


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CHRISTIAN GREECE



SEVEN ESSAYS

ON

CHRISTIAN GREECE

BY

DEMETRIOS BIKELAS

TRANSLATED

BY

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It has always been one of the avowed objects of the *Scottish Review* to endeavour by occasional Articles by Foreigners or from Foreign sources to afford its readers a knowledge and appreciation of Foreign views upon Historical, Social, and Political, as well as Literary Questions. The Translator was therefore happy to contribute to its pages in April 1886, with the permission of the Author, an English version of his Lecture upon 'The Greek Question,' delivered in French at the Cercle St. Simon in the year 1885, and afterwards printed in the *Publications du Cercle St. Simon, No. 3*. This was followed in October 1886, and January and April 1887, by translations of his Lectures *περὶ Βυζαντινῶν*, originally delivered at Marseilles, and published in London in 1874; in April 1889 by one of his Article in the *Nouvelle Revue*, January 1, 1884, on 'Greece before 1821'; and in July and October of the same year of his two Articles upon 'The Formation of the Modern Greek State' and 'The Territory of the Greek Kingdom,' which had appeared in the *Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique* in 1887. These Seven Essays are now reprinted in one volume in the order required by the chronology of the subjects.

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THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE.

MY present object is to give as clear an idea as I can of what I believe the Byzantine Empire really to have been. I have certainly no intention of attempting to compress into a few pages the abounding history of that Greek and Christian State which withstood all shocks for more than a millennium, or of entering deeply into all the important phases which it underwent. I propose only to call attention to some general conclusions to which a study of the history of Christian Constantinople leads, and to discuss how far the real facts justify the low esteem in which that autocracy is now so commonly held.

As a matter of fact, what impression does the very name of the Byzantine Empire usually convey? How have we been taught to picture to ourselves the historical reality which it indicates? There is no use denying that in the popular imagination the Byzantine Empire appears as a political monstrosity, in which one incapable Emperor succeeded another, each putting out the eyes of his predecessor, and which was remarkable for the absence at once of courage and of military capacity, except on the part of the foreign mercenaries who were alternately the

venal tools and the exacting taskmasters of a detestable Government—a polity in which the union of Church and State formed a grotesque hybrid, utterly destitute of real religious feeling, but where every one was incessantly occupied with childish theological disputes—a State in which the spectacle of a people and a nation was replaced by that of eunuchs governing slaves—a society where the learned, when not exchanging personal vituperation in the course of religious controversy, occupied themselves in composing poems in the form of an egg or of a swallow—a world, in short, which consisted in civilization run to seed. In a word, the Byzantine Empire is regarded as fully deserving the contemptuous appellation of the *Lower Empire*, by which Western Europe has learned to designate it.

But is this what the Byzantine Empire really was? Surely, the fact that it lasted for a considerably longer space of time than that during which the kingdom of England has as yet even nominally endured, is in itself enough to prove the contrary. This duration cannot be attributed either to security purchased by inaction or to immunity from causes of dissolution and ruin. On the contrary, the history of the Byzantine Empire is an history of unceasing and unwearied activity. Without, from the hour of her foundation to that in which her sun finally sank in blood, Christian Constantinople was engaged in constant struggles against successive hordes of barbarians. She did not always triumph in the strife, but, even when

she was beaten, she did not succumb, but carried on the contest still ; and the fact that she was able to do so is alone a sufficing proof of the strength and vitality of her organization. Within, she had to fight heresy after heresy, but succeeded nevertheless in raising the edifice of the Church upon solid and enduring foundations ; and at the same time, by preserving and completing the Roman legislation, she established the principles of Jurisprudence recognised to-day throughout so large a portion of the civilized world. And yet, all the while that the New Rome was thus engaged upon the double work of ecclesiastical and legal construction, her lettered society was careful to keep alive the lamp of antient culture ; it is true that Byzantine literature could not rival the productions of earlier ages, but it preserved none the less the tradition of the intellectual splendour of Greece.

Nor can the Imperial Government be accused of neglecting material interests. Even if we did not possess historical proofs of the supremacy of the Greek world, throughout the whole of the Middle Ages, in those things which make the well-being of a State, it would be enough to look at the ruins of public works which still survive the deluge of savagery, to assure us that the subjects of the Empire had no ground for casting on their rulers the reproaches in which Western European writers are so persistent.

No one, indeed, will be prepared to put forward Byzantine society as presenting an ideal type of civilization or political morality. That society had,

no doubt, its features of vice and of shame. Like every other social body, either antient or modern, it bore within itself the elements of decay and dissolution. It had its times of decadence. But it had also its epochs of greatness; and, in the full tide of its prosperity, it possessed the most perfect political organization known in its day. Its existence guaranteed the preservation of the most precious interests of real civilization. And this remark is true, of every moment of its long existence.

The Byzantine Empire was predestinated to perform in especial one great work in human history. That work was to preserve civilization during the period of barbarism which we call the Middle Ages. For the discharge of that task no abundant originality was needful. The mission of Christian Constantinople was not to create but to save; and that mission she fulfilled for the benefit of the Europe of the future. It is not just on the part of the modern world which has thus profited, to refuse to its Benefactress the tribute of its gratitude; and still less so, when it caricatures history in order to lessen the apparent burden of its indebtedness.

When Constantine the Great, in realization of the project conceived by Diocletian, transported the seat of Empire to the shores of the Bosphoros, and there established a new capital which derived new life from a new religion, he hoped to render the government stronger and the dynasty more

secure by removing both from the revolutionary atmosphere of legions and camps. This end was attained even more perfectly than Constantine can well have foreseen. While the Empire still remained for nearly a century one and undivided, under himself and his successors, the Western half already began to show symptoms of approaching dissolution. But when, after the death of Theodosius the Great in 395, the Imperial power was definitely partitioned between his sons Arcadius and Honorius, it forthwith became evident that the two moieties of the Roman world were reserved, both by nature and by fortune, for destinies entirely different. Old Rome was dying. New Rome, on the contrary, the New Rome which was both Christianized and Hellenized, had before her a long vista of life and energy. For eighty years after the accession of Honorius, the Western Empire fell rapidly, and in 476, the deposition of Romulus Augustus, his eleventh successor, brought the line of the Emperors of Old Rome to a tame and obscure conclusion, when the unity of the Empire was again nominally restored in favour of Zeno, who, two years before, had ascended the throne of Constantinople.

During more than a millenium, from the accession of Arcadius in 395 till the heroic death of Constantine XIII. in 1453, the Eastern Empire was governed by a succession of eighty-one lawful Emperors. The larger number counted by historians, (and which indeed owes a good deal to numismatology), is obtained by reckoning Princes

such as Constantine XII., who were merely proclaimed Augusti, or Pretenders like Constantine VIII., whose ephemeral success does not justify their enumeration among the real Monarchs, with whom alone it is needful to concern ourselves in such a sketch as the present. Of the eighty-one autocrats who actually reigned seventy-three can be assigned to one or other of ten dynasties, or, to speak more correctly, groups, the members of each of which respectively, if they did not always succeed one another from father to son, were at least mutually connected by some such tie as marriage, adoption, or tutorship. In other words, each of these dynasties is a group of persons who succeeded one another upon the throne either by right of blood, or of the Imperial will, and by the consent of the regnant family, of which they were thus the representatives and, in a sense, the members and continuators.

Thus the house of Arcadius embraced four Sovereigns, and lasted till 457, when the dynasty closed with the death of Marcian, the widower and successor of his daughter St. Pulcheria. The line of Leo I., (surnamed the Thracian, and the Great) similarly came to an end in 518 on the decease of his third successor Anastasius I. (Dikoros*), who had espoused Ariadne, widow of Zeno, his son-in-law. The third dynasty was that founded in Justin I., and lasted through five reigns and eighty-four years, ending in 602 by the murder of Maurice,

* So called from his eyes being of different colours. (Tr.)

son-in-law of Tiberius II., who had been associated in the Empire by Justin II. When the crimes of Phokas, the murderer of Maurice, had at last worn out the patience of the Byzantine world, he was in his turn deposed and slain in 610, by Heraclius, the founder of a fourth dynasty, which numbered six princes and lasted a century, including the ten years during which the reign of Justinian II. (Rinotmetos*) was interrupted by those of Leontius II. and Tiberius III. (Apsimaros). After the execution of the tyrant Justinian in 711, the throne was occupied in succession during a space of little more than four years by Philippicus (Bardanes), Anastasius II., and Theodosius III., before the abdication of the last made room for Leo III. (the Isaurian). The family of Leo reigned till 802, when the Athenian Empress Irene, the fifth monarch of his line, the widow of his grandson, Leo IV. (the Khazar†) and one of the most remarkable women in European history, was dethroned and banished to Lesbos. The sixth dynasty, founded by Nikephoros I., lasted only eleven years, and in 813, Michael I. (Rhangabes) his son-in-law, and the third Prince of the House, was deposed and retired into a monastery. The career of the successful usurper Leo V. (the Armenian) was short. He was assassinated in Church on Christmas Eve, 820, and the seventh dynasty was founded by Michael II. (the Stam-

* On account of his nose having been cut off by order of Leontius in 695. (Tr.)

† His mother was a daughter of the Khan of the Khazars. (Tr.)

merer). He was followed by his son, his daughter-in-law, and his grandson, but the latter, Michael III. (the Drunkard), was murdered in 867. Basil I. (the Macedonian), who had been Michael's chief chamberlain, had repudiated his own wife to marry the Emperor's mistress, in exchange for whom he had given up to him his own sister, and had finally planned his assassination, immediately took possession of his throne. From the accession of this monarch, one of the most extraordinary characters in history, the Imperial dignity became really hereditary. Seventeen Macedonian Emperors succeeded one another till Michael VI. (the Warlike), who had been selected as her successor by the Empress Theodora, was defeated by Isaac I. (Komnenos) in 1057, and thereupon abdicated and retired into a monastery. Three different branches of the Komnenoi then successively held the Imperial title for a series of eighteen reigns. The last of these branches was that of the Angeloi. Isaac II. (Angelos), was deposed and blinded in 1203 by his brother Alexis III., but restored and with his son, Alexis IV. In the January of the succeeding year, Alexis V. (Doukas, surnamed Mourtzouphlos*) a son-in-law of Alexis III., put Alexis IV. to death, and Isaac II. died of grief. Constantinople was stormed by the Crusaders in the ensuing April, and Alexis V., having been taken prisoner, was carried thither from the Peloponnesos, and executed in the same year by being thrown from the top of the

* On account of the close junction of his shaggy eyebrows. (Tr.)

column of Theodosius. Hereupon the Crusaders established their own Latin dynasty, and the throne of New Rome was accordingly filled by a rickety series of six Western Emperors, of whom indeed the third, Peter, died in prison in Epiros without ever reaching his capital. This Latin succession passed in the female line from the House of Flanders to that of Courtenay (of the same family as the present Earls of Devon,) and included John of Brienne, guardian and father-in-law of the last of the dynasty, Baldwin II. In the meanwhile, the Greek Imperial family had retired to Nice, where Theodore I. (Laskaris) was crowned Emperor. He and his son and grandson, John III. (Batatzes), and Theodore II., were the terror and scourge of the Latin intruders. At last, in 1258, on the accession of John IV., the youthful great-grand-son of Theodore I., his guardian, Michael VIII. (Palaiologos) was associated with him in the Empire, and in 1261, they reconquered Constantinople; Baldwin fled; and Michael inhumanly deposed, blinded and exiled his defenceless colleague. The dynasty of the Palaiologoi is the tenth and last of those which reigned over the Eastern Empire. It consisted of a series of eight Princes, including John VI. (Kantakouzenos), associated for a time with John V. Finally, on May 29, 1453, Constantinople was taken by the Turkish Sultan Mahomet II., and the Roman Empire ended. The Emperor Constantine XIII. was killed fighting at the gates, and by his heroic death placed a last crown, a crown of imperishable glory, upon the autocracy which had

derived its origin from Julius and Octavian. 'The body,' says Gibbon, 'under an heap of slain, was discovered by the golden eagles embroidered on his shoes.' The Imperial bird had never taken a nobler flight than was his last.

It will be seen by this summary that the course of the ten Byzantine dynasties was only broken by seven isolated Princes, whose combined reigns amount to a period of about thirty years. At the same time, it must be admitted that the Monarchs who constituted the ten dynasties themselves did not too often reign in peace, and that the transmission of the crown from one head to another among them was frequently effected by crime and violent revolution. Of the seventy-six Emperors* and five Empresses who occupied the Byzantine throne

15 were put to death,†

7 were blinded or otherwise mutilated,

4 were deposed and imprisoned in monasteries,
and

10 were compelled to abdicate.

This list, comprising nearly half of the whole number, is a sufficient indication of the horrors by which the history of the Empire is only too often marked, and it may be frankly admitted that these dark stains, disfiguring pages which but for them would be bright with the things which were

* Not counting the Latin Emperors, of whom two died in prison.

† Without counting Nikephoros I., who was taken prisoner and murdered by the Bulgars, nor Constantine XIII., killed by the Turks.

beautiful and glorious, go some way to excuse, if not to justify, the obloquy which Western writers have been so prone to cast upon the East. But it is not by considering the evil only, any more than the good only, that it is possible to form a just judgment upon an historic epoch. To judge the Byzantine Empire only by the crimes which defiled the Palace would be as unjust as if the French people were to be estimated by nothing but the massacre of St. Bartholomew, the Reign of Terror, and the Commune of 1871.

The dynastic crimes and revolutions of New Rome were not a constant feature in her history. On the contrary, the times of trouble and anarchy were episodes between long periods of peace. They arose either from quarrels in the Imperial family itself, which degraded the dignity of the Crown, or from the contentions of Pretenders struggling among themselves till one or other had worsted his rivals and was able to become the founder of a long dynasty. Thus, two centuries elapsed from the time of Arcadius before Phokas, as the murderer of his predecessor, was in his own turn put to death by Heraclius. Heraclius himself died upon the throne, but his reign was followed by a series of tragedies. In the century succeeding his death, five Emperors were murdered or executed, and six deposed, of whom four were blinded or otherwise mutilated. The strong dynasty of the Isaurians then assumed the Crown, but in little more than half a century the Empress Irene, when she deposed her own son Constantine VI., and put out

his eyes, began a new series of crimes which continued with little interruption till the murder of Michael the Drunkard, eighty years later. His assassin, however, Basil the Macedonian, was the founder of a dynasty which reigned for nearly two centuries.

The most deplorable epoch in the history of the Byzantine Empire, the period in which assassination and mutilation most abounded, was that in which it was exposed to the influence of the Crusaders, and thus brought into contact with Western Europe. In the twenty years between 1183 and 1204, six Emperors occupied the tottering throne of the East; all of them were deposed, two of them were blinded, and all were put to death except Isaac II., who anticipated the executioner by dying in prison. I do not point out the coincidence of circumstances in order to throw upon the Franks the whole responsibility for this series of tragedies. But I cannot help remarking that the continual and uninterrupted contact of the Empire with the barbaric elements by which it was surrounded, from the beginning to the end of its existence, supplies an explanation though not a justification of these lamentable incidents in its history. The Byzantine people, although in every respect the superiors of their contemporaries, were unable entirely to escape the influence of their neighbourhood. As the guardians of classical civilization, they strove to keep above the deluge of barbarism by which the rest of the world was then inundated. But it was a flood whose waters

prevailed exceedingly upon the earth, and sometimes all the high hills were covered, even where might have rested the ark in which the traditions of ancient culture were being preserved.

Modern writers are not unfrequently given to accusing the Byzantine Empire of cruelty. They seem to forget that the contemporary manners and jurisprudence of Western Europe were marked by a ferocity which nothing in Byzantine despotism ever approached. To listen to these gentlemen, one would imagine that the legislation of their own countries, both while the Eastern Empire endured and long afterwards, was a model of humanity and sweet reasonableness. It needs no research to find examples to the contrary, nor would there be room to recount them, but a few specimens float through my mind at once. Take for instance the executions of Dolcino in Italy, of Hugh le Despenser (the younger) in England, of the murderers of James I. in Scotland, and the whole history of the processes against the Templars or the lepers in France. Long after the Byzantine Empire fell, the peculiar English sentence for High Treason was fully carried out until within the last century, and has been pronounced in Ireland within my memory. Similarly, I might point to the legislation of England with regard to religion; and especially to its application during the sixteenth century. The executions of the family of the last Inca of Peru by the Spanish Government, or of Damians by the French, are little more than a century old, and I need not go on to cite even later instances, the

noyades of Nantes, for example. That much that went on in the Empire justifies the charge of cruelty, I admit. But I ask Western writers to consider how the histories of their own countries will show by comparison, before they cast the first stone at Constantinople.

Putting aside such matters, and returning to the main question, the history of the Greek Emperors, taken as an whole, leaves no doubt that the end which Diocletian and Constantine sought to attain by transferring the capital seat of the Roman Empire, was more than realized. That history shows also the instinctive tendency of the Byzantine people to be ruled by sovereigns reigning through lawful hereditary succession, a tendency which becomes especially apparent during the last six centuries of the Empire's protracted existence. This Legitimist sentiment, so marked in the New Rome, was certainly not derived from the Old. On the contrary, the absence, in the Old Rome, of any constitution strong enough to secure the regular succession to the Crown, was one of the very things which contributed to paralyze her and to hasten her fall. At Constantinople, on the contrary, there was from the very beginning an effort to correct this evil, and an effort which was continued until the principle of legitimate hereditary right was established.* It would be difficult to say whether the sentiment in favour of Monarchy which grew continually stronger in the East was the effect or the cause of the peculiar

* See Rambaud, *L'Empire Grec au dixième siècle*, p. 23.

State ceremonial, half Asiatic, half Roman, which was so distinctive a feature of the Byzantine Court. The Emperor Constantine VII. (Porphyrogenetos*) and George Kodinos, the Kuropalates, have left us elaborate works upon this subject. It is one which is sometimes treated with a smile of contempt. If, however, we consider how in England the scrupulous retention of certain old-world official customs and costumes, which are often absolutely ridiculous in the eyes of foreigners, is accompanied by the most perfect exercise of liberty, both political and personal, we shall probably pause before ascribing to the antique formalities of the Byzantine Court the decline and fall of the Roman Empire.† Moreover, if we are to judge the Byzantine Court by its fruits, we shall not see in it the habitual abode of frivolity and effeminacy. I am certainly not going to make myself the advocate of the herd of eunuchs whose presence dishonoured the Imperial Palaces, nor seek for a moment to justify the crimes which were committed within their walls. But neither, on the other hand, will I forget that manly virtue was never long lacking to the Byzantine throne, and that the greater number of the Sovereigns who occupied it showed themselves not unworthy of

* Constantines VI. and VII. were so-called because born (A. D. 771, 905) in an apartment of the Imperial Palace panelled with porphyry, which was specially destined for the use of the Empresses upon these occasions. (Tr.)

† That learned and at the same time attractive work, *Κωνσταντινούπολις*, by the k. Skarlatos D. Byzantios, contains (vol. III., chap. 10) a very able picture of Byzantine manners. See also *Paparragogoulos*, v. 26 *et seq.*

their exalted station, and were no dishonour either to the pages of their country's history or to the people whose life they represented. I shall not go through the list name by name. I shall only cite, in support of my contention, one or two in a century; but I venture to think that they are names which are in themselves enough to cover every period of the Byzantine history with honour.

Thus, in the sixth century, reigned for forty years Justinian I. As a conqueror, he restored to the Roman arms their ancient lustre; as a sovereign, he adorned by his great buildings not only his capital, but cities planted in his remotest provinces;* as a legislator, he took that place in the history of Jurisprudence which he still holds to-day. The seventh century is filled by the great name of Heraclius, who, in his victorious wars against the Persians, resumed and continued the work of Alexander the Great. His great-grandson, Constantine IV. (the Bearded) was faithful to the glorious traditions of his progenitor, and by his brave resistance to the repeated expeditions of the Arabs against Constantinople, stemmed the tide of Mohammedan conquest, and earned the title of Deliverer of Europe. † In the eighth century, Leo III. the Saviour of Constantinople and Reformer of the Empire, ‡ founded the new dynasty of the

* On this point, especially consult Prokopios, *Περὶ κτισμάτων*.

† See *Paparragogoulos*, III., 322-340.

‡ By Finlay, Leo III. is regarded as the true founder of the Byzantine Empire, so far as this portion of the Roman Empire may be so distinguished from its earlier phase. (Tr.)

Isaurians, and gave a new impulse to the Byzantine world. The efforts made by Leo and his son Constantine V. (Kopronymos*) to remodel the State failed, and the enemies of their Reform have sought to darken their fame by destroying the contemporary records, but their forms loom none the smaller amid the obscurity which overshadows the history of their epoch. In the ninth century, Basil I. (the Macedonian), the founder of the dynasty which bears his name, crowned the work of Justinian I. by his final codification of Roman Law, and exalted the power of the Empire, which enjoyed, under himself and his successors, a lengthened period of greatness and prosperity. In the tenth century, the need of self-defence against the Mohammedans and the Bulgars called to the throne such men as were Nikephoros II. (Phokas), John I. (Tzimiskes), and Basil II. (the Bulgar-slayer). In the twelfth century, three successive monarchs of the House of the Komnenoi, Alexis I. (Komnenos), his son, John II. (the Good†) and his

* However revolting may have been the vices and crimes of this Prince, nothing but disgust and contempt can be felt for the inventors and propagators of this filthy nickname, founded on an accident said to have occurred when he was in the baptismal font. However, a world which has learnt to execrate his memory, has since applied it to him so habitually that his name is almost never heard and would rarely be understood, without it. (Tr.)

† Kalo-Joannes. The adjective has sometimes been translated 'the Handsome' and the origin of the surname disputed. He was personally very ill-favoured, in striking contrast to the rest of the Komnenian race; from which it would seem that if intended physically the nickname was a sarcasm. It is, however, generally

grandson, the heroic Manuel I. (Komnenos), in the midst of every species of plot and distraction, saved the dignity of the throne and preserved the safety of the State. In the thirteenth century, Theodore I. (Laskaris), and John III. (Batatzes) rallied the national forces in the midst of calamities, and cast lustre upon the weakened majesty of the Imperial Crown, till the day when Michael VIII. (Palaiologos) by the re-conquest of Constantinople, opened the way to a new period in the history of the Eastern Empire.

These are not the only Emperors who have left upon the pages of history names which time will never obliterate. If ignorance and spite have long combined to cast obscurity over their renown, the impartiality of more modern writers is at length beginning to do justice to their memory.

Nor is it only to the throne that we must look in order to find the great names of Byzantine history. Through the whole course of the Empire's existence, there were never lacking eminent subjects who do honour to mankind, and have preserved the best traditions of the classical ages. In every period there arose illustrious soldiers, able statesmen, good and saintly ecclesiastics, and, last but not least, men of learning to whom the Hellenic nation owes at least the almost unique advantage of possessing

interpreted of the noble qualities of his mind and heart, and the word (*καλός*) which is already applied to moral excellence by classical writers, has continued to the present day to be used more and more exclusively in that sense. (Tr.)

in its own language, its own annals, for an unbroken stretch of more than twenty centuries.*

Let us now consider what was the incessant succession of enemies, who never left the Byzantine Government a moment of respite from attack. By looking at them we shall be better able to form a fair judgment as to what must have been the strength and vitality of the Empire itself, and what the extent of the services which by its unflinching and unflagging war of defence it rendered to Europe, or, to speak more truly, to the cause of civilized humanity.

The first adversaries against whom Byzantium had to contend were the Goths. About eighty years before the foundation of Constantinople, these savages crossed the Dniester and the Danube, and ravaged far and wide. After a variety of successes and defeats, they occupied Dacia. Constantine the Great brought them into subjection, and they remained loyal to his lineal heirs, but when these came to an end, they rebelled, and were again subdued, after a long struggle, by Theodosius the Great. After his death they recommenced their invasions, and over-ran and devastated Greece under Alaric. At length, however, they were checked by

* Space does not permit me here to enlarge further upon the foregoing topics. I must be allowed to refer the reader once more to that great national work, the *Ἱστορία τοῦ Ἑλληνικοῦ ἔθνους*, of the κ. Παπαρηγόπουλος. There it will be seen how the Empire when in need never failed to produce a man equal to her wants.

the Imperial armies, and determined to cross into Italy. The East was thus delivered from this plague. It is out of place here to follow their career of adventure across Western Europe. It is enough to remark that if they had taken root and founded States in the East, as they did in Italy, Gaul, and Spain,—if the Byzantine world had been engulfed beneath the flood of their immigration,—the history of the human race would have been a different one to that which it has been. If the East had been barbarized by the Goths as was the West, and the Eastern Empire had been destroyed, from what materials would the European Renaissance have sprung?

About a century and an half after Alaric, Belisarius and Narses, the Generals of Justinian, crushed the Gothic power in Italy, and destroyed the Vandals in Africa. These military triumphs were a powerful aid to the regeneration of social life and order in the former country, by promising them protection; in the North, however, the Byzantine supremacy was not long-lived; in the Central provinces it disappeared towards the close of the eighth century, at the time of the Iconoclastic persecution; but in the South it lasted on into the eleventh century, when the definitive rupture between the Eastern and Western Churches was a cause not less powerful than the Norman conquests in effecting the complete severance of Italy from Greece. It must, nevertheless, be owned that the obstinate adherence of the New Rome to the traditions of the Old, and the consequent interference of the Byzan-

tine world in affairs purely Italian, was one of the main causes which accelerated the decline and fall of the Empire. On the other hand, the civilizing influence exercised by the representatives of the Imperial power, the Exarchs of Ravenna and the Governors of Southern Italy, had a larger share than is often assigned to it in gradually polishing the rough elements and preserving culture in the West.

After the Goths, came the Huns. These hordes, gradually advancing from Asia into Europe, made their appearance in the fifth century, under Attila, who, after defeating the Roman troops sent to stem the tide of his conquests, ravaged Thrace and Macedonia, and imposed an humiliating peace upon the Government of Constantinople, which happened to be represented at the moment by a child and a woman, namely, Theodosius II. and his sister, the Empress Pulcheria. When, however, in course of time, the husband of the latter, the Emperor Marcian, ascended the throne, and Attila sent to demand the continuance of the tribute, he was met by the stern reply, 'I have iron for Attila, but no gold.' Whether this haughty answer, and the unflinching firmness of Apollonius, the Imperial Ambassador, would have been justified by the result of war, is a question which was perhaps fortunately not brought to an issue. Attila moved away Westward, spreading devastation and terror around him, till the day when Aetius broke the power of the Huns upon the plain of Chalons-sur-Marne.

Next after the Goths and the Huns, came the

Avars. This tribe poured down from the region of the Volga, in the sixth century. In the time of Justin II. and his successors, they devastated the Byzantine provinces, sometimes as avowed enemies, sometimes under the treacherous pretence of alliance. Priscus, the general of the Emperor Maurice, at last subdued them, in the year 600. But, twenty-six years later, they advanced, in alliance with the Persians, to the very walls of Constantinople, and plundered the suburbs. The siege, however, was in vain; the Avars retired, and never afterwards played an important part in the history of the Empire; but the deliverance of the capital is still commemorated by the Church in the use of the Ἀκάθιστος Ὕμνος, which was composed to celebrate it.

And now it is time to speak of the Slavs. The consequences of the contact between Byzantium and the Slav tribes were much more permanent than those produced by the incursions of any other barbarous nation; in fact, they are still to be seen at the present day. The first Slavs who attacked the Empire were the Antai. They had seized Dacia, but were subdued by the great Justinian. Nevertheless, they and other Slav tribes continued to move forwards till they even entered Greece itself. From this time onwards, sometimes as allies and sometimes as enemies, sometimes as subjects and sometimes as prisoners, the Slavs scattered themselves about the Empire, and at last took permanent possession of the settlements in which they are still to be found. From the sixth to the eighth century, there were frequent Slav invasions of

Greece, and it is upon this fact that Fallmerayer based his famous theory to the effect that the Hellenes are extinct and that Hellas is now peopled by a Slav population.

Since I have here mentioned the above celebrated fad, I hope I may be allowed to remark parenthetically that I think my fellow-countrymen have given it a great deal more notice than its importance demands. It would really seem as if some people thought it a kind of patriotic duty to refute the whimsical fancy in question, and to denounce its author, upon every possible occasion. Even supposing, for the sake of argument, that Fallmerayer had been right in asserting that Hellas was submerged by a flood of Slav immigration, it would have been no disgrace to the Hellenes to receive an accession of foreign blood. On the contrary, many nations great in modern history owe to such an admixture the union of qualities which has raised them so high. Whether, moreover, the Slavs overspread Greece or not, no one who has any knowledge of the actual phenomena could testify to anything but that their absorption has been complete. The entirely and exclusively Hellenic character of all the features, physical and intellectual, presented by the present inhabitants of the country, is a most striking fact, almost unique in history, a glorious mark of our race, and a wondrous proof of the intensity of our national vitality.

But to continue the list of barbaric invaders from the North. Since we have spoken of Slavs, it is impossible not to speak of the Russians. The

Russians first appear upon the stage of history in the ninth century, when the Scandinavian Rurik, with his Warings or Varangians, took possession of Slavia. When Rurik came Southwards to Kieff, the Russians began their attacks upon the Empire from the Dnieper.* Four times in two centuries did they set sail against Constantinople, but these attempts all failed. The first was in 864, in the reign of Michael III. (the Drunkard); the second in 907, in that of Leo VI. (the Philosopher); the third and fourth in 940 and 944, in the time of Romanus I. (Lekapenos); on the last occasion the Russian Grand Prince, Igor, was scarcely able to escape with a few of his ships. After the deposition of Romanus, Olga, the widow of Igor, who had not long survived his defeat, came to Constantinople, where she was baptized in 956, and by her Christianity was introduced into Russia. From this time forth, the Russians were generally friendly to the Empire, and the 'murderous nation of godless Russians' as they had hitherto been termed, are henceforth designated by the writers of Byzantium 'the most Christian nation.' About the year 960, the Grand Prince Vladimir, the son of Olga, and first Christian Monarch of Russia, married the Princess Anna Posthuma, younger daughter of Romanus II. These relations with the Empire gradually introduced civilization into Russia, where the survival of Byzantine forms and traditions in many things as well as in the Imperial device of

* Called the *Danapris* by Constantine VII.

the two-headed eagle, is even now more marked than in any other country of the present day; her political and religious systems are taken from Constantinople, and so is her mission with regard to the nations of Asia.

Along with the Slavs we must reckon the Bulgars, although these latter appear in reality to be a Turkish tribe, and to have nothing in common with the Slavs except the fact that they speak (at present) a Slavonic dialect. After gradually subduing the Slavs, they moved forward from the Volga to the Danube, and in 559 invaded Thrace and menaced Constantinople: but the city was saved by the aged Belisarius. Thenceforth, they were a source of continual trouble to the Empire. They seemed to have reached the zenith of their power in 811, when they captured and murdered the Emperor Nikephoros I., and destroyed his army. About a century later, they besieged Constantinople again, and for a time the Byzantine Court was compelled to accord to their chieftain the title of βασιλεύς, which they had hitherto restricted on principle to their own Emperor and to the ruler of Persia, while they styled the Sovereigns of Europe *βῆγας* (*reges*) and *ἑξουσιαστὰς*, and other Princes simply *ἀρχοντας*. The results of alliance between the reigning Houses of New Rome and of Bulgaria, the constant intercourse with the subjects of the Empire, and the humanizing influence of Christianity, seemed to have mitigated the savagery of the Bulgars, when, towards the close of the tenth century, there broke out a war more frightful than ever.

After a bloody struggle which lasted thirty years, Basil II., hence called the Bulgar-slayer, completely shattered their power in 1018, and Bulgaria was made a Byzantine province. But an hundred and seventy years later, in the time of Isaac II. (Angelos), they rose in rebellion again, after they had acknowledged the religious supremacy of the Pope. Nevertheless, while the Latin dynasty was reigning at Constantinople, John, *Kral* of the Bulgars, fought on the Greek side against the Franks. Such is an epitome of the history of the Bulgars. Unhappily, they are again to be found to-day arrayed in hostility to the Hellenic element in the peninsula. I may, however, be forgiven for expressing the hope that this hostility will not be enduring. The causes which excited mutual animosity in the Middle Ages are dead; and there is no reason why two nations which have suffered side by side for so many centuries should not now stand side by side in brotherly alliance.

The Magyars or Hungarians are another Turkish tribe, who, after defeating and partially assimilating the inhabitants of the countries through which they passed, filled Europe with alarm, until their power was destroyed by the German Emperor, Otho the Great, in the middle of the tenth century. The Government of Constantinople encouraged the attacks of the Magyars upon the Slavs, but they were dangerous allies, and, until the last days of the Empire, never ceased to furnish auxiliaries to its enemies as well as to itself.

Space fails me to write of the Petzenegoi, the

Komans, the Khazars, and the Ouzoi. We may as well turn away at once from the contemplation of that particular class of foes who came down from the North, during six centuries, to threaten and jeopardize the Byzantine Empire. In the end the Empire succeeded, often by arms, at other times by diplomacy, but most of all by the influence of religion, commerce, and civilization, not only in protecting itself against the dangers of these successive inroads, but in laying, amid these hostile and barbarous tribes themselves, the foundations of civilization and even of future greatness. Thus these tribes, either by conquest, by submission, or by alliance, became resolved into a number of small States, scattered around and sometimes even within the Empire, stretching from the Caspian to Sicily and from the sea of Azof to Syria, but all of them States whose progress was guided by the influence of Constantinople.

The Oriental enemies of the Empire were of a different sort. The Byzantine Power had not there to deal with barbarous tribes, which might indeed first be conquered, but could afterwards be assimilated to the Imperial State by the influences of civilization and Christianity. In the East, New Rome was called to wrestle with mighty nations, possessed of an highly organized polity and animated by a special religious faith. Europe and Asia were thus brought face to face in implacable contrast and collision; the Empire of Constantinople was the

representative of Europe, and the modern world owes to it a lasting debt of gratitude for the long contention by which it continued the traditions of classical Hellas in the same regard.

The continuity of these traditions was specially marked in the struggle of the Empire with Persia. The Sovereigns of that country, as the successors of Darius the son of Hystaspes, regarded the Strymon as their proper frontier. The Emperors, on the other hand, considered themselves the representatives of Alexander the Great. The collisions between these opposing forces were terrible. Whole armies perished. Rich and fertile provinces were reduced to deserts. The combatants sometimes fairly wore one another out, and, in the moment of exhaustion, concluded some treaty which promised a duration of peace; but the wounds inflicted in the last battle were hardly healed, before the war was renewed with more carnage than ever. The deadly conflicts of so many centuries might surely have convinced both the Greeks and the Persians that it was an idle task to try and alter the boundaries assigned to each by nature. But it was not so. Neither conqueror nor conquered was willing to abstain from renewed strife. Vain was the triumph of Julian (the Apostate) and equally vain the victory of his rival, Sapor. It was in vain that Belisarius earned in battle with the Persians his earliest laurels. In the end they were overcome by Heraclius, who, after a long and glorious struggle, imposed peace upon them in 628. 'Since the days of Scipio and Hannibal,' says Gibbon, 'no

bolder enterprise has been attempted than that which Heraclius achieved for the deliverance of the Empire.' The peace he forced them to accept, they never broke, but the reason was they had ceased to exist before they had had time to recover strength for another fray. Four years later, in 632, while Persia was still prostrated from her defeat by Heraclius, and farther enfeebled by internal dissensions, she was finally conquered by the Arabs, then in the outburst of their strength. And from this point the Asiatic enemies of Christianity were no longer the Persians, but Mohammedans, the Arabs first, and afterwards, the Turks.

Persia had not yet been destroyed and Heraclius was still fresh from his victory over her, when he was confronted at Edessa by the ambassador of Mohammed, who summoned him to embrace the new religion. Against the prophet and his followers he was not successful. Jerusalem was captured by Omar, in 637. The next year Egypt fell into the hands of Amrou, after Alexandria had sustained a siege of fourteen months. Nine years later, the Arabs under Abdallah conquered the remaining countries of Roman Africa, and, in sixty years more, under the command of Mousa, they destroyed the kingdom of the Goths, and took possession of Spain. From Spain they passed into France, but the tide of their conquests in that direction was at length arrested for ever by Charles Martel upon the plains of Tours, in 732.

But while Mohammedanism was thus pouring into Western Europe, Constantinople formed a

barrier on the East which it utterly failed to surmount. Constantine IV. (the Bearded) had hardly begun to reign when the Arabs assailed his dominions, and in 672 the Imperial city itself sustained a beleaguerment of five months. The attempt was vainly repeated for seven consecutive years, and was followed in the end by a peace of thirty years' duration; but in 717 the Arabs again subjected the capital to a futile siege, which lasted thirteen months. If only they had succeeded in their first attempts, and conquered the European provinces of the Byzantine Empire, they would have been able to advance Westward and unite their forces with those of their brethren who were moving Northwards out of Spain. In that event, we should have had to-day no victory of Charles Martel to celebrate as the deliverance of the Christian world, and the probable result would have been that delineated by Gibbon: 'A victorious line of march had been prolonged above a thousand miles, from the Rock of Gibraltar to the banks of the Loire; the repetition of an equal space would have carried the Saracens to the confines of Poland and the Highlands of Scotland; the Rhine is not more impassable than the Nile or Euphrates, and the Arabian fleet might have sailed without a naval combat into the mouth of the Thames. Perhaps the interpretation of the Koran would now be taught in the schools of Oxford, and her pulpits might demonstrate to a circumcised people the sanctity and truth of the revelation of Mahomet.'

In 823 the Arabs from Spain conquered Crete, and when, an hundred and thirty-eight years afterwards, it was reconquered by Nikephoros II. (Phokas), that prince found it so thoroughly Mohammedanized, that it required the plantation of new colonies and a new evangelization before the island could be reclaimed to Hellenism and Christianity. The terrible example of the work wrought by the Arabs in this instance is a sufficient proof of how great was the danger from which not only the Hellenic world of the East in particular, but also Christian Europe in general, was saved by the efforts of the Byzantine Emperors. Constantine IV. (the Bearded), Leo III. (the Isaurian), Constantine V. (Kopronymos), Lachanodrakon under Leo III. (the Khazar), Basil I. (the Macedonian), Kourkouas under Romanus I. (Lekapenos), and, above all, Nikephoros II. (Phokas), and John I. (Tzimiskes), by their calm heroism and their military genius, succeeded not only in checking the Arabs but in weakening them. The day came, however, when a new enemy broke the power of the Caliphs, and took their place as the mortal foe of Christianity. That new enemy was the Turk.

The Turks first appear in history towards the middle of the sixth century. Their relations with Justinian and his successors were friendly, and Heraclius was assisted by them as allies in his wars against the Persians and Arabs. They afterwards adopted the Mohammedan religion, and then joined the banner of the Caliphs, who allowed themselves to be much influenced and guided by the commanders

of the Turkish battalions forming their guard. In 1037, Togroul, the son of Seljouk, founded the dynasty thence called Seljoukide, and in 1068 his nephew Alp-Arslan invaded the provinces of the Empire, and took prisoner the Emperor Romanus IV. (Diogenes). Twenty years later, the Turks conquered Asia Minor and expelled the Fatimite Caliphs from Jerusalem.

The capture of the Holy City by the Turks was the cause of the Crusades, which, instead of achieving the permanent deliverance of the Holy Places, effected the impoverishment and ruin of the Byzantine Empire.

The struggle between the Empire and the Ottoman Turks lasted for four hundred years. The effort of the Turks was, by continual and violent incursions, to exterminate, if possible, the Christian inhabitants of the country, and thus to weaken it, with a view to ultimate conquest. As a matter of fact, by dint of habitually massacring the peasantry, making slaves of the survivors, and reducing the cultivated tracts to a condition of wilderness, they succeeded after a while in extinguishing the Greek population and doing away with the Greek language, in the interior of Asia Minor. The Imperial armies, now growing feebler and feebler, strove in vain to repel these sudden invasions and to protect the territory and subjects of the Empire. Nevertheless, the internal divisions among the Turks were so serious and their wars against the Mongols so unfortunate, that it is possible that the Byzantine Government might in

the end have succeeded in getting the better of them, if the young Christendom of the West had been willing to become the ally and helper of the venerable Christendom of the East. But it was not so. On the contrary, Constantinople found in the Latins, not allies, but enemies. Blinded by religious and commercial rivalries, by the question of the Papal Supremacy, and by the material interests of the Italian Republics, Western Europe failed to see that the line of defence which was imperilled was really her own, and that by being themselves the first to rend and degrade the Imperial purple, the Crusaders were only hastening the moment when the Turks should trample it down in mire and in blood.

Thus it came to pass that the Eastern Empire ultimately fell before the unceasing attacks of its Asiatic foes. Equally unceasing was its strife with the enemies who assailed it from the North and the West. In the case of these latter, however, there always existed a certain tie which even the storms of war could never utterly break. This tie was the common profession of the Christian religion, which always left open the door, in some sort, for the hope of a reconciliation. On the other side, it was quite different. Between Constantinople, Christian, Hellenic, and Imperial, on the one hand, and the despotisms of Pagan or Mohammedan Asia, on the other, there was a great gulf fixed. With them, no community of life could ever be possible. The Arabs took the place of the Persians, and the Turks took the place of the Arabs. But from the

beginning to the end, the Asiatic enemy, whoever it was, was always inspired by one and the same feeling, and one and the same motive. The feeling was an intense passion of religious hatred; the motive, a rabid longing to annihilate that Christian State which formed a barrier between them and the destruction of Europe. But it was thanks to that barrier, that Christian Europe was saved, first from a persecution of extermination conducted by Persian fire-worshippers, and then from a slavery where the religion of the Koran would have been propagated by the sword of the Arabs. And it was thanks to that barrier, that Western Europe had the time given her so to develop her strength, that, long after Constantinople herself had fallen in the struggle, a martyr in the cause of the human race, she was able to shatter the Turkish navies upon the waters of Lepanto and to rout their hordes before the walls of Vienna. Unhappily, however, the fall of Constantinople was in great part the work of that very Europe which owed and owes her so much. It is true that the death-blow was given by the battle-axe of Mahomet II., but this blow was only fatal because the victim was already half-dead, and it is the Crusades which are responsible, more than anything else, for reducing her to that condition. What were they then, these Crusades, which moved Christendom, both Eastern and Western, to the very depths of its being, and were fruitful of consequences which the world is still experiencing to-day?

The preaching of Peter the Hermit kindled in

Western Europe an irresistible conflagration of religious excitement. Latin Christianity seemed to be about to emigrate bodily into Asia for the purpose of rescuing the Holy Sepulchre. It may possibly be the case that the movement owed a good deal of its success to the hereditary nomad instinct, transmitted to their descendants by the barbarian hordes which had convulsed and colonized Europe some five or six centuries previously. However that may be, the present migration was destined to repair all the ruin which these tribes had inflicted upon the civilization of the West, by bringing back to it once more, from the surviving representative of Imperial Rome, the tradition of the classical culture of which it had been deprived.

The Crusades wear a very different aspect according as they are viewed from an Eastern or from a Western standpoint. To the Western eye they present themselves in all the noble proportions of a great movement based upon motives purely religious, when the Europe which has since attained such vast developments, not in one continent or one hemisphere only, but in New Worlds besides, first appears, the self-sacrificing champion of Christianity and of civilization, in the vigour of her strong youth and the glory of her intellectual morning. It is natural that a certain honourable pride should still inspire any family of the Latin aristocracy which can trace its pedigree to those who fought under the banner of the Cross. But when the Easterns beheld swarms of illiterate barbarians looting and plundering the provinces of

the Christian and Roman Empire, and the very men who called themselves the champions of the Faith murdering the Priests of Christ upon the ground that they were schismatics, it was equally natural that they should forget that such a movement had originally been inspired by a religious aim and possessed a distinctively Christian character.

The cruelty and violence of the Crusaders roused at once the indignation and the disgust of the subjects of the Empire. From the very beginning, the Latins and Greeks regarded one another with mutual distrust. They looked upon each other not only as heretics, but as political adversaries. For this reason the attitude of the Crusaders in dealing with the Byzantine population was originally one of hostility. Their appearance upon the stage of history is the first act in the final tragedy of the Empire. The tact and skill of the Emperor Alexis I. (Komnenos) were able to turn the First Crusade, in 1096, to the temporary profit of his country, but both that expedition and those which followed it, in reality shook New Rome to her very foundations, shattered her forces, and drained her resources. The climax was reached in the capture and sack of Constantinople in 1204. The outrage upon the Majesty of the throne, and the concomitant dismemberment of the Empire, dealt it a blow from which it never again entirely rallied. 'If,' says Papparegopoulos, speaking of the First Crusade, 'the Emperor Alexis had been able to employ against the Turks the land and sea forces which he

at length found himself compelled to turn against his pretended allies, and the troops whom he had been obliged to send with them into Asia Minor and Syria; if he had been able to reserve for the struggle against Mohammedanism, the resources of which he was plundered by the looting and extortions of the Crusaders, he would have been able to get rid of all danger from the unbelievers far more effectually than was done by the ephemeral success of the Latins.'

History has yet to treat the attitude of the Crusaders in the East from a point of view of judicial impartiality. The images of these events are still shown to us through the glass of Western prejudices. 'The Latins,' admits Finlay, 'would not allow that their disasters were caused by their own misconduct and imprudence; they persisted in attributing all their misfortunes to the treachery of the Greeks; and though Alexis delivered many from captivity, the Crusaders generally regarded him as an enemy.' According to these accounts, it was always the Byzantines who were in the wrong; they were liars and traitors; and they had no cause to regard the Crusaders with suspicion. But the Western historians, whether they be those who strive to rise above national prejudices or those who allow themselves to be carried away by them, are alike unable entirely to conceal the barbarism and self-seeking, the unceasing quarrels, the faithless disregard of oaths and treaties, and the total absence of any capacity for the direction of either military or civil affairs, which so abundantly mark

the conduct of the Crusades, and especially of the earlier. Was it possible that such armies could long withstand the Mohammedan hosts, or save that Empire against which they themselves actually plotted? And were not the Emperors right, after a thorough experience of what they were, in doing what lay in their power to get rid of company so doubtful?

In the First Crusade, the Franks did not assume possession of the Imperial throne, not because they would not, but because they could not. But when the turn of the Fourth Crusade came, they were more accustomed to things Eastern, and they had the luck of finding the Empire in a state of weakness and paralysis, the outcome of the unceasing wars of Manuel I. (Komnenos) and the series of revolutions which had followed him. Under these circumstances, the Latin conquest of Constantinople was easy. However, the Latin conquerors remained in possession of the Imperial throne for only fifty-seven years, and during that time a glorious succession of gallant Emperors gathered together in exile the now recovering forces of Greek nationalism, and turned them upon their Christian adversaries until the day came in 1261, when Michael VIII. (Palaiologos) reconquered the city of Constantine. From that moment the division between East and West became more marked, and their mutual estrangement has been lasting. From time to time, attempts were made at reunion, but they were made without confidence on the one side and without sincerity

upon the other. The fundamental element in every proposal which emanated from the West was the recognition of the Papal Supremacy. There were some Emperors who, in moments of national weakness and peril, accepted the claims of the Latins, but the mass of the people were never willing to purchase by such a sacrifice the help of Western Europe. On the contrary, when they called to mind the Frankish conquest, with its burnings, its devastation, its banishments, and its religious persecutions, they feared the Western alliance, and came to say, with Luke Notaras, 'better a Turk's turban than a Cardinal's hat.' It was a mistake, of course; and a mistake which was dearly paid for. And yet, after all, who knows? Supposing that the Frankish conquest had been lasting—supposing that an enduring political edifice had been raised upon the foundation of a Latinized Byzantine Empire—supposing that the Bosphoros had been for ever cleared of the Turks by the arms of the Western immigrants who would then have settled there as permanent masters—the consequences might have been even more fatal to the free development of the purely Hellenic genius than has been the Ottoman sword. It is true that those fair lands which the Turks have blasted for four hundred years would not have suffered so long if the Franks had been their owners instead. But when the inhabitants of these lands are viewed from the purely ethnological standpoint, as *Hellenes*, they may to-day owe something even to Mahomet II. It might perhaps have been that in an Hellas,

definitively occupied and ruled by Westerns, the Hellenes would have lost the traditions and memories of their own antient glories, and that to-day they might not have been what they are, but an hybrid mixture of Eastern and Western races, speaking a language reduced to a corrupt dialect, and emasculated of those elements which, amid all the calamities of their nation, have been at once their safety and their honour.

The invasion of Byzantine territory by the Normans may be regarded as an incident cognate with the Crusades, although, as a matter of chronological sequence, it began somewhat earlier. After their conquest and occupation of a portion of Northern France, these barbarians adopted the use of the French language, but they did not relinquish their own customs, their nomadic instinct, and their hunger for conquest. In the year 1016, a Norman army poured into Italy and seized the provinces still ruled by the Eastern Empire. Between 1081 and 1084, Robert Guiscard made two expeditions against Greece, but although he began by defeating Alexis I. (Komnenos) he did not succeed in establishing any permanent foothold. About sixty years later, the Normans attempted a new expedition against the Empire. They captured Corfu and harried the mainland. But the Emperor Manuel I. (Komnenos) repulsed them, carried the war into Italy, and compelled them to sue for a thirty years' peace. Meanwhile the same race conquered England. The difference of their fortunes in the two

countries is a sufficient proof of the comparative superiority of the Byzantine Empire at the time.

The Norman incursions paved the way for the Frank occupation of Greece proper, which followed the seizure of Constantinople in 1204. This occupation lasted two centuries, but it has left hardly any abiding trace, and introduced no important change in the destiny of the country. Neither did it do anything to retard the progress of the Turkish conquest. And then Constantinople fell, and the whole Hellenic world passed into Turkish slavery. Western Europe looked on with unconcern at the appalling catastrophe. It was in vain that the last of the Palaiologoi cried to them for help. 'Christendom,' says Gibbon, 'beheld with indifference the fall of Constantinople. . . . Some States were too weak and others too remote; by some the danger was considered as imaginary, by others as inevitable: the Western Princes were involved in their endless and domestic quarrels; and the Roman Pontiff was exasperated by the falsehood or obstinacy of the Greeks. Instead of employing in their favour the arms and treasures of Italy, Nicolas V. had foretold their approaching ruin; and his honour was engaged in the accomplishment of his prophecy. Perhaps he was softened by the last extremity of their distress; but his compassion was tardy; his efforts were faint and unavailing; and Constantinople had fallen before the squadrons of Genoa and Venice could sail from their harbours. Even the Princes of the Morea and of the Greek Islands affected a cold neutrality: the Genoese

colony of Galata negotiated a private treaty ; and the Sultan indulged them in the delusive hope that by his clemency they might survive the ruin of the Empire.'

Thus perished Constantinople, Christian and Imperial. Up to her last hour she had never ceased, for more than a thousand years, to fight. In the fourth century she fought the Goths ; in the fifth, the Huns and Vandals ; in the sixth, the Slavs ; in the seventh, the Persians, the Avars, and the Arabs ; in the eighth, ninth, and tenth, the Bulgars, the Magyars, and the Russians ; in the eleventh, the Koumanoi, the Petzenegoi, and the Seljoukian Turks ; in the twelfth, thirteenth, fourteenth, and fifteenth, the Ottomans, the Normans, the Crusaders, the Venetians, and the Genoese. No wonder that at last she fell exhausted. The wonder is, how she could keep herself alive so long. But it was by this long battle that she succeeded in saving from destruction, amid the universal cataclysm which overwhelmed the classical world, the civilization of the antients, modified by the Christian Religion. The moral and intellectual development of modern Europe are owing to the Byzantine Empire, if it be true that this development is the common offspring of antiquity upon the one hand and of Christianity upon the other.

BYZANTINISM AND HELLENISM.

BYZANTINISM AND HELLENISM.

NOW-A-DAYS, it necessitates a certain amount of culture and demands a certain mental effort, to enable an inhabitant of Western Europe to realize the state of society in which the Byzantine Empire was compelled to play a part. At present the question is no longer how Christendom is to be defended against Asiatic hordes, but how England and Russia are to partition between them the work of subjecting Asia. European civilization has no longer to face any enemy from without; the danger to her life is one which she has bred in her own vitals, that spirit of revolution which is as a worm that dieth not within the frame of modern society itself. Hence the difficulty, to those reared amid such a state of things, of bringing home to themselves what was meant by the invasions of barbarians of which I have already spoken. Not long ago, we should have had to seek in Greece the few aged survivors who still live to remember the Turkish rule, and the outbreak of the War of Independence in 1821, as the only men in Europe who knew by experience what the Asiatic savage is in invasion, the only men who had seen not only all they possessed in this world destroyed, but also

their wives — and their children — murdered, enslaved, and dishonoured. But the Bulgarian atrocities and the Thessalian massacres have since rendered such an appeal needless. Still, however, for those born under happier skies it is hard to pass in imagination to the times and the places when the barbarians broke into provinces where commerce and industry were flourishing, to enact their work of ruin and devastation. It is hard to picture creatures without a moment's regard for the religion, the honour, or the life of their wretched victims, giving the rein to their will over everything they found in their way. The very rumour of their approach spread like an earthquake of terror. 'The land is as the garden of Eden before them, and behind them a desolate wilderness.' Wherever they settled, prosperity and peace were replaced by barbarism. This is the picture which must be realized before it is possible to realize also with what the Byzantine Empire was called upon to contend.

Moreover, there is no use in denying, with regard to the Empire itself, that whatever may have been the advantages which it sometimes gained in the struggle, the very contact with such adversaries was beyond all doubt harmful. It was impossible that a state of everlasting contention against foreign enemies destitute of any element of civilization, or sometimes even of any capacity for it, should prove a mean for developing among the subjects of the Empire those political virtues for the want of which Western writers are so fond of condemning them.

If we are to judge the subjects of the Byzantine Empire, not indulgently but justly, either by a political or a moral standard, it is necessary to keep in view what were the causes which produced their faults. Above all, it is necessary to view them side by side with their own contemporaries in other countries. It is not fair to compare them with that glorious antiquity after which they came, or to contrast them with whatever we may admire most in the political or moral development of the European world of to-day, which they preceded, and the foundations of which were so largely their work. However, principles of historical criticism of this sort have hardly begun to guide the judgments of Western writers. Most of them are still quite contented and happy in going on in the old rut. They have simply to yield, and do yield, to the injustice and onesidedness which, under the stimulus of prejudices begotten of circumstances utterly passed away and passions which have aimlessly survived their very *raison d'être*, have succeeded in investing the very name of 'the Lower Empire,' in the Western mind, with an idea of certain despicable characteristics.

The fact is, that the blame for creating this popular idea of the Byzantine Empire must rest in great measure upon two eminent writers, both of whom were inspired by the philosophy of the last Century, and both of whom did a great deal to call the attention of modern Europe to the history of the Greek Empire. The two writers I mean are Montesquieu and Gibbon. It would be an imper-

tinence on my part to arraign the work of these great authors, were it not for three facts. These are, firstly, the admitted truth that history is like every other science, in this respect, that she moves towards perfection by progressive development; secondly, that it has only been within this Century that the true science of historical criticism has even begun to be applied to history in general; and, lastly, that the Byzantine era is precisely one of the least known and most obscure of the fields of historical study. And so it is that at the present day Montesquieu and Gibbon mould the judgment formed upon the Byzantine world by a great many people, who know nothing about Mediæval Greece from any other source.

Montesquieu gave far less attention to the Byzantine period than to the Roman. This it is easy to perceive by reading even superficially his *Considerations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence*. As long as he is dealing with the Roman period, his arguments are vigorous and his conclusions are impregnable. They are based upon facts which he had studied and mastered. But as soon as he reaches the Byzantine epoch, a change is perceptible. It is the same writer, but his subject seems now to be beyond his control. And then the reader, feeling the remarkable absence, in the last pages of the book, of the clearness and attractiveness which charmed him in the earlier portion, thinks that the fault is in the topics handled. This impression is confirmed by the contemptuous tone adopted by the writer. The fact is that Mon-

tesquieu's treatment of the history of the Byzantine Empire is both superficial and prejudiced. He informs us generally * that 'from the period of Phocas onwards, the history of the Greek Empire is a mere tissue of rebellion, conspiracy, and treachery. . . . One revolution begot another, until the effect itself became the cause. The Greeks had seen so many different families mounting the throne one after another, that at last they became indifferent to them all, and fortune had found Emperors in men of so many divers sorts and conditions, that no origin was too vile and no deserts too slight to suffice to cut off all hope.' In his last chapter he says, 'the Emperors were led by the nose by the monks and priests, who became all-powerful after their triumph over the Iconoclasts, . . . and if,' he concludes, 'anyone will compare the Greek clergy with the Latin clergy, and the conduct of the Popes with that of the Patriarchs of Constantinople, he will see on the one side men as wise as those on the other were silly.' These quotations are in themselves quite enough. As for the reasons by which Montesquieu proposes to explain the fact that the Byzantine Empire lasted for more than a millennium, they are simply self-contradictory. The principal seems to him to be the chemical invention used especially in naval warfare, and commonly known as the 'Greek fire,' and the second is maritime and commercial supremacy. But if the Greek sailors and soldiers had been

* Chap. xxi.

cowards and fools, of what use would the Greek fire have been in their hands? Who won and kept the supremacy of the seas? And would commerce have flourished in the absence of the elements of power, of order, and of enlightened administration?

The concluding pages of Montesquieu's work contain many observations which are lucid and pointed. What he did not choose to see was, that just as Old Rome had her rise, her greatness, her decline, and her fall, New Rome also had a rise, a greatness, a decline, and a fall of her own, quite independently of the other,—that the work which Byzantium had to do for the human family was a work quite other than and different from the work of Old Rome,—and that the history of an Empire which endured for a thousand years cannot be exhaustively taught by being crumpled up into a few contemptuous sentences, especially when that history presents an amount of diversity and complication such as the history of no other Empire probably involves.

The truth is, that it has only been by enveloping the shallowness of his historical judgments upon Christian and Imperial Constantinople in the glittering phantasmagoria of a witty style and an audacious dogmatism that Montesquieu has succeeded so largely in inducing posterity to swallow his aphorisms.

No such reproach can be cast at Gibbon. That great writer, with much skill and—making all due allowance for the peculiarities of his style—with manly and incisive eloquence, has drawn the his-

tory of the Byzantine Empire, in that monumental work, whose dimensions are yet all too cramped for the extent and variety of his matter. The value of this celebrated book, however, is injuriously affected by his partiality and the manner in which he has allowed his judgment to be biassed by his prejudices.

Gibbon, indeed, may be said to have written the history of the Eastern Empire with the express aim and object of propounding and supporting his own preconceived ideas. The fundamental principle of his theory of history is that Christianity was the cause alike of the ruin of antient civilization, of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, and of all the misery and darkness of the Middle Ages. In fact, in the last pages of his work, he says formally and in so many words:—‘I have described the triumph of barbarism and religion.’ The conjunction which couples the two last substantives is a sufficient demonstration of what his theory of history was. He viewed the Christian and Hellenized polity which occupied the throne of the Cæsars at New Rome as chiefly responsible for the result he bewailed, and consequently he never loses an opportunity of decrying the Mediæval Greek world. It is a curious evidence of his prejudices upon this subject, and of the way in which he allowed himself to act upon them, that, sometimes, in the very same page, and whether he is narrating military events or political intrigues, he calls the very same people ‘Romans’ when they conquered or dealt honourably, and ‘Greeks’ when they were defeated or acted treacherously. When

he uses the word 'Greek' it is his regular custom to qualify it by some depreciatory adjective. This habit grew upon him to such an extent that at last he found himself unable to keep within the limits of the historic facts with which even the last and lowest moments of the Byzantine Empire could supply him, to justify his systematic attacks; and he accordingly took refuge in the habitual amplification of the facts into the boundless and convenient regions of conjecture, by the use of 'if' and 'perhaps.' Thus it is that, when he speaks of the annual religious celebration which glorified the memory of a Martyr's triumphant death, he writes that, 'as soon as the doors of the church were thrown open . . . if they approached the balustrade of the altar, they made their way through the prostrate crowd, consisting, for the most part, of strangers and pilgrims, who resorted to the city on the vigil of the feast; and who already felt the strong intoxication of fanaticism, and *perhaps* of wine.' This sort of insinuation really seems to reach its climax when, as he is describing the last siege of Constantinople, the scenes of agony which followed its capture, the butchery and the slavery inflicted on those who had taken refuge in the Church of the Uncreated Wisdom, he says:—'The loudest in their wailings were the nuns, who were torn from the altar with naked bosoms, outstretched hands, and dishevelled hair, *and we should piously believe, that few could be tempted to prefer the vigils of the harem to those of the monastery.*' This last pleasantry is, to my mind, horrible.

It is perhaps possible to account for some of the repulsive traits of Gibbon by ascribing them to peculiarities in his own psychological temperament. There are, in fact, some men, who feel an actual pleasure in the very idea of destruction. It has an attraction for them, it causes them a sensation of joyful excitement. There are probably no finer pieces of writing in Gibbon than the Twenty-second and Twenty-third Chapters, in which he gloats over the efforts of the Apostate Julian to annihilate the work, and to exterminate the worshippers, of the Galilean whom he had denied. Next to these in literary merit is perhaps the Fiftieth, in which he pours, as with an enchanted pen, the life of Mohammed and the genesis of Islam. It is with a similar admiration that he narrates the acts of Zingis Khan, with the remark that 'it is the religion of Zingis that best deserves our wonder and applause.'

However, Gibbon's theory of history, where it appears biassed by admiration for success and worship of mere strength, is but one instance of a feature only too characteristic of the English mind. Not only the way in which Gibbon has written of us, but many a phase of the sentiment and action of the English people towards us, can be explained by the same trait. I shall not take upon myself to describe it. One of themselves, even a prophet of their own, has said what it is, to my hand. Gibbon is not alone in supplying an exhibition of it in his treatment of Greece. Carlyle and Froude have applied it to Poland and to Ireland; and here is what

a writer in the *Edinburgh Review* for January, 1873, says about it, in discussing Mr. Froude's *English in Ireland*:—"The dominant principle that Mr. Froude carries into the consideration of our relations with Ireland for the last seven centuries, is what is known as the Imperial idea—that is, that a strong, bold, courageous race has a sort of natural right to invade the territory of weak, semi-civilised, distracted races, and undertake the task of governing them in the best way possible, without any consideration for their rights or feelings. The conception is akin to the passion of the hour for men of blood and iron. We are taught that vigour and fortitude are to compensate always and in all circumstances for rapacity and faithlessness; that force of character must cover a multitude of sins; that the feeble are as bad as the false; and our admiration is claimed for the deeds of an Attila or a Tamerlane rather than for those of a Wilberforce or a Howard. This is the familiar philosophy of Mr. Carlyle, who glorifies force and justifies all its crimes. Mr. Froude is evidently one of his most ardent disciples. . . . It is not many years since the former likened Ireland to a rat and England to an elephant whose business "it was to squelch the rat on occasion." In his life of Frederic Wilhelm he tells us that just as when a man has filled the measure of his crimes, we "hang him and finish him to the general satisfaction," so a nation like Poland, fallen into the depths of decay, must be disposed of by some similar process. The misfortune is, however, that though you can finish a man on the gallows, it is

impossible to finish a nation in the same way. We shall presently trace the fruits of this teaching in the work of Mr. Froude. If we are to accept the historic guidance of either, we must submit to have evil turned into good at the bidding of genius, and the verdicts of history wantonly reversed, while the faculty of discerning the true from the false will be everywhere sensibly weakened. The doctrine of force is profoundly immoral, and opposed to every principle of English freedom, and to every generous impulse of sympathy with the oppressed.'

This witness is true.

But, besides all this, I do not believe that Gibbon was superior to that traditional antipathy which began to make itself manifest as soon as the natives of Greece and of Italy came face to face, an antipathy which the religious differences of the two Romes ultimately brought to a climax, and the conduct of the Crusaders has rendered lasting up to the present hour. As Gibbon himself says, speaking even of the Fourth Century:—'The natives of Italy affected to despise the servile and effeminate Greeks of Byzantium, who presumed to imitate the dress, and to usurp the dignity, of Roman Senators: and the Greeks had not yet forgotten the sentiments of hatred and contempt, which their polished ancestors had so long entertained for the rude inhabitants of the West.'

From that time forth appeared the first indications which threatened religious division. These differences were fostered as much by antipathies of race as by the claims to supremacy made by the

Popes of Rome. The separation occasioned by the struggle between Ignatius and Photius was indeed healed, but the rent caused by the excommunication of Michael Keroularios has proved to be one which time has hitherto failed to close for any enduring period.

I am not going to undertake an examination of the question of the Schism. The modern historian Papparegopoulos has treated it with the talent and impartiality which are habitual to his pen. As for myself, I only mention the subject because it is one of the causes of the mutual hatred which has existed between the East and the West. The abuse which we first find in Latin writers, and which Old and New Rome continued throughout the whole of the Middle Ages to exchange with fresh additions and renewed violence, does no credit to either side. Supposing that some philosopher belonging to some newly-created and altogether alien race, and absolutely free from prejudice one way or the other, could ever be called on to form a perfectly unbiassed historical judgment upon the controversy between the Greeks and the Latins, upon no evidence except the contemporary monuments of each side, he would probably find it hard to decide which of them best deserved the abuse of the other. It is the misfortune of the Greek party that no such ideal historian has ever arisen to make such an examination of the real facts. If Western Christendom had fallen during the Middle Ages, and Eastern Christendom had survived, so as to have had the telling of the story all her own way,

and the world had been unable to learn anything about it except what it could obtain from Byzantine sources, traditions, and points of view, it is the reputation of the Latins instead of that of the Greeks which would have suffered. But the fact has been the other way. The East fell four hundred years ago and was thereby silenced. The West survived; and has had all the talk its own way ever since. It has used the opportunity in the full spirit of the rancour which already animated it. This rancour is a sufficient explanation not only of the ill-feeling with which Greece is regarded by the Western parts of Europe and the comfortable indifference with which they contemplated the agony of her slavery, but also of the downright hostility which appears whenever any difference of interests gives an excuse for indulging the antipathy originally begotten or fostered by these old-world controversies. At the same time, it may be admitted that this historical question is not—at least consciously—the sole cause of the abundant anti-Hellenic literature with which so numerous a body of writers have undertaken during so many years to enlighten the European public. But anyhow, from Luitprand of Cremona down to the Governors by whom the Venetian Republic was represented in Greece, and from Gibbon down to the Special Correspondents of certain sections of the press, we are, unfortunately, surrounded by proofs of the ill-will with which Western Europe too often regards our race. In some of the modern works, indeed, the very outrageousness of the

violence and the childishness of the expressions used, make the attacks less vexatious. But let us try to apply to them all the famous line of the great Italian—

‘Non ragionam’ di lor’, ma guarda e passa.’

After all, we must not forget such parallel cases as the rivalries of race which have divided and do still divide the other European nations among themselves, such as the antient enmity between England and France, and the hatred between the French and the Germans. We must remember that sentiments of exclusiveness and jealousy of foreigners are the characteristics of what we have been taught to call the civilized world. We can only hope for an increase of knowledge and a spread of civilization in the best sense of the word, and that, as means of inter-communication are multiplied, the contact of nations one with another may gradually efface the result of traditions begotten in ignorance and in barbarism. As far as we are ourselves concerned, we may well welcome as a forecast of such a transformation the impartial judgment which we now begin sometimes to find in the more learned and critical of the Western writers, when discussing Byzantine Hellenism.

But here we may well ask the question, How far is Hellenism responsible for the faults of Byzantinism?

I do not propose to call in question here the

measure of solidarity which united Hellenism with Byzantinism. I will refrain from saying anything against the historical scheme of the k. Papparego-poulos, which is full of political meaning. In performing his work of narrating the history of our race, from the earliest known period down to the present day, he has treated the Byzantine Empire as an integral part of that history. But I wish to call particular attention to a fact which the historian in question has himself not failed to notice, and of which we must not lose sight, viz., that during the Byzantine period Hellenism was subject to a remarkable modification.

The conquests of Philip and Alexander the Great, and the consequences which had followed them, had had the effect of widely extending the sphere of Hellenism in the East. This extension received a new and much wider impulse from the unity of Government which the Roman Empire was able to impose upon what was then reckoned the whole civilized world. Then came Christianity, which borrowed from Hellenism its language, and so much else besides, and again most powerfully contributed to spread the influence of Greek letters and culture far beyond the limits which Geography would have naturally assigned to them. In the end, the Greek language was spoken as far as the Danube on the North, and Armenia and the Euphrates on the East, and all these Greek-speaking countries were gradually united into a sort of mixed world, which constituted the Byzantine Empire.

This diffusion of Hellenism, however, was accom-

plished at a cost to the pure Hellenic element somewhat similar to that suffered by a glass of undiluted wine when poured into a pitcher of water. The pitcher contains, indeed, a larger amount of liquid, and of a liquid in which are clearly perceptible the colour and taste of wine; but the colour is pale and the taste insipid. It has needed the chemistry of ages, it has cost the distillation of centuries of grief and suffering, to eliminate again from the feeble dilution of the Empire the pure Hellenic element as it is once more this day, freed from Byzantine adulteration, strong and sound.

What is certain is, that it was only after the decline of the Byzantine Empire had begun, that the Byzantine people began to call themselves Hellenes and their Monarchs Emperors of the Hellenes. Until then, the autocrats were termed *Augusti* and *Emperors of Rome*, and their subjects were styled *Romans*. This custom has proved so deep-rooted that it not only still survives as the universal usage of the East,* but even in such writers as Byron we find the Hellenic language termed Roman ('Romaic'). At the same time, the inhabitants of Hellas proper were not called Hellenes but *Helladikoi*, and the ancient and glorious word *Hellen* was employed (by a usage possibly imitated from the New Testament) in a depreciatory sense, to indicate an *idolater*. Moreover, it was the East which was, as it were,

* Among the Arabic-speaking inhabitants of Syria, the adherents of the Orthodox Church are styled *Romans* to distinguish them from Catholics, and, among the latter, Uniats of the Greek Rite are termed *Roman Catholics* to distinguish them from the Latins. (Tr.)

the body constituent of the Empire, and, although some few of the Emperors married Athenian women, they were themselves by origin all either Thracians, or Armenians, or Isaurians, or Cappadocians ; there was not a single Athenian or Spartan among them, or one sprung from any other purely Hellenic stock.

But while the true Hellas, properly so called, was thus thrust into the background, the use of her language preserved and propagated the spirit of Hellenism. Of this new Hellenism Constantinople was the capital, as she became also the centre where the antient traditions were preserved. The learned, who there studied the master-pieces of the classical intellect and endeavoured in vain to imitate them, were the true heirs of Greek antiquity, imperfect as might be the ties of race which joined them to Perikles or Philopoimen. Those who, when Constantinople fell, fled from the ruin, bearing with them the treasures of the wisdom of their antient forefathers, well deserved the name of Hellenes by which they styled themselves. It was likewise no violation of historical continuity, while it was a proof of the solidarity which Byzantinism had effected with Hellenism, that during the slow ages of slavery, the longing of the Hellenes gathered round the Church of the Eternal Wisdom.

But it is time now to look at this solidarity, which undoubtedly united Byzantinism and Hellenism, and to examine it in the light of scientific history. It is time to draw the line between the two elements, and to assign to each what portion of the whole is its due.

If such an examination be made with both knowledge and justice, the result will be to show that it was not its Hellenic element which was responsible for the shortcomings of the Byzantine Empire. The truth was, that the Roman Empire was dying out, when it had the good fortune to be absorbed in the life of Greece, and derived from that union a renewed energy, which gave it another millennium of existence. The protraction of the Roman Empire for that additional period was a blessing to civilization and to mankind. On the other hand, Hellas indeed for a while regenerated the worn-out frame of the Italian autocracy by thus sharing with it the blood of her own strong vitality, but the transfusion cost her an epoch of exhaustion and prostration from the effects of which she has not yet completely recovered. And this exhaustion meant, in her case, the repression, for a while, of some of her most precious characteristics.

What, however, were exactly the faults of the Byzantine Empire? And how far were these faults essential and not incidental?

The principal fault which has been found with the Empire of which New Rome was the capital, has been that there was no *people*. It is said that the political edifice rested upon only two foundations, viz., the Imperial Court and the Patriarchal Court; an Emperor waited upon by a gang of eunuchs on the one side, and an Hierarch supported by an

army of monks upon the other—nothing between the two—no patriotism, no nation, no people.

Now, it is quite true that the constituent elements of the Byzantine Empire were very different from those which had formed the strength either of the old Greek States or of the old Roman Commonwealth. The State was no longer composed, as in them, of a body of free citizens. There had been no more free citizens since the day when Rome, finding herself mistress of the world, had been pleased to commit her power to the hands of one Emperor, and her victorious eagles darkened with the shadow of their wings the surface of what was then considered the whole civilized world. It is quite true that the theory of the Imperial Monarchy at Constantinople was, from the very beginning, a compound of the traditions of the Elder Rome on the one hand, and of the ideas of an Oriental despotism upon the other. But it ought not to be forgotten that this Imperial monarchy, although it was absolute, was not unlimited. 'The authority exercised by the Senate,' attests Finlay, 'the powers possessed by Synods and General Councils of the Church, and the importance often attached by the Emperors to the ratification of their laws by *silentia* and popular assemblies, mark a change in the Byzantine Empire, in strong contrast with the earlier military Empire of the Romans. The highest power in the State had been transferred from the army to the laws of the Empire—no inconsiderable step in the progress of political civilization. The influence of those feelings of humanity

which resulted from this change, are visible in the mild treatment of many unsuccessful usurpers and dethroned Emperors.' The Emperor himself, in his Coronation Oath, swore 'to abide and perpetually be found a faithful and sincere servant and son of Holy Church, and moreover her defender * and avenger, and to be kind and loving toward his subjects, and to abstain from bloodshed and mutilations and the like, as far as he should be able, and to consent to all truth and justice' (Kodinos. De Officiis. cap. xvii.)†

As a matter of fact, the Church, the Senate, and the prevailing respect for Law, were always able to oppose a barrier, which was usually insurmountable, to the individual vagaries of autocracy upon the part of the Emperors. And more than this. Any one who studies the history of the dynastic intrigues and internal dissensions of the Empire, will observe that the mass of the people did not always stand aloof from politics, that they never abdicated altogether their rights in the direction of public affairs, but took an active part in nearly all these changes, and, moreover, that the cause espoused by them was generally the rightful one. Thus it came to pass that many of the worst Emperors were deposed by the popular indignation, and that most of those who were raised to the supreme dignity by the voice of the popular choice

* δεφένσωρ.

† Concerning the Byzantine polity in general, see Papparegopoulos. IV. Introduction.

were among the best Princes who did honour to the throne of Constantine. I may cite as an instance of the one sort, the first dethronement of the insane savage Justinian II. ; and of the other, the elevation of Anastasius II. Of the latter, Gibbon says:— ‘The free voice of the Senate and people promoted Artemius from the office of secretary to that of Emperor ; he . . . displayed in a short and troubled reign the virtues both of peace and war.’ And of the event of 1071, when the two Nikephoroi, Bryennios and Botaneiates, were contending for the supreme power, he says again:— ‘The name of Bryennius was illustrious ; his cause was popular ; but his licentious troops could not be restrained from burning and pillaging a suburb ; and the people, who would have hailed the rebel, rejected and repulsed the incendiary of his country. This change of the public opinion was favourable to Botaneiates, who at length, with an army of Turks, approached the shores of Chalcedon. A formal invitation, in the name of the patriarch, the synod, and the senate, was circulated through the streets of Constantinople ; and the general assembly, in the dome of St. Sophia, debated with order and calmness on the choice of their sovereign. The guards of Michael would have dispersed this unarmed multitude ; but the feeble Emperor, applauding his own moderation and clemency, resigned the ensigns of royalty.’ Since, moreover, I have named the Second Justinian, I cannot abstain from citing the pregnant remark which the account of his restoration draws from the k. Papparregopoulos, (III. 366)

‘The ease with which Justinian succeeded in invading the capital, and which is equally to be observed in the case of Apsimaros and of other Pretenders to the throne of Constantinople, as opposed to the futility of the wars waged against it through so many centuries by so many strange nations, is on the one hand a proof that the native Pretenders always had a party within the walls who facilitated their entrance, and shows, on the other, the hearty unanimity with which the people and the army combined to drive back the foreign invaders, and the strength of the public opinion which existed among the people themselves.’

The popular voice made itself especially heard in the Hippodrome, where it was all the more powerful on account of the guilds into which the people were divided. It was there, to use the language of a French writer,* that ‘the Byzantine people made and unmade Emperors; there that justice was administered and the guilty punished, and that triumphs were celebrated over barbarians and rebels; there that the masses gazed upon the wonders of art and of nature; there, in short, that their superstitious and their religious feelings, their love of glory and their love of the beautiful, found free scope.’ When the populace found themselves gathered in the Hippodrome, and there realized their own power, they forgot the sports, and pro-

* M. A. Rambaud, in his article on *Le monde Byzantin et l'hippodrome*, in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* of August 15, 1871. See also on this subject, Papparegopoulos, III. 116, *et seq.*

claimed their own will, with the frequent result of obtaining it. Their will was not always wise or right, and such a form for manifesting it cannot be taken as a model. We look in vain in the Hippodrome of Constantinople for any representative of the Pnyx or of the Roman Senate. But if Gibbon had had as wide an experience as history has afforded since his day of what popular and social movements may become, he would not have selected the Byzantine people of Constantinople as peculiarly open to the reproach of being 'devoid of any rational principles of freedom.' The true question is, whether they displayed that indifference to the fate of their country which is too often imputed to them—and which, when it really exists, is the last symptom of a nation's decadence. As a proof that the interest in public matters felt and shown by the people of Constantinople was shared in the other parts of the Empire, it is enough to cite the rebellion of the Greeks against Leo III. in 727, and their march upon the capital under Agallianos, styled 'the mobleader (*τουρμαρχης*) of the Helladikoi.'

The Byzantine people cannot indeed be justly represented as destitute of the sentiment of their own national existence. But it is at the same time unfortunately true that the system of Government under which they lived did not afford a sufficiently wide and regular sphere for the development of their natural activity. The Constitutional polities which are the fashion now-a-days, supply plenty of opportunities by which the voices of the injured or

of the ambitious can make themselves heard. It was not so under the political system of the Byzantine Empire. Hence we find that when, in exceptional circumstances, the discontent or indignation of some province or of some party was determined to find an outlet, the natural consequence of the system was that it did so in Church controversies, in local rebellions, or in military mutinies, which usually led to the proclamation of a new Emperor.

But it is said that the Byzantine people had no patriotism. The high and intense feeling of the antient patriotism which the Greeks of this century again so nobly displayed during the War of Independence, was not and could not be the sentiment of the subjects of the Empire. They looked to Constantinople as a centre, and on religion as the chief bond of unity. For them the idea of Fatherland was concentrated in the Imperial Labaron and in the Cross with its Greek inscription — *ἐν τούτῳ νικᾷ* — 'Herein is victory.' The Labaron and the Cross were the double standard, for which they were ready to die in the field, and on which they centred their national feeling. In such a sense as this, there was certainly patriotism at Byzantium. It was the love of that second Fatherland of which the late M. Thiers spoke when he said, on May 4, 1873, — 'There are two Fatherlands. One is the soil. The other is the moral and public order, the great political and social truths. These form a Fatherland not less important than the material earth on which we have been born.' ..

Now let us take up the next count of the indictment. The Byzantine world is accused of having taken too much interest in religion.

* I am not going to attempt to justify or even to defend the excessive place occupied by theological questions in the life of Byzantine society. Never-ceasing disputes, now about a word and now about a syllable, have not added to the glory of the Empire, nor did the importance of the part assumed by monks contribute little to its decline. Perhaps these controversies assumed a position of greater comparative importance at Constantinople because a people confessedly so intellectual and so cultured found in them a field for the exercise of mental activity which was not opened to them by printing or newspapers, or telegrams from all parts of the globe, or General Elections, or Parliamentary Debates. Probably, however, this had little to do with the matter. In the midst of all these distractions, we do not find that religion ceases to be an object of public interest. I might cite the Vatican Council, or the Cultur-kampf. I might point to the English newspaper press, a few years ago, ringing with controversy about the ecclesiastical hymn commonly called the *Creed of St. Athanasius*. I

* The author desired that I should translate the following passage literally, and I have accordingly done so. But had he permitted me, I should have preferred to modify it, because it seems to me that to readers in the land of the Solemn League and Covenant and of the Disruption, not to speak of the history of England and of Ireland from the time of Henry VIII. down to that of Catholic Emancipation and onwards, it is surely unnecessary to discuss how a public interest may be felt in such questions. (Tr.)

abstain from commenting at length upon the fact that in the Middle Ages, and for long after, such discussions in Western Europe were more important, or at least led to more violent action, than they do now, or than they then did at Constantinople. I will not enlarge upon the history of the Albigenses, or upon the story of Jeanne d' Arc, upon the Wars of the Reformation in Germany, or the persecutions of the Jews, or the records of the Spanish Inquisition, and a good many other phenomena presented at different periods by the Western States of Europe, which show what has been the treatment of questions of conscience when brought into connection with the storms of human passion.

And yet, the question of truth in religion, which touches the life of every individual citizen not only in things temporal but also in things eternal, and which profoundly touches the State as the agglomeration of individuals, touched the Byzantine State and the worldly life of the Byzantine subject far more deeply than it touches most States and most individuals. They had to make the Church strong. Her unity was universally regarded as forming, along with the unity of the State, the very foundation upon which rested the prosperity and even the preservation of the latter. 'The Greeks,' says Mortreuil, 'felt towards their religion an attachment which amounted to fanaticism; their religious beliefs were the centre around which all their other ideas were grouped; and the bond of religion was more powerful than any other in in-

spiring the Hellenic nationality with a lively and enduring unity, while it never ceased to supply fresh force to the hatred excited by the Latins.' But the Latins were not the first adversaries against whom the Church had to contend. The classical paganism itself still existed till the latter part of the Ninth Century, when the *Mane* at last embraced Christianity in the reign of Basil I. (the Macedonian). Next came the heresies, which were not less menacing to the civil and ecclesiastical unity, even where they did not, as in the blackest cases, threaten the existence of Christianity itself. Lastly, arose a new and implacable adversary in the shape of Papal Rome, which gave a semi-religious character to every attack which was made by the West. The intimate union of ecclesiastical questions with those of both domestic and foreign policy was a fact to which it was impossible for the public to remain blind or the government indifferent. While, however, this national or political element was certainly a feature in the religious questions which agitated Byzantine society, it is impossible from a purely religious point of view to deny the services rendered by that society to the cause of the Christian religion, or to dispute that the action taken in such questions was generally dictated by the very highest motives, and that the faith and love which found their centre in the New Rome have to-day their wide and their abiding results in the existing condition of the Christian world.

The heresies, and the Councils which were needful to crush them, offer, alike and together, a very

interesting study, even if viewed from a standpoint merely psychological, of the intellectual phenomena presented by the Greek mind. The heresies owed their origin to the radical and instinctive desire to philosophize. In this sense they may be regarded as the last product of the schools of heathen thought. Hence they offer, on the one hand, an interesting study in the development of intellectual activity, and constitute, on the other, a curious monument left by the progress of the human mind in its transition from one phase of speculation to another. Mortreuil says, 'The Greeks are by their very nature philosophical and speculative. The search for abstract truth is to them more attractive than the pursuit of reforms, or the regulation of manners. They are a race eminently literary. They have always been thinkers rather than statesmen. They seized accordingly upon that side of Theology which most appealed to their natural genius. The heresies which arose among them were begotten by the same spirit which is manifest through the whole history of their race. It is a case of Theological Science subjected to the criticism of pure reason, and dogma analyzed by brilliant and impetuous logic. Religious controversies, centred upon the discussion of Divine Being and upon the explanation of Divine Mystery by the light of the laws of natural phenomena, assume in the Greek schools a character purely scientific. The Communion of the Eastern Church was shaken by the question of two Natures and two Wills, two Natures and one Will, or one Nature and one Will

in Christ Jesus. Even the heresy of the Iconoclasts was a case in which the proclivity towards Idealism found an incidental expression in connection with externals.'

But the unity of the Church was saved by the Councils. These assemblies protected her from the heresies, defined her doctrine, and ratified her organization. The territory of the Byzantine Empire was the scene in which the Councils met. Their conduct was animated from first to last by the keenness of the Greek intellect, which, now clothed in its Byzantine phase, here offered to the service of the Gospel the same natural and national gifts which had once produced all that was best in the thought of the old Hellenic world. Nor was the confutation of heresy the sole consequence of the Councils. 'It was by them,' says Chateaubriand, 'that there was first developed the idea and presented the example of One Universal Society, whose members exist in all countries, consist of all races, and are loyally subject to all lawful governments, but which is itself independent of all civil governments—a Society which is of all peoples, and of no people, which sends delegates from any part of the planet to meet together to speak of nothing but of the relation between man and God.'

Thus, Christianity owed to the Byzantine Government the protection which enabled her to define the dogmatic system of her belief. It was equally under the protection of the Byzantine Government that the world was able to assume the form of Christian Society, and the Church to direct and regulate the

activity of her lay element. It was under this same protection that the machinery of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy was put into shape, that doctrinal teaching received its unity, and the Christian world the sacred legislation of the Canons. It was the Byzantine Government which settled the relations between Church and State. When the Catholic Bishops of Prussia, on May 26, 1873, petitioned their Government in protest against the new legislation then attempted in Germany, they had to complain that 'these laws invade the rights and liberties of the Church, they reverse the fundamental principles upon which the relations between Church and State have been based throughout the different nations of Christendom *ever since the time of Constantine the Great*, and which recognize the State and the Church as two distinct powers, both instituted by God, and neither of which ought to trespass upon the sphere assigned to the other in common peace and harmony.' It was the Byzantine Empire also which resisted from the very first the political pretensions of the Popes. If we are of opinion that Christianity is the principal foundation of modern civilization, we certainly owe some gratitude to the Empire which enabled it to assume an organized form, and which contributed so much to diffuse it.

It is needful to keep these things in mind before pronouncing judgment — and especially an unfavourable judgment — upon the position occupied by ecclesiastical matters in the Byzantine Empire. Moreover, the mutual attitude of Church and State

under that Empire, had not the character commonly attributed to it. The combination of these two elements, of which some writers are so fond of talking, was not chronic. It was not the normal state of things for the Patriarch to be the tool of the Emperor, or for the Emperor to be the slave of the Patriarch. On the contrary, history has preserved the record of plenty of cases where the jealousy of the civil or of the ecclesiastical powers for their respective independence brought them into something very like collision. In fact, the truth is, that the annals of the Byzantine Empire bear more traces than do those of many modern European nations of a continued effort to put in practice the celebrated principle enunciated in Italy by Cavour:—‘*Chiesa libera in Stato libero*—a Free Church in a Free State.’ For instance, the Patriarch Polyuktos forbade the marriage of the Empress Theophano with the Emperor John I. (Tzimiskes), with whom she had been an accomplice in the murder of her husband, Nikephoros II. (Phokas); the Patriarch Nicolas continued firm in refusing the Holy Communion to Leo VI. (the Philosopher) after he had contracted a fourth marriage, in defiance of the Canons of our Church, with Zoe Karbonopsina; the Patriarch Ignatius publicly passed over the Cæsar Bardas, in consequence of his sin with his half-sister, when the Prince, then in the plenitude of unlimited power, came up to communicate at the Altar. Many more such examples could be cited, following, in great measure, from attempts of the State to intrude

within the sphere of Ecclesiastical authority. The point of view from which such things were regarded can perhaps hardly be better summed up than in the words addressed to the Emperor by Theodore of the Studium when the autocrat had taken to meddling in the Iconoclastic controversy :—‘ O King, unto thee hath been committed the civil State and the army. See thou to them. Leave the Church to Pastors and Teachers.’

Nevertheless, I have already admitted that I think that the population of the Empire sometimes devoted an excessive amount of attention to the discussions of Theologians, and that there were periods when the development of monasticism was anything but beneficial to the State. Such was the case when the number of monasteries was increased to excess, and their walls were filled with citizens who were thus allowed to elude the fulfilment of their duties to the State. The monastic habit itself became degraded, when the Civil Power enforced its adoption as a punishment, to ensure the withdrawal from the world of those of whom the Government desired to be rid. The clergy became a danger to the State, when they found many to listen to the doctrine, that all war is sinful because it leads to homicide ; and when conquered armies sought in their sins the sole explanation of their disasters, the hour of decadence had struck. In the face of such things, I cannot dispute the opinion of Gibbon, when he says that the clergy became one of the main causes of the fall of New Rome, and that some of the fruits of

forms of devotion which found protection under the shadow of monasticism 'seriously affected the reason, the faith, and the morals of the Christians. Their credulity debased and vitiated the faculties of the mind; they corrupted the evidence of history; and superstition gradually extinguished the hostile light of philosophy and science.'

It is impossible therefore, not to feel some sympathy with those of the Emperors who endeavoured to benefit society by imposing restrictions upon monasticism. The history of the Iconoclastic persecution is well related by the k. Paparregopoulos, who explains the causes which led to this reforming movement, and the reasons why it failed. But although the persecution was unsuccessful, it did not last for a century and a half without leaving marks more or less apparent both in the current of history and in the organism of society, without as well as within the limits of the Empire. The discussion of this extremely interesting subject would, however, carry us outside the bounds of the present discussion. I must content myself with remarking that the restoration of these pictures to the prominent public position, which they have ever since held in the external forms of the Orthodox Church, was followed at Constantinople by a great increase in the influence of the clergy.

On the other hand, it cannot be denied that it was the Iconoclastic persecution, which was mainly responsible for the separation of Central Italy from the other domains of the Empire; and it is remark-

able that in this way it may be regarded as the parent of the Temporal Power of the Popes of Rome, an element which from that time forth has never ceased to form so powerful a factor in the history of Christendom. This is certainly a most singular result to have been produced by a school of thought, which may be regarded as the earliest important forerunner of Protestantism, as Gibbon himself characterizes it in his Fifty-fourth Chapter—a circumstance which throws a quaint light upon his remark in the Fifty-third to the effect that the Byzantine world did nothing for civilization. As for the persecution itself, although finally defeated, it at any rate left the practices of respect, shown towards the objects in dispute, defined by a limit which reconciles piety with reason. We read in the Synaxarion, that when St. Theodora, after the death of her persecuting husband Theophilos, kissed the picture of the Blessed Virgin, ‘she proclaimed publicly that she worshipped (*προσκυῖν*) and kissed the images relatively and not in adoration, not as if they were gods, but as likenesses of which she was fain to behold the originals.’

At the same time, historic truth demands for the members of the monastic Order the just praise which they earned by spreading Christianity among the barbarous nations, and, with the Christian religion, spreading and preserving Christian civilization. The Byzantine monks went forth to preach the Gospel, but, as they toiled in this Divine work of mercy, they composed Alphabets and taught Letters and Arts. It was they who raised and

guided the barbarous populations who surrounded the Empire, to the development of social organization. Thus, for instance, the Slavonic language was reduced to writing by the two Greek monks Cyrill and Methodius ; and Greek monks were the teachers of Ulphilas, the principal Apostle and civilizer of the Goths. This extension of Christianity and of civilisation affected the Empire itself, not only by becoming a means of exercising influence over foreign nations, but also by forming in itself a bond of internal unity. The champions of monasticism have certainly the right to plead these things as a set off against any unhappy results produced at a late period by some developments of the system. The free Greece of to-day, moreover, can never forget her everlasting debt to the monasteries of her Church, which were centres of national life and national culture, as well as of national religion, during the ages of her bondage.

Anyhow, such evil effects of the exaggerated growth of monasticism and of the perversion of religious sentiment were slow to appear. Ages upon ages of life and of struggle rolled by before the robust form of Constantinople was disguised under any clerical habit. It is true that in her closing days demoralized legions attributed their defeats to the anger of God ; and the last of the Palaiologoi was fain to recruit with foreign auxiliaries the dwindling ranks who defended his falling capital ; but armies enough had already fought gloriously and successfully under the Cross and the Labaron through centuries enough and against enemies

enough to clear for ever in the eyes of history the honour of the Byzantine forces. 'The Byzantine soldiery,' says M. Rambaud, 'was recruited from among the most warlike races of both the Greek and the barbarian population of the Empire. They enjoyed the superiority over every enemy against whom they had to contend, both as regards tactics and arms. They were braver than they often get the credit of having been. They knew how to fight when they could not count upon victory. The continual invasions brought against them constant hordes of new enemies with new modes of warfare and new terrors. But Byzantine soldiers never refused the challenge. Under Heraclius and John Tzimiskes, they glowed with enthusiasm: under Leo VI. they knew how to face their fate and to do their duty.'

It is quite true that the Greeks were at first overcome by the invasion of the Latins, but the fact that their resistance to them was ultimately crowned with success is a proof that they had not been deprived of military capacity by the catastrophe which the assault of the Crusaders had brought upon the Empire. On the contrary, the warlike ability shown by the National Government established at Nice, in contrast to the paralytic incapacity of the Latin dynasty enthroned at Constantinople, demonstrates that in the very hour of their weakness the Byzantine people were still comparatively strong, and is the simple explanation of the ease and speed with which they resumed possession of the antient capital.

While, however, the Byzantine Empire possessed a military organisation and a class of the population subject to enlistment, the army formed a separate body in the general class of the people. The citizens and the soldiers were distinct, the ordinary run of the labouring and trading classes had ceased to look upon themselves as the natural defenders of their own hearths and of the independence of their country. This feeling greatly facilitated the recruitment of foreigners and prevented the natives from looking upon such enrolments as either a trespass upon their rights or a danger to their independence; to them they appeared rather in the light of a convenience and a means of escaping the performance of a tiresome duty. The employment of these auxiliaries had indeed some advantages which the k. Paparregopoulos has pointed out, (III. 17.) But when a nation delegates to mercenaries the duty of protecting it, it is opening a path to the loss of its own independence. Mercenaries fought on the Carthaginian side at that battle by the Metaurus which crushed for ever the haughty rival of the Elder Rome.

Thus it came to pass that under the dominion of the Byzantine Government the ordinary private subject became more and more inclined to leave to the army the defence of the frontiers and often of his own very home. As regards the internal policy of the country, he learnt to leave everything entirely to the Court of Constantinople. He thus became more and more estranged from all affairs of State, and the domain of religion afforded for the

exercise of his natural activity a field which was both useless and dangerous. The system of centralisation which was the basis of the Byzantine Government, did a great deal to hasten the fall of the Empire. Constantinople became a sink into which the wealth of the provinces was drained, and which claimed to their detriment an overwhelming share of the attention of the Emperor. Treasures which would have served to render armies efficient and provinces happy were often squandered to furnish amusements for the inhabitants of the capital or to feed the luxurious splendour of the Imperial Court. Thus it was that political life ceased to exist in those very spots where its development had once been the most intense. The nations who constituted the population of the Empire became no longer capable of opposing even moral obstacles to neutralise the causes of internal decay. The material resources which enabled them to resist external foes were exhausted by the protracted centuries of conflict. They were subjected at length to the common law of destruction, and had to drain the cup of bitterness to the very dregs.

The history of the Byzantine Empire ought to be a lesson of great price for modern States. It is a lesson in especial which ought to be before the eyes of my fellow countrymen. They love to take the antient past as their only rule and their only model, but to apply the lessons of that epoch of glory is a task less practical than to profit by those of the Middle Ages. It is true, that it is the aim

of the Greek world of to-day to purify itself from everything foreign, to fall back upon its own resources and to keep its eyes constantly fixed upon its own origin, with small heed to the twenty centuries which separate it from the time of Perikles or of Alexander. But it has been precisely in these centuries that has been formed the Hellenic world which exists to-day, the new, the Christian Hellas. The Byzantine Empire also was reared upon the Christianized Hellenism, and it is by carefully observing what were the causes which produced the rise, the greatness, the decline, and the fall of that Empire that we shall see how to steer clear of the rocks upon which it made shipwreck. Thank God, it cannot be asserted that the decline and fall of the Greek Empire were due to any fault in the people. The people lacked no quality which creates the greatness of States. The fall of the Empire was the result of causes within, which hindered the due exercise of the virtues of the people, and of attacks from without, which it met manfully as long as it had strength left to stand, but before which it fell at last exhausted, conquered, but not dishonoured, not like a slave offering his neck to the hangman, but like a soldier who dies upon the field of battle with his sword in his hand and his face to the enemy.

*THE SUBJECTS OF THE BYZANTINE
EMPIRE.*



THE SUBJECTS OF THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE.

THE durability shown by the Byzantine Empire could not be entirely accounted for if we did not take into consideration the material prosperity enjoyed by its subjects. The State could not have lasted so long without the defence afforded by armies and navies, and the cost of equipping and supporting these armies and navies was defrayed out of the wealth gained by industry and commerce. Of what this wealth was, we may gain some idea from the impression which it produced upon foreigners, even after the decline of the Empire had begun. In the year 1170, for instance, the Jewish traveller, Benjamin of Tudela, after passing through France, Italy, and many of the cities of Greece, visited Constantinople. It may be assumed that he was a competent judge of the value of the things which he saw. And here is what he says:—‘The immense treasures which pour into Constantinople from every province, town and city, surpass anything which can be imagined or which exists any-

where else. In the midst* of the Church of Wisdom there is an innumerable collection of pillars of silver and gold. The Emperor's palace contains treasures and precious stones, the value of which it would be very hard to appraise. The inhabitants of the land are rich. They dress in silk, and wear mantles embroidered with gold. When you see them attired thus, and coming out on horseback, you would take them for kings' sons. The country is broad, and abounding in bread, and meat, and wine, and fruit. There are no men in the world so rich as these people.'

Fifty years later, the same astonishment was felt by the Crusaders when they arrived to attack the Imperial City, and cast anchor before San Stefano.† 'Those who had never seen it before,' says Villehardouin, 'stood on the decks, gazing upon the marvellous sight, and scarcely able to realize that the world could contain a city so rich. Above all were they astonished at the sight of the lofty walls and great towers wherewith it is engirt,

* He probably refers to the number of columns of the precious metals belonging to the Bema, and which was certainly too great to be at once realized by the eye, without counting. The eikonostasion was of silver, and had at least twelve, but, more probably, twenty-four columns of that metal. The Baldaquin, which must have had at least four columns, was entirely of silver-gilt except such portions as were of pure gold. The episcopal thrones round the apse, at least seven in number, were separated by shafts of gold. We may also conjecture the form and material of the Imperial and Patriarchal thrones, the pillar-like standards for lights before the eikonostasion, &c. (Tr.)

† The place from which the Treaty concluded between Russia and Turkey after the late war derives its name.

the magnificent palaces, and the splendid churches, the number of which is such that no one can believe it who has not seen it, and the length and the breadth of this Queen of Cities.' And when they had taken it and laid their hands upon the wealth which had made their eyes sparkle from afar, their wonder was not lessened nor their hopes disappointed. 'The loot,' continues their chronicler, 'was such as no man could guage. There was gold, and silver, and precious stones, and gold and silver plate, and silken stuffs, and furs, and everything that there is beautiful on earth. One might say with truth that a conquered city has never yielded such a loot since the creation of the world.'

The work of the historian Papparegopoulos contains a calculation based upon contemporary sources, which shows that in the Twelfth Century the annual revenue of the Byzantine Empire amounted to about twenty-five millions of pounds sterling, a sum which, if we make allowance for the then greater value of money, would in the present day be equivalent to about an hundred and twenty millions. We can judge what must have been the material prosperity of the subjects of New Rome when we compare this with the public income of the entire British Empire, which in 1884 amounted to only close upon two hundred and three millions. And we can judge also what the change has been under the Turkish Empire, which now occupies Constantinople, and a far larger territory than that of the Byzantine Empire in the Twelfth Century. The anticipated revenue of the Turkish Empire in 1883-4,

was equivalent only to something over thirteen millions and a half. The fact was that Constantinople, placed upon the borders of Europe and Asia, had opened to her, upon the one hand, through the Propontis, the whole Mediterranean and beyond that, the Atlantic Ocean itself, and, on the other, through the Black Sea, and its great river tributaries, the most distant regions both of Europe and of Asia. Thus she became the capital not only of the Empire, but of civilization itself, and her unique position afforded her advantages which she enjoyed far beyond any horizon which had ever met the eye of her classical predecessor Byzantium. It was in her marts that, throughout the whole of the Middle Ages, was centred the trade both of India and of Northern Europe, as well as the commerce in the fruits of her own national agriculture and industry. It was from her docks that there issued those navies of Greek merchantmen which visited every port of the Mediterranean and supplied the rest of Europe with silk, carpets, linen, perfumes, precious stones, cotton, dressed leather, oil, wine, and fruits.

The time came, however, when the newly-founded Italian Republics began little by little to contest the monopoly of the merchants of New Rome. They began under the shelter of the Imperial Government itself, of which their colonists professed themselves the vassals. But at length, by turning to skilful account the successes of the Crusaders, they transformed their counting-houses in the East into the independent outposts of foreign states, and

gave a political turn to their commercial relations with Constantinople. In the period which elapsed between the First and the Fourth Crusades, the navigation and commerce of the Italian Republics obtained a vastly increased development, at the same time that the military organisation of the whole of feudalized Europe disputed what had hitherto been the exclusive supremacy of the Eastern Empire. After Constantinople was taken by the Crusaders in 1204 the maritime supremacy of the Mediterranean passed into the hands of the Venetians, and when the Greeks had again expelled the Latin intruders, the Western merchants and workmen who had settled in the East during their occupation, still held their ground, nor did the Byzantine population ever again find itself able to wrest from them the commercial and industrial predominance which they had acquired. The Emperor Michael VIII. (Palaiologos) in order to obtain the support of these Italian colonies against the Franks, confirmed to the Venetians, the Pisans, and the Genoese, of whom they were composed, all the privileges which they had already acquired. They had laws of their own, administered by magistrates drawn from their native places, and who were termed by the Venetians *Bailies*, by the Pisans *Consuls*, and by the Genoese *Podestà*. But the injury inflicted upon the commerce of the Empire by Italian competition did not stop here. Originally transferred to the hands of Italians settled in the East, trade in time passed away to Italy itself, and

Constantinople was deprived of the main sources of her wealth.

The Byzantine Government tried to get rid, first of the Venetian, and then of the Genoese settlers, by playing upon their mutual rivalry. But whether it was one or the other who was for the moment uppermost, the result for the real natives of the Empire was the same. Trade passed away into the hands of foreigners. Manufactures which had once been peculiar to the East, were now transplanted to Sicily, Italy or Spain. The heaviest blow which the Normans ever dealt to the Byzantine Empire was the removal of the centre of the silk-trade to Sicily.

But let us turn to another aspect of the case. Let us forget how ruinous to the trade of the Empire was the commercial rivalry at length developed in Italy. Let us forget that it was Venice which was the first cause of the fall of Constantinople by bringing on the Latin conquest. Let us forget that the first Turks who assailed the Imperial City were borne under her walls in Genoese vessels. Let us remember instead, that contact with New Rome was the starting-point and the origin of that material and intellectual prosperity of the Italian Republics which preceded the Renaissance of the rest of Europe. It is but another link in that chain which attaches all the progress of the renewed West to the fact of the long-continued existence of the Byzantine Empire.

It may indeed be said that if we follow up to their sources almost any of the modern branches of

Art, we find ourselves at last confronted by Byzantine teachers and Byzantine models. This is especially the case with the Art of Venice, which likewise owed to the East her industries and her commerce. Venice was the principal instructress of modern Europe. But she was herself an outpost of the Byzantine world, settled on the Northern shores of the Adriatic. The Venetian Republic itself remained a vassal of the Byzantine Empire until the Twelfth Century, that is to say, so long as it suited the interests of her citizens to enjoy the protection of Constantinople and to profit by the advantages of being subjects of the Emperor. It was not till the new States which began to spring up in the East had attained a convenient amount of development, and the Crusades had changed the aspect of European politics, that the Republic be-thought herself of becoming independent of New Rome.

It was to the East that Western Europe owed not only the arts of rearing the silk-worm and weaving silk, but also those stuffs embroidered and enwoven with gold, those carpets and tapestries which soon claimed a place as essential elements in Western luxury. It was from the Byzantines that the Venetians learnt the manufacture of glass, and the fabrication of all the articles in this material, whose beauty causes them to be still so much sought after and esteemed. As for jewellery and goldsmiths' work, it was long before the craftsmen of Italy, of Germany, and of France, succeeded in equalling the Byzantine artificers

whose productions they copied. It was likewise at Constantinople that organs were first invented, so that it is to Greek mechanics that the Western churches owe that very instrument which so tickles the ears of their worshippers, but which the East has refused to admit into competition with the voice of the creature praising the Creator. Nor was it in works of peace alone that the Byzantine inventors displayed their industry and their ingenuity, as is proved by the superiority of their engines of war and the discovery and use of the Greek fire.

In all that concerns the Fine Arts, modern Europe is deeply indebted to Christian and Imperial Constantinople. It is quite true that, in order to produce master-pieces, natural aptitude is not all that is needed, nor even material prosperity. There must also be the enjoyment of political freedom. Byzantine Society lacked those elements which produced in antient Hellas and in mediæval Italy the artists whose works are now regarded with universal admiration as the highest known achievements of their kind. But here it is necessary to remember, as has been already remarked, that the peculiar work to which New Rome was called in the history of human progress, was not that of invention but of preservation. And this work she did for the Fine Arts as well as for other things. The Byzantine artists may have allowed the Idea of the Beautiful to fade and to deteriorate, but still it was they who guided the infant Art of the West towards the imitation of

the antique. Their hands may have grown weak, but they never ceased to employ them upon every branch of Art, even when they had lost all hope of attaining the Beautiful and the Sublime. Nevertheless, when we find Byzantine Art confining itself for so many centuries to the same unchanging models, we cannot but perceive that these deathless types must have been themselves produced in a better day, and it is to that better day that the modern student of Art ought to direct his attention.

As regards Architecture, the building which offers at once the highest expression and the most characteristic type of the Byzantine style is the colossal Church of the Uncreated Wisdom at Constantinople. This temple is in itself enough to win for the names of the architects, Anthemios and Isidoros, a place among the very first of their profession. But Byzantine Architecture was not confined either to the reign of Justinian or to the capital city, to the limits of the Byzantine Empire, or to the epoch when that State flourished. This style is a direct development from the Art of Greece and Rome. It is the transition between Classical and Modern Architecture. It produced the earliest distinctive type of a Christian place of worship, and its influence upon the Architecture of the Christian world has been vast. Especially is this the case in Venice, in Sicily, in Russia, and throughout Eastern Christendom. At Venice, the Church of St. Mark is an enduring monument of its grandeur. In Sicily, the mosaics which stir the

awe and wonder of the traveller at Monreale, at Palermo, and at Cefalù, are the work of Greek artists. On the other hand, all that is most beautiful in Mohammedan architecture is either actually Greek work, or an imitation from it. Even the Turks themselves have been forced to invoke the genius of the people whom they have conquered. It was to the Greek Christodoulos that Mahomet II. had fain to commit the building of the mosque which still bears his name.

As to Byzantine Painting, we are not now able to speak with the same exactitude, because none of the works of the best period have survived. Probably the long-drawn persecution waged by the Iconoclasts has had something to do with this fact. At the same time, the miniatures which adorn some MSS., the traits preserved in the later hagiography, the existing mosaics, and, above all, the descriptions of contemporary writers, combine, even more than some few surviving remains, to suggest the former existence of an higher school of Art than any of which we now possess any extensive monuments. Whatever the Byzantine Painting may really have been, it was undoubtedly the parent of Modern Painting. Anyone can see this in the picture-galleries and the churches of Western Europe, by glancing at the works of Cimabue, and the rest of the early Italian masters who were the forerunners of Raphael.

The same remarks which apply to the condition of the Fine Arts in the New Rome, will equally apply to the condition of all the other branches of

learning and culture. They had periods of weakness, but they were not wholly neglected. What was there known as 'General Education' (*ἡ ἐγκύκλιος παιδεία*) was always considered as the completion of any really good systematic training, whether for men or for women. The general diffusion and the high standard of education is a fact which explains the uninterrupted succession of learned and able persons in such a Society as the Byzantine, where genius lacked the invigorating atmosphere afforded by the polity of a free State.

It was owing to this wide dissemination of culture that women as well as men were able to take an active part in affairs of State. Thus we find that Finlay, when speaking of Eudokia Palaiologina, daughter of Michael VIII., sister of Andronikos II., wife of John II., Emperor of Trebizond, and mother of his successor Alexios II., makes the remark:—'Eudocia showed herself as much superior to her brother Andronicus in character, judgment, and virtue, as most of the women of the house of Palaiologos were to the men. The difference between the males and the females of this imperial family is so marked, that it would form a curious subject of enquiry to ascertain how the system of education in the Greek empire, at this period, produced an effect so singular and uniform.' It was indeed especially in the latter days of Byzantine Society that women, both at Constantinople and at Trebizond, gave proof of possessing a wisdom, a virtue, and a courage which were not unfrequently greater than those of men.

This superiority in the Byzantine system of education was recognized as a fact by contemporary Europe, where princes esteemed themselves happy if their daughters were brought up under the care of the women of the Court of Constantinople. Nor is it possible, before leaving this point, to avoid alluding to the fact of the very great number of books written by women during the Byzantine epoch, and of which some are still extant. The literary merit of these works is of course various, and a matter of discussion. But the nature of the subjects treated, and the erudition displayed in dealing with them, leave no doubt as to the learning, the tastes, and the culture of the writers.

History gives us plenty of testimonies to the honours and consideration with which the Emperors treated the learned, and in this respect the Court was only the leader of the rest of Byzantine Society. We may perhaps smile now-a-days when we find the title of *Prince of Philosophers* (ἄριστος τῶν φιλοσόφων), bestowed upon Michael Constantine Psellos in the Eleventh Century. Perhaps, however, we should first do well to have some acquaintance with the life and works* of the

* Numerous as were his already published works, we have had to thank the k. K. Sathas for at last causing the whole to appear in print, as well as for the excellent biographical notice with which these hitherto unedited compositions are accompanied. The learning of Psellos was so vast and varied as to be almost encyclopædic ; but the title bestowed upon him can hardly be understood as meant to indicate that he was to be termed the chief of *all* philosophers. It implies rather that he was the leader among the learned of his own contemporaries and fellow-countrymen. The word ἄριστος properly

writer in question. But whatever may have been the merits or the faults of these philosophers, the schools of learning which they directed were schools in which Plato and Aristotle were taught. The teaching may have been more or less pedantic and lifeless. But minds could not be brought into habitual contact with the master minds of ancient Greece without result. And the result is one which often strikes the reader of Byzantine literature. The authors of that literature have met with less esteem than they deserve.

Those who acquired the 'general education' did not all become historians or theological disputants. Any extensive biographical dictionary* is filled with the names of Byzantine authors, grammarians, mathematicians, geographers, physicians, writers upon the physical sciences, upon astronomy, upon music, and, in fact, upon every department of human knowledge. It will be contended that none of them inaugurated an epoch in any branch of science. Well, let it be so. In any case the ceaseless toil with which all these men strove to acquire and to spread knowledge is of itself a noble thing, of which the modern world ought to take account when it sits down to judge the Greeks of the Byzantine Empire.

It has been the fashion to credit the Arabs with having preserved or created a great deal of scientific

means a *Consul*, and after the retirement of Psellos into a monastery, the title was given by Alexios I. (Komnenós) to Joannes Italos. (Tr.)

* Smith's larger *Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology* is an instance (Tr.)

culture during the darkness of the Middle Ages. But the truth was that what the Arabs learned they acquired from the Greeks of Constantinople, and that the Arabic translations in which some classical works were preserved were made for them by Greek scholars. The Caliphs, when at the height of their power and greatness, did indeed patronise and encourage the study of letters and of science, but it was thanks to Greek men of learning, that they were able to cultivate any such exotic at Bagdad. The Caliph Almamoun deserves credit for having attracted to his Court such men as Leo of Thessalonica, but Byzantine Society deserves the gratitude of posterity for having produced them. 'There is no such thing,' says Dr. Daremberg,* 'as an original Arab medical science. Arab medical science was a slavish imitation from the Greek. And the same remark is true of all the sciences. The Arabs have never been inventors. They are enthusiasts, possessed with a passion for anything new, which renders their enthusiasm itself evanescent. And in consequence of this incapacity for perseverance, they soon forgot the lessons in medical science which they had once acquired from the Greeks, and have fallen back into a state of the most absolute ignorance.'

After all, however, Jurisprudence is the science in which the work of the Byzantine Empire was of most importance, and in which it has left the most

* *Journal des Débats*, Dec. 13, 1882. 'Le Caire : Impressions Médicales.'

enduring monuments. The authorities of the Empire preserved the whole structure of Roman law, and at the same time performed the work of adapting it to the needs of Christian society.

Byzantine Legislation is especially connected with the names of two great Emperors—Justinian I. and Basil I. (the Macedonian). 'The Greek lawyers,' says Mortreuil, 'who laboured by command of Justinian, displayed an ability so great that after the lapse of thirteen centuries, the compilations of that monarch still represent the entire spirit of Roman Jurisprudence, and the modern Codes of to-day submit to his prescriptions and to his doctrines.'

Three centuries after Justinian, Basil the Macedonian undertook the compilation of a New Code, based upon the commentaries by which the Byzantine legists had explained and completed the work of Justinian and his successors. This Code received from its author the title of *Basiliká*. It became thenceforth the Law of the Christian East. Even after the conquest by the Turks, the measure of temporal jurisdiction with which they invested the ecclesiastical tribunals, caused it to survive as a civil code, and as such it is still in force.* In the *Basiliká* the ancient Roman Jurisprudence appears subject to a profound modification. The monarchial form of the Byzantine Government, and still more,

* In the Kingdom of Greece proper, the necessity for a Criminal Code created by the freedom of the country has been met by an adaptation of the criminal portion of the Code Napoléon, but in civil causes the tribunals there also still judge by the decrees of the Byzantine Emperors. (Tr.)

the adoption of Christianity, give it a new character, which it preserved entire as long as Emperors ruled at Constantinople to carry on and to perfect the work of their predecessors. Meanwhile, alongside the secular Code, the Byzantine tribunals formed likewise the system of Canon Law.

The necessity for applying, for studying, for commenting, and for explaining this double Code produced a series of eminent lawyers which was never interrupted from the beginning till the end of the Empire. Many of their names have passed into oblivion, but a long list remains, stretching from Tribonian to Harmenópoulos. The legal schools of Constantinople and Beyrouth were the nurseries in which these learned men were reared. Other Schools of Law existed at Athens, at Alexandria, and at Cæsarea. Nor must we forget the remark of Mortreuil, who finds in the resemblance to them which marks the corresponding schools of Italy, another proof of the extent to which Byzantine Jurisprudence has affected the legislation of Western Europe.

It may now be permitted to touch upon the subject of Literature. This is a standard by which it is always possible to measure the intellectual development of a nation. In this particular the Byzantine world has been very much cried down. Is there anything to be said upon the other side? I shall not cite the Fourth and Fifth Centuries, which are rendered illustrious by the names of Basil, of the Gregories, of John Chrysostom, of Synesios, of Zosimos, of Stobaios, of Mousaios, and

of so many others. These men are generally looked upon as the last representatives of classical culture. The fact is, on the contrary, that all of them, and especially the Doctors of the Church, should be considered as among the earlier glories of the Byzantine period. Taking only one or two names in each succeeding century, we find in the Sixth the remarkable historians Procopius and Agathias. In the Seventh lived George of Pisidia, whose works, while they do not justify the contemporary judgment which compared them to the tragedies of Euripides, are a striking proof of the living tradition of the classical poetry. The Eighth Century was the period of John of Damascus, surnamed 'of Golden Streams,' whose religious writings have become the basis of Orthodox Systematic Theology, and whose words of prayer still lend a voice to the faith and love of Christian hearts throughout the Greek Churches. The Ninth Century is marked by the name of Photius. The Tenth affords the examples of two Imperial authors, Leo VI. (the Wise) and Constantine VII. (Porphyrogenetos) as a proof of the esteem in which the pursuit of letters was held upon the throne itself. In the Eleventh Century, Suidas compiled his Lexicon, and Kedrenos his History. The Twelfth is distinguished as the period of the learned Bishop Eustathios and of the lettered Princess Anna Komnená. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth increased the roll both in numbers and merit, and in the Fifteenth the fall of Constantinople was the means of obtaining for Italy the presence of those

learned men who bore with them the intellectual testament of classical Hellas. Thus, the last benefit which the dying East conferred upon the new-born West, was to transmit to her that heritage of antient culture of which she had been the jealous guardian during so many ages. The emigrants of Constantinople completed the work which had been begun by the immigrants of the Crusades. These two things—first, the Crusades, and, secondly, the diffusion of the antient culture by Byzantine scholars—comprise that epoch of germination during which Western Europe, hitherto shapeless and semi-barbarous, grew into Modern Society.

We certainly do not find in the Byzantine authors the same depth and originality which mark the antient writers whom they copied. Far from it. But there are many of them who cannot be read without both profit and pleasure. In doing so we are at least reminded of their early predecessors. In a word, we cannot condemn Byzantine Literature as having produced no remarkable works. And the prejudice with which they are habitually viewed is curiously and strikingly proved by the fact that certain poems which had been lauded to the skies for centuries as the compositions of Anacreon, have now been proved by modern criticism to be the productions of anonymous Byzantine writers. If such were the verses written at Constantinople, who shall say how many works instinct with a grace truly Greek,

may not have been the product of the same atmosphere, but now lost for ever.

* This imitation of the antients, however, even when it was successful, was unhappily the essential weakness of Byzantine Literature. The learned shut themselves up in the study of the past, and this contemplation did not act as a lever to raise new ideas. Antient thought was unadapted to the living needs of another and newer world. The seeds of genius lay frost-bitten and fruitless in the cold, confined atmosphere of retrospection. Byzantine men of talent and culture dedicated themselves so persistently to the worship of the letter that they came to overlook the spirit. They were naturally moved by an intense admiration for the language of their ancestors. Hence they came to regard it as the only instrument of which an author

* The passage which here follows will not be understood without an explanation, by those who are unaware that the present Greek literary world is divided into two streams of somewhat contrary tendency. All are indeed agreed that the spoken language ought to be cleansed as far as possible of certain foreign words and vulgar circumlocutions which are occasionally to be heard among the uneducated. One school, however, of which the k. Bikélas is an eloquent exponent, regard as natural and healthy developments engendered in the progress of time, the use of certain particular words and of some grammatical constructions which are seldom or never found in antient classical writers. Another school regard these features as the productions of an epoch of degradation, and do everything in their power to abolish them. The difference in the two styles may be seen by comparing a Byzantine historian with the work of the k. Papparepoulos. Those who desire to study the subject of these developments or corruptions may do so, among other works, in the *Horæ Hellenicæ* of Professor Blackie, and in the Appendix to Messrs. Vincent and Dickson's *Handbook to Modern Greek*. (Tr.)

ought to make use for the expression of his thoughts. The living language of Hellas, under the influence of the ordinary laws of philology, developed new forms and entered upon new phases of life. But for the literary world of Constantinople the living tongue came to be stigmatized as vulgar, rustic, or *popular*. At length the contempt of the learned for the living tongue and for those who spoke it, ended by alienating them as a class from the body of their fellow-countrymen. They did not follow, they would not or could not become the mouthpieces of the spirit of their age. Hence the lifelessness which is apparent in their works. A literature which is not a representative of the epoch which produces it, which does not receive from the vital heat of a living people that animation which manifests itself in the light thrown back upon its source, such a literature must necessarily be wanting in the life, the elevation, the passion and the vigour which are the distinctive features of every really strong and healthy national inspiration.

This is the reason why, with all the advantages which the Byzantine writers possessed, with all the learning which distinguished so many, all the grace and all the wisdom which adorned some, they could not escape the fatal consequences entailed by blind attachment to a state of things which was past and gone. The prose authors competed with each other as to who should write prose most like that of the Attic authors of a thousand years earlier. The poets were occupied in trying to produce imitations, sometimes of Euripides, at other times

of Anacreon. They forgot that the emotion with which Demosthenes had thrilled Athenian assemblies from the Pnyx was not admiration at the profound learning displayed in the correct use of obsolete archaisms. They forgot that the language in which Socrates conversed with his disciples was the living Greek language of his own day. They forgot that when the Athenians who had been enslaved at Syracuse won their freedom by reciting verses, those verses were the verses of a contemporary poet, namely, Euripides. They did not reflect that if the flowers of eloquence and of poetry are ever to blossom, they must spring up in a natural soil and open under the light and heat of a living sun.

Perhaps Constantinople had no such soil. She lacked the Pnyx, the Theatre, and the Academy of Athens. And her literature has left us no monuments like those antient works which shine as everlasting beacons upon the horizon of the human intelligence.

There is one exception to the unhappy rule of artificialism which stamps Byzantine literature. It is that branch of it which belongs to the sphere where the Life and the Truth reigns. It was there that real feeling insisted upon having a voice, and the result, even from a point of view purely literary, is enough to prove that the Byzantine world had the power of giving noble expression to thought, when it was able to trample down the chains of pedantry.

It has already been necessary to remark that, in

the Byzantine Empire, religious questions came to be the principal centre of political and social life—hence it naturally came to be the case that religious feeling was one of the principal motives in individual life, and it is accordingly to religious feeling that we owe the most vivid and striking expressions of Byzantine thought. To it we owe the Church of the Uncreated Wisdom. To it also we owe the ecclesiastical literature formed and illustrated by the Greek Fathers of the Church. And to it we owe, moreover, the Service-Books of our own Church. These books are far freer than any others from the signs of weakness in intelligence and in taste which mar the rest of Byzantine Literature. In them the spirit of the writers soars above the mimicry of the dead into the strong, clear atmosphere of living humanity.

The group of the regular Liturgical Services, as well as those for special occasions and seasons, with their beautiful and often poetical prayers, which have now for so many centuries answered the spiritual needs and supplied an utterance to the deepest feelings of so many generations of Christian believers, is not itself the product of any one individual period or of any one particular class of writers. Many of the calamities of our country have left their echo in those pages. Many a wounded heart has breathed its sorrow into them. This is the reason why the Service-Books of our Church have from the beginning borne that peculiar stamp which is happily characteristic of the religion of our race. Our Church is bound up with

our history. The highest and deepest of human feelings, the most sacred experiences of the individual human heart and conscience, are with us indissolubly associated with reminders of the destinies of our Fatherland. An historical analysis of these sacred books would be a work well worthy of the studies and labours of the most learned Greek. The k. Spyridon Zampelios has done enough, in some moving pages of his admirable studies of Mediæval Hellenism,* to show of what a development the subject is capable.

The works of the kk. Zampelios and Sathas, and other Greek writers, and above all the national history of the k. Paparregopoulos, are but the first-fruits of what will be done when Greece advances farther in the study of her own Middle Ages. I say, when Greece advances in that study, for surely the study ought to be hers. It has only been within this century that the task has attracted the serious attention of some learned foreigners. We owe to their researches valuable works which will form an excellent guide for the young writers of Greece. It will be easier for natives than it has been for foreigners to penetrate the mysteries of the history of New Rome, and to unravel the tangled threads of her vicissitudes. In that history how many pages are still obscure! How many chapters will have to be re-written! It is for this reason especially that I wish that our young writers would make the history of the

* Chap. xxxviii., 'On the Offices for the Dead.'

Middle Ages a subject of study, and would especially seek to illustrate particular points in it by special essays. Such studies would not be barren, for Byzantine history offers many events, many personages, and many episodes which are fit subjects for such treatment, whether the writer seek to illustrate the movements of religious thought, the phases of commercial activity, or the condition of the people viewed socially and morally.

It is above all the moral condition of the subjects of the Byzantine Empire which seems to me to call for exact investigation. It is time that we should know with precision how far an impartial examination of the facts will justify the low estimate so often formed as to this aspect of Byzantine Society. For such a purpose I think a historian should examine such questions as the following: What were the relations between the governing and the governed? What events took place which may serve as a test of the public conscience, as shown by the action of the people? In what light were the good and bad Princes respectively regarded, and was there any difference in this respect between different periods? How was the estimation in which the clergy were held affected by their personal conduct? Lastly, what was the tone of legislation? I am persuaded that the result of such questions truthfully answered would be to give the Byzantine world an higher place than it now enjoys in popular estimation.

This subject seems to me so important that I prefer not to treat it in any words of my own. I

will cite a foreign historian of Mediæval and Modern Greece, the learned Scotchman who spent so many years of study among us, Finlay. No one will accuse him of being intoxicated with too much Philhellenism. On the contrary, he has accustomed us to hear criticisms which are always hard, if not always just. Well, here is what Finlay says. He is speaking of the state of society among the people of the Byzantine Empire in the Eighth and Ninth Centuries, but the same observations are generally applicable to the whole period during which the empire lasted.

‘That the moral condition of the people of the Byzantine Empire under the Iconoclast Emperors,’ says Finlay, ‘was superior to that of any equal number of the human race in any preceding period, can hardly be denied. The bulk of society occupied a higher social position in the time of Constantine Copronymus than of Pericles; the masses had gained more by the decrease of slavery and the extension of free labour than the privileged citizens had lost. Public opinion, though occupied on meaner objects, had a more extended basis and embraced a larger class. Perhaps, too, the war of opinions concerning ecclesiastical forms or subtleties tended to develop pure morality as much as the ambitious party-struggles of the Pnyx. When the merits and defects of each age are fairly weighed, both will be found to offer lessons of experience which the student of political history ought not to neglect.

‘There may be some difference of opinion concerning the respective merits of Hellenic, Roman,

and Byzantine society, but there can be none concerning the superiority of Byzantine over that which existed in the contemporary empires of the Saracens and the Franks. There we find all moral restraints weakened and privileged classes or conquering nations ruling an immense subject population, with very little reference to law, morality, or religion. Violence and injustice claimed at Bagdad an unbounded licence, until the Turkish mercenaries extinguished the caliphate; and it was the Norman invaders who reformed the social condition of the Franks. Mohammedanism legalised polygamy with all its evils in the East. In the West, licentiousness was unbounded, in defiance of the precepts of Christianity. Charles Martel, Pepin, and Charlemagne are said all to have had two wives at a time and a numerous household of concubines. But on turning to the Byzantine Empire, we find that the Emperor Constantine VI. prepared the way for his own ruin by divorcing his first wife and marrying a second, in what was considered an illegal manner. The laws of the Franks attest the frequency of female drunkenness; and the whole legislation of Western Europe during the Seventh and Eighth Centuries, indicates great immorality and a degree of social anarchy, which explains more clearly than the political events recorded in history the real cause of the fall of one Government after another. The superior moral tone of society in the Byzantine Empire was one of the great causes of its long duration; it was its true conservative principle.'

So much for the moral tone of Byzantine Society.

Side by side with the question of public and social morality, arises that of the organisation of the different social strata into which the population was divided. An enquiry into this subject will enlighten us as to the position occupied in the State by the main body of the people, as to the degree to which they were dependent upon the Government, and as to the progressive development of those municipal institutions which, when the crash came, were a plank of safety for the enslaved nation.

It will be perceived that the Byzantine world possessed certain general features which were its distinctive and distinguishing marks from the beginning to the end. But, beside these, there were certain characteristics which marked different epochs. These successive phases of Byzantinism were not produced by the influences of their own past alone, nor only by the events internal to the Empire. The intellectual movements of the foreign world also had their share in producing them. The events of contemporary history affected the Empire at all times and in different ways.

The manner in which Byzantine history thus actually falls as it were into chapters greatly facilitates the production of special studies. At the same time, it is almost needless to remark that any writer who desires to portray any one of these periods with intelligence and correctness must necessarily have a thorough knowledge of Mediæval history in general. Some French authors have already given

us excellent studies of the kind indicated. Such are the works of M. Alfred Rambaud upon the times of Constantine Porphyrogennetos, and of M. Ludovic Drapeyron, upon the reign of Herakleios. Above all, the learned Amédée Thierry in his *Récits de l'histoire Romaine d' Orient*, has shown how curious and how attractive are the materials with which New Rome invites the labour of the historian. But, in truth, how many of the Emperors are there the record of whose lives could fill many stirring pages! What spectacle, for instance, can be more striking than that presented in Constantinople by the Christmas Day of the year 820—the Emperor Leo V. (the Armenian), falling under the blows of assassins disguised as Priests, within the Church itself, where his intonation of the first Antiphon gave the signal for the onslaught—his successor, Michael II. (the Stammerer), led to the throne from the dungeon, where he was awaiting, for the second time, the arrival of the executioners, to bear him to the fiery furnace in which he was to die, having once already been brought forth for death, and respited at the last moment on account of the prayers of the Empress that he might be reprieved for a few hours in respect to the sanctity of the day? What scene can be found more tragic than the death of Theophilos, when, resolved to secure his son's throne at the expense of his own conscience, he ordered the head of his brother-in-law Theophobos to be brought to his bed-side, and when he had gazed long and steadily at the well-known features, his mind doubtless wandering over the memory of many

a battle-field where they had fought together, he at last slowly exclaimed, 'Thou art no longer Theophobos, and I am no more Theophilos,' turned away, sank upon his pillow, and never spoke again? Few histories are more terribly affecting than the life of Romanus IV (Diogenes), spared, after condemnation to death, by the Empress, who raised him to the throne, first the conqueror and then the betrayed prisoner of the Turks, liberated only to return home to find treason enthroned, defeated by its arms, and blinded in defiance of treaty, silent under his tortures, save to pray that they might be received as an expiation of his sins, and sent unattended to the island of Prote, to die of the putrefaction of his wounds. Few lives can show changes more strange than that of Eudokia, daughter of Alexios III., Emperor of Trebizond, wedded to the Turkish Emir Tadjeddin, betrothed, after his murder, to the young Prince, afterwards Manuel II., and married in the end to the Emperor John VI. More like a romance than an history appears the career of of Andronikos I. (Komnenos), a man who may be termed the Alkibiades of Mediæval Greece, the darling of nature, who, after a life of every imaginable adventure in love, in war, and in politics, among Greeks, Latins, Slavs, and Turks, in Thrace and Macedonia, in Cilicia and Syria, in Hungary and Russia, in Persia and Trebizond, at Constantinople, at Jerusalem, at Bagdad, at Damascus, at Kieff, at Semlin, at Thessalonica, after the reign of a year made horrible by his cruelties, was himself torn from the Imperial

throne to die in the Hippodrome by the hands of the people after being compelled for hours to suffer tortures which nature recoils from recording.

These are but five instances taken at random from the history of the Byzantine throne only. If we descend among subjects, vast is the number of those who have left an impress for good or for evil upon the fortunes of the East, and the study of whose lives would throw new light upon the history of their epochs. If I once allowed myself to sketch a list however superficial of the themes with which the records of New Rome might inspire either an historian or an artist, I should go farther than I may allow myself. The writers, the poets, and the painters of modern Greece, possess in that history a mine of material which has hardly been touched, which is practically inexhaustible, and which is filled for them with promises alike of labour and of fame.

If, instead of the brief and superficial notes which are here drawing to a close, I had myself endeavoured to attract attention to some one episode in the history of Mediæval Greece by the composition of such a special treatise as I have just indicated, I should perhaps have succeeded better than I have done in conveying in an interesting manner a true idea of what I believe the Byzantine Empire really to have been.

In the present summary sketch I have not sought to treat of the history of the Byzantine Empire. My only wish has been to call attention to a few of its general features, and at the same time to point out how the distorted glass of national antipathy

and old-world prejudice still disfigures the view of the past.

Thus I have striven to show how happily the Byzantine Empire was constituted for the long preservation both of its existence and of its unity, and how that constitution enabled it to preserve through so many centuries all the elements of civilization. Under the shelter of a State equipped with a legislation so singularly perfect, and the protecting eye of a watchful Government, the production of both public and private wealth attained gigantic proportions, while military organization and maritime supremacy assured to the State itself its integrity and its superiority, amid the unceasing and unchanging assaults to which it was subjected, and the intellectual and moral condition of its subjects formed a veritable oasis in the midst of all the barbarism of the Middle Ages with which it was surrounded on every hand. Above all, I have tried to point out that by spreading education and diffusing Christianity, by the cultivation of the Arts and the development of Commerce, by the study of Literature and the pursuit of Science, the Byzantine Empire did more than keep the traditions of civilization for itself; it passed these traditions on to its uncivilized neighbours, and was thus the guide and the teacher of the modern world.

While, however, I have been desirous to acknowledge these benefits, I have had no wish to omit the shadows from the sketch which I have tried to draw. I have remarked in the Byzantine Empire the absence of that political liberty which would have

given more cohesion to the State, and done something to neutralize the evils of a centralization by which the life and energy of the Empire were in danger of being all drained away into the capital. I have mentioned the unhappy results of the excessive prominence given to ecclesiastical questions, and the equally unhappy results of a political education which ended by leaving the real natives of the Empire incapable of defending their own country by force of arms.

The feature last mentioned was the principal cause of weakness in the Byzantine Empire, and the element in which we must seek the explanation of its decline and fall. The state of confusion which invited and which followed the Latin conquest brought the faults of this political system clearly to view, just as a shock will cause the mud to rise to the surface of a pond which has hitherto appeared limpid. The low condition into which Government had fallen, the struggles of Pretenders to the throne, and the consequent relaxation of the bonds of internal unity in the State, rendered possible the conquest of the Empire by the comparatively small army of Crusaders. 'The lesson,' as Finlay well remarks, 'is worthy of attentive study by all wealthy and civilized nations, who neglect moral education and military discipline as national institutions. No State, even though its civil organisation be excellent, its administration of justice impartial, and its political system popular, can escape the danger of a like fate, unless skill,

discipline, and experience in military and naval tactics watch constantly over its wealth.'

At the same time, the shock produced by the Latin conquest had the effect of separating sharply, and therefore in a sense purifying, the confused and heterogeneous mass of elements of which the body social of the Empire was composed. Out of the ruin caused by the catastrophe, there suddenly broke forth a strong light of pure Hellenism. It was this light which illuminated all the attempts made for the recovery of Constantinople, and shone upon the recommencement of the Byzantine rule within her walls. From this point onwards, although the Empire still continued to bear the name of *Roman*, it became in itself more and more exclusively Hellenic in character. A new lease of life seemed to be opening before it. The State had now become more homogeneous, and it had acquired fresh strength from the trials through which it had been compelled to pass. It might have proved permanent, if only it had taken a new departure. Then, perhaps, guided by the sceptre of the Palaiologoi, a new Power, a Power purely and exclusively Hellenic, might have arisen, and the history of Europe, both in Mediæval and Modern times, would have been materially altered.

But such a development was arrested by two causes. One of these was within the Empire itself, and consisted of the intense conservatism with which the whole of society clung to the institutions and even the forms of the past, the enduring pride with which they nursed the consciousness that they

were the Roman Empire, and a clinging attachment to these antient memories. So strong was this sentiment, that it was in itself enough to prevent any radical transformation. While Western Europe was changing and taking new shapes, the East stood still. And here to stand still meant to decline. The other was the ever-narrowing circle of enemies by which the New Rome was now hedged in. The Slavs, the Bulgars, the Franks, and, above all, the Turks, by burning the harvests, slaughtering the flocks and herds, and enslaving the inhabitants, had now reduced the provinces to a desert, and confined the Hellenic population of the Empire to little more than the neighbourhood of Constantinople. The New Rome still indeed stood for a while, as the antient and glorious metropolis of Christianity, the magnificent capital of Eastern civilization. But at last the hand of Mahomet II. fell upon her also.

I hope that in my attempt to give an idea of the past, I have said nothing but what is true. I do not think that my judgment has been obscured by national feeling. Our national feeling now is not a feeling for Byzantinism, but for pure Hellenism, which the march of time and the instincts and endowments of the Hellenic race have once more eliminated from the Byzantine amalgam; although, of course, we at the same time acknowledge the facts of history and the existence of certain elements in common.

.If, when I call to mind the benefits which Mediæval Greece has conferred upon civilization, I

have neither desired nor been able to escape being fired by some admiration for the acts of individual men, the greatness of soldiers, the glory of scientists and artists, I have had no intention of weakening for one moment the higher feeling which the thought of the antient Hellas creates in every noble spirit. Certainly not.

It is true that, whether in peace or in war, the men of the Byzantine Empire often displayed qualities which the men of antient Hellas would not have been ashamed to own. It is true that in such matters as regard Literature, Science, and Art, they ought to be judged more fairly than they have been hitherto; for they strove at least to imitate the glorious models which they could not rival. By the propagation of the Christian religion and the establishment of the Church, they have laid the modern world under an obligation which cannot be denied. But, nevertheless, although we may do justice to the men of the Byzantine epoch, and may strive to dissipate the spiteful caricature under which their real character has been disguised, our hearts will never warm to their names as they warm to the holy names of Marathon and of Plataiai, or at the glorious memory of the heroes and sages of Antient Hellas.

And why? Is it because the Parthenon is a nobler building than the Church of the Eternal Wisdom? Is it because Athens was the mother of Aischylos and Thoukydides, whereas Constantinople has only bequeathed us Photios? No. The true reason is because the double love of Freedom and

of Fatherland does not exalt the mind and quicken the heart, at Byzantium, as it does in Hellas.

This is the real point of difference which creates so wide a separation between two worlds which have so much in common. This is why the Hellas of to-day, although she does not forget Constantinople and all the things which make it hers, is always looking steadfastly to the glory of her early fathers, and why her heart and her intelligence alike bear her back to the Hellas of the past.

This is why, when the poet of modern Hellas sings of her Resurrection, he does not invoke the names of Constantine the Great, or of Herakleios, or of the Komnenoi, or of the last of the Palaiologoi. Instead of doing so he falls down in worship before the Three Hundred who died at Thermopylai, and hails the glorious fact that Freedom rises from their grave.

'Απ' τὰ κόκκαλα βγαλμένη
 Τῶν Ἑλλήνων τὰ ἱερά,
 Καί' σὰν πρῶτα ἀνδρειωμένη,
 Χαῖρ, ὦ! Χαῖρ' Ἐλευθερά!

But we must not rest satisfied with having a glorious ancestry. We must not allow ourselves to be lulled into activity by the knowledge of what our fathers have done. Let us remember how largely the decline and fall of the Byzantine Empire were owing to the fact that those who guided its fortunes were always looking to that which was gone. Let us profit by that warning example. Let us take both the epochs which lie behind us as the foundation and the starting-point for the work

which lies before us, but let our eyes, and our hopes, and our energies be directed to the future, and let our word of command be, not Backward, but FORWARD.



GREECE BEFORE 1821.

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THE Hellenic race occupies at the present day very nearly the same geographical position which it held in the days of classical antiquity. The course of ages, the forces of political movement, the vicissitudes of invasion, and the influences of successive conquests, have wrought but little change in it in this respect, save in Southern Italy and on the Western coasts of the Mediterranean.* The Hellenic population is compact in the islands of the Ægean Archipelago and in the peninsula of Greece proper. From the mouth of the Strymon Eastwards, it occupies the sea-coast both of Turkey in Europe and of Turkey in Asia, and stretches inland for a greater or a less distance. According to Eton, in his *Survey of the Turkish Empire*, published in London in 1799 and again in 1801, † the Hellenes at the beginning of this century

* A great deal of Greek blood of course exists in a more or less corrupt state in these districts, and the tradition of the race is preserved in Southern Italy and Sicily by the existence of a good many Greek Churches, especially in the cities, where the worshippers, although otherwise scarcely distinguishable from other Italians, continue to use the forms and language of the Greek Church. (Tr.)

† Ed. 1799, p. 291.

calculated their own numbers at seven millions. Eton himself, however, justly remarks that this estimate was obviously an exaggerated one. Even at the present day, with the increased population of the free Hellas, and the comparative amelioration in the condition of the peasantry in some parts of the Turkish Empire itself, it would not be safe to reckon the entire number of Hellenes as amounting to seven millions.

When the War of Independence broke out in 1821, the consequences were felt wherever an Hellenic population existed. All the Hellenes did not take an active share in the struggle, but they were all exposed to be massacred, persecuted, outraged and plundered. The inhabitants of Thrace, of Asia Minor, and of the islands immediately adjacent, were too close to the centre of the Empire, too much surrounded by Turks, and too open to all the excesses of tyranny, to have been able to move, even if they had had the courage. In Epiros, in Thessaly, and in Macedonia, where the Hellenic element was strong, and where men's nerves were braced by the pure air of the mountains, the population rose in arms at the very first signal. In these districts, however, the revolutionary movement was immediately crushed. They were strongly occupied by the Turks, and served them as bases of operation during the whole of the war. The struggle itself raged in the Southern parts of the mainland of Greece, in the Peloponnesos, in Crete, and in the Western Islands of the *Ægean*. These Greek provinces alone, containing about one

quarter of the entire Hellenic race, maintained, by themselves, for the space of seven years, an unequal conflict against the whole power of the Ottoman Empire. And yet, when the war was over, they were not all allowed to keep the freedom to gain which they had suffered so much. The territory which was formed into the new Greek kingdom was found to contain scarcely 700,000 souls, when its inhabitants essayed for the first time to count themselves after having laid down their arms.*

* Félix Beaujour (*Tableau du commerce de la Grèce, 1787-97*, vol. I. p. 22) estimates the population of Macedonia, Epiros, and Thessaly at 1,400,000; that of the rest of the mainland of Greece at 220,000; and that of the Peloponnesos at 300,000. Stefanopoli (*Voyage en Grèce*, II. 166) arrives at the same conclusion with regard to the Peloponnesos. The census made by the Venetian Republic in 1686 (*vide* Sathas, *Τουρκοκρατούμενη Ἑλλάς*, p. 366) gives only 200,000, but it is not an unnatural phenomenon that the population should have increased by fifty per cent. in an hundred years. Pouqueville, however (*Voyage en Grèce*, III. 410), taking his figures from those of the *Kharatch* or poll-tax paid by the Christian inhabitants, reckons the Christian population of the Peloponnesos about the beginning of this century at only 150,000, that of Thessaly at 275,000, and that of Epiros at 373,000. As for Crete, Pashley (*Travels in Crete*, ii. 326) estimates the population before 1821 at between 260,000 and 270,000. In classical times they were believed to amount to a million. When the Venetians took possession of the island in the Thirteenth Century, the inhabitants amounted to between 500,000 and 600,000. Half of them were still left in the Sixteenth Century. After the Turkish Conquest of Crete, an English traveller quoted by Pashley, calculates the number at no more than 80,000.

According to the statements made by Capodistria to the representatives of the Powers in 1828 (*vide* Mamoukas, *Τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἀναγέννησιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος*, I. 235-6), the population of the territories then forming the Greek State had been 950,000 before 1821, but had sunk to 765,000. This figure would seem to have been exaggerated. Thus, the inhabitants of the Islands of the Archipelago are set down

The population of the same districts had been in antient times at least six times as numerous, and, notwithstanding all the wars which the Byzantine Empire had been compelled to wage, they were still plentifully inhabited when the Crusaders dealt the first blows at the power of Christian Constantinople, and even at the later moment when she was finally annihilated by the Turkish conquest.

The Turks set themselves to batten upon what remained of the antient prosperity of the country which they had conquered. They did so with the simple and unthinking instinct of beasts. They ate whatever they found, without any

as 178,000 in both years; Eubœia is credited with 169,000 in 1821, and 120,000 in 1828. But the Isles of the Ægean had only 157,931, according to the last census taken in 1889. As for Eubœia, the census of 1840 gave only 43,340, and that of 1889, 88,679. The population of the Peloponnesos amounted to 431,000 in 1840, and to 790,574 in 1889; according to Capodistria, the numbers had been 500,000 before 1821, and 400,000 in 1828, the former figure however including the Mohammedan population, which formed about one-tenth. The first census of the kingdom, made according to Capodistria's calculation, gave a total population of 650,000; and that of 1836, 751,000, nearly the same as given by him in 1828. In 1840 the total had risen to 856,000, and according to the census of 1879, the original provinces contained 1,409,334 inhabitants, and the Ionian Isles, 244,433; giving a total of 1,653,765. The portions of Thessaly and Epiros since added to Greece raised the figure by about 340,000. According to the census of 1889, the total for the kingdom of Greece amounted to 2,187,208. The population of the original provinces seems to double in 48 years (see the official statistical tables for 1875, p. 18), but it may be hoped that an increase both of well-being and of territory will not make it needful to wait another fifty years in order to see doubled or trebled the present number of free Hellenes. As to the population in classical times, the reader may consult the dissertation of the k. Kastorches in the *Ἀθήναιον*, vols. IV. and V.

thought for the morrow. It never occurred to them to think of preserving or developing the bountiful resources of the territories upon which they had lighted. And accordingly, under their deadly government, these countries proceeded to fall rapidly into ruin and desolation. 'Wherever,' observes the English eye-witness Eton,* 'the Turks have established their dominion, science and commerce, the comforts and the knowledge of mankind have alike decayed. Not only have they exemplified barbarism and intolerance in their own conduct, but they have extinguished the flame of genius and knowledge in others.' The dwindling of the population and the steadily increasing imminence of public ruin not only have hitherto been, but still actually are, the glaring evidence of what is meant by being under the Turkish Empire, as regards the complete destruction of all public prosperity. In the year 1204, when Villehardouin and his fellow Crusaders came into contact with the East, their first emotion was one of dazzlement at the spectacle of such marvellous wealth and splendour. But since those days the Turks have been allowed to effect a complete change. The travellers who visited Turkey at the end of the last century or the beginning of the present, are unanimous in recording with horror the wretchedness which was co-extensive with the Ottoman Empire. The inhabitants had learnt by experience not even to till

* P. 143, ed. 1799, p. 135, ed. 1801.

the ground beyond what was necessary for the bare support of life. 'They have no courage,' says the French traveller Savary,* 'no spirit. And why should they attempt anything? If they took to sowing or planting, it would lead to the idea that they were rich, and so inevitably bring down the Aga to devour whatever they possess.'

One result of the cessation of cultivation and production was that all communication with the rest of the world came to an end. Greece became an inaccessible and unknown country. From time to time, some traveller gifted with more obstinacy, more culture, and more curiosity than almost all the rest of mankind, overcame the difficulties which beset him, and visited Hellas in order to see what material monuments of her past greatness might still survive, and then went away again. The impression left upon these travellers, with regard to the Hellenes, varied. Some of them left the country moved by an humane compassion, others reproached them—cruelly and unjustly—as being unworthy of the soil, that soil consecrated to civilization, upon which they had allowed themselves to be made vile. 'When I was at Gastouni,' says Bartholdy,† 'I overheard a conversation between an English traveller, a Greek monk, and our own host, who was the doctor in the place. The churchman and the physician complained bitterly of the Turkish yoke. 'God,'

* *Lettres sur la Grèce.* Paris, 1788, p. 45.

† *Voyage en Grèce, traduit de l' Allemand.* Paris, 1807, II. 13.

said the Englishman, 'has deprived the Hellenes of their freedom because they did not deserve to have it.'

The rich vales of the Peloponnesos almost ceased to supply any produce for commerce. Foreign relations grew less and less, 'on account,' as it is expressed by M. Chaptal,* 'of the insecurity which reigns inland, where every species of disorder was rampant.' 'Our own French merchants,' says M. Juchereau de Saint-Denis,† 'were at one with those of Holland and of England in complaining, years before our Revolution, that trade in the Levant had ceased to offer the same advantages as formerly, and they attributed the miserable prices offered for their own merchandise and the diminution of their profits to the increasing poverty and depopulation of the Turkish Empire.' The plain of Elis had become an uncultivated wilderness. 'The execrable Government of the Morea,' says the English witness Leake ‡ 'added to local tyranny, has reduced the Greeks of Gastouni to such distress that all the cultivated land is now in the hands of the Turks, and the Greek population have become cattle-feeders or mere labourers for the Turkish possessors of the soil.' 'The town [of Dhivri]' he tells us in another place § 'occupies a large space, the houses, to the number of 300, being dispersed

* *De l'Industrie Française*, I. 147.

† *Revolutions de Constantinople en 1807 et 1808*. Paris 1819, I., 134.

‡ *Travels in the Morea, 1805-1806*. London, 1830, I., 11.

§ *Ibid.*, II., 237.

in clusters over the side of the hills ; but a great part of them are uninhabited. This is chiefly owing to the *angária* of the Lalliotés, who come here and force the poor Greeks to carry straw, wood, etc., on their horses to Lalla without payment.' The inhabitants of Monembasia and its neighbourhood had endeavoured to save themselves by emigrating to Hydra, to Spezzia, and even to Asia Minor. 'Before the Russian invasion of the Morea,' says the English traveller,* 'there were 150 Greek families, but they, as well as the Greek inhabitants of the villages of this district, fled after that event to Asia or to Petza, Ydhra, and other islands. Some of them returned after Hassan, the Capitan Pascha, had expelled the Albanians, who had marched into the Morea against the Russo-Greeks, but the Vilayeti has never recovered its Christian population, and does not now contain more than 500 Greeks.' 'The town of Karitena,' continues the same observer,† 'is much depopulated of late. There now remain about 200 families, of which not more than twenty are Turkish. The emigrants have chiefly gone to the territory of Kara Osman Oglu, in Asia Minor, where they are subject only to the land tax and kharatj.' The nomadic movements by which these poor wretches strove to find some amelioration in their condition by passing from one part to another of the Ottoman Empire were merely like the action of a sick man who seeks to find relief by thrusting his

* *Ibid.*, I., 204.

† *Ibid.*, II., 23.

aching limbs first into one and then into another part of his bed of pain. Turks in Asia are just the same things as Turks in Europe. The same causes produce the same results there as elsewhere. The rich plains of the East had been reduced to the same state of barren wilderness as the vales of the West. The Asiatics were reduced to beggary as well as the Europeans. 'The depopulation of some provinces' testifies M. Juchereau de Saint-Denis,* 'has been so marked that, out of twenty flourishing villages which formerly existed in the neighbourhood of Aleppo, it is now scarcely possible to reckon four or five. The tyranny of the provincial Governors drives the peasants to seek refuge in the towns, and, once they are there, starvation soon decimates them.'

It was a common device to try and find relief by changing from one town into another at a small distance. The subjects of Ali Pasha at Galaxidi, for instance, endeavoured to escape by going to Vostitza. But this expedient was more difficult for those who inhabited the country remote from the sea-coast. It was the habit of Ali Pasha to make a periodical round of all the towns and villages under his jurisdiction, in order to receive the 'voluntary offerings' of his wretched subjects. 'When Ali,' says the same English observer, Leake, in another work,† 'makes a tour round this part of his territory, he never fails to visit this place. The Archons

* *Révolutions de Constantinople*, I., 134.

† *Travels in Northern Greece*, I., 308-9.

generally meet him in the plains, and offer perhaps twenty purses, begging him not to come into the town. He receives the present with smiles, promises that he will not put his friends to inconvenience; afterwards comes a little nearer, informs them that no provisions are to be had in the plain, and, after being supplied upon the promise of not entering the town, quarters on them, in the course of a day or two more, with his whole suite, perhaps for several days, nor retires until he has received a fresh donation. In these *progresses* he expects something from every village, and will accept the smallest offerings from individuals. His sons, in travelling, fail not to follow so good an example. As he dares not exercise this kind of oppression in Albania, the districts on the Eastern side of Pindus are the great sufferers; and neither pestilence nor famine are more dreaded by the poor natives than the arrival of these little scraps of coarse paper scrawled with a few Greek characters, and stamped with the well-known little seal which makes Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia tremble.'

The people of Galaxidi had taken flight because Ali Pasha wished to compel them to serve as sailors on board the fleet which he was equipping. But the town of Vostitza, where they had taken refuge, is just across the water, in the Peloponnesos, and 'the present Pasha of the Morea,' as we again learn from Leake,* 'is said to have paid the Porte 400

* *Travels in the Morea*, II., 346. ; ed. 1830. See also Pouqueville, *Voyage en Grèce* Chapter cxxxv., at the beginning.

purses for his appointment for one year, and he will probably squeeze 1,000 out of the poor province. Vanli Pasha, who was removed last year to Candia, paid 600 purses for two years, and yet greatly enriched himself. The Morea has the character of being the most profitable Pashalik in the Empire, of those, at least, which the Porte has the power of selling annually.'

As a rule, indeed, these satraps were only appointed for a period of one year at a time. The frequency of the appointments was of large pecuniary benefit to those who possessed over the Sublime Porte the influence—open or occult—necessary to secure a nomination to a provincial Pashalik. In the report * which Capodistria addressed in 1828 to the representatives of the Powers in answer to the questions which they had put to his Government, he gives some extremely interesting information as to the manner in which Pashas were in the habit of exercising their powers. 'How was it possible,' he asks, 'to look for just and enlightened administration from a Pasha who but very shortly before attaining that dignity had been in work as a slaughterman, and who is now simply the ignorant nominee of an absolute despot? . . . No man dared to open his mouth in the presence of the Pasha of the Peloponnesos. That Pasha had the power of life and death over his subjects—and they trembled whenever they had to go near his seraglio. Fear seized them before ever they found themselves within

* See it in Μάμouκας, Τὰ κατὰ τὴν Ἀναγέννησιν τῆς Ἑλλάδος. II. 316.

sight of the despot, or within earshot of the terrors of his voice. At the gate of his palace were always to be found ready waiting an hundred and fifty soldiers under full arms, an itch-aga, and an executioner. It needed only a particular sign of his head to cause any one of his petitioners to be led out to die.'

The Turks amassed fortunes, but, as they grew richer, the people whom they ruled grew poorer. 'The Ottoman Empire,' wrote Pouqueville,* with a feeling of generous indignation, 'the Ottoman Empire is the Empire of woe. It is not like any other country in the world. The people who live in it are at once ferocious and apathetic, and are destitute of the slightest feeling for the public interest. From Constantinople to the banks of the Euphrates, and from the shores of the Bosphoros to Cattaro, the towns are cess-pools full of dung and filth: the villages are either dens of wild beasts or deserted. The exclusive subjects of conversation are pestilences, conflagrations, epidemics, and famines. The gates of the great cities are hidden by groups of gibbets and towers loaded with human skulls. The roads traversed by the local governors are lined with gory heads, stakes for impalement, and other instruments of death. The traveller meets no one who is not clad in the livery of destitution. There is no police, no public order, no rest, and no safety for life and property. The gentler virtues are unknown in this country. If a

* *Voyage en Grèce*, II., 231.

man has any money he buries it, and if he has any valuable objects he hides them in the depths of his harem. If he wishes to escape suspicion he must avoid living with the appearance of being in easy circumstances.'

In the cities the Greeks inhabited quarters separated from those occupied by the Turks. The Turks inhabited the citadel, if there were one: if the town had no fortress, they expelled the Christians from the best neighbourhoods. Christians were always liable to expulsion from their dwellings at any whim of their masters. Savary relates (p. 262) a curious anecdote illustrative of this fact. The circumstance occurred in 1780, and is, as he remarks, a proof of the treatment which the Greeks received in their own country. 'With the exception of the Archbishop and of Europeans,' he says, 'no Christian has the right to ride inside a town. The Bishop of Canea took it into his head to disregard this tyrannical regulation. One evening, when he was returning from the country along with several monks, he did not dismount, but passed through and rode quickly up to his own house. The janissaries who were on guard at the gate looked on this action as an insult. The next day they roused the troops, and it was determined to burn the Bishop and the Priests. The mob, roaring curses, were already carrying combustibles to the Bishop's house, and its inhabitants could not have escaped the horrible fate to which they were destined, had not the Pasha, warned in time, issued a proclamation, by which

any Greek, of what class soever, was forbidden to sleep within the walls of Canea. This prohibition was rigorously enforced, and, every evening, these wretched slaves might be seen slinking out of the gates of Rettimo, and retiring for the night into the fields.' This state of things lasted for two months, 'but,' says Savary, 'money is here the cure for all evils. The Cretans combined their resources together, and, by a very heavy bribe, obtained the revocation of the edict. The pride of their Bishop cost them dear.'

That a Christian who might happen to be on horseback had to dismount as soon as he came in sight of a Turk was not the only badge of slavery to which he found himself subject. To make a Greek smart at every turn of daily life by something to remind him of his subjection to an Osmanli, was an object upon which the Government of the Sublime Porte bestowed an almost infinite ingenuity. Thus speaks the English traveller Eton * — 'The insulting distinction of Christian and Mahommedan is carried to so great a length, that even the minutiae of dress are rendered subjects of restriction. A Christian must wear only clothes and head-dresses of dark colours, and such as Turks never wear, with slippers of black leather, and must paint his house black or dark brown. The least violation of these frivolous and disgusting regulations is punished with death.' On this head each class of inhabitant found himself

* *Survey of the Turkish Empire*, p. 104, ed. 1799.

under a special law. Whether a man were a Greek, an Armenian, or a Jew, was to be displayed at once by his costume. Special laws regulated the hats with which the chiefs of the Christian communities were allowed to shelter their humble heads.* Bishops and other ecclesiastics (who, be it said, enjoyed peculiar and exceptional privileges above their fellow-believers), were absolutely forbidden to wear the broad-brimmed hats which immemorial custom had assigned for their use. They were not allowed to have any brims.†

But mutilating the head-dress of the clergy was only among the minor vexations to which the adherents of the Christian religion were exposed. They were not allowed to build any new Churches, and even the repair of the old ones was only permitted by special firman, which could only be obtained with great difficulty and by means of heavy payments in money. 'According to a recent firmahn,' says Leake, ‡ speaking in 1805, 'the Greeks of Mistra are allowed to repair their Churches on condition of paying 300 piastres for each to a mosque at Constantinople.' 'The Greeks [of Smyrna],' says Chandler, § 'before the fire [of 1764] had two Churches. They applied to their Bishop at Constantinople for leave to rebuild

* See not only Eton, as above cited, but also Lacroix, *Etat présent des nations et églises grecque, armenienne, etc.*, p. 11. Paris, 1741.

† Hence the peculiar hats which long usage has now rendered the ordinary head-covering of the Greek clergy.

‡ *Morea*, I. 133.

§ *Travels in Asia Minor*, p. 66. London, 1775.

that which was destroyed, but the sum demanded was too exorbitant to be given.' The traveller who records this incident remarks that by the continuance of such a policy the extirpation of Christianity within the Turkish dominions was only a question of time.

The use of bells was not allowed except in a few privileged places where there were no Turks to be offended by the hateful sound. Among these favoured spots were the villages of Chios, the inhabitants of which carried on the cultivation of mastic. These villagers were exceptionally fortunate on account of their dependence upon the Imperial harem, but even they were not allowed the full enjoyment of the fruits of their own labour. One half of their entire harvest was the property of the harem, and the other half they were only permitted to sell at the price fixed by the will of the Aga of the island. The cultivation of mastic was allowed nowhere except on the land of such villages as had received the authorization of the Government.*

If a neighbourhood happened to possess any natural advantage, the feature in question, instead of proving a benefit to the inhabitants, was immediately made a source of misery and oppression. Thus, for instance, there is a spot near Kandelion in the Peloponnesos, where the snow lies long. 'The mountain on the left,' says Leake,† 'has

* Olivier, *Voyage dans l'Empire Ottoman fait par ordre du gouvernement*. Paris. Year IX., vol. I., pp. 285-9.

† *Morea*, III., 109.

a remarkable cavern, or shady hollow, an unlucky circumstance for the poor Kandeliotēs, who are obliged to supply the serai at Tripolitza from it, and carry the snow there at their own expense.'

But it was not necessary to be a Pasha in order to be able to maltreat Christians. Anybody who was a Turk was allowed to do it to his heart's content. For instance, Colonel Leake saw a Turk kill a Greek peasant at the gate of Larissa, because the Christian had an ass loaded with charcoal, which he wished to carry for sale to the market-place (in hopes of a more certain, as well as a higher price for it), instead of letting the Turk have it. It is hardly necessary to add, as the conclusion of this example, that the *cadi* declared the murderer guiltless. The only chance the other way would have been if the family of the victim had had more money.

Whenever a suit lay between a Christian and a Mahommedan, no Christian was admitted as a witness. This provision of Turkish law, however, it must be owned, pressed with comparative lightness upon such Christians as were wealthy, because Turkish witnesses are never wanting to call God to witness to anything, as long as a suitor is able as well as willing to pay them to do so; and if he also possess the funds needful for securing the favour of the judge, the latter is exceedingly easy as to the character of the witnesses. The drawback to this method in the eyes of Christians, viz., that the righteous and the innocent are thus exposed to ruin and to death through the words of a few hired per-

jurors, is not one which a Turk regards as of any consequence.

‘In every province of the Morea,’ said Capodistria, in the statement already cited,* ‘in every province of the Morea there was a *cadi* nominated by the *cajasker* of Roumelia. Such a *cadi* held his post for a period varying from six to twelve months, or, on some rare occasions, for as much as eighteen months. He was the judge, and the judge without appeal, of every civil and commercial cause, of whatever nature or of whatever magnitude, and to him appertained likewise the duty of enforcing his own decisions. The execution of the judgment could alone be suspended by an appeal to the Pasha, at the centre of administration, Tripolitza. These facultative appeals were a mere abuse of power. From the Pasha there was no appeal. And yet law-suits dragged on and on. Turkish jurisprudence, obscure and often inconsistent, allowed of differing opinions by the *ulemas* which only made confusion worse confounded.’

It is probably not difficult for the reader to form some idea of the sort of justice which was meted out by such tribunals. In Pouqueville’s *Voyage en Grèce*† will be found an account of the judicial method adopted by the Pasha of Tripolitza for clearing himself of his liabilities towards his doctor, who had lent him money. It was simple.

Besides this, it was not held as a crime in a

* *Mamoukas*, vol. XI., pp. 312 *et seq.*

† IV. 231.

Turk to murder a Christian. 'It may be further remarked,' says Eton (101), 'that there is not one instance of a fetva which declares the murder of Christians to be contrary to the faith; or of any argument drawn from justice or religion, used to dissuade the Sultans from perpetrating such an enormity. The pleaders for mercy have been guided by policy or moved by compassion.' But on the other hand, as we find remarked by the same writer (98), 'A Christian may not kill a Mahomedan even in self-defence; if a Christian only strikes a Mahomedan, he is most commonly put to death on the spot, or, at least, ruined by fines and severely bastinadoed; if he strikes, though by accident, a *Sherif* (*emil* in Turkish, *i.e.*, a descendant of Mahomed, who wear green turbans), of whom there are thousands in some cities, it is death without remission.'

Wherever there was most reason to be apprehensive of the Christian population, the Turks made it a principle to treat them with especial severity. Thus we learn from Olivier* that in Crete, 'whether it be that the Sfakiotes inspire them with mistrust, or because the great number of the Greeks renders it necessary for them to be upon their guard, the Turks are here more given than anywhere else, upon the slightest pretext, either to kill a Greek with their own hands or to send him for execution.'

It is, no doubt, true, as has been before remarked,

* I. 214.

that for those who have money enough, it has always been possible to purchase the friendship, or at least the protection, of Turks. 'The whole Divan,' remarks Felix Beaujour, 'is for sale, if only the intending purchaser has money enough wherewith to buy it; and this is the reason why the Beys and the Agas utilize the provinces to obtain the means of saving themselves from the bowstring and acquiring appointments to the office of Pasha.'

Venality was the grand principle which formed the ground-work of the whole administration of the Pashas. 'They buy their appointments,' continues Beaujour,* 'at Constantinople, where there is nothing which is not for sale, and they recoup themselves anyhow they can. Throughout the whole of the Ottoman Empire, the Governors work an inexhaustible mine of fines.'

In other words, the whole tribe, from the Sultan himself down to the smallest personage in the employment of his government, live by sucking their subjects. It is a long and thorough experience of the Turkish race which has generated the Greek proverb—

Τούρκον εἶδες, ἄσπρα θέλει,
κὶ ἄλλον εἶδες, κὶ ἄλλα θέλει.

The most convenient medium for the extortions of the Turkish Governors was the *Kharatch*, or poll-tax. The *Kharatch* or death, was the alternative offered to every Christian. Everyone who paid it took care to secure his receipt, and yet the

* II. 181.

Governmental receipt often proved to be no protection against the ingenious rapacity of the tax-gatherer. The language of the receipt itself is striking. 'Every *Raya*,' says Eton (98), 'every *Raya* (that is, every subject who is not of the Mahommedan religion) is allowed only the cruel alternative of death or tribute; and even this is arbitrary in the breast of the conqueror. The very words of the formulary, given to their Christian subjects on paying the capitation-tax, import that the sum of money received is taken as a compensation for being permitted to *wear their heads that year*.'

The nominal figure of the poll-tax was not high. But the publicans or collectors to whom the collection of the tax was farmed always found means for extorting from the tax-payers at least double the sum which found its way into the Treasury. It is unnecessary to say that this difference of more than 50 per cent. went into their own pockets. The abuses committed in the collection of this tax, as well as the stamp of inferiority which it was intended to impress, rendered the *Kharatch* more odious than the tithe, or than any other of the varied means of extortion and oppression which the fiscal ingenuity of the Turks devised for enabling them to harass and to beggar their wretched Christian subjects.

The *Kharatch* was of three sorts. The first applied to the rich, who were legally subject to a payment of twelve or fourteen piastres per head. The second class of contributories embraced all other adults, from artisans and labourers down to

the very beggars, without any exception. These paid half as much per head as was paid by the rich. Lastly, came children of fourteen years of age and under, who were assessed at three piastres each, beginning to be liable at the age of eight years in towns and at that of five years in the country. 'If,' says Beaujour (I. 51), 'the father of a little Greek raises any dispute as to his exact age, the tax-gatherers measure the child's head with a cord, which is made to serve as a sort of standard, and, as they can always make the cord what length they like, the father can always be proved in the wrong.'*

The Greeks of the islands were justly considered to be the least unfortunate of their race, since, as a rule, there was no Turkish population settled among them. But with the return of each spring-time and the accompanying appearance of the Capitan-Pasha to levy the taxes, the islanders were made to suffer at one blow the accumulated evils which they had been spared during the preceding twelve months. The Capitan-Pasha, like his brethren of the land, extorted under the name of offerings and presents to himself, a sum at least

* On the subject of the system of taxation which prevailed in the Turkish Empire before the war 1821, and especially with regard to the *Kharatch*, the first chapter of the fifth volume of Pouqueville's *Voyage en Grèce* may be consulted, as well as the work of Felix Beaujour, and that of Eton, already cited, p. 39 *et seq.* Tournefort and Choiseul-Gouffier give detailed accounts of the islands visited by them. It is as well, also, to consult the work of Moschobákēs upon the state of the law in Greece during the Turkish domination, Athens, 1882.

equal to the total of the poll-tax and other imposts which he raised on behalf of the Treasury. At the same time also, his officers and other myrmidons down to the private soldiers, swarmed about over the islands, wringing subsidies for themselves out of the poverty of the inhabitants. It was in vain that these latter fled to their mountains, to hide themselves in dens and caves of the earth, or sought to conceal the few objects of value which they might possess. The Turks seized the elders and put them to the bastinado, until their wives had brought them their trinkets, and those of the women their neighbours. It was, moreover, very often the case that the Turks, after appropriating the jewellery, threw husband, wife, and child together into slavery.*

Besides this, the inhabitants of the isles and of the coasts were subject to a conscription of young men for service in the fleet. It is true that the number of young men so taken was not sufficient to imperil the natural increase of the population, and that the denial of Christianity was not imposed upon them. But the sea-faring population bewailed nevertheless the loss of their sons, whom the will of their tyrants tore from their homes. It was a tax of blood which was paid with tears.

Yet the conscription of sea-faring lads was as

* Eton, p. 177 ; Choiseul Gouffier, I. 185. See also an article by the author, in the *Éorra* newspaper for June 20, 1882, upon the capture of a Turkish frigate by the Christian slaves on board her.

nothing in comparison with that indescribable blood-tax, the conscription of little children, which lasted till towards the close of the Seventeenth Century, and the memory of which haunted every Greek home like the presence of a devil. Every five years the agents of the Janissary regiments went through Greece, and took away one little boy out of every five over seven years of age. It is unnecessary to say that they chose the most beautiful. The fathers and mothers knew that the children they thus lost were lost to them for ever, that they would become Mohammedans, live and die Janissaries. As for the race, this tribute threatened its very existence, the very hope of its future was turned against it, its persecutors forged from its own very blood the instruments of their oppression. Bondage seemed a light thing in comparison with this tribute. No other enslaved nation has ever had to suffer such a torture as this.

Thus lived the Greek race from the Fall of Constantinople in 1453 until the outbreak of the War of Independence in 1821. They seemed to be buried, if not crushed, under the sufferings and degradations entailed by their slavery. And yet they still kept heart alive, because they knew that their racial existence was not dead. The very contempt with which their savage masters held themselves separate from the 'unbelievers' served to cherish and foster both the consciousness of

nationality and the sentiment of nationalism. Under the heavy rod of Osmanli despotism the Greeks stood apart as a separate and peculiar people, all the members of which were bound one to another throughout the whole breadth of the Turkish Empire, not only by the threefold tie of one blood, one tongue, and one religion, but also by the very political and social organization to which they had been subjected by their conquerors at the date of the fall of their country.

When Mahomet II. had made himself master of Constantinople, he empowered the Œcumenical Patriarch to exercise over his co-religionists a civil jurisdiction which practically rendered this ecclesiastic the head of the Greek nation. The Patriarch's enjoyment of this office was accompanied by certain privileges, and his investiture by certain external marks of honour. In adopting this course of action the Turkish conqueror has been accredited with the intention 'of rendering their bondage less irksome to the Greeks and of accustoming them to bear its yoke, by the concession not only of liberty of conscience but also of the right to the public celebration of their religious worship.*' Whether these were Mahomet's motives at all, may well be questioned. Certainly, they were not his sole motives.

It was impossible that the Supreme Pontiff of Islam, the Khalifeh of the True-Believers, should profane his sacred character by sinking so low as

* Lacroix. *Etat présent des églises grecques*, 758.

to concern himself with the civil or religious affairs of infidels. The prescriptions of the Mohammedan religion left a choice of two alternatives for his new subjects. They might either become Moslems or they might redeem their lives by a regular payment in tribute. For those Christians who chose the latter alternative, the Turkish Government devised the special organization of which they made the Patriarch of Constantinople the pivot, with the view of concentrating the central control of the whole national affairs of his fellow-countrymen and fellow-believers in the hands of this one man, and thus having this complete control directly, easily, and simply, under their own eye and hand, in the person of an officially recognised head and representative. It may perhaps also be the case that, by investing the Patriarch with this character, they hoped to prevent any action of the Orthodox in the direction of an inter-communion with the Latins, since it was possible that a re-union of the Eastern and Western Churches might have raised fresh forces against the common enemy of all Christianity, and that to this end also was designed the high position with which they sought to enhance the dignity of the ruling pastor in the eyes of his flock.*

The Patriarch accordingly obtained privileges which gave him what might be called, in a sense, a sort of relative independence. He was solemnly invested with an almost sovereign authority over

* See Moschobakes, p. 51.

his co-religionists. He was the person who was their representative in the eyes of the Sublime Porte. He was elected by the Prelates and the representatives of the laity. He was responsible to no authority except the Divan, and to the Divan only in case he were accused by the Synod. He was the Supreme Head of the clergy, and over them he possessed the power of exercising criminal jurisdiction. He had a power of direction over every church, and the financial affairs of each were subject to his control. Over the laity he was invested with a judicial authority which extended not only over all matrimonial cases but also over every case where the parties concerned were both Christians, whatever the character of the question, unless the parties themselves voluntarily elected to compare before the Turkish tribunals rather than before that of the Patriarch. These powers the Œcumenical Patriarch was in the habit of delegating to the different Archbishops and Bishops, as his Legates in the provinces. Even the humbler of the clergy shared in the advantages of the jurisdiction with which their Head was invested. They were exempt from the *Kharatch* (poll-tax) and were allowed themselves to levy a tax upon every Christian family, in order to meet the expenses incidental to the discharge of the public functions which were conferred upon them by law.*

The result of all this peculiar legislation for conferring a Temporal Power upon the Patriarch of Constantinople, was of course to establish an *im-*

* See Moschobakes, as before, and also Mamoukas, XI., 308.

perium in imperio—a Patriarchal Temporal Power inside a Mohammedan Temporal Power. Nor need it be disputed that in an ideal state of things this arrangement might have served very well, not only for smoothing over the various difficulties which necessarily resulted from the political and social revolution of 1453, but also as leading to an improvement in the future position of the Christian population. That such might, however, have been the result, pre-supposed certain conditions which did not exist. The Turkish Government, on the one side, would have had to have been somewhat less savage, fanatical, cruel, and tyrannical, and the Greek clergy, upon the other, would have had to possess a morality rather higher than that which had already existed among them in the last days of the Empire, and which had been shaken still lower by the terrible cataclysm of the Mohammedan conquest and by the consequent annihilation or expatriation of all the best surviving elements in Byzantine society. The real marvel is, not that things were no better, but that they were no worse—that the clerical group thus placed at the Head of the Hellenic people showed themselves endowed with such an amount both of intelligence and of patriotism as to render it possible to preserve and to uphold the standard of Hellenism beneath the shelter of the Phanar.

It must be remarked, at the same time, that the conquered Christians had no guarantee whatever to assure to them the continuance of the privileges which had been solemnly promised to them at the

moment of the conquest. As a matter of fact, several of the successors of the conqueror annulled at their mere will the concessions granted by their predecessors. In 1519, for instance, the Christians of Constantinople were deprived of all their stone churches, with the exception of two, the largest of which was taken from them in 1607.* There were some Turks who even went so far as to advocate the extermination of the *giaours*. Mahomet II. himself degraded the Patriarch Joasaph (the second successor of Gennadios) and caused not only his beard but also his nose to be cut off, because he refused to contravene the Canons of the Church by giving a dispensation to the Protovestiaros to contract a bigamous marriage with the daughter of Demetrios Assam, an Athenian magnate, during the lifetime of the lawful wife of the said Protovestiaros—the which refusal brought upon the Patriarch in question the wrath of the Sultan, or rather, of the Pasha, who happened to be a personal friend of the Protovestiaros. When it came to be a question of electing a successor to Joasaph, one section of the electors sent the Sultan an offering of a thousand pieces of gold, as an accompaniment to a petition that they might be allowed to elect anyone whom they chose. The Sultan pocketed their money, called them fools for their pains, and said, ‘Elect whoever you like.’ †

This little incident typifies from the very com-

* See ‘*Τψηλάντου Τὰ μετὰ τὴν Ἄλωσιν*. Constantinople, 1870, p. 123.

† *Turco-Græcia*, pp. 21, *et seq.* and ‘*Τψηλάντης*, p. 19.

mencement the relations of the master to his slaves. The Sultan called them fools for their pains—but he pocketed their money. He did not care a straw what was the condition of Christians, as other rulers would have cared about the condition of any large and important class of their subjects. His only idea was how much he could get out of them, the same consideration which presents itself to the mind of the conquering side in a war, when settling the amount of indemnity to be exacted from the losers. On the other hand, the Christians had already learnt by experience to know that with Turks, money, nothing but money, but money, is Almighty, and that the Sultan himself is for sale. So they made haste to meet his wishes, and thenceforward has continued the system of venality which forms the very base and pivot of the whole administration of the Ottoman Empire.

This system of venality is one of which the higher clergy of the Christian Church have not always been able to avoid the contagion. The Bishops had to obtain their Sees by bribery, and they could only retain possession of them by bribing the Pashas, and by other forms of self-degradation. It was not very long before the habit of giving money to their masters began to be accompanied by that of wringing it out of their flocks. It was the Turks who invested the Bishops with power, and they imbibed with it some of the Turkish habits in its use. And yet, all the same, covered as she was by the leprosy of venality aggravated by all the ills of slavery, the Greek Church never lost the consciousness of her

duty towards the Greek nation. While that dark night lasted there were always to be found Bishops whose virtues redeemed the vices of some of their brethren. In short—and say what we will—the Greek people owe to their Church the preservation of their Faith, of their Language, and of their Unity. And their Church will never find their gratitude lacking towards her. The errors of the past were more than atoned by the death of the Patriarch Gregory V., hanged at the Phanar in 1821, by the patriotic devotion of Germanus of Patras, and by the deeds of so many other Prelates who have died the Martyrs or lived as the Confessors of the cause of our National Independence.

Moreover, the results of living under the Turkish Empire were not confined to the clergy. The evil was in the fact. Priest or layman, Patriarch or Grand-Dragoman, it was the same thing. Every Christian who accepted authority from the Turkish Government and used it in their name, was brought, willed he, nilled he, to the same expedients—cringing before his owners and bullying his humbler fellow-slaves. The very Elders of the country villages were not always exceptions to this rule—a fact quite sufficiently attested by the meaning which is attached to the title '*codja-bashi*' in the Peloponnesos.

The degradation which the national character suffered under the influence of such causes was really the greatest both of the dangers and of the evils of slavery. Happily, amid this deterioration, the Hellenic people never lost the sense of their

own dignity. And it was this sense which breathed a life ever keener and more keen into their longing to be free. It was not the hardships alone of the life of slavery which they bewailed: the consciousness of dishonour smarted still more. It is sufficient to cite in proof the writings which Hellenes were able at that epoch to publish in foreign countries, and, after the war broke out, the documents in which the insurgents made known to Europe their resolve to die sooner than endure again what they had suffered for so long.

At the same time, and notwithstanding all that may be said as to the tyrannical misconduct of some village elders in some parts of Greece, it is still none the less true that the communal system was the social anchor to which Hellenism owed its preservation. The Patriarchate, as has been already remarked, supplied the element of political unity, and afforded what may be termed the external expression of national life. The Grand Dragomen, the Princes of Wallachia and Moldavia, and the aristocracy of the Phanar in general, by being in the eyes of the Turks and of foreigners the representatives of the New Hellenism as it quickened, exercised upon the destinies of their race an influence as fortunate as it was powerful. But it was in and by the communal system that shape was given to the home life of the people.

The pressure of slavery under the foreigner, which weighed upon all alike, not only made

warmer the ties which bound the members of every family one to another, but also bound each to all within every little community. Like the members of a larger family, every member of the community, by helping his brother, found it less hard both to suffer and to resist in the common interest of all. They were not free, but they found in the community a certain field for social activity which, narrow as it was, recalled, after a fashion, what life had been in the days of independence, and so, in a fashion, carried on the old memories of national life and made ready, in a way, for the coming Hellas of the New Birth. It is needless here to enter into the question whether the communal system which existed in Greece under the Turks owed its origin to classical or to mediæval times. This is a question which concerns rather the students of the monuments of past history. But the phenomenon of these *demoi*, all independent of each other, differing so widely from each other in regard to details, and yet all recognizing, as the very basis of their organization, the equality of the electors and the responsibility of the elected,—this phenomenon, presented by surviving Hellas, so vividly recalls, in its varied unity, the character of the antient Hellas, that if it be not indeed an unbroken inheritance from her early days, it is hard not to admit that it was at the least but a new flower upon the old stem still growing in the old soil.

Fortunately, it did not occur to the Turks to make any attack upon the communal system. On the contrary, they found that it suited their system

of administration very well, and they accepted it quite willingly. Just as they made the Patriarch of Constantinople responsible for the whole race, so did they make the elders responsible for the whole of each community. Thus the communal system served greatly to simplify the machinery of government. It was an easy way of assessing the tribute, regulating the forced labour, and getting in the *Kharatch*, and the subjects of these imposts found them less difficult to bear when they were able to adjust the weight of the burdens among themselves without being harassed by the intervention of Turks. It is true that there were many places where the relief thus obtained was but small, owing to the presence of Turkish persecutors, whether official or private, and acting either in the name of the Imperial Exchequer, or in virtue of that right to oppress which every Turk claims for himself. But there were also many places where there were no Turks, and where the population could consequently breathe freely and the community flourished. The communal system, by binding the interests of every individual to those of institutions common to all, by allowing to all some occupation other than that of trying to meet the exactions of the tax-gatherer, by concerning all in the local government, in the affairs of schools and hospitals, in the management of the police, and in the development of the resources of the country, prepared the people for freedom, and gave some foretaste of the progress of which they would be

capable whenever they were delivered from the burden of the Turkish domination.

When the War of Independence broke out, these communal societies served as centres of activity, and also as bases for the new organization of the country. Then did the Elders of all kinds, Proestôtēs, Codjabashis, Demogerontes, Ephoroi, or Epitepoi, put themselves at the head of their freed fellow-countrymen and contribute to form an aristocracy of champions of the Fatherland; they, like the Prelates of the Church and the rest of the Phanariote hierarchy, now cast aside the signs of their slavery and degradation, threw themselves upon the side of their country, and contended for the honour of leading the national movement and of striving to ensure its success.

It was when the war broke out that the vastness of the gulf by which nature has separated Hellen from Turk became most strikingly visible. For four centuries had they been associated in intimate contact. Mutual familiarity had done nothing but intensify their mutual hatred. While the Turk degraded and corrupted the Greek population, it had never occurred to him to try and attract even the principal inhabitants towards his system or to make it the interest of any of them to support it. The Osmanli Government looked upon all Hellenes as its enemies, and treated them accordingly.

Hence it came to pass that even those who did not approve the revolutionary outbreak, cast themselves into it, because they realized that such a course was less dangerous for them than to adhere

to the Turks. But it is not in this direction that we are to seek the causes of the national movement. The cause of the war was the gradual and universal awakening of the Hellenic people.

The author of these essays has elsewhere* remarked how large a part in this awakening was due to the increase of education. It is true enough that Hellenic culture had never entirely died out. But in the earlier periods of Ottoman domination, it was confined to a few clergy who enjoyed an ecclesiastical education, and a still more limited number of laymen who found means to pursue the study of letters and of the sciences. The mass of the population was plunged in ignorance. The village teacher was generally the Parish Priest, and the few pupils whom he could gather around him under the shadow of his Church acquired little more than a mechanical power of reading the Psalms and the other contents of the ecclesiastical office-books. These humble schools did little more than supply a proof that the love of learning, which is in-born in the Hellenic mind, was not dead. They were, so to speak, only the little morsel of leaven which was destined in the future to leaven the whole mass. But from the Seventeenth Century, the Hellenes in the service of the Porte afforded their aid to the Patriarchate in commencing an extended system of education, by founding schools and protecting the teachers and their pupils. The true development, however, did not

* *περὶ Νεοελληνικῆς φιλολογίας, δοκίμιον.* London, 1871.

take place until still later, especially towards the end of the last Century. Then it was that the lowly teachers of the preceding generations gave place to men of learning, who were imbued with an enlightened love for the classical glory of their race, and kindled with a passionate desire for its renewal. Henceforward many an Hellenic town had a school, and pupils came in thither from the country round about. In these schools, moreover, the works of the classical authors and of the Fathers of the Church no longer formed the only subjects of study. In them were to be learnt the results of modern science, which cultured Greeks were now busying themselves in communicating to their countrymen, either by original works or by translations of the best foreign treatises.*

The principal source which supplied means to education, and was the strongest lever for raising the Greek people out of the rut of lethargy into which they had fallen, was Commerce. Commercial activity dates its revival from the Eighteenth Century.

‘The Greeks of other days,’ said M. Juchereau de St. Denis,† ‘crushed under the yoke of Osmanli despotism, used to get European merchandise through the hands of European agents, established in the different seaports of the Levant. Within the last fifty years, under the impulse of

* See the *Σχεδιάσμα περί τῆς καταστάσεως τῶν γραμμάτων*, by Par-
anikas (Constantinople, 1867), and also the fuller work upon public
instruction in Greece by Chassiotis (Paris, 1881).

† I. 155.

their constantly disappointed hopes for a brighter future, they have taken to studying our language, imitating some of our manners and customs, and trying to gain some knowledge of Europe by personal observation.'

From the epoch when he wrote, the commerce of the Levant became mainly centred in the hands of Hellenes. Little by little, the Christian's home began to learn what is meant by ease and comfort, and with material improvement, began the aspiration after a higher intellectual and moral position. These happy results of commercial activity were not confined to Constantinople, to Smyrna, to Thessalonica,* or to the isles of the Ægean, whose merchant ships were now beginning, in ever increasing numbers, to bear to their rocky homes the wealth which was destined, later on, to keep alive the War of Independence. The improvement was also to be seen here and there in landward Hellas, wherever the absence of Turks permitted some out-of-the-way village to enjoy a certain amount of security and of freedom. The commercial and industrial development achieved by these communities, was itself a clear proof of the talent and the activity inherent in the Hellenic population. The existence of such oases in the midst of the desert of Osmanli savagery, startled the few travellers who were able to reach them, by recalling the memories of European civil-

* See Félix Beaujour, *Tableau du Commerce de la Grèce, 1787-1797*, Paris, Year VIII. ; and also the Comte Chaptal, *De l'industrie Française*, Paris, 1789, vol. I., where there is a special chapter upon the trade of the Levant.

ization. The German Bartholdy, a man whose prepossessions are sufficiently unfavourable to the Hellenes, was astonished to find at Ampelakia,* in Thessaly, several persons who were capable of addressing him in his mother-tongue, and he was still more astonished when he found that they had given themselves, as a recreation, the opening of a little theatre, in which they were representing Kotzebue's *Menschenhass und Reue*, which was then in vogue in civilized Europe. At Kalarrytes, at Syracon, in Epiros, † similar phenomena were to be found. 'It is the tradition of Kalarytes,' says Leake, ‡ 'that the Vlakhotes have not been settled in this part of Pindus more than 250 years, which is very credible, as it is not likely that they quitted the more fertile parts of Thessaly until they felt the oppression of the Turkish conquerors, and their inability to resist it. The removal has not been unfortunate, for their descendants have thereby enjoyed a degree of repose, and have obtained advantages which their former situation could hardly have admitted. They began by carrying to Italy the woollen cloaks,

* French translation (*Voyage en Grèce*), I. 183, *et seq.* Félix Beaujour speaks of Ampelakia, I. 272, *et seq.* He gives full particulars of the organisation of this Thessalian township as an industrial community. He says that there were 25 factories, where 2,500 bales of cotton were dyed in a year. This industry was based upon the red dye, commonly called the Andrianople red, and it is not generally known that this trade was introduced into France from Greece. See M. Chaptal, *L'art de la teinture du coton en rouge*. Paris, 1807.

† See Pouqueville, *Voyage en Grèce*, II. 173, *et seq.*, and Leake, *Northern Greece*, I. 274.

‡ *Northern Greece*, I. 274. See also Pouqueville, II. 431.

called *Cappe*, which are made in these mountains, and much used in Italy and in Spain, as well as by the Greeks themselves. This opened the route to a more extended commerce: they now share with the Greeks in the valuable trade of colonial produce between Spain or Malta, and many are owners of both ship and cargo. The wealthier inhabitants are merchants, who have resided abroad many years in Italy, Spain, or the dominions of Austria or Russia, and who, after a long absence, return with the fruits of their industry to their native towns, which they thus enrich, and, in some degree, civilize. But they seldom return for permanent residence till late in life, being satisfied in the interval with two or three short visits. The middle classes pursue a similar course; but, as their traffic seldom carries them so far from home as the higher order of merchants, they return more frequently, and many of them spend a part of every summer in their native place.'

At Siatista, in Macedonia, there could hardly be said to be a single family some member of which was not established in Italy, in Hungary, in Austria, or in Germany. Among the old men in the town, there were very few who had not lived abroad for ten or twelve years. Among the mountain villages near Volo, in Thessaly, the same activity was attended by the same results. It is to these merchants, while either still living in some foreign land or when returned to their native country, that Hellas owes that wonderful revival of popular education which preceded her political resurrection. Such

men were the Zosimai, the Maroutsoi, the Kaplanai, and so many other benefactors of their race. Such men were those who founded and endowed schools. These were they who were either themselves workers in the fields of literature and learning, or who generously subsidized and supported the publication of useful books by others. These were they who made themselves the leading apostles of freedom and of civilization, by telling their fellow-countrymen what they had heard and seen in the dominions of civilized governments, and exciting in them the desire to obtain the like blessings for their own land. It is among these merchants that are to be found the names of the first founders of the *Hetairía*. It was principally from among them that were drawn the emissaries who spread through the provinces and colonies of the Hellenic race the secret knowledge of the national movement which was about to break forth. Of 692 recorded names of members of the *Hetairía*, 251 are those of business-men, and 35 of ship-captains.* The wealth which trade and commerce had amassed in Greek hands was freely and readily offered for the needs of their country.

But it was not alone the development of trade which engendered the War of Independence. Trade brought material well-being, trade brought about and helped relations with foreign countries, trade brought out and hastened the moral and

* See the appendix to the 1st vol. of Philemon's *Ἱστορικὸν δοκίμιον περὶ τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς Ἐπαναστάσεως*. Athens, 1860.

intellectual awakening of the people, trade stirred up the desire to be free ; trade was the mother of those merchant-ships wherein were trained the sailors who have gained immortality by labouring and fighting for Greece. Trade was like a quickening breeze which blew upon the grey heap of ashes until the fire, which smouldered below, broke out into a clear blaze. But the fire had been there all the while, and the fuel was ready to be re-kindled. The Church and the communal system had saved the integrity and the unity of the nation. The class of men who surrounded the Patriarchal throne at Constantinople had shown their intellectual and political superiority over the Turks. The Kleptai and the Armatoloi, by handing down from generation to generation the warrior-spirit of our race had given a continuous promise—a promise since fulfilled by what deeds ! and by what devotion !—that when the hour for battle came, Hellas would have children who could fight for her. All these things together showed that Greece was ready for liberty. All her population were but awaiting the moment to shake their chains from their limbs. The Hetairía did it, because the hour was come. When the sowers of that brotherhood went forth to sow, they found everywhere good ground, ready to receive the seed which has now begun to give to Hellas the first fruits of her second spring-time.

There were some people at the time of the outbreak of the war—and there have been some since—who thought that the outbreak was premature.

It is possible, from one point of view, to understand this opinion. On the side of the Hellenes there was a want of organization either military or political, there was the want of sufficient means, and there was the want of any alliance or of any hope of help from any foreign nation. On the side of the Osmanlis there was power and strength, vast, bloated, overwhelming: all went to show that the battle must be a hard one, and that success was very problematical. And, as a matter of fact, for many a long year, as she writhed against her gigantic oppressor, Hellas bled heavily. For ten years, in a war wherein she received no quarter, her population was much more than decimated, in the field, in massacres, in epidemics. Anything which Turkish savagery had hitherto by any accident spared went now. The towns were destroyed. The country was laid waste. Anyone who happened to have any property lost it. There was not a family which had not agony and martyrdom carried into its midst. And when it was over—when so much blood had been shed, and so much suffering borne, it was only a little fraction of the Hellenic race who obtained independence. Three hundred thousand Hellenes gave up their lives, in order that six hundred thousand might be free.* We have had to wait fifty years more to see another scrap—a very small one—of Hellenic soil, liberated by the will of Europe. God knows how long the Hellenes, who are still slaves, will have to

* Herzberg, *Geschichte Griechenlands*, IV., 590.

wait before the hour of deliverance strikes, or how long the alien tribes, which have immigrated into the Balkan peninsula and are striving to make themselves a way to the shores of the Greek sea, will be tolerated in their efforts to defraud Hellas of her rights.

The people who blame the War of Independence for having been premature are fond of saying that if the Hellenes had only been content to go on living quietly under the Turks, they would have ended by becoming gradually more and more powerful both in the administration and in the Government, that their superior intelligence, education, and adroitness would have enabled them peacefully to take the places of their masters, while they would at the same time have preserved and confirmed their moral and political supremacy over all the other races which inhabit the Turkish Empire. By such means, argue these thinkers, the Hellenes, by stepping gently and imperceptibly into the shoes of the Turks upon the one side, and uniting themselves with all other sorts and conditions of Christians, upon the other, would have been enabled, by sheer force of time and events, to raise again upon the shores of the Bosphoros that Christian Empire which was felled by Mahomet II.

These dreamers forget that when the Hellenes took up arms, they proclaimed their indestructible rights, and not their own rights only, but the rights of every race which the Osmanli had enslaved. These dreamers forget that if the Hellenes had not claimed and won those rights,

these same Hellenes themselves, and all the other Christians in the Turkish Empire, and all the other peoples in it, and the Turks themselves along with them, would have been very likely to have fallen one solid prey to Another Conqueror—Another Conqueror, whom Turkey's constantly growing weakness must necessarily have invited to come in at last, and to take all,—a Conqueror, strong and civilized,—a Conqueror, within whose mighty Empire Hellas would have run much chance of losing the very consciousness of her nationality, as she must have lost even the dream of independence.

And even if that had not been so, to what depths of degradation would the Greek race have sunk had they refused to the ancestral blood which filled their veins the honoured task of washing out the stains of slavery? If they had thrown themselves solely upon their intellectual acumen and trusted to nothing but to the power of their superiority in cabal and intrigue to enable them to restore the Byzantine Empire? Half a century has passed by now since the War of Independence, and yet that long lapse of time has not been long enough to remove all the stains which the degradation of Turkish slavery has left upon the character of our race. No, a people who voluntarily keep their chains around them are a people who are not worthy to be free. The second birth of Hellas was a thing which could not if it ought, and ought not, even if it could, have been the work of Christians disguised as Pashas. It was not and is not the destiny of Hellenism to effect a reconstruction of

the old Greco-Roman Empire. It was right that Hellenic independence should be won, as it was won, sword in hand and at a great cost. Some people say that that cost was too great. If so it be, so much the greater ought to be the gratitude of posterity towards those who did not grudge the price. It is owing to them that Hellas has once more taken her name and place among the nations, with the light of a new morning beginning to glow round her head.

*THE FORMATION OF THE MODERN
GREEK STATE.*

THE FORMATION OF THE MODERN GREEK STATE.

TOWARDS the end of the year 1822, Europe held a sort of Continental Council at Verona, where the different States were represented in the persons of Sovereigns and their Ministers. This was the first occasion upon which their collective wisdom was called upon to occupy itself with the Greek Question.

In the spring of the preceding year, the news that an insurrectionary Greek movement had broken out in Moldavia had already troubled the deliberations of the Monarchs assembled at Laybach. The Emperor Alexander I., who was then the arbiter of Europe, hastened to express his condemnation of the revolt of the Greeks, a condemnation which was emphasized all the more because the insurgent chief, Hyspilantes, who had but recently been not only a General in his service but also an aide-de-camp in his household, was addressing to him the most urgent appeals on behalf of that country to whose cause he had now devoted himself, and to which he believed—as all the rest of his fellow-countrymen believed with him—that

Russia and her mighty Sovereign could not refuse their sympathy and their help. Hypsilantes was soon undeceived. The Orthodox Tzar and the whole of Europe disowned and condemned the Hellenic War of Independence from the very moment it began.

The national movement, initiated outside its natural sphere, seemed at that time to have no chance of continuing, far less of succeeding. But circumstances had changed somewhat before the close of the next year.

The insurrection had been stamped out in the Danubian Principalities, where it was not upon native soil, but Hellas herself had already some claim to be called free and independent. In the Peloponnesos the Turks had lost everything except the two fortresses of Patrai and Nauplion; on the mainland they had just evacuated Athens, and the whole of that part of the country, from sea to sea, was cleansed of them; the Kleptai of Olympos in Thessaly, and the Souliotes in Epiros, still kept the Sultan's arms in check; Greek fleets swept the Ægean up to the very Dardanelles; and lastly, the representatives of the risen race, gathered together in a National Assembly, had been enabled to lay the first foundations of a political organization, and had testified before the civilized world to the existence of an Hellas with both the power and the will to live.

The Greeks, from the very beginning, seized every opportunity of defending their movement against the unjust imputation of revolutionary

principles, which was at first cast upon it. The Assembly at Epidaurus, in their proclamation of January 15, 1822, say, 'Our war against the Turks is not the outcome of seditious and subversive forces, nor the weapon of party ambition. It is a National War, undertaken with no aim save that of reconquering our rights, and saving our existence and our honour.' When they cried for the help of Christendom, they declared betimes their desire that their new State should be a Monarchy. Their appeals and proclamations remained perfectly futile. The world continued to regard them as subjects in rebellion against their lawful Sovereign.

When they heard of the Congress of Verona, the Hellenes hastened to send a mission thither in order to explain their wishes and to plead their cause. The Congress refused even to receive the petition which the insurgents had had the audacity to address to them. They forbade the Greek representatives to set foot in Verona, and requested the Pope to expel them from Ancona. Official Europe damned the Greek War of Independence from its very inception.

During the last twenty-five years a number of new States have been able easily to take shape and assume their positions in the European family of nations, and that, sometimes after defeats instead of victories, and sometimes after the populations have merely allowed themselves to be massacred without making any resistance. In view of such spectacles as these it is difficult to realize that

Hellas, after having fought and triumphed by sea and by land for two years, and thus virtually acquired independence by her arms, entirely failed to make the Governments of that epoch even listen to what she had to say. To understand such a phenomenon it is necessary for the reader of to-day to place himself in thought at the period in question, and to remember that diplomatic Europe was then guided by the principles of the Holy Alliance. No better exposition of these principles as they prevailed in 1822 is, perhaps, to be found than in the ironical description in which the Duc de Broglie depicted it in one of his speeches,* 'Every revolution whatever,' he said, 'is not only a rebellion against the Government which it attacks in particular, but a criminal attempt against civilization in general. Every nation which tries to gain its rights, when its Government has refused it the liberty, is a nation of pirates which ought to be outlawed and proscribed by all Europe. Constitutions have no lawful source except in absolutism. Any Government which is the child of a revolution, is a monster, which ought to be killed as soon as possible.' It was against such doctrines as these, as much as against the arms of Turkey, that Hellas had to contend in order to conquer her independence.

And yet, when the Hellenes addressed their petition to the Congress of Verona, the moment

* *Souvenirs*, II. p. 346.

was a singularly propitious one for effecting a settlement of the question in conformity not only with the principles of the Holy Alliance but also with the interests of Turkey herself. It would then have been easy to have done what was afterwards attempted in vain, viz., to have brought about the pacification of Greece, while still preserving the Suzerainty of the Porte. It would then have cost no more trouble to succeed in such a proposal than it cost to fail at a later date. If the European Powers had not then been so exceedingly tender about the Sovereign rights of Turkey, they would have been spared the trouble of crushing Turkey five years later upon the waters of Navarino. But it is a curious fact that in this everlasting and tiresome Eastern Question, it is always the fate of Europe, or at least of Western Europe, to make the mistake of leaving undone those things which she ought to have done, and so having to confess afterwards that she has done those things which she ought not to have done.

And so, as we have already remarked, Europe, in 1822 as well as in 1821, left Hellas to her fate in the conviction that it would not be long before the Sultan crushed her again.

It must, indeed, be confessed that it was difficult to foresee how a little nation with no organization, no resources, no allies, and no protectors, could successfully resist a power as formidable as Turkey still was at that time. It seemed impossible but that such an insurrection must be promptly stamped out. But the energy of despair gave tenfold force

to the Greeks. Their struggle for liberty was a war without quarter. It could only end in one of two possible ways ; either they would become free, or they would be exterminated. Between them and their old masters there was a great gulf fixed, which put anything like understanding or compromise out of the question.

So they went on fighting, and, contrary to all foresight, their cause prospered for two years after the Congress of Verona. Hellas, left entirely alone, had some grounds for hoping at last that after four years of struggle the Sultan would find himself obliged to cease a profitless war, or that Europe would step in and end it, if only by acknowledging her independence as an accomplished fact.

This hope would have been realized if Turkey had had no resources but her own to fall back upon. The aspect of affairs changed when the armies and fleets of Egypt came to her aid, and from 1825 fortune turned against Greece. The son of Mohammed Ali knew how to gain victories where Turkish armies had met with nothing but defeats. But the Greeks did not give in. When they were beaten they still set their stubbornness against the enemy's advance ; they contested their burnt and blackened fields against the disciplined Arabs of Ibrahim ; and, with the continued cry of *Ἐλευθερία ἢ θάνατος*, still appealed to the conscience of Christian Europe.

Those appeals were not altogether unheard. In despite of their Governments, the nations soon began to show their sympathy with Hellas. The

material help and, still more, the moral support which they thus gained afforded the Greeks an encouragement of which it is impossible to exaggerate the value; but unhappily, at the same time, this popular sympathy became an additional reason for the rabid hostility with which the Governments regarded the Hellenic cause, by identifying it in their eyes with the principle of Anarchy. 'How is it possible to doubt,' wrote Count Bernstorff from Berlin on July 27, 1821, 'how is it possible to doubt that the safety of European society is menaced by the war which threatens Europe, when we see that every revolutionist in every country is making it the object of all his hopes and expectations? . . . It would appear that their aim in wishing to have Greece free is only that they may set free the spirit of evil in all the Christian States of Europe; they only hate the Turks in order to satisfy their hatred of the allied Powers, and they call for the intervention of Russia with the treacherous hope of thereby dissolving the union which curbs them, restrains them, and chastises them.'* It was many a long year since the pressure of public opinion was strong enough to efface from the memory of the Hellenes the remembrance of the fact that private sympathy was far from being strong enough to counteract the effects of public hostility.

The European Cabinets did nothing for Hellas until the very last moment. When at last they

* *Prokesch-Osten*, III. 347.

acted, they acted unwillingly. It may fairly be said that what inspired them then was not the generous thought of helping an unhappy people. They never dreamed of doing anything when they heard of the massacre of Chios, or of the massacre of Constantinople, or of the massacre of Cydonia, or during any of the long years before the Egyptian armaments came upon the scene. It was when Greece, broken down by the struggle, fell a prey to anarchy, when the Hellenic Government was driven to desperation, when the army refused to yield obedience any more, when the men of the fleet took to plundering the seas of the Archipelago, then it was that, for the first time, Europe found it necessary to put an end to the war. The European nations only took up the cause of Greece when Prince Metternich had been able to write (May 19, 1826) that it was only the future, and a very near future, which would be able to show whether there were still any Greeks left to deliver.*

The first public and collective act by which the powers of Europe intimated their willingness to interfere in the Greek Question was the treaty of July 6, 1827. This was the beginning of that Triple Alliance which was to end, some years later, in the '*untoward event*' of Navarino, and the independence of Hellas.

* *Ibid.*, IV. 245,

The notion of this independence formed no part of the design of the contracting Powers. All they wanted to do was to put an end to the war without cutting Greece clear of Turkey. Circumstances ultimately compelled them to go a great deal further than they wished, just as this Triple Alliance itself had only been forced upon them by necessity.

The truth is that the treaty of July 6, 1827, was the result of long preceding negotiations. It was impossible not to pay some attention, from the very beginning, to a war out of which, as Lord Strangford expressed it, there might arise 'one of the gravest as well as most delicate questions with which diplomacy has ever had to deal.* But when it came to negotiation, the Powers all had different interests and different aims, while none of them were wholly unaffected by what was going on in the East. Each of them tried to turn events to its own advantage, or, if that was impossible, at least to prevent their turning to the advantage of some one else. There was only one point upon which they were all agreed—and this was, to prevent the formation of any Greek State strong enough to be really independent.

Russia had not yet begun to discriminate between the different races to which the Christians of the East belong, and she could not well remain indifferent to their fate, nor, however much she might condemn the Greek insurrection, abandon her own character of Protectress of the Orthodox Religion.

* To Prince Metternich, July 1, 1824. *Prokesch-Osten*, IV. 104.

She had not yet discovered that she had any kinsfolk in the Turkish dominions. She had still only co-religionists. The murder of the Patriarch of Constantinople, and the persecutions and massacres, of which the Greek clergy and people were made the victims, roused a righteous indignation in Russia and evoked from the Russian Government a series of protests, remonstrances, and threats, which contributed, along with other causes of dissension, to bring about the rupture of diplomatic relations with the Porte, long before the outbreak of war in 1828.

The great object of European diplomacy, guided by Prince Metternich, was to prevent the outbreak in question. The result was only to retard it. This, however, was in itself a great success from the point of view of the object to be attained, viz., the preservation and integrity of Turkey. 'A war of Russia against the Porte *now*,' wrote the Prussian minister, Herr Ancillon, 'will not end like former wars in a treaty of peace, the utmost result of which would be to give Russia a new province. The Emperor's forces are so formidable, Turkey is so weakened, and the diversion effected by the Greeks will be so powerful, that it will be a question of nothing less than driving the Turks back into Asia and making the Crescent in Europe give place to the Cross. This is a result which neither Great Britain nor France can, to judge by their present policy, desire.'*

Neither did Russia desire to see the formation of

* *Prokesch-Osten*, III. 342.

a strong and independent Greek State. Katherine the Great's *projet Grec* had been abandoned by her successors, and Alexander I. was very far from wishing to sacrifice the principles of the Holy Alliance, in order frankly to take the Greek side. At the same time, it must not be forgotten that during the whole course of the War of Independence Russia was the only power which acknowledged the claims of humanity as an element for her consideration. M. de Nesselrode wrote on August 29, 1821, 'The Emperor is sincerely affected, for the sake of Europe, to see that the barbarity of the measures adopted by the Porte is such as to clothe the revolution with the character of lawful self-defence, and to gain it the secret good wishes of every man who prides himself upon not remaining indifferent to the sufferings of his kind.'

But for Russia, it is not unlikely that public opinion alone would have failed to rouse the European Cabinets to action in favour of 'rebels.'

Russia had already proposed two alternatives for the pacification of Greece, at the Congress of Verona in 1822. These were 'that the Porte should either consent to enter into direct negotiations as to the Guarantees under which the Greeks should again come under the Sovereignty of the Grand Signor; or should prove by her acts that she respects the religion of Greece and is trying to re-establish tranquillity in the interior of that country upon bases such as may assure to Russia the establishment of durable peace.'*

* *Ibid.*, III. 179.

On January 9, 1824, Russia took another step. After a number of tentatives addressed to the other Cabinets, she now produced a formal memorandum in which she proposed 'to establish upon the mainland of Greece, Principalities analogous to those upon the Danube. In accordance with the geographical position of Greece these Principalities should be three in number. The first, or *Eastern Greece*, should include Thessaly, Boeotia and Attica. The second, or *Western Greece*, should embrace all the old Venetian coast line which has not passed into the possession of Austria, Epiros, and Acarnania. The third, or *Southern Greece*, should be composed of the Morea, to which might even be added the island of Candia. The islands of the Archipelago should be placed under a municipal system which would be in fact only the renewal and regularization of the privileges which they have already possessed for centuries.'*

The subsequent fate of other provinces tributary to Turkey and the re-union of principalities inhabited by the same race show us now-a-days how much the realization of this project might have turned to the advantage of the Hellenes. Hellas herself would thus also have been spared the desolation caused by six more years of war, while the high deeds already wrought would by themselves have been enough to render glorious for ever the history of her new birth. But the Hellenes had made up their minds never to submit again to the domina-

* *Ibid.*, V. 5.

tion of the Porte in any shape, and they unanimously rejected the scheme.

The Turks on their side stubbornly refused to allow any intervention of the Christian Powers in their dissensions with their subjects. They would hear of nothing but absolute submission, and as M. de Nesselrode truly observed in one of his despatches, they discriminated, with an acumen peculiarly their own, between simple diplomatic demonstrations and settled resolutions. It was only an Europe resolved to be obeyed which could make the Turks give in. But the European Powers were not really at one. It is true that they had all given their adhesion with an apparent heartiness to the Russian proposal. But the initiative which Russia had assumed the right to take with regard to the Greek question was none the less a cause of disquiet and jealousy. The inter-nuncio of Austria wrote to Prince Metternich on September 25, 1824, 'We know her schemes. Russia talks of religion, but all she is looking to is the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire. She despairs of obtaining the consent of the other Governments to the partition of Turkey, and so she covers her plans of ambition with the veil of religion and humanity, and invokes their compassion in favour of the Greeks.'*

So the proposal to erect tributary Principalities in Hellas came to nothing. The negotiations between the Powers were broken off. The war went on still,

* *Ibid.*, IV. 121,

notwithstanding the success of Ibrahim. The victorious Pasha was credited with a plan for transporting the entire Hellenic population of the Peloponnesos to Egypt, and colonizing the country with Mohammedans.* Messolonghi had just fallen, after an heroic defence which had lasted a year. Sympathy for Greece became stronger in Europe than ever, and under its pressure the Governments again began to turn their thoughts thither. Negotiations recommenced. This time it was England which began. Canning, on December 1, 1824, wrote to the Greek Government in reply to their communications. This was the first time that any European Cabinet had addressed them directly and officially, and it was considered by the Greeks as the first recognition of their political existence. Unfortunately for Greece, Canning's ministry lasted only a few months, and his policy expired at his own untimely death.

It must not be forgotten that all this time the only question under discussion was the submission of the Hellenes to the Turks. England wanted nothing more, and Russia desired to go no further. In 1824, M. de Nesselrode again declared 'that Russia will never admit the independence of the Greeks; she wishes that they should remain under the Suzerainty of the Sultan, but in the enjoyment of as much self-government and of as many privileges as possible.' In April, 1828, on the very eve

* *Ibid.*, IV. 271, 306.

of the Russo-Turkish war, the Emperor Nicolas expressed himself just as incisively. In an interview which he held with the Austrian Ambassador, he assured him that he detested the Greeks, because he regarded them as subjects in rebellion against their lawful sovereign; that he did not wish that they should become free; that they did not deserve freedom; and that if they were to succeed in obtaining it, it would be a very bad example for other countries.* Such declarations, however, did not prevent the other Powers from crediting Russia with interested motives. They thought that she was seeking, by the pacification of Greece, merely the re-establishment of her former relations with the Greek people; and Russia herself on her side saw in every new proposal which could possibly end in Hellenic independence, a fresh scheme for undermining her influence.†

The Cabinet of St. Petersburg was not far wrong in suspecting that jealousy of Russia was the motive which inspired the other Powers with interest in the affairs of Greece. Lord Aberdeen wrote plainly to the Duke of Wellington on April 27, 1829, that the object of England in taking in hand the affairs of Greece had been to prevent the war between Russia and Turkey, and to prevent Russia obtaining an exclusive influence in Greece.‡ Thus also, M. Thiersch, writing from Greece in

* *Ibid.*, V. 207.

† *Ibid.*, *Geschichte des Abfalls der Griechen*, I. 343.

‡ *Wellington Despatches*, VI. 76.

1832 to Mr. Stratford Canning, then English ambassador at Constantinople, had no hesitation in accounting in the same way for the tardy protection which Hellas had at last obtained from the Western Powers. 'Why,' said he, 'have France and England joined the Triple Alliance?—To prevent Russia having the settlement of the Greek Question all to herself.'*

If, however, there were some reasons for suspecting that Russia was not altogether disinterested, Russia herself was not without having some grounds for fearing that England was trying to obtain in Greece exactly the same preponderating influence which she would not permit to her rival. Her close promixity as protectress of the Ionian Islands, the presence of her fleets, the vogue of the liberal ideas of which she posed as the representative, the sympathy which different Philhellenic Committees had manifested for the Greek cause, all combined to furnish the British Government with means of action sufficient to ensure her success in this struggle for influence.

As a matter of fact, when the Greeks had been disappointed in their hopes of help from Russia, they had very soon turned their eyes towards England. In 1821 they had already conceived the idea of placing themselves under the protection of the same Christian Power whose standard floated over the Republic of the Heptanessos. If Europe had given her consent, perhaps England would not

* *De l'état actuel de la Grèce*, I. 386.

have refused. But Europe did not consent. And as the war went on, the Hellenes became more and more attached to the idea of complete independence. A Christian Protectorate became nearly as repulsive to them as renewed submission to the Turks. In 1825, during the confusion which followed the victories of Ibrahim, some of the Greek leaders revived the idea of an English Protectorate, and Captain Hamilton procured some overtures in this sense; but the Hellenic people were now determined to abide by their last resolve, and the intrigues in question came to nothing.

Whether England ever indulged in the dream of a Protectorate over Greece or not, it is certain that she was even more bitterly opposed than ever was Russia to the notion of a strong and independent Greek State. Russia had wished to obtain self-government for a fairly extended area, albeit divided into three principalities. England wished to restrict to the Peloponnesos the limited benefits of conditional freedom.

Such were the circumstances under which these two Powers entered together upon the solution of the Greek Question.

The Emperor Alexander had died in December, 1825. This event, however, did not seem to be accompanied by any change in the Eastern policy of Russia. In the ultimatum which the Russian Government addressed to the Porte in the ensuing month of March, the Greek Question was not mentioned; but it was none the less evident that the fate of Greece was deeply concerned in the results

of the war which was now about to break out. It was at this moment that Canning appealed directly to Russia to concert with England some settlement of the affairs of Greece. On April 4, 1826, a Protocol by which the two Powers bound themselves to act in concert for the pacification of Greece was signed at St. Petersburg. The arrangement to be proposed to the Porte was that Hellas was to be attached to and dependent upon Turkey, and was to pay her an annual tribute. The limits of the territory to which this arrangement was to apply were reserved as a matter for after discussion.

The overtures made by the two Powers to the contending parties were entirely futile. The Greeks could not consent to be dependent upon Turkey, and Turkey absolutely refused to permit any foreign interference between her and the insurgents. It was evident that she would never consent to let them be independent until she herself had been brought to her last pass. It was altogether in vain that M. de Nesselrode protested that 'the conditions of the Protocol in no way stipulate for the independence of Greece, and so far from changing the Sovereignty of the Grand Signor into a Suzerainty, they reserved to him the entirety of all his rights by specifying that the Greeks should be attached to and dependent upon the Ottoman Empire.'* The Porte remained unconvinced by these arguments.

At the same time, the English Cabinet was

* *Prokesch-Osten*, V. 2.

trying to convert the other Powers to its own views ; and Russia, as if she felt ill at ease at finding herself alone with England, was anxious to obtain the participation of her old allies in the task which she had so long been pursuing. France alone made any reply to these overtures. She professed to share those views which they both held in common, and made a proposition tending to impress the more obligatory and solemn character of an European treaty upon the preliminary stipulations concluded by Russia with the Court of St. James's in the Protocol of April 4, 1826.*

If England was roused to action with the object of defeating the schemes which she attributed to Russia, she was quite as sensitive on the subject of the influence of France in the East. Her suspicions were kept on the alert by the fact that the suggestion of the Greek Committee at Paris that it would be well to elect a French Prince to the Hellenic Throne had not been without supporters in Greece itself. Moreover, the inconsistent policy of the French Cabinet was not calculated to inspire her with confidence. The Duke of Wellington pointed out to Prince Lieven that France was playing a double game ; while she was encouraging the Greeks to hold out, she was at the same time undertaking to form and discipline the Egyptian Army.†

The reproach was perfectly just ; and it was

* *Ibid.*, V. 10.

† *Prokesch-Osten*, IV. 186.

the Greeks above all who had the right to address it to France. They would have had little to fear from Ibrahim if he had invaded the Peloponnesos with undisciplined Arabs, who would have been certainly less formidable than Turks. It was French discipline and French science which had made of these Arabs a redoubtable army. The French Volunteers who fought upon the side of the Hellenes found themselves face to face with French officers who were leading the Egyptian batallions. But the Greeks have forgotten all that now. They only remember the act of justice as well as generosity by which French soldiers under General Maison hunted Ibrahim's troops from off their soil.

It is none the less true that the French Government, between the pressure of public opinion on the one hand, and the doctrines of the Holy Alliance upon the other, did not seem to know its own mind. Count Apponyi, the Austrian Ambassador at Paris, thus summed up on June 5, 1827, the reasoning of M. de Villèle, the President of the Council. 'France desires the preservation of the Turkish Empire; she is opposed to the emancipation of Greece; she looks upon the Russo-English alliance as monstrous and dangerous; she desires its dissolution at whatever cost; and the only means which she can see for accomplishing these ends is herself to join this very same alliance whose aims and works are consecrated to secure the precise evil which she wishes to avert. The principle which underlies her policy is, if I may

venture to use such an expression, the *homœopathic*.*

The tone of this little extract sufficiently indicates the spirit in which Austria looked upon the whole matter.

During the whole of the war Austria had never done anything to win the sympathy or the gratitude of the Hellenic population. On the contrary, she did everything which could ensure their recognising in her the most implacable of all the enemies of their regeneration, and the most intractable among the representatives of the Holy Alliance. Prince Metternich, as was remarked by the Duke of Wellington, gave himself up 'body and soul' to the Turks as far as regarded Greece. He looked upon the Greeks simply as rebels against their lawful Sovereign. No doubt he would have been glad to see some reforms introduced into this Sovereign's system of government, but he would have had the armed resistance of the Greeks put down with a strong hand, and he could not conceive that any length of duration, or any measure of success, could ever clothe an insurrection with the character of a lawful war. The Greeks complained bitterly of the conduct of the Austrian ships, which they represented as being the most effective allies of the Turkish cause. The Austrians transported convoys and munitions of war to the Turkish garrisons and fortresses, and broke through the Greek blockades—acts which,

* *Prokesch-Osten*, V. 83.

in the eyes of all who recognised in the Greeks the character of belligerents, were more than a gross violation of neutrality, and amounted to a direct participation in the war on the side of the Turks.* However, the diplomatic history of this epoch now shews us that, in spite of these acts, Austria, at least from 1825, was the most far-seeing of the European Powers. If the other Governments had been anxious to arrive at a solution at once frank and radical, so as not to leave the door open to new and inevitable complications, they would have had nothing to do but to act upon the views expressed by the Cabinet of Vienna. But they had no anxiety of this sort, and it was just because he knew how far the other Powers intended to go, that Prince Metternich was able to be, or at least to appear, sincere, without any fear of being taken at his word.

While Russia and England were both insisting upon the necessity of making Greece a tributary province under the Suzerainty or the Sovereignty of the Sublime Porte, Austria pointed out the impracticable character of any scheme based upon a compromise between the old state of things and pure and simple independence. The Austrian inter-nuncio at Constantinople wrote—‘The first consequence of the proposed step must necessarily be to give a powerful encouragement to the very insurrection which we wish to suppress, and to create an important diversion in its favour, without

* *Prokesch-Osten*, V. 83.

giving us any assurance that the Turks will ever consent to our suggestion, and I would therefore prefer to begin by jumping the ditch which we should still leave before us, and recognising an independence which would put an end to a good many difficulties.' *

This was evidently what had to be done.

When England sought his co-operation in the formation of a tributary Greek State, whose possible frontiers she did not indicate, Prince Metternich replied by some observations of which it is impossible to deny the plausibility, while it is to be regretted that Europe has not since allowed herself to be guided by them to a line of action which, if it had not removed, would at least have mollified all the difficulties against which she has had to contend since, and will have to contend again. The Austrian Minister wrote to Prince Esterhazy on June 8, 1826—'It is hard to tell what is meant by the word *Greece*. Does it mean the Peloponnesos and the Islands? or does it mean all the parts of Turkey in Europe where the majority of the population is Christian? If it means the Peloponnesos, whether by itself or in union with the Islands of the Archipelago, and if such a territory presents—which we do not admit that it does—the elements indispensable for the constitution of a State politically independent, the existence of such a State would be enough to render problematical that of the Turkish Empire in

* *Prokesch-Osten*, IV. 157.

Europe. If it means a union of all the countries where the Greek population is predominant, it would make it impossible. Whether therefore it means one or the other, the establishment of an independent Greece means, in either case, the expulsion of the Turks from Europe.* This exaggerated view of the consequences of the independence of Greece ought to be contrasted with that of a Greek statesman. On December 5, 1824, Alexander Maurokordatos wrote from Messolonghi—'We are the greatest enemies that the Turks have. We have good reasons for being so. Nevertheless, if our frontiers were once fixed, and our independence recognised by Turkey, our policy as an independent State would have to be in contradiction to our feelings and our national antipathy. We should be obliged to desire, and even to support, the existence of what would be left of Turkey in Europe, because we should have nothing to fear from her, but everything to fear from Russia. We are the natural enemies of the Turks, but if the Russians undertook to expel them from Europe, we should be their most faithful allies against them.†

Subsequent events have proved that the Greek statesman saw farther than the great Austrian Chancellor, and that if the frontiers of Greece had been fixed, as they ought to have been, the danger that Prince Metternich feared would not have come from that quarter. But let us hear him again.

* *Ibid.*, IV. 299.

† *Prokesch-Osten*, IV. 135, VI. 219.

‘If,’ he continued, ‘we put aside all abstract considerations of right and of justice, and if there existed the means necessary for expelling the Turks from Europe, and for again putting in their place a great Christian State, Austria, of all the Powers, would be the one which would have the least cause for regretting such a restoration.’

Unhappily Prince Metternich did not see that Austria would have no cause for regretting the formation of a really strong and independent Greek State, whose existence would not necessarily entail the expulsion of the Turks from Europe. He worked out his hypothesis ingeniously, so as to increase the embarrassment of the Powers. He had no belief in the half measures which they advocated, and their indecision lent plausibility to his arguments.

‘There are only three ways,’ he said, in conclusion, ‘there are only three ways of effecting the pacification of the insurgent provinces. They are, first, the voluntary submission of the Greeks to the Ottoman Power; secondly, the definitive conquest of all the insurgent provinces by the force of the Turkish arms; or lastly, that the Powers should bring about a friendly arrangement between the Sultan and his insurgent subjects. This last solution has occupied the attention of our Court for the last five years. Our efforts have come to nothing, because the questions have never been approached with frankness and order either by the Cabinets or as regards the contending parties. . . . At present the successes of the

Porte and the internal decay of the insurrection have placed matters in a position different from that which they formerly occupied. We will never claim the right to interfere with a pacification, of which we cannot deny the legal existence, and which can take place without our help.'

It is easy to see which of the three alternatives was most to his taste. The invitation to join the projected alliance was met by a categorical refusal. Prussia followed the example of Austria. There only remained France who was willing to consent to the proposals of Russia and England. The three Powers signed the Treaty upon July 6, 1827.

This Treaty went no further than the Protocol which had preceded it. It stipulated 'that the Greeks should be dependent upon the Sultan as Lord Paramount, and should pay him an annual tribute.' As for the limits of the Greek territory, the signatories reserved to themselves the question 'of determining them in the course of negotiations to be hereafter undertaken between the High Powers and the two contending parties.'

The Triple Alliance ended by going further than its programme. This might have been foreseen from the beginning, in view of the insurmountable difficulties which the original scheme was bound to raise. As Prince Metternich remarked, the question thenceforth 'turned less upon the pacification of Greece, than upon what means should be adopted to compel the Ottoman Government to

consent to it. The end was thus eclipsed by the means, and the experience of all ages teaches us that in politics as in private quarrels the latter are the most difficult to regulate.*

His foresight was soon justified. As soon as the three Powers had made up their minds to act, they found themselves obliged 'to unite their forces in order to prevent the transport of any troops, arms, or munitions of war, either to the mainland or to the islands of Greece.† This was the first step which was necessary with a view to effecting the pacification. The consequence was the destruction of the Turkish fleet at Navarino. It is quite true that after that event the Powers continued to assure the Porte, just as much as before, of the entirely friendly and peaceful nature of their intentions, but a month later their Ambassadors were obliged to leave Constantinople, and to break off all negotiations with the Turkish Government, and thereupon followed at last the outbreak of that Russo-Turkish war which diplomacy had so long been endeavouring to stave off.

Nevertheless, neither this war, nor the battle of Navarino, nor the French expedition into the Peloponnesos, made any change in the language of the Cabinets as regarded the independence of Hellas. They would not give up the terms of the treaty of July 6, 1827. The idea of the entire

* *Ibid.*, V. 203.

† These were the very words addressed to Ibrahim Pasha by the officers in command of the Allied Fleets, on the eve of the battle of Navarino.

emancipation of Greece entered into the thoughts of no one of the three Powers. On November 16, 1828, they placed the Peloponnesos and the islands of the Archipelago under their provisional guarantee, but always under reservation of the Suzerainty of the Sultan.

It was once more Prince Metternich who foresaw the issue of this dilemma, and therefore strove to show the Powers, on the one hand, that they would be necessarily bound to admit the independence of Greece, and, on the other, to persuade the Porte 'that if she would frankly give up possession of the Morea and of the islands, she would have the immense advantage of escaping all the future complications which would be entailed by preserving a nominal power over them.'

The Hellenes themselves seemed to have cut the knot of the question by electing Capodistria as President without asking or waiting for any authorization from the Porte. They had named the head of their own Government, a Government which Prince Metternich observed 'would have to fall to pieces the instant that the Turks accepted the proposals of the Powers.'* They had performed an act of independence, and what was more, this act had received the sanction of the Powers, in their recognition of the election of Capodistria, while they still persisted in picturing the Greek State as dependent upon the Porte.

It was nearly two years after the signature of

* *Prokesch.*, V. 203.

the Treaty of July 6, 1827, when the plenipotentiaries accredited to the Conference of London ventured, on April 18, 1829, to insert in one of their Protocols as a mere suggestion, 'whether it would not be desirable at once to constitute the Greek State, and to recognise its absolute independence, without asking the consent or recognition of the Turkish Government, to which it would be enough to make an official notification of the decision adopted by the Allies.'

Some months later, Turkey, beaten by the armies of Russia, signed the treaty of Adrianople, by the tenth article of which she gave her accession to that of July 6, 1827. This was not a recognition of the independence of Greece, but that independence had already been resolved upon by the Powers, and on February 3, 1830, they formally declared that 'Greece shall form an independent State of which the Government shall be an hereditary monarchy.'

This same Protocol which clinched the question of Greek independence, declared that the new State was to extend beyond the isthmus of Corinth, but without comprehending the Western Provinces of the mainland. The question of the frontiers was not settled, nor was it destined to be so for a long time after.

Ever since the negotiations began, England had been obstinately opposing the formation of any State which should spread beyond the isthmus. For her, Hellas meant the Peloponnesos. She only gave way upon this point inch by inch, and with a

protracted struggle. 'In the event,' wrote Lord Aberdeen to the Duke of Wellington upon July 19, 1829, 'in the event of our being compelled to go beyond the Morea, what do you think of making the Northern State under a separate Government? This would be more agreeable to the Porte; it would be more in unison with the declamations of the classical dreamers; but, above all, it would operate as a check upon the encroaching and restless spirit of Greek ambition, which we must expect to see in any State to be established, especially under one head.'*

Later on, the English Cabinet consented to the addition of Attica, but it did everything that it possibly could to shut out the island of Eubœia. 'Should the Turkish Power,' wrote Lord Aberdeen again, 'be ever good for anything, the possession of Candia and Eubœia ought effectually to control Greece.'† Happily, Eubœia was reunited to the rest of Hellas; thanks to France, the Northern frontier was stretched as far as a line between the gulfs of Volo and Arta;‡ but the island of Crete remained and still remains under the Turkish dominion, after all the sacrifices which have been offered for her, and after all the struggles of Capodistria and Prince Leopold to set her free.

Capodistria, who had been chosen the President of Greece on April 11, 1827, did not reach Nauplion until after the battle of Navarino. The joy with which that great event inspired him was not un-

* *Wellington Despatches*, VI. 29. † *Ibid.*, VI. 176. ‡ *Ibid.*, VI. 9.

marred by misgiving. His political foresight showed him the consequences which were likely to ensue, and he feared the growing rivalry of the Powers which would now claim to have wrought the salvation of Greece. This is not the place in which to point out all that Greece has since had to suffer, especially during the first years of her freedom, from being made the arena of their rivalries; it is enough to cite the testimony of a Russian officer who had the frankness to own, in 1827, that Greece would never be at rest as long as foreign agents had anything to do with the management of her internal affairs.*

Although he submitted to the decision of Europe, Capodistria never concealed the fact that his own wishes sought a far wider territory than that within which Greece was to be confined. Before the treaty of July 6, 1827, was concluded, he had claimed for the new State a frontier which should embrace all Thessaly and a part of Macedonia, including Thessalonica. This is the natural frontier of Greece, and it is that which, as we have already seen, Russia had suggested in 1824 in her scheme for the Three Principalities. It is true that things were not quite the same in 1830 as they had been in 1824. Free Hellas had lost ground in the interim, and the Powers were not disposed to help her to regain it. England in especial vehemently opposed the idea of making conquests for Greece at the expense of Turkey.

* *Thiersch, De l'état, etc.*, I. 176.

Since the moment when the great Chatham majestically declared that he would not stoop to argue with any one who did not regard the preservation of the Ottoman Empire as a point of supreme importance to England, the maintenance of the integrity of Turkey at any cost has remained a sort of axiom with English statesmen. The integrity in question has been pretty often knocked to pieces during the last hundred years, but the belief in its continual existence is nevertheless held in England as an article of faith, which the fact of Turkey's repeated mutilations is powerless to remove. The principal victims who have suffered from this curious hallucination have been the Greeks. In 1829, after the complete defeat of the Turks by the Russians, there appeared for a moment to be some hope of a cure. The Duke of Wellington despaired of Turkey, and it occurred to him that the Greek element might supply for his policy the void which was about to be caused by her disappearance. Prince Esterhazy, the Austrian Ambassador in England, wrote from London on October 12, 'The Duke of Wellington admits that Turkey has received her death-blow, that all our efforts to restore her to animation must be futile, and that our energies ought really to be directed to getting something to take her place among the Powers of Europe. I have pointed out to him that it would be inexcusable to act upon anticipation, and that even if the Porte is to expire to-morrow, we are bound to give it a helping hand to-day, were it only to soften the fall and to prevent the effects

of a shock so violent. Lord Aberdeen agrees with his chief and is taken up at present with the idea of the consolidation of the Greek State, in which the English Ministers seem already to recognise a Power which is destined to take the place of the Ottoman Empire.* But this was only a lucid interval. The curious delusion returned with full force. It has required much time and many a mortification to make England admit that the integrity of the Turkish Empire whether in the past, the present, or the future, is a matter open to doubt. And when at last it became evident even to her that it is not a thing to be absolutely calculated upon, she has actually taken up an idea that it may be possible to use *Bulgaria* as a barrier against Russia! The Hellenes owe much to the land of Byron, of Canning, and of Gladstone; they can never forget the support and protection which they have often derived from England; but they cannot help calling to mind, that if half as much had been done in time for them, as has been done in the attempt to fashion an independent Bulgaria, the object would have been attained long ago, at far less cost, and the Eastern Question would have received a solution in harmony, not only with their own lawful aspirations, but also with the true interests of Europe.

When Capodistria perceived that it was impossible to obtain a more extended frontier, he fell back upon that which ran between the Gulfs of

* *Prokesch-Osten*, VI. 183.

Arta and Volo. France brought the whole weight of her influence to support this scheme, and at the same time recommended to the three Powers the emancipation of the island of Crete. England gave way at last as regarded the Northern frontier ; but neither the French Government, nor Capodistria, nor Prince Leopold, nor later on the King of Bavaria, were ever able to shake her opposition to the emancipation of Crete.

On February 3, 1830, Leopold was officially accepted by the Powers as King of Greece. His name had been already proposed by the Emperor of Russia several months before, but the King of England had persistently opposed his nomination ; and it was only after a vain attempt to agree upon any other name that the plenipotentiaries of the three allied Powers were fain to fall back upon his. On October 13, 1829, Russia proposed Prince Philip of Hesse-Homburg ; on October 19, France, Prince Charles of Bavaria ; next day Lord Aberdeen proposed Prince Frederick of Orange, and ten days later Prince Maximilian of Este. There was always some power ready to veto any proposal. Each of the three had agreed to exclude members of their own reigning houses. At last they agreed on Prince Leopold, and George IV. yielded with as bad a grace as possible. 'The King,' he wrote to the Duke of Wellington from Windsor Castle on Jan. 16, 1830, 'The King cannot but deeply regret the selection made by France and Russia of Prince Leopold as the Prince to be placed at the head of the Greek Kingdom. Without entering into a

detail of reasoning, the King considers Prince Leopold not qualified for this peculiar station. Nevertheless the two great Powers, France and Russia, having conjointly named Prince Leopold to be placed at the head of the Greek Kingdom, the King, in deference to the desire of those two great Powers, gives his assent.*

That Prince Leopold resigned the crown which had been offered to him and which he had accepted, has been attributed to the intrigues and personal ambition of Capodistria. This is not the place to examine the foundations of such an assertion. I think, however, that the ill-will of the Court and Government of England was a force quite strong enough to dishearten Prince Leopold, and to cause his resignation. This he signified definitely upon March 21, 1831, on the ground that he did not wish to place himself at the head of a dissatisfied people, and to let his name be associated in the minds of the Hellenes with the mutilation of their country and the desertion of their brethren, who had fought along with them to set that country free, and were now to be cut off from it.†

The abdication of Prince Leopold was the formal condemnation of the English policy. He had failed to obtain any of the concessions which he regarded as indispensable conditions of stability and progress for the State which he had been called to govern. On February 9, 1830, he wrote to the

* *Wellington Despatches*, VI. 426. † *Prokesch. Geschichte*, II. 419.

Duke of Wellington—'I have considered the Protocol of the 3rd inst. ; it appears that, if its spirit be duly executed, it will effect as follows :— (1) It will establish an armistice and *de facto* peace between the contending parties, provided peaceable means suffice to carry this purpose. (2) It will give birth to a Greek State and promise it independence. (3) It will have traced out for this state boundaries, weak in a military, poor in a financial point of view. (4) It will have found a Sovereign for the new State.'* The obstinacy with which freedom was refused to Crete appeared to him to be especially unjustifiable. 'As I see nowhere,' he wrote in the same letter, 'that it is English policy to separate Candia from Greece, I am afraid that the hidden interest, which caused this separation to be determined on, will augur no good to the new State. The exclusion of Candia will cripple the Greek State, morally and physically, will make it weak and poor, expose it to constant danger from the Turks, and create from the beginning innumerable difficulties for him who is to be at the head of that Government.'

The subsequent history of Crete and of Greece has amply justified his sorrowful foresight. Austria had not opposed the nomination of Prince Leopold, although she was herself more inclined to give to Greece a constitution in the form of a Federative Republic [somewhat after the manner of Switzerland,] in which case it would have been natural for

* *Wellington Despatches*, VI. 489.

Capodistria to have occupied the position of President.* But Hellas herself and all the other Powers had formally pronounced in favour of monarchy. After the abdication of Prince Leopold, and while Capodistria was still alive, the idea of a Federative Constitution might again have been brought forward. But in October, 1830, Capodistria fell a victim to private revenge, and the Hellenes, torn by internal dissensions, were agreed only on the necessity of obtaining from the Protecting Powers a King, the commencement of whose reign should mark a new era in the history of their country.

On February 13, 1833, Prince Otho of Bavaria, who had been proposed by France, was named King of the Hellenes. His father, King Lewis, insisted upon the annexation of Crete, but was no more successful in obtaining it than had been Prince Leopold. Otho was sent to reign over a country condemned already to waste her strength in the efforts required to obtain an inevitable expansion, and thereby impeded in the course of internal development. 'An Hellas,' as wrote M. Thiersch,† 'an Hellas which did not embrace the Ionian islands, nor Crete, nor Thessaly, nor Epiros, did not deserve the name, and was incapable either of maintaining her own independence or of educating herself for the destiny to which Providence seemed to be calling her.'

When the Great Powers set themselves to

* *Prokesch. Geschichte*, II. 391.

† *De l'état, etc.*, I. 202.

deprive the new State at its very birth of the means either of independence in the present or of preparation for the future, were they merely dissembling a friendship which they really felt? Did they regard their imperfect work merely as the germ from which a new creation was to develop? After the series of historical facts which the preceding pages have recalled it would be hard to answer, Yes. Fortunately, neither the Hellenes themselves nor their true friends have ever ceased to believe in their future. Putting aside more ambitious dreams which the past justifies but the present forbids, they have always looked upon the curtailed frontier which European diplomacy assigned them in 1829, as marking only the limit of a first day's march. It has been a long time before they have been able to move forward another stage. Late events are now beginning to prove that they were right not to despair of their future, and encourage them to persevere until their national wants shall be satisfied. The ambition which Lord Aberdeen condemned by anticipation, is not the insatiable greed of a child which asks for more, the more it has been spoilt; it is the consciousness of what is due to them which inspires a nation who know that life lies before them, and who seek, when all is said, nothing but what history, ethnology, and geography alike teach them to be their inalienable rights.

*THE TERRITORY OF THE GREEK
KINGDOM.*



THE TERRITORY OF THE GREEK KINGDOM.



WHEN King Otho mounted the throne of Greece he was still in his boyhood. He was an upright Prince, animated by excellent intentions, a lover of justice, and thoroughly devoted to his adopted country. If he had been placed in ordinary circumstances, in an organised society, and surrounded by the traditions and elements of stable government, he might have been an ideal King. But he did not possess the qualities necessary to rule a people new-born from a long and bloody war. His capacity was not great enough to meet the difficulties of the task imposed upon him. He did not realize all the hopes which his new subjects had formed of him, and he did not possess the art of making them forget faults, of which he was not always alone guilty. His childlessness denied him the happiness of founding a dynasty on which the Hellenes might have placed their hopes, and so consoled themselves for the disappointments of the present by the expectations of the future. He yielded without resistance to the revolution which dethroned him. If it had pleased him to do so, he might have found

partisans enough to have endeavoured to repossess himself of power. But he gave Hellas a last proof of his love for her by deliberately sparing her the woes of civil war. He left the land of his adoption with words of farewell full of majesty, and good wishes for her happiness which were dictated by a sincere affection. The Hellenes have not forgotten his weaknesses; but they are ever recalling his good qualities with more and more of appreciation. They remember of him, above all, how he loved their country; and his memory is dear to them.

The heart of Otho became Hellen. He identified himself with his subjects, he was soon penetrated with their natural aspirations, and to realize these was his unceasing aim from the hour of his accession to that of his abdication. He felt, like all the rest of the Hellenes, that the formation of his kingdom was not the full emancipation of their race. During the thirty long years of his reign he seized every opportunity which seemed to offer him a chance of repairing the injustice inflicted upon those who had fought and bled for freedom, but to whom the Powers of Europe had refused permission to enjoy it. Unhappily, he did not possess the ability necessary to surmount the double difficulty with which he had to contend; on the one hand, in the weakness of his small and still disorganized State, and, on the other, in the hostility of the Powers, who were again worshipping with redoubled devotion the malign fetish of the Integrity of the Turkish Empire, and were less than ever disposed to allow Hellas to grow to her natural proportions,

The free Hellenes of the new kingdom were not, however, the only Hellenes with whom it was necessary to reckon. Those who live in the dominions of the Sultan, and more especially the inhabitants of the border-provinces and of the islands, have always looked upon the Hellenic kingdom as the centre round which they are destined sooner or later to gather. Whatever may have been the errors committed by her Statesmen, whatever may have been the faults of her policy, domestic or foreign, free Hellas has always been for the enslaved Hellenes, more than ever Piedmont was for the Italians, the stay of their hope for unity.

Otho had hardly attained his majority when risings took place in Epiros and in Crete. They were crushed, one after the other, but without destroying the hope of an happier future.

These hopes were rekindled in 1840, on the outbreak of the long foreseen struggle between the Sultan and his great Vassal in Egypt. Crete then thought that the hour for her deliverance had struck. The population rose like one man. The Cretans made themselves masters of the whole island, with the exception of the fortresses into which the Turks had shut themselves. The ambiguous conduct of an English Consul inspired hopes of the moral support of England. But the Ambassadors at Constantinople hastened to condemn the insurrection, while the English representative repudiated the action of his Consul ; a large

Turkish fleet brought fresh reinforcements ; and the rising was drowned in blood.

The occasion was lost. Only hope remained.

Nothing can give a better idea, not only of the constancy, but of the scope of Hellenic aspirations, than the memorandum which was placed before King Otho by Alexander Maurokordatos in 1848. This memorandum does honour both to the wisdom and to the political foresight of its writer, and it shows moreover that Hellenic Statesmen, without allowing themselves to be led astray by impracticable dreams, had early sketched the outlines of a practical and possible policy. The present writer has already elsewhere taken occasion to point out that even during the War of Independence the reasonable bounds of national aspirations had been well understood. Those aspirations remain the same to-day. Their realization has already begun. It is to be hoped that it will not be long before their accomplishment makes Hellas what she might have been made, and ought to have been made more than half a century ago—a State enclosed by her natural frontiers and able to dedicate herself wholly to the work of her internal development.

It may be permitted to give here some extracts from the memorandum drawn up by Maurokordatos : their importance will excuse their length.

‘The object of the war of 1821,’ he observes, ‘was to free the entire Hellenic race from the Ottoman yoke. This was the watchword of Rhegas and of the Hetairía, this was what Hypsilantes proclaimed in his declarations, and the voice which

was heard amid the sound of our rising, from the Danube to Tenaron, from Souli to Kydonia, from Athos to the Cretan Ida. Our first national assembly proclaimed at Epidaurus that this was our object, and it has been to attain this end that blood has run in every Greek country of Europe and of Asia.

‘ But it has been the case that the fortune of war, the force of circumstances, and the interests of the great European Powers, on the one hand, and our own lack of resources on the other, have narrowed the field of battle, and have brought it to pass that only a small portion of the Hellenic territory and of the Hellenic race have been able to recover their independence.

‘ Nevertheless, narrow as are our frontiers, and small as is our population, our new State is looked upon by the Hellenic populations which are doomed still to remain under the yoke, as the seedling whence is to grow in the future the tree of their freedom. And the Greeks already free, seeing the incompleteness of the work for which they have toiled and sacrificed so much, have never had their eyes diverted from the future, nor ceased to prepare for it in concert with their enslaved fellow-countrymen. Hence was continued the operation of secret societies, which, under divers names and with varying organisations, all worked for the same end, viz., the deliverance of all Hellenes and their reunion with the newly created State. . . .

‘ The undertaking was too vast ; but, until 1840, the chances of success were not altogether visionary

After the death of Sultan Mahmoud, after the defeat of the Turkish troops at Nezib, and the defection of the Ottoman fleet, we might perhaps have succeeded if we had possessed the necessary preparations, and if Europe had not come to the rescue of the Ottoman dynasty.

‘ Since then, things have changed. Turkey has regained strength ; her internal condition is improved ; and her foreign relations are such that in case of necessity she might count upon the help of some of the European Powers. At the same time, when we speak of Turkey, we, of course, know too much to share the delusions of the Westerns, who, for the most part, neither know her nor (it would appear) wish to know her. We know that the apparent improvement in her internal condition will not be lasting : that the reforms which have been introduced with so much trouble have not taken root and never can possibly take root, and that the least unforeseen event might destroy the whole thing at any moment. . . .

‘ Nor must we forget that, although all the Powers collectively have guaranteed the integrity of the Turkish Empire, they do not all agree as to the introduction of the measures by which Turkey is to consolidate her internal improvements and develop her resources. Russia has never been friendly to the cause of Turkish internal reform, and the reactionary opponents of such measures have always enjoyed her support. What can Russia mean ? On that point, every one may form their own conclusion. The indubitable fact is, that

Russia is the only one of the Powers which really knows Turkey thoroughly, and that she has means of action there which no other Power possesses. . . .

‘What, then, are the countries which Hellas can and ought to take to herself? It is plain that in order to effect, if only partially, the reunion of all the Hellenic race in one State, the State in question must embrace those countries in which the Hellenic race preponderates. These countries are unquestionably Thessaly, Macedonia, Epiros, and Crete. Can Hellas annex them? Hellas alone has neither the strength nor the resources necessary for making conquests, nor, as she now is, could she lend any effectual assistance to a rising of the inhabitants of these countries, unless, indeed, external circumstances were exceptionally favourable. . . .

‘But, although it is not possible to settle the exact hour for action, or to foresee the precise circumstances which will create the opportunity, it is necessary to be ready in view of a favourable moment.

‘If the populations of Epiros, Thessaly, Macedonia, and Crete had been better prepared in 1840, that occasion would not have been lost.

‘The circumstances which we are able at present to picture to ourselves are either a war of Russia against the Porte or a preponderance of the Slav races backed by Russian support. . . . At this moment a Russo-Turkish war does not seem as likely as it did some months ago. Russia has got her hands full just now, and will take care to ensure

Turkey's keeping quiet.* But if she comes off victorious from her war against Hungary, what will be her line towards Turkey afterwards? The Servians, who are vassals of the Sultan, are taking an active part in the present struggle, and Russia not only has not prevented them, but has furnished them with supplies and ammunition. . . . If the Hungarians are defeated, the Servians will come home flushed with victory, and convinced that their brethren in Austria will be ready to come and help them to throw off the Ottoman suzerainty, just as they have helped the brethren in question in their struggle against the Hungarians. What would Russia do then? Would she leave the Servians to their fate? Or would she support them in a covert manner? She would probably do the latter. Once the Servians had risen, it would be impossible to keep Bosnia and Bulgaria quiet. It is known that for some time past Slavonic societies have been secretly working among the populations of these countries. The existence of these societies is perfectly well known to the Russian Government. Their headquarters are at Odessa. There they print pamphlets in support of the Slavonic propaganda, in editions of thousands at a time, and send them for gratuitous distribution in Servia, Bulgaria, and even some parts of Macedonia. Why does Russia wink at it? Certainly not for love of Turkey.'

It is curious to remark in this memorandum the

* Maurokordatos was writing at the moment of the Russian intervention in Hungary.

acumen with which the Greek Statesman perceived the movements which were then in preparation in the Slavonic world, and foresaw events which were not accomplished till thirty years later. It was in consequence of this foresight that he set himself to indicate what Greece ought, as far as her means permitted her, to do, in order to be ready for whatever might occur. He lays stress principally upon internal improvements. It behoves that Hellas should gain the growing confidence of the civilized world by her moral and material progress, so as to merit and to win the friendship of some of the great Powers and the confidence of the populations which desire to be reunited with her. He concludes with these words:—

‘If we had not gained the sympathy of Christendom, we should not have succeeded in gaining even such an independence as we have. . . . There is no use deceiving ourselves. Sympathy with us and dislike to the Turks are neither of them so strong now as they used to be; more was hoped of us than we have been able to accomplish. The Turks are supposed to be making giant strides in the path of progress. There is no use discussing here the extent of this latter delusion. What we have got to do is to enlighten public opinion, and make it turn again in our favour, . . . without forgetting that the prevailing motive which dictates the friendship or goodwill of any State, either absolute or constitutional, is self-interest.’*

* Dragoumes, *Ιστορικοί ἀναμνήσεις*, 2nd ed., Athens, 1879, II. 165 *et seq.*

The prescience of Maurokordatos as to what Russia would do as soon as she had emerged victorious from the Hungarian affair, was justified by the events which preceded the Crimean War.

The hopes of the Hellenes both within and without the new kingdom were reawakened by the prospects which the new Russo-Turkish War seemed to open. Had they had, to lead them, a Statesman like Cavour, they might perhaps have seen that, like Piedmont, they had more to gain by joining the Allies of Turkey than by listening to the national feeling which prompted them to take part with the hereditary enemy of their old oppressors. But since 1850 the persistent ill-will of the English Government, which had especially shown itself in the Pacifico affair, had convinced the Hellenes that, at any rate for the time being, they had nothing to hope from England. Their confidence in the help of France had been shaken since the death of Coletti, and the change which had come over French policy after the fall of Louis-Philippe. Besides this, these two Powers were making war in order to sustain and preserve the integrity of the Turkish Empire, whereas Russia came forward as the Champion of their oppressed co-religionists.

When the emissaries of Russia arrived in the Hellenic provinces of Turkey, they met with no difficulty in bringing about a rising. Epiros and Thessaly broke into insurrection at the beginning of 1854. Greek volunteers went to the Crimea to range themselves under that banner which displayed the Cross against the Crescent. At home,

the prospect of another struggle to complete the work of independence was received with enthusiasm. Armed bands crossed the frontier to join their insurgent fellow-countrymen. The people, the army, and the Court all gave themselves up to the most brilliant dreams.* They did not know what the Emperor Nicolas had said about the Hellenes to the English ambassador before embarking in the war, a war which was, it must be confessed, the only one from which Russia has ever been obliged to retire without some immediate advantage, but the consequences of which have been more fatal to Turkey than had been her preceding defeats.

Hellas was soon undeceived. The allies could not tolerate a diversion in favour of Russia. France occupied the Piræus from May 26, 1854, till February 27, 1857; the Greeks found themselves reduced to absolute powerlessness; and the insurrection in the border provinces was soon crushed by the arms of Turkey. This was all that resulted to Hellas from the part she took in the Crimean war, and she was, naturally, not mentioned in the terms of peace dictated by the conquerors of Sebastopol.

The Italian Revolution in 1859-60 gave the Greeks a fresh impulse. The Italians obtained their independence, and were soon to obtain their unity, through the generous help of a friendly neighbour. Why should not the Hellenes hope for something of the same kind? Why should not

* Herzberg, IV. 666, 694, *et seq.*

Italy do for Hellas what France had done for Italy? Italy did not yet possess statesmen penetrated by the principle that their country, having attained the position of a Great Power, is bound to treat with the sternest reprobation any weak nation which dares to think of union and strength. The Hellenic cause had warm friends in Italy. There were long negotiations with Garibaldi. What was thought of was a rising in Epiros and Thessaly, to which the hero, at the head of his volunteers, should give the support of his name and presence. The Italian Government offered no obstacle to these projects. Perhaps they thought that they might thus be enabled to create a useful diversion in case of a new war against Austria; perhaps also they welcomed the prospect of finding a field for Garibaldi's energies outside their own dominions.

While this new insurrection was being prepared, and while the inhabitants of the Heptanessos, inflamed by the example of Italy, were proclaiming more loudly than ever their right to re-union with their country, there began to break out that series of mutinies, which, although at first suppressed, ultimated some months later in the dethronement of King Otho. There were then, and there still are, those who attribute his fall to the action of English agents; it certainly coincided in point of time with his acceptance of new schemes against the integrity of the Turkish Empire. Such an explanation must not be too easily believed. At the same time, it would be impossible to say that England liked Otho, or to deny that she had

already openly threatened him with the loss of his crown. For instance, we read in the *Memoirs of an Ex-Minister* (the Earl of Malmesbury), in 1854: 'It appears that the King of Greece favours the insurrection against the Turks; and Lord Clarendon told Baron Cetto (the Bavarian minister in London) the other day that if the King did not behave better we should dethrone him,'*—a threat which the French occupation of the Piræus rendered it unnecessary to execute at the moment.

In spite of all his wishes and efforts, Otho left the Kingdom of Hellas confined within the same narrow limits which it had occupied when he came to the throne. King George began his reign with a piece of better fortune. He brought to Greece on his arrival the news of the annexation of the Heptanessos. It was a generous act upon the part of England, and it was all the more appreciated because it was unexpected. It may indeed be said that Mr. Gladstone had already prepared the public mind for such a step, and that since the introduction of steam into naval warfare, Malta supplied England with as much as she wanted for the purpose of dominating the Mediterranean. It is said also that the English Government, in its jealousy of Russian influence, of which it saw a symptom in the candidature of the Duke of Leuchtenberg as successor to Otho, had made a sort of bargain with the Hellenes, to give them the Heptanessos if they would elect a son of the Queen.

* *Memoirs*, I. 430, 2nd edit.

It is none the less true that States always find it hard to give up territory; they must be very strong indeed before they can afford such extravagance. But the British Government was pleased at having got rid of King Otho, and the English people had been flattered by the unanimous election of Prince Alfred. By resigning the protectorate of the Heptanessos, England gratified the wishes of the islanders, gave to the whole Hellenic race a striking mark of friendship, and enabled the young Danish Prince who had become King of the Hellenes under her auspices to meet his subjects bringing in his hands a precious earnest of the future.

At the same time, all the Statesmen of England were not agreed as to the cession. Lord Derby wrote to Lord Malmesbury on December 22, 1862:—‘I think the measure at any time one of very doubtful policy, but the present moment appears to me singularly ill chosen . . . It strikes me as the height of folly to make a gratuitous offer of cession, and to throw the islands at the head of a nation in the very throes of revolution, the form of whose Government is yet undecided—much more so, the person of the Sovereign, if they are to have a Sovereign—whose finances are bankrupt, whose naval power is insignificant, and the first of whose political aspirations is accession of territory at the expense of a war with its most powerful neighbour!’

Happily, subsequent events have proved the baselessness of the objections raised in this

extremely blunt language. The Ionians have not had to regret their reunion with the rest of Hellas, and Hellas may console herself for the severity of Lord Derby's judgment by considering that it was based upon a double error. He remarked that the protection of the Ionian Islands had been committed to England as a Maritime Power able to combat the piracy with which these seas were infested. As a matter of fact, the question of piracy had nothing to do with the establishment of the English protectorate over the Republic of the Heptanessos in 1815, and no such thing as piracy has been heard of in that part of the world since the Greek Kingdom was established.

But statesmen do not seem always to think it necessary to know much about the matters upon which they speak and—what is worse—with which they have to deal. For instance, on December 9, 1829, when the French Government was trying to save Samos from falling back under the direct and absolute power of the Sultan, even if it were not allowed reunion with the rest of Greece, the Duke of Wellington wrote to Lord Aberdeen, his Minister for Foreign Affairs: 'I omitted to mention to you that Samos is an island inhabited by Roman Catholics whom the French affect to protect; and they have been more than once suspected of desiring the possession and Government of the island.'* It is hardly necessary to remark that there are no Catholics in Samos.

* *Wellington Dispatches*, VI. 315.

It would be possible to multiply like examples of official ignorance upon the matters with which diplomacy has to deal, especially as regards the East. The state of mind in which M. de Villèle said with regard to Hellas, 'What can be the particular interest which attaches to the locality?''* was not peculiar to himself. Such things must be cited, not for the mere pleasure of showing that those who talk loudly do not always talk sense, but seriously to indicate that many political errors and wrongs are caused by mere ignorance. The force of arms and the skill of diplomatists are sometimes credited with settling questions which they merely complicate and protract, because those who hold the strings do not know with what they are dealing. Those who are ablest and luckiest in their policy are also those who are best informed.

The annexation of the Heptanessos was a great benefit to Hellas. It was not only a piece of good fortune for the present but an earnest of the future. If mighty England, recognizing the right of the Hellenes to be free and to form themselves into a State, voluntarily resigned the possession of these seven Greek isles, how much more might be hoped for other Hellenic lands, whose case was so much more crying because, unlike the Heptanessos, they did not enjoy an administration whose merits could make their inhabitants bear, if they could not forget, the fact of foreign domination! There still remained the delusion of the Integrity of the

* *Souvenirs of the Duc de Broglie*, II, 413, and again III. 172,

Turkish Empire ; but the Christians of the East really cannot believe in the sincerity of all the Powers who proclaim and sustain this extraordinary figment, any more than they are able to fall a prey to the hallucination itself. The re-union of the Heptanessos with the rest of Hellas was therefore regarded as marking the beginning of another and better era—a sanction to the hopes of other reunions in the future.

The first of the Hellenes who endeavoured to gain for themselves the same good fortune which had fallen upon the Ionians were again the Cretans. They defied Turkey for three years, 1866-7-8. With the exception of certain fortresses, the whole island was free. Acts of heroism and sacrifice such as those which had rendered glorious the first War of Independence, again challenged the attention of the world. Volunteers from the West recalled the Philhellenic enthusiasm of old days. The Hellenes of the mainland did not leave their brethren alone in the hour of danger ; they hastened to fight at their side, while they opened in their own homes a place of refuge for the women and children of the island. Nearly sixty thousand fugitives found protection there.

For a while there was room for believing that the deliverance of Crete was at last accomplished. Russia and France were favourably disposed. Unhappily the good-will of these two Powers could not overcome the opposition of England, strongly supported by Austria. Diplomacy fought for the enslavement of the Cretans with as much persist-

ence and more success than those with which it had opposed the deliverance of Greece. Freedom has not yet come for Crete. The islanders obtained by their struggle nothing but a doubtful amelioration of their condition by means of a sort of charter which was extracted from the unwillingness of the Porte in 1868, under the name of the 'Organic Regulation.' This edict has never been honestly put in force.* However, even if it had been carried out, it would not have been a settlement of the Cretan question. The Cretans have never concealed what they want, or ceased to proclaim their intention of demanding it until they obtain it. At the time of the Congress of Berlin they thought once more that they would succeed. They got nothing but another promise from the Porte 'to enforce scrupulously the Organic Regulation of 1868, with such modifications as might be judged equitable.' Who were to judge them to be so (as has been well remarked by M. d'Avril) was not stated. The Porte? The inhabitants? The Powers? There is quite matter enough here for a new Conference. But sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof.†

* *Le traité de Berlin, annoté et commenté*, by Benoit (Brunswick, Paris, 1878) cap. vi. See also *Négociations relatives au traité de Berlin*, by Adolfe d'Avril (Paris, 1886) p. 367, *et seq.*

† Recent events in Crete have shown how right my remarks were. The island is once more in a state of revolution, and its Christian inhabitants have once more proclaimed their wish for annexation to the mother-country. (Note by the Author).

The history of the Greek Question at the Congress of Berlin and the conferences which followed it, is not to be treated in detail here. The time is not come for knowing all that took place. It is true that the documents which have been already published are numerous, but the knowledge which can be drawn from them has already been laid before the public in different forms. The recent work of M. d' Avril upon the *Négociations relatives au traité de Berlin* is lucid and impartial. But in spite of all the Blue Books, Yellow Books, White Books, and Green Books, laid before the different Parliaments of Europe, we cannot flatter ourselves that we yet know the motives which inspired the action or inaction of each of the Governments which, to one extent or another, took part in the matter. We do not know why England, after having taken up the championship of Hellenic interests as opposed to the protection afforded by Russia to those of the Slavonic races, left France to take the initiative in favour of Hellas. We do not know why France, after having gained the point, thought well to give it up and to take part in substituting another line of frontier for that which had been already sanctioned by the collective vote of Europe. We do not know why Hellas herself remained so long with her sword undrawn during the Russo-Turkish War—what promises or what threats held her back from moving when the armies of Russia, checked before Plevna, would have welcomed a diversion in the West, and when the Hellenic people both within and without the King-

dom were chafing at the do-nothing attitude of the Government of Athens.

Everyone in Greece felt that the moment was come. The measures taken by hordes of Bashi-Bazooks were hardly sufficient to repress the insurrection which was ready in all quarters, and which at length broke out in the mountains of Thessaly. The young manhood of the kingdom answered with enthusiasm to the call for the Reserves, which was made by the Government for the purpose of restraining rather than of using the warlike spirit of the nation. The leaders of all political parties had to bend before the will of the people, and to unite in a Coalition Ministry which met with the fate usual to such conglomerations, one mind neutralizing another, with the general result of impotence, for want of any common head.

It was only at the last moment, when the war was on the point of being closed by the treaty which victorious Russia compelled Turkey to grant at San Stefano, that the Greek Government, under the Presidency of Koumoundouros, yielded tardily to the pressure of the nation, and allowed the army to cross the frontier. It was too late for the diversion to be of any use to Russia, and it could look for no support from any other Government in Europe. This fact was realized at Athens, but men felt, at the same time, that it was needful to remind the world at any price that there is a Greek Question connected with the Eastern Question. The step was taken, but it was taken with a hesi-

tation which betrayed itself in act as well as in word.

In announcing to the Powers their adoption of this course, 'the Government of the King was careful to remind them of all which it had done in order to prevent the insurrection of the border provinces before the inhabitants had taken arms; it witnessed their rising with all the more concern because it did not blind itself to the consequences. When the other nations of Turkey were recovering their independence and their self-government, the Hellenes could not but consider their own future. The Hellenic Government could not leave the inhabitants of the insurgent provinces exposed to all the horrors of a bloody repression by the undisciplined troops employed by Turkey for that purpose. It had therefore resolved upon a provisional occupation of the provinces in question. Hellas does not wish to make war upon Turkey. She wishes to guarantee her own security, and to act in such a way that the condition of the Christian populations which look to her may receive some definitive amelioration.'*

In spite of all these explanations, Diplomacy saw the danger of the fresh conflagration which the armed intervention of Greece was capable of kindling. The utmost possible amount of pressure was therefore brought to bear upon the Government of Athens in order to induce it to retrace the step, and in the result an order was obtained to

* *Despatch of the k. Delgiannes, Jan. 20, 1878.*

the Greek Commander-in-chief to recross the frontier, upon the solemn assurance of the great Powers 'that the national aspirations and interests of the Greek populations should be the subject of the deliberations of the approaching Congress.'* Hellas had no reason to regret a four days' campaign which obtained her this assurance, but she has had to regret that she did not take the more timely and more decisive action which would have enabled her to present herself at the Congress of Berlin with all the weight which the righteousness of her cause could have conferred upon her. At a later date Koumoundouros wrote with truth— 'At the moment when the Russo-Turkish War broke out, Hellas possessed an army of between thirty-five and forty thousand men. I suppose that no one will deny that if she had interfered in the struggle, the result would have been a general rising in Turkey and the radical and definitive solution of the Question which is now occupying Europe. The state of Epiros, Thessaly and Crete, urged us to interfere. Hellas, without shutting her eyes to the complications which the general collapse of Turkey might produce both in the East and in the West, consented to yield to the wishes of Europe. She elected rather to contribute her part to realize the wishes of the Powers for an immediate pacification, she yielded to their advice, and checked the action which had already begun for the realization of what the Hellenes have

* *Despatch of Jan. 27, 1878.*

desired for so many centuries. This she did after having received from Europe a promise that the rights of the Hellenic race should be taken into consideration when the fitting time came, and that the insurrection of the border provinces to which her influence had put an end, should be reckoned as still existing when the hour arrived for the definitive settlement of the Eastern Question. From these facts and these promises issued the thirteenth Protocol of the conferences of the Congress of Berlin. The object of that Protocol was to put an end to the insurrection of the Greek Provinces, and to assure their pacification upon a solid basis.*

The meaning which Hellas attached to this pacification was plainly stated to the Congress by her representatives. 'The true and only wish of the Hellenic Government,' said the k. Delgiannes, 'has always been the same as that of the entire race of which free Hellas is only a fraction. This is the same wish which animated the Hellenic people in 1821, when they undertook the long War of Independence. The Hellenic Government is under no delusion as to the many difficulties with which the realization of that wish is met. Therefore it feels bound to be contented for the present with the annexation of Crete and of the border provinces, as all which is at this moment practicable.'

* *Despatch of the k. Koumoundouros to the k. Brailas, Greek Minister at Paris, Dec. 27, 1880.*

On July 5, 1878, the Congress accepted the resolution proposed by the French plenipotentiary, 'inviting the Porte to come to an understanding with Greece for a rectification of the frontiers in Thessaly and Epiros, a rectification which may follow the valley of the Peneus upon the Eastern side, and that of the Thyamis (or Kalamas) upon the Western.' In other words, they assign to Hellas the whole of Thessaly and a large part of Epiros. Notwithstanding the abandonment of the island of Crete, this was some satisfaction for the wrongs which she had suffered at the delimitation of the Kingdom. Had she received this accession of territory, Greece would have been able frankly to accept along with the benefit the obligations which it entailed, and to dedicate herself to the work of internal development. Of course she would not have laid aside the hope of a complete enfranchisement of all her territory, as had been designed by Capodistria and Maurokordatos; but she would have awaited her hour with patience, and her interests would even have lain in the direction of such a policy as that indicated by the latter of these two statesmen when he spoke of the possibility of a Turko-Hellenic alliance.

But the scheme suggested by the Congress and sanctioned by the Conference of Berlin on July 1, 1880, was not carried out. When Turkey found that she was not confronted by an Europe determined to be obeyed, she refused to submit. And then the Powers, whose main anxiety was peace at any price, instead of insisting upon her com-

pliance, put upon Hellas all the pressure which they were able to exercise, to induce her to submit the question of the frontiers to a fresh arbitration. The Hellenic Government insisted upon the right which had been given to them by the collective and solemn decision of Europe. On December $\frac{1}{2}$ 7, 1880, the k. Brailas wrote to M. Barthélemy Saint-Hilaire : ' The Protocol of Berlin has only been the fulfilment of a solemn promise, the termination of a long-standing injustice, and a guarantee for the peace both of Europe and of the East. Whatever distinction may be drawn between a Protocol and a Treaty, the Protocol of Berlin can never be looked upon as a mere expression of wish, an abstract opinion, or a diplomatic hypothesis. Lord Beaconsfield and Lord Salisbury, who were certainly not those of the plenipotentiaries most friendly to Greece, have always treated this document as the decision of Europe. . . . Turkey has admitted the principle of the rectification, since she has entered into negotiations with us twice over and proposed a line ; and she has also recognised the authority of the conference, since she has submitted her proposals to it. . . . The frontier proposed by Turkey is derisory, and presents more difficulties than the existing one. . . . The line agreed on is a middle one between that proposed by the Turks and that which we claim. To come any further south of the Kalamas and the Peneus is impossible. This is not a mere question of more or less which Europe has taken upon herself to settle. The object of the Protocol was to set a

limit to what were admitted to be just claims upon the part of Greece, and necessary concessions upon that of Turkey.'

No arguments or protestations of the Hellenic Government availed to save Europe from submitting to the obstinacy of Turkey, and repudiating the resolution which had been taken at Berlin. Hellas had to yield, and on July 2, 1881, three years after the signing of the famous Protocol of Berlin, she signed the convention by which Turkey ceded to her the flat part of Thessaly and a small scrap of Epiros. She did not consent to take this step without protesting that the faults of the new frontier would soon give rise to difficulties in the present and dangers in the future, and that Greece could not help asking herself the question whether her present consent placed the question on any better footing, or would help to bring it to a full, speedy, and peaceful solution. Europe, in the words of the k. Koumoundouros, had 'allowed her own work to be undone for the sake of humouring Turkey; she condemned herself for the sake of considering reasons which she had already fully weighed and decided to be worthless. . . . Epiros and Thessaly,' he continued, 'have the right to be free, a right which Europe has admitted and Hellas accepted; it will seem incredible to them that the European Governments should have played with their sufferings, or should have recanted their own doctrines for no object but to please Turkey. They are strong in their rights, and they will take every opportunity to claim them.'

Recent events have shown the wisdom of the protests of the Hellenic Government. Must they not have availed also to convince the Turks that they would have done better to accept the formal decision of Europe given at Berlin? I cannot affirm it. Yet it seems as if it would have been an advantage to Turkey to have had as her neighbour a contented Greece. Community of interests might then have led her to believe the conciliatory language which would have come to her thence. If Hellas had entered into possession up to the line of the Peneus and the Kalamas, Hellas would have been bound to Europe, as well as to Turkey, not to seek a further extension as long as the present state of things endures in the East. She would have preferred Turkey to any other neighbour. Turkey, on her side, might have found that friendship with Hellas was the best guarantee she could have for the prolongation of her Empire in this part of Europe. This would have been on her part an act of wise and foreseeing policy, as far as it is possible to talk of political foresight within a sphere where the impossibility of any enduring construction limits the field of vision to a very near future. Thus, to give up the province of Ioannina would have been a gain for Turkey. But, as has been already remarked, States always find it hard to give up territory; they must be very strong indeed before they can afford such extravagance. Turkey has not been able to give such a sign of combined strength and wisdom.

As for Hellas, she has to wait again. She can

console herself by remembering the remark made in irony by Lord Beaconsfield that *she can afford to wait, because she has a future before her*. A similar piece of advice has also lately reached her from a quarter whence she did not expect it. The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs has made practically the same remark. Hellas has only to act thus. She will wait. The only drawback is that these long intervals of waiting prevent her being able to advance as quickly as she otherwise could in the work of her internal development. Her narrow artificial limits condemn her to be always looking beyond her frontiers, and the present Hellenic State has been passing from one crisis into another for the last fifty years. To speak only of the last twenty, the shock of the Cretan insurrection of 1867-8-9 was followed by a period of exhaustion which was hardly passed before the disturbances in the Herzegovina in 1875 began the series of changes which have so modified the conditions of the Balkan peninsula. Hellas had hardly recovered from the struggles and the sacrifices which it cost her to obtain a fraction of the territory which had been allotted to her by the Congress of Berlin, when the reunion of Eastern Roumelia with Bulgaria and the results of this violation of the treaty of Berlin involved her in new difficulties, the consequences of which it will not be easy for her to forget, and the removal of which it does not depend upon her alone to prevent. How can she regard tranquillity as assured outside her borders when that Eastern Europe of which she forms a part and in which she

has rights, which it is her duty both to exercise and to claim, still quivers in the uncertainty of what the morrow may bring forth ?

Yet no one can any longer refuse to Hellas the right to assimilate to herself her separated provinces on the ground that her internal progress does not justify her claim. In spite of all the obstacles with which she has had to contend, she has done enough, especially of late years, to deprive such a reproach of any pretence to foundation. It is true that it is difficult to do away with fancies which have become petrified into prejudices. But all those who have been to Greece of late years bear testimony to the change which has come over her under the light and warmth of freedom. Cultivation is extending, produce is increasing, commerce is developing, great public works are multiplying her resources. Seven or eight years ago she had only seven miles of railway ; now about eight hundred are open to the public, and as many more are in construction, besides the line to the frontier which has lately been conceded to an English contractor ; and her high roads are still being formed in every direction. The lands which have been reunited to her have had no reason to complain of the change in their lot. Even the Ionian islands find themselves better as part of the mother country, although the Greek administration can make no pretension to rival either the lights or the means of that of England. The plain of Thessaly is already transfigured. It is quite true that this district felt for a moment the emigration of the Mohammedan population, who, in

spite of all the inducements that could be offered them to remain, could not bear to accept the position of equals with those whom they had been used to treat as their slaves. But it will not be long before their places are well filled, and meanwhile civilization hails the construction of railways, the multiplication of the means of communication by sea, and the introduction of public instruction, of the security due to such a Government as had been unknown before, and the regular administration of justice. No doubt Hellas has still much to do before she realizes her ideal in internal development, but what she has done already is quite enough to justify not only her recognition as an independent State in Europe, and the accessions of territory which she has since obtained, but also her righteous hope to see her territorial work accomplished by the inclusion of the provinces whose inhabitants are Hellenes, and are fain to cast in their lot with their fellow countrymen.

THE GREEK QUESTION.

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THE Greek Question is anything but new. It may be said to have in reality begun as soon as the Turks appeared in Asia Minor as a danger to the Christian world. It took a new shape five centuries ago, when they first set foot in Europe. Since then it has passed through different phases and assumed different forms. Christian Constantinople did not fall in one day. The Byzantine Empire, enfeebled as it was, sustained the struggle for nearly two hundred years. The last sickness of that Empire was as long, and its death-agony as protracted, as are now those of the Ottoman State which took its place. At last, Constantinople fell, and the Turks established themselves definitively in Europe.

From that moment, the Eastern Question became a Question for the nations of the West. Their own existence was at stake. The Turks made no secret of their intentions with regard to Italy. Hungary was soon a Turkish province. Vienna was more than once in imminent peril. The whole of Europe was in danger of an Ottoman conquest. That danger had to be met somehow. Such was the first phase of the Eastern Question in Europe. It

lasted about two hundred years. Then the Battle of Lepanto destroyed the naval supremacy of Turkey, and the victory of John Sobieski checked forever the military extension of her power by land. From that time, the fears of Western Europe were laid to rest, and consequently the Eastern Question seemed to interest her no more. As soon as the Sultan ceased to be a terror, Western Europe had no acute objection to allowing him to remain at Constantinople, and took comparative little heed of what became of the Eastern Christians who were the victims of his oppression.

But while the Western nations were becoming indifferent to the struggle against Turkey, a new enemy arose for them in the North. This enemy has proved to be all the more dangerous because she is not hampered by any of those rivalries which weaken the collective action of Western Europe. Russia has no interests to serve except her own, and no counsels but her own to follow. She has had one especial point of strength in the fact that by having the same religious belief she inspired with confidence the Christian nations of the East. Moreover, she has had the immense advantage of making her appearance only since Turkey has begun to decline. But this last circumstance has in itself been enough to make her a cause of alarm to Europe. Nobody desired to see the worn-out Turk replaced at Constantinople by a nation full of youth and of ambition. And so the Eastern Question again became a subject of interest in the West.

But it was not long before another element appeared to change the aspect of the Eastern Question. The races brought into subjection under Turkey began to move for the recovery of their independence.

Russia has done a great deal to awaken the national aspirations of these races. It is true that it is not to her alone that most of them owe their deliverance. Some of them have gained it by their own struggles and with the help, however tardy, of other Powers. But it is none the less true that Russia has a just claim to much of their gratitude. She it was that undertook their protection in the hour of their distress. At first she saw in them only fellow-believers in her own religion, groaning in slavery under Mohammedans. After a time the religious feeling became subordinate to the sympathy of race, and she stood forth as the one champion of her Slavonic kinsmen. If, however, it may be permitted to judge by present events, it would hardly seem that, since these nations have become States, the banner of Slavism is likely to be of a more permanent use to Russia than that of the Orthodox Faith. Now, does this last phenomenon arise merely from the proverbial ingratitude of nations? Or does it find its explanation in a kind of suspicion—whether ill or well founded—that this extremely mighty Protectress may perhaps not be quite disinterested?

However that may be, the awakening of the Christian races subject to Turkey has brought the Eastern Question into another phase. The start-

ing-point of this phase was the Greek War of Independence. After ten years of bloody struggles and of diplomatic negotiations, the Greek War resulted, in 1832, in the formation of the present Greek Kingdom—small, mutilated, and deprived—as though on purpose—of the very means of subsistence. However, this Kingdom was the first independent State cut out of the agglomeration of Ottoman conquests.

Since that time, other Eastern peoples have been emancipated one after another. The Danubian Principalities have been transformed into the Kingdom of Roumania. Servia also became a Kingdom, and has been altogether set free from Turkish suzerainty. Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia have been made tributary Principalities. Greece and Montenegro have obtained accessions of territory. The Eastern Question seemed at last to be drawing close to a solution, by the gradual development of a Confederation of Christian States, a solution which would beyond all doubt have been speedily effected, if only all these nations had united themselves for the one common object, and arrived by mutual concession at a compromise dictated alike by justice and by their own interests. But unhappily that solution has not been reached. The nations concerned are divided not only by racial rivalries, but also by jealousies and ambition which have been skilfully aggravated from outside. Instead of a mutual understanding between Servia and Bulgaria, we have seen these States bathed in the blood of a fratricidal war, leaving the hands of

Turkey free to deal with Greece, who, on her side, was straining every nerve to prepare for the unequal struggle. Such was the spectacle which in 1885 called for the wonder and sorrow of Europe.

Before it is possible to appreciate the position of Greece, it is necessary to consider what part she has already played in the successive phases of the Eastern Question.

From the time of the fall of Constantinople until the present day, through all the agonies of a slavery which lasted for four hundred years, and amid all the trials of better days, the Greeks have never lost their hope for their future. This national hopefulness is not the mere vanity which remembrance of the past inspires in a fallen race. We have hoped and we do hope, because—even during the first two centuries of our bondage, when the hand of the Turks was still full of strength and lay so heavy upon us—we have always known what were and are those things which give us our true life and strength. The Byzantine Empire and the Greek people are two different things. The Byzantine Empire perished when Constantinople fell. When Constantinople fell, another chapter was opened in the history of the Greek people.

It is wrong to condemn and revile the Byzantine Empire. That Empire had a great mission to fulfill; and it fulfilled it. It preserved the traditions of antient civilization in the midst of Asiatic barbarism, on the one hand, and the European barbarism of the Middle Ages, on the other. It did not perish until Western Europe was ripe and

ready to receive from its dying hands the precious inheritance of which it had been the guardian. It existed long, and its history is not inglorious. The marks of that history are to be seen to-day in the history and institutions of all the existing civilized world,* and especially in that of all the countries which the power of the Byzantine Empire occupied. But the Byzantine Empire, however much it included and however much it represented Mediæval Greece, had nothing Greek about it except its civilization and the language which it spoke. The idea of the mother-country of the Hellenes was not to be found there. The Western nations of Europe called it the Greek Empire, but it did not acknowledge the title. It was and it always remained, the Roman Empire. The Emperors and their subjects alike gloried in the name. The fact that it was the Empire of Rome was never forgotten or allowed to fall into the background, and it was this fact which in the end proved its destruction. The last Emperors might have raised it from its death-bed to a new life if only they had cared to change the Roman State into a National State, and to set the flag of Greece higher than the antique monogram of the Labarum or the religious banner of the Cross. A sort of idea of the kind indeed floated across their minds, but they lacked either the nerve or the will to carry it into effect.

Two works have been published which seem to

* The influence of the Code of Justinian upon Jurisprudence may be cited as one example.

me in themselves sufficient to show what resources a really National Government could have developed from under the worm-eaten case in which the Greek nationality had then been enclosed. The first is a book in French ; it is the *Bibliographie des ouvrages publiés en grec par des Grecs au XV^{me} et au XVI^{me} siècles*, by M. Emile Legrand. The two large volumes which constitute it do the utmost credit to their learned author, but they do no less honour to the memory of those Greeks who, as it were on the very morning after the crash, set themselves to work in hope for the time of restoration. The admirable biographical notices which precede this Bibliography, and the letters hitherto unpublished which form its Appendix, show us these men of learning occupied unceasingly with the destiny of their race. Those who lived in their own country kept the Nationalist sentiment alive if by nothing more than by their lamentations over the condition of things by which they were surrounded. If they lived in exile, they lived as the Apostles of Hellenism. They went from country to country seeking help, or at least sympathy, for their own. Such as stood in high places, like Bessarion or Laskaris, exhausted their influence with Popes, Princes, and Kings in the endeavour to stir up a new Crusade. They and their writings are in themselves proof enough that Greece was not dead.

Intellectual activity alone is not a sufficient proof that a people still live ; it is more of a sign or symptom of such a life. A pen alone is a poor

weapon against an armed robber. The Greeks had also military capacities of which the Empire of Constantinople had not had the sense to avail itself. The proofs of this military capacity have been collected and published by the k. Sathas in the second of the two recent works to which I have alluded. It is his history of the *Ἑλληνες Στρατιῶται 'εν τῇ Δύσει, καὶ ἀναγέννησις τῆς Ἑλληνικῆς τακτικῆς.*

We see that the Ottoman conquest was hardly over before these companies of Greek soldiers, first recruited by the Republic of Venice, placed their paid services at the disposal of the Princes of Europe, and appeared amid the very flower of their armies. They played an important part in the wars of Charles VIII., and, again, in those of Francis I., in Italy. We find them mustered under the French flag in opposition to Henry VIII. of England, and in the long struggles of Charles V. and his successors against the Dutch.

But it would be a mistake to imagine that the then surviving military spirit of Greece found no development except among these mercenaries. The *Kleptai* and the *Armatoloi* are a matter of no recent history. In fact, the mountains of Greece have never been without men who offered an armed protest against the Turkish domination. Of what stuff as soldiers we were, and were known to be made, we may call Turkey herself as a witness, in the fact of the hellish 'Blood-tax,' the compulsory conscription of our little children, by which she was fain to recruit the ranks of her Janissaries. Our military capacity was a power which the Turks

saw, and of which they availed themselves. The Byzantine Empire had not had as much sense. It is true that that Empire fought the ground, inch by inch, to the last ; but it was mostly to allies and mercenaries that she had recourse for contingents. The heroic Constantine XIII., the last Emperor, fought right gallantly and fell right gloriously, but the army at whose head he died was not a National army of Hellenes.

The ruin had not long been complete before there were seen some symptoms of an attempt to rise again. Wherever it was possible for such a sign of life to appear, there were to be found agitations and plots. The Hellenes felt that they had not strength enough by themselves to enter upon such a conflict without some help from outside, and for such help they resorted to the Christians of Western Europe ; they entreated them to come to their aid, they promised them to rise at the first signal of a deliverance, and, as a matter of fact, the Greeks seized upon continual occasions to break out into insurrections, which, being only suppressed almost as soon as they took place, had little more result at the moment than to serve as a pretext for more deeply embittering the cup of slavery. On the other hand, every such movement, every fruitless rising, was a proof of the right of Hellas to be heard upon the Eastern Question. Out of the Eastern Question they evolved a Greek Question.

At the same time, the foes of Turkey were far from neglecting to reckon the power of the Greek factor in their calculations against the common

enemy of all Christianity. The re-establishment of a Greek Empire was the day-dream of Charles VIII. For this he sought Greek help. Laskaris attached himself to him for that end, and for that end followed him from Rome to Paris. Arianites, the commander of the Greek contingent, held in his hands the threads of a conspiracy whose object was to prepare a general rising of the Greeks as soon as the King of France should set foot among them. But death came, and the scheme perished.

I will not here dwell upon the different projects which were set on foot for raising a new Crusade, or upon the different insurrections which broke out in Greece before and after the Battle of Lepanto. Neither need I recount the negotiations of the Greeks of Cyprus and of the Maina,* at one time with the Duke of Savoy, and at another with the Duke of Nevers, on whom they called to resuscitate the Byzantine Empire, of which he claimed to be the lawful heir, as descendant of the Palaiologoi. All these brilliant schemes and ingenious plots came to nothing. Only one of the Western European States, namely, the Republic of Venice, waged an unceasing war against the Turks, and she often did so with success. But the policy of this Republic was so entirely selfish and so purely mercantile as to prevent her gaining the confidence either of the

* The Maina, or Mane, is a district which occupies the ridge of Mount Taygetos; but its inhabitants resisted the Turks, came in contact with the West, and were constituted as a sort of semi-independent principality.

other States of Europe or of the populations which were overshadowed by her power.

I have only one more remark to make as to the position of the Greek people with regard to those of Western Europe during the first two hundred years after the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople. It is this. There was a certain black cloud always hanging over the whole question. That cloud was the religious separation between the Eastern and the Western Churches. It is true that the Westerns had a certain feeling of compassion for those whom they regarded as their erring brethren; but they appeared to them to be, first and foremost, heretics who had wilfully provoked and justly incurred the avenging stroke of God's anger. The Greeks, on the other hand, still held to all those antipathies which had brought to nought the Re-union of the Churches more or less imperfectly effected during the last days of the Empire. They remained the staunch adherents of their own Church, and that, all the more, because the temporal privileges with which the Mohammedan conquerers had invested the ecclesiastical authorities caused these latter still to offer, amid the otherwise uniform darkness of slavery, something which bore the form of a separate and independent nationality. Under the shelter of the Greek Patriarchate of Constantinople, the Greeks still found themselves gathered together as a nation. The Patriarchate gave them at once a remembrance of what had been and the hopeful suggestion of what again might be.

Thus passed two whole centuries, and then came a

time of discouragement. Western Europe ceased to care what happened in the East. The Greeks found themselves entirely forgotten. They did not know that the Decline and Fall of Turkey had begun. On the contrary, they beheld the Ottoman conquest of Crete, and the last efforts of Venice to maintain an hold of the Peloponnesos, from which she was so soon to be expelled. While the Turks were being defeated in the North, they were making their final conquests in the South; and the weight of their oppressors was too crushing to allow the Greeks to find any consolation in the reverses of their arms before Vienna. The last half of the seventeenth century was the direst time through which we have ever had to pass.

With the beginning of the eighteenth century, the dawn of hope began again to break. Russia entered on the stage. Greece turned her eyes amid her night towards this *Aurora Borealis*, this Northern Light, this Power whose populations shared her religious beliefs, and who freely fed her with promises and encouragements. During the whole of the last century the Greeks were the pivot upon which the machinery of Russian policy in the East was made to turn. At St. Petersburg and Moscow the word 'Slav' was not employed. Peter the Great had his portrait engraved with the title '*Russo-Græcorum Monarcha.*' The Empress Anne continued these relations with the Greeks, with an eye to a Revolutionary movement. Catherine II. sent a Russian fleet from the Baltic into Greek waters, with a view to the insurrection

which she had already pre-arranged ; and later on she called her second grandson by the significant name of Constantine, and actually had him reared by Greek nurses. She hoped and thought that she and they were rearing a future Greek Emperor. With this view she at the same time concerted with the Emperor Joseph II. ' the Partition of Turkey,' in harmony with the famous *projet Grec*. According to this arrangement, Austria and Russia were both to obtain an enlargement of territory by annexing the Turkish Provinces which lay nearest to them. A Roumanian State was to be formed under the name of Dacia. The Turks were to be turned out of Constantinople bag and baggage, and the Byzantine-Greek Empire was to be restored there. Such were the leading ideas of this plan. They were the same as those of Charles VIII. and of the Duke of Nevers, only they were much better and more fully worked out, and had so much the better chance of succeeding as they were more in accord with both the religious and the patriotic aspirations of the Greeks.

However, the confidence reposed by the Greeks in Russia had already received a rude shock from the history of the insurrection which broke out in 1770, on the appearance of the Russian fleet under Orloff. The Turco-Russian war was brought to an end by a treaty in which the Greeks were entirely forgotten. As soon as the Russians had turned their backs, they were left to the mercy of their old tyrants. And the vengeance which the Turks wreaked was terrible.

Nevertheless, the result of this abortive revolt was rather to fan than to extinguish the hopes of the conquered. It was the first serious attempt which had been made to bring about a general rising of the whole nation. It was only an attempt, and it was an attempt which had failed, but still it had shown what might be done under more favourable circumstances. So we did not lose courage. We did not even give up the struggle. It was not only the Kleptai who kept it alive in the mountains. From that time we began to dare to face the Turks at sea. The success of these first maritime experiments encouraged Lampros Katzones to fit out, about the year 1788, with the help of patriotic subscriptions, what was really a little fleet, and he managed to keep the banner marked with the Cross of Christ and of Hellas floating over Greek seas for as much as four years. The Turks were not able to destroy his small navy till 1792.

The Hellenic world was still quivering from the results of Russia's last lame and impotent conclusion when the hurricane of the great French Revolution burst. This tremendous cataclysm was not without some effect in Greece. It hastened the National awakening. The Greeks knew and understood very little of what was going on in France, but they drew from it a certain conclusion, viz. : that an oppressed people can get rid of the government which oppresses them, if only they have the will. And in this sense, two apostles of this new gospel, Rhegas and Koraes, set themselves, each in his own way, to stir up men's minds by

preaching and spreading the principles of the French Revolution.

It was not long before circumstances brought the Greeks into actual contact with the French. The first thing was the expedition to Egypt. To Greek eyes this expedition seemed to be the war of civilization against savagery, of the Christian against the Muslim. In a little while the French flag was floating over the Ionian Islands and the coast of Epiros. The sight gave a fresh stimulus to the hope that deliverance was at length at hand. These hopes found encouragement in the policy of Napoleon, who reckoned Greece as a factor in the vast conceptions to which his daring imagination gave birth. As early as 1797 he sent the two Stefanopoli, natives of the Greek colony in Corsica, to try and come to an understanding with the Greeks of the Maina. Rhegas, at the same time, called on the victorious French General to afford the aid of France to the national movement for which he was labouring. In short, from the time of the French Revolution, the Greeks looked Westward with more hope than they had ever felt in that quarter before.

And these hopes were again deceived. They soon found that they could count on no help from Western Christendom, so they turned again towards Russia. There they found the same religious beliefs as their own, and the same hatred for Turkey. But while the Greeks again looked to the help of Russia to aid in the success of any new National rising, they were not blind to the fact

that they themselves by their origin, their history, their traditions, and their tendencies, are allied to Western Europe, and that, geographically, they form the outer link in the chain of the European States. Greece wishes to live with the life of modern Europe. In the throes with which she bursts her fetters, she appeals to the West in the name of her historic past, the mother of all their culture. The Greek Revolution is not a movement to restore the Byzantine Empire. It is the re-awakening of ancient Hellas.

It must be remarked that the separation between the idea of Hellas and the tradition of the Byzantine Empire was not the work of a moment, nor was its development at once clear and sharp. On the contrary, it came obscurely and slowly. And it could not have been otherwise. The Empire of Rome had struck deep roots into the Greek soil; it had adopted the Greek language and the Greek civilisation; and the profession of a common Christianity had welded it with the Greek people. But after the decline of the Roman Empire had begun, long before Constantinople fell, the idea of Hellas had begun to put aside, one after the other, the Roman swathing-bands in which she had been wrapt. The Imperial Byzantine tradition, however, went on in the Church, after the fall of the Empire. Under the Turkish domination, the Church preserved what remained of the temporal power of the State. Her ceremonial was Byzantine. She has actually never expunged from her services the supplications in which she besought

the Almighty 'that it may please him to grant to our Emperor victory over the barbarians.' Her Kalendar of Fasts and Festivals brings round year by year the solemn Commemorations of events in Byzantine history. All these things tended to bring the Empire home to Greek recollection, and to confound with that recollection the hopes of the oppressed Greek people. All the abortive schemes for a restoration of the Empire, from Charles VIII. to Catherine II., had been confirmations and encouragements to this Byzantine tradition. But, alongside this archæological survival, the new dawn of Hellenism was brightening more and more clearly. And it was exactly in those regions which were the most intensely Hellenic that the fair new light arose the most strongly.

Thus it is that, fifty years before our War of Independence, and while Catherine II. was working at her Greek scheme, and the inhabitants of the Peloponnesos were calling upon her for her aid, we find that they no longer based their claims upon the traditions of the Komnenoi and of the Palaiologoi. It was to the glorious fact of what they themselves were, that they appealed. 'Set free,' they wrote to the Tzarina, 'set free the children of the Athenians and Lacedæmonians from the crushing yoke under which they groan, and which, nevertheless, has not been able to destroy the spirit of their nation, where the love of freedom still burns. Our chains have been powerless to stifle that love, for we have always had set before our eyes the living memory of our heroic fathers.'

Even as late as 1821, there was as much of the Byzantine tradition as of the Hellenic idea in the minds of those who prepared the outbreak of the National movement. The poet Rhégas addressed his passionate appeals to every Christian on whom the yoke lay; he called on them 'to light a fire which should wrap all Turkey, from Bosnia to Arabia.' As long as the secret intrigues of the *Hetairía* had their centre in Constantinople, as long as the conspirators concocted their plans of revolt under the shadow of the desecrated church of the Eternal Wisdom, so long the National hopes were mixed up with dreams of the restoration of the Empire. Thus, the War of Independence began upon the banks of the Danube before it broke out on the shores of the *Ægean*. So far as it is now possible to credit any defined plan to those who organized this first movement, it would seem to have been their idea to cause an attack to converge upon Constantinople from the outer provinces, and there to establish the Romano-Greek Byzantine Empire. This is what had been the Greek scheme of Catherine II.

The fact is, that this project was not then as visionary as it now seems. The spirit of Nationalism had not then been roused in the other races of the Balkan peninsula. Their religion bound them together as against their common oppressor. They felt that they were Christians first, and anything else afterwards, and the leading part taken by the Greeks had then nothing about it to repel the other nationalities from uniting under them in order to

form along with them one Christian State. It is true that the Holy Alliance was then all-powerful; that Russia, from the very first moment, repudiated the insurrection; and that the whole of Europe, by the action of its Governments, set itself to oppose it. Nevertheless, there were then some chances of success which have never since presented themselves. If the Revolution had been better organized, if Hypsilantes had possessed the genius of a Washington or of a Napoleon, the Great Idea of a restored Byzantine Empire might perhaps then have been realized. It was a case of *Then or Never*. It was not *Then*. The rising in Wallachia was soon stamped out, and the struggle for independence became limited to the coasts of the *Ægean*. Since then, the Byzantine idea has been fading away before the Hellenic idea. The War of Independence became a war exclusively Greek, and since the formation of the new Greek Kingdom, the Greek aspirations have been growing ever more and more exclusively Hellenic.

It must not be forgotten that during the domination of the Turks, Constantinople, which was the seat of the Patriarchate, had been the real capital of the Greek nation. There was there—as indeed there still is—the largest Greek population contained in any one city in the world. The new spring-time of Greek literature had blossomed in the centre of culture which had there been formed. The flower of the race was included in the aristocracy of the Phanar. Constantinople was *the* Greek city, above all others; and everything there recalled

the Byzantine tradition. But since the Greek Kingdom has come into existence, the centre of Greek thought has shifted. It is now at Athens. The germ of the Greek future is the little State washed by the Ægean. It is that State which ought to be made greater, were it only in reparation for the injustice committed upon it when it was brought into being. The greater and more prosperous it becomes, the greater is the influence which it will exercise upon the Greek provinces which do not yet belong to it, which it cannot now pretend to annex, but whose nationality can never allow them to be to it a subject of indifference. No one thinks now of a restoration of the Eastern Empire; it is not possible, and the fact is fully faced. But the stronger we feel ourselves, the more strongly we shall feel it to be our duty to spare no effort to prevent new enemies arising to take the place of the Turks—and enemies, moreover, who are all the more dangerous because, whereas the Sultans tolerated and acknowledged the existence of a Greek element among their subjects, the declared object of the new foes who have succeeded them is expressly to swamp and to destroy it.

It has been needful thus to trace the past history of the Eastern Question, in order to explain truthfully and clearly the change of form which Greek hope has now undergone. The idea of the re-establishment of the Byzantine Empire was what was called 'the Great Idea.' Time has been when it was a good idea. It is an idea which history at once explains and justifies. But the course of time

has now necessarily guided Greek aspirations into another channel. The Hellenic Idea has now emerged and cleared itself from any necessary connection with schemes for restoring the Empire of Constantinople. It is still a Great Idea, and it is all the stronger because it is more concentrated.

The more this idea takes shape, the more it will prevent individual Greeks wasting their energies in pursuit of dreams which have passed out of the range of practical politics. The path of Greece is clearly laid out for her, and from this path she has not swerved for the last sixty years. She has been working hard to develop her own resources so far as she has been allowed to do so. Whenever she could, she has tried to complete herself by receiving into her State any of those other Greek provinces by which she is surrounded, and which are hungry to cast in their lot with her's. This desire has already been partly gratified. The Ionian Islands, the plain of Thessaly, and a very small fraction of Epiros have been re-united to free Greece, and find themselves all the better for the change. The rest of Epiros, the Greek portion of Macedonia, and the island of Crete are eager for their own turn to come.

These aspirations are entirely confined within the limits of a possible and practical policy. They are in no way opposed to the just aspirations of any other nation in the East. It is impossible for the Greeks to forget that by their own War of Independence they were the first to set an example before their fellow-bondsmen, and to propound to all Europe the principle of Nationalism. They

have remained steadily faithful to that principle. For that reason, their heartiest wish has always been to see the emancipation of the other races inhabiting the Balkan Peninsula; and it has been their consistent joy to watch the gradual steps by which that emancipation has been advancing. They were the first to hail the formation of the Kingdom of Roumania. They rejoiced to see crowned with success the heroic struggles of the Servians and of the Montenegrins. They welcomed like brothers the deliverance of the Bulgars. When the Principalities of Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia were created under the Treaty of Berlin, with safeguards protecting the rights of the Greek population, the Greek people beheld in that creation only another step towards the solution of the Eastern Question on the principles of peace and justice. They would have seen with a satisfaction equally great and equally honest the union of these two last Principalities, had it not been that the Revolution effected at Philippopolis had in it an element which went beyond that union. This element was an undisguised menace against Greek nationality, and a threat against the peace of the regenerated East.

The truth is, the Bulgars have got a Great Idea of their own. What this Bulgar Idea is, we learn from their own mouths. Nothing can give a fairer idea of it than a little book which was printed at Philippopolis and distributed gratuitously on the recent occasion of the thousandth anniversary of the Saints Methodius and Cyrill, the two Greek

missionaries to whose Apostolic devotedness the Slavonic nations were indebted for the introduction of Christianity among them. The book in question is intituled *Macedonia at the Millenary of Methodius, or, How the Bulgars stand to-day in Macedonia*. It has been translated into Greek. The principle of the work is the doctrine that Macedonia is a Bulgar province which the Greeks are wickedly attempting to Hellenize. It proceeds on the supposition that Cyrill and Methodius, instead of being Greeks, were Slavs. They came from Thessalonica; therefore it is argued that Thessalonica must be by nature a Bulgar town. 'The future of Bulgaria,' says the author, 'lies in Macedonia; it lies in the elevation of the Macedonian Bulgars. That is what we have to work for, for in that are bound up our greatness, our future unity, our National integrity, our very existence as a State. A Bulgar State in the Balkan Peninsula would be insignificant and worthless without Macedonia. Of a true Bulgaria, Thessalonica must be the front door. In a structure really Bulgarian, Thessalonica must be the main window through which the light will enter. As long as Macedonia has not been made a part of Bulgaria, Bulgaria has not been constituted. That is the truth which every man ought to know and never to forget' (p. 7 of the Greek translation).

However, it still seems, even according to this reluctant witness, that Macedonia is as yet only imperfectly Bulgarian. 'It is,' he says, 'painful and humiliating to have to admit it, but the fact

must be faced. The truth is, that the greater part of Macedonia is as yet destitute of that consciousness of its own nationality which a people must needs feel before they claim their rights; and if collective Europe were this day to call for a plebiscite of the inhabitants of Macedonia to declare to what nationality they belong, it is greatly to be feared that most of them would not declare for us' (p. 91). The writer of this phenomenal work feels it almost needless to remark that such lamentable blindness on the part of the Macedonians as to what they themselves are is nothing but the result of Greek oppression and intrigue; but, he says, 'if only we had ten or even five years of thorough good work, it would be enough to enable the Bulgaria secured by the Treaty of San Stefano to become a reality, oppose it who would' (p. 97).

At the same time, Macedonia is not the only feature in this programme. Of their pretensions in the direction of Serbia I say nothing. I am only concerned with those which threaten Greece. Where it is asserted that Cyril and Methodius were Slavs, we cannot be surprised to find it recorded that Justinian was born at Ochrida. For the present, the Bulgar propagandists' field of work lies in Macedonia; but the turn of Thrace and the rest is to come later. It is enough for them just now to claim the district of Adrianople. 'Macedonia and the district of Adrianople are Bulgar provinces, and ought to belong to none but Bulgars.' Constantinople is not actually named, but

it is remarked that the Exarch of Bulgaria ought to reside there. 'His banishment thence is a thing which never can nor will be allowed. The place of the shepherd is with his flock.' In other words, we are informed that not only Macedonia and Thessalonica, but also Thrace and Constantinople, are by nature provinces of Bulgaria.

This Bulgarian theory is, of course, utterly without base in history. All the records of the past may be searched in vain without finding anything which can even suggest how it ever arose. Whence comes it, then? It springs from the fosterage of that Great Power alongside, which has toiled so hard to bring it into being, in order to use it as a tool. That is the fact which invests it both with importance and with danger. And that is the fact which explains the excitement felt both in Servia and in Greece when the Bulgars, a few years ago, began to try to realise their programme by force.

The world has been both astonished and shocked at the sight of the fratricidal war between the Bulgars and the Servians. A contest between the Bulgars and the Greeks would have seemed much more natural. For the last twenty years, the ear has got quite used to the noise of the dissensions between the Bulgars and the Greek Patriarch of Constantinople. Since the Treaty of San Stefano the designs of the Bulgars upon the Greek district of Macedonia have been so avowed, that it does not appear astonishing that all Greece should have armed itself to withstand them. Nevertheless, at the time of the Greek War of Independence, and

for long afterwards, there was nothing to forbode any dispute between Greeks and Bulgars. So much the contrary, the Bulgars and their best friends looked forward to a future which should be marked by an intimate alliance with the Greeks. A French writer who has made a profound study of the Slavs, who has lived among them, who was extremely fond of them, and who, notwithstanding some mistakes, gave on these questions, then just coming into being, an opinion which was generally true and indeed sometimes almost prophetic, looked forward to the same thing. Here are the words of M. Cyprien Robert in his book on *Les Slaves de Turquie*, published in 1844 (Vol. I., p. 323).

‘Bulgaria is incapable of forming a State by herself, but she is strong enough to be able to refuse any Union with her neighbours which may be offered to her upon any lower condition than that of federal Home Rule. This is a fact which the Servians must never forget, if they wish to retain the good-will of the Bulgars. The truth is, that while a community of language and of origin establishes a tie necessarily close between the Servians and the Bulgars, the latter are at least as strongly drawn towards the Greeks by commercial interest. Moreover, the Government of Athens is the only Government in the Balkan Peninsula which can never be brought to close quarters with Bulgaria. The difference of nature between the Bulgars and the Greeks is of such a kind as in itself almost to render any friction impossible. The Greek has a proud consciousness of his own intel-

lectual endowments, and it is by them that he aspires to rule; the Bulgar, on the other hand, feeling his own mental inferiority, is willing enough to yield to the impulses of Greek thought as long as he is allowed to plough and reap in peace. Now, the Greeks, with their tendency to sea-faring and commerce, are most willing to let the Bulgars alone—indeed, they are only too happy to find in them good quiet neighbours, who are content to till the ground and to supply rough material for Greek factories. Thanks to this instinct of mutual need and convenience, the two peoples fraternize more and more. All educated Bulgars know the Greek language; they are very fond both of speaking it and of writing it; they call it the language of their teachers, the language of those who civilized their fathers, and who will again bring back to themselves and to their children the culture which they have lost.’

It ought to be kept in mind that the above words were written, in 1844, by an author whose sympathy with the Bulgars went the length of suggesting Thessalonica as the capital of their future State. After that, no one can accuse him of Philhellenism.

Twenty years later, another French observer, the lamented M. Albert Dumont, in remarking the progress made by the Bulgars, made exactly the same observation as to the influence exercised over them by the Greeks. ‘Of all the different nations,’ he says, ‘which inhabit Turkey in Europe, the Bulgars have hitherto been the most peaceable.

They have not been induced to revolt against the Porte either by the example of the Bosniaks or of the Servians, of the Greeks or of the Albanians. Nevertheless, within the last ten years they have passed through a silent revolution, or, rather, a transformation, which has already begun to bear important fruits. They have begun to educate themselves, and they have conceived the hope of a better future. This movement best deserves to be studied in this district [which has since become Eastern Roumelia], because this district was its birthplace, owing to the stimulating influence exercised upon the Bulgars by the contact with Greeks and with the Greek activity and intelligence.*

I prefer citing these different foreign writers, because I wish to place myself beyond the reach of the accusation of prejudice. However, I might have added the witness of my own experience. When I was a child, I knew a good many Bulgars. We did not distinguish between them and Greeks. They sought Greek women in marriage, by preference, rather than wed their own countrywomen, and many of the children of such marriages must have had hard work to learn their paternal tongue before being accepted as Bulgars indeed. Of the elderly men who hold some position in the two Principalities, many, if not most, have had a Greek education at the schools of Constantinople or even at the University of Athens. They cannot have

* *Le Balkan et l' Adriatique*, pp. 130-1.

looked upon this as any great hardship, since their National awakening owes its existence to the influence of Greece. However, that is all changed now. The later generations have been sent to Russia, or elsewhere, for their education and their ideas. The Greek language is spoken no more; on the contrary, the fact of having acquired it is concealed. The great wish now is to owe nothing to Greece.

How has this change come about?

Some people have been anxious to find the explanation in the pretended tyranny of the Greek clergy. I am not going to set myself up here as the advocate of the Greek clergy. I will merely point out the fact that there were no Greek clergy at all in Bulgaria, with the exception of the Archbishops and Bishops named by the Patriarchate, and the few Deacons who were their personal attendants. The general body of the clergy were Bulgars. The Church Service was performed in the Slavonic language, or, where the population was sufficiently mixed, in both Slavonic and Greek. I grant that among these Bishops there have been some who brought little credit upon their character of shepherds of souls. But, again, these Prelates, whether in Bulgaria or anywhere else, were not representatives of the Hellenic Idea. As they came from the Patriarchate, they were invested with a certain amount of that temporal jurisdiction which had been bestowed upon the Patriarchs by Mahomet II. Thus they exercised within their dioceses an authority received from the Turks, and so formed

a part of the Government of the oppressor. But this was a feature from which the Greek inhabitants had to suffer just as much as the Bulgars. The Bulgars were fully aware that it was so, and it never occurred to them that venality on the part of the upper clergy was any reason for estranging themselves from their Greek neighbours, even after they had taken up the idea of having a National Church of their own. M. Cyprien Robert's book is a sufficing testimony upon this point. No; the question of giving the Bulgars a National Church of their own has been nothing but a pretext most skilfully used for a political purpose, the true aim of which has only come to light by degrees.

The Crimean War checked Russia, for a moment, in the execution of those designs which she had nourished for centuries, and it was only on the morrow of the Crimean War that she took the Bulgars under her exclusive protection. The Greeks had ceased to be of any more use to her in her Eastern policy; they are too much drawn towards the West both by their natural instincts of race, and by their interests. The Servians are a great deal too close to Austria, and their historical traditions, in spite of their kinship of race, make them almost as difficult to manage as the Greeks. The Bulgars offered no such obstacles. For the purpose of making them play the desired part, there were two principal means at hand. One was the principle of Nationalism, and the other was the allied notion of having a National Church. And these means were worked accordingly.

The peculiar phase of Russian policy thus indicated has become identified with a name now famous, namely, that of General Ignatieff, so long, and until the last Russo-Turkish War, Russian Ambassador at Constantinople. On this policy I decline here to express any opinion. I confine myself to bearing testimony that it has been carried out with the most consummate ability.

The idea of the National Bulgarian Church was first started in 1856. It made its appearance in the form of a petition to the Sultan, in which the signatories, styling themselves the Representatives of the Bulgarian people, practically besought His Imperial Majesty to grant to the Bulgars (as though they were already a distinct body within the Ottoman Empire) the same privileges as enjoyed by the Œcumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople; to recognise their Church as an independent body, in the same way as the Patriarchal Church is recognised; and to allow them, as well as the Patriarchate, to have their ecclesiastical headquarters in Constantinople. Four years afterwards, on April 3, 1860, Archbishop Hilarion, publicly officiating in the Church of St. Stephen, at Ortakieue in Constantinople, proclaimed the independence of the Bulgarian Church, by omitting from the public prayers the name of the Patriarch of Constantinople. According to the rules of our Church, this act was in itself schism, and entailed excommunication. At last in 1870, the Sublime Porte published the firman by which it authorized the formation of the Bulgarian Exarchate. The

Greek Patriarch was thus at last compelled to proclaim the schism, in other words, to call public attention to the fact that it had pleased the Bulgars to secede from the Communion of the Greek Church. According to the laws of the Turkish Empire, the Bulgars should now have been obliged to find some new costume for their clergy, since these laws do not permit the ministers of one denomination to disguise themselves in the distinctive dress of those of another. But this official recognition of the fact of the separation would have probably had some awkward consequences for the seceders. The true state of things would then have been revealed to the eyes of the most ignorant, and they might have found many less disposed to abandon the Church of their fathers, so long ruled by the Patriarchs. Moreover, greater difficulties would have been put in the way of appropriating the ecclesiastical and educational buildings belonging to the Greek Church. It became an object, then, to prevent the Porte recognizing the new Communion as such, and the screw from outside was, as a matter of fact, so effectually worked that the recognition in question has never been made up to this day. For the same reason, an unceasing attempt has been made to put a similar screw upon the Patriarchate, with a view to have the declaration of schism withdrawn, which would considerably facilitate the operations of Panslavist propagandists in Macedonia and Thrace, where the Exarchate does not make any secret that it means to set up an hierarchy of Bulgar Bishops as soon as it

can. Meanwhile, everything has been done to weaken the Patriarchate. It was thought that the despoiling of its goods might deprive it of the power to resist. Accordingly, its possessions in Wallachia were confiscated by the Government of Prince Couza. This act was generally believed to have been done at the desire of the powerful neighbour on her Eastern frontier, and the belief in question was not dissipated when the Russian Government proceeded to seize the property of the Greek Church in Bessarabia.

And, nevertheless, when all has been done, it would not seem that the work of Bulgarizing Macedonia is getting on quite so quickly and so easily as the workers could wish. The book already cited, *Macedonia at the Millenary of Methodius*, says :—‘ There are many examples of the fact that the Bulgars of Macedonia and Adrianople* will only give up their Greek Bishops and recognise the Bulgarian Exarchate on condition that they have to pay nothing. This is painful ; but it is true. It is more than certain that if the Exarchate were to lay upon these Bulgars the slightest Church contribution, many of them would at once acknowledge the Greek Bishop ’ (p. 66).

The Bulgars have many good qualities. They are docile, hard-working, and peaceable; and recent events show that they can fight well. There are those who have reproached them with some deficiency of intellectual keenness. I am not inclined

* By ‘ Adrianople ’ understand *Thrace*.

to think anything of the kind, but, even if it were so, we need not perhaps consider the Bulgar any the worse off. During the latest phase of their history such a feature would certainly have done them no harm. The cleverest people are not always the people who manage their own affairs the most wisely, especially their external affairs. If the affairs of the Bulgars have been managed for them by others, the management has at any rate been so remarkably well done, that we may fairly congratulate them upon having left it in such able hands.

It may also be sometimes rather an advantage not to be burdened with too glorious an history; only, where such is the case, he who is free from any such encumbrance ought to adapt himself to the circumstances of his case, and not to fall into the error of a man without a pedigree who makes himself ridiculous by parading a forged string of imaginary ancestors. It is a proud thing to have a glorious history, but it is not less noble to will to make one—a young nation has its future before it, and the Bulgars are a young nation, although they cannot be called a new one. They have been settled between the Danube and the Balkans for the last twelve hundred years. May be it is not all their own fault that they are still in leading-strings.

The obscure question whether they are by race Slavs or Turanians, is one which it seems to me idle to discuss here. What they talk, at least at present, is a Slav form of speech. They want to be

Slavs. They have been admitted into the brotherhood of Slav nations. That is enough for our present purpose. We must look upon the Bulgars as being at any rate practically Slav, while we examine what they have been, what they are, and what they hope to be.

This examination has hitherto been left almost exclusively to Slavs or Slavophiles, gushing with sympathy for the Bulgars. I would not for one moment be understood to call in question, for this reason, either the honesty or the culture of such learned persons. Moreover, there is no doubt that it is natural—indeed, there is something noble in it—to be carried away by a generous enthusiasm, in taking the position of a party advocate, and that, more especially, when the cause to be advocated is passing through a very critical episode, and is anything but won. But the very least of the dangers which beset such enthusiasm is that of distorting facts from what they are into the form which best suits the advocate's prepossessions, and this he is liable unconsciously to do, even while his intentions are the most honest in the world. Nor, since I have come to speak of distortion, can I help adverting to certain ethnographical maps which are now to be seen in circulation, and in which the ethnological frontier of Bulgaria is drawn so as to embrace localities as purely Greek as Southern Macedonia, including even the Chalcidic Peninsula and Mount Athos itself. I am very likely to be told that Greeks, on the other hand, have been known to publish ethnographical maps, in which the limits of

the Hellenic population were no less exaggerated; and indeed I should find myself hard pressed to rebut such an accusation. I will only remark that the fate of the Greek cartographers ought to have served for a warning to the Bulgars or Bulgarophiles, by showing them that something more than the arrangement of maps is needed before the nationality of a country can be changed.

Statistics have been treated on the same principle as the maps. We are told on all sides that there are five millions of Bulgars. Now, the official statistics* are based upon the census made by Bulgars themselves, and, according to them, the entire population of the Principality of Bulgaria amounts to 1,998,983 souls, all told, of whom 66 per cent. are Bulgars by nationality; that is to say, there exist in Bulgaria 1,319,500 Bulgars. In Eastern Roumelia there are 815,946 souls, of whom 70 per cent.—or 561,000 are Bulgars. The total number of Bulgars, therefore, on both sides of the Balkans, is 1,880,500. And if we take the whole population of the two Principalities, without regard to whether they are Bulgars or not, it amounts to 2,815,000 inhabitants. Whence then come the rest of the 5,000,000? The population of Macedonia is very difficult to gauge, but even if that name be reckoned, for the sake of argument, to cover a very much wider territory than is allowed to it by Greek geographers, the remaining millions

* See Otto Hübner, *Geographisch-statistische Tabellen*. W. Rommel, Frankfort, 1885.

could not be found there. In 1844, M. Cyprien Robert reckoned the number of Bulgars at 4,500,000, but if he had been right, they would have doubled before now; and they themselves have been pleased only to name 5,000,000. As a matter of fact, the key to this singular piece of statistic is possibly to be found in the work of M. Cyprien Robert himself, in an anecdote which sparkles with all the enchanting guilelessness of childhood. He tells us as follows (Vol. I., p. 248):—

‘During the first months of my sojourn among the Bulgarians, when they asked me, as they were constantly doing, where I came from, and I replied “from Frankistan,” they used to say, “How lucky thou art, O brother, to come from a country where the people are all Bulgars.” “Bulgars?” I exclaimed “why, I never saw such a thing!” They answered, “What! are there no Bulgars in the land of the Franks? Even thou thyself, art thou not a Bulgar?” When I replied to this last question that my countrymen and I most certainly were not Bulgars, I noticed that they hung their heads sadly, and said no more. It was only later, and after the above conversation had taken place several times, that I discovered that they thought that *all Christians are Bulgars.*’

Certainly, on this principle, it is hard to guess where the Bulgar claims to extent of population are likely to stop.

The history of the Bulgars can, I think, be summed up in a very few words. Between the year 679, when they settled where they are, and

1382, when Bulgaria was swallowed up in the tide of Mohammedan conquest, there has three times been a Bulgarian Kingdom. The first was that of the Tzar Simeon, and was destroyed by the Emperor John Tzimiskes. The second was that of Samuel, and was destroyed by Basil II. The third was that of John Aslan, and was destroyed by the Sultan Bajazet. During these three periods the southern frontier of Bulgaria has been more than once pressed forward for the moment beyond the Balkans, and has touched Greek countries, but it has never reached the shores of the Ægean. During the chaos which followed the Fourth Crusade, Thessalonica often changed hands between the Greeks and the Franks, but never did the Bulgars set foot there.*

From the days of Bajazet until our own, nothing had ever disturbed the reign of Turkey over Bulgaria. There never was any insurrection. It is quite true that attempts have been made to bring forward the celebrated Paswan Oglou as an instance of a Bulgar insurgent; but this Mohammedan, whom the Porte finally appointed Vizir of Widdin, cared just as much, and no more, about the autonomy of Bulgaria, as Ali, the Pasha of Ioannina, did about the independence of Greece. Bulgaria never turned in her sleep till after the Greek Revolution. Her waking was very slow. When the Russian army appeared there in 1828, they found her still quite indisposed to rise. In 1830, the Duke of

* See Freeman's *Historical Geography of Europe*.

Wellington received from Sir R. Gordon a detailed report upon the whole campaign, executed by Captain Chesney after that officer had spent three months in travelling about the scene of the war. The only instance of any patriotic activity on the part of Bulgars which he met with, was that of one particular village where the Turks had burnt down the houses of the Christians. In this case the Christians, when assured that the Russians were on the point of arriving, avenged themselves by setting fire to the houses of the Turks, and sixty of them took up arms. 'Elsewhere,' says Captain Chesney, 'there has been no disposition amongst the Bulgarians to join the Russians, nor would they do so in case of a future war. . . . Whatever contests may arise, the Bulgarian will most likely remain passively cultivating the soil, attending his flocks, and enjoying that rough portion of plenty which his cottage (sunk in the ground) always affords.*' Clearly, Capt. Chesney was not endowed with the gift of prophecy.

It is not more than forty years ago since Russia again brought Bulgaria to the notice of the world. As has been already remarked, she began by starting the Church question. The reasonable complaints of the Bulgars on this subject would have been perfectly satisfied by the nomination of Slav Bishops to those dioceses in which the Bulgar element is predominant. But there was a great deal more meant by this cry than the mere getting

* *Despatches, &c., of the Duke of Wellington*, Vol. VI., p. 483.

rid of Greek Prelates. What was asked was the creation of a National Church of Bulgaria separate from the Greek Church of Constantinople. The Greek Church allows the existence of independent National Churches where there are independent nations, but so long as the Bulgars were the subjects of the Porte, it was impossible for the Patriarchate to consent to the setting up of two separate Orthodox Churches in the same country. The Patriarchate appealed to the rule which does not allow one community to have two heads, any more than two communities to have the same head. However, the plan went on. The Turkish Government having been persuaded that it was in its own interest to have a division between the Greeks and the Bulgars, became the instrument of Russian diplomacy. The Porte recognized the existence of the National Church of Bulgaria, and the Bulgarian Exarchate was established at Constantinople as a standing menace to the Greek Patriarchate.

As soon as Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia were made into independent Principalities, the Patriarchate would have been delighted to recognize the Bulgarian Church, in the same way that it recognises the churches of Russia, of Greece, of Servia, and of Roumania. But this is not at all what is desired by the pullers of the Bulgar wires. By them it is desired that the Bulgarian Church should not be confined within the frontiers of the two Bulgarian States, but should exist wherever there are Bulgars—and there are Bulgars everywhere. For the Bulgar view on that subject it is only

necessary to call to mind M. Crypien Robert's experiences with regard to their idea of France.

It has been a great misfortune that the element of religious difference has been allowed to additionally embitter the jealousies which diversity of race and conflict of interests were already powerful enough to stir up in Eastern Christendom. To what lengths these jealousies can be carried, we have had proof enough in the events which have of late years passed before our eyes. It is to be hoped that in course of time these painful differences will pass away. In the very midst of the present struggle, there are, at least as seems to me, signs of a more hopeful future. The question of the equilibrium of the Balkan States outweighs even the question of race. We see that this question of the equilibrium has been enough to plunge two of the Slav States—Serbia and Bulgaria—into a fratricidal war, and at the same time to bring Serbia into an alliance, understood if unwritten, with the Hellenes. Yet people have been found who are ready to jest at the question of the equilibrium. But the preservation of the equilibrium is essential to the future peace of the East. In the deliberations of the Powers represented at Berlin, it held a chief place. The frontiers of Serbia, of Bulgaria, and of Greece, were there carefully and specially drawn so that each of these States might have a population of about two millions. Thus Count Kalnoky, addressing the Austrian Envoys on Nov. 7, expressly said:—‘By the treaty of Berlin it was undoubtedly intended to establish

a sort of equilibrium among the States of the Balkan Peninsula. It is impossible for any one of these States to upset that equilibrium for her own individual aggrandisement, without arousing just resentment upon the part of her neighbours. If the Bulgarian movement were to be carried from Roumelia into Macedonia, the interests of Greece would be undoubtedly jeopardised.' It is a misunderstanding of their own interests which causes the divisions among these nations. When they understand their own interests better, they will be drawn together. There is plenty of room in the Balkan Peninsula for them all, and their respective aspirations can be combined in one common understanding as soon as they agree to a common policy of compromise and conciliation.

To such a common understanding, the aspirations of Greece offer no obstacle whatsoever. Greece makes no extravagant pretensions. There may be still some warm hearts, some enthusiastic imaginations, that delight in visions of the past and are roused by the Great Idea of raising again the Christian Empire once enthroned at Byzantium. But that idea has long ago ceased to govern the thoughts of those who now-a-days guide the destinies of Greece. It no longer actuates the movements of our national policy. It is not the object of the Greek people to set up a Greek Empire at Constantinople. What we are struggling and longing to do is this. We hope to have a Greek State with a Northern frontier starting Eastwards from the Adriatic at some point north

of Corfu, and reaching the Ægean at some point east of the Chalcidic Peninsula, including such part of Macedonia as is Greek. The Island of Crete would be our farthest limit Southward. We would fain see Montenegro aggrandized, and, between such a Montenegro and ourselves, an emancipated Albania, either autonomous or attached to ourselves by a brotherly tie. We would that our Northern frontier should meet those of a fully expanded Servia, and of an enlarged and united Bulgaria, embracing not only the actual Bulgaria and Eastern Roumelia, but also all territory which is really inhabited by a majority of Bulgars.

These are the limits of Greek aspiration !

Of course this does not mean that when Greece should be thus constituted, she would become callous to the fate of the Greeks outside her borders. She never could forget the ties which bind her to her children who would still remain separated from her in Europe, or those her more numerous children in Asia Minor. But the notion of gathering all Greek populations together into one Greek State is, and would be, just as impracticable now as it was in the days of the antients. During the classical period of Greek history, the Greek people (setting aside their Western colonies, which have now disappeared), occupied exactly the same territories as they still do at the present day. They did not then form a single State any more than they do now, but they did and do form a single whole which is called *Hellenism*. And Hellenism can again be all that it has been. But

if part of the Greek world is to be swallowed up in an unjustly expanded Bulgaria, or in an extension of Russia to the shores of the Bosphoros, the part so devoured may perhaps be lost to Hellenism for ever. Under the present Government of the Porte they have every chance of preserving their nationality intact. The changes which have been introduced into the Turkish administration, at least in these regions, subsequently to the Greek War of Independence, the abatement of savagery, the absence of a proselytizing attitude towards other religions, the traditions of the administration, and the very interests of Turkey herself, all seem to promise a free development for the natural and national genius of such Hellenes as may have still to remain under the Turkish rule, whether in Europe or in Asia.

For my own opinion is that Turkey is destined still to remain in Europe. She will give up her Western provinces, which are her source of weakness, and will concentrate herself in Thrace. If she would only rid herself of the difficulties caused her by those European territories with which the Treaty of Berlin has left her still hampered, and rest upon Asia, she could still assure herself a long era of prosperity at Constantinople. Her stability there would be secured by the very jealousies of the other States of the Balkan Peninsula. The great difficulty in the whole Eastern Question has always been :—Who is to have Constantinople? It was the mutual rivalry of the Christian Powers which originally made the Ottoman Conquest

possible. It is this same rivalry which has kept Turkey in existence from the days of Peter the Great till our own. And this same rivalry is still ready to serve Turkey—and to serve her better than ever—in the new lease of life, which, for my part, I believe to be before her. The newly restored States which will surround her will be at once her allies and her supports. Thus there may soon be seen in the Balkan Peninsula a true confederation of independent and contented States, bound each to all by the respective interests of each. The efforts of each and all would be turned in one direction, namely, the path of progress and of civilization. Europe would no longer be harassed and troubled by an Eastern Question.

But while I sketch in colours so bright the outlines of a possible future, I do not forget how anxious is still the present. During the last few years we have always been in the midst or on the eve of events of which it has been impossible to predict either the issues or the consequences. We are face to face with the unknown. But, whatever may happen,—however we may yet be tried,—the Christian East has and will have rights based on justice. These rights are rights which have a foundation other than rights which are based upon Treaties, that is to say, upon force, and those who are compelled to yield to force have this comfort, that they believe that force is not everlastingly mighty to crush right. It has been in thus believing that the Greeks have hoped on through their centuries of woe. It will be in thus believing that

they will still continue to nerve themselves, if their efforts now are destined to be for the while vain. They believe that the right is on their side ; and therefore they hope.

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
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
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