attacks. On one occasion, he actually succeeded in reconciling Saul to David, 1 Sam. 19: 1—7. When he had concealed his friend in such a manner that he could be an unseen witness of the conversation, Jonathan said to his father: "Let not the king sin against his servant, who hath been so useful to him!" Then Saul swore that he would not kill David, and David came again into his presence. But the fire which glimmered under the ashes soon broke out afresh. David now exhibited solicitude lest Jonathan should finally, though with the best intentions, leave him in the hands of Saul, 20: 1—23. Remembering his subordinate condition, he falls immediately into the tone of one addressing a superior, and says: "Show mercy unto thy servant, with whom thou hast entered into covenant, and slay me thyself rather than expose me to thy father." Then Jonathan retired with his friend to a solitary place, in order that he might pour out his heart undisturbed,

Here he gave full vent to the overflowings of his enthusiastic friendship. Once and again, he swore eternal fidelity, v. 16, 17;[1] and took the same oath of him, v. 23. Since David had, in addition, made mention of his own death, Jonathan would still as it were, outbid him, "as soon as thou hast become a king, thou mayest indeed slay me, if only thou wilt remain my friend," v. 14, 15.[2]

He was conscious, that he could not find words sufficient to protest how ready he was to sacrifice throne and life for his friend. He was not contented merely with words, 1 Sam. 20: 24—42. Saul, on one occasion, passed over in silence David's absence from the royal table on the first day of the new moon. But as his seat was vacant on the second day, he inquired the reason. Jonathan, in accordance with a previous agreement with David, answered, that the son of Jesse, on account of some family business, had asked leave of him to go to Bethlehem. But the splenetic king, noticing the pretence, abusively exclaimed, "Thou foolish rebel![3] well know I, that thou hast chosen the son of Jesse, to the disgrace of thyself and of thy mother who bore thee. For so long as he lives, thou wilt not attain to the throne! Well, bring him here! for he must die." Then Jonathan defended his friend, with all boldness: "Why should he be put to death? And wherein has he offended?" And when his father, infuriated with rage, hurled a spear at him, he sprung from the table, "full of indignation and grief, because his father had treated David shamefully." He hastened to David, to warn him of the impending danger, "And they kissed one another, and wept one with another." When the circumstance is added,

[1] The passage יִבַּקֵּשׁ, etc. is elliptical and is an expression of certainty. "He made a covenant with David, and (said), 'Jehovah *will certainly punish* all David's enemies, (me also, should I become his enemy.")

[2] These affecting, accumulated words are variously misinterpreted by the translators. Jonathan plays on David's words, v. 8, "Show me kindness and slay me." He now says in reply: "Thou wilt not need that I should then live—thou wilt then have no occasion to show kindness (like that of God) to me, in order to preserve my life (i. e. when thou art made a king, then thou *mayest well put me to death*, if policy should require it), if only thou wilt not withdraw thy kindness from my (guiltless) posterity."

[3] I do not believe, that the word נַעֲוָה is intended to attach any guilt to Jonathan's mother, when she is rather mentioned with honor in what follows. But the participle feminine stands for the abstract, and בֶּן, by a Hebraism, forms the concrete: "Thou son of the perverseness of rebellion."

that "David exceeded" in weeping, it is a stroke full of meaning. David now saw the sorrowful future that was before him. The dissension between himself and Saul was incurable. He must wander on in misery. Jonathan, on the contrary, in order to keep up the spirits of his friend, assumed a firmer tone than he had employed, v. 41. On this account, he thus spoke briefly in parting, "As we have sworn that there shall be an eternal covenant between us and our posterity (so let it remain!)[1] Subsequently, when David had wandered in various places, for a long time, Jonathan sought him out in a wood among the Ziphites, as a proof of his unalterable friendship, and certainly not without personal danger. They here once more joined their hands instead of an oath (בֵּאלֹהִים), and Jonathan added, "that David need not fear, for Saul could not find him; he also knew that David would be king."

3. Jonathan, however, in consequence of his profound and glowing friendship, now came into circumstances of the most painful collision; and it is this which gives to his history such a deep tragical character. In repeated instances, Saul had publicly declared his son to be a miserable traitor, who had entered into a conspiracy with the enemies of his king and his father. It is touching to see, how Jonathan did everything possible to remove this reproach from himself, without becoming false, in the least degree, to his friendship. In order to avoid the inquiries of his father for the absent David, he resigned to Abner his accustomed place at the royal table next the king, and took a seat at a greater distance, 20: 25.[2] Besides, when Saul had fully resolved upon the destruction of David, the latter was warned of his danger by Jonathan, and in such a way that by means of privately concerted signals, no one discovered it. On a certain occasion, he concealed David, outside of the city, 20: 40, at the stone Ezel, where, according to the probable conjecture of Josephus,[3] was his field for military exercise, somewhat like a gymnasium—where also his solitary retirement could not be discovered. He now called to the boy, whose duty it was to collect the arrows which had been shot away, "Is not the arrow beyond thee?" He thus gave his friend a hint that it was necessary for him to flee. Under

[1] These words are too full of feeling to permit the ellipsis to be supplied.

[2] This seems at least, to be the meaning of the obscure expression וַיָּקָם.

[3] ὅπου γυμναζόμενος διετέλει, it is called in Archaeol. 6, 11, 8. So also 1 Sam. 20: 20, "Here he was accustomed to shoot at a mark (לְמַטָּרָה).

cover of a suitable excuse, he thereupon directed the lad to retire, while he poured out his heart to David, with still greater freedom. Suspicion, however, proved to be more sharp-sighted than friendship. Soon afterwards, Saul said to his servants assembled around him, 22: 8, "Ye all have conspired against me, and there is none that showeth me, that my son had made a league with the son of Jesse; therefore, now this my servant seeketh after my life." Nevertheless, the stain which was here publicly fastened upon him, the noble Jonathan at last removed in a glorious manner. His father, whom he had never forsaken, he faithfully followed, even in that last battle against the Philistines on Mount Gilboa; and as Saul fell, Jonathan also found the death which he probably sought, in order that he might free his honor from the suspicion of high treason, 31: 2.

4. After this catastrophe it refreshes us to hear, *how precious to David was Jonathan's love.* Carefully has the historian collected every circumstance whereby the new king honored the memory of his departed friend. David then sung the celebrated elegy, 2 Sam. i, with the undoubted design of rescuing Jonathan's name from all accusation of having entered into a conspiracy against his father. Jonathan is intentionally placed before Saul in this beautiful poem, but still he appears inseparable from his father,—united in life and in death.[1]

19 The gazelle (lies), O Israel, slain on thy mountains!
How are the mighty fallen!
20 Tell it not in Gath!
Publish it not in the streets of Ascalon!
Lest the daughters of the Philistines exult!
Lest the daughters of the uncircumcised triumph!
21 Mountains of Gilboa!
No dew nor rain upon you!
Be a field for execration![2]
For there was cast away the shield of the hero,
The shield of Saul,—no (more) anointed with oil.

[1] In a poem of such deep emotion, the *strophic* symmetry cannot appear strongly marked. Still, the first three verses are a general lamentation; the three following are devoted to the two heroes, but in such a manner that Jonathan appears preëminent; the last three are employed upon Jonathan alone.

[2] [Or let it not be a field for oblations, i. e. yielding rich fruits.—Tr.]

22 From the blood of the slain, from the flesh of the mighty
The bow of Jonathan turned not back,
And the sword of Saul returned not empty.
23 Saul and Jonathan—lovely and pleasant in their life,
And in their death not divided;
Swifter than eagles!
Stronger than lions!
24 Daughters of Israel! weep for Saul,
Who clothed you in crimson, with beautiful decorations;
Who fitted upon your raiment ornaments of gold!

25 How are the mighty fallen in the midst of the battle!
O Jonathan, slain upon thy mountains!
26 Wo be to me for thee, my brother Jonathan!
Very dear wast thou to me!
Wonderful was thy love to me—more than the love of women!
27 How are the mighty fallen!
And the weapons of war perished!

David, thereupon, commended the inhabitants of Jabesh Gilead, because they had taken care of the remains of Saul and Jonathan, 2 Sam. 2: 5—7. He thrice showed kindness[1] to Mephibosheth, Jonathan's son, and that too, "for Jonathan's sake." Mephibosheth was not, indeed, an object of fear on the part of David, as he had a lameness caused by a fall when he was five years old, his nurse fleeing with him on the news of his father's death, 2 Sam. 4: 4. But David sent for him from Lodebar beyond Jordan, gave him a permanent seat at his own table, and bestowed upon him the land and the whole private estate of Saul, entrusting the management of the property to Ziba, who had been a servant of Saul and the overseer of his house. During the insurrection of Absalom, this Ziba accused Mephibosheth of entertaining designs on the throne as his own right. David then granted the whole of Saul's estate to Ziba, 2 Sam. 16: 3, 4. The historian, however, gives us to understand that this was a false accusation, for Mephibosheth had never put off his mourning garments from the time of David's departure till his return home, 2 Sam. 19: 25—29. David, in the meantime, divided Saul's estate, half to the accuser and half

[1] Like that of God חֶסֶד אֱלֹהִים

to the accused. This might have been owing either to the fact that he had still some doubt of Mephibosheth's innocence, or because he had pledged his word to Ziba, v. 30, 31. When, subsequently, David had resigned to the Gibeonites, as a bloody expiation, the remaining posterity of Saul, (without doubt in order to strengthen the succession to the throne in his own family), he still spared Mephibosheth, "on account of the oath of Jehovah which was between him and Jonathan," 2 Sam. 21: 7. As a satisfactory conclusion to this entire and elegantly delineated picture, the history states that David honorably interred the bones of Saul and Jonathan in the family burial-place, in the tribe of Benjamin, 2 Sam. 21: 12.

NOTE BY THE TRANSLATOR, p. 75.

The article above translated is found in the Theol. Stud. u. Krit., Vol. V. 1832, pp. 366—376. The writer, John Frederic Köster, theological professor in the university of Kiel in Denmark, was born in 1791. In an article on Rationalism and Supernaturalism in the German Conversations-Lexicon, he is classed with the moderate supernaturalists, approaching more nearly to such men as Lücke and Ullmann than to Hengstenberg. Some of the principal publications of Prof. Köster are the following: Meletemeta Crit. et Exeget. in Zachariae Prophetae, Cap. IX—XIV. 1818; Die Strophen oder der Parallelismus der Verse der Hebräischen Poesie. His object in this piece is to show, that the verses of Hebrew poetry are regulated by the same law of symmetry, as the members of the verses; and that consequently this poetry is, in its essence, composed of Strophes, i. e. its verses are arranged in symmetrical divisions. He seems, however, to give the name of *Strophe* to that which we are accustomed to call a *paragraph*. See Bibl. Repos. I. 611. In accordance with his theory, Köster has published translations of the books of Job and Psalms, with introductions and notes. His remarks display extensive knowledge and an excellent spirit. He has lately inserted in the Stud. u Krit., an article entitled, 'Notes on the Old Testament out of the Book of Kosri.'

PROPHECY AND SPEAKING WITH TONGUES.

BY

DR. L. J. RÜCKERT.

ON THE GIFTS OF PROPHECY

AND OF

SPEAKING WITH TONGUES.

PREFATORY NOTE.

[THE following Article may be found at the close of Dr. L. J. Rückert's Commentary on the First Epistle to the Corinthians, Leipsic, 1836. A brief notice of the author, together with some account of his principles of interpretation, may be seen in a subsequent part of this volume.

The subject of the gift of tongues is confessedly one of great difficulty. As it has been remarked, we have lost the things which the terms were intended to denote. A great variety of particulars which were perfectly familiar to the primitive church are now covered with darkness. We can by no means determine the exact limits of the different miraculous gifts. We have not sufficient data to reconcile, on every point, the notices on the gift of tongues in the Acts of the Apostles, with those in the Pauline Epistles. In short, a state of things is alluded to, (not described), which ceased with the life of the apostles, or soon afterwards. All attempts perfectly to reproduce or describe it must fail. The principal theories on the subject of the gift of tongues are the following:

1. The Holy Spirit miraculously imparted to the apostles and to many of their disciples the power to use foreign languages, which they had never learned. The terms 'tongues,' 'other tongues,' etc. mean foreign languages, or languages which had not been acquired in the ordinary way. It is supposed to have been a permanent faculty of the individual, which he could employ according to his own discretion, and to have been miraculous only in the mode of its ac-

quisition in the first instance. It is also regarded as one of the principal supernatural aids granted to the first preachers of Christianity, and which enabled them so soon to diffuse it through the world. The 'interpretation,' ἑρμηνεία, was needed for the sake of those who were present during the address of one endued with the gift of tongues, and who did not understand the language in which he spoke. This general theory has been almost universally received in this country and in Great Britain. It is supported by the use of the epithets καιναῖς, 'new,' in Mark 16: 12, and ἑτέραις, 'other,' in Acts 2: 4; also by the entire tenor of the account in the second chapter of Acts, and by Paul's citation of Isa. 28: 11 in 1 Cor. 14: 21. On the other hand, it has been urged, that it represents the miracle as one of an entirely external character, and imposed upon individuals mechanically. Besides, it is not easy to unfold the idea of it, nor to point out its real object. If we imagine that object was to facilitate the efforts of the apostles and early Christians in propagating the gospel in distant lands, by means of the knowledge of foreign languages which this gift conveyed, in that case, we go beyond the record. In the inspired narratives the gift is mentioned as manifesting itself only in prayers and discourses in the church.

2. Another theory maintains that γλῶσσα is the tongue, or the physical organ, and that γλώσσῃ λαλεῖν means, 'to speak only with the tongue,' i. e. to utter inarticulate sounds which give no meaning. According to this theory we must conceive of the gift as an inspired babbling or stammering. It is wholly incompatible, however, with the passage in Mark xvi, and with the history in Acts ii. What kind of an effect would such a senseless babbling have had upon intelligent hearers; or how could the Holy Spirit have communicated it, or Paul given precepts for its regulation?

3. The theory adopted by Herder and De Wette, and strenuously defended by Bleek, is the following: γλῶσσαι are peculiar expressions, belonging to a language or dialect not in common use, and therefore, not known to all, but of which the poets, or those speaking under the influence of inspiration, might make use. This theory, it is said, is strongly supported by the usage of the word γλῶσσα in the Greek and Roman profane writers. Bleek has made a copious collection of illustrative passages. In those writers, the word sometimes denotes antiquated expressions, which had dropped out of common use, and which, when again employed, required a particular ex-

planation. Sometimes also the word means idiotisms, or provincial expressions which are employed and understood only in certain districts. Bleek thus describes the application of the term: "When a believer made use of a language, as decidedly different from that of common life, as the highly poetic language of the lyric poets was from that of simple prose, and, when from his natural gifts and previous education, no such style of speaking as that employed by him could have been expected; then must this have appeared, of necessity, as something supernatural, and as the effect of that miraculous inspiration by which they saw themselves in general influenced. When, moreover, all their discourses were on religious subjects; when in all, they proclaimed the praise of God who had proved so gracious, and of the Saviour through whom that grace was extended to them, as well as the blessedness they had found in believing on him,—how could any one fail to find in such a γλώσσαις λαλεῖν an effect of the Spirit whom the Lord had promised to send to his people?" Conclusive arguments against this theory are adduced in the sequel by Rückert.

Olshausen and Neander differ somewhat from Bleek. The former, Theol. Stud. u. Krit. III. 64—66, admits that the speaking in glosses was a speaking in an elevated poetical strain; but, on the other hand, he supposes also, that it sometimes rose to be actually a speaking in foreign tongues. This occurred, he imagines, when individuals were present, who understood the respective tongues.

"In the gift of tongues," says Neander, "the high and ecstatic consciousness in respect to God alone predominated, while the consciousness of the world was wholly withdrawn. In this condition, the medium of communication between the deeply moved inward man and the external world, was wholly wanting. What he spoke in this condition, from the strong impulse of his emotions and inward views, was not a connected discourse, nor an address adapted to the wants and circumstances of others." "He was wholly occupied with the relation of his own soul to God. The soul was absorbed in adoration and devotion. Hence to this condition are ascribed prayer, songs of praise to God, and the attestation of his mighty deeds. Such an one prayed in spirit; the higher life of the soul and spirit predominated in him. When therefore in the midst of his peculiar emotions and spiritual contemplations he formed for him-

self a peculiar language, he was wanting in the power so to express himself as to be understood by the greater number."

It is not necessary, however, to proceed further with our notices of the peculiar views of the Germans on this subject. Those who may wish for additional information will do well to consult J. A. Ernesti, Opuscula Theol. Lips. 1773, 457—476; Heydenreich, Comm. in prior. Pauli ad Corinth. Epist. II. 249—270; Billroth, Comm. zum Corintherbriefe, 1833, 166—180; the Translation of the same in the 23d No. of the Edinburgh Bib. Cabinet, 13—35; Neander in Bib. Repos. IV. 249; and Olshausen, Comm. über das N. T., II. 582 seq. There is an Article on the subject in Vol. II. of the Stud. u. Krit. 1829, pp. 3—78, by Prof. Bleek of Bonn. Some strictures are offered by Olshausen on these views of Bleek in the same volume, pp. 538—549. To these Bleek replied in the following year, 1830, Vol. III. pp. 45—64. Some brief observations are appended by Olshausen, pp. 64—66, in which he seems to approach nearer to the opinion of Bleek. We now proceed to the essay of Rückert, who, it will be perceived, coincides substantially with the commonly received opinion.—Tr.]

Introductory Remark.

In the Commentary on the fourteenth chapter of the first Epistle to the Corinthians, I took pains to present as clearly as possible all those marks which might serve to define the nature of those spiritual gifts,[1] which are now to be more closely examined. The inquiry will be pursued in the following treatise, so as to exhibit in connection what was before considered only in detached parts. I shall also compare what is found on the subject elsewhere in the New Testament, weigh the views of preceding writers, and from all these, present, as far as possible, a picture of the gifts as a whole. This cannot indeed be completed with the fulness which a monogram would admit. It may, however, be done in such a manner

[1] [Charismen, χαρίσματα. We prefer the old words, 'gifts,' 'spiritual gifts,' to the terms Charisma, Charismata, which have been sometimes employed by English writers.—Tr.]

that it will not be the author's fault, if the reader should quit the investigation without having found the knowledge which was sought.

Prophecy.

The solution of the problem in respect to prophecy is easy. It can be stated in a few lines, and without reference to the labors of others. Even in Eph. 4: 11, the idea of a christian prophet, as gathered from the Acts of the Apostles and the Pauline Epistles, is accurately marked. It is this: a prophet was a man who, without any definite office, without any call made to him outwardly, spoke, from the impulse of the Divine Spirit dwelling within him, words which would serve for the information, encouragement and strengthening of believers. He likewise uttered predictions of future events, if the Spirit suggested such to him. He differed from an apostle in this, that he was not sent like him to make known the message of salvation to unbelievers. They were alike, however, in respect to the nature of what they did say. Thus the apostle was also a prophet; but the prophet as such was not an apostle. We learn from our epistle to recognize prophecy as a gift conferred on man by the Spirit, 1 Cor. 12: 10, according to his good pleasure, verse 11. Man himself, therefore, could neither impart nor acquire it, though it was possible for him to strive for the attainment of it.[1] All Christians did not possess it.[2] Inasmuch, however, as Paul desired that it might be enjoyed by all verse 5, he did not consider an universal participation in it impossible. The nature of the declaration to be made was revealed to the prophet, and this revelation certainly could take place in a moment.[3] Various as it may have been, still the manifestation of the hidden secrets of the human heart is given as an elementary part of the prophetic discourse.[4] The form in which the prophecy appeared was that of a language generally understood. Thus, doubtless, the language of the country which was in everyday use was employed. The effect which it produced was particularly directed to believers verse 23, and consisted in the edification and spiritual improvement of the church.[5] Unbelievers, however, might be deeply affected by it, and be brought to self-knowledge and to the worship of the true God.[6] It was not designed for a contin-

[1] 1 Cor. 14: 1, 39. [2] 1 Cor. 12: 29. [3] 1 Cor. 14: 13.
[4] 1 Cor. 14: 24, 25. [5] 1 Cor. 14: 3, 4. [6] 1 Cor. 14: 24, 25.

ued existence. On the contrary, a time was to be anticipated and hoped for—the time of the completion or fulfilment—when there should be no more prophecy.[1] All this is stated with great clearness and definiteness. It completes for us the beautiful picture of a preacher's office, free, christian, confined to no situation, having no human call or appointment. It was an office, which the primitive church in its simplicity could enjoy, which a world adorned by the name of a church, in its wisdom, cannot enjoy; so little can we enjoy it that if the Spirit should once more act in the same manner as he did in the early christian times, the worldly arm of a civil power, which has the guardianship of the church, knows how to extinguish the office by law and mad-houses.

Speaking with Tongues.

While thus the nature of christian prophecy can be stated almost with perfect precision, on the other hand there rests upon the phenomenon that is wont to be designated by the words, 'speaking with tongues,'[2] a darkness whose impenetrableness the older commentators perceived, and which has, by no means, been removed by the additional, very praiseworthy labors of modern interpreters. This darkness, I imagine, can never be perfectly dispelled. Far as possible am I from supposing that I can accomplish it. I shall only pursue my duty as an interpreter, while I undertake to say the few things on the subject which I am able to say. I shall here make that reference to the labors of the latest interpreters, already named in the Commentary, which is allowed by the narrow limits which I am compelled to put to this treatise. A fundamental exhibition of what has been propounded by them of itself, without any examination of it, would occupy more room than I have. I am, therefore, compelled to refer those readers who wish to look over the entire discussion to the treatises of those learned men themselves, which besides are not difficult of access. This I do with the more pleasure, as the excellent things laid down in them all are so numerous that no one will regret the reading of them. The path that I here take seems to me to be demanded by my position as an interpreter of the epistle to the Corinthians. The author of a monogram might indeed choose his point of departure as he pleases. He might begin,

[1] 1 Cor. 13: 8—10.

[2] γλώσσαις λαλεῖν.

perhaps, in the most fitting manner, with the notices in the Acts of the Apostles. The interpreter of Paul, however, has to direct his eye first to that which the apostle himself says upon the topic, and merely to call in those notices to his aid, provided the words of the apostle are not sufficient of themselves to afford the necessary light.

Preliminary Remark in respect to the Investigation.

Two observations I must here premise. One relates particularly to the investigation of the thing; the other to the advantage which we are authorized to expect from the words of Paul. Both are allied to each other. Even the latest authors[1] seem to me in general not to have sufficiently considered what, in a subject of this kind, is the principal difficulty, namely, that our inquiry cannot be so much grounded on the nature of the gift itself, as on the mode in which Luke and Paul have presented it to us, or the views of it which their representations will authorize. They are the only men whom we have to testify on the subject, and they can do it from their own observation. We would not be misunderstood here, as though the subject were presented by them otherwise than it was in reality. On the contrary, even if they had so desired, they could not have given an untrue representation, because they wrote for contemporaries and eye-witnesses, and even for those who shared in the gift itself. If they had fully delineated its nature and its external marks, then we should have accepted their view as perfectly authentic. This, however, they do not do. On the contrary, Luke supplies a few scanty notices. Paul offers to his readers, who were familiar with the thing, some judgments and observations upon it. Our curiosity, simply aroused but not satisfied with the information, can but supply in the way of conjecture what the history has not given. This course ought to remain unprohibited. We should not, however, forget that we are endeavoring to supply an historical fact, which is either wholly unique in its kind, or yet for us so obscure that we do not know whether among the phenomena presented to our experience any thing similar can be found or not. It hence follows that we are to be on our guard, first, lest we place too much reliance on analogies drawn from other facts, not knowing whether the observed analogies

[1] Bäumlein only excepted, who merits the highest praise of all, especially for his thoroughness, method and impartiality.

are essential or accidental, real or only apparent; secondly, lest we should wish to press with our psychological principles—derived only from experience—upon an actual phenomenon where all experience fails us; and thirdly, lest our metaphysical or theological views should decide questions where historical arguments alone can determine. If arguments of this nature fail us, then the question must remain unsettled. By observing these cautions we are, to be sure, cut off from the most copious sources of statement and illustration; we also subject ourselves to the danger of being compelled to confess our ignorance on most points. At the same time we avoid, as it seems to me, the far greater danger of creating a fact for ourselves, which is like the actual truth hardly in the remotest features.

Preliminary Remark in respect to Paul's Language.

The second observation is this—we may venture to hope that we can ascertain from the words of the apostle, not the nature of the gift of tongues in Corinth, but the nature of this gift as Paul himself understood it. He was in the possession of it;[1] he imparted it to others.[2] Thus far, accordingly, we may expect that he will delineate it as it was; that nothing will be said by him which was foreign from it. But the violent proceeding of the Corinthians in relation to it, he could not know from his own observation. What he had learned through others could not but be imperfect, because these may have known it only of Corinth.[3] That it was actually so, the handling of the subject which he has deigned to give is an incontrovertible evidence. He exhibits the 'speaking with tongues,' always, as an actual gift of the Divine Spirit—as a donative which, good in itself, and salutary to its possessor, could not have been fitted for use in the church on account of its not being understood. Paul recommends that it be employed but rarely in the assemblies. How can we therefore, how dare we admit that this was the gift of

[1] 1 Cor. 14: 18. [2] Acts 18: 6.

[3] Eichhorn, Einl. III. 121, 128, has also made a similar remark. He does not, however, apply it correctly. He has well explained the caution which the apostle observed in his treatment of the subject; but the hypothesis, which he frames out of the words of the apostle that relate to the disorder in the Corinthian church, is altogether inconsiderate. Here Eichhorn has gone, characteristically, into as copious details as if he knew more about it than Paul himself.

tongues in *Corinth?* However any one may judge finally of the Spirit himself and of his gifts, still all may unite in this, that the gift in question was the result of a divine energy, and that its workings could be disclosed only in the individual who was himself warmed and enlivened by it in favor of that which was good and holy. But that this last effect could not be attributed to the Corinthians generally, our epistle must have probably convinced us. Of particular persons nothing is here said. The assertion respects the majority, since in Corinth the speaking with tongues was excessive, and was shared in by multitudes. The majority, however, were far from possessing the christian feeling which could induce us to believe that the Holy Spirit had made them particularly, in preference to many others, his abode and scene of operation. The greater part [of this exhibition] in Corinth was probably mere imitation and parade. But in what manner exactly this was shown, how far it proceeded, and into what caricatures it transformed the original phenomenon—on these points Paul himself had perhaps no knowledge; or if he had, he concealed it, because he did not learn it from his own observation. He contented himself, for the moment, in limiting its excessive use in the church, until he could be present in person to distinguish truth from falsehood and expose the hypocrisy. We, however, who have nothing at command besides that which Paul communicates in his epistles, must be contented, in our efforts to form an acquaintance with the subject in general, simply with what flows in a direct way from his words. We may also compare the notices in the Acts of the Apostles. At all events, that must be regarded as peculiar to the subject as developed at Corinth which cannot be brought into agreement with the notices of Luke.

The Gift of Tongues an actually spoken Language.

To the inquiry, how Paul understood the gift of tongues, we must answer, first, that he recognized it as an actual speech or language, and as entirely foreign from the notion of an inarticulate, senseless sound.[1] Whether any thing like this existed at Corinth,[2] we must

[1] This is the view of Bardili and Eichhorn; also of Bertholdt. It may, however, be variously confuted. Yet Olshausen II. 575, 577, has assented to it with some limitations.

[2] This, properly speaking, is maintained only by the defenders of the view in question, i. e. Bardili, etc.

leave, after what has been said, undetermined. That Paul himself had no such idea is obvious not only from 1 Cor. 14: 9, but also from the fact that it is impossible that he could have ever regarded such a senseless stammering and howling—if it came out fully—as any thing good, edifying, or desirable; in short that he could view it as a gift of God, and admonish the Corinthians (which he has actually done), that God was to be served by them in an orderly manner, while, as it will appear, he has not uttered a word about any thing unknown or unintelligible. Some persons may refer to "the groanings which cannot be uttered,"[1] but of this we not only know far too little which would enable us to build aught upon it, but in the passage before us there is nothing at all said of "groanings;"[2] it is 'speaking,'[3] and a 'declaration.'[4] Therefore, there is not the remotest resemblance in the expression even. That this speech or language was audibly uttered cannot be inferred[5] with certainty from what Paul has said. All these phenomena—the 'interpretation'[6] itself not excepted—might as well have occurred when any one who was influenced by the Spirit actually spoke. But on the ground that one made known the secret workings of his mind by mere pantomime, by an inaudible moving of the mouth outwardly, then he alone could understand, whom the Spirit had put into a similar state. The unlearned, or uninitiated, however, must have been almost compelled to regard it as a sign of madness, especially if it often occurred. At all events the words, 'let there be silence,'[7] is decidedly against it. If we must grant, however, that the inarticulate speaking was a distinguishing mark of the gift of tongues as conferred at Corinth, still, in this case, there must have been discovered in the apostle's words some vestige of a deviation from the general form in which the gift was manifested. But no such trace can be found. The tongue, as Paul understands it, was accordingly not merely a discourse, but a discourse audibly uttered. Meanwhile, nothing further is said about the length or brevity, the fulness or the marked abruptness of it. The tongue was not, however, a single one, but there appear to have been various species of it, distinguished from

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[1] στεναγμοῖς ἀλαλήτοις Rom. 8: 26.

[2] στεναγμοῖς

[3] λαλεῖν

[4] λογός

[5] This has been already remarked in the Commentary on 1 Cor. 14: 2.

[6] ἑρμηνεία.

[7] σίγατω

each other.[1] Thus Chap. XIV. often, it is true, uses the singular number, but never with the article.[2] Had the gift of tongues been a mode of speaking which, in all the various forms of it—occasioned by the ideas, by the individuality of the speaker or by other causes—yet ever retained one and the same essential character, for example, abruptness or high elevation, or certain favorite forms, then the language would indicate this. It would have been named 'the tongue,' or 'speaking by a tongue,' not 'the tongues,' or the 'kind of tongues.'[3] Since then the last named forms actually appear, we must suppose that the single gift appeared in its manifestations so essentially diverse that it was possible to distinguish several kinds. The power to speak in this way was a gift of the Divine Spirit, like all the other qualifications of Christians which were peculiar to them as such.[4] Thus it was also a gift of God,[5] which the Spirit in his free, good pleasure had communicated,[6] and which therefore all did not possess.[7] Accordingly, it was not anything that was learned or acquired. Man, according to his own inclination, could not impart it. Since the Spirit communicated his gifts only to believers,[8] they alone, therefore, possessed this power; and it was not communicated to them till they had received the Spirit. This gift, moreover, was not bestowed from the mere fact of their being Christians. That it was something miraculous however, in the doctrinal sense, does not of course follow, for the language of the New Testament not only does not, in general, recognize this distinction between the natural and supernatural, but there are found to be enumerated several gifts,[9] which can in no manner be considered as imparted supernaturally.

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[1] This is said in so many words 1 Cor. 12: 28, 'diversities of tongues.'

[2] Verse 9 does not belong here, 'To another faith by the same Spirit,' etc.

[3] *τὴν γλῶσσαν*, or *γλωσσολογίαν*, not *τὰς γλώσσας*, or *γένεσιν γλωσσῶν*.

[4] 1 Cor. 12: 7—12.

[5] See verse 28 in the same chapter.

[6] 'But all these worketh that one and the self-same Spirit,' etc.

[7] Comp. verse 30, 'Do all speak with tongues,' etc., with 1 Cor. 14: 5, 'I would that ye all spake with tongues,' etc.

[8] This may well be received as the predominant view in the New Testament.

[9] 1 Cor. 12: 8—10, 28, gifts of healing, helps, governments, etc. [The author is probably incorrect in this remark; it seems to be the general doctrine of the New Testament that most, if not all the gifts in question were miraculous.—TR.]

Even from Ch. 14: 22[1] this cannot follow with perfect certainty, inasmuch as it is conceivable, that it served somewhat as a sign, εἰς σημεῖον to another person, that is, as a mark of admonition, without being absolutely in consequence a supernatural event in our sense. At what time or manner an individual came into the possession of it, whether he continued in the enjoyment of it, or whether it was only for a limited time and under given circumstances—respecting these and other related questions, Paul gives us no answer. This only we learn,[2] that it was possible not to make use of the gift; that he who could speak with tongues had it in his power to do it or not to do it according to circumstances and opinions of propriety. It hence follows that Paul did not recognize him who spoke with tongues as one who was in an unconscious condition, not having command over himself—a passive instrument of a higher power that ruled over him; for, from such persons he could not have expected the reflection and deliberation which are there mentioned. In that case, he would by no means have commanded the employment or the non-employment of the gift. The same thing may also be inferred from the fact of his saying that the one who spoke with tongues edifies himself, while we cannot believe, that the intelligent and discreet Paul expected a salutary spiritual and moral influence from words which the speaker poured out unconsciously, and which consequently could be neither understood, nor made use of. When therefore he says, 'he that speaketh with tongues, speaketh in spirit or in the spirit, his spirit speaketh, while his mind is unfruitful,' verse 14,—we cannot in this find any proof of an unconscious state; but we are rather to recollect, that even the prophet uttered words 'by the spirit,' and therefore we are certainly to look for an elevated condition in the one who spoke with tongues—a condition in which, according to the views of the apostle, that intelligence and inward energy which rested in the man, appears to have been a predominant spiritual power that dwelt in him, but not of such a nature, that he knew not what he uttered, or what befel him. The unfruitfulness of the mind, however, he placed in this

[1] 'Wherefore tongues are for a sign, not to them that believe, but to them that believe not,' etc.

[2] 1 Cor. 14, 27, 28, 39. "If any man speak in an unknown tongue, let it be by two, or at the most by three," etc.; "and forbid not to speak with tongues."

alone, that the man did not here labor with self-possession; what was imparted to him by the Spirit, he only passively received; he did not work it up, turning it to a practical account, as was the case in relation to prophecy. Respecting the nature of what was uttered, definite information indeed fails us; thus much, however, we learn from Ch. 14: 5,[1] that only when it was not understood by the hearer, was it inferior to that which was uttered by the prophet; thus even the one as well as the other could be made the means of edification. We see, however, from verses 14—17, that it must have been chiefly the form of a prayer, of a song of praise, or of thanksgiving; so likewise from verses 2, 28, that the gift of tongues was directed mainly to spiritual intercourse with God. Thus from all these marks, we may perhaps rightly conclude that the gift was particularly employed in publishing the mighty works of God for the redemption of mankind; but it differed from prophecy in this, that while the latter communicated definite instruction to the hearers in respect to salvation, verse 19, the gift of tongues, without any special reference to the needs of the hearer, poured itself out in loud praise of the works which had been accomplished. And inasmuch as such an out-pouring could not find a place—or at least should not—without an inward feeling and apprehension in the heart, of the wonderful grace of God, Paul might well desire that all believers should speak with tongues, verse 4, and that the unlimited edification of the one who spoke should be seen as the fruits of his words, verse 5.

Up to this point everything appears tolerably clear and simple; we recognize in the speaking with tongues the out flowings of a heart influenced by the Spirit of God, and so also thoroughly pervaded by a feeling arising from the wonderful works of God in the redemption of mankind. We may very readily conceive, that such experience would not be wanting in the emotion which sprung up in consequence of the blessing just received. We may also suppose that these feelings were very strong. That the tranquil operation of the understanding was for a short time suspended and obscured, is not strange to us, when we consider the character of the oriental world, and the many phenomena existing in the church, at a later time, when, almost at once, Christianity brought a strong excitement

[1] Ch. 14: 5, "I would that ye all spake with tongues, but rather that ye prophesied," etc.

upon the feelings, so that a great excess and a spiritual extravagance need not create astonishment. We often observe similar things in history. We must believe that *up to this point*, we have rightly apprehended the thing, because we have advanced no conclusion, for which we have not found arguments either in the words themselves, or in what we know of the religious views of the apostle from his own writings.

Now, however, we come to the knot of the riddle. This consists in part in the unusual name which is given to the mode of speaking in question,[1] and partly in the various explanations of the apostle. He represents it as useless to the church because it could be understood by no one without an interpreter,—thus appearing like madness to those unacquainted with the phenomenon.[2] We must subjoin that if the common mode of explanation of verse 13[3] be correct, then the one who spoke could not give, in every case, the interpretation of what he had said; and if he could do it, this even was to be regarded as a gift of God just as much as the original endowment. The inability to understand a discourse audibly uttered may have had its origin, either in the contents of the discourse or in its form. That it does not lie in the contents is sufficiently proved, as I think, in my Commentary. On such a supposition, moreover, there would be no significance in the name. This inability is therefore to be sought externally, in the form. Here I recognize three possible reasons why it could not be understood.

These are the unintelligible enunciation—the obscurity of the style—or the foreign language unknown to the hearer. This last might have originated in various ways. The unintelligible utterance would not fall in with Eichhorn's hypothesis of stammering, for in this case, there were actual words; but furthermore it could never have been regarded as a gift. Besides, it would have been very easy for the one who spoke to have uttered his sentences clearly. This supposition has absolutely nothing in its favor. Before we investigate the other two, we will turn our attention to that which the Acts of the Apostles presents us.

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[1] γλώσσαις or γλώσσῃ λαλεῖν.

[2] 1 Cor. 14: 2, 6, 9, 16, 17, 23.

[3] 'Wherefore let him that speaketh in an unknown tongue pray that he may interpret.'

Notices in the Acts of the Apostles.

We find in Ch. 19: 6, the mention of twelve disciples of John who received the Holy Spirit by the ministration of the apostle, and immediately spoke with tongues as well as prophesied. This passage, however, serves us merely as a certain proof that Paul could impart from his own inward power the gift to others, as well as that he possessed it himself.[1] It also shows us that these two gifts, differing from each other, were received at the same time with the communication of the Holy Spirit, and indeed, as it appears suddenly; it shows nothing respecting their nature. A second passage,[2] likewise, teaches us the contemporaneousness of the reception of the influence of the Spirit and the entrance of the gift of tongues, and strengthens us in our conception of the meaning of what was uttered by the words *μεγαλυνόντων τὸν θεὸν*. In regard to what belongs to the form of its manifestation, the words of Peter,[3] and so likewise the reference of the same apostle to this event,[4] merely teach us, that it had presented itself to him, an eyewitness, altogether in the same manner as the first exhibition of this gift on the day of Pentecost; and since there is no other passage yet extant which shows us anything respecting it,[5] we see ourselves driven back entirely to Acts ii. as the main text. When, however, we consider this narrative with an entirely unprejudiced eye, we cannot resist the conclusion, that Luke has narrated the circumstances in the following manner: The persons there assembled, on the moment, when, (with the rushing of the wind and the appearance of flames of fire on their heads), the Holy Spirit had fallen upon them, did actually speak in the languages of the strangers mentioned in verses 9 and 10. The most astonishing feature in the entire event was this,—the men who unexpectedly possessed and exercised this power were Galileans,

[1] 1 Cor. 14: 18, 'I thank my God I speak with tongues more than ye all.'

[2] Acts 10: 44—47. [3] Acts 10: 47. [4] Acts 11: 15, 17, 15: 8, 9.

[5] The power indeed which Simon Magus, Acts 8: 18, 19, desired to purchase of Peter might be only that which the gift of tongues would enable him to effect; we, however, learn nothing of that in which it consisted,—at most we ascertain the single circumstance, that it was something very striking which Simon believed that he could not himself effect, but by which, if he could procure it, he expected that he should gain much with the astonished multitude.

of whom nothing like this could have been anticipated. This view of it was everywhere the predominant one, until a genuine spirit of investigation had undermined it in various ways.[1]

Various Hypotheses.

Here is not the place to repeat the many explanations of the phenomenon which are collected, perhaps in the fullest manner, in Kuinoel's Commentary on the Acts. Of these it is necessary to name only what the more recent investigations on the gift of tongues have advanced for and against this interpretation. Here, first, Bleek[2] meets us in the history of the Pentecost, with the following difficulties. 1. The speaking of the disciples with tongues occurred before the multitude of foreign Jews had come together, which must have appeared wholly without an object, since words in foreign tongues could not have served as the natural expression of religious feelings. 2. That if each one spoke a particular language, and if he was understood by those to whom this was vernacular, no reproach of drunkenness could have fallen on those who spoke. 3. Peter in the subsequent discourses makes no mention whatever of foreign languages. Bleek remarks subsequently, that, if the narrative can be understood only of foreign tongues, then he must conclude that this circumstance was owing to an incorrect understanding of it by the reporter, [on whom Luke depended.] This he would do, rather than recognize the actual speaking in foreign languages.[3] Baur goes a step further still, when he allows,[4] that such could not have been the words in the account of the Pentecost, but that they belong to a traditional transformation of them, which transformation the original fact had already here received. The character of this transformation he seeks to point out from the poetico-rhetorical bearing of verses 6—12, from the obscurity in respect to the word 'others'[5] in verse 13,[6] and from the failure of all traces of the event. Neander regards the narration simply as obscure, and hence would explain it from the remaining portions. Since these contain nothing

[1] Perhaps a dread of anything miraculous was the original occasion of this change. ['Genuine' in many respects, but misdirected here.—Tr.]

[2] I. 17, 18. [3] II. 62, 63. [4] P. 105, 106 note.

[5] ἕτεροι.

[6] Acts 2: 13, "Others mocking, said these men are full of new wine."

about foreign tongues, and since, moreover, there could be no use for such an endowment,[1] then he can admit nothing like this. That of a positive nature, however, which these learned men present for the tongues in question, is various. Bleek explains the word γλῶσσα thus, 'an antiquated, provincial, altogether uncommon mode of speech, and without a particular explanation, unintelligible; hence it could have been of use to those only, who, as orators and poets, spoke in a lofty tone of feeling.' This explanation, which others also had contemplated before him, he seeks to establish philologically by a very learned examination of the usage of γλῶσσα in Greek; he then turns to the existing forms of the expression in the New Testament and endeavors to exhibit the occurrences mentioned in the Acts and in the epistle to the Corinthians as words in a lofty poetical dialect, with a mingling of such glosses. They were consequently unintelligible to the majority of the hearers, while the inability of the speaker to explain his own words was owing to the failure of his recollection.[2] That such words might seem to be the operation of the Holy Spirit is owing in part to this reason—a language so elevated could not have been adapted to men with such little cultivation as the disciples of Jesus, and in part to the contents of what was uttered, a lofty commendation of the works of God. Olshausen[3] assumes several stages in the gift, according to the degree of one's moral powers, and of the participation in other gifts. Thus the speaking with tongues was always an ecstasy; but like somnambulism it passed over to the utterance of a foreign language, only when persons were present who were skilled in the language; at the Pentecost such was actually the fact, even to the highest degree. To the gift of tongues there was also added the interpretation of them and prophecy. On the contrary, in respect to Corinth[4] he inclines strongly to the side of Eichhorn's hypothesis of an inarticulate sound. Billroth seeks to avoid the difficulties which rise against the various modes of interpretation by 'going a step beyond Olshausen.'[5] He explains it as "a speaking in a language which, in a certain degree, comprehended the elements of the various actually historical tongues." On the contrary, Baur, Steudel and

[1] This besides could have been no abiding possession.

[2] Herein resembling the Greek μάντις.

[3] Olshausen I. 545, 546, II. 568 seq. [4] II. 575, 576.

[5] Billroth's Comm. on Corinth. pp. 177, 178.

Neander recognize nothing but the vernacular tongue. They see nothing miraculous; they find in it merely that which was produced or enlivened by the Spirit, that which was never before perceived in this manner, so far new that it uttered, as it were, with a new tongue—the organ of the Spirit—words concerning the mighty works of God, but which, in its nature as consisting in praise of God, had been long known in the inward experience of all the hearers, Jews and proselytes. As allied to the feelings which it had long before cherished, its experience might be native or natural.

Objections against the Theory of Foreign Tongues.

In respect to the argument adduced by Bleek against the supposition of foreign languages at the Pentecost, it cannot be denied, to be sure, that the narrative of Luke places the commencement of speaking with tongues at a time before the multitude of strangers had assembled, and Olshausen's supposition to the contrary, I. 542, does not agree with the meaning of the words in the passage. That such speaking might appear aimless to us is readily conceded, but to the consequence deduced from it, that it could not therefore have happened, we dare not assent; because, by the same argument, we should not only make improbable many other narratives of the New Testament, but we should certainly occupy a false position, in desiring to construe a fact according to our own peculiar views, forgetting that very many things might have actually occurred, of which we not only cannot see the design, but might show even that they had no object, without, as a consequence, drawing the conclusion that they had no existence. The imputation of drunkenness might have occurred to evil disposed or frivolous minds just as well if each individual spoke a particular language, which was not vernacular to him, as if they all spoke in different dialects; but it is very well known that nearly all drunken persons—even the better educated—in this situation are wont to fall upon speaking in a foreign language. That Peter in his discourse did not revert at all to the tongues is, moreover, no sufficient objection, because in the first place we certainly do not possess the speeches of the apostle in their original form and perfection,[1] but only what Luke found in his authorities, or

[1] Who could have marked at such a moment, or have indicated in the least, what the man did say?

regarded probable, either from tradition, or from his own reflections.[1] Secondly, Peter had no reason whatever to do any thing more than to show that the prophecy of Joel was fulfilled in the fact which now lay notoriously before the eyes and ears of all. Since this contained nothing in respect to speaking with tongues, (and in the first moment no one certainly would think whether it differed from prophesying, and if so, how far), Peter would therefore naturally conclude that the gift of tongues was contained in that of prophesying, and would satisfy his hearers, while he taught that it was to be derived from the Spirit just poured out. How little weight in general is to be attributed to the foregoing arguments may be seen from the fact, that Bleek himself, in conclusion, gives up one half the objection. He remarks that the history seems strongly to point to foreign tongues, and that his resort to a traditional change of the original fact rests on the assumption[2] which Baur still maintains as unanswerable. In the mean time, so much that is excellent has been said against this theory by Steudel[3] and Bäumlein,[4] that we may here

[1] [These various hypotheses in respect to Luke are without foundation. No one, perhaps, among the primitive Christians, with the exception of the twelve apostles, enjoyed better opportunities for becoming personally and familiarly acquainted with the events which he has recorded or the persons whom he has described. Eusebius relates that his birth-place was Antioch in Syria. If so he must have had good advantages for intercourse with Palestine Christians and with the heads of the infant church in Jerusalem. In accompanying Paul, he must have had abundant facilities for becoming acquainted with the men who had personally known our Lord, particularly the apostles. A number of individuals are mentioned by Paul 'who were in Christ' before himself, and whom Luke must probably have known. For example Andronicus and Junias are alluded to, Rom. 16: 7, and Rufus, v. 13, who is supposed to be the son of Simon of Cyrene, who bore the cross of Jesus. There were also persons like Barnabas and Mark, whom Luke might have seen on their missionary journies. How often must he have heard the conversations of Paul with various individuals, when the facts in regard to the original history of Christianity were brought out? How must the discourses and the reasonings of the apostle to the gentiles with Jews and with pagans have served to make Luke acquainted with the christian history? Luke was with Paul in Jerusalem, when the elders of the church were assembled. He was also with him at the time of his imprisonment at Caesarea and Rome. See some excellent remarks on this subject in Tholuck's Credibility of the Evangelical History in the Reply to Strauss, 2d Ed., Hamburg, 1838, p. 148.—Tr.]

[2] This has been previously mentioned. [3] P. 135 seq. [4] P. 66 seq.

well pass it over. We will now advert to the most recent expositions. In respect to the history of the Pentecost, it has been remarked by Olshausen and Baur, in opposition to Bleek, that the words *ἑτέραις γλώσσαις* as explained by him would be unfitting and pleonastic; that we cannot imagine how a phenomenon, such as Bleek supposes, could have been burdened with the name *γλώσσαις λαλεῖν*; that it is inconceivable how a discourse, be it ever so short, could be put together in mere glosses (in Bleek's sense). Besides, one would not name it from an unessential appendage, but from its peculiar, essential character, whether that character is expressed by the words, 'to speak in an ecstasy,' or 'in the Spirit.'[1] Though glosses may have been used by the poets in the sense in question, yet it cannot be proved, nor is it probable, that a poetically enlivened discourse would acquire a name from this single element alone, when its character was formed by many other things. Thus no result can be obtained from all which Bleek has brought forward on the phrase. The view maintained by him in respect to the history of the Pentecost, neither is established, nor can be.[2] How is it credible that a mingling of this antiquated, provincial, or even poetical style or mode of expression could have appeared so remarkable to any body that he would name the whole phenomenon merely in accordance with such a style or manner; or that he could look upon this as a proof of the distinguished control of a higher power, or a 'sign'[3] for the unbelievers? Less credible is it, that the assembled multitude, on account of such expressions as this theory supposes, which possibly some understood in one way, others in another, should have exclaimed, 'and now hear we every man in our own tongue wherein we were born,'—and 'we do hear them speak in our tongue the wonderful works of God!' Why should they have said in amazement, 'What meaneth this?' How can it be accounted for, that while in Jerusalem all were believed to understand what was uttered by means of these very expressions, at Corinth for the same reason, Paul would represent this entire mode of speaking as absolutely incapable of being understood? Allow as we may that single expressions might remain not understood, still this cannot take away the impression of the whole. And must not the prophetic discourse also, if it approximate in the least degree to the style of the

[1] *ἐν ἐκστάσει* or *ἐν πνεύματι λαλεῖν*. See Olshausen I. 541, 543, 544.

[2] Baur, 87—89.

[3] *σημεῖον*.

ancient prophets, have contained very much which was not understood by all, and thus glosses would be attached to it also? And how could there have been a particular gift, charisma, connected therewith in order to explain and illustrate such expressions; or how could the apostles have recommended silent communion with God to those who thus spoke; and how could they have regarded it as so edifying for the speaker? In short, the more one looks into all those things which have been said in relation to this gift, the less is the probability, I venture to say, that he will find the essence of the thing to consist in this alone.

Against Olshausen's supposition of various gradations, or stages in the gift, etc., a main argument, as I think, is, that it rests on no historical grounds. I will not examine whether such a confused intermixture of the elements of all tongues, as Billroth's motley language implies, can be anywhere called a λόγος and furnish any sense whatever; or even how far it might serve for edification. That, however, which must avail here, as well as in regard to Bleek's view, is, that such a discourse could not have appeared capable of being understood by the multitude in Jerusalem. The reverse must have been the fact to all without exception. It would be a mere confused pell-mell, with random human voices. Equal difficulties arise against the view of Baur, Steudel and Neander, with whom Bäumlein has to do, particularly in the controversial parts of his treatise. If the speaking with tongues was in truth only the manifestation of the Spirit in the consciousness of Christians, then we cannot conceive why the words of Jesus, the first sermon of Peter, Acts II, and the epistles of Paul, in all which still the christian spirit may be expressed, must not also be regarded as indicating the gift of tongues, (as this is placed in contradistinction to prophecy), and how this kind of speaking can be explained as absolutely unintelligible? It must appear remarkable that the view of Baur is not strictly applicable to the two main passages, Acts II, and 1 Cor. XIV. Why, moreover, should Luke have had in the first narrative a different conception of the subject from that in the last two passages where he mentions it? But if Steudel deduces the unintelligibleness of the tongues in Corinth from the want of susceptible feelings in the church there, still a highly animated manner of presentation is always that which of itself makes the deepest impression on feelings little sus-

ceptible.[1] Besides, Paul would not, if he had so understood it, have checked those who spoke with tongues, but he would have censured the want of susceptibility in the hearers. It remains not less inexplicable, how an animated discourse, declaring the works of God through Christ, could have had a definite import in the view of strangers, the sounds of which did not die away within them for a long time, while the same thing to the church at Corinth, (christianized years before), and presented in their native language, must have been in its very nature unintelligible and unedifying. This and several other things, which cannot be here repeated, lead us to the conclusion, that the history of the Pentecost allows of no other interpretation, than that of a discourse of the disciples in the languages of the tribes to which their hearers belonged. To us such a phenomenon may be inconceivable; to us it may be without aim; we may think it improbable and even incredible. All this can have, it ought to have, no influence on our interpretation, where the words are so clear, and while all the other modes of explication are involved in a multitude of difficulties. Luke, therefore, understands in Acts II., under *ἑτεραῖς γλώσσαις*, a discourse in a language other than the vernacular; so he does likewise in the two other passages under *γλώσσαις*. This also one will be most inclined to recognize in Mark 16: 17. Of glosses in Bleek's sense one can hardly think, when he reflects that this phenomenon comes in as a *σημεῖον* in the series, along with casting out devils, taking up serpents without being injured, etc. It is here almost inconceivable, that a discourse in a lofty poetical diction could be added as mere glosses to the others—(a pleonasm being unsuitable)—and where hardly a contradiction can be thought of, which might seem to lie in the word *καιναῖς*. It is very evident also that by this word we are not compelled to understand an absolutely new language.[2]

View of the Passage in Corinthians.

After this digression, we return to the passage in Corinthians. Since we cannot recognize Bleek's theory of glosses, there seems to remain, as possible, but one of the causes of the unintelligibleness of

[1] Prophecy also, on this supposition, would be as little useful.

[2] Comp. Bäumlein pp. 63—66.

this subject mentioned above, on p. 98. This is, foreign languages. We will, therefore, recur to the particulars contained in this passage, in order to ascertain, not so much whether any thing decisive *in favor of* such a view can be found there, (for this cannot be done), as whether there is any insuperable objection *against* it. The twelfth and thirteenth chapters include nothing of this nature. The 'kinds of tongues,'[1] mentioned in Ch. 12: 10, 28, *may be* the different languages, that is, the various tongues—ability to use these languages being conferred on believers by the Spirit, 'who worketh all things.' The 'tongues,'[2] Ch. 13: 1, are literally 'speech,' 'words,' while Paul, to be sure, here refers to the gift, charisma, and from the reference certainly selects this example, yet he says nothing of the languages themselves. From the identity of the word employed therefore, nothing follows in respect to the identity of the thing, provided the term γλῶσσα does not in every case, as used by him, necessarily mean a language. In verse 8, where he places γλῶσσα along with προφητεία and γνῶσις, he has perhaps in his mind merely the idea of a gift, charisma. Nothing, therefore, could be inferred from the passage in itself. Yet it must be admitted, that by the undoubted reference to the first verse, it would be the most natural to understand the γλῶσσα as referring to languages. We now come to the fourteenth chapter, which is the principal passage. Here the use of the singular γλῶσσα, is employed by the opponents as an objection to the theory of different tongues.[3] An implied conjecture of the words ἑτέρα and καινὴ might indeed have little in its favor.[4] Such a conjecture, however, is not necessary. It will be sufficient that γλῶσσα means only 'language,' 'speech.' If then the expression γλώσσαις λαλεῖν was used in order to indicate briefly,[5] and intelligibly for contemporaries, a discourse in a language which was conferred by the Spirit,[6] then the singular number might be employed without objection. In that case γλῶσσῃ λαλεῖν would mean, 'to speak in a language by which all, who were ac-

[1] γένη γλωσσῶν. [2] γλῶσσαι. [3] Bleek, I. 15. [4] Bleek, II. 51.

[5] This is the single aim of language. Hence in the construction of particular forms of expression for the purpose of indicating the phenomena in the subject in question, the process is far less laborious than in the often erroneous language of verbal criticism, which subsequently assumes the task of interpretation.

[6] The foreign quality of it was neither the only nor the principal mark.

quainted with the subject, would be reminded of one of those gifts which were communicated by the Spirit, without troubling himself to investigate further. At the same time, no one spoke except in a particular language. In the same manner γλῶσσαν ἔχει, verse 26, means, 'he had a language,' to wit, one conferred by the Spirit, as all the other things there mentioned are gifts of the Spirit. He is in possession of one of those languages which the Spirit communicates; consequently he has the ability to speak in it. On the philological side I therefore see no difficulty.

A second argument, namely, that Paul could not have said οὐδεὶς ἀκούει, verse 2, when in a city like Corinth there must always have been at least some persons who would have understood foreign languages, has no weight with me, because, first, the fact itself is very doubtful, and, secondly, if it were so, these were only exceptions, rare exceptions, which Paul in an altogether general consideration of the thing did not think it necessary to bring into the account. The Greek conceitedness at that time allowed the people to acquire the languages of barbarians, as little as in our days many nations, notwithstanding all the intercourse with us Germans, allow themselves to learn our language. The Greek demanded that foreigners should study his tongue; he could the more easily require this, as his master, the Roman, adapted himself to it, and in the unbounded extension of this language, he could not well come to any place where he would not find colonists of his race, or Hellenized barbarians. Perhaps native Corinthians understood, along with the Greek, the Latin in part, but certainly not other languages; and Paul needed not to refer to anything like an assembly of foreign visitors; the less so, as he did not consider the matter so much according to its aspects in Corinth, as in its general features, wherever it existed.

A third argument is deduced from the fact that he who spoke with tongues could not always interpret what he spoke.[1] This is indeed remarkable, especially if we suppose that the individual was not in an unconscious, but in a conscious state; as we certainly believe that he must have been. One cannot conceive how a man could speak in a foreign tongue, and so speak as that he himself was edified thereby, and still be unable to interpret to others what was uttered. But not only can the inconceivableness of itself alone be no ground for denial, least of all in a matter where personal

[1] Bleek I. 23.

observation and experience wholly fail us, but this same difficulty remains, and as I think, in a higher degree, in the other modes of explanation attempted in very recent times; therefore it is not more decisive against one of these theories than it is against the others.

In the fourth place, it is said, that were these γλῶσσαι foreign languages, then Paul ought rather to have framed his admonition[1] so that these persons should have abstained altogether, when they would speak before a congregation, which did not understand them; and if an interpretation intervened, no essential advantage could be derived. Besides, it would have been difficult to have used it in intercourse with others who spoke with tongues.[2] But here it is forgotten that Paul does not in the least demand the speaking by tongues, but only permits it, since as a gift of the Spirit he may not check it; he may also assume that the one who spoke with tongues always had control over the gift, and in such a degree, that he could use it for the instruction of foreign nations; yet this nowhere follows from the statement of the apostle, neither does it accord with the history. The power of speaking with tongues seems not to have been an abiding one at all; it was a σημεῖον, it came in suddenly, and left its possessor again, when the high, ecstatic feeling which it produced passed away. To this we may add, what has been said on the nature of the words uttered, that it was not a didactic statement, but an out-pouring of the heart, and hence Paul could have given no other precept respecting it, than that which he has given, if he did not wish to check the thing altogether.

Another objection is the one raised by me in the Commentary on Ch. 14: 18, 28,[3] that we cannot conceive what connection foreign languages had with silent intercourse with God; how Paul could have used them for this purpose, or admonished others in relation thereto. I still have the same difficulty, and had we knowledge of the γλῶσσαι only from his letters, then I should possibly attribute some weight to the argument; now I cannot do it; besides, what seems to be unfitting to me is not necessarily so to others. Still it is possible that Paul, (who regarded the phenomenon as the effect of the operation of the Divine Spirit), as well as the historian of the Pentecost, may have discovered, (from some grounds unknown to

[1] 1 Cor. 14: 26—28.

[2] Bleek I. 24.

[3] "I thank my God I speak with tongues more than ye all," "But if there be no interpreter, let him keep silence," etc.

us), that the praising of God in foreign languages was more becoming, than it now appears to us. In the same way may the case stand in relation to verses 10, 12. While we read Paul's epistles alone, what is there said may decide us against the idea of languages; but if we recollect, that the occurrence at the Pentecost is conceivable only on the supposition of foreign languages, and that we cannot allow ourselves to lose sight of the presupposition, that the phenomenon with which Paul had to do, was essentially like the one which first comes before us in the Acts, then we may indeed wonder how he could have expressed himself as he has done in the Epistle; but though it is *not impossible* that he has committed a logical fault, we do not believe ourselves called upon to overthrow everything which we have elsewhere recognized, until we have evidence that he is guilty of such a fault. It therefore follows, that the passage in the Corinthians contains nothing, which makes it absolutely impossible to understand the gift of tongues as a power, in particular moments of high inspiration, to praise God in languages which one had never before learned.

Conclusion.

What now is the result? In my opinion it is this. All which we have above ascertained, pp. 93–7, on the nature of the mysterious gift, remains untouched. Hence it is not needful that it should be repeated. In respect to the unintelligibleness of its form we cannot come to perfect certainty; still from the notices which the history of the Pentecost supplies, a strong probability arises in favor of the theory of foreign languages; the observations also, which Paul makes in our Epistle in relation to it, in part easily fall in with this supposition, and in part do not stand in such opposition as to compel us in consequence to give up what, from the narration of the first introduction of the gift, appears to follow inevitably. Therefore, without being able to say, that we know the precise circumstances of the case, we have still arrived at so much as this, we know to what conclusion the single authorities which we have at our command will lead us; and at that point, I believe, we must stop, while all the advance which we might make would remove us from that position which we regard as the only possible one for such an investigation. At this point we therefore stop.

[Rückert frequently refers, in the preceding article, to his Commentary on the chapters in the first epistle to the Corinthians which treat of the spiritual gifts. We here subjoin one or two extracts from his Commentary. They will serve for an outline of the apostle's course of thought. On Chap. XII, Rückert remarks: "Paul speaks of things which were then perfectly well known. He addressed the persons among whom these things occurred. He employed expressions which were in every-day use. His object was not to explain the nature of these gifts to the Corinthians, but to give them directions in respect to the value of the gifts. It was not his design to communicate information to those who should live in subsequent centuries, but to check the abuse of the gifts at the time. Every trace of the things which Paul here handles was lost in the progress of time. We know nothing of them except what can be drawn from the discussion itself, compared with some passages in the Acts of the Apostles."

The thought which serves as the basis of the argument in Chap. XII is, "that everywhere in Christianity, the Divine Spirit is the agent, operating as the cause or principle of the Christian life. Paul then proceeds to the special object of the inquiry, namely, the value of the particular manifestations of the Holy Spirit's agency, and the preference which should be given to one or to another of the gifts in question. Paul thus, indeed, allows that there is a diversity in the gifts, but, in tracing back one and all of them to the same source—the Spirit, he calls attention to the common value of all, and points out the object which all should promote, namely, the general good of the Christian body."

"The 13th Chapter is a delineation of the 'more excellent way,' or an illustration of the fact, that love is that one among the graces of the Christian, without which no gift, no virtue has any real value. Love is the best and noblest of all the graces, the fountain of all true virtue. It shall remain when all other gifts shall fail."

Rückert thus sums up Chap. XIV. The gifts of the Spirit are various; yet the God who bestows them is but one, and the design of all is the common good. While the body of man has many members, there is yet but one body. One member is not independent of another. All are intended for one harmonious whole. So the Church of Christ is one body of the Lord. All Christians are mem-

bers of this body. They have different offices, but each is to labor for the good of the others, and thus promote the well-being of the whole. All cannot have the same business; each one might, however, strive after the highest gifts, but still there is a more excellent blessing—love. Without this, no gift, no knowledge, no power, no virtue even would be of any value. The Corinthians should rather desire prophecy than speaking with tongues. The one who spoke with tongues edified himself only, since no one could understand him; the prophet edified the church. Paul desired indeed that all might enjoy the gift of tongues, but rather that they should prophesy, since the former consisted in unintelligible words, and, without interpretation, was useless, etc.

In addition to the authors, before mentioned, who have written on the Gift of Tongues, we may name Baur and Steudel in the Tübingen Zeitschrift, 1830; and Bäumlein, in Klaiber's Stud. der Evang. Geistlichkeit Würtemb. VI. No. 2. 1834.—Tr.]

SPECIMENS OF THE SERMONS

OF

DR. A. THOLUCK.

SERMONS OF PROF. THOLUCK.[1]

SERMON I.[2]

THE RELATION OF CHRISTIANS TO THE LAW.

If we institute a comparison between the form which piety assumes in our own time, and that which it assumed in the time of our forefathers, we shall find that a prominent distinction between the two is the following: the piety of our forefathers was connected in a high degree with an external discipline in religious duties, while piety with us is dependent upon this discipline no further than the feelings of any one may more or less incline him to make it so. Our fathers were stimulated by faith in these words of the apostle,—'God will have all men to be saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth;' and they demanded therefore of every one, that he pray 'with fear and trembling,' that he seek, that he knock, until the door be opened, until Christ come and keep the sacramental feast with his soul. We, on the contrary, seem to be often influenced by an impression, that the language of the apostle, 'all men have not faith,' has no other meaning than this,—in order to have faith men must be inwardly *organized* as it is called, in an appointed way. And accordingly we see, that the one class of believers displayed, in their life, a fertile power of faith, and brought forth much fair fruit; while the other class remain dry and unfruitful trees. Our fathers however found a great part of their guilt to consist in the fact, that the discipline of the law did not control, with sufficient power, their internal christian character. If now we take notice that Christians of modern days are speaking constantly and exclusively of *Freedom*, of *Spirit*, of the *Children of God*, but very seldom of the *Discipline of Law*, of *Self-denial*, and the true idea of

[1] See Note A, at the close of the Sermons.

[2] An Analysis of each sermon is given in the notes. For an analysis of this, see Note B, at the close of the Sermons.

the word *Servant of God;* we shall regard it as a profitable exercise, to examine the question, what is the true idea of the outward disciplinary influence of law upon the inward christian character. A comprehensive and profound explanation of the subject we find in the expression of our Lord, Mark 2: 27, 28. "And he said unto them, the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath. Therefore the Son of man is Lord also of the Sabbath day."

There is something enigmatical in these words, and yet their meaning may be easily discovered. That the Saviour permitted his disciples to pluck the ears of corn on the Sabbath, and thus to break the law of a rigid observance of the day, has been a stumbling stone to theologians.[1] By this act the Lord shows what is the binding force of an external, and especially a ceremonial law. Man, he says, was not made for the Sabbath; that is, the end of man's existence is not attained by the observance of the ceremonial law, the end of his existence is life in God; instead of man's being made for the Sabbath, the Sabbath was made for him, that is, such external ordinances as the Sabbath, are instituted only for the purpose of educating man; they are an external discipline, designed to form him from without to that character, for which he has no strength to determine himself from within. The thoughts of man, created as he is by God, should habitually come forth from within, to fasten on his Creator. The flesh, however, is weak; Israel must therefore have its Sabbath and Christendom its Sunday, so that by this outward discipline, the spirit may be educated to the same goodness which it ought to work out from its inward impulses. And as these ceremonial commands and ordinances are given merely for the sake of man, so likewise in a certain sense may it be said, that all the moral commands of God, as far as they are mere *commands*, are given for the same end. Only while the Spirit of God does not incline us from within to all good, are these commands necessary. But the Son of man, as it is here said, is Lord of the Sabbath; for whoever has the Spirit without measure, as Christ is represented to have had, can stand in no need of a law educating from without.

You see, my worshipping friends, how clearly as well as profoundly this language of the Saviour instructs us in the application of the outward discipline of law to faithful Christians. The Son of man and of God is Lord over the law, because he has the Spirit

[1] See Note C, at the close of the Sermons.

without measure. The same Spirit, however, will be given to his followers through faith: and therefore this language teaches us, in the first place, that where the Spirit of God controls, the outward discipline of the law ceases; but it teaches us, with the same certainty, in the second place, that where the Spirit of God does not yet control, there the outward discipline of the law must remain.

I say, where the Spirit of God controls, there all outward discipline of the law ceases. To the righteous, says the apostle, no law is given; and again, where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is liberty; and still again, all things are yours; and finally, I have all power.[1] These are bold, they are hazardous words. They are such words, as a fanatic hurls, as he would a burning torch, into the world. And yet, beloved, we have long known, that as there must be a light to make a shadow, so there must be a great truth to correspond with every great error; that the errors, which we call effective, only borrow their efficiency from a great truth deformed. It is undeniable, that Christianity, in its development, aims at a state, in which there is a degree of freedom, which excludes all kind of restraint. Where the Spirit of God controls the inmost affections with absolute sway, there, certainly, the commands of religion cease to interfere with the man's will; yea, no commands at all are given to such a man. What does he know of *the command*, Love God above all things else, when the love of God is to him the very life of his soul? What does he know of the command, Love thy brother, when brotherly love has become so much of a second nature to him, that he ceases to breathe when he ceases to love? The same may be said of all the commands of religion, of self-denial, chastity, humility. As it stands recorded of the pious man, that he is a tree planted by the water-brooks, which bringeth forth its fruit in its season, so all good works, in their season, that is, whenever they are called for from without, are performed by the man of this priestly spirit, without his even thinking of the fact, that they are required by a *command*.

Does this ideal of character, which I present before you, seem too elevated? Consider the manner in which we, who have received the first fruits of the Spirit, are already affected in reference to civil laws? Who is influenced by the consideration, that the

[1] See 1 Tim. 1: 9. 2 Cor. 3: 17. 1 Cor. 3: 21. 2 Cor. 4: 15: 6. 10. Phil. 4. 13. 1 Cor. 6: 12, 10; 23.—Tr.

civil law commands, under severe penalties, thou shalt not steal, thou shalt not commit adultery. These commands are obeyed by us from our own inward impulses. We should be obliged to deny ourselves, in order to conduct differently from what the law requires; and therefore amid all the restraints of command, we know ourselves to be *free*.—Oh how happy is that state, when we do not need to urge ourselves to obey the law of God; when, as Paul says, the Spirit of God incites the children of God; when it is no more commanded from without, do this, do that, forsake this, forsake that; when to do the will of the Deity is the food of our souls. He who has been made by the Divine Spirit, thus inwardly free from all law; how he stands up, untrammelled amid the restraints imposed by all the relations of the world, yea even by its calamities! He is free when in chains, free in the prison, free under the pressure of gnawing disease.—It is the will of God which has selected for me the chain, the prison, the disease; and as my will is not discordant with the Divine, so under all these restrictions I am free. Imagine, what must be my consciousness of king-like elevation, when all the events, which occur to me as by necessity from without, are yet freely chosen and determined by myself. That was the sentiment of a king, with which the first Christians went through the world, and with which Paul cried out, All things are yours. Yea truly where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom; but where it is not, there discipline is imperiously needed.

And does this Spirit of the Lord rule constantly in us, who are believers? If Paul speaks of himself and of all Christians, as those who have received only the first fruits of the Spirit, and who are even yet waiting for the full harvest;—and not only the creature, he says, but we ourselves also, who have received the first fruits of the Spirit, long within ourselves after the adoption;[1] if he speaks thus of himself, what must we, in our poverty, say of ourselves? This we must say; that where the Spirit of God does not control, there the external discipline of the law must remain. Yea, friends, so far as the Spirit of God does not bear the sceptre within us all, so far we still need the law. And particularly, we need the law, in the first place, as a representative of the virtue which we do not possess; in the second place, as a barrier against the sin which

[1] Rom. 8: 23.

importunes us; and in the third place, as a seal of the method of salvation which we have chosen, of salvation by grace.[1]

We need the law, as a representative of the virtue which we do not possess. The knowledge of sin, says Paul, comes from the law, and in this manner we obtain an idea of that virtue of which we are destitute. Many proofs may be given of the truth of Christianity, and of the divine origin of the Holy Scriptures; but, my friends, I am not able to mention a single proof, which is higher and more urgent than this,—there is no book which unfolds, as the Bible does, the secrets of the human heart. The mysteries of God are great in the height to which the Bible has carried us; but truly the mysteries of the human heart, in the depth to which the Bible has carried us, are equally great; and in proportion as the Spirit of the Lord does not rule in our affections, we must be educated, all the days of our life, in this school of self-knowledge. Paul was far advanced in the knowledge of himself, and yet he felt obliged to utter the memorable remark,—'It is to me a small thing, that I should be judged before a human tribunal; I even judge not mine own self: I am conscious of nothing amiss, but by this pure consciousness I am not justified; it is the Lord who judgeth me.'[2] If you would perceive, my friends, how far you have advanced in the knowledge of yourselves, then answer the question,—can you repeat, in sincere self-application, these words of the apostle? Are you actually persuaded, that if you were conscious of having committed no sin at all, still you would not be thereby justified? If you can and must acknowledge this, then you need a mirror, which may show you the virtue which is wanting; you need the mirror of the divine law.

To be particular, I understand here by the term law, not merely the laws of the Old Testament, but every thing which stands recorded in the Scriptures, so far as we consider it as a command, from which may be learned the claims of God. Thus the narrations of the Old Testament, in which God contends with his people, because they were continually forsaking the fountain of life, and becoming idolaters, are a mirror of the law, a constant proclamation to the heart of man,—'Thou shalt have no other Gods besides me.' So the whole history of Jesus Christ is a proclamation to the heart of

[1] Salvation is here used in its wide sense, as exemption from punishment hereafter, and from its precursors here.—Tr.

[2] 1 Cor. 4: 2, 3. See Calvin on the passage. Vol. I. P. 257.—Tr.

man,—'Whoever says, that he abides in Christ, let him walk even as Christ has walked.' So the whole history of Paul is a continued proclamation,—'Be ye followers of me, even as I am of Christ.' The preaching too of all the witnesses of the Gospel, those mentioned in the Scripture, and those out of it, are a continued exhortation,—'Wherefore let us also, since we are surrounded with such a crowd of witnesses, lay aside the sin which retards our spiritual progress, and makes us always sluggish.' 'For,' says the same apostle, 'all Scripture, given by God, is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for reformation, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, made ready for every good work.' Ye who are sincere and earnest in your profession of religion, do ye daily hold before your eyes this mirror of God's claim upon us? Again, and yet again have I pointed you to the law; and has even one, here and there, actually reduced it to practice? I hope in God it is so; and yet there have been very few seasons, when the preached Gospel has so easily found *applause*, but so hardly found *obedience*. Ah, after what do many preachers of the word themselves inquire and seek? Instead of inquiring, whether the preached word be obeyed, do they not seek after the miserable approbation of their fellow men?—The cause of this disobedience to the preached Gospel, is the fact, that we, the Christians of this time, give way too much to our evil propensities. And from the very fact, that we too freely surrender ourselves to sinful impulse, arises our need of the discipline of law.

Secondly, where the Spirit of God does not bear sway, we need the external discipline of the law as a barrier against the sins which importune us. As every deed of man is an efflux from his will, so the deed operates back again upon its source. As from the sinful thought, sinful words and sinful actions emanate, so the sinful words and actions have a reflex influence upon the thought. Vanity, anger, unchaste desire harass our spirits within, and are clamorous to break out in words. At last you speak the word,—the fiery dart flies back ignited into your heart. Therefore what the Lord said to Cain is always appropriate;—'If thou be not seriously inclined, sin lieth at the door; yet surrender thou not thy desire to it, but rule over it.'[1]

[1] Gen. 4: 7. If thou doest not well, sin stands ready to be committed, lieth in wait for thee; but thy duty is, not to be overcome by it, not to comply with its solicitations however urgent, Rom. 6: 12, but to resist and subdue it. This is the interpretation of Rosenmüller and others.—Tr.

Christians, we are permitted in no circumstances to surrender our wills to sin. If the spirit cannot repress it from its own impulses, we must place against it, from without, the barrier of the law. In the effeminacy of the present times, our Christianity fails in this respect, more than in any other. Our religion is one of feeling, but not of prayer and of law. If we feel ourselves piously excited, then we are pious; if the feeling be irreligious, then we yield to impulse and are irreligious. But have we not read, that 'through the Spirit we should die to the things of the flesh?' Christians, every instant of our life, must we obey the invisible King, whose we are? Can we not obey him as his children? Well then, we must obey him as his servants. Obey, we must. Accordingly, there must be, every instant, some ruling power in the life of a Christian, to control him; and if this be not the flame of the spirit from within, it must be the barrier of the law from without. Who has been a man of such spiritual excellence as Paul? And yet even with him the work of sanctification was not completed with perfect ease, and freedom from the law. Even he was obliged to set before himself a dike and barrier from without; for he says, 'I mortify my body and afflict it, that I may not preach the Gospel to others, and be myself cast away.' Wherefore, Christians, write it deeply upon your consciences, nothing is less seemly for a religious man, than for him at any time to give the rein to his evil passions. He only can give way to his impulses *who has no Lord.* But we, if we live, then let us live to the Lord; if we die, then let us die to Him. Whether therefore we live or die, we still are the Lord's. A Christian cannot surrender himself up to evil feelings; either he will be incited by the urgency of the Holy Spirit, or he will be held back by the barrier of the law of God. Beloved, think of a man, who has been permitted to dwell near his monarch, before the face of that monarch to pass his life, will he ever let himself depart from that monarch's will? No. He will never allow this departure. If he is not incited by the spirit of reverence and love from within, he will yet be held back from without by the restraints of the law. But we also, Christians, live continually before the face of a great King, the omnipresent God; wherefore woe to us, if we ever let ourselves depart from his will!

This is the place for learning the nature of those external laws, which are not properly moral laws, but are simply designed for the

discipline and regulation of the outer life. You may perhaps have often looked with astonishment upon that indefinite number of external ceremonies and statutes, with which Moses encompassed the children of the old dispensation. An Israelite could scarcely spend a single hour, without being reminded of some one of the many outward duties, which were prescribed for him. These outward disciplinary laws were the very barrier, which has been described for the sinful inclinations of such a heart as was not swayed by the Spirit. If, from the depth of the Israelite's consciousness, the feeling did not force itself upon him, that he was dependent, constantly, and in all his deeds upon the invisible King of all kings, still, by such a system of outward legal discipline, this feeling must have been ever freshly excited in his bosom. He was not permitted to resign himself to his impulses. Every one of these commands would be, as it were, a fact preaching to the heart that had forgotten its Creator,—Man, thou art a servant of God. And since we, Christians, so far as the Spirit of the Lord does not dwell within us, stand in general, like the Israelites, under the outward discipline of the law, so we cannot dispense with such an outward disciplinary administration, such external ordinances. They are a barrier to the sins that harass our minds.

How far even the most spiritual Christian is from being so much of a spirit, as to have no further need of the prescribed external observances, I am able to show by an example relating to the services of divine worship. You have heard of that sect of Christians, calling themselves by the simple name of Friends, who strenuously insist, that in the sacred assemblies of Christians the fire of devotion should enkindle itself simply and solely from within; and they therefore wish to hear of no call of the bell to devotion, no temples stretching up toward heaven, no sacred vestments for the Sabbath, and no holy seasons. They come together under no other sound of the bell than that of praying souls; and with no other sacred vesture, than the ornament of devotion. And in what other manner, they ask, can we properly explain the instructions of the Lord about worshipping in spirit and in truth? And it is a fact; did the sacred tide of spiritual influence diffuse itself through our whole internal system, what need should we have of these solemn altars, and these sacerdotal vestments; of the sound of the bell, and the organ-tone, and of such halls aspiring to heaven? Oh, at that Sabbath, when

Christians shall keep their everlasting rest, the time will have arrived, when we shall worship perfectly, in spirit and in truth; when the glorified company of the Lord shall no more need the organ, and the sound of the bell, to awaken their inward devotion! But who of us is not fully convinced, that in our present state, the Spirit of the Lord having manifested himself within us scarcely in his first fruits, we cannot dispense, not even the most spiritual among us, with these outward ordinances and disciplinary forms? If then, in the public worship of God, the external regulation must come to the aid of the spirit, the same is true in our whole religious life. We need an external regulation which may coöperate with the efforts of the spirit. The whole Christianity of our time too wants such an external system; for it is moving in uncertainty hither and thither upon the waves of feeling. There is no longer a solemn observance of Sundays and a regular attendance at church; there is but little regular secret prayer in the closet, or social prayer in the family. Spirit! Spirit! we cry out; but should the prophets of God come again, as they came of old, and should they look upon our works,—Flesh! Flesh! they would cry out in response. Of a truth, my friends, even the most spiritual among us cannot dispense with a rule, a prescribed form, in his morality and piety, without allowing the flesh to resume its predominance. You are all obliged to confess, that the sway of the Spirit of God within your minds is yet weak; carry, then, holy ordinances into your life. As the apostle commands you, take your food with the expression of thanks; by this means will you be reminded that your sustenance is the gift of unmerited mercy.—Observe your Sunday by attendance at church, and by prayer; so you may vividly call to mind, at least on that day, as you do not during the whole week, who your Lord is, and to what company you belong. Offer solitary prayer in your closet, and social prayer in your family. And should it seem to you that the yoke is too severe, reflect that you have already received the first fruits of the Spirit; love to your Saviour has commenced within you; and this principle of love, must unite with the principle of obedience, else it will be nearly as difficult for you as for any one to obey the law, simply because it is law. Think of the severest duties, the acutest sufferings of disease, the heaviest losses; is it not true, that love will here insinuate itself, and if it will not do every thing, will at least help to make the duty and the command easy to you?

But if the external discipline of the law were necessary neither as a representation of virtue, which we have not, nor as a barrier against the sins which harass us, still it would be beneficial as a seal of the method of salvation which we have chosen—of salvation by grace. Let us now, in the conclusion of our discourse, glance at this topic.

This outward discipline of the law, if we subject ourselves to it, is a perpetual seal, that the way to the Father, which we have chosen, a way opened by the grace that appears in Christ, is all that can make man happy. Whoever faithfully subjects himself to the discipline of the divine law, is confident, is without a doubt, that neither happiness in the world to come, nor peace in the present world, is ever obtained on the ground of mere desert. Such an one learns for the first time, by this legal discipline, how difficult it is to obey the law of God.—But you ask, can there be among us the false conceit, that any one has merit before God, when there is no word oftener sounded in our ears from the pulpit, than Love, and Grace? My friends, I tell you, this error does prevail among us, and perhaps in no less degree than in the church, from which ours originated. With the altered times, indeed, this error has assumed a new dress. It has put on the garb of moral improvement. The hand of eternal justice holds the two scales of the balance; into the left scale fall your wicked deeds, and into the right your virtues. Will the right be so heavy as to sink?—Will the *right* sink?—Oh, I would not depend upon it, that from the heart of any one present, there would come a negative answer to this question. I could not confidently anticipate such an answer, for—your eye is too dim to discern what falls into the left scale. You perceive the works of your hand, but the works of your mouth, of your heart, you see not. But look, Christians, at the unrighteous words, the unrighteous thoughts and wishes, which have been ever rising up from your hearts! Behold them—fallen down without number into the left scale. But I hear the words uttered eagerly, loudly, and without delay, from the hearts of most men,—"Ah no! the right hand scale will *rise!*" What then, my friends, will you place in it, so that it may sink? Will you place in it the unmerited mercy of God in Jesus Christ?—Oh I see, I see that some tears drop into the right hand scale; some tears of sadness and penitence; and the left scale seems to ascend before your eyes.—Yea, Christians, if the church

of Rome has placed a legal righteousness in mortifications and pilgrimages, so have we placed a legal righteousness in tears. It is indeed very true, there is in a solitary tear an uncomputed weight, greater than all the weight of the mountains of the world; in a tear which flows from the deepest fountain of the penitent soul; and yet, even tears cannot atone for us. And the reason of their insufficiency is not the simple fact, that our penitence is never deep enough, and our tears are never warm enough; by no means; nothing but the pure unmerited grace of God, appropriated to ourselves by faith, can make the atonement for our sins.—Believer, this grace will fall into your right hand scale, and the scale will sink!—To this consciousness now, that neither our works nor our tears can cause the right hand scale to descend, only that man comes, who has travelled in the rough way of the discipline of God's law. So it is then, that this severe life under the law stamps a sure seal upon the fact, that we have chosen for our good the way of grace, a way that conducts us to happiness in the life to come, and to peace of heart in this life.

Come then, Christians, whoever of you are earnestly engaged for your highest welfare, never surrender yourselves to your sinful impulses. Pray for the Spirit of God, who moveth the children of God from within. Whenever a single duty, a single command is presented to your conscience and you are not able to perform the duty, to obey the command, under the mere incitement of the spirit, then surrender yourselves in obedience to the divine law. It will be for you a school-master to bring you to Christ, and to afford you the favor of communing with the Son of man. Whoever is actuated by the Spirit of God, the same is Lord of the Sabbath. He is a righteous man, and as the apostle says, no law is given to him.

SERMON II.[1]

GENTLENESS OF CHRIST.

CHRISTIANS, this day are you assembled the second time, for the purpose of celebrating the advent of a child. What a birth-day

[1] For an Analysis of this Sermon, see Note D, at the close of the Sermons.

solemnity is this! What child is there among mortals, whose birth is celebrated by such multitudes as in all parts of the world go this day to their holy places, and by such tears of joy as are poured out this day in many a closet. And this has been the fact for eighteen hundred years, and will continue to be, as long as time shall endure. My christian friends, either this child was in fact incomparably superior to all children, who have ever been placed at the mother's breast; or else Christendom is devoted to error, as no other community of men has been. But no! Christians, under no misconception do you come together in the holy place; under no misconception do the flames of sacrifice ascend, pure and holy, to heaven, from all parts of the world, on this day. The child that was born to you to day is the Prince of Peace, the Government is upon his shoulders. And the two days which are set apart in our christian community, for the purpose of celebrating his advent, are only the highest point of that festival in honor of the infant's birth, which is observed by all redeemed hearts as often as, in their anguish and forebodings, they console themselves with the thought, that this infant is the Redeemer from all sin and all evil.

Delightful and instructive is this day-spring from on high, as the Holy Scripture denominates the birth of Jesus, whether we consider what the Redeemer has abolished, or the particular style of action which he adopted. It is this last consideration which will engage our minds during our present exercise. The passage, to which we annex the discussion, we find in 1 Kings, 19: 1—13.—"And Ahab told Jezebel all that Elijah had done, and how he had slain all the prophets with the sword. Then Jezebel sent a messenger unto Elijah, and said unto him,—'May the gods do to me this and more also, if I do not, tomorrow about this time, make thy life like the life of one of these men.' When he saw that, he arose and went forth whither he would, and came to Beersheba in Judah and left his servant there. But he himself went a day's journey into the desert, and came and seated himself under a juniper tree, and prayed that he might die, and said,—'It is enough; so now, Lord, take away my life; I am not better than my fathers.' And he lay down and slept under the juniper tree. And behold, an angel touched him, and said to him,—'Rise up and eat.' And he looked around him, and behold at his head lay toasted bread and a can of water. And when he had eaten and drank, he lay down again to sleep. And

the angel of the Lord came the second time, and touched him, and said,—'Rise up and eat; for thou hast a long journey before thee.' And he arose, and ate and drank, and went on the strength of that food forty days and forty nights, even to Horeb, the mount of God. And he went unto a cave there, and remained in the cave over night. And behold, the word of the Lord came unto him, and said to him,—'What doest thou here, Elijah?' He said,—'I have been zealous for the Lord, the God of Hosts; for the children of Israel have forsaken thy covenant, and broken down thine altars, and slain thy prophets with the sword; and I only am left, and they attempt to take my life. 'Go forth,' he said, 'and stand upon the mount before the Lord.' And behold the Lord passed by, and a great and strong wind rent the mountains, and broke in pieces the rocks before the Lord; but the Lord was not in the wind. After the wind, came an earthquake; but the Lord was not in the earthquake. And after the earthquake, came a fire; but the Lord was not in the fire. And after the fire came a gentle soft sound. When Elijah heard this, he hid his face in his mantle, and went out, and stood in the door of his cave."

When you see the child of God, whose birth we this day celebrate, descending in the still night to the manger in little Bethlehem, unnoticed by all the great and wise of the earth; and when you see the small company of shepherds celebrating the natal day; and when you understand the passage just recited from the Old Testament; tell me, does it not appear to you as if the ancient narration, which we have read, were barely a prophetical discourse on the birth of your Saviour?—The Lord is not in the storm and the tempest, but in the gentle soft sound;—this is the sentiment here proclaimed to us. It is indeed true, that when originally uttered, the words had a reference very different from that which we have just noticed. If we look for the meaning of this elevated symbolical appearance in the connection of Elijah's history, we shall see how the great prophet had been consumed with zeal in the contest against the impiety of his nation, and how his love of life even had forsaken him. 'He went a day's journey into the wilderness, and seated himself under a juniper tree, and prayed that he might die, and said,—It is enough, so take now, Lord, my life from me.' This appearance therefore may be regarded as a mere admonition, that God was not in the consuming zeal of Elijah, so far as that zeal was

unsustained by love, by patience, by forgiveness. There would be found, in this reference of our text, a rich subject of consideration, if I were disposed to show you, in what way the zeal of Elijah must be tempered, in order that God may be in it. The topics for consideration and application, which the subject presents to us, are very various, whether we apply the subject to the mode in which we are related to God, or the mode in which He is related to us; whether we apply it to the history of the world, or to an individual heart. Variously and in multiplied forms is it true, that God is not in the storm and tempest, but in the soft gentle sound.[1] To day, however, we will consider this truth in regard to the manifestations of the Saviour of the world; and, first, in regard to his entrance into the world; secondly, in regard to his progress through the world; and thirdly, in regard to his departure from it. Throughout the whole discussion, we will inquire how he might have appeared when confronting a finite race, and when confronting a sinful race, and how he actually did appear.

1. 'The Lord is not in the storm and the tempest, but in the soft gentle sound.' Thus are we addressed by the entrance of the Son of God into the world. How might he have appeared when he met a finite race?—There rests concealed behind all the excellence of nature, there rests concealed behind every spectacle in history, there is ruling concealed in the depth of the earth, there is ruling concealed in the immensity of the starry world, the eternal spirit, which we call God! There are hours, when thou dost imagine thyself to come near him;—oh, there are wonderful hours in the life of man, when it is as if the great mystery of all existence would at once burst asunder its bar, and come forth, unveiled! Our inmost soul is agitated at such an hour. But how is it when the bar is actually burst asunder; when he who dwells in unapproachable light, where no man can draw near,—when the infinite Spirit, who sustains heaven and earth, assumes a visible form, and appears among his finite creatures? Who does not now expect, what is written of the day of his second coming, that his heavens, which are his throne, will tremble; that this small earth, his footstool, will shake; that a foreboding sentiment, such as we have elsewhere discovered at the occurrence of great natural phenomena, will seize all tribes of the earth, and cause some to rejoice, and others to weep!—

[1] See Note E, at the close of the Sermons.

'Soon after the affliction of that period,' it is written, 'the sun and the moon shall lose their brightness, and the stars shall fall from heaven, and the powers of heaven shall be shaken; and then shall appear the sign of the Son of man in heaven, and then shall all the tribes of the earth wail; and they shall see the Son of man coming in the clouds of heaven, with great power and glory.' Yet behold, as nature is everywhere still when she creates, and loud only when she destroys, so is she still, indescribably still, when the greatest of all who are born of women comes into the world. The sun did not stand motionless in the heavens, when he came; it was night. He did not make his first appearance in the capital city; but in one of the smallest places of the land. No sleeper waked up at his coming; but only they who watched through the night had intelligence of his advent. The earth that night did not shake; the heaven that night did not tremble. Only a few childlike souls, who then kept vigil at his birth, trembled; yet their trembling was a trembling for joy. "The eternal light enters," says the poet, "and gives the world a new splendor; it shines clearly at midnight, and makes us children of the light. He whom the whole circumference of the world could not embrace, lies in the womb of Mary. He, who alone sustains the universe, has become a little infant."

How might Jesus have appeared when he met a sinful world? He will, at his second coming, appear to it as its Judge; and at his first coming, even then, it might have been said, in the words of the poet,—"Trembling at the foundations of the earth, will proclaim the approach of the Judge, and he will search into the hearts of men." Even at that advent, might an anxious foreboding have seized the whole world of sinners; even then might they have cried, as they will one day cry,—'Ye mountains, cover us; ye hills, fall on us.' Yet the Lord was not in the tempest, but in the gentle soft sound; and the heavenly hosts sung at his birth,—Peace on earth and good will to men. As the poet says,—"The Son of the Father who has the same nature with God, became a guest in our world; he raised us up from the valley of our lamentation, and gave us an inheritance in his palace."

Beloved of God, with what feelings must we keep this natal feast, when we reflect how the Redeemer might have appeared, and how he did appear; and moreover, when we reflect on the other side, how he will appear at a future period. For, says the apostle,—

'He hath taken and will retain possession of heaven, until the time when all these things shall be accomplished, which God hath foretold by the mouth of all his holy prophets.'[1] He who came the first time to save sinners, will come the second time to judge them; he who came the first time to bear our sins, will come the second time to condemn them. Now we are enjoying the day of comfort, when the Lord does not appear in the tempest but in the soft gentle sound; oh then let our hearts be touched by this soft gentle sound! Let us kneel down at the manger, let us worship with the pious shepherds, let us strow myrrh with the kings from the East.

2. The Lord is not in the tempest, but in the soft still sound;—this has been verified in the progress of Christ through the world. 'He had,' as the apostle tells us, 'not thought it robbery to be equal with God, he had deprived himself of his rightful dignity, and taken the form of a servant, and he became even like another man, and was found in appearance as a man.'[2] But even among men there are gods; that is, there are such as, on account of the dignity and elevation of their rank in relation to other men, are called gods of the earth. Yet it was submitted to his choice, whether he would reign in a palace, or in a hut; whether the proclamation,—'come unto me, ye who are miserable and heavy laden,' should be sounded from a throne or from the highways and hedges;—whether nothing but the brightness of a celestial world, that had been kept concealed, should come to the eyes of mortals, or at the same time the brightness of an earthly dignity should blind them. But lo! the Lord is in the gentle soft sound. The house of a carpenter in Nazareth is not too low for the king of heaven, that he should abide therein; the woollen garment, woven throughout, is not too strait for the Lord of glory that he should wrap himself in it as he travelled through this vale of earth. The King of all kings chooses the office of a servant, among servants, his subjects;—in this way did he go forth to meet his finite brethren.

Yet even in this humble disguise, how different might have been his mode of confronting a sinful world, from what it was. Though no star glistened on his breast, and no crown upon his head, yet he carries even in his humiliation thunder and lightning on his tongue, thunder and lightning in his hands. What had been the result, if every word from the lips of the holy man had been an imprecation against

[1] Acts 3: 21. [2] Phil. 2: 6, 7.

sin, and every speech a proclamation of justice against the transgressor? The Lord, the God of Israel says to Jeremiah, the prophet,—'Take this cup, full of wrath, from my hand, and pour out of the same upon all the people to whom I send you.' How had it been if the Son himself had appeared, with the cup full of wrath in his hand, and with his voice of authority, to execute justice upon a fallen world? But the Lord is not in the tempest; he is in the soft gentle sound. 'Comfort ye, comfort ye my people; speak ye kindly to Jerusalem; proclaim to her that her warfare is accomplished, and her sin is forgiven,'—this was the text of his prophetical discourse. When he comes, for the first time, into the synagogue of Nazareth, he turns to the saying of the prophet,—'The Spirit of the Lord is upon me, because he hath anointed me, and sent me to preach the Gospel to the poor, to heal bruised hearts, to proclaim to the captives that they may be at liberty, to the blind that they may receive sight, and to the bruised that they may be free and unshackled;—to preach the acceptable year of the Lord. And as all eyes in the synagogue were fastened upon him, he began to say unto them,—This day is this Scripture fulfilled in your ears.' 'Wisdom is justified of her children, and becomes the companion of publicans and sinners.'[1]—He does indeed bear in his hand a cup of wine;—but it is not the wine of the wrath of God; it is the wine with which the Samaritan washes the wounds of the bruised man; it is the cup of wine, of which he says,—'Drink ye all of it; it is my blood of the New Testament, which was shed for many, for the remission of sins.' For the prophets of the Old Testament there is no higher praise, than that they moved about in 'the spirit and the power of Elias,' as it is also written of John the Baptist; that they opened their mouth, and restrained not their voice, and proclaimed aloud,—'The axe is laid at the root of the tree.' But of this prophet of the New Dispensation it is written, in delightful words, what is written of none besides,—'He shall not strive nor cry, and his voice shall not be heard in the street; a bruised reed shall he not break, and the glowing wick shall he not quench.' Thus does Isaiah prophesy concerning him; and do you know a more delightful and appropriate coloring, with which to picture him forth? Ye glowing wicks, ye shall not be extinguished altogether; thou bruised reed, thou shalt not be completely broken; for not in the tempest doth the Lord move among us, but as a soft gentle sound.

[1] Luke 4: 18—21. 7: 35.

We have only spoken of the thunder and the lightning, which might have come forth from the Messiah's preaching; but he also had the same power over the thunder and the lightning in his miraculous interpositions. He who can lay his hand on the blind, and they see, can also nod, and those who see shall be made blind. He who can say to the leper, 'be clean,' can cover the clean with a leprosy. He who can say to the dead, 'stand up,' can place the living in the slumber of death by his bare will. The storm which is stilled in obedience to his nod, must also obey him when he calls it up from the abyss, to destroy his adversaries. You owe it to this aspect of the works and conduct of Christ, that when his miraculous power is spoken of, you think merely of a miraculous power which blesses. There is, however, a miraculous power of which the Scripture speaks, which instead of blessing, punishes. It is in the Old Testament that we discover, preëminently, a manifestation of this power. There is an instance of it in the speech of Moses against Korah's company. 'When he had uttered these words,' it is said, 'the earth beneath them was rent asunder, and it opened its mouth, and swallowed them up; and they went down alive into the pit, they and every thing which they possessed; and—the earth covered them up.' In the same way also does Peter, in the New Testament, say to Ananias,—'Thou hast not lied unto men, but unto God; and when Ananias heard these words, he fell down and gave up the ghost; and great fear came upon all who heard this.' Lo, in this manner might our Saviour have gone through the world, with his hand uplifted, conjuring the storm from the abyss or the thunder from heaven against every transgressor, an avenger of every crime. Yet the Son of man, it is said, did not come to judge the world, but to save it. The Lord is not in the storm and tempest, but in the soft gentle sound. All his miracles, his miracles of deliverance and of kindness are designed to teach us the spiritual significancy of his appearance on the earth. Yea with perfect faithfulness does the evangelist, when he describes a healing of the sick by Jesus, apply to him the words of the prophet,—'He bore our sickness.' For was it not an endurance of our sickness; did he not in truth take it and bear it in his feeling heart, when he lived from morning until evening surrounded with the infirm and the miserable, whom he relieved?

3. As was his entrance into the world, so was his departure

from it. The same instruction, that was proclaimed by his advent, and by his life, was also proclaimed by his ascension.—How might he have departed? If the Lord of glory whom they had nailed to the cross, but who could not be held by death, had, when risen from the grave and glorified by heaven, gone to the place of his agonies, to the mount of Olives, and there waved his banner of victory before all the world; he had only to give one nod, and the city which had cried out against him,—'Away with Jesus, release unto us Barabbas,' would have sunk into the deep, like Sodom and Gomorrah; and the people who had cried,—'His blood come upon us and upon our children,' must have shrieked out,—'Ye mountains, cover us, and ye hills fall upon us.' Yet here also the Lord was not in the storm and the tempest, but in the soft sound. Early in the morning did he once more assemble his own in Jerusalem; darkness still brooded over the streets of the city; he then walked, in the stillness of the morning twilight, with the eleven to the mountain, which had witnessed his bloody sweat on the night of his sorrows. The earliest rays of the opening day shone through the clouds; and then, says the history, he lifted up his hands, and blessed his chosen ones, and a cloud took him up from the earth. Amid the shades of night he came; in the redness of the morning dawn he went away; ever, ever shalt thou stand before our souls, thou glorified Saviour, in the same attitude in which thou didst leave the world, with thy hands extended over thy chosen to bless them! Yea, the Lord is not in the tempest, but in the soft, mild sound!

Oh beloved, who of you is so unsusceptible, that such love cannot allure him. As long as it is called to-day, thy God cometh in a gentle sound. Receive him. Surrender to him thy heart. He will at a future time come in the storm, and the heaven and the earth shall flee away. Then will he not smite thee, but judge thee. Oh, to-day, if ye will hear his voice, harden not your hearts.[1]

[1] See Note F, at the close of the Sermons.

SERMON III.[1]

CAUSES OF THE PRACTICAL INEFFICIENCY OF OUR RESOLUTIONS TO DO GOOD.

A NEW academical half-year is a new section of life; and the man who is conscious of an object in living, begins every distinct period of his life with new resolutions. The boy enters upon the period of youth with new resolves; every new year and the new day begins with new resolves; and with new resolves do you, academic youth, commence the new half-year. But at every such fresh resolution a thought arises, which breaks the wing of him who was just ready to soar, and by destroying his confidence robs him of his strength;—it is the thought of the many resolutions we have made already, which have been like water poured out; the thought of our innumerable purposes and deeds, which have been attended with no success. We stand upon a hill-top; the path of life lies behind us, resolutions at every one of its stopping places;—resolutions, but no results. And where this is the fact, are we able to look with confidence into the future? What wonder, if, when the eye glances back upon the last period of life, and idly rests upon the hope, that as the land behind us has been one of resolutions only, so that before us will be one of results,—what wonder, I say, if even the doubt should then thrust itself upon the mind,—'Who knows, but in the land before us also—!' Has a resolution never been brought to successful issue on the earth? Who then will give security, that it shall be successful hereafter.—And who can stand with a wing so broken, without being an object of commiseration? And would Christianity deserve the name of a *power*, if it could carry men on no further than this? Never, never! Either Christianity is no power from God, or we, who have not firmness to execute the purpose of doing everything demanded by the divine will, are no Christians; we belong not to the same company of disciples with him, who though he was clothed like ourselves with flesh and blood, yet cried out, 'I can do all things through him who strengtheneth me.'

[1] For an Analysis of this Sermon, see Note G, at the close of the Sermons.

It is this solemn consideration which leads us to the query, why our resolutions so frequently remain without results? We learn the answer to this query in Psalm 119: 67, where the Psalmist makes this confession, "Before I was humbled, I went astray; but now I keep thy word."[1] We are unable to determine, whether or not those words of the Psalmist came from that deeply fallen and deeply humbled monarch, who has pictured before us, in so elevating a manner, the pains of sin as being the triumph of grace. It may be admitted, that they are not the words of David, yet they express, as many passages which actually do belong to him, the royal Psalmist's experience of life. In the innocence of piety, he had once sung his songs by the herds of his father; he had sung in childlike confidence; 'The Lord is my shepherd, I shall not want.' But the authority and splendor of the throne had dazzled his eyes; in this point and that he had become lifted up in pride; and his ability to gratify himself in all things had prepared the way for the deepest fall; even for the sin with the wife of Uriah; for a fall so deep, that if we look at the outward act, perhaps there is no one of us who would not be better than he. Severe accusations are often raised among us against the royal sinner on account of this fall. How could we put a light estimate upon this guilt which he had contracted, when he himself regarded it as so heinous, that he cried out; —'While I chose to conceal my sin, my bones wasted away, by means of my daily groaning; for day and night was thy hand upon me heavily, so that my moisture was consumed, as in a summer's drought.'[2] If now he condemned himself, we for the same reason cannot acquit him. There are two things, however, which we must not forget. Should we forget the strong temptation, which the unlimited power of an eastern monarch brought with it? and should we further forget the pains of the repentance, which produced so much subsequent fruit?—He, the absolute monarch, hid his head in shame, when Nathan the prophet said to him, to his face, thou art the man! and he lay in the dust before God, even till he obtained forgiveness again, and was able to cry;—'Happy is he whose transgressions are pardoned, whose sin is blotted out;—now I keep thy word.' The man, who can say this in the presence of God, and with a consciousness of all those affections within him which are opposed to God, must be a man in whom every resolution has its

[1] See Note H, at the close of the Sermons. [2] Ps. 32: 3, 4.

yea and amen. The question, therefore, why our resolutions have so frequently no results, is at length answered for us in these words, —*because our sins do not humble us in the right way;* or, more particularly, *because we do not humble ourselves;* do not humble ourselves *before God*, do not humble ourselves *in faith.*

I say, in the first place, our resolutions are so frequently unproductive of results, because we do not humble ourselves for our faults.

The desire of pleasure is deeply implanted in human nature. How completely bound, as it were with cords, does a man feel, when he is not permitted to enjoy himself. The youth above all others has this feeling, when all his senses are in vigorous play, and life opens before him with its hundred avenues. This love of pleasure when considered in its elements, is not to be entirely condemned. Our God is called the blessed King of all kings;[1] and shall not this most blessed of all, who communicates from himself all other good to his subjects, communicate also his happiness to them? But humility for our faults and sins causes pain. It does cause pain, pain indeed, when the severe, holy eye of conscience opens itself wide upon us, and darts its rays of rebuke like consuming lightning upon our conduct, and wakes up the spirit of self-impeachment and shame, and penitence, and self-condemnation. Christian humility for our sins causes not merely a simple, but a variously compounded pain. And it is through fear of this, that men generally recoil from beginning an earnest christian life. Through fear of this, they remain in such a state, that the best resolutions are attended with no good consequences. If the man is no longer sensual, yet he has no heart to be spiritual; for his life perpetually oscillates between heaven and earth, between yea and nay. There is no better description of this state, than in these words of the apostle:—'We know that the law is spiritual, but I am carnal, sold under sin. For I know not what I do; for what I would, I do not; but what I hate, that I do.' This is that human heart, of which it is said by the poet:—"The heart of man is an apple, driven over the level heath by a storm;" and again, "The heart of man is like water, rising and sinking in a boiling cauldron." Truly, the disgust, the impotence, the loathing which such a divided, distracted life brings with it, is much more intolerable than the pain of humiliation and penitence. Be men, therefore; ye who are tossed hither and thither between heaven

[1] 1 Tim. 6: 15.

and earth, collect your strength, and make choice of that death, through which you must pass on your way to life. For it is no otherwise than has been said by the poet;—"We have a twofold nature; yet the same law is observed in one as in the other; the path to real joy winds only through death and sorrow." As in the present condition of human nature, it is the law of true *life* that it shall lead through death; the same is likewise the law of moral *freedom*, which is itself the truest life;—it also leads through death, through self-mortification. Natural life then and natural desire must die; not so as to be annihilated altogether, but only so as to be extricated from what opposes the spiritual; for even in this natural desire and this natural life, as you see it before you, there is concealed a germ of true life. This is most plainly expressed in the words of our Lord, 'Whoever seeketh to preserve his life, shall lose it, and whoever will lose his life, shall save it.' Mark this expression, my brethren, we shall obtain the life of our souls, our natural life, if we will subject it to the death of penitence and humiliation. Then will it strip off its outward covering and rise from the dead, spiritually and in truth. Brethren, in the hours of self-impeachment and self-condemnation, when our natural desires and pleasures are surrendered up to death, then the death of our souls does not take place, not by any means; then rather we obtain for them a new life. Why do you so dread the pain of humbling yourselves, when according to the words of the Saviour, you shall obtain thereby true life to your spirits!

We have thus far made our appeal to the man who stands without, to him who does not live spiritually; but we also make the same appeal to those who are permitted to say, that the life in God and with God has commenced in them. For who is there among us, that has never been called to mourn over resolutions fruitless in good, purposes leading to no fulfilment? Can we without a falsehood say with Paul,—'I can do all things through Christ that strengtheneth me?' And yet this cheerful, victorious courage is an essential characteristic of christian faith! But does any one of you imagine, that only such ardent men as Paul, could speak thus triumphantly? Hear then how John exclaims in the same cheerful confidence,—'Our faith is the victory which hath overcome the world, for he who is in us, is stronger than he who is in the world.' How many of us, I ask once more, can utter such an expression without an inward

falsehood? What then is the reason why even in *our* life, resolutions have no good effect, purposes are not fulfilled? Because we want the *right kind* of humility. We have indeed humbled ourselves; we are no longer like the world who live without conviction of sin; we have, in the general, a consciousness of human guilt and sinfulness; but we do not discern and rebuke our sins in their individual occurrence, we do not humble ourselves for them every day and every hour. Are there not multitudes even among the better inclined, upon whom, in many parts of their character, we see some old habit and vice, making unresisted but injurious advances; even the very vice which is most thoroughly melted into their natures, and which should therefore be most earnestly opposed? We always acknowledge in the general, 'yes, we are sinners,' and even more particularly, 'I am a sinner;' but on what points I am daily a sinner, on what side my daily inclination and conduct is dark with wickedness, we do not inquire. Brethren, where this is the case, the new life in Christ can be no source of triumphant power to our resolutions. Why not? Because in our inmost soul there is a want of truth, and where truth is wanting, there power also is wanting. We are altogether deceitful, so long as our self-accusation and self-rebuke are confined merely to sinfulness in the general, and do not affect the boughs and branches of actual sin which shoot out in the life. There are some Christians, upon whom the enjoyment of sense seems to have at present exactly the same claims which it had in their unconverted life. There are Christians, who yield to impatience, to anger, to slothfulness, exactly as if they were the children of the world; and—would you be *true* Christians? Would you be disciples of him who has said of hypocrites,—'by their fruits ye shall know them?' My friends, even such a certainty of overcoming the world as Paul and John had, does not exclude daily humiliation. You know that Paul says,—'I mortify my body, and subdue it, so that I may not preach the Gospel to others and be myself cast away;' that he confesses,—'Not that I have already attained; one thing I say, I forget what is behind, and strive for that which is before, and run toward the mark set before me.' You understand also what the Lord means when he says,—'Whoever will follow me, let him deny himself and take up his cross daily and follow me.'[1]

[1] Luke 9: 23.

He speaks here of daily denying one's self, of daily bearing one's cross. Must it not necessarily belong to the christian life, to sit daily in judgment upon one's own soul, to humble one's self daily for everything which is so displeasing to Jehovah?

But such humiliation as we here describe is, in the second place, a humiliation before God. We must, I say, humble ourselves before *God;* that is, our grief for sin must be in view of the fact, that we have grieved our Maker, and this our grief must be expressed in a confession before Him. A certain kind of grief for sins and vices is indeed experienced by all, but it is difficult to believe in how many cases this is simply and solely a humiliation and grief for the sake of men, for the sake of the injury and the shame which we have prepared for ourselves in the sight of others. Yea so incessantly do we glance our eyes toward men, that we may say it would be a very great advance in piety, if one should attain such a state as to grieve over each of his iniquities, simply because it had offended his God and Lord. Even from early childhood, we are instructed in these modern times, to fix our eyes, in committing iniquity, only upon the opinions of our fellow mortals. It is no longer said, as formerly, to the child, 'do not that thing, the beloved Lord sees it;' it is now said, 'be well behaved; what will the people say!' And so, therefore, we grow up; our glance directed always to men alone, and if we are ever ashamed of our vices, it is on account of the eye of man, and not on account of that eye, which seeth the hidden recess of the heart. Oh that you might again understand, what is the high and holy meaning of the word—religion! What meaning has it other than—regard for God! It is such a disposition of the inner man, as leads him to look through all things, through nature, through art, through his goods, through his palaces, through his tears of joy, and through his tears of sorrow, through all—to God. But if there must be religion, a regard to God, even in our sorrow for sin, how should it be exercised? Our sorrow must arise from this, that our iniquities have grieved our Maker. What says David, when he had committed a grievous crime against his fellow men? 'Lord, against thee only have I sinned,' he cries. Not that he wished to hide from himself the truth that he had committed a sad offence against his brother; but the fact that he had, in sinning against his brother, sinned also against the commandment of his Creator, this is the sting which most deeply pierces his conscience;

this it is which makes his pain so heart-rending. And what says Paul, when he was accused of having conducted himself improperly in his office? 'It is a small thing that I am judged by a human tribunal. It is the Lord who judgeth me.' Our humility for our sins must of necessity have this character, in order that strength of resolution may go forth from it. If it be not of this kind, it is not of the spiritual kind. You have surprised yourself in incontinence, in vanity, in anger: you are ashamed before others; yea you are ashamed before your own conscience. Beloved brother, so long as you are not ashamed, that you have sinned against your Father in heaven, your sorrow is not a spiritual sorrow. You have trespassed against your fellow man, you have perhaps made his wife and child unhappy, you have even plunged him into the grave. You beat upon your breast,—'Woe is me! I have made a family miserable!' Man, thy pain is great and deserved; but it is not wholly spiritual; there yet cleaves to it such compassion as flows from mere natural sensibility. 'Against thee only have I sinned and done evil,' cries David to the Lord.'[1] And again, 'Lord, be merciful to me and heal my soul; for against thee have I sinned!'[2] This, and only this, is the pain which gives to our humility the character of true spiritual penitence.

And the grief for our sins before God should be poured out in a confession before him. This bare thought, flitting through the mind amid the bustle of life, 'I have again been led astray, and grieved my Lord and God,'—it is too transitory a thought, to be able to impart strength of resolve. We must step before the eye of Him who seeth in secret: and as our pain for transgression gains spirituality by means of our sorrow before Jehovah, so does it gain depth by our confession before him.—Why, why, my friends, has our Lord laid so great stress upon praying in the retired closet, and under the eye of him who seeth in secret? This is the reason; man does not, as a matter of fact, come near to God, while he thinks of him only transitorily, amid the intercourse of life. In solitude do we first dwell with ourselves; in solitude does God first dwell with us. The eye, when it suddenly comes from darkness into the light, requires some time to accustom itself to the brightness; so the heart of man requires some time, before it can so adjust its powers as to receive into itself the full radiance of the Divinity. When, in the closet, you

[1] Ps. 51: 6. [2] Ps. 41: 4.

first spread out all the faults of your heart before God, then for the first time does the sun of divine grace penetrate, with its mild rays, deeper and still deeper into your soul. Your humility for sin became spiritual, when you grieved before the eye, which seeth in secret; it becomes deep, when you express your grief before the same all-seeing Judge. Brethren, if the confession of our guilt before a man whom we have injured is pleasant, and gives great aid in self-reformation, how much more must this be the case with the confession of our guilt before God, our heavenly Father!

Thirdly. There is, indeed, a divine strength imparted to purposes of amendment by such confession; there is a divinely sanctifying power in it; but the fullness of power belongs only to that kind of humility before God, which is accompanied with faith. By faith is meant confidence in the divine word. Nothing but this faith makes our self-abasement genuine; nothing but this makes it cheerful. It makes, I say, our self-abasement genuine; for, my friends, how completely is every deed of ours enveloped in darkness, so long as we have not before us the pole-star of the divine word. Even pain for sin is thus enveloped; and history shows to us many a false kind of humility, which better deserves the name of self-torment. Whenever the word of God sheds not the true light into the soul, there a man grieves indeed, but to no purpose; and at another time the heart remains quietly at rest, when it ought to tremble. Thus, especially with many ingenuous spirits it is the greatest grief, when they come before God, that they cannot always be cheerful and serene. The tide of emotion alternates, ebbing and flowing. It is seen in the diaries of pious men, that with many the severest trouble of life arises from the so frequent alternation of cheerfulness with despondency. Their self-accusations for this fault have absolutely no end. But how entirely different would it be with us, if in our humiliation the word of God were our leading-star. For where indeed has Paul or John, or the Lord himself made a *happy state of feeling* the first condition of a holy life? They have demanded faith and love; and this joy in the Lord, which the apostle also everywhere demands,—it will follow of itself when faith and love have gone before.

This faith in the word of God gives a cheerfulness to our penitence and humility, and thus gives strength to the resolutions; for it makes us certain of forgiveness of sin and the aid of the Holy Spirit.

Depression of mind in itself can give us no power. A sorrowful disposition indeed always tends to dissolve the bands of our power. Hence men are afraid of it; as they know that a moral life is invested with strength. And this strength, beloved friends, you will certainly obtain, unless you have that kind of depression which is unattended with faith.—Hear ye not what our Psalmist says,—'but now I keep thy word?' That the feeling of depression robbed him of his power,—oh this was but too well known to the singer of Israel. Or have ye not heard his numberless complaints, as when he cried out,—'My heart trembles, my strength hath forsaken me, the light of my eyes hath fled.' But what does he say on the other side? —'Keep me by thy word, that I may live.' Beloved, the cup of humiliation is bitter, but the *word of God* therein makes it sweet; the cup of humiliation enervates, but the word of God therein neutralizes its weakening influence. This word of God is the word of forgiveness; it is the promise of the aid of that Spirit, in whose power even the imbecile can say, 'I am strong;' the word which makes all self-abasement and penitence a cheerful exercise. This word of God has already been proclaimed under the old dispensation. Already has David been able to sing in his strength,—'Happy is he whose iniquities are forgiven, whose sin is covered; happy is the man to whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity;' and again,—'Praise the Lord, my soul, and forget not what benefits he has conferred upon thee; he forgiveth all thy sins and healeth all thine infirmities.' This is that word of God, which, since 'the word of reconciliation hath been established among us', sounds forth continually from the sacred temple, giving consolation to all who approach God with humility and in faith. And indeed it is of no avail for a man, barely once for all to shut himself up to this command of God; he should abase himself for every particular transgression; his humility beginning with the tears of repentance, and ending with the tears of gratitude. Never is the Christian permitted, after truly humbling himself before God, to go away from the divine presence, without being assured of the forgiveness of even this his particular transgression; without cheerfulnes in his humility. Only the reconciled heart is a strong one.

Come then, all ye, in whose eye the tear hath started at the recollection of good purposes without good deeds; and good resolu-

tions without results, come, learn the power which lies in christian self-abasement; an abasement before the eye of God and in the exercise of faith.

SERMON IV.[1]

TESTIMONY OF OUR ADOPTION BY GOD, THE SUREST PLEDGE OF ETERNAL LIFE.

We have to day a solemn memento of death; we keep the feast in commemoration of the dead. We have this memento at the time when nature also proclaims the same truth to us.[2] The heavens are invested in their gray attire; the fragrance and the music of living nature have died away; the whole creation has put on its funeral robe, and in this solemn vestment preaches to thee,—as it were the word of God,—Man, thou must die!—Ah, you say I go only for a little while into a silent chamber, and when the lovely spring returns, I shall bloom out again. Child of the dust, what reason hast thou for this thy faith? I know what you will adduce as a reason; it is the emblems which nature exhibits in the butterfly, and in the swelling germ that rises up in sight from under a mantle of snow.—Have you ever stood by the death-bed of one you loved, when his altered countenance could scarcely be recognized, when the dim eye gleamed forth but faintly from its deep socket; when the emaciated hand was convulsively clenched, and there was heard the rattling at the breast; and had you then no other reason for your hope of immortality than was afforded by these symbols in nature? —Oh then, what did such a reason avail you! Your hope faded away with the declining pulse of your dying friend! And when you yourself shall lie on your dying bed, with the drops of death-sweat on your brow, and friends around you, waiting for your last breath, you will need some stronger reason for your hope than you can draw from the emblems of nature.

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[1] For an Analysis of this Sermon, see Note I, at the close of the Sermons.

[2] See Note K, at the close of the Sermons.

But I see your finger pointing to another place;—behold the Prince of life in the tomb at Golgotha; how he rises from the grave, how the burial garments fall from him, and himself ascends to his Father amid the glories of Heaven.—But what shall we say, when even in this assembly may be found men, who believe that he whom we adore as the Prince of life, did not rise up victoriously from death, but only from an oppressive swoon! Such men have arisen in the christian church,—and yet even a disciple of charity may say, 'they are not of us.'—From these men, however, I turn my attention to you, who have not ventured to doubt the truth of what is said in our apostle's creed, 'on the third day he rose from the dead;'—you do not doubt this, but do you *believe* it also? Is this resurrection from the dead so certain to your minds, that you could lay down your life for it?

Christian brethren, no one believes, with a truly living faith, in the resurrection of Christ from the dead, save one who has been raised with Christ to a new life. No one believes, that, as Inspiration says, the Father has in truth caused his holy Jesus to burst the bands of death, save one who himself has become a child of God. Wherefore let us reflect on this sentiment; "*The testimony that we are the children of God is the surest pledge of eternal life.*" To this reflection are we led by the words of the apostle which we find recorded in the epistle to the Romans, Chap. viii. verses 15—17. "Ye have not received the spirit of a servant, that ye should live again in fear; but ye have received the spirit of a child, whereby we cry, Abba, dear Father! This same spirit giveth testimony to our spirits, that we are the children of God. If we are children, then are we heirs; heirs of God, and co-heirs with Christ."

In reference to this expression let us consider, first, how the testimony is given that we are the children of God; secondly, why this testimony is a pledge of eternal life.—May the Spirit of God be our Teacher!

First, how is the testimony given, that we have been adopted as the children of God? The apostle places in contrast with each other the spirit of a servant, and the spirit of a child; the former trembles the latter prays.—Let us consider more closely the spirit, that trembles. Israel once received its law under the sound of thunder, amid darkness and tempest. These appearances in nature were necessary to give a people who were slaves to sense, a proper

view of the dignity of the law. So fearful was the impression of the scene, that the man who immediately received the law, stood and cried out, 'I tremble and am terrified.' And after the tribes of Israel had taken possession of the land which the Lord had promised, they stood, with mount Gerizim at the right, and mount Ebal at the left, and the curse was sounded forth against every transgressor of the law of God;—'Cursed be he who does not fulfil all the words of this law, to conduct himself according to them;—and all the people said, Amen.'—And the child of man, who now surveys the faults which he has committed from the first to the present period of his life, his open and his secret sins against this holy law; should he not tremble? Whoever you are, man, you have a Sinai from which you have received the law of God; and you must bow down before the law with agitating fear. In your own heart is established a holy legislation; and is it not true that you can mention the hour, when with a loud sound of the trumpet, and amid tempest and darkness the law raised its voice within you, so that you could not help falling on your knees and trembling? And would you suppress the voice, which coming from flaming Sinai sounds aloud within your spirit? Even if you would, the same law stands recorded in the book of God; and it has been given to men from without, as well as from within, so that the external voice, which man cannot drown, may call forth the voice which belongs to the depth of his own soul.

And how is it with you? Have you experienced this trembling of the spirit? How large the number of those, who know nothing of it, and simply because they have been strangers to this fear, imagine that they have received that blessed spirit of adoption, of which the apostle speaks in our text! Let me above all things warn you against this error.—Beloved, not the man who is a stranger to the feeling of dread at the sacred voice of Jehovah, not the man who has felt neither terror nor shame before the Holy One of Israel, not the man who *never trembles*, but the man who *prays*, is the child of God. A melancholy perversion of a wholesome truth is common in our day; hearing as we do from so many the negative side of this truth, that the Gospel is not a religion of precept; and hearing from so few the other important side of it, the Gospel is a religion of prayer. You who know not what the trembling of the servant is, if you also know not what the praying of a child is, then you are not

a child, you are not even a servant; you are a faithless, truant slave,—a rebel.

Prayer then is the testimony that we have been adopted as children of God: not every kind of prayer, however, but only that which comes forth from the depth of the soul, in the spirit of—Dear Father! Let us more particularly consider, first, how this prayer arises from the depth of the soul, and secondly, how it expresses itself.

I. 'That mystery,' as the apostle calls it,[1] 'which has been kept secret from the beginning of the world,' is the truth, which, wherever it has been preached to sorrowful and heavy-laden souls, elicits prayer. It is the gracious purpose of God, since his image is not restored in its original purity to any of our race, to look upon them who believe in the holy Son of his love, no longer as they are in themselves, but as they appear in his beloved Son, and to translate them into the kingdom of their Redeemer.[2] The apostle calls this purpose a mystery, not because he would imply that it now remains hidden from the souls of the faithful, but because no mere human reason had formed any conception of it, until, in the fulness of time, it was developed as a truth. And yet it remains not the less mysterious to you, if you have not tasted of those powers of the world to come, which lie involved in it.[3] The wonders of grace and love, which present themselves to view within the sanctuary, it is difficult to make intelligible to those who stand without at the door. As, when you bent over the dear person of a father that you loved, you even forgot the misconduct of your erring child; and while your eyes were fastened upon the countenance of your kind father's image, you threw your arms around your unfaithful child and blessed him; —lo, in the same way has your heavenly Father forgotten that you are a most recreant child. When you have thrown yourself into the arms of the Son of his love, and cleaved closely to his heart, then does the Father no more look upon you as you are in yourself, encompassed with all your sins, enveloped in your misery; he then loves you in the Son of his love, and the darkness within you is irradiated by the light that beams from his countenance. 'As you are in yourself,' says the heavenly vine-dresser,—'you are a withered, useless stalk; but lo, if you will become a branch of the vine which I have planted for myself, then shall the living power of that

[1] Rom. 16: 25. [2] Eph. 1: 6. Col. 1: 13.

[3] See Note L, at the close of the Sermons.

vine diffuse itself through you; I will no more remember what you have been, a dry twig; you shall bloom and grow green as a branch of the vine of Christ, and shall bring forth much fruit.'

You have the story of the lost son. It stands recorded, that when he went back to his father's house, the father saw him a great way off, and went forth to meet him, and stretched out his arms to receive him. There are some who find in this narrative an argument against the assertion of Scripture, that sinful man is denied all access to God except through a Mediator.[1] But, my friends, is it not always in the Son of his love, that the Father goes forth to meet a penitent transgressor? Is it not always in the Son, that he opens his loving, paternal heart? It is in Christ Jesus, that the Father falls upon thy neck, that he carries thee home to the feast of joy. Does it not stand recorded, 'God was in Christ, when he reconciled the world unto himself?'[2] As then the penitent is in Christ, and Christ in God, it follows that the very person who is to be reconciled is in the Being who reconciles him. Great is the mystery, I say the mystery of the oneness of the Father with the Son.

It is the announcement of this love, which, when it enters through faith the afflicted and heavy-laden heart, calls forth the instant cry of amazement and of gratitude, and prompts us to exclaim with John,—'Behold what manner of love the Father hath shown us, that we should be called his own children!'[3] That love of God, which, while we were sinners, was exercised toward us, is shed abroad in our hearts; so says the apostle.[4] And this assurance of having received the love, which was exercised by God toward us before we loved him, is the pledge of eternal life; it is the signet, with which the faithful are sealed for heaven. Amazed at this grace which they cannot comprehend, they reiterate the exclamation which was made by John, the disciple of love,—'Now are we the children of God, and it doth not yet appear what we shall be!'

2. Having shown how prayer, which is the testimony of our having been adopted by God, is prompted in the soul, let us next inquire how it is expressed. All that can be said on this subject, the apostle has included in this one supplicatory word, which illustrates the nature of the prayer;—*dear Father*.—We will now, therefore, definitely ascertain what is the scriptural idea of a prayer. Prayer

[1] 1 Tim. 2: 5. John 14: 6.
[2] 2 Cor. 5: 19.
[3] 1 John 3: 1.
[4] Rom. 5: 5.

is the pulsation of the soul. It need not be always expressed in words; for the apostle exhorts Christians to pray without intermission.[1] But if the prayer must necessarily be uttered in audible language, how could Paul, yea how could Christ himself have prayed without intermission? No, my friends. There is a prayer which the faithful offer, and which like the pulse in the veins, never ceases its motion, not by night, not by day, and which can be heard by no human ear. In this inward silent supplication are the faithful continually exclaiming, Abba, dear Father! How is it with you, when some beloved friend is called away from you by death? Through all the hours that succeed his departure, do you not bear him constantly about with you in your heart? Yea, are you not wont to conduct a silent, uninterrupted dialogue with him, which is not audible to the ear of a companion? So it is with the ceaseless prayer, going forth from the man who has received into his own heart the testimony of his heavenly adoption. He cannot forget, what new and unmerited grace has been bestowed on him; he cries out continually,—'See what love the Father hath shown us, that, 'we should be styled the children of God;' and in the inmost sanctuary of his soul the words are repeated incessantly, beloved Parent! precious Father!

But as the conversation which a man silently carries on with himself is converted into audible language, as soon as he is seized with a quickening feeling of pain or of joy, so likewise is the converse which a man silently conducts with his heavenly parent. When his soul is actively excited, he feels compelled to employ words. And so we read of the Saviour, in the moment of his deepest pain he cried out, Abba, dear Father![2] And all that the heart of a child of God has to say, when it approaches the throne of grace, yea all is comprehended by the apostle in this one word, dear Father.—Dear Father! So cries the little child, when, conscious of its own guilt and ill desert, it yet receives a new overflowing of its parent's love, and sinks down on its knees, weeping. Dear Father! So cries the child, when full of trouble it folds up its hands, and would fain fly into its parent's bosom, and to his heart. Dear Father! So cries the same child, when it has a full tide of joys, and cannot bear to keep these joys for itself alone, and must share all the treasures of its heart with the parent, whom it loves.

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[1] 1 Thess. 5: 17. [2] Mark 14: 36.

Is it not truly a blissful image;—this image of an affectionate child of God? Who would not sigh in his spirit, and exclaim, Oh, that I were such an image! But do not fancy, beloved, that it is nothing more than an image. Our age will not believe the Scriptures, when they describe the depth of human corruption, and the greatness of human misery; but why will ye not believe them, when they describe the wonders of the grace of God to the poor sinful man, who has faith! It is a truth; God is able to make men thus blessed through the power of faith, to make them such, even here, if they be obedient to the word of his grace. He has made them thus blessed; he will make them so again. Paul and John and Peter and Luther are witnesses of what he has done; and whosoever of you has a longing for this spirit,—the door of the Lord stands open to you all the time, and his fountain of living water is always full. And, beloved brother, as you call to mind that brief hour, when your fitful vision will survey the long solitary path stretching onward before you,—a path along which none of your loved ones can conduct you, and of which you do not know whether or not it will lead you to a sweet home; as you think of that hour, your surest pledge for the eternity before you is the evidence, that you may have, of being adopted as a child of God.

This evidence is the surest pledge, for first, you are no longer flesh, you are spirit; it is the surest pledge, for secondly, whoever has this evidence, has already been translated from death to life.

1. The voice came to the prophet and said, proclaim! He asked, What shall I proclaim? And the voice said,—All flesh is grass, and all its goodliness as the flower of the field. My friends, the Scripture speaks very diminutively of man. Proud mortal, the name which the word of God giveth thee is, flesh. I am well aware how many among you never see this application of the term in the Scriptures without repugnance of feeling, but will you charge the sacred oracle with a misrepresentation?—There is a wonderful power in the kingdom of nature which draws down every particle of matter toward one, single, mysterious, central point. There is the concealed operation of a rigorous power, which draws down the physical man, irresistibly, to the central point, to his mother, to the earth.—But man, not only is the earth thy mother, the Father of spirits is also thy Father. There is another resistless power, a power full of mystery, pervading the kingdom of spirit. It is the

power of love. Every thing that is truly spirit, this power attracts to a spiritual, central point, a point of rest; to its original, to the Father of spirits. And as the stone, thrown into the air, does not attain its resting place until it reaches the ground from which it was taken, so nothing, which can be properly called spirit, is able to find repose, until it rests in the central point of the world of spirits, in God.[1] All ye, who are here assembled, ye future priests and administrators of the mystery of the Gospel, are ye—spirit? If ye are, then let me ask you, do you experience this great attracting power of spirits? Does it draw you without intermission to the central point of the spiritual world? Can you find no rest until you find it in God? If you must acknowledge that you are not spirit; if the concealed attraction of earth draws down your heart along with your body to the dust; then murmur no longer because the Bible calls you flesh; you are flesh.

2. Yet, mortal, however deep your degradation may be, as represented in the Gospel, you may be raised as high as you have sunk low. Lift up your hearts, ye who love the Redeemer, and pray; so shall ye be partakers, through Christ Jesus, of the divine nature. The sacred oracles assure us of this; and the whole plan of redemption as recorded in the Gospel, what is it, but a plan for the elevation of human nature to a likeness with God?[2] The Spirit that giveth life is poured forth by the Prince of life upon fleshly natures, and Jesus Christ affirms, 'I live, and ye shall live also.' He has promised to his faithful ones,—'I, and the Father will come unto you and make our abode with you.'—And shall the mortal man, shall the fragile tenement in which both the Father and the Son have made their abode, be given over to corruption? Oh this wonderful testimony within the faithful heart;—see, that which was old hath passed away; everything hath become new, as soon as thou art loved in the Son of God's love! Who, besides the Spirit of God, could leave such a testimony within the breast of man? The same conscience which condemns thee can never acquit thee. It is the Spirit of the Father and of the Son, which implants the conviction within thee, that thou art one with them.—'Where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom;'—such freedom as bursts

[1] For a further illustration of the power of christian love, see Note M, at the close of the Sermons.

[2] See Note N, at the close of the Sermons.

the bars of death, and cries,—'Death, where is thy sting?' Here you have the key to that mysterious passage of the Redeemer, in which he declares, 'The hour is coming and has come already, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of man, and they who hear shall live.'[1] Yea it has come already, it is now,—the resurrection from the dead; for wherever the Spirit of the Lord is, there is the seed planted of an unending life.

'Your body,' says the apostle, 'is indeed dead on account of sin; but the spirit is life on account of righteousness. If now the Spirit of him who hath raised Jesus from the dead dwelleth in you, then the same Being who hath raised Christ from the dead, also giveth life to your mortal bodies, for the very reason that his Spirit dwelleth in you.'[2] The Spirit which the Lord pours out upon his own, is the same by which he has overcome death; and the same Spirit triumphs over death in us also; and our frail tabernacles it will build anew, and invest them with glories like the glories of the body of Jesus. Wherefore, elevated as no mere mortal ever was, the Saviour stands and cries,—'Whoso believeth in me shall never die; he hath been translated from death to life!' Has it already been your experience, beloved, that you have tasted of all joys and have found none of which you can say, these will satisfy me forever? Your experience of the vanity of this world's good, has been as it should be. There is only *one* kind of joy, in which the soul is interested, and of which I never become weary. This is the joy and the peace which the testimony of our adoption by God brings with it. Oh ye, who are yet afar off, believe it, there are, yea there are, in the life of the faithful Christian, not only minutes and hours, there are days and months and years, which he could wish to be prolonged to all eternity, and he would never be weary of them. There is a richness in these periods, and a fullness in them, a life and a stillness, an activity and a deep repose, and a steadiness, which fills the whole soul, and which no one can adequately understand, but one who has felt them. And the voice of the faithful Christian bears audible testimony,—'We have tasted of the good word of God, and the powers of the world to come.' In what they already enjoy here below, they have a foretaste of the future world.

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[1] John 5: 25. See Note O, at the close of the Sermons.

[2] Rom. 8: 10, 11.

From this you will understand why, in our text, the children of God are called heirs of God; and why the Spirit, which is imparted to them, is called the surety of the future inheritance. The apostle says in the subsequent context, that they who have faith have received the first fruits of the Spirit. Now the first fruits of a harvest are followed by the full harvest. In these first fruits Christians are fully assured, how rich a harvest is preserved for them in heaven, when they shall behold in glory, what they now hope for in weakness. But so long as you remain destitute of that degree of faith, by which you may taste the powers of the world to come; so long, Christians, as you are not made happy men by the power of your faith,—tell me, how can you explain the words of your Redeemer, when he says that 'the man, who has faith, has already pressed through death and has passed unto life?'[1] Tell me, does there not appear to be a sacred intimation, in these words of Jesus, that the idea of faith involves something more, decidedly more, than that poor and starveling principle, which is all that your experience comprehends? But whoever of you in this christian assembly can say, we have felt the powers of the world to come, since we have exercised faith; we have experienced the first fruits of the Spirit, which will one day be followed by the whole harvest; we have been sealed by the Holy Spirit of promise, and have thus received an earnest of our heavenly inheritance; whoever can say this, to you heaven is secure beyond a doubt. Ye happy ones, to you there remaineth not a solitary doubt, that heaven shall be your home. When the hour shall arrive, that last hour, when they who love you shall surround, with tearful eyes, your dying bed, then, oh ye happy ones, ye shall need no consolation from others; a consolation strong and clear shall spring up from the deeps of your own breast; your eye shall look upward steady and serene, and your last word shall be,—'I know that my Redeemer liveth.'

And now tell me, ye who have never received this surest pledge of eternal life, have you indeed no knowledge of it? How then will you stand up in the last struggle? He who knows nothing by experience of the grace of Christ, is represented by Luther as repeating this stanza:

[1] John 5: 24. See also 1 John 3: 14.

I live, but ah! how long,
I do not, cannot know;
I die, but know not when,
Nor whither I shall go:
Why then, I ask with wonder, why
Do I thus live in ease and joy?

You on the contrary, who, through the grace of God, feel warranted in saying of yourself,—'I know in whom I have believed,'—why will you remain downcast and fearful? Whoever has received such a pledge of eternal life as you have, is entitled, says Luther, to sing,

I live, and I can tell
How long my life will last;
I die, and know full well,
When Jordan will be passed;[1]
How I shall die and whither go
The Lord hath made me clearly know:
Why then, I ask with wonder, why
In sadness do I droop and die?

In harmony with these sentiments, I will close my discourse to day, this feast-day for the dead, with two questions. To you, who bear about in your breast no earnest of future bliss, and have no protector, standing ready to intercede for you at the judgment; to you I put the query, 'Friend, how *can* you live in ease and joy?' But to you, who have obtained pardon; to whom God hath given through Christ Jesus the first fruits of his Spirit, for a pledge of eternal life; to you who can say in faith, 'I know that my Redeemer liveth;' I put the question, 'Why do you droop in sadness so often and so deeply?'

May the Spirit of God be shed abroad in us all more and more richly; and in him and through him, may we all receive the cheering testimony, that we are the adopted children of God in Christ Jesus![2]

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[1] I know when I shall die, for I die every day, and every hour to the world.

[2] See Note P, at the close of the Sermons.

SERMON V.[1]

THE REPENTANCE AND PARDON OF THE THIEF ON THE CROSS.

THE words which will lead our devotions to-day, are found recorded in Luke 23: 39—43. "But one of the malefactors which were hanged with him, reviled him, saying,—'If thou be Christ, save thyself and us.' Then the other answered and reproved him, saying,—'Dost thou not fear God, since thou also art in the same condemnation? And we indeed are justly in it, for we have received what our deeds deserve; but this man hath done nothing amiss.' And he said to Jesus,—'Lord, think on me, when thou comest in thy kingdom.' And Jesus said unto him,—'Verily I say unto thee, this day shalt thou be with me in Paradise."

A narration, rich in all kinds of edifying thought. We will first inquire, what the passage contains that may elevate our spirits; secondly, what, that may abash them; thirdly, what it contains that is apt to be misunderstood; fourthly, what, that is fitted to console.

First, then, we will inquire what the passage contains that may elevate our spirits. He who once commanded the waves in a storm, hath been brought down low to the dust. In him hath been fulfilled the ancient prophecy,—'He was of all men the most despised and scorned; full of sorrows and sicknesses; he was so despised that we hid our faces from him.[2] They have scourged him on the back; they have spit upon him, even in his Godlike face; they have smitten his kingly head with a reed; they have erected his cross between two malefactors; they have stripped him of his garments and left him nothing but his crown. Scourged, spit upon, smitten, naked and crowned with thorns, there he hangs;—and yet, even under his cross, a sea of malice is foaming up with invective against him. Oh it has contained a fearful truth, that old prophetic word,—'I am poured out like water; all my bones are out of joint; my heart is in my body like melted wax; my strength is dried up like an earthen vessel; my tongue cleaveth to my jaws; thou hast placed me in the dust of death.'[3]

[1] For an Analysis of this Sermon, see Note Q, at the close of the Sermons.
[2] Isaiah 53: 3. [3] Psalm 22: 14, 15.

Have you considered, what a startling confirmation was given this last hour of the Lord's sorrow, to the great truth that sin, even in the most terrific revolt from God, must yet serve him? Can your most daring fancy form for itself any image, by which the idea of the God-like could more deeply agitate your souls, or penetrate them with a holier sorrow, than is done by this image which a Saviour's passion presents?—by this man of pain, his bleeding shoulders covered with purple, the reed in his hand, the crown of thorns upon his head? Has ingenuity ever succeeded in devising a more sacred form, one which united greater contrarieties of abasement and majesty, one in which abasement bore upon itself such heavenly, significant and noble symbols? And did this rude insolence of the Roman soldiers and of the servants of Herod,—an insolence which was the occasion of your now beholding such an image of the Saviour,—an image which, for hundreds of years, has been one of holy consolation to all heavy laden hearts,—did this rude insolence, I ask, take place through the mere play of accident? Oh tell me, have you anywhere in history a single example, which more clearly demonstrates the existence of a power above the clouds, into whose hand the threads from all men's hearts and arms run together, at whose nod even the loose play of chance arranges itself into the regular chain of a sacred, everlasting law embracing earth and heaven? It is this sublime sentiment, which is awakened in our minds by the history contained in our text. That cross which they have erected for him between the malefactors,—they have erected it for him as a kingly throne! Behold! the King of glory on his throne! The crown adorns his brow. His arms are stretched out to embrace the whole world, and place it at his heart. Above the throne shines the regal title,—'This is Jesus, the King of the Jews.' At the right and the left are the two great divisions of the world; at the left the unbelieving world, who revile him; at the right, the converted world, who do him homage; and he himself is between them, imparting blessedness to the one, punishment to the other, bending from his throne to open the gates of paradise for the penitent transgressor. Of a truth, there is in this spectacle an inward greatness and sublimity, against which no heart of man can harden itself; and even from the lips of an unbeliever, the instant he turned

his mind to the spectacle and considered it, there was forced out the expression of astonishment,—'Truly this was the Son of God!'

But secondly, there is something contained in the text, which may abash our spirits. Christians, you should learn,—yea verily, you should learn self-abasement from a malefactor; a malefactor who was nailed upon the cross. Refuse not the lesson from this man. If you will not receive it from him, he will pass sentence upon you!; pass sentence, as the Redeemer said of the queen of the South,—'She shall rise at the last judgment against this generation and shall condemn it; for she came from the ends of the earth to hear the wisdom of Solomon, and a greater than Solomon is here.'

What a wonderful appearance,—this malefactor at the right hand! When the God-like man stood, and lifted up his face to heaven, and cried,—'Father, glorify thy name,' and the voice came from the clouds,—'I have glorified it and will glorify it again;' when he stood, and placed his hand upon the eyes of the blind, so that they saw, and upon the ears of the deaf, so that they heard; when he entered into the royal city, and the people cried aloud,—'Hosanna to the Son of David, blessed be he that cometh in the name of the Lord,' then many were able to doubt concerning him whether he were a King. But now, when he lets his bruised and bleeding head sink down upon the ignominious tree; when the heaven over his head veils itself in clouds; when instead of the celestial voice from above, no words come to him but those of hell from beneath,—'He hath saved others and cannot save himself'; when the hands which were once placed upon the eyes of the blind, upon the breast of the leper, and upon the head of the little child, blessing everywhere and in all ways, are now nailed to the cursed wood; when the same people, who once cried 'Hosanna,' are exclaiming,—'If thou art the Son of God, come down from the cross;' even at this time, the eye of the repenting sinner sees the King in Jesus, and as his *knee* can no longer bow to him, the *heart* bows before him in adoration and lowliness.

Friends, do you consider what a strength of faith was requisite, at that juncture, for the act of believing, that a man, nailed to the cross, was yet a King; and that before his "Epphatha, be opened,"[1] even the gates of paradise must be unclosed to a repenting malefactor? From what vapor, men have asked, could such a hope have been born at such an hour?

[1] Mark 7: 34.

Perhaps the malefactors, who were crucified with him, saw the man, when he stood without an equal even before the court; and when Pilate led him forth, covered with blood, a spectacle to angels and to men; and presenting him to the people cried out,—'Behold, what a man!' They certainly saw him walk along the tedious way through the city, from the place of judgment to the place of blood; he walked in silent sorrow, till he fainted under the burden of his cross. They heard him, when he said to the weeping daughters of Jerusalem,—'Daughters of Jerusalem, weep not for me, but weep for yourselves, and your children.' They certainly lent him their ears, and looked upon his face, as with them he raised his pain-burdened head, and cried out, under his crown of thorns,—'Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do;'—yea, as we conjecture, they beheld at that instant, and in that face, a spectacle, the like to which no mortal hath ever witnessed.

But friends, did not both of the crucified men behold the same? Why did the invective ascend from one heart, while the other presented homage? It was his perception of his own moral need, which gave to the relenting thief so clear a view of the afflicted yet royal personage at his side. The beams, which radiated from the noble fellow-sufferer, beams that impregnate the spirit; it was these, that by little and little melted away the ice of the heart that was benumbed by sin. Hear ye not from his mouth such words as the following?—"And indeed we are justly in the condemnation, for we have received what our sins deserve;—but that noble personage, who suffers in such a way,—he cannot be a deceiver. When he bore witness of himself, that he held in his hand the keys of heaven and of the abyss, he spoke the truth.—Yet, how in a hand that was pierced through, could the key of heaven lie? And a head that was pale in death, shall it wear the crown of majesty? It is not possible! And yet it is possible!"—In this way does faith struggle with doubt in the agonized heart, until faith triumphs, and the man exclaims, 'Lord, think of me when thou comest into thy kingdom.'

Brethren, could *he* believe and adore, who saw nothing but the crown of thorns, and the pierced hand, and the running blood, and the death-sweat under the thorns upon the kingly brow; could he believe, that this man uttered no falsehood when he testified that the keys of heaven and of the abyss lay in his pierced hand?—and will *you* doubt, you who have lived to know of the ascension morning,

which burst open the grave of rock, and brought up the mighty dead, as the Prince of life? And will you doubt, who have lived to know of the ascension morning, which raised the Prince of life to the throne of majesty? And will you doubt, who have seen his invisible sceptre guide his church through more than a thousand years, and have beheld the seed-corn, which was planted in the dark night with tears, grow up to a tree, under the shadow whereof the fowls of the air take lodging?—Brethren, Christ has said that the queen of the South shall condemn the children of this generation, for she came from the ends of the earth to hear the wisdom of Solomon: Verily, you who can doubt whether the keys of heaven and of the abyss lie in that pierced hand, the thief on the cross shall be your condemning judge.[1]

But let us see in the third place, brethren, what this history exhibits that is apt to be misunderstood.

Is it then a fact, I hear you inquire, can the last spasmodic breath, with which the profligate breast is able to utter a 'God have mercy on me,' drown in silence the loud cry of a long, vicious life for vengeance? Is it a fact, that there are no blood spots so dark, and so great, that they cannot be washed away by that solitary tear, which falls from the glassy eye of a dying sinner? Oh happy me! so let me drink deeper of it, the intoxicating cup of pleasure;—I had only moistened my lips at its very brim! Oh happy me! Do I then have my portion in *both* worlds; the joys of salvation and of the present life? Let me first pluck the chequered, the sweet poison-flowers in the garden of time, ere I hasten to your spotless lilies, which bloom in the garden of your eternity!

Look at this! how the brightness of heaven, which lies over the spectacle that we are contemplating, is changed into the yellow reflection of hell, for our blinded, diseased eyes! It is true, we have a religion, which teaches that in the very interval of death, between, as it were, the lightning's flash and its stroke,[2] there is time to secure salvation. We have a Scripture that proclaims, 'Where sin hath abounded, grace abounds still more.' We have a Saviour, whom the poet fitly represents as saying,—'Whoever devotes himself to me as my servant, I choose him as my bride; and the sin which his

[1] See a further illustration of christian faith, in Note R, at the close of the Sermons.

[2] Between the lightning of death and its thunder.

heart repents of, I look upon as having never been committed.' And should you wonder at this? *To believe*,—with a bruised heart to believe,—what is it either more or less than to open the door of the soul? When there was no penitence and faith, this door was shut; the Saviour knocked, but it was not opened. When however it is once opened, does he not enter the soul, and with the Father take up his abode therein? Does there not enter with him, the Spirit of discipline and of pardon, whose work it is to convert the heart of man into a temple of God? The kingdom of God then with all its treasures is within such a soul, and will you shut the door of heaven upon it, and leave it without?

The blind man, who as he rushes upon the precipice is suddenly restored to sight, and who with lifted arms and joyful thanksgiving springs back from the abyss, seizes and kisses the good hand that touched his eyes, and will never more let it go,—will you make no distinction between this blind man, and such an one as will not receive the kind hand that was about to touch his eye-lids, but thrusts it back, until—a more convenient season?—Blind man! and how do you know that the hand will ever come to you again? Do you suppose, that it will come to you just as soon as you will to become penitent, to shed tears of contrition, to exercise faith? Oh brethren, —so perhaps many of you may have already experienced, these holiest of all tears, they flow not barely when the man wills to have them. Have you not heard of the judicial obduracy which comes over those, who turn the grace of God into licentiousness? Believe me; in the inward life of the sinner, to whom the grace of God would give the sighings of repentance, and the tears of contrition, and the blessedness of faith, but he will not receive the gift,—there will come to him hours of slumbering, when the breast shall heave no more sighs, the eye shall shed no more tears, and the hands, though they shall fold themselves convulsively, yet shall not be able to extort a prayer; when the anchor of longing desire, thrown out on all sides, shall find no bottom to which it may cleave. Be not deceived, God will not be mocked! Oh the Holy Spirit which inviteth man to repentance is a tender Spirit,—once sent away, he comes back again—reluctantly and rarely. Of them who do evil, so that good may come, the word of truth testifies, their 'damnation is entirely just.'[1]

[1] Rom. 3: 8.

But let us in the last place, my friends, consider the rich consolation, which this passage of sacred writ exhibits to us.

Sinner, while thou standest *this side* the grave, it is never too late for thy repentance,—this is the sacred comfort which springs forth from the words of the Redeemer on the cross.

'*It is too late!*' Oh word of terror which has already fallen like the thunder of God upon many a heart of man!—See that father, as he hastens from the burning house, and thinks that he has taken all his children with him; he counts, one dear head is missing; he hastens back,—'It is too late!' is the hollow sound that strikes his ear; the stone wall tumbles under the roaring torrent of flame, he swoons and sinks to the ground.—Who is that hastening through the darkness of the night on the winged courser? It is the son, who has been wandering in the ways of sin, and now at last longs to hear from the lips of his dying father the word, 'I have forgiven you.' Soon he is at his journey's end, in the twinkling of an eye he is at the door,—'It is too late,' shrieks forth the mother's voice, 'that mouth is closed forever!' and he sinks fainting into her arms.—See that victim for the scaffold; and the executioner, whetting the steel of death. The multitude stand shivering and dumb. Who is just heaving in sight on yonder distant hill, beckoning with signs of joy? It is the king's express; he brings a pardon! Nearer and nearer comes his step: Pardon! resounds through the crowd—softly at first, and then louder and yet louder. 'It is too late!' the guilty head has already fallen!—Yea, since the earth has stood, the heart of many a man has been fearfully pierced through by the cutting words, 'It is too late.' But oh, who will describe to me the lamentation that will arise, when at the boundary line which parts time from eternity, the voice of the *righteous Judge* will cry, 'It is too late!' Long have the wide gates of heaven stood open, and its messengers have cried at one time and another,—To day, to day, if ye will hear his voice! Man, man, how then will it be with you, when once these gates, with appalling sound, shall be shut for eternity! "Agonize that you may enter in at the narrow gate; for many, I say unto you, shall strive to enter in, and shall not be able. When once the master of the house hath arisen and shut the door, then shall ye begin to stand without, and to knock at the door, and to say,—'Lord, Lord, open unto us,' and he will answer and say unto you, 'I know you not, whence ye are."

But, my friends, the more appalling the truth is, that, at the dividing line between time and eternity, the sentence will be proclaimed,—'It is too late;' so much the more consoling is the word, flowing down to us from the cross of Jesus,—Sinner, while thou standest on this side the grave, it is never too late.—'Therefore let us fear,' cries an apostle to us, 'lest we should slight the promise of entering into his rest, and some one of us remain behind;—to day, if ye will hear his voice, harden not your hearts.' Whether the voice of thy God will come to thee again and search thee out,—this thou knowest not; but whatever may lie behind thee, whether nights of the darkest error, whether mountains of sin,—thou distinctly hearest to day his proclamation,—'It is not too late!'

SERMON VI.[1]

THE PRESENCE OF GOD WITH HIS CHILDREN.

To-day, beloved in Christ, I turn my attention to one particular class of hearers; not to those among you who are secure and at ease in the way to death, nor to those who enjoy peace and blessedness in the way to life; but to you, unhappy men, who hang between heaven and earth; who cannot die, and cannot live; whom the earth will not leave unmolested, and whom heaven will not accept. It is a fearful state when, in the heart that was created for God, the world and Satan reign, and yet the man can pass on in presumptuous confidence, and say to himself and to others,—I have peace, all goes well. But you will say, it is a condition still more fearful, when one looks at the opened heaven above him, full of grace and truth, and yet cannot break loose from the pollutions of earth; when he is thus the prey of two conflicting powers. Many supposing this latter state to be worse than that of careless sin, make no attempt to wake themselves from the slumber of death, but press down their eyelids so much the closer, that they may sleep the more. But let

[1] For an Analysis of this Sermon, see Note S, at the close of the Sermons.

us see which of the two states is the more fearful. Were the pangs of the struggling soul, which oscillates between death and life, to be your eternal portion, then would you have reason to regard it as of all portions the most disconsolate. But, my brother, such pangs are the pangs of the new birth. They are the contending of the morning twilight with the thick clouds of the night. Struggle on with fortitude, and the soul will be born anew; the sun will come out clear from the former darkness.[1] Ye who are striving with sin, who are stretching out your hand for help, I will reach out to you a brother's arm. Ye who like Peter of old walk on the waves, and with hands stretched forth, cry out, 'Lord, we sink;' Christ will extend his hand to help you; ye shall not sink. From these birth-pangs shall the new man be born after the image of God. From these night-heavens shall the sun of righteousness shine forth. *Wilt* thou be made whole? Thus the Lord asked the sick around him; thus also he asks you, to-day. Hear the words of the Holy Scripture which, in this discourse, I will present before you in the name of God. They should be to you like the hand, that is stretched out from heaven to raise up from the power of sin and death all who will take hold of it. "Draw nigh to God," cries the apostle James, chap. 4: v. 8, "and he will draw nigh to you."[2]

Before we commence the regular discussion of these words of the apostle, let us, beloved, free them from a misconstruction which might attach itself to them. It might easily appear from this mode of expression, as if it were man himself who took the first step in the way to life. But if so, where would be the apostle's words, 'What hast thou which thou didst not receive, and if thou didst receive it, why then dost thou boast of thyself.' No, my friends, he who is the first to stretch out the hand and to come near, is God; and the apostle's assertion in this passage can be applied to support no sentiment but the following,—whatever aid is proffered thee, thou must eagerly embrace, if thou wouldst obtain more. We are, all of us, stewards of the manifold gifts and graces of God; accordingly he hath come to meet us all, and it is needful that we go forth to meet him, if we would receive more of his aid. In a manner altogether peculiar then, are the words of our text designed for you,

[1] See Note T, at the close of the Sermons.

[2] See Note U, at the close of the Sermons.

who with deep humility confess that the grace of God has already come near you, but yet weep, partly because you cannot appropriate this grace to yourself, and partly because you have not full and entire satisfaction in it. Let us then, in the first place, propound the question, how God draws near unto men, and secondly, how men draw near unto God.

1. How does God draw near unto men? He draws near to them as God the Father, in the work of creation and preservation. On all sides is every thing which liveth surrounded with the great mystery of love. It was love which, on the morning of the creation, cried into the darkness, 'let there be light,' and light was. The independent and eternal God, who might in his self-existence and blessedness have dwelt forever alone, desired to have co-partners of his blessedness, and he therefore created the world and spirits allied to his own nature. And now, soul of man! whenever in the elevation of joy thou lookest upon thyself, and sayest to thyself, 'I am;' be sure that thou also utter this exclamation, 'It is eternal love which hath made me in the image of God.' That love, which brought thee into existence on earth, see, how it bears thee in its motherly arms through this poor life, which is wreathed about with thorns and misery. Far above this earth, where souls of men abide, thither penetrates a beam from this sun, and thither goes with it this motherly love, mild and blessing; and it warms and sustains and cherishes and shelters the ever needy heart of man. Even the rudest mind can form a conception of this near approach of God in the work of creation and preservation. Paul goes into the midst of the heathen world and proclaims, 'Turn ye to the living God, who made heaven and earth and the sea and all that is therein; and hath not left himself without a witness, but hath given us much good, and hath sent rain and fruitful seasons from heaven, and hath filled our hearts with joy and gladness.'[1]

But creating and preserving love has not provided a mirror for itself in thee alone. Around us and afar off has it also erected its tabernacle. The morning stars of heaven rejoice in their Maker, and the modest flower of the earth praises him in the lovely vale. When a man, who hath first received into his own heart the full consciousness of that love which encircles heaven and earth in the embrace of its motherly arms, when such a man goeth forth on a

[1] Acts 14: 15, 17.

bright day of spring into the solitary temple of nature; oh—what a unison doth he feel between his own heart and all created objects, as they adore and sing,—'Eternal, all-protecting love! Hallowed be thy name!' Yea my brethren, in the work of his creation God the Father hath approached near unto us, inexpressibly near unto us, even as man to man;—to us, his poor children, standing in the need of help;—and let every thing which hath breath praise and exalt the Lord![1]

But although, my friends, we are placed in this glorious temple of nature as the priests of God, yet are we in no way profited by it, unless we be in reality priests. Of what avail is the fulness of all gifts and good things, which flow forth to thee from the exhaustless store-house of heaven and earth, if they do not expand thy heart to deep-felt gratitude, and humble obedience? Of what avail, that every star in the heaven and every worm upon the earth has a tongue, with which it bears witness of eternal love, when the heart is deaf, and thy mouth continues speechless? Of what avail to us, that God the Father has revealed himself in us and in nature as the Father of all that lives, unless we be his children? And until God the Son has transformed us to be the children of his Father, oh how pitiably man stands on the heaving bosom of nature; how poor, how ignorant; unable to expound the riddle; living like the heathen without God and without hope in the world; and instead of folding his hands, he wrings them in despair.

2. But, brethren, God hath come near unto us, as God the Son, in the work of Redemption. Without Christ the heaven of stars, as well as the heart of man, remains to us, a sealed hieroglyphic. Seest thou not how men conjecture about it? how diversely they unravel it? how they interpret scarcely a single syllable here and there of the great enigma? The Holy, the Unknown, whose characteristic features thou couldst not detect when thou soughtest to decipher them from the flowers, from the stars, from the hearts of men; lo, he hath come forth to meet thee, he hath come near to thee, as a man to his neighbor; in Galilee hath he set up his tabernacle; look into the heart of Jesus, and thou hast read the heart of God; for, this is his exclamation, 'Whoever hath seen me, Philip, hath seen the Father.' Adorable love! when I passed thee by and

[1] See Note V, at the close.

knew thee not, then didst thou lie hidden behind the veil of nature; then did I form conjectures concerning thee, and my heart swelled with fulness of longing desire; but since I have looked upon thee in the Son of God, who hath come to find the lost sheep, and who inviteth the sorrowful and heavy laden to himself, since that time, I have looked directly upon thy face, and I know thee, and bow my knee before thee, and exclaim,—Eternal love! pass not away from me, from me the poorest of thy children!

Yea, my friends, what a hidden being is God, before he hath become manifest to us in Christ; and how completely veiled also is the heart of man, before thou learnest its character, in contrast with the Saviour's. While I look upon him as the Son of God and of man, the feeling is awakened in my breast, that even I am of a God-like race; and yet, when I look upon him, tears break forth from my eyes; for alas, the God-like image within me is shamefully disfigured, and that which ought to reign in my bosom, serves. In contrast with his obedience, I learned my own disobedience; in contrast with his humility, I learned my own pride; in contrast with his compassion and the swelling of his heart with tenderness, I learned how cold and unfeeling was my own spirit. And I stood troubled exceedingly, and ashamed, and my tears flowed forth. Then spake a voice, from the throne of glory, saying, 'Weep not, for the Lion of the tribe of Judah hath overcome.' *Wilt* thou be made whole? 'Yea, Lord,' I answered, 'ah thou knowest how strongly I desire it.' Then said he, 'My Son, be of good cheer, there is help for thee; stand up and follow me.' And I followed him, and lo, I became conscious that he had not disappointed me, when he said, 'Whoever believeth in me, *hath* already received everlasting life.'

Behold, how God comes near to man in the work of redemption. But in vain does he come outwardly near thee in the work of creation and atonement, unless he come also near thee in the sanctuary of thine own soul. Christ as well as nature, the manifestation of the Son in redeeming as well as of the Father in creating, stands before thee as a dumb enigma, unless the Spirit perform his preparatory work upon thy heart.

3. But God the Spirit also approacheth men in his work of sanctification. If God bring thee not to God, thou canst not find God. This is the third way in which Jehovah comes near to man;

he sends the Divine Spirit, who has his seat of operation in the inmost recesses of the human heart, who invites and attracts continually, until he has brought the man to Christ. 'God hath caused all nations of men, being of one blood, to dwell on the whole face of the earth; and hath fixed and pre-determined the bounds, both of time and space, in which they should live, so that they might seek after God, if perhaps they might feel after him and find him. And indeed, he is not far from every one of us, for in him we live, move, and are.'

Man! feel the whole greatness of that which is proclaimed to thee by this truth. In thine inmost nature art thou thus rooted within the Spirit of God. No finite being is so near, not even thou thyself art so near to thine own soul, as the Spirit of God is. He is with thee when thou standest up; he goeth with thee when thou liest down; and if thou take the wings of the morning, and fly even to the outmost sea, yet even there will his hand hold thee. Thou canst by no means escape from his strong hold. The man who hath sunk into darkness, would fain release himself from God; he may not recognize his divine companion, yet the hand of this companion is upon him. Thou hangest the veil before thee, thou seest him not, but he seeth thee. Beloved man, he who inwardly speaketh to thee is not thine enemy. Turn not away from his voice. It is the voice of thy friend, the voice of thy best friend, thy God and Father, who will bear thee to his Son. What he teacheth will indeed give thee pain; thou thoughtest thou wert full and hadst a sufficient supply; oh see, he convinceth thee that thou art naked and destitute; he exciteth in thy soul a hunger and thirst; it may make thee lament, but, beloved man, turn him not away; lo, he maketh thee poor and naked and hungry and thirsty, for no other reason than this, that he will clothe thee with new celestial garments, such as his Son hath provided for thee, and such as thou shalt wear in his kingdom; for no other reason than this, that he will feed thee and give thee drink,—feed with heavenly bread, and give thee living water, such as his Son shall dispense to thee in his kingdom.

Behold, my christian friends, the arms of love which your God spreadeth out for you, which come near unto you, and are stretched forth to embrace you in all your ways! A sea of love surrounds you all, with its waves on all sides; but how many of you thirst amid these waves, and must continue to thirst in the midst of them, if you will not extend your arms to meet your God. Will you be

made whole? This is the question which I earnestly repeat to you. If it was necessary that the man, upon whom the miracle of physical healing was performed, should be willing to be cured, how much more necessary is it that the man, whose soul is to be restored, should desire the restoration. Christ revives and enlightens you, not without nor against your will. But behold, here is the diseased place in your heart. All ye who are not dead in your sins, and who yet cannot come into decided spiritual life; who affirm that you believe, and yet are not conscious of the power and blessedness of living in the Redeemer,—the reason of your present condition is this; when Christ with all earnestness inquires, 'Will you indeed be made whole,' you answer, 'No, we will not!' You hunger not, you thirst not,—how shall God give you food?

Will you indeed be made whole? Then draw near to God. Draw near to him and he will draw near to you. The sea of love will not barely surround you, so that you shall remain joyless amid its waves; you shall drink from that sea.

1. Draw near to God in the work of creation and preservation. Why fleest thou from solitude? Why dost thou shun the lonely hour? Why passeth thy life away like the feast of the drunkard? Why is it that to many of you there cometh not, through the whole course of the week, a single hour for self-meditation? You go through life like dreaming men. Ever among mankind, and never with yourselves. So it was not with our forefathers; they had in their life many a still hour. When the evening came, then had every one a set period which was consecrated to his God. You have torn down the cloister; but why have you not erected it within your hearts. Lo, my brother, if thou wouldst seek out the still hour, only a single one every day, and if thou wouldst meditate on the love which called thee into being, which hath overshadowed thee all the days of thy life with blessing, or else by mournful experiences hath admonished and corrected thee; this would be to draw near to thy God; thus wouldst thou take him by the hand. But whenever in ceaseless dissipation of heart thou goest astray, the sea of the divine blessing shall surround thee on all sides, and yet thy soul shall be athirst.—Wilt thou draw near to God in his works of creation and preservation? Then seek the still hour.[1]

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[1] See Note W, at the close.

2. Draw near to God in his work of Redemption. How like a friend he hath come forth to meet a world of sinners! and they go not forth to meet him! Ye, who are conscious that ye have in the word of God eternal life, do ye read that word every day? Believe me, there are very many among you who will remain in suspense and fluctuation of mind, and can never arrive at sure conviction, until they find opportunity to read the Scriptures every day in the still hour. But it is a question of vital import,—In what manner do you read? Ye who are earnest in the pursuit of heaven, read first the history of your Lord, so that you may collect into a single sun all the scattered rays of his image. Let your first effort be to obtain a deep impression of his entire, holy character and conduct. This sacred image will attend you through the whole day, as a companion to humble, to console, to animate you; it will be with you like a good spirit. Whoever looks for a long time at the sun, receives the sun's full image in his eye, so that he beholds nothing anywhere but that luminary. Thus, my beloved brother, when through the whole morning you look upon the sun of the Redeemer's image, that sacred form will impress itself upon you, and whatever you see, you will see it only in its relations to Christ; you will rejoice when you recognize one ray from him; you will weep when you cannot discover him; you will follow every way-mark, and every lifted finger which points to him,—Will you then draw near to God in the work of Redemption? Read the testimony respecting his Son, which he has placed in your hand.

3. Draw near to God when he comes to you in the Spirit, as it operates within your heart. Oh that I might, with divine power, penetrate all your souls with this cry;—whenever you feel within your spirits the attraction and voice of your Father, resist it not; it is the voice of God; it is the work of God; fail not to hear it; for it is in this particular that the righteousness of God is manifested in the most fearful way. 'There dwells,' says a heathen writer, 'in men, a Holy Spirit, who treats us as he is treated by us.' Once turned away, he comes back again the more seldom, and speaks to us with less and less power. But what can I do, you ask, if the voice within me sounds but softly; or if I have disdained it, until it has become scarcely audible? Brother, it stands recorded: 'Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and you shall find; knock, and it shall be opened to you.' You reply, 'I have a cold heart. I cannot

pray;' but I ask you, is not a warm heart a good gift? If it is so, then I add, it stands written, 'If ye who are evil yet know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more will your Father bestow favor upon them who ask it.' It is a mistake, a dangerous error to suppose that man should pray only when his heart prompts. What shall one do, when his heart dies away, and incites him no more? Knowest thou not, that the soul is stimulated to prayer by prayer itself. Hast thou never yet experienced that happy state, when the soul, grieving over its inward barrenness and coldness, casts itself down, and begins with frigid feeling to pray, and this very prayer transforms the heart of stone into one of flesh, and thine affections begin to swell within thee and to pour themselves out more and more freely, and the words flow forth in richer and richer abundance, and thou canst find no end to them, and thou art overpowered, and criest aloud,—'Yea verily, oh God, thou canst do superabundantly above all that we ask and think?' But you say,—'Alas my supplication falls back again so cold and faint upon me. It seems as if I mocked God with my prayer, full of words but without a soul.' Brother, I ask you only one question:—Do you hunger for the bread of life? If you do, then certainly you do not mock your God with your supplication. Shall it be that you entreat longingly for bread, and are refused? Nay, nay, he in whose countenance we behold all that is paternal, hath inquired, 'What man is there among you, who if his son ask for bread, will give him a stone?' Cry out in full trust, 'Bread, Father! I wish! Thou who givest earthly bread to the young ravens, thy child longeth for the bread of the soul.' And do you think that to you alone, among all mortals, there would come a refusal? Remember that the holy men of God; remember that, in particular, Augustus Hermann Francke[1] fell on his knees and prayed,—'God, if thou art, manifest thyself unto me.' Lo, thus was he obliged to *begin* to learn how to pray; and the manner in which he ended, the conclusion to which he came, you know—see, the edifice of his faith, of his prayers, is erected among you, an imperishable monument. And can you still doubt, you with the cold heart, that you will learn to pray with warm and glowing feeling, if you will but begin in faith? Beloved Christians, draw near to the Holy Spirit of God in supplication.

Come then, all ye who are not dead, and yet are not alive; ye

[1] See Note X, at the close of the Sermons.

whom the earth will not leave unmolested, and whom heaven will not accept; ye who serve two masters, how long will ye fluctuate? Hold fast in your souls this one truth; whatsoever can be done on the part of God, hath already been done. The wedding festival is prepared; you have been invited; nothing remains but for you to come. The sea of love surrounds you; nothing remains but for you to drink. At the last day, when you wring your hands in despair, shall it be said, 'I was willing, but ye were not willing?' How to approach him who approacheth you so graciously, you know. Seek the still hour, every day. Read the Holy Scriptures, every day. Attend, every hour and every instant, to every attracting influence of the Holy Spirit. When the Spirit keepeth silence, then cling to your prayer.

Israel! why wilt thou die? Lo, thou knowest what course is needful for thy happiness. Whoever remaineth shut out, whoever remaineth shut out from the work of grace,—he hath shut himself out.

NOTES BY THE TRANSLATOR.

NOTE A, Page 115.

The sermons of Tholuck, which are translated in this volume, may not be the most highly finished specimens of his pulpit-style; but they are supposed to exhibit as much thought that would be interesting to American Christians, and in combination with this as much of their author's peculiarity of manner, as any equal number which he has published. They were all preached at the service appointed for the University students at Halle. The title of the volumes from which they are taken is, "Predigten in dem akademischen Gottesdienste der Universität Halle in der St. Ulrichs—und in der Domkirche gehalten, von Dr. A. Tholuck." The first sermon in this selection is found in Tholuck's 4th Volume, or more properly "Sammlung," pp. 54—68; the second, in his 2d Vol. pp. 164—176; the third, in his 4th Vol. pp. 123—136; the fourth, in his 1st Vol. pp. 32—46; the fifth, in his 1st Vol. pp. 161—171; the sixth, in his first Vol. pp. 74—86.

NOTE B, Page 115.

The title which Tholuck gives to this sermon is, "The true idea of the external discipline of the law under the Christian economy." As Tholuck is sometimes accused of incoherency in his train of thought, it is judged expedient to give a brief synopsis of the contents of each sermon. The following is an analysis of the first discourse.

Introduction;—the piety of former times characterized by observance of law; that of modern times, by impulses of feeling; p. 115. Text, explication, division; p. 116. The fervent Christian is not prompted to the performance of his religious duties by the fact, that they are commanded; p. 117. Illustration, drawn from our performance of many moral duties, without being prompted by the civil law; happiness of such a state of freedom; p. 118.—The Christian, so far as he is remiss, stands in need of law; he needs the law, that he may have before him a standard of perfect virtue; in what manner does the law humble for sin; what is comprehended under the term 'law;' p. 119. The imperfect Christian needs the law, that he may be fortified against the sins, which most strongly tempt him; reciprocal influence of internal and external actions; p. 120. Necessity of resisting sin; p. 121. Importance of outward observances, illustrated in the case of the ancient Israelites; also in the case of the Quakers; pp. 122, 123. Exhortation to observe outward forms; p. 123. The imperfect Christian needs the law, as a seal of the method which he has chosen of obtaining the divine favor through grace; p. 124. Dependence of Protestant Christians on their own works; illustration; pp. 124, 125. Conclusion, p. 125.

NOTE C, Page 116.

Perhaps there is no act of the Saviour's life, more full of doctrinal instruction, and more illustrative of the remark that his deeds were in themselves discourses, than that recorded in Matt. 12: 1—8, Mark 2: 23—28, and Luke 6: 1—5. He evinced here as well as elsewhere, the greatness and stability of his mind, by doing what was precisely right, in opposition to the two parties who were, though in two opposite ways, wrong. Some would have been glad to see the Sabbath desecrated, and many would have been glad to see it observed with over-scrupulous strictness; but Christ in opposition to both extremes does what is just right. An ultra-conservative spirit would have inquired, whether one extreme of wrong were not safer than the other; whether there were not a stronger tendency in man to license than to rigor; and therefore whether it would not be the more judicious and prudent course, to go a little farther than needful one way, so as to deter men from going too far the other way; to encourage the extreme of undue severity, so as to draw men from the worse extreme of injurious liberty. But with a full view of the proneness of man to convert indulgence into license, our Saviour defended the course which was most obnoxious to the high religionists of his time. And yet he defended it on such sober

principles, as to give no countenance to those latitudinarian views of the Sabbath, which his act is supposed by some to have sanctioned.

The five reasons, which he gave for the plucking of the ears of corn, are,—first, that the example of David, recorded in 1 Sam. 21: 6, is a precedent for allowing the necessities of nature to suspend ceremonial observances; secondly, that the custom of sacrificing victims, circumcising infants, and performing other works connected with the rites of Judaism, was a precedent for allowing just so much manual and secular labor, as the spiritual good of men required; thirdly, that the Old Testament expressly declares mercy to be more acceptable to God than sacrifice; or, in other words, kindness and rational benevolence to one's self and others, to be better than austere and onerous ceremonies, see Hosea 6: 6; fourthly, that the Sabbath is not the end and man the means, but man is the end and the Sabbath the means; and fifthly, that the Messiah is Lord of the Sabbath, and has power at any time to release from its observance. For a full explanation of these reasons, see Calvin's Com. Vol. I. pp. 280, 281.—The evil consequences, which have resulted, and are still resulting, to the interests of religion upon the continent of Europe, from the loose views of the Reformers on the subject of the Sabbath, and from the propagation of these views through the German and the neighboring churches, form a striking commentary on the dissonance of so lax a doctrine with the doctrine, always salutary, of the great Teacher of morals.

This may be a proper place to add, that first in the paragraph to which this note refers, and subsequently in various parts of the sermon, there is an explanation given of the words, "the Son of man is Lord of the Sabbath," which although defended by some able critics, does not seem to be correct. "In the concluding expression," says Olshausen, "which all the evangelists have in common,—'The Son of man is Lord of the Sabbath,' the words 'Son of man' cannot possibly be supposed parallel with the word 'man' in Mark 2: 27. For although sinful mortals were not made for the sake of the law, but conversely the law was made for the sake of these mortals; yet it would be altogether improper to affirm, that they are Lords of the law, or of any one of its ordinances. This can be said of him only who is the perfect man, the first of men. The phrase 'Son of man' is here to be regarded as in contrast with the word 'man' in Mark 2: 27, and therefore the phrase expresses the Messianic authority of Jesus. As the Lord of heaven (1 Cor. 15: 47), even while wandering here below in the plain garb of a human being, the Messiah was elevated above all the legal ordinances, for his will itself was the law. He never exhibits himself, however, as in any manner annulling the law, but as fulfilling it in a deep spiritual sense, Matt. 5: 17. Thus the Redeemer fulfils the precept of the Old Testament respecting the Sabbath, while he recommends an inward warmth of soul and rest in God." Comm. on New Test. Vol. I. p. 366.

Tholuck's opinion, that the term Sabbath is used in the text by synecdoche for the whole law, is the same with that of Olshausen, Vol. I. p. 365, and of other evangelical commentators.

NOTE D, Page 125.

The title which Tholuck gives to this sermon is, "The truth, that the Lord is not in the storm and tempest, but in the soft, still sound,—considered in reference to the appearance of the Saviour in the world."

The sermon was preached Dec. 26, 1834, on the second day of the Christmas-Festival; hence the allusions in the introductory sentence. The religious festivities of Christmas, as observed by the German Lutherans, commence on the 25th of December, and extend to the 6th of January; the former day being regarded as that of Christ's birth, and the latter as that of the Epiphany. The 26th of Dec., the second day of Christmas, is connected with a particular reference to the martyrdom of Stephen; the 27th, the third day, to the memory of John the Evangelist; and the 28th, the fourth day, to the slaughter of the infants at Bethlehem. See Augusti Handbuch der Christ. Archaeol. I. pp. 531, 7, 8.

The following is the analysis of this discourse. Introduction; general celebration of the birth of Christ; p. 126. Text; explication; pp. 126, 127; Division, p. 128. The gentleness of Christ's mission is shown by the manner of his entrance into the world; p. 128. Effect produced on the mind by conceiving of the appearance of Jehovah to us; p. 128. Difference between the mode of creating, and that of destroying; peculiar circumstances of Christ's advent; what might they have been; p. 129. What will be the circumstances of his second coming; p. 130. The gentleness of Christ, exemplified in his progress through the world; humility of his appearance; p. 130. Predictions of his mildness; contrast between him as a preacher, and other inspired men; p. 131. Character of Christ's miracles in contrast with what it might have been, and what the character of other miracles has been; p. 132. The gentleness of Christ shown in the manner of his leaving the world; how might he have departed; how did he depart. Conclusion; p. 133.

NOTE E, Page 128.

Tholuck has another discourse on the same text with this, and immediately succeeding it, in Vol. 2, pp. 177—192. Subject,—The truth that 'God is not in the storm and tempest,' considered in its application to God's treatment of men. The following is a brief abstract of it.

"My worshipping friends, on the last Feast-day I made this text the theme of a discourse, and considered it in reference to the appearance of Jesus Christ in the world.—But as the diamond sends forth its bright beams from whatever side it may be looked upon, so many incidents and expressions recorded in sacred writ impart instruction, from whatever aspect they may be viewed. This is true with our text; in various respects the Lord is not in the storm but in the soft sound. Let us to day consider the words in reference to God's treatment of men.

If now we understand by the storm and tempest those times in which God comes near to men with terror and desolation, it may appear questionable, whether the words of our text can be applied to his treatment of our race. For who of us does not know how often in the history of the world, how often in the history of the christian church the Lord has appeared in terror and devastation? Yea who is not aware how much more infrequent have been the times, when God appeared to him in the mild gentle sunshine, than those in which he came as the storms roared, and the clouds of the tempest gathered. The Lord does indeed appear to man in the storm and tempest, as Christ also will appear in the same, though at his first coming he appeared in the soft sound.

We add, however, that the most appropriate manifestations of the Deity are in the gentle mode. When our text asserts, that he is not in the storm and tempest, it can be understood only in this sense, he is not in the storm and tempest so characteristically as in the gentle whisper. Thus you often find in the Bible an exclusive and negative proposition, which must be understood with some limit of this sort. It is said for example, 'I am *not* come to bring peace *but* a sword,' and also, 'when thou makest an entertainment, invite *not* thy friends, *but* the poor, the cripple, the blind, the lame.' Wherefore let us consider, first, the truth that the Lord does come in the storm and tempest, and secondly that he comes, in a more peculiar sense, in the soft sound.

1. That the Lord comes in storm and tempest is evident, in the first place, from the history of the world, and of the church, as they are considered collectively. It seems to be with men, as it is with the hour-glass, which must at certain times be turned upside down, so that it may go. (Illustrated by various historical facts.)

That the Lord comes in storm and tempest is shown, in the second place, in the history of men considered individually.—Is it not true that when the sun shines upon us, and we feel its gentle warmth in our life, we become indifferent to its mild beams, and do not so much as ask, whence comes the pleasant light? Because it is grateful to our feelings, we think that it is a matter of course. If any one says, this is the work of the beloved God, it is said in mere *formality*. Not until the tempest comes, which we dread, do we look around us and inquire,—whence comes this? Before the eye of the Christian there rises to the clouds from every event in life a thread, on which the eye moves along up to the Source, where all gifts end and begin. But the eye of the natural man sees not the thread, so long as the sun shines. When it is night and lightning gleams through the darkness, then only does he discern the thread, then for the first time do his tardy affections rise upward to God. Oh what an image of the heart of man, in this respect, is the history of Israel. What Moses says in his parting song, how it is confirmed in the history of us all. 'The Lord found them in the desert, in the barren wilderness; and as an eagle fluttereth over her young, and beareth them away, so the Lord spread out his wings, and took them, and bore them on his wings, and nourished them with the fruits of the

field, and let them suck honey from the rock, and oil from the hard stone. But when they were satiated and had become fat, they were insolent. They grew strong, and neglected the God who made them.' As David confesses of himself, 'Before I was brought low I went astray, but now, Lord, I keep thy word,' so do the greater part of Christians confess, each of himself, 'As long as thou, eternal God, heldest back thy lightning and thunder, I went astray; but when they prostrated me upon the ground, I then attended, for the first time, to thy word, and learned by experience that the Lord cometh to men in the storm and tempest.' And this is not only the fact at the first return to God, at conversion; ah, is it not our general experience that the star of faith never shines brighter, than when it is night all around us? and that the field of our life never brings forth better fruit than when the storm and tempest come over it? What but this is the reason that you, who are the most experienced Christians, when you look back upon your days gone by, think of the days of storm and commotion, with no less gratitude than those of peace; for all chastisement when it is upon us, seemeth to be not a matter of joy but of sorrow; yet afterwards it will yield the peaceable fruit of righteousness, to those who are exercised by it?

2. It is true, however, that the appropriate coming of the Deity is in the gentle sound. What do we understand by the term, appropriate coming? We understand such a manifestation as that which he will make through all eternity, and in which he will always come to his glorified church. When, as the Scripture saith, 'the condition of the world passeth away,' then shall also pass away all those modes, in which the Lord was wont to present himself before his friends, in a world where sin and death reigned. And the way in which God will exhibit himself through all eternity, when sin and death shall be no more, must be the proper and appropriate way. (For the admissibility of such a phrase, see Isaiah 28: 21.—Tr.) Let us consider how the holy seer viewed these last days, when he said, 'And I John saw the holy city, the New Jerusalem come down from God out of heaven, prepared as a bride adorned for her husband. And I heard a great voice from heaven saying, Behold the tabernacle of God is with men, and he will dwell with them, and they shall be his people, and God himself shall be with them, and shall be their God, and shall wipe away all tears from their eyes, and death shall be no more, neither sorrow nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things have passed away.' So shall it be at the end of the world; as a silent sunbeam he shall come down softly and solemnly, and all the hearts of men shall be flowers holding themselves still before him, and drinking in the sunbeam, without moving, without turning away, for God will be All in all."

(The state of spiritual rest in God is begun on earth, and the instances are frequent, in churches, see Acts 2: 47, and pious individuals, such as Arndt, Spener, Francke, in which God has erected his tabernacle among men, and moved about, as a Friend and Father, in solemn stillness.)

NOTE F, Page 133.

Like all other writers, Tholuck has his favorite ideas, which he is apt to repeat in a varied form. The scenes of the Saviour's life are among his select topics, and the reader will at once see the resemblance between the following descriptions, and some of those in the sermon to which this note refers.

"From the instant of the Saviour's resurrection, when he left mortality behind him in the tomb, he belonged to the earth no more. While he had previously been the constant companion of his disciples, living with them as a father with his children, he now appears to them but occasionally, and in divers places. Where he now abides they do not ask him. They ask him not and we know not. That he would return to the Father he has often taught them; and they may therefore have concluded, that even at this time he made his abode with his Father. He has assembled them for the last time in the capital city. He has said to them not a word more respecting himself. He has spoken with them of the kingdom of God. Early in the morning, at an hour when no unconsecrated eye could see him,—for only they, who believed in him, had beheld him since his resurrection,—he walks with the eleven,—the twelfth had gone to his own place, as the Scripture says,—through the yet silent streets of the city,—he goes out at the gate, and ascends with them the very mountain, whose foot had been moistened with the tears, yea with the bloody sweat of the now glorified man. Who conjectures what now passed through his God-like heart, as he stood on this commanding eminence and cast the earthly, human glance for the last time, upon the scene of his agonies, the scene of his weeping. "It is finished," he had exclaimed once, as he bowed his head upon the cross; "It is finished," he now cries out once more. There lie at his feet eleven men, whom his wrestlings and his tears have taken captive as a precious prey from the world; but more than eleven millions, who will lie at his feet on some future day, and for whom *these* eleven are but the small grains of seed, are in his prophetic view.—It is finished."

"You all know, my hearers, of what invaluable worth is the last look of a departing friend. As his countenance then appeared—*that* is the image which imprints itself most deeply on the soul. Why is it unpleasant to stand, as one must, by the dying-bed of a friend, who is trembling under the cold touch of death. Ah, above all things else is it on this account, that the loved one will ever recur to our remembrance in this image of pain. How delightful now it is to see the manner in which the last glance of the Saviour fell upon his chosen. It is said in the Gospel of Luke, that 'he lifted up his hands and blessed them, and as he was blessing them, he parted with them.' If an inventive fancy would form some conception of the mode in which the Saviour might have taken his departure from earth, that Saviour who broke not the bruised reed, nor quenched the glowing wick, could it design a more becoming, a more

beautiful picture than this? I have already, on another occasion, asked you to consider how rich the Gospel history is in subjects for representation by the arts. This mode of the Redeemer's departure did not take place by accident. It is in keeping with the whole life of him, who came into the world not to condemn it but to make it happy. Imagine that the Saviour of sinners had terminated his earthly course like Elias, that preacher of repentance, who was carried to heaven in a chariot of fire by a tempest of the Lord; and you will then feel that such a termination is not consonant with either the beginning or the middle of the Saviour's course. We read of the apostles, that 'they went back to Jerusalem with great joy!' With joy? With joy after their One and All had been parted from them, and while they were not yet certain of his revisit in the Spirit?—Yea with joy. They had seen the hands stretched out to bless them. Wherever they stood and wherever they went, the blessing hands were before their eyes.—And do not we, beloved brethren, exclaim, oh that we had been there, oh that we had seen them, those blessing hands? Go then, dear friends, go in the spirit so much the oftener to that cheering history; celebrate Christ's ascension in your hearts. And wherever ye behold men sorrowing and always grieved, there show them these blessing hands!"—Vol. II. pp. 124, 125, 129, 130.

The reader will at once perceive the resemblance between the main idea of Tholuck's sermon on the gentleness of Christ, and the following passage taken from the close of Milman's Fall of Jerusalem.

"Thou wast born of woman, thou did'st come,
O Holiest! to this world of sin and gloom,
Not in thy dread omnipotent array;
And not by thunder strow'd
Was thy tempestuous road;
Nor indignation burned before thee on thy way.
But thee, a soft and naked child,
Thy mother undefiled,
In the rude manger laid to rest
From off her virgin breast.

The heavens were not commanded to prepare
A gorgeous canopy of golden air;
Nor stoop'd their lamps th' enthroned fires on high;
A single silent star
Came wand'ring from afar,
Gliding uncheck'd and calm along the liquid sky;
The Eastern sages leading on,
As at a kingly throne,
To lay their gold and odors sweet
Before thy infant feet.

The earth and ocean were not hush'd to hear
Bright harmony from ev'ry starry sphere;
Nor at thy presence brake the voice of song
From all the cherub choirs,
And seraphs' burning lyres
Pour'd through the host of Heav'n the charmed clouds along:
One angel troop the strain began,
Of all the race of man,
By simple shepherds heard alone,
That soft Hosanna's tone.

And when thou didst depart, no car of flame
To bear thee hence in lambent radiance came;
Nor visible angels mourn'd with drooping plumes:
Nor didst thou mount on high
From fatal Calvary,
With all thine own redeem'd out-bursting from their tombs.
For thou didst bear away from earth
But one of human birth,
The dying felon by thy side, to be
In paradise with thee.

Nor o'er thy cross the clouds of vengeance break,
A little while the conscious earth did shake
At that foul deed by her fierce children done;
A few dim hours of day,
The world in darkness lay,
Then bask'd in bright repose beneath the cloudless sun;
While thou didst sleep beneath the tomb,
Consenting to thy doom,
Ere yet the white-robed Angel shone
Upon the sealed stone.

And when thou didst arise, thou didst not stand
With devastation in thy red right hand,
Plaguing the guilty city's murtherous crew;
But thou didst haste to meet
Thy mother's coming feet,
And bear the words of peace unto the faithful few:
Then calmly, slowly didst thou rise
Into thy native skies,
Thy human form dissolved on high
In its own radiancy."

NOTE G, Page 134.

This sermon was preached at the commencement of a new term, (half-year, semester), in the University at Halle. The title which Tholuck gives it is, "Why do our resolutions remain so frequently without results." The following is its analysis.

Introduction; discouraging influence of broken resolves; power of Christianity to secure adherence to our resolutions; p. 134. Text; explanation; p. 135. Division; reluctance to humble ourselves; p. 136. Comparison between humility of mind, and the death of the body; reproof of Christians; p. 137. Insincerity, and want of particularity in confessing sin; p. 138. Sins should be confessed before God, and chiefly in view of having been committed against him; distinctive mark of a Christian; meaning of the term religion; p. 139. Humility in view of having sinned against God has great power; importance of secret prayer; p. 140. Our humility should be accompanied with faith; happiness not the first duty of the Christian, but consequent upon faith and love, which are the first duties; p. 141. True humility cheerful, illustrated by examples; p. 142. Conclusion; pp. 142—3.

NOTE H, Page 135.

"Before I was humbled," gedemüthigt. Luther and De Wette give the same translation. The Vulgate also gives 'humiliarer,' and the Septuagint, ταπεινωθῆναι. The word humbled is however, in this place, equivocal; as it may refer the renewed obedience of David, either to previous suffering of body or mind, or to the grace of humility, which was followed by that of faithful obedience. That the former is the right shade of meaning is probable from the facts in David's history (if he wrote this Psalm), and from such parallel passages as Ps. 116: 10. 119: 71, 75, etc. See Gesenius on the word עָנָה, which he translates in this passage by afflictus, depressus, oppressus est; and De Wette, Com. on Ps., p. 522, where he says 'adversity (unglück) had benefitted the poet,' and considers the passage parallel with Ps. 118: 18, 'the Lord hath chastened me sore,' etc. Tholuck's idea of the passage, as developed in the progress of his sermon, includes both the idea of our English translation, that of being 'afflicted,' oppressed with pain, and also that of being penitent in view of sin. His application of the words does not seem to be precisely correct.

NOTE I, Page 143.

The following is the analysis of the fourth sermon.—Introduction; insufficiency of reasons from nature for believing in the immortality of the soul; p. 143. The resurrection of Christ the great argument; proposition of the discourse; text; division; p. 144. Contrast between the trembling spirit of a servant and the praying spirit of a child; case of the Israelites; importance of trembling; p. 145. Prayer is the evidence of our adoption;

what kind of prayer; whence arising; how excited; grounds on which God hears it; illustrations; pp. 146, 147. How is this prayer expressed; nature of prayer; praying without intermission; true mode of prayer illustrated; p. 148. Happy effects of prayer; how a pledge of future life; how is the transformation of the heart from flesh to spirit a pledge; p. 149. Practical appeal; how is the transformation of the heart from spiritual death to spiritual life a pledge of future blessedness; joy of a devoted Christian; pp. 150, 151. Practical appeal to unfaithful and faithful Christians; to sinners; conclusion; pp. 152, 153.

NOTE K, Page 143.

This sermon was preached in the autumn of the year 1833, on the religious festival observed by the Lutheran church in memory of the dead. Hence the allusions to the scenery of nature, etc., in the Introduction. It may be here remarked, that Tholuck disapproves of such papal festivities as these; but avails himself of their observance, as a means, furnished by the prejudices and customs of the people, of exciting a class of sentiments and feelings which the usual services of the sanctuary leave dormant. Many of his brethren defend the observance, as peculiarly fitted to exert a salutary influence on the religious sensibilities, to strengthen the belief in the soul's immortality, and enliven the hope of the resurrection of the dead. Its tendency, however, to be abused, to be celebrated with undue pomp, to be regarded as a means of benefitting the dead, to enthrone mere humanity in the place of the Deity, is admitted by the more considerate of its advocates. For a notice of the solemnity, see Augusti's Handbuch der Christ. Archaeologie, Vol. III. pp. 285, 286.

NOTE L, Page 146.

The expression, 'tasting the powers of the world to come,' is frequently used by Tholuck as equivalent to, 'experiencing the powerful influence of those truths which are connected with eternity and heaven.' The word 'tasted,' in the passage (Heb. 6: 5) from which the expression is taken, appears to be synonymous with 'experienced,' 'fully experienced;' see 1 Pet. 2: 3. Heb. 2: 9. Prov. 31: 18, and other passages; the phrase 'powers of the world to come,' appears to signify the miraculous powers given to the early Christians, and which attested the truth of their religious system. That such is sometimes the meaning of the word *δύναμις*, see Mark 6: 14. Acts 6: 8. 10: 38. Heb. 2: 4. That the word *Αἰών* may denote the new dispensation of Christ, see Robinson's Lex. on the word: 2. b. β. The literal translation then should be, 'miraculous powers of the dispensation which was to come.' See Stuart on Heb., Vol. II. pp. 16, 66, 68, 142—4.

NOTE M, Page 150.

In Tholuck's first Vol. (1834) of sermons, there are two on the 13th chapter of 1 Cor., which exhibit the peculiarities of his feeling on his favorite theme, christian love. The following are extracts.

"What is love? It is the struggling of your soul to give up every thing of value which you have, as a sacrifice to the beloved object, to empty yourself of your own self, and to become full of the being you love, and of all his fullness. You have often seen how earthly affection, which is but an image, and sometimes but a caricature of the everlasting love, seeks to become full of the beloved object; how every sensibility is excited to obtain this fulness; the eye, the ear, the hand, the whole spirit long to be full; yea even the mouth is open to take in the breath of the loved one. Oh ye who hang with all the fibres of your system upon a creature of God, and long after that creature, have you ever longed in the same way after your Creator? Why do you not learn what is the blessedness of the faithful one, when his inmost soul lies spread out in holy prayer before God; when the eye lingers upon the distant, deep, clear heaven, the fairest emblem of the boundlessness, the serenity, and the magnificence of that love which first loved us; when his ear takes in no earthly sound; and only this solitary feeling lives in his soul,—oh thou Eternal One, thou *art!* At that moment he sinks into the Deity;—"I in him, thou in me, let thyself but find me, and I vanish away within thee." Not that by such an affectionate surrender to the Eternal One, the Christian's personal identity ceases; no, his spirit is rightly manifested and developed rather, by his reception of this everlasting, unfolding, illuminating and enlivening power of love." pp. 123, 124.

After saying that at death faith shall pass away into vision, and with it hope; for there shall then be no more a future, but there shall be an eternal present, he proceeds,—"But love shall remain. Yea, not only shall it remain, but the narrow brook which in this life flowed from deeply hidden fountains, will in that life become a wide stream. Here love could be preserved only while the eye of faith held the invisible world directly before itself. Try it, shut for an instant this internal eye, look at nothing but the visible world, and thou wilt love only what thou seest. Ah, why dost thou hang solely upon the creatures of earth, and long after them; why but because thine eye of faith is not open, and thou seest not the invisible glory of the Father's image? Couldst thou see this, thou must love it also: to see the invisible and to love him is the same thing. But when there shall be no more need of this intellectual exertion, when the thick cloud of the earthly vale shall no longer press upon the eye of faith, when the very object in which we here faintly believe, shall stand constantly before our vision, oh how easy will it then be to love. The death of the believer shall be the death also of his faith and hope, but it shall be the resurrection hour of his love.

This is the reason which the apostle gives us, why among the first three virtues, charity stands the very first. Yet seeing that it will remain forever, it exhibits itself also in another relation as the first of the virtues. Love is the state of mind in which faith is produced, and in which it is perfected.

First, it is the state in which faith is produced. Let me recal your attention to what has been previously advanced, that as all matter is attracted

by a mysterious power to its central point, so likewise in the realm of spirits there is a resistless power, the power of love, which attracts to the Father all spirits which have come forth from him. In every heart of man even the darkest, there lies hidden under a thousand coverings of night a holy seed of love toward God. (See Bibl. Repository, Vol. VIII. pp. 327, 328). What is it that allows you to find no rest in any of the inclinations of ordinary life? What is it that allows you no repose anywhere on the bosom of created nature? What is it that leaves you constantly to exclaim, oh I must have something further by which my soul may be satisfied?—Brother, this is the holy seed of love to God, which is swelling within thee, and will force its way through all the coverings of night. Thou knowest not what thou seekest, but yet thou dost seek with inextinguishable thirst. Some prophet-voices sound out to thee, and preach of an everlasting good in which thy soul can repose. This longing of thy soul urgeth thee to an act of faith; for alas the hungry man *must* believe that there is bread for him. Lo, thine undeveloped love toward the Source of all good becometh in this way, the very state of mind, which causeth thee to believe in things invisible. And when the dark impulse of thy love hath given to thee an assurance that there *must* be a kingdom of the spirit and of the truth, in which thou canst find repose, oh then he who is the King of the land of truth, needeth but to step before thine eyes, and with the assurance of faith thou fallest down before his feet. Wherever there is an assurance, that there must be a land of truth which maketh blessed, there faith in the King of that land is a very easy act. Behold, in this undeveloped love is illustrated that great sentiment, which may have been already often repeated to you.—'The things that belong to men, must be understood in order that they may be loved; the things that belong to God, must be loved in order that they may be understood.' (These words are from Paschal.)

But, secondly, faith is also perfected in love. The greater the certainty of the object of our affection, so much the more heartfelt is our surrender to it; the more heartfelt our surrender, so much the richer is our experience; the richer our experience, so much the more vivid is the certainty of the object. Thus you see in the aged disciples of the Lord, to whom an experience of seventy years has made certain what they believed, how familiar they are with invisible things, as familiar as if these things lay before their eyes; how they scarcely need to say, 'I believe,' but have almost the certainty of vision. Yea more, that elevated passage of the apostle is fulfilled in them;—'There is reflected from us, with unveiled face, the glory of the Lord, and we are transformed into the same image from one glory to another, as by the Spirit of the Lord.' Thou wert sitting in a dark dungeon under the earth, and in thy heart was an inclination for the light. This inclination was a prophecy for thee, that there must be a light; and thou didst believe that there was one, even before its mild shining came to thine eyes. Thus love created fa h. Through a small chink there came into thy dungeon messengers from the mild light; and they greeted thee as a friend; thou gavest thyself up to them, and the

reception of these few rays made thy certainty so much the stronger that there must be a sun. Thus faith is perfected in love. Thou shalt one day come forth from the dark dungeon, the full sun shall pour forth all its beams upon thy face; with all thy sensibilities thou shalt cherish this light within thee; thou shalt have full experience how this light is the light of life. Thy perfect experience in love will perfect thy faith. And this perfection of faith will also be the end of it; for, in its perfection, it will vanish away as faith, and will pass into vision, just as the blossoms disappear in the fruit." pp. 128—131.

NOTE N, Page 150.

"What is it, but a plan for the elevation of human nature to a likeness with God?" The literal translation would be, what is it other than a deification (eine Vergöttlichung) of the human nature according to the image of Jesus Christ. The employment of such bold phraseology would be defended by Tholuck, by a reference to such passages as 2 Pet. 1: 4. Heb. 3: 14. 6: 4. John 17: 21—23. 1 Cor. 6: 9, and numerous others.

NOTE O, Page 151.

The words of Inspiration, to which reference is here made, are connected so intimately with the whole course of reasoning on pages 149—152, that some remarks on these words, and on the train of argument to which they give rise, here and in other passages of Tholuck, may not be inappropriate. It is a course of refined reasoning to which Tholuck seems rather peculiarly attached. It is composed of such elementary principles as these: What a reasonable being commences he will continue; a partial fulfilment of a promise indicates its complete fulfilment; the desires that God has implanted within us are an indication that he will gratify them; the agreement of witnesses with each other is an evidence of the veracity of each of them; etc.

The following is the train of reasoning and of appeal to Christian sentiment, which Tholuck frequently pursues. He supposes that our Saviour in John 5: 21—29 speaks first, verse 21, of both resurrections, the spiritual and the physical; then, verses 22, 24, 25, of the spiritual resurrection alone, and afterward, verses 28, 29, of the physical alone. Tholuck represents conversion as the beginning of the resurrection era, as the first step of that process which is terminated by the raising of the body from the grave,—see Rom. 8: 10, 11; and sees therefore a peculiar propriety in our Saviour's combining, in his discourse, allusions to the beginning and the end of this resuscitative agency of God. He says, that to one who has been made a partaker of the first, i. e. the spiritual resurrection, 'there is no difference in point of fact between this world and the world to come;' such an one is regarded by God 'as glorified for all eternity, Rom. 8: 30;' he has already received *the* life, which is to be perfected in heaven and to constitute heaven John 4: 14. 6: 58;—he is not to pass from death to life, for this he has done, 1 John 3: 14, but only from a lower to a higher degree of life. Christ de-

clares then, John 5: 25, that under the preaching of the Gospel, sinners 'shall hear the voice of the Son of God,' i. e. obtain an internal perception or apprehension of the truth; and under the influence of the truth thus apprehended the dead "shall live," i. e. sinners shall be converted, translated from the kingdom of death to that of life. Having already been thus translated from death to life, at the moment of conversion, they have already obtained heaven, not indeed in its fulness but in its essential characteristic. They are sure of eternal life, because they are even conscious of it as already commenced in their souls. The prediction that they shall have life is already in part fulfilled, and thereby warrants the expectation of an entire fulfilment. There is an exact coincidence between the testimony of Scripture on the subject of eternal life and the testimony of the Christian's feeling; and the coincidence of the two indicates the credibility of the scriptural promises. As the Christian feels the promised life in his own soul even now, he instinctively expects, without evidence to the contrary, that this life will continue, just as he expects, without evidence to the contrary, that the laws of the universe will continue. These seem to be the elementary principles of the second argument; that on pp. 150—152.

The first argument, that on pp. 149, 150, is of the same character. It has had an influence on many minds which denied its logical authority. It is an appeal to a constitutional feeling, which cannot be reasoned away more than it can be excited by reasoning. As the longing after immortality has inspired many a heathen with a strong hope for it, and expectation of it, so the consciousness of an impatience to find rest in God, and of an inability to find rest out of God, the strong drawing forth of the affections toward him, the desire of an intimacy, a oneness with him, has itself caused many a Christian to expect the blessedness that was so intensely craved. Did God implant this desire only to disappoint it? See this principle beautifully illustrated in Tholuck's Sermons, Vol. I. p. 31. And again, the harmony between the *spiritual* views of the renewed man and the doctrines of the Gospel, between his *spiritual* feelings and the promises of the Gospel, is in itself an argument in favor of the fulfilment of those promises,—as the coincidence of two distinct testimonies is an independent argument for the correctness of each of them. This spirituality of emotion is also felt to be a *specimen* of what is promised, the first fruits of the harvest, a *pledge* that the divine revelation will not disappoint the believer. It is felt to be so, even when the feeling cannot be defended by any logical formula. Every child knows the force of the argument derived from an 'earnest,' a 'foretaste.' When favors are promised him and he actually receives some of them, he feels renewed confidence in the sincerity of the whole promise. When great preparations are made, he anticipates some correspondent results.

These elementary principles, when examined one by one, do not seem so logically convincing, as they are *felt* to be when exhibited collectively in an argument. See the application of some of them in Rom. 5: 5—11. Phil. 1: 6. 2 Cor. 1: 22. 5: 5. Gal. 1: 13, 14.

NOTE P, Page 153.

Appended to the volume containing this sermon, is one of the hymns which was sung, when the sermon was delivered; and appended to the hymn is the following note. "This is the second time that this hymn has been sung at the University church-service, to the very excellent tune composed by the music-director Mr. Naue, to whose interested zeal the liturgical part of divine worship is on all occasions very much indebted. The impression, especially that which was made by the last words, as sung by the University-choir alone, will be forgotten by no one." p. 173. An American clergyman, present on the occasion, says, "It was impossible to refrain from tears, when at the seventh stanza, all the trumpets ceased, and the choir, accompanied by a softened tone of the organ, sung these touching lines, 'Quid sum miser tunc dicturus?" etc. The hymn referred to is part of the Catholic requiem, or mass for the souls of the dead. It is the "Dies Irae," composed by Thomas von Celano, a Minorite, about the year 1250. It has been set to music by Mozart, and several other composers, and has been translated into several different languages. Goethe has introduced a few stanzas of it into his Faust; and Scott, a few into his Lay of the Last Minstrel, p. 150, Bost. Ed., see Church Ps. Hymn 629. But no translation has equalled or can equal the original Latin. As this is not accessible to the mass of readers, it is given below, accompanied with the best literal translation of it into English, which we have seen. See Christian Observer, Vol. XXVI, p. 26.

Dies iræ, dies illa	On that great, that awful day,
Solvet sæclum in favilla,	This vain world shall pass away.
Teste David cum Sibylla.	Thus the Sybil sung of old;
	Thus hath holy David told.
Quantus tremor est futurus,	There shall be a deadly fear
Quando Judex est venturus,	When the Avenger shall appear,
Cuncta striete discussurus!	And, unveiled before his eye,
	All the works of man shall lie!
Tuba mirum spargens sonum,	
Per sepulchra regionum,	Hark! to the great trumpet's tones,
Coget omnes ante thronum.	Pealing o'er the place of bones.
	Hark! it waketh from their bed
Mors stupebit, et natura,	All the nations of the dead,
Cum resurget creatura,	In a countless throng to meet
Judicanti responsura.	At the eternal judgment seat.
	Nature sickens with dismay:
Liber scriptus proferetur,	Death may not retain his prey;
In quo totum continetur,	And before the Maker stand
Unde mundus judicetur.	All the creatures of his hand.

Judex ergo cum sedebit,
Quidquid latet apparebit,
Nil inultum remanebit.

The great book shall be unfurled,
Whereby God shall judge the world:
What was distant shall be near;
What was hidden shall be clear.

Quid sum miser tunc dicturus,
Quem patronum rogaturus,
Cum vix justus sit securus?

To what shelter shall I fly?
To what guardian shall I cry?
Oh in that destroying hour,

Rex tremendæ majestatis,
Qui salvandos salvas gratis,
Salva me, Fons pietatis.

Source of goodness, Source of power,
Show thou, of thine own free grace,
Help unto a helpless race.

Recordare, Jesu pie,
Quod sum causa tuæ viæ
Ne me perdas illa die.

Though I plead not at thy throne
Aught that I for thee have done,
Do not thou unmindful be
Of what thou hast borne for me;

Quærens me, sedisti lassus,
Redemisti crucem passus:
Tantus labor non sit cassus.

Of the wandering, of the scorn,
Of the scourge, and of the thorn.

Juste judex ultionis,
Donum fac remissionis,
Ante diem rationis.

Jesus, hast thou borne the pain;
And hath all been borne in vain?
Shall thy vengeance smite the head
For whose ransom thou hast bled?
Thou whose dying blessing gave
Glory to a guilty slave;

Ingemisco tanquam reus,
Culpa rubet vultus meus:
Supplicanti parce, Deus.

Thou who from the crew unclean
Didst release the Magdalene;
Shall not mercy vast and free
Evermore be found in thee?

Qui Mariam absolvisti,
Et latronem exaudisti,
Mihi quoque spem dedisti.

Father, turn on me thine eyes:
See my blushes, hear my cries;

Preces meæ non sunt dignæ,
Sed tu, bone, fac benigne,
Ne perenni cremer igne!

Faint though be the prayers I make,
Save me, for thy mercy's sake,
From the torments of thine ire,
From the worm and from the fire;

Inter oves locum præsta,
Et ab hædis me sequestra,
Statuens in parte dextra.

Fold me with the sheep that stand
Pure and safe at thy right hand.
Hear thy guilty child implore thee,
Rolling in the dust before thee.

Confutatis maledictis,
Flammis acribus addictis,
Voca me cum benedictis.

Oh the horrors of the day
When this frame of sinful clay,
Starting from its burial place,
Must behold thee face to face.

Oro tristis, et acclinis,
Cor contritum quasi cinis:
Gere curam mei finis.

Hear and pity; hear and aid;
Spare the creatures thou hast made.
Mercy, mercy! save, forgive;
Or who shall look on Thee and live?

Lacrymosa die illa
Qua resurget ex favilla,
Judicandus homo reus,
Huic ergo parce, Deus.

NOTE Q, Page 154.

This discourse Tholuck in his index calls a homily. His reviewer however in the Stud. und Krit., Vol. VIII. p. 245, objects to this designation; because the sermon is as regular and strictly logical in its plan as any other, and the main idea of a homily as distinct from a sermon, is that it embraces a variety of dissimilar trains of thought, which though loosely connected are yet reduced into some unity of arrangement. The analysis is as follows.

Text; division; p. 154. First, the reproaches and indignities which Christ suffered, are a means of illustrating his character, and an argument for the elevating truth, that God's providence and government are universal; pp. 154, 155. Secondly, the faith which the penitent thief exercised in Christ, at the time of Christ's lowest humiliation, is a reproof to us for our want of faith, at the time of Christ's exaltation; pp. 156, 157, 158. Causes and process of the malefactor's faith; p. 157. Peculiar reasons for faith in modern times; pp. 157, 158. Thirdly, the mode in which the repentance of a sinner at the end of life is liable to be abused by his survivors; p. 158. Folly of deferring repentance to a future period; p. 159. Fourthly, the mercy of God in pardoning a sinner at the termination of a wicked life, is a source of rich consolation, p. 160. The sad state of one, who has passed all hope of salvation; illustrates by contrast the happy state of those who still enjoy opportunities for obtaining heaven; pp. 160, 161. Conclusion; p. 161.

NOTE R, Page 158.

Perhaps there is no one particular, in which the discourses of Tholuck appear to be more happily conformed to the apostolical standard, than in their frequent and rich development of the nature and value of *faith*. This grace they everywhere exhibit as a peculiarity of evangelical religion. It is to be feared that its distinctive nature is too much overlooked in the American pulpit; and that it is too often merged into the generic duty of obedience, or love to God. A dignified and distinguishing characteristic of evangelical religion is thus neglected; and the variety of several specific duties is sacrificed to the monotony of a single general one. The following are a few of Tholuck's many illustrations of Christian faith.

"The faith of the Holy Scriptures is an undoubted certainty of that which man cannot see. We have five senses, by which the visible world comes before our observation. Faith is a new sense, a new eye, by which the *invisible* world comes before our observation. Whoever has this eye of faith walks among objects distinctly perceived by him, but unperceived by others. The mind that has faith understands what the Christmas morning is, and the cradle with the child of God; what the Easter morning is, with the Prince of life who has overcome death; what the Ascension morning is, with

the Captain of our salvation, elevated to the right hand of the Father, so that he may prepare a place for us; what the opened heaven is, and the glory of the throne of God, with the thousand of thousands of his holy angels; what the rent veil of the abyss is, and the uncovered deep, where the worm gnaws that never dies. The world say of such a man, he is a fanatic; will you be angry with them for saying so? You cannot—you cannot be angry with the blind man because he does not see what you see. But truly they should not deny, that there is another sense, besides those five senses of which they are conscious—a sense of which John testifies, 'He hath given unto us a faculty that we should discern him who is true:' 1 John 5: 20. You perceive then how rich you are made by faith. You often say, 'ah poor blind men! over the heaven and upon the earth is so great glory spread out, and you can perceive none of it,—ah, by the whole world are you poorer than we." Vol. 1. p. 120.

"The certainty which, through faith, we now have of the invisible world, is a certainty that stands opposed to every thing lying before our visual sense. The chain of cause and effect pervades the immensity of all created things and seems to give a reason and ground for every event that occurs. But you must believe that the last link of this chain hangs upon the invisible finger of the Father of Jesus Christ; and that it is his invisible breath which sets all the links in motion. As kings and lords of destiny, the children of men seem to walk over the earth; according to his own mere pleasure, the insolent monarch hurls thousands into the abyss of wretchedness; unconstrained, the father of lies moves with his children through the world, and scatters his seeds of tares by day as well as by night; and yet thou shouldst have faith, that from every head and every hand an invisible cord goeth up to the clouds, and that all these cords run together into the hand of eternal wisdom and righteousness; thou shouldst believe, that above all this lamentation and confusion and strife a king sitteth enthroned, who can say at any instant to the swelling waves, 'thus far and no farther.' Here thou beholdest him, who had not where he might lay his head; and thou must have faith that the reins of the government of the world lie in his perforated hand. Here thou beholdest the Son of man, whom human beings smite in the face, and upon whose sacred head they press the crown of thorns, and thou must believe that under his unsightly apparel the thunders of heaven repose. Thou seest that the disciples of him who promised to his own, that they should judge the angels, wander over the earth like other children of earth, their brow covered with sweat, and the tear in their eye; and thou must believe with full assurance, that if we suffer with him, so shall we also reign with him. The course of human events is a dark enigma of syllables; one and another syllable of it thou mayest solve, but the whole word no one can decipher. How hard it is for the eye, upon which presses the cloud of this earthly vale, to raise itself upward; oh how often is poor man, who ought to be superior to all finite things, weary even with holy services! This kind of assurance, which believers have of the upper world, shall one day cease. What thou hast believed, thou shalt one day see: as thou hast expected so shall be the actual fact.—Thou shalt see

how all the strings from all hearts and all heads run together into one heavenly hand; thou shalt see the Holy One of God, who here wore the crown of thorns, wear the crown of heaven; thou shalt see those, who sowed with tears, reap and bind their sheaves with joy; thou shalt see those who had not where they might lay their head, sitting at the royal wedding feast, at the right and the left of the Son of man. As the poet says, "The inward life of the Christian is resplendent, although its splendor is veiled by his earthly condition. What the King of heaven hath given to him, is known to no one but himself. What no one can feel, what no one can touch, embellishes his enlightened mind, and raises it to a God-like dignity." Vol. I. pp. 125, 6, 7.

Faith and hope and charity, the chief of the Christian virtues "make a concord of three tones, which exhibits an analogy to the divine Three in One. Faith, which is the firm conviction respecting that whole realm which lies above the senses, corresponds with the original ground of the Godhead, from which every thing has proceeded; that is, with the Father. Hope corresponds with the Holy Ghost, who will one day conduct everything within us to its completion. Love corresponds with him, by whom and in whom the original occult ground of the Godhead, with its whole fulness, has come near unto men and through all eternity will communicate itself to them. So likewise among the apostles, each tone of this holy concord has found its own representative. Paul is the preacher of faith, John is the preacher of love, and Peter in the first of his Epistles is the preacher of hope. All however without distinction, Peter and James not excepted, give the chief praise to love." Vol. I. p. 124.

NOTE S, Page 161.

This discourse also Tholuck denominates a homily; though the arrangement of its thoughts is synthetic, and more conformed to the rules for a sermon, than that of the majority of his discourses: see Stud. und Krit., Vol. VIII. p. 245.

The above-named reviewer of Tholuck's sermons cites the passage on pp. 164, 5, beginning with 'The Holy, the Unknown,' ending with 'everlasting life,' as a distinctive illustration of our author's style. The following is the analysis of this discourse.

Introduction; comparison between the state of the anxious, and that of the careless sinner; pp. 161, 2. Text; does God or man take the first step in the renovation of the heart; p. 162. Division; how does God display himself to man in the work of creation; happiness of living with the heart-felt recognition, misery of living without such a recognition of the creating and preserving love of God; pp. 163, 4. God becomes intelligible in Christ; our own characters also become intelligible in him; pp. 164, 5. Necessity of the Spirit's influences; nearness of the Spirit to man; utility of his instructions; p. 166. The will of man must coöperate with the agency of the Spirit; importance of solitary meditation on the love

of God; p. 167. Importance of studying the Bible, especially the history of Christ; p. 168. Importance of cherishing the influences of the Spirit; of praying to the Spirit; pp. 168, 9. Reflex influence of supplication upon the heart of the suppliant; exhortation to prayer as a means of exciting the proper spirit of prayer; p. 169. Conclusion; p. 170.

NOTE T, Page 162.

One object in translating this discourse has been to exhibit the manner in which Tholuck, in unison with other evangelical divines on the continent, exhorts the unregenerate to perform certain duties, which are not only anterior to, but conditions of the renovating influence of the Spirit. It is common to charge the American divines, who recommend 'unregenerate doings,' with recommending a sinful course of effort as essential to subsequent holiness. But the peculiar philosophy of Tholuck must exempt him from the charge of exhorting to sin, as a means of good. His philosophy is here styled peculiar, not in its relation to that of his own countrymen, nor to that of some evangelical divines in Great Britain, Jeremy Taylor for example, nor to that of many of the Fathers in the Latin and the Greek church; for these have adopted the same philosophy: but it is styled peculiar, in its relation to the prevailing philosophy of American divines. Tholuck supposes, that the deep depravity of our race does not preclude the existence of good inclinations in the heart, but rather that it consists in the entire subjugation of these good inclinations to the evil; that regeneration is the restoring of the rightful authority and predominance to the good over the evil; that the work of regeneration is performed by the Spirit in compliance with the desires and yearnings of the good principle, as it struggles under the oppression of the bad; and that the unregenerate, overpowered sinner is bound to do all that in the nature of the case he can do, that is, contend against the principle which enslaves him, and cry for deliverance to that Power which will re-organize the inner man, and fortify the good inclinations against the evil. These unregenerate strugglings are of course not the immediate condition of eternal life, but of the commencement of the spiritual life; they are not saving acts, but pre-requisite to such as are saving; they are not sinful, neither are they neutral; they are positively good, and pleasing to Jehovah, and yet are destitute of that 'new life,' that mysterious 'new principle,' which is the creation of the Spirit alone, and which, in the established economy of grace, is the indispensable condition of future blessedness. 'Christ teaches,' says Tholuck, 'that there is indeed a truth lying at the base of deism, inasmuch as deism maintains that there is in the heart of man a divine voice, or revelation implanted by God.—that there is something there akin to God;' 'instead of a will, single and in unison with the divine will, man has a *divided* volition, which acts feebly in concert with God, but whose strongest impulses are selfish and arbitrary;' 'when with firm decision conscience holds rigorous duty up to man, there is a secret stirring which moves him to its performance,

but an unbridled lust, which lies at its side, starts up like a Cyclop, awaking from his sleep and demanding gratification;' 'my higher I, (my feeble inclination of the heart toward God), 'my proper I (it is here acknowledged that the root of man is God-like, that evil is not the substance of his being), is on the side of the divine law, so that the evil I do is done by that overpowering, blind impulse within me, which as a trespasser has obtruded itself into my God-like nature;' 'I *will* always to do good (according to the self-denying, God-like but feebler inclination of my will), but I am not able,' 'human nature is a frightful region of night, over which, as over the plains of Baku, low sacred flames of fire run;' 'the drawing of the Father, spoken of in John 6: 44, consists in the divine voice of the soul, which becomes audible in the longing after a union with God;' 'it depends upon the determination of the will, whether this drawing becomes effectual;' 'in the words of Theophylact, As the magnet does not attract everything, but only iron, so there must be in man a certain state of mind, (that is, he must not suppress the divine incitements within), if the attractions of God are to be efficacious.'

From the point of observation furnished by our philosophy, such remarks as the preceding may appear to some, inconsistent with the doctrines of our natural and entire depravity, and our complete dependence upon the gracious influences of the Spirit. But it is the prerogative of a narrow and ungenerous mind, to strive to press the free-hearted reasonings of such a man as Tholuck into the mould of a philosophy, which, however true, he unhappily discards, and which, though important is not essential, as the writings of Tholuck everywhere evince, to the vitality and elastic power of the evangelical system.

NOTE U, Page 162.

The sermon immediately preceding this in the first of Tholuck's volumes, is on the Omnipresence of God, from Jeremiah 23: 23, Am I not a God who is near, and not a God who is afar off? etc. The object is to show, first, what the Scriptures teach concerning the omnipresence of God, and secondly, what feelings are excited by this doctrine, first, in the bosom of the regenerate, and secondly, in the bosom of the unregenerate. Under the first general division are several ideas, which are here introduced, as intimately connected with the sermon to which this note refers, and as illustrating some of the peculiarities of Tholuck's habit of thought.

"What does the Holy Scripture teach us concerning the divine omnipresence? A dark consciousness of this truth has gone through all the inhabitants of the heathen world. They indeed did not suppose themselves to be surrounded, on all sides, by the Being before whom their knees bowed, and who, in his external manifestations, was at all times equally near them. From the deep vale they climbed to the mountain top, that they might approach nearer to the all-cherishing Power, which holds and conducts the universe. They hastened from their homes to the distant holy places, where

the heaven bends down lower to the suppliant. And yet none the less on this account did a dark consciousness say to them, that he whom they sought was with them, even before they went out after him. In the power of conscience, have all the inhabitants of the earth paid homage to the omnipresent God. Deep in the breast is it planted, that inexplicable power—a spirit so mild, so dim-sighted, so delicate, which can be reduced to silence so easily; and yet again, a power which whenever it raises its menacing finger, prostrates the affrighted mortal upon the earth. In your own breast, in that which you call your inmost me, it has established its throne, and still it accosts you from that same throne with a *Thou*, and you must serve it. How did that celestial power find its way into your inward nature? What a wonder, that in this secret place of the bosom of all men who dwell on the earth, the mystery of the omnipresent God should have been foreboded and felt! Oh that those of you, whose ear is closed to the preaching of the Holy Scriptures, might at least listen to those clear voices, which in the minstrels of the ancient Pagan world, have testified prophetically concerning the power of conscience, as of the omnipresent God; 'concerning those primeval laws, as an old poet of Greece calls them, which have come down from on high, have been proclaimed from the firmament of heaven, which no frail human nature has devised, and which oblivion will never bury, in which a great God rules, whose years never fail.' Even the sacred Scriptures, my worshipping friends, instruct us to seek the omnipresent Deity, first, within the sanctuary of our own bosom. Is it not the consciousness of the inward presence of Jehovah, which led the Psalmist to say, Whither shall I flee from thy Spirit? etc. Ps. 139: 7—10. It was the Spirit, the face of Jehovah, which accompanied the Psalmist in all places; he was conscious of this Spirit abiding within him, whether he should ascend toward heaven, or make his bed in hell; this Spirit who reproveth men for sin, this Divine countenance which looketh upon men with flaming eyes, went with the Psalmist wherever he went.—When the apostle enters Athens, he cannot refer, as he generally does, to that word of God, which Israel has on its roll of parchment; but he refers to a yet more ancient word of God, within the human breast. He announces that Jehovah has made men, in order that they may seek after him and find him, and indeed he is not far from every one of us. To find the Deity, after whom they were hastening to and fro over all the earth, after whom they had stretched out their hands with longing desire upon the heights of the mountains, he directs them to their own bosom, where God is present without limitation of space and time. To what else refers that remarkable, mysterious declaration of the Lord, that 'whoso heareth and learneth of the Father cometh unto me;' (that is, whoso attendeth to the voice speaking within him, which is the voice of the present God, is united to God; see Tholuck on John 6: 45.) Oh that the beloved Father would endue me with grace, that I may rightly apply to your hearts this one passage at least, a passage so rich in meaning. Oh man, man! how highly honored art thou, that he, who hath made heaven and

earth will, within thee, instruct thee concerning himself. I pray you, let no one go to day from this house of God, without hearing it sounding incessantly in his spirit, Whoso heareth and learneth of the Father, the same cometh to me. According to this word of the Lord, there is an altar of divine revelation in every breast of man; a sacred ark of the covenant in which lies the law of God, written with characters that cannot be obliterated, and over which the Holy One of Israel sitteth enthroned, and speaketh to men, and pointeth them to the Son of his love, where the grieved ones are refreshed." Vol. 1. pp. 61—64.

"The heart, which is dead to divine truth, is one to which divine truth is also dead. But the truth of God's omnipresence is such, that no mind, at least in our christian community, is entirely dead to it. There may perhaps be some among us, who declare with the mere lips, that they know nothing of the Omnipresent One, because they do not see him with their corporeal eyes, and cannot touch him with their hands. It is with them as with those fools, who do not believe in the existence of the air around them, because they do not see it with their eyes, and cannot grasp it with their hands;—but let the strong wind awake, and the invisible Power is suddenly invested with a form before their eyes! let the strong wind awake, and the invisible Being assumes a form before the atheist; and oh! it is a form so mighty and so true, that everything, which in the visible world, had previously appeared to him as a reality, now appears as a shadow; and over against every shadow, there will stand before his soul nought but this solitary truth,—there is a God. Man has power to forget only, but not to disbelieve that there is a Being every where present. Thus the hundreds and the thousands, who wander over the earth, and are content to sport in the radiance of the material sun, have forgotten him. But as the wretched one, whom to-morrow's sun-rising wakes to the gallows, slumbers for a while in forgetfulness, but all on a sudden rouses up, at the striking of the death-clock; so the man who forgets God, suddenly awakes, as the voice all at once strikes upon his ear,—'Man! I, the Holy One of Israel, *am*." Vol. 1. pp. 67, 68.

"There is no contradiction between the truth that God cannot be contained by the whole heaven and earth, and the truth that the sanctuary is the place where he dwells in an especial manner. 'Draw near to me, and I will draw near to you.'—And again, 'In the place where ye shall seek me, I will be found.' Is not now the house of God the place where men first approach him, where they seek him? Who knows but there are some, even in this assembly, who have let the whole week pass away without once seeking their Lord in the little chamber. Here you have come together with minds undistracted; here has it now become still around you; yea here, the devotion which you see in the assembly and which one reads in the features of another, awakens your sluggish spirits. Should not God now come near unto you? Yea, though you do not make a temple of your little chamber, yet the house of God is the temple, where he may in a peculiar sense be approached.

"Further, the Bible speaks of our God, as the God who is in heaven. Yet even on earth does it hold true, that 'in the place where ye seek me, I will be found.' Why do we pray, 'Thy will be done, as in heaven so likewise upon earth;' save that here upon the earth sin abides and misery, but in that other world those holy spirits dwell, who live forever in that state of innocence and adoration of God, in which they were created; save also that those higher realms are peculiarly a temple of God, in which he dwells as he does nowhere else. But at the same time, throughout this description, it may be represented to man and made comprehensible even to the child, that he who, by his almighty word, sustains and conducts the earth and every thing therein, is himself elevated above its narrowness and defilement,—pure and unapproachable, even as those shining hosts of stars under whose pavement the clouds gather.—A little child standing under the heaven bright with stars, once asked its mother,—'Dear mother, are those yonder the open places, which the glory of God shines through?' In this way is the splendor of the Divine presence everywhere diffused, and yet at certain places it bursts out with especial brightness." Vol. I. pp. 64—66.

NOTE V, Page 164.

As might be expected from one of so poetical a fancy, Tholuck is fond of drawing religious instruction from the works of nature. There is something peculiarly intellectual in his mode of describing these works. The following is from his first volume.

"Who can stand amid the scenes of nature on a flowery morning of spring, or in the starry night, without hearing the rush of that stream of life, which from Orion flows down to the very heart of the earth? If thou perceive no other sound but that of the dark rushing of an unknown stream, in which thou thyself art but a single small wave,—tell me, where is thy courage?—art thou not seized with a shuddering? Oh I have often had, often even in early youth have I been forced to have a foreboding of an unlimited Power pervading the whole world, and I had no name by which I could designate this Power, nor could I obtain sure ground for a conviction, that it was a Power of holiness and of love!—But to know, yea not barely to know, but to believe with a full heart, and on the authority of him whose word is itself a pledge,—to believe that this stream is one of love and holiness, that it flows forth from the heart of him, who has given his only begotten Son for the life of the world,—oh how entirely different a hue does this belief give to our faith in the universal presence of the Deity." p. 67.

The first sermon in Tholuck's fourth volume is on "the wonders of the grace of God in the height and in the deep;" from Ps. 8: 3, 4. He says in his preface, that the sermon is but an 'echo of one contained in Dr. Chalmers's excellent Astronomico-theological work.' The following extract will show the tenderness and pious simplicity of Tholuck's feeling in view of the grand and majestic in nature.

"When now we fit out the eye with instruments, when science comes to

our help with her observations and reckonings, how vastly do the wonders of heaven increase. The nebulae are discovered to be constellations, and each of the constellations proves to be a system of suns, and of such nebulae the aided eye has already numbered four thousand. The observer sees a hundred and sixteen thousand stars in the milky way, hastening across the disc of his telescope within a quarter of an hour. One of the sun's rays, arriving at our earth in eight minutes, must travel more than six years through lonely space, if it would arrive at Sirius. And in this unlimited multiplicity of movements, what an undeviating order, what a rigid law, that never disappoints the calculating pen of a human observer! Yea even those wandering stars, which seem to break open their path according to their own choice, are not they also suspended from the arm of the Highest, and does he not lead them on, so that even *their* path may be accurately measured by observing mortals?—Worm of the dust as I am, I am amazed, I tremble, I adore; but if I have no other theatre of his greatness and of his grace to look upon, but that in those unmeasured distances, then does my heart despond and break. Him who hath spread out his throne over immensity my narrow mind cannot comprehend. If I can behold no other spectacle for the display of his benevolence than that immeasurable one, then I may call him the Infinite, but the name Father dies upon my lips. It is always imagined to be a very natural thing for this word Father to flow forth from the heart of man to his lips; but when we place ourselves in full view of the infinity of the worlds of God, is it to be wondered at, that the name dies away abashed upon our tongue?

"Great are the wonders of Jehovah in the height above us; and if we direct our eyes to this height alone, we shall necessarily despond. Before such an immeasurable expansion, what is this little earth? And if with all the living beings who walk abroad upon it, it should vanish into nothing, what notice would those worlds take of its disappearance? It would be to them as if a small sparkling star had ceased its glistening in their horizon. If this earth should pass away, what would that majestic infinity of worlds lose in splendor? Just what the forest loses in its magnificence, when a leaf shaken by the storm falls down.—Beloved, the greatness of God oppresses our heart, when we look only at the wonders above; and the words of astonished and humble thankfulness, become also the words of doubt, 'What is man that thou art mindful of him!' Therefore let us hasten away, that our heart, in a narrow space, may come to itself again; that we in the Infinite may find again our Father.—The more the telescope opens before us a view into the immensity above, so much the more may it take away our assurance, that he who is occupied in those illimitable spaces, will be found in the same activity here upon the earth. But you must acknowledge, that no small part of the brightness of his glory is taken away, if he has called into existence so many worlds, that his sustaining and providing power cannot keep equal pace with his creating; if the eye which guides the four thousand nebulae cannot discern the falling tear that is shed on this little earth. But it is not so, beloved! No sooner was the telescope

invented to the fostering of human doubt, than another instrument, the microscope, was invented to the removal of that doubt: and the infinity of God, thou findest it again in every flying straw, and in every grain of mustard seed. Is it not the same instrument, which discovers to us, on every leaf of the forest, whole races and families of a world of joyous life; which opens to our view upon the wing of a fly a scene of wonders surpassing everything produced by the industry and art of man? Yea beloved, I put to you the bold quere.—Where is God the greater, in the great things, or in the small, of his creation? in the immeasurable of the earth, or in the infinite of the heavens?—If thus, through all visible nature there is seen this majestic, manifold and inexhaustibly rich variety; if the flying straw and the wing of the smallest insect is a theatre of God's wonderful works, how much greater care must he have bestowed upon man!

"Differing from all other natures, there steps before us a form erect, looking toward heaven; and in that noble form a spirit, which may mount on the wing of thought from earth to the skies, and come back again from the skies to earth. Yet ah! what do I see?—That form which is made to walk through life with heaven in its eye, it does not even look toward heaven; and that spirit, which in its meditation may turn from earth to heaven, and back again from heaven to earth, it brings down no sure intelligence! I ask, 'Wanderer, whither? Wanderer, whence?' But there comes to my ear the answer, 'I know not, but I see the heaven full of stars and the heart of man full of foreboding.'—Yea, foreboding, longing, this is the only relic which man has saved from the great apostasy, in which he lost the primitive nobleness of his nature. And all his wise men and learned men, they can excite this longing still more keenly, but they can never satisfy it. And shall it actually remain unsatisfied? No. He who hath made the heart with such ceaseless cravings, he will appease them, he will appease these cravings in the kingdom of grace; and the wonders in the kingdom of his grace are even greater than those in the kingdom of nature." Vol. IV. pp. 3—7.

NOTE W, Page 167.

The paragraph to which this note refers, alludes to several topics, which Tholuck very frequently introduces into his sermons. He often mourns over the degeneracy of the present age, and yet indulges no morbid and sickly distrust in the future prospects of the church: see in particular Vol. II. pp. 226—7. He often insists on the importance of secret meditation, of retirement from the world, and yet does not encourage that merely sentimental piety, which characterizes so many of his evangelical countrymen. The following are specimens of the mode, in which he recommends the habit of secluded thought; of habitual private reflection upon our own sins and God's paternal love.

In a sermon upon Christian Truth, from Eph. 4: 25, he says,—"The first instance of a want of truth toward ourselves and toward God, is seen in this, that we purposely forbear to examine ourselves in the presence of our Maker, that we do not seek the still hour. Of this want of truth some per-

haps are almost altogether unconscious; it may be the result of an entirely thoughtless levity, which leads a man to live as if he would never die; but we, who live within the precincts of the Christian church, are in some measure and in a majority of instances conscious, that we are in this respect untrue to ourselves. Do not the most of us well understand, that if they would often, in the still hour and before the eye of God, examine themselves, they would appear in an entirely different light from what they now do? You know how that brilliant jewel, that sparkling ornament, which ravished the eye by lamp-light,—how it often grows pale, when the morning sun shines upon it, because it is a mere imitation. Oh my beloved, in the same way do many of you bear about with you the consciousness, that you are moving, through life, under this deceitful shining of a lamp. But you are resolved to remain in this false light, because you fear that your jewels, if the rays of the sun should fall on them, would prove themselves to be but imitation-trinkets. Poor, deluded souls! You now congratulate yourselves that you are able to shut out from you the light of day; but when the day of decision shall arrive, and its morning sun shall come forth in its splendor, can you then hold it back, and say, 'Sun, shine on me no more?' This is that sun, rising directly upon you, chasing away all darkness; this is the thief in the night, before which you are dismayed, and by which your peace of conscience is destroyed, because it will one day rob you of all your fair appearances." Vol. III. pp. 45, 46.

In a sermon preached by Tholuck Nov. 10, 1833, in commemoration of the birth-day of Luther, is a brief description of Luther's conversion. The heavenly voice, which once cried out to the apostle, Saul, Saul, why persecutest thou me? is represented as having, in a similar and almost miraculous manner, arrested Luther in his course of sin, and as having cried out, Martin, Martin, why seekest thou me not. The discourse then proceeds as follows: "Luther began at this time to seek God. It was the time when every one, who would seek and serve the Lord, must resort to the stillness of the cloister. 'Flee far from me, ye joys of the world,' so the new convert cried from his very soul, 'where the melodies of the world are heard, there the instrument of God shall make music for me!' So he withdraws himself into the cloistered cell; he seeks the approval of Jehovah; in daily, severe self-denial he seeks it. With every new step that he takes in the divine life, he perceives the image of perfect holiness rising higher and higher above him. On all sides it is cried out to him, 'be holy, heart, be holy;' but lo, the goadings of passion and of evil desire do not cease. Overpowered with severe sickness, he sinks into a state of deep disquiet of soul. When even his beloved music ceases to console him, then does he hear a more glorious music. An old cloister-brother repeats to him, from the Apostle's creed, which you hear every sunday before the altar, the words, 'I believe in the forgiveness of sins.' Innumerable times had he, as have you also, listened to these words; but, brethren, the declaration of the forgiveness of sins is one which will be first understood, when the need of the soul and the thirst after divine grace have opened the intellect. With many

such words does the sacred Scripture come to men as to the deaf and dumb: they learn to utter the words, but the meaning of what they utter they understand not. If the deaf mute could acquire the power of hearing, he would be obliged to learn anew all that he has artificially repeated. The wants of the soul, the thirst after divine grace must first open the understanding for every divine truth."

And now "brother, a voice from God rings in thine ears, my child, why hast thou not sought me? Yea from infancy up,—first, when thou wast sitting in thy mother's embrace, while she told thee the story of the dear Redeemer; and then in thy boyhood, when in starry nights thou gazedst on the grandeur of thy heavenly Father's mansions, and thine eyes shed drops of thankfulness, that among all his millions of worlds he forgot not thee, poor child; and then in thy youth, when sin conflicted sorely with thee, and thou learnedst the truth 'he that trusteth in his own heart is a fool;'—every where and all the way has thy Father's voice cried out to thee, 'wherefore seekest thou me not, my straying child, for I am still thy Father'—Art thou then awakened, brother, by this voice; then confer not with flesh and blood; bid farewell to the world. What! you ask, shall we fly from the relations in which God has placed us, shall we seek the cloistered stillness, and the cloistered garments? No, my friends. We are indebted to our Luther, that we have learned another mode of separation from the world, than that by monkish garments; and another mode of living in the cloister, than that of living between four narrow walls. He it was, who taught the Christian what is that evangelical separation from the world, that evangelical mode of living in the cloister, which is thus described by Paul, 'they have as though they have not, they enjoy as though they enjoyed not." Vol. I. pp. 6, 7, 8.

NOTE X, Page 169.

The allusion to Francke in this passage will perhaps appear forced and inapposite, unless we consider that the name of this remarkable man is associated, in a peculiar degree, with faith in God, with earnestness in prayer, and with very surprising divine interpositions in his behalf; unless we also consider that he was a resident. for more than forty years, at the place where this sermon was delivered, that he was one of the first theological professors in the University, that he was the original founder of the orphan-house, for which Halle has been so long distinguished, and that his name is remembered throughout Germany with the profoundest veneration. His orphan house, to which Tholuck more particularly alludes, was in an emphatic sense built by prayer; was undertaken without any resources except the prospective and unpledged contributions of the benevolent; and often when the devoted founder had not a farthing to pay his workmen, he could do nothing but fall on his knees, and entreat the overruling Providence for the needed supplies. It was singular, that individuals, known and unknown, frequently sent him, by the post, at these fearful emergencies, the very donations which he had just implored from Heaven.

SKETCH OF THE LIFE AND CHARACTER

OF

PROF. THOLUCK.

SKETCH OF

THOLUCK'S LIFE AND CHARACTER.

The following sketch was originally intended for insertion among the notes to the preceding sermons of Tholuck, and therefore its analysis of his character was designed more particularly to exhibit his qualifications as a preacher. It is inserted as a separate article, because its length would have increased the notes to a disproportionate bulk. Many of the statements which it gives are translated from the Supplement to the Conversations-Lexicon der neuesten Zeit und Literatur, Vol. IV. pp. 625—628. Leipsic, 1834. Though the article on Tholuck in that Lexicon was written by his opposers, and was designed to produce an unfavorable impression concerning him, it may still be relied on as accurate in its general statement of facts, many of them having been furnished for the Lexicon by Tholuck himself. Other facts, detailed in the ensuing sketch, were gleaned from the letters and journals of American divines, who have enjoyed the acquaintance of Prof. Tholuck.

Frederic Augustus Gottreu Tholuck was born at Breslau, the capital of Silesia, on the thirtieth of March, 1799. It was early intended that he should follow the occupation of his father, which was that of a goldsmith. He accordingly left school in his twelfth year, and entered upon his apprenticeship. He had such an aversion to his employment, however, that he soon returned to the Gymnasium, and in 1816 entered the University at Breslau. He was now seventeen years of age, and as yet had acquired no predilection for any particular course of study. But in a short time he formed a strong attachment to oriental literature, and made application to Kosegarten, Professor at Griefswalde, a pupil of De Sacy, and one of the first

oriental scholars in Germany, for means to prosecute his studies in this department. Before he had been three months at the University, he resolved to solicit the patronage of the celebrated orientalist, the prelate Von Dietz, formerly the Prussian ambassador at Constantinople. Having received recommendations from the philologist Schneider, and from other literary men at Breslau, he set out for Berlin, and found in Dietz a much more cordial welcome than he had expected. The prelate adopted him as his foster-son, and promised to afford him the means of travelling in the East at some future day. After the lapse of three months, however, this benefactor of Tholuck deceased, but Tholuck was not deprived of the means of pursuing his favorite study. He had become known as a promising orientalist to many who cheerfully lent him their aid; and through the instrumentality of the minister Von Altenstein, he was endowed with a considerable stipend, which enabled him to continue his oriental studies. He availed himself chiefly of the instructions of Ideler and Wilken.

In a paragraph which Tholuck prefixed to the English translation of his Comm. on the Rom., he says, "Even in early boyhood infidelity had forced its way into my heart, and at the age of twelve I was wont to scoff at Christianity and its truths. Hard has been the struggle which I have come through, before attaining to assurance of that faith, in which I am now blessed. I prove, however, in myself, and acknowledge it with praise to the Almighty, that the longer I live, the more does serious study, combined with the experiences of life, help me to recognize in the christian doctrine an inexhaustible fountain of true knowledge, and serve to strengthen the conviction, that all the wisdom of this world is but folly when compared with the glorious gospel of Jesus Christ." Edin. Bib. Cab., No. V. p. 14, Pref. During the whole period of his residence at the Gymnasium he was decided in his infidelity, and for the theme of the oration which he delivered on leaving that institution, he chose, The superiority of Mohammedanism to Christianity. It was not until the last year of his university life, that his theological views became more consistent and rational. An intimate acquaintance with Professor Neander of Berlin was highly serviceable to his religious character. He was also peculiarly indebted to the faithful religious counsels of Baron Von Cottewitz, a very pious Lutheran, still living at an advanced age in Berlin. Tholuck himself frequently refers to this man as his spiritual father.

Immediately after completing his three years' course at the University, Tholuck became one of the private teachers at Berlin. In 1819 De Wette, having written a letter of condolence to the mother of Sands, the young theological student who murdered Kotzebue, (see Cons. Lex. Art. Sands), was peremptorily dismissed from his Professorship at Berlin; and Tholuck, having early become a favorite with the Prussian Government, was appointed his successor. He had however only the title of Professor Extraordinarius. At the time of his promotion to this elevated chair, he was only twenty years of age. Succeeding at so early a period of life, so distinguished a Professor as De Wette, he was obliged to withdraw his attention in some degree from his oriental studies, and direct them more particularly to theological. He applied himself with great zeal and assiduity to the defence of evangelical religion, and his efforts secured the warm approbation of the King and Ministry of Prussia, and soon elevated him to the station of a leader in the orthodox party. The honors which he received immediately after the change in his religious views and character, have induced his enemies to ascribe this change to his desire of procuring the patronage of the Government, and becoming the head of what they are pleased to call the fanatics and pietists.

The mental precocity of Tholuck was nearly equal to that of Gesenius, who published his invaluable Hebrew Lexicon at the age of twenty three, his larger Hebrew Grammar at twenty seven, and his celebrated Commentary on Isaiah at thirty-one. Tholuck was but twenty-two years old, when he published his Hints for the Study of the Old Testament (8vo. 1821), and also his Ssufismus, or Pantheistic Theology of the Persians (8vo. 1821), a work which, together with his other productions in oriental literature, has been highly extolled even by his opposers; see Cons. Lex. Art. Thol., and All. Literatur-Zeit., 1825. He was but twenty-three years of age, when he published his Treatise on the Nature and Moral Influence of Heathenism; an article which Gesenius pronounced the ablest which he had ever seen on the subject. This article was translated by Prof. Emerson of Andover, and published in the Bib. Repository, Vol. II. pp. 80—124, 246—290, 441—499. He was but twenty-five years of age, when he published his Comm. on the Romans; which has passed through three editions in Germany, and has been translated into English, in the Edin. Bib. Cabinet. De Wette,

though far from evangelical in his sentiments, has pronounced this Commentary superior to any that had preceded it on the same Epistle. Tholuck was but twenty-six years of age, when he published the following works: a separate Translation of the Epistle to the Romans, which has been carried through two editions in Germany (8vo. 1825 and 1831); an Anthology of the Oriental Mystic Poems, with an Introduction on the Mystics generally and the Eastern in particular, (8vo. 1825); and an article on Sin and the Redeemer, or the conversion of a Skeptic, which has passed through four editions in Germany, and part of which was translated by Mr. Nast for the Bib. Repos., Vol. VIII. pp. 308—341. In the succeeding year, 1826, he published a work on the Speculations of the later Orientalists respecting the doctrine of the Trinity.

In the year 1825, Tholuck took a journey to England and Holland. He visited England again in 1835. His first journey was taken for the purpose of literary improvement, and especially of extending his acquaintance with the Oriental writings. His expenses were defrayed by the Prussian Government, with whom he still continues to be a favorite. While in England he expressed, as every sincere and honest Christian would be inclined to do, his grief at the looseness of German theology. Some of his remarks, particularly those made in speeches before the British and Foreign Bible Society, were reported in Germany, were distorted and exaggerated by the Rationalists, and thus excited great, but unmerited indignation against him. His opposers have not yet forgotten nor forgiven these remarks.

While he was on his foreign tour, he was attacked with a severe illness, and was obliged to return, earlier than he had intended, to his native land. Dr. Knapp, Professor Ordinarius of Theology at Halle, having died in 1825, Tholuck was appointed in 1826, when but twenty-seven years of age, the successor of that distinguished theologian. His appointment was violently opposed by the Rationalists at Halle, who constitute decidedly the most numerous as well as the strongest party at that seat of learning. They denounced him as a fanatic, accused him afresh of having pre-condemned them in a foreign land, and they endeavored by various means, to prevent his acceptance of the appointment. He did accept, however, and mitigated for a time their hostility by his amiable spirit and deportment, and his exhibition of extensive and various learning.

In 1827, the year after his appointment to the theological chair

of Dr. Knapp, the chair which he still retains, he published his Commentary on the Gospel of John, which has passed through five editions in Germany, and been translated into our own language. Having suffered for a long time and very severely from disease, he was appointed in the spring of 1828, Chaplain of the Prussian Embassy at Rome. He accepted the appointment, and spent a year in Italy with decided benefit to his health. The intellectual pleasure as well as profit, which he must have received in the library of the Vatican, will be appreciated by all who consider the richness of that library in foreign manuscripts, and Tholuck's familiarity with foreign languages.

While a private teacher and a professor at Berlin, Tholuck had the title of Licentiate of Theology. When he removed to Halle, the University of Berlin conferred on him the degree of Doctor of Theology. When he accepted his chaplaincy, he applied for ordination at Merseburg, and received it without a previous examination. This examination is customarily omitted at the ordination of Doctors in Theology. In 1830, he was appointed Court-Preacher at Dresden. This invitation he declined, and immediately afterwards received from the Government the honorary title of Consistorialrath, Counsellor or Assessor of the Consistory. This is now his proper style of address. It is somewhat higher than the doctorate of divinity among us. Only one ecclesiastical honor, that of Oberconsistorialrath, is higher than this in Germany. Bibl. Rep. Vol. I. pp. 413, 414.

In 1829 he published a volume of sermons, which were preached at Berlin, Rome, London and Halle. This is, strictly speaking, his first volume of sermons, though that published in 1834, is marked the first, from its relation to the subsequent series. In 1830, soon after his return from Italy, he became involved in a very serious altercation with the Rationalists at Halle, a slight allusion to which is found in Bib. Rep., Vol. I. p. 29. The circumstances of the case are the following. Ludwig Von Gerlack, then associate Judge at Frankfort on the Oder, a contributor to Hengstenberg's Evangelical Church Journal, exposed in that periodical the impious manner in which Gesenius and Wegscheider, Professors at Halle, ridiculed certain portions of Scripture, and slandered the sacred penmen. He sustained his charges by quotations from notes taken by the students of the University. It was thought to be an outrage upon the rights

of the professors, and upon the character of the students, thus to publish abstracts of lectures, which were not intended for the public eye, and which could not be fairly exhibited in such a shape; and above all to publish them for the purpose "of accusing these esteemed and distinguished men of heterodoxy," and of exciting against them the hostile feeling of the Government. The professors resented, as an infringement of their privileges, the attempt to make them responsible to the public and obnoxious to the ministry, for the remarks which they might make at a private lecture; and the students not only sympathized with the professors, but felt that an imputation was cast upon their own honor.

Tholuck had not approved of Von Gerlack's article, had even attempted to dissaude him from the publication of it, yet he was suspected of having instigated the whole exposure. So great was the consequent excitement against him that his life was endangered, and he was obliged to have a military guard when he visited the Ministry. His opposers now say, with the coolness of true Rationalists, that "as he was known to be one of the leaders of that fanatical party, who support the Church Journal, and as he was then resident at Halle, it was natural that he should be suspected of an agency in this attack upon his colleagues, and that he should be thereby exposed to the first out-breaking of the merited indignation, which was felt by the youth, then pursuing their studies at Halle and feeling themselves calumniated in the offensive article. On a closer examination, however, it appeared that Tholuck was free from participating in that accusation of heterodoxy, and that he had not recommended the interposition of the Government against the Rationalist teachers. But as he agreed, in substance, with the dogmatic principles of the Evangelical party, the indignation and the literary attacks of the freethinking theologians were aimed against *him* in an especial manner. Among these attacks, by far the most severe was doubtless that which came from Charles Frederick Augustus Fritzsche, of Rostock; for while all others contended against Tholuck's dogmatic principles, this writer accused him of the rudest ignorance concerning the laws of language and of interpretation." "Fritzsche came forward with a work called 'A Review of the merits of Mr. Tholuck as an Interpreter,' (Halle 1831). In this work he showed, by a long catalogue of examples from Tholuck's exegetical writings, that he committed every moment

mistakes, (to irritate Tholuck he called them blunders), of the gravest character against the canons of language and of interpretation; that he did not know how to place the accent aright, but offended in this respect against the forms of speech and against syntax; that he coined words in a mode which usage did not justify; that he gave definitions, which are not and cannot be sanctioned; that he fell into the most incredible errors in apprehending the meaning of the original, etc." "Against these criticisms, expressed in so cutting a manner, Tholuck endeavoured to defend himself in his 'Contributions to the Interpretation of the New Testament, together with a Review of the Criticism upon my Comm. on the Rom., by Dr. Fritzsche,' (Halle, 1832). He was far, however, from being successful in exculpating himself from all the errors charged against him; on the contrary he emboldened Fritzshce to publish a new work, Preliminaries, etc.," (Halle 1832), in which the same errors were forcibly particularized, and new errors added. Against this work Tholuck endeavored to defend himself again, in his 'One sober word more,' etc., (Halle 1832); but he could not entirely wash away the stain, which was fastened upon him." "This contest between Fritzsche and Tholuck was on subjects, purely philological. It is, however, to be regarded as an important part of the contest between Rationalism and Super-naturalism; inasmuch as the combatants belonged to the two opposing parties, and the spirit of party manifestly contributed to make the contest more bitter and violent, than it could have been made by mere philological differences. It derived interest, also, from its operation upon the general controversy between the two parties, for it had a close connexion with the literary character of one of the chief men among the super-naturalists, one upon whom the influence of those men in the province of letters essentially depended. Previously to this, Tholuck had been universally acknowledged to be a man of profound learning, particularly in the department of oriental literature; his exegetical labors had, therefore, no small influence in favor of his theological opinions; and he was the pride and the bulwark of his party." "Though it may be regarded by the rationalists as a fortunate event, that their most influential opponent was thus divested of his false show of learning, yet still this kind of literary warfare, this fault-finding (splitterrichterliche) dispute on words, these despicable reproaches for blunders in language, must be regarded as a proof of a base spirit in our

learned community." Cons. Lex. Arts. Tholuck, and Rationalism and Super-naturalism; Vol. IV. pp. 626, 7, and Vol. III. pp. 693, 4.

That the animadversions of Fritzsche, and more recently of Strauss, upon Tholuck's literary character were not entirely unjust, is admitted by many of Tholuck's friends; and the influence of them is said to have been decidedly beneficial both to his habits of investigation, and his style of writing. But that these attacks were so ruinous to his reputation, as the preceding narrative of the Rationalists would indicate, is not pretended now even by his enemies. They are obliged to concede, that the censures heaped upon him were too unqualified and indiscriminate, that his inaccuracies were by no means so gross nor his faults of style so censurable as was pretended: see even the Cons. Lex. Vol. IV. p. 628. The replies of Tholuck, which are mentioned so disparagingly above, are said by many to be among his happiest efforts. They convict his reviewer of greater inaccuracies than were charged upon himself. His deportment, through the whole conflict, was truly christian and noble. He considered himself as attacked not by Fritzsche alone, but by the great body of the Rationalists. They instigated Fritzsche to his merciless criticism; men, of whom we should little suspect such dishonorable conduct, furnished him with materials for his censure; and his condemnatory works may be considered the joint effort of those most interested in Tholuck's downfall; and yet the effort was, as the candid now confess, unsuccessful. It may also be remarked that there were feelings of personal ill-will, which instigated Fritzsche to his encounter with Tholuck. He is of about the same age with his antagonist, like him is the author of several Commentaries on the sacred books, but instead of being, as his father was before him, in a Theological Professorship at Halle, he is Professor of Theology at Rostock, the smallest of the German Universities. He formerly held the same Professorship at Leipsic. The father, Christian Frederic Fritzsche, D. D., was a decided rationalist, and his spirit rëappears in his son.

In 1830, Tholuck established a periodical paper, called the Literary Advertiser, for Christian Theology and General Intelligence. It is a single sheet, quarto, and was issued at the rate of eighty numbers a year. The greater part of its articles are said to be from his own pen. He is about to publish a collection of essays from this paper, in a separate volume; to which he designs to append some arti-

cles never before given to the public. From this periodical there have been translated into English, an article on the present state of Theological Literature and Education in Italy, Bib. Repos. Vol. I. pp. 177—186, and II. pp. 394—405; an article on the Lexicography of the New Testament, Bib. Repos. Vol. I. pp. 552—568; an article on the Hypothesis of the Egyptian or Indian Origin of the name Jehovah, Bib. Repos. Vol. IV. pp. 89—108; and an article on the merits of Calvin as an Interpreter, Bib. Repos. Vol. II. pp. 541—568. The first two articles were translated by Prof. Robinson of New York, the last one by Prof. Woods of Bangor, and all of them were written by Prof. Tholuck. The establishment of the Literary Advertiser originated from no want of friendship for Hengstenberg; for Tholuck still contributes to the pages of the Church Journal, and Hengstenberg contributes to the Advertiser. The two editors are personal friends, though Tholuck is not so violent and caustic as Hengstenberg, but occupies a middle ground between him on the one side, and Neander on the other, being more tolerant than the former, less accommodating than the latter. His opposers, speaking of his relation to the two periodicals, say, not in all respects with perfect correctness, that "Tholuck in his dogmatical system is more liberal and stands more upon speculative ground, than that rigorous portion of the evangelical party which is represented in Hengstenberg. He does not sanction the dogmatic exclusiveness of the last named writer, and that fanatical system of persecution and impeachment for heterodoxy, which is founded on such exclusiveness. Since the catastrophe at Halle he seems to have freed himself from his earlier connection with the Church Journal, and has established a theological paper of his own; which preserves more of a scientific character than Hengstenberg's, and during the most violent party-contests, has preserved a commendable moderation." Con. Lex. Vol. IV. p. 627.

In 1833, Tholuck edited Calvin's Commentary on the New Testament, 6 Vols. 8vo. In the same year he also published his Commentary on Christ's Sermon on the Mount. Part of this Commentary, that on the 5th of Matt., was translated into English for the Edinburgh Bib. Cabinet, No. VI. and part also, that on the Lord's Prayer, was translated by Prof. Torrey of Burlington for the Bib. Repos. Vol. V. pp. 190—238, and Vol. VI. pp. 187—207. The following extract from a letter of Tholuck to Rev. R. Menzies, of

Scotland, will present the view, which our author entertains of this Commentary, in comparison with his Comm. on the Romans. "I wish especially to remark, that the work (on the Rom.) is to be regarded as the production of an earlier period of my life, and as having been intended for a particular purpose. I composed it in my twenty-fifth year, with the special view of commending to the hearts of my countrymen the doctrine of justification by faith, which at the time I perceived to be greatly misunderstood. Other points are hence labored with less care; and at this time (1833) I believe that on the 9th chapter I should be able to give some more profound views. Accordingly, it by no means presents what I now consider as the beau ideal of a theological commentary. I am occupied at present with the publication of an extensive commentary upon the Sermon on the Mount, and it is to this I must refer, if your countrymen should wish a more mature work from my pen. It contains many expositions of the doctrines, and might serve to render the dogmatical part of our theology more accessible to English divines. At the same time I am persuaded, that none of them would there meet with anything at all contrary to the pure orthodoxy of your church." Ed. Bib. Cab. Preface to the Comm. on Rom. pp. 13, 14.

In 1835, Tholuck published a Comment on the Influence of the Greek Philosophy upon the Theology of the Mohammedans and the Jews; in 1836, his Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews; in 1837, his Treatise on the Credibility of the Evangelical History, with his reply to Dr. D. Strauss's Leben Jesu; and in the four years 1834, 5, 7, and 8, he published four Volumes of sermons, each containing about 200 pages, 12mo. They have recently been published in a new edition of 2 Vols. pp. 366 and 429. His contributions to the German periodicals have been numerous and important. Those published in the Studien und Kritiken are, one on the Want of Agreement among the Interpreters of the New Testament Vol. V. No. 2, a translation of which by Prof. Robinson is in Bib. Repos., Vol. III. pp. 684—707; one on the Sin against the Holy Ghost, Vol. IX. No. 2, and one on the Study of Paul's Epistles, Vol. VIII. No. 2. He is at this time engaged in a labored revision of his Comm. on the Romans; and when we consider the great advantages which he enjoys for improving his preceding editions, we may reasonably expect that this Commentary will surpass in interest either of his others.

Notwithstanding the variety of Prof. Tholuck's publications, his labors have not been confined to the study. When at Berlin, he established at his own house a religious conference, chiefly for the benefit of the pious students of the University. It was held every week, and its exercises were prayer, singing, the reading of the Scriptures or of a sermon, familiar conversation on doctrinal or practical theology, and sometimes a direct religious address. This conference is still continued every Saturday evening. It is the more worthy of notice, because meetings of this character are generally subjects of ridicule among the Germans; and besides are often regarded with suspicion, have sometimes indeed been expressly prohibited by the Government. Since Tholuck has been at Halle, he has held similar meetings at his house once or twice a week. He also conducts a missionary meeting every month, at which he presents the latest intelligence respecting American, English and other missions. He labors much in preparation for this meeting, and imparts to it a lively interest. This missionary spirit would not be indeed particularly noticeable among American Christians, but it is to be viewed in contrast with the prejudices and the dormancy of even the evangelical party in his own land. Read the description of the want of religious enterprise among German Christians, in Bib. Repos. Vol. I. pp. 438—451. The German Professors ordinarily have little or no personal intercourse with their pupils, are often wholly unacquainted with them. The students are too numerous, and the Professors too much absorbed in study, to permit a great degree of social interview. Neander and Dr. F. Strauss at Berlin, however, have labored to exert a personal religious influence upon their scholars; and Tholuck, as he has a very peculiar interest and tact in conversation, employs his talent with fidelity. Prof. Sears, writing from Halle in 1834, says, "The uncommon pressure of Tholuck's public labors leaves him no leisure time. But when he walks, which he does twice a day, and an hour and a half at each time, he invites three or four students of similar religious character to accompany him. With these he converses in a manner best adapted to win them to a religious life. With the serious he comes directly to the point. With others he spreads his net wider; and through the medium of literary, philosophical, or theological discussion, conducted with vivacity and the utmost affection, he steals upon their hearts and holds them his captives. Another company

are, for the same purpose, invited to his dinner table; and thus daily he spends several hours, as a friend, patron and pastor to the more hopeful among his pupils. If they are indigent, he remits their tuition; and if he publishes a sermon or a pamphlet, the profit goes to them. His extensive and choice library is always at their service."

In addition to the personal influence which Tholuck exerts upon his pupils, he conducts an extensive correspondence both with his own countrymen and with foreigners, and is distinguished for his attention to the literati who visit Halle from other lands, and particularly from England and America. The pious foreigner feels at home when with Tholuck; and nearly every one, coming within the reach of his influence, feels a strong attachment to him. "To the American Christian," said Prof. Robinson in 1831, "who travels on this part of the continent, Tholuck is undoubtedly the most interesting person whose acquaintance he will make. He possesses a greater personal influence and reputation than any other theologian in Germany." Bib. Repos. Vol. I. p. 29. His opposers ascribe his popularity to his extensive and intimate intercourse with foreigners, to the strong personal attachments which he has formed, and to his connections with a religious party: as well as to what they are obliged to acknowledge, his superior talent in lecturing, and some considerable power in his writings. Cons. Lex. Vol. IV. p. 627.

It is worthy of remark, that notwithstanding Prof. Tholuck has for a long time given to the world two or three volumes a year, some of them highly labored; and in connection with these efforts for the public has delivered regular lectures at the University, sometimes two or three lectures a day; has preached statedly once a fortnight, and on frequent intermediate occasions; has maintained the responsible and onerous station of a leader in the evangelical party for the period of nearly twenty years, and is at the present time but just forty years old; and notwithstanding he has combined with all these labors a sedulous attention to the personal duties of a gentleman, a Christian, and a pastor, he has been afflicted during the whole period with feeble and precarious health, and has been reduced at times nearly to a state of blindness. Suffering under a broken constitution, he has been obliged, like Neander and Hengstenberg, to depend on rigid physical discipline for ability to prosecute his studies. His person is slender, his temperament nervous, and his life is a perpetual conflict between mind and body. His appearance is at

present that of a man prematurely grown old. It is to be earnestly hoped, that he may add another to the many illustrations of the remark, that men of the feeblest constitutions often accomplish the most, and live the longest.

The philosophical opinions of Tholuck are peculiar; more congenial however with the prevalent systems of his own countrymen, than with any other. He is a decided opponent of Locke, Reid, Stewart and Brown, of the whole "sensual" system, so called, which prevails in Great Britain and America. He does not however entirely sympathize with either Kant, Schelling, Fichte or Hegel. He may be called perhaps an eclectic transcendentalist; having a system of his own, which is culled from the various systems of what is termed the spiritual philosophy. We have understood that he finds no objection, in his speculations, to the new theory of animal magnetism, but has avowed his belief in it, and defended some of its principles in his lectures on theology. Hegel and Schleiermacher, and indeed many of his most distinguished countrymen have avowed the same belief. The following note in Hegel's Encyclopaedie der Philosophie pp. 591, 592, will indicate (so far as it is understood) the views which this prince of the transcendentalists entertains of Tholuck's philosophical tendencies. "The rich contributions which Tholuck has given us in his Anthology of the Oriental Mystics, from the poems of Dschelaleddin, and others, were produced with views like those which we have here presented. In his introduction, Tholuck shows what a thorough comprehension he has of the mystic philosophy: he there determines very accurately the character of the Eastern, and that of the Western and Christian writers in reference to this system. Notwithstanding the dissimilarity of these classes, they have the common designation of mystics. The union of mysticism with what is denominated Pantheism includes according to Tholuck, p. 33. that inward vitality of the mind and soul, which essentially consists in this, the annihilation of that external *All*, which is wont to be ascribed to Pantheism. In other places Tholuck acquiesces in the common but obscure representation of Pantheism. He had no interest in a fundamental discussion of the subject, further than was necessary for ascertaining the feeling of the writer whom he quoted. He seems to be seized with a wonderful enthusiasm in behalf of a mystical philosophy, which is to be called, in the usual sense of the term, entirely pantheistic. But yet when-

ever he undertakes to philosophize, (p. 12, seq.), he does not go beyond the ordinary view taken by the metaphysical understanding, nor beyond its indefinite forms of thought."

In his theological speculations, as well as philosophical, Tholuck is independent and untrammelled. It needs not to be stated that the spirit of his theology is eminently evangelical, and such as exposes him to the severe animadversions of the rationalists. They complain of his fanatical "mystical" pietism, as his great weakness. It must be remembered, however, that in his orthodoxy, Tholuck is a German, and not a Briton, or of British descent. He makes no effort to regulate his creed by any of our formularies, but examines every doctrine for himself, as if he were the first man who had investigated it. He adopts the prevalent continental view of the Sabbath, and such a view of the nature and extent of inspiration as no evangelical Christian in America would approve: see Bib. Repos. Vol. VIII. p. 487. He is an admirer and eulogist of Calvin: Plato, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas and Calvin are said to be his favorite authors; yet he sometimes expresses such feelings in reference to the peculiarities of Calvinism, as can be palliated only on the ground of a mental structure and habits of association altogether peculiar.

The believers in the final restoration of the lost have sometimes, in triumph, claimed Prof. Tholuck as an authority in their favor. They have rested their claim on the representations, which several of our evangelical writers have given of Tholuck's belief on this subject; representations which have been misunderstood by some, and misinterpreted by more. In the first place, there can be no doubt, that the whole spirit of Tholuck's theology is as dissonant from that of American universalists, as music from discord. In the second place, the tendency which his speculations may have had, at a former period, toward the doctrine of the final restoration of all mankind, cannot be ascribed to them, in the same degree, at present. His mind was once fluctuating on the subject; and the difference between a permanent conviction that a doctrine is true, and a temporary inclination toward the doctrine is too obvious to be insisted on. In the third place, the notions which he may have entertained in sympathy with the doctrine of universal salvation, he never made prominent in his system; never thrust them forward into a conspicuous place, nor even avowed them, except with the caution of one who knew the licentious influence which they might exert. An

opinion, when entertained in the shape of a subordinate and incidental theory, is as different in its influence from that same opinion, when entertained in the shape of an essential and conspicuous doctrine, as the alcohol in bread is different in its effect from the alcohol in brandy. A man's physical system may be, on the whole, sound, though it be not free from some local disease in a foot or finger; but his state is essentially different, when disease has infected the whole body, and finds no stamina in the system to counteract it. In the fourth place, Tholuck never adopted a "positive" belief in the doctrine of the final blessedness of all men. It was a tendency of mind to such a belief, a wish, a hope that it might be confirmed by fact, rather than the "positive" belief itself.

But in the fifth place, the inclination of Tholuck's mind toward the obnoxious doctrine, he defended not on exegetical so much as on dogmatical grounds. Under date of Dec. 22, 1837, he states in reference to expressions which he had made three years previous, "If I remember right, my expressions at the time (1834), were these: dogmatically, i. e. as a theologian I feel myself drawn toward this opinion (i. e. the doctrine of ultimate universal salvation); but exegetically, i. e. as an interpreter, I do not know how to justify it." As a speculative theologian, he was inclined to draw an inference in favor of the final restoration of all men, from the love and mercy of God; and also, from the peculiar philosophical objections which he has, in common with his evangelical countrymen, against a perpetual division, dissension, Zwiespalt, in the moral universe. When his mind was directed to these speculative principles, he expressed a strong attraction toward the obnoxious doctrine. So too, when his mind was directed to such passages of Scripture as Acts 3: 21. Rom. 5: 18, 11: 36. 1 Cor. 15: 22—28. Col. 1: 16. Phil. 2: 20. Heb. 2: 10. 10: 13, 14, he sometimes expressed a still stronger leaning toward the doctrine. These passages, like a magnet, would draw him toward a belief, from which, however, he would be soon drawn back again by other passages, attracting in a different way. Accordingly he said, even at that time, that to the texts above suggested, "other important passages stand in direct opposition; those which speak of eternal punishment, Matt. 25: 41, 46. 1 Thess. 5: 3. Jude 7;—those which speak of the sin against the Holy Ghost, Matt. 12: 22;—those which speak of Judas, Matt. 26: 24; — those which say that Christ did not die for *all* but for *many*, Matt. 26: 28, and 20: 28." Thus troubled by the apparent opposition between two

classes of arguments, thus drawn by the two opposing forces, first one way and then the other, Tholuck often, in view of a single class of reasons, made expressions which, considered apart from expressions made in view of the opposite class, would give a wrong idea of his belief *as a whole*. The arguments, prominent in his mind at one moment, elicited expressions of confidence, which would be essentially qualified by expressions, made at another moment, when different arguments were more intently examined. Many of the illustrations, employed to reconcile Paul and James on the subject of faith, may be employed to reconcile Tholuck with himself on the subject of punishment. The remark of Prof. Sears, in reference to Tholuck's mental character, seems to intimate the true mode of making this reconciliation. The remark is, simply, that Tholuck's mind is not like that of Locke, or Edwards, or Robert Hall, is not distinguished for systematic order, or exact balance, or philosophical discipline. The phraseology of such a man, in a particular mental state is not therefore to be interpreted, as the phraseology would be of a more deliberate and cautious philosopher, like Dr. Reid or Dugald Stewart. Accordingly we find, that when Tholuck has intended to express his opinion as a whole, the leaning of his mind in view of the two classes of evidence, both at the same time equally prominent in his mind, he has, at such times, given preference to the exegetical argument, above the dogmatical; and to the positive declarations of Scripture, above those which are susceptible of a qualified sense. Thus, after a comprehensive view of both sides, he said four years ago, "Therefore we must conclude as follows: the perfectly good, good in the christian sense, will be eternally happy. The perfectly sinful, those who to eternity never receive Christ, will be eternally unhappy. But the question remains, will any eternally reject Christ? If we consider the freedom of the will, and consider that it is the curse of sin to become more and more hardened, we cannot deny the possibility. Although, therefore, God has an infinity of methods of affecting the sinner, as many as the sun has rays, Rom. 11: 32, 33, still men can always resist; and Matt. 12: 32 expressly declares, that there will be those, who will be forever unsusceptible of the Spirit and of forgiveness. Indeed this passage, more than any other, may show (dürfte darthun), that some will be eternally hardened."

In the sixth place, the more recent developments of Tholuck's

mind discover an increased repugnance to the doctrine of universal salvation. Writing from Halle, Dec. 22, 1837, and stating that he had, in 1834, expressed a hope of the final salvation of all men, he says, "I confessed at the time that I did not know how to reconcile (this hope) with the clear passages in Scripture, which made me reluctant even at that time, to embrace that opinion as an unquestionable truth. Mature reflection, however, on the sin against the Holy Ghost has made me since abandon the idea of the final restoration of all men; for what Christ says concerning it seems too clearly to imply a degree of opposition against holy truth, which leads to eternal unhappiness."

In the seventh place, the process of Tholuck's mind, in reference to the doctrine of universal salvation, furnishes a strong collateral argument against the truth of it. The opposers, rather than the friends of this doctrine, may derive encouragement from the authority of his name. — It is often said that American Christians acquiesce in the belief of unending punishment under the influence of feeling and prejudice; but Tholuck's feeling and prejudice have been against this belief; he has hoped that it would be proved untrue, and has wished in vain to prove it so himself.—The belief in the doctrine of eternal punishment among us has been often ascribed to fashion; not only, however, has it been fashionable to disbelieve it among the more popular German divines, but Tholuck says even of the evangelical theologians, "a good number of them cherish a hope of a final conversion of all men; though there will be, I dare say, but few, who allow themselves more than a hope, and who would venture positively to say, that such a restoration will take place." It is then in defiance of fashion, that he himself absolutely abandons this hope.—The doctrine of eternal punishment is often said to be contrary to the Bible. But Dr. Tholuck, who has spent his life in the study of the Bible, declared even when he was struggling to disprove the doctrine, that, 'to be sure most of the Bible appears to assert an everlasting punishment of the wicked, and yet he could not but hope that this may be the result of a wrong interpretation.' An interpreter, then, even while under the blinding influence of a desire to overthrow the orthodox belief is compelled, if he be a fair interpreter, to acknowledge its harmony with the general current of the Scripture, and to confess his inability to accommodate the exegetical evidence in favor of it

to the speculative inferences against it. A creed can be worthy of but little respect, if it cannot be supported from the Scriptures, by a skilful philologist when stimulated by strong desire to support it. And not only did Dr. Tholuck acknowledge that the Bible presented insurmountable obstacles to the positive belief of what he hoped might be true; but he also confessed that he did not feel warranted to declare from the pulpit what he hoped, and that the popular belief in the final blessedness of all men would probably exert a deleterious influence. If a friend to a theory acknowledges that it is unfit to be preached, what shall its enemies say of it? And if this friend to the theory has, on mature reflection, abandoned it as altogether untenable, what shall we infer, save that the power of truth has prevailed over hope, and desire, and prejudice and fashion, and has brought one of the most erudite theologians in the world to the defence of what he once doubted, but could never positively disbelieve.

Prof. Tholuck, it may be said, continues to favor, more than he should, the error of the Restorationists, by still retaining a hope, that some who die impenitent will be restored. But as he positively believes, that some will be lost forever, he virtually admits, that all the objections against the orthodox doctrine are inconclusive. If some are to be eternally punished, then eternal punishment is not, in itself, irreconcileable with the attributes of God, or the scheme of the mediatorial government, or the assertions of Scripture. That Tholuck's theories and conjectures on the subject of a second probation and a possible delivery of some from their adjudged punishment are not precisely what we wish they were, and hope they will be, is conceded. Still we must repeat, in palliation of his unseemly error on this subject, the noble language which himself employed in reference to a pernicious doctrine of the German literati: "Far be it from us to pronounce woes upon every one whom this fearful error holds captive. There is a power in the spirit of the age, which, although it does not release from all guilt, yet seizes, with a force difficult to resist, individuals as well as communities." The mind that has wrought out its own way into so much truth, against the spirit of such an age as this in Germany, is not to be inconsiderately censured for its occasional aberrations.[1]

[1] The preceding information, in reference to Tholuck's views of universalism, has been derived from various sources, but principally from a statement by Rev. Prof. Sears of Newton, in the Christian Watchman of Jan. 19, 1838.

As a Commentator, Tholuck has many excellences. This would be anticipated from the fact, that his reading has been so various, and his memory is so retentive; from his almost unequalled facility in acquiring language, and his peculiar intimacy with the Hebrew and its cognate tongues. He is able to write and converse in a great variety of languages, as the English, Italian, Dutch, French, Spanish, Latin, Greek, Arabic, Persian, and others. He is, of course, qualified to illustrate the sacred text by a multiplicity of references; and he quotes with peculiar pertinence and effect from the Oriental, and especially from the Rabbinical writings. For a single specimen, read his comment on John 7: 37—39, and Rom. 5: 7. The classical quotations too in his commentaries, and especially in his Comm. on the Rom., are eminently valuable. His researches have been extended over so wide a surface, and he seizes such a multitude of important principles, that we ought not to look in his commentaries for that punctiliousness of accuracy, that close philosophical argumentation, which we may find in works of a narrower range. The merits of such a mind as his, are not to be determined by the number of his faults, but by the excess of his excellences above his faults.

The same erudition, enthusiasm, and glow of piety which make Dr. Tholuck interesting as a commentator, make him still more so as a Lecturer. Though he is associated with such men as Wegscheider and Gesenius, his lectures were attended, in 1834, more fully than those of either of his colleagues, and they are often more attractive than any, except those of Gesenius. Nor are they merely attractive. They excite the apprehension even in those who resist their argument, that, after all, the "fanaticism" of Tholuck may be right reason. "It is a common remark," says Prof. Sears, "that if a young man do not wish to become a pietist, let him avoid Tholuck's lecture-room." "Of the theological students at Halle scarcely one is to be found, who comes to the university with personal piety. Of the five hundred who are now studying theology here, perhaps there are sixty serious young men, and about thirty hopefully pious; and these are the fruits of Tholuck's labors. Two of these said to him a few days ago, that they never read the Gospel of John, till they heard theological lectures upon it!" For the number of pious students four years previous to this, see Bib. Repos. Vol. I. p. 426.

It was to notice Prof. Tholuck as a preacher, that the following sketch was more particularly designed.

One of the most obvious peculiarities of his sermons appears in their plan. The introduction always, and the proposition often precedes the announcement of the text. This however is no peculiarity of Tholuck, in comparison with other German preachers. It is their custom not only to have the introduction precede the text, but sometimes to have it founded upon a separate passage of Scripture, and occasionally in the delivery of the discourse, to have a hymn sung by the choir, between the introduction and the body of the sermon. The "division" of Tholuck's discourses is generally definite and precise, sometimes beautiful; almost always simple in its nature, but often artificial in its mode of expression. It is expressed so as to be remembered, and often according to the lower principles of mnemonics. Hence the paronomasia and antithesis which are employed in the various 'topics' of his division. In two of his sermons he expresses his division thus: first, Worin, secondly, Warum; in two others, thus, first the Anfang, secondly, the Fortgang, and thirdly, the Ausgang. See Vol. I. p. 34, and II. p. 40. Vol. II. p. 63, and IV. p. 28. His most objectionable form of expressing a division is found in Vol. II. p. 124, in his sermon on Acts 1: 1—14. 'The quickening thoughts, to which this narration leads us, are the following:

1. Die Stätte seines *Scheidens*, die Stätte seines *Leidens;*
2. Verhüllet ist sein *Anfang*, verhüllet ist sein *Ausgang;*
3. Der *Schluss* von seinen *Wegen* ist für die seinen *Segen;*
4. Er ist von uns *geschieden* und ist uns doch *geblieben;*
5. Er bleibt *verhüllt* den Seinen, bis er wird *klar erscheinen.*

Tholuck would perhaps apologize for such a device, by appealing to the alphabetical Psalms, to the genealogical table in the first of Matthew, and to the impression made by such an arrangement upon the memory, especially that of children. But it seems to be one of the instances in which his oriental cast of thought needs to be chastened.

Another characteristic of Tholuck's sermons is, the absence of all display of learning, of abstruse thought, and long continued argument. His freedom from literary ostentation is the more commendable, as he has so vast an amount of literature which he might display. If the classically laden discourses of Jeremy Taylor were

written, at least many of them, for the family and domestics at Golden Grove, we may well admire that Tholuck has written with such modest plainness for the audience of a German university. That he should give us likewise so little of the obscure and abstruse, is the more praiseworthy, as transcendentalism like his often leads its possessor above the comprehension of the uninitiated. His discourses however are by no means destitute of thought and argument, as is shown from such specimens as the first, third and fourth in this volume. That they are less solid and consecutive than many English and American discourses, results from his principles of sermonizing. The Germans, being excessively attached to music, devote a greater proportion of the hour of worship to this exercise, than we do. The devotional service of their churches occupies a longer time, than that of ours. Consequently the sermon must be brief, and its brevity forbids protracted argumentation. The minds of the hearers too are unfitted, in Tholuck's opinion, for a severe reasoning process, and are more in need of spiritual than of intellectual appeals. The argument of a sermon, he says, should never be scholastic, but should be founded on the moral feelings; and in the house of God, the heart rather than the intellect, should lead the way into the truth.

It must of course be conceded, that different customs of society demand different modes of pulpit address; yet when we consider, that the Sabbath is the great day, and in many cases the only day for popular instruction on the doctrines of religion, it seems to be an obvious necessity, that sermons should be rich in instructive matter; by all means not too abstruse, by no means too simple. Is not the elevated theological character of some portions of Great Britain and the United States a comment on the utility of the didactic and argumentative style of preaching, common in those regions?

Another characteristic of Tholuck's sermons is, the elevation and richness of religious sentiment which they display. His standard of christian character is much more like that of Paul in such chapters as the eighth of Romans, than is common among British and American divines. He loves to exhibit and dilate upon the vast difference between a renewed and an unrenewed man. His religious feelings, too, as exhibited in his sermons are deep, full, overflowing. He evidently has thought for himself, and as a consequence has felt for himself. Hence the originality of his emotions; his freedom

from stereotyped trains of feeling, and his new, fresh, warm sentiment, gushing forth from a full heart. He everywhere shows that he has drunk deep at the sacred fountain; that he has sympathized and held intimate communion with the old Prophets, and imbued his soul with the spirit of Paul.

Tholuck's sermons are also characterized by liveliness and exuberance of fancy. He is a poet in his prose. His imagination knows no bounds. He resembles in this respect the poets of antiquity; he takes his descriptions from real life, not at second hand from the pictures of others. The advantages to be derived from reading his sermons are similar to those derivable from the ancient, and from all other original authors. His style, as well as his mind, exhibits the fertility of the Orientals; and every word seems to be pregnant with life. That there is often a gorgeousness of fancy, an excess of figurative allusion, an indulgence in paronomasia and other conceits, we must admit; and where is the oriental writer who has not the same characteristics? And where is the poet of great fertility of imagination, who does not sometimes appear exuberant? Tholuck has genius in the popular sense of that term, and therefore his faults are those of genius, positive rather than negative. With the pliant, exhaustless, and emphatically living German language for his instrument, we do not wonder that his fancy often revels, like that of an Asiatic.

Tholuck's sermons are characterized by vigor and boldness. His quickness of thought, his rapidity of transition often give an air of abruptness to his style, and sometimes an obscurity; but they also save it from tameness, and that feeble, torpid correctness, which is the innocence of a compiler, rather than the virtue of a thinking man. The energetic boldness of his style is equal to that of his sentiment. When we read his discourses, we are to remember that they were preached in the very citadel of rationalism, to young men who were cherishing that peculiar independence, and unmanagable self-esteem characteristic of a university life; to candidates for the ministry, who had no sober view of the nature of their office, but looked down with contempt upon the religion of the heart; to an audience, the vast majority of whom were not only violent in their prejudices against the preacher's doctrine, but still more so against his religious feeling. The theological students at the German universities are sometimes required to attend divine service on the

Sabbath; and sometimes, like the law and medical students, are allowed to consult their own inclinations on the subject. The majority of the professors, theological as well as others, are seldom seen in the house of God. Tholuck usually attracts throngs of the Rationalists to hear him, and the boldness of his sermons cannot be properly appreciated, unless it be remembered, that they were written for infidels who were expecting soon to occupy the pulpit; to that class of infidels, who are peculiarly unsusceptible of religious influence; to men who were enjoying the daily instructions of Gesenius and "the standard-bearer of Rationalism," Wegscheider. But, notwithstanding the imperviousness of his auditory to religious impression, Tholuck is by no means like one that beats the air. By his boldness of appeal he often produces great excitement of feeling. There is one sermon in particular, that in Vol. I. pp. 147—160, which elicited peculiar violence of resentment, and may be now alluded to, as an exhibition of Tholuck's moral courage.

The sermon is entitled "The Horrible Exchange." It is founded on Matt. 27: 15—26. Its object is to compare the guilt of those who believe in the mere humanity of Christ, with the guilt of those who cried, 'release Barabbas and crucify Jesus.' To hearers, who look up to him with the expressive eye of astonishment, indignation, or conscious guilt, he announces his design to describe first, the horrible exchange that unbelieving Israel made, when, instead of Jesus the Son of God they chose Jesus Barabbas; and secondly, the horrible exchange that the unbelieving world now make, when, instead of considering Jesus the Son of God and man, they choose to consider him as the mere child of man. After depicting the barbarous conduct of Israel in preferring the criminal to the Messiah, he proceeds to show that the denial of Christ's divine nature is a virtual charge of haughtiness, presumption and blasphemy against him; that it represents him as a robber of the divine glory, in his aspiring to receive divine homage; as a malefactor, who himself needed expiation and whose cross could be nothing better than a scaffold, on which he died for his own iniquities. He follows the pretended Saviour to the final judgment, and describes the manner in which he must be condemned for his treasonable claims. He then adds a pungent reproof to the candidates for the sacred office, who thus impeach the virtue of Jesus, and closes with a solemn prayer, that their hearts may not accuse them, in the holiest hours of their life, for paying worship to a peccable child of man.

The Stud. und Krit. Vol. VIII. 243—4, while it sanctions the logical process of the sermon, condemns the revolting terms, in which it depicts the consequences of the humanitarian theory; and decides, that the argument is pressed to a greater extent, and in a bolder way, than the religious sensibilities of an audience will justify.

Fervid and bold, however, as the discourses of Tholuck are, they are distinguished, in a still higher degree, by tenderness and child-like simplicity. It has been said of him, that "he has read every thing;" it may also be said of him, that he feels everything. One of his characteristic expressions is, "When God smites, the smitten man should receive the blow not as the stone would, but as the *man* would, or rather as the trustful child of God. Is the cup bitter? man should have sensibility to taste the bitterness, but he should also taste the sweet drops in the cup, which are the love of his Father in heaven." The delicacy of sentiment, the gentleness of manner, the childlike sweetness and sincerity, which characterize the preaching of Tholuck, are conspicuous in the second, fourth, and fifth sermons of this volume, and also in the notes, pp. 176, 7. 181, 2. 191, 4, 5, 8.

There is another peculiarity of our author's sermons, which deserves attention; their variety of thought and expression. Possessing great constitutional excitability, he feels an enthusiasm on a great variety of subjects; and as his themes vary in their nature, the variations in his style are correspondent. Being appropriate to his subject, his style is almost as free from monotony, as truth itself is free. There is sometimes the softness of an infant, and sometimes the impetuosity of a war-horse; now withering rebuke, and now almost lover-like fondness; here gorgeousness of fancy; there refinement of analysis; great keenness of perception intermingled with ease and calmness of sentiment. From one sermon, a reader might form an opinion that its author was too much inclined to extravagance of declamation; from another, to severity of personal reproof; from a third, to the narrative style; from a fourth, to the expository and paraphrastic. It were indeed wonderful, if amid such multifarious variety of matter and expression, there were not some offences against chasteness and prosaic accuracy. His German is not the most classical; and, as a writer as well as a man, he must be ranked among the sensitive rather than the calculating.

In his manner of delivery, Tholuck is animated but not boisterous; neat but not fastidious. He writes his sermons, but does not read

them; neither, in strictness of terms, does he preach memoriter. He is careful to retain in memory the course of thought and the most striking illustrations of the written sermon, but beyond this trusts entirely to extemporaneous impulse. It need not be added, that a man of his quick sensibility and rich treasures of language, is fluent and even voluble in his unpremeditated addresses. "In the power of composition and oratory," says one who has frequently heard him, "Tholuck stands unequalled in Germany."

It has already been remarked, that our author's faithfulness of appeal to the conscience is sometimes offensive to his hearers. In general, however, his preaching is by no means unpopular. "The university of Halle," says Prof. Sears, "has no place of worship attached to it; it has, however, a morning service once in two weeks, in one of the principal churches in the city. The preacher, who is appointed by the King of Prussia, was Prof. Marks; but when Dr. Tholuck came to Halle, and was appointed associate preacher, he drew so much larger audiences than Prof. Marks, that the latter resigned." Whatever may be thought of the adaptedness of Tholuck's sermons to affect an American audience, they certainly do affect, deeply and beneficially, the audiences for which they are intended.[1] The critic, before he pass sentence upon their general

[1] The following extract from the review of Tholuck's sermons by J. Müller in the Stud. und Krit. Vol. VIII. pp. 239, 240, will show the estimation in which his sermons are held by many of his own countrymen.

"Everything presents itself to the mind of Prof. Tholuck in large outline. It is foreign from his cast of mind to analyze any subject minutely, so as to exhibit all its elements; to define any doctrine with precision in all its relations. There are always, if I may so express myself, great masses, which he sets in motion so as best to promote his own design. The happiness of heaven, and the pain of perdition, the struggles of our life on earth, the forebodings and dreams of childhood, the emptiness and misery of later years that are passed without religion, the terrors of the hour of death, and the ecstasies of the hour when we are born into a new life; these dissimilar topics he brings together, with a strong hand, so as to form one picture, the central figure of which is the sacred form of the Son of God; and he penetrates with these themes into the inmost recesses of the heart, now producing in it the deepest pain, and now raising it to the highest joy. For the feeling of grief at the power of sin, of longing after the unknown God and Redeemer, of joy at the possession of his grace, of desire to possess it in its highest degree, of silent resignation to the will of God, for all such feeling he has the liveliest, the most pathetic, the tenderest expressions. Bold and brilliant images are always at his command. Not only does the Holy Bible

character, should summon up, in ideal presence, not a New England auditory, nor a Scottish, but a German. He should attend to the impressive and venerable rites with which the delivery of the sermons was accompanied, to the music from thrilling and deep-toned instruments, from the powerful choir of men, and the still more affecting one of boys.[1] The best comment, however, that can be made on the preaching of Dr. Tholuck is this; it is often instrumental, through the divine blessing, in effecting that radical transformation of character, without which no man can see the Lord.

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open to him its treasure-chambers, but the sages of Greece, the ancient and modern teachers of the church, the christian lyric poets present him their most beautiful flowers, and lay at his feet the most apposite expressions. Nor are allusions to unsanctified poets rejected from his sermons, but the world, willing or unwilling, is made serviceable to the sacred orator. There is given to Dr. Tholuck the power of enchantment over mind. His discourses possess, in a degree altogether peculiar, everything which secures the most powerful, immediate impression upon the hearers. We can very easily imagine how often a student, having never before listened to an animated discourse, which penetrated into the inmost soul, and who has therefore gradually accustomed himself to look upon a certain kind of dullness and tediousness as belonging to the very essence of a sermon, and constituting its edifying quality, when he has once strayed into Dr. Tholuck's church, would hang with fixed eye upon the lips of the preacher, and be confounded at the new and wonderful power of language with which he was addressed."

[1] The following is a condensed description of the rites, more impressive probably upon Germans than they would be upon us, which were connected with the delivery of the fourth sermon in this Volume. 'We sat,' says Prof. Sears, "directly in front of the pulpit, and when the congregation paused, we could just hear, at the altar at our extreme left, the accents of the preacher uttering the Lord's prayer; then suddenly voices of melody broke upon our ear from the orchestra in the gallery of the opposite extreme of the house. The preacher and the choir were facing each other, and responding; while the whole congregation, standing, occupied the vast space between.—During the responses the organ was silent. Then followed that which is called 'the chief song,' in which everything, that could utter a sound, united. In these shouts of the multitude, and tumultuous clangor of the instruments, which appear like an attempt to carry the heart by storm, there is, in my opinion, something too gross and physical to have the happiest effect. Before the hymn was concluded, the preacher was standing in the pulpit in true German style, in a fixed posture, with his hands clasped before his breast, and his eyes turned upward," etc.

THE RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD.

BY

DR. L. J. RÜCKERT.

THE DOCTRINE

OF THE

RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD.

A COMMENTARY ON THE FIFTEENTH CHAPTER OF THE FIRST EPISTLE TO THE CORINTHIANS.[1]

THIS chapter includes the last principal section of the Epistle, the defence and development of the doctrine of the resurrection, against certain deniers of it in Corinth. Who these were and what it was particularly which they denied will be a theme for inquiry at the appropriate place. The importance of this section is generally acknowledged, as it contributes the greater part of what we know respecting the form, in which the doctrine had developed itself in the mind of our apostle. A high value he evidently attached to it. Accordingly he handles it with much fulness, and, as we shall perceive, very systematically. Hence also the special introduction which precedes the consideration of it.

CHAP. XV. v. 1, 2. I now call your attention, brethren, to the Gospel which I preached unto you, which ye received, and by which ye stand, by which also ye shall be saved, if ye hold fast the word which I declared unto you, unless ye have believed in vain.

The construction demanded by Heydenreich and Billroth,[2] makes so harsh an inversion of the passage, that on no account can we

[1] See Note A, at the close of the Article.

[2] Namely, γνωρίζω ὑμῖν τίνι λόγῳ εὐηγγελισάμην ὑμῖν τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ὃ εὐηγγελισάμην ὑμῖν ὃ καὶ κ.τ.λ. 'I call to your remembrance with what discourse (or what was the nature of the Gospel which) I preached,' etc.

adopt it. Billroth remarks indeed, that the meaning of the first verses will be wholly disfigured by the common and obvious mode of construction. It may be shown, however, that this is not the case. We accordingly connect together the words 'I now call your attention to the Gospel,' etc.[1] The usual meaning of γνωρίζω is 'to make known.' But Paul could not have now, for the first time, imparted to them the knowledge of that with which they had been long acquainted, and hence the common explanation of the verb 'to remind,' 'to call to remembrance.' Since, however, it neither has nor can have this meaning, while Paul elsewhere makes use of the phrase in transitions as synonymous with the expression, 'I do not wish to have you ignorant,'[2] I choose instead of attaching to it a new signification, rather to acquiesce in the more general sense, 'I call your attention to.' The Gospel which he had preached to them, as explained by himself in the third and subsequent verses, was the knowledge of the death and resurrection of Christ. To what the Gospel thus contained, namely, to the fact that the Gospel which they had heard and received related to the death and resurrection of Jesus, he now invites their attention, in order that they might remember that to this, with all its consequences, including the doctrine of a general resurrection, they must either adhere, or else cease to be Christians; because, as he maintained, the denial of the resurrection of the dead would result in a denial of the resurrection of Christ, and of the redemption accomplished by him. He now makes the preliminary remark, that they would not renounce the name of Christians, they would not abjure the Gospel. Therefore he hopes that the more he could impress upon their hearts the relation in which they stood to the Gospel, the more certainly he should attain his object. This appears in the subsequent position, namely, 'which ye have received.'[3] The addition is important. He had not only announced the truth, but they had received it thus; they had acknowledged it as true. They would not now resort to the subterfuge of pretending that they had not understood it, or that they had not originally believed it. 'In which ye also stand.'—He now advances

[1] γνωρίζω ὑμῖν τὸ εὐαγγ. κ.τ.λ.

[2] In which case we are not to press the meaning of particular words too closely.

[3] The verb has a like meaning in John 1: 11, 'his own received him not.'

a step higher. The Corinthians had not merely heard the Gospel; they had not simply received it; they also stood in it, that is, they adhered firmly to a belief of it; they were still Christians; they had not yet rejected the Gospel.[1] The remark is not intended to flatter or delude them, because all to whom he wrote, firmly believed the doctrine that Christ died and rose again. Otherwise, he could by no means have built an argument upon it, as he has done in verses 13, 16, 20. All, however, had not drawn the same conclusion in respect to a resurrection strictly considered as he had. But this consequently was to be believed, and he employs it in order to lay as firm a foundation as possible for his subsequent reasoning. 'By which also ye are saved.' This is the highest point in the climax. Thereby they obtain salvation.[2] The apostle now subjoins a condition in the words 'if ye hold fast the declaration which I made known to you.'[3] If we take these words together, as most preceding commentators have done, we must recognize a transposition, by which the object is placed before the verb, a circumstance not by any means impossible.'[4] The word *κατέχειν* means 'to hold fast.'[5] An indirect question being implied, this firm adherence must relate rather to the memory than to the convictions of the mind. The apostle cannot, however, be naturally supposed to make any wide distinction. Rather a certain fulness of meaning is to be attached to the verb, including both a remembrance of what had been delivered to them, and a true, inward adherence to the object of their recollection. He uses *εἰ* and not *ἐάν* because he does not intend to represent the thing as problematical and possible, but as certain and real. We rightly translate *τίνι λόγῳ* 'in which discourse or declaration,' not 'in which word;'

[1] It is clear that the Perfect tense does not point, as some think, to a past time.

[2] Many suppose, but not correctly, that the Present tense is here used for the future. This would be the case only when *σωζῆται* pointed to nothing but to the attainment of future eternal happiness. But as it is an expression for salvation, as a whole, and while this relates to a continued process, as well to what has been already gained as to what is to be yet hoped for, so, according as the thing is presented in each particular instance, the Present tense may be as appropriately employed, as the Perfect in Eph. 2:5, 8, or the Aorist in Rom. 8:24.

[3] *τίνι λόγῳ-κατέχετε.*

[4] On the other hand, if we connect these words with *γνωρίζω* v. 1, then *κατέχετε* would stand by itself, to which Paul would have certainly added *αὐτό*.

[5] 1 Cor. 11: 2

or, if we take the Dative in a causal sense, 'on account of which declaration,' that is, 'on which ground or reason.' The words have the latter signification in Acts 10: 29, and thus Kypke interprets them here. But this is impossible, because there is no reference to the ground or reason which had induced the apostle to announce his message. We are to understand here the theme of his preaching, thus 'if ye possess and hold fast what I announced unto you as the Gospel.' To this adherence to the word preached, and indeed to all included under it, they must stand firm. There was to be no narrowing down or mutilation, which some individuals endeavored to effect. In these circumstances, when he felt constrained to awaken their attention, it was very proper to assure them that they could not attain the salvation, which he had declared to them as the fruit of the Gospel, and which unquestionably they still expected to enjoy, if they did not comply with this condition. I therefore see no reason at all, why this interpretation of the words should disfigure the thought.—'Unless ye have believed in vain.[1] The meaning of εἰκῇ is 'rashly,' 'without ground.' The entire point will be elucidated in the course of the subsequent reasoning, where the apostle shows that if there be no resurrection of the dead, then preaching and faith are vain, and salvation is impossible.[2] Looking forward to this position, he here subjoins a remark entirely incidental but not without severity, and which stands in connection with the clause 'by which ye shall be saved, if ye hold fast,' etc. 'In attaining salvation through the Gospel, it is an implied point that you remain true to whatever it contains.' As if recollecting himself, and intending to explain what he had before said, he adds, in an ironical manner, 'It would be somewhat thus,—ye would have believed without good reason, if they are in the right, who by subverting the belief in a resurrection, would make the whole Gospel a fable.'

V. 3, 4. For I delivered to you among the first what I even received, that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, and that he was buried, and that he rose again on the third day, according to the Scriptures.

[1] The pleonasm lying in ἐκτὸς εἰ μή has been remarked upon in 1 Cor. 14 5. In respect to the present passage, Kypke has collected ten like instances from Lucian.

[2] Comp. verses 14, 17, seq.

These verses contain a summary of the contents of the Gospel which had been preached to the Corinthians. 'I delivered what I received.' He had received the historical fact perhaps only by tradition, while the import of it was indeed 'by the revelation of Jesus Christ.[1] What had been entrusted to him, he communicated to them, and that too 'among the first.'[2] If πρώτοις is in the neuter gender, the phrase shows that the death and resurrection of Jesus was one of the first topics which he communicated to them. Accordingly it would seem to follow, that he considered it as the most important doctrine, the fundamental principle of the whole Christian system. On this supposition, the difficulty which I have experienced entirely disappears,[3] and it is remarkable that in my manifold consideration of the passage, this signification of it did not occur to me. I will not pronounce it a false exposition, but yet it ill accords with my feelings.[4] Paul does not delay long in mentioning the death of Christ. It was enough here to indicate it as having happened, though he subjoins, without explanation, two qualifying clauses. First, 'he died for our sins.' This he deemed necessary, because he had awakened in them the feeling that they were no longer in their sins, verses 4, 17. Secondly, it was 'according to the Scriptures,' that is, it was in close correspondence with, and a fulfilment of the predictions which the Old Testament contained respecting the death of Christ. It is well known how often in the Gospels, Christ referred to the fact that the Scriptures would be only fulfilled by his sufferings and death. That there must have been many indications of this sort is clear.[5] Paul, as we see, does not name the passage to which he refers. One naturally thinks of the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. The assertion might have appeared important to the apostle in so far as it was a testimony, not to the event itself which was undoubted, but to the importance of it, since an antecedent announcement had been made in the writings

[1] Gal. 1: 12.

[2] Chrysostom explains ἐν πρώτοις of time, 'at first,' 'in the beginning,' ἐξ ἀρχῆς. οὐ τοῦτο.

[3] See Note B, at the end of this Article.

[4] Partly on the ground of the proximity of the word ὑμῶν, and partly, as it appears to me, if this sense had been intended, it would have been written τοῦτο πρῶτον.

[5] Luke 24: 25—27.

of the Old Testament which were regarded as sacred. The mention of the burial of Jesus may have been intended to show that he actually died, and to remove the cavil that possibly he was not truly dead, and so could not have been raised to life, but was resuscitated from a condition resembling death. Everything, however, which befals the literally dead had befallen him. His body was laid in the tomb, and was there confined three days. Finally his resurrection was according to the Scriptures.[1]

V. 5—7. And that he appeared to Cephas, then to the twelve, then he appeared to above five hundred brethren at once, of whom the greater part remain to this present time, though some are fallen asleep; then he appeared to James, then to all the apostles.

A confirmation of the fact from the instances of his appearance after he arose. Here is not the place to institute a strict comparison of the occurrences which in this passage are barely mentioned with those recorded in the Gospels, or to investigate how far they do, or do not, harmonize. A few words must suffice. 'He was seen of Cephas.' This is nowhere else mentioned, with the exception of Luke 24: 34, and there only in a word. 'Then of the twelve.' From the use of the adverb 'then,' it might seem that the appearances are named in the order of time, so far as Paul was made acquainted with it. But how perfectly such knowledge was possessed by him, or whether it was actually possessed by any other one, can never be determined. The mention of the 'twelve' has occasioned some attempts to introduce Matthias. It has been long acknowledged, however, that the apostles are here alone referred to, though but eleven in number; or but ten if there be an allusion to the narrative in John 20: 19, 23. They are called 'the twelve' with the same propriety as the terms decemviri, centumviri are employed, or as Xenophon mentions 'the thirty' after the death of Critias. It is, in a sense, the title of their office. 'Of above five hundred brethren at once.' The adverb 'above' is equivalent to 'more than' as used in Mark 14: 5.[2] 'Brethren,' means the same with 'disciples'[3] as

[1] He might have referred to Ps. 16: 10. Is. 53: 10.

[2] See ἐπάνω Mark 14: 5. The construction in which a case connected with a verb stands instead of a Genitive which should be used is common in Latin numerals. In Greek, definite examples of it are wanting. Those mentioned in Matthiae Sect. 455. 4. are insufficient.

[3] μαθηταί

used by the evangelists in the wider sense. In respect to the event here mentioned it cannot be determined whether it is one which we find in the evangelists. Matt. 28: 16 has been suggested, but there the eleven only are named, while the concluding clause in verse 17, 'some doubted,' leaves us uncertain in respect to the presence of others. Against Heumann's conjecture that the assembling at the time of the ascension is meant,[1] it may be said that the number, 'one hundred and twenty,'[2] is less opposed inasmuch as there may have been a greater number on the Mount of Olives than had subsequently remained together in Jerusalem, than the circumstance that Paul names two subsequent appearances, if we suppose that he follows the order of time. The additional remark that the larger part of the five hundred still lived, some only having fallen asleep, appears to have been designed to exhibit them as witnesses whose testimony might still be examined. An appearance made particularly to a James alone is not elsewhere mentioned in our authorities.[3] That James the brother of the Lord is meant can be regarded as probable, since at that time he was in high esteem, while the brother of John was not then living. Heumann's notion that Thomas is to be understood is unworthy of notice. Equally ignorant are we in respect to the last appearance, 'to all the apostles.' Some have referred to John 20: 16 when Thomas was present, he having been absent on a previous occasion. Others take the word 'apostles' in a wider sense. But the conclusion of the whole matter is that we know nothing about it.

V. 8, 9. And last of all he appeared to me also, as one born out of due time, for I am the least of the apostles, and am not worthy to be called an apostle, because I persecuted the church of God.

Finally Paul names himself as among those to whom the risen Saviour had appeared. We inquire when and at what place? On

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[1] Luke 24: 50. Acts 1: 6 seq. [2] Acts 1: 15.

[3] What Jerome narrates in his Catal. Script. Eccl., from the Apocryphal Gospel according to the Hebrews, has perhaps as little credibility as it has harmony with the order of time. [The appearance to James is mentioned by this Apocryphal writer as occurring immediately after the resurrection.—Tr.]

the road to Damascus, is the usual reply. But it has been already shown that it is by no means certain that Paul actually saw the Saviour on that occasion.[1] If he did not, then we must here resort to a later vision. In reality this does not alter the case, for the appearance on that journey can be well explained only as an internal one, to the mind; and what is of essential importance, such a manifestation would not prove the resurrection of Jesus. If it proved any thing, it would prove only his existence, but it would not show his previous return to life in a corporeal resurrection. Both ideas were, however, closely united in the mind of Paul. He could think of a living Christ only as one who had risen, and so of one not risen only as one dead; at least, his course of argument in the thirteenth and the following verses rests on this ground. If thus the life of the Lord was made certain to him by what had happened, so also was his resurrection. The mention of the fact that he also had seen the Lord leads him to express a very humble opinion of himself. This must have been the genuine out-flowing of his inward feelings; the more so, as there was no external inducement for such an expression. We then learn from him the ground of these feelings—grief for his early persecution of the church of Christ—grief, as it should seem, which did not leave him while he lived, its sting ever more active within him, stimulating him to the most indefatigable efforts for the cause against which he had once turned the whole force of his powerful will. This expression, that Jesus had appeared to him last of all, springs from his emotions, while he still subjoins, 'as to one born out of due time.'[2] That the noun means nothing else than a premature birth is shown so incontrovertibly by Wetstein in a multitude of instances adduced from physicians, grammarians and other writers, that we may fully coincide with Fritzsche[3] in his refutation of the exposition of Schultess,[4] provided even that this exposition strongly commended itself on other grounds, which is by no means the case. From the earliest times downward, unspeakable pains have been taken in order to determine the sense in which Paul could say that

[1] See Note C, at the end of this Article. [2] ὥσπερεὶ τῷ ἐκτρώματι.

[3] De Nonnullis Post. Pauli ad Corinthios Epistolae Locis. Dissertatio I. Lips. 1823, p. 6 seq.

[4] First published in a Review of Kuinoel's Comment. on N. T. in the N. Theol. Annalen; then in opposition to Emmerlung's Bemerkungen in Kiel and Tzschirner's Analekten I. St 2. and as a Defence of the same St. I. 212.

he 'was born out of due time'' Here also I must agree with Fritzsche, that we are not to seek for an explanation by a special search over the wide regions of possibility,[1] but we are to look simply and only at the apostle's own words in verse ninth. A premature birth, (for he could not have understood the word of a monstrous, misshapen birth), is feeble, imperfectly formed, rarely able to live. Thus Paul calls himself a premature birth, being as unworthy of the high name of an apostle, as a premature birth is of the name of a man; as little fitted for the duties of an apostle as that is for a natural life in the world.[2] The phrase is softened by prefixing 'as it were,' 'just as if,'[3] and accordingly the whole verse runs thus, 'Last of all he appeared to me also, who am among them, as it were, a premature birth, the poorest and most unworthy of all.' Verse 9 contains the explanation, 'For I am the least of the apostles, who am not worthy to be called an apostle, because I persecuted the church of God.' 'I am the least of the apostles,' as in Eph. 3: 8, he declares that he is 'least of all saints,' and on this account, (for this appears to be the connection expressed by the relative 'who'), 'I am, (properly speaking), unworthy[4] to be called an apostle.' It is by no means necessary to give the verb 'to be called,'[5] another sense as is done by Heydenreich and Flatt. The ground of his unworthiness is his former persecution of the church of God.

V. 10. But by the grace of God I am what I am, and his grace which was in me was not in vain, for I labored more abundantly than they all; yet not I, but the grace of God which was with me.

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[1] Dum de vocabulo ἔκτρωμα ad P. consilium connivent.

[2] Paul writes τὸ ἔκτρωμα, not ἔκτρωμά τι, which indeed he might have done, and it would have contributed to soften the harshness of the expression; but, he was neither compelled to do this, as he wished to compare himself with the other apostles, he being among them 'the premature one,' that is, the feeblest and weakest of them all; nor, could it have been expressed by using τῷ in the sense of τινί, a form which is altogether foreign to the dialect. It is foreign to it, for there are retained in 1 Thess. 4: 6, ἐν τῷ πράγματι. 'In anything,' there means ἐν μηδενὶ πρ.

[3] ὡσπερεί. See Longinus π. ὕψ. in Wetstein.

[4] The word ἱκανὸς is equivalent to ἄξιος Matt. 3: 11, Luke 3: 16. It is used for ἄξιος John 1: 17.

[5] καλεῖσθαι.

So deep was this feeling of his great unworthiness, while so profound also was his consciousness of the labors which he had performed since the grace of God had called him to the apostleship, notwithstanding his unworthiness, that he cannot permit it to pass unnoticed. It would thus augment the glory of Him who had given him strength to labor. 'Through the grace of God he is what he is,'[1] and indeed[2] his grace, which he hath manifested in him,[3] was not in vain, for he labored more than they all; yet, it was not he but the grace of God which was with him,' that is, which accompanied him and sustained his labors.[4]

V. 11. Whether, therefore, I, or they, so we preach and so ye believed.

This concludes what is preliminary to the main discussion, namely, that the message respecting the death and resurrection of Christ was taught unanimously by all the apostles, and was by them received as the foundation of their faith. 'So ye believed.' Thus ye put confidence in it; that is, in this message ye received Christianity. 'Believed' is used in the same sense here, as in Rom. 13: 11 and elsewhere.

V. 12. Now if Christ be preached that he is raised from the dead, how say some among you that there is no resurrection of the dead?[5]

He now passes to the controversy itself. The apostle presupposes two points when he inquires, how it was possible, that while Christ was preached as if raised from the dead, there yet should be some among the Corinthians who denied the general resurrection. First, no one disbelieved the resurrection of Christ. That there were such

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[1] The words 'I am,' imply more than if he had said, 'I am an apostle.' It includes not only his apostolical office, but his fitness and his labors devoted to a fulfilment of the duties of that office.

[2] 'Indeed,' this is the force of *καὶ* in this place.

[3] The phrase *ἡ εἰς ἐμέ* is the same as *ἣν ἐνδείξατο ἐν ἐμοί* · which he has made operative in respect to me.'

[4] *ἡ σὺν ἐμοί–ἡ συνεργοῦσά μοι.*

[5] On the passage v. 12—19, comp. a Dissertation of Knapp in his Opusculis varii Argumenti, Fasc. I. 299.

persons whether Jews or Gentiles is not at all probable. It is indeed inconceivable that any man could be then found, who would acknowledge a crucified but not a risen Messiah as the Lord, and the author of salvation to man. The other presupposition is, that a belief in the resurrection of Christ and a denial of the general resurrection involved a contradiction, for such a contradiction is indicated by the relation between the first and second members, and by the interrogative πῶς 'how.'[1] But in order to a correct estimate of his confutation—for his exhibition is to be viewed in such a light rather than as a direct proof of the doctrine of the resurrection—it will be indispensable that we inquire, in the first place, who denied the doctrine, and secondly what were the points, particularly, which they denied. If we could establish one of these two points with any certainty, then we might arrive at a tolerably safe conclusion in respect to the other. But since Paul has given no definite information in respect to the two points, nowhere intimating who were the deniers, or what was the nature of their skepticism, while his refutation is so constructed, that one point perhaps excepted, we can determine with certainty nothing relating to it, we are thus compelled to remain without any full or explicit information in respect to either of the topics. That we may, however, ascertain what is practicable, we will inquire what these deniers of the resurrection rejected. In what way did they refuse credence to it? Did they reject the personal, continued existence of the soul after death? Such must be the ground which those assume who think that they have detected Sadducees or Epicureans in the persons in question.[2] They rest their opinion on verses 18 seq., 29, 33. Those who discover traces of Epicureanism refer particularly to verse 32. I must, however, oppose all conjectures of this sort. The argument against it, employed by Ziegler,[3] namely, that Paul, if he had been contending with the Sadducees, would have done so by drawing his proofs from the Scriptures, is certainly too weak, inasmuch as we do not know but that he might have found reasons which would apply also against the Sadducees; and even if

[1] See Gal. 2: 14.

[2] Heumann, Michaelis Einl. 1229, Storr Opus. Acad. II. 333., Flatt, Knapp, 310, Bertholdt Einl. 3329 seq.

[3] Theol. Beitr. II. 36.

the scope of his reasoning were appropriate to the Sadducees, this would not remove the conjecture that there were Epicurean opponents. But what is decidedly opposed to every interpretation of the kind is the fact, that those to whom Paul refers believed in the resurrection of Christ. This is undeniable, for Paul seizes hold of this position as firmly as possible. He not only does not intimate that it was doubted, but he makes it the basis of his subsequent course of reasoning. This he could not have actually done, if there had been any place, for doubt. Besides, as has been already remarked, neither the Sadducees nor Epicureans were so spiritually inclined that they could have believed in a Christ who had not risen from the dead. We may, therefore, conclude that they [the opponents] were not of these sects. That they denied the doctrine of a future existence is not at all conceivable. Christianity offered to its adherents so little that was joyful in this present life, that without the hope which it brings with it—and this Paul as the promulger of it concealed as little in his sermons as in his letters—they would have been at most only men possessing an elevated natural morality, on which ground certainly such multitudes would not have received it as actually did receive it. Besides, in the anticipated approaching coming of Christ [then prevalent] one might have hoped for eternal life without the separating process of death. That life must have been at all events expected, else one could not have been a Christian. The reasoning of the apostle may, however, seem favorable to the opinion which I reject, so far as he actually declares that he has to do with those who denied an immortality.[1] The ground of this opinion, nevertheless, lies only in the fact that for him as a Jew and a Pharisee,[2] the doctrines of the continued existence of the soul and of the resurrection were so mingled, that whoever denied the one could not firmly adhere to the other, and therefore Paul, without fully knowing what was maintained or denied at Corinth, and looking at the whole subject from his own point of view, supposed that he might treat the opposers of the doctrine of the resurrection as opposers of a belief in a future life.[3] In regard to the traces of an Epicurean sentiment, which some persons imagine that they find in verse 32, we must remark that the passage is a proof of the contrary. Paul there informs his readers

[1] Comp. verses, 19, 29 seq. [2] Comp. Knapp. 303.

[3] Neander Geschich. der Pflan. u Leit. d. Chr. Kirche, I. 213.

that a denial of the resurrection, including a rejection of the continued, personal existence of the soul, will lead to nothing as a consequence but a frivolous mode of spending this present life, which he there describes, in order that, on the presupposition that they rejected such a view of life as much as he did, they might thus be convinced of the pernicious nature of their unbelief, and might be restored to faith in the true doctrine. At any rate he must have been altogether ignorant of the existence of such an Epicurean sentiment, because, otherwise, he could not have applied this argument, which would have been wholly useless.

Accordingly we understand at least so much as this. The 'some'[1] in Corinth were not the materialists who deny all personal existence of the soul beyond the grave; but they were those who contended only against the form in which the hope of Christians educated in the bosom of Judaism had, necessarily from its origin, clothed itself, namely, a belief in the resurrection of the body after its dissolution by death. Hence certainly it follows that the persons to whom Paul refers did not belong to the Judaizing party, at least, that they were not Jewish Christians. A Jew, who believed in a future life, believed also, undoubtedly,—some few Hellenizing Jews perhaps excepted—just as our apostle did. Most probably he had his eye on some Gentile Christians. But what occasioned their doubts, whether the idea of the unfitness of earthly materials as a dwelling for the spirit in a higher stage of life, or the inconceivableness of the process by which a new body is erected from the wasted and scattered remnants of the old, or whether, like Neander, we feel compelled to assume that the persons in question were philosophical doubters,—to these questions no satisfactory answer can be given. Supposing that Paul did not himself, of his own accord, start the inquiry, 'how are the dead raised,' verse 35, and put it into the mouth of an opponent, viewing it as one of the difficulties which would be elsewhere raised against the doctrine, then we may admit it as a proof, that the inconceivableness of the event was one of the reasons at least, on account of which the doctrine of the resurrection was controverted at Corinth. But here also we have no certainty.

We now proceed to examine and state the grounds on which Paul argues with those who denied his doctrine. As the meaning of the

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[1] τινὲς ἐν ὑμῖν.

words is surprisingly clear in the whole subsequent discussion, it will be the main business of the interpreter to investigate the arguments which the writer adduces according to their logical value, and according to this alone. He must here, if anywhere, dismiss his peculiar philosophical and doctrinal views, and endeavor so closely to stand in the position of the historical Paul, that wherever possible he may see all the principles advanced by him with the same eyes with which he did ; and holding up before himself the one object of inquiry he may proceed with logical exactness, while on the same grounds also he seeks to refute the opinions which are opposite. The less this has been done heretofore, the more the peculiar doctrinal view has everywhere exerted an influence on the interpretation of this chapter, the more fully shall I be justified, in my own handling of the subject, in omitting to refer to my predecessors, with whom it is not my business to contend. My simple object is to show how Paul himself thought, and to exhibit the logical connection of his arguments.[1]

V. 13. Now if there be no resurrection of the dead, neither is Christ raised.

Paul having already said that a belief in the resurrection of Christ and a denial of the resurrection of believers involved a contradiction, he proceeds to the proof.[2] 'Now some among you think that there is no resurrection, but if there be no resurrection, then,' etc. The words 'is not,'[3] have the same propriety as in ch. 7: 9, 9: 2, 11: 6, when the non-existence of the resurrection is affirmed. The inference follows, 'If there be no resurrection of the dead, then Christ is not raised.' In order to form a correct estimate of the reasoning,

[1] The more—with regret I must add—will my Commentary displease the doctrinal exegetes. I see this beforehand, but I cannot change my course; I cannot be faithless to my principles in order to win applause. I cannot allow that the two diverse persons—the interpreter and the doctrinal writer—can be merged into each other. No good ever did come from it, nor ever will.

[2] He might have used γὰρ 'for.' That he employs δὲ 'now' shows, that he has not so much in mind the πῶς λέγουσιν 'how do some say,' as the simple λέγουσιν, 'they say.'

[3] οὐκ ἔστιν.

we must bear in mind what is contained in the premises as Paul states them—not simply that 'the spirits of the dead continue to live, while their bodies shall not be reänimated,' but 'if with the death of the body all life be absolutely annihilated.'[1] His argument may then assume this form.[2] 'What is universally impossible cannot occur in a particular, definite instance. If there be found no place for the return of the dead to life, then Christ is not restored to life, but is dead, as all others are.' This course of argument, obvious as it may be, is attended with some difficulty. I do not here refer to the fact that Paul has identified the continued existence of the soul and the resurrection. So far as this is a difficulty, it lies in the fundamental conception of the subject, not in the reasoning. Neither do I allude to the fact, that there seems to be a difference between the calling to life of a corpse that had been dead but thirty six hours, and one that had been for a long time decayed. Paul does not here view the subject in the aspect of a purely natural possibility; and even if he had done so, he could have replied, that with the Almighty, who 'calleth things which be not, as though they were,'[3] there is no difference between what is easy and what is difficult. But what I here intend is this—the conclusion that there is no resurrection of the dead if Christ be not risen, can hold only so far as Paul establishes a perfect coincidence between the nature of Christ and that of man.[4] So far as Christ is to be regarded as a being of a higher nature, so soon as he is considered the eternal Logos, the creating power of God, the same rule or law for him and for created man cannot hold, and while *he* must have a continued existence, the ceasing to exist on the part of *man* is conceivable. We are thus compelled to say that Paul views Christ here only in his human nature, which certainly is the same with the nature of all other men. He does not speak of a distinction between the nature of Christ and that of men, or at least it is nowhere definitely indicated. Thus it only remains, either that the apostle had unconsciously before his eyes the human nature of Christ, or else the argument does not prove what he intended.

[1] Comp. v. 19, 29—32.

[2] From Knapp 316, somewhat different from that followed by Heydenreich and Flatt.

[3] Rom. 4: 17.

[4] Believers are in this case to be regarded simply as men, since their union with Christ has altered nothing in their nature.

Allowing the validity of the reasoning, he might proceed at once to affirm, 'but now is Christ risen, and therefore there will be a [general] resurrection.' He postpones this, however, to the twentieth verse, in order first to adduce certain consequences which would follow on the supposition that Christ was not raised.[1]

V. 14. If Christ be not raised, then is our preaching vain and your faith is also vain.

First consequence. If Christ be not risen, then the preaching of the apostles and the faith of Christians are vain. To understand by 'preaching' simply the declaration respecting the resurrection of Christ would give too narrow a sense. Paul expresses himself without limitation, and he must certainly be regarded as referring to the whole circle of his preaching. In a more special sense it related to Christ, the reconciler of man with God, the liberator from the guilt of sin, the author of the right to eternal life for those united to him, and the founder of the church of God, which embraces all nations without distinction. Paul avers that this preaching would be useless if Christ were not risen. In what manner it would be useless he explains in the seventeenth verse. If the work of redemption had not been accomplished, then the merits of Christ would have been of no service whatever, and the proclamation of his grace, failing in objective truth, would have been a declaration of falsehood. 'Faith' is also a general term, and to be taken in the wider sense, as the belief of Christians, a conviction in respect to the whole circle of evangelical truth and a reception of it in the inmost soul. If Christ were not risen, this faith would be vain, that is, it would rest on a false foundation, and therefore would be of no use to believers. In order to justify this inference, Paul must have considered that not only the death but the resurrection of Jesus was a condition of his qualifications as a Redeemer. This, indeed, cannot be deduced with entire certainty from any definite expressions, since Paul, who on no occasion conducts us through a philosophical theory of the terms of salvation, but everywhere announces what had actually occurred, had no occasion to express himself on the point in question. It may, however, be recognized as well from scattered hints,[2] as from

[1] See Note D. at the close of the Article. [2] Rom. 4: 25. Phil. 3. 10.

the entire tenor of his doctrines. Thus his conclusion rests on just grounds, although it would exert its peculiar power as a proof only upon him who was fully convinced of the actual fact of the redemption which had been accomplished. In the view of an opponent a consequence would not follow, except when it embraced something impossible, an absolute contradiction to that which was certainly true, or else something incontrovertibly proved. This is not here the case. Faith in the actual existence of the work of redemption is grounded on the fact of the death of Christ, and, according to Paul, of his resurrection. If the fact be not true, then assuredly the faith falls to the ground, because it ceases to have any truth. But it does not follow that the fact itself must be true. Paul, however, writes in the most lively consciousness of this salvation, and thus portrays it before his readers. So far he may employ the consequence as an argument.

V. 15. Yea also we are found false witnesses before God, because we testify against God, that he raised Christ, whom he did not raise, if the dead are not raised.

The second consequence. The apostles are deceivers and criminals if Christ be not raised. They step forward as witnesses who have seen the risen Saviour, while yet he is not risen. They are thus false witnesses. They declare that God has raised up Christ, when he has not done it. Thus towards God they have become false witnesses. False testimony is the crime which is forbidden in the decalogue ; how much more if this testimony relate to what God has done ? The expressions are finely chosen so as to place the crime in as clear a light as possible. 'We are found false witnesses.' We are not only such, but we are discovered to be such; we stand in that position. 'False witnesses,' not deluded but deceivers —those who testify that they have seen what they have not seen. 'False witnesses of God.' The genitive is used in order to point out him of whom they testified, namely, God, that he had done what he had not done. This testimony Paul terms 'against God.'[1]

[1] The preposition κατὰ is employed with the design of aggravating the offence, for it presents it as testimony in opposition to God. This preposition, indeed, with the Genitive, originally signifies merely 'of,' 'in respect to' any object, but its usage has been so modified that it indicates an unfriendly

The last position, 'Whom he did not raise, if so be the dead are not raised,' was not absolutely demanded inasmuch as it proceeds from the supposition in question, but viewed oratorically it is a very energetic repetition. 'If so be,' 'indeed,' 'truly,' 'if it be actually true what they assert.' This consequence, powerfully as it must have stirred the feelings, when viewed as a challenge to their faith in the honesty of the apostles, and deserving of high praise coming upon them as an oratorical stroke, would yet appear forced when considered as an argument addressed to an opponent. That may certainly follow which Paul here announces, if Christ be not risen. But little as a man would regard the apostle as capable of a deceit, so little still could he see an absolute impossibility in the case; and, as before remarked, it is only where this is involved, that a consequence becomes a valid argument in the view of an opponent.

V. 16—18. For if the dead be not raised, neither is Christ raised; and if Christ be not raised, your faith is vain, ye are yet in your sins; then also those who sleep in Christ have perished.

This may seem, so far as the thoughts in verses 13, 14 are reiterated, a mere repetition; but I think it is more. Did Paul wish to deduce the series of consequences which would flow from the position that the dead are not raised, in order to produce the desired effect on the feelings, then the members of this series must follow each other in a rapid manner, and he could not delay on any one of them, as indeed he has not done. The reflection, 'your faith is vain,' would bring upon the true Christian a burden so heavy that rather than bear it he would submit to anything, and this reflection Paul could not suffer to remain unemployed, so that by means of it he might bring back his readers from the thought 'that the dead are not raised.' Accordingly he reverts to it once more, in its external form connecting it as a proof or illustration to verse 15, 'we are false witnesses,' etc., but in fact intending a still further reference to verse 14, 'your faith is vain,' etc. 'Thus,' he exclaims, 'if the dead be not risen, then also Christ is not risen, but if Christ be not risen, your faith is vain.' 'Faith' must be taken in the same sense altogether as where used above, else the apostle could not be under-

or hostile relation. Knapp justly shows this, p. 319, in opposition to Erasmus, Beza and others.

stood in the other parts of the comparison. 'Is useless.'[1] This I do not consider as entirely equivalent to 'is vain'[2] in verse 14. The former seems to point merely to the groundlessness of the faith, from which follows its worthless character, its want of value; while the latter strongly affirms, 'your faith will not save you;' to which the following thought is annexed as a comment; 'ye shall die in your sins,'[3] means 'ye shall die without having been delivered from your sins,' so here 'to be yet in your sins,' must signify, that 'ye are not freed from your sins.' The design of the death of Christ was to rescue mankind from their sins, and to present them faultless before God. For this end believers confide in Jesus, through whom their sins are taken away, and they attain a state of justification. If they do not arrive at this state, then their faith is fruitless, they have accomplished nothing by it. As we have before remarked, Paul presents the resurrection as a condition of the actual achievement of salvation; thus if the resurrection does not follow, then faith in Jesus would bring no fruit. But this to him who had received the faith in the sincerity of his soul was the hardest thing which could befal him; it was to lose his life and his labors; and what could be more cruel than this?

In verse 18, Paul deduces another consequence, which was embraced indeed in the foregoing, but is here more fully brought out, in order to make a still deeper impression on the feelings. 'Then those who sleep in Christ have perished.' He refers to those who had died in communion with Christ, or as believers on him, the Christians who were already dead. We are not here to think of the martyrs. Destruction,[4] it is well known, is the lot of sinners, when salvation is impossible. But if Christ has effected no deliverance, then perdition will be the common doom of all without distinction, the living and the dead. In respect to the living, however, there is one advantage. Though he have hitherto mistaken the way, he may yet by some other path reach the goal;—but all the dead—they are given over a prey to perdition without redemption. Paul, skilfully making use of a prevalent mortality at Corinth, which might have here and there snatched from them [the Corinthian believers] a loved one, thus leads them to reflect, that if they denied the resurrection, they would pass sentence of eternal destruction on their own beloved dead,

[1] ματαία ἐστίν.
[2] κενή ἐστιν.
[3] John 8: 21.
[4] ἀπώλεια.

which certainly they would not wish to do. This argument is also oratorically good, and appropriate, but would be deficient as a convincing logical proof in the same manner as the preceding inference.

V. 19. If in this life we have hope in Christ only we are of all men the most miserable.

We have in this verse, undoubtedly, another inference. We may inquire, however, whether it is deduced directly from the position, 'if the dead are not raised,' or indirectly through another position, namely, 'then is not Christ raised.' We think, however, that the latter is firmly established in the fourth and subsequent verses in order to serve as an immoveable basis for the contradiction of the first position, and that all the preceding inferences may be deduced from the single [supposed] fact, 'Christ is not raised.' On this alone we think that the last series of thoughts rests, and as there is not a syllable to indicate that there is another basis assumed, we feel very much inclined to refer this [the inference in the nineteenth verse] also to the same foundation. Thus it may be argued from verse 28, that the idea always floating before the mind of the apostle must have been, 'if Christ be not raised,' not 'if the dead be not raised.' Besides, there appears to be a resemblance between verse 18 and verse 19. What in the first is asserted of the dead, is in the last indeed averred of the living, and of all the living without distinction, yet the language refers us to the end of life, as is implied by the use of the Perfect tense. That which is in the first instance declared of some persons, in the last appears to be applied to all. Finally, the position of the adverb 'only'[1] is such that, although on the supposition of a harsh inversion it might certainly be connected with the phrase 'in this life,'[2] as it appears to have been viewed by all the commentators, Morus excepted, and although the phrase, 'only in Christ',[3] would be a far better construction, it yet appears much the most simple to connect 'only' with 'Christ.'[4] These various circumstances have led me to deduce this verse as a consequence from the second position, namely, 'that Christ is not raised.' To hope in one, is to put confidence in him.[5] The time referred to in the verse must be that period when we shall attain the reward of our faith, at

[1] μόνον. [2] ἐν τῇ ζωῇ ταυτῇ. [3] ἐν μόνῳ τῷ Χριστῷ.
[4] μόνον with ἐν Χριστῷ. [5] Comp. Eph. 1: 12 2 K. 18: 5. Judith 9: 7.

the end of this life. But μόνον connected with ἐν Χριστῷ suggests the thought of the exclusion of all other grounds of trust. Accordingly we have the idea, 'If through the course of this life we repose our entire reliance in Christ alone, abjuring all other grounds of confidence and sources of happiness, and yet Christ be not raised, but be still dead, our faith a dream, our sins not taken away, and Christ able to accomplish nothing which he promised—then we of all men are the most wretched.' This thought, concentrating into one great impression the terrible consequences of everything which had been previously declared, is fitted, in a very peculiar manner, to be the key-stone of the entire refutation. The phrase, 'we are of all men the most miserable,' may be explained in one of two ways. First, the miserable man is he who has no hope. Far more wretched, however, is the one who had a hope, who directed to it the whole force of his mind, regarding it as infallible, offering up everything else to it, when at the termination of his course, he finds himself deluded, and is compelled to know that he has sacrificed everything to a shadow, an empty dream; in short, that all his longing and struggling, his hastening and running, his hopes and pains have come to nought. Or we may suppose, secondly, that the apostle has entirely descended to the common modes of estimating happiness among men; he regrets that he had devoted his life to goodness, that for her sake he had treated the pleasures of life with contempt, when after all, he has no reward, no enjoyment for his sacrifices. Such an exposition would not be impossible. Paul always knew very well how to address his readers in the quarter where they were the most susceptible, and in verse 29 seq., we have in fact something of the sort. In this passage, however, he certainly considers the subject from a more elevated point of view. I cannot consequently adopt the latter interpretation, but must adhere to the first named.

V. 20. But now is Christ risen from the dead, and become the first fruits of them who slept.

Having completed the delineation of the unutterable wretchedness embodied in the single thought, 'the dead are not raised,' connecting it with the inference that then Christ could not have risen, the apostle takes away, as with one stroke, this entire misery, by the triumphant reflection, 'now is Christ risen.' The great results he then

describes successively from verse 21 to verse 28. From verse 29 two arguments follow in order to overthrow the opposite opinion. This whole subsequent section has been frequently viewed as a digression or an episode. But this opinion is certainly incorrect. It is the principal division, and the only one of a positive character in the whole of the first part of the discussion. It cannot be considered as an episode. Much more natural is the supposition, that the arguments did not occur to Paul till he came to verse 20; they then appeared to be sufficiently important to be appended to the conclusion. In accordance with his manner, he announces the fact which will take away the opposite consequences before mentioned, which would flow from the position, [that the dead are not raised.] This is fitly introduced by the particles 'but now.'[1] The result, properly speaking, he rather intimates, than expresses in so many words, 'thus all this misery is taken away; rather is our resurrection now made certain to us.' 'Christ is raised,' he exclaims, 'and become the first fruits[2] of them who slept.' The meaning of this clause might refer to those who first died, but the whole connection of the passage, and particularly verse 23, 'each in his own order,' etc., show clearly that Christ is intended as the one who first rose, the first fruits of them who slept, the first one who was brought to life from the realm of death. First fruits, however, are followed by a harvest. Therefore the consequent resurrection of all connected with Christ is involved, that is of all believers. The full sense of the passage is accordingly this, 'Christ is risen, not in order to remain the only one so risen, but that he might be the first among his associates, the precursor of all the others, the primary member in a long series of his friends who have fallen asleep.' The same idea could have been expressed thus, 'that he might be the first fruits of them who slept,' or 'thus he became the first fruits,'[3] etc. How far Christ is the first fruits, and how his resurrection follows from that of believers, the

[1] νυνὶ δέ.

[2] 'First fruits,' see Rom. 8: 23. 11: 16.

[3] εἰς τὸ εἶναι ἀπαρχὴ τῶν κεκοιμ., or καὶ οὕτως ἀπαρχὴ ἐγένετο τῶν κεκ. This appears to be what Billroth means, when he remarks that the words 'became the first fruits,' etc. are not merely to be considered as in apposition, but as a predicate of the *entire* preceding proposition. Grammatically, indeed, they are only in apposition, but such a construction in Greek frequently expresses a complete idea of what is contained in the main proposition

apostle fully explains in the following section. We are now to listen to him, and to exhibit, in as perspicuous a manner as possible, the true sense and bearing of his arguments, entirely abstaining from that exposition which is properly of a dogmatical character.

V. 21, 22. For since by man was death, so by man was the resurrection of the dead; for as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.

That Paul here designs an illustration is evident from the particle 'for.' The principal proposition, 'Christ is now raised,' cannot be referred to. It is manifestly that which is in apposition, namely, 'that he might become the first fruits of them who slept.' But the subject is illustrated by means of a parallel, which the apostle draws in the same manner as in Rom. 5: 12 seq., between Adam the author of sin and death, and Christ the destroyer of sin and the restorer to life. Both Adam and Christ he places here, as well as there, at the head of two series or races, the representatives, as it were, and the leaders. The second, Christ, abolishes what the first introduces, restoring back to man what the first Adam took from him. 'By man was death.' This is more fully expressed and illustrated, Rom. 5: 12. 'By one man sin came into the world, and death by sin.' The death is here to be understood simply, or at least principally, in a physical sense.[1] In the subsequent member of the sentence the conjunction *καὶ*[2] has obviously the meaning 'also,' or 'even so.' The 'man' is Christ, who in order to preserve the parallel must here be necessarily designated as a man. 'Resurrection of the dead,' is not in itself altogether the right expression to indicate the antithesis. It would be either 'life,' or 'a return to life,' if we regard death as the loss of life. While Paul, as already remarked, recognises a return to a life which was lost, only through the medium of the resurrection, consequently both ideas with him are perfectly equivalent, so that the deficiency in the antithesis, on this ground, disappears. The relation between the former and the latter members of the sentence is pointed out by *ἐπειδή*, 'since indeed,' 'because now,' a particle, both of time and of causality, in which

[1] See Note E, at the close of this Article.

[2] *Καὶ δὶ ἀνθρώπου ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν.*

the meaning seems to lie, that as it had been man who had destroyed life, so also it *must be* man who should restore it. This is illustrated in the following verse—(not in the light of a demonstrative proof which could not here be given), by the introduction of some new marks or indications. The first is, the similar position of the two persons Adam and Christ, as the heads of their respective races, and the consequences in relation to the authors, expressed by the particles 'as,' and 'so.'[1] The second mark is in the preposition 'in.' 'In Adam,' says he, 'all die.' This can mean nothing else, than that this happens by virtue of the connection in which they, the all, stand to him; inasmuch as they are of his race; thus what necessarily befals him must likewise befal them, namely, mortality. Thus it remains undetermined, whether Paul has considered this relationship as a merely physical one, that of descent, or a moral one, as men are all sinners like Adam, or both in connection. 'Even so now,' he proceeds, 'in Christ all shall be made alive.' Here the use of the Future tense, which exhibits the consequences as yet to be expected, shows that the apostle contemplates a restoration to life, (which is also indicated by the connection) which is not a species of moral restoration, but of a physical. In order, however, that the similarity, pointed out by the particles, may find a place, the clause, 'in Christ,'[2] will not simply signify 'through Christ,' that it is he who awakens all, but, that by virtue of the connection in which they stand to Christ, so far as they are spiritual, (and no other relation with Christ can be thought of), they belong to his race or generation, they must, with him, also live as he himself does; they must return to life in the same way that he did. Thus as Paul finds the ground of all the happiness which comes to man, only in communion with Christ, so he places the hope of a future life in Christ alone, and thereby, what he here asserts is in full agreement with Rom. 8: 10 seq. But what follows from it? That the resurrection, which he expects, can refer only to those who stand in such union with him as that is upon which he enlarges in verse 35 seq., where he speaks of the mode of the resurrection; it can relate only to those. Thereby he has settled, as it seems to me, the controversy, not yet decided, respecting the extent of the meaning of 'all,' πάντες, in this passage. Those who are not united to Christ can expect no resurrection. Paul

[1] ὥσπερ and οὕτως.

[2] ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ.

does not mention such in his Epistles.[1] They belong only to the first series, only to the race of Adam; as such they are obnoxious to death; as sinners they go to destruction. An existence after this life he may have assigned to them, also a kind of resurrection perhaps, in reference to the judgment, which he calls the resurrection in Acts 24: 15, where nothing depends on an accurate definition; not using the term there in the special and higher sense in which he has employed it in his Epistles. Here the 'all' are certainly believers only.

V. 23. But each in his own order; Christ, the first fruits, then those who are Christ's at his coming.

The order of the resurrection. The dead shall be raised, each in his own order. The word τάγμα, ordo, order, is not properly abstract, but it signifies that which is *ordered*, *arrayed*. They are the ranks, divisions, cohorts in a warlike host. Still, elsewhere, the meanings of the words τάγμα and τάξις seem to flow into each other.[2] The order itself is simple. Christ, the first fruits, that is, first fruits of all; then those who are Christ's, who belong to him, Gal. 5: 24. Their return to life follows his coming; that is, at the time when he shall come in his glory to raise the dead and judge the world.[3]

V. 24. Then the end, when he delivers up the kingdom to God, even the Father, when he shall put down all authority and power and might.

What strictly belongs to the discussion is ended, for there is nothing more said of the resurrection. But the spirit of the apostle having once mounted up to that time when the resurrection has passed, or is about to take place, and the great spectacle has presented itself to his vision, then he feels constrained to finish the picture fully to that point, where all thought ceases, where all our imaginations fade

[1] See Note F, at the close of this Article.

[2] Comp. Clem. Roman. Ep. Corinth. 1: 37. ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ ἰδίῳ τάγματι τὰ ἐπιτασσόμενα ἐπιτελεῖ; also 41, ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐν τῷ ἰδ. τάγμ. εὐχαριστείτω θεῷ, 'Let each one of us in his own rank perform the required duties,' and 'let each one of us in his own order give thanks to God.'

[3] 1 Thess. 2: 19. 4. 15. 2 Thess. 2. 8.

away in the shoreless sea of eternity. 'Then the end,' he exclaims. The adverb appears to show that the 'end' follows the resurrection immediately, and as there is no other passage in his epistles at variance with it, we must regard this as his meaning.[1] But what is this 'end?' Not the end of all existence, for such Paul did not expect, but the end of this world as at present organized, the moment of the completion of all those things which belong to the Divine plan of redemption, the end of time and the beginning of eternity, of which the apostle, 1 Thess. 4: 17, can say nothing further, than, 'thus we shall be ever with the Lord.' If we are satisfied that he can mean this only, that he has not given a more definite idea, and that, perhaps he had nothing further to communicate, why then, without the least security, [of being right,] should we seek to supply the deficiency [as we may consider it] elsewhere, or from our own conjectures? Still something coëtaneous with the 'end' he allows us to perceive in the words, 'when he shall deliver up the kingdom,' etc. The Present, 'when he delivers up,'[2] resting on good authority, places the 'giving up' in the same time with the 'end,' τέλος, as it harmonizes best with the whole passage, and particularly with verse 28. The word ὅταν is a relative particle of time, in Latin, finis, quum tradit; as we should say, 'when he shall deliver over.' Hence from these words nothing at all can be derived in the shape of a proof of an intermediate period between the 'resurrection' and the 'end.' Paul thus teaches, that Christ, on his return, when the resurrection of believers is accomplished, having been Lord of all with the design of completing the great plan of redemption,[3] will deliver up the government to God. He terms him 'God and Father,' that

[1] I know, indeed, that others, for example Bertholdt in his Christology, p. 179, and Billroth, judge differently, and, fortified by passages from Rabbinical and apocalyptical writers, insert a long period, the reign of a thousand years, between the 'resurrection' and the 'end;' and I am aware also that Paul shared with his countrymen substantially in his ideas on such subjects, and hence he may be often illustrated from their writings. But I do not believe that he was compelled to say on all points just what they said, while in his own free and active mind, many things would be variously modified, and hence if his words contain nothing of consequence which one finds in those writers, but, on the contrary, exhibit in their simple, literal sense, different things, then I should fear lest I might obtrude foreign notions upon him, when I ventured to interpret him throughout by them.

[2] παραδιδῷ.

[3] Eph. 1: 20—22. Phil. 2: 9—11.

is, him who unites in himself both predicates, 'God' and 'Father.' It is here used in relation to Christ in the same manner as is commonly done in the formula, 'the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.'[1] But this surrender will take place after he has put down all powers, dominions and principalities. The subjugation must precede the surrender, for this is the object which Christ is to attain by his government of the world. The 'powers' must be the 'enemies' spoken of in verse 25 seq. Earthly princes and potentates cannot be meant, neither does the idea of 'demons' exhaust the full sense of the words, for in verses 25, 26, death is included in the hostile powers. Paul indeed personifies death by the manner in which he has spoken of it, but still, assuredly, he could not have regarded it as an actually existing person. We must accordingly interpret it of all those powers, which are opposed to the entrance of a perfect state—to what is now an ideal condition of things.

V. 25, 26. For he must reign until he has put all enemies under his feet; death, the last enemy, shall be destroyed.

Here we have the explanation of what is contained in verse 24. The apostle has in view the surrender of the dominion—which involves the idea of the possession of it—and the destruction of every hostile power as matters well understood. It now seems to occur to him, that possibly they cannot be so perfectly known to the Corinthians; therefore he subjoins the following position, not as a new one, but merely as a carrying out of the preceding. The principal idea in the first proposition is contained in the 'must,' the δεῖ, 'he must reign,' that is, 'you must understand that there is a necessity in the Divine plan, in respect to the world, that Christ must reign thus long.' The necessity is not strictly the reigning, but the reigning up to a definite period. This period is thus indicated, 'until he has put all enemies under his feet.' That Paul has in his mind, Ps. 110: 1, 'The Lord said unto my Lord,' etc., is allowed, but only so far as the idea has assumed the same form. Though many interpreters, depending on this passage and on verse 27, assume God as the subject, yet I must think not correctly. In the first place, it is unnecessary. Had we the passage formally cited from the Psalm, then, possibly, we must admit the necessity. But we have merely

[1] Comp. Rom. 15: 5. Eph. 1: 3.

the passage as employed in the expression of a similar thought, when there is no identity in respect to the subject in the two places. In verse 27, God, without being named, is indeed the subject; but it does not follow that he must be here; it is the less so, because the contents of the two verses, as will be shown, are different. In the second place, the supposition is not admissible. With a correct view of the object of our verse, as above expressed—(and when we consider its meaning in connection with verse 24, and it must be so considered)—then here we cannot regard the words as referring to what God does, but only to what Christ has done, or is to do, during the period of his dominion. It is in accordance with the eternal counsel of God, which must be accomplished, that Christ should be clothed with universal power, in order that he might put all his enemies under his feet. This last phrase[1] is a figurative expression, meaning 'to conquer,' 'to tame,' differing from καταργεῖν 'to subdue,' verse 26, only in this, that the latter conveys the idea of complete annihilation, while the former, employed in relation to *all* enemies, cannot be so used. Of these enemies, we are to understand, as above intimated, everything which in the period before the final consummation, stands opposed to the introduction of the perfect kingdom of God, including the infernal powers, as well as sin and death.

V. 27. For he hath subjected all things under his feet; but when he saith, 'he hath subjected all things,' it is manifest that he is excepted, who subjected all things.

This must serve, as the particle 'for' shows, to confirm or illustrate the last sentence, namely, why must Christ destroy all his enemies. The words, 'he hath subjected all things under his feet,' are borrowed from Ps. 8: 7, and thus God is to be understood in the otherwise very remarkable omission of the subject. The 'subjection,' however, is essentially different from 'the placing under the feet,' in verse 25. It is nothing else than the act of the Divine will, by which the Son is clothed with the power and the right to rule over all, and to subdue all enemies, as Jesus says of himself, 'all power is given unto me in heaven and on earth,'[2] an act which must have occurred before this course of subjugating all things commenced,

[1] θεῖναι ὑπὸ τοὺς πόδας.

[2] Matt. 28: 18.

but, according to the passages quoted in the comment on verse 24,[1] has actually taken place since the elevation of Christ; it is, as it were, a temporary resignation of the government of the world to the exalted Messiah, while 'the placing under his feet' is not fully accomplished till Christ's second coming. Now, however, the apostle seems to be apprehensive, lest, to the proposition before laid down of the subjection of all things to Christ, should be annexed, by sophistical reasoning, with which he had perhaps already met, a false interpretation, as if in the existing period, God himself is reduced to nought, as if he had entirely divested himself of the government of the world, as if he was now at rest, or was himself placed under subjection to the Son, an idea which indeed the representation of the dominion of the Logos may produce, and has often produced; the conception of God, through the greater prominence of the Logos, becoming estranged from the feelings, as darkened by Christ's nearer light. In order to prevent such an interpretation, Paul adds the following merely incidental remark, 'When he says,' etc. Inasmuch as this last position is a quotation from the Scriptures, we must judge in relation to the subject as in 1 Cor. 6: 16. If this were not a citation, one might suppose that he had Christ's own words in his mind. The limitation which he makes, is indicated by him to be such an one as interprets itself.

V. 28. Now when he shall subject all things to him, then also the Son himself shall be subject to him who subjected all things to him, that God may be all in all.

In the words ἄχρις οὗ, verse 25, lies the intimation that, according to the expectation of Paul, the kingdom of Christ would have a limit, that it would not be eternal. This is now expressed in a more definite manner, as illustrating that intimation. All must now be in subjection to God, consequently even the Son himself. The Father committed to him the government for the purpose of restoring the world to its original condition, which had been interrupted by Satan, and so that to him as Lord every knee must bow; his government, however, would continue only till the goal should be reached, till the

[1] Eph. 1: 20—22, "When he raised him from the dead, and set him at his own right hand," etc., and Phil. 2: 9, 11, "Wherefore God also hath highly exalted him," etc.

restitution of all things. Then the Son will give back the dominion into the Father's hand, himself also being subject, and the original order of things will again commence. God is all[1] in all, or through all, that is, he is the only absolute sovereign of the whole world, the world in all its parts has become the kingdom of God alone. As this is the design of the sufferings and reign of Christ, which his delivering up of the dominion would perfectly accomplish, so the last position is indicated by the particle ἵνα, 'in order that.'

V. 29. Else what shall they do who are baptized for the dead? If the dead be not raised, why are they baptized for them?

The handling of the question, whether the dead are raised or not, is now properly concluded. It seems, however, that two further arguments occurred to the apostle, which would clearly show the absurdity of denying the resurrection; these he proceeds to append. It is remarkable only that he should have introduced the first of these arguments by the word ἐπεὶ, 'since,' as if a proposition affirming the resurrection had immediately preceded, when still these arguments stand in no relation with the contents of the preceding verses. We must attribute this to the freedom of the epistolary style, and suppose that Paul, after finishing verse 28, perhaps rested a while from writing, or was called away, while he had in his mind, but had not expressed, the thought, 'the dead will be raised.' 'If it were not so,' he continues, 'what shall they do,' etc. 'On the words, 'baptized for the dead,' there have been so many interpretations from the earliest times, that Mosheim and others found it impossible to enumerate them. Since Mosheim, the number has further increased. If any passage can show the pernicious influence of preconceived opinions on exegesis, it is the one now before us. The words are so clear that they contain no ambiguity whatever, and their literal sense accords so perfectly with the general train of thought, that nothing less objectionable could have been inserted. But this sense has not pleased the interpreters; it has seemed to them that Paul could not have expressed it. Thus each of them must lay this poor text on

[1] The article creates no difficulty. In the well known idiom which Paul here employs, we have τὸ πᾶν and τὰ πάντα εἶναι, not indeed so often as πᾶν and πάντα, but still they are used. See some examples in Matth. Gr. Gramm. § 438, Kypke, Raphel.

his Procrustean bed, and there mangle it, amid the lamentation of grammar and the common usage of language, until a sense was procured, which the next succeeding interpreter, not recognizing it as his own work, would certainly reject, in order to begin again the same labor, to be attended with like results. We pass all this over; the words give but one sense; whatever else they have been made to signify, must be false. Why should we recal the memory of these false expositions? The phrase means, 'they are baptized for, or in behalf of, the dead.' This suggests to us the idea, that there were those in Corinth, who, convinced of the necessity and salutary influence of baptism, and erroneously regarding it not as a symbol, but as purifying the heart, adopted the notion, that the living might stand as the representative of the dead, in order that the dead might share in the benefits of baptism, and so there was a representative baptism. Now, were there no other life, were the dead not raised, which is the thought which lies in Paul's mind, then there would be no sense in a baptism like this; as an unmeaning act it must appear ridiculous. These were Corinthians, not perhaps the identical persons, but still Corinthians, who observed this usage and denied the resurrection; therefore, they would contradict themselves; they must either retract their denial, or confess the folly of their practice. Thus it is a very good argument *ad hominem;* no one would receive it as a conclusive refutation. Had we no other trace of the existence of such a custom in the primitive church, then we must consider this as a solitary fact, but yet one to be depended on, and the interpretation would remain the same. But we have traces which are certain, and such, at the same time, as show us how it was that the custom was early introduced, since the heretics, the Marcionites especially, had adopted it, at least in reference to catechumens who had died previously to baptism.[1] Hence the passage is so understood by some interpreters, Ambrose, Erasmus, Grotius, Augusti, Billroth, etc. But the observance must have been a superstitious one? This was possible, for no one can suppose, that the early church was free from superstition. But Paul could not approve it? Do we know then that he did approve it? In 1 Cor. 10: 4 seq. he mentions the public speaking of women in the church without a word of disapprobation, and then in 14: 34, he utterly prohibits

[1] Compare Tertullian De Resurr. 48, Adv. Marc. V. 10, Epiph. Haer. 48, Chrysost. Hom. 40, in hoc loc. See Note G, at the end of this Commentary.

such speaking. Just so it might have been, it is conceivable, in the end, in this case, though, to speak honestly, I do not believe that he disapproved it. An ideal Paul indeed, with the cultivation of the nineteenth century, would have done so, on the ground that the usage was not only superstitious, but because it was pernicious, as it supposed a magical power in baptism without improvement of the heart. But would the actual and historical Paul do so? He regards the passage through the Red Sea, 1 Cor. 10: 1, as a baptism; thus he might attribute powers to baptism which no one of us should. Perhaps had the usage been introduced without his sanction, he might still tolerate it, on the ground that it was consolatory to those who were anxious respecting the fate of their friends that had died without baptism. Still, be that as it may, the thing remains, and we, whose only object is historical truth, must receive it, although no explanation of it can be given.—The meaning of the words 'what shall they do,'[1] is this, 'If your position is true, that is, if the dead do not rise, then these persons must cease to do what they now do.' We have the expression 'the dead,' *οἱ νεκροί*, since particular individuals were meant, and the baptism for them was a well known occurrence. In the following clause, the words in the text copied by me, namely, 'for them,' instead of 'for the dead,' have been approved by many of my predecessors; they give a stronger and hence a more emphatic sense. 'If the dead are by no means raised, that is, if there is no other life to be expected, why still are these [living persons] baptized for them?'

V. 30, 31. And why are we in danger every hour? daily I die, I protest by our rejoicing, brethren, which I have in Christ Jesus, our Lord.

Here we have a second argument. It has no connection with verse 29, except what exists in the kindred nature of the object. The exertions of the Corinthians in their baptism, for the benefit of others, were futile, if there were no resurrection; so likewise would the labors and sacrifices of the apostle and his associates be folly, if there were no resurrection. What has here been said by many on the connection of this paragraph with the last, would not have been said, had it not served to fortify their interpretation of verse 29.

[1] *τί ποιήσουσιν.*

We need not, therefore, here consider or refute it. 'We,' ἡμεῖς, may refer to Paul in connection with others, or, it may more appropriately refer to him alone, καὶ being connected with the pronoun, thus, 'I also;' 'we are all foolish, you in that point, I in this.' That the phrases, 'to be in danger every hour,' and 'to die daily,' are expressed hyperbolically, hardly requires a remark. In the connection in which the last stands, it can indicate only a daily, that is, a constant impending of fatal dangers, and indeed of such dangers as were caused by his adversaries. We are not here to suppose sickness, as the Epistle furnishes no traces that he was subject to any corporeal disease. To what had been said, Paul subjoins an assurance, confirmed by an oath. Such a confirmation, however, does not compel us to understand what Paul had said in a literal sense, when it could not have occurred to him that the Corinthians would so understand it. On inferior authority, I have preferred the reading 'our,' to 'your.'[1] In justification of it, I remark, in the first place, that in reference to ἡμεῖς and ὑμεῖς, with their derivatives, the constant fluctuation of the MSS, arising from the Iotacism,[2] renders it impossible for any authority to be considered as adequate. The sense in such cases, is always to be carefully consulted. Thus it may happen, that the meaning which is best, and most in harmony with the context, will be found in the minority as it respects the MSS. Such a sense is not in truth exhibited by ὑμετέραν, and this is our second argument. In that case the pronoun must be taken as the object,[3] which certainly is not impossible.[4] Still it would be a strange thought for Paul to swear by his glorying of them, (his glorying concerning them, not in them); and besides, he limits it by showing to whom it relates, namely, it was that which he

[1] ἡμετέραν rather than ὑμετέραν.

[2] See Note H, at the end of this Article.

[3] Per gloriam (meam) de vobis. 'By my glorying in respect to you.'

[4] Comp. Matth. Gr. Gramm. § 466. 2. To the examples there found, the following are subjoined, Plat. Apol. p. 20. E. ἐπὶ διαβολῇ τῇ ἐμῇ λέγει. Thucyd. I. 33, φοβῷ τῷ ὑμετέρῳ. ib. τὴν ὑμετέραν ἐπιχείρησιν. VI. 85, ἐπὶ τῷ ἡμετέρῳ ξυστήσαντες ὑμᾶς ὑπόπτῳ. ib. 89. τῆς ἐμῆς διαβολῆς. Æsch. Prom. 388. μὴ γάρ σε θρῆνος οὐμὸς εἰς ἔχθραν βάλῃ. Still there is no instance in Matthiae, nor in the examples which I have adduced, where the verbal root of the substantive καύχησις appears to be construed with a preposition.

had in Christ. But this would justify the most solemn appeal which he could make—a protestation in form of an oath. We now read ἡμετέραν, 'our,' and we have the thought, 'in the trust which I place in Christ,'[1] that is, 'so true as I myself glory in Christ my Lord.' In such circumstances, where the authority is doubtful, and we are to choose between a very good and a very bad sense, I have supposed that to adhere to an established usage was rather the sign of the want of critical knowledge, than of the possession of it.

V. 32. If, after the manner of man, I have fought with beasts at Ephesus, what profit was it to me? If the dead do not rise, let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we shall die.

This is not a new position. Having embraced his entire life in verses 30, 31, Paul now simply refers, as an additional circumstance, to the fate which had befallen him in Ephesus, where he now was. On 'the contending with the beasts,'[2] expositors have arranged themselves into two great, and perhaps about equally divided parties, one interpreting the matter literally, the other figuratively. Of the later commentators, Flatt, Neander,[3] and Billroth, incline to the literal explanation. I have already given my reasons in the Introduction, p. 12, why I cannot accord with the literal interpretation. I here add the following considerations. First, the silence of Luke appears to me to be worthy of notice. His omissions are not to be denied, yet his narrative of Paul's residence in Ephesus is too ample to have allowed entire silence in respect to an event of this sort—an event which could not have been produced by a momentary outbreak of a wildly excited multitude, but must have resulted only from a judicial proceeding and a regularly pronounced sentence, even if, in a degree, of a tumultuary character, an event which consigned the beloved apostle to such imminent peril. He might have been thrown to the wild beasts in a storm of popular fury; but to a contest with wild beasts he could have been sentenced only by a Roman judge. Secondly, if we suppose that such an event did happen, and Paul had consented to fight, how could he have escaped? Was he a man of uncommon physical strength? or did he try his gladiato-

[1] Καύχ. ἔχειν ἐν τ. = ἔχειν καυχᾶσθαι ἐν τ., in whom, any one may glory, a sense well established in 1 Cor. 1. 31, and elsewhere.

[2] θηριομαχεῖν.

[3] See Neander, as above, p. 12

rial art? Or can we imagine a miracle, so that the wild beasts laid aside, in respect to him, their ferocity, and allowed him to escape unhurt? Neither the one nor the other. He must have been destroyed. Thirdly, if the contest actually occurred, how could he, after it, have remained at Ephesus, and how could he have expressed himself in regard to his abode there as he has actually done, 1 Cor. 16: 9?[1] In that case we must imagine, that the fortunate escape, and the wonderful deliverance, had so turned all hearts to him, that, though he had been sentenced to death, he was now unexpectedly able to remain without danger in a city which had just before been so hostile to him. But where is the right to suppose this? In short, I do not see how we can extricate ourselves from the difficulties in which the literal interpretation will involve us, and hence I must still adhere to the figurative. Of those who decide for the latter, some refer the event to the insurrection of Demetrius; others, as Beza and Piscator, to the controversy which, according to Acts 19: 9, the apostle had with the unbelieving Jews. I think that nothing very definite can be affirmed respecting it, only that the insurrection of Demetrius cannot be referred to, because, as it appears to me, Paul did not come into personal danger in that excitement. Besides, if he wrote the epistle subsequently, he could not possibly have disclosed his intention of remaining there till Pentecost, because Luke, in Acts 20: 1, informs us that he very soon after left Ephesus, which altogether accords with his usual proceeding in such cases. To the words, 'after the manner of man,'[2] as many meanings have been assigned as there are interpreters. To enumerate them would be of little use, as the greater part are manifestly groundless. We therefore proceed to investigate the point itself. In the first place, it will make a great difference in the interpretation, according as we annex, or not, the thought, 'if still the dead are not raised.' On the supposition that it is not annexed, two interpretations are possible. In the first place, we may consider the phrase, 'to fight after the manner of man,' etc. as an actual fact, and thus Paul would say: 'What should I have gained, when I fought, or that I should have fought,' etc. In this case κατὰ ἄνθρ. can only mean, 'with man's ability,' 'according to what man is able to do.' That the words

[1] "For a great and effective door is opened to me, while there are many adversaries." 1 Cor. 16 9.

[2] κατὰ ἄνθρωπον.

might mean this, I believe, though I cannot bring any proof passage. But in this sense, the whole question has no sort of relation to the design of the representation; it must, therefore, be rejected. In the second place, we may suppose that Paul, in the first member of the sentence, is to be understood in a negative sense, intending, by means of the subsequent member, to destroy the force of the κατ. ἄνθρ., 'after the manner of man,' in the first member; thus, 'if I *only* κατ. ἄνθρ. had fought, what would have been my gain,' that is, 'if I had done this, I should have accomplished nothing;' whence it would follow, 'that I did not perform it simply κατ. ἄνθρ.' Thus this expression would merely mean, 'after man's way,' 'in man's method,' 'in accordance with a human mode of thinking.' If we do not, however, supply the following words, namely, 'without reference or hope of a higher life and happiness,' then the connection is not preserved; and if we should supply them, no sort of argument would be made out. We therefore reject this method of solution also, and assume, that the clause, 'if the dead be not raised,' belongs to the proof of this point, so far as that it may be understood as supplied in the thought, though the words, as expressed, may be more properly attached to the following sentence. This mode of explanation may be considered as more correct, inasmuch as the whole process of reasoning rests on this hypothesis. Thus Paul asks, 'if I, after the manner of man, had contended with wild beasts, and still the dead be not raised, what would it have profited me?' that is, 'if it be true that the dead do not rise,' (in the sense of Paul, that there is no second life), 'what then would it have profited me, if I should have fought?' 'It would have been foolish. I should have lost my pains; thus I might properly say, rather let us eat and drink,' etc. This explanation of the entire phrase enters well into the connection, because what he would show is, that all struggles and pains to reach a higher object, would then, in that case, be foolish. We suppose that the words κατ. ἄνθρ. will still have only the sense, 'according to man's ability, with the exertion of his higher power;' we have thus to append this idea. The last member of the sentence appears also in a more vigorous form, by connecting 'if the dead be not raised,' with the first part: 'what shall I obtain for all my sacrifices? If the dead do not rise, then let us,' etc.

The words, 'Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die,' are copied exactly from the Septuagint version of Isa. 22: 13, and have

the sense 'let us enjoy a sensual life. Shortly it will all be over.' They thus imply a demand to renounce all moral effort, to do nothing but enjoy life, since death puts an end to every thing. That Paul does not thereby indicate the feelings of his readers, but simply wishes to call attention to the fact, that the denial of the resurrection, (he regarding it as the condition of a future life), would necessarily lead to these frivolous and immoral sentiments, has been already suggested in the comment on verse 12. But if the last three verses, particularly the conclusion of verse 32, attaches to the apostle the idea of suggesting a mercenary pleasure, in its naked form, then it may be the duty of the interpreter to say a word to his readers on the point. That Paul has here assumed a character which is in no sense his own, that he is not speaking in his own person, is a supposition which is the less conceivable, because he had mentioned that his *own* labors would be entirely fruitless without a resurrection. It is unquestionable that his whole life would have appeared vain and aimless to him, unless there had been beyond the grave a higher life, as a fulfilment or completion of the present; if a severe moral philosophy cannot allow this, then we must remember that Paul was not a philosopher, and, perhaps, had never in his life heard of the abstract worth of virtue. Yet he was too much of a practical man, while in the possession of a living hope that his course would not be fruitless, to ask himself, 'wouldst thou do all this if there were no hereafter,' and thus had come to the conclusion that he would not, if there were none. In the second place, he here speaks oratorically, and with the intention of producing as deep an impression as possible on his readers, who stand on a lower ground; he therefore states the case in its extreme point, while all his epistles represent him to us in a manner entirely different from that presented by the words in question. The epistles, without doubt, give us the only correct picture. Finally, the reward which he expected, and on account of which he seems to have labored, was not that of pleasure; it was the vision of Him whom he loved, of Christ his Lord, and the most intimate communion with him, who was here the soul of his life. Such was his desire; though, in the present case, it assumed the form of laboring for a reward, yet it was entirely a spiritual reward.

V. 33, 34. Be not deceived; evil communications corrupt good

manners. Awake to righteousness and sin not; for some have not the knowledge of God; I speak this to your shame.

Here we have the conclusion of the discussion, whether the dead are raised, together with a delineation of the moral corruption to which skepticism, on this subject, would lead, coupled with a solemn warning. In respect to the persons addressed, I have been led by Billroth's observations, to the following conclusions. In the first place, we do not know who, or how many, at Corinth, shared in doubts respecting the resurrection. Possibly Paul himself did not well know this. In the mean time he was safe in proceeding on the assumption that there were but few who absolutely denied it. These deniers are nowhere mentioned in this passage. Verse 36 may be directed against them. They are the τινὲς, 'the certain,' in verses 12, 34. Elsewhere, in these thirty-four verses, the Corinthians are always addressed. Among these were the τινὲς. The discussion is conducted before the whole, in order to confirm the believers, to restore the wavering to confidence, to confute the opponents, and, if not to convert them, at least to render them harmless. To suppose that what is directed to several classes of persons, did not go before all the Corinthians, but only to distinct classes of them, as Billroth conjectures, is inadmissible, especially when Paul does not indicate by a single word, that he makes any such distinctions. He certainly regards the deniers, the τινὰς, as bad men, and hence he warns the Corinthians, 'Be not deceived,' 'be careful not to fall into an error.'[1] These words are very appropriately addressed to all, for the τινὲς were in the midst of all, and, 'a little leaven leavens the whole lump.' He also points out the danger of their being corrupted by intercourse with the individuals referred to when he subjoins, 'evil intercourse corrupts good morals.' The interpreters have shown that these words are copied from the Thais of Menander. Paul writes χρηστά, as the MSS. and the Fathers also present it, not χρησθ. Perhaps he was not aware that he was citing a line of poetry, which might have come into common use as a proverb, or he designedly sought to conceal the poetical form. The words are appropriate, for he thus assumes that the Corinthians, as yet, possessed good morals, while he delineates the danger of intercourse with the skeptics in question,

[2] Πλανᾶσθαι is not in the middle voice, but in the passive, and hence it may be best translated thus. Comp. 1 Cor. 6: 9.

they being bad men, and, indirectly, advises a separation from them. More severe, appear the words, ἐκνήψατε δικαίως, because they seem to indicate that the persons referred to were in a state of drunkenness, or intoxication. Still, that a separate class of men were addressed, will not follow, partly, on the ground that Paul had sufficient reason to be dissatisfied with the Corinthian church, and partly because the orators of antiquity did not employ such delicate terms in addressing their hearers, as we use from the pulpit. Whoever has read the orations of Demosthenes, will understand with what compliments he favored the Athenians. And still he attained his object. The word δικαίως, one may understand as he will. The only good sense is the following: 'that which is right,' 'fit,' 'complete;' 'that which one ought to do.'[1] This, though it may be uncommon, is notwithstanding to be received. Some understand ἁμαρτάνειν in the sense of 'err,' 'mistake.' But it is never used by Paul in this manner. He here might have called attention to the fact, that their skepticism was either itself a sin, or would lead to sin. The word ἀγνωσία, means 'ignorance of any thing.'[2] Strictly speaking, Paul uses it thus: 'there are some among you who know not God.' Thus we may explain: 'those who know not what God can do, entirely distrust his Almighty Power.' The connection is better preserved, while the warning seems to be appropriate, if we translate thus: 'who do not understand,' or, 'who do not wish to understand or remember, that God is not mocked,' and, therefore, they are not afraid to provoke him by their immoral instruction.[3]

V. 35. But some one will say, How are the dead raised? and with what body do they come forth?

Having now sufficiently considered the question respecting the *fact* of a resurrection, the apostle proceeds to the second inquiry respecting the *manner* of it, and the condition of the bodies which shall be raised. The transition to this point, he effects by raising an objection, 'but here some one may say,'[4] etc. We may conclude,

[1] Luther translates, 'werdet doch einmal recht nüchtern.'

[2] Eurip. Med. 1173, Elmsl. ξυμφορᾶς ἀγνωσίᾳ.

[3] 1 Cor. 10: 22. Comp. on ἄγνοια, Eph. 4: 18. πρὸς ἐντρ. ὑμ. λέγω, see 1 Cor. 6: 5.

[4] Ἀλλ' ἐρεῖ τις, Sed hic dicet aliquis.

what is not in itself improbable, that the *mode*, the *how*, occasioned the principal difficulty to the speculating Corinthians; that the inconceivableness, the impossibility of the resuscitation of a dead and wasted corpse, was, perhaps, the great stone of stumbling. Two questions are suggested. In the first place, how are the dead raised, and secondly, with what bodies do they come forth from the tomb? In the following verses, the apostle gives the answer. To hear this answer and nothing else, will be our business. For this once he has made the task very easy for us. The passage, so far as the meaning of the words is concerned, is one of the least difficult in his epistle. Of all the important doctrinal passages, it is the most readily comprehended.

V. 36—41. Thou fool! That which thou sowest is not quickened, except it die; and in respect to that which thou sowest—thou dost not sow the body which shall be, but a mere grain, possibly of wheat, or of some other grain; but God giveth to it a body as it pleaseth him, and to each of the seeds its own body. All flesh is not the same flesh, but there is one kind of flesh of men; and there is another flesh of beasts; and another of birds; and another of fishes. And there are bodies celestial, and bodies terrestrial; but the splendor of the celestial is one, and the splendor of the terrestrial another. There is one splendor of the sun, and another splendor of the moon, and another splendor of the stars, for one star differeth from another in splendor.

The subject is illustrated by analogies. The address by the term, ἄφρων, 'unskilful,' 'foolish,' and the subsequent *thou*, σύ, express a certain disapprobation, in that an individual could entertain a doubt on a question whose solution had been already given in the analogies of nature. The first thought is this: The seed-corn which is deposited in the ground, can reach a nobler and higher life, only through death. The change which takes place in the corn in the earth, the dissolution, the decomposition, whereby it ceases to exist as a corn, is termed its death. In like manner Christ represents it, John 12: 24. Application. Man can attain to a nobler life only through the separating process of death. Second thought. What is sown, and what rises, is not the same body. This leads to the application. The body which is raised is not the same with that which died and

was buried, but it is a different body. In how far it is different,—whether it be formed from the germs or parts of the old body, or, as the plant which springs up, indeed, from the seed, but yet borrows its constituent parts from the surrounding earth, and is composed of entirely different elements,[1]—cannot be determined from the apostle's words. Third thought. God gives to each germ its own body, as it pleases him. The whole change leads back to the power and good pleasure of God, which should also cause man to feel that he ought not to rest in his own thoughts and speculations, while he is conscious that his destiny is in good hands. Fourth thought. When God is said to give to each seed its own body, it appears still to refer to this, that Paul expected a difference among those raised, because he could not refer to the difference between the earthly bodies and those raised, unless he dropped the image altogether. It is possible, notwithstanding, that while effecting a transition to a topic somewhat new, he would not be careful to preserve his allegory. In vs. 39—41, he seeks by an induction of particulars to lead the reader to the conclusion, that there being such a manifold variety of bodies, it would truly be a mark of folly to imagine that there could be no other bodies for man but these existing, terrestrial ones. He first points to the great differences between the organic structures of this earth; then to the varieties among the earthly and the heavenly bodies, for example, the visible luminaries, the sun, moon and stars, and finally, to the striking variety in the splendor of these luminaries.

V. 42—45. So also shall be the resurrection of the dead; it [the body] is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power.

The application is shortly this: 'Even so there is a great difference between the bodies which are laid in the tomb, and those which shall rise from it.' This difference is illustrated in several distinct considerations, by a series of antitheses. The subject is indeed not formally announced, and this is very suitable, in respect to a topic like that of the body, σῶμα, or rather of two different bodies, the one existing before, and the other after the resurrection. To the former are attributed three predicates, corruption, dishonor, weakness; to

[1] To which 2 Cor. 5: 1 seq. seems to point.

the latter, three, immortality, glory, power. These are indicated, respectively, by the opposite terms, natural body, and spiritual body. The natural body, as already pointed out, 1 Cor. 2: 14, is such as is appropriate to the ψυχή, the animal soul, the life, anima, as it occurs in the three terms, 1 Thess. 5: 23.[1] The natural body is fitted to be an abode and an instrument for this animal life, being earthly and sensual like this life; in its nature σάρκικον; in short it is what experience shows it to be in daily experience, where the ψυχή is the predominant principle. Thus also, the spiritual body is such as is fitted to the πνεῦμα, the higher, the spiritual nature of man, being such in its material and its form, as qualifies it to serve the spirit in its destined higher and nobler existence, which first begins in perfection when the spirit is released from the *body of death*, Rom. 7: 24, and at the same time from the ψυχή, the animal life, which is probably regarded by the apostle as not destined to a continued existence. A clear description of such a body, Paul was as little able to give, as we ourselves. He naturally contemplated it as made of finer and more delicate materials than this earthly body. Besides this mere, comparative indication of resemblance, he has asserted nothing in respect to its nature, which was, indeed, impossible, and still remains so. Paul has nothing to do with all those speculations which have subsequently come in, and about which the greatest pains have been expended, in order to show, that they are authorized by his language. He contents himself with a single thing, which he makes it necessary for man to believe, namely, that the new life is a purer, better life than this present one; it is a life of the spirit. Hence that new organization which he gives us reason to hope for—(how far is known only to God)—an organization fitted to such a life, not to impede, but to aid its movements. We also stop on this point, with the apostle. He appears, however, to be solicitous, lest it should be further inquired, whence he knew anything of the spiritual body. In order to anticipate this inquiry, he announces the general proposition, 'there is a natural body, and there is a spiritual body.' Hence the conclusion, 'now the first is undeniable; so also must be the second.' As a ground of the proposition in question, there appears

[1] [1 Thess. 5: 23, τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα, where πνεῦμα, the rational part is distinguished from ψυχή, the vital part, and both from τὸ σῶμα, corresponding to Heb. רוּחַ, נֶפֶשׁ, בָּשָׂר.—Tr.]

to lie a more general thought, namely, a necessary opposition or contrast, whereby the existence of the one is a condition of the existence of the other. To the metaphysical proof, a biblical one is subjoined, which rests on a very free use and carrying out of the thought in Gen. 2: 7, 'Adam was made a living soul.'[1] The apostle then annexes a commentary. The first man[2] here, as in verse 20, Adam, is presented as the head of a race, and in opposition to the last Adam.[3] He then explains the words, 'living soul,' etc., as a mere physical man, animated being. Following the principle of contrast expressed in verse 44, he connects, without any occasion from the passage in Genesis, the second member of the sentence, 'the last Adam a quickening spirit,'—so connected, indeed, that with the words, 'it is written,' must also be referred those words which are merely his own. That the last Adam can mean no other than Christ, is clear. He is named Adam, since that appellation, by common usage, signifies the first man, and Christ is the first in his series, as Adam was in the earlier. Why ἔσχατος, and not δεύτερος, as in verse 47, is employed, we cannot certainly determine; it is, possibly, with reference to the fact, that he had come into the world, ἐν καιροῖς ἐσχάτοις. He is πνεῦμα in contrast with ψυχή. I venture not to determine whether the apostle would describe him here, in relation to the whole of his existence, or whether he refers only to the period since the resurrection, where then the ἐγένετο εἰς πνεῦμα may point to this his first entrance on a spiritual life.[4] But an antithesis lies in the ζωοποιοῦν. The first Adam was made simply a living being; he had a life, indeed, but it was merely a ψυχή, communicated only from without. The last Adam, however, since he is a spirit, and the spirit especially giveth life, 2 Cor. 3: 6, has not only life, but he creates life. A definite object is not to be sought in ζωοποιοῦν, for the thought is altogether general. But it admits of a particular application, in that he, as the special source of life, is also the source

[1] וַיְהִי הָאָדָם לְנֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה.

[2] ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος.

[3] ἔσχατος ἀδάμ.

[4] The last is the more probable, since, if Paul had contemplated him as a 'spirit,' during his abode on earth, he would not only have made him very unlike his redeemed brethren, but he would hardly have avoided the error of the Docetae, of which in his epistles there is not the most distant trace, as it was foreign to his entire intellectual nature. See Note I, at the end of this Article.

of life for believers, and indeed, as the connection teaches, of a similar, spiritual life. That the proposition, in itself, contains no real proof, hardly needs a remark.

V. 44—49. But not first that which was spiritual, but that which was natural, then that which was spiritual. The first man was of the earth, earthy; the second man was the Lord, from heaven. As is the earthy, such also are they who are earthy, and as is the heavenly, such also are they who are heavenly. And as we have borne the image of the earthy, so also shall we bear the image of the heavenly.

The question is brought nearer: 'If now there is a spiritual life, and that so much higher and nobler than the present earthly one, why do not we, men, immediately enter upon that life? Why do we first pass through this natural life, with all its troubles and sorrows, with the necessity, also, of entering upon that other life, by the bitter, separating process of death?' This question Paul appears to have foreseen, and to have met by the following considerations—a proof how thoroughly he had considered his subject, and how fully he had weighed it, in all its aspects. He leads us to the point by an ἀλλὰ, *but*. In this word we have an allusion to the thought, that, spiritual existence is, indeed, of a better and nobler nature. This, however, cannot be the first in order. I consider the proposition of the 46th verse as entirely general; hence I do not take the words as epithets, in the sense of adjectives, but rather as substantives, 'the spiritual,' 'the natural.' Paul now lays it down as a general law in the development of life, that the spiritual succeeds the natural; the former proceeds from the latter. It then follows that our life must observe that gradation, which he now, in verse 47, points out in the heads of the respective series, Adam and Christ. The first man is of the earth, as Gen. 2: 7 announces him to have been at his creation; and hence, being fashioned from the earth, he is earthy, χοϊκός, that is, he resembles the material from which he is formed, and is terrestrial, like that which he brings with him. The second man, Christ, is of heaven, ἐξ οὐρανοῦ, for this is to be recognized as the only genuine text. He is descended from heaven, and hence, (what is here remarkably omitted, though presupposed in verse 48,) he is heavenly, ἐπουράνιος, a heavenly man. And now as the head

of the race is, so must be the race, which is descended from him; thus he adds, in conclusion, though without the particle of comparison, *to*, 'as is the earthy,' etc. Meaning: 'The human race, springing from Adam, must be, in virtue of their descent, like their head; as Adam was earthy, they must be the same; they have only an earthy body, life, existence; on the other hand, those connected with the heavenly man, must be like their head; they must be heavenly, as he is. We ought not, however, to understand what the apostle here says of the two races, as if he meant different series of individuals; both may meet in the same person. As a son of Adam, every one is first earthy; as connected with Christ, the believer will be subsequently heavenly. This is indicated in verse 49: 'and as we have borne the image of the earthy, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly.' The subject here concerns believers only, not all men in general, for of them Paul here asserts nothing. He uses the Preterite, since he stood in spirit on a point of time, where what he describes comes to an end. In the concluding member, the authority is, indeed, most decidedly in favor of the subjunctive φορέσωμεν, received by Lachmann, but the sense and connection are altogether opposed to it. An exhortation we cannot here have. The course of thought begun, and hitherto carried on, in a calm and reflective manner, Paul would conclude in the same way. He cannot have so greatly erred, as here at once to break off, and pass over to an admonition. Either a mere oversight originated the ω in the first MSS., and from these it passed into a great number of the authorities, or individuals misled, possibly, by verse 50, have not understood him. The Future only could have proceeded from Paul. He speaks of the confidence that believers, as they have been like the physical man, Adam, will, also, when they have become spiritually one with Christ, bear his image in their new, spiritual life.

V. 50. But this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God, neither can corruption inherit incorruption.

The hope expressed in the last verse, however, demands a limitation. There were, perhaps, those in Corinth, that thought it would be still better, if all could live till the advent of the Lord, and enter, as they were, into the kingdom of immortality. In consequence, Paul further instructs them, first, that a change was necessary, and

secondly, how this should relate to those who would be alive at the time of the Lord's coming. Both points are considered in what follows. First, we have the explanation of the impossibility of entering on the future life with these existing bodies. 'Now this I say,' is an intimation, that the previous remark required a limitation: 'We shall all bear the image of the heavenly Adam. But this I say,' etc., that is, 'I cannot still withhold from you the remark,' etc. The sense of the verse is simply, 'this mortal body cannot share in an everlasting, unchangeable life.'[1] He first calls it 'flesh and blood,' then corruption,' ἡ φθορά, which is equivalent to τὸ φθαρτόν. He thus indicates the absurdity in which a contrary expectation would be involved. He now proceeds to the last topic.

V. 51—53. Behold! a mystery I show you; we shall not all sleep, but we all shall be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, in the last trumpet, for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed; for this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality.

Paul now discloses to those who should be alive at the coming of the Lord, the prospect of a change, which shall fit them, as well as the dead, to enter into the kingdom of God. He announces it as a mystery, in the same manner as he announced the future restoration of the Jews, to the Romans.[2] Consequently, it is in the highest degree probable, that he was informed of it by a special revelation. Perhaps an arbitrary, doctrinal caprice has been nowhere more allowed than in respect to the text of this clause: 'We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed.' It is clear that Paul could have written nothing but what the received text presents, if not altogether according to the present arrangement of the words, still certainly in the sense implied in them, namely: 'we shall not all indeed die, but we shall all experience the change indispensable to our entrance into the everlasting kingdom of the Lord.' This meaning is made out in the fullest manner by verse 52; and it agrees most perfectly with 1 Thess. 4: 17. But it had a consequence which does not agree with the prediction. Paul died, the other apostles died, all their contemporaries died, and still Paul must have uttered the truth. That

[1] Comp. 1 Cor. 7: 19. [2] Rom. 11: 25.

he gave himself up to an expectation, which the event contradicted, was a thought which the times would not bear. When it was proposed, (which was certainly very early done), to alter the text, merely to transpose a little word, a negative, and when all this was done, and Paul was made thereby to contradict himself, the words also disagreeing entirely with the context,—these were points which created no trouble for the interpreters of that day. Thus the change became universal. Still, those interpreters possessed the MSS., with the genuine reading; but these remained unconsidered, and the wonder is that the true reading has still come down to us in some of them. Whether the negative retained its original place in the text, we indeed do not certainly know; that it did, is indeed possible; it might have been subjected to various changes, perhaps thrown out, and again inserted;[1] but in the end, retaining its place improperly. Yet where it stands, it gives the correct sense.[2] The change, of which Paul furthermore speaks, refers not only to the living, whom he indicated in verse 52, but also to the dead, who would likewise have a new, spiritual body, instead of that which had decayed in the tomb. And thus *πάντες*, as repeated, may be taken in the most general sense, namely, of all those who entertain a hope of the resurrection, that is, believers. The change, indeed, will occur in 'a moment,' 'in the twinkling of an eye,' with inconceivable rapidity. The word *ἄτομον* means indivisible, here an indivisible, minute point of time. For a particular reason, on account of which Paul mentions the great rapidity with which the event would happen, we need not inquire; the less so, as it was manifest, that this was a circumstance embraced in the expectation of the Jews, and Paul here obviously entered somewhat more deeply into the subject than was absolutely demanded. Thus, likewise, he subjoins as a mere accessory circumstance, the words, 'in the last trumpet,' and as a matter well known. He then, as it should seem, reflects, that possibly his readers would be less familiar with it, and accordingly he confirms it,

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[1] Cod. A. furnishes an instance with its text, *οἱ πάντες μὲν* *οὐ* *κοιμηθησόμεθα οὐ πάντες δὲ ἀλλ.*

[2] Thus we may say that the genuine Greek text is this, *κοιμηθησόμεθα πάντες μὲν οὔ*. Plato's writings furnish a multitude of examples of a similar construction. Thus Paul could have used the words *π. μ. οὐ κοιμηθ*, in this sense: 'die we shall indeed not all, but,' etc.

by adding, 'for it shall sound.'[1] The word, ἐσχάτη, 'last,' as Billroth has correctly remarked, does not mean that there are to be several blasts of a trumpet on the final day, and that this was, in that sense, the last which should be blown, but simply that it would be the trumpet of the last day, after which no more would be heard. Then follows the resurrection and the transformation of the living, the certainty of which is again declared by the remark, that it was necessary that the corruptible should put on incorruption, and the mortal, immortality.

V. 54—57. Now when this corruptible shall have put on incorruption, and this mortal, immortality, then shall come to pass the saying which is written: 'Death is swallowed up in victory! Where, O death! is thy victory? Where, O death! thy sting?' The sting of death is sin, and the strength of sin is the law. But thanks be to God who giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ.

The discussion is concluded. The apostle has arrived at the point, when his spirit, standing at the portals of eternity, can think of nothing more than that for it, finiteness and mortality have ceased. His own soul is now full of the elevation and glory of the object, and as a fine conclusion, there flows from his pen, a brief but striking triumphal song. He seems to delight in these songs at the close of his more important sections.[2] The final clause of verse 54, is a repetition of verse 53, in another form, and as pathetic, fitted to affect the heart. In the conclusion of the verse, he adds, 'then shall come to pass the saying which is written,' or as one might say with truth, 'what is written,'[3] namely, 'death is swallowed up in victory.' This is a free translation of Isa. 25: 8, 'He shall swallow up death forever.'[4] Paul has changed the active voice of the verb in the original,

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[1] A definite subject of the verb καλπίσει, Winer, in Gram. p. 471, has not thought to be necessary in this passage, as Billroth seems to imagine, especially because he does not cite the passage itself, but simply wishes to indicate, by the term which he has quoted. ὁ καλπιγτὴς, the origin of this impersonal mode of expression.

[2] Comp. Rom. 8: 11 seq. 11: 33 seq.

[3] A similar expression is found in Plato's Phaedon, p. 72, C. ταχὺ ἂν τὸ τοῦ Ἀναξαγόρου γεγονὸς εἴη, ὁμοῦ πάντα χρήματα.

[4] בִּלַּע הַמָּוֶת לָנֶצַח . Sept. κατέπιεν ὁ θάνατος ἰσχύσας.

into the passive, and he translates 'forever,' by 'in victory,'[1] as the Seventy do in other passages. Still, verse 57, doubtless, shows that he viewed *νῖκος* as equivalent to *νίκη*. The meaning is clearly, 'that death shall be utterly destroyed and annihilated.' The following words, 'where, O death! thy sting,' are from Hos. 13: 14.[2] The apostle subjoins a brief comment. 'The sting of death,' says he, 'is sin.' I cannot agree, as Billroth does, with the explanation of Schöttgen, who supposes, that the sting of death, alludes to the goad with which one drives his team, when he cultivates his field; but, with others, I consider the sting as the instrument with which death, here personified, destroys men. This is sin, for were there no sin, then, according to Paul, death would never have any power over mankind; it would be harmless, as an insect without a sting. But if death was to have no more power, then must sin be abolished, and to that, the apostle particularly directs the attention of his readers, in his comment. Further, 'the strength of sin,' that which gives it its power, 'is the law.' The meaning of this may be learned from Rom. 7: 5, 7 seq. But why are these words subjoined? A logical necessity for them does not exist; but they are rather dictated by the personal feelings of the apostle. What difficulty the law had occasioned him during his life! In the first place, in an inward sense, when he was in subjection to it; then, outwardly, when he met with opponents of his free salvation. Hence he cannot think of happiness, without an entire absence of the law, and thus he concludes, 'if death shall be abolished, then sin must be destroyed; and if sin is to be destroyed, then there can be no more law.' He teaches his readers to recognize, in the passage from Hosea, a prediction of a state of perfect sinlessness and freedom. He then concludes with thanks to God, who giveth the victory through Christ.

V. 58. Wherefore, my beloved brethren, be steadfast and immovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, knowing that your labor is not in vain in the Lord.

This verse contains a concluding exhortation, drawn from the certainty which was now secured in respect to the future life of the

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[1] לָנֶצַח by *εἰς νῖκος*.

[2] אֵהִי דְבָרֶיךָ מָוֶת אֵהִי קָטְבְּךָ שְׁאוֹל . In like manner the Sept. *ποῦ ἡ δίκη σου, θάνατε; ποῦ τὸ κέντρον σου, ᾅδη.*

Corinthian believers. They should be steadfast[1] and immovable in their convictions, or, more generally, in their belief in Christianity. They ought, also, to be perseveringly zealous in the work of the Lord, inasmuch as they knew that their labor would not be fruitless, as it would be, if there were no resurrection. 'In the Lord,' because they were united with him, and were members of his body.

THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY.[2]

BY J. P. LANGE.

In the third Number of the Theological Studies and Criticisms, for the year 1835, Prof. J. Müller has given a very instructive examination of the essays and reviews of Weisse, Göschel and Fichte, which were called forth by Richter's treatise entitled, 'The Doctrine of the Last Things.' The criticisms which the respected author has occasionally suggested, in relation to the views of these excellent and estimable thinkers, are important. He has shown, for example, in opposition to Göschel, that the Hegelian philosophy, according to the earlier representations of its adherents, certainly occasions the denial of man's personal, continued existence after death. Contrary to the views of Weisse, he has proved that the Scriptures authorize us to distinguish the doctrine of man's continued, personal existence from the doctrine of future, everlasting happiness. Against Fichte he maintains, that the resurrection of the dead is not connected with the close of life, but with the end of the world. Professor Müller very readily admits, on the other hand, whatever there may be that is new or profound in the contributions, which these distinguished authors have made to the completion of the christian eschatology.[3]

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[1] See the word ἑδραῖοι, 1 Cor. 7: 37.

[2] See Note J, at the close of this Article, which the reader is requested to peruse before examining the remarks of Lange.

[3] See Note K, at the close of this Article.

The writer of these pages begs leave to add some remarks on a sentiment which Müller has expressed in connection with the phrase, p. 778, 'resurrection of the flesh.'[1] Müller advances the sentiment in the observations in which he approves of Fichte's notion of an organic identity in man's corporeal nature. The idea is certainly a beautiful one, and viewed *negatively* is quite obvious. It may be thus indicated, 'The human body cannot be, in its essential features, that mass of matter which is in a constant process of flux and of self-renovation—which was originally foreign to it, was connected with it only in the way of assimilation, and which was forced to aid in its organization.'

But what opinion must we form of this organic identity in its *positive* aspect? Besides the *materials* which compose the body, nothing will remain, except a mere law or power in the human spirit, by means of which it can acquire a definite corporeal organization, fitted to its nature, both in its internal operations and its outward sphere of action. At all events, nothing will remain but the figure, or ideal image of the body, which is contained in the spirit. Müller, in the meanwhile, having adopted this opinion of Fichte, endeavors to point out its agreement with the Bible: "It is not the flesh," says the inspired word, "it is not the mass of earthy materials, but it is the body, it is the organic whole, of which the resurrection is predicated. The organism, or organic structure, viewed as the living form, which appropriates matter to itself, is the real body, which, when glorified, becomes the spiritual body. Paul denies all gross representations of the resurrection and of the human body, when he says, 'flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God.'" The author, after quoting another passage in proof of his position, remarks: "It is, therefore, to be regarded as a very erroneous mode of expression, when we inculcate a definite resurrection of the flesh, instead of the resurrection of the body, as is done in the oldest rule of faith—the so-called Apostolic Symbol."

In opposition to these views, we submit the following considerations. By the term, *ἀνάστασις σαρκὸς*, we are not, indeed, to understand the existing, earthy substance, the mass of matter belonging to the terrestrial man. We need not do this in order to retain, without variation, the phraseology in the Symbol above quoted. Although we should fully admit the notion of organic identity, we must still

[1] See Note L, at the close of this Article.

receive, as a consequence, a resurrection of the flesh. The author in agreement with Fichte, regards the body as 'the organism,' 'organic structure,' or 'the form,' which brings under subjection, and appropriates to itself, the corporeal substance. But how can a physical organization exist without the matter which it organizes? Can the figure of a body amount to anything more than a phantom, like the notion of the Docetae, if destitute of the material, by which it was first built into a substantial structure? So far, a resurrection of the body, without a resurrection of the flesh, is not conceivable. Could a bodily organism, or organic structure, be united, at some future time, to a purely spiritual, disembodied existence, there being no glorified body in order to give significance to it, as Müller seems to imagine, then we should conclude decidedly, that a resurrection of the body would never once be named; for a body without a substance or a material, is a mere form. Now the material of the body is the flesh.

If we adhere to the theory of an organic identity, we must of necessity retain the material in which this organic identity can develop itself. The organic, vital power assumes a *new* material, so soon as it lays aside, in the course of nature, its *old*. Without this, the notion of a bodily organism or structure cannot be maintained. It is for this reason, that I have endeavored to gain a more exact view of the idea above indicated, namely, a law or vital energy in man's spirit, by means of which it acquires a corporeal structure fitted precisely to its nature, either in its internal development, or its outward sphere of action.

There may, however, be imagined more appropriately, a kind of organic identity, as an ideal form of the body, contained in the spirit, or as a tendency of the spirit towards the assumption of a body.

This feature in the human constitution, has a more general ground in the fact, that we are inclined to clothe every spiritual object in a corporeal form. Light is the garment of the Deity; the creation is his house; his fullness dwells in Christ *bodily*. The Word became flesh. The angels are enveloped in winds and fiery flames.[1] No finite spirit, as such, can float into the infinite; it must be found

[1] The interpreters have not rightly apprehended the passage, Ps. 104: 4, whether they give the explanation, 'He maketh his angels like winds,' etc. or the reverse. [See, however, Prof. Stuart on Heb. 1: 7; also, the note of De Wette on Ps. 104: 4.—Tr.]

somewhere and be formed *somehow*. In its inner life, in the central point of its union with God, it may be understood as having no relation to space or time. With its personality, however, its finiteness or a circumscribed limit remains connected. The Pantheistic philosopher is ready enough to speak of the spirit, or of man's spirit, but reluctantly of spirits, and almost contemptuously of angels. A continued, endless duration of persons, or beings, destined to an eternal existence, wars against his system. We are to regard man, in relation to this subject, as one entire whole. His inward powers were called into existence at the same time with his external. The priority, indeed, belongs to his spiritual part so far as it has a nearer connection than his body, with the Divine Being. In the soul of man lies his personality. In his personality he is distinct from the Creator, he is a creature in the creation. As a spirit, man has the ability to assimilate to himself inferior elements, and to make them subserve his purposes. As a spiritual creature, he has a peculiar measure of powers and talents, mingled in a peculiar manner, and therein lies the principle or essential element of his formation. The figure, the form, or the appearance possessed by men, depends upon, or has a connection with, the spiritual powers which belong to all in common. The particular combination of the faculties in each individual, imparts to him his appropriate individuality, even in its external manifestation. Thus the assumption of a corporeal form, on the part of man, has its ground in his spiritual nature. As a purely spiritual, incorporeal being, he proceeds from God, who made him in his own image. He has now the principle of his form or organization. He goes from God into the creation, which bestows upon him an organic covering from its finest and most delicate materials. In his spirit, he has the scheme or ideal figure of his bodily structure. But in the creation, he has a close affinity with the earth, and accordingly assimilates to himself what he needs of earthy material, in order to effect his bodily organization.

This organic law has its corresponding idea in the biblical comparison of man, sleeping in the grave, to a seed-corn, which is to germinate at the resurrection. The entire, deceased man is the seed-corn, not what we term his remains, in and of themselves. These are rather the perishable, by which is enclosed the imperishable part of this seed-corn, the germ of a new life, of a new organization. The undecaying portion is the inner man, which is renewed

day by day, while the outward perishes or dies. This is the seed for the resurrection.[1]

If we adopt such an hypothesis, however, we may appear to arrive much too soon at the period of the resurrection of the dead. This might seem to follow immediately after death. But the apparent difficulty will vanish on a nearer consideration.

The spirit assumes for itself a form *as* it is, from materials *where* it is. To the first of these positions we shall revert at the conclusion of these remarks. We now proceed particularly to consider what is founded on the second position, namely, that the spirit takes its organization from materials existing where it has its residence. This we shall do under the three heads of death, intermediate condition after death, and resurrection of the body.

We are to contemplate the death of man, separately from its moral relations, as a laying aside of the earthly, or as a departure from the earth, for both these are essentially the same. When, however, man leaves the earth, he does not leave the creation. When he puts off the terrestrial, he does not lay aside what he received from the creation. As the earth has in itself matter which is simply earthy, while this same matter is pervaded by something of a higher sort, which belongs to the entire creation, (thus the heavens are pervaded, for example, by light, electricity, the gases, in general by the ether, the mysterious ocean of all vital energies diffused through universal space), and as, finally, the Divine existence pervades and fills the creation, so man, also, in accordance with the biblical representation of his entire nature, has the three simple characteristics—earthly—ethereal—godlike, or something from God, something from the general substance of the creation, and something from the earth. When he dies, he retains, not merely what he possessed, as he came from God, a purely spiritual existence, but what he had from the creation, a soul-like, ethereal form or organization, and he leaves only that which he had from the earth, namely, the mortal, the perishable, because he now quits the earth. That by death man is divested of the earthy, of the corruptible, we need not stop to prove. It is enough merely to mention the passage quoted by Müller.[2] That man at death leaves the earth, the Scriptures,

[1] See Note M, at the close of this Article.

[2] *Τὰ βρώματα τῇ κοιλίᾳ, καὶ ἡ κοιλία τοῖς βρώμασιν, ὁ δὲ θεὸς καὶ ταύτην καὶ ταῦτα καταργήσει.* 1 Cor. 6: 13.

likewise, teach in the general declarations respecting the entrance of the departed into the realms of death, or, specially, of the admission of the righteous into Paradise, into heaven, into the eternal mansions, and of the going away of the wicked to hell.[1]

In the consideration of the intermediate state of man after death, we must further inquire, whether, subsequently to death, anything remains of a bodily nature, anything besides a purely spiritual existence. The following point may be regarded as fixed. The Bible knows nothing of a boundless generalizing of man beyond the grave, in accordance with which the personal, continued existence of the spirit is made in its infinity, to have neither form nor place. It speaks of spirits in prison, of habitations in Sheol, of paradise, of many mansions in our Father's house, of the dwelling of Christ far above all principalities. There are bright realms, fixed, local habitations in man's spiritual world. We can form, indeed, of necessity no other conception of the continued existence of the soul, than that it must be somewhere. When one seeks to elucidate the opposite notion, namely, the denial of the *where*, he comes instantly to the position, that a finite spirit vanishes and is lost in the infinite. This is the pantheistic immortality of Richter of Magdeburg, the death-prophet, who was animated with the thought of one day dying, not *like man*, but of *dying utterly*, and who announced to his contemporaries, as if he had a new gospel, words, which Frederic the Great is said to have addressed to his wavering grenadiers, 'Ye hounds, ye wish then to live always.'

If now, universally, the spirit of the departed stays in the creation, then it will retain that which it had from the creation, which it appropriated out of the existing materials of the creation, in the way of a definite organization for its own spiritual powers. This organization is the soul, which serves as a kind of robe for the spirit. And when it obtains its particular dwelling-place, then it will assimilate, from the materials of this place, what will be fitted to

[1] Were one to admit what has been often conjectured, namely, that some departed souls, fast held by a chain of earthly sense, linger still, for a long time, *near the earth*,—in that case a possibility is admitted, that they might occasionally make their appearance in an *imperfect*, volatile form. The possibility of the visible appearance of angels, rests also upon the principle of organization indicated above; they come, however, from a superior, ethereal world, investing themselves with robes which gleam like the lightning.

itself, and thus it will assume an organization adapted to its sphere. How otherwise, could a moving, acting, forming spirit remain in its sphere, and live in its entire activities, with its associates, in the same sphere? A *perfect* nakedness of the spirit, would amount to its being in an absolute solitude, or in a state of utter loneliness, which we cannot think of. Even a *relative* nakedness—the unclothing of souls from their spherical organization or covering—would unfit man for a particular sphere which might be named. We think of departed souls at death as still present, or near, but not visible to us. They are then unclothed and *relatively* naked, but not unclothed in the sense of being merely pure, spiritual existences; they are not *absolutely* naked. They again make use of what may be termed a body, or a corporeal substance. Accordingly the spirits in Hades must take their organization from materials in Hades; the spirits in heaven, from heavenly materials. The finer the material of their place of abode, the finer and the more delicate will be their garments; but there nowhere exist perfectly immaterial places and forms. Without doubt, the lamentation of the rich man in hell, and in suffering, 'I am tormented in this flame,' has a spiritual meaning, but a figurative, spiritual sense can hardly exclude every thing of a bodily or corporeal form. When Jesus says to his disciples, 'I will no more drink of the fruit of the vine, till the day when I drink it new with you in my Father's house,' there lies, in these words, together with all the fulness of a spiritual conception, something which is inconsistent with the absolute exclusion of what is material or corporeal in the future state.

In respect to the passage, 2 Cor. 5: 4, 'we would not be unclothed but clothed upon,' etc., Professor Müller assumes that Paul is here describing the intermediate state of the departed after death, as a mere naked, spiritual existence. In opposition to this idea, we submit the following remarks. In the first verse Paul says: 'we know that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens;' and, 'in this we groan, earnestly desiring to be clothed upon with our house which is from heaven.' How near is placed the entrance upon our new habitation to the exit from our old! and as the tent reminds us of the frail, earthly body, so must the eternal habitation remind us of the spiritual, heavenly body. Though this assumption of an organization which awaits the spirit, on its entrance

into heaven, does not exclude a future corporeal resurrection, still the idea will forbid an absolute nakedness of the spirit. The apostle makes use of three terms, whose meaning may be illustrated grammatically, and in their connection as follows: 1, 'To be clothed upon,'[1] when the perishable is laid aside in the process of the change—the swallowing up of mortality in life; 2, 'To be unclothed,'[2] is the laying down of the earthly, tangible garment in the bitter experience of death, before the new garment can be assumed; 3, 'To be clothed,'[3] that is, again clothed, after having been unclothed at the fearful moment of death. The following is the sense of the passage:[4] We sigh to *become clothed upon.* If we were only *clothed*, (according to the existing state—not clothed *upon*—though that is the deepest want of man, and therefore to be the most profoundly desired), then we should not be found naked. For we, who are in this tabernacle, groan, being burdened, though we do not desire to be unclothed, but clothed upon, that mortality may be swallowed up of life. The passage may be expressed concisely thus: 'We would not be clothed upon, well as we might long for that, but were we unclothed, we would still be again clothed.'[5]

If there are many mansions in our Father's house, many realms of life, then also there will be many kinds of heavenly bodies. One spirit will be clothed at the sun, of the material of the sun; another at the moon, of the material of the moon; a third at the stars, of the material of the stars. In the classical passage respecting the resurrection, 1 Cor. 15: 39 seq., Paul first speaks of various kinds of *flesh*, 'not all flesh is the same flesh, but there is one flesh of men, another of beasts, another of fishes, and another of fowls.' Then he speaks of various kinds of *bodies:* 'and there are celestial bodies and bodies terrestrial, but the glory of the celestial is one, and the glory of the terrestrial another.' Finally he speaks of the bodies in the universe, or the spheres of life. 'There is one glory of the sun, another glory of the moon, and another of the stars, for one star differs from another in glory.' Would Paul have given this entire exhibition, merely in order to show, by accumulated analo-

[1] ἐπενδύσασθαι. [2] ἐκδύσασθαι. [3] ἐνδύσασθαι.

[4] Ἐπενδύσασθαι ἐπιποθοῦντες· εἴγε καὶ ἐνδυσάμενοι, οὐ γυμνοὶ εὑρεθησόμεθα. Καὶ γὰρ οἱ ὄντες ἐν τῷ σκήνει στενάομεν βαρούμενοι, ἐφ' ᾧ οὐ θελομεν ἐκδύσασθαι ἀλλ' ἐπενδύσασθαι, ἵνα καταποθῇ τὸ θνητὸν ὑπὸ τῆς ζωῆς.

[5] See note N, at the close of this Article.

gies, that the resurrection-body of man will be different from his existing body? It rather seems, that in these analogies, he has given what may be termed the laws of organization, or incarnation. Therefore stands as preliminary, the great principle, 'God hath given to it a body, as it pleases him,' (as Creator in the original decree), 'and to each of the seeds its own body.' The seed-corn, or the inner vital principle, clothes itself in accordance with its inmost nature and necessities; it assimilates its own as flesh. Hence on earth there are *so many kinds* of flesh, according to the diverse natures given to what God has created. But apart from all this variety, there are for these natures, man's, as an example, different ways or *courses* of life, and accordingly different bodies, earthly and heavenly; the former fashioned for earthly needs, with earthly appetites, organized into sexes; while the latter are fitted to the circumstances of the heavenly state, according to the declaration of Jesus, 'these neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are like the angels in heaven.' Thus the butterfly has an ethereal body, in some sense related to the earthly body which it has as a caterpillar. The assumption of a body, in the first place, depends on the inner principles of its being as a creature; in the second place, on the stage of its development; to which finally, the third thing is annexed, its dwelling place, whether the sun, or moon, or stars, since each kind of flesh takes its appropriate sphere of life.

In the same manner as the old seed of wheat, so long sown as dead, shall come in a new, mature form, as it were, to its resurrection and glorification, (retaining also an organization in its intermediate state, in its changing form of a germ, a tender blade, a stalk), thus also the human spirit, in the intermediate state after death, is not without its organization. But as the old seed of wheat appears first in its new and perfect form, when it has undergone the process of renovation, thus also the dead will not come to their perfect, glorified state, till the resurrection of the body, which will take place at the end of the world.

Professor Müller remarks, p. 783, in opposition to Fichte, 'that it is an indisputable doctrine of the Bible, that the resurrection of the dead will be universal and simultaneous, followed by the glorified change of those then alive—at the end of the world—at the second coming of Christ for judgment, and for the revelation of his glorious power. In close connection with this perfect manifestation of his

power, and with the redemption of our body, which serves as a cause or occasion of this manifestation, the apostle has further added, in that profound passage, Rom. 8: 19—23, a glorification of terrestrial nature, a raising of it up so as to share in the glory of the children of God, in accordance, of course, with its appropriate manner. For the body of man exists in the closest and the most inseparable union with this nature; and it is, therefore, scarcely possible to form a conception of the resurrection of the body, without including the glorified nature as the scene of its new life.'

The following sentiment is alike founded in the Bible. 'This glorification of nature, however, this renovation of the heavens and the earth, according to the apostle, will not occur till the destruction of the present world.' It yet strikes us as remarkable, that Müller finds a contradiction to this, when Fichte refers it [the glorification] to a higher nature and organization, 'which [higher nature] penetrates that [nature] which is now observable only by our senses, and by which the former is veiled, at least for the present, and into which the departed spirit immediately enters.' In the first place, this is maintained by Fichte in respect to the earth; its future destruction will be only a change, whereby its higher nature will be developed, which had already existed, veiled in the lower. In the second place, it is assumed of all creatures; their most anxious expectation, their sighing and longing is towards a coming redemption from subjection to vanity, that they may be fixed in glorified forms, and their sighing is an expression of their original constitution—the primary tendencies of their nature. In the third place, the same thing is asserted of men, for the germ of the resurrection is now contained in the old, perishable body, (else this would be no seed-corn), and thus a higher organization is contained in the lower. Should this idea of Fichte be construed thus: 'that the departed spirit at death immediately assumes the resurrection-body,' then it is manifestly at variance with the Bible.

The spiritual being of man remains at death, clothed only with that delicate garment derived from the general substance of the creation; still, it has besides, in this form, the power, the elementary rudiment, the principle and scheme for every single organization in its new dwelling-place—for every organization in whatever world it may be. So then it has this tendency, this sort of capability, or preliminary ground for the resurrection of the body. In respect to

the evidence of a higher nature, which lies concealed in our present nature, the transfiguration of Christ on the mountain is a conspicuous instance.[1]

We will now advert to the texts, Matt. xxv., John v., Rom. viii., 1 Cor. xv., 1 Thess. iv., 2 Pet. iii., and Rev. xx. and xxi. We here have the doctrine respecting the last things, with its great outlines linked together in a way which is full of mystery;—the return of Christ, the end of the world, the resurrection of the dead, the final judgment, the renovation of the earth, the glorification of the righteous. The connections of the events are mysteriously developed. In those lofty words, Rev. 20: 11, this stupendous, wonderful change is indicated. The old earth, with its heavens, flees away before the face of the universal Judge, seated on a great, white throne, so that no more place is found for them. Then follows the resurrection of the dead, the judgment, and the separation of death and hades and the lost souls of earth, who are together cast into the lake of fire.

The end of the world comes with the last tremendous struggle between the kingdom of light and the kingdom of darkness, with the return of Christ to judgment, and the destruction of the old earth.[2]

[1] Müller alleges, p. 750, that Christ arose from the tomb with the same material body which he had before his crucifixion. As a proof he adduces the fact, that Christ ate, and that he showed Thomas the marks of his wounds. But very many proofs of an opposite kind may be alleged, the most important of which is the ascension into heaven. To the ascension belongs a glorified body, which had from the earth only that which was imperishable. Might not a glorified one eat, while the food was transformed by an inward, higher, living energy into a superior element, or be chemically evaporated? Is not the most gross and material substance evaporated into ether by means of forces of great power? And could not the wounds in the body be verified by marks in the resurrection-body? We may inquire, whether the change in the body of Christ was complete at the resurrection, or did it proceed gradually till the ascension, so that the moment of its completion was the moment of Christ's being received up, when the earthy band was wholly sundered?

[2] The declaration respecting a new heaven in addition to a new earth, may be taken in the same sense, as Gen. I., where the creation of the heavens, the sun, moon and stars is interwoven with the creation of the earth; yet so that the preëxistence of the stars is not denied, when it is said that they were made on the fourth day of the creation, in order to furnish an enlightened atmosphere *for the earth*. One may now see in a pure, thin,

A revolution of the earth, which shakes and transforms the planetary system; and which, while it occurs as the decree of God, at the last moment of the world's history, is also connected, as a subordinate natural phenomenon, with a great moral change in mankind, is the signal for the coming of Christ. Here the christian eschatology has almost anticipated a conclusion of philosophy, which well agrees with the idea of a future change of the globe. In the course of nature, the earth is destined, by the laws of heat, to be burned up with its works. Perhaps here is to be placed the white shining throne of the approaching Son of man, Rev., or his appearing in the clouds of heaven, Matt., or his coming with fiery flames for vengeance, 2 Thess. At one grand signal, the trump of God sounds—the voice of the archangel, 1 Thess., the voice of the Son of God, John, the passing away of the heavens with a great noise, 2 Pet. This is the mysterious, extraordinary event, which, as a signal, shall assemble the entire race of man before the judgment seat of Christ on earth, who shall renew the earth with its works, shall change the living, shall awake the dead.

In the thunder of that change, the earth shall yield up her dead. The spirits, assembled to judgment, shall be again clothed with materials of earth. The earth itself shall be in a process of purification; the perishable shall separate from the imperishable; the heavenly from the gross and stiff materials of earth. By the purifying flames, it shall be freed from death, the principle of destruction, from evil, and from every former curse. From the old materials of the earth, the spirit will not receive its body, but, in accordance with its inward nature, it will assimilate to itself that which is fitted to its development and formation. The saints may clothe themselves in the pure element of the renovated earth; they will shine forth as the sun. The incorrigible sinner shall be clothed in the dark, perishable, debased materials of earth; according to Daniel, he will arise to shame and everlasting contempt; according to the Apocalypse he will be cast, together with death, into the lake of fire.

The reason why the resurrection of the just is mentioned so much more frequently than that of the wicked, is, possibly, because there remains for the latter only the garment of corruption for a covering,

air, on high mountains, the heavens of a dark blue, and the stars burning as torches. Still this consideration would not exclude the final renovation of the universe in all its single parts.

the smoke and mist of a curse, the degraded element of the old earth, so that they will share in the blackest, most ghostly raiment for the soul, thereby expressing their own broken, confused and hateful state.

That the righteous will assume their body from the material of the purified earth, is in accordance with the promise by which they shall dwell on a new earth—a final fulfilment of the declaration: 'The meek shall inherit the earth.' For by means of the assumption of a bodily organization, can they first come to tread, permanently, on this new starry home. But as their organism, or the ideal form of their body, which has its foundation in the spiritual powers as they are developed, purified and formed in the soul, must assimilate to itself the requisite, corporeal, living material from the new earth, so then the resurrection of the flesh also must be taken into the account when we are considering this material.

But how can an incarnation of this sort be viewed as a resurrection of the dead, or as a calling them from the tomb? We answer, first, because the departed spirit has an element for the resurrection, a germ of the seed-corn derived from the old, decayed body. Secondly, as in the old earth there lies the ground or elementary plan by which it may be renovated, so there lies in the ashes of the old life of man a ground for an everlasting growth for man, changed and to be changed. In the third place, as the departed have laid aside those corporeal substances which were entirely fitted to their organization here, so they will assume from the earth what is most appropriate to them, what belongs to them, what may serve as a robe to their spirits, taking again, as it were, their bodies from their graves. Then we are to add, in the fourth place, that the new body will have an organic identity with the old, though the lower organs which were exclusively adapted to the old life will not be found. The new body will be more delicate, more spiritual, fixed to an eternal state, a new, renovated image of the first body.

Thus man's spirit assumes its organization from materials *where* it is. The same is also true in respect to the *how*, or the *manner* of this assumption. The inward, vital energy, the degree of life, the stage of interior development or of deterioration, the ground and the elementary conception, the rude notion and state of cultivation, everything in the inward structure is forced to express itself in the outward form, or at least it struggles towards such an expression. Still

these pictures or ideals here exist first in a process of growth, in constant change, and if they truly correspond in all the finer characteristics, still they are not entirely alike in what meets the eye. The outward appearance of man seems to be often in contrast with his inward condition, when it is not taken into the account that there are many apparent contrasts of this kind, which rest on false assumptions, as to the manner in which the spiritual ought to clothe itself in a corporeal form. A part, however, of the actual contrast depends on the circumstance, that the spiritual nature changes more rapidly than the corporeal. The former is endlessly active in its freedom; the latter, in its immovable state, is in close connection with a natural necessity. But even in the noblest forms, from which we derive our opinion of the beauty of the original element or fundamental ground, there will still appear a kind of reflex action from the inward germ —or a step backward. Now another part of the contrariety in question consists in this, that the earthy man, the ἀνὴρ χοϊκός, is created out of spirit into the relations of life; with this natural life, he exists under the influences of the external world, moral as well as physical. The proper development, or culture, of his nature, from within outward, may experience a strong retroactive influence from without, by which it will be modified. The first great action or influence of this kind consists in the manner in which the innate, original nature of man, [as formed by God], is darkened from its lustre through the hereditary, ingrafted depravity of a fallen race. Now as there is a general influence of this native depravity, so there are various special effects which it produces. Thus a child of the most beautiful kind may receive from the blood of its father a cause of sickness, which will disfigure its form. Other similar influences proceed from the manner of life, from one's destiny, from climate, from the national spirit, and from other powerful influences. All these influences may modify and interrupt the settled arrangements of human life; they enter deeply within. In the most hidden springs of life, however, in the freedom of the spirit, they lose their predominant power, and on that part of our being can only avail in the way of excitement or misleading. Therefore man, however externally deformed, distorted and mutilated, may be again restored from his inward life outward, to the living, perfect beauty of a new man, by applying the means of restoration. In spite of all external hindrances, he may wholly triumph over his outward man by virtue of his

inward movement. Though an apostate man, he may again rise with the help of grace. He can become more than conqueror over the dark force of nature whereby his outward man rules over his inward. And so far as the spirit has not marked out a course for itself, the body does not determine for it, but is itself to be regarded as a disposable power, so that in this sense the words of St. Martin are true, "The body is nothing more than a project or draught." As an imperfect plan, the body is only a copy of the nature of the inner man, but not of his moral condition. So also the corporeal form of man here below is no perfect picture of his inner.—But it will be otherwise. At the resurrection, the body will be a perfectly suitable form for the soul. The bodies of the righteous will be pervaded and completely ruled by their spirits, as their spirit is by the Spirit of God. Therefore, they are spiritual bodies, an image of God, similar in fraternal traits to the glorified body of Jesus, 1 John. According to the same law, the forms of the wicked will be hateful, within and without; they will arise to shame.

But along with the glorification, or degradation, of those who shall rise, which has its ground in their inmost being, there is, also, to be considered, as before remarked, their place of residence. The external sphere will furnish them their materials of organization. And in accordance with this, their external form will receive its modifications. The science of ethnography now shows the same thing in the every day life of man. The diminutive Esquimaux and the gigantic Patagonian, the ugly Hottentot woman and the beautiful Circassian, the awkward Mongol and the nobly formed Spaniard; these all, in their contrast, lead us, at first indeed, to the difference in the intellectual faculties of their respective nations; but this difference itself, in *a certain degree*, has its foundation in the thousand existing influences of climate,—as children may show at the present time, indirectly, in their forms, what their country is, and the region where they live. And in accordance with some such analogies or marks, must the new earth be inhabited by forms of human beauty, while the *outer darkness* where there is wailing and gnashing of teeth will clothe, as it were, caricatures of the human form.[1]

[1] I have now, for the first time, after completing the above remarks, been able to read the essay itself of Fichte. I have done so with much pleasure and satisfaction. In order to correct what was my supposition of Fichte's idea, and which was founded on the above mentioned notice of him, and

NOTES BY THE TRANSLATOR.

NOTE A, p. 229.

Respecting the author of this Commentary, Dr. L. J. Rückert, we have been able to find but very scanty notices Previously to 1826, he appears to have resided in a small village in the vicinity of Zittau, in the Saxon part of Upper Lusatia. From 1826 to 1837 or 1838, he was employed as a teacher in the flourishing gymnasium in Zittau, a town of about 8,000 inhabitants. From various allusions in his writings, we infer that he has encountered no little opposition, and even personal hardship, in consequence of the independence with which he avows his religious opinions. In the summer of 1838, we find him in Leipsic, establishing a "Magazine for the Exegeis and Theology of the New Testament." The first number is written wholly by the editor, and contains 146 pages. About ninety pages are employed on the ninth chapter of Romans, from which the author concludes that Paul teaches the doctrine of predestination. Another article is on the situation of Galatia, and the time when the epistle to the Galatians was written. The Magazine is to be entirely occupied with the exegesis of the New Testament. In the Preface, he has the following remark: "Employ all the proper means in your power to ascertain the true sense of the writer; give him nothing of thine; take from him nothing that is his. Never inquire what he ought to say; never be afraid of what he does say. It is your business to learn, not to teach. From this principle I cannot depart in the least, al-

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consequently, for a correction of the notice itself, I must observe, that Fichte by no means regards the resurrection of the body immediately after death, as actually realized in the organic, continued existence of the soul. He only seeks to prove *physiologically* the personality and individual existence of man in death. But the further question, namely, to what particularly belongs the resurrection of the body, he leaves for a religious-philosophy to discuss. The fundamental view in which he grounds immortality, is closely, though independently, connected with Goethe's doctrine of an indestructible monad. We may, undoubtedly, greet this work of an eminent philosopher as an important advance in the philosophical, fundamental proof of immortality. The conviction expressed by me in the foregoing essay, that an existence in space, a *where*, must be ascribed to the departed spirit of man, will be found handled in the treatise of Fichte, variously, with the greatest precision, and with a philosophical clearness. Would that he had been able to have contended successfully for the widest prevalence of this conviction over the territory of philosophy, where a belief in immortality will decay at its very roots, so long as the opposite doctrine is predominant.

though it is unpopular, and I well know what it will cost me, and what personal sacrifices I have been obliged already to make."

Some years since, Rückert published in two volumes, "Philosophy of History, or Philosophy of History and of the Bible in relation to each other." In 1831, he brought out his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, a second edition of which has just made its appearance. The first edition is in a volume of 700 pages. We have never seen a copy of the work, nor scarcely what may be called a review of it, in the German periodicals. In the Halle Allgemeine Literatur Zeitung for Sept 1835, it is noticed by an anonymous critic, who is apparently under the influence of prejudice and ill will. He makes a long parade of the errors into which he says Rückert has fallen, while he scarcely alludes to the excellencies of the book, though he acknowledges that there are many things which are correct and worthy of attention. We apprehend that somewhat of the reviewer's ill-nature is to be attributed to Rückert's independence of thought, and unwillingness to fall into the style of commentary which suits so many of the gentlemen who manage the Journal at Halle. This may possibly explain some allusions which we find in the Preface to Rückert's Commentary on the first Epistle to the Corinthians, published at Leipsic in 1836. We quote the following sentence. "In conclusion, it only remains for me to express the wish, that the portion of the public that have hitherto been favorable to me, may still remain so. The opponents, in part the authors themselves of commentaries on the epistles explained by me, who have made me feel pretty strongly their censorial importance—even to menaces—are still at liberty to exercise their office on my labors. So far as they are in the right, I will seek to profit by their remarks, whether made in a friendly or inhuman manner, so that my undertaking—the sound interpretation of the great apostle—may be advanced. What objections of a personal nature they may have to propound, I shall, as hitherto, pass by in silence." In the Preface to his Commentary on the second Epistle to the Corinthians, published in 1837, he says: "That which I have accomplished I commit to the unprejudiced examination of reasonable critics. Whatever opinions or even confutations of my positions I may see,—for these I shall be grateful. Some things may escape me in consequence of the location in which I find myself. When occasion offers, earlier or later, I shall seek to profit by these criticisms. On the first part—the Commentary on the first Epistle—no judgment has been expressed to my knowledge, except that the sale which it has found in the course of the first year, seems to show that the public are not unfriendly to it."

The principles on which Rückert proceeds in his expositions, are stated in the Preface to his Comment on the Romans, and are quoted in the Review of the Halle Journal, above referred to. 'In the first place, says Rückert, a commentary should be *philological*. This implies an exact knowledge of the language and its idioms; an historical knowledge of all important matters relating to the condition of the people and of the age to which the writing belongs; logic, that is, a strict prosecution of the course of thought, not merely from verse to verse, but even through the entire argument of a sec-

tion or division, with an accurate development of the proofs adduced by the author; and imagination, that is, a lively versatility, by means of which the interpreter divests himself of his individuality, and assumes the very position of his author. In the second place, a commentary must be *impartial*. The interpreter of the New Testament has no system and ought to have none, neither a doctrinal system, nor one where sentiment predominates. As an exegete, he is neither orthodox nor heterodox, neither a supernaturalist, rationalist nor pantheist; he is actuated neither by pious feelings nor by those of a contrary character; he is neither moral nor immoral; neither of tender sensibilities nor the reverse. His only business is to investigate the meaning of what his author says, and to leave other things to philosophers, doctrinal writers and moralists. As an interpreter, his only interest is rightly to understand his author, and exhibit his thoughts to the reader without any foreign admixture. In the third place, a commentary should not be crowded with *matters not immediately connected with it*.' Rückert here refers to the intermingling of illustrations from authors belonging to other nations and times. This rule is frequently transgressed by quotations from the classics. 'Fourthly, a commentary should be *methodical*. The sense of every passage should be so exhibited before the reader, that he shall see the right explanation gradually developing itself, and while, with perfect freedom his own thoughts are following the interpreter, he may obtain through him a correct exegesis.'

In the Preface to the first Epistle to the Corinthians, Rückert remarks, that the 'principles, as well as the whole method of my interpretation, have been vehemently assailed. I have made no change, because I remain convinced of the correctness of these principles. My mode of interpretation, and indeed my whole manner, have become so established, that I could not expound in a different way, without first becoming a new man.' Again, in the second Epistle, 'the peculiarities of this Epistle have compelled me sometimes to tread on conjectural ground, and I have occasionally arrived at results which differ from those of my predecessors. Still I am conscious of never having run after hypotheses, and those which I have been compelled to exhibit, have been employed with that freedom in the way of illustration with which I am accustomed to regard subjects of an unusual character.'

Rückert, so far as we have been able to judge from the portions of his commentaries which we have read, is faithful to his principles. A striking characteristic, on every page, is the straight forward manner in which he advances to his object. He turns neither to the right hand nor to the left. His single object is to develop the ideas of his author. In doing this, he is perfectly ready to march against the frowning batteries and proudly cherished structures of his predecessors, or even to pass on to his object without the slightest notice of their labors. This honesty of aim, this directness of purpose, we cannot but admire. We have increased confidence in the invincibleness of truth. We have more unwavering trust in those great doctrines which can endure this sharp-sighted critic, which come out unim-

peached from the most severe cross-questioning. The advocates of the faith of Jesus are sometimes accused of timidity when they approach the Scriptures; they shrink back from an avowal of their honest opinions; they see difficulties, it is said, which they are afraid to avow; from education or superstition they are not accustomed to subject the Bible to that rigid canvass, which they not only tolerate but require, in respect to the histories of Hume and Gibbon. Here, however, we have a writer who has no fears of this character. He boldly confronts his author. He does not permit him to hide in the precincts of the sanctuary or to take hold of the horns of the altar. He looks steadily at the real value of the thought, at the logical coherence of the reasoning. If the author seems to fail in these respects, his commentator is not afraid to say so. Here we have accordingly, the testimony of an impartial judge, who sets out with the determination to render just judgment, unwarped by his imagination or feelings.

It will be understood, of course, that we do not approve of all the modes of expression which Rückert has adopted on this subject. That he agrees substantially with orthodox commentators in this country, we have no doubt. At the same time his views of the inspiration of the sacred writers appear to be erroneous. We apprehend that he has been somewhat influenced, insensibly, by the neological notions prevalent around him. He does not grant that degree of inspiration to the sacred penmen which they justly challenge, and which infallibly secures them from error. One must bear in mind, however, the unfriendly climate in which the author has lived. We cannot judge him harshly, if we knew all against which he, and men like him, have to contend. Were this not so, had the orthodox doctrines prevailed always and universally in Germany, still the modes of interpretation adopted by these men would differ from our own. They are Germans. They are not descended from the English Puritans. They hold Luther and Melancthon in the highest veneration. Their whole system of intellectual and religious education is very different from the New England mode. Instead, however, of rejecting their commentaries and theological systems on this account, it becomes us to study them, to adopt what is good, and to throw the bad away. Are we afraid of the stability of our own views? Are we bigotted enough to imagine that we have obtained the best possible modes of illustrating truth? Do we complacently judge that our minds do not need to be any further enlarged and liberalized?

We may be here permitted to say a word in regard to Rückert's principles of interpretation. As we find them stated in the Halle Journal, they are liable to be misunderstood and misinterpreted. Of the importance of a logical mind in an interpreter of the Bible, especially of Paul's writings, no one can doubt. Paul has chains of argument, long and sometimes close processes of reasoning. His thoughts are not thrown out at hap-hazard. At the same time, his writings are not to be judged by the technical logic of the schools. In many cases, he employs arguments which may not be strictly logical, but which are perfectly proper, and fitted to make a deep impression. In fact no other mode of exhibiting a subject would be so appro-

priate to the time, place and other circumstances. If they were dialectically presented, they would be uninfluential. The conception owes its origin to deeper feelings than those possessed by the mere logician. It is intended to benefit *man*, who has a compound nature, feelings, sensibilities, imagination, as well as the discursive faculty. Besides, the Scriptures communicate truths which possess no logical connection, in the strict sense of that term. They are revealed facts which we could have never inferred from any principles of natural reason. They are not, indeed, illogical facts. The Bible never employs an inconsequential mode of reasoning. They are not barren and naked facts. They are fitted most perfectly to our moral and intellectual nature. They satisfy the deepest wants of our being. But we could not have inferred, from the existence of these wants, the mode which God would have taken to satisfy them. Neither can we discover in many of these facts any thing like a mathematical connection. It is a doctrine of the Bible, that none of those who have been given to the Son shall fail of eternal life, or, in other words, that all true Christians shall infallibly be saved. But this could not be deduced from any principle in man. It does not follow from the nature of true piety, viewed simply in relation to its possessor. It depends solely on the power and promise of God. In the case of the fallen angels it would have been, perhaps, the natural and rational inference that they would have forever persevered in a progress towards the great end of their original creation. The provision of a Saviour for lost man could not have been logically reasoned out, any more than the want of such a provision in the case of the lost angel. It therefore demands sound sense in the commentator to judge when he is to apply his dialectical principles. It may be that in some cases, he ought rather to refer to his rhetoric—to a cultivated taste, to a chastened imagination, or to the emotions of an enlightened and ardent piety.

What Rückert says in respect to impartiality in a commentator is perhaps capable of a sense altogether right and proper. He certainly ought not to bring any prejudices, any preconceived opinions, to the illustration of Scripture. He must be impartial. If he is liable to be governed by impulse, if he has an unfounded attachment to system, if he is a man of warm imagination, he must be particularly on his guard. The interpreter of the Bible must be free from bias, from sectarian prejudice, from everything which would distort his judgment, or weaken any of his intellectual or moral powers.

He will not, however, he cannot be, without a theological system. A careful and intelligent perusal of the Scriptures will lead him to perceive that they contain certain doctrines, and that they discard certain others which have been attributed to them. He sees that the Bible reveals certain facts. He believes in these facts. He need not call them doctrines, or form them into a theological system. But with this preëstablished belief, he does proceed to the interpretation of the Scriptures. It cannot be otherwise. The mind of man is so formed, that it must have a belief of some kind or

other. The human intellect is not a piece of white paper. It is framed to perceive truth, and to delight in system.

Again, we maintain that the interpreter must possess pious feelings in order properly to expound the Bible. A neutral condition in this respect is not conceivable. A state of equipoise, of absolute indifference, is impossible. He will either love the truths of the Bible, or dislike them. If the latter is the case, he cannot be a safe interpreter. He will be inevitably biassed. He will be insensibly led to explain away or confound doctrines which are at variance with his feelings It will be very easy for him to array philosophical reasons against a doctrine which fills him with pain or disgust. This is exhibited by some of the learned and, in many respects, excellent commentators of Germany. We would not trust some of them in the exposition of doctrines, because we fear they have not the feelings which qualify them to be interpreters. The heart is as necessary as the head. A sound intellect is no more indispensable than pious feelings for him who would interpret the mysteries of the gospel. Porson or Hermann may interpret Pindar or Horace, but they are not competent to expound Isaiah or Galatians. An expositor must be a *man*, in the symmetrical or complete sense of that word. Accordingly he must possess ardent and enlightened piety. Else he is essentially deficient. How should we regard him who should attempt to comment on Homer or Milton without a particle of imagination, without one responsive emotion in his own bosom to the sublime conceptions of his authors? How ought we to look upon the expositor of the Scriptures who has no heartfelt sympathy with the feelings of David and Paul?

We may repeat again that we are not to be considered as responsible for every thing which Rückert advances. His errors seem to have arisen mainly from low or incorrect views of the nature of inspiration. Accordingly, he treats the inspired apostle too much as he would a pagan Greek or Roman. In some cases, we have added notes, which give the views of other commentators. We have not judged it necessary, however, to do this in every instance. Thus on pp. 274, 275, and elsewhere, Rückert takes for granted, as many other Germans do, that Paul expected to live till the second coming of Christ, or at least that he believed that coming to be very near. Nothing, however, is to be admitted on this difficult point which will conflict with the inspiration of the apostle, especially since he has himself asserted, 2 Thess. II., that important events were to precede the coming of the Lord. On the passage relating to this subject in our epistle, and in the epistles to the Thessalonians, the remarks of Grotius, Calvin, Schott, Pelt and Bloomfield may be consulted.

We may here mention, that remarks of a critical nature in the text, and those included in parentheses, we have frequently transferred to the bottom of the page as notes.

NOTE B, p. 233.

We translate the following remark from the author's Introduction to his

Commentary, in respect to the words ἐν πρώτοις. 'In and of themselves, indeed, the words can mean nothing else, than that the Corinthians were among the first who received the message concerning the death and resurrection of Christ. But it is not necessary to understand the words in the strictest sense. It is possible to regard Corinth, which was actually the fact, as one of the first cities of Achaia to which the gospel was preached,' etc. Olshausen remarks: 'The πρώτα, among which he includes the points which he immediately subjoins, are what are designated in Heb. 6: 1 seq., as θεμέλια or στοιχεία. The death, burial and resurrection of Jesus were the only topics which he made prominent,' etc. Comm. p. 678. Billroth approves of Chrysostom's explanation; 'and not only so, but the doctrine was a necessary one, *wherefore* it was delivered ἐν πρώτοις,' etc. Billroth p. 206. Flatt p. 354, accords with Chrysostom, 'It was the first, and at the same time, the most special instruction,' etc. See Heydenreich II. p. 458. 'The resurrection was preached by him and made, as it were, the principal topic of the gospel. It was in a manner the foundation of the structure,' Calvin I. p. 387. The interpretation suggested by Rückert seems to us to be forced and unnatural. Is not the expression illustrated by what Paul says, 1 Cor. 2: 2, 'For I determined not to know any thing among you save Jesus Christ and *him crucified*?' The following passages from the Sept. may throw some light on the phrase ἐν πρώτοις, 'And he placed the two maid servants and their children *first*, ἐν πρώτοις,' Gen. 33: 2. 'And David said, whoever smiteth the Jebusite *first*, ἐν πρώτοις.'

NOTE C, p. 236.

'Without doubt,' remarks Billroth, 'on the way to Damascus.' In 1 Cor. 9: 1 Paul says: 'Have I not seen Jesus Christ our Lord?' This Billroth refers to the appearance narrated Acts IX. XXII. and XXVI. 'Paul is here asserting his apostolic dignity, in respect to which he was on an equality with the other apostles. It was necessary that Christ should have appeared to him in the same manner that he did to them, after his resurrection.' See Gal. 1: 16. 'It must be clear to every unprejudiced mind that 1 Cor. 9: 1, cannot refer to Paul's having seen Jesus during his life on earth, though the thing itself is possible; for this would have no connection with his apostolic calling; nor can it refer to a mere perception and acknowledgement of the doctrine of Christ.' Neander Pflanzung, I. p. 112. See also Olshausen on 1 Cor. 9: 1. Flatt p. 357.

NOTE D, p. 244.

Various attempts have been made to reconcile the reasoning of Paul with the rules of the logicians, or to show how it legitimately follows that the resurrection of believers will take place in consequence of the resurrection of Christ. Our author seems to imply that there is some deficiency in the reasoning of the apostle, that his premises do not support his conclusions. Is it a case, however, where the formulae of logic are applicable? Does Paul

here intend to reason dialectically? Does he mean to assert any philosophical connection between the physical laws of one being and those of others, between Christ's body and those of the Corinthian Christians? Would it follow logically that the bodies of all Christians shall be raised from the grave, because there had been a single instance, that of Christ, showing the possibility of the thing? Was an example of the possibility necessary after the raising of Lazarus? Might we not, on good grounds, argue that the redemption wrought out by Christ would have received a perfect accomplishment in the eternal salvation of the *dis*embodied spirits of all believers?

Is not Paul here stating a revealed fact? Does he not remind the Corinthians that what he had preached to them as the gospel, and which had been communicated to him by direct revelation, included in its promised results the resurrection of the body; that salvation would not be complete without the resurrection of the bodies of all who slept in Jesus;—that as the sin of Adam had brought death upon the body, thus the righteousness of Christ would impart life to that body—so that in every respect Christ might come off conqueror, yea more than conqueror!

It is certain that great prominence is given by the apostles to the fact of the resurrection of Jesus. Thus Paul, 'That they should live not unto themselves but for him who died for them and rose again.' 'Who was delivered for our offences and raised again for our justification.' 'That he might free us from the punishment due to our sins.' 'And if thou believest in thy heart that God raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved.' At Athens Paul preached Jesus and the resurrection. Peter writes, 'by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead we are begotten again to a lively hope,' of obtaining an unfading and an eternal inheritance.

It appears, likewise, to have been a current doctrine in the preaching of the apostles, that the bodies of the saints should as certainly share in the felicity of heaven as their spirits—that in both respects they should be like their glorified head. 'Who shall change—transfigure—our vile body and fashion it like unto his glorious body.' 'Who is the beginning, the first born from the dead, that in all things he might have the preëminence.' 'For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, so also those who sleep in Jesus will God bring with him.'

NOTE E, p. 251.

Temporal Death. It will be seen that Calvin accords with Rückert. "The cause of death is Adam, and we die in him; therefore Christ, whose office is to restore what we lost in Adam, is to us the cause of life, and his resurrection is the foundation and pledge of ours. As the one was the original of death, so the other is of life. The apostle pursues the same comparison in the fifth chapter to the Romans, with this difference, that there he treats of spiritual life and death, but here of the resurrection of the body, which is the fruit of spiritual life." Comm. in Eph. I. 392. "Altogether similar to

Rom. 5: 12 seq., except that there the reference to spiritual life predominates." Olshausen, p. 684. "In the Epistle to the Romans, death and the resurrection are not expressly contrasted, but death and life, *κατάκριμα* and *δικαίωσις ζῶης*, from which last, however, the resurrection follows." Billroth Comm. p. 217.

NOTE F, p. 253.

Resurrection of the wicked. From the passage, Acts 24: 15 and the context, we learn that the doctrine of a resurrection of the unjust, as well as of the just, belonged to the general strain of the apostle's preaching. He asserts that he worships the same God with the Jews, receives the same sacred books, and has the same belief in the resurrection both of the good and the bad. Christ himself says, John 5: 28, 29, 'All who are in their graves shall hear the voice of the Son of Man, and those who have done well shall come forth to the resurrection of life, those who have done evil to the resurrection of condemnation.' This was a common mode of speech among the Jews, Macc. 7: 14. 12: 43. Dan. 12: 3. Compare also Rev. 20: 5, 6. 1 Thess. 4: 16.

NOTE G, p. 259.

Baptism for the Dead. It seems from Tertullian, that there were heads of families in the East, who, on a particular day every year, namely on the Calends of February, renewed the rite of baptism in behalf of their friends who had died without baptism, in imitation of the Feralia instituted by the Romans, and observed in February. The object of the feast and sacrifices, was to obtain rest for the souls of their departed friends. "The apostle, however," adds Tertullian, "ought not to be considered the author or favorer of this custom." "Noli apostolum novum statim auctorem aut confirmatorem eum denotare, ut tanto magis sisteret carnis resurrectionem, quanto illi, qui vane pro mortuis baptizarentur, fide resurrectionis hoc facerent. Habemus illum alicubi unius baptismi definitorem. Igitur pro mortuis tingui, pro corporibus est tingui." These last words seem to intimate the manner in which Tertullian construed the passage before us. Tertull. Adv. Marcion. v. 10. "Si et baptizantur quidam pro mortuis, videbimus, an ratione? Certe illa presumtione hoc eos instituisse contendit, qua alii etiam carni *vicarium baptisma* profuturum ad spem resurrectionis, quae nisi corporalis, non alius hic baptismate corporali obligaretur." See the passages in Semler's ed. of Tertull. I. 351. III. 242. Also Heydenreich Comm. II. 518. The following passage is translated from Epiphanius Haer. 48. p. 113, edit. Colon. "For in this country, I speak of Asia, and also in Galatia, the opinion of these persons was widely spread Some report of it has come down to us. It is this: when any individuals among them had died without baptism, others were baptized into their name instead of them, lest, being unbaptized, they might be raised at the resurrection to condemnation and punishment." Chrysostom, Homil. 40 in Cor., remarks, "When a death

occurred among them, they concealed a living man under the couch of him who had died, and approached the deceased with the inquiry, 'whether he desired to receive baptism.' He making no reply, the one concealed beneath him, then answered, 'that he desired to be baptized,' and so they baptized him in the place of the departed." The following is the commentary of Ambrose. "Paul, in order to show that the doctrine of the resurrection was perfectly established, quoted the example of those persons, who were so secure of a future resurrection, that they were even baptized for the dead, if one died before having received that rite, fearing either that the deceased would not rise at all, or only to condemnation. Thus a living man was baptized in the name of the dead. Whence Paul subjoins, 'Why are they baptized for them?' By this example, he did not approve their custom, but by it he wished to show how firm was the faith in a resurrection."

Perhaps the quotations above will not be regarded by all as sufficient to prove the existence of the custom in the primitive churches, or at least that it was a custom adopted extensively enough to allow of the apostle's reference to it. As Heydenreich remarks, we can never come to entire satisfaction in respect to it. Paul speaks of a usage which was perfectly well-known to the Corinthians, while contemporary notices of it are wanting to us. In favor of the interpretation above maintained, we have the very important consideration that every word is taken in its *natural* sense, and thus the exposition originates from the words themselves. Most, if not all the other modes of solution, do violence, in a greater or less degree, to some one if not to all the words in the clause. Olshausen says, 'that if representative baptism be referred to, an approbation of the custom certainly lies in the passage, for its whole scope rests on the ground that if the dead are raised, then they will have gained something by the fact that the rite had been performed for them.' But may it not be a mere *argumentum ad hominem?* the employment of that which would be a good argument in the view of the persons addressed? Is it not similar to Matt. 12: 27, "And if I by Beëlzebub cast out devils, by whom do your children cast them out, therefore they shall be your judges?" Whitby remarks on this passage, as quoted by Dr. Scott, that "Christ uses this as an argument *ad homines;* that they who professed themselves to cast out devils by the God of Abraham, had no reason to say, that he did it by the prince of devils." Certainly Christ is not to be understood by this language to approve of the practice of exorcism. As little may Paul be supposed to approve of representative baptism. It is possible that at some other time he expressly discountenanced it. Or he might have viewed it, as Rückert intimates, as one of those comparatively harmless observances which would soon disappear of itself, if it were not harshly denounced. It seems to us to be a much more rational exegesis than that of Olshausen, who supposes that before the coming of Christ and the resurrection, there must be a definite number of believers—the fullness must come in. This must take place before the dead could be raised. All then who were baptized, in a sense benefitted the dead—did that which was necessary before the dead could rise.

NOTE H, p. 261.

Iotacism. The common usage of the Reuchlinian pronunciation is the following: η is pronounced like ι; the diphthong αι like *e* in *there*; the diphthongs ει, οι, υ and υι, are all not to be distinguished from ι, etc. This mode of pronunciation is sometimes called Iotacism or Itacism (*i* as in *machine*) because it gives to so many vowels the sound of ι. See Robinson's Buttmann, p. 23.

NOTE I, p. 271.

Docetae. The Docetae were a sect of the Gnostics who held that Jesus Christ was a mere phantasm, φάντασμα, destitute of a real body, that he lived, labored and suffered only in appearance. The first Epistle of John belongs to that age, when this Docetic or Gnostic error was gradually becoming more dangerous, and specially in Asia Minor. The Manichaeans held that Christ descended from the sun in a *seeming* body, to lead men to the worship of the true God. It is supposed that 1 John 1: 1—3, and 4: 1—6 were designed to oppose the doctrine of the Docetae. See Fosdick's Hug, p. 732, Cunningham's Gieseler I. 69, Lücke Comm. on Ep. John Einl. 62.

NOTE J, p. 278.

We do not print these remarks of Lange as a supplement to, or a carrying out of the views of Rückert. Many of them are rather to be considered as a counterpart. As speculations, they may have, or may not have, foundation in truth. They are of such a nature that nothing positive can be affirmed of them. Some of them, however, appear to have no solid foundation. Such, undoubtedly, are his notions on the form or external covering, which he supposes the spirit will assume from the place or sphere of its future abode. There are also passages of Scripture which, it seems to us, he does not rightly interpret. We object also to the air of dogmatism with which some things are propounded. Lange speaks with the confidence of one who actually knows. Why then, it may be asked, is the Article inserted? We answer, first, because it contains interesting truth, or at least hints and suggestions, on topics of intense personal concern to every human being. Who can look with indifference on the events which await him as a disembodied spirit, or on the condition of his body, when it shall be raised from the tomb? The attempt to repress curiosity on this subject, by calling hard names, as Gnosticism, mysticism, and the like, is vain. From the inmost recesses of our being, we rebel against any restraint of this kind. We are not at liberty, indeed, to state as scriptural truth, what we may imagine or conjecture. We must not avow our surmises as articles of belief. Still, we have no right to discourage the efforts which the human mind makes in this direction, so long as they do not contradict the Bible. What is Paradise Lost but a series of lofty imaginations, on subjects where the Scriptures

afford but a slight basis? And yet who condemns the great poet? Secondly, the article of Lange is a specimen of the boundless fertility of the German mind. The creation would seem to be ransacked—and sometimes the Germans launch forth *extra* flammantia moenia mundi—for every possible topic of discussion and speculation. Can we altogether blame them in this matter? The human intellect when its energies are repressed in one direction, will burst out in another. If scope for practical effort is denied, it will adventure itself on a course of the most hardy theorizing. We Americans, however, may derive benefit from becoming acquainted with the irrepressible energy of the Germans. We are in little danger of losing our practical individuality, or of adopting what we do not believe. But if we do not, in our fancied perfection, gain any new views of truth or duty, we may receive some recompense in the increased activity of our minds. We may derive benefit by being thrown out of the range of our hackneyed habits of thinking.

In the remarks of Lange, also, we have a striking contrast to the commentary of Rückert. The latter is strictly exegetical—an exposition of the text and nothing else. Lange enters on a different field, and if he accomplishes nothing else, will, at least, show by contrast the value of a genuine commentator. That he has done more than this, however, we think all candid judges will admit.

Of the author we know nothing, except that he is a preacher in Duisburg. His remarks, here translated, are found in Stud. u. Krit. Vol. IX. pp. 693—713. The Article of Müller, to which Lange refers in the beginning of his remarks, is found on pp. 703—796, of the 8th vol. of that work. Richter's essay was entitled, "The Doctrine of the Last Things." This was reviewed by Weisse in the Journal of Philosophical Criticism for September, 1833; and again in the same periodical in January, 1834, by Göschel. In 1834, Weisse published a pamphlet with the title, "The philosophical, mysterious doctrine of the Immortality of the individual Man." In the same year, Fichte published "The Idea of Personality and of the individual, continued Existence." This last was subsequently reviewed by Weisse. These various essays and reviews are made the subject of the Article by Müller to which Lange refers. Professor Müller concludes as follows: "Thus we have, in the foregoing essays and papers, three different attempts to establish, on philosophical grounds, the faith in a personal immortality." "In conclusion, the reviewer cannot conceal his conviction that philosophy can never furnish any proof, strictly considered, for a personal immortality, so that from the idea of personality, the imperishable, continued existence of a being to whom that personality belongs, would follow with absolute necessity." "An unconditional and perfect necessity belongs only to the eternity of God, as an absolute Being, who has the ground of existence in himself. In this sense, he is the only one who hath immortality, 1 Tim. 6: 16. That God is mortal, that he can cease to exist, is a manifest inconsistency, it is something absolutely inconceivable. But in the supposition that a created being may cease to exist, as he had an origin, there is no absolute con-

tradiction. The knowledge of the existence of this personality certainly leads to the recognition of its immortality, and it exists in close relation with it. But this relation can by no means be regarded in the form of a necessary conclusion from the personality." The author then remarks, that philosophy finds its appropriate place in *confirming* and *illustrating* the revelations of Christianity on this subject.

We may here mention that Müller is, or was lately, a professor at Göttingen. Göschel is a professor at Berlin. Immanuel Hermann Fichte is a son of the celebrated philosopher, whose life he has published. He is himself an able philosophical writer, and is a professor at a gymnasium at Düsseldorf. Christian Hermann Weisse was born at Leipsic in 1801. Since 1827, he has been professor of philosophy at Leipsic. He has distinguished himself by his spirit and acuteness in philosophical investigations, at first in the manner of Hegel, but of late with more independence.

In the 8th vol. of the Stud. u. Krit., J. O. Müller, a licentiate of theology at Bâle, has inserted an essay on the question, 'Is not the doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body one of the ancient Persian Doctrines?' He contends, in opposition to Hävernick, that it was one of the articles of belief in the old Parsee system. In the 9th vol. pp. 187—219, Weisse reviews a volume of Göschel entitled, 'Proofs of the Immortality of the Human Soul.' Göschel, in the same volume, presents a positive philosophical theory on the soul and immortality, and endeavors to show that the doctrine of immortality is not peculiar to any one philosophical system, but is the united result and import of all the philosophical investigations of all times and of all philosophical schools. Weisse finds occasion to controvert some of the main positions of Göschel. In the subsequent number of the work, Weisse himself has inserted an essay of more than 150 pages on the Philosophical Import of the Christian Doctrine of the Last Things. We have also a paper in the same volume from the pen of Weizel, a *repetent* in Tübingen, on the primitive christian doctrine of the immortality of the soul. These references will serve to show the fertility of the Germans, and the interest which is felt on this and on kindred subjects.

NOTE K, p. 278.

Eschatology.—This is from the Greek ἔσχατος λόγος, 'Doctrine of the Last Things,' Res ultimae aut novissimae. Four subjects are commonly embraced in the term, viz. death, resurrection, judgment, the end of the world.

NOTE L, p. 279.

'The opponents of Origen among the Greeks and Latins began to insist, that not merely the resurrection of the body (corporis) should be taught, but also *carnis* (crassae). The older fathers used *corpus* and *caro* interchangeably, as was also done in the older symbols, and intended by the use of these terms to denote only that there would be no new creation of a body; since both of

these terms, according to the Heb. usus loquendi, are synonymes, as when we speak in reference to the Lord's Supper, of the corpus and caro Christi. But since caro implies, according to the same idiom, the associated idea of weakness and mortality, it was abandoned by many who wished to use language with more precision, and instead of it, the phrase resurrectio corporis was adopted. It was on this account that the Chiliasts insisted so much the more urgently upon retaining the terms σάρξ and caro.' *Woods's Trans. of Knapp, II.* 633.

NOTE M, p. 282.

Lange here refers, in a short paragraph which we omit, to some speculations of Goethe, which may be found in Mrs. Austin's Translation, I. 65. The speculations were thrown out in the course of a conversation between Goethe and Von Falk, on the day of the funeral of Wieland. The friends were conversing in respect to the actual condition of the departed soul of the poet. 'The destruction of such high powers,' said Goethe, 'is a thing that never, and under no circumstances, can even come into question. Nature is not such a prodigal spendthrift of her capital. Wieland's soul is one of nature's treasures; a perfect jewel.' Goethe then goes on to develop his theory, or speculation, for it can be called nothing more, concerning *monades*. 'I assume various classes and orders of the primary elements of all existences, as the germs of all phenomena in nature; these I would call souls, since from them proceeds the animation or vivification of the whole. Or rather *monades*:—Let us always stick to that Leibnitzian term; a better can scarcely be found, to express the simplicity of the simplest existence. Now, as experience shows us, some of these monades or germs are so small, so insignificant, that they are, at the highest, adapted only to a subordinate use and being. Others, again, are strong and powerful. These latter, accordingly, draw into their sphere all that approaches them, and transmute it into something belonging to themselves; *i. e.* into a human body, into a plant, an animal, or, to go higher still, into a star. This process they continue till the small or larger world, whose completion lies predestined in them, at length comes bodily into light.'

NOTE N, p. 285.

'The apostle shows no fear of death, since he is ready to die, if it be necessary. Still he is a man, and has not thrown off man's nature so as to make us believe that he had a stoical contempt of death; otherwise, he would not have expressed such thoughts as he has in 2 Cor. 1: 8—11. Here, however, he seeks to explain in a christian manner that fear of death which is fixed in human nature, and also in his nature, while he teaches us that there is cause for feeling, not because Christians dread annihilation, or that they see ground for fear in respect to their eternal life, but merely from dread of the process of unclothing, in which the soul becomes an exile from its home. Therefore we groan, says he, and feel ourselves bur-

dened, since we do not desire to be unclothed, but rather to be clothed upon, that mortality might be swallowed up of life, that is, we would desire such a change, that, without the bitter separation of the soul from the covering which now surrounds it, we might, as it were, put on the new garment over the old, and then the living principle of life in the new, would destroy the principle of corruption in the old; we would become immortal without passing the gates of death. In respect to the possibility or impossibility of it, he says nothing; still less does he undertake to point out the mode or manner in which the thing might take place. It was enough for him to show what that is which the heart, properly speaking, feels, and what is the nature of the wish which lies at the ground of the universal dread of death.' Rückert, Comm. on 2 Cor. 5: 4, p. 149.

LIFE OF PLATO.

BY

W. G. TENNEMANN.

LIFE OF PLATO.

CHAPTER I.

BIRTH AND EDUCATION.

PLATO was descended from an ancient and noble stock. The celebrated Codrus, the last king of Attica, was an ancestor of his father. His mother, Perictione, derived her descent from Dropides, the brother of Solon.[1] Were we to credit the fabulous reports of many ancient writers, our philosopher must have owed his existence to Apollo, who is said to have introduced himself to Perictione under the form of a serpent.[2] The report that Ariston did not cohabit with his wife until she had borne Plato, and that this, according to the statement of others, was enjoined upon him in a dream, might excite the suspicion, that possibly, the whole thing was fabricated, for some special object, in the early times of Christianity, if it had not been mentioned by the older writers, as Speusippus, Clearchus and Anaxilides. These, however, are far from asserting it as an actual fact, but, they very readily admit, that it rests on mere rumors which were current at Athens. After the birth of Christ, when faith in miracles had found a number of apostles, the wonderful story in question would not have been doubted by a multitude of writers. The superstitious Plutarch speaks with much earnestness in relation to it, and affirms that Apollo could have had no reason to have been ashamed of his son.[3] Olympiodorus says that Plato gave himself out to be the son of Apollo from the fact that he considered himself to be, along with the swans, a servant of that god. Here, however, Plato has reference to Socrates.[4] Like many similar things, this

[1] Apuleius, Leyden 1623, p. 265. Diogenes Laertius. III. 1. Olympiodorus (Life of Plato prefixed to Tauchn. ed. Lips. 1829,) deduces his origin on the father's side from Solon, and on the mother's from Codrus, in opposition to the express testimony of other writers. [Relative οἰκεῖος, not brother,' Boeckh].

[2] Apul. p 265. Diog. III. 2. Plutarch, Sympos. VIII. 1. Olympiodorus.

[3] Plut. Sympos. VIII 1 [4] Phaedo, Vol. I p 193. Bip. Ed. of Plato.

strange report, probably, owes its origin to a mere play of the imagination, occasion for which was possibly furnished by some incidents which might have happened to his mother, but more especially from the circumstance, that he was born on the same day in which Apollo saw the light. The birth-day of Plato was the seventh of the month Thargelion, which was afterwards observed by the disciples of Plato as a festival.[1]

Authors are not agreed respecting the year of his birth. I will mention the different statements, and by comparing them, seek to ascertain which is the most probable. According to the testimony of Phavorinus,[2] certain writers report that he was not born at Athens, but on the island Ægina, whither the Athenians, having expelled the inhabitants, had sent new colonists, among whom was Ariston, Plato's father. Now this event occurred in the second year of the Peloponnesian war, which began in the second year of the eighty-seventh Olympiad. According to this account, Plato must have been born in the fourth year of the eighty-seventh, or in the first year of the eighty-eighth Olympiad. This is the year given by Apollodorus and Hermippus. According to Athenaeus, Plato was born in the third year of the eighty-seventh Olympiad. The Chronicon of Eusebius names the fourth year of the eighty-eighth Olympiad, when Stratocles was archon, while the Alexandrian Chronicon mentions the first year of the eighty-ninth Olympiad, in the archonship of Isarchus. Neanthes makes him eighty-four years old (at his death); hence, if we assume that he died in the first year of the one hundred and eighth Olympiad, he must have been born in the second year of the eighty-seventh. Diogenes, however, relates that the event occurred in the archonship of Amenias, which, according to Diodorus, was in the second year of the eighty-seventh Olympiad. We have a report from Hermippus, not, it is true, explicit, but from which it follows, that Plato died in the eighty-second year of his age, in the first year of the one hundred and eighth Olympiad.

In order that we may draw a consistent conclusion from these contradictory statements, we must attend to other facts which have been related with more definiteness. Here belongs the year of his death. Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Plutarch, Diogenes and Athenaeus all state the year of his death to have been the first of the one hundred and eighth Olympiad. This reckoning is on the authority

[1] Diog. III. 2. [2] Plut. Sympos. VIII. 1. [3] Diog. III. 3.

of Hermotimus, who wrote the lives of celebrated philosophers, and of the well-known chronologist, Apollodorus, whose testimony is of still greater weight. With these we must always count Neanthes, who composed the lives of distinguished men with much industry. If Neanthes had deviated from other writers in respect to the year of Plato's death, Diogenes would not certainly have forgotten to mention it. Eusebius deserves no attention, when in opposition to the definite statement of these old and somewhat reputable writers, he names the fourth year of the same Olympiad. If now there was as much certainty in relation to the length of his life, then we could have the adequate data to fix upon the year of his birth. Here, however, there are three varying opinions. According to Neanthes, Plato was eighty-four years old ;[1] according to Hermotimus, Cicero, Seneca, Lucian and Censorinus, eighty-one years ;[2] and, finally, according to Valerius Maximus and Athenaeus, eighty-two years.[3] Though the last statement cannot be maintained against the conclusions of the other writers, still it rests, perhaps, on common grounds with them. Since Plato is said to have died on the very anniversary day of his birth, his death may be set down as well in the departing as in the commencing year, and we have the right equally to say that he died in the eighty-first, or in the eighty-second year of his age. We have now only to consider the two reports respecting the years eighty-one and eighty-four.

According to the testimony of Plutarch and Dionysius of Halicarnassus, Isocrates was born in the second year of the eighty-sixth Olympiad, seven years earlier than Plato, and five years before the Pelopennesian war.[4] Diogenes Laertius fixes the intermediate time between Isocrates and Plato at only six years, probably in accordance with the reckoning of Neanthes.[5] Were we to follow his arrangement, Plato would have been born in the second year of the Pelopennesian war, or in the fourth year of the eighty-seventh Olympiad. Now when we reckon backwards from this year to the

[1] Diog. III. 3.

[2] Diog. III. 2. Cic. De Senect. c 5. Seneca Epist. 58. Lucianus de Longaevis, Censorinus de Die Natali, c. 15.

[3] Val. Maxim. VIII. 7. Athenaeus, V. 18.

[4] Plat. Vit., Isocrates, Dionysius Judicio de Isocrate.

[5] Diog III. 3.

second year of the eighty-sixth Olympiad, we have only six years; and from the beginning of the Pelopennesian war only four years, consequently we must include both the year preceding these, and the year following. Herein, indeed, lies the only doubt, which has not as yet been removed. This reckoning leads us back to the fourth year of the eighty-seventh, or to the first of the eighty-eighth Olympiad as the year of Plato's birth, which I have the best reason to regard as the most probable, inasmuch as we always return to the same point, though we go out on different paths.

To the preceding grounds, on which we form a conclusion, we we will add a new one. Plato lived as a pupil with Socrates eight years, namely, from his twentieth to his twenty-eighth year.[1] Brucker here finds a singular difficulty. 'Plato,' says he, 'could have been only eight and twenty in the first year of the ninety-fifth Olympiad, in which Socrates drank the poisoned cup, but he must have been at least thirty years old, for he was at that time senator, to which office no one was eligible before his thirtieth year.'[2] I cannot say from what source Brucker learned that Plato was a senator, for I do not find the least proof of it. If we now go back from the year of the death of Socrates twenty-eight years, the fourth year of the eighty-seventh or the first year of the eighty-eighth Olympiad will be fixed upon as the year of the birth of Plato. In the mean time we adopt this reckoning, until learned men, from better grounds, shall have decided upon another.[3]

Of his father and mother but a few circumstances are known. His father died very early, before Plato had commenced his philosophical course, probably before the 28th year of his age.[4] But his mother was living even after he had come into the court of Dionysius the younger.[5] His brothers were Adimantus and Glauco; he

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[1] Diogenes III 5, 6. Suidas Platone, ἀπογνοὺς δὲ τούτων ἐφιλοσόφησε παρὰ Σωκράτει ἐπὶ ἔτη κ. A more correct reading is probably ἐπὶ ἔτει κ.

[2] Historia Critica Philosophiae, Lips. 1745, I. 632, Note.

[3] [Professor Boeckh of Berlin, as we learn from MS. Notes of his Lectures on Plato, loaned us by a friend, places his birth 429 B. C., on the 7th of Thargelion, 21st or 22d of March. According to Ritter, Geschichte der Phil II. 152, Berlin, 1830, Plato was born at Ægina or Athens, in the 87th or 88th Olympiad, at the time of the death of Pericles.—Tr.]

[4] Plut. περὶ φιλοπολυπραγμοσύνης II Frankf. 1620, 496.

[5] Plat Epist XI. 174.

had a sister called Potona. Plutarch puts down Antipho as a younger brother.[1] But he was only a half brother, on the mother's side, since Perictione, after the death of Ariston, married Pyrilampes, as we should conclude from the reference below.[2] We now turn back to Plato himself.

Nature had furnished him with many qualifications and accomplishments, which placed him in a condition to act the part of a great man. His bodily frame was very firm and strong, but perhaps not altogether symmetrical, the due proportion of parts of his body to the whole not being preserved. According to the account of some writers, either his breast, his shoulders or his forehead were unusually broad. Hence was derived his name *Πλατών*, for he was first called Aristocles, from his grandfather.[3] Plutarch also relates that he was hump-backed, but this, perhaps, was not a natural defect; it may have first appeared late in life as a result of his severe studies.[4]

But though his bodily frame was not entirely symmetrical, yet it could not have disfigured him; rather he was so constituted, that from his external appearance, particularly from his countenance, we should have attributed to him a superior mind. So at least Socrates judged, who, with his wonderfully sharp eye, was wont to ascertain the inner, hidden disposition, and here at least he did not deceive himself.[5] A strong susceptibility and excitableness, a fiery imagination, wit and keenness, a high degree of understanding and reason were the gifts which Plato had received from nature. And there were wanting neither education, fortunate circumstances, nor his own activity, by which he might cultivate these talents, bring them into action and give them a determinate direction.

His father contributed all which, according to the circumstances of the times, was necessary to give to his son a good education. Plato first learned grammar, that is, reading and writing, from Dionysius. In gymnastics, Ariston was his teacher. He excelled so much in

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[1] Diogenes III. 4. Apuleius 366. Plutarch, *περὶ φιλαδελφίας* 484.

[2] Parmenides X. 73.

[3] Diogenes III. 4. Seneca Epist. 58. Apuleius 365.

[4] Plut. de Audiend. Poet. 26, 53.

[5] Apuleius p. 366, quem ubi adspexit ille, ingeniumque intimum de exteriore conspicatus est facie.

these physical exercises, that he went into a public contest at the Isthmian and Pythian games.[1] He studied painting and music under the tuition of Draco, a scholar of the well-known Damon, and Metellus of Agrigentum.[2] But his favorite employment, in his youthful years, was poetry, since this furnished abundant nourishment to his spirit, struggling upward, and which in itself, as well as in the prospect of the honor and renown for which he earnestly strove, promised such manifold pleasures. After he had made use of the instruction of the most distinguished teachers of poetry, in all its forms, he proceeded to make an essay himself in heroic verse. But when he perceived its ordinary character, and the great difference between it and the masterpieces of Homer, he threw it into the fire. His love of distinction, which was his ruling passion, did not allow him to regard any one as superior to himself, and his feelings taught him that it was impossible that he should excel Homer.[3] His efforts in lyric poetry did not result any more auspiciously, or at least, they failed to give him satisfaction. Finally he sought his fortune in dramatic poetry. He elaborated four pieces, or a Tetralogy, with which he might wrest the prize from other poets. But an accident induced him to quit forever this career, to which he was not probably destined. A short time before the feast of Bacchus, when his first piece was to be brought upon the stage, he became acquainted with Socrates, who discovered in him talents which would fit him for a large sphere of action. To his desire for honor, Socrates gave an entirely different direction, as we shall show further on.[4] But though he abandoned his poetic attempts, yet he still attended to the reading of the poets, particularly of Homer, Aristophanes and Sophron, as his favorite occupation.[5] He derived from them in part, the dramatic arrangement of his dialogues.

It was then customary, for young men who were preparing for the polite world, or to distinguish themselves in any manner, to attend a course in philosophy. Plato had heard the instructions of Cratylus, a disciple of the school of Heraclitus.[6] When Diogenes,

[1] Diog. III. 4. Apul. 366, Olympiod.

[2] Diog. III. 5. Apul. 366. Plutarch de Musica. [3] Ælian II. 30.

[4] Ælian II. 3. Diogen. III. 5, Olympiod. Apul. 366. [5] Olympiod.

[6] Aristoteles Metaphysic. I, 6 *ἐκ νέου τὲ γὰρ ὀιγγενομένος πρῶτον Κρατύλῳ καὶ ταῖς Ἡρακλειτείοις δοξαῖς.* Apuleius 366, et antea quidem Heraclitî secta fuerat imbutus.

Olympiodorus and other writers assert that he did not become a scholar of Cratylus till after the death of Socrates, they give less credit to Aristotle and Apuleius than they deserve; the former a contemporary, the latter drawing his information from Speusippus.[1]

There are yet other grounds which take away all probability from the information of Diogenes, who has not given his authorities. In the first place, it is not credible, that Plato, up to his twentieth year, had not studied philosophy, which was then the universal practice of high-born youth. Philosophers in great numbers, and of all kinds, then exercised their profession at Athens. Ariston, as it appears from all the authorities, spared no expense which could promote the education of Plato. In the second place, provided Plato did not attend upon the instructions of Cratylus till after the death of Socrates, it would appear, even according to the supposition of Diogenes, that he must have attended immediately after that event. But Diogenes directly thereupon relates, out of Hermodorus, that Plato, in the twenty-eighth year of his age, repaired to Euclid at Megara. And how could he have still remained at Athens, when with the other disciple of Socrates he left Athens for the very reason, that he feared the same fate at the hands of the Athenians which Socrates had suffered?

Diogenes says further, that Plato, in addition to Cratylus, attended upon Hermogenes, an Eleatic philosopher, and that too *after* his attendance upon Socrates. Now as no early writer alludes to this Hermogenes, not even in a single word, I am inclined to believe, that he is the same one who preceded Cratylus as a teacher, and was the son of Hipponicus, an Athenian. Since Cratylus was a teacher of Plato, this circumstance, or some other authority misled Diogenes, and caused him to confound Cratylus and Hermogenes together, and thus while Cratylus passed for a Heraclitic philosopher, Hermogenes, with like inconsiderateness, was regarded as an Eleatic.

But it is very probable, that Plato, in his youth, had become acquainted with the several kinds of philosophy, which then found disciples. For opportunity could not have been wanting in Athens,

[1] Diog. III. 6., Olymp., Anonymous writer in the Bibliothek der alten Litteratur. ["Aristotle says Plato was connected with Cratylus from his youth, Meta. 1. 6. Ast improperly doubts this. His first philosophy was Ionic. That Cratylus, in his dotage, is represented unfavorably, is owing to the fact that Plato now despised that philosophy." Boeckh. Tr.]

which was a favorite rendezvous for all the so-called philosophers, sophists and rhetoricians. So far it is certain, at least, that Plato had an indescribable desire for knowledge, and spared no labor nor pains, in order to amass information.[1] Apuleius likewise records, that he was very modest, which is also corroborated by Heraclides.[2] While a youth, he was so serious and collected, that he was never guilty of any irregularities, or, as some say, he never laughed throughout his life.[3] It is scarcely worth the pains to animadvert upon the extravagancies in these ludicrous fabrications. But it is more important to consider what some writers, in opposition to the assurance of Speusippus and Heraclides, have asserted, namely, that Plato, in his youth, indulged excessively in love, and that he went so far even as not to disdain beautiful boys.[4]

This point, which has furnished both the friends and enemies of Plato, from the early times, a fine opportunity to show their adroitness either in attack or defence, has not, in our days, been settled with the proper definiteness, and one is thereby always in danger of confounding the man with the philosopher, of making an individual, aside from his own deserts, a saint or a sinner. To examine the grounds assumed by the opponents is all which we can now do. The alleged illicit loves of Plato, are inferred from three general heads. First, that he sought the intercourse of beautiful youths. But this Socrates did, and in itself it is no fault. Secondly, there are still extant a few amatory songs concerning maidens and boys which breathe something wholly different from lawful love and delicate friendship.[5] But it cannot be determined that these sports of a juvenile phantasy originated with Plato. The greater part of them were in the Greek Anthology attributed to other authors. Would not Plato have burnt his verses of this sort with his other poems? Apuleius asserts, indeed, explicitly, that he spared only these; but that

[1] Apul 366. Nam Speusippus domesticis instructus documentis et pueri ejus acre in percipiendo ingenium et admirandae verecundiae indolem laudat; et pubescentis primitias labore atque amore studendi imbutas refert.

[2] Diog. III. 26. [3] Diog. III. 26, Olymp.

[4] Diog. III. 34. Athenaeus I. XI.

[5] Diog. III. 35. Athen. I. XIII. Apul. Apolog. 249. Gellius I. XIX. c. II, says, "Some regard Plato as the author of one of these poems, which he composed at the time that he wrote tragedies, before he attended upon Socrates."

writer has no other historical ground for this assertion than their existence, which is indeed very slender. Once more, could they be charged on him, as the author, they may be regarded as the play of a juvenile, ardent imagination, much of which one might consider as useful, and according to the Greek ideas of propriety and fitness. In mature age, indeed, Plato would not have allowed himself to compose such poems. Thirdly, Antisthenes, in order to torment Plato, prepared a certain dialogue, called Satho, which contained an allusion to his name, as well as a satire on his excesses in love.[1] But whether Plato merited this is not clear. For if he was guilty of profligate habits, he, doubtless, did not continue to practise them in mature age.

It were certainly possible, and somewhat in keeping with the character of Antisthenes, to revive the remembrance of Plato's youthful faults, so as to gratify his own pride and inclination for scandal. It is not, indeed, my intention to attempt to free Plato from every fault; but the foregoing charges are not sufficient to attach any stains to his life; and to judge from his dispositions and his labors, he cannot, as it seems to me, be regarded as a sensualist.

It may appear to be a remarkable circumstance in the life of Plato, that, in his struggle for honor and renown, with his talents, and in very favorable circumstances, he should not have trod that path which was most customary in a republic,—by his deeds and services in behalf of his native land, to acquire for himself a glorious name. In inclination he was as little wanting as other young men. Had he desired to perform an active part in public business, so soon as it was in his power, his motives, in taking the common course, might have been mere ambition, or a wish to make himself generally useful, or the consciousness of duty.[2] Critias, one of the Thirty, a near relative, being his uncle on the mother's side, and other friends aroused him to the subject, and placed before him things of a stimulating nature.[3] The requisite qualities and the aptitude we cannot deny him. Cicero, at least, believes, that as an orator, he might

[1] Diog. III. 35. Athenaeus I. II. III.

[2] Epist. 8. XI. 93, *νέος ἐγώ ποτε ὤν πολλοῖς δὴ ταυτὸν ἔπαθον· ᾠήθην, εἰ θᾶττον ἐμαυτοῦ γενοίμην κύριος, ἐπὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως εὐθὺς ἰέναι.* Epist. 5. 89. Epist. 9. 165.

[3] Epist. 7. 94, *τούτων δή τινες οἰκεῖοί τε ὄντες καὶ γνώριμοι ἐτύγχανον ἐμοί· καὶ δὴ καὶ παρακάλουν εὐθὺς ὡς ἐπὶ προσήκοντα πράγματα μέ.*

have played a conspicuous part.[1] But notwithstanding all these fortunate circumstances, notwithstanding all the internal and the external inducements, he kept himself wholly aloof from all public occupations and services. He never once went into an assembly of the people either to impart counsel or to propose measures.[2] For the reason of this remarkable fact, we have Plato's own confession. He was too considerate; he weighed everything in cool blood, and did not allow himself to be seduced into any rash resolutions. Accordingly he determined in the first place to observe what rules those men who had the helm of State in their hands followed; and he soon found evidence enough to satisfy himself, that they could not harmonize with his principles in the least degree. It is probable, that through his intercourse with Socrates, his moral sense was so developed and educated, that the cruel deeds, the acts of violence and the despotic principles of the Thirty filled his soul with horror, and produced the first disinclination to a life of business. For he would not adopt their maxims, and he could not follow his own, without plunging himself into the most evident hazard of life, and he did not see that the common good would receive any advantage from such a course.[3] When afterwards the power of the Thirty was annihilated, and a new reformation of the political system followed, his inclination for political life was again somewhat excited. But many new scenes which occurred, particularly the iniquitous execution of Socrates, gave to his original resolution, namely, to have nothing to do with the administration of the State, firmness and permanence; they imparted to his mind a particular direction towards the investigation of the fundamental errors and radical deficiencies, not only in the Attic Commonwealth, but in other States, and led him to reflect on the causes of this evil, and the means of thoroughly removing it.[4]

Perhaps another cause had an influence. So strong an inclina-

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[1] Cic. Officior. 1. 1.

[2] Epist. V. 88. We are not entirely certain, whether he performed military service more than on a single occasion. The information of Diogenes III. 8, from Aristoxenus and Ælian VII. 14, that he fought at Tanagra, Delos and Corinth, cannot be true, for Plato was at that time only a child.

[3] Epist. 5. 89, *ἐπεὶ πάντων ἂν ἡδιστα, καθάπερ πατρὶ, συνεβούλευεν αὐτῷ, εἰ μὴ μάτην μὲν κινδυνεύσειν ᾤετο, πλέον δ' οὐδὲν ποιήσειν.*

[4] Epist. 7. 93, 96.

tion for a political course of life might have led him to attain it, but this was not the only thing which filled his soul. From the zeal with which he had struggled to educate his mind and to collect knowledge, we may safely conclude, as it appears to me, that he had enjoyed, in a high degree, the pleasures which mental pursuits awaken. Hence there must have originated a special interest in certain objects, and a particular direction must have been given to his entire pursuits, although at first he had determined to educate himself merely for a statesman. Thus he did not want other objects and motives for labor, and sources of satisfaction, when he had been disappointed in his original purpose, and the means by which he would have effected his object took the place of the object itself.

These reasons appear to me to be sufficient to account for the phenomenon. Brucker thinks that he took no part in the administration of the affairs of the State, because he was not pleased with the laws of Draco and Solon;[1] but Brucker has confounded, as it seems to me, the effects and operation of the laws, with the reasons for them. Of the laws of Draco nothing in particular can be said, since they were abolished by Solon. Neither the character of the laws, nor the constitution of the State could have impeded Plato's struggle for political life, for he could not have once thought of these things; it was the men—their maxims and rules, which first drew his attention, and which first awakened in him discontent and indignation. Now he desired even, that the Athenians should copy the morals and dispositions of their ancestors, and that the laws of Solon should have their full influence. It was subsequently only, when a necessary survey and observation of the moral and political relations of men had turned his mind to these objects, that he believed that the grounds of the manifold existing evils were to be found in the constitution of the State, in legislation and education.[2]

This circumstance, besides, exerted great influence on the cultivation of his mind, and in directing him towards philosophy, travelling, and many other things. Had Plato been fortunate in the attainment of his objects, or rather had not such sinister maxims and motives met him in his path, we should have had, it may be, no Plato the philosopher; his writings, instinct with genius, would not perhaps have seen the light. His observant mind would have been turned especially towards men in their social relations, their actions,

[1] Hist. Crit. Philos. I. 648.

[2] Epist. 7. 94. 96.

motives and maxims. His judgment would, in that case, have sought opportunity to distinguish between what appeared to be customary, and what ought to be. But here we must not forget that the education, which his mind received through the intercourse, the instruction and the leading of Socrates had the greatest share in all these effects, and that the circumstance above referred to must have been regarded only in its aspects as an occasion, or a subsidiary reason. It is time, however, that we should resume the narration, where we just now suspended it.

Plato had already gone through the course of knowledge which young people then customarily pursued, had attended the philosophical lectures of Cratylus, and probably of several others, and perhaps had read the works of the older philosophers, as Xenophanes and Parmenides. He had already, as we have seen, made attempts in various kinds of poetry, and was even about to bring four dramatic compositions on the stage, when he became acquainted with the excellent Socrates, by which means the cultivation of his mind was hastened. According to the testimony of most writers, Ariston himself led his son, now in his twentieth year, to Socrates, because he thought that intercourse with him would be useful to his son.[1] This occurrence is interwoven with some wonderful circumstances, perhaps mere additions, but which still may have some authority. The night before, Socrates had the following dream.—A young swan flew away from the altar which was consecrated to Love in the academy, and alighted on the lap of Socrates, and, finally, rose into the air with an enrapturing song. As Socrates was relating this dream to his pupils the next morning, Ariston came with his son. The sight of the youth, whose external appearance bespoke so much superiority, delighted Socrates. He turned to his pupils and said, "There is the swan of the academy." The writers referred to relate this only as a report which was deficient in the proper historical grounds. In the mean time, any one who considers the lively imagination of Socrates and his conviction of the full meaning of dreams,

[1] Apul. 366. Diog. III. 5. Olymp. Ælian narrates in a different manner touching the commencement of the acquaintance of the two men, but we will not vouch for the truth of his account. Plato was compelled through poverty to betake himself to a soldier's life, but when he was in the act of buying his accoutrements, accident conducted Socrates to him, who, by his first conversation, brought him to another resolution.

may well enough suppose that some such thing might have happened. Of the eight years which Plato passed in intercourse with Socrates we know little or nothing, interesting as the detail of all the minute circumstances and incidents would be for us, inasmuch as it would show us two great men of antiquity, perhaps in an entirely new aspect. How many wonderful things might we learn, particularly in respect to the course of the development and education of Plato's mind, could the history of this period of his life contain something else than a dry collection of a few fragments.

Socrates must have greatly rejoiced when a slight acquaintance confirmed the judgment which he had formed on the first glance at his countenance, and which satisfied his expectation. He discovered in him all the fine qualities, the expression of which has imparted such an interest to his writings; a lively imagination susceptible of everything beautiful, wit and acuteness. He however noticed that the spring which set in motion all his powers of mind was nothing but ambition. Hence Socrates did not deem it necessary to stir up these powers by any excitements; he gave to them merely a determinate direction by virtue of that sense of honor, of which he, as a good educator, knew how to make a very judicious use. He ennobled this propensity, while he led Plato off from things on which he sought to display his brilliancy, and conducted him to those objects which elevate us in our own consciousness.[1] As a consequence, Plato burned all his dramatic poems, and ever after renounced poetry. Light as must have been the task of education in respect to the mind, since Plato was quite teachable, and as, it appears to me, in addition to his good talents, possessed of great susceptibility for moral studies, still, on the other hand, would it be very difficult for Socrates to satisfy the aspiring and the inquisitive spirit of his pupil. In all his conversations, he started questions, raised doubts, and always demanded new reasons, without allowing himself to be satisfied with those already given, and thus caused his teacher not a little trouble.[2] This liveliness and activity of mind could not displease Socrates with

[1] Apul. p. 366. Jamque carminum confidentia elatus, certatorem se profiteri cupiebat, nisi Socrates humilitatem cupidinis ex ejus mentibus expulisset, et verae laudis gloriam in ejus animum inserere curasset.

[2] The anonymous writer of his life in the Bibliothek der alten Litteratur, 13. *μετὰ δὲ τό τὴν ἠθικὴν ὠφεληθῆναι, καὶ πράγματα παρασχεῖν αὐτῷ τῷ Σωκράτει ἐν ταῖς πρὸς αὐτόν ἐντεύξεσι.*

his manner of thinking; so little was this the case, indeed, that Plato already, in the lifetime of Socrates, wrote dialogues, in which he introduced his teacher as the principal person, and carried on discussions in a method which was not entirely his own. There are, indeed, many writers who believe that they have discovered, that Socrates was by no means satisfied with the course of Plato in falsely imputing to him so many things which he had never said. But they can adduce no satisfactory grounds, or competent testimony, for their conclusion. The single thing to which they appeal can prove nothing for them, because it is ambiguous. When Plato brought forward his Lysis in the presence of Socrates, the latter exclaimed, as they say, "By Hercules! how many things does the young man falsely report of me!"[1] Now it cannot be determined, that Socrates uttered this sentiment with these words and with this manner, but it is rather probable, that the report was related in a different way.[2] But, allowing that the fact is correctly stated, still we cannot infer from it in any manner, a reproof, accusation or even disapprobation on the part of Socrates. It were certainly inconsiderateness in Plato to have recited his writings to Socrates, which were of such a nature as to have aroused his indignation. The words, however, will well bear the meaning, that Socrates, wishing to commend the richness and fruitfulness of the young man's mind, employed the Attic elegance which very well agreed with that sort of irony of which the words of the anonymous biographer contain an example. Athenaeus, further, relates an anecdote, which perhaps would indicate more dissatisfaction on the part of Socrates than the preceding story, if it were not destitute of all historical probability: "Socrates is reported to have once said, in the presence of Plato and of other pupils, 'I dreamed that thou art become a crow, and hast picked my bald head. I predict that thou wilt prate many falsehoods about me among the people.'"[3] Were Athenaeus, indeed, in many of his anecdotes about the philosophers deserving of particular credit, still, that this would be wholly unfounded, we can show by testimony which

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[1] Diog. III. 35. φασὶ δὲ καὶ Σωκράτην ἀκουσάντα τὸν Λύσιν ἀναγνώσκοντος Πλατώνος, Ἡρακλεῖς, εἰπεῖν, ὡς πολλά μου κατεψεύδετ' ὁ νεανίσκος.

[2] The anonymous biographer so relates the fact, 13. τὸν γὰρ Λύσιν διάλογον συγγέγραφως, ᾧ ἐντύχε καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης, ἔφη τοῖς ἑταίροις αὐτοῦ, ὁ τός ὁ νεανίας ἄγει με ὅπη θέλει, καὶ ἐφ' ὅσον θέλει, καὶ πρὸς οὓς θέλει.

[3] Athenaeus Dipnos. edit. Casaub. L. XI. 507.

would be entirely satisfactory to an adversary. It is derived from a writer, who was a contemporary, a fellow-pupil of Plato and also a rival. Xenophon, who has taken special pains, as Plato did in different circumstances, not to mention Plato's name except in a single instance, could not avoid saying once, as it were in passing, that Socrates had a very particular regard for Plato.[1] This testimony, or rather this hint, removes all subsequent reports, and obtains additional weight when we consider the disposition and conduct of Plato towards his teacher.

Plato esteemed and loved Socrates, as was fit in view of the excellent character of the latter. But here not only his writings furnish very many proofs,—in which, with the finest touches, he exhibits Socrates in accordance with his own mode of thinking, and defends him with great earnestness from all his unjust charges,—but the facts which he adduces corroborate his statements. When he was accused, Plato ascended the orator's stand to prove his innocence to the judges, though he did not obtain the object of his wish. When the clamor of the assembled multitude compelled him to descend, ere he had hardly begun to speak,[2] Crito, Critobulus, Apollodorus and Plato entreated Socrates to offer to the judges a sum of money as a voluntary fine, in order to redeem himself from his cruel sentence, while they would contribute thirty minae from their own resources.[3] Although Socrates did not accede to their request, still it was a very strong proof of their sincere attachment to him. The death of this good man, of this distinguished teacher and dear friend, filled Plato's heart with the deepest feeling, partly of grief, partly of indignation towards his enemies.[4] Athenaeus here relates an anecdote that is not, perhaps, more credible than the others which he has so abundantly collected. When some of the disciples of Socrates, after his death, were entirely dejected and disheartened, Plato, who was in their company, taking a cup, said, that they ought not to permit their courage to fail; he felt himself sufficiently strong to continue the school of Socrates, and reached the cup to Apollodo-

[1] Xenoph. Memor. Soc. III. 6, *Σωκράτης δὲ εὔνους ὢν αὐτῷ διὰ τὴν Χαρμίδην τὸν Γλαύκωνος καὶ διὰ Πλατώνα.*

[2] Diog. II. 41, from Justus Tiberius, a very recent writer. That Plato defended Socrates in the trial is very possible, Xenoph. Apolog.

[3] Plato, Apolog. 88. Xenoph. Apolog.

[4] Phaedo, 265, 267. Epist. 7. 94, 95. Plutarch de Vita Morale L. II. 449.

rus. The latter, however, replied with displeasure: 'Rather would I drink the poisoned cup of Socrates, than take a cup of wine from thee.'[1] Now it might have been true, that Plato himself, while still a scholar, formed the determination of establishing his own philosophical school; possibly this resolution acquired more strength after the death of Socrates; but the conduct in question does not accord with his character, and it has a number of serious difficulties in opposition to it. But is it possible that Plato was so unfeeling, that, in view of the compassionate sympathies of his fellow-disciples, he could think only of gratifying his personal pride? Stupid must he have been in sense and feeling, to imagine that by forwardness in assuming the place of Socrates he could mitigate the sorrow of any one for the loss of his ever memorable teacher. And would he have done this at a time when all were in anxious fear lest they should share a fate like that which had befallen their master, and when most of them did not consider it prudent to remain at Athens? Had Plato entertained the serious intention of teaching philosophy in the place of Socrates, and had circumstances favored it, he would have been entirely certain of accomplishing his object, without bringing on himself the disapprobation of others.

Before I proceed further, I must say something concerning the relation of Plato to the other disciples of Socrates, and in respect to their mutual coldness and jealousy. Diogenes and Athenaeus have collected a great multitude of such narratives, nearly all of which have the object of disclosing, in their nakedness, the infirmities and faults of Plato, or rather by collecting them together to put his whole character into the shade. I have often been astonished when I have seen respectable writers of modern times give credence to the word of those authors, repeating pictures which were entire caricatures, without investigating the accuracy of the particular lineaments, without examining the sources from which they were derived, without presenting the facts under a general point of view, without having gone over this historical criticism and separated the false from the true;—a manner of proceeding in which there is always danger of being unjust towards this or that individual, and of exhibiting the character of persons in a false light. I will, therefore, collect together all the facts in connection with a full view of what relates to them, examine their correctness, and finally arrange to-

[1] Athenaeus L. XI. 507.

gether some investigations which have particular reference to the unfriendly relations of the disciples of Socrates.

The writers referred to accuse Plato of having left traces in his conduct towards most of the disciples of Socrates, of envy, jealousy, contempt and revenge, which greatly darkened his character. In all his writings, Plato mentions Xenophon but once, and not at all in the Phaedon and the Apology, where he should have found a place in connection with the other pupils of Socrates. Plato declared, for the purpose of giving pain to his opponent, that the Cyropaedia was a mere romance. Precisely similar was the conduct of Xenophon. He mentions Plato's name but once in his writings. When Plato had brought out the first two books of his Republic, Xenophon wrote his Cyropaedia in order to present an opposite to the Platonic ideal of a commonwealth. Their jealousy showed itself in the circumstance that both composed similar works, namely, the Apology of Socrates and the Symposium.[1] Of the facts first mentioned, in their main points, there is undoubted proof. The last named, however, when they are not absolutely false are, at least, very doubtful. When Plato says that Cyrus, as he himself represents the matter, had acquired no particular education, but such as was customary for a youth destined to a rough manner of life, that he might become a good soldier, and that while he carried on wars through the whole of his life, he took very little care of his domestic affairs and of the education of his sons, still we cannot hence conclude that Plato would offend Xenophon by this exhibition, supposing even that he had declared the Cyropaedia to be a mere romance.[2] Another mode of exhibition, namely, the refutation of an opponent, does not betray a malicious disposition, and when the name of an opponent is passed over, as in this case, with modesty, it is rather an indication of esteem or forbearance. The second allegation, that Xenophon wrote his Cyropaedia in opposition to the first two books of the Republic, and that in order to present a different ideal of the science of government, has almost nothing in its favor, and every thing against it. Now in these first two books, there occurs no ideal of a perfect commonwealth, so that Xenophon could not have composed his Cyropaedia with the design of contending against Plato. In respect to their object and plan, both productions could not have been very

[1] Diog. III. 34—37. Athen. L. XI. 504, 507. Gellius XIV. 3.

[2] De Leg. III. Vol. VIII. 142.

diverse one from the other. The similarity of the writing cannot furnish the least ground of proof, in which, the Apology excepted, it is so slight. In the Symposium, the resemblance lies only in the name, while the dissimilarity in the design and execution, is very great. There now remains only the simple fact that neither mentions the name of the other, except that Xenophon does so in one instance. In the two cases, however, where the silence of Plato may be considered as the most remarkable—in the Apology and the Phaedon—we cannot find any thing censurable in the course of Plato. For in the last named dialogue, he mentions only those followers of Socrates who were with him, or might have been with him, on the day of his death, to which number Xenophon did not belong. In the Apology, however, he does not mention his name, because it would have done no good at that time to have spoken of Xenophon to the Athenians. But that Plato and Xenophon, these cases excepted, should have thought as little of each other as if not in existence, appears to show not, indeed, hostility, but a certain distance and separation, the reasons of which are perhaps not so concealed but that they may be conjectured.

That which is censurable in Plato's treatment of Xenophon sprung from his jealousy as a writer, which did not always restrain itself within due bounds. But the weightiest charge, and that which is most prejudicial to Plato's character, has its origin in the narrations of his deportment towards Æschines. The conversation which Æschines had with Socrates in prison, in order to persuade him to flee, Plato, either through unkindness towards Æschines, or because he lived on better terms with Aristippus than with him, puts into the mouth of Crito.[1] While Plato was residing in the court of Dionysius, Æschines also came there, in order to obtain some relief in his poverty, but instead of recommending him to the king, Plato treated him with contempt.[2] When both again returned to Athens, Plato was not ashamed to deprive his poor fellow pupil of his only scholar, Xenocrates.[3] The first statement rests on the authority of Idomeneus, who wrote a book respecting the followers of Socrates; but this writer has been often blamed for his want of trustworthiness.[4] His veracity appears in a doubtful light in consequence of this single report.

[1] Athen. XI. 507. Diog. II. 60. III. 36. [2] Diog. III. 36. II. 62.

[3] Athen. XI. 507. [4] Plut. Pericle 157. Demosthenes 853, 856.

For, according to Xenophon, there were several friends who would have secretly carried off Socrates from his confinement, but still Crito appears to have acted the principal part in the matter, since only a man of respectability and wealth would think of such an enterprise. What party spirit did Plato make himself obnoxious to, when he had attributed to another man rather than to Æschines a project which was so severely censured by Socrates and rejected? In the second report, Diogenes has not quoted his authority, but mentions it simply as a story. Plutarch, however, comes forward and relates exactly the opposite.[1] The third statement Athenaeus merely relates, without referring at all to his sources. It is in itself worthy of little credit, as Athenaeus often compiles without any discrimination. If it is true, that Xenocrates in his early youth attended on Plato, that Æschines remained with Dionysius until Dion banished him from Sicily, and that after his return to Athens, he did not venture publicly to teach philosophy, because Plato and Aristippus had already gained general applause,[2] then the report in question, (to the prejudice of Plato), must be a naked fabrication. I am tired, however, of quoting, in order to confute, statements of this kind, which bear the appearance of falsehood on their face, and which can be in no manner regarded by respectable writers as having any show of credibility. From the specimens already given, we must conclude that very little faith can be placed in anecdotes like these.

Meanwhile, however, as these and all similar reports can be regarded as nothing but fabrications, which the credulous writers of a later age eagerly seized upon without any evidence, still we cannot believe that they were forged in the absence of all reason. It is, indeed, more than probable, that a kind of jealousy or coldness prevailed among most of the disciples of Socrates, the external manifestations of which were held in check, so long as Socrates lived, by their relation to him as pupils, by the universal love towards their teacher, and, finally, by the powerful influence of his admonitions, but which afterwards broke out so much the more strongly as they found no further restraint. This state of things exhibited itself, not only in regard to Plato, but also in respect to all those, nearly without an exception, who distinguished themselves in any manner. The reasons, as it appears to me, were the following. The character of their mind and feelings was too widely different to allow us

[1] Plut. de Discrim. Adulat. 67. [2] Diog. IV. 6, II. 63, 64.

to think of any close and heartfelt union as practicable. All had participated in the society of Socrates, and had been educated by him; but notwithstanding, all remained as they had been; each one used those conversational instructions which most nearly approximated to his own method of thinking and system of ideas; each made his own use and application of the rules and instructions of Socrates, and thereby educated himself, but not in accordance with the teaching of Socrates.[1] In that high esteem and love for Socrates, respecting which all his disciples, as it were, emulated each other, it was natural that each one should imagine that he himself understood Socrates in the best manner, that he could the most correctly exhibit his wisdom and copy his manner of life. Hence every one found something to censure in another who exhibited any peculiarity in thought and action, while he believed that himself alone had rightly copied his teacher. To this selfishness was added a peculiar kind of philosophical bigotry which could not endure that any one should seek, in addition to what Socrates had attempted, other modes and means of making philosophy itself useful. They believed that Socrates, who was declared to be the wisest of mortals, not only by men but by the response of an oracle, must have perfected philosophy, and that it would be folly to wish to build anything else on what he had done. This seems to me to have been particularly the case in respect to Plato, who was looked upon as an apostate by the Socratic school, who while he was, indeed, satisfied with the substantial design of the Socratic philosophy, still, on the other hand, strove after a philosophical and systematic acquaintance with this philosophy, and, in the mean time, in order to gratify his curiosity, travelled into distant lands, came into connection with other philosophers and sought nourishment for his spirit from all the books which he could obtain. This is the origin of many of the charges against Plato which we find in the letters of the Socratics. These letters are, indeed, according to the unanimous judgment of learned men, not genuine, and, by their ridiculous errors, only betray the lateness of the age of the authors; but there still lies in them much historical material for argument, which the authors handled in a very awkward manner. Hence I conjecture that the same thing appears evident in respect to these unfavorable judgments on Plato, as from the numerous anecdotes which Diogenes and Athe-

[1] Cic. de Oratore III. 16.

naeus have collected. One circumstance still may be mentioned which must have stimulated the zeal of the followers of Socrates, namely, that Plato by his mode of philosophizing acquired such an extensive fame as seemed to eclipse them. But in regard to Plato, neither this nor the other reason could have operated, for he had a very liberal mode of thinking, and fortune had raised him above jealousy. But the manner of thinking of the one class which would not listen to any other except the Socratic philosophy; the fact that the character of another class was so different from his; the passion for imitation in a third being nothing else than to copy Socrates; perhaps also various occurrences fitted to displease him—all these things taken together were sufficient to produce a certain distance and reserve, but which, so far as one can imagine, had no such influence on his conduct as that he put away from him the claims of humanity. They manifest themselves in his writings by silence; also when he quotes sentences from them, which he is compelled to censure, and if he names them, it is only, (a few persons excepted), when he quotes historical facts from Socrates. Still it appears as if Cebes and Plato lived on friendly terms.[1]

CHAPTER II.

FOREIGN TRAVELS.

After the death of Socrates, Plato, in connection with others of the Socratic school, made a journey to Megara, and remained some time there with Euclid.[2] They thought it not safe for them to stay at Athens, and they feared that the revengeful feelings of the enemies of Socrates might not be appeased by one offering. In Megara they had not only full freedom and security, but enjoyed also the pleasure of being received and entertained in a friendly manner by their fellow-disciple. Through some deficiency in the accounts, it is uncertain whether all the followers of Socrates, or a part of them, or, in other words, who the individuals were who betook them-

[1] Epist. 12. 177.

[2] Diog. III. 6. II. 106, from Hermidorus.

selves to Megara, or how long they remained, or what their employments were. Brucker says that Plato received instructions in dialectics from Euclid.[1] But no other writer has any reference to it. It is rather probable that both, in their philosophical conversations, sought to enrich and to settle their knowledge. Hence Cicero relates, that the Megarian philosopher drew many of his opinions from Plato.[2] It is also uncertain whether Plato returned to Athens from Megara, or proceeded on his learned travels. The former, however, is the more probable, as he must have made some arrangements and preparation for such lengthened travels before commencing them. If that were true, which Valerius Maximus has recorded, that at the time that Plato investigated the remarkable objects of Egypt, young men had resorted to Athens in crowds in order that they might place themselves under his instructions in philosophy, then it would follow, not only that the first supposition was certain, but, also, that previously to his travels he had founded a school. But we cannot determine very much from this account, since Valerius has not mentioned his authorities.

Plato's subsequent travels are indeed well known, but we have scarcely any definite information about them, except some fragments. The occasion, the reasons, and the object of his travels, we can conjecture on more probable grounds than we can settle the exact historical narrative. As he had tasted in his early youth of the pleasures which flow from the cultivation and improvement of the mind, so he never ceased to collect the materials for enriching his knowledge. His mind embraced all the branches of science which were then known, and he limited his curiosity to no particular kind of object. Hence it could not but happen that Egypt, Italy and Sicily must have possessed peculiar charms for him, because those countries must have promised important additions to his knowledge, partly in consequence of the many remarkable objects and uncommon natural phenomena, and partly in consequence of the great and celebrated men with whom he would there meet. Egypt especially was a land which was regarded as the seat of all refinement and knowledge, which was contemplated with a kind of astonishment and

[1] Brucker Hist. Crit. Philos. V. I. 611, 633.

[2] Academ. Quaest. IV. 42. Hi quoque multa a Platone.

[3] Valer Maxim. L. VIII. C. 7.

lofty admiration, which had already returned so many Greeks enriched with the treasures of wisdom, where Orpheus had acquired his elevated religious attainments, Solon his political wisdom, and Pythagoras his philosophy. The Pythagorean and Eleatic philosophy were still flourishing in Sicily and Italy, of which, probably, Plato had gained out of the books some foretaste, which made him eager to acquire a more intimate knowledge by personal intercourse with celebrated Pythagoreans. Since all this, as it is in the highest degree probable, first inflamed in him the desire for travelling, so perhaps there was still another circumstance, which irresistibly impelled him to put his intention in execution. In consequence of various political circumstances, his intention of laboring for the good of his native land was frustrated, as we have before shown. At this time his desire for observation was directed particularly to the subjects of political science, the various forms and constitutions of States, the rules of administration and the connection between politics and morals. He wished to give the greatest compass to his information, and to compare the results of it with observations on other States. That this was the reason of his travels appears not only from a passage in his seventh letter,[1] but from certain narrations which we shall adduce further on.

In respect to the order and course of his travels, writers are not agreed. According to the testimony of Cicero, with which Valerius concurs, he went first to Egypt and then to Italy.[2] Quinctilian gives the reverse order, first to Italy, afterwards to Egypt. Apuleius has it thus—Italy, Cyrene, Egypt, Italy; according to Diogenes, Cyrene, Italy, Egypt; finally, according to the anonymous biographer,—Egypt, Phoenicia, Sicily.[3] Of these, the most natural, and of course the most probable, is the order given by Apuleius, while it alone has the advantage of being reconcileable with the other accounts, since we may conclude, that some persons, by mistake or misrecollection, omitted the first journey to Italy; others, the second. The statement of Diogenes has neither advantage.

Plato then, if we adopt the arrangement above given, went first to Italy, or Magna Graecia, to the Pythagoreans, who, at that time,

[1] p. 969. He had finally convinced himself, he says, that all known States had a defective constitution.

[2] Cic. De Finib. V. 29, and a fragment in the first book of his Republic.

[3] Apul. 307 Diog. III. 6. Quinct. Instit. I. 19.

had acquired a great name, not only by their attainments but also by their political sagacity. According to Cicero, Quinctilian and Valerius, the particular object of this journey was to enrich his theoretical knowledge; but, according to Apuleius, it was with more particular reference to moral improvement.[1]

I suppose his design was to learn everything worthy of knowing, to obtain an insight into political knowledge and into mathematics, to make himself acquainted with metaphysics, and to turn all these things to the cultivation of his mind and heart. Numerous and respectable writers believe, that Plato became formally a scholar with the Pythagoreans, and gave himself up as a pupil to be initiated into their doctrines; these writers, however, do not appear to me to consider that Plato must have been then at least thirty years old, and that with his not insignificant name, he would not probably have subjected himself to these formalities. He came perhaps as a stranger, who sought acquaintance and intercourse with the learned and with political men, and in the character of a lover of all good knowledge, in respect to all things which had awakened the interest of these persons, might expect and did actually find a friendly reception. In these circumstances, he must have entered into a relation of equality with the Pythagoreans, which consequently imparted mutual benefit in regard to their attainments respectively, whereby each gave and received what he could. I can, indeed, adduce no certain proof, that this relation, and no other, actually existed between them; but, besides, that it seems to me altogether fitting to the character and circumstances of all parties, I can still adduce some reasons from the imperfect, extant narrations, which give to my conclusion a tolerable degree of probability. Plutarch, in his Life of Marcellus, relates that Archytas and Eudoxus first made experiments in relation to the laws of mechanics. Not being able to solve some difficult problems in geometry by demonstration, they attempted to effect it by mechanical contrivances, seeking to bring out in an easier manner *a posteriori* what they could not *a priori*. For example—to two given lines it is required to find a middle proportional line. In order to solve it, they contrived various drawings

[1] Apul. l. c. Sed posteaquam Socrates homines reliquit, quaesivit, unde proficerer, et ad Pythagorae disciplinam se contulit. Quam etsi ratione diligenti et magnifica instructam videbat, veram tamen continentiam et castitatem magis cupiebat imitari.

and instruments, whereby in every case the desired middle line would be immediately produced. With this Plato was much dissatisfied, and censured them because they annihilated the great preëminence of geometry, so far as it was independent of experiment. The rebuke deterred them from attempting any further mechanical performances of the kind.[1] This narrative, so far as it is true, shows clearly that Plato had his own, peculiar ideas, that he communicated them to the Pythagoreans, and that he enjoyed greater consideration than to permit himself to be set down as a mere scholar. I say, if the narrative is correct, which, in my opinion, cannot be certainly denied. Plutarch, who in general, and particularly in his biographies, is a trustworthy writer, here certainly merits the more confidence as his design was not to say anything to the honor of Plato. Here comes in also a passage of Plutarch.[2] The incident agrees also very well with what we know of the mode of thinking of the Attic philosopher. That Archytas employed himself in mechanical contrivances, we learn from other authors.[3] Besides, when Plato had returned to Athens from his second Sicilian tour, he received immediately thereupon a second invitation from Dionysius. The king regretted that he had allowed Plato to depart without forming a closer acquaintance with his philosophy, as Archytas and other philosophers, who supposed that Dionysius understood the peculiar system of Plato, had held learned conversations with him, whereby his ignorance had been made manifest.[4] When we bring together both these testimonies, I know not who can still hesitate to regard the foregoing conclusion as probable, which is all that can be done in the want of direct sources of evidence.

How long Plato remained in Italy cannot be determined, since all the accounts relative to it are deficient. But so much is certain, that he did not leave this country before he had gained the entire

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[1] Plut T. I. 305. Also Symposiac. L. VIII. T. II. 718.

[2] Adversus Colotem. 1126.

[3] Gellius, A. N. X. 12. Hereby, moreover, an historical difficulty is removed. Cicero, de Divinat. II. 42, and Diogenes VIII. 86, relate that Eudoxus scholar of Plato. Probably he was a scholar in the same sense that Plato was a was a scholar of Archytas, and this itself falls to the ground, as do the difficulties started by Brucker, Hist. Crit. V. 114, and other writers.

[4] Epist. VII. 123, *ὡς Διονυσίου πάντα διακηκοότος ὅσα διενοούμην ἐγώ.*

friendship of the principal Pythagoreans, of which they subsequently gave most unequivocal proofs.

From Italy, Plato went to Cyrene, a celebrated Greek colony in Africa. It is not certain whether he visited Sicily in passing. According to Apuleius, the object of this journey was to learn mathematics of Theodorus.[1] This mathematician, whose fame perhaps surpassed his knowledge, had given instruction to the young in Athens in his branch of science, but he did not probably stay there long, as mathematics had never many charms for the Greeks.[2] Plato, however, was not an entire stranger to this department of knowledge, as is obvious from what has gone before. Hence, it could not have been his design to have commenced the study of mathematics here, but on the other hand, he probably designed to complete his knowledge of this subject, or of other things. In consequence of the negligence of writers we cannot get at the exact truth.

Celebrated as was his journey to Egypt, very little is known concerning it with certainty. Euripides and Eudoxus are said to have been his companions.[3] But it is not true of the first, for he was not living after the ninety-third Olympiad, and thus he died before Socrates. As it respects Eudoxus, Brucker and others would show on chronological grounds that he could not have accompanied Plato on this journey. For, he could not have been a pupil of Plato, as the latter first began to teach, after his return, about the ninety-third Olympiad. This difficulty I have already removed. A remaining circumstance, namely, that he received a letter of introduction from Agesilaus to king Nectanebo is indeed against the supposition [that Eudoxus accompanied him], for the first and second kings of this name ruled later, (if there was no mistake in the name); the thing, however, appears to have been correct. Strabo heard not only from the Egyptians the particular circumstance, but he saw still the chamber where both, as it appeared, dwelt.[4] Plutarch reports that Simmias, the scholar of Socrates, was his fellow-traveller.[5]

According to some writers, he remained in Egypt thirteen years.[6] But this statement is obviously false. We will suppose that he en-

[1] Apul. 367.

[2] De Repub. VII. 7th b. 155. De Legib. VII. 8th b. 387–385.

[3] Diog. III. 6. VIII. 86.

[4] Strabo L. XVII. ed. Casaub. 806.

[5] Plut. de Daemonio Socrat. 578.

[6] Strabo l. c.

tered on his travels immediately on the death of Socrates, which is more than we can assume, then he could have employed on his entire travels not more than about thirteen years. For when he first came to Syracuse, he was not far from forty years of age, (somewhere about the ninety-eighth Olympiad,) and this must have been immediately after his return from Egypt.[1] He had, however, spent some time with Euclid; it is likely that he went back to Athens; he had visited the Pythagoreans in Italy and Theodorus in Cyrene. If to this be added the time which he spent on his journey out and homeward, one may easily see that a considerable sum must be subtracted from the years specified.

Writers differ very much in assigning the object of this journey. Cicero says that he performed it, in order to improve himself in arithmetic and astronomy.[2] Valerius Maximus mentions geometry, astronomy and an acquaintance with the curiosities of the country;[3] Quinctilian says that he wished to gain a knowledge of the secret doctrines of the priests;[4] Pliny, on the other hand, adduces magic;[5] Apuleius names astrology and the rites of the priesthood;[6] according to Pausanias, his design was to attain an understanding of the doctrines of the priests respecting the immortality and the transmigration of souls.[7] Whether Plato had a very definite object before his eyes, I will not decide.[8] The wonderful reputation for wisdom enjoyed by the Egyptian priests was sufficient of itself to lead him to undertake the journey, even if his favorite inclination for becoming acquainted with political and civil affairs had not tended somewhat to the same course. Perhaps he might wish to acquire information in respect to all those objects which writers have named singly. Possibly he was in quest merely of historical knowledge. I know not whether his expectations were realized in relation to the priests, as those allege who make Egypt the centre of every kind of learning and refinement. In the meantime, I am very much mistaken, if there be not glimpses of the contrary in some passages which I will quote from Plato. He yields indeed to the Egyptians and

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[1] Epist. 7. 93, 99, 103. Epist. 2. 67. [2] De Finib. V. 29.

[3] VIII. 7. [4] Instit. Orat. I. 19. [5] Hist. Nat. XXX. 1.

[6] P. 367. Astrologiam et sacerdotum ritus. [7] Pausan. Messeniac.

[8] ["Plato travelled for the same reason that we travel, to learn men and things," Boeckh.]

the Syrians the honor of having been first attracted by their serene skies to the contemplation of the starry firmament, but he also subjoins that one might rightfully expect, that the Greeks, as in regard to everything which they acquired from foreigners, may also have perfected this science and improved upon the religious usages of the Egyptians.[1] Astronomy and theology are the very sciences on which the Egyptians build their greatest fame. Still it appears as if Plato would indicate that they were far remote from that degree of perfection, which he then allowed himself to believe as attainable. In another passage, however, he commends the Egyptians, because their young men received instruction in arithmetic; but, on the other hand, he censures them the more emphatically as they attended to it through an ignoble participation in the tradesman's spirit, remarking in connection upon the impurity of their knowledge and the low motives of their actions.[2] Not less did he disapprove of their rough treatment of strangers.[3]

It is, indeed, not to be denied, that he might have very much enriched his attainments on this journey; but whether the addition was anything else but a collection of materials, whether the priests lent him the form of his philosophy, whether they themselves had brought their knowledge into a philosophical order — these are questions which must probably be answered in the negative. This much, at least, is certain, and it appears even from the few fragments of his life, that he carried with him into those lands his philosophical spirit and his intellectual bias towards certain theoretical and practical propositions; and hence he had previously laid the groundwork of his system.

From Egypt, Plato would have gone to Syria and Persia, in order to form an acquaintance with the Chaldeans and Magians, but a war which had broken out in the mean time, probably the one waged by Artaxerxes with the Egyptians, frustrated his intention.[4] In itself it is not improbable, that a journey into Syria and Chaldea—the native land of various kinds of knowledge—made a part of Plato's arrangement. Two writers of no great weight testify, that he went from Egypt to Phoenicia, and after holding a conference with some Ma-

[1] Epinomis 9th vol. 265, 266.

[2] De Legibus VII. 8th vol. 334. 5th vol. 246. De Repub. IV. 6th vol. 359.

[3] De Legibus XII. 202.

[4] Apul. 367. Diog. L. III. 190. Athenaeus XI. 507.

gians, returned to Sicily.[1] The testimony of neither of the writers is in itself very important. One might, indeed, adduce passages from his writings, when he mentions the mercantile spirit as the national characteristic of the Phoenicians, as a sufficient proof of the assertion in question, but he could have obtained this information from other persons or from writings.[2] The report is, however, confirmed by a circumstance which is related in Plutarch. When Plato had reached Caria on his return from Egypt, some messengers from Delos requested him to expound the meaning of an oracle. The inquiry had been made, "What ought the Greeks to do in order that they might be freed from a general calamity?" The answer was, that they should enlarge the altar of Apollo at Delos, to twice its existing size. Through ignorance of mathematics, they had doubled every side, so that they had made the whole altar eight times as large. Plato pointed out to them their mistake, showed them the only right construction, and directed them for further information to Eudoxus or Helicon.[3] This is the important discovery of the duplication of the cube, which has brought him so great reputation.

CHAPTER III.

FIRST RESIDENCE IN SYRACUSE.

Authors are, indeed, almost unanimous in asserting that Plato, after his Egyptian travels, came to Sicily, but in the statement of particular circumstances and events, they differ so widely from each other, that it is only with the greatest difficulty that we can determine what is the most probable. Fortunately, we still have some letters of Plato, and also Plutarch's biography of Dion which will help us, in some measure, through these labyrinths of contradictory accounts and fabulous stories. Plato came to Syracuse, for the first time, when he was about forty years of age, in the eighty-ninth

[1] Olympiod. and the anonymous biographer in the Bibliothek der alten Litteratur. 14.

[2] De Republica IV. 359.

[3] Plutarch De Socratis Daemonio, VII. 288. Valer. Maxim. VII. 13.

Olympiad, in the reign of Dionysius the Elder.[1] According to the statement of all the writers who make mention of this tour, his only object was to see the volcano,[2] but from the seventh letter of Plato, it is very evident, that a different object engaged his attention. His observations were directed particularly to the inhabitants, their character, morals and mode of life, their political regulations and constitutions. These were probably the points to which he gave special attention in the other countries over which he travelled.[3] The inhabitants of Syracuse led, at that time, an extremely luxurious and sensual life, in which they were followed by the other Sicilians and by the people of Lower Italy. The predominant passion for enjoyment and pleasure had supplanted all other considerations and objects of effort from their minds, and allowed no place for noble and great ideas. The loss of their freedom, and the oppression of a king who had subdued them and who ruled arbitrarily, they endured with all possible quietness, because their mind, in its single pursuit after pleasure, had lost all its elasticity. Such was the situation of Sicily when Plato arrived. Unintentionally, a revolution was brought about, which, in a short time, overthrew the power of a king who was regarded as invincible. Plato was acquainted with Dion a near kinsman of Dionysius, and an opulent young man. Into him he infused an abhorrence of the prevailing excesses, awakened a sense of freedom, and formed his heart and understanding by means of noble principles and sentiments. Dion being yet very young and his heart uncorrupted, these ideas found an easy entrance; they strengthened and fortified him, and became the rules of his conduct.[4] Consequently, he began to place a higher estimate on virtue and morality than upon all the pleasures and all the luxurious living of the Syracusans. Hence his hatred of those who acted in accordance with despotic principles. Thenceforward, a friendship was developed in both Plato and Dion, which ever after brought them into close communion, and which stood the proof of the hardest trials. Dion, who was held in very high esteem by king Dionysius, contrived that the latter should form an acquaintance with Plato, and express a wish to hear some philosophical remarks from him. Dion probably thought that the conversation of Plato would produce in the understanding and heart of Dionysius the same effects which himself had experien-

[1] Epist. 7. 93. [2] Epist. 7. 97 seq. [3] Epist. 7. 97.

[4] Epist. 7. 98, 99. Plut. Dion, 959. Cic. De Oratore III. 34

ced. But the attempt failed, and had nearly cost Plato his life. The remarks, or the conversation between the two—for writers are not agreed in respect to this point, perhaps it was both intermingled—were on the subjects of despotic government, the higher laws of freedom of action, and that morality, and not selfishness, was the supreme rule.[1] Olympiodorus preserves a fragment of the conversation. Whether it is genuine, I cannot say.

Dionysius, who would gladly listen to some flattery, asked, "Who, in your opinion, is the happiest man?"

Plato. "Socrates."

Dionysius. "In what consists the duty of a king?"

Plato. "To make better the citizens."

Dionysius. "But does it appear a small matter to you when one decides a law-suit according to the rules of equity?" (Here was a fit of ambition, for he would have gladly heard himself commended, as a just judge.)

Plato. "This is one of the smaller duties of a king, for good judges are like the clothes-menders who repair torn garments."

Dionysius. "Dost thou not believe, that a king, (a tyrant who has placed himself arbitrarily on the throne), is a bold and courageous man?"

Plato. "The most timid of all, for he is afraid of a barber's knife."[2]

These and similar declarations, which were in direct opposition to the principles of a tyrant, made a strong impression on Dionysius, and he trembled on his throne, while he observed the effects which Plato had produced on the many individuals present. To this is to be added his vexation, that he had been worsted in the dispute. In the first heat of passion, he would almost have punished the boldness of the philosopher with death, unless Dion and Aristomenes had together restrained him from it. They conceived therefore that Plato could no longer stay at Syracuse without hazard. They accordingly secured a passage for him in a ship, which was about to carry home Polis, a Lacedaemonian ambassador.[3] Dionysius heard of it, and bribed Polis either to throw Plato overboard, or if his conscience would not allow him to do that, to sell him as a slave. He was accordingly sold by the treacherous Polis on the island Ægina which

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[1] Plut. Dion, 959. Diog. III. 19. [2] Olympiod.

[3] According to Olympiodorus, he was a merchant of Ægina.

was then involved in a war with Athens. According to other writers, he was sold by the Æginetans. A certain Anniceris from Cyrene redeemed him for twenty or thirty minae. Plato's friends and scholars—according to some Dion alone—collected this sum in order to indemnify Anniceris, who however was so noble-minded, that with the money he purchased a garden in the academy and presented it to the philosopher.[1] Although the particular circumstances are not related in the same manner by all the writers, yet it seems to be definitely settled, that Plato once lost his liberty.[2] Plato, indeed, makes no mention whatever of these events, (which must certainly awaken some suspicion), not even when he alludes, though obscurely, to the misfortunes which happened to him on his first tour. In his seventh letter, he says that he had been thrice delivered from great peril which had impended over him in Sicily. The first can be no other than that which occurred in his earliest travels.[3]—Before I proceed further, I must adduce one or two examples of the negligence with which some of the late writers have compiled their accounts. Olympiodorus relates, that Plato was sold by Polis, at the instigation of Dionysius the Younger. And the wretched compiler Tzetzes, makes out that he was sold three times in the same journey.

CHAPTER IV.

SCHOOL OF PLATO AT ATHENS.

When Plato had completed his travels and had reached the end of their various dangers and calamities, he returned to Athens and began publicly to teach philosophy in the academy. He had here a garden from his paternal inheritance, which was purchased for five hundred drachmae.[4] If now the story about Anniceris be

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[1] Diog. B. III. 19. Plut. Dion. De Tranquillitat. Animi, B. II. 417.

[2] To the writers already quoted, we may add Seneca Epist. 74. Macrob. Saturn. I. 11. Diodor. Sicul. XV. 461. ed. Steph.

[3] Epist. 7. 115, *καί μοι πείθεσθε Διὸς τρίτου σωτῆρος χάριν.*

[4] Apul. 367. Plut. de Exilio, 603, says it was bought for 3000 drachmae. But I conjecture that the transcriber read *γ*, instead of *τ*. [The drachma is reckoned at 8 cents.]

true, Plato must have had two gardens in this place, which also a passage from Diogenes allows us to conjecture. This writer remarks that Plato taught philosophy first in the academy, but afterwards in a garden at Colonus.[1] His academy very soon became celebrated and was quite numerously attended by high-born and able young men, for he had before, by means of his travels, and probably by some publications, acquired a distinguished name. He might indeed have taught some persons in philosophy before he founded his academy, for he says in a letter to Dionysius, which might have been written about the one hundred and fourth Olympiad, that some persons for thirty years had reflected on his philosophy.[2] As Plato came to Syracuse about the ninety-eighth Olympiad, he could not have commenced teaching in the academy till about the ninety-ninth Olympiad. The names of his most celebrated disciples are known, so that I need not stop to mention them. The regulation of his school and his mode of teaching were regarded by ancient writers as circumstances so unimportant, that they passed them by almost in silence. By a diligent investigation, I have been able to bring together nothing more than some disconnected accounts, which I here communicate in the hope that intelligent men may employ their talents in uniting these detached fragments into one whole.

Plato in teaching pursued a method altogether different from Socrates, inasmuch as his philosophy, in its contents, extent, form and object was very far removed from the Socratic. Socrates wished to quicken and develop the moral feeling. This object he could accomplish in no better manner than by his own ability to exert a direct influence on the hearts of his disciples by means of conversations. Plato, on the contrary, rather labored to give his philosophy a systematic form, since he considered it proved that all knowledge and action must rest on certain grounds which philosophy only could establish. The doctrines of Socrates were of common practical utility, and designed for universal application; to them was fitted a popular delivery. Plato's philosophy, for the most part, was not intended for the public, inasmuch as it contained the scientific grounds of theoretical and practical philosophy, whose results Socrates communicated in the way of conversation. Hence Socrates was a teacher of the people; while Plato founded a school for those who would educate themselves as philosophers. Consequently he could not, as

[1] Diog. III. 5.

[2] Epist. 2. 72.

his teacher had done, go round to the public resorts, but he taught in a fixed place.[1] Ought he not, however, at least to have made the attempt to bring publicly before the great mass of the people some results of his philosophizing, which he regarded as truths generally necessary and fitted to the dignity of man? I find in Themistius a few notices that he actually did something of this sort, and that he lectured in the Pyraeus on goodness, but that he found no adequate encouragement in the mass of people who ran together, and who left him also as rapidly as they had collected.[2] Whether this statement is authentic I cannot say. Plato's establishment very much resembled the Pythagorean school; it had, however, its peculiarities. He required of his pupils no oath of secrecy, and he taught before no fixed circle, not even in a closed chamber.[3] Every body had access. In the mean time, whenever he felt obliged to animadvert on various errors in the religion of the people, and to lay down many positions which were contrary to the orthodox system, he was compelled, in order to avoid the perils with which freedom of thought had then so often to contend, either to expound at certain hours his esoteric philosophy to his own pupils only, or to communicate it simply in a written form. We learn from Aristotle, that he gave such a sketch of his esoteric philosophy.[4]

In respect to the method which he pursued in his philosophical statements, I find two contrary opinions. Brucker believes that it was not different from the one which we find in his writings. Meiners, on the contrary, maintains that he adopted the manner of the sophists.[5] But we here want definite information, so that we cannot decide positively respecting it. In the mean time, though Plato did not expound his system by means of conversations, but in connected discourses, still it is not probable that he would declaim exactly in the manner of the sophists, inasmuch as his design was not to excite astonishment, or to make use of persuasion, but to convince by arguments.[6] Hence it is to me at least evident, that his method was the dialogistic, if not universally, still in certain cases, especially in the presence of recently admitted scholars. It was customary then to teach philosophy by means of questions and answers, and no other mode of instruction was fitted so well to his doctrines re-

[1] Olymp. [2] Orat. XXI. edit. Harduini, 245. [3] Olymp.
[4] Aristot. Physic. IV. 2 [5] Epist. 2. 70, 72. [6] Epist. 2. 70.

specting ideas. It seems that Plato always examined new students in order to ascertain whether they were furnished with the necessary qualifications. This examination consisted in his presenting to them before every thing else the excellence of philosophy, and also the difficulties with which one must struggle, and the exertions which he must make, in order to obtain possession of it. If by such representations, the desire was not suppressed but rather strengthened, if zeal and unquenchable interest gleamed forth, he regarded it as a good omen, and believed that such pupils had the talents and dispositions to dedicate themselves to philosophy.[1] Perhaps he gave to them certain propositions and problems, and allowed them to make trial of their powers, so that they might see whether they could search out in their own reflection, the necessary arguments and proofs. This exertion, this calling to self-reflection was a part of the examination to which he subjected new pupils.[2] The study of the mathematics was regarded as a preparatory exercise to philosophy, as it accustomed the mind to self-knowledge, and, what Plato particularly valued, to the use of the pure reason. According to Brucker, Plato required of his pupils that they should make themselves perfectly acquainted with mathematics before they commenced the study of philosophy. But though he has brought no definite testimony in favor of this conclusion, still every one will think it probable that Plato gave instructions to his disciples in this science, since it has so intimate a connection with philosophy, and since he was not far from being the greatest mathematician of his time.

The Platonic school had some resemblance to the Pythagorean, inasmuch as the improvement of the heart was united with the cultivation of the understanding. For this purpose, Pythagoras had introduced a kind of orderly arrangement which required of the members a strict observance of certain rules, and by means of subordination and discipline which were inseparably attendant, he exercised control over them. Plato did not adopt this regulation, but followed, in respect to it, an entirely different maxim. Without giving himself the air and appearance of a king, who is used only to command, he sought to educate the moral character of his friends and to amend their faults, while by means of arguments, admonitions and his own example, he influenced their mode of thinking and action in a way which was consistent with their native rights and per-

[1] Epist. 7. 127, 128

[2] Epist. 2. 70

sonal freedom. By such means, he brought Speusippus back to a better mind, who in his youth had trodden the hazardous path of dissipation. The sharp reproofs and admonitions of his parents had been in vain. But Plato, by gentle conduct and an entirely different treatment, awakened the feeling of shame and the resolution of amendment.[1]

CHAPTER V.

SECOND RESIDENCE IN SYRACUSE.

When at length Plato had taught for some years with much reputation, and had occupied himself in the education of many young men, who dedicated themselves partly to the study of philosophy and partly to an active life, an event occurred in Sicily which at once opened a prospect to a new, though an already long-desired sphere of action. When Dionysius the Elder had died, in the second year of the one hundred and third Olympiad, and his son Dionysius the Younger had taken his seat on the throne, Dion believed that the fortunate moment had come in which Syracuse and all Sicily could be placed in a desirable situation of rest, security and freedom, if only a moral sense and love of wisdom could be awakened in the young king, and if he might be made to form the resolution of reigning rather as a king having respect to the law, than as a mere arbitrary monarch. Plato seemed to Dion to be the only man who, by his mind and character, could effect in Dionysius so great and important a change. It could not appear to him to be a difficult matter to induce Dionysius to invite Plato to his court, since intercourse with the greatest philosopher of his time must necessarily appear as something quite flattering to a very ambitious young man. Dionysius also experienced in fact the want of a careful education, wherein he had been wholly neglected by his father, and also a deficiency in attainments without which a king can be no king, or indeed a very miserable man, and in which deficiency he had had an

[1] Plut. de Discrimine Amici et Adul. 71. περὶ φιλαδελφίας p. 191.

example in his father. For these reasons he invited Plato, in a very honorable way, to his court. At the same time Dion also wrote a letter to Plato in which he omitted no considerations, which could influence his mind to accede to the invitation. He presented the thing as a service demanded by friendship. Duty to mankind laid him under obligation to repair, furnished with counsels and information, to the young ruler; now the most favorable point of time had come in which to realize what he had thought out in respect to the best political constitution; now, without the shedding of blood, and in the way of persuasion, without any violent means, a revolution could be effected in the mode of government, and all the Sicilians could be brought into a method of thinking and acting which would harmoniously unite the claims of reason and the necessities of human nature.[1] Although the proposal accorded, in the highest degree, with what Plato was striving to accomplish, inasmuch as in part, he desired to advance among men the study of wisdom, and in part to realize, as far as possible, his ideal of a State; still he was in so much doubt, that he considered the matter for a long time in various aspects before he could come to a decision. He was particularly solicitous in respect to the youth of Dionysius; he could promise himself no constancy, nothing substantial in his resolutions; he saw the possibility that Dionysius, as it often happens with young men, might be quickly led astray by other and contrary pleasures. Still, the consideration that Dion had now reached a manly age and possessed firmness of character; the reproach which he had cast on himself that he could do nothing but speculate, while he never sought by his deeds to make himself useful to men; and finally the conviction that it was his duty to assist his friend Dion in this critical emergency, and not to abandon him for the sake of ease or from unnecessary doubts,—all these considerations induced him to leave his flourishing school and travel to Sicily.[2] These were the real inducements and motives according to Plato's own confession and the testimony of Plutarch; and I find no reason for considering them as false, and the less so since even the remaining writers concur as to the main points, and differ only about the subordinate matters.[3]

[1] Epist. 7. 99, 100.

[2] Epist. 7. 99, 103. Epist. 3. 77. Plutarch Dion, 962, 963, philosophandum esse cum principibus L. II. 779.

[3] Apul. 368. Corn. Nepos in Dione. Diog. III. 21. Olympiod. Ælian IV. 18.

They all say that Plato was invited by Dionysius to his court, but they do not agree in respect to the purpose. Apuleius says that Plato wished to make himself acquainted with the laws of Sicily. It is not improbable that Plato actually did this, but it could not have been the reason why Dionysius sent for him. According to Diogenes, Plato went, as it should seem, uninvited, in quest of a place where he could realize the ideal of his republic. At the same time, this writer subjoins that Plato wished to infuse into Dion and Theodotes, not without hazard of life, a higher idea of freedom and a hatred of despotic power, which in its results hurled Dionysius from the throne. The last is true, but the first is false. In relation to this no writer says any thing from which Diogenes could have derived his story, except Athenaeus, who considers it as very wrong in Plato, that, through an unbecoming pride, he sought actually to establish his own republic and system of legislation.[1] I think it very probable that the whole story originated from a misunderstood passage in Plato, in which he says that he had regarded the invitation of Dionysius as a very favorable occurrence, as it might subject to actual experiment that which he had conceived in idea respecting government and legislation.[2] This passage must necessarily mislead all those who do not raise their conception to his lofty ideal, so that they imagine that his remarks concerned the realization of the republic; which was nothing but the medium through which his ideal could manifest itself. Finally, Diogenes is here deserving of the less attention, as he makes himself guilty of an incredible negligence throughout the entire narrative, and so much confuses the succession of events that he places in the second journey that which happened long after in the third. But it is now time that we should narrate the consequences of the journey.

After Plato had committed to Heraclides Ponticus the oversight of the academy and the course of instruction, he sailed in company with Speusippus to Sicily,[3] and was received by Dionysius in a very honorable manner.[4] His arrival was celebrated as a festival in all Sicily, while every one promised himself the happiest changes in favor of the island. The only circumstance that diminished aught

[1] Athenaeus Lib. XI.

[2] Epist. 7. 101.

[3] Suidas in Heraclides Epist. 2. 73.

[4] Plin. Hist. N. VII. 30. Ælian V. 18.

from the general joy was that Plato came from Athens, which not long before had devised a plan to overthrow freedom in Sicily. In fact the endeavors of Plato and his influence over the mind of Dionysius were so successful, that the most important consequences might be anticipated. Plato began by trying to awaken in Dionysius a susceptibility for the pleasure which mental cultivation supplies. By means of mathematics he sought to prepare his intellect for philosophy. This proceeding of Plato gives us a happy proof of his sagacity, and of his insight into the character of Dionysius, who was not destitute of good capacities, and who was possessed of great ambition, though, in the constant intoxication of pleasures, he remained uneducated. For this ambition Plato opened innocent scope, where the understanding of the king could find sufficient reason and motive for improvement, while at the same time Plato could afterwards labor the more diligently to improve the heart by the cultivation of the reason. Dionysius found very great satisfaction in the study of the mathematics, and gave himself to it with a sort of passion. This example the whole court followed, and the entire palace was now covered with sand. Frugality reigned at the table, and modesty in the outward deportment. Dionysius, by his striking course of conduct, showed that he perceived how shameful it was for him to be a tyrant and a despot.[1] This revolution in the young prince's mode of thinking and of acting was too obvious and considerable to allow the court-party, who were contending against Dion, not to mark the danger which threatened a sorrowful end to their influence and power. They perceived that they were too feeble to injure the reputation of Plato and Dion, and they saw that it was necessary to place a man at their head, who by his eloquence could again restore their sinking cause. Such a man was Philistus, (called also Philistides), a celebrated historian whom Dionysius the Elder had expelled from Sicily. Dionysius allowed himself to be easily persuaded by his courtiers to invite this Philistus again to his court. He here took the lead of the opposition party, in order to sustain the tottering throne of the tyrant, and to be to the son as he had been to the father, a zealous upholder of despotism. By means of cabals and tricks, in which he was a master, he brought Dion under the suspicion that in the disguise of promoting the education of the prince, he was himself striving after the throne. Dionysius from the beginning of his reign, seems to have

[1] Plut. Dion. 963.

suspected the dispositions of Dion. This suspicion Plato could not remove, though he took much pains to do so. As the result of these intrigues Dion was taken off by guile in a ship, and set down on the coast of Italy. When this took place Plato had been three months at the court. All the friends of Dion were thrown into consternation in consequence of this unexpected occurrence, and in the anticipation of no happy fate from the suspicious Dionysius. Even a report went over Syracuse that Plato was about to be executed as the author of all these troubles. The sympathy which the friends of Dion felt in his fate, the movements which were on foot in the city, where the discontented now hoped for nothing less than an entire revolution, appeared to Dionysius to betoken no little danger to himself. In order to avert it, he assumed a very friendly air towards Dion's friends, particularly Plato, and requested him most earnestly to remain with him. But at the same time he made such arrangements as to compel Plato to stay, though he might be unwilling, for he placed him in a castle where, without his knowledge, no one could go in or out. Reports were immediately current in Syracuse that Plato and Dionysius were on more intimate terms of friendship than ever before. No one would come to any other conclusion, who looked merely at external appearances. For Dionysius attached himself more and more to the philosopher, and appeared to find increasing pleasure in his society. He became extremely jealous because Plato entertained a better esteem for Dion than for himself, and gave him a higher place in his friendship. From this rank Dionysius wished to degrade Dion in order to elevate himself. He would gladly have indemnified Plato for this loss with the office of first minister if he could have accepted it without prejudice to his principles. But Plato maintained steadfastly his honor. He would not have hesitated to put Dionysius on an equal footing in respect to friendship and esteem, if the latter would have elevated his character to that of Plato by means of true love and inclination for philosophy, or could he have been imbued with a similar mode of thinking. This was the object of Plato's journey, and he labored incessantly, though in vain, to accomplish it. Dionysius, at this period, was very reserved and distrustful. Philistus and his faction had infused into him an inextinguishable suspicion, as though Plato's labors were wholly directed to this point, namely, to remove the king's solicitude, until in the mean time, Dion could get possession of the

government.[1] Plato, at length, earnestly pressed for permission to depart. Meanwhile Dionysius was involved in a war, and in consequence gave his consent the more willingly. Still he compelled Plato to promise that he would return so soon as peace should be restored. Plato assented to it; for what had a refusal availed him? but still on the condition that Dion should return with him to his native land.[2] Plato then went back to Athens. Speusippus, however, remained, as it appears, in Syracuse.[3] Plato had previously established certain relations between Dionysius, Archytas and other Pythagoreans, which had great influence on his subsequent fates.[4] In political affairs Plato interfered but very little, especially because he foresaw that his proposals would not be carried into effect. There was the additional circumstance, that after the banishment of Dion, his influence was far less than it had been before, and the opposite party were only too much rejoiced to lay to his account all those measures and acts of the government, which notwithstanding might be wholly at variance with the laws of justice and the maxims of Plato. In this way they accomplished two objects; they freed themselves from all public reproach, and they turned upon Plato the hatred of the people. Still Plato, as long as he enjoyed through the presence of Dion an unobstructed sphere of action, turned his efforts to the improvement of the form of government, and to the supplying of its manifest deficiencies. It is probable that he advised Dionysius at this time, to reëstablish the Greek republics in Sicily, to give them good laws and constitutions, so that they might live with one another in harmony and friendship, and make common cause against the assaults of the Carthaginians. He counselled him also further to change the despotic form of government into a regal, that is, into such a form as would be itself in subjection to general laws.[5] He added some prefaces and introductions to the laws, but which, as he says, contained some other additions, from whose hand he knows not.[6]

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[1] Plut. loc. cit. Epist. 7. 112.

[2] Epist. 7. 103—106. Epist. 3. 77, 78. Plut. Dion. 962, 964.

[3] Epist. 2. 73.

[4] Epist. 7. 123, 125. Plut. Dion. 965.

[5] Epist. 3. 75. 7. 111.

[6] Epist. 3. 76.

CHAPTER VI.

THIRD RESIDENCE IN SYRACUSE.

When Plato returned to Athens, he found Dion in that city, where he had never before met him. Dion here sought to improve his character; and as he had in his manner something gloomy and severe, Plato advised him to acquire by constant intercourse with Speusippus habits of amenity and grace.[1] At this time Plato exhibited a chorus to the Athenians in his best manner.[2] Dion bore all the necessary expenses, while Plato rejoiced to grant him this opportunity to secure for himself the good will of the Athenians.[3] In the meantime Plato still carried on a correspondence with Dionysius. He still cherished the hope that when the war was ended, Dionysius would invite Dion back, while he also desired that in the interval the king would cherish no unfriendly feelings towards him. Consequently Plato did everything which was in his power to suppress his displeasure. He still retained the hope that he should entirely reconcile them with each other, and he held the claim of Dionysius to be reasonable so long as he did not become openly faithless to his word.[4] As soon as peace was restored in Sicily, Dionysius wrote to Plato that he ought now, in conformity with his promise, to come again to the Syracusan court, but added that Dion must wait another year. Though Dion urged Plato to gratify the desire of the prince, for the report was current that Dionysius was now more than ever interested in philosophy, still Plato without hesitation refused, as he was now becoming old, and Dionysius had not kept his word.[5] In the mean time, it mortified the king extremely that he had received a negative answer, and he believed that every body would see that it was because Plato entertained no good opinion of his character, or of conduct towards the philosophers. In order to make good this deficiency, he invited to his court in an ambitious manner, according to the testimony of Plutarch, other philosophers, who had only a measure of celebrity, or he enticed them by the good reception which he gave them.[6] About this time too Archytas came from Tarentum to

[1] Plut. Dion. 964. [2] A dramatic entertainment. [3] Plut. Dion. 964.
[4] Plut. Dion. 964 [5] Epist. 7. 122. 3 76 [6] Plut. Dion. 965

Syracuse. All these men, together with other friends of Dion, who had obtained some scattered fragments of the Platonic philosophy, often engaged with Dionysius in conversation on philosophical subjects, on the supposition that he was thoroughly initiated into the Platonic system. This was very flattering to the king, though he suffered not a little shame, as he had betrayed his ignorance before the eyes of all.[1] His mortified pride allowed him no rest, until he had sought anew every means to prevail on Plato to come once more to his court. Here we must remember that it was not so much a longing after mental cultivation, as it was pride, which thought itself scorned, together with the hope of gaining that preëminence himself in the friendship of Plato, which Dion had maintained, that operated as a motive on Dionysius. From this trait in the character of Dionysius, and also from the weakness which allowed him to be controlled by others, the nature of the results of Plato's first and second journeys may be perfectly comprehended.

Dionysius now despatched for the third time a three-rowed galley for Plato, with a letter, in which he very earnestly pressed him to come to him, and on the subject of the condition respecting Dion, he promised to do whatever Plato might desire. At the same time came many friends of Dion and of Plato from Sicily, who urged him to undertake the journey. Dionysius, in order to leave nothing untried, had induced Archytas and the other Pythagoreans to despatch urgent letters of invitation to Plato. In Athens also no incitement was wanting. All his friends, particularly Dion who had received an explicit charge to this effect from his wife and sister, urged him to decide in favor of going. Entreaties and urgent requests from so many quarters, friendship for Dion and the Pythagoreans, the desire once more to reconcile Dion and Dionysius, and as far as possible to improve the character of the latter,—all these things taken together induced him at length to undertake this second journey, although he himself predicted no very favorable issue.

At his coming every patriot in Sicily rejoiced, hoping that he would now get the victory over Philistus, and philosophy over despotism.[2] But the result did not correspond with these general wishes. From the first, Plato considered it necessary to put Dionysius to the test, in order to determine whether his anxiety for philosophical attain-

[1] Epist. 7. 124. Plut. loc. cit. [2] Epist. 3. 78. 7. 124-126. Plut. l. c.
[3] Plut. l. c.

ments was really as great as it had been represented to him. When, however, he had held conversations with the king, and had exhibited the difficulties as well as the dignity of the subject, and had stated some of the higher positions of the philosophy, Plato became convinced at once, that the king's desire for knowledge was not pure and genuine, but flowed from pride, ambition and self-love. Hence he would not confess his ignorance, but gave himself the airs of one who already knew everything. Plato therefore entirely gave up the undertakking.[1] Rather he now commenced his negotiations in respect to Dion, and desired that Dionysius in accordance with his promise would invite him again to Sicily and restore to him the free use of his estate. But Dionysius gave no heed to the matter; on the contrary, he forbade the guardians who had been placed over the estate, to take care of it, or to transmit the income to Dion in the Peloponnesus, since, as Dionysius said, the estate did not belong to Dion, but to his son, of whom he himself as his uncle was lawful guardian. Plato, in the highest degree displeased and dissatisfied not only with the king but with himself and with those who had induced him to undertake this journey, made immediate preparations for his departure, as it was now the season of summer when the ships sailed away. Dionysius indeed was very earnest that he would remain longer, but he adhered to his determination. The king now thought of other means by which he might change his purpose. For he believed that his own reputation would suffer, if Plato departed so soon, and his ambition was only directed to this point, namely, that the philosopher, who was an inmate of his house, should become his special friend, and should prefer him to Dion. In respect to the means of effecting this, he behaved like a despot, who regards his own will as the highest law, and claims to tyrannize over freedom by his arbitrary power.

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[1] Epist. 7. 127, 129. Plato says that, as he had understood, Dionysius had committed some things to writing as his own discoveries which he had heard from others. Yet this was not known to him for certainty. Epist. 7. 129. From this and the second letter, it is very manifest that Plato had communicated to Dionysius some points in his secret philosophy. But it was very unpleasant to the philosopher, with his mode of thinking, that Dionysius should make these things publicly known. But wherefore? Was it any sudden fit of a haughty self-love? According to what he states to us, these things were of such a character, that they could not be communicated to the public. In another place, I will try to solve this riddle, so far as it is possible.

He thus, for a mere pretence, made new proposals in order to retain Plato. Dion was to remain in the Peloponnesus, not as an exile, but as a friend who might be permitted to return so soon as it was found to be best for the common good; still with the condition that he would undertake nothing hostile to the king. Dion was to promise this, and Plato with his friends were to stand sureties. Dion's income would be sent to the Peloponnesus or to Athens and be deposited with some man whom the parties themselves might propose, so that Dion should not have the free use of it, because it was impossible to trust him, since he had so large an amount of property in his hands, (about one hundred talents). Plato could, if he was pleased with the proposition, remain another year and then depart with the money. Although this entire arrangement was displeasing to Plato in the highest degree, still he felt it necessary for the sake of prudence to request a little time for reflection. After mature examination he judged it best to assent to the proposal, rather than attempt to depart contrary to the will of the king, since the latter project might be rendered wholly impracticable, and thereby Dion's case might be rendered still worse. When therefore he made known his determination to Dionysius, Plato subjoined that he could not believe that Dionysius would treat Dion as a master does his slaves; that they must have Dion's own free explanation of the case, and consequently a letter must be written to him. Dionysius was satisfied with this. In the mean time, the ships set sail. Immediately thereupon Dionysius stated that he could deliver up to Dion only one half of his property, as the other half belonged to his son. Plato heard this with the utmost astonishment, but said nothing in relation to it, further than that they must await the answer of Dion. As Dionysius caused the effects of Dion to be sold at once, Plato saw that it was but too evident that all representations and negotiations would be fruitless, and he concluded to observe thereafter a profound silence. During this whole time Dionysius retained the philosopher, as it were, in imprisonment,—for he dwelt in the castle garden, where no one could go in or out without permission. Plato, however, longed for freedom. Still, the Sicilians conceived that Dionysius and Plato were good friends, for neither disclosed to others their reciprocal relations, although Dionysius, by means of complaisant treatment and caresses, subjected himself to all possible pains to win over the philosopher and draw him away from the friendship of Dion.

Meanwhile a mutiny occurred among the mercenary soldiers, whose pay Dionysius wished to diminish. This could not be quieted, except as Dionysius would grant whatever they desired, and even allow still more. Common rumor made Heraclides, a friend of Dion, the author of the trouble; he was consequently compelled to conceal himself or to flee. Another friend of Dion, Theodotes, going to Dionysius, requested him to give up all persecution of Heraclides; he believed that Heraclides would appear and defend himself, if he could have a safe passport. Dionysius engaged to do so in the presence of Plato, but he did not keep his word. Plato made representations, but they were contemptuously rejected. Dionysius now believed that it was entirely manifest that Plato was fully committed to the party of Dion. He then felt compelled to remove him from the castle-garden to the Archedemus, since the court ladies performed their private sacred rites in the garden. Plato now excited the wrath of the king anew on account of his conversation with Theodotes. He was therefore directed to reside among the mercenary soldiers, a situation which proved to be unsafe for him, it having been commonly reported that Plato endeavored to persuade Dionysius to dismiss his body-guard—a circumstance which might probably have happened previously. At length, when Plato heard that some soldiers had conspired to murder him, he informed Archytas of his critical situation. Archytas, under the pretext of public business, despatched a certain Lamiscus to the king, who obtained permission for Plato to depart. Dionysius was still so friendly that he paid the expenses of the journey.[1] Plutarch says that Archytas himself wrote to Dionysius, and Diogenes has actually introduced a letter of this tenor into his biography of Archytas. But Plato makes no mention of it.[2] On his homeward voyage, Plato landed in Elis, at the time of the celebration of the Olympic games. As he here met with his friend Dion, he related to him his fortunes and the results of his journey. Dion immediately declared that he would punish the tyrant for the iniquitous and faithless conduct of which he had been guilty towards himself and towards Plato. In such an undertaking, however, Plato would take no part, and for various reasons. He had now, as he said, become too old. Dion had drawn

[1] These statements may be found in Epist. 3. 80—82. 7. 137—148. Plut. Dion. 965, 966.

[2] Dion. 966.

him, as it were, contrary to his will, into friendship with Dionysius, which even now he would respect, especially since Dionysius had still so much regard for him that he had not exposed him to the murderous designs of his enemies; he would therefore remain wholly neutral, so that he might yet be able to effect a reconciliation between them.[1] After his return, Plato wrote once more to Dionysius—this is the third of the extant letters—and defended himself against various aspersions.

CHAPTER VII.

VINDICATION OF PLATO'S CHARACTER.

I hope my readers will not censure me because I have been somewhat diffuse in the delineation of these two journies. They are the only fragments of his life which are in a degree connected, and they are the more precious, as without them we should know almost nothing of his character, deportment and maxims. His abode and his conduct at the court of Dionysius, caused him already in his lifetime many reproaches and unreasonable censures, which modern literati have repeated, and to which they have added others, so that his character has often been placed in an unfavorable light. Without these narratives, we should indeed have still had reason for rejecting the unfavorable opinions, since his whole life would have presented so many refutations of the false or of the merely half-correct stories,

[1] Epist. 7. 149. Plut. Dion. 967. I must here adduce some incorrect statements of certain writers, by which we can see, through a few examples, how negligent the later writers often are. For instance, Apuleius remarks that Plato had actually reconciled Dion and Dionysius and had obtained permission for Dion to return to Sicily, p 368. After the second journey, says Olympiodorus, Dion was plundered of his estate and thrown into prison. Dionysius promised him his liberty on condition that he would induce Plato to come to his court the second time. The same, according to Olympiodorus, was the object of his third visit. Diogenes Laertius, III. 21, 22, with his accustomed carelessness, places the hazard of life which Plato incurred, in his second journey.

and partial or fugitive opinions which are current; but we should have wanted almost entirely the sources and the reasons of them, and the surest means for testing them. I will add a few only of the reproaches which his censurers have alleged against him, and inquire whether they can be actually justified on sure grounds. In the first place Plato is blamed for having preferred the Syracusan luxuries to frugality and temperance.[1] This accusation is contained in a letter whose author is uncertain, and which may, on that account, be regarded as unimportant. But it is directly contradicted by the character of Plato, and by the fact that he, at one time, introduced habits of economy into the court of Dionysius.[2] Plato, it is further alleged, was not free from a dishonorable aspiration for the favor of great men, and that this was a principal motive for his Sicilian journies. Or perhaps he wished to enrich himself by courting princes.[3] But the history of his travels, his conduct at the court and his constancy in the friendship of Dion so fully refute the first allegation, that I will not say a word further about it. The second charge is more plausible, especially if we regard the thirteenth letter as genuine. In order to judge properly in respect to this subject, we must first determine what property Plato then possessed, and in what relation he then stood to Dionysius. It is probable that the inheritance which he received from his father was not great, still it was considerable. After his travels had somewhat diminished it, the deficiency was made up in the garden given him by Dion or Anniceris. We must also here take into the account, that Plato possessed the means of living, with his habits of frugality and temperance, in an agreeable and independent manner. We do not learn that he taught for definite wages, a practice which he so severely censures in the sophists. But notwithstanding, we may conclude on good grounds that his scholars and friends gave him liberty to make use of their property when and as he wished, and that he thus did avail himself when it was necessary.[4] We may further suppose that Dionysius, who sought out with a kind

[1] Epist. I. Xenophontis.

[2] Plut. Dione. 963.

[3] Meiner's Geschichte der Wissenchaften II. 683.

[4] Epist. 13. 173, 174. From the latter passage it is evident that Plato, with the help of his friends and pupils, took care to provide his female relatives with dowries, if their fathers or mothers were dead. This was a custom among the Athenians.

of ambition all necessary means by which he could draw Plato to his court, would not have omitted to make use of the great wealth which he possessed; and we may conclude with entire safety from the passages last quoted that Dionysius actually offered him the unrestricted use of his funds.

It is also settled, if the eighth letter is genuine, which still I do not maintain, that the whole sum which he had received from Dionysius after his second journey amounted to only fifty-six minae, an amount, which taken in connection with other sums given him by Dionysius, would not prove any low passion for gain on the part of Plato. The philosopher looked upon all this money as of no account in itself; but he expended it in part in the works of benevolence, and in part in expenditures necessary and becoming to one in his condition. Here agree very well some anecdotes which Plutarch and Diogenes mention, according to which Plato received no present in money from Dionysius, but only some books.[1] If Dionysius sometimes lost sight of his friendship to Plato and made him feel the arm of despotism, he treated him, as some writers intimate, in no other way than as he deserved to be treated, inasmuch as Plato under the mask of friendship had projected a plan with Dion to dethrone Dionysius. But this charge seems to me to be in the highest degree unjust. The enemies of Dion and Plato and of their good cause, circulated these reports in order to infuse suspicion into the king, and to hinder the political reform which they hated on personal grounds.[2] Plato in the beginning was always open and candid. He censured cautiously what was worthy of blame; he repeatedly counselled Dionysius to rule as a king over free subjects, and he became more reserved only as he found that the reproaches of his adversaries were listened to. He moreover, as soon as it was practicable, separated himself from the king. Had his heart been capable of such malice, he would certainly have adopted a wholly different course, and by flattery, complaisance and a forward manner would have been sure of Dionysius. When the enmity between Dion and Dionysius broke out into open war, he was so grieved that he took no part in it, but still endeavored to restore peace. He was ever firm and unshaken in his principles, and conducted towards Dion and Dionysius in accordance with the same maxims.[3] He was

[1] Plut. Dion. 965. Diog. II. 81.

[2] Epist. 7. 112.

[3] Plut. de Discrimine Amici et Adul. 52.

impartial towards both, but he owed the greatest degree of esteem to the most worthy.

With more ground we might perhaps consider that a certain pride and ambition were faults in Plato's character. But these passions did not have unlimited sway over his heart; he followed virtue and probity, and next to these, he strove to acquire the qualities of a cultivated and independent mind in every thing; but there was still conspicuous in all his actions an endeavor to exhibit these qualities before the public. He was conscious of possessing these properties of intellect and of heart, and he attributed to this consciousness a too great importance. It appeared as if there were a certain satisfaction with which he called the attention of Dionysius to the reputation, which he had at that time acquired, and which gave him the first rank among all contemporary philosophers;[1] not without a kind of elation he said of himself, that he alone could be great in his own eyes, because he alone acted in accordance with his reason.[2] He had so high an opinion of his own merits as a writer that he maintained that all which he had written was without stain or blemish.[3] It is possible that the respect, the esteem, the love, and the applause which flowed in to him from all quarters, caused this proud self-conceit, which must detract very much from the value of his character, if it actually belonged to him, as it would appear to have from the foregoing reports. But when I think again that our accounts of his actual life are so very poor and deficient, it appears to me to be somewhat hazardous to decide upon his character from these solitary expressions.

Then it is very probable that considerations and motives existed which required him, as it were, to speak of himself in this manner. Certain writers imagined that they have found in some of his actions and thoughts unequivocal traces of an envious and malicious disposition. It is only from this, say they, conceivable that he censures the greatest statesmen with so little forbearance; that he does nothing but contradict, and as it were triumph over all the philosophers who were before him, while he lived on friendly terms with

[1] Epist. 2. 67.

[2] Epist. 2. 64.

[3] Epist. 7, 582. [It will be recollected that the Letters in which Plato reports these things of himself are not regarded by many as genuine. Boeckh, however, thinks that the seventh may have been written by Plato.—Tr.]

none of his fellow disciples.[1] In respect to his relation to the disciples of Socrates, I have already spoken sufficiently. But I cannot really conceive how we can derive such a conclusion from any actual facts. Freedom of thinking and permission to communicate thoughts is an universal right which can be made a crime in no man. It is apparent that Plato did nothing else than make use of this right when he passed sentence on the actions and opinions of the dead. If it is admitted that this may be sometimes too harsh, or even unjust, still this is not a fault of his heart but an error of his understanding, which is always the case in partial judgments. It is true that Plato censures many philosophers who were not living and other distinguished men, but not all; he speaks not only of what is faulty in them, but of what is good. His liberal mode of thinking, his readiness to allow justice to all, and to give to every one the merit to which he was entitled, appears especially in his opinion respecting the sophists. Though he very often attacked their principles and maxims, still he did not deny them the praise of being possessed, for the most part, of good abilities and of great stores of knowledge. Besides, we must not overlook the circumstance, that when he opposed the opinions of his contemporaries, he never names the individual.

Not less unreasonable is the reproach which has been cast upon him by the older writers and recently by Plessing, that from a proud selfishness he regarded nothing but his own opinions as the truth; while all other sentiments he looked upon as erroneous; that from a blind attachment to the orthodox system of a religion of mysteries, he persecuted all who thought differently, and more particularly hated Democritus and the sophists, and treated them in his writings in a wholly unjustifiable manner.[2] This accusation stands or falls, in part, with the narrative which we find in Diogenes. He relates out of Aristoxenus that Plato went so far in hatred to Democritus, that he desired to burn all his writings which could be brought within his reach, and that he would actually have done it, unless Clineas and Amyclas, two Pythagoreans, had stated that these writings were already in so many hands, that he could not destroy them. For the

[1] Diog. III 26. Dionys. Epist. ad Pompeium. Aristides Oratio II. Platonica. Meiners Geschichte der Wissen. II. 687.

[2] Plessing's Menmonium. II. 435. Diog. III. 35.

same reason Plato makes no mention of Democritus.[1] Aristoxenus is indeed in other respects regarded as an accurate and careful writer, but I doubt whether he deserves this praise by his Historical Reminiscences,[2] in which this report is found, since here he is a mere compiler. Still, be that as it may, this narrative appears so much like a fable that without other grounds of credibility it must be given up. For why should Plato have persecuted Democritus with such hatred? Why moreover burn his writings? There are some which contained far nobler thoughts, for example, those which flowed from the pen of Gorgias and Protagoras.

If Plato had cause to be dissatisfied with Democritus in respect to a single point, it must have been because he limited himself merely to physics, or to the exposition of natural phenomena from natural causes. But it appears from Plato's writings that he did not disapprove of these investigations, but rather commended them in opposition to the supernaturalism of that day, and took them into his protection in order to remove the reproach that they tended inevitably to the denial of a God. But how does this mode of thinking agree with the conduct of which the preceding anecdote furnishes an example?[3] The circumstance that Plato never mentions the name of Democritus appears indeed to us to be somewhat strange. Since the invention of printing, we can indeed procure nearly all the products of learned industry. But with the ancients, especially in Plato's time, it was certainly a happy fortune which could collect the most important productions of the mind. Perhaps we can here discover the cause why Plato observes so profound a silence in respect to Democritus; and several other causes may have conspired which are entirely unknown to us. I have already remarked that Plato was guilty of no injustice in respect to the services and talents of the sophists. Plessing cites still another passage in the tenth book of the Laws, where Plato fixes the punishment of imprisonment and death for those who deny the existence of a God or his moral attributes. Without attempting to cast any light on the value or on the worthlessness of these expressions, I will content myself with remarking that we can determine only in a slight degree Plato's mode of thinking and action, from the expressions which are contained in this book, since they embraced an ideal of a political administration

[1] Diog. IX. 40. [2] ἀπομνημονεύματα ἱστορικά.
[3] Socratis Apolog. 42, 54. De Legibus VII. 8th Vol. 387.

which was never reduced to experiment. And if this be conceded, then the judgment of Plessing on the character of Plato, so far as it is inferred from this passage, must be regarded as inconsiderate, since it will be found on more accurate examination that Plato does not consider the denial of the divine existence as an immorality to be punished. Finally, how a man like Plessing, who had not only read but studied the writings of Plato, could err so widely in his judgment as to attribute to this philosopher a bigotted mode of thinking and a blind attachment to the religion of his country, appears to me to be nothing less than a riddle, while one may find in almost all Plato's writings undeniable proofs that he had a very clear insight into the errors of his religion, and that he defended with true, heartfelt earnestness, not the entire religion as it was at that time, but the religion purified from its fundamental errors. He had no attachment to those particular forms of religion by which it was disfigured; but the essential truths of it, (without which its existence is not conceivable,) and its connection with morals, he rightly judged to be attended with such conviction as must make it dear and valuable to every man of sound mind and heart.

CHAPTER VIII.

LAST DAYS OF PLATO.

It is a striking circumstance, that Socrates and Plato, though both sought with the greatest zeal to supplant religious prejudices by means of a more worthy mode of representation, should, notwithstanding, have met with so different a fate—Socrates, in consequence of his noble design, compelled to drink the cup of poison—Plato dying in peace on his bed. I know indeed, that it may be said, in order to account for this difference, that the enemies of Socrates in fact made use of religion only as a cloak to give to their persecution a color of justice. But I doubt whether this ground can be regarded as sufficient. For if Plato, no less than Socrates, was in a situation to have had enemies; if even he also by so many free remarks on politics, religious and moral errors and prejudices, must have ex-

cited against himself the censure, the hatred and the persecuting spirit of multitudes of men of all classes, then it must still ever remain a problem why the offended self-love of the Athenians did not use the same artifice (in respect to Plato), by covering itself under the cloak of piety. I will here hazard a few conjectures which may make this phenomenon in some measure intelligible. The consequences that followed when Socrates had attacked these prejudices in accordance with his convictions, and when the enemies of the truth had satiated their vengeance upon him, were such that Plato must have advised on the one hand prudence and caution, and on the other forbearance and moderation. The opponents of the new investigations could now learn from experience, that their violent measures, however they might bring their designs to a prosperous issue, still tended to nothing else, than to expose the authors to the reproach and abhorence of their contemporaries, as well as of succeeding generations. All which they could gain was but for a moment, but what they hazarded was far more. While these considerations must have in fact limited the intolerance and the persecuting spirit, (that they had an influence I conclude from the fact that Socrates was the last bloody victim), they must certainly have been in a great degree the fruit of the influence which Plato, Xenophon, and other disciples of Socrates exerted by their writings on their contemporaries. Although by these means violent assaults on freedom of thought were either driven back or overpowered, still no author who wished to write the truth could free himself from all anxiety; he must yet continually dread lest the blind and hoodwinked religious zealots would be again let loose against him with the more violence, in proportion as they had been held in a kind of check. He had the greater reason to be on his guard, since neither the force [of the opposition], nor those things which would serve as a counterpoise to it could be mathematically determined. These observations taught him a certain species of foresight and caution so as not to provoke his opponents. This, it seems to me, is a second reason which is very obvious in the writings of Plato. On the one hand, he felt the necessity and the right of speaking the truth, and of clearly exposing the errors which his reason pointed out to him; but, on the other hand, he discovered those dangers which were inseparably connected, and thus he trod a middle path, so that he could do enough to satisfy the claims of reason, without wantonly exposing

himself to danger. Among the means by which he sought to secure his person against attempts of this kind, I give the first place to the style of his writings. All those things whereby he would bring himself into danger, are written in a dialogue form. Under this safeguard, he could write very freely and fearlessly, since it could not be regarded as his own peculiar style of reasoning, but rather an exhibition of the thoughts of others. Besides, he attacked in a special manner those religious errors only which could not consist with the laws of morality, whereby he made it appear as though he admitted the popular religious system as orthodox, and would suppress only some false principles. He speaks with much warmth and freedom on this point. The remaining attacks on the foundations of the popular faith, on the polytheism, he knew how to veil so adroitly under the form of irony, that they could not easily occasion him any inconvenience. Thus ridicule was concealed when he said: "So far as relates to the twelve gods, we must believe every thing which the poets say concerning them, be it ever so inconceivable, since they as sons of those gods must know best."[1] Still, a remark must be here made. In those dialogues which Plato wrote in his old age, one may easily see that there is more freedom in the language, more spirit and candor in the assault upon errors, than we can discover in his earlier writings. This may be owing either to his having reached a more free and comprehensive point of view, or because declining age had made him indifferent to danger, or finally because he imagined that the weakness of his enemies was greater.

Plato probably observed the external rites of religion in the same manner as Socrates and other wise men had done, although his mode of thinking on some points was very different. Socrates, for example, had not freed himself from all superstitions, but still was strongly in the faith of soothsaying, dreams and divine responses. On the other hand, we find no traces of this in the life of Plato, though a few times in his writings, he seems to revert to the consideration of this subject. When Xenophon was about to engage in the service of Cyrus, Socrates sent him to make inquiry of the oracle at Delphi. Plato, on the contrary, made no such inquiry, but trusted to his own judgment, when he had received an invitation to the court of Dionysius. This was certainly not a less important and difficult emergency for him than the other was for Xenophon. He

[1] Timaeus, Vol. IX. 324.

believed that he heard no divine voice, but perceived a call addressed merely to his reason, although he was possessed of a far more ardent imagination than Xenophon.

Plato was employed by many kings and commonwealths as a philosopher and statesman; and was commissioned by several of them to compile systems of laws; for example, by the inhabitants of Cyrene, Laodamas (perhaps king of the Thasians), by the Arcadians and Thebans.[1] With Perdiccas, king of the Macedonians, he carried on a correspondence, and sent to him his scholar Euphraeus, to tender him good advice.[2] According to Plutarch, he projected laws for the Sicilians, after the death of Dionysius, and also for the Cretans for the use of their colony Magnesia, which were said to have been actually adopted. He sent Phormio to the Eleans and Menedemus to the Pyrrhaeans[3] in order to give a settled form to their commonwealths. But so far as it respects laws for the Sicilians and Cretans, I very much fear that Plutarch has fallen into an error, or has not expressed himself with sufficient precision. An Introduction to his book of Laws, Plato had actually committed to writing for Dionysius, as we have before related. After the death of Dion, he had communicated proposals to the Sicilians, so that they might be able to give to their republic a fixed constitution, as we still find it in the Seventh and Eighth Letters. But it remains equally uncertain whether his proposals were accepted, as whether he composed the still extant laws in accordance with the desires of the Cretans, or from the impulse of his own mind.

This remarkable man died in the first year of the 108th Olympiad, on the first day of his eighty-second year. Although his health had suffered considerably by his many journies, exposures and labors, still by his exemplary temperance and government of his passions, he prolonged his life to this good old age.[4]

To this is to be attributed in part the happy circumstance that his mind was awake and active to the last moment.[5] After his death there was found on a wax tablet the beginning of his Republic, in which his anxiety to file and amend the expression was manifest.[6]

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[1] Diog. III. 23. Ælian. V. H. 42. XII 30. Epist. XI. Plut. πρὸς ἡγεμόνα ἀπαίδευτον.

[2] Epist. 5. 87.

[3] Plut. Advers. Coloten. 1126.

[4] Seneca Epist. 58.

[5] Cic. De Senect. c. 5. Seneca Epist. 58.

[6] Dionysius περὶ συνθέσεως edit. Hudson. 55. Quinct. VIII. 6.

Hence we may conclude, that this composition was his favorite, if it had not been already evident from his pains and from his style, that he must have labored upon it with particular interest. Death came upon him like a soft sleep, when he was present at a marriage feast.[1] His body was buried in the Ceramicus,[2] not far from the academy. The Athenians erected for him in the same place a monument with an inscription, which commemorated his services and the estimation in which he was held by his contemporaries. Pausanias found this monument still existing in the second century. A statue was erected for him by king Mithridates.[3]

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[1] Diog. III. 2.

[2] [A public walk at Athens, and also a place where those were buried who were killed in defence of their country.—Tr.]

[3] Diog. III. 40. 25. Pausan. Lib. I. 76. Edit. Kühn.

PLATO AND HIS BIOGRAPHERS.

SKETCH OF

THE BIOGRAPHERS OF PLATO

AND OF THE

COMMENTATORS UPON HIS WRITINGS

The object of this sketch is to combine some scattered notices illustrative of the preceding Article, which we had originally intended to insert in the form of notes. An exhibition of the literature of this subject, brought down to the present time, may not be without interest to our readers. We are enabled to do this the more satisfactorily from having in our possession, through the courtesy of a friend, brief MS. Notes of the Lectures on Plato which are delivered at Berlin by the eminent professor and classical scholar, Augustus Boeckh.

Diogenes Laertius, Apuleius, Olympiodorus and Suidas in his Lexicon have preserved many particulars of Plato's life. They had before them the biographies which were written by contemporaries of the philosopher. There is no reason, therefore, to doubt the authority of those biographies which we possess. They must contain substantial truth, though there are many conflicting statements in respect to particular incidents. Among the early writers is Speusippus, the nephew, the pupil and the successor of Plato. He wrote an encomium or eulogy on his master.[1] Diogenes mentions another eulogy on Plato by Clearchus, who was probably the pupil of Aristotle. Hermodorus wrote a book with the title, 'Of Plato.' He was probably a contemporary and a scholar of Plato and the one who made known his dialogues in Sicily. Aristoxenus, the celebrated pupil of Aristotle, wrote the life of Plato and of other philosophers. Pha-

[1] His writings were purchased by Aristotle for three talents.

vorinus, who flourished in the time of Trajan, also wrote, according to the testimony of Suidas, an account of Plato. He is esteemed, says Tennemann, as a very credible authority. Plutarch, in his life of Dion, has tolerably full notices of Plato's residence in Sicily, which agree substantially with what is contained in the Letters that have been attributed to Plato. There is reason to believe that Plutarch examined and compared various writers in relation to this subject.

The earliest biographer of Plato, whose works are now extant, is Apuleius. He wrote a treatise in Latin, 'Concerning the Nativity of Plato and the Nature of his Doctrines.' He has some statements which are not found elsewhere. He appears to have made use of the Eulogy of Speusippus. In cases where he agrees with Diogenes, he seems to have drawn from the same sources. Diogenes Laertius, who flourished under Alexander Severus, or a little later, devotes the third book of his memoirs entirely to Plato. Diogenes is a mere collector. He throws his facts together without selection or order. The authorities are not always given, and his reader is left in entire uncertainty in relation to the value of his narrations. Differing statements are brought forward without any attempt at examination. With all his faults, however, his work is of indispensable importance, on account of the many materials in it which we can find in no other book. Olympiodorus has prefixed to his Commentary on the Alcibiades of Plato a short biography. It however contains more errors than that of Diogenes. It is inserted in the Tauchnitz edition of Plato. Prof. Heeren has printed in the fifth number of the Bibliothek der alten Litteratur u. Kunst, a life of Plato by an anonymous author, from a Pergamus MS. of the year 925. It agrees generally with Olympiodorus. It contains, however, some notices of his errors, and also a few facts not elsewhere found.

Many Commentaries on the Platonic writings are lost. Others remain in libraries still inedited, or edited but in part. Of these may be mentioned Damascius, Dexippus, Olympiodorus, Proclus and Theon of Smyrna. Albinus, a contemporary of Galen, wrote an Introduction to the Platonic Dialogues. We have a few fragments of the work of Atticus, a Platonic of the age of Marcus Aurelius, on the difference between the Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. The commentary of Porphyry, in which he attempts to show the agreement of the two systems, is still extant. We have a work

of Proclus on the Platonic Theology in six books, and also the Platonic Dictionary of Timaeus the Younger, a grammarian of the fourth century. The Lexicon of Suidas, in which are united extracts from the older grammarians, scholiasts and lexicographers, is essentially different from the glossaries, as it contains not only explanations of words, but also historical notices, particularly information in respect to the most celebrated writers with extracts from their works. This author is so entirely unknown that doubts have been expressed whether such an individual ever lived. Eustathius, however, cites him in a number of places. By some he is placed in the tenth century, by others in the eleventh, and by others still in the twelfth. A very complete collection of the Scholia on Plato was made by David Ruhnken, which appeared after his death. They are partly grammatical, partly historical. They contain many proverbs, also genealogies, mythological notices, verses from lost books, etc. These Scholia were printed at Leyden in 1800, and again by Tauchnitz in his edition of Plato.

The predominance of the Aristotelian philosophy in the schools of the Middle Ages, gave way to the Platonic after the revival of letters. The Florentine, Marsiglio Ficino, translated, under the patronage of Cosmo de Medici, the entire works of Plato into Latin. This translation has often been re-printed. The first Greek edition of the complete works of Plato came from the Aldine press at Venice in 1513, in two volumes folio. The edition edited by Herbst and Simon Grynaeus, Basil, 1534, was much improved by a careful revision, by the addition of the commentary of Proclus on the Timaeus and the Republic, and by good indexes. In 1578, Henry Stephens published at Paris the works of Plato in three volumes folio, with a new recension of the text. J. de Serres (Serranus) supplied a new Latin translation more elegant than that by Ficino, but often incorrect.[1] This edition was reprinted, the translation being improved, in 1590, at Lyons, and again at Frankfort in 1602. The Bipont edition was brought out in 1781—87, in eleven volumes, with the text of Stephens and the translation of Ficino. Croll, Exter, Embser and Mitscherlich had the editorial charge of the edition. The Dialogorum Platonis Argumenta of Tiedemann may be regarded as a twelfth volume of this edition. The stereotype edition of

[1] Schöll Geschichte der Griechischen Litteratur, I. 521 ed. 1828.

Tauchnitz, Leipsic 1819, is printed from the text of Stephens. Schleiermacher also translates, with a few exceptions, from the same.[1]

Of the editions issued in the present century we may name that of Immanuel Bekker, the well-known philologist at Berlin, 1816—18, in eight volumes octavo. Two volumes of commentaries were added in 1823. The text is improved by a new comparison of many MSS. The dialogues are printed in the order which was proposed by Schleiermacher. A very superior edition of Plato has just been completed by Frederic Ast. The text, with an entirely new translation, is contained in nine volumes. The remaining volumes include a critical and exegetical commentary, a Lexicon Platonicum and indexes. The basis of the text is that of the first Aldine edition. The external appearance of the volume is much superior to that of many German editions of the classics. Professor G. Stallbaum of the University of Leipsic, one of the greatest of living scholars in the writings of Plato, published his works in 1821—26. He had the advantage of an unfinished edition commenced by Bast and Heindorf. The text is the result of the collation of the Vienna, Paris, Florence and Zittau MSS. The last four volumes are furnished with critical observations, occasional illustration of difficult passages, etc. Another edition by C. E. C. Schneider is, we believe, in progress at Leipsic. We have seen no notice of its completion. It was to contain the results of all which has been hitherto done, in a critical respect, for Plato. It was also to embrace a new recension of the text and a complete critical apparatus.

Our limits will compel us to omit all notices of editions of single dialogues or productions of Plato. In this service men no less distinguished than Wolf, Buttmann, Routh, Heindorf, Bekker, Boeckh, Ast, Dindorf, Jacobs, Wyttenbach, Stallbaum, etc., have labored. Tennemann, in his System of the Platonic Philosophy, enumerates nine distinct treatises or essays on the life of Plato, twelve on subjects connected with his life, six on his character as a writer, thirty on Plato as a philosopher, fourteen on the relation between Plato and Aristotle, and forty-two on particular topics connected with or growing out of his philosophy; in all one hundred and thirteen This enumeration was made in 1794. Since that time the number has greatly increased. Indeed Plato's writings are one of the most fruit-

[1] Rixner der Gesch. der Philos. I. 210. ed. 1829.

ful topics of discussion in fruitful Germany, to say nothing of Italy, France and Holland.

One of the earliest general histories of philosophy was that of Thomas Stanley, London, 1701. A fourth edition, translated into Latin by G. Olearius, was published at Leipsic in 1811. The history of philosophy most known in this country and in England is that of J. I. Brucker, first published at Leipsic in 1742—67, in five volumes quarto. From this work our current notions respecting Plato are derived, partly through the medium of Dr. Enfield's History. Brucker has never enjoyed, it has been said, a very high reputation among the learned of Germany. Dugald Stewart thinks that this fact is rather to the disadvantage of the German taste, than to that of the historian. 'Brucker is indeed,' says Stewart, 'not distinguished by any extraordinary measure of depth or of acuteness; but in industry, fidelity and sound judgment, he has few superiors.'[1] At the time of writing the above remarks, 1820, Stewart was not acquainted with the work of Tennemann. He had seen J. G. Buhle's Manual of the history of Philosophy, Göttingen, 1796—1804, eight volumes. In addition to this work Buhle published a History of Modern Philosophy, Göttingen, 1800—6, in six volumes. Stewart's opinion of this author is unfavorable.

William Gottlieb Tennemann was born Dec. 7, 1761, at Brembach, a village between Erfurt and Eisenach, where his father was clergyman. At four years of age he was visited by a long illness resulting from an attack of the small-pox. This delayed his intellectual development and laid the foundation for many bodily pains. The method of instruction pursued by his father, a man, according to the son's testimony, of a gloomy and stern temperament, did not hasten the mental progress of the youth. In his sixteenth year he joined a school at Erfurt. After remaining there eighteen months, he connected himself with the university then existing at Erfurt. His love for philosophical studies turned him aside from theology, to which, agreeably to his father's wishes, he had devoted himself. In 1781, he went to the university of Jena, where he was greatly excited by the writings of Kant. At first he joined the opposition, but he soon became a devoted adherent of the Critical Philosophy. In 1791, he gave a connected view of 'the Doctrines and Opinions of the followers of Socrates on the Immortality of the Soul.' This

[1] Works of D. Stewart, Camb. ed. VI. 487.

was followed by his 'System of the Platonic Philosophy,' four volumes, Leipsic, 1792—94. This contains the life of the philosopher, which forms the preceding article in this volume. Being limited in his external means, Tennemann now devoted himself rather to academical pursuits than to those of an author. In 1798, he was appointed professor extraordinary of philosophy at Jena. In 1804, he became ordinary professor in the philosophical chair at Marburg, vacant by the death of Tiedemann. This office—to which was added, in 1816, that of second university librarian—he continued to fill till his death, Sept. 30, 1819. Besides the writings already named, he left a number of very useful essays; a translation of Hume's Inquiry into the Human Understanding, with Observations, 1793; of Locke's Essay, three volumes, 1795—7; and De Gerando's Comparative History of Systems of Philosophy, two volumes, Marburg, 1806. His principal reputation rests on his History of Philosophy, in eleven volumes, Leipsic, 1798—1819. An abstract of this work, not fully completed, entitled Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, was published in 1812. The fifth edition was edited by Professor Wendt.[1] It has been translated into English by Arthur Johnson. Nothing of Tennemann's spirit, however, can be discovered in this skeleton. With the exception of Brucker, Tennemann was the first writer who exhibited the whole history of philosophy from the sources, in a philosophical spirit, and so as to make it accessible to the general mind. He has the merit of having awakened a manifold interest in these studies, and of having helped many thinkers to a proper recognition of them. The principal fault which has been found with Tennemann is thus mentioned by Mr. Stewart. "The history of Tennemann in particular (a work said to possess great merit) would appear to have been vitiated by this unfortunate bias [derived from Kant] in the views of its author. A very competent judge has lately said of it, that 'it affords, as far as it is completed, the most accurate, the most minute, and the most rational view we yet possess of the different systems of philosophy; but that the critical philosophy being chosen as the vantage ground from whence the survey of former systems is taken, the continual reference in Kant's own language to his peculiar doctrines, renders it fre-

[1] Wendt was born at Leipsic, Sept. 29, 1783. In 1816, he became ordinary professor of philosophy at Leipsic. In 1829 he took Bouterwek's place as ordinary professor of philosophy at Göttingen. He died Oct. 15, 1836.

quently impossible for those who have not studied the dark works of this modern Heraclitus to understand the strictures of the historian on the systems even of Aristotle or Plato."[1] Notwithstanding this defect, Tennemann is a perspicuous and agreeable, as well as profound writer. The indiscriminate charge of obscurity and Kantism, which has been sometimes alleged against him, can by no means be supported.

In regard to the life of Plato, by Tennemann, which we have translated, Schleiermacher has the following remark: "Tennemann, in his system of the Platonic philosophy prefixed to the life of Plato, has already subjected to a sifting process the compilation of Diogenes and the other old biographies of Plato, compared with what is found scantily dispersed in other sources. As, then, since that time neither materially deeper investigations have been published, nor new facts discovered, affording any well-grounded hope of leaving far behind them, in their application, the labor already bestowed on this subject, it is best to refer such readers as wish to be instructed upon that point, to what they will there find." A high commendation of Tennemann's labors from the pen of Schleiermacher—certainly a most competent judge—we shall quote in the sequel.

In the early part of the present century, Dr. Frederic Schleiermacher betook himself to an examination of all known systems of morals; and it is he to whom is mainly owing the new ardor for the study of Plato. His translation of the Platonic dialogues appeared at Berlin in the years 1804—9. It was accompanied by a general introduction, and also by particular introductions.[2] It was his intention to publish the whole of the works of Plato upon this plan; but we have to regret the want of introductions to the Timaeus, the Critias, the Laws and a number of the pieces which are not regarded as genuine. He viewed the works of Plato as a whole, and endeavored to arrange them in their natural connection; and he conceived that by internal evidence he had found in them the order in which the author's thoughts were developed, being also that in which the several works were written. Though details of his scheme have been loosened by later inquirers, the main principles are regarded by good judges as finally fixed.[3]

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[1] Stewart's Works, VI. 486. [2] Translated by Wm. Dobson.

[3] London Quart. Rev. No. 122. p. 258.

In his general introduction, Schleiermacher, after remarking upon the impracticable modes of arranging Plato's dialogues proposed by Diogenes, Eberhard, Geddes and others, thus proceeds: "Quite different, however, from all that has hitherto been done is the character of the attempt made in Tennemann's system of the Platonic Philosophy; the first, at all events, with any pretensions to completeness, to discover the chronological order of the Platonic dialogues from various historical traces impressed upon them; for this is certainly critical in its principles, and a work worthy in every way of an historical investigator like the author of that treatise. In this undertaking, indeed, his view is directed less to discover, by the methods he adopts, the real and essential relation of the works of Plato to one another, than to discover in general the dates of their composition, in order to avoid confounding early and imperfect attempts with an exposition of the philosophy of the mature and perfect Plato. And to that undertaking, generally, the present is a necessary counterpart; and thus, on the other hand, that method, resting as it does entirely upon outward signs, provided it could only be universally applied, and provided also, it could definitely assign to any Platonic dialogue its place between any two others, would be the natural test of our own method, which goes entirely upon what is internal. It may not indeed be necessary on that account that the results of the two should perfectly coincide, for the reason that the external production of a work is subjected to other external and accidental conditions than its internal development, which follows only such as are inward and necessary; whence slight deviations might equally arise, so that what was internally in existence sooner than something else, does not appear yet externally until a later period."

Schleiermacher divides the works of Plato into three classes. In the first class, the development of the dialogistic method is the predominant object; and hence manifestly the Phaedrus is the first and the Parmenides is the last in this class, partly as a most perfect exhibition of it, partly as a transition to the second part, because it begins to philosophize upon the relation of ideas to actual things. The Phaedrus, Protagoras and Parmenides, have a character of youthfulness quite peculiar. They appear in the first glitter and awkwardness of early youth. They are not worked up into one whole, with a definite purpose, and with much art. In them also

are shown the first breathings of what is the basis of all that follows, of logic as the instrument of philosophy, of ideas as its proper object, consequently of the possibility and of the conditions of knowledge. In the second part, the explanation of knowledge, and of the process of acquiring knowledge, is the predominant subject. At the head of this part stands the Theaetetus beyond the possibility of a mistake, taking up, as it does, this question by its first root; the Sophistes with the annexed Politicus is in the middle, while the Phaedon and the Philebus close it, as transitions to the third part; the first, from the anticipatory sketch of natural philosophy, the second, because in its discussion of the idea of the good, it begins to approximate to a totally constructive exposition, and passes into the direct method. This second part is distinguished by a great artificialness, as well in the construction of particular dialogues as in their progressive connection, and which might be named for distinction's sake, the indirect method, since it commences almost universally with the juxta-position of antitheses. Some of the Platonic dialogues are distinguished above all the rest by the fact that they alone contain an objective, scientific exposition, the Republic for instance, the Timaeus and the Critias. Everything coincides when we assign to these the last place, tradition, as well as internal character though in different degrees of the most advanced maturity and serious old age; and even the imperfect condition which, viewed in connection, they exhibit. But more than all this, the nature of the thing decides the question; inasmuch as these expositions rest upon the investigations previously pursued; upon the nature of knowledge generally, and of philosophical knowledge in particular; and upon the applicability of the idea of science to the objects treated of in those works,—man himself, and nature.

In 1816, Prof. Frederic Ast published a volume entitled, 'Plato's Life and Writings.' Thirteen pages are occupied by a general introduction, twenty one only with Plato's life, and four hundred and eighty on his writings. The work is thus described in the Halle Journal. "Ast has here suggested considerations on the nature of the Platonic philosophy, on the spirit which shows itself in the exhibition of Plato's philosophical ideas, and has made them, in connection with the analysis of particular dialogues, together with the historical notices of Plato and of other authors, the basis of the entire introduction. The work is particularly characterized by a

fulness of learning, by a philosophical spirit, by efforts to separate the uncertain and the merely probable from that which is true, and to give to all these investigations, (which are particularly distinguished by subjective feeling,) a solid basis. Hence the work contains much that is peculiar in its views and results, and much that is new. If this latter is not always to be taken as correct, the production, notwithstanding, is very interesting and worthy of the closest examination."[1] The following extract will show the spirit of Ast. "In Plato more than in any other philosopher of antiquity do we find the ideal joined with the actual, the mythic with the dialectical—an inward bond of science and philosophy in the element of religion—and that, from which all the other peculiarities flow, a philosophical spirit which, without embodying itself into a system, lives in the free and boundless region of ideas. The peculiarity of Plato's compositions is this, namely, *that he has no peculiarity;* Platonism cannot be regarded as a system opposed to what is peculiar in another system; all which is peculiar, all which belongs to the temporary condition of the individuals is lost and transformed in the idea of philosophy. Platonism is not, therefore, to be viewed as a system, in which the thinker, Plato, according to his peculiar individual manner of reflection, has expressed his own views and inquiries on the cause, nature and final purpose of things, but he is lifted above what is finite and temporary; he lives in the etherial realm of ideas; he lives in the bright light of philosophy itself. Hence one finds in Platonism the germ of all systems without itself being the foundation of any; for it is the idea of philosophy, the focus of its particular forms, the immovable sun of its planetary changes. Platonism is idealistic, without being itself apparently idealism; it is realistic, without being realism."[2]

Ast classifies the Platonic dialogues in the three following series. 1. The Socratic. Those which have to do directly with the ideal Socrates, and in which the poetic and dramatic element predominates. Of this class are the Protagoras, Phaedrus, Gorgias and Phaedon. 2. The dialectical, brought out probably at Megara after the death of Socrates. These are pervaded by a dialectical acuteness. Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus, Parmenides and Cratylus. 3. The purely philosophical. Philebus, Symposium, Republic, Timaeus and

[1] Halle Allgem. Litt. Zeit. 1817, I. 56.

[2] Platon's Leben u. Schriften, p. 5.

Critias. These are penetrated with the poetic and dialectical element.

The principal deficiency of Ast arises from his skepticism. "Of all modern learned men," says Schoell, "who have assailed the Platonic writings, Ast has carried his skepticism the furthest." Boeckh calls him hypercritical. A principal ground of the *historical* incredulity of Ast, or that which relates to the life of Plato, is the disagreement of ancient writers in their narratives; for example, of the journies of Plato, and of his residence in the Syracusan court. Hence only the mere fact is regarded as historically certain, everything else is fiction, decoration or conjecture. This fate attaches to all the great men of antiquity, especially to those who were most intellectual in their life and labors. In respect to facts related of these, historical skepticism must be altogether justifiable. This way of thinking is not to be disregarded; yet it will be pressed too far, if it does not allow room for historical probability in connection with that which is certain. If the fact be undoubted that Plato was thrice at the court of Syracuse, then these journies must have had a reasonable object. Why may we not from the various narratives in relation to these journies hold those things as true, which agree with the character and labors of Plato?[1]

Joseph Socher on 'the writings of Plato, Munich, 1820,' arranges the Dialogues into ten groups. The first group embraces those which relate to the trial and death of Socrates, as the Euthyphron, the Apology, the Phaedon, etc.; the second includes those which directly follow one another, Theaetetus, Sophistes, Politicus, the Republic, etc.; the third, those which are directed against false wisdom, Euthydemus, Protagoras, Gorgias, etc. This arrangement, however, seems to be especially arbitrary.

One of the eminent Germans who has given much attention to Plato is Augustus Boeckh. He was born at Carlsruhe, 1785, studied at Halle, and, in 1811, became professor of classical literature at Berlin. He is greatly distinguished by his works on Pindar, and by his Political Economy of the Athenians. He is now engaged in a great work under the patronage of the Berlin Academy, entitled 'Corpus Inscriptionum Graecarum.' His smaller writings relate chiefly to Plato and to the Platonic philosophers.

From the brief MS. notes of Boeckh's lectures on Plato, before

[1] Allgem. Litt. Zeit. 1817, I. 62.

mentioned, we will now make a few miscellaneous extracts.—'Plutarch in his life of Solon says that Plato went to Egypt to sell oil! a joke possibly. Oil was the chief product of Athens. Produce was equivalent to our letters of exchange. Plato brought no wisdom from Egypt, for there was none there. Thus the hieroglyphics, so far as they are deciphered, teach. The Egyptians were dull and steady; the very opposite of the Greeks. In Cyrene, Plato spent some time. He was from childhood inclined to mathematics. Platonic mathematics were speculation, not practical matters as with us. Geometrical figures were an *image* of the *ideas*. This gave Plato a great zeal for mathematics.'

'Had Plato *esoteric* and *exoteric* doctrines? That he had both is said on the false, or at least doubtful supposition that he was a Pythagorean. The opinion originated in a love of the mysterious. The position is supported by no proof, though in his seventh letter, it is said that he never fully explained his views in his books. But the reason is, he chose that way of dialogue, hints, allusions, etc., as best fitted to his purpose.' 'The sophists took away philosophy by skepticism. But Socrates restored it by selecting from the truths which were acknowledged by poets, statesmen, etc. Plato carried this to a higher degree. By means of criticism, the different and conflicting systems were sifted, and the true put into one system. Plato's philosophy is said to be a mixture of the Pythagorean, Eleatic, Ionian, etc. But Plato was not a mere eclectic or compiler, but his system had an internal bond of connection, and came from within outward. Plato takes a wide view of what was before seen partially. All the tendencies, physical, ethical, etc. were united in him. It is an organized whole.' 'The one and the many are united in Platonism. This unity is not made out, however, by a symbolic system of numbers, but by *ideas*.' 'The language of Plato is, in the historical sense, the new Attic. The older Attic, as that of Thucydides, was rougher and stronger. The new Attic was more soft, delicate and beautiful. Plato had no single form, but united *all* forms. He joined the prosaic and the poetic manner. This results not merely from his genius. Plato was very pains-taking in writing, like Addison. Style was a study. Every subject had its own manner, partly because he entered into it, and partly because he made it a special object. At first, in accordance with his youthful studies, he was more poetic, as in the Phaedrus.' 'Again, Plato was highly

mimical. This tendency was probably cherished by Sophron. Whether he was influenced by Aristophanes is doubtful.' 'In the earlier literature, the dialogue had three elements, besides poetry. First, it was a description of moral action, copied exactly from common life, as was the case with Sophron's mimics, where nature is free. This is not rejected by Plato. Secondly, the Eleatic form was the direct opposite. Here there are no mimics, and no real persons. One man acts two parts, asking questions, and then answering them. It was more dialectic than dialogistic. This Plato used in part, as in the Parmenides. Thirdly, the Socratic. This is a natural, simple dialogue, designed to teach all kinds of men, so that all could understand.' 'The whole principle of dialogue is this. In *writing*, it is impossible to say exactly what one wishes—to exhibit every thing so clearly as not to be misunderstood. A discussion is more like a conversation, so that the reader will be as if he were hearing a conversation. Plato wished that the reader should be himself *active* in the discussion. Men commonly think that Plato had no definite system, but spoke differently on different occasions. Schleiermacher has, however, shown, that when Plato was giving his *own* opinions, which seem to disagree, it was merely because he took different views of the same subject, which in form, not in fact, are contrary to one another.'

We will now advert to Dr. Henry Ritter's History of Philosophy. When he commenced his publication he was professor extraordinary of philosophy in Berlin. He is now ordinary professor in the same department at the university of Kiel. He is not a relative, we believe, of the distinguished geographer, Dr. Charles Ritter of Berlin. The first volume of his History of Philosophy was published in 1829. It contains a general introduction, and six books on the Oriental, Chinese and Indian systems of philosophy, and on the Greek philosophy anterior to the age of Socrates. The second volume, 1830, includes one book on Socrates and the Socratic school, and one book on Plato and the old Academy. Volume third, 1831, contains two books, one on Aristotle and the Peripatetics, one on the Skeptics and Epicurus, and one on the Stoics. The fourth volume, 1834, in two books, describes the decline of the old systems, the new developments of the Greek philosophy among the Romans and Orientals, and the rise of New Platonism. A second edition of the first two volumes has lately appeared. Dr.

Ritter has guarded against the fault of Tennemann,[1] and states the doctrine of the ancients, as much as possible, in their own words and forms of expression. About 350 pages of the second volume of Ritter are devoted to Plato and his doctrines. The life is despatched in a few pages. Ritter is less skeptical than Ast, while he is more disposed to doubt than Tennemann. He considers that the grounds on which Socher, Ast and others reject a number of the dialogues of Plato are insufficient. He coincides with the general arrangement of Schleiermacher. His remarks on the writings of Plato are arranged under the three heads of Dialectics, Physics and Ethics. One chapter is devoted to the pupils of Plato in the old Academy, Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemon, etc. We may add that the first two volumes of the second edition of Ritter have been translated into English by Mr. A. J. W. Morrison. Ritter is much less inclined to extravagance than some of the writers on philosophy.

The works of Plato, it is well known, are in the process of translation into French by Victor Cousin. Eleven volumes have appeared. The translator is now diligently engaged in completing his undertaking. These translations are welcomed with much interest in Germany,[2] as fitted to extend in a popular form what the German philosophers have been long laboring to effect, in their too often scholastic and unintelligible style. Cousin prefaces each dialogue with a dissertation. His general view of Plato he has reserved for the conclusion of his work. The translation is clear and flowing. The French language, however, is ill fitted to express the subtle conceptions of the Grecian.

In the mean time a zealous Platonist has arisen in Holland, in Professor Van Heusde of the university of Utrecht. In the years 1827—31, he published in two volumes, 'Initia Philosophiae Platonicae.' This work is written in good Latin, and contains a review of the spirit and composition of Plato's works, rather than a dry analysis of his philosophy. It shows Plato's own character, and his

[1] Ritter speaks, however, in the highest terms of this writer. "No impartial person can deny the great service which Tennemann has rendered to the history of philosophy in the investigation of facts, from the limited point of view from which he has examined the systems." Introduction, I. 34.

[2] See the remarks of Schelling translated in Mr. Ripley's Specimens of Foreign Literature, I. 201; also Rixner d. Geschich. d. Phil. I. 202.

views of what human life ought to be. It contains extracts made with taste and judgment from the more picturesque dialogues. 'The work,' says the London Quarterly Review, 'is not unlike Lowth's Lectures on Hebrew Poetry.' In 1834—5, Van Heusde published in the Dutch language, 'The Socratic School, or Philosophy for the 19th Century, in three parts.' This production is reviewed by Ullmann in the Theological Studies and Criticisms for 1837. It is not so much an exhibition of the mode of thinking of Socrates and Plato, as it is a presentation of the wisdom and practical observations of those great men, with special reference to life and to our times. The author has kept prominently in mind the relation of the Socratic philosophy to the christian religion. The first part contains remarks on the Beautiful and on the corresponding abilities and powers of man, on the fine arts, music, poetry, etc.; on truth and the means of acquiring knowledge; on the sciences, their principles and nature, and their application in particular departments; on the relation of art and science, and the bearing of both on the education of man. The second part relates to the so-called moral and positive sciences, jurisprudence, theology, etc., but more particularly to ethics, philosophy and history, and develops their nature and principles. The third part goes over into the metaphysical region, and handles at length the relations of philosophical knowledge to the ancient world, to religion and to Christianity. Here the author takes special pains, for the benefit of younger theologians, to point out the best way in which study can be pursued. He inquires how far the ancients went in the knowledge of religious truth, and in what points they were at variance with the higher revelations of Christianity.

In 1835, Dr. Charles Ackermann, archdeacon at Jena, published a book of 370 pages, entitled the 'Christian in Plato and the Platonic Philosophy.' This is reviewed in a very able manner, in the ninth volume of the Stud. u. Krit. by Dr. C. J. Nitzsch, and Dr. Henry Ritter. "In Ackermann's work," says Nitzsch, "we have the fruits of rich and persevering study, a living acquaintance with the objects compared and of their relations, and an inward, spiritual love for them. The author makes the things themselves speak; he possesses, in an extraordinary degree, the gift of causing them to speak. Aside from the clearness and the definiteness of his principles, we cannot class him with any particular school, although he has brought himself into vital connection with all existing philoso-

phy." A principal thought in the treatise is, that 'Plato designed happiness for man, but still did not produce it.' The author then proceeds to point out the difference between Platonism and Christianity. The former wants the person and the deed, the life and sufferings of the Redeemer. Sin is rather a mistake than sin. Platonism knows nothing of the humbleness and the child-like reverence which Christianity awakens. It does not lead to a holy, personal, living God.

In 1837, Professor Baur of Tübingen published an essay with a title similar to that of Ackermann. We translate the following from the preface: "An Essay by Ackermann under the title of the 'Christliche des Platonismus, the relation between Platonism and Christianity, has unquestionably given to this particular object of inquiry a certain degree of interest for the time being. On this account, a new treatise, under the same designation, cannot appear strange. Ackermann, however, has not included in his inquiry the important bearing which the person of Socrates must have both on Platonism, and especially on the question what are the traces of Christianity in Platonism, or what is the relation of Socrates to Christ, though such a consideration is urgently demanded by the religious and theological aspects of the times. Here lies the demand to present the question lately raised by Ackermann in that definite, religious, and philosophical shape as will include the view of the subject to which I have referred, along with other matters of moment connected with the inquiry. As the external occasion of the appearance of this volume lies in the interest which the very useful treatise of Ackermann has awakened in me and in others, I may be permitted to repeat in relation to Platonism, and particularly to that view of it here presented, what I have brought forward in connection with it in some of my writings published in the last few years, in order to present more prominently the relation of Platonism to Christianity, and to the development of the christian doctrines. I refer particularly to the results of my investigations on the *Christian Gnosis.*" Among the subjects which this writer takes up are—the principles of self-reflection in Platonism, the Platonic State and the Christian Church, the Platonic Ideas and the Christian Logos, the Preëxistence and the Fall of the Soul, the Platonic Love and the Christian Faith, God and his relation to the world, the Relationship of Platonism and Christianity in respect to the importance which Plato attributes to the person of Socrates, etc.

THE SINLESS CHARACTER OF JESUS:

BY

DR. C. ULLMANN.

LITERATURE OF THE SUBJECT.

It is well known, that the doctrine of the sinlessness of Jesus has been repeatedly discussed already. Every theological system must take notice of the doctrine; and it has also given occasion to numerous particular treatises. For the sake of presenting a view of the literature of the subject, I would cite the following works, some of which, I regret to say, I have had no opportunity to examine. The passages in the Christian Fathers, which treat of this subject, are cited very fully by Suicer, in Thes. Eccl. I. pp. 287—289, under the words ἀναμαρτησία, ἀναμάρτητος. In the middle ages, the controversy respecting the immaculate conception of the virgin was designed, principally, to affect the question of the sinlessness of Jesus. Among the schoolmen, Duns Scotus maintained the possibility of Christ's sinning (humanam naturam Jesu non fuisse ἀναμάρτητον), and he was attacked on that ground. By modern, particularly Protestant theologians, the doctrine has been discussed with greater circumspection. Among the older theological systems of our church are especially to be cited, Buddeus's Compend. Theol. Dogm. p. 497; Gerhard's Loci Theol. III. 373, and Cotta's Observations appended. Still more may be found in Baumgarten's Untersuchung Theologischer Streitigkeiten, II. pp. 449, 529 seq., and in Bretschneider's Systemat. Entwickelung, p. 562. Among the more modern systematical works, which briefly treat of the doctrine, are particularly to be mentioned, Doederlein's Institut. II. p. 206 seq.; Zachariae's Biblische Theologie, III. pp. 38—46; Reinhard's Dogmat. II. § 135 and 138; Wegscheider's Institut. § 122, pp. 390, 391; Daub's Judas Iscarioth. I. pp. 55, 64, 73, and in many other passages; Knapp's Vorlesungen, II. § 93. p. 151; Schleiermacher's Christ. Glaub. II. pp. 221, 222, and in many other places; De Wette's Christl. Sittenlehre, I. pp. 173—193. Separate treatises on the subject are, Walther's Diss. Theol. de Christi Hominis Ἀναμαρτησίᾳ, Viteb. 1690; Ejusdem Diss. de Dissimilitud. Ortus nostri et Christi Hom., in his Diss. Theol. accedd. ed. Hoffman. pp. 207—244; Baumgarten's Diss. de Ἀναμαρτησίᾳ Christi ejusque Necessitate, Hal. 1753; Erbstein's Gedanken über die Frage, ob der Erlöser sündigen konnte? Meissen, 1787; Ueber die Anamartesie Jesu, in Grimm's und Musel's Stromata, St. 2. S. 113; Weber's Progr. Virtutis Jesu Integritatem neque ex ipsius Professionibus neque ex Actionibus doceri posse, Viteb. 1796.—Detached passages will be occasionally quoted from other writings.

AN APOLOGETIC VIEW

OF THE

SINLESS CHARACTER OF JESUS.

PREFATORY NOTE.

[THE following Treatise, über die Unsündlichkeit Jesu, is the first article in the first number of the Theol. Studien und Kritiken ; a periodical established in 1828, and edited by Professors Charles Ullmann, and F. W. C. Umbreit, of Heidelberg. The treatise has exerted a visible and salutary influence in Germany. In 1836 three editions of it had been called for by the public. The translator has taken the liberty to divide it into sections, as it was not divided by the author. An incidental design in translating the article has been to show the state of theological discussion in Germany, and the wants which evangelical Christians there are compelled to meet. The reader will find in it a dignity and dispassionateness, a freedom from forced constructions and personal censures, which it were well for our controversial writers to imitate. The main design, however, of the translation has been, to exhibit the connected proof of a proposition that is generally taken for granted ; and thus to render our faith in that proposition more rational, and by consequence more animating and stable. The Saviour is more honored by one who worships him, with a clear view of the reasons for such worship, than by one who yields to mere authority and blind impulse. It is a great mistake to suppose that argument is always useless, where the conclusion will be admitted without argument. The consecutive proof fastens the attention upon the principles to be proved ; and by holding them up before the mind, secures their appropriate moral influence. Some American preachers, it is to be feared, are prone to urge upon the conscience the obligation to a particular feeling, without presenting to

the intellect such ideas as are requisite for the exercise of that feeling. They are too apt, it may be, to forget that an affection is not elicited by mere command or exhortation, but rather, in union with these, by the development of the appropriate object of affection. The spotless character of the Saviour is so presented in this treatise, as to exhibit winning reasons for our confidence in him, and to show the intimate union between the doctrine and the life; between purity of purpose and unexceptionable conduct.

The author of the treatise is Dr. C. Ullmann, one of the editors of the Stud. und Krit. He has been favorably known, since 1821, as an author, and enjoys a very high reputation as a lecturer. Some of his writings, particularly in the department of Ecclesiastical History, have attracted great attention. In 1829 he was called from the University of Heidelberg to that of Halle, but has recently been called back to Heidelberg, where he is again associated with Umbreit in literary labors. He is between forty-five and fifty years of age. He is said to be a particular friend of both Tholuck and Gesenius.—Tr.]

SECTION I.

Introduction.—Comparison between the external and internal evidence in favor of the christian religion.—Reasons for confining ourselves, in this treatise, to the internal evidence.—Importance of proving the sinlessness of Jesus.—Plan of the treatise.

In modern times it has become more and more obvious, how incalculably important for the proof of historical Christianity, is a clear and positive knowledge of the inward religious character of its Founder. The sum of the spiritual life of Jesus is the central point of the whole christian system. From this all rays of light, and all operations of moral power proceed; and to it all must be traced back, so long as Christianity shall have, on the one hand, a sure historical basis, and on the other, an inward moral excellence. The apostles, indeed, do not represent the superior purity of Christ's religious character and the superior elevation of his whole soul, as the only reason why he appeared to them so peculiarly entitled to adoration. They formed their conception of him, (as they might do

with good reason and certainly without unfair accommodation), by viewing his character more historically. They were convinced of his Messiahship, not only by the loftiness and divinity of his whole spiritual appearance, but especially by the miracles that were wrought by him and upon him, and by the agreement of his acts and destination with the prophecies of the Old Testament. Still from everything which they have left us, it is very evident that they had an additional reason for believing in the Messiahship of Jesus. This reason was, that his words were those of eternal life, and his acts were a spiritual exhibition of something truly divine. The apostles would not have acknowledged him to be the Saviour, had he not stood before their minds in all the fulness of spiritual dignity. Without the unweakened influence of his inward character upon their moral and religious consciousness, they could not be firmly convinced that he was a pure image of the invisible God by the most astonishing perfection of his power. It was only because he approved himself to them as a living representation of the divine love, truth and rectitude, that they were able to discover in the extraordinary effects which he produced, evidences of a peculiar connection with the Deity.

The nature of the case and the necessities of their contemporaries fully justified the apostles, in proving the divine mission and the Messiahship of Jesus by the argument from miracles and prophecy. But the necessity of the times and of individuals may in this respect vary, and although the gospel in its *essence* remains the same, and contains eternal, unchangeable truth, yet in a different age, a different method of proof may lead more immediately to the acknowledgement of this truth. In our own time, it seems proper to fix our eyes especially upon the spiritual character of Jesus, in order to obtain satisfactory proof of the divinity of his mission and instructions; not because the apostolical mode of proof has become untenable, but because this other mode has a more vital efficacy on account of the style of education prevalent at the present day. We do not find ourselves in immediate, conscious connection with the spirit and prophecies of the Old Testament, as the Jews were in the time of the apostles; we live among contemporaries to whom miracles are more a ground of doubt than of faith; we should not forget, that the proof from miracles exerts its full power, properly speaking, on none but the eye-witnesses of them, and conducts us to the desired conclusion

only by a circuitous path.[1] On the other hand, a vivid apprehension of the inward character of Jesus brings us nearer to the operative centre of Christianity, and at the same time makes us feel the influence of the moral power, which goes forth from that centre. Here, faith in Jesus rests immediately on himself; it is free, spiritual confidence in his person. As with his contemporaries everything depended on the yielding confidence with which they received the favors which he brought them; so likewise with us this confidence may be the element of a full belief in Christianity, and is, at all events, a condition of receiving benefit from our Redeemer.

While, in what follows, we intend to enlarge upon this mode of proving the divinity of the christian religion, it is by no means our design to represent this mode as the only right one, and to reject every mode that differs from it. It always tends to retard the dissemination of religious and moral truths, to make any one argument for them exclusively valid, and thus to forget, that in this case very much depends upon each individual's mental peculiarities and degree of education. The same God, whose will it plainly was that there should be an immeasurably rich variety, as of natural productions, so also of minds, has opened, for the various intellectual organizations, various ways of arriving at the *one* truth which Christ came to disclose. But in whatever way we are led to the acknowledgement of the christian system, this system is of such a nature, that it makes itself entirely master of the mind which it has seized; and from whatever point we step out into the great and well closed circle of christian truth, we shall always see, as we follow on with connected thought and feeling, that we are surrounded by the whole circle.

It is evident, that the inward character of Jesus can lay the foundation for such a pious faith in him, as shall cause everything that comes from him, to appear holy and true simply because it comes from him, (though it may also be proved true from internal reasons), —it can lay this foundation, only so far as we have the assurance, that his spiritual nature was in every respect faultless, that his desires and feelings were free from every breath of sin, his thoughts from every momentary lapse into error. If Jesus is holy in feeling, without a stain; correct in judgment without any mixture of mis-

[1] See Note A, at the close of this Treatise.

take; if there are realized in his person those combined, purest ideals of holiness and truth, which in the view of all other men seem too lofty to be attained; then is he, by this very circumstance, raised above the common lot of mortals, for they without exception are subject to sin and error; then are we morally and religiously bound to revere his decisions as words of the highest truth; and there cannot be imagined a nobler endeavor, than to assimilate ourselves to the unsoiled image by which his life is represented, to cast our own moral natures into the mould of his. But if the contrary be supposed, if he were not only susceptible of sin and error, but also subject, even incidentally, to the one as well as to the other, then the case stands differently with Jesus and our relation to him. Then he ceases to be to us what he was to the apostles and all the faithful, the image of Deity, the purest pattern of consummate virtue, the perfect representation of eternal truth in the speech and life of man, the King in the invisible realm of truth. Then does he no longer stand out alone in the world's history, but steps down from that relative elevation, upon which, to the eye of christian faith, he seemed to stand, and mingles with the company of the wise and noble of our race, as a great and superior man indeed, but yet as one of their fellows, who as well as they is obliged to pay the tax of human infirmity and narrowness. He is a great truth-seeker and truth-finder, but not the Truth. He is a good and great man, perhaps the best, but not the Holy One of God. His life and his instructions are no longer the unimprovable standard of the good and the true; but are subject,—who can tell how far?—to improvement and correction. His example and his words have no longer an authority absolutely binding. The system of historical Christianity which is founded on his character becomes brittle in its ground-work, and the ecclesiastical community, which is built upon that system, must either be dissolved, or must become in its inmost character something different from what it was originally, and from what it has been until the present time. Yea, Christ ceases to be the Redeemer; for, if he himself is subject to sin, how can he make others free from the power of the same? How can he obtain that commodious solid standing place, outside of a sinning world, by which he will be able to raise up, as it were, the world from its worn out poles? How can he become the Creator and the Fountain of a new, pure, sanctified life? If then, as error always enters the mind in conjunction with sin, Je-

sus were also not free from error, how could he redeem mankind from it? And in what inconsistencies do we find ourselves entangled, when we compare with such suppositions all those lofty remarks of Jesus, in which he represents himself as the Truth which only can make men free!

Thus important in all respects, is the certainty that Christ was elevated above all sin and error. This is a foundation-rock of historical Christianity; and especially in our own day, the trouble of examining thoroughly the firmness of this foundation will be certainly repaid. In the ensuing remarks, I would contribute somewhat to establish this fundamental principle; and shall consider, first and principally in its historical aspect, the position that Jesus was sinless and holy in his character, and shall then attend to the consequences which result from this principle in favor of the truth and divinity of the Saviour's instructions.

SECTION II.

Definition of sin and sinless.—Natural power of Christ to sin.—Fearful consequences which would result from his sinning.—Certainty that he would not sin.—Principles and mode of reasoning in this treatise.

If, in the ensuing treatise, we take as a basis that definition of sin which is both truly biblical and also generally recognized in the theological dialect,[1] and if, accordingly, we define sin to be the deviation of a free nature from the moral law of God; the disagreement of the moral life, that is, the intentions, the general aim of the will, or a single act of the will, and the outward deeds, with the divine law; we must then assign for the first meaning of the word sinlessness, nothing more than the absence of such a disagreement, the non-existence of a contradiction between the individual free will and the will of God, which latter includes the universal law. But we cannot stop with this mere negative definition of innocency. As sinlessness is an idea applicable only to beings, who are so constituted that they must act morally, and who cannot even omit moral action without violating law in the very omission, the idea must necessarily

[1] For Bretschneider's definitions of sin, see Note B, at the close of this Treatise.

refer to something positive, to the performance of something good. As he who is to be sinless, cannot be so without willing and doing something, neither can he be so without willing and doing what is perfectly good. Innocence always involves a positive agreement with the divine will. A free and rational nature, which is without sin, is also necessarily holy; and when we describe Jesus as sinless, we are not to separate from him pure goodness and holiness, but we characterize him as both destitute of sin and positively good.[1]

We by no means, however, understand by the term sinlessness an absolute impossibility of sinning. Not the non *posse* peccare, but only the posse *non* peccare, and the non *peccasse* should be attributed to Jesus. Only of God himself, in his everlasting and absolute holiness, can the perfect impossibility of sinning be predicated; Whenever we attribute, in a proper manner and in the sense of Scripture, all the moral elements of man to Jesus, we are not to disjoin from them that freedom, which is the power of choosing between good and evil; and for this very reason we are to admit it as conceivable, that he might at some time, have been influenced to a departure from the will of God.[2] Unless this be supposed, the history of the temptation, however it may be explained, would have no significancy; and the expression in the Epistle to the Hebrews, "he was tempted in all points as we," would be without meaning. Where there is an absolute elevation above the possibility of sin, as with God,[3] or where there is altogether wanting a conscience to distinguish good and evil, and a susceptibility for the one or the other, as with irrational natures; in all such beings a moral temptation is impossible. But where there is a conscience to determine right and wrong, and where there is no absolute necessity of doing either the one or the other, as is the case with free human beings; there a susceptibility to temptation exists, and with it, a possibility of the actual commission of sin. As Jesus was a complete man, this susceptibility and this possibility must be supposed to co-exist in him. Did they not thus co-exist, he would cease to be an example of per-

[1] See Note C, at the close of this Treatise.

[2] "The sinlessness of Jesus does not depend upon his being in any measure exempted from the nature of man." Schleiermacher's Christl. Glaub, II. p. 222; where however there are additional remarks, which are opposed in part to the above.

[3] James 1: 13, "God cannot be tempted with evil."

fect human morality.[1] At the same time, his holiness would be not the result of freedom, but as we must think the holiness of God to be, the result exclusively of the inner unchangeable necessity of his nature. And though, when we contemplate Jesus at the height of his perfection, we find in him freedom in the highest sense of the word; that is, a pure, perfect and uniformly triumphant desire of good; still, this higher development of freedom could originate only from that lower stage of it, at which the power of free will appears more evidently to be the simple power of choosing between good and evil. The idea of sinlessness presupposes merely, that the development which Jesus made of human morality, went on of itself, without any check or cessation of his freedom to choose between good and evil.[2]

In my opinion, this is the view to be taken, when we examine the character of Jesus, simply as a human character. If, on the other hand, we reflect from a higher position upon the plan of God; a plan which has been in process of preparation for thousands of years, and is destined to operate for thousands of years to come, and which passed into fulfilment through Jesus Christ, then the thought seems truly a most fearful one, that Christ could, as a matter of fact, have sinned. Humanly speaking, that plan of God would have been frustrated, if Christ had committed a single transgression; and the only light, that was perfectly clear in the whole history of man, would have been put out. In this relation, therefore, there seems to be a still higher necessity in the moral government of the world, that Christ should not have actually sinned. And if, moreover, we reflect that a divine principle lived and operated in Jesus, in natural and constant unison with the human part of his nature, we shall see, that by this principle also, he would be secured against the actual commission of iniquity. Now I by no means disown the conviction, but rather profess it with joy, in company with the apostles and the whole christian church; the conviction, that Jesus is the Christ, the son of the living God; that the whole fulness of the Deity actually dwelt in him, that God was in him, and was reconciling the world to himself. This conviction is, to be sure, directly connected with the certainty, that Christ was free from transgression, and holy, as

[1] This position has been established most conclusively by Kant, Relig Innerhalb der Gränzen der bl. Vernunft. St 2. Abschn. 1.

[2] See Note D, at the close of this Treatise.

the God whose nature he exhibited to man, by word and deed, by life and death. But in the following treatise, we are with propriety forbidden to reason from the principles of a christian belief already formed; for this is not designed to be a *dogmatic* development of the doctrine of the sinlessness of Jesus, but rather to be an *apologetic* view, and is thus designed to consult more particularly the wants of those readers, who are not yet convinced of several fundamental principles of Christianity, nor even of the truth and divinity of the whole christian system. It is doubtless proper, therefore, to proceed from principles generally owned and conceded. But no one now denies, that Jesus was a true and complete man; and that to him as such belongs a moral preëminence altogether peculiar. Christ's character, therefore, is to be considered, at present, in its human lineaments alone. Indeed, his sinlessness is a property not of his divine, but of his human nature, and even in a distinctively doctrinal exhibition, when the peculiar excellences of his *human* nature are treated of, (under which sinlessness is usually ranked), the properties and powers of his *divine* nature are not canvassed in connection with them. While we endeavor then to prove the sinlessness[1] of Jesus, we must not understand by the term an absolute impossibility of sinning, but only the actual fact of not sinning, and, what is in a rational and free nature inseparable from this fact, the highest moral perfection and holiness.

SECTION III.

Character of the testimony which we might desire, and of that which we have, concerning Christ.—Testimony of men who were hostile to him, who were indifferent, who were friendly.—The evangelical history not dogmatical.

When we examine, historically, the developments which Jesus made of his own moral feeling, we are instantly inclined to wish that men of the most various character, friends and foes, doubters, inquirers, and inspired men, had left their respective testimonies concerning the impression which his conduct made upon them.

[1] On the use of the word ἀναμαρτησία, some remarks will follow hereafter.

But this is denied us. The few writers, not Christian, who, near the apostolic age, alluded to the existence and works of Jesus, give, as is well known, only a negative decision. If we discover some parts that are genuine in the oft-quoted passage of Josephus, yet they leave only the general impression, that this cultivated Pharisee speaks not disparagingly, but with respect and kindness of Christ, as he does also of John, the herald of the kingdom of God. As these testimonies[1] give us no precise information respecting the spiritual peculiarities of Jesus, we must depend for this information on the reports of his friends in the Gospels. And these reports are of such a character, that, as to everything immediately relating to the description of Christ's spirit and life, they carry in themselves the indisputable pledge of truth. It may be well regarded as an established fact, that the evangelists were not competent to originate the spiritual idea of Jesus, and that they were enabled to exhibit this idea in a manner as plain as it is dignified, only by having observed the Saviour's actual life. The Gospels contain the very richest description of the particular circumstances in which Jesus was placed, and present to us, in features simple and characteristically true, the impression which his appearance made on men of every class. They contain, in peculiarly vivid and affecting types, the whole history of the kingdom of God, and of its relation to the feelings and efforts of men. The treatment of men toward Jesus, and their opinion of him might indeed, in another history, have assumed a different form, but in substance they would certainly have appeared just as they now do.

If then we look into the Evangelical history, we shall find that men of the most various mental character have given testimony, by word and deed, that Jesus was a man of extraordinary moral excellence and also that he was entirely pure, sinless, and holy. His remarkable elevation of character is proved, if we may briefly mention the most significant actions and expressions that relate to it, by the hatred of his enemies, who strove in vain to impeach the purity of his demeanor, and even by the deportment of those who remained in other respects indifferent towards him, of Pilate and his wife.

The former, one in no way susceptible of the lofty and the

[1] The passages here referred to, from Suetonius, Tacitus, and Josephus, are too well known, to make it necessary to quote them. The passage from Josephus appears to me to contain a mixture of the genuine and the spurious. [For quotations from several ancient authors see Note E. at the close.—Tr.]

magnanimous, yea, a hard-hearted and austere person,[1] felt himself compelled to acknowledge solemnly the innocence of the persecuted prisoner; and the latter, his wife, of a gentler spirit, but in other respects little concerned about a Jewish teacher, was yet so filled with the certainty of the pure intention and the blameless life of Jesus, that the meditation on his fate, and the anxiety lest her husband should stain his hands with the blood of this innocent man,[2] allowed her no rest in sleep. And a third Roman, who, commanding the watch at the cross of Jesus, saw the whole process of his agonizing crucifixion, felt constrained to cry out, Truly, this was a righteous man: he was the Son of God.[3] What else could move the soldier, who felt strong in spirit, to utter these words, but, in connection with the remarkable circumstances of Jesus's death, the perception of the inward dignity and the noble spirit of the dying man, for designating whom even the Roman could find no more fitting expression, than—"the Son of God." And what a spectacle it must have been, this dying man! Even the malefactor, crucified with him, was strengthened by it to a new hope, and filled with the joys of a better life.[4] This was indeed no situation for awakening or nourishing the hopes of a Messiah; and yet the crucified malefactor discovered in the man crucified with him, the Founder and the Lord of the new kingdom. What an impression also must have been produced by the spiritual strength of the man forsaken of every outward aid, even on the cross! How must the kinglike and divine of his nature have shone through the deepest ignominy!

With these testimonies from persons who were not very well acquainted with Jesus, is to be ranked that of one who knew him most thoroughly, and who sealed his testimony in favor of Christ's pure and innocent character, with death, but with a death of utter despondency;—I refer to the testimony of Judas Iscariot. Had the betrayer of his Lord, through a long and truly intimate intercourse, found in him a single thing worthy of blame; had he recollected one

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[1] For a description of the character of Pilate, there is, besides the Evangelical history, a passage of Philo, not to be overlooked, de Legat. ad Caj. II. p. 590. Ed. Mang. [See close of Note E.—Tr.]

[2] Matt. 27: 19. Especially the words: "Have thou nothing to do with that just man."

[3] Luke 23: 47. Matt. 27: 54.

[4] Luke 23: 40 seq.

word or one deed which indicated that Jesus was fanatical or fraudulent in his pretensions to be the Messiah from God, he certainly would have sought out the most insignificant foible, so that he might palliate his crime and relieve his conscience in view of the fearful results of his treachery. But he can find nothing. He feels himself forced to make the bitter confession,—I have betrayed *innocent* blood;[1] yea, the consciousness of this crime presses so insupportably upon his spirit, that he at last goes out and gives himself over to death!

If the traitor is forced to testify thus concerning his Lord, what shall we expect from Christ's true friends, but the unconditional acknowledgment of, and the highest veneration for his perfect goodness and holiness of motive and conduct. With entire harmony, they point him out, in an especial manner, as the just man and the holy;[2] as the man who was tempted in all points as we are, yet without sin;[3] who is the most eminent pattern for us, because he knew no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth;[4] as the pure and spotless lamb;[5] as the true high priest who is holy, harmless, undefiled, separate from sinners, and made higher than the heavens; who therefore needed not, as other high priests, to bring an offering for his own sins;[6] who rather, simply because there was no iniquity found in him, was able to take away our iniquities.[7] Without this persuasion of his perfect innocence and holiness, the apostles had not been at all able to discover in him that which they did discover, not only the noblest prophet, but the Messiah, endued with the whole fulness of the divine Spirit;[8] the founder of a new divine kingdom of love, truth and righteousness, in which he himself would be the lawgiver, king and pattern; the Redeemer from sin; the vanquisher

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[1] Matt. 27: 4.

[2] Acts 3: 14. 7: 52. 22: 14. 1 Pet. 3: 18. 1 John 2: 29. 3: 7.

[3] Heb. 4: 15. [4] 1 Pet. 2: 21, 22. [5] 1 Pet. 1: 19.

[6] Heb. 7: 26, 27.

[7] 1 John 3: 5. 2 Cor. 5: 21. Consult on the first passage Lücke's Com. pp. 161, 162.

[8] In the Old Testament description of the Messiah also, he is represented as free from sin: Is. 53: 9. If the Messiah must be a true servant of God, a pure minister of Jehovah, a representative of God in the Theocracy, then he must in all respects perform the divine will, be perfectly righteous, and free from iniquity.

of all evil; the image of God, the only good and holy One. Indeed no man can be an image of Jehovah, a living expression of the divine nature, in whom there is a single moral error or delinquency, who in a single respect deviates from God's moral law. He only can be this image, who is altogether without sin, and in the highest sense of the term, holy; who is, as it were, the incarnated will of God, and who through his whole life brings into distinct view the law of holiness. Even so a Redeemer from sin and the power of evil, can be no other than one who is himself free from the same; every other would have stood in need of his own redemption, and reconciliation with God.[1]

By these remarks, however, we would by no means give room for the idea, that the assertion of Christ's sinlessness was made by the apostles merely from the *dogmatical* point of view, that Jesus could not, unless holy, have been the Messiah and Redeemer. No, their conviction rested on a thorough knowledge of his life; they did not model the life of Jesus according to their own ideas, but their own ideas were by degrees modelled according to the instructions and the life of Jesus. They were indeed, at the beginning, scarcely able to understand him; they frequently were perplexed concerning him; but they always found themselves drawn to him again with new spiritual power,[2] until, advanced from one degree of evidence to another, they were able to take clearly into their vision the lofty spiritual image, which the whole deportment of Jesus held out before them. And accordingly this image is exhibited in the Gospels with such artless, convincing truth, that every unprejudiced man feels and will confess, that it was not a doctrinal presupposition from which the apostles started, and then described a man who might answer somewhat to their ideal of pure holiness; but it was an actual, real life which was displayed before them, and from which was developed in their minds, a faith in the Holy and God-like man.

[1] Heb. 7: 26, 27

[2] See, for example, John 6: 69.

SECTION IV.

Peculiar elevation of Christ's character; his serenity, moderation, condescension, power to govern both himself and others, dignity in the treatment of his enemies, tenderness of sympathy, liberality of mind, expansive benevolence, completeness of character, physical temperament.—Ruling motive of his life.—Importance of his character, as a bare idea; how this idea must have been obtained by the evangelists.

The idea which Christ's disciples give us of his character is elevated and peculiar. There is in it this peculiarity; though always unattainable, the character stands before us in so much the greater dignity and pureness, the more highly we cultivate our own spirits, and the more strenuously we endeavor, under the influence of love, to assimilate ourselves to it. Every attempt therefore to represent the fulness of Christ's moral nature must of necessity be but partially successful. And the following remarks must be received with a full understanding of their necessary imperfection. For they are remarks, that venture to arrange in one connected order what the evangelists have left scattered, and to reduce the whole to the principle which pervades and animates the entire practice of Jesus.

The events of Christ's life give the impression, that he had the greatest calmness, clearness of mind, and discretion, united with living, deep enthusiasm. It is not the vehement strain, the flaming spirit of Isaiah and Ezekiel, that distinguishes him; not the legislative, sometimes violent energy of Moses; his whole nature is serenity and peace; and the blazing, consuming fire of the old prophets changes itself in him into a soft creative breathing of the spirit, into an uninterrupted consecration of the soul to God. In the spiritual atmosphere to which others raise themselves only in the hours of their special consecration, he walks as in his appropriate element of life. As the sun in a clear firmament, so he, still and sure, travels on in his safe path, and never deviates, dispensing light and life. His action is full of love, without effervescence of feeling, without vehemence and passion. He does nothing indiscreet and aimless; whatever he begins is securely finished and accomplishes its design. Even when with holy reluctance, he comes to reprove in word or in deed, it is no irritated personal feeling, that vents

itself, but it is always the indignation of love; holy, free from all selfish aim, hating the vice, but yet, in the vicious, loving the man who is still susceptible of improvement. And in all this, he never oversteps the bounds of moderation.

Jesus is soft and mild; he seeks above all, the lowly, the helpless, the despised; and of his own free will lets himself down to the deepest degradation, and the most ignominious suffering; but from under the veil of poverty and distress which covers him, there shines forth in every situation of his life a high, kingly spirit. He possessed that talent for government, that commanding power, by means of which great minds are always and entirely their own masters; by which they know, in the most embarrassing situations and with the composure of one free from doubt, just what is right and fit to be done, and by which they hold a sway over other minds that is like enchantment. With this dignity, this kingly mien, sealed by his spiritual greatness, did the same Jesus who had not where to lay his head, move about among his friends, and present himself before his foes. "His deed was decisive as his word, his word as his deed." Where his enemies sought to lay snares for him, he rent asunder the snares, and with his superior power of mind, repelled all attacks, until himself was convinced that his hour had come. Not seldom did he shame his enemies by bare silence; a silence which was then most effective when, in calm consciousness of innocence, he stood before the Sanhedrim as they were burning with revenge. But nothing exceeds the dignity with which Jesus bore testimony of himself, in face of the secular governor and judge. "I am a king: for this end I was born, and have come into the world, that I may testify to the truth: whoso is of the truth, heareth my voice." How all other greatness fades away, before the consciousness of such elevation! And what word of sage, hero, or any one of the greatest or mightiest men, can for its inward majesty, be placed by the side of this, "I am a king; for this end have I come into the world, that I may testify to the truth!"

With the greatness of a hero Jesus stepped forth in the garden of Gethsemane, among the officers who sought him, and said, "I am he," and they fell on the ground before him. With a power that cut to the heart, he said to Judas, "Betrayest thou the Son of man with a kiss!" With a look full of love, yet doubtless full of reproving dignity, he deeply pierced the soul of the disciple, who had de-

nied him; and what irresistible effect must the thrice repeated words have had, which, soon after rising from the dead, he addressed to the same disciple, "Simon, son of Jonas, lovest thou me?" It was the court of love, which here pronounced its decision upon the unfaithful friend; a decision in which lay a marvellous power to humble deeply the magnanimous disciple, and, at the same time, to afford him a truly exquisite relief, and to strengthen him.

Such words of life and power, spoken with the majesty of Jesus, must work irresistibly; they must entrench themselves in the souls of those who heard, so as never to be expelled. They show to us a *man* in the noblest sense of the word, a king-like hero, who is so much the greater, because without any outward power, he merely bears the sword of spiritual worth. And even this great man, whose will, never deviating from the way of God, no power of earth could bend, who was even as mighty in deed, as silent, self-denying, and piously trustful in suffering,—he was also as mild and full of love, as the gentlest woman,[1] when he would aid, console, feelingly sympathize. He went about and did good, helped the poor in body and in spirit; blessed children, placed himself on a level with the least of his brethren; for whoever comforts one of these least with a cup of water, hath done the same unto me.[2] Nothing that concerned humanity was foreign from him; every man stood near to him as a brother. His characteristic action was, to raise up again the bruised reed, to enkindle anew the glimmering wick. He wept over the city that rejected him, and prayed on his cross for those who had nailed him to it. His whole life was a sacrifice.

As Jesus, in his moral constitution, did not belong exclusively to one sex, so neither in any of his higher operations, was he fettered by family ties; nor in his whole spiritual formation, was there any national feeling, which could restrain his comprehensive, pure philanthropy. He was the best of sons, and performed the duties imposed by the filial relation, with the tenderest love, even in the hour of death. But at the same time he made all that was personal in

[1] He blended in his nature the virtues of the noblest manliness, with those of the purest womanhood; and was also, in this respect, the most complete model of a perfect human being; so that although his destiny required him to belong to one sex, he yet is a suitable pattern for the purest virtues of the other.

[2] Matt. 10: 42

such connections subordinate to what was higher, to the general good, to the glory of his Father.[1] As the Messiah, his office was of greater moment to him, than all these relations; as the founder of the kingdom of God, he recognized in every one who did the will of God, his mother, his brother, his sister;—and he required of every one who entered into this great spiritual covenant, that he should be ready to sacrifice the most precious personal connections, whenever the law or the design of the new kingdom demanded it. So likewise Jesus was a pious Jew, and observed the religious customs and laws of his nation with as much scrupulousness as liberality of spirit; yet nothing at all of an unseemly national prejudice was mingled with his observances; not a shadow of that which pointed out a Jew, as such, to his disadvantage. He possessed the virtues of his theological nation, as it may not unfitly be called; but in such a way, that they could be generally appropriate to man in any relations whatever. And by this he distinguishes himself, in the most prominent manner, from all, even the greatest spirits of antiquity.[2] All these great spirits have a thoroughly national stamp; their most praiseworthy virtue is the free obedience to the laws of their country; their highest enthusiasm is devoted to the interests of their own nation; their noblest sacrifice is death for the land of their fathers; the great work of their life is, to express the full spirit of their people; in this spirit to act, for this spirit, if need be, to give up all. In the strength of his endeavor, in his ability to make every sacrifice, Jesus stands second to none of the greatest heroes; but he performs his labors and makes his sacrifices not barely for his own nation, but for all mankind. Free from every impulse of that national feeling that stints the soul, he develops himself purely from within, from his own resources; and as he exhibits the image of a *man* in his whole, unspotted, perfect nature, and is the first by whom the idea of pure humanity, in the highest and at the same time the *realized* sense of that word, was presented to the human mind,—so is he the first who breaking over all the bounds of national predilection, embraces in his efforts, and with holy love, the whole race; ventures for the whole race to live and to die.

In general, the character of Jesus, though thoroughly individual

[1] For examples, see John 2: 4. Mark 3: 32—35. Luke 11: 27, 28.

[2] [See a lengthened examination of this topic in Reinhard's Plan, Part II.—Tr.]

and unlike every other, has yet no such eccentric or peculiar feature, as results from a disproportional combination of the inward faculties. On the contrary, there is in his nature the most perfect harmony and completeness; and his acts bear the stamp of universal propriety and rectitude. Who can say, that the peculiar characteristic of Jesus was soundness of judgment, or tenderness of feeling, or richness of fancy, or power of execution? But all these excellences are found in him, just in their due proportion, and they work together in uninterrupted harmony.[1] High fervor and gra-

[1] It seems to us altogether erroneous, to ascribe a temperament to Jesus in the ordinary sense of that word; as is done at large by Winkler, for example, in his Psychography of Jesus, p. 122 seq. He makes the Saviour to be a man of the choleric temperament, and remarks: "The choleric (choleriker, bilious) temperament is that of every great mind. If any mind be destitute of it, then it is a mind within itself, but not out of itself (!); it has a power for investigation, but wants elasticity of action, etc." A temperament always indicates a certain disproportion in the mingling of the internal powers, a preponderance of one part of the mental dispositions over another; but this was not the case with Jesus, for in him was found the purest *temperamentum*, in the old sense of that word; a thoroughly harmonious combination; a just, sound proportion of all powers and dispositions.

[It may be worthy of a quere, in passing, whether the popular apprehension of the Messiah does not deny him this completeness of character, and attach to him those excellences only which belong to a particular temperament, and are peculiarly appropriate to one of the sexes. Does not the tone of authority which Christ sometimes employed, of severe reproof, of high-minded indignation, conflict somewhat with the prevailing ideas of his predominant virtues? Has not a partial view of his character, combined with an unfounded interpretation of certain passages of Scripture, led many fictitious writers, and many painters, both ancient and modern, to represent Christ's personal appearance as more effeminate than we need suppose it to have been? (We have indeed no means of determining what his personal appearance was, but from such passages as Luke 4: 15—30. Mark 11: 12—19. John 18: 6, etc., we cannot think it so destitute of the manly, as it is often represented). Is not the same one-sided view which is often taken of Christ's personal character, taken also of his Gospel? The prevalent idea of the evangelical system is expressed perhaps in Paley's Evidences, Works, Vol. II. pp. 175, 176. Cam. Ed., but the representation there given will certainly not explain some of the phenomena in the conduct and the teachings of Christ and his apostles. To this habit of diverting the attention from the whole of Christ's excellences to one particular class of them, may be ascribed in part the disrepute into which several of the sterner virtues have sometimes fallen, and the association of something unchristian with all acts of self-defence. The remarks of such writers as Dymond, on War, Litiga-

cious mildness; heavenly serenity and absorbing sadness; elevation above earthly pleasures and conditions, and a pure cheerful enjoyment of the same; regal dignity and self-denying humbleness; vehement hatred toward sin and affectionate forbearance toward the sinner,—all these qualities are combined in his nature in one inseparable whole, in the most perfect unison; and they leave on the spectator the lingering idea of peace and perfect subordination. Never was Jesus driven out of his own path; it was a quiet path, and always even. All the manifestations of his spiritual life have *one* great aim; his whole character has a unity that is perfect, complete within itself. This unity and completeness in the spiritual life of Jesus depends on the unity of the principle from which all his manifestations of feeling proceed, by which they are pervaded and animated. And this principle is not in any respect the abstract moral law; not in any respect, a mere endeavor, in conformity with the judgment, to act right and perform duty; but it is the simple, great, fundamental purpose, born out of free-hearted love, *to do the will of God.* It is apparent from multiplied expressions of Jesus, and from all his acts, that the will of his Father, which he was entirely certain that he perfectly understood, was the only rule and the living power of his conduct. To God, as the source of his spiritual life, was his soul ever turned; and this direction of his mind was a matter of indispensable necessity to him. It was his meat and his drink to do the will of the Father. Without uniting himself to God wholly, consecrating himself to God unreservedly, feeling himself to be perfectly one with God, he could not have lived; he could not have been at peace in his spirit a single instant. By this means, the mo-

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tion, etc., in his Ess. on Mor. pp. 125—128. 404—424, etc., exhibit a kind of emasculated principle, which would have shrunk back from making "a scourge of small cords." As in listening to a choir of music, we choose to perceive the harmony of the whole choir, rather than the prominence of one particular voice; as in viewing a monument of architecture, we choose to see a due proportion in the whole, rather than a protuberance of one particular part, so in surveying the character of Christ, it is more grateful and more useful, to notice its symmetry and exquisite balance, than to see any one of his virtues disturbed in its nice adjustment and magnified at the expense of others. A healthy mind will regard the Saviour as the impersonation of all the excellences duly blended, rather than as one who allows an individual excellence to transcend its line of proportion, and to assume the character, which has been assigned by the poet to a "virtue out of place."—Tr.]

rality of Jesus became perfectly religious; it was not merely something which flowed from a sense of duty, it was a *holy* sentiment of the heart.

It is indeed true, as a saint who knew Christianity from the life, once said in his heart-winning way,[1] "One might well consent to be branded and broken on the wheel, merely for the idea of such a character as Christ's; and if any one should be able to mock and deride, he must be insane. Every man, whose heart is in the right state, will lie in the dust, and rejoice, and adore." It is true; even as a bare idea, the spiritual image of Jesus, which the Bible holds out to us, is the most dignified and the most precious, which is known to our race. It is an idea, for which one may well be justified in offering up his life. For, we may boldly assert, this idea is the most sublime to which, in the province of morality and religion, the human mind has been raised. It is the jewel of humanity, and whoever knowingly tarnishes or disfigures it, commits an outrage against the majesty of the heaven-born soul of man, in its most beauteous manifestations. Let it be a fable, it is still the most noble truth, which has been either received or communicated by the human mind, and preponderates, even as a fable, over a thousand verities of ordinary experience. But it is not a fable; it is not a bare idea; for the man who was able to produce, from his own invention, such a character, such a pattern, must himself have possessed this greatness of soul, if we deny that he observed it in another. We must transfer the spiritual and moral greatness of Jesus to his biographer, if we deny it to himself.[2] If we glance at the greatest characters which have been exquisitely portrayed to us by the creative power and art of the most gifted poets, do we find in these

[1] The Wandsbeck Messenger, in the excellent letters to Andres, Letter I.

[2] [The reader will perceive that this is the same idea with that of Rousseau in his celebrated eulogium on the character of Christ. May not a man, some will ask, conceive of virtues which he does not practise, and imagine an excellence of character far above that which he will ever attain? That such an operation does not exceed the original powers of the mind, Ullmann would be willing to admit; but he intends to deny strongly, that men like the evangelists would in fact have ever originated the idea of a character like Christ's, and to maintain that such an operation would be as contrary to the usual processes of the mind, as if it exceeded the constitutional capacity. The moral wonder in the one case would be as improbable as the natural miracle in the other.—Tr.]

characters anything like that which is developed in Jesus? And these plain, uncultivated, Jewish evangelists, *they* forsooth desired to invent such a character! *they* forsooth were able to invent it! How far, as an unaided man, did each of these writers of Memorabilia stand below Xenophon and Plato; and yet how high, in its silent majesty, stands the simple image of Jesus, which the unlettered evangelists present, above the character that is given to the wisest Greeks by the two masters of language and rhetoric!

SECTION V.

Two objections to the reception of the apostles' testimony respecting the sinlessness of Christ, stated and answered.—Testimony of Christ himself respecting his own sinlessness.—Particular explanation of some expressions which he used concerning himself.—Objections to Christ's testimony stated and answered.

If then we cannot deny that the apostles, with entire unanimity, supposed Jesus to possess a nature perfectly sinless and holy, and that they gave, as evidence of the correctness of their supposition, a most vivid and true history of his unimpeachable deportment, we are still met by another objection which needs to be briefly considered. It is said for instance, "that in the nature of the case, the testimony of the apostles concerning Jesus, so far as they give it as a result of their own observation, must be merely negative; it must be merely, that they knew no sin which he had committed. For, in the first place, they knew Jesus only during the three years of his public office as a teacher, but not during his earlier life; in the second place, the moral worth of actions depends on the motive which determines them, and which can be judged of only by God."[1]

As to the first objection, that the acquaintance of the apostles with the mind and conduct of Jesus, was limited to the period of his public ministry, and that they could not have known what moral

[1] This train of thought is pursued by Weber, in the Programma above mentioned: Virtutis Jesu Integritas neque ex ipsius Professionibus, neque ex Actionibus doceri potest. Viteb. 1796. Bretschneider coincides with him, Dogmatik. § 138.

errors he may have committed during the thirty years preceding; this, in our judgment, presupposes an incorrect idea respecting the general development of moral qualities. This development should always be viewed as a growing whole, its parts dependent on each other; and though great crises, though sudden and extraordinary changes may take place in the same individual, still the earlier moral condition will transmit its influence to the later. Particularly the earlier sins cannot be so absolutely effaced, that traces and effects of them will not be found afterward in the moral consciousness, in the feeling, in the conduct. Every sin has its moral influences,[1] the conscience is stained by it, and prevented from raising itself to that state of perfect innocence, purity and safety which according to the Scriptures must be supposed to have been the state of Jesus. We must either entirely deny, that the testimony of the apostles concerning the excellence of Christ's feeling and conduct is valid, or, if we admit its validity in respect to the years of their intimate intercourse, we must deduce from it the positive inference that his earlier life was also free from sin.[2] The developments of those three years were merely the result of his earlier life, and cannot be separated from it arbitrarily. Such fruit, as the moral conduct of Jesus, so far as we know it, could grow only from a root thoroughly healthy and sound; and if a part of his conduct was actually perfect, then the whole must have been.

We will now consider the second objection, which is, that the apostles could judge of nothing but the outward legality of Christ's deportment, and could not decide upon its internal morality, since this depends upon feeling and motive. It is indeed true that

[1] Very apt and profound remarks on this subject may be found in Schleiermacher's writings, particularly in the fourth of his Feast-day Sermons, p. 95 seq. We beg that the whole of this sermon, very weighty as a doctrinal one, may be compared with our own views.

[2] If the reader, in addition to this, desires express testimony in favor of the earlier period of Christ's life, we may adduce the very important expressions of John the Baptist. That there was an early intimacy between Jesus and John, seems to me in the highest degree probable, (the words, I knew him not, John 1: 31, 33, referring merely to the full recognition of him as the Messiah); and if this be admitted, then the refusal of John to baptize Jesus, his modest retirement at the public appearance of Jesus, in short his whole connection with the Messiah, is a most important and decisive argument for Christ's extraordinary moral elevation in this earlier period of his life.

they could not, as the All-Wise, look directly into his heart; but what is the life other than a representation and development of the spirit? and can we satisfactorily account for such a perfect moral life, otherwise than on the ground of a perfect moral intention? such pure conduct otherwise than on the ground of pure motive? Shall we derive purity from impurity, goodness from badness? Or what one act in the life of Jesus is fitted to encourage the suspicion, that he may at any time have been merely legal in his outward demeanor, without being truly moral? that there may have been a discordance between his feeling and his conduct?[1] But if, since we have not the least reason for thinking otherwise, the inward and the outward, the feeling and the conduct, the motive and the deed were in Jesus one harmonious whole, then the apostles had a right, and we have the same, to argue from the perfect goodness of the conduct, to the perfect purity of the motive from which the conduct emanated.

But should our minds still hesitate, they will be convinced by Christ's own testimony respecting himself, which is of the highest importance. We may rely upon the most entire self-knowledge and veracity of Jesus, on the one hand, and upon his great humility on the other; yea, unless we would introduce into his spiritual and moral nature contradictions, which cannot be proved to exist, we are compelled to attribute to him these qualities. Now this same Jesus, in life and in death a man of truth, a pattern of the purest humility, comes forth with the highest and clearest confidence in his own character, and utters respecting himself these peculiar words, 'Who can accuse me of sin?'[2]—words which indeed no other mortal without revolting arrogance can repeat after him, and which no other one has repeated, unless it be in frantic fanaticism, or in the most melancholy infatuation. Indeed conscience and the law of nature oblige every one to confess his sin; and still more under the christian system, which develops so clearly the idea of a holy God, and the example of a Redeemer, and the perfect purity of a moral law, must the

[1] "It is the dictate of justice, says Kant, that the irreproachable example of a teacher, in respect to that which he teaches, especially if this example is a duty for every man, be ascribed to no other than the most obvious motive, unless there be evidence of some other." Is there any such evidence in the case of Jesus?

[2] John 8: 46.

conviction of sin be deepened in the greatest degree. And accordingly the same John, who reported to us that remarkable expression of Jesus, could with undoubted justice declare, "If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us."[1] From this declaration, applicable to all men, confirmed by every one's inmost consciousness, Jesus represents himself as an exception; he denies that any one can accuse him of ἁμαρτία. The meaning of this expression is somewhat doubtful. It is a question, whether ἁμαρτία is to be taken in the ordinary New Testament sense, as sin properly so called, as *moral* delinquency; or rather, according to pure Greek usage, as *theoretical* departure from truth, as error. The last signification seems indeed, at first glance, to coincide more exactly with the context, and particularly to form a more striking contrast to the preceding ἀλήθεια, and the succeeding ἀλήθειαν λέγειν. But in the first place, it would be difficult to point out a decided instance of this use of the word in the Hebrew Greek; and in the second place, we are bound especially to consider, that in the whole passage the knowledge and reception of the truth (v. 47), as well as the rejection of it (v. 44), is placed in most intimate connection with the moral state of the soul. According to this last idea then, the appeal of Jesus to the perfect purity and faultlessness of his moral character, for establishing the truth of his doctrine, would be in no way disconnected and isolated. So far from it indeed, there lies at the foundation of the whole passage the sound principle, that as untruth and error proceed from a sinful bias of the will, so the clear apprehension of truth is most intimately connected with exemption from sin, and indeed is absolutely dependent upon it. Should there be also in the word ἁμαρτία[2] a reference to theoretical error, still Jesus certainly asserted his faultlessness in knowledge, only so far as he at the same time asserted his faultlessness of will, only so far as he attributed to himself the εἶναι ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ in the most eminent sense, that is, the most perfect connection with God. In each interpretation of the passage then, freedom from sin is directly implied.

The same elevation of the moral consciousness, and the sure conviction of perfect freedom from sin are equally evident in other expressions of Jesus; not only in those where he designates himself

[1] See John I: 8. and, upon this passage, Lücke, III. pp. 98—100.

[2] Some translate the words, perhaps most fitly, *who can accuse me of a failing*, in which expression there is also a double reference to the practical and the theoretical.

as the Messiah, but chiefly in those passages of weighty import, where he says, "I and my Father are one;" "whoso seeth me, seeth the Father."[1] We are not of the opinion, that there can be derived from the oneness with the Father which is asserted in the first of these passages, the metaphysical idea of oneness of essence, and the whole doctrine of the church concerning the ὁμοούσια[2] of the Son with the Father; yet we should be equally unwilling to limit the expression to a bare moral agreement. We would, in accordance with the most excellent interpreters, both of ancient and modern times, refer it immediately to the oneness of power, which the Son has with the Father. And yet oneness of will is necessarily involved in this; for in no respect can there be an entire oneness of rational nature with God, except so far as it is obtained by oneness of will. But wherever there is oneness with the divine will, there must also be, of necessity, perfect freedom from sin. "For how can he, in whom there is only the faintest trace of sin remaining, say that he is one with the Father, the Father of light, him who only is good and pure, and to whom everything approximates, only so far as it partakes of goodness and purity."[3] Indeed sin is a departure, a separation from God, a turning away of the creature from his holy Creator;[4] but where oneness with God is asserted, sin is at the same time absolutely denied. So is it with the words, "Whoso seeth me, seeth the Father;" they are certainly not to be limited to this, that we find something God-like in Jesus, as we can also find it, though connected with imperfection and sin, in every other man; but they are to be understood in a far higher, fuller sense, that Jesus is spiritually and morally an image of God, the resplendence of the Majesty on high, the expression of the divine nature within the restrictions of a human life. No man who is not perfectly good and pure can be

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[1] John 10: 30. 14: 9.

[2] [Ullmann here refers to the doctrine of Christ's essential oneness with the Father, which was discussed so earnestly during the Arian contests: ὁμοούσιος denoting that Christ has the *same* nature, ὁμοιούσιος denoting that he has a *similar* nature, and ἀνόμοιος that he has a *dissimilar* nature with the Father.—Tr.]

[3] Schleiermacher's Feast-day Sermons, Vol I. p. 97.

[4] Gregory of Nyssa says, "Sin is estrangement from God, who is the true and the only life." And Chrysostom: "He that sins is far from God, not in place but in disposition" More of the like passages are to be found in Suicer, Thesaurus Eccl. I. p. 209.

called a spiritual image of God. Where sin is in the heart, the man is not holy; where the man is holy, sin is not in the heart.

It is a matter, then, of not the smallest doubt, that Jesus ascribed to himself entire sinlessness, holiness, and thereby elevation above all mortals.[1] If we will not receive the peculiarly noble testimony which Jesus gives of himself, if we will not in simplicity confide in his high declarations; there is left us nothing but the fearful alternative of declaring him a visionary, or an impostor. There are

[1] The question here arises, whether such remarks of Jesus as are quoted above, are not contradicted by the passage, Matt. 19: 16, 17, where, in reply to the question of the young man, Good master, etc., Jesus says, "Why callest thou me good, there is none good but one, that is, God." By this remark, Jesus seems to decline receiving the epithet good, without qualification. We will not avail ourselves of the different reading of this passage, by the adoption of which the difficulty is removed; since it is but too evident, that this new reading originated in the design of removing from the passage its apparently offensive features; and at all events the same expression of Jesus must still remain in the parallel passages, Mark 10: 18. Luke 18: 19. But the contradiction is removed, when we properly consider the circumstances and the relation in which the words of Jesus were spoken. He was conversing with a man, who, although striving after goodness, was yet accustomed to entertain the common pharisaical ideas of virtue, and was not a little satisfied with his own perfect obedience to the law. This is seen by his asking, v. 20, "What lack I yet?" In this situation, it became necessary to teach him, first of all, a humbling lesson of self-knowledge. Jesus does this directly by his own example; by declining the title of good master, as it was misused by pharisaical pride, and by directing the inquirer, in the most significant way, to the ideal of all goodness and holiness, to the only fountain of all goodness, to God. But the young man was not brought to a knowledge of himself by the deep signification of these words, and therefore the heart-searching teacher took a yet stronger hold of his conscience, by demanding of him a sacrifice, on which his imagined virtue was wrecked. Thus is the apparent offensiveness of the passage removed by reflecting on its connections. Jesus is exhibited in it as a living, instructive image of humility; he does not deny that he is good, he only refuses to be called so, in the style of pompous ceremony. Why callest thou me good, he asks; and, speaking as a man on a level with his inquirer, and filled with holy reverence for God, he directs the man to Him, who, in the highest sense of the term, is the only good one, the holy one, the fountain of all goodness. In so far, however, as Jesus is not separate from God in a moral point of view, but one with him, he cannot deny that he is purely good. He constantly derives his goodness however, from the Father, the fountain of holiness. It were well for the reader to consult on this passage, Grotius, and the remarks quoted by him from the older theologians.

but two suppositions which we can make, and one of them we must defend. The first is, that Jesus was not very especially punctilious in discriminating good from evil, that he had not searched into all the recesses of his own heart, had not known all the movings of his will, had not rigorously examined all the words and actions of his life, and must therefore have been in a mere self-delusion, when he uttered these lofty expressions. But how can this be conceivable in a mind, which in other respects distinguished between good and evil with unequalled precision; which reflected upon God and man so clearly and purely; which looked through all men, even to their inmost recesses, and on all moral subjects felt with such inexpressible tenderness and delicacy? Must he not have known directly his own self? No other man, even the most contracted, whose moral sensibilities were most imperfectly developed, would entertain a single doubt on the question, whether he had sinned during his life; and if Jesus had sinned, could he have been ignorant of the fact? could he, in fanatical delirium, have exalted himself into a saint?—Or, if this first supposition fail, we must take the second, that Jesus was inwardly conscious of some transgression of the divine law in thought, word or deed, and yet testified to the opposite in unambiguous language. But what man could undertake to defend the position, that he who had labored, in all the scenes of his life, merely for the purest conviction, and who at last died on the cross for the truth, was an impostor, a mere pretender to holiness?

Since then, by the former and the latter of these suppositions, we lose ourselves in an unreasonable contradiction, we choose to confide in the simple testimony of that most judicious thinker, and magnanimous witness of the truth, even though the testimony cannot be demonstrably verified by mathematical proof. Many of the noblest spiritual blessings that we possess, we obtain and enjoy only by a free spiritual confidence; by faith,[1] which can well be justified as something rational, but cannot be forced upon us by argument. And indeed, he is worthy of this confidence from us, whose whole activity for our salvation sprung from his most cheering confidence in the susceptibility of our nature for improvement. Nothing but the cer-

[1] It scarcely needs to be remarked, that here we are not speaking of faith in its restricted sense, of the πίστις which Paul describes; but of the moral faith in the purity and divinity of the spiritual manifestations of Jesus, which faith is, or may be a stepping-stone to the πίστις, distinctively so called.

tainty, that the nature of man, weak and degenerate though it be, yet at the same time kindred with the Divinity, is susceptible of even the highest elevation, could animate him to begin his work for the moral advancement of mankind; and nothing but the firm confidence, that heavenly virtue would at last triumph among men, could strengthen him to persevere unto the end, while experiences, the most bitter, seemed to announce the failure of his great schemes. Of all mortals, not one has found such malevolent opposition to such noble endeavors; not one has had stronger outward temptations to give up all faith for mankind, and not one has clung to this faith with so holy an enthusiasm, even to the latest breath of life. On the very tree, upon which men crucified him, he did not despair of their improvement, and even his last supplication was a testimony to the same inextinguishable confidence. As he confided in our moral progress, so we can approach him only with unmingled confidence in himself; and as all trust and all love is a perfectly free product of a noble sentiment, raising itself above the hesitation of the vulgar, so also is the spiritual faith in Jesus. It demands elevation of soul, full enthusiasm for the divine excellence and beauty which are conspicuous in the words and deeds of Jesus, a warm-hearted, confiding sympathy with the love that is shown to us in him.

SECTION VI.

The effects, produced by Jesus, prove the excellence of his character.—Effects produced on Paul, on other individuals, on whole communities.—Necessity that the idea of perfect excellence should have a realization.—Mode in which the excellence of Christ's character affects our own.—The bare idea of Christ insufficient to reform men.—The idea of perfect excellence presupposes an archetype.—The realization of this idea peculiar to the christian history.—Ethical sytem of Christ.

Let us now turn our attention to still other arguments, which tend to establish the certainty of the perfect holiness of Jesus. In the first place, we may reason from what Jesus did to what he was. Such deeds as his have never yet been performed by a human being; the motive-power then, from which they originated, must be altogether peculiar in its kind. The view, which we are taking,

requires only a brief notice of what he did in the moral world. We here see, that it was a new spiritual creation which came forth from the fulness of his quickening spirit, and that he established a system which from its indwelling energy works on forever. There can be no doubt that Christianity, in this view, can boldly confront every other philosophical system, or religious institution, and maintain the pre-eminence; for wherever it has prevailed in its true spirit, it has really and fundamentally transformed men, communities as well as individuals, from bad to good.

We can here say but little. One example of the creative moral power of Christianity upon an individual is the apostle Paul. His whole nature was truly an immediate production of the spirit of Christ, so that he could say, 'I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me.' When we contemplate this man, as full of impassioned efficiency and yet full of cool discretion, he is restlessly at work for a spiritual object; as he couples vigorous earnestness and manly strength with the tenderest mildness; as his deep spirit overflows with love, yet without becoming soft and weak; as he is able to accommodate himself to all conditions, bear all things, hope for all things, joyfully deny himself all things, even such as are lawful; as he lets his own personal interest fade entirely from his view, so that he may labor for the invisible kingdom of God, and live for a crucified man, who was rejected by the world, and yet in the knowledge of whom he had found the highest good, and would willingly impart this good to all men; when we thus contemplate him, we cannot deny, that he was one of the greatest, most efficient, most spiritual men, who have ever stepped foot on the earth. And when we consider how wild, fanatical, eager to persecute, narrow-hearted, and pharisaical he had previously been, we see represented most vividly in him, the true import of being made by Christianity a *new creature*, and we must wonder, in the highest degree, at the moral power of the Gospel. To Paul are to be added the other apostles, all harmonizing in essential feelings, yet all retaining their natural peculiarities; and after them Origen, Chrysostom, Augustine, Huss, Luther, Zuinglius, Melancthon, Fenelon, Spener, and many other noble, sanctified spirits, persecuted witnesses of the truth, champions for the divine prerogative, and for true freedom; who, each in his own way, according to his own individuality, exhibited in its living power, the everlasting spirit of the christian system.

And as upon the individual, so has Christianity operated most benignantly upon the mass. It has everywhere softened the manners, and elevated the domestic and public relations; it has given to sense a direction to the invisible, and a sure holding-point upon the eternal. It has introduced into life the idea of humanity, and the recognition of human worth; it has abolished or at least equalized the wide distinctions of caste, class, and nation; it has increased to an almost indefinite extent the interest of man in man; it has united all its adherents with the spiritual family bonds of uncorrupted humanity; has established a covenant, invisible, but so much the more inwardly and closely binding, between the souls of men; and by providing that God be served morally, in spirit and in truth, it has destroyed, in the root and forever, the service of nature, the dependence on external forms, and the religion of bare law. But all these and numerous other influences of the Christian system proceed at first from one central point: and this is none other than the manifestation that Jesus made of his inward character;[1] he being purely good and holy, the ever animating, creative image of moral perfection. For although we are far from desiring to place in the shade the high importance and utility of Christ's instructions, and especially of the moral part of them, yet we cannot deny, after an unprejudiced historical examination, that the most peculiar and the deepest moral influences of Christianity must be traced back directly to the person of Jesus; and that his teaching had its true power and full meaning, only in inseparable connection with his personal character.[2] In this respect also, as in so many others, there is in Christianity a preeminence worthy of its divine original,—it reveals its purest ideas and most elevated principles in combination with its facts; it connects

[1] [This manifestation of Christ's character includes all his acts, and emphatically that act, by which the atonement was made.—Tr.]

[2] Luther says, indeed, in the preface to his Translation of the New Testament: "If I were obliged to give up one of these two, the works or the discourses of Jesus, I would give up the works more willingly than the discourses; for the works help me not, but, as himself says, his words, they give life." But the actively devoted Luther would surely not have been able to spare the life of Christ; we can no more part with the one than with the other; the words contain *light*, the works have the *power;* the word without the work would be inefficient, the work without the word would be unintelligible; both are requisite for the production of true christian life, and therefore both are exhibited in the Bible.

together, in the most fitting way, the ideal and the realization of it; it exhibits a spirit and at the same time a living incarnation of that spirit. Not theory, but life, produces life. The noblest christian characters have not been formed by the rules of the Gospel, so much as by receiving into themselves the life of Christ, as it is portrayed in historical reality, and in fulness of spiritual power; so much as by living in Christ, becoming like him, having him, as the apostle says,[1] formed within them.[2] This is the essential thing, that Jesus not only taught, but also exhibited a truly God-like character, and from this central point of his spiritual nature, which was perfect as a pattern, and yet historically real, from this representation of divinity in uncorrupted humanity, there streams forth on all sides power and life; a fresh spiritual motion extends itself over our race, in ever widening circles. If we take away this fountain, the perfect holiness and uncontaminated purity of the life of Jesus, then the moral influences of his religion become perfectly inexplicable to us; there would be an extraordinary effect without a sufficient cause; actually new life sprung from a bare semblance of life; the noblest truth originating from a fancy: the historical establishment of Christianity would be unaccountable, and the whole noble structure would rest on a hollow base. As these things cannot be rationally admitted, so that central point, the perfect purity and holiness of Christ's character, must be considered as an historical reality, as true and undeniable. Thus the existence of the christian church, together with the good which is done in it and by it, testifies for the holiness of its founder.

This we can the more positively assert, because the moral influence of Christianity still extends to us, and because our own inward experience springs from that energetic power, which works at the very heart of the christian system, and which consists in the character of the Messiah. Indeed essentially the same influences, which were exerted eighteen hundred years ago, are still exerted upon us by the spirit and the life of Jesus; and they must be exerted, for otherwise there would be no oneness in the nature of Christianity, no inward coherence in the company of Christians, and the agency of Jesus would have no truly universal characteristics. Redemption

[1] [See this idea more fully illustrated in Erskine on Int. Evid., particularly Sections III. IV.—Tr.]

[2] [Gal. 4: 19, also Col. 1: 27, and perhaps Col. 3: 10.—Tr.]

cannot have been a different thing with the apostles, from what it is with us; the redeeming power must therefore be ever the same in its influence. It was not the bare teaching, nor the bare death of Jesus, but in inseparable connection with both, his redeeming, that is, his spiritually emancipating life, which was efficacious in the days of the apostles. We must therefore conclude that the simple and artless scriptural exhibition of this life, from which the spirit of Christ breathes upon us, will exert the same influence upon our minds, which the personal observation of it exerted upon his disciples and their contemporaries. We of course include under the life of Jesus, the circumstances of his death, in the significancy which is assigned to that death by Jesus himself and the apostles, as the close of his redeeming life, and as absolutely essential for completing the work of redemption. The mode in which this life operates upon us is the same now as it was at first; it is essentially the following. By a trustful meditation upon the whole character of Jesus, and by applying it to our own moral and religious nature, we are in the first place, brought to a knowledge of our great distance from Christ, and to a severe condemnation of our moral state. In the next place, we are lifted up above the feeling of our sins and deficiencies; freed from the painful consciousness of guilt, which separates us from God, the Holy One; brought into a most intimate connection with an all-loving Father; and filled with new strength for a better life, by the consciousness of a pure, divinely imparted freedom, of a serene peace within our own hearts. This power, which can emancipate our wills, which can elevate and compose, which in fine can redeem, is possessed by no other object; by no word, no doctrine, no idea, no moral exhibition, even of the most noble and excellent kind; but only by the life and works of Jesus, considered as a whole. Depending however on the development of Christ's character, and attested by the experience of every Christian, the power is necessarily derived and inseparable from the unspotted holiness of the Messiah's conduct. None but a nature which stands before us in full purity, can exercise over us this spiritual influence; none but he, in whom the truth itself, which emancipates the soul, has at the same time been exhibited as perfect virtue, and has triumphed spiritually over all opposition, can make us thoroughly free; only one, elevated above us, and above sin, can elevate us above ourselves and above sin; only by the most intimate communion of

our souls with a holy being, can the power of holiness live and constantly strengthen within us, and the power of sin be forever extirpated from our natures. But if we think of Jesus as not morally pure, as stained with guilt, then, however small the degree of that guilt, all these effects cease; no longer as a Redeemer from sin does he satisfy our cravings; he becomes only a teacher and prophet to us; and that the longing of our souls may be appeased, we must wait for another, who may at last exhibit to us a life, fully pure, truly pleasing to God and conformed in all respects to the divine will. But such a longing desire cannot be felt by one, who has actually known Jesus; he finds himself really emancipated, renewed, fully comforted by the Saviour; he possesses in Jesus everything which can supply his spiritual wants. His belief, then, in the unspotted holiness of Christ must involve a strong assurance; for without this sinlessness, Christ could have no power to redeem. As certainly as he is our Redeemer, so certainly must he be free from all transgression.

One may indeed reply to this, that the bare *idea* of a sinless and holy life would produce the same effects as the *realization* of it; more especially since such a life does not now come to us as a matter of experience properly, but as a mere conception of the intellect, and is thereby presented to us in an ideal form. We will not here insist on the fact, that a bare idea never possesses the living power of truth, and that faith in the innocency of Jesus produces no effect so far as it is faith in an idea, but only so far as it is faith in a matter of fact, in the realization of what was conceived. We will say, however, that whenever we trace this idea up to its source, we always come back again to the matter of fact, to the historical exhibition; and, as it has been already proved, the representation of Christ's immaculate life did not originate from the previous idea of perfect holiness, but this idea originated from the actual previous observation of an immaculate life. The general remarks of the sacred writers on the perfect virtue of Jesus would lose their peculiar power over the feelings, if these writers did not *also* describe to us, in detail, and with such striking, irresistible truth,—if they did not even bring into our ideal presence the pure motives and holy conduct of the Messiah.

If, looking away from any particular case, we fix our attention upon the idea of a life entirely pure, holy, and pleasing to God, we

shall find it evident, that there is such an idea in our minds; and that, for this very reason, it must, at some stage of moral progress develop itself in the minds of all. Even this circumstance assures us, that the idea will be also realized; for every conception, that slumbers in our minds, presupposes somewhere and somehow an existing object of it, points to a corresponding reality. The idea is by no means a bare fancy, a shadow without a substance.[1] All our moral efforts depend in fact, whether we are more or less conscious of it, upon the idea of perfection; and everything which we desire or do, in the province of morality, has necessary reference to this idea. As moral beings, we cannot be without the conviction, that a state of feeling and of conduct is possible, in which all the excellences that human nature can admit, are united in one inseparable and noble whole, and all weaknesses are excluded; a state which, on this account, corresponds perfectly with the will of Him who is the only good one; with the design of God in respect to man; and which, because it presupposes the purest harmony of our existence, necessarily includes in itself such elements, as will make our existence perfectly blessed. This state, so far as we are in any degree holy, we always endeavor to attain; yea, the attainment of it is commanded by our consciences. If now, oppressed as we are with so many faults and imperfections, internal and external, we must despair of reaching this high mark, at least in our present course, we may yet hold fast the lively wish to see this perfection attained by some related nature, and to see the ideal of sinless virtue realized. It cannot but afford us the most heartfelt satisfaction

[1] [Such statements as the foregoing seem to be more scholastic than just. It is, however, by no means an unimportant thought, that there is a harmony between our idea of human perfection, our desire to see it developed, and the actual development of it in Christ. The supposition of his perfect virtue has that peculiar fitness to our intellectual and moral wants, which, if not itself an *a priori* argument for the truth of the supposition, may still corroborate other arguments, as well as predispose the inquirer to receive them. Though the German mind is apt to go too far in reasoning from the correspondences between our inward conceptions or feelings, and certain outward events, it may be a question whether the American mind is disposed to go far enough. Notice, for example, our general neglect of the *moral* arguments for the existence of God, and the immortality of the soul, etc.; such arguments as are founded on the coincidence between these truths, and our natural hopes and fears.—Tr.]

and joy, if the moral perfection, the agreement of a whole human nature with the divine goodness be anywhere exhibited to us in life. This is the actual fact in the exhibition of the character of Christ. In this character is realized the highest idea of the human spirit, that of the purely good. The true and the beautiful cannot indeed be separated from such a life; and yet by its goodness alone a noble and deep necessity of our nature is satisfied. And as our intellect demands an exhibition of a perfect religious character, so our heart longs after an entirely pure and faultless object of attachment; after an object in which there would be nothing which could, from time to time, injure and wound our moral feeling, and thus weaken and cloud our love, as all even the best of human love is frequently interrupted; after an object in which the highest feeling of self-sacrificing benevolence is connected with a faultless morality, and which must elicit from us a reciprocated attachment, an attachment that is pure and debased by no false admixture. This object of truly perfect and unfeigned love we possess in Christ, inasmuch as his religious character is unexceptionably pure, and contains nothing which can offend our moral consciousness.[1] So then the supposition of Christ's unspotted virtue is sustained by the fact, that such a supposition meets our highest spiritual necessities, which without it must remain unsatisfied, and that it realizes to man the very thing toward which his noblest efforts have been directed, but which he cannot produce from his own resources.

That the idea of an entirely pure moral life is distinctly developed by real occurrences, by the historical manifestations of Jesus, that it can be developed by nothing else, appears evident from the fact, that though the idea was previously slumbering in our minds, yet it was never clearly expressed, until Christ's appearance. It is a very remarkable truth, that the idea of a holiness which is entirely perfect and free from fault, was never entertained in the world before Christ, nor in the heathen world, either before or after.[2] One may indeed

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[1] Compare Schleiermacher's Christian Feast-day Sermons, Vol. I. pp. 99—104.

[2] As the idea and the word denoting it are intimately connected, it will not be improper to say here something about the expressions ἀναμαρτησία and ἀναμάρτητος. They are, it is true, established terms in the ancient classical style, but do not signify such an entire fulness of moral perfection in the classical, as they do in the christian usage. Ἀναμάρτητος means one

refer to intimations of this idea, as it is scarcely possible to philosophize upon ethical subjects without approximating to it; but the idea could not attain a complete development in the heathen world for two reasons. First, the heathen intellect had not yet apprehended the fundamental principle, to which Christianity raises the mind, that virtue is something altogether internal, springing from the purest love. Secondly, the morality of the ancient pagans was deficient in its religious features, yea even their religious faith operated injuriously upon the moral life. But even if the idea of a perfectly pure and holy moral character could be found among the heathen, still no example can be adduced, in which this idea was believed to be realized in any one person. Such an example would be looked for, first of all, in the wisest of the Greeks, in Socrates; but although we have such excellent descriptions of this great man from two re-

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who cannot sin, as well as one who does not actually sin. In the first sense, the word is used by Plato, de Republ. I. *Πότερον δὲ ἀναμάρτητοι εἰσιν οἱ ἄρχοντες, ἢ οἷοι τε καὶ ἁμαρτάνειν.* Here, from its being opposed to *οἷος ἁμαρτάνειν,* it is evident that *ἀναμάρτητος* involves the impossibility of sinning. In the other sense the word is used by Xenophon, *Ὁρῶ γὰρ τῶν ἀνθρώπων οὐδένα ἀναμάρτητον διατελοῦντα.* With the same double signification is *ἀναμαρτησία* also used by the ancients, and is then translated into the Latin by the word, impeccabilitas, (at least Aulus Gellius has the word, impeccabilis), and again by the word, impeccantia, (Jerome). Many passages from the ancients may be found collected together in Henr. Stephani Thesaur. Ling. Gr. II. p. 1920. ed. Lond.—Among christian authors, we find the expression *ἀναμαρτησία,* at first used by Clement of Alexandria in the sense of ceasing, withdrawing from sin, and in this meaning it was applied to the moral condition of men in general: Stromat. Lib. II. p. 371. Lib. IV. p. 482. *Ἀναμάρτητος,* however, is also used by Clement in the stricter sense of sinless; *μόνος ἀναμάρτητος αὐτὸς ὁ λόγος;* Paedag. III. 12. It is, however, used by later christian writers in the sense of absolute freedom from sin; of pure, holy sinlessness; and in this sense is applied only to God and Christ. The Fathers of the church ascribe sinless purity only to God, (Isidor. Pelus. Epist. Lib. I. p. 435; *τὸ ἀναμάρτητον μόνου ἐστὶ θεοῦ*), and also to Christ, so far as he is partaker of the divine nature. They therefore treat of sinlessness as a property, not of the human, but of the divine nature of the Redeemer. They also lay great stress on the thought that, without being *ἀναμάρτητος,* Jesus could not have been the Redeemer of mankind. For example, Chrysostom in the 38th Homily on the first Epistle to the Corinthians, says, "He who died for sinners must himself be sinless; for if he himself sinned, how could he die for other sinners?—but if he died for the sins of others, he died being sinless himself." Various proofs for what is advanced above, may be found in Suiceri Thesaur. Eccles. I. pp. 287, 288.

vering pupils, yet neither of these pupils, nor indeed any other one, has expressed the opinion, that he was free from all moral failings and perfect in all respects.[1] This idea of perfect holiness, as in its accurate development, so in the certainty of its having been realized in human nature, is an excellence that distinguishes Christianity, not only above heathenism, but also above all other religious and philosophical systems. The fact too, that the idea is so accurately and clearly developed only in the christian system, proves the historical truth of its having been embodied in Christ. If it had sprung merely from an attempt to glorify a great man, or the founder of a religion, why was not the same representation made elsewhere? And how could it have been made in express reference to Jesus, and made with such precision and steadiness, unless there had been a sure ground for it in his life? We cannot resist the belief, that he who produced the steadfast conviction upon the minds of his contemporaries, that his virtue was throughout pure and holy, in fact was a decidedly perfect man; and we must look upon the extraordinary, and to this day undiminished, vital influences of this belief, as a testimony in favor of its inward correctness.

There is yet one more point to be briefly touched. There may be adduced, in proof of the sinless character of Jesus, the irreproachable truth and purity of his *ethical system.* This system is most assuredly of such a character, that it receives its full and unlimited confirmation in our own conscience. It is in the principle that animates it, and in all its individual parts, so pure and just that it must be pronounced unimprovable. But such faultless ethics can be the product only of a faultless, unpolluted spirit. From none but a healthy root is good fruit obtained; and as a holy moral sentiment pervades the whole gospel, so must it have lived originally in the author of that gospel.

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[1] The only passage, so far as I know, which can be mentioned in support of the contrary position, is one in Xenophon's Memorabilia, Lib. I. Cap. I. § 11: "No one ever saw Socrates doing, or heard him saying, anything profane or wicked." But from the whole scope of this apology, and particularly from what immediately precedes, it is evident that the author is here speaking of mere legality, so far as it becomes known by outward acts and words, and not of morality in the highest sense of that term. [For the philosophical distinction between the terms, legality and morality, see note B. —Tr.]

If we glance over the whole preceding investigation, we shall find that the hatred of Christ's enemies, the conduct of those indifferent toward him, the acknowledgement of his betrayer, the love and reverence of his friends, a love and reverence inextinguishable and sealed with death, and lastly the most noble consciousness which Christ had of his own rectitude; all these are a testimony in favor of his spiritual excellence and pure holiness, such as history gives of no other man. This testimony is strongly confirmed by the spiritual effects, altogether peculiar in kind, which have been wrought by Jesus, and which are still exemplified to us in living experience. It is also confirmed by the adaptedness of his immaculate character, to the noblest and otherwise unsatisfied wants of our mind and heart; by the striking preëminence of the christian, above all other religions; and by the stainless purity of the evangelical system of morals.

There is a doubt, however, which threatens to rob us of the historical and well-grounded conviction, that Jesus was strictly sinless. The doubt is produced by various objections, which we must now clear up thoroughly. Otherwise, we can make no advance with a sure step.

SECTION VII.

Objections alleged against the character of Christ by his contemporaries.—Objections drawn from his cursing the fig-tree; from his destroying the swine; from his expelling the traders; from his going up to the feast, after he had been understood to decline going; from the history of the temptation.—Various theories in reference to the temptation.

The objections, first to be considered, which were made by the contemporaries of Jesus against his uncorrupted virtue, though we would not entirely pass them by, are yet insignificant. Yea more, on a narrow inspection, they turn themselves into pleasing proofs of the true spirituality and perfectness of his moral life. This is the case with the objections, that he would not, like the Pharisees and even John the Baptist, zealously fast, and live austerely abstinent, but would eat and drink as other men, and was therefore a glutton and a wine-bibber; that he received into his society publicans and

sinners, and sat at table with them; that he could not be from God, because he did not keep the Sabbath perfectly, but healed the sick on that day, and permitted his disciples to pluck the ears of corn.

It was in opposition to just such narrow-hearted charges, that Christ unfolded, by word and deed, the great principles of a morality, that was generous, and that sprung from the fountain of divine love; a morality by which the free-born gospel is raised far, far above all moral servitude, and every form of self-righteousness. It was in just such circumstances that he found occasion, both to prove the serenity, which belongs to a life that is pleasing to God,—a serenity that is cheerful, disturbed by no asceticism that pains the body, but enjoying all things temperately and thankfully; and also to communicate and apply those simple instructions of his, which contain in an appropriate and individual form elevated and eternal truths. I allude, for example, to such instructions as the following; that true morality lies in feeling; that love is something more than a sacrifice, and an outward fulfilling of the law; that the Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath; and more of the like nature.

In respect also to some other acts of Jesus, which the evangelists describe with entire impartiality, and without intimating that they might contain anything offensive, every difficulty vanishes as soon as we survey the acts from the right point of sight. Thus the procedure of Jesus, in cursing the fig-tree,[1] has appeared to many to be of questionable character; not so much because he allowed himself to make an encroachment upon the property of another man, for no one can prove that the tree actually belonged to any one; but because it seems as if Jesus was so much irritated by the impossibility of his gratifying the wants of the instant, that he gave vent to his rage by cursing an innocent tree. But we shall evidently form a very erroneous conception of Jesus, if we think of him as passionately excited in this transaction. He performed in this, as well as in other instances, a deed of cool discretion. He desired to furnish an example by word and act. He desired, it may be, as was common with him and the orientals generally, to invest his deed with a symbolical character; either to make it the means of calling attention, at this important time, to the certain ruin of the Jewish nation, which was now spiritually unfruitful; or else, as seems more probable from the instructive words which he added, to make the act a re-

[1] Matt. 21: 17—22. Mark 11: 11—26.

newed proof, to his friends, of his exalted and perfect power, and a new means of strengthening their confidence in himself and God, in view of the dangers that threatened.

It were more reasonable to charge the Saviour with the crime of encroaching upon another's property, in that remarkable act which he performed within the territory of the Gadarenes.[1] The miracle of healing, which he wrought here upon one or two demoniacs was immediately connected with a loss, more or less important, to the inhabitants of the country. Almost every commentator on this passage has thought it needful to frame an apology for Jesus; and, as might have been expected, the issue of this has been various, as men, in looking at the Messiah, have stood upon a lower or higher point of observation. I would hesitate to exculpate the Saviour, as most modern commentators do, on the ground of his not foreseeing the consequences of his deed. This representation militates against the idea which the evangelists give of their Lord. Indeed if we separate from his acts, as far as possible, the character of the extraordinary, we must at all events leave to them this peculiarity, that they were accompanied with an unaccountable fore-sight of their consequences. Instead of resorting to such an apology, I would make the truth so much the more prominent, that Jesus, in this as in all his miracles, acted as the representative of the Godhead; and is to be judged, in reference to the act, by different rules from those which are binding on us. When God, for high benevolent purposes, destroys individual property; when by lightning, hail, inundation, he ruins the estate of one man or many, who can accuse him of unrighteousness in the matter? The good of the whole, viewed comprehensively, demands the destruction, and the arrangement of single phenomena is guided by a wisdom infinitely above our thoughts. On this elevated position does Jesus stand; acting with the power of Divinity, and with heavenly wisdom. Such a position is not at all adapted to encourage scruples for the safety of a few swine, when the spiritual and temporal good of rational natures is concerned. Should we disdain to allow, however, that Jesus acted from the fulness of divine knowledge and authority, then it will be very difficult to justify his act, unless we also refuse to allow, what the evangelists assert, that he always foresaw the consequences of his deeds.

[1] Matt. 8: 28—31. Mark 5: 1—20. Luke 8: 26—39.

If it may be supposed, that Jesus was not passionately excited at the cursing of the fig-tree, there is yet another proceeding described in the evangelical history, from which the idea of the passionate and the violent can scarcely be separated; viz. the expulsion of the exchangers, the sellers and buyers from the temple-court.[1] This act can indeed be colored in such a way, that a character of violence altogether peculiar will be impressed upon it. But we have certainly no right to do this. It was not the physical force and bodily chastisement that Jesus employed, so much as his holy earnestness and high personal dignity which gave expressiveness and efficiency to his conduct. It was the feeling that he was in the right, and they in the wrong, that drove out the traders of the temple. But after all, there does remain in this act of Jesus something of excited passion, which seems to be in contrast with his former mildness; and even the apostles perceived in this conduct a consuming zeal.[2] But here we must introduce the distinction between the anger of a private individual, and the noble indignation of one occupying a divine office. Jesus stands not as a Jewish Rabbi, before Jewish traders; but he stands as an ambassador from God, as the Messiah, as the purifier of the true theocracy, before those who profaned the house of his Father. This extraordinary office gave him the right to proceed in a way, which needed not to be legitimated by ordinary rules. If the doubtful right of zealots (jus zelotarum) were even admitted, it would surely not be necessary to appeal to it for the justification of the Messiah. "It was the authority and the power of a true prophet, whose office it was to correct and chastise; an office, which at all times and among all people, when the temporal relations and the ordinary course of existing customs cannot avail to check growing corruptions, will be exercised and should be exercised by the higher natures who are called to the duty."[3] But such an act, the right and duty of Jesus to perform which lay in his office as Messiah, could never be performed without a deeply terrifying earnestness, and an intensely burning zeal. Such earnestness and such zeal are

[1] Matt. 21: 12—14. Mark 11: 15—19. Luke 19: 45—48, compared with John 2: 14, 18.

[2] John 2: 17. [Zeal for the honor of God's house hath absorbed me, possessed me so thoroughly that I should be willing to sacrifice my life for it; consumed, devoured me.—Tr.]

[3] See Lücke's Commentary on this passage, I. pp. 536, and 537.

developments of uncorrupted humanity, and of manly greatness. Whoever is not susceptible of such an inflammation of mind, so free from all mere personal feeling, is not capable of a great action. To the pure mind then, Jesus appears to stand, in this act as well as in others, upon an unclouded height.

Finally, some may persuade themselves, that they discover, in the Gospel of John,[1] the trace of an untruth, which came from the lips of Jesus; and one of the earlier adversaries of Christianity, Porphyry,[2] has not failed to set up, from this passage, an accusation of fickleness against the Messiah. Here also we should obtain the easiest solution of the difficulty from a variation of the text; from adopting οὔπω instead of οὐκ. We are compelled, however, to refuse this aid; since it can scarcely be doubted, that this mode of reading the passage has been urged, merely for the purpose of removing a difficulty from it. As a definition of οὐκ, and it was at first merely a definition, we may be well satisfied with οὔπω; since elsewhere, and particularly with John, οὐκ has the signification of *not yet*.[3] In either case, whether the implied idea of the present time lie in this unusual meaning of οὐκ, or in the strict designation of the present tense in ἀναβαίνω, to which verb we may supply νῦν, we are obliged to confine the expression of Jesus to a very limited period, including only the present and the immediately succeeding future. The words directly following, "my time has not yet come," show the necessity of this limitation. Had not the evangelist thus understood the words of Jesus, he must himself, at the first glance, have marked the striking contradiction between the words and the subsequent act, and he would not so obviously have represented Jesus as uttering an untruth. To suppose, however, that Jesus intentionally, from motives of prudence, desired to employ an equivocal expression would not be in accordance with his character.

The history of the temptation,[4] in its reference to Christ's pure innocence, is more difficult to understand, than the subjects hitherto

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[1] John 7: 8—10.

[2] The following is the statement of Jerome adv. Pelag. Lib. II: "*Jesus denied that he would go, and then he did what he had previously refused to do*, so Porphyry rails, and accuses Jesus of inconstancy and change." Porphyry also must have read οὐκ, and not οὔπω in the verse.

[3] John 6: 17. Besides this, we may refer to Mark 11: 13, and Ezra 3: 6.

[4] Matt. 4: 1—11. Mark 1: 12, 13. Luke 4: 1—13.

noticed. Although we cannot engage in a copious discussion of this part of the evangelical history, we must not omit the brief expression of our views respecting it. If we conceive of the temptation as something altogether external, so that the words of the devil, whether he be supposed to have been Satan or a human tempter, were heard by Jesus only with the bodily ear, and, so to speak, were not conveyed into his mind at all; that the temptation, therefore, did not affect him inwardly in the least, but barely glanced upon him, as the jet glides off from a smooth and impenetrable rock; then, to be sure, the subject has no difficulty for our present consideration. It is equally free from difficulty, if we look upon the narrative as a poetical fiction, a fable or a parable. But neither of these views of the subject seems to be the right one.

As to the first view, I for one cannot persuade myself to adopt an entirely literal interpretation of the narrative, and to suppose that Satan appeared personally and visibly to Jesus, and carried on a conversation with him, every word of which is to be regarded as strictly diplomatical. Not insisting on the fact, that such a personal appearance of the devil is never elsewhere alluded to in the New Testament, we are content with saying, that the supposition of such an appearance gives to the whole scene, when examined narrowly in its particulars, an air of oddity. We are forced to wonder, even as much at the manner of the devil's proceeding, which fails altogether to exhibit cunning and good sense, as at the unlimited forbearance of Jesus, following Satan to the pinnacle of the temple, and then again to the mountain. To understand however by the term, devil, a mere human tempter, seems to me not more opposed to the use of language, when closely examined, than it is forced in the idea itself.[1] As to the supposition, that the narrative is mythical or parabolic, this also, I believe, has more against it than in its favor. That the evangelists should commence their account of the distinctively Messianic portion of Christ's life directly with a fable, is entirely in-

[1] When I penned the above, I was not aware of the existence of a treatise on the history of the temptation, in the first and second numbers of the Tübingen Theological Quarterly, for the year 1827. This exhibits the most plausible view, which can be given of the interpretation that has just been rejected. Without entering upon a close examination of it, I content myself with recommending it to the attention of interpreters, as an essay of rich literary character, and of acuteness.

consistent with their character as writers, and is throughout incredible. That the narration, moreover, has in no way the form of a parable, and is not carried on as such, every one will allow, who candidly compares it with the other parables of the New Testament. He will allow it, unless indeed he adopt the most improbable supposition, that the evangelists had so entirely misunderstood a parable of Jesus, not merely in its spirit but also in its form, as to have taken it for an historical narration.

We come, then, to that view of the subject which is the most worthy to be adopted; which supposes the whole series of the temptations to have been really internal, but to have been presented, in the description, as external. This view, however, again branches out, as we know, into the double form,—that the temptation was a dream, a vision or ecstasy; or else, that it consisted in tempting thoughts, during a time of mental clearness and self-possession. The first of these forms introduces into the character of Jesus something visionary and fanatical. This however is incompatible with his cast of mind, which, in all other instances, appears to be decidedly clear and discreet. It is also without example in all the evangelical histories. The remaining form, that of considering the whole as a series of tempting thoughts, has indeed its difficulties; but, as it appears to me, they may be solved. That an inward train of thought should be thus represented in the outward living form of external deeds, is certainly not inconsistent with the oriental, and especially the Hebrew style. The particular temptations may very fitly be regarded as tempting thoughts, if we will keep in view the main design of the narrative. This design was to exhibit the whole scene, as a *proving of the Messiah;* to exhibit Jesus as tempted by the prevailing but false ideas about the Messiah, which were presented to his mind, but over which his true Messianic spirit triumphed, completely and forever. The first temptation consisted in this, that he should perform a miracle for his own advantage, and the relief of his animal wants; the second, that he should make a miraculous display, so as to convince men of his Messiahship, by overpowering their senses, as it were; the third, that he should found a political Messianic kingdom, and maintain his influence over minds by power and authority. All this the contemporaries of Jesus might expect from the Messiah, and did actually expect. They supposed that he would be invested with extraordinary powers; and, in accordance with their secular views,

they could not avoid the belief, that he would employ these powers immediately for his own advantage, relieving his necessities and exalting himself. They demanded of him the most surprising miracles; wonders from heaven, as they are so often called in the Gospel. They hoped to see in him, the founder of a temporal kingdom; and to see the visible theocracy reëstablished by him, in splendor and power. This was doubtless the idea which Christ's contemporaries had of the Messiah; and the chief elements of it were expressed in the individual acts of the temptation, in a manner true to the life. But the holy spirit of a Messiah, which Christ possessed in all its fulness, and which in all its power operated within him, especially after he was solemnly consecrated in baptism to his office, now triumphed victoriously over all his temptations. Even in the most urgent necessities he would perform no miracle for his own advantage, but with unlimited confidence referred it to the Father, to determine the means, which Omnipotence should provide for his succor. From the time of his temptation it continued to be the inviolable principle of his life, never to employ, for his own benefit, the extraordinary powers which were at his command, but to employ them for the benefit of others only. He was equally unwilling to make any miraculous display; and though often and urgently entreated to do so, by his degraded and wonder-loving contemporaries, he never suffered himself to be persuaded. Finally, he would, least of all, establish a temporal kingdom, however alluring may have been the prospect of the magnificent results of this course.[1] By such an enterprise he would become unfaithful to the holy God, would walk in communion with evil, and in subjection to it. In this way, then, did the divine idea of a perfectly spiritual Redeemer, laboring for the good of others, and denying himself in all things, going about in unostentatious simplicity, and in the form of a servant, triumph over the false idea of a Messiah, which, at his entrance upon his official course, was suggested temptingly to Jesus, and which gave him an opportunity, before he subdued other minds by the word of truth and by the power of love, to achieve the noblest spiritual victory within his own soul.

But this explanation, which our object requires us barely to suggest, is met by an objection, referring particularly to the statement that Jesus was not tempted by anything which came to him immedi-

[1] John 6: 15.

ately from without, but by his own thoughts. The objection has been expressed by no one more keenly than by Schleiermacher. "If Christ," he says,[1] "even in the slightest degree harbored such thoughts, then he is no longer Christ; and this interpretation appears to me to be the vilest neological abuse of Christ's personal character, which has appeared." But this interpretation would involve an injury to Christ, only in case that it could not be adopted without denying his perfect purity and holiness. And we should be obliged to deny this, if we admitted either that the evil thoughts of the temptation were engendered in the soul of Jesus himself,—for so far as his soul, of its own choice, originated, even in mere thought, anything of evil, it would be indeed stained with sin;—or if we admitted, that the tempting charm was ever effective in determining his will. But neither the former, nor the latter branch of this alternative is conceded by our interpretation. If tempting thoughts did arise even in the soul of Jesus, still they were not engendered in it. They were the elements of the prevailing idea respecting the Messiah, and this idea was an objective reality.[2] The idea could not be unknown to Christ, and it was altogether inevitable that it should occur to his mind, on some external occasion, as he was now preparing himself for his office. He must, at such a time, necessarily consider what his contemporaries would expect of him, when he should appear as the Messiah. He thought therefore upon this popular expectation, the predominant features of which were earthly and wicked, as an existing fact. But though a deed be wicked in itself, the thought of it is not necessarily wicked. If it were so, then God could not be holy; for he surveys the whole sum of wickedness. It would be a very different thing, if this meditation upon evil were accompanied with a pleasure participating in the evil and determining the will. But this, according to the narration in the Gospels, was not the fact. So soon as the tempting thought arose in the soul of Jesus, and excited desire, it was thrust down by his pure and strong power of choice.

But even if we regard the temptation as an external occurrence, still the objection of Schleiermacher may be substantially urged as

[1] Kritischer Versuch über die Schriften des Lucas, p. 54.

[2] [Etwas objectiv gegebenes: it was not a mere fancy of Christ, but was an idea actually existing in the popular mind, and *as such* it occurred to him. —Tr.]

before. Even if it were external, we are yet compelled to believe that an inward temptation, one of the thoughts, was connected with the outward process; for otherwise the idea of being tempted is taken away altogether. A temptation consists, not barely in the ear's hearing evil words, such as are designed to encourage immorality and sin, but always in the mind's receiving certain ideas, so as to feel, in connection with them, some excitement of desire. This must be the case, even if we choose to adopt the notion of a tempting agency working from without, of whatever nature the agency may be. But neither in that thought of evil, such a thought being also in the mind of God; nor in that excitement of desire, such an excitement being inseparable from human nature, there being without it no possibility either of moral combat or victory; in neither, I say, is there any sin at all, so long as the power of choice triumphs purely and perfectly over both. The doctrine then of the Saviour's innocency receives no detriment from this mode of explaining his temptation.

If, however, we should choose to adopt the idea, that Christ's temptation was entirely external, so that, properly speaking, only Satan made an attempt to seduce Jesus, but Jesus was not inwardly affected by it in the least; so that the temptation was therefore objective merely, and not at all subjective; still, I see not how we can dispose of other passages in the New Testament, without admitting an inward excitement of desire, and a struggle ensuing from it in the soul of Jesus. The passages in the Epistle to the Hebrews, 4: 15 and 5: 7, will still be left; so likewise will many occurrences recorded in the Gospels, where the physical appetite, the excitability of sense, the passions of Jesus, are seen to be in lively movement. Above all we can always appeal to the conflict of his spirit in Gethsemane. There was something in him, at that time, which elicited the wish to be delivered from the fearful suffering, that was inseparable from his elevated destination. But this sensuous[1] part of his hu-

[1] [Sinnlich, sensuous, in distinction from sensual: the former referring to the animal sensibilities in their constitutional and therefore innocent exercise; the latter to these sensibilities in their undue, inordinate, and therefore sinful indulgence. The word has been, recently, often used in this peculiar signification; and yet it must be conceded, that there is no valid authority for the usage. It has been, unjustifiably perhaps, inserted here, and on one or two subsequent pages, merely for the sake of convenience. The

manity, which broke forth strongly for a moment, and the wish which was excited by it, did not determine the will of Jesus; no, his power of choice, and of pure intellect triumphed; and the victory was proclaimed in these great words, "not as I will, but as thou wilt." We cannot divest Jesus of such excitements, unless we divest him of humanity; but this we cannot do, for it would contradict the plain idea which the New Testament gives of Christ; nor need we do it, for the sensuous power, the excitability connected with it, the susceptibility to temptation resulting from it, are inseparable from human nature, and therefore cannot be regarded as sinful.[1]

SECTION VIII.

Possibility of perfect virtue.—It cannot be disproved by the actual imperfection of the race.—The vitiosity of our race no proof that Christ was not perfect.—Original sin no proof.—The fact, that Christ's animal sensibilities were sometimes excited, no proof that he ever yielded to sin.—His finite nature no evidence of guilt.—His feeling of humility no evidence of it.

These are perhaps the more important historical objections against the uninterrupted holiness of Jesus. We are next met by some in-

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word, animal, might perhaps have been substituted. But this word, as well as sensual, often suggests the idea of moral degradation, and such an idea is to be especially guarded against in this connection. A new word is manifestly needed in our language to express the full idea of the German, sinnlich.—Tr.]

[1] [To say that a holy being possesses the susceptibilities, which, being excited to a certain degree, are the inward or subjective motives that occasion the change from holiness to sin, is only to say that this holy being is a moral being. To say that all excitement of these susceptibilities is itself sin, is to say that there is no difference between voluntary and involuntary desires, between the character and the constitution of man; it is to say that sin is unavoidable, that it is to be charged upon the Deity, as the only voluntary cause. To admit, however, that the excitement of these susceptibilities is not in itself a sin, and, unless an *undue* excitement of them be indulged by the *will*, leaves the being as holy as ever, is merely to admit, that there is such a thing possible as the *temptation* of a being who remains sinless. The admission is essential to the idea of a moral agent. When it is said that God cannot be tempted with evil, it is of course meant that there is the most entire certainty conceivable of his never choosing any improper object. See Note G, at the close of this Treatise.—Tr.]

ternal difficulties, which in like manner demand investigation.—A man may deny the reality of a virtue, that is entirely pure and perfect, on the ground of his believing such virtue to be impossible; he is convinced that there can never be a human being completely holy. This decision, that no man can be perfectly pure and holy, must be founded either on general experience, or on a dictate of reason; it must be either an historical truth, or an *a priori* one; and we will see whether it be this or that.

In the first place, as to general experience. This has indeed in many minds produced an entire want of confidence in the purity of any human virtue, and an entire distrust in the moral goodness and greatness of our race.—And it is a fact, the deeper we penetrate, and the more earnestly we look into the developments of human life and history, and the more clearly we see our own hearts, so much the more difficult is it to convince us, that an unexceptionably good and pure man has ever lived. For look where we will, there is to be seen, though veiled perhaps under a thousand smiling forms, voluptuousness, vanity, ambition, love of property and power, uncharitableness, envy, and the evil of all evils, selfishness, which knows how to steal, with the most delicate windings, into our noblest desires and acts. Seldom are we cheered, for an instant, with the discovery of a deed that is altogether good and pure; never do we find a man whose life has exhibited an untarnished picture of moral perfection and true spiritual freedom. We have been so habituated to this constant view of dereliction from duty, that we are now almost incapable of conceiving, in all its sublimity and lustre, a development of virtue that is really exalted and altogether unstained. We have lost that mental elasticity, which is essential to our belief in the true greatness of the intellect and heart; and in the end, our knowledge of men dissolves itself into the melancholy state of absolute distrust in the race. But the knowledge of mankind, which leads to this conclusion, is in fact derived from the principle of distrust. At the outset, it is predisposed to discover imperfection and faults, and either to overlook the good and noble, or else to refer them to impure and evil motives. Such acquaintance with human nature shows itself to be unsound by this, that it makes a concession which tends to cripple and utterly prostrate our best moral dispositions, our love and trust, and kills in the root our enthusiasm for mankind.

On the other hand, when we look among men with unprejudiced

feeling, we see an unquestionable amount of the good and noble. Men of the keenest understanding, united with the deepest experience of life, show by their example, that one may possess these qualities, without being induced by them to give up all faith in human nature. They prove, that it depends not so much upon experience, as upon the disposition and the previous judgment with which one examines the phenomena of life, whether he be led to an entire distrust in human virtue, or retain a faith in it. And this faith, properly speaking, is something which lies beyond the sphere of individual experience and is independent of it; it has its foundation, like faith in God, in the depth of the spirit, and, like that, is a power which holds us erect amid the storms of life, and raises us above the influence of bitter experiences. As little as true faith in God can be destroyed by adversity, even so little can faith in mankind be destroyed by the moral imperfections, or wickedness of individuals. All the experience which we can have on this subject is partial and contracted. It therefore in no way entitles us to draw the conclusion, that whatever we find throughout our own narrow horizon, is of course a fact existing everywhere and by absolute necessity; and whatever we do not discover in that same circle, is of course a plain impossibility. In investigating the laws of nature, a phenomenon occurring uniformly allows us to infer, that it is both universal and necessary; but in investigating the operations of the free will, a different process is required. Here millions of ordinary phenomena prove nothing against one extraordinary phenomenon; and this is not in the slightest degree less possible than those. The necessity of sinning and the impossibility of not sinning, is by no means a law of the moral nature of man. Nay, perfect virtue is man's true and original destination, and the appropriate law of his being; and sin is an exception from this law. And what now can entitle us to believe, that there are, everywhere and of necessity, only exceptions to this law; that there can be never and nowhere a fulfilling of it? If ever so many exceptions present themselves before us, they yet do not destroy the credibility, that some one at some period may arrive at the high destination of his race; that he actually may have arrived at it; and if the real existence of a perfect man be represented to us as an historical fact, in all other respects fully entitled to belief, the multitude of opposing experiences cannot rationally prevent us from admitting this *one* great reality. If we should, in the

department of morals, give credence only to that which we learn from immediate observation, our circle of vision would become very small and confined; and we should lose not only faith in the absolutely pure virtue of the Redeemer, but also faith in the moral excellence of all the great and good men, whom we have never had an opportunity to know. But there is in the moral nature of man, an obligation to believe in such high virtue, even if it do not fall directly within the sphere of our actual notice. We cannot therefore divest ourselves of firm confidence in the purest and most perfect goodness, so far as its appearance, as a matter of fact, is supported by all the external proof, which can make it worthy of credence.[1]

But now the question arises, whether moral imperfection and vitiosity do not, in some degree or other, lie in the nature of man; and whether reason do not pronounce it a universal truth, that no man can be perfectly good and holy. All the doubts, so far as I know, which pertain to this part of the subject, have been stated particularly by De Wette.[2] Following in the footsteps of this honored theologian, we will bring forward the points, which are here to be examined; although we expect to be obliged to solve the difficulties, in a different way from that which he has adopted.

"If," as may be first remarked, "we ascribe to Jesus the possibility of sinning, then we make him a partaker of vitiosity; for this vitiosity consists not in the sum of sins actually committed, but even in the possibility of committing a sin. If then we declare Jesus to be free from actual sin, we have not thereby declared him to be free from original sin. Vitiosity includes a degree, though the least conceivable, of sin, and therefore excludes absolute innocence." That there was in Jesus a possibility of sinning, so far as he was a truly human being, cannot indeed be denied; but this is by no means identical with vitiosity. The possibility of sinning exists in the very nature of free-will; it is inseparable from the constitution of a finite moral being. If therefore it is in itself sinful, then a germ of sin is communicated to man *with*, and even *in* his constitution; and if this be the fact, then the author of our moral constitution, is also the au-

[1] See Note F, at the close.

[2] Christliche Sittenlehre; I. pp. 182—193. We make the general request, that the whole section, "Christus der Heilige," by De Wette, may be consulted.

[3] De Wette Sittenlehre; I. p. 188.

thor of our sinful tendencies. But this is a conclusion which De Wette rejects, as decidedly as every other sound-minded man. Plainly the word, vitiosity, must mean more than the bare possibility of sinning; for the possibility of sinning is consistent with a complete indifference of the free will; but vitiosity presupposes a decided propensity to evil, and a germ of sin from which actual transgressions subsequently unfold themselves.[1] Therefore, although we are to ascribe the possibility of sinning to Jesus, we by no means allow that there existed, in connection with this possibility, any sinful disposition; any, even the least propensity towards evil, or any real evil.[2]

It is another question, whether, besides the possibility of sinning, necessary to every free nature, there were not also in Jesus that peculiar bias to evil, which has been superinduced upon the nature of man, without his own choice; that vitiosity which is called *original sin*.[3] If we consider a predominant bias to evil as dwelling universally in human nature, it will be peculiarly difficult to avoid the supposition, that Jesus was swayed by it, and thereby his moral purity was defaced. In many systems which retain the strict doctrine of original sin, this difficulty, as we well know, is removed by the theory, that the peculiar divine interposition, at the miraculous conception of Jesus, prevented the implantation within him, of the human original depravity; and the divine nature being united with the human at the first moment of its earthly existence, precludes the introduction of the least degree of moral evil into that human nature.[4] But we do not allow ourselves to examine, at present, this mode of solving the difficulty, and we must decline making any use of the solution for the two following reasons. First, it has been our design, throughout the whole of this essay, not to interrupt the regular historical course of our investigation by the admixture of dogmatical principles. Secondly, it cannot be proved, that the fact of Christ's extraordinary conception, as it is definitely taught by both Matthew and Luke, is ever in the New Testament brought into connec-

[1] Einen positiven Hang zum Bösen, und einen Keim der Sünde, aus welchem sich dann die wirklichen Sünden entwickeln.

[2] See Note G, at the close.

[3] For the meaning of original sin, and the distinction between it and vitiosity, see note H, at the close.

[4] [See Knapp's Theol. IX. § 78. Storr and Flatt IV. § 75.—Tr.]

tion with the freedom of his nature from original sin. If the New Testament does not give this solution, it cannot be considered as authoritative, even though it have many an argument in its favor.

A reply now, somewhat like the following, might be made to this objection. 'Whatever shape may be given to the dogma of original sin, the doctrine of moral freedom must never be endangered by it. This doctrine we must hold fast, both in the sense in which it is taught in the Gospel, and also in the shape in which it is declared by our moral consciousness. For even if we have a propensity to evil, we are yet conscious every moment of an inextinguishable power, by which we can resist allurements to sin, and act virtuously. Without this immediate consciousness, there would be no exercise of the moral sense, and no imputation of moral qualities; for all moral judgments are founded on the conviction that we are both able and bound to avoid the evil, and perform the good. Now in this certainty of freedom, the supposition of which excludes all absolute necessity of sinning, we have the pledge, that it is possible to be a partaker of human nature, and yet to be without sin. For if the power of free-will is one, which can overcome the inclination to evil, and do what is right, in every individual case, then it also includes the possibility of doing right in all cases. It is therefore conceivable, that in some human being this possibility should be exemplified in actual fact.'—But this kind of exemption from sin presupposes an entirely uncorrupted and unweakened power of choice; and the existence of such a power is denied by the supposition of a universal corruption of human nature.[1]

The objection, therefore, which we are now considering, may perhaps be answered more satisfactorily in the following manner: 'It cannot be regarded as a truth of abstract reason that man must sin; nor even that he is infected by nature with a propensity, or bias to sin. Looking away from Revelation, we can be convinced of this bias cleaving to ourselves only by *experience*.'[2] By this experience, indeed, we are compelled to believe that the moral consciousness of every one may convince him of the weakness which exists in his own will. Still, on the other hand, if a rational being appears, who

[1] See Note I, at the close of this Treatise.

[2] Even Kant appeals to experience, when he would prove the existence of a bias to evil in human nature. Relig. innerh. der Gränzen der bl. Vernunft, 1. Cap. 3.

does not experience this moral failing, and who with vast mental power, and with cool discretion, bears testimony to his own perfection of virtue, then, unless this testimony be destitute of other criteria of truth, we have no reason to reject it. We have no reason, as sin must not be considered necessary to man, to refuse such testimony, even if, at first view, it be not entirely obvious how a being, who belongs to a corrupted race, can yet be free from the common corruption.

There is another objection. It is said,[1]—"So far as the virtue of Jesus was human, it must have had a mixture of the sensuous, from which no human resolution is entirely free; and in being thus subjected to a law of sense, there is such an imperfection, as is incompatible with the idea of absolute completeness of virtue." There is some truth in this idea. We cannot deny that the sensuous principle, which imparts excitement to the resolutions and acts, was intimately connected with the virtue of Jesus. We cannot deny it, so long as we suppose, that he had necessarily the same connection of soul with body, which other men have. It is not to be conceded, however, that in this sensuous element of the voluntary and of the external action, there is anything in itself evil and sinful. As soon as the last and highest impulse to the volition and the outward act goes forth from the appropriate leading power, from spirit (pneuma), the volition and the act are morally good; even if in the progress of these there be conjoined, as is inevitable, an excitement of the animal sensibilities. The excitement of sense is evil, only when in opposition to higher spiritual principles. But we do not find this opposition in Jesus, neither in suffering, nor in acting; and wherever, as the result of his human nature, any enticement arises from his animal sensibilities, the enticement is overpowered by the spiritual nature. If then an operation of the sensuous principle is exhibited in the conduct of Jesus, it is still in harmonious subordination to the ruling spiritual power. Now the excitements of this principle are actually essential to human nature; if we should suppose them to be at all sinful, we must ascribe the guilt to the author of them. That these sensuous impulses, however, operated unsuitably, even in a single instance, as the means of determining the will of Jesus, can in no way be shown.

Still less is it evident to me, how any one, without considering

[1] De Wette Christ. Mor. I. p. 188.

every created being as an apostate from God, and without adopting the representations of the oriental Gnostics and of Origen, how any one, I say, can speak of Jesus as "guilty in having a finite nature;" and can make the remark, that "as a human being, he must have been finite, and therefore a subject of the contractedness and guilt, which belong to the finite state, as such."[1] Every being, as is obvious, is perfect only according to his constitutional structure. The perfection of a finite nature is therefore by no means absolutely identical with the perfection of an infinite; the highest and purest human virtue is yet not the holiness of God, for this holiness is conjoined with the comprehensive whole of his nature and attributes. But the finite being is not guilty on account of this difference. Whatever corresponds with the origin and design of his constitution is right; all that belongs to pure humanity[2] is, as such, perfect. If we impute finiteness, as a sin, to a finite nature, then again the sin lies at the door of him who has actually made that nature as it is, made it not infinite. But yet the perfectly virtuous will of man, though it be finite, may correspond with the holy will of God, which is infinite; and the human, in the sphere of operation assigned it, may harmonize with the divine. This is all which we assert, when we ascribe to Jesus, in his mere human nature, innocence and holiness. Only when the finite will goes out of its appropriate sphere, does it become guilty for its finiteness, and just so far guilty, as it puts itself forward for something different from what it actually is, (and comes short of what it pretends to be.) This charge however is not brought against Jesus; at least not in the preceding objection.

Finally, it is still objected,[3] "The feeling of humility in the breast of Jesus resulted from the consciousness of being imperfect and circumscribed; and of having some vitiosity and guilt. This humility is an essential feature of the moral perfection of man; by it man purifies himself from the guilt cleaving to him; and therefore Jesus, when he humbles himself as a finite nature, before the heavenly Father, is in this respect also an example for us." But if a self-consistency must be ascribed to the character of the Messiah, we cannot admit this assertion. The same Jesus who declared himself free

[1] De Wette, Christ. Mor. I pp 189, 192.

[2] [Whatever belongs to the constitution of man as he came from the hand of God.—Tr.]

[3] Ibid I. p. 192

from every fault, who was confident of his oneness with God, who was immovably persuaded that in all his life he represented the character of his Father, could not have been humble on account of any, even the slightest feeling of moral deficiency and guilt. It was only from a generous condescension, that he was humble. It was only for the sake of being an example to the race, for the sake of attracting and elevating men to himself, by the power of a self-denying love. The general truth is, humility does not distinctively consist in the consciousness of our moral imperfections and faults; this is the feeling of guilt. Humility is the modest estimation of the good which belongs to ourselves, the mild judgment respecting others of inferior worth, and the conviction that none of the good which we possess is of our own acquisition, but is the gift of a higher power and love. And this humility we find in Jesus. He allowed no splendid exhibition of his high and peculiar excellences. He was always mild and condescending; so that he might bless the weakest with the beams of his light, and the power of a better life. And above all, in every thing which he said and did, he pointed to the fountain of truth and goodness; to the Father, who permitted the Son to have in himself, and to exhibit to man a heavenly life that was pure, perfect and self-sufficient.[1]

[1] It is indeed true, that the heaven of heavens is destitute of the degree of purity which belongs to God, and may therefore be called comparatively impure; and the angels are destitute of the degree of wisdom, which belongs to Him, and may therefore be charged with comparative folly; and all finite beings are necessarily, in the strictest sense of the term, imperfect, and are bound to feel and acknowledge their inferiority to Him, who only is absolute perfection. Hence the angels veil their faces before God, and fall prostrate. Hence Christ, as a man, was "meek and lowly," and cried "not as I will but as thou wilt." These created intelligences are perfect relatively to their capacities, but as they are not perfect in the absolute sense, they feel bound to appreciate their inferiority, as it really is. This heart-felt appreciation may be termed humility; a generic word, which, though it ordinarily includes the specific idea of penitence for sin, does not always, nor necessarily. See De Wette, Christian Morals, Vol. I. p. 192.—Tr.]

SECTION IX.

Concluding Remarks.—Jesus is the only perfect man.—Dependence of one part of our nature upon another.—Intellectual character of Jesus.—His testimony concerning the origin of his doctrine.—A revelation increases rather than decreases the mental activity of the recipient.—Faith a rational principle.

Even in view, then, of the preceding difficulties, the conviction of the pure sinlessness of Jesus remains unshaken; and he appears still more clearly before the mind's eye, as the realized ideal of the highest spiritual perfection, as the perfect image of holy, God-like humanity. But it is still necessary, that we make some concluding remarks, which are suggested by the principle that we have been endeavoring to establish.

In the first place, Jesus is the only one, of whom history testifies that he has lived without sin, pure and holy, and in respect of whom the truth of such testimony can be substantiated. Of all other men, even the best and noblest men, the most that can be said is, their failings were outweighed by their virtues; but of Jesus we can entertain the well-grounded belief, that he was altogether without fault and defect, and was the purest image of perfection. By this he stands out in the world's history, *alone*, as a moral wonder;[1] and, considered even as a mere man, he is lifted up above all other men, whose common lot it is to be imperfect. Pure innocence and holiness make a distinction between the character of Christ and that of all other men; a distinction not merely in degree, but in kind also, not for a brief period, but forever. The moral consciousness of every other mortal, tells him without gainsaying, that he is stained with sin. He feels the purity of his soul tarnished by the remem-

[1] "A man, who was subject, like other mortals, to every temptation to sin, and still fell not, was not defiled by the slightest breath of iniquity, wandered not once in his life, not even a hair's breadth, from the path of virtue; such a man is indeed no less a wonder in the moral world, than one raised from the grave, and lifted up with a visible body to heaven, is a wonder in the physical world." See ORELLI, on the controversy between Rationalism and Supernaturalism, p. 26.

brance and the continued operation of his earlier iniquities. He beholds himself at all times encompassed with imperfection, every instant exposed to the possibility of leaving the safe path of the divine will; and he is compelled to renounce the hope, that he shall attain, at least within the limits of the present life, perfect purity of virtue. On this height of the unclouded spiritual life, however, Christ is exalted. He is the pattern of humanity, to which indeed we may make an approximation, but to which we never completely raise ourselves. The figure of Jesus always moves above us in unattainable purity and dignity; and the more we model ourselves according to it, so much the higher is the standard it holds out for our endeavors. Truly the distance which every healthy eye discerns between ourselves and the Redeemer, a distance which is incalculable and which we shall never entirely pass over, ought to fill us all with the deepest and holiest awe of his person. It ought also to make us constantly mindful of our obligation to recognize in him an intellectual as well as moral nature, which, in the department of ethical and religious truth, has an altogether superior degree of knowledge, and on that account can make altogether peculiar pretensions. But this will be made still clearer to us by the second consideration which follows.

In whatever way the faculties of the mind may have been distinguished and separated, still, as a matter of fact, this mind is not partitioned out in the frame work which psychology has contrived, but is one simple spirit, which acts in various directions, and exhibits itself in various modes. The threads of the undivided, active spirit are so intertwined, that every impression affects in some way the whole soul; and every operation, even of an apparently isolated power, stands in some close connection with all the remaining powers. Never can the thinking faculty be in operation, without some influence upon the feeling and the will; nor can the faculty of will be in operation, without the activity of the intellect, and an excitement of the affections. This indivisible oneness of spirit then being considered, it is not conceivable that a soul should stand at the highest point of perfection in the department of morals and religion—a department which has immediate reference to the will and the conduct,—and yet should be subjected to imperfection and fault in the department of thought and knowledge. Perfection of act presuppo-

ses directly a like perfection of knowledge, and every defect in knowledge brings after it a corresponding fault in act. Experience indeed shows us, that the power of the soul may be brought forward principally in one direction, while it suffers manifest want in other directions. A man may, for example, have an excellent moral character, without especial culture of the memory, or taste for the fine arts. But there is a radical self-contradiction in supposing that in the very same province of the spiritual life, there may be an absolute perfection of practice, conjoined with an imperfection of theory. On the contrary, in this province a practical faultlessness presupposes a theoretical. Our most immediate concern with Jesus, as the founder of a religion, respects his moral and religious life merely; and it is precisely here, if anywhere, that thoughts and acts, theory and practice stand in inseparable interchange and connection. Every sin operates upon our thoughts, to dim them; and every error of moral principle imprints itself also, in some way, upon the will and the conduct. On the other hand, clearness of knowledge on moral subjects exerts a purifying influence upon the will, and the purification of the will makes still clearer the thoughts and the knowledge. Both applications of the mind, then, the theoretical and the practical, meet together, ultimately, at the innermost point of the character, and by means of this inseparable connection between the different parts of the character, both modes of applying the mind have, in their complete development, such a reciprocal influence, that every impression and every reaction in either department is communicated necessarily to the other department. If, therefore, the inmost principles of the soul, in its practical development, be pure and perfect, they must be likewise pure and perfect in its theoretical development, in the thoughts, in the knowledge. The same is true conversely. Holy innocence and unerring perception of the truth reciprocally imply each other. Jesus would not have discovered the truth in its full celestial purity, had not his soul been free from sin; neither could he have been holy, and free from sin, without the purest and most perfect perception of religious truth. His moral and his perceptive powers must develop themselves in true proportions, in pure, perfect and undisturbed harmony. If then we confide firmly and unconditionally in the moral perfection of Jesus, we are obliged in all reason to transfer the same confidence to his knowledge of truth, and the instructions which spring from it. If his life is to us a rule

of moral perfection, and a perpetual example, then his declarations on moral and religious subjects must be our rule of belief. If Jesus, as we do not doubt, was holy without a fault, so likewise was his knowledge correct without an error.[1]

Add to this, there is in a general view somewhat of a contradiction, between the acknowledgement, on the one hand, that Jesus was the purest and most elevated spirit, and, on the other, that he was subject to errors and weaknesses in his meditation on moral and religious subjects;—to such errors and weaknesses as would scarcely ever be chargeable upon a man of even inferior understanding.[2] It is well known that a venerable theologian, now in glory, has pointed out in full, what peculiarly noble qualities of mind and character were requisite, to devise a plan for the general blessedness of mankind, and to accomplish it as it was accomplished by Jesus. This theologian supposed it unreasonable to regard local and temporary causes, and the ordinary methods of human education, as sufficient to account for the development of that mind, which originally devised such a plan and executed it in such a way. Hence he infers, that Jesus was sent and sustained in an especial manner by God. If now we hesitate to follow Reinhard in this inference,[3] we must still consider it as a fact universally acknowledged, that we are not only allowed, but, as rational beings, are absolutely obliged to reverence most deeply the mind from which the new, all-embracing creation of the christian system proceeded. Indeed it was the noblest thought, and the most worthy of a divine being, to establish an order of things, by the operation of which, all mankind in all times and all lands, even to the remotest eternity, may be blessed. The mind, which was the first to embrace all human beings in its uncontracted view, the heart which was the first to beat for the salvation of the whole human brotherhood, must be called great, if anything can deserve that name. Nothing but a union of the greatest intellect with the most expanded heart made such a thought possible. And noble

[1] Consult Schleiermacher's Dogmat. 2. p. 223, and in other places; also his fourth Feast-day Sermon, referred to above, especially p. 96.

[2] [No private individual, of ordinary powers of mind, would, while in fact imperfect, have made such pretensions as Christ made to perfect virtue; would have been so ignorant of his true character, and of his relations to the divine law; or would have demanded such respect and reverence from others.]

[3] [See Reinhard's Plan, particularly Part III. and Appendix F.—Tr.]

as was the thought, the expression of it was equally bright and glorious. The brief, unostentatious, and altogether spiritual activity of Jesus has produced the deepest and the most wide-spread effects, for nearly two thousand years. These effects have extended over a great portion of mankind; and even now warrant the lively hope, that they will be extended, in still wider circles, over the whole race, and will carry freedom of spirit and the truths of a divine life to the most distant people. Never was there wrought a greater, more fundamental, more comprehensive change for the better, than that wrought by Jesus. At least, therefore, we are intellectually compelled to acknowledge, that he possessed a mind of the most profound and extensive views, and one from which effects have gone forth, that surpass everything in the history of the world, for purity, goodness and extent. Could now this greatest of men, with all his superiority of mental power, have been subject to the common errors of his time?—for to suppose that he accommodated himself to them with the conviction that they were errors, would imply that the origin of Jesuitism may be traced back to Jesus himself,—could the greatest clearness of thought have coëxisted with fanaticism and with dimness and confusion of view? Would not, rather, everything in the province of morals and religion, and especially would not his relation to the Godhead, have been clear and plain to him? But this mind, be it remembered, which conceived the great scheme that has blessed our race, protested in repeated instances and in various forms, that 'his instructions were not from himself but from God, who sent him; he spoke not his own words, but what the Father commanded him to teach, that only did he communicate to men.' With the same high self-confidence, which he displayed in speaking of his unspotted holiness, he declared that 'he came into the world for the purpose of testifying to the truth,' yea he designated himself expressly as 'the Truth!' All these expressions are found in the simplest prosaic style; and are almost universally so unambiguous, that, without a mingling of *a priori* principles in the interpretation, they would never be misunderstood. When Jesus says that he did not come into the world of himself (ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ), and did not teach of himself, neither the *usus loquendi*, nor the sound, simple intent of the passage, properly allows us to restrict the expression to this, that he did not teach with the desire and intention of aggrandizing himself; but the meaning is, that he came and taught for the furtherance of the di-

vine plan. Wherever then the phrase ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ λαλεῖν, or a similar one occurs, especially in the New Testament, it always denotes an expression, act, or something else, which proceeds from one's own merely subjective conviction, authority and power; in contradistinction from a remark or an act which proceeds from the authority, and under the influence of another. Precisely the same meaning is to be adopted, when Jesus very plainly contrasts the instruction and the deed, which proceed from himself (ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ), with the teaching of that which he had received from God, and the performance of that for which he had been commissioned and endowed by God. Equally unambiguous is the expression, "my doctrine is not mine, but his that sent me." The meaning is, 'my doctrine in its essential import was not conceived, discovered, developed by me, as a mere human being, and according to the laws of my human intellect; neither is it promulged barely on my own authority; but it originated from God, it sprung up under his influence and is confirmed by his authority.'[1] Had Jesus simply said, 'my doctrine is divine,' the meaning might perhaps have been explained thus, 'I have not come without a preparation from God for the doctrines which I teach, and these doctrines are fully worthy of God.' On this supposition, then, the instructions which the Saviour might have originated and arranged by his mere human intellect, were declared by him to be of divine origin, simply because they were the truth, and perhaps also because he had ascertained their truth providentially, as it is called, or in other words, under that general divine guidance, which extends to all who make discoveries in science, and advance the cause of virtue. But such an hypothesis is refuted by the plain and decisive contrast, *not* mine, *but* God's. In this phraseology the origin of Christ's instructions from his own human intellect is obviously placed in opposition to their having originated from the Deity; their origin from the former source is denied, from the latter asserted. It is therefore maintained by Jesus himself, and in the full sense of the terms, that his instructions were derived from God.

[1] Much that might be said on this subject, has been so thoroughly discussed in two recent works, that no further elucidation is needed. A complete argument, and one extending into very minute particulars, is given by Süskind, in his historical and exegetical Inquiry, In what sense did Jesus assert the Divinity of his Religious and Moral Instructions?—A shorter exegetical solution is given by Schott, in his Letters on Religion and the Christian Revelation. Jena, 1826, p. 115 seq.

When Christ says, further, that he came 'to bear witness to the truth, that he himself is the Truth,'[1] he employs the word, truth, not by any means to denote a moral system, which, though excellent, is mingled somewhat with the errors, follies, and superstitions of his age; but he employs it to denote the complete system of pure and authentic doctrine; he intends to assert, that he makes known to men all the knowledge of moral and religious truth which they need, and which will at the same time make them blessed, if it be received in its vitality.

If we will not trust the simple assurance of Jesus, we must maintain that a fanatical self-delusion led him to ascribe to God the origin of doctrines, which, in their spirit and essential import, he had discovered and proclaimed by the force of his own genius. We must reply however to such a charge, that a self-delusion, like this, does not comport with the clear, discreet and penetrating mind of the Saviour. There can be no doubt, that such a mind as his might distinguish easily, between that which developed itself from the depths of his own soul, by the use of his own powers, and that which came to him from another and higher source. Knowing that he could clearly make this distinction, we should expect nothing else than that he would truly and plainly communicate to us what he believed to be the fact. At all events, no one but himself was able to give satisfactory information about the origin and source of his instructions; none but he knew his own inward condition, and the relation of his spirit to the Spirit of all spirits. The testimony of so great and clear-minded a lover of truth should, then, have more weight with us than all the theories which can be fabricated, after the lapse of eighteen hundred years. Must not Jesus have known what existed and took place within himself, better than we know? Must not the self-consciousness of so extraordinary a mind, when it expressed itself about its internal history, have a more decisive voice than our own surmises and thoughts upon the subject?

We have no desire to investigate here the *manner* in which divine truth was communicated to Jesus, nor the internal connection which subsisted, in this respect, between his spirit and the Father. Even Jesus himself gives us no decisive information on this subject. It is not essential to know the *mode*, in which he obtained his doctrines; it is only essential to know the *fact*, that these doctrines

[1] See Note K, at the close.

were from God; that in their essential import they were the product, not of a mere human mind, contracted, subject to error, but of the Divine Mind, which is absolutely true, which is the perfect Reason. But in whatever way we may seek to determine the precise manner in which truth was revealed to Jesus, it seems to me by no means necessary to suppose, that the individual activity of his soul was in any manner superseded by the fact of his being inspired, and that he was reduced to a mere passive instrument. On the other hand I am fully convinced, that the idea of receiving supernatural revelations from God, perfectly agrees with the supposition of the freest, liveliest, and most exalted mental activity in the recipient. Every communication to the intellect is designed and adapted to excite and invigorate it; and provided the communication be of a proper kind, it advances the soul to a purer knowledge and an elevated life. It can be no otherwise with that form of communication to the intellect, which we call revelation; and plainly, if we suppose the receiver of such revelation to be merely passive, we introduce into the idea something entirely impertinent. If we cannot conceive of the primitive act of revelation, as performed otherwise than by means of the inspired man's own activity,—and this activity purified, exalted, ennobled by being thus employed; so neither can we suppose, that the truths thus revealed, can be propagated without the individual activity of the minds to which they are addressed. Never are the truths of revelation properly received by us, without the free exercise of our own mental powers. Such a reception of them always tends to exalt, purify, and invigorate the whole intellectual life, and the rational thought not less than the pure sentiment and will.

Faith, therefore, in Jesus and his instructions, when it is of the right character, is not a blind, limping, spiritless deference to mere authority; it is a new germ of life, which is planted in our spirits, so that, in its free unfolding, it may bring forth the richest blossoms and fruits. We may indeed be justified in yielding to the bare word of him, who, unlike every other man, is perfectly innocent and holy, and therefore, in the knowledge of divine things, unerring. This is a kind of faith, however, which is not blind, and does not sacrifice the reason of man. It is founded directly on our rational, our moral constitution; and on the sound principle, that a soul which is perfectly sinless and good, which dwells in the purest union with Deity, will be capable of a clearness and a perfection of religious know-

ledge, such as no other intellect can attain. And if, penetrated with this persuasion, we receive certain instructions as true, which Jesus gave, receive them at first barely for the sake of the person who gave them; yet by no means are we precluded, by this faith, from subsequently retaining the same truths on the ground of their inherent excellence, for their own sake as well as their author's: nor are we precluded from searching after the inward principles which support them. Far from it. There is, on the one hand, in the spiritual truths themselves, which the Bible exhibits, something that allures to still further development; something that has a quickening influence on the mind; and, so far forth, revelation is incessantly effecting an improvement in the intellectual character of the race. There is, on the other hand, in the mind itself, a necessity of working over, in its own thoughts, the truth that is presented to it, and of making continual advances from what is obscure to what is obvious. In no way, however, can that which we believe on the bare authority of Jesus, contravene the laws of our own intellect. On the contrary, we ever feel ourselves bound to receive his doctrines, under the previous supposition, that they are the outflowings of the highest, the absolute, the divine Reason, from which have proceeded not only these truths, but also the nature, the laws, and the necessities of our own narrow, but yet divinely-related intellect. We feel assured that there is a preëstablished harmony between revelation and the human soul; and we are convinced that there will be discovered, at the last, a most exact agreement between the truths revealed by the divine reason, and the laws which regulate the human. It must be understood, however, as a condition of this agreement, that the human reason is to be in the right train of investigation; of pure-minded investigation, originating from the noblest cravings of the soul, excited by God-like impulses of truth, and therefore equally profound and modest.

NOTES BY THE TRANSLATOR.

NOTE A, Page 392.

The argument drawn from the moral character of the writers and the doctrines of the Bible, appears to increase in its relative importance, as the sensibilities of men become more refined. There are multitudes, whose attention must be aroused by the exhibition of wonders, and whose heart must be assaulted violently, or it will not be benefited at all. But there are others, who are more effectually subdued by the still small voice. The argument from miracles, meeting as it does a demand of the human soul, is by no means to be undervalued; and yet this is not the kind of proof, to which the majority of cordial believers in the Bible are, at the present day, most attached. They have neither the time nor the ability to form an estimate of the historical evidence, that favors or opposes the actual occurrence of miracles. They know the Bible to be true, because they feel it to be so. The excellence of its morality, like a magnet, attracts their souls; and sophistry, which they cannot refute, will not weaken their faith, resulting as it does from the accordance of their higher nature with the spirit of the Bible. The internal argument in favor of Christianity is also recommended by its moral influence. The full exhibition of it is a melting appeal to the heart; and as the heart becomes the more susceptible, the argument becomes the more convincing. With the unlettered Christian, then, the moral evidence for the Bible is the more effectual, because the more simple; with the educated Christian it is so, because the more dignified. It may be questioned, indeed, whether the argument from miracles is not logically dependent, for its complete force, on its connection with the argument from the moral nature of Christianity. Was not the former argument designed to operate in conjunction with the latter; and does it not, when severed from that union, fail to afford *full* conviction? We have read of wonders performed ostensibly for a bad object, and also of wonders performed in mere frivolity. Can any evidence whatever, in favor of these anomalies, fully convince the mind of their real occurrence, *as miracles?* Can we be fully satisfied, that miracles have occurred, while we view them as mere naked phenomena, abstracted from their connection with a divine government, from any and every moral object to be attained by them? As the proof of the inspiration of the Bible is, in the logical order, subsequent to the proof of the existence and government of God, we certainly have a right to decline a controversy on the former subject, until our opponent has conceded the fundamental truths relating to the latter. When he has conceded these, we may connect with them the external argument for inspiration. The controversy between Campbell and Hume shows the disadvantage, under which any one must labor, who attempts to prove the occurrence of miracles as *insulated facts*, or to dispute on their credibility with one who denies the first principles of

natural religion. And when Campbell intermingles with the abstract discussion, as he often does, references to the actual or possible design of a moral Governor in producing the disputed phenomena, he may be censured perhaps for diverging from the line of argument, which he at first intended to pursue; but may be approved for practically acknowledging, that wonders, so great as those recorded in the Bible, must be viewed in some connection with a worthy moral end to be answered by them, or they will not command the *full* assent of the intellect. Consult, however, on the general subject, Hume's Ess. on Mir., and Campbell's Reply. Erskine on Int. Ev. pp. 110—129. Brown on Cause and Effect, Notes E. and F. Paley's Ev. (Prep. Consid). Price's Diss. pp. 384—464. Butler's Anal. II. 7. Starkie on Evidence, I. pp. 471—475. Whateley's Rhet. P. I. Ch. 2. § 4, and 3. § 4. Abercrombie on Int. Powers, P. 2. S. 3, particularly pp. 77—86.

NOTE B, p. 394.

The following explanation of terms, which is taken from Bretschneider's Entwickelung, § 90. pp. 520—524, may throw light upon the phraseology of Ullmann, in this, and in subsequent parts of his treatise. "Sin, peccatum, denotes, in the theological usage, sometimes a property (or attribute) of the free being himself, sometimes a property of his feelings and acts. The former is sin in the *abstract;* the latter, sin in the *concrete.* (Cicero, paradox. III. says, "to sin is, as it were, to pass over the lines; the doing of which is cause of blame." Peccare therefore is the same as *παραβαίνειν.* Salmasius derives peccatum and peccare from pecus: "more pecudum, sine ratione agere." Gellius, however, and Isidorus derive it from pellicatus, because adultery was first called sin by the ancients, and the name was afterward extended to all kinds of iniquity.) Sin, in the *abstract,* is the want of coincidence between the state of free beings and the commands of God, or, which is the same thing, the object for which those beings were created. It is "illegality, or want of conformity with the law,"[1] Calov. V. p. 14, or "the want of agreement with the law,"[2] Reinhard, Dogm. p. 267. ['He is said to sin,' says Henke, 'who deviates from the divine law either in feeling or in action. The rule of right is the divine law, or the pleasure of God made known to men, concerning that which is to be done or avoided. Bret. Dogm. II. pp. 5, 6.—Tr.] Perhaps, however, the term vitiosity rather than the term sin should be applied to the abstract idea; the term sin being most frequently used in the concrete. [See Note G, following.—Tr.] This simple and popular idea is expressed by John, 1st Epist. 3: 4, "sin is the transgression of the law;" and all the terms employed in the Scriptures respecting sin, include the distinctive mark of opposition to the law, over-stepping the rule, or disobedience to the rule. Thus the most usual word, *ἁμαρτάνειν* means "to miss one's aim," and Suidas explains the word *ἁμαρτία* by the phrase,

[1] Illegalitas, aut difformitas a lege.

[2] Absentia convenientiae cum lege.

failure from moral good, aberration from the right path, from one's aim.[1] The same is also expressed by the Hebrew חֲטָא. Other expressions are עָוֹן, that which is perverted, crooked, deviating from rule;[2] שְׁגָגָה, error, wandering from the right aim and way; רָע, *κακία, πονηρία,* that which is wrong in itself, bringing perdition; רֶשַׁע, making confusion, worthy of punishment. Particularly deserving of notice are the figurative terms denoting a falling away from the law, or a stepping over it, as פֶּשַׁע, מֶרֶד, מְשׁוּבָה, מָעַל, *παράπτωμα, παράβασις, ἀποστασία, παρακοή,* and such like. But sin is not only predicated of acts which are contrary to the law, but also of feelings, as in Matt. 9: 4. Mark 7: 21, and of the whole state of the man, so far as it does not agree with the commands of God; Rom. 7: 17. 5: 12. 6: 1 seq. 1 John 1: 8. John 8: 34.

Sin, in the *concrete*, is every feeling or act of a free being, which is contrary to the known law; "the free motions and actions that are not in agreement with the divine law."[3] Doederlein, Inst. Vol. II. p. 99.

In a more exact development of the idea of sin, we must distinguish between the *material* of it, and the *formal*. The material implies a law given or promulged, (Rom. 4: 15. 5: 3), and a feeling or deed at variance with it. This has also been called *objective* sin (Doederlein, Inst. II. p. 100); and to it belong all those feelings and acts, which we exercise or perform while we are not in a state of moral freedom.[4] Perhaps this might be called *metaphysical sin*. The formal consists in the knowledge of the law, and such a deviation from the law, as is made in the exercise of free will, i. e. in a rational state. The formal is *subjective sin*, which the man must also acknowledge to be sin; or it is *moral*, such as may be imputed. From the formal originates guilt; reatus, that is "the state of being obnoxious to punishment, or to the suffering which proceeds from fault."[5] (Mosheim, Elem. Theolog. Dogmat. I. p 589.) This guilt (exposedness to punishment) follows from the imputation of the sin; i. e. "from the judgment, in which we affirm that any one is the author of anything, which was done deliberately,"[6] Reinhard, Dogm. p. 291, or the "judgment by which any one is held chargeable with a fault."[7] [For an explanation of this distinction between the material and the formal, see also Bretschneider, Dogm. Vol. II. p. 5. See Rom. 4: 15. 5: 13.—Tr.]

The opposite of sin is virtue, or the harmonious relation of our feelings and acts to the divine law. It is piety, the fear of God (pietas, *εὐσέβεια, φόβος τοῦ θεοῦ*), if reverence for God, and desire to please him, which is

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[1] "*Η τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ ἀποτυχία,* aberratio a recto, a scopo.

[2] Abnorme.

[3] Motus et actus liberi legi divinae haud consentanei.

[4] Deren wir uns in einem unfreien Zustande schuldig machen.

[5] Obligatio ad poenam, aut, obligatio ad malum sustinendum, quod ex culpa nascitur.

[6] Judicium, quo affirmamus, aliquem esse rei cujusdam, in quam deliberatio cadit auctorem.

[7] Judicium quo quis culpae reus habetur.

holiness, (ἁγιοσύνη, sanctimonia), if the feeling of the absolute worthiness of virtue and the unworthiness of sin be the ruling motive. In virtue also, as in sin, we may distinguish the matter and the form. This distinction may also be expressed by the words legality and morality, illegality and immorality. Legality is the agreement of our actions with the law; morality is that harmony of our actions with the law, which proceeds from motives that have a moral character. This distinction is designated in the symbolical books by the expressions, justitia civilis, and justitia spiritualis; and also, justitia externa, and justitia interna. By the former term is understood the external decency of the act, according to which it agrees with the law; by the latter, the internal morality of the act, according to which it proceeds from a knowledge of God, and of goodness, and from pure love to both."

Though we would not be considered as resting on the authority of Bretschneider, we would simply repeat the substance of his definitions, so far as they affect our present object. It appears, then, that all "subjective sin," all "moral sin," all such sin as can be imputed to the sinner as blame-worthy, consists in 1, an act; 2, a voluntary act; 3, a voluntary act in violation of law; 4, a voluntary act in violation of *known* law; that all other kinds of sin, such for instance as constitutional tendency, are *objective* or *metaphysical*, but not moral, such as its possessor cannot charge upon himself as matter of blame, though it may subject him, as is supposed by some, to punishment. Justice, one would think, must require that the punishment for metaphysical sin be metaphysical punishment; that putative ill-desert be followed by merely putative penalties; or in the words of the schoolmen, "aequum aequo." If all sin consists in sinning, then there may indeed be *pain*, but there cannot be *punishment*, without a previous act of the will against known law.

NOTE C, p. 395.

If the only sin, chargeable upon man, is "a free act which is opposed to the divine law, or which deviates from it," (Knapp, Art. 9. § 73. 1), and if the divine law requires every man to love God with the whole heart, then it is one and the same thing to say, that a man is guilty of no sin, and to say that he perfectly complies with the requisition of supreme love.—If the law requires that, at every moment of our moral existence, we have some form of a desire to promote the glory of God, then a man who does not deviate from this law, must always have some form of a holy desire. The nature of a moral being, prevents the possibility of his avoiding a positive compliance, or else a positive refusal of compliance with every known claim of law. If he be supposed to prefer a state of neutrality above a state of decided subjection or rebellion, then, in that very preference, he rebels against the command to be decided for God. If the will of a man be dormant, then the man, considered merely in reference to his state of dormancy, is not a moral being. If the will be in exercise, then its most innocent state is that of choosing to be neither for nor against God, rather than to be against him; and yet

to choose, specifically, not to be for him, is as real disobedience as to choose, specifically, to be against him. The two acts of choice are essentially the choice of evil rather than good.

"Actual sins are divided into sins of commission, i. e. positive sins, such as are committed against the law forbidding; and sins of omission, i. e. negative, such as are committed against the law commanding. Reinhard, p. 313. Matt. 25: 24—30. 42—45. This division is not accurate, and depends on a difference in the use of language, rather than a difference in the nature of the thing. For every commission of evil is, at the same time, an omission of the good opposed to it; and vice versa. The distinction however, in practice, is a useful one; see James 4: 17." Bretschneider, Entwickelung § 91. 1. a.

NOTE D, p. 396.

"If it should be *impossible* for a man to live otherwise than virtuously, or if his virtue should be necessary, it would have no value and no merit. All freedom, in that case, would vanish, and man would become a mere machine. The virtue of Christ, then, in resisting steadfastly all the temptations to sin, acquires a real value and merit, only on admission that he could have sinned:" Knapp's Theol. Art. 10. § 93. 3. B. b. If then the value of holiness in a creature is entirely taken away by the supposition of the creature's absolute inability to sin, why does not the same supposition of necessary holiness in the Creator entirely take away the value of that holiness? Does the impossibility of sinning, ascribed to the Deity in Heb. 6: 18, differ in kind, or only in degree, from the impossibility of doing right, ascribed to sinners in John 6: 44? Are there not, in the Bible and elsewhere, many instances in which God is with propriety represented as being unable, in the figurative sense, to do what he is, by confession of all, able in the literal sense to do? If man, as a moral agent, was created in the image of God, how can he have a power of doing what he certainly will not do, while yet his Prototype has no such power? Which is the more honorable to Jehovah, to suppose that he will always, with infallible certainty, choose, as a free agent, to do right, or that he will do right, because he has no ability to do otherwise? Does not our author in his remarks on the power of acting wrong, which was essential to Christ as a moral agent, seem to overlook that certainty of acting right, which was as infallible in Christ, as if he could not have acted otherwise?

Our sentiment of reverence for the Saviour is repelled perhaps by the assertion, that he could have done wrong; but is it not because we associate with the phrase, power to sin, some degree (however small) of reason to suspect that the power will be exercised in actual sinning? And is there anything repulsive in the statement, that every holy being in the universe has a power to be unholy; unless we consider this power as something more than a constituent element of moral agency, as something which involves more or less of a reason to suspect, that what *can* be, *will* in fact be? It is perfectly easy, as it should seem, to keep distinct the two ideas of an agent's

ability to act either way, right or wrong, and an uncertainty whether he will act in this or that way, right or wrong; it is perfectly consistent to affirm the former, and to deny the latter in reference to the same being; to affirm the one, as an element of his moral nature, and to deny the other, as the excellence of his character. It is from a habit of confounding these two ideas; of supposing that a power to act either way, right or wrong, involves an uncertainty in which way the being will really act, that the assertion of a power in all the holy beings of heaven to become unholy, seems to derogate from the firm and ever undeviating holiness of those beings. The assertion should rather lead us to reverence such exalted natures, as, with all the liberty which moral agents can possess, will *choose*, will ever persevere in choosing the best course.

The last sentence in the paragraph connected with this note, may be translated in the following manner. "Sinlessness only presupposes, that the development, which Jesus made of human (goodness or) virtue, went on without any hindrance or interruption, resulting from his power to choose between good and evil; (or in respect to his choosing between good and evil.")

NOTE E, pp. 398, 399.

There may be some readers of this treatise, who are not so familiar, as Ullmann would suppose, with the early heathen and Jewish testimony respecting the Messiah. A brief view of it may be, therefore, not entirely useless.

The Epistle of Abgarus, King of Edessa to Jesus, and the Rescript of the latter to the former, have long been considered a forgery. The Acts of Pontius Pilate, and his Letter to Tiberius, have likewise been so considered by many. The Acts now extant are doubtless spurious. That Pilate ever gave to his Government or to his countrymen, a written expression of his opinion concerning the Messiah, rests on no authority, but that of some early christian writers, none of whom assert that they had seen his Acts or Letter. Justin Martyr in his First Apology, about A. D. 140, refers to the Acts of Pilate twice. Tertullian in his Apology, about A. D. 200. says, "Of all these things," i. e. the crucifixion and resurrection of Christ, "Pilate, in his conscience a Christian, sent an account to Tiberius, then Emperor." He also makes another statement, the substance of which is contained in the following abstract of a passage in Eusebius. (Eccl. Hist. B. 2. Ch. 2.) This historian asserts, chiefly however on the poor authority of Tertullian, that as it was customary for the Roman Governors to write to the Emperor an account of any remarkable events, which had occurred within their respective provinces, so Pilate wrote to Tiberius an account of the miracles of Christ, and of his death and resurrection; that Tiberius consequently proposed to the Roman Senate to place Jesus among their gods, "as he was already believed by many to be a god;" that the Senate, who exclusively had the power to deify, refused assent to this proposal, their alleged reason being the complimentary one, that Tiberius himself had once

declined the honor of deification; that the Emperor, though obliged to acquiesce in this decision, still remained favorable to the Christians, and discouraged persecution against them. The evidence for and against the credibility of this narration, is given at length in Lardner's Works, Vol. VI. pp. 605—620. Lardner himself seems to judge of it too favorably.

The five different methods, which Pilate adopted of showing his reluctance to condemn Jesus, are a sufficient testimony of his esteem for the character of his prisoner; and are so much the more convincing, as his moral sensibilities were not such as to be excited by any ordinary exhibitions of virtue. When we consider the irascibility of his temper, and the independent spirit of Christ's replies to him, it seems probable that he would not have brooked such answers from any man of less commanding virtue. But of Pilate's character, more will be said at the close of this note.

The notices, which the Roman historians have given of Christ and his system, furnish less of direct information, than of matter for inference. What they say of Christianity will suggest their opinion of its author.

Tacitus, speaking of "Pomponia Graecina, a lady of eminent quality," says that she was "accused of practising a foreign superstition," (superstitionis externae rea), Ann. B. XIII. ch. 32. This "foreign superstition" is supposed by Lipsius, and others, to have meant the christian religion.—Again, after speaking of the great fire at Rome in the year 64, he says, Nero "inflicted the most cruel punishments upon those people who were held in abhorrence for their crimes, and whom the common people called Christians. They received their name from Christus, who, in the reign of Tiberius, was put to death as a criminal by the Procurator, Pontius Pilate. This pernicious superstition, though checked for a while, broke out again, and spread, not only over Judea, the source of this evil, but reached the city of Rome also, whither flow from all quarters, all things vile and shameful, and where they are practised (celebrantur). At first they only were apprehended, who confessed themselves of that sect; afterwards, by their information, a vast multitude were apprehended; and they were condemned, not so much for the crime of burning the city, as for their enmity to mankind."—"At length these men, though really criminal and deserving exemplary punishment, began to be commiserated; as people who were destroyed not from regard to the public welfare, but merely to gratify the cruelty of one man." Ann. B. XV. Ch. 44. The enmity to the human race, of which Tacitus accuses the Christians, is probably nothing more than their neglect of the common Pagan worship, and the apparent singularity of their religious faith.

Suetonius says of Claudius, "He banished the Jews from Rome, who were continually making disturbances, Chrestus being their leader." Life of Claud. Ch. 25. See Acts 18: 2. Christ was often called Chrestus by the Romans; and the Jews and Christians, (Chrestiani as they were often called), were regarded, by Pagans generally, as one and the same class. In his life of Nero, Ch. 16, Suetonius says, "The Christians were punished; a sort of men of a new and magical superstition;" (superstitionis novae et maleficae; which last word Mosheim considers equivalent to the word, exitiabilis, in the above-quoted passage from Tacitus, and there translated

pernicious.) Suetonius speaks, with apparent complacency, of the persecutions which the Christians endured.

Pliny the Younger, in his celebrated letter to the Emperor Trajan, written A. D. 107, expresses himself with an indefiniteness like that of the preceding historians, in reference to "the contagion of the (Christian) superstition." He says, that he has never been present at any of the trials of Christians, and therefore does not exactly know what is the subject matter of punishment, or of inquiry. He does not know whether men ought to be punished merely for the fact that they bear the name of Christians, when they are detected in no crime, or whether they should be punished for nothing but the crimes connected with the name. Some who have been arraigned as Christians, he says, recanted their principles at the trial, repeated an invocation to the gods, made supplication to the image of the Emperor, which, with other statues, was brought out for that purpose, and reviled the name of Christ: "none of which things, it is reported, they who are really Christians can by any means be compelled to do." He concludes his letter with the well known description of the only fault or error acknowledged by the new sect; i. e. 'their meeting on a stated day, before light, and singing, one after another, among themselves, a hymn to Christ as a god,' their frequent partaking without any disorder, of a social meal, their mutual pledge to commit no crime, etc. etc.

The passages in Josephus, which allude to the Saviour, are found in his Antiquities, XVIII. Ch. 3. § 3. and XX. Ch. 9. § 1. The former passage only has been deemed an interpolation. The genuineness of it, however, has been defended by many, and with singular ability by C. G. Bretschneider. See Trans. of his defence in Bibl. Repos. Vol. IV. pp. 705—711, and Ch. Spec. 1825. The following are Bretschneider's versions of the two passages.

"At this time lived Jesus, a wise man; if indeed it be proper to call him a man. For he performed astonishing works, and was a teacher of such as delight in receiving the truth: and drew to himself many of the Jews and many also of the Gentiles. This was he who is (called) Christ. And when Pilate, at the instance of the chief men among us, had caused him to be crucified, still those who had once loved him, did not cease to love him. For on the third day he again appeared unto them alive; divine prophets having foretold these and ten thousand other wonderful things respecting him. And even to this day, that class of persons, who were called by him *Christians*, have not become extinct."

"Ananus assembled a council of judges, and having brought before them the brother of Jesus, called Christ, (whose own name was James), and certain others, and having accused them of violating the laws, he delivered them over to be stoned."

The character of Pilate, a correct appreciation of which is important for understanding the history of our Saviour's trial, may be learned from Winer's Bib. Realwörterbuch, Art. Pilate, and the authorities there mentioned. The following is a translation of the passage in Philo, referred to on page 399, of this volume.

"Pilate was Procurator of Judea. Not so much out of favor to Tiberius

as hatred of the Jews, he dedicated gilt shields, and placed them in Herod's palace, within the holy city. There was no figure upon them, nor any thing else that was forbidden, except a certain needful inscription, containing the name of the person who dedicated them, and of the person to whom they were dedicated.—When this transaction was noised abroad, the people petitioned that the shields, thus newly introduced, might be taken away, that their hereditary customs, which had been kept safe through so many ages by kings and emperors, might not be violated. He opposed their wishes with roughness, as he was a man of inflexible temper, arrogant and implacable. They then cried out, "Do not you excite sedition and war! Do not you put an end to our peace! The Emperor is not honored by treating our ancient laws with disrespect. Do not make him, then, a pretext for injuring our nation. He does not wish to have any of our usages abolished. If you say that you have received any edict or letter, or any thing of the kind from the Emperor, produce it, that we may cease troubling you with the matter, and by ambassadors may entreat the Emperor to revoke his command." This last exasperated Pilate very much; for he was afraid that if they should send an embassy, they would prove against him many mal-administrations of his government: his pronouncing judgment under the influence of bribes, his abusive conduct, his extortion, his violence, his injustice, his oft-repeated slaughters of men who had not been condemned, his inhuman cruelty. Feeling angry and implacable, Pilate now could not tell what to do. On the one hand, he neither dared to remove what had been dedicated, nor was he willing to do anything for the gratification of men who were his subjects; and on the other hand, he was not ignorant of the firmness of Tiberius in things of this kind. When the chief men of the nation saw his perplexity, and also that he repented of what he had done, but did not wish to have his sorrow perceived, they wrote to Tiberius the most supplicatory letters. When the emperor had read these letters, what did he say of Pilate? What did he threaten? It is needless to narrate how angry he became; the event itself declares; and yet he was not easily irritated. The event was, that immediately, even on that very day, he wrote a letter to Pilate, rebuked him severely for his recent audacious proceeding, and commanded him to remove the shields forthwith. Accordingly they were removed from the metropolis to Cesarea by the sea-side, called Sebaste, in honor of your great grand-father (Augustus); that they might be placed in the temple consecrated to him there. In that temple they were deposited." Letter of Agrippa the Elder to Caligula; in Philo Jud., de Virt. et Leg. ad Caj., Works, Vol. II. pp. 589, 590. This account from Philo is remarkably similar to one in Josephus, Ant. XVIII. Ch. 3. § 1. Instances like these, (supposing them to have been two different events), and like that of Pilate's attempting to bring a current of water into Jerusalem, (recorded in Jos. Ant. XVIII. Ch. 3. § 2), must have convinced the Prefect, how dangerous it was to oppose the religious prejudices of the Jews; and thus excite them to complain of his mal-administration to the Emperor. They will, therefore, serve to account for the fear which he manifested during several parts of our Saviour's trial. See John 19: 7, 8. 19: 12, etc.

NOTE F, pp. 437—439, 415, 416.

Perhaps there is no better method of investigating any theory than by examining the converse modes of exhibiting it. Take, for example, the statement that free agency implies a power, existing in its possessor, to choose what he does in fact refuse, and to refuse what he does in fact choose. The power to sin, as possessed by every moral being who is now and ever will be free from sin, illustrates the power to be perfect, as possessed by every moral being who is now not only imperfect but entirely sinful. As the power of sinning is entirely consistent with an infallible certainty of not sinning; so the power of becoming and remaining free from all sin, is entirely consistent with an infallible certainty of remaining forever sinful. As the statement that the elect angels, that the Saviour, that even the Deity, have the ability to do what any other moral agent can do, is often condemned for its apparent disrespect to the character of God, so the statement that the evil angels, and all the non-elect have the ability to repent, is often condemned for its apparent disrespect to the divine purposes, and its assumption of human independence. Both the statements however are condemned unjustly. It has been already remarked, (Note D.), that the power of the highest orders of holy beings to sin, is connected with an infallible certainty, that the power will not be exercised in actual sinning; so it may be remarked, that the power of man to be perfect is connected with the same kind of certainty, that this power will not, during the present life, be exercised in this perfect obedience. It seems unreasonable to insinuate that the doctrine of natural ability to do whatever God has required, is at all inconsistent with man's inveterate unwillingness to do it, and his consequent entire dependence on the special interposition of the Holy Spirit.

Such remarks, however, as those of Ullmann on pages 437—9, oblige us to confess, that evangelical divines, insisting on the exact equality between the power of man and his obligation, do sometimes include in this power, such a degree of contingency, as would render it always uncertain, whether the possible will not be also the actual. The mere possession of an ability is regarded, tacitly at least, as some evidence that the ability will be developed in this or that way! Because man can be perfect, there is thought to be some ground for expecting, or at least suspecting, that he will in fact and in this life be perfect! And because he has faculties adequate to all that is demanded of them, he is called upon to confide in himself, and cherish "faith in human nature."

While we would condemn such a style of reasoning as is pursued on pages 437—439, and such phraseology as is employed there, and also on pages 415, 416, such for example as "faith in human nature," (Glaube an die Menschheit), we would still choose to stop, in our condemnation, at the proper bounds. There is no error, believed by man, which is not mingled with some truth; and the remarks of Ullmann, however untrue as well as unfortunate in some respects, are yet pervaded by a sentiment, not only correct but important. If, in our theories, we extend the depravity of man be-

yond its real province; if we deny the innocence of some of his natural desires; if we abjure all confidence in the decisions of his moral sense; if we deny the adaptedness of divine truth to exert a hopeful influence on his constitutional susceptibilities; if we reject the idea that he works out his own salvation simultaneously with his being influenced by God; if we insist on his passivity and dependence, so as to exclude his activity and freedom in the renovation of his soul; above all, if we forget the fact, that the Spirit of converting love never intermits his watch and care over the race, but stands ready to hear the faintest cry for help, and to inspire the prayer which he afterwards answers; we shall benumb our own sensibility, and shall labor with diminished zeal and skill for the accomplishment of the divine promises. There is always danger, lest, in our zeal for the letter of a human creed, we lose the spirit of the Bible; and in wishing to make out a strong case of human depravity, we bereave ourselves of some of the choice sentiments of our religious being. There is sad reason to believe, that one class of good men, at the present day, overlook man's need, in their zeal for his possessing a moral nature; and another class overlook his real agency, in their zeal for his being governed by his Maker. Meditating disproportionally on what God has given to man, some almost forget how obstinate man is in abusing all these gifts. Meditating too exclusively on our depraved and dependent state, others are inclined to respect our constitution as little as our character, and they impute sin to all that we are, as well as all that we do. Now there can be but little doubt, that those, who wish to produce a strong impression of man's guilty helplessness, would succeed better than they have as yet done, if they would insist more frequently upon those noble powers, which are unremittingly abused, and which are essential to man's aggravated sinfulness. There can be but little doubt, also, that those who wish to commend the doctrine of ability commensurate with duty, would sooner dispel the prejudices that oppose them, if they would insist more on what they firmly believe, the undeviating tendency of the natural heart to turn all its power of well doing into the channel of evil doing. The whole truth, just as it is, must be believed, or we cannot unite evangelical activity with rational dependence. The powers of man must be acknowledged to exist, or he will not feel his responsibility and his guilt. His inveterate unwillingness to do what of good he can do, must be exhibited fully, or he will be tempted to regard his capabilities as in themselves virtuous, which would be as irrational as to regard them sinful. The fault, so far as there is any fault, in two of the evangelical parties, who are jealous of each other in reference to the doctrine of natural ability, seems to be, not so much that either party believes what is positively false, as that each party is somewhat inclined to insist on merely half of what is true. The charge of positive heresy, when made by either party against the other, appears to be gratuitous, and even if made from good motives, is productive of but few good results.

NOTE G, p. 439, 440.

The word Sündhaftigkeit is used in distinction from Sünde, just as vitiositas is used in distinction from vitium, and vitiosity from sin. Sündhaftigkeit is the abstract; Sünde is the concrete. Sundhaftigkeit denotes the state of a person who acts sinfully; Sünde denotes the sinful act itself. "Every departure," says Bretschneider, "which we make in a state of freedom, from the design of our being, or, which is the same thing, from the known will of God, is sin in the concrete, actual sin, Sünde, peccatum; and the tendency to such a departure is sin in the abstract, Sündhaftigkeit, vitiositas." And again: "The general definition of sin, (Sünde) is therefore, every deviation from the law of God (1 John 3: 4): but in a more restricted sense, and with reference to morality, it is every deviation, which we make as free agents, from the known law of God. The state of vitiosity, (Sündhaftigkeit) is moral corruption, (corruptio, φθορά, 2 Pet. 1: 4. 2: 12. Eph. 4: 22. 2 Cor. 11: 3.), which, according to the symbolical books, is found in all men." Bretsch. Dogmatic, § 118.

Our theological dialect needs some convenient term, which shall designate, without ambiguity, the state of mind leading to actual sin, as distinguished from actual sin itself; the propensity, tendency, proclivity of the soul to wickedness, as distinguished from the actual wickedness.

The state of the soul, which constitutes this propension or proneness to sin, seems to consist not in barely possessing susceptibilities, the gratification of which is, in certain circumstances, a sin; but in possessing them in such a degree of liveliness as will certainly lead to voluntary sinful indulgence. These 'lower,' 'inferior,' susceptibilities, as they are called, constitute part of our nature, as God originally made it; but they do not, in themselves, constitute what is technically denominated native depravity, or sinful disposition. When, however, these susceptibilities are in such a degree of liveliness as results in an improper gratification of them, when in their active power they overbalance those susceptibilities which would otherwise determine the will to holiness, then they constitute that tendency, bias, disposition to sin, which is technically denominated native, as distinct from actual depravity, and which is the uniform occasion of sin, in the proper sense of that term.

There is doubtless a difference, in some respects, between the state, the very nature or constitution of a holy being, and that of a sinful being; the nature of the former is such, that in his moral developments he will fulfil the law, and the nature of the latter is such, that in his moral developments he will transgress the law. The nature of the holy being is such, that he will use in a certain way such powers as the sinful being has and invariably uses in the opposite way. In the good being, those higher susceptibilities, the preponderance of which determines the will aright, are so much more lively than those lower susceptibilities, the voluntary gratification of which, beyond a certain degree, constitutes sin, that the being finds his chief pleasure in benevolence. In the wicked being, those lower suscepti-

bilities, the voluntary gratification of which beyond a certain degree is forbidden, are so much more active and excitable than the higher, that the being finds his chief pleasure in selfishness. In the good, that part of his nature which was designed to be subordinate is kept so, and that which was designed to sway, does so; but in the wicked, the nobler susceptibilities are swayed by the baser; swayed as certainly and as invariably as if unavoidably.

(The first of these two classes of susceptibilities is often called spiritual; the second, sensual or carnal. But the words sensual, carnal, do not seem to be the precise words which are needed. First, they are often used in their primary signification, as equivalent to animal; whereas there are some sensibilities whose indulgence is, in certain circumstances, sin, which are not bodily or animal. Secondly, the words sensual and carnal are often used as equivalent to sinful, wicked; whereas it is not here intended to designate the susceptibilities, which are the occasions of sinning, as in themselves blameworthy. For these reasons, a circumlocution is substituted for the words often employed on this subject.)

It is frequently said, that previous to any change in the moral quality of an individual's actions, there must be a change in his nature or state; *this* change securing the certainty of *that*. If the change of state do not precede, in the order of time, the change in act, it is said to be necessarily anterior in the order of nature. Now may not the change in the nature or state of Adam, which secured the certainty of his change from a holy to a sinful choice, have been, a change in the relative activity, or excitement of the two classes of susceptibilities, which he had possessed from the first? On this supposition those susceptibilities, which were originally the more lively, or had been the more excited, became now the less so. They had been the inward incitements to holiness; they became now no longer predominant in determining the will; the will then no longer obeyed the law. Those susceptibilities, on the contrary, which were originally the less active or excited, which were kept as they were designed to be, subordinate, became now the more lively in their action, and predominant in determining the will. Just so soon as the sensibilities, constituting the subjective incitements to sin, came, by the pressure of objective temptation, into more lively exercise than the opposite sensibilities, just so soon were they disproportionately, i. e. sinfully indulged. The first act of will, gratifying the inordinate craving of these sensibilities, was the first sin; the apostasy. The mode, in which the proper balance between the two classes of susceptibilities may have been permanently changed, has been intimated, with his usual succinctness, by Bishop Butler, Anal. Part 1. Chap. 5.

If the change of nature in Adam may be said to consist in a change of the balance between the activity of the higher and that of the lower susceptibilities; may not also the change of nature in regeneration be said to consist in a partial restoration of the original balance; in changing the relative state of the susceptibilities from the inclination toward evil to the inclination toward good? The common remark is that in the new birth no new power or faculty is imparted to man; but he begins, in his new *state*, to use for God the talent which, though previously possessed, was kept hidden.

In this view of the subject, which is suggested as a matter of speculation and not of faith, Ullmann is evidently correct in saying, in the paragraph under comment, that the power to sin does not constitute the tendency to sin; for the susceptibilities variously termed inferior, sensual, carnal, may be so counterbalanced by the susceptibilities termed superior, higher, spiritual, that while there is a power to either course, the right or the wrong, there is a decided tendency to one course, the right, and a certainty, as fixed as if unavoidable, that the wrong course will never be commenced. And as the power to sin is distinct from the tendency, so the tendency is altogether distinct from the sin. What precedes is distinct from what follows. The antecedent occasion of an event is distinct from the event itself. The tendencies to sin are devoid of guilt; nothing but the voluntary indulgence of them is blameworthy. See Woods's Transl. of Knapp's Theol. IX. § 78. 111.

In reference to the question then, whether God is the author of the propensity in our souls to do wrong, it may be affirmed, that if we pronounce him to be the author of it, we by no means pronounce him to be the author of sin. It does not follow from the fact of his having created within us susceptibilities inwardly tempting us to do wrong, that he has shut us up to those susceptibilities, and thereby necessitated us to do wrong. He has also created antagonist susceptibilities within us, has commanded, and, if so, has of course capacitated us to subjugate the more degrading principles of our nature to the more elevating. It is indeed true, that He has given us a preponderance of appetite that leads to sin; but this preponderance is an apparent evil, not a moral wrong; an affliction to us, not a crime. The same Universal Cause, which has produced apparent evil in the world of matter, sees reasons which we cannot see for producing it in the world of mind. This apparent evil he has, however, commanded us to resist and overcome. He has taught us, that the excessive liveliness of our lower sensibilities, is a temptation, which we must combat; that it is connected with sin, no further than we voluntarily and disproportionately indulge what we have a power to mortify and keep subordinate. When our inferior propensities are indulged to an excess, *they* do not become sins; the indulgence of them is the only sin; and this indulgence is an act of ours, and cannot, either philosophically or evangelically, be represented as the immediate effect of Him who has forbidden it, and whose soul loathes it. On the cause of our propensity to sin, see Knapp's Theol. IX. § 78, 79. Storr and Flatt, III. § 55. While on the one hand, there is no need of becoming Manichaeans, and endeavoring to deny that the certainty of the existence of sin was established by the Holy One, so on the other hand it is an equally unwise extreme to become fatalists; and in an excess of zeal for the agency of God, to deny the agency of his creatures, and their undivided authorship of their own iniquity.

The only remaining question suggested by Ullmann is, whether Christ possessed the vitiosity, which all other men possess. Our author does not deny, but rather affirms, that Christ possessed the same kind of constitution, which we do, i. e. the same kind of susceptibilities to animal and other en-

joyment. If then our constitution is itself sinful, if any of our susceptibilities are in kind blameworthy, then, by necessary inference, they were so in the Saviour. But they are not so in us; of course not in him. Neither does Ullmann deny, but he rather affirms, that those susceptibilities the inordinate indulgence of which is sin, were sometimes excited in Christ; he only denies that they were ever inordinately indulged; the excitement was always subdued, before it became so great as to determine the will to an act of sin. See pages 434—436. The conclusion then seems to be, that Christ did not possess such susceptibilities as lead to transgression, *in the same degree* of liveliness in which we possess them; and that he did possess what is called the spiritual susceptibilities *in a greater degree of liveliness* than we possess them; that he had, as some express themselves, the same nature *in kind* with us, but not the same *in degree;* that all the temptations to evil, which his nature may have presented him, he uniformly resisted; and was therefore entirely free both from actual transgression and the proclivity towards it, from sin in the proper sense of the term, and from what is technically but ambiguously called a sinful nature. See Heb. 4: 15.

NOTE H, pp. 440—443.

Those who are not familiar with the Lutheran theology, will more correctly appreciate the manner in which Professor Ullmann speaks of original sin, if they will peruse the statement of the doctrine given by Bretschneider in his Entwickelung, § 94, and Hahn in his Lehrbuch 2. § 80. As the whole subject is one, on which precise definitions of what men have believed are, at the present day, peculiarly important, it may not be amiss to insert here the following translation from Bretschneider.

"Theologians make a distinction between original sin, peccatum habituale, and the actual sinful deeds which proceed from that habitus. As sources of actual sins they assign, original sin, the seductions of the devil and bad example. Gerhard, Vol. II. p. 161. Calov Vol. V. p. 369." Entwick. § 91.

"By *habitual* sin, theologians understand a property or condition of human nature, by means of which this nature is in a state of moral corruption, the source of actual sin. Habitual sin is original sin, peccatum originale, that is, derived sin; which has resulted from the peccatum originans, that is, the first sin, the fall of man. The full idea of original sin, according to the symbolical books, is that incidental, total corruption of human nature, which originated from the fall of man, is propagated by generation to all men, has taken the place of the lost image of God, and is never in this life to be entirely separated from the nature of man; a corruption by which man is made incapable of a true knowledge of God, of love toward him, and of real virtue; is on the contrary full of a prevailing inclination to evil, and on this account is subjected to the punishment of death and to eternal condemnation."

According to this, original sin is, first, something negative; namely, "the total want, and defect or privation of concreated original righteousness, or of the image of God."[1]

Secondly, it is something positive, "impotence and stupidity, by which man is utterly unfit for all spiritual things."[2] Under spiritual things is in-

[1] Totalis carentia et defectus, seu privatio concreatae justitiae originalis, sive imaginis Dei. Formula Concordiae, Art. 1. p. 640.

[2] Impotentia, ἀδυναμία, et stupiditas, qua homo ad omnia spiritualia est prorsus ineptus. Formula Concordiae, a. a. O.

cluded everything which concerns "our salvation and eternal happiness." This impotence consists, first, so far as the reason is concerned, in the fact that "men are born without the fear of God, without confidence in God;"[1] or that from birth there dwells in them "ignorance of God, contempt of him, a destitution of fear of him, and confidence in him; an inability to love him."[2] Secondly, so far as the will is concerned, this impotence consists in "evil concupiscence,"[3] that is, "a perpetual inclination of nature to seek for carnal things, which are against the word of God; to seek for not only the pleasures of the body, but also wisdom and carnal righteousness, and to confide in these good things, and to despise God."[4]

Thirdly, this positive corruption is not a kind of external obstacle to the operation of the powers of man, without these powers being themselves corrupted;[5] but it affects the powers themselves, the whole man, body and soul. It is "the corruption of the whole nature and of all the powers, but especially of the principal and higher faculties of the soul, in mind, intellect, heart and will."[6]

Fourthly, it has originated from the fall; or "the mass, from which God at this day forms man, was corrupted and perverted in Adam, and is thus propagated to us in the hereditary way."[7] It is communicated to us by generation, by hereditary and natural propagation," because "in primo conceptionis nostrae momento ipsum semen, ex quo homo formatur peccato jam contaminatum et corruptum est." F. C. I. p. 644. Aug. C. Art. 2.

Fifthly, it is however not the substance of the man himself, or an essential property, that is, a property necessary to the nature of the man; but it is an accidens, an incidental property like leprosy in the body.[8]

Sixthly, but this property is common to all men without exception. "After the fall of Adam all men, propagated in the natural way, are born with sin."[9] (As the human nature of Christ was not propagated in the ordinary way, so he alone has been considered exempt from original sin.) This property cannot be entirely removed even from the converted. "It will be fully removed, however, by death in the happy resurrection."[10] Baptism however takes away the guilt of original sin; and the Spirit, imparted through baptism, "begins to mortify evil desire and creates new feelings in the man."[11]

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[1] Homines nascuntur sine metu Dei, sine fiducia erga Deum. Aug. Con. Art. 2.

[2] Ignorantia Dei, contemptus Dei, vacare metu Dei et fiducia erga Deum, non posse diligere Deum. Apol. 1. p. 53.

[3] Concupiscentia prava. Aug. Con. Art. 2.

[4] Perpetua naturae inclinatio (Apol. p. 51), quae carnalia quaerit contra verbum Dei, h. e. quaerit non solum voluptates corporis, sed etiam sapientiam et justitiam carnalem, et confidit his bonis, contemnens Deum. Apol. p. 55.

[5] Form. Con. 1. p. 642.

[6] Corruptio totius naturae et omnium virium, imprimis vero superiorum et principalium animae facultatum in mente, intellectu, corde et voluntate. Form. Con. p. 640.

[7] Massa, ex quo hodie Deus hominem format, in Adamo corrupta et perversa est, et ita haereditario modo in nos propagatur. F. C. 1. p. 647.

[8] F. C. Art. 1. p. 642, 577, 645.

[9] Post lapsum Adae omnes homines, secundum naturam propagati, nascuntur cum peccato. Aug. C. Art. 2.

[10] Hoc per mortem in beata illa resurrectione plene fiet. F. C. I. p. 575.

[11] Incipit mortificare concupiscentiam et novos motus creat in homine. Apol. 1. p. 56.

Seventhly, this corruption is real sin, that is, punishable by God. "It is truly sin, condemning, and bringing now also eternal death upon those who are not born again by baptism and the Spirit."[1] We are by this corruption "children of wrath by nature, and slaves of death and condemnation."[2] The punishment for original sin is, according to A. C. II., eternal perdition; it is also according to Apol. I. p. 58, death, and other physical evils, and the dominion of the devil (over us). So likewise the Schm. Art. pt. 3. art. I., and F. C. I. p. 641, and in other places.

Our theologians, until these modern times, have adhered without deviation to this doctrine of original sin; and the older writers of systems unanimously described original sin, according to the idea found in the symbolical books, as defectus and corruptio, want of holiness, and, positively, bad inclinations; besides which they only considered the guilt of original sin as its third essential feature, and in opposition to the Romish church they ascribed this sin to the mother of Jesus. (Callixtus is an exception to the preceding remark. He considered the image of God, as something superadded, a supernatural gift, and asserted that from the fall there resulted a privation of original righteousness, but no positive corruption of the powers of man; that man however is now given up to his natural dispositions. He therefore denied the positive part of the doctrine of the church).

Modern theologians, on the contrary, who have followed the standards of the church, have yet deviated from them on this subject, in the following points. First, they have not admitted the idea, that human reason is corrupted in the discernment of good, but barely that there is an undue (abnorme) preponderance of the animal inclinations, or of the animal susceptibilities above the reason. So Michaelis, Morus, Storr, Reinhard, etc. Secondly, they have not agreed with the older theologians, (such as Gerhard, Vol. II. p. 155), in explaining this undue preponderance of the sensual excitability as a punishment for the first sin of Adam, nor moreover, as a consequence of this first transgression alone; but have asserted that this transgression is only the first beginning; but the preponderance of the animal inclinations has been gradually occasioned by the sins which have perpetually succeeded that of Adam. Thirdly, they have therefore added the position, that this moral corruption has no fixed limits assigned to its quantity, and is not the same in different subjects, but is susceptible of increase and diminution;[3] and by Christianity will be more and more diminished.[4] Christianity brings men back into (their normal state;) the state in which they should be; that of moral freedom, or the dominion of the true, the good and the beautiful.

Others, on the contrary, have rejected this doctrine of the church, and have denied that man is in a state of corruption, which did not originally belong to him, but which has been subsequently added to him. They have admitted nothing, but a vitiosity, a tendency to sin, which is natural to man, which is original; and which is dependent on the inevitably earlier development, and therefore the greater cultivation and activity of the sensual part of our nature. They regard this as a limitation not to be separated from human nature, and itself not punishable. Doederlein, p. 48, however, will yet allow, that the incidental faulty conditions of temperament can be propagated by generation. The 'radical evil' which Kant supposes to exist in human nature, comes back also to this same idea. He places this evil, first, in the weakness of the human heart, as to following the moral principles it has received; secondly, in the insincerity of the heart, in obeying commands of

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[1] Vere est peccatum, damnans et afferens nunc quoque aeternam mortem his, qui non renascuntur per baptismum et Spiritum Sanctum. A. C. II.

[2] Natura filii irae, mortis et damnationis mancipia. F. C. I. p. 641.

[3] So Reinhard, p. 307. Bretschneider, Vol. II. pp. 75 seq.

[4] Bretschneider, Vol. II. pp. 585 seq.

duty not from pure moral considerations, but from the incitements of selfishness; and thirdly, in the hostility to good (or in badness), in the arbitrariness in reference to principles, by which the moral motives to an act are treated as subordinate to those which are not moral.

As to the biblical idea of original sin, the passage in Gen. iii. contains not the slightest notice of such a sin as commencing at the fall of man; and Gen. 8: 21. Ps. 58: 3. Isa. 48: 8. Eccl. 7: 20. Prov. 20: 9. Job 14: 4. 1 Kings 8: 46, speak only of the historical matter of fact, (which the New Testament also acknowledges in John 1: 8—10. Gal. 3: 22. Rom. ii. and iii.), that no man is without sin, and that the tendency to sin develops itself at an early period. On the other hand, Paul teaches, Rom. 7: 14 seq., more definitely, that the sensual part of our nature has a preponderance over the rational; and he derives this and the consequent sins of the human race, as also the origin of death, Rom. 7: 14 seq., from the offence of Adam. He holds this preponderance to be punishable; see Eph. 2: 3. He does not however express himself definitely on the nature of this connection between Adam and his posterity." Entwick. § 94.

NOTE 1, p. 441.

Perhaps no writer has more fully, as well as intelligently, believed in "the universal corruption of human nature," than Dr. Bellamy; and yet how far he was from believing that this corruption is inconsistent with "an unweakened power of choice," may be seen in his Works Vol. I. pp. 148, 149. The remarks there made, if made in these days of uncandid dispute, would be condemned by some as Semi-Pelagian; and yet they received the explicit sanction of President Edwards, and were generally supposed, until the recent prevalence of a controversial spirit, to represent the standard doctrine of New England. It is obvious, from several of the remarks of Ullmann on the subject of natural ability, that his views are not so definite as those which have, since the days of Edwards, been current in New England. The same criticism may be made on the representations, which other foreign authors have given of the same doctrine. It is not true, that they have derived all their knowledge of the doctrine from American divines. The distinction between that which is, in the strict use of language, an ability to do right, and that which, in the words of Robert Hall, "may without absurdity be called an inability," was by no means discovered in the last century, and in this corner of the world. Like every other fundamental truth, it has always been assumed by those who have written on moral agency; assumed tacitly even when denied openly. It has been intimated in the current maxims, Ejus est velle, qui potest nolle; Consentire non potest, cum nec dissentire possit. Many of our old theological writers came so near stating the doctrine with precision, that the reader is now startled, at their standing so long on the threshold, without opening the door. Remarkably clear expositions, however, are given of this truth in the works of John Howe, Richard Baxter, and Jeremy Taylor. For the mode in which the latter alludes to it, see Sermons, Vol. I. pp. 137, 138, 191, 399 et al. In some passages he has anticipated some of the identical phraseology of Edwards.

"The earliest regular treatise on this subject," says Robert Hall, "it has been my lot to meet with, was the production of Mr. Truman, an eminent non-conformist divine. In his Dissertation on Moral Impotence, as he styles it, he has anticipated the most important arguments of succeeding writers, and has evinced throughout a most masterly acquaintance with his subject. This work is mentioned in terms of high respect by Nelson, in his Life of Bishop Bull, who remarks that his thoughts were original, and that he had hit upon a mode of defending Calvinism, against the objections of Bull and others, peculiar to himself. His claim to perfect originality, however, was not so well founded as Nelson supposed." Hall's Works, Am. Ed. Vol. II. p. 450.

It may appear to some a matter of surprise, that New England men, whose tendencies are practical rather than speculative, should have been so successful in elucidating this article of our creed. It is to be considered, however, that the doctrine is one which harmonizes with the peculiar habitudes of the American mind. It is not to be learned from literary research, but from common sense. It is to be learned from practical life. Our divines have aimed at the immediate conversion of their hearers; this doctrine harmonizes with that design; it would be discovered more readily by a mind which was in a state congenial with it, than by any other. Its effect too, when first distinctly developed, was marked; and by its beneficial influence on the character and results of New England preaching, it has been perhaps more diligently studied by New England divines, than by men more exclusively speculative.

NOTE K, pp. 451, 449, 393.

The explanation that some commentators give of John 14: 6, "I am the true guide to eternal life," Ullmann would condemn as jejune. He often uses, in this treatise and elsewhere, the expression Christ is the Truth, as denoting that 'the word of God did not come to him from without, by occasional impulses, but that this word constantly dwelt in him, and went forth from him, without his receiving at peculiar times peculiar inspiration; that he not merely taught the truth by his words, but exhibited it also in his acts; that every deed of his was a doctrine, and every doctrine a God-like deed; that his whole life was one great, connected, divine act, in which world-redeeming love was always identical with world-redeeming truth.' See Ullmann's Aphorisms, in Stud. und. Krit. Vol. VIII. pp. 598—602. "The word 'truth' stands opposed not only to falsehood, but likewise to vanity. In the profound view of John, truth is one with *essence;* the opposite of that which is not real, which is empty, destitute of the divine nature. This is the character of the sinful world, (Rom 8: 20). The truth, on the contrary, is God himself, and his Logos, John 14: 6. He *has* it not, as something existing in idea with him, as something possessed by him; but he *is* it, itself, in his own nature. The communication of truth, therefore, by the Logos is not the communication of certain correct ideas, but it is the communication of a nature, of the principle of all truth; it is the communion of the Spirit. On this account it is, as Seyffarth (p. 96) with entire correctness, declares, that the saints, who are born of God, are said by John to be sanctified by the truth," John 17: 19. In the style of John, therefore, ἡ ἀλήθεια, (with the article), is to be distinguished from ἀλήθεια (without it), see John 8: 44. Some degree of truth is possessed even by the unsanctified. Only of the devil is it said, 'truth is not in him.' But the absolute Truth is only the Eternal." Olshausen, Comm. on N. T. Vol. II. p. 52.

It is, perhaps, unnecessary to introduce so much that borders on mysticism into the interpretation of the phrase, Christ is the truth. As he brought life and immortality to light; as his instructions were peculiarly comprehensive, definite, and tangible; as he continues to illuminate the minds of men; as he is the object to which a great part of revelation pertains; and as, in his capacity of the revealer and at the same time the object of truth, he merits the implicit confidence of all, he may, by a union of various figures of speech, be called the truth itself. On the same principle, though with far less propriety, we call a wise man wisdom; and a foolish man, folly, etc. So Christ is called the way, the life, the resurrection, etc.

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