


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
CEDAR RUN, MANASSAS
AND
SHARPSBURG

BY

E. W. SHEPPARD



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AND MARYLAND

June 26th to September 20th, 1862

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SPECIAL CAMPAIGN SERIES.

No. 14

THE
CAMPAIGN IN VIRGINIA
AND MARYLAND

JUNE 26TH TO SEPT. 20TH, 1862

CEDAR RUN, MANASSAS, AND
SHARPSBURG

By

SECOND-LIEUT. E. W. SHEPPARD

10th Battalion Manchester Regiment (T.F.)

WITH THREE MAPS AND SEVEN PLANS



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THIS BOOK
THE FIRST I HAVE WRITTEN
IS DEDICATED TO
MY
FATHER AND MOTHER

LIST OF AUTHORITIES CONSULTED

- “ War for the Union. Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies.” Compiled by the War Department, Washington, vol. xii., Parts II. and III.; vol. xix., Parts I. and II.
- “ Battles and Leaders of the Civil War.” 4 vols.
- Ropes, “ The Army under Pope.”
- Ropes, “ Story of the Civil War.”
- Palfrey, “ The Antietam and Fredericksburg.”
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- Major Von Borcke, “ Four Years in the Saddle.”
- Woodbury, “ Burnside.”
- “ The Campaign of Pope in Virginia, 1862,” “ Campaigns from 1862 to 1864.” Publications of Massachusetts Military Historical Society.
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INTRODUCTION

THE writing of history is always a delicate, and generally a thankless, task. It is, then, only with diffidence that the present volume is offered for the perusal of the public ; for on any question of historical fact, still more of criticism, there may, and indeed must, be two opinions. Hence, in the latter department at least, that of comment, no care, however scrupulous, no investigation, however thorough, can prevent some people disagreeing with the views put forward. The most the historian can effect is to present to the reader all the available facts, and then leave him to form his own judgment. Such a procedure does not exclude comment, but renders it suggestive and stimulating rather than final.

Much depends, in this respect, on the point of view from which one sets out. The writer has no doubt that readers and students of "Hamley" (at present our only strategical text-book) will profoundly disagree with much of what is here put down. He himself considers that "Hamley," though good enough for its purpose when first published, has by now become absolutely useless, and indeed harmful, for anyone who really wishes to learn strategy. What can be more absurd, for instance, than to put down Napoleon's splendid success in the Ulm campaign to the fact that he possessed an angular base, formed by the lines of the Rhine and the Maine ? Such a

statement is an insult to his genius. "Hamley" can never be effectively modernised, for the whole spirit pervading the book is wrong, and if we still cling too closely to it we shall find, as did the French in 1870, by bitter experience, what are the evil results of out-of-date systems of making war.

The American Civil War is perhaps, of all modern conflicts, the one about which the fullest and completest information is at disposal. The official records, and the countless memoirs and critical histories dealing with it, are not likely to be supplemented to any considerable extent in the future. The reports of the actions and the correspondence of the generals are all collected ready for historians to weld together into one narrative; though this task of itself is not an easy one. There are several distinct gaps in the records, especially on the Confederate side; but a more serious difficulty for anyone who seeks the truth is to be found in the exaggerations indulged in by both belligerents with regard to numbers, and even in chronicling actual events. In this respect the Southerners are by far the worst offenders. To be sure, both McClellan and Pope at times produce the most astonishing statements; but Confederate generals seldom do anything else. Lee and (as a rule) Jackson are exceptions; but the rest make up for the moderation of these two men. The worst of them all is D. H. Hill, whose reports are most exasperating to read. A Northern general writes of this tendency in very bitter terms: "A few more years," he says, "a few more books, and it will appear that Lee and Longstreet, and a one-armed orderly, and a casual with a

shot-gun, fought all the battles of the rebellion, and killed all the Union soldiers except those who ran away." This is perhaps a little sweeping, but it is not far from the truth. One wonders at times whether the generals themselves really believed all the nonsense they put down; if so, their common-sense must have been considerably outweighed by their credulity.

Nevertheless, these are but small difficulties compared to these afforded by other wars and other events. It has been the writer's earnest endeavour to overcome them as far as possible, and to make this book a trustworthy picture of a short period in the titanic struggle known as the War of Secession. Nobody can be more aware than he himself of its defects. It is hoped that, in spite of them, some may be induced to study more closely the events herein described, and to ponder more deeply over their lessons; and if the volume contributes in any way to render our military thinking clearer, and our knowledge of war greater, the labour spent on it will have been repaid with interest.

E. W. SHEPPARD.

Cedar Run, Manassas, and Sharpsburg

CHAPTER I

THE GENERAL SITUATION

FIRST MOVEMENTS

THE first campaign for the capture of Richmond and the subjection of the Confederacy had proved a complete failure; and to those who had watched the course of events during the spring and early summer of 1862 it must have been clear that the second was doomed to a like fate. Throughout the whole of the Eastern Theatre fortune had refused to smile on the Union arms. McClellan was lying within sight of the spires of Richmond, but confronted by a host which he estimated to be twice as strong as his own, waiting for regiments which did not come and writing despondent letters to the capital. The forces which Lincoln had set in motion to "bag" Jackson had not only failed but failed ignominiously in their task; and that elusive leader, after defeating in turn Banks, Frémont and Shields and retaining the troops, that should have assisted McClellan, in a defensive attitude in front of their own capital, had vanished from the Valley, none knew whither. It was in these circumstances that the Army of Virginia was created.

Lincoln and Stanton, in consultation, decided to amalgamate three out of the four departments into which the State of Virginia was for military purposes divided, and to place over them one leader. The forces at their disposal comprised those in the Mountain Department, under Frémont, those of the Valley Department, under Banks, and McDowell's corps, once the I. Corps, Army of the Potomac, since April 4th the troops of the Rappahannock Department; about 40,000 men in all, not counting the garrison of Washington. By a decree dated June 26th, 1862, these were all united into one army, and a Western soldier, Major-General John Pope, who was junior to all the three department commanders, was appointed to the command. The task of this new army is thus set down in the decree: "The Army of Virginia shall operate in such a manner as, while protecting Western Virginia and the national capital from danger and insult, it shall, in the speediest manner, attack and overcome the rebel forces under Jackson and Ewell, threaten the enemy in the direction of Charlottesville, and render the most effective aid to relieve General McClellan and capture Richmond." This was telegraphed to the three department commanders on the very day that Lee commenced the first of those Seven Days' Battles which were to wreck McClellan's schemes for a future offensive, and remove all danger to the Southern capital, so far as the Army of the Potomac was concerned.

Pope, when he arrived at Washington to take up his new duties, soon realised that his was no easy task. He had many obstacles to contend against. Coming as he did from another theatre of war, he knew nothing of either the leaders or the troops he was to command, nor yet of the country in which he was to operate, except that the generals were all his superiors in rank, and that the

various forces were all so badly organised and so demoralised that they would be for some little while unfit for an offensive. His first duty, then, was to reorganise his army and supply it with the indispensable material without which no forward movement could be made. Sigel, who had relieved Frémont in command of what was now the I. Corps, give a very sad report of the state of his unit, which, he says, "I found in a very bad condition in regard to discipline, organisation, construction of brigades and divisions and to a great extent demoralised," and as late as July 5th the Assistant Inspector-General opined that Sigel would need six or seven more days before he would be ready to move. Banks reported on June 26th that he would be able to march at the end of the month—not before.

At the time of Pope's assumption of command, the various units of the army were scattered on a wide front of eighty miles. The I. Corps (Sigel) and the II. (Banks) were in the Valley, between Winchester and Middletown, with cavalry at Front Royal. In the centre, forty miles off, was a division of McDowell's corps, under Ricketts, at Manassas Junction, with an advance-guard at Catlett's Station; the other division, King's, was at Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, waiting to be transported to the Peninsula. With these forces, most of whom had suffered defeat more or less severe during the past month, Pope had to evolve a plan of campaign. His news as to the enemy was clear and correct; Jackson and Ewell had gone to Richmond, but whether any troops were left in the Valley was not quite certain. It was probable that, if there were, they would only be in small numbers.

Obviously before anything else it was necessary to concentrate his forces. He ordered the I. and II. Corps therefore to unite at Front Royal as a preliminary move-

ment ; but the actual place of assembly could depend only on the idea of his future operations. A zone was necessary from which the army could either move to defend Washington and the Valley from Richmond, or else strike at the line Richmond-Charlottesville, south and west. Pope found this zone in the line Sperryville-Waterloo Bridge. From this point, should any large body of the enemy endeavour to enter the Valley, he could move against their communications and sever them from Richmond, while the garrisons of Winchester and Front Royal could deal with small parties. If Lee, on the other hand, advanced along the Alexandria and Orange R.R. towards Washington, he would soon find Pope on his flank and rear and be compelled to turn aside and fight, with his communications imperilled. Lastly, Sperryville was only two long marches from the Virginia Central R.R. at Gordonsville, one of the main arteries uniting the capital to the rest of the Confederate States. If Pope could place himself astride of it, he stood a good chance of compelling Lee to send strong forces to drive him off and so weaken himself in front of McClellan.

Such were the reflections which prompted Pope to take up this particular line. The Administration at Washington however looked at things from a different point of view. Observing that the direct line *via* Fredericksburg to Washington was left open to a hostile advance, they remonstrated so strongly that the general was compelled, much against his will, to leave King where he was, separated from the rest of the army by a wide gap of forty miles. Thus the intended concentration was only partially accomplished.

Yet other difficulties beset the new commander. Even as he was elaborating his first measure, McClellan, abandoning his base at White House, was retreating, pursued by

Lee's army, towards the James. Pope was much disheartened at this news, realising that by these successes the Confederates had gained an interior position, from which they could strike in either direction against the separated Federal armies. Further, there was no hope of any effective action from McClellan. That general declared he would need at least 100,000 men before he could hope to resume his march on Richmond; and to Pope's communication, endeavouring to concert plans with him and to obtain some suggestions as to what could best be done by the army of Virginia to assist the operations of the army of the Potomac, he replied in a very unsatisfactory letter, which contributed nothing of value to the necessary mutual understanding.

It became clear that a superior officer was necessary at Washington in order to exercise a common control over Pope and McClellan alike. Major-General Halleck, then in command of the Western armies, was therefore summoned to the capital to exercise the supreme direction of the operations in Virginia. This was on July 11th, and a few days previously Pope had had an interview with the President and his Cabinet, which resulted in a very stormy scene, culminating in the new general's resignation. This was not, however, accepted, nor was a second request to the same effect, when Halleck had entered upon his new duties. Pope therefore took the field, resolved to do his best, but filled with reluctance and with the gravest forebodings.

On August 1st it was resolved that McClellan's army should be withdrawn from the James and united to the Army of Virginia, and the function of the latter force at once assumed quite a different importance. A new strategic problem had to be met. We may give the situation in Pope's own words: "I had," he says:

“(1) To cover the approaches to Washington from any enemy advancing from the direction of Richmond and to oppose and delay its advance to the last extremity so as to give all possible time for the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac from the James river.

“(2) If no heavy forces of the enemy moved north, to operate on their lines of communication with Gordonsville and Charlottesville, so as to force Lee to make heavy detachments from his force at Richmond and facilitate to that extent the withdrawal of the Army of the Potomac.”

In other words, Pope's was a subordinate rôle; he formed the advance-guard of the Federal march upon Richmond, and his first object was to assure the union of the two armies, at present separated by one hundred miles and by Lee's host, before the latter could inflict on him a decisive defeat. It was a difficult and delicate mission. If the Army of the Potomac took as long to withdraw from the Peninsula to Washington as it had taken over the journey in the reverse direction, September would have come before Halleck would be able to lead the united force into the field for the third campaign against Richmond.

Pope resolved to maintain his position for the present. By “lying off the left flank of the rebels” he could effectually bring to the halt any advance on Washington; the enemy must turn to fight him and, if he could resist them long enough, they would find the Army of the Potomac advancing against their right and rear from the northeast, while engaged with Pope on the west. If too hard pressed, the latter could always retire to the Shenandoah Valley, or else by his left to the north, and still delay the enemy. The manœuvre was quite in the best Napoleonic style—in fact, a counterpart of the one actually carried out in the last days of February, 1814, before the battle of

Laon, when Marmont and Mortier held Blucher in front behind the Ourcq, while Napoleon marched into his rear by Château Thierry.

Turning now from strategic plans in the Cabinet to actual movements in the field, the various corps were set in motion towards the zone of assembly, starting from July 5th. Banks marched from Middletown on that date *via* Front Royal and Amissville to Warrenton, reaching it on the 8th; the I. Corps left Middletown on the 7th, and, following in Banks' track, arrived at Sperryville on the 11th. Ricketts was already at Waterloo with McDowell's headquarters. Finally, Banks' corps, which had been sent to Warrenton owing to a clerical error by Pope's chief of staff, closed in on the 14th, to Little Washington, five miles east of Sigel. The latter's cavalry were west of the Blue Ridge, patrolling towards Luray; Hatch, with the II. Corps cavalry, watched the front of the army for twenty miles towards Stanardsville and Gordonsville, while a brigade under Bayard extended the screen towards Fredericksburg.

As these movements were being completed, Pope, from Washington, published his famous address: "To the officers and soldiers of the Army of Virginia." It was intended to improve the morale of his army, and it may be safely said that no one was more surprised at the real result than the author himself. The whole nation greeted its appearance with a storm of ridicule and indignation; Pope was at once put down as bombastic, egotistic and tactless. The address can be found in so many places that it is unnecessary to quote it in full here; its gist was, so it seemed at the time, a reflection on the qualities of McClellan and the Eastern armies, a contempt for the whole art of war as commonly understood and practised, and a glorification of Pope himself and his Western

comrades. Read at this date, it scarcely seems to bear that meaning; but it was unquestionably a very ill-considered publication, and the friction between Pope and his subordinates and, still more, between Pope and McClellan, must have been augmented in a noteworthy degree.

The period from July 14th to the battle of Cedar Run was marked principally by an activity on the part of the cavalry which, among the Federals at least, had been previously unparalleled. Information of late had seemed to point to the approach of a large hostile force from Richmond way, but only a small body of infantry and cavalry held Gordonsville at present. General Hatch was therefore ordered, on July 14th, with his own cavalry and Bayard's brigade, to cross the Rapidan, capture Gordonsville and push on to Charlottesville, destroying all the lines between these places and Richmond, as well as the James River Canal, a raid of 120 miles. Hatch set out on the 16th, but took with him infantry, artillery and waggons, in addition to his cavalry. His march therefore was slow; reaching the Rapidan that night, he moved thence by his right towards Madison Court House, and halted there, intending to try a reconnaissance in force next day. It was already too late. The patrols found Gordonsville strongly held, and the former rumours were confirmed, that Jackson and Ewell, with 30,000 men, were at Louisa Court House and holding the line of the Rapidan from Liberty Mills to Wolftown in strength.

Before the news of Hatch's failure reached him, Pope had already intimated to King at Fredericksburg his wish that an expedition should be undertaken against some point on the Central R.R., thirty-five miles away. On the night of July 19th-20th a light cavalry regiment

started on this mission ; arriving at Beaver Dam as the day dawned, they set fire to the depot there, and severed the communications by rail and wire for several miles east and west. A number of Confederate stores, chiefly ammunition, were destroyed in the flames, and the cavalry returned to their main body after a long march of eighty miles in thirty hours, bringing back information that a force of at least four brigades was ready to resist the Federal attack at Gordonsville.

The success of this expedition seems to have encouraged the Federals to attempt something further in front of the main army. Hatch was once more sent, this time with cavalry only, to turn the left of the enemy at Gordonsville and destroy the line from there to Lynchburg about Charlottesville ; he was to move either west or east of the Blue Ridge, as he thought fit. This raid was no more successful than the last. The cavalry crossed the Blue Ridge at Luray, in pelting rain, and moved along the Shenandoah to Rockingham, and thence to Stanardsville. Here the exhaustion of their horses, the fearful state of the roads, and the bad weather, rendered them incapable of further effort, and abandoning their project they returned to Culpeper. Pope, already much incensed by the former failure, relieved Hatch from his command, giving him instead a brigade of King's division ; Buford, a young and promising officer from the inspector-general's department, took his place.

King had been displaying great activity down at Fredericksburg. A body of cavalry, under a leader afterwards famous, Kilpatrick, set out on the 22nd, and next day met and defeated two Confederate regiments near Carmel Church, on the North Anna. The enemy were chased right into Hanover Junction, stores and a camp were burnt, the telegraph cut, and, on the 24th,

the expedition returned without the loss of a man. The same day General Gibbon, with three infantry regiments, a squadron, and a battery, marched towards Orange Court House along the Plank road. Halting that night within five miles of their objective, they pushed on next day to within sight of it, and learnt that Robertson's cavalry was there, with Ewell and Jackson in support, some 30,000 men in all. Gibbon, on receipt of this news, decided to go no farther ; he therefore retraced his steps, and, after repulsing a sharp attack on his rear-guard, rejoined his division on the morning of the 27th.

The cavalry in front of the main army had also not been idle. On the 26th, Crawford led a reconnoissance to Orange Court House, and next day another pushed beyond the Rapidan and felt the hostile pickets. On August 2nd a Federal force of two regiments from Raccoon Ford pushed right into the village of Orange. Their main body was attacked, while still in the street, by a body of horsemen coming from the west, and thrown into disorder ; but as they streamed out from the village their pursuers were charged in rear by two of the flanking squadrons ; the enemy in their turn fled and left the Federals in possession of the town. The latter, after a while, fell back to Rapidan Station, having lost eight men as against the enemy's fifty odd.

Pope by now had got to know for certain that the Rapidan was strongly held. On July 30th he believed the enemy in front of him were retiring towards Danville and Lynchburg and proposed to follow them. Halleck, however, warned him to be cautious and expressed his fear that Jackson meant to enter the Valley once more. King, on the 2nd, reported that the Confederates had only 15,000 men in line, but on the same day A. P. Hill's arrival with 10,000 men was announced, and on the 5th

Pope wrote to Halleck that Jackson had with him his own, Hill's, Ewell's, Whiting's and Longstreet's divisions, with Robertson's cavalry ; the strength 30,000 to 40,000 men. Although he himself had barely 40,000 at this time, Pope had resolved on the 3rd to move forward. King was instructed to draw in his detachments in preparation for movement. On the 4th Ricketts was ordered from Waterloo to Culpeper, arriving there on the 6th ; next day Banks' corps was directed to Hazel River Bridge on the road to Culpeper ; Sigel was left at Sperryville for the present. The Army of Virginia would thus be arrayed in a long column of twenty miles along the Sperryville-Culpeper pike ; its cavalry were in front, Bayard near Rapidan Station, picketing from Raccoon Ford to Barnett's Ford, and Buford at Madison with pickets from Bayard's right to the Blue Ridge. In rear of him, at Russell's Ford, on the Robertson river, was posted an infantry brigade of Sigel's corps. Another cavalry regiment watched the river from Raccoon Ford to the forks above Falmouth, and a signal station had been established on Thoroughfare Mountain.

Meanwhile other forces had begun to reach Virginian soil, bound for the scene of action on the Rapidan. Burnside's troops from North Carolina were even now disembarking at Aquia, and preparing to join Pope. On August 3rd Halleck acquainted McClellan with the decision of the authorities to evacuate the Peninsula and transport the Army of the Potomac to Aquia and Alexandria, and after a bitter protest the general began to make his preparations for this new movement. Already the sick were being embarked.

King's division then and some of Burnside's troops might be expected to reinforce Pope within a week ; but the Army of the Potomac, though it is said Halleck antici-

pated it would be all landed within seven days, could not by any possibility come into line before the end of August. For nearly a month, therefore, the Army of Virginia would be compelled to rely on its own resources, and with them to resist the attack of the united forces of Lee and Jackson.

On the Confederate side, Lee, after his success in the Seven Days' Battles, had fallen back with all his forces to Richmond, leaving only Stuart to watch the enemy at Westover. But there was to be little rest for the gallant defenders of Virginia, nor perhaps would they themselves have wished it otherwise. No sooner had it become clear that McClellan would not stir from the shelter of his gunboats than plans were brought forth for further movement. Jackson, with an appreciation of the character and capabilities of his opponents which was not shared by those above him, was strong for an invasion of the North. That entry into Maryland which he had suggested after Banks' defeat at Winchester again returned to his mind, and he advocated it with all his might, both to the member of Congress for the Upper Valley, Mr Boteler, and to Lee himself. He declared that only a crushing defeat of the Federal forces close to the doors of their own capital could bring the North to terms. If the Confederacy confined herself to repelling the blows of her adversary, without striking any in return, the mighty resources of the latter must in the end crush all life out of her, as actually happened. The cause of Secession could only triumph by a sudden, shattering stroke at a vital point. Now was the time, when McClellan's "Anaconda Scheme" had just been brilliantly frustrated, to carry the war to the enemy's very gates.

Other views, however, prevailed: The Army of the Potomac had been scotched, not killed, thanks to a

variety of causes which do not concern us here. It was still very possible that, after a short breathing space to recruit his damaged forces and bring up fresh troops, McClellan might resume his advance; and if he showed as much skill as he had done in the retreat, it would go hardly with Richmond, shorn of its defenders. Again, another leader might succeed to the command, and more vigorous measures be adopted as a result, which would gravely imperil the Southern capital, even if the whole of Lee's army were ready to forbid the approaches. These considerations, which were those of common prudence, naturally prevailed with President Davis and his advisers as against the dictates of military wisdom, and so it was decided that for the present it would be impolitic to send any large proportion of the army away from the Peninsula.

Lee, however, was not the man to remain idle for long. Remembering the disproportionate results gained earlier in the year by the presence of even a small hostile force within striking distance of Washington, and also realising the danger afforded by the presence of an army, under a commander whom he knew to be vigorous and enterprising, within easy reach of his communications with the south and west, he resolved to move a part of his troops to the north-west, in order to check Pope and alarm Lincoln for the safety of the Northern capital. Accordingly, on July 13th, Jackson was sent to Louisa Court House and Gordonsville, "there to oppose the repeated advance of the enemy from the direction of Orange Court House." He had with him only Ewell's and his own divisions, amounting in all to barely 10,000 men.

The march began at once. Ewell moved off first, his infantry going by road, his batteries by rail. Sixty miles were covered in three days and the head of the column reached Gordonsville on the 16th, just in time to anticipate

the Federal mixed force under Hatch, whose movements we have already narrated. The Confederate cavalry, two regiments under Robertson, pushed out pickets on the 17th beyond the Rapidan, holding the inn in rear with strong parties from Rapidan Station and Liberty Mills towards Wolfstown. On the 17th the pickets near Madison were driven in and a strong force appeared in Robertson's front, intending, it seemed, to cross, but they confined themselves to demonstrations. Next day a party of Federal troopers, pushing rashly over the river at the station, fell into the enemy's hands; but no serious attempt at a passage was made.

At this time the Confederate ideas as to the positions and strength of their enemy seems to have been somewhat vague. On the 18th Lee wrote to Stuart that the hostile forces at Fredericksburg were stated to be withdrawing and moving on Gordonsville, presumably by Spotsylvania, and therefore the cavalry leader was instructed to replace Jackson's cavalry at Hanover Junction by his own, in order to guard the Central R.R. Five days later, however, the commander-in-chief was very much in doubt as to the position, strength and intentions of the hostile forces on the Rapidan, and believed Pope to be as far back as Manassas Junction. Under these circumstances, as he thought McClellan's reinforcement likely, he considered it injudicious to send more troops to Jackson, so long as the latter had so little prospect of being able to strike effectively. On the 25th he writes again, expressing his willingness to despatch reinforcements if Jackson sees any good chance of a successful attack on isolated hostile forces; and he suggests a movement down the left bank of the Rappahannock, so as to sweep away the force at Falmouth, in conjunction with Stuart, "if Pope goes far enough." As King's division was at least 12,000 strong at this date,

under a very able officer, and as the movement could hardly have been effected without Pope getting to know of it early, the success of this "strategic penetration" would have been, to put it mildly, problematical. It was proved later at Gainesville that King's troops were by no means unworthy opponents even of the famous II. Corps of the Army of Northern Virginia.

On July 27th Lee definitely decided to reinforce his lieutenant. McClellan had shown no signs of activity for nearly three weeks, and it was considered that he was not likely to do much now. So on this date Jackson was notified of the arrival of A. P. Hill's division and the 2nd Louisiana Brigade (Hays'), 12,000 men in all, bringing the total effective of his command up to close on 24,000 men. Knowing his lieutenant's tendency to extreme reticence, Lee tactfully advised him that Hill was an excellent officer whom he might freely consult, and recommended him to hide his infantry, wait for an opportunity to strike, and be ready to return afterwards, if necessary. Hill and Hays were moved by railway to Gordonsville the same day, and arrived complete on the 28th.

Meanwhile the enemy's cavalry had been causing great annoyance to the little army behind the Rapidan. Scarcely a day passed but there was an attack on the Confederate pickets, a raid on their communications with Richmond, or a strong reconnaissance against their front or flanks. August 2nd saw the defeat of the 7th Virginia Cavalry at Orange Court House, when part of the Confederate troopers displayed what might without exaggeration be called a lack of spirit. Jackson's position was undoubtedly precarious. He knew that the hostile force in his front greatly outnumbered his own; he realised from the vigour of the cavalry that the new leader was a man of very different stamp from the cautious and hesitat-

ing McClellan ; and he must have felt that, if Pope moved resolutely forward, he could hardly hope to check his march with the forces at his disposal.

Nevertheless, like a true soldier, he did not think of defence. He meant to attack, if any chance offered itself. The Confederate correspondence at this date shows remarkable gaps, and it is difficult to reconstruct Jackson's ideas ; but so far as it is possible now to tell, they were as follows :—On August 4th he wrote to Lee a letter which has not been found, but which referred to “ taking a central position in order to force the enemy to fight, not in their strong and chosen position, but on more favourable ground.” Lee in reply approved of this object, considering however that “ passing their left flank ” would better achieve this end.

It seems, then, that the “ central position ” referred to would be “ central ” with reference to the two bodies of the enemy at Sperryville and Fredericksburg, more especially as Jackson appears to have asked for information as to the latter force. From this “ central position,” too, it would be easy to “ pass the enemy's left flank,” as Lee suggested, and thus get between them and Washington. The idea then is the same as Lee's plan of the 25th, but with larger forces and greater prospects of success. The latter general, however, seems to have preferred now to turn the left flank of Pope's main body, and thus compel it to fight at a disadvantage, and he promised further reinforcements to render the movement more likely of success. Which plan Jackson finally adopted no one knows, nor does it much matter, for some time between the evening of the 4th and the afternoon of the 7th information came in which entirely changed the aspect of affairs.

This information was that Pope was pushing forward a part of his force in front of his main line to Culpeper Court

House. A chance seemed to offer itself of crushing the enemy in detail; Culpeper was barely thirty miles from Gordonsville and a swift and secret movement, such as those which had been executed so successfully in the Valley, might well give the Confederates an opportunity of defeating the isolated fraction of the enemy's army before the rest of it could arrive on the field; at least, so it appeared to Jackson, and, as a result of this view, orders were issued, about noon on August 7th, for a forward movement.

In accordance with these orders, the three divisions marched from their respective stations to Orange Court House, and there concentrated. It was late in the afternoon when they set out, and thus only eight miles were covered before nightfall. Speed and secrecy were essential for the success of the expedition; but the hardest part of the work still lay in front of them. Next day the advance was certain to be discovered and opposed by the strong force of Federal cavalry who had proved so enterprising during the past fortnight. Robertson's horsemen were few in numbers, and only with the help of their infantry could they hope to drive back their more numerous and skilfully led opponents. Jackson therefore issued orders for an early start on the morrow, at dawn; Ewell's division was to lead, Hill's and Jackson's next in that order. The army was to cross the Rapidan at Barnett's Ford and thence follow the pike to Culpeper, and it was hoped that the Federal force at that place would be reached and routed early on the 9th, under the very eyes of its unsuspecting comrades.

But, though commanders may propose, their staffs often dispose. August 7th was a day long remembered in the Confederate ranks as an example of thoroughly bad staff work. Major Dabney, Jackson's Assistant Adjutant-

General, was incapacitated by sickness, and from the first dawn of day the blunders began. Ewell's division was at the last minute directed to Barnett's Ford *via* Liberty Mills, and moved off at the appointed hour along the road ordered with its trains in rear. Meanwhile Hill's division, the next in order, had moved with its head of column to the street down which Ewell was supposed to pass and waited there for it to come up. Jackson's division also reached the town and halted on the outskirts. Here all waited, fuming and fretting, for over an hour.

"Stonewall" himself had bivouacked three quarters of a mile north of the town, and seeing nothing of his troops, who ought to have come up long ago, rode back to see what was the matter. At Orange he met Hill, but not his division, and therefore sent word to Winder (in command of Jackson's division) to lead on. This column also took its trains with it, and the result was that Hill's men had to wait in the village street till nearly noon before they could begin to move. Meanwhile a second block took place at Barnett's Ford, two miles further on, caused by Ewell's trains and also by the resistance of Bayard's cavalry. By 5 P.M. Hill had covered two miles only, and at this point his patience gave out. The day had been swelteringly hot, and the march most vexatious and trying, and accordingly the division went into bivouac where it stood, coolly disregarding an order from Jackson himself to press forward. Ewell's advance-guard reached Locustdale Post Office, still twelve miles from Culpeper. It had been in every way a most disastrous day. Jackson declared that Hill himself was to blame and one cannot but convict him of a reprehensible lack of zeal, due partly no doubt to his want of knowledge of the general scheme of operations; but defective arrangements had probably more to do with the *contretemps* than anything else.

The position of Jackson on the night of the 8th-9th was anything but promising. He wrote to Lee next day that he expected now to do very little more than close up and clear off the hostile cavalry, and he feared that the expedition was ruined. And indeed it was enough to dishearten any man to see his plans thwarted, and a chance of striking a good blow at a scattered enemy vanished, because of carelessness or ill-will on the part of subordinates. Nor could it be denied that he might, by going on, push his head into a hornet's nest. Pope must have known of the Confederate advance by now and he must be hastening his concentration, if indeed it were not already completed, in order to overwhelm this audacious little opponent who had dared to advance to meet a foe of twice his own strength. And in what sort of position would he find himself, confronted by Pope with his whole army, with, possibly, King's division moving against his communications, a superior and energetic body of horsemen on his flanks, and two broad rivers in rear ?

Jackson, beyond all doubt, weighed all these factors well, but his resolve was nevertheless unshaken. The ground was known to him, his troops had already defeated the men opposed to him in more than one encounter and might well do so again. Against inferior numbers Jackson was certain of victory ; and if the worst came to the worst it would not be the first time he had escaped from a superior foe. Probably, too, he had a shrewd idea that his own forces were over-estimated, and what was more likely to confirm that impression than a bold advance ? And lastly there was always the possibility that he had overrated his opponent's energy and skill ; he might yet find Pope divided and scattered ; he might still be able to strike the blow he wished at a force inferior to his own.

Influenced by these considerations, " Stonewall " kept

to his first design and ordered his army to continue the march on the morrow. It was a daring resolve and one that none but a man of the greatest determination and strength of purpose would have made. Had Cedar Run been a defeat, one can imagine what a storm of criticism Jackson's "rash obstinacy" would have aroused. But Fortune favours the brave; and she was about to provide the Confederate leader with an unexpected, if not perhaps undeserved, opportunity for plucking success from the very jaws of failure.

CHAPTER II

THE ARMIES AND THE LEADERS

FOR the understanding of the campaign about to open, it is essential that there should be in the mind of the reader a complete grasp of all the circumstances in which the generals of the respective armies were placed and also of the character and achievements of the generals themselves. An army is not a machine which never gets out of order and always works at the command of its director promptly and without a hitch, but a living, thinking organism, susceptible to the most various, and often the most trivial, disturbing influences, and always presenting to the will of its general a certain amount of resistance and friction, which usually vary in inverse ratio to its training and war experience. If such violent fluctuations in the temper of the same army are often produced when the circumstances under which it works are altered, it must be clear that armies of different nations will differ in a much greater degree one from the other; and the student of war who, after a course of reading in military history, turned to the War of Secession for the first time, without getting some idea of the peculiar characteristics of the American soldier, would find much of the strategy and tactics of the belligerents very hard to comprehend.

The United States may be said to have possessed no regular army worthy of the name. The establishment was only about 10,000 men and the duties were those of frontier police. Staff and administrative service were

naturally non-existent, for there was no need for them ; and the whole of the troops were scattered in small detachments along the western border, only occasionally being united for a punitive expedition against the Indians. Such a life was excellent, so far as developing the courage and self-reliance of the junior commissioned ranks went, and afforded excellent instruction in the art of leading men. Many of those who rose to fame during the Civil War had served their apprenticeship in command in these desolate and forgotten regions, but it is doubtful whether the ranks of the United States regulars could be regarded in any way as a good school for the practice of "*la grande guerre.*"

The military academy at West Point was intended to supply the officers for service in case of a war with a civilised foe, and to this academy a great proportion of the upper classes of America came. West Point, in fact, was more than a training school for army officers ; it held a corresponding place to that of the universities of modern times. The education was good, the discipline military in form and strictly enforced, the range of subjects to be studied wide, and the course itself by no means easy. Those who graduated successfully were well fitted, so far as education could fit them, for any walk of life, not merely for the army alone ; and moreover they had not only been well instructed in book learning, but had been taught by the discipline of the academy that self-restraint and that duty of obedience which is the first step in the knowledge of how to command.

The rank and file of both Federal and Confederate armies were necessarily formed from men voluntarily enlisted and untrained. Most of them were free-born American citizens, and it is estimated that at this period (summer of 1862) the foreign element, even in the ranks of the

Union armies, where it was greatest, never rose above 30 per cent. of the whole forces. Of this element the greater part were Irishmen and Germans. The former, sprung from a fighting race, were in every way as good soldiers as the native Americans ; the latter consisted, to a large extent, of exiled revolutionaries of 1848, and were popularly supposed to be of somewhat inferior quality. There seems some ground for this opinion, and we may take it as certain that the German soldier, whose strength lies in his amenability to strict discipline rather than in his independent spirit, felt himself rather out of place in the loosely knit ranks of these volunteer armies, and would have been much more at home in a better officered and more mechanically trained force.

The American soldier had many excellent military qualities. His patriotism was necessarily at a very high level ; whether he fought under the Stars and Stripes for the integrity of his country, or under the Stars and Bars for the freedom of his state, he had deliberately sacrificed ease and pleasure for the hardships of the bivouac and the horrors of the battlefield, and having made his choice he held to it ; suffering, without complaint, all the inevitable concomitants of war—hunger, thirst, cold, heat, weariness, wounds and death. Many of the wealthiest and best-born of America's citizens were found shouldering a musket in the ranks, and it was by no means uncommon, especially on the Confederate side, to find officers giving orders to men who, in civil life, would have been far and away their social superiors. The courage of an army composed of such men was of course beyond criticism ; and both sides possessed in a high degree that obstinacy and stubbornness in defence, that splendid spirit that never knows when it is beaten, which is pre-eminently a quality of the Anglo-Saxon races. It may be doubted whether

at any time in the history of war that superiority of defence over attack, which is announced with the greatest regularity at the appearance of every successive improvement in weapons, was as real as it was at this period.

The intelligence of the men was on an average very high ; this was especially the case with the Northern armies. Among the Confederates there was a certain number of countrymen, fierce tempered, obstinate and wild, whose mental capacity was very little above that of the raw material which Prince Kraft had to train for the German army in the early part of his career. The Northerners, however, their intellects already highly developed by their labour in the factory and the workshop, were very capable of understanding what they were doing, and of carrying out in the best possible manner the designs of their leaders. As a consequence many mechanical aids to strategy—telegraphs, railways, ironclads—were first employed in the War of Secession, and the wealth of technical ability in the armies was often employed in tasks which to-day would need a special departmental corps to accomplish. Roads were made through swamp and forest ; railways were built, destroyed and repaired ; and, later in the war, the making of rough entrenchments with earth and logs was carried to such an extent that even during the shortest halt, and without any orders from their officers, the men would set to work and in very little time raise a stockade, even if their only tools were tin mugs and bayonets.

At the same time the faults of the American volunteer were numerous, and some of them serious. His moral character was good and there was little need for repression and strict punitive measures ; but, for all that, his discipline left something to be desired. He needed plenty of humouring ; the relations between the leaders and men were such as would have shocked a Prussian officer accus-

tomed only to the stiff and formal intercourse of a regular army. The soldier was accustomed to speak his mind, and round the bivouac fires chaff and criticism flew freely, neither field officers nor staff officers nor even generals escaped the quick tongues of their subordinates; and those who were unpopular or incompetent were never spared. All this was harmless enough in itself; but it was only a symptom of a deeper and worse evil. No one could be more ready or willing to execute orders than the American soldier, provided he saw the reason for them; once he appreciated the importance and the necessity of a particular movement his zeal and courage left nothing to be desired. The history of Pickett at Gettysburg and Upton at Spotsylvania are sufficient proof. But that habit of obedience which obeys an order because it is an order; that spirit, peculiar to well-disciplined and thoroughly trained armies, which teaches that disobedience, or even half-hearted obedience, is the worst of military crimes, because it strikes a deadly blow at that bond which unites the army and alone prevents it from dissolving into an armed mob—this habit of obedience the American soldier never learnt. It was this failing that accounts for so many disastrous defeats, for so many lost opportunities; it was this which, more rampant in the Confederate than in the Federal ranks, was in the opinion of more than one competent critic one of the greatest causes of the former's ultimate failure.

This spirit displayed itself in many ways, both on the march and on the field of battle. On the march it accounted for the constant evil of straggling, which at times reached enormous proportions. During the Federal movement to Bull Run the march was painfully slow, and hindered by a rapidly increasing crowd of laggards, who strayed all over the fields on either side of the road, pick-

ing blackberries or getting water, and behaving more like a monster party of excursionists than an army marching to battle. This was the first campaign of the war ; but the evil, though never so great as on this occasion, was, nevertheless, always very serious. Two examples will show this. In the spring of 1862 Blenker's Federal division marching from Alexandria to Petersburg in West Virginia shed no less than 3000 men *en route*, out of a total paper strength of 10,000 ; in other words, 30 per cent. of its effective. The result can hardly be put down to hard marching, as the average distance covered per day was between four and five miles ! Later on, in the autumn, when the Confederates invaded Maryland, Henderson calculates that Jackson's corps, which was, taking it all in all, the finest body of troops in either army, lost in stragglers 4000 men out of 15,000—over a quarter of a whole. The Army of the Potomac, too, at this time was in very little better condition : "The States of the North," says McClellan in one of his letters, "are flooded with deserters and absentees. One corps has 13,000 men present and 15,000 absent." General Lee published numerous general orders on the subject, and some even in the last few months of the war, when the troops could not be called untrained or wanting in experience.

The same cause led to slackness on outpost duty, and hence to disastrous surprises, both of small and large bodies. Everyone will at once think of the rout of the XI. Corps at Chancellorsville by Stonewall Jackson ; but there were other instances. The capture of the bridge head on the Rappahannock by Sedgwick on the night of November 7th, 1863, and the surprise of Kenly at Front Royal in the Valley Campaign, are examples on a large scale ; and cases of the surprise and loss of small parties of cavalry and infantry abound in the Official Records.

It was the same story: the independent spirit of the volunteer often prevented him from paying all due attention to those irksome and apparently unimportant duties; and it was only when they had had the penalty of carelessness taught them in the hard school of experience that the men took matters into their own hands and saw to it, as a body, that the essential service of security was thoroughly and conscientiously performed.

So much for the errors engendered by the spirit of indiscipline in strategical duties. Tactically, the same weakness showed itself in three very conspicuous ways. Firstly, fire-discipline was non-existent; and this is hardly surprising, for of all forms of control fire-discipline is the most exacting and the hardest to attain. The officers having very little control over the fire of their men, the inevitable results followed; much wild and ineffective shooting and a great waste of ammunition. Individually the marksmanship of both armies attained a high standard of excellence, but battles are won not by the fire of individuals but of masses, and this fire of masses was usually very much out of hand, and not by any means, as it should be, a powerful weapon, the most powerful in a leader's armoury, to be applied, at the time and place that he chooses, to decide the conflict as by an irresistible and staggering blow.

Secondly, there was much lack of precision in movement. Even the charge was often ragged and scattered, a wild rush of independent warriors, rather than the united advance of serried lines powerful as a river in full flood. In evolutions whose immediate utility was not apparent there was still more confusion and hesitancy, while for some time there was a marked tendency on both sides to break up if subjected to artillery fire during a movement—a sure sign of defective discipline.

Thirdly, the curse of present-day armies, skulking, was present in all the American battles. A Federal leader at Sharpsburg narrates how he saw, all over the ground which lay between him and the enemy, men leaving their posts to help the wounded to the rear. Sometimes the sight was almost ludicrous ; two, three or even four men would be supporting the wounded man, another carrying his rifle, another his cap, another his greatcoat or haversack, and so on ; the evil grew so great that henceforward both sides were compelled to picket the rear of their battle lines with cavalry or provost guards, and allow no unwounded soldier to go to the rear who had not a signed pass from his commander. Those who endeavoured to push through were either collected and, when a suitable number had been reached, handed over to the next advancing general to be placed in the forefront of his line, or else shot forthwith. It is doubtful whether skulking was ever practised to so great an extent in the whole history of war except by Gambetta's raw levies on the Loire in 1870.

In spite of all these weaknesses, the soldiers of 1862 were, if anything, above the average as fighting troops. They could take a great deal of punishment without getting demoralised ; their defence was stubborn, their attacks always vigorous and resolute. Their tactics and formations were skilfully adapted to the various, and often very difficult, terrain which formed the scene of their combats ; modern tactical methods, the use of skirmishers on a large scale, the advance by rushes of small bodies, covered by their comrades' fire, and the gradual building up by these methods of a firing line within charging distance of the enemy—all had their origin in the fields of the Civil War. As we have already said, the desperate encounters of the Wilderness and before Atlanta revealed for the first time the enormous gain to the defence and the still greater

one to the attack, from the extensive employment of rough field defences. The cavalry, especially that of the Southerners, was handled both strategically and tactically in a manner never since equalled, and which is still full of lessons for the future. Splendid riders and excellent shots, equally skilled with the sword or the rifle, the horsemen were led by cavaliers whose names stand very high on the roll of fame, who, whether on outpost duty in front of their own army or riding on a raid far in rear of that of their enemy, whether engaged in discovering the march of their opponents or preceding and screening their own, knew how to turn to the best advantage every accident of the ground, every natural obstacle, every quality of their own troopers and every defect of their adversaries. The splendid fighting powers of both Federals and Confederates cannot be denied, and need not be affirmed by aught but their own achievements, for these speak louder than the words of any writer who ever set pen to paper. They had, of course, their peculiar defects, and other defects common to all partially trained and imperfectly disciplined troops; but the English nation may well esteem itself fortunate and happy if the Territorial Army of the present day fights as well and acquits itself as nobly as did these American volunteer armies of fifty years ago.

Perhaps the greatest cause of the early errors of the combatants was after all the weakness of their officers. So enormous were the numbers put into the field by both sides that the supply of regular officers and West Pointers was only just sufficient to fill the higher commands and the staff. As a result of this, good regimental officers were few and far between; and the method of obtaining them, election by the rank and file, was not calculated to make the best of the available material. Those selected were chosen largely for their social, not for their military,

qualities; others were appointed as being prominent politicians or influential local magnates; and the efficiency of the armies suffered in direct ratio. McClellan weeded out some of the worst of these officers on the Federal side; but even so there were far too many left in the service. Hence the men could not, and did not, trust their leaders, as was necessary if victory was to be won. Federal and Confederate alike fell into the habit of criticising their superiors, and sound and well merited as this criticism often was, its existence did not contribute in any way to the well-being and success of the army. Later the Federal leaders, especially the lower ranks, improved vastly and learnt to handle their men in all circumstances with the greatest coolness and judgment, but it is to be noted that this improvement coincided with a change of relations between officers and men and the destruction of the old familiar intercourse.

Another weakness of these early American armies was to be found in their staffs. If there is one department more than another that needs, if it is to be really efficient, a constant and careful peace instruction, that department is the general staff; and therefore the American leaders found themselves, early in the war, tremendously handicapped by the friction that often arose in their commands because of the inexperience of their staff officers. Bad management of this kind had spoilt Lee's Peninsular Campaign; it was responsible for the failure in co-operation at Mechanicsville and Gaines' Mill, for the disjointed pursuit, and the checks at Savages' Station and Glendale, and for the disastrous repulse at Malvern Hill. In all the Seven Days, lack of combination, absence of inter-communication, faulty and incomplete reconnaissance and careless and ambiguous orders were very conspicuous. Among the Federals things were better; but here were

jealousy and distrust among the higher leaders which proved nearly as fatal to success, and from which the Army of Northern Virginia was happily free. This, and the system of repressing initiative, adopted with the worst results by both McClellan and Pope, were handicaps and drags which often lost many a great chance; and the result was an unintelligent, wooden leading, even among the upper ranks of the hierarchy of command, which reached its climax on the field of Chancellorsville.

A few words about the armament and organisation of the contending hosts in the summer of 1862 will conclude the first part of this chapter. The Federal infantry were mostly armed with muzzle-loading rifles, effective range being about 250 yards and extreme range 1000. The average strength of units may be calculated as follows:—Banks' corps numbered 14,500 men, on its first entry into the field under Pope; it consisted of two divisions—one of two, the other of three, brigades; in each of these latter were any number from three to six regiments. This would give for a division about 7000 men, and for a brigade from 3500 to 2500; regiments being from 800 to 500 men each.

The Federal artillery were well armed with rifled ordnance, effective at any range up to 2000 yards; the officers had as a rule a good knowledge of their weapons from a technical point of view; but their full tactical possibilities in close combination with the other arms they had yet to learn. The Federal cavalry, attached by brigades to the infantry corps, were in a very poor state; the mounts were good, but the riding execrable, and they were at present quite unable to cope with the excellent Southern horsemen. Their regeneration under such able leaders as Buford, Pleasonton, Kilpatrick and Averell was still a thing of the future; and of the glorious days await-

ing the arm when Sheridan led it, with such men under him as Custer, Merritt and Gregg, few could at this date have even dreamed. The Transport and Supply departments were working well, and anything that the wealth of a great people could supply was stored up within easy reach of the Federal hosts—and also within easy reach of Stuart's enterprising cavalry.

The Confederate infantry were armed and equipped far worse than their opponents. Old muskets and flintlocks were used by a great part of their regiments, and the result was that they relied far more on their bayonets than on fire, in direct contrast to the average Northern troops. The Confederates were organised in divisions and brigades; if we take an average division (Ewell's) of Jackson's army at Cedar Run, we find it 7550 strong, and composed of four brigades, of from four to seven regiments each, which would give 900 for a brigade, and from 200 to 150 men per regiment. But many of the divisions were far weaker; for instance, the famous Stonewall Division, of four brigades and twenty-one regiments, numbered only 3000 men! The vicious system adopted by both sides of forming new units with fresh recruits instead of drafting them into the old organisations to keep them up to strength was responsible for this undue weakness.

The Confederate cavalry were in a splendid state of efficiency and led by some very able leaders. The artillery were numerous, but their armament, smooth-bore guns with an effective range of barely a mile, was inferior to the rifled ordnance of their enemy. The administrative services of the army were in a thoroughly bad condition; the troops were almost invariably ill-supplied; and in many cases boots were absolutely lacking. "The route of the Confederate army from the Rappahannock

to Chantilly," it has been written, "might be traced by the bloodstained footprints along the highways."

So much for the armies; we will now turn to the men who led them.

On the Federal side we have to deal with two distinct sets of generals. One set served under Pope from Cedar Run to Chantilly, and the second set, relieving them after the latter engagement, led the Army of the Potomac at South Mountain and Sharpsburg. Let us take them in order.

The Federal Army of Virginia was led from June 26th to September 2nd by Major-General Pope, who had as corps commanders Sigel, Banks and McDowell, and later was reinforced by three corps from the Army of the Potomac, under Heintzelmann, Reno and Porter respectively.

Major-General John Pope was born in 1823, and was thus thirty-nine years old when he assumed command. He was an alumnus of West Point, having graduated there in 1842, in the same class with Rosecrans, Doubleday and Longstreet. He had served with distinction in Mexico, being breveted for his conduct at Monterey and Buena Vista. On the conclusion of the campaign he had been engaged in geographical exploration in the Red River district and elsewhere in the West; and in this duty he continued till May 1861, when he was gazetted Major-General of Volunteers and appointed to a command in Missouri under Frémont. Here he showed himself an able and energetic leader, his best-known achievement being the capture of New Madrid and Island No. 10, with a large number of Confederate prisoners.

As to Pope's merits as a general, there has been much dispute. Few will deny that he possessed many military

virtues. He was brave, energetic and resolute ; he was by no means unskilful in the handling of troops, and he possessed right up to the end a supreme confidence in his own powers. But he had several undoubted faults. He was intolerant of counsel and interference ; and he was very much wanting in tact. He alienated the sympathies of his men at the very beginning of the campaign by a boastful address, in which he seemed to extol the western at the expense of the eastern armies ; his orders were often curt and harsh and he never gained the esteem and confidence of either his troops or his subordinates. As a tactician he had little to recommend him ; as a strategist he was clear-sighted and prompt to decide and execute ; but he was prone to forming preconceived ideas as to what his foes were doing or intended to do, and nothing could then shake him in his opinion.) In a word, he possessed all the merits and most of the defects of the “ *bon général ordinaire* ” who triumphs easily over inferior men but is a simple plaything to the commander of genius.

Major-General Franz Sigel had taken command of Frémont's old corps, on the latter's refusal to serve under Pope, his junior. He was a German officer, born in Baden in 1824, and had taken a prominent part in the revolutionary movements of 1848. Like many of his fellows, on the defeat of the cause of liberty, he fled to America, and there undertook teaching work for nine years. Appointed to a command in the west on the outbreak of Civil War, he distinguished himself at Carthage and Pea Ridge, and in the summer of 1862 came with Pope to the eastern theatre to take command of the I. Corps, composed entirely of Germans and Poles. The famous Carl Schurz, whose memoirs were lately published, was one of his divisional generals. Sigel was not a conspicuous success as a leader of volunteers ; he never

seemed to understand their peculiar characteristics, yet he was a great favourite with his men, and his appointment to high command was a judicious step in view of the large German element in the army.

Major-General Nathaniel P. Banks had started life as a mill hand and thence worked his way up to membership of the Massachusetts Legislature in 1849 and to a seat in Congress six years later. Just before the war he was acting as president of a railroad company. He was an ardent Abolitionist, brave and zealous, but with no idea of war except what he had picked up from service in the State militia. He was one of Lincoln's "political generals" whose tenure of office did so much to handicap the Union armies and throw away the lives of Union soldiers in disastrous engagements. Up to the present Banks' only command had been in the Valley of Virginia, where he was unfortunate enough to meet against Stonewall Jackson, to the great augmentation of the latter's fame as a general.

Major-General Irvin McDowell was forty-four years of age at this time and had graduated at West Point in 1838. He had served in Mexico in the same regiment with Jackson and Hooker, and in the years following had been employed in the War Department at Washington. He was appointed brigadier in May of 1861, and commanded the first Federal army during the short campaign of Bull Run. The voice of the people held him responsible for that defeat, but history has fully exonerated him from the blame which really attached to the lack of training and unreadiness for war of the army and the nation. During the whole of the Peninsular campaign he had been retained at Fredericksburg with the I. Corps and saw no fighting at all, being used by the Administration as a convenient plaything to be given to or withdrawn from McClellan

according to the movements of the Confederates in the Valley. McDowell was a gallant and capable officer, but it was his misfortune never to take part in a single successful engagement. After this Second Manassas Campaign he saw no more fighting, being relieved of his command and never reappointed.

Brigadier-General Jesse L. Reno, commanding the IX. Corps of the army of the Potomac, was in every way an excellent leader. He was the same age as Pope but graduated at West Point four years later than his general-in-chief. He was one of the few officers breveted twice in the Mexican War for distinguished conduct in the field ; after this he was employed by Government in topographical work. His previous services in the Civil War had been under Burnside on the North Carolina coast, whence, on the formation of the Army of Virginia, he had been recalled with two divisions and attached to the newly formed force.

Major-General FitzJohn Porter, the leader of the V. Corps, the gallant fighter of Gaines' Mill and Malvern Hill, was one of the most experienced and able officers in either of the two armies. Just forty years of age, he had served his Government in Mexico and at West Point, in Kansas, Utah and Texas. He was the close personal friend of McClellan, of sound and matured judgment, and a skilful handler of troops both in defence and attack. He was reckoned beyond dispute the ablest tactician of the army, and probably, from every point of view, there was no better officer then at the disposal of the Federal Government.

Such were the men of the first period. After the disasters of Manassas and Chantilly, there was a general shuffling of commands. The only men who still retained their posts were Reno and FitzJohn Porter. Pope,

Sigel, Banks and McDowell all disappear from the scene. Reno's career was cut short at South Mountain and his corps given to Cox, a general whose fame was won chiefly in the western theatre with Sherman. McDowell's corps, now the I. Corps, Army of the Potomac, received as its new chief "Fighting Joe" Hooker, that most able of corps leaders and worst of subordinates. These two bodies formed the right wing under Burnside. Sumner led the centre, consisting of his own (II.) corps and the XII., once commanded by Banks, now by Williams. The V. Corps (Porter's) and the VI. (Franklin's) constituted the left wing; Franklin being the superior officer. McClellan was Generalissimo of the whole.

George B. McClellan had had up to this date a long and distinguished career. Born in 1826, he had passed through West Point and the Mexican War, where he had served on the staff, and had been employed since by the Washington Government in many ways, until he had finally been sent out as United States attaché to the allied forces in the Crimea. From 1856 he had been director of a large railroad company, and managed it with striking skill and success. On the outbreak of war he had been appointed to the chief command in the Ohio department with the rank of Major-General, and after Bull Run had been called to the command-in-chief of all the Federal armies, his appointment being chiefly due to a successful campaign in West Virginia. After five months' tenure of this exalted post he was relieved, and given the leadership of the Army of the Potomac. His Peninsular campaign is well-known history.

In personal appearance McClellan was dignified and handsome; in manner courteous and winning; in every way a thorough gentleman. His power over his troops was very great, and none of the leaders who commanded

the Army of the Potomac could count more surely on the wholehearted devotion of the men who followed him. He was hard-working, energetic, and methodical; one of the greatest organisers known to history, forging into a great and united host the heterogeneous and undisciplined masses of men who had assembled by the shores of the Potomac after the Bull Run disaster. As a strategist in the Cabinet he was unrivalled; no one knew better how to plan a campaign and direct the movements of great armies. His reputation at the time when he first assumed control of the military forces of the Republic was deservedly high, and continued so till the end.

He had however grave faults. He was excessively cautious, especially in his execution; he seemed incapable of action till everything had reached an ideal completeness seldom attained in war. When an opportunity presented itself he "feared to put it to the touch, to win or lose it all," and so let the chance slip by untaken. Add to this that he had a bad tendency to magnify obstacles instead of seeing through them, and to multiply in his imagination the numbers of his foes out of all proportion to their real strength. Hence the opinion current about him among all those who had closely watched his interminable delays and excuses in the Peninsula, that he never would succeed in doing anything.

Probably, however, these faults would not have effectually prevented his retention of command, if there had not been another reason for his removal. He was a politician and a Democrat, and he often let this appear in his letters to the President and Mr Secretary Stanton; he had an unfortunate manner of expressing himself in these letters, and on more than one occasion used such language as no servant of State could be pardoned for employing under any circumstances. And therefore, little by little,

the Government began to lose confidence in their chosen general, and the breach grew wider and wider until it culminated, after the battle of Sharpsburg, in the removal of McClellan from command.

The necessity was most unhappy, and the general opinion seems to be that Lincoln made a mistake in so dismissing him. McClellan was not a great general but he was learning from his errors, and there seems some ground for Lee's verdict that he was the greatest leader the Army of the Potomac ever had. History will probably endorse that conclusion, only adding as an exception the name of Ulysses S. Grant.

It will be sufficient here to give short sketches of McClellan's three wing commanders. Edwin V. Sumner had been, up till the Peninsular campaign, a colonel of cavalry, when he had suddenly been promoted to the command of a corps. He was a man of excellent character but too old for active campaigning; and, besides, he suffered from a constitutional defect. Physically the bravest of men, he rapidly became demoralised, as a commander, by hard fighting; his tactical judgment, never very great, then completely forsook him, and rendered him unable either to see an advantage or to press it home if he saw it.

Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside, who led the right wing, had fought at Bull Run, and during the Peninsular campaign had been engaged in an expedition with the IX. Corps in North Carolina, where he had met with some success. He was handsome, frank and captivating, a generous and loyal friend; but he had few soldierly qualities. As a tactician he was incapable of handling large masses of men with order and effect; and his tenure of chief command resulted in one of the severest repulses the Union arms ever underwent. His powers were certainly not those of a general-in-chief, and it is

doubtful if he was really capable of commanding an army corps.

William B. Franklin had graduated at West Point in 1843. Possessing undeniable abilities, and a thoroughly well-trained and capable soldier, though not of the strongest character, he yet cannot be numbered in the list of fortunate and successful generals; and his conduct at Fredericksburg, though it was influenced to a large extent by the incapacity of his general-in-chief, so glaringly exposed his defects that he was relieved of his duties. In this case also the judgment of his contemporaries has been to a great extent modified by posterity.

Such were the leaders of the Union armies; of them a Northern general has written, and his words apply not only to the generals of the Antietam but to those of Manassas: "If a student of history, familiar with the characters of the War of Secession but happening to be ignorant of the battle of the Antietam, should be told the names of the men who held high commands there, he would say that, with anything like equality of force, the Confederates must have won, for their leaders were men who made great names in the war, while the Federal leaders were men who, with few exceptions, never became conspicuous, or became conspicuous only through failure."

The Confederate chiefs whom it is necessary to note here are Lee, Jackson, Longstreet and Stuart. There were many other famous soldiers in the Southern ranks: Ewell, who lost a leg in this campaign, R. H. Anderson, McLaws, Early, Hood, the two Hills and Fitz Lee—to mention only a few—but we have not space for their biographies.

Robert Edward Lee, America's greatest soldier, was already well advanced in years when he entered on the series of campaigns which made his name world-renowned. Born in 1807 he had been chief engineer in Mexico and

there met and studied many of those who were then his comrades, later his opponents. In 1861, after a long mental struggle, he decided to throw in his lot with the South and at once became a major-general. Defeated in West Virginia by McClellan and Rosecrans, he took charge of the Atlantic coast defences early in 1862, and after the battle of Seven Pines succeeded Joe Johnston in command of the army covering Richmond. Few commanders have ever possessed a greater insight into the nature of war than Lee; few have known how to turn more skilfully to account the advantage of close acquaintance with the adversary's character and weak points. With McClellan, Pope, and Burnside, he dared anything; Hooker he artfully led on, until the time had come to strike him the shattering blow that ruined his plans and dashed all his hopes; to Grant he opposed a defence stern, tenacious, and untiring. Few men possessed, as he, in the most intricate country, intersected by river and swamp, and veiled by forest and jungle, such an unerring eye for the strength and weakness of a position; and no man ever more quickly captured or more closely held the hearts and affections of his soldiers. For Lee was not only a great warrior; he was more. He united in himself all the chivalry and courtesy of the knights of old with the humility and faith of a Christian. The only faults that the closest scrutiny of nearly fifty years of criticism can find in him are that his modesty was at times too great, that he yielded too readily to the voice of subordinates or of political chiefs without one tithe of his wisdom; and that, for fear of asserting his own opinion too loudly, he kept silence when the welfare of the cause might have been better forwarded had he spoken. These criticisms doubtless do, in some degree, detract from the merits of the general; they can only increase in our minds our admiration for the man.

To attempt to sum up in a few lines the character of Stonewall Jackson would be to attempt the impossible. A soldier of the highest ability, with a natural genius for war, he united to an inexhaustible patience, which could wait and watch for its time to strike, a fiery and inspiring energy which, when the chance came, scattered resistance like chaff before the wind. To this he added a stubborn obstinacy in defence, a mastery of ruse unequalled since the days of Hannibal, a clear and cool strategic insight, and a tactical *coup d'œil* second to none, not even to Lee's. His character was reserved, yet strangely attractive, and his men while they laughed at his peculiarities, yet learned to love and trust him wherever he led them. The understanding between him and Lee was marvellous; Lee declared that Jackson was his right hand; Jackson avowed that he would follow Lee blindfold; and when "Stonewall" fell at Chancellorsville, not only the South but the North also felt instinctively that one of the best and greatest men of his generation had passed away.

James Longstreet, who commanded the right wing of the Army of Northern Virginia, was at this time forty-one years of age. He had the reputation of being the hardest fighter in the Confederate ranks, and was indeed a very able and successful soldier; but his good qualities, which were many, were counterbalanced by certain peculiarities of temperament which rendered him difficult to work with and awkward to control. Of a very stubborn and independent turn of mind, his self-reliance often degenerated into sheer obstinacy, and at Gettysburg, and also in a lesser degree at the Second Manassas, he preferred to argue at a critical moment instead of obeying. He was a soldier out of whom much splendid work could be got, but he required studying and humouring. It says much for Lee's tact that their relations were so uniformly amicable.

“Jeb” Stuart, the famous cavalry leader, was the youngest of the generals on either side, not yet having reached the age of thirty. Cut off in the prime of his days before he had attained the half of man’s allotted span of life, he left, nevertheless, a glorious record behind. Trained in the United States regulars he had taken the lead of the cavalry under Johnston in 1861, and from that date sprang rapidly into fame. In the work of strategic reconnaissance and screening he was vigilant, daring, judicious, and indefatigable; while he first conceived and carried out those brilliant raids which were a feature of cavalry work in this war. As a tactician he was one of the few leaders known to history who successfully combined fire and shock action, and in this respect at least he has never yet been surpassed by any cavalier. Gay, vivacious and full of animal spirits, he was the life and soul of the Confederate bivouacs; all the generals with whom he served testified to his splendid services, although he made more than one strategic error, notably in the Gettysburg campaign, and his raids have been justly criticised as involving an undue waste of horseflesh. Be that as it may, few will deny his sterling value as a leader; and to him and his gallant troopers must be allotted by no means the least share in the credit of the Confederate victories.

CHAPTER III

THE BATTLE OF CEDAR RUN

WE left the army of Virginia preparing for its concentration at Culpeper, where Ricketts had already arrived, covered by the cavalry along the Rapidan, some ten to twenty miles in advance. On August 7th Pope was at Sperryville, inspecting the I. Corps of his army, when reports reached him from Bayard and Buford that the foe was advancing. The former's pickets were driven in early in the day, and by 4 P.M. the commander-in-chief was satisfied that a serious attempt was being made to cross the river between Barnett's Ford and Rapidan Station, and fall on his still widely separated columns; but the direction of the hostile march was as yet uncertain. It might be towards his left flank, to separate the mass of the Federal Army from Burnside and King, a danger against which Halleck had warned him and which Pope himself feared even so late as August 9th; or it might be to attack his isolated brigade at Culpeper. Thither he at once hastened, and found that Crawford had been reinforced by Ricketts from Waterloo that same day. Thirteen thousand good troops were thus holding this important point; seven miles in rear were 7500 more under Banks; while the I. Corps, eleven miles farther back still, could arrive in twelve hours. King was two good days' march distant, but Pope did not despair of bringing him up also in time for the imminent battle. For the last two days he had used all his persuasive powers to win Halleck's consent to a move

from Falmouth to Culpeper, arguing that, since Burnside was already disembarking at Aquia, King could safely be relieved from his guard over the Government property there and the direct road from Richmond to Washington. Unhappily the IX. Corps had no cavalry with it and Halleck steadily refused to permit King to move unless he left his cavalry behind. Stuart's raid from Hanover Court House up the Telegraph road towards Fredericksburg, which on this very date (August 8th) was making extensive captures in rear of Hatch and Gibbon, sent off on an expedition southwards and, compelling their hasty retreat, certainly gave point to Halleck's arguments. As a result of these delays, King was on the day of Cedar Run still encamped at Falmouth.

We must go now for a while from Pope's headquarters to the cavalry screen along the Rapidan. General Bayard had heard on the night of the 7th that the enemy were passing in great strength west of Rapidan Station and had driven back all the pickets. At dawn on the 8th the general rode forward to see for himself; one regiment accompanied him and a squadron was sent off westward along the Madison road, thence to wheel to the left and strike the adversary in flank. But as Bayard reached the fort of Cedar Mountain, his advance-guard, thrown well out, beheld a camp and a long train of waggons, all covered by strong cavalry posts. Infantry were evidently in front of him, and at this moment a deserter came in and reported Ewell's whole division to be across the river and pushing forward. Orders were sent to the flanking party and all the pickets along the Rapidan to fall back at once. The main body retreated slowly to the junction of the roads from Madison and from Culpeper, and there turning held off the hostile cavalry until the other squadron came in, bringing a score of prisoners with it. Guns now opened

from the south, but Bayard slipped over Robertson's river, destroying the bridge; the camp was evacuated and all stores sent back to Culpeper, preceded by a disorderly stampede of camp-followers. The Federals then fell back a mile behind Cedar Run and encamped there, one regiment being on outpost duty along the Run. They had carried out their duty of delaying the enemy with coolness and success, and had given warning to their chief in ample time to allow him to effect at leisure his concentration for battle.

Pope, in fact, had despatched orders to Banks and Sigel quite early in the day, enjoining them to move at once on Culpeper. Banks received the message at about 1 P.M., and moved off some time during the afternoon; but he seems to have marched slowly, for Gordon's brigade, forming the rear of the column, did not reach its destination till midnight. Sigel did not move at all. In the late evening of the day, the astonished Pope received a note from him, written at 6.30 P.M., asking by what road he should move; at once an order was sent him to start at once and reach Culpeper by noon on the morrow, moving along the turnpike, which was, as a matter of fact, the only possible road. The delay, however, was to prove fatal.

At the same time as he despatched these orders, Pope sent Crawford's brigade forward in support of the cavalry. When it reached Cedar Run the enemy were found in front, and here the little force bivouacked in a position of readiness, sheltered from view and fire in the bed of the stream. Ricketts was also pushed up to Colvin's Tavern, two miles behind Crawford; and Buford, then falling back towards Sperryville, was ordered to make a dash against the hostile flank and rear about Barnett's Ford if he saw a chance, but to be very cautious. Pope's view of the situation is given in a letter to Halleck, written at 10 P.M. :

“ One division of the enemy crossed the Rapidan to-day at Barnett’s Ford and is resting at Robertson’s river. This is probably a reconnoissance in force, but may be possibly an advance on Culpeper. To-morrow morning I shall push the enemy again behind the Rapidan and take up a strong position. I will be very careful that my communications with Fredericksburg are not cut.”

The 9th of August dawned a hot, stifling summer day. On both sides the armies girded themselves up for the battle. Sigel had resumed his long-delayed march on Culpeper, but could not be up for some hours. On the field of battle itself Bayard, emboldened by the support of the infantry, took measures to check the further advance of the enemy. His cavalry were drawn up in line on a ridge just beyond the run, which had been the outpost position of the previous night. The whole force numbered four regiments ; one of these was sent off to watch the left in the direction of Cedar Mountain, and two squadrons of another to perform the same duty on the right. Reinforcements were coming up from the rear ; Banks’ corps, enjoying but six hours’ rest after its march of the day before, was under orders to go forward towards Cedar Run. At 8 A.M. the first of the troops moved out from the village and a long column of dust, rising in thick opaque clouds, soon marked out their track over the plain. Pope, at this hour, was seated in the Court House, reporting to Washington that the Confederates seemed to be moving against his right, and expressing his intention of falling on the flank of their marching columns if they continued on this course.

Meanwhile fifteen miles to the southward Pope’s antagonist had been early on the move. Speed was necessary if the operation undertaken by Jackson on the 7th, and persevered in through all discouragements, was not

to end in failure. Even before daylight Hill had set out and overtaken the rear of the Stonewall division just as the latter was starting; by dawn the whole of the Valley army was marching northward over the plains between the Rapidan and Robertson rivers, Ewell still leading, with Early as advance-guard and the cavalry in the extreme van. But the advance was not to be free from interruption. Before the last of the Stonewall division had passed the Rapidan, blue troopers had appeared to the west; their numbers grew so great and their attitude so threatening that Jackson felt it necessary to detach two whole brigades (Gregg's and Lawton's) to guard the trains from any molestation. Early also was ordered to detail a regiment and a half to furnish posts on the roads to right and left of the advance.

The passage of Locustdale Ford was effected without interruption from the hostile horsemen, and about noon the leading infantry had reached the base of Cedar Mountain, when the report came in that a strong force of Federal cavalry were drawn up across the Culpeper road, preparing to dispute a further advance.

It may be as well, at this point, to give some description of the scene of the battle. The road from Orange Court House to Culpeper, running in a general north-easterly direction, divides the field into two parts. Generally speaking the south-eastern half is undulating, open country, while the north-western is extensively wooded. A mile and a half south-eastward from the junction of the Madison and Culpeper roads, at a point marked by a schoolhouse on the left of the latter, rises from the plain a lofty hill, its sides clothed with trees and undergrowth, and commanding the whole of the low ground to north and west for nearly 2000 yards. This eminence bore the name of Cedar or, more appropriately, Slaughter Mountain. Due north-

wards from its eastern foot ran Cedar Run, at this season almost if not quite dried up, and between the hill and the Run was the road from Mitchell's Station, uniting with the Culpeper road some 1200 yards west of the bridge over the stream. This road passed along the low ridge forming the main Confederate artillery position. Separated from it on the west by a field of standing corn was another ridge, the ground from which to Cedar Mountain was open, except for some small clumps of brushwood and rail fences. The eastern bank of the run, however, was veiled by dense woods, approaching within 500 yards of the stream, from which the ground sloped up gradually, giving a good field of fire from the edges of the trees.

West of the pike, and half-a-mile north of its junction with the Mitchell's Station road, rose a commanding, wooded eminence on which was situated a house bearing the name of Mrs Brown. From the Run westward along the road for about half-a-mile the ground is open, then comes a strip of wood, at right angles to the road and narrowest along it; beyond lies a bushy wheatfield of irregular outline, just opposite the cornfield on the south-east of the pike; this, which was covered with shocks, extended about 800 yards from the road and 600 along it; and another field adjoined it, separated from it at its northern edge by a low bushy ridge. All round this piece of open ground were thick and extensive woods, running back from the west edge of the wheatfield for a mile or more to the bed of the Robertson river.

Over the eastern and southern half of the battlefield, then, the ground was open and easy for manœuvres; the ridges, low and not very pronounced, yet gave good cover to troops lying down and afforded a number of successive lines of defence. To the west and north, however, the woods rendered vision and movement alike diffi-

cult, and the flank of any defensive line would always be liable to surprise attack from that direction.

Half-a-mile west of Cedar Run Bayard had taken up his position for battle; at once a Confederate battery was brought forward to the foot of Cedar Mountain and opened on him at 800 yards' range, compelling him to fall back under shelter; but the fire was answered by several hostile batteries from near the the Mitchell's Station road, and under cover of this the cavalry returned to their former positions. Early halted near the schoolhouse, deploying across the pike with his left in the woods.

Meanwhile Jackson had ridden forward. He realised at once that there was something more than a brigade and a few cavalry regiments in his front. His army was still strung out along nearly seven miles of road, and two hours at least must elapse before it could all come into line. He resolved then to delay his attack until he had a larger force in hand. For the present Early was sent forward in the centre with the batteries of Ewell's division; the two other brigades, Trimble's and Forno's, were switched off to the right to occupy Cedar Mountain. Winder's division was to support the advance-guard and form on its left.

Early, on receipt of this order, resolved to try and surprise the hostile cavalry, and making a detour to the left crossed the pike and, skirting the edge of a wood, moved once more over the road; here he brought up his right shoulder and advanced as far as the farm road from Mrs Crittenden's, driving the cavalry away in haste. As the brigade breasted the slope of the hill in front and came out on the sky-line, a rapid fire greeted it from the guns beyond the cornfield, and drove it in haste behind the crest again. The artillery had already taken post as follows:—Three guns on a rise to Early's right front; five on the ridge north of Mrs Crittenden's house; nine on

Cedar Mountain. Here Trimble and Forno arrived about 3 P.M. and halted on the north-west shoulder, hidden from view, Trimble in front, Forno in reserve. The rest of the army was gradually coming up from the valley of the Robertson river. Winder's three divisional batteries came into action at the north-east corner of the wood; Taliaferro's brigade drew up in support of them parallel to the pike; Garnett's held the left of the line on the south edge of the wheatfield, unable to fulfil its mission, the attack of the flank of the line of hostile guns, by reason of infantry in strength in its front. The Stonewall brigade, under Ronald, was halted some considerable distance in rear of the line under cover of the woods, as reserve. Hill was yet on the march. For two hours a fierce artillery duel raged; shells flew to and fro across the little valley and burst, not always without effect, among the artillery on the crests or the infantry in the hollows; to one of them the gallant Winder fell a victim.

Turning our attention to the Federals, Banks' corps had been marching forward since an early hour, in most trying heat, which caused the death of several men and strewed the roadside with exhausted stragglers. The head of the column, passing Ricketts' division lying down in the fields near Colvin's Tavern, reached Crawford's position at noon and extended into the woods on the crest of Cedar Run to enjoy the much-needed rest and water. Williams' guns came into position beside Kemp's battery (Crawford's brigade) beyond the stream, making a mass of about thirty guns in all, and began to reply to the hostile fire. Behind them, the infantry took post. Gordon's brigade seized the height on which stood Mrs Brown's house and established itself firmly there; Crawford was still under cover across the pike; Augur's 2nd division deployed on his left, Geary's brigade next to Crawford's, then Prince's and

Greene's. The batteries took position on the left and centre of the division; a cavalry regiment guarded the exposed flank. In this position the Union forces remained until 5 P.M.

Banks himself arrived on the scene of action at 3 o'clock with the following order in his pocket :—

“CULPEPER, 9.45 A.M., Aug. 9, '62.

“*From* COL. LEWIS MARSHALL.

“Genl. Banks to move to the front immediately, assume command of all forces in the front, deploy his skirmishers if the enemy approaches, and attack him immediately as he approaches and be reinforced from here.”

There has been ever since the battle considerable controversy as to how far the commander of the II. Corps carried out Pope's intentions on August 9th. Roberts, the chief of staff, accompanied Banks to the field, and he asserted that the latter general received orders from him, given in Pope's name, to take up a defensive position and not to fight until the army was completely concentrated. Banks denied this and declared that Roberts used certain rather provoking expressions, such as “no backing out here to-day,” which he construed as a reflection on his own courage and that of his corps. In any case, Banks had no idea that any considerable forces were in front, much less that all Jackson's corps was coming up, and said so to Roberts, who disagreed with him; by 5 P.M. the corps commander had flung patience and prudence to the winds, and believing himself, no doubt, fortified by Pope's written order, issued orders for an immediate attack. Williams was ordered to move Crawford into the woods on the right of the road and strike the

hostile left ; Geary, followed by Prince, was to move up in support of the skirmish line of the 2nd division.

Crawford at once proceeded to carry out his orders. Forming his brigade under shelter of the trees into one line, he set his attack in motion without awaiting the promised artillery support ; the three regiments advanced to the edge of the covert, fixed bayonets, and, with colours flying, charged with a roar of cheering across the wheat-field. The enemy was completely surprised. Their right held firm, and a hail of bullets smote the advancing line and tore great gaps in its serried array ; but the blue-clad troops never paused ; folding round the defender's left, formed by an Irish battalion, they rolled it up, and sweeping onward, sent the whole of Garnett's brigade, one regiment after another, flying in disorder through the trees. Already Augur's men had moved to the onslaught against Jackson's centre. Geary and Prince advanced in echelons, each in two lines, under a heavy cross fire from front and left, and entered into a fire fight with Early at short range. Here little ground was gained, but on the left of Early, Crawford was carrying all before him. Taliaferro's brigade, in support of the Confederate guns, found the enemy thronging round it and firing into its flank and rear. The artillery were ordered back at a gallop, only just in time to escape capture ; and the infantry, unable to hold on, turned about and fell back in more or less confusion towards their right. In the centre also the fight was turning in favour of the Federals ; advancing under cover of some dead ground, they had got quite close and all but captured some guns, which had driven recklessly forward into the very jaws of the enemy. Early saw their peril, and charging with a yell, pushed the hostile lines far enough back to permit the escape of the artillery ; but fresh Federal regiments came pressing

forward ; Crawford's soldiers, in disordered array but flushed with success, swung in against Early's left ; the regiment on that flank, thrown back to meet this new foe, was caught in the act of changing front, and scattered into fragments ; the next unit, and the next, were alike broken by the vigorous assault, and the mass of blue, storming up the slope of the hill with loud and prolonged shouts of triumph, seemed about to sweep the two remaining regiments from their path. All was confusion ; the road and the ground south of it were covered with fugitives, hastening panic-stricken to the rear ; through them the Stonewall brigade was trying to force its way, its right giving and breaking up before the torrent of routed and broken soldiery. Gun teams and waggons were galloping off southwards, intent only on escape ; shells from the well-served Federal guns fell crashing into the mob and added to the terror of the scene.

Stonewall Jackson was undismayed. Riding into the midst of his troops, he drew his sword, crying : " Rally, men, and follow me," and the sight of the loved leader checked like magic the panic flight. Indeed the Federal attack had spent itself ; Ronald's Stonewall brigade, arrayed across their path, had checked their further advance with rapid and steady volleys ; and Hill's division, hurrying forward, was about to lend aid. Thomas' brigade had formed on Early's right, just in time to save the latter from an envelopment on both flanks ; Branch, Pender and Archer hastened up to support Ronald. Opening their ranks to let the fugitives through, Branch's men commenced a deadly fire against the disordered masses of the enemy ; Archer was forming his line well in rear of Branch's left, Pender obliquely to Archer. The Federals could not resist the rush of these fresh, unbroken troops ; giving ground before Branch's volleys, they fell

back over the cornfield towards the strip of woodland. Here, stiffened by a fresh regiment, the 10th Maine, they made a stubborn stand; for some minutes a fierce fire fight raged across the wheatfield; then, under the ever-increasing pressure from front and right, the gallant Northerners had to abandon their position.

In the centre too the success of the attack had been but transitory. The second line of Prince's and Geary's brigades coming up had inadvertently fired into the backs of their own first line, and the latter promptly fell back to a small road in rear. The second line held on for a while, but the forces of the enemy in its front were increasing every minute; troops were beginning to flank the assailants on the right and in a very short time the line had to go back, covered by the troops in the road, leaving General Prince in the hands of the enemy.

Everywhere over the field the Confederates were pressing forward. The woods were still disgorging Crawford's broken troops; Augur was falling back on the left, for Ewell's men on Cedar Mountain, who had been unable to advance before because of the fire of their own guns sweeping the ground just in front of them, were threatening his flank and rear with two intact brigades. Suddenly a column of Federal horsemen appeared charging headlong down the pike. It was a gallant but fruitless effort; the grey skirmishers were scattered, but the closed lines in rear, wheeling up on both flanks, decimated the troopers with rapid volleys, which strewed the road with men and horses and compelled the survivors to seek safety in flight. At the same moment the roar of battle broke out afresh on the left. Gordon's brigade had been ordered up as a forlorn hope. Stumbling through the strip of woods the men opened fire against the flashes of the enemy's muskets, the only indication of his position in the gathering dusk. The


uneven fight did not last long ; and when Pender's brigade came up on their flank, Gordon had to fall back in good order but with heavy loss to his position of the afternoon.

The field was Jackson's ; but that leader was not satisfied, for he wished, if possible, to reach Culpeper that night ; and though darkness had fallen, and his brigades were still incompletely rallied, the march was ordered to be resumed. Field's and Stafford's brigades, which had not been engaged, led the advance. Caution was necessary, for the rest of the Federal army might well be near at hand ; and such turned out to be the case. Half-a-mile north of Cedar Run the enemy were reported on a rise to the left front. Field and Stafford deployed, and artillery opened on the Federal line, causing great confusion among the still demoralised men of Banks' corps ; but several batteries began a most effective return fire, and the Confederate gunners soon desisted, after considerable loss. It was clear that Pope and his army were confronting Jackson, and the latter at once gave orders for the troops to halt where they stood.

Pope had at last assembled his forces. Taken quite by surprise at the sound of the heavy cannonade, he had ridden forward from Culpeper, and reached the field at 7 P.M. Banks' corps was then falling back along the whole line ; Ricketts was at once brought up and posted on Banks' right, Williams' division, or what was left of it, being massed behind the centre. In this position the troops underwent the alarm above described and bivouacked afterward for the night. Sigel had reached Culpeper at 4 P.M. instead of at noon, and his men were so wearied that a rest was necessary. Moreover, contrary to Pope's orders, they had no rations in their haversacks and had to be fed before they could go forward. The I. Corps thus never reached the battlefield.

The next day passed quietly. Jackson had ascertained that the whole of the Army of Virginia was before him; but he did not, for all that, propose to retire. He drew back as far as Cedar Mountain, and there halted; Pope,

MAP FOR BATTLE OF CEDAR RUN



on his part, merely advanced his pickets to keep in touch. The great heat and the fatigue of his men, he avers, prevented him from taking action. On this day General Stuart joined Jackson and took command of all the cavalry of the army.

Pope seems to have planned to strike Jackson's right with King's division, which was marching up to join him, having left Fredericksburg on the 8th, if the former remained where he was. But on the 11th he heard that Longstreet was at Gordonsville and began to fear an attack. Probably the Federal leader was agreeably surprised, on the morning of the 12th, to find that his enemy had retired the previous night behind the Rapidan. He at once proposed to move straight on Louisa Court House, in pursuit, and received in reply a note from Halleck: "Beware of a snare. Feigned retreats are Secesh tactics." The commander-in-chief had rightly gauged the designs of the enemy; for Jackson himself reported that his intention in falling back was not merely to avoid attack by superior forces, but to induce Pope to follow him and thus meet his fate south of the Rapidan at the hands of Lee and Longstreet, now on the point of leaving Richmond for Gordonsville.

There are several points calling for discussion in the short campaign the history of which we have just narrated. The first of them is Halleck's decision to withdraw the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula.

On July 25th the general paid a visit to the headquarters of that army at Harrison's Bay and there satisfied himself personally as to the state of the troops and the views of their officers. The following appeared to him to be the situation:—The Army of the Potomac and the new Army of Virginia were at two opposite ends of a line over 100 miles long and between them was the whole strength of the enemy, at present confronting the former force. This hostile mass was estimated by McClellan himself at 200,000 men and growing every day; the Army of the Potomac numbered at most 90,000, of whom about 10,000

were sick and unable to take the field. It was clear, if this were so, that McClellan could not take the offensive unless he were reinforced. But where were the troops to come from? McClellan asked for 35,000; Pope's command on July 31st numbered 40,000 present for duty; King at Fredericksburg had 10,000; Sturgis, with the garrison of Washington, 8000; and Cox, in West Virginia, 9000. There were thus in all 67,000 men, and this force Lincoln considered none too large for the defence of Washington. It was clear then that since Pope could not reinforce McClellan, McClellan should reinforce Pope, and to do that he must evacuate the Peninsula.

McClellan himself bitterly protested against this decision. He represented that his army was already within striking distance of Richmond, the vital spot of the Confederacy; that it was absurd to withdraw it from a point within twenty-five miles of the capital to Aquia, seventy miles away; that the troops would be demoralised and the Union prestige diminished by such a confession of failure. "Here," he wrote, "is the true defence of Washington; here the fate of the Union will be decided." Halleck replied, urging the considerations given above, stating—which was quite true—that a prolonged stay on the banks of the James would be fatal to the health of the men, and scouting McClellan's idea of the demoralising effect of the proposed move. So the decision remained unaltered.

One cannot but side with Halleck in this matter. That he was forbidden to send Pope to reinforce McClellan was no fault of his. Lincoln insisted on Washington being made secure, and he was quite right, for its capture would have been a fatal blow to the cause of the North. What he did not see was that the safest form of defence was so to nail the Southern forces to the defence of their own

capital that they could not turn their attention to Washington, and Halleck was not the man to impress this fact on him. McClellan urged it, but the President mistrusted McClellan, which is not hard to understand. Consequently Halleck had to do his best under existing conditions or else request to be relieved of his command. He chose the former course and resolved to withdraw the Army of the Potomac and unite it with Pope's in Northern Virginia, for the simple reason that there was no other way of effecting the junction of the two armies. The military error—for such it undoubtedly was—must be attributed to the politicians at Washington, who in their ignorance of war failed to see that indirect is often more effective than direct defence, especially if the former takes the shape of a vigorous attack.

Turning to the field strategy of the two forces, Jackson, in his move against Pope's divided forces, gave a very good example of this defence by means of attack. Realising the strategical importance of Culpeper as the point of junction of the hostile columns, he aimed at placing himself in such a position as to be able to strike right and left from this central point, or at least at crushing a part of the Federal van before the main body could arrive to its assistance. In this he was successful; but his success was due solely to causes which he had no part in producing and which he could not, and as a matter of fact did not, foresee. One cannot but regard Cedar Run as a lucky victory; a mere matter of hours enabled Jackson to defeat the II. Corps while yet unsupported, and that these few hours were vouchsafed him was due solely to Banks' impetuosity on the one hand and Sigel's want of initiative on the other. But for these two things the expedition to Culpeper must have met the same fate as the expedition to Kernstown in March.

With Pope's strategy before the battle little fault can be found. His concentration at Culpeper was not effected in time, but this was hardly his fault. For Sigel's folly in delaying the I. Corps in order to ask unnecessary questions on a trivial matter there can be no excuse. A corps commander is expected to be able to ^{act} on his own initiative and fill up, with the exercise of a little common-sense, any gaps in his orders. In this case there was but one road along which Sigel could march, and why he did not take it none at this date can possibly tell.

Even so, however, the delay would not have been very serious if only Banks had kept on the defensive behind Cedar Run instead of rushing madly to attack a force about three times his strength. As to the orders he received it must be said that they might undoubtedly be interpreted so as to justify an offensive course, and in fact that is their most obvious meaning. But if Banks had considered the question, and had had any grain of military knowledge, he must have recognised that an offensive battle would not at all fit in with Pope's plans. The army was not yet concentrated, and would not be till the morrow; any course then that might bring on a serious engagement might be exceedingly dangerous. And even if Banks supposed, as he doubtless did, that only a small force was in his front, he could not be sure of it. There was nothing to be gained by attack; there might be much to lose; Banks' obvious policy was to watch and wait.

However he in no way considered this aspect of the question. Urged on by his own impetuous spirit, and by the fear that Pope would think he did not want to fight, possibly also actuated by the hope of avenging on the enemy his defeats in the Valley, he rushed forward headlong like a bull at a gate, without reconnoissance, without

combination, without asking for reinforcements or even informing his general. It was the worst course he could possibly have taken.

At the same time we cannot acquit Pope of a share in the responsibility. Napoleon would not have remained in Culpeper, and trusted to the reports of a subordinate when the cannon was thundering. He would have ridden forward to the scene of action and there satisfied himself by a personal reconnoissance as to what was in front of him and what was his best course. Had Pope done so, he would probably have realised the actual state of affairs ; as it was, the battle was fought out while he was superintending the distribution of rations to Sigel's corps, and while Ricketts' division was lying inactive within three miles of the field.

With the giving of the order for attack General Banks' share in the battle seems to have begun and ended. The actual dispositions for its execution he left in the hands of Augur and Williams, which, considering the scope of his tactical ability, was probably the wisest thing he could have done. We catch but one glimpse of him near the end of the day, " watching the combat, undisturbed by the shots that fell about him "—an attitude, by the way, quite in accordance with the latest German ideas on the rôle of a commander-in-chief in battle. We do not read that he exerted himself in any way to drive home the advantage won by the attack, or to stem the tide of defeat, by his own personal influence. Jackson's conduct was very different.

The attack itself was indifferently prepared and executed. There was no attempt at a massed attack on any decisive point ; the two divisions were deployed on one line side by side, only two small brigades, Gordon's and Greene's, being held back in rear, too far off to render effective help, either by pushing on the attack or by

covering the retreat of the first line. The corps then marched straight forward and attacked in equal strength all along the front. The movements of the units were badly combined ; they came up in succession, the left leading ; each brigade fought its own battle, unaided by any other forces, and each was in turn defeated by the superior numbers arrayed against it.

The first success of Crawford's attack proved once more that the weakest of all supports for a wing is a wood, which hinders the fire of the defence and permits the massing of heavy forces at short distance by the attack. And yet no great attack was ever initiated from a wood, and Crawford's assault failed finally because here, as always, the forest rendered impossible that close co-operation of the three arms which alone can lead to decisive result.

It is remarkable that throughout the whole of the battle there was no real combination of infantry and guns, and a study of the Civil War will show that this was usually the case in all the engagements. This phenomenon has already been insisted on by Colonel Maude, and was perhaps the greatest cause of the superiority at this date of the defence over the attack. In the Napoleonic wars the Emperor nearly always prevailed by means of a vigorous offensive ; in the War of Secession the only real victories to the credit of the attack, in Virginia at all events, were Gaines' Mill, Winchester, Port Republic and Chancellorsville. But Napoleon had gained his victories by means of guns massed within case shot range and an assaulting column, and he relied more on the former and less on the latter, as the quality of his troops deteriorated. The case shot attack, however, was impossible for the American armies, for guns coming up to within such short range of infantry could never have fired a round in face of the latter's volleys ; the improvements in the infantry arm had outstripped

those in the artillery. Thus, as the latter seldom fired over the heads of their own infantry, they had to resort to preparation of the attack by preliminary bombardment of the hostile position at long range, as distinct from covering fire, and how unsatisfactory this method is the experiences of Plevna and South Africa teach us. Thus here Banks' guns were ordered to cease fire when the infantry advanced—the very time when they should have been firing their very hardest according to our modern ideas. We are in a very different position now from the armies of those days, for the power conferred on us by modern improvements in weapons, of turning every gun on a line of eight to ten miles long against the selected point of assault at the decisive moment, has rendered the advantage of the assailant over the defender greater than at any time in the history of war.

Turning now to the Confederates, Jackson had chosen his defensive line well. The commanding hill on his right rendered any turning movement on that side impossible, and afforded a good gun position whence fire could be crossed with that of artillery on the ridge to the northward. The gentle slopes gave good cover from infantry and shell fire, and favoured the concealment of heavy reserves. The left, however, was weak and the lack of careful patrolling on this wing was duly punished by its surprise and defeat. Jackson himself seems quite to have realised the dangerous situation there, and to have done his best to ensure its safety by ordering patrols to be sent out and reinforcements provided. Both measures, however, were taken too late to avoid the disaster; the former, one would think, was the duty of the brigade or regimental commander, without orders from the generalissimo.

That the battle was not lost owing to this error was solely due to Jackson's magnificent coolness and energy.

When all around him were flying, he thought only of advance ; when his defence had broken, he thought not of retreat but attack. His personal influence, exercised just at the right moment, checked the rout of his men and hurled them once more against the enemy. Establishing his line firmly in front, he executed an enveloping movement on both flanks, and the counterstroke won the battle. As always, the attackers' temporary success resulted in all the greater failure, when the force of the rush had spent itself and no support was at hand to secure what had been won. In this case, certainly, three disordered brigades had to contend against four fresh ones, and on the left one brigade fought with three ; but the lesson of all military history is that, even if the proportion had been reversed, the result would have been the same. Order and cohesion will always prevail against superior numbers.

The soldiers on both sides, as their losses attest, had fought with splendid courage and dash. The heaviest roll of casualties in the Federal army was in Crawford's brigade, which lost 50 per cent. of its effective ; one regiment, the 5th Connecticut, having 55 per cent. of its strength disabled. The losses of the whole II. Corps amounted to 302 killed, 1320 wounded and 594 missing ; total, 2216, out of about 8000 who took part in the battle. The casualties in Ricketts' division amounted to 163 all told. On the Confederate side Campbell's brigade suffered far the most heavily, two regiments, the 21st and 42nd Virginia, losing over half their strength each ; and the corps was diminished by 1276 casualties in all, only, however, about 6 per cent. of the whole force. With regard to the fighting qualities of the rank and file, then, there was not much to choose between Federals and Confederates, but " in war," as Napoleon says, " men are nothing ; it is a man who is everything."

CHAPTER IV

ON THE RAPPAHANNOCK

WHILE Pope and Jackson were fighting their indecisive duel in Culpeper county, everything in the Peninsula seemed to point to a proximate Federal retirement. Information had also been received that Burnside's corps was about to join Pope, and there was thus considerable peril that the Valley army at Gordonsville might find itself overwhelmed by superior numbers. To disgarnish altogether the neighbourhood of Richmond seemed too dangerous, but it appeared to Lee that the reasons, which had caused him to go back on his former promise to Jackson of reinforcements for the blow against the Army of Virginia, had now lost their force. He resolved therefore to transfer the bulk of his army to the Rapidan and proceed thither himself to take up the chief command.

On August 13th the movement began. Longstreet's corps of ten brigades, about 17,000 muskets, was transported by railway to Gordonsville, during the night of the 13th and the morning of the 14th. Behind came Hood's division, nearly 4000 men. D. H. Hill and McLaws remained for the present in the Peninsula; these were the only forces still confronting McClellan, for on the 16th R. H. Anderson's division was withdrawn from Drury's Bluff, south of the James, and united to the army assembling behind the Rapidan, the infantry proceeding by rail, the guns and waggons by road. Fitz Lee's cavalry brigade was ordered by Stuart on the 16th to move from

Hanover Court House by Beaver Dam to Raccoon Ford. Thus a force of rather over 30,000 men was set in motion between the 13th and 17th to reinforce the Valley army.

Lee left Richmond in person on August 15th. The day previous he had exchanged notes with Longstreet as to his future course of action; his letter is interesting as outlining substantially the plan which was actually adopted a week later. "I incline," runs the note, "to the right flank movement. You, being on the spot, must use your own judgment and determine. It is all important that our movement should be as quick as possible." Next day the three higher commanders held a council to discuss the measures to be adopted. The Federal army seemed to be lying quietly in their front, unsuspecting of danger, its left extended only a few miles beyond the Culpeper railroad. A glorious chance seemed to offer itself of compelling Pope to fight at a disadvantage. A short march would bring the army into such a position that it could be rapidly thrown over the Rapidan beyond his left and compel him to change his front in haste and fight to a flank, while Stuart's cavalry, moving northwards, would reach unopposed the Rappahannock railway bridge, destroy it and operate thence against the Federal rear. A defeat in such circumstances must result in little short of annihilation.

It was decided then to make the preparatory movements on the 17th, and to cross the river on the 18th. Lee would have preferred to move at once, but neither Anderson, Hood nor Stuart had yet arrived on the scene, and without them the Confederates would be too inferior in numbers to their adversary. Stuart himself came up on the 16th from Hanover Court House and took command of all the cavalry of the army. Robertson's brigade was with Jackson; Fitz Lee was due at Verdierville next day.

By the evening the whole of the army was massed near Mount Pisgah Church, concealed from the opposing scouts and sentinels by the intervening mass of Clark's Mountain. But an untoward incident, trivial in itself, was to wreck the Confederate plans.

The Union army, after the battle of Cedar Run, had moved slowly forward to the Rapidan and taken post with its right, Sigel's corps, at Locustdale Ford, and its left near Raccoon Ford. On August 14th the first of the reinforcements arrived; Reno led up from Aquia two divisions of the IX. Corps, his own and Stevens', about 8000 strong, excellent troops, bringing up the effective strength of the Army of Virginia to 45,000 men. These new arrivals took post on the extreme left of the line, next to McDowell, who was at Rapidan Station, with Banks' shattered corps thirteen miles in rear at Culpeper. From this line Pope, with his accustomed enterprise, sent out cavalry expeditions to work round the flanks of Jackson, whom he knew to be near Louisa Court House, with a force rather over-estimated at 30,000 men; and it so fell out that one of these raids was to prove the salvation of the Federal army.

Pope himself quite realised the peril of his position. Writing to Halleck on August 16th he declared that his left was his weak point and expressed the fear that a strong hostile force from Richmond might cross at Germanna and interpose between the army of Virginia and its reinforcements at Falmouth. He suggested that these latter should be sent up as soon as they arrived to the vicinity of Richard's Ford, whence they could at very short notice block the passages of the Rappahannock to the west and operate effectively against the flank of a force moving to turn his own right.

If these were the views of the general, he took few or no

steps to avoid the danger by a closer concentration of his army towards the threatened flank ; he merely ordered Reno, on the 17th, to throw out his cavalry well beyond the river and clear up the situation there. It seems that it was a party of these horsemen who, on the morning of the 18th, brought in most valuable information, which in a moment tore aside the veil shrouding from Pope the chasm on the brink of which he and his army were standing.

Stuart, who had ridden down the plank road towards Chancellorsville late on the evening of the 17th, had seen nothing of the expected brigade of Fitz Lee, for which the whole army was waiting. At dawn next morning he was surprised by a party of Federal cavalry in his lodging at Verdierville, and only escaped with the loss of his adjutant-general and his despatch-box, in which was found the order from Lee for the movement of his forces. Pope thus gained a clear glimpse into the measures and plans of his adversary, and a contraband coming in at the same time confirmed the fact that the whole of the rebel army was assembled behind Clark's Mountain.

The Federal commander possessed that most valuable faculty for a soldier, that of thinking quickly. Seeing at once that his position was rendered untenable by the fact that, in the present relative situation of the two armies, the enemy massed beyond his left in superior numbers could reach the line of railway and the all-important bridge in his rear as soon as he himself could, and that, while success from a battle in such a position would be problematical, and the results at best indecisive, defeat would be equivalent to disaster, he resolved to get away while he might. The orders were issued at once ; the enormous trains of the army were to go first ; the combatant troops were to follow as soon as the roads were clear, while the cavalry pushed out towards the river covered the retirement.

Before midday the transport of the army had been set in motion for the north; but the movement was only executed with the greatest difficulty and consumed an enormous amount of time; all that day the long columns crawled slowly and painfully over the dusty plains between the Rappahannock and the Rapidan; even by dint of marching all night, the last of McDowell's waggons only passed through Culpeper at 11 A.M. on the 19th. Reno moved by Stevensburg to Kelly's Ford; Banks and the III. Corps along the railway to the Rappahannock bridge; the I. Corps to Sulphur Springs by Jefferson. However, in spite of the slowness of the operation, all went well; at 7 P.M. Pope's time of anxiety was over, and his army was safely behind the river, extending from Kelly's Ford to a point three miles above Rappahannock Station.

Nevertheless the escape of the Federals was primarily due, not to their own promptitude or decision, but to the fortune of war, which so often overthrows the most skillfully laid combinations. Fitz Lee, the deciding factor in the movement, had failed to understand that his journey from Hanover Junction to the Rapidan was anything more than an ordinary route march; he had, for greater comfort and security, gone with his whole column *via* Louisa Court House, whither he had been directed to send his waggons only; this delayed his arrival for a day. It was decided therefore, in accordance with the counsel of Stuart and Longstreet, very much against that of Jackson, to postpone the movement till the 20th. Moreover, as it happened, the 19th was a most unfavourable day for extended observation; when Lee ascended Clark's Mountain, the fair prospect of the day before was veiled by a sultry haze, which only lifted late in the afternoon, to disclose to the Confederate leader the last Federal rear-guards dis-

appearing to the northward. The chance of a successful blow had gone with them.

Lee resolved to press on next day in pursuit. At 4 A.M. the Southern army broke up from its bivouacs and started forward; Longstreet *via* Raccoon Ford on Culpeper; Jackson, crossing at Somerville Ford, moving on his left, with Anderson in rear of him. Stuart passed at Morton's Ford, and sent Fitz Lee's brigade in the direction of Kelly's Ford, he himself with Robertson's brigade taking the route to Stevensburg and Brandy Station.

Very early in the morning the latter force ran into the enemy. Federal horse had deployed behind Mountain Run and thence fell back doggedly under heavy pressure towards the railway line, in front of which they drew up under shelter of a wood, and succeeded in holding their ground for some time. A threatened turning movement against their right at length caused them to evacuate this position, only to take up another not far from St James' Church. The country was close and intersected by ditches, which favoured the defence. Stuart, however, hurled his regiments at them in close column of fours along the turnpike road and drove them to seek protection under the cover of McDowell's guns on the left bank of the Rappahannock. Fitz Lee's brigade, which had on its side had a successful engagement with Federal cavalry near Kelly's Ford, was now ordered to send two of its regiments to the main field, and the Confederates took up their quarters just out of range of the hostile guns. Jackson bivouacked with his head of column at Brandy Station; Anderson was near Stevensburg; Longstreet had reached Kelly's Ford early in the afternoon and closed up his command.

Next morning the Confederates discovered that their foe had taken up a strong position. His army, collected and well in hand, was massed in rear of a broad, swift

river, of which all the passages were well watched. His artillery, posted on commanding bluffs, swept with its fire the whole of the low-lying right bank for some distance ; the front of his army was thus absolutely unassailable, and every day's delay brought nearer the arrival of reinforcements which it was known were hastening to join him. Action must therefore be taken at once ; since this front could not be attacked, the Southern army must seek their adversary's flank. Longstreet favoured a movement against the left, a view which Lee himself did not share ; little result could be hoped for from it, except the advantage of interposing between Pope and his reinforcements at Aquia, a gain which might well turn out perilous rather than profitable. The Federal right seemed a better point for attack.

On the 21st the two regiments of Fitz Lee's brigade under Rosser dashed over the river at Beverly Ford, covered by their own guns, dispersed a small force on guard there, and prepared to hold the passage for the rest of the army. King's division was at once sent forward to recover the position, which it did, driving the enemy back whence they had come, after a warm fight ; the ford was rendered secure by means of a strong line of guns, which entered into a spirited and destructive duel with the artillery of Jackson, who had come up to Rosser's aid. Robertson's brigade, which had crossed higher up near Welford's Mill, evacuated its position during the night. Longstreet had confined himself to a long-range fight with McDowell and Reno in the vicinity of Kelly's Ford ; but about noon a column of all arms, under Buford, pushed over beyond the Confederate right and came back with information that Longstreet and Hill were there, moving up towards the railway.

Pope at the end of the day had come to very accurate

conclusions as to the position and intentions of the hostile army. He quite realised that the weak point of his line was the right, and had already formed his plans if the enemy should cross on that side ; in that case, he wrote to Halleck, he would fall on their flank and rear as they moved on Warrenton. Halleck wrote back, urging him to " fight like the devil " and undertaking in forty-eight hours to send up such reinforcements as should make the river line absolutely secure—a promise which was not by any means fulfilled.

For the present, however, the Federal commander was confident of his ability to hold his own. The events of the next day confirmed his predictions as to the enemy's intentions and his own power to frustrate them. Lee had given orders to Jackson to feel still farther up the river towards Waterloo and Sulphur Springs ; Longstreet followed, opening fire every now and then across the river to distract the enemy's attention. The II. Corps moved up therefore to the north, Sigel keeping pace with him on the far bank. About noon the Federal commander, thinking he saw an opportunity of falling on Jackson's trains, which were parked near Welford's Mill on Hazel river, sent over a brigade of infantry ; their rush met with some success, but was checked by the staunch resistance of Trimble's regiments acting as baggage-guard. Towards 4 P.M. Hood arrived on the scene with a Texas brigade, and the two together drove the Federals back over the river with some loss ; the defeated troops found shelter under their own guns. Meanwhile Jackson's main body had marched on undisturbed and, reaching Sulphur Springs late in the afternoon, had thrown Early's brigade beyond the stream and occupied the heights on the left bank.

Longstreet had carried on a successful fight farther south near the railway. He opened fire at sunrise and

before noon had driven the Federals, ensconced in a bridge-head on the right bank, to seek safety beyond the stream ; neither, however, could his own men approach the bridge, which remained unoccupied by either side till the close of the day.

The interest of this day centres chiefly in Pope's headquarters. That audacious general had conceived a daring plan, in accordance with which orders were sent to Sigel, who had requested the help of Reno's division to repel the movement against his right, to let as many of the enemy cross as would do so, for Pope had resolved to mass his whole army near the railway, and by a rapid passage to throw it against the forces of the enemy beyond the river, beat them before aid could come and then turn against the other half of the hostile army ; this course he considered the only alternative to a retirement towards Washington.

However the plan was never to find execution. The afternoon of the 22nd had been dark and threatening, and ere the sun set a heavy storm broke ; the roads became mere seas of mud, the streams swelled into torrents, and the Rappahannock fords soon became absolutely impassable. The railway bridge alone remained and it was itself in imminent peril of destruction ; the movement as conceived had become impracticable.

But the floods which had wrecked one scheme had rendered a second possible. If the Federals could not cross the Rappahannock, neither could the Confederates at the Springs recross ; Pope knew that a strong force of the enemy was isolated beyond the river, and changing his plans, resolved to fall on them with his whole army. Sigel was to move up at once towards the Springs ; Banks and Reno were to support him, and the united forces—30,000 strong—were to attack and beat the enemy wherever he was found ; McDowell with Reynolds' division of Penn-

sylvania reserves, the first troops from the Peninsula to join Pope, was to march on the right of the main column to Warrenton.

Sigel moved with the most extraordinary slowness and caution, and it was late afternoon before he arrived near the Springs. Here he found the enemy, but concealed in woods, and supposing them to be in great strength resolved to delay his attack until more troops came up. Early, who was quite well aware of his critical situation, had moved up in the morning towards the river passage, taken up a line facing north-west, with his right covered by the swollen waters of Great Run. From here he could see the blue troops gradually massing on his front and pivoted on his right to meet them; but it was dark before an attack was delivered against the left of his line, which repulsed it with no great difficulty. Lawton's brigade, which had thrown a temporary bridge over the river, now came up to his aid; but as it was clear to both leaders that next morning they would have to deal with all Pope's army, the whole force was ordered to withdraw from its difficult position. The crossing began at 3 A.M., and was completed shortly after daylight. When the Federals that morning moved to the attack they found no foe to oppose them.

Pope's chagrin at this failure must have been increased by an event which had taken place twenty-four hours before. Colonel Haupt, the director of railway transport at Manassas Junction, was alarmed on the night of the 22nd by a sudden outburst of heavy firing from the south, and when morning dawned he learnt that the terrible Stuart had once more been wreaking destruction far in rear of his enemy. Crossing at Waterloo Bridge and Hart's Mill, beyond the Federal right, on the afternoon of the 22nd, the Confederate cavalry, 1500 strong, with two guns,

had made for Warrenton, which they reached late in the afternoon. Nine miles distant lay the iron road which connected the army of Virginia with its supplies and depots at Washington ; none of the enemy had been seen on the march ; no patrols had discovered the column. Stuart resolved to strike that night at the viaduct near Catlett's Station ; his men moved off once more under a sky darkening with storm-clouds, which soon broke in a torrent of rain. The artillery had to be left in rear under the charge of one of Robertson's regiments ; the rest, however, pushed on, and, in the midst of a pitch blackness which rendered objects invisible even at a distance of a few yards, the Federal pickets were surrounded one by one and captured. Led by a negro, who had fallen into their hands and was known to Stuart, the command then charged into the camp. Pope's officers, who were just about to have supper, fled into the night ; the garrison of the post, completely surprised, concealed themselves beneath the parked waggons ; many fell into the hands of the daring raiders, among them Pope's quartermaster, on whom was found the general's despatch-book. A party had at once been sent off to destroy the railroad bridge over Cedar Run, but it could neither be fired nor cut down, owing to the resistance of the bridge guard, and after collecting his men, and setting fire to the captured camp, Stuart withdrew in perfect security. He felt some anxiety as to the safety of his command, whose retreat might be cut off by the swollen rivers ; however, the brigades succeeded in reaching the Rappahannock next day, with all their spoils of war.

During the 24th no very important movements were undertaken by either side. Sigel's corps, with Milroy's independent brigade as advance-guard, moved leisurely up the river, and halted at nightfall between Waterloo

and Sulphur Springs. The only noteworthy incidents were an abortive attempt by Milroy to capture some Confederate guns abandoned on the west bank of the river, and a heavy cannonade at Waterloo Bridge. Banks and Reno followed Sigel; McDowell with Reynolds, who had reached Warrenton the previous night, extended out towards the river; King on the night of the 24th being on the road to the Springs, Ricketts north of him on that to Waterloo. Buford's cavalry were covering the right of the army for some distance up the stream. On the Confederate side Longstreet had reached Jefferson with his head of column; Jackson and Stuart were on his left.

Next day—a day of great and important measures on the Confederate side—was employed by Pope in taking up a new position for the defence of the river. His general order to this effect placed McDowell and Reynolds at Warrenton, with an advance-guard on the Waterloo and Sulphur Springs roads; Sigel at Fayetteville; Banks along Marsh Creek, near Bealeton Station, with a division guarding the destroyed railway bridge; and Reno at Kelly's Ford. Since the arrival of Reynolds on August 22nd two divisions of the III. Corps, Army of the Potomac, under Generals Hooker and Kearny, had come up by rail and were ordered to take position at Germantown. The army was thus to be arrayed on a long north-and-south line of twenty miles, with all the bridges in its front destroyed and the fords strongly held. However about noon there came in a series of messages from the signal officers on Watery Mountain, that completely altered the aspect of the situation.

In order to understand them we must go to the Confederate headquarters on the night of the 24th. Lee had, thanks to Stuart's dashing raid on Catlett's, been able to obtain from Pope's papers a full insight into the Federal disposi-

tions and, still more important, into the state of mind of the Federal general, and with the perfect confidence which always marked his relations with his subordinates called in Jackson to assist him in finding a solution of the difficult problem which confronted him. And, indeed, it was one which might have taxed any commander's brains. The enemy lay in front of the Confederates, in a strong, almost unassailable position, his front protected by a considerable stream, his flanks watched by vigilant cavalry. Worse than this, reinforcements were arriving rapidly. Some of the troops of the Army of the Potomac were already up, more were on their way; Burnside's corps had effected a junction; Cox's division had been summoned from West Virginia. Every day's delay darkened the Confederate prospects. How was a way to be found out of the toils?

The case was apparently desperate, and demanded desperate measures. But Jackson and Lee both knew, alike from their knowledge of Pope's character and from the captured letters, that though to them the Federal leader seemed to have placed his army in an ideally secure position, to himself he did not. They perused more than one complaint that he could not hold on behind the line of the Rappahannock; if such were his view, little would be needed to compel him to evacuate it. Under these circumstances Lee resolved to send Jackson round his right by Thoroughfare Gap in order to strike the railway, as Stuart had done two days before, but farther away from the Federal army. This at least would induce Pope to fall back hastily to recover his lost communications, and a chance might very likely offer itself of giving battle under more favourable circumstances than the present. Once Pope could be induced to fight, his defeat was almost a foregone conclusion.

Such were Lee's views, and such the plan he adopted ; next day was to see its execution. For it preparations were made secretly and in haste. Jackson's staff busied themselves in picking out the best route to Thoroughfare Gap ; Longstreet's men replaced Jackson's at the outposts, and the latter collected at Jefferson. Three days' cooked rations formed the only impedimenta of the troops, who were to leave their packs and every other superfluous article behind. All was got ready according to orders, and the men who were on the morrow to take part in the famous " march to Manassas " lay down in their bivouacs to snatch a few hours' slumber before the brightening of the dawn.

It may be as well at this point to turn our attention to the rear of the Federal army and see what was happening to the reinforcements for which Pope was so urgently calling. We have already noted the arrival of Reno's 8000 men of the IX. Corps on August 14th, of Reynolds' 6000 on the 22nd and of Heintzelmann's 10,000 on the 25th. A fourth body of troops had also become disposable on this date. FitzJohn Porter's corps, only 9000 strong, began to arrive at Aquia on the 20th, and were all disembarked two days later ; by the 25th it had reached the lower fords of the Rappahannock, Morell's division being at Morrisville, Sykes' two miles in rear of him. This reinforcement brought up Pope's total strength to about 83,000 men.

Of the other corps of the Army of the Potomac, Sumner's and Franklin's (Keyes' having been left at Fortress Monroe), the former was expected at Aquia on the 25th, but did not in reality arrive till much later ; the latter on the other hand was disembarking at Alexandria, and all the combatant troops had already been landed ; the

trains, however, were still on board the transports, and without them the corps could not go forward. Lastly Cox's division, 7000 men, and Sturgis' 8000 were expected by Pope on the evening of the 26th at Warrenton Junction, together with Franklin's corps. At present, however, all these troops were far in rear at Washington and Alexandria. It will be seen therefore that not only had Halleck failed to fulfil his promise, made to Pope on the 21st, that he could by the 23rd make him strong enough to hold the line of the Rappahannock, but that, two days' after this should have been accomplished, of the Army of the Potomac not one quarter, and of the other reinforcements barely one-third, of the total effective had been placed in a position to exercise the least influence on the course of operations.

COMMENTS

The operations just described offer very few salient features, and comment therefore is rather barren. At the same time there are certain points which call for discussion.

The escape of Pope on the 19th and 20th was due chiefly to the fortune of war, which not only gave him in an unexpected manner the information which showed him his danger, but also delayed the attack of the enemy at the very time when he was least prepared to meet it. It is impossible to doubt that, had he been forced to deliver battle where he was, with his communications cut and the enemy interposing between him and his reinforcements, he must have suffered a heavy defeat.

The reason for the postponement of this smashing blow is given by Stuart in his report as the non-arrival of Fitz Lee's brigade at the rendezvous ; the commander-

in-chief, General Lee, however, states merely that, "the necessary preparations had not been completed." If the first reason be accepted as the true one—and it undoubtedly influenced the decision—the fault falls partly on Stuart, for the inexactitude or insufficiency of his orders; partly on Fitz Lee himself, for departing from them when given. Apparently the orders were given verbally, and no mention was made in them of the importance of the movement or of the fact that it was something more than a mere march of assembly. Fitz Lee regarded it therefore as quite within his province to depart from his instructions.

A question of this kind opens up the whole matter of initiative in war. When is a subordinate leader justified in altering the orders he has received? Our own regulations are very clear on this point; they declare that "a departure from the spirit or letter of an order is justified if the subordinate who assumes the responsibility bases his decision on some fact which could not be known to the officer who issued the order and if he is conscientiously satisfied that he is acting as his superior, if present, would order him to act." Judged by these canons, Fitz Lee's action must be condemned. So far as we know, there had arisen, since Stuart's order was issued, no new circumstances calling for a departure from it; the situation remained as when he had received his directions, and therefore his gratuitous and unnecessary failure to comply with them must be censured. Initiative, one of the most essential qualities in any army, must never develop into indiscipline, or its results will be as grievous as they were here.

At the same time Stuart, and probably Lee also, must be accounted in some measure responsible for the error. It is to be presumed that Stuart knew the importance of a

timely arrival of his cavalry, and he might well have imparted his knowledge to Fitz Lee ; he probably, however, regarded himself as bound to silence by the fact that the commander-in-chief's instructions were "secret." Such secrecy, as a rule, is a doubtful advantage ; one sacrifices, to avoid the chances of a plan leaking out to the enemy, the intelligent co-operation of one's own subordinates ; and, in spite of the fact that the method was often employed by two such great soldiers as Napoleon and Stonewall Jackson, it seems that in these days of mighty armies, when it is impossible for a single brain to manage all the threads, the loss outbalances the gain. It is curious to note that these instructions, which because of their "secrecy" kept the subordinates, who were to execute them, working in the dark, did fall into the enemy's hands and showed him in a moment all the Confederate designs.

There is, however, as Henderson says, reason to think that Fitz Lee's absence was not the only factor which caused the postponement of the advance. It may be regarded as certain from Lee's despatch that the army was insufficiently prepared for a rapid move, and several of the letters from the staff to the quartermaster's department bear out the fact that some of the troops were without transport, and that the supply of rations was very limited. Anderson's division also had not come up till the morning of the 18th ; and without it Lee's army would be considerably inferior to the enemy's forces. Consequently it was decided to postpone the measure until everything was ready, and the result was, it was never carried out at all.

It seems necessary to enlarge somewhat on this point, if only for the reason that the problem which confronted Lee would have probably been solved by nine out of ten commanders in the way he solved it. The disadvantages

of rushing to the attack like at a bull at a gate are so very obvious that there is often a tendency to fall into the opposite error ; this is particularly exemplified in recent German schools of thought, and, most of all, in the Japanese operations in Manchuria. The battle of the Yalu is a very good example of the extremes to which "the last gaiter-button mania"—if one may so call it—will often lead. The assailants in this case were so very much afraid of doing something wrong, or omitting some essential preliminary, that they would have ended, with a more skilful commander against them, by finding nothing to do at all. "One of these days," remarks Sir Ian Hamilton, "this passion for making everything safe may be the ruin of our careful little friends."

The above discussion must not, of course, be understood as implying that careful preliminary measures are an evil, still less that complete and painstaking preparation has not been, and must ever be, the distinguishing mark of the greatest generals. But it may be remarked that, though they have never omitted such preparation when circumstances allowed, these masters of war knew how to dispense with it when it was necessary to act at once ; they realised that in certain situations a gain of time was worth everything else put together. This was the true meaning of Napoleon's saying, "I may lose a battle, but I will never lose a minute."

It was just because in this case Lee failed to strike that just balance between the essential and the unessential that he lost the best chance he ever had of crushing Pope. His army was assembled behind Clark's Mountain in a position where it might at any moment be discovered by the enemy ; the Confederate soldier could, as was proved over and over again in the course of the war, fight and win without trains and transport, and almost without supplies ;

therefore his best plan would have been to strike at once, and trust that the results achieved would be worth the labour and privation which they cost. That such would have been the case no one at this date can possibly doubt.

The next points for discussion are Pope's plans for the night of the 22nd and the morning of the 23rd. With regard to the first—namely, that of passing the river with his whole force and falling on the forces opposed to him, in this case Longstreet's corps—the scheme certainly had the merit of being bold and daring. Whether it would have had chances of success is another matter. Let us suppose the movement carried out as Pope intended. There were five passages of the Rappahannock available—Beverly Ford, the railway bridge, a pontoon bridge near it, Norman's and Kelly's Fords. Reno and Banks would probably have passed at the latter places, McDowell at the bridges, Sigel above them; the operation must have taken at least three hours—*i.e.* from dawn to 8 A.M.—and long before then the warning would have been sent to Jackson. The latter was barely ten miles away to the north, and could be up with his head of column before noon—with his whole force, however, not before seven hours from the time the order was first received. In other words, Longstreet with 22,000 good men would have had to hold out for at least seven hours—*i.e.* till after noon—against an ever-increasing force of the enemy, which after 8 A.M. would outnumber him by two to one. However, he would from noon onwards be receiving reinforcements from Jackson, which by mid-afternoon would bring his strength almost to an equality with that arrayed against him. When we remember that Napoleon implicitly, and Clausewitz explicitly, calculated that an army corps, if it could manœuvre, should be able to hold out for at least a day even against overwhelming numbers, and that since then, as

we have seen, the balance between attack and defence had veered distinctly in favour of the latter, and add to this the fact that Jackson on the day of Groveton actually did hold his ground for the whole day of the 29th August, with about 18,000 men, against over 33,000, it may be concluded that, unless Pope had developed a tactical ability of which he showed no trace at Manassas, the dash over the Rappahannock would probably have resulted in a defeat.

The second scheme, which followed hard on the heels of the other, was far preferable, and undoubtedly on the morning of August 23rd the Federals had an excellent chance of destroying a portion of the Confederate army, though by no means so large a portion as they had hoped. This fact, however, should only have made its defeat more easy, and to this day the reasons for their failure to seize the opportunity are rather obscure. It seems clear that Sigel moved with the most extraordinary slowness; he must have received the order of movement, written at 7.15 A.M., a little after 8 A.M., and should have got his troops moving at 9 A.M. From a point between Beverly and Freeman's Fords, where his corps was posted, to Great Run, is only about eight miles, and we are informed by Early that he noted no large force of the enemy south of that stream till late in the afternoon. The I. Corps then seems to have moved at the average rate of about one mile per hour, and, even accepting the fact that the roads after the recent storm were in very bad condition, this was excessively slow. The result of this delay was that Sigel could not get across Great Run that night, and when he passed next morning the enemy had disappeared.

The whole account of this operation seems mysterious. Probably we should not be far from the truth if we agreed

with Early, who puts down the slowness of his enemy to an exaggerated estimate of the strength of the force that had crossed the river. If he imagined that he was about to meet all or most of Jackson's corps, Sigel had some excuse for caution. One may hope, however, that a modern leader, versed in the function assigned by Napoleon to his advance-guard, to hold the enemy to his ground until the rest of the army can be put in order to deliver the decisive blow, would not have dallied in front of a force of unknown strength, as the I. Corps did here. Its leader could not of course know that the enemy was weak enough to be crushed with the troops then on the ground; but he seems to have taken no steps by which he could have found this out. The destruction of Early's brigade, which might easily have been consummated on the 23rd, must have had a considerable moral influence on the future course of the campaign, though from the material point of view it was not so important. Pope's own idea of Sigel's capabilities as a corps commander was expressed in his letter of the 25th to Halleck: "Sigel, as you know, is perfectly unreliable and I suggest that some officer of senior rank be sent to command his corps; it will never do much service under that officer. His conduct to-day has occasioned me great dissatisfaction." The same verdict might well have been passed on the operations of August 23rd.

It has been often stated, even by Henderson himself, that Halleck's sending forward of General Pope as far as the Rapidan was a very grave error. He would be a bold man who would venture to criticise the author of "Stonewall Jackson," but this statement seems hardly accurate. To begin with, Halleck was no advocate of the line of the Rapidan; "It would be far better," he wrote to Pope on the 19th, "if you were in rear of the Rappahannock. We

must run no risks just now but must concentrate. If threatened too strongly, fall back behind the Rappahannock. Every possible exertion is being made to increase our forces on that line." Moreover Halleck did not, as Henderson says, order Pope to "fight like the devil till he could be reinforced," until August 21st, when Pope was no longer behind the Rapidan but behind the Rappahannock. As these rivers are fully two marches distant from one another, the point is not so trivial as it seems at first sight.

Of course this only modifies the criticism without changing its essential nature; but it seems that censure is here given somewhat unnecessarily. Granted that Pope's inferior force was within reach of an army which held the interior lines, and that the concentration had been ordered under the fire of the enemy's guns, what other course could have been adopted in order to give the time necessary for the removal of the Army of the Potomac from the Peninsula?—and how could it be possible to distract attention from this very difficult and delicate operation, except by the advance of a fairly considerable army against Richmond from the north? Given this decision to remove the Army of the Potomac, the strategy actually carried out was the only means of achieving the desired end—namely, the relief of McClellan and the capture of Richmond. Neither of these objects was likely to be accomplished by keeping Pope's army back at Alexandria or Bull Run; if he was to draw off any serious forces from the neighbourhood of Richmond, he must do so by being aggressive, by threatening something which the Confederates could not afford to lose, in this case Gordonsville, Charlottesville and the Virginia Central Railroad. It must be remembered that the defeat of the retreating Army of the Potomac would be a far

more serious affair than a check to Pope, who had all Virginia to retire into.

The political aspect of the question has not been considered here, because strategy must always take precedence over politics in time of war ; but one cannot doubt that a measure such as the abandonment of all South Virginia to the enemy before a battle had been fought must have been a great blow to the confidence and prestige of the North.

However, if Pope was to be pushed forward so far, it was necessary that he should clearly understand that he was for the present only, so to speak, the covering force for the concentration of a larger army ; whether he did really understand this is doubtful. He says indeed in his report, " If, as was feared, the enemy threw his whole force in the direction of Washington, it became my duty to resist his advance at all hazards and so to delay and embarrass his movements as to give all the time possible for the arrival of the Army of the Potomac behind the Rappahannock." But these sentences were written six months after the campaign, and the proclamation to his army breathed a very different spirit. The probability seems to be that Pope at the beginning clearly comprehended that his first duty was to gain time, as he says, though that he forgot this fact in the later period of the campaign is more than likely.

Starting, then, from this assumption, it is difficult to see where exactly the strategical error comes in. To gain time in war for a strategic concentration only two ways are possible ; one must either place the area of that concentration so far back that the enemy cannot reach it before the assembly is completed, and leave out in front only a few detachments for observation, not resistance, as was done in 1870 ; or else one must interpose a fighting

force between the selected area and the enemy, not, be it noted, to resist, but to delay, his march. Further, the distance between the position of the covering force and the zone of assembly varies inversely as the strength of this force; obviously a weaker force must be pushed further towards the enemy than one which, because of its strength, can offer more prolonged resistance in a given position, and can thus be drawn nearer the object to be defended, because, not being able to employ the method of resistance to the same extent, it must have recourse more and more to the method of space. All this presupposes that the said force is able, as Napoleon expected every force to be able, to fight in retreat without being crushed; in other words, knows how to gain time by delaying the enemy, as is done by a rear-guard after every lost battle. The advance of Pope's army to the Rapidan had much to be said for it. He could from there threaten the enemy's weak points and compel Lee—as he actually did—to detach heavily from Richmond and give up the idea of striking at the Army of the Potomac. Further, when the time came to retire he had at least three successive positions, the lines of the Rapidan, the Rappahannock and Bull Run; and after losing all these he could still find safety under the guns of Washington.

Where Halleck made his mistake was in ordering Pope to cling too long to the second of these lines. In this lay his real error, not in pushing him on originally to that line. One may note, however, that, even as it was, little harm would have been done if Pope had not also forgotten his true mission during the last few days of August, and if Halleck had not made a grave miscalculation in his estimate of the time necessary for the arrival of reinforcements.

The above argument perhaps has been somewhat un-

necessary, for the actual events bear out the contention. They speak for themselves ; in spite of the errors committed, Pope's army did actually succeed in gaining the time necessary for the transfer of the Army of the Potomac to Aquia and Alexandria. Of the four available corps of that army, Heintzelmann's went up to Warrenton Junction on the 25th, Porter's on the same date was in touch with Pope's left, Franklin's arrived next day at Alexandria, Sumner's on the 28th at Washington. Both of these corps could have been up on the 29th if steps had been taken to supply them with the needful transport, and for this the resources of the capital were ample. The IX. Corps had long ago reached the front, and thus the only troops not yet up were Cox's division, which did not belong to the Army of the Potomac at all. We see then that not only was it possible for Pope to gain time for the concentration of the two armies, but that he did in substance do so ; the fact then that he had been pushed up far forward of the zone of assembly was certainly not the dangerous measure it is commonly supposed to have been ; it was rather the only means of fulfilling his mission.

The fact of his defeat at Manassas has no bearing on this point ; it was due to quite other causes, which remain to be investigated in the subsequent chapters.

CHAPTER V

JACKSON'S MARCH—THOROUGHFARE GAP AND GAINES-VILLE

WE have said that Pope's plans for the 25th were much influenced, and in fact entirely changed, by fresh information which came in about noon. This consisted of a series of five reports from the signalling officers on Watery Mountain, sent first to Banks and by him forwarded to headquarters. From them it was clear that a strong hostile column of all arms was moving rapidly northward along the Jefferson-Flint Hill road.

This might indicate several things. The enemy's destination as yet was quite uncertain; however, in all probability, either he was moving to strike the Federal communications, as Stuart had done two days before, by the gaps of the Bull Run Mountains, or else he intended to march into the Valley, from there, covered by the Blue Ridge, to move northward round the right of the Army of Virginia in a wide sweep and possibly enter Maryland. Either of these lines of action was possible, but the direction of the enemy's march, and the undoubted peril of such an operation as a blow with far-separated forces against the Orange and Alexandria R.R., seemed to favour the latter supposition. Pope resolved, should such be the case, to throw McDowell, then near Warrenton, against the hostile rear, so as to cut up the trains; but he rather veered round by the end of the day to the belief that the column seen by the signal officers was only the flank-guard

of the army, the main body of which was marching farther south along the Thornton's Gap road to Luray. Under the circumstances, an isolated movement by McDowell might be too perilous, and Pope therefore ordered Sigel also to pass the river at Waterloo simultaneously with the III. Corps at Sulphur Springs, and see what was on the right bank. Reno was also to reconnoitre in strength beyond Rappahannock Station, all these movements being timed to take place early on the 26th.

The orders were not executed, chiefly owing to the misfortunes of the ever-unlucky I. Corps. That body had, on the morning of the 25th, been ordered to Fayetteville, its place at Waterloo to be taken by one of McDowell's brigades. About noon, however, General Roberts, whom we have before found, exercising an unfortunate influence on events, enjoined Sigel verbally to stay where he was, as Banks and McDowell would support him on either flank if necessary. Late in the day the enemy assumed a very threatening attitude in front of Waterloo, passing troops over the river to right and left of the I. Corps and rendering its commander every moment more and more nervous. When the latter discovered that none of the troops mentioned by Roberts were anywhere near him, he took measures to get away as soon as possible. Part of an order having reached him which he construed into meaning that he should march as before on Fayetteville, he set his corps in motion towards that locality as darkness fell, destroying Waterloo bridge before leaving. Just then arrived a message directing him on Warrenton ; the head of column reached there about midnight, and the corps was marching through the streets till morning broke. Naturally after such a wearisome and exhausting twenty-four hours it was quite impossible to dream of executing the proposed reconnaissance in force beyond the river at dawn.

Reno also misunderstood his orders and went to Warrenton Junction, ten miles from the place where he was to cross the Rappahannock. Pope, therefore, seeing that two of the three forces constituting the reconnoitring mass had failed at the rendezvous early on the 26th, ordered McDowell to use his own judgment about performing his part of the programme, but to make every effort to discover the state of affairs in his front. In accordance with this permission, the III. Corps confined itself to a cannonade at Sulphur Springs, during which it found out that the troops in its front belonged to Anderson's division, the last arrivals from the Peninsula. Buford, by McDowell's orders, collected all the cavalry still fit for service on the Waterloo road, preparatory to marching towards Chester Gap on the 27th at dawn.

Pope and McDowell, during the course of the afternoon of the 26th, exchanged notes as to the general situation; both agreed in considering that, whether the enemy intended to throw part of his forces round the Federal flank or whether he was beginning a move into the Shenandoah Valley, it was necessary to concentrate the army towards its right, so as to be able to deliver battle at Warrenton. Sigel and McDowell were therefore to be posted at that town, with Reno on their right and Banks on their left rear. Porter was to join Reno, and Heintzelmann to remain at Warrenton Junction. Meanwhile Halleck was urgently requested to push a division at least to Manassas, and to hurry Franklin up to Gainesville. Before all these orders had been issued, however, the situation had completely altered.

At 8 P.M. the telegraphic communication with Washington was suddenly cut off, the wires going down apparently somewhere about Bristoe Station. The Federal leader believed at first that this was a new manifestation of

Stuart's activity, and enjoined the despatch of a regiment by rail to repair the damage ; but the illusion did not last long ; an hour later two reports establishing the presence of a large mixed force moving at noon that day from White Plains on Thoroughfare Gap showed clearly that the affair was too serious to be dealt with by such means. Pope had to consider this new development.

As his line of supply and communication was at present severed, there were only two possible alternatives : either to fall back on the new reinforcements from Aquia, Porter's and later Sumner's corps, in order to draw supplies from that base, or else to reopen his former line by force. It is not to be supposed that the decision between these two courses was hard, or that it consumed much time. The whole crux of the matter was the peril to the Federal capital, the defence of which was one of Pope's first cares. At present, as far as he knew, there were in the fortifications, besides the regular garrison, only Franklin's corps, unable to move for want of trains, and some of Cox's division—a totally insufficient force. This consideration, and the fact that his army could not subsist if the Orange and Alexandria Railroad were occupied in strength by the enemy, decided Pope to turn his whole army about in order to repel, and if possible annihilate, this troublesome intruder.

From this point begin the most difficult and intricate operations of the campaign—a bewildering succession of contradictory orders resulting in a series of corresponding movements and counter-movements, only to be understood by the closest attention and a most careful study of the map.

The orders were issued early on the 27th for a march of the whole army in two columns to the north-east. The left wing, Sigel and McDowell, was to march along the Warrenton road to Gainesville ; Heintzelmann's corps and Reno's divisions from the neighbourhood of Warrenton

Junction on Greenwich ; while Porter halted at the former place till the arrival of Banks, and then followed in rear of Reno. Banks was placed in charge of all the trains of the army and ordered to repair the line where it was broken in order to bring them as far back as possible in the direction of Manassas Junction. Later on, however, Pope altered this disposition slightly and, fearing perhaps that the II. Corps, which he reported to Halleck as being "weak and still much demoralised," would be exposed to the blows of the enemy at Manassas, while hampered by the enormous number of waggons which it was guarding, he sent Hooker's division of Heintzelmann's corps in front of Banks along the railroad.

Following the fortunes of the left column first—Sigel's corps, Milroy's brigade leading, started early from Warrenton along the Gainesville road and, arrived within four miles of its destination, found the bridge over Broad Run in flames, and the passage barred by hostile horsemen. These latter were soon dispersed, the fire extinguished and within fifteen minutes the bridge was once more passable. The head of the corps reached Gainesville that night, the last brigade, Steinwehr's, being left at the bridge. McDowell, in rear, reached Buckland Mills. To the west of the Bull Run Mountains, Buford had been reconnoitring, and discovered a large hostile column marching from Salem on Thoroughfare Gap, which had been induced by the skilful handling of this small cavalry force to halt and deploy, thus losing nearly an hour. McDowell, to whom had been entrusted the command of the left wing of the army, considered that this could only be Longstreet's corps, and fearing that they would be passing Thoroughfare Gap next morning, resolved to send Sigel, reinforced by one division, to block that defile, while he himself, with the rest of his corps, moved against Jackson. These

orders were nullified by Pope, consequent on events which had ensued farther to the south.

Hooker's division had, as has been said above, been ordered to push forward along the railroad, in order to find out what were the actual forces which had intercepted the communications at Manassas ; starting at 7 A.M. with the 3rd brigade in front, the leading regiment soon came up with the enemy. These latter being in small force were at first easily pushed back ; however, about 2.30 P.M., stronger masses were found in dense woods a short distance in front of Bristoe. The command deployed across the railroad, the 3rd brigade on the left, and behind its outer flank the 2nd brigade in column, and the 1st on the right. Before the latter had come up into line the left wing pushed forward ; the resistance seemed feeble and the foe not inclined to stand. Suddenly a hot fire smote the Federal right flank from a body of infantry sheltered behind the railroad embankment. The first line fell into confusion, but only for a moment ; the second line reinforced and two of its regiments, changing front swiftly, swept up and over the track in a dashing charge, before which the Confederates fled in haste. Their whole front began to give way and Hooker's men, reinforced by the 1st brigade and some of Kearny's troops, pressed them back over Broad Run as night fell.

Pope had come up just at the end of the action, and the severity of the engagement finally convinced him of what he had been for some time suspecting, that all Jackson's force of three divisions was near Manassas Junction. Touch with him, lost for the last three days, had now been recovered, and on this basis the plans for to-morrow were to be established.

The positions of the Federal army on the night of the 27th were : Hooker on the right bank of Broad Run ;

Porter behind at Warrenton Junction, with Banks close in rear ; Kearny, Reno, and Stevens at Greenwich ; Sigel and McDowell from Gainesville to Buckland Mills. Before we detail the orders for the 28th, it will be advisable to turn to the Confederate operations up to that date.

Jackson's corps, Ewell's division in front, then Hill's and Taliaferro's, the whole preceded by a cavalry regiment, with which was Captain Boswell of the engineers, who was acting as guide, set off from their bivouacs on the morning of the 25th, in the darkness preceding the dawn. Splashing through the ford at Hinson's Mill, and leaving the sounds of war far in the rear, they trudged steadily forward through the dust, rising in ever denser clouds as the brilliant August sun climbed the heavens ; sometimes a little relief was afforded, when the line of march left the road, and led over the springy turf of the fields on either side, or when the blazing rays were shut off by the arching boughs of some Virginian wood. More than one village, and many a tiny farm nestling in a sheltered valley, the column left behind ; the sun sank behind the Blue Ridge, and the stars one by one began to peer out, but still the measured tramp woke the mountain echoes ; it was midnight ere the wearied troops saw before them the village of Salem, with the railway winding through it, the place assigned by their leader for the few hours' rest which was all that could be granted. They had marched over twenty-six miles that day. Aroused again in the chill small hours, with time only for a hasty meal, often of green corn plucked from the fields close at hand, they changed direction to the right, and breasted the narrow track leading with intricate windings up the side of the Bull Run Mountains, clothed with dark forest, which separated them alike from enemy and friend. A little before midday the head reached the crest at Thoroughfare

Gap, where the road passes to Gainesville, and there saw, spread out before them, bathed in summer sunshine, the vast plain, studded with villages and diversified by field and forest, through which ran the iron road connecting the Federal army with Washington. Down the mountain-side the column plunged into the level country beneath, and headed for Gainesville; as they entered the village the clatter of hoofs behind them announced the arrival of the gallant Stuart at the head of his squadrons; he had been on the move ever since 2 A.M. that day, pressing on to overtake the infantry, and now there fell to him the duty of guarding Jackson's right and covering it against any advance from the south.

But in that direction there was no sign of hostile movement, and undisturbed the Confederates pressed forward. Manassas was the chief Federal depot, but it was determined before attacking it to strike the railway near Bristoe, destroy the Broad Run bridge, and only under cover of a force watching the direction of the enemy to move against the Junction. This was done; the company on guard at Bristoe were snapped up before they could discover what had happened; Munford, who commanded the cavalry in advance, blocked the track with piled sleepers, in spite of which one train from Warrenton succeeded in dashing through the obstruction and reaching Alexandria. Several others, following, were derailed and captured. Darkness had now set in, but Jackson deemed it of the utmost importance, now that the escaped train had reported his arrival to the garrison of Manassas, to capture the Junction that night. Trimble and 500 men of his brigade volunteered for the task, Stuart accompanying him with a brigade of horse. Feeling their way very cautiously along the permanent way, the troops groped forward until they were loudly challenged by the Federal

sentries and opened on by artillery ; all together then rushed forward in the direction of the flashes, overran the defence with the bayonet and found themselves in a few minutes in undisputed possession of the coveted prize.

Next morning, while Ewell's division remained at Broad Run, with orders, if he were attacked by largely superior numbers, not to dispute the ground too stubbornly, but to retire on the main body, the latter moved up to Manassas. It was not to be left to enjoy in peace the enormous capture of the night before ; as the head reached the station buildings, they were fired on by guns from the north and soon after deployed lines of infantry were seen advancing in beautiful order to the attack ; it was a brigade of Franklin's corps under Taylor, sent out from Washington to clear the line of the enemy and repair the damage done. No one in the capital seems to have suspected that "Stonewall's" whole corps was astride Pope's line of communication. The assailants, swept by musketry and artillery fire and threatened by heavy hostile masses on both flanks, soon gave way, leaving their mortally wounded general and a number of prisoners behind, and were pursued as far as the bridge over Bull Run, where a part of Cox's division, hurrying to their assistance, was involved in their retreat. The whole were driven back along the line by Fitz Lee's troopers to within ten miles of Alexandria.

Jackson, relieved of his apprehensions in that direction, now let his starving soldiers loose on the great stacks of supplies of every description, piled up in ever-increasing quantity by the lavish administration of the Federal armies, and destined for quite other hands than those into which they had now fallen. Not one tenth of them could however be utilised by the Confederate soldiery in the comparatively short time of their stay ; for before the

afternoon was well on, the roads leading up from the south were seen to be covered with marching columns. One was clearly espied on the Warrenton turnpike, and the muttering thunder of guns, swelling soon to a mighty roar, told that Ewell at Bristoe was heavily engaged. Evidently Jackson's position at Manassas was untenable ; what was to be the next move ? Two courses presented themselves : the force might gradually fall back to the north and north-west in the direction of Longstreet, who was known to be following Jackson's road of two days ago ; this would certainly facilitate the reunion of the army, for, if its two fractions could not effect their junction this side of the mountain, they could do so farther to the north-west, towards Aldie, in perfect security. Or, if this course did not commend itself, Jackson might march southwards, pick up Ewell, throw himself round the Federal right and rear, wreaking havoc among their trains in his passage, and unite with Longstreet after completing a full circuit of the hostile army.

The latter offered a tempting prospect, but Jackson decided against it. He resolved on the former course, and after watching the return of Ewell and issuing orders for a grand bonfire of all the captured stores which could not be carried off, directed the first division, Taliaferro's, to lead the movement northward, starting just after sundown and marching by the Sudley Mill road to the scene of the first engagement of the war. This was accomplished by dawn on the 28th ; the other divisions did not, however, follow in Taliaferro's track but struck off farther eastward. One hour after midnight, Hill, his departure lighted up by the glare of the burning supplies, retired to Centreville, crossing Bull Run by Blackburn's Ford ; thus far he was followed by Ewell, who then, however, turned off sharp to the left, and as the sun rose, recrossing

the stream by the Stone Bridge, united again with the troops already in position, north of the Warrenton Pike, and hidden by dense forest. Hill had halted at Centreville till 10 A.M. and then, watched by a few Federal horsemen, had gone southward to the same hiding-place. Jackson had thus successfully reassembled his whole force, having completely deceived his foe as to his real movements and position, and rendered certain a proximate junction with Longstreet.

Pope had not anticipated this manœuvre. When he reached the field at Kettle Run, heard Hooker's report—probably exaggerated, as most of that general's were—of his easy success, and saw the fierce light reddening the sky to the northward, he believed that next day Jackson must fall like a ripe plum into his hands. As Hooker's division had exhausted its ammunition, at 6.30 P.M. he sent urgent orders to Porter to move one hour after midnight on Bristoe, and to Kearny, then at Greenwich, to do the same "at the very earliest blush of dawn." The other corps of the left wing and centre were to march on Manassas, Sigel and McDowell by the railroad from Thoroughfare Gap, throwing their left well round in rear of the Junction and preventing all escape to the northward; Reno's two divisions from Greenwich by the shortest route, or, if necessary, across country. Thus Pope believed that the enemy, caught between the converging wings of the Federal army, and his retreat cut off on every side, would be entrapped and forced to surrender; "if you are prompt and expeditious," he wrote to Reno, "we shall bag the whole crowd."

Once more, however, the orders were not executed as the commander-in-chief wished. Porter's corps was exhausted by a long march the previous day; the road it was to take was blocked up with waggons and vehicles

of all descriptions, and the night was so dark that one could not see one's hand before one's face. After consultation with his subordinates, and much against his own will, Porter resolved to wait till 3 A.M. before starting, and so little progress was made before dawn that the corps only reached Bristoe at 10.30 A.M., very much wearied by its exertions. Kearny had come in two and a half hours earlier, and, uniting with Hooker, pushed on to Manassas ; but nothing was to be found there but smouldering heaps of ashes. The enemy had vanished into thin air.

With the left column too the march was delayed, partly owing to Sigel's trains, and partly because that officer, with his usual genius for misunderstanding orders, read McDowell's direction to march on Manassas, "his right resting on the Manassas Railroad," to mean that he was to march six miles to the south, and rest his right on the line from Manassas to Warrenton Junction. Reynolds, at the head of the III. Corps, was therefore pushed on in front and before long came under artillery fire from the northward ; his own guns took position to reply, while Meade's brigade deployed across the pike and attacked the enemy, who rapidly disappeared in the thick forests and was lost to view. As a matter of fact they formed part of Taliaferro's division, under Bradley Johnson, but the Federals, believing them to be only isolated cavalry, did not trouble to pursue, but renewed their march ; Sigel, who with a more correct instinct had countermarched to the sound of the guns, and was preparing to attack in force, received peremptory orders to follow Reynolds. When, however, the leading brigade came within sight of Manassas, it was seen to be occupied by friendly troops.

Pope's perplexity was great. He seems to have heard nothing of the skirmish to the west, which might have enlightened him as to the real state of affairs. The orders

he issued were, however, quite suitable to the situation ; McDowell and Sigel were to go by Newmarket and Sudley northward, Reno and Heintzelmann to Gainesville, " unless there was a large force at Centreville," which McDowell was to discover. Unfortunately, this plan was soon abandoned for another ; on receipt of information that Hill's rear-guard had passed through Centreville that morning, the Federal leader, rejoiced to have some definite data on which to work, resolved to follow on this last trail with all his army. Accordingly, everyone was directed on Centreville, Reno and Heintzelmann by Blackburn's Ford, McDowell and Sigel by Newmarket. Kearny, in advance of the right column, reached the goal late that night, drove out a few Confederate troopers who were found there and bivouacked on the Warrenton pike ; Hooker, following behind him, did not get beyond Bull Run ; Reno halted for the night in the town itself.

The fate of the left column was very different. When McDowell received the order directing him on Centreville, Ricketts' division, whose operations we shall follow later, was detached to the west ; Reynolds was near Bethlehem Church, a short distance from Manassas ; Sigel's corps one mile in rear, and King's division quite near the Warrenton-Centreville pike. The last was directed therefore by his corps commander to march on that road to his destination ; the remainder of the force to pursue various northward tracks on his right towards Bull Run.

Meanwhile, Jackson's corps had been lying hidden all day long in the woods near Groveton, while their foes were seeking for them everywhere in the utmost bewilderment. Early in the morning a despatch from McDowell to Sigel was captured, and in it the whole movement of the Federal left was revealed. Supposing, therefore, that the main body of the enemy would march up the pike in

front of the Confederate position, Jackson at once directed Taliaferro to move his division forward, and, aligning it parallel with the highroad, to take the passing columns in flank as soon as opportunity offered. But the sun sank gradually into the west; the evening breeze began to freshen; and still the expected prey came not. No sign of the Federals could be seen in all the deserted countryside; they had apparently, after the slight skirmish of the morning, turned off south towards Manassas.

As the twilight began to fall, however, the advance-guard of a long blue column appeared in the distance, trudging amid clouds of dust down the long hill leading to Groveton. Bands playing and colours flying, they seemed to have no suspicion of the presence of the foe lurking in the covert, not a mile from their left flank. The foremost brigade reached Groveton, but still more and more followed on their heels. Never was such a chance for a surprise.

Two batteries, suddenly emerging from cover, opened at short range on the Federals, and within the forest the infantry began to form for the attack. But though for a moment the foe fell into confusion at the unexpected onslaught, it was not for very long. Supposing the guns to be some of Stuart's horse artillery, the column left turned into line, and dashed forward against them. The instantaneous apparition of grey skirmishers and closed bodies in rear, advancing with yells to meet the Federals, soon showed them their error. But in the men of King's division Stonewall's soldiers had met their match; both sides, reinforced by fresh troops on both flanks, stood face to face, often not 100 yards apart, firing rolling volleys unflinchingly in the gathering gloom, until at length only the flashes of the rifles marked to each man the position of the enemy. The losses were fearful;

Gibbon's brigade, on whom the first attack had fallen, were aided by Doubleday's, the other two not being able to come up in time to participate; Taliaferro's men received timely assistance from part of Ewell's troops, the remainder, attempting a turning movement against the hostile right, got lost in the mazes of the forest and the deep cut of the unfinished railroad traversing it, and never came into action. In spite of their numerical inferiority, then, the gallant Federals succeeded in holding their ground until at last by a kind of mutual consent the firing died away. The Federal losses had been so heavy—the brigade commanders estimated them at over one-third of the force engaged—and their position, outnumbered and without cavalry, in front of an enemy of uncertain strength, so critical that at 1 A.M. King, who had been joined by Ricketts after dark, decided to go back to Manassas, which his much-tried troops reached at 7 A.M. next morning. Jackson was thus left in possession of the field, which had cost him two of his divisional generals and a great number of other casualties.

Of the troops on King's right, Sigel had late in the evening become slightly engaged with the extreme left of Jackson's corps, and had brought up his men to the Henry Hill, fronting towards Groveton. Here he bivouacked. Reynolds was marching to his right rear, and, hearing the roar of guns from his front and left, ordered his division to close up to the front, and rode off in person to ascertain the cause of the firing. He arrived at the field after the battle had ceased and, promising King his support next morning, returned to his own command, which passed the night on the left of the I. Corps.

We must now devote a few minutes to the consideration of Longstreet's action during these stirring events on the Manassas plains. On the night of the 24th his left wing

had, as we have already mentioned, relieved Jackson's corps near Jefferson, and for the greater part of the next two days the I. Corps confined itself to a series of noisy cannonades and skirmishes, intended merely to attract the enemy's attention and make him believe that the whole Confederate army was still in his front. Late in the afternoon of the 26th Anderson's division took Longstreet's place, and the latter followed Jackson's track as far as Orleans. Next day the march was resumed, but at a somewhat leisurely pace; the Federal cavalry, hovering on the flank, caused several vexatious delays, and the column only succeeded in reaching White Plains before nightfall. Certainly there seemed little need for haste, as reassuring messages followed one after another from Jackson all that day.

At dawn on the 28th, Longstreet's men were aroused once more from their bivouacks and began their steady tramp up the side of the mountain range forming the last barrier between them and their comrades. The roads were bad and steep; and it was 3 P.M. ere the column came within sight of the narrow cleft, barely eighty yards across and shut in by almost vertical slopes, covered with pines and ivy, through which they were to pass. The main body halted while a regiment, extended as skirmishers, pushed cautiously through the gorge. Only a few hostile pickets were met and pushed back; but after a short time they were aided by stronger bodies of troops, who compelled the Confederates in their turn to retire, and a large force of Federals, foot and guns, extended a barrier of steel across the eastern exit of the defile and even sought to gain the cliffs on the right of the road. Anderson's division (of Longstreet's corps) had already deployed on the northern face of the gap, and now sent in haste to the opposite heights Toombs' brigade, which just succeeded in

forestalling their enemies upon it. Driving them headlong down whence they had come and passing skilfully under cover of a deep ravine running due east, the Georgians succeeded in gaining the left flank of the foe. At the same time Ricketts, whose division it was that, detached by McDowell early that morning, was now opposing the Confederate advance, found his right also threatened by two forces, the one of three brigades under Hood, coming over the range by a cattle track just beyond his flank, the head of the other, consisting of Wilcox's two brigades, reported as passing through Hopewell Gap, three miles distant. Unsupported, Ricketts dared not further endanger his command, and, covered by the rapidly falling darkness, skilfully drew his regiments away; the enemy did not follow, and before midnight the division had reunited with the main body of its corps on the blood-stained field of Gainesville, having gained a whole day by its resistance.

That night Longstreet's head bivouacked between the pass and Haymarket, while his rear extended back over the mountain to Georgetown. Jackson, as we know, was at Groveton, and now no body of Federals any longer intervened between the separated portions of the Southern army. Their junction must be an accomplished fact before noon next day; and indeed communication between Lee and Stonewall *via* Haymarket had already been established that afternoon by the agency of Stuart's indefatigable troopers.

COMMENTS

The events just narrated marked the turning point of the tussle between Pope and Lee. The result of the duel had up to the night of the 24th been indecisive, and that

very fact was all in favour of the Federals. Lee's manœuvre of the next day was bound to turn the scale one way or the other. The army was deliberately divided and part of it sent round to strike the rearward communications of the foe, while the other part was to follow at two days' interval and unite with its comrades on the battlefield under the enemy's nose. These risky operations were crowned with brilliant success. As to the question whether this success justified the manœuvre as an operation of war, whether it can serve as a model for future leaders to copy, various opinions have been expressed.

To take two typical examples, Mr Ropes, in his valuable little monograph "The Army under Pope," writes as follows:—"The rules of war allow of no such dangerous movement as Jackson's, unless the object is a far more important one than the one which on this occasion he proposed to himself." On the other hand Henderson holds exactly the opposite view: "Lee's strategy," he says, "was justified by success. . . . The campaign against Pope has seldom been surpassed." It is impossible to reconcile these opinions, put forward by two of the ablest military critics of modern days, and we shall not attempt to do so. However, since both these writers published their histories, a little fresh light has been thrown on the matter, which we may note here.

Where both Mr Ropes and Colonel Henderson agree is in emphasising the extreme peril of Jackson's flank march. "It was a dangerous move and one which could have been entrusted to none but Stonewall Jackson, and it was so desperate that even he came within an ace of being totally defeated." "We have record of few enterprises of greater daring." In a measure this verdict is true; but it is, we think, largely exaggerated. Two facts seem to have been overlooked in estimating the risk; one has been touched

on before in this narrative ; the other is quite clear from the whole course of the campaign.

“ In 1861-65,” writes Henderson, “ the side that stood on the defensive, unless hopelessly outnumbered, was almost universally successful.” The reason for this is not merely to be found, as he seems to think, in moral influences, but also in the fact, previously remarked on, that effective preparation of the attack by artillery was impossible in the conditions of armament then prevalent. Just as every improvement in the long-distance arm favours the attack, so at times when the rifle has, so to speak, out-paced the gun in mechanical advance, the defence may be expected to prevail. The period of the American Civil War coincided with one of these times and this fact reacted in a remarkable manner on the events of the war right up to the very end. Take, for instance, Pickett’s charge at Gettysburg. Led with consummate skill and executed with unsurpassed bravery, it yet ended in failure. Why ? Partly because it was not combined with simultaneous holding attacks against both flanks of Meade’s line ; partly also because the supports were ill handled ; but chiefly because, from the very nature of things, close co-operation of artillery and infantry was rendered impossible. The guns could not get up to within decisive range, and so had to content themselves with a distant bombardment, which ceased when the infantry went forward to the attack. The same phenomena has been remarked on as occurring at Cedar Run.

Yet again, it must be remembered that the combatant armies were not composed of regular soldiers but of troops at best half-trained. Everyone knows that, with such men under him, the leader who stands to await attack has a great advantage, for regiments which are perfectly capable of standing firm in position and repulsing an assault may

very well be quite incapable of manœuvring on the offensive ; the events of First Bull Run prove this very clearly.

Now in Napoleon's day it was calculated by Clausewitz that a division of 10,000 men could hold on for about six or eight hours against a twofold superiority, and that a corps in favourable circumstances might be relied on to gain a whole day and very likely a night by its resistance. In 1862 these time calculations would have to be considerably modified in favour of the defence, for the reasons given above. This factor, of which Lee must have been perfectly well aware, undoubtedly influenced his decision by diminishing the dangers involved in exposing Jackson's isolated corps to be attacked by Pope's whole army.

The second factor was different. The Confederate leaders were not ignorant of the state of affairs in the Federal army. They probably knew that the system of command was one which cramped all initiative and made headquarters the sole originator of every movement. They knew that Pope's force was no army, but a number of scratch bodies drawn together from many different quarters and united under generals who knew neither each other nor their common superior. They knew the full extent of the martial ability of most of these generals. They knew that Halleck was hampering the free action of the general in the field by orders from a distance. They knew that the old leaders of the Army of the Potomac were not likely to be well inclined towards the western commander, who had been so bitterly sarcastic at their own and their beloved McClellan's expense. And, finally, they knew from Pope's captured despatches that not he but Halleck was bent on maintaining the line of the Rappahannock, and that a very little would induce him to forsake it.

In contrast with this, the Confederate army had now become an army in the best sense of the word, superior in

morale, in leadership, in tactical ability, in rapidity of movement, in the quality of its cavalry. In addition, it might hope to derive aid from the population of the country. In only one point, that of numbers, was it inferior. Lee, therefore, might dare much. Who can estimate, for instance, the additional power of defence conferred on the II. Corps by the fact that it was led by Stonewall Jackson ?

The case then is hardly stated fairly if one says that "Lee exposed by this operation one portion of his army to an attack by a fourfold superiority of force." What he did was to expose a corps of excellent troops, supported by a fine body of cavalry, and led by a master in the art of war, to the attack of a heterogeneous army, whose horsemen were exhausted, whose superior leader was distrusted and whose officers were mediocre, under such conditions as naturally gave to the defence a great advantage. The risks of the manœuvre are by these considerations much diminished, though not removed.

It seems, therefore, that both of the authors above quoted, who are only typical of two opposite schools of thought, have exaggerated the dangers Jackson underwent by the direction of Lee, from August 26th to 29th. There was of course peril involved in the course chosen ; no one refuses his admiration for Lee's courage and strength of character in persevering in spite of that peril ; but so much has it been over-estimated that the march round Pope has been considered heretofore to have been either a desperate throw of a daring and lucky gambler or a stroke of intuitive and almost superhuman genius. It was neither of these ; it was a bold, well-considered move of a master of war, based on considerations which were none the less weighty because they appear up to the present to have escaped the notice of military historians.

Before considering Lee's strategy more fully, Pope's

measures in answer to Jackson's raid must be briefly dealt with.

Most critics seem to agree in declaring that his action up to the afternoon of the 27th was eminently sound. The effect of that action was to put his army in a very favourable position, advancing in echelons, the left wing leading and interposing between Jackson and Longstreet, so that it could at any time block Thoroughfare Gap to the latter, while the right wing was already in touch with the former some miles to the south-east. Pope now thought that his net was already well spread, and that by throwing it far enough round he would succeed in enveloping Jackson beyond all hope of escape. In this, as we know, he failed. What were the reasons of his failure ?

It was not that his orders were not executed. It is quite true that Porter delayed his march for two hours, and that the left wing started some three hours behind time. But even if the former had seen fit to inflict on his corps the worry and toil of a night march on an encumbered road, and the latter had moved, as Pope desired, "at the very earliest blush of dawn," Jackson would not have been caught ; his rear-guard by daylight was far away from Manassas on the banks of Bull Run.

The cause of the *coup manqué* lay, in fact, not on the left wing, as Pope says in his report, but on the right, where he himself was. Hooker had got into touch with the enemy on the afternoon of the 27th, and had before night-fall driven him over Broad Run. There, however, contact seems to have been lost ; Ewell's rear-guard fell back unmolested, and reached Manassas by dusk ; from that time onward not a patrol seems to have been sent forward along the railroad to see if the enemy were actually where he was supposed to be, or if he were evacuating his position that night, although the glare from the burning stores, which

could be seen for miles round, made the last hypothesis at least tenable.

The reasons for this neglect are quite clear and have, it must be admitted, great weight. To begin with, there was no cavalry to furnish officers' patrols so far out; all the squadrons fit for service had been collected under Buford and sent off to the west of the Bull Run Mountains. Hooker's division was in a very exhausted condition; it had fought a heavy action and suffered severely; it was absolutely isolated, the nearest troops (Kearny and Reno) being seven miles away to the left, and Porter's corps at Warrenton Junction, ten miles down the line. The troops had arrived on the theatre of operations by rail from Washington in the utmost haste, without any guns or trains, and as a result of this they had at hand little food and less ammunition; Hooker reported that, after the fight at Bristoe, only five rounds per man were left. Lastly, the night was, as several witnesses aver, one of the darkest ever known.

Whether these reasons justify the neglect to keep touch with the enemy is a very difficult point. In any case, the results of the failure were disastrous. A whole day was spent in looking for the enemy, found the previous afternoon, lost once more next morning; a day which proved of the utmost value to the Confederates. Pope was thrown back on conjecture, as he had no real information, and his conjectures led him utterly astray, first to Manassas, then to Centreville, then, too late, to Groveton. And, but for the action of his enemy, he might have spent the whole of the 28th without finding the enemy at all. Conjecture is not, and never can be, a sound basis for action in war; but complete information unfortunately is seldom or never to be had. All the more necessary is it then that touch, once gained, should never be surrendered, and that

by means of the contact obtained every effort should be made to impose one's own will on the enemy, in other words to fix him to his ground by means of the offensive action of one part of the force, while the rest manœuvres to crush him. It was just because the touch gained was not maintained that Pope's operations next day, based on nothing but his own guesses, fell absolutely to the ground. The main cause of that failure was the action, or rather inaction, of the contact troops on the previous night.

The situation on the afternoon of August 28th is a very curious one. We doubt whether the history of war can show a parallel. For if Pope's strategy had ended in failure, Lee's was within an ace of it as well. Here were two forces, Pope's and Jackson's, almost in presence; the one was trying all he knew to bring his enemy to battle before the assistance hastening up to the other could reach him; the other was quite as anxious to fight, but only when his aid should be within measurable distance. And both were driven by circumstances quite beyond their control to do just the opposite of what they wished. Pope never began to fight Jackson till the head of Longstreet's column was almost up; when "Stonewall" made his attack on King, Ricketts was still blocking Thoroughfare Gap.

Jackson was bound to draw on himself the whole Federal army, sooner or later, simply because, without such an action, his great march would have missed its main end. No one supposes that Lee and Jackson incurred all the risks they did simply in order that the latter might make a bonfire of Pope's stores at Manassas; otherwise one would be right in regarding the manœuvre as one of the most injudicious ever undertaken. The object was quite different; they hoped in some way or other to bring Pope to battle at a disadvantage. They quite realised the confusion into which the Federal army must be thrown by

its sudden march to the rear and the disorganisation that must ensue from the loss of communications and supplies. But, though all this had come to pass, the Confederates all but failed to take advantage of it. The fact is that Jackson had "deluded Pope" (to employ the usual expression) so well that the main end of the manœuvre was almost sacrificed. It was to his interest that Pope should attack him in order that he might draw on himself all the forces of the enemy, and so allow Lee next day to deliver the decisive blow. In other words, he was to fulfil the rôle of the Napoleonic advance-guard. Remember what was said above of the time calculation of the resistance of the unit, and the mechanism of the strategy, as conceived by Jackson, becomes quite plain. He might count on the ability of his corps to resist Pope's attacks all the day of the 28th, and by next morning Longstreet, he hoped, would be up, his march hastened by the sound of the guns, to snatch the victory by a sledgehammer stroke.

But Pope did not attack him and therefore he was himself driven to take the offensive. It was for that purpose that he commanded A. P. Hill, early on the 28th, to move from Centreville and block the Bull Run fords. The order was based on the incorrect view that the movements of the enemy, observed from Groveton, were part of a general retreat of the Federal army. It was just such a movement that Jackson was most anxious to stop, for it meant, as we said before, the failure of his strategy. Hill disobeyed these orders, because meanwhile two despatches from Pope to McDowell (presumably the order of 9 P.M. August 27th, ordering the march on Manassas) had fallen into his hands and showed him that the enemy were not retiring, but were massing for battle on the Manassas plateau, and he considered therefore that he would be needed near the main body.

The movements of the enemy indeed were not meant as a retreat, but their effect was, nevertheless, to lead him far away from Jackson and past his front in the direction of Washington, so that the latter no longer interposed between the foe and his base. When Jackson found out that Lee's strategy had thus failed, or whether he ever found it out, we do not know; but in any case he resolved about noon on the 28th that he would attack the first body of the enemy that came within striking distance. He was ready to attack Reynolds at midday if that commander had not turned off to Manassas. When King's division arrived in the evening he leaped out of his lair upon him, not so much with the hope of crushing an isolated portion of the enemy as in order to draw upon himself the rest of Pope's army. In this he succeeded admirably, for next morning brought the battle he so ardently desired.

We have traced the movements of Jackson and the ideas in his mind rather closely because they seem to us a very excellent example of the action of the commander of a strategic advance-guard under peculiarly difficult and dangerous circumstances. If criticism is based on the assumption that Jackson's main idea was to dodge the enemy, then his orders and dispositions for the whole of this day, the order to Hill in the morning, the preparations for attack at noon, the assault on King at nightfall, are quite incomprehensible. But if we remember that his mission was not to run away from the enemy but to lead him on to attack him in a good defensive position, such as he found in the morning behind Bull Run, and later in the woods near Groveton, the whole of "Stonewall's" action on the 28th is seen to be absolutely coherent and reasonable.

The movement undertaken by Lee on August 25th finds at least one parallel in the Napoleonic manœuvre

of 1806 which led to Jena. The mechanism of the design, allowing for the altered conditions, is almost exactly the same. In each case the superior mobility of the assailant enabled the thrust to be aimed in such a direction that, if not averted, it threatened to strike the adversary in a vital spot; the object of the manœuvre being to compel the enemy to fight an offensive action against the first portion of the army he met with, in order to avert that thrust, and then by the resistance of that portion to gain time for the rest of the army to come up and deal a staggering blow while he was still at a disadvantage; in other words, to bring about as early as possible a decisive battle, in which the advantages of position, strategical and tactical, would be all on one's own side.

That was the aim of the conceiver of the operation on each occasion. The results too were curiously similar. The peril that threatened Lannes was the peril that threatened Jackson—namely, that the very superior forces of the enemy would succeed in crushing the advance-guard before the rest of the army could arrive; in other words, lest the time calculation on which the whole manœuvre was based should prove wrong. In each case too the attack finally came, not from the enemy threatened but from the advance-guard itself. Lannes took the offensive against Tauenzien and Jackson assaulted King simply in order to draw down on themselves the weight of the enemy's forces and so render easier the task of the body entrusted with the decisive attack. Alvensleben acted in the same way at Vionville. In each case the object was completely fulfilled, with the greatest advantage to the final result. And yet critics have blamed Napoleon and Lee alike for having exposed isolated forces to danger, forgetting apparently that if one runs great risks, it is for the purpose of gaining great advantages, and that it is

only the masters of war who execute such apparently perilous manœuvres, because they see their goal beyond the pitfalls, while lesser men tremble and turn aside from great ends, because they let "I dare not," wait too closely on "I would."

Of the two operations—both of which were brilliantly successful—the campaign of Jena must, we think, be adjudged the most exemplary. It is very doubtful whether Lee was wise in separating his forces by so wide an interval as two days' march, and we think it certain he would have altered his plan slightly in that direction had he been placed again in the same position. Or he might—probably would—have adopted Napoleon's plan of marching round the enemy with all his army united. Remembering that this was only Lee's second campaign as commander-in-chief of a large army, and recollecting that even heaven-born geniuses, for example Napoleon himself, have to serve their apprenticeship in war, it will seem no reflection on Lee's reputation if we consider that he would not in 1864 have taken the risks he took in 1862. In proof whereof the following facts may be mentioned. A year after, Lee did actually find himself in almost identically the same position with regard to Meade as with regard to Pope. But he did not this time throw part of his army round the Federal rear and follow with the rest two days later; he kept his forces closely united and, as Napoleon did in 1806, passed Meade's flank with his whole army, intending to strike his rear at Bristoe, as Jackson had done. The reasons why he adopted this safer, if less brilliant, method were very many. Henderson, with a biographer's love of his hero, attributed it to the loss of Jackson. Doubtless this influenced him; so also, to as great, perhaps to a greater, extent did other reasons, such as the fact that superior mobility and

superior cavalry were no longer on his side ; but we think he also realised the fact that his former method had owed much of its success to fortune and that it was not to be lightly repeated. He fell back then on the more strictly Napoleonic form, and if with it he failed to achieve such great results as at Manassas, the chief reason was that Lee was not the only general in Virginia who had learnt something from the events of the war. The success of an operation is not always the best criterion of its merit.

In any event, the success in this case fell to the side which sought to woo it by violating all the accepted maxims of war. We often hear that the best general is he who makes the fewest mistakes. The definition might well be further extended. The best general is not only he who makes the fewest mistakes, but he who knows how to choose his time to make them. In other words, a good half of the strategical art consists of the just recognition of the occasion when it is essential to throw most of its dictates overboard.

CHAPTER VI

GROVETON AND MANASSAS

GENERAL POPE was supping at Centreville when, about 10 P.M. on the night of the 28th, the news reached him of King's engagement and the fact that he and Jackson were still in presence. The message overjoyed him, for at last he had brought his elusive foe to bay. There could now, he thought, be no escape for Jackson. With his accustomed promptitude, orders were sent out straightway, which had as their object the concentration of the whole Union army by dawn next morning on King's battlefield; the latter commander was enjoined, not once, but several times, to hold his ground and to prevent the retreat of Jackson to the west. For Pope believed that he now held the key to all the hostile movements which had so puzzled him during the 28th; Jackson, driven back by Hooker at Broad Run, had since then been seeking to escape and rejoin his main army by a move first to Centreville and then, doubling back on his own traces, along the Groveton and Gainesville road to Thoroughfare Gap. McDowell, however, had intercepted this retreat; therefore all that was necessary now was to bring all the force at Centreville down the pike, so as to strike the Confederate rear, while they were striving to hew their way through the forces of McDowell, Sigel, and Reynolds, over 35,000 men, in their front. Kearny then was enjoined to march down the Warrenton pike at 1 A.M., even if he could only take 2000 men with

him and attack next day at dawn ; Hooker and Reno were to follow two hours later. Meanwhile Porter, who was supposed to be at Manassas, was ordered to move to Centreville "as a severe engagement was expected," and to be there at a very early hour. Thus the foe, assailed in front and rear by forces at least twofold superior, must be "bagged," as Pope expressed it. The only danger of the plan miscarrying seemed to be that Jackson might move north on Leesburg by cross tracks, but it was hardly likely that this could be done without Kearny or McDowell finding it out and bringing him to a stand.

Scarcely, however, had the last of these orders been despatched when Pope heard of King's retreat to Manassas. He was much annoyed, as this destroyed the foundation of the whole plan. Jackson's line of retreat was now quite open, and the advance of the Centreville forces would thus merely push him back towards the Gap, damaging him doubtless, but not destroying him. However a new scheme was resolved on with little delay. Porter, instead of McDowell, would form the anvil to the blow of the main army from the east, and for this end he was sent to Gainesville, by a verbal message, which was later supplemented by a written note, directing him to take with him King's division, and "be expeditious or we will lose much." Sigel, meanwhile, was to attack the enemy vigorously and hold him to his position, while the rest of the army was to execute its original orders. Pope hoped that by these means the surrounding of Jackson might still be feasible. The new set of instructions had been all issued by 5 A.M.

Leaving Centreville, let us now precede Kearny's advance-guard down the pike to the battlefield. Crossing Bull Run, a stream about the width of the Thames at Oxford, by the Stone Bridge, we find the white, dusty

road rising gradually in front of us, straight as an arrow, up to the village of Groveton, not quite two and a half miles distant, and beyond to Gainesville. To right and left the country is wooded, but with easy, gentle slopes, and traversed by small streams whose beds afford little cover and no obstacle to movement. Passing on for about 2000 yards, where the Stone House nestles between the wooded heights of Buck Hill to the north and Henry Hill to the south, we come to the Sudley and Newmarket road, which may be regarded as the eastern boundary of the field.

Looking due west and north-west from the little rise above the Dogan House, 1000 yards beyond the Sudley road, there rises, over a mile in front, the flat stony ridge of Sudley Mountain. Its lower slopes are traversed in a north-east and south-west direction by the grade of the unfinished railroad to Alexandria, and this cut formed Jackson's position. For a space of one and a half miles south of Bull Run it is sheltered by woods projecting beyond it and affording little field of view or fire ; farther south, however, the ground slopes gently, open and unencumbered, towards Young's Branch, a stream running practically alongside the pike as far as Groveton village. South of the rivulet the ground again becomes densely wooded, culminating 2000 yards away in a dense forest, one mile broad, and more than that in length, which is impassable for cavalry and guns and practically so for infantry. Through the middle of the forest runs the Manassas Gap Railroad, and half-a-mile to the south of it the road from the Junction, *via* Bethlehem Church, to Gainesville. West of Groveton the ground rises higher and higher till it culminates in a wooded knoll, just where the unfinished railroad crosses the pike, forming the highest point of the battlefield. Here the artillery of Longstreet

took post, and in the woods and hollows to the east of it was concealed, throughout the whole of the 29th, the main body of his corps.

Along the line of the unfinished railroad, Jackson had deployed his men for battle. The left wing, from the rocky knoll near Sudley Church to the bend of the track three-quarters of a mile south of it, was held by A. P. Hill's division, with fourteen guns. Three of his brigades, Gregg, on the left, then Thomas and Field, occupied the embankment, in first line; behind them, in the woods, were Archer, Pender, and Branch. The batteries took post on the ridge some 500 yards in rear of the railroad. The centre, of two brigades, Lawton and Trimble, extended the line as far as the point where the Groveton-Sudley road crosses the line; to their right stood the division, commanded yesterday by W. B. Taliaferro; Starke and Baylor in front, A. G. Taliaferro and Bradley Johnson in rear. With the division were twenty-four guns. Lastly, in the wooded knoll on the extreme right, and separated from their main body by half-a-mile of open land, stood the brigades of Early and Forno, with a battery, in order to guard the flank against a turning movement, some indications of which had already been noticed in the direction of Manassas. Early hid his men well in the trees, pushing out detachments to his front and right to guard against surprise.

In this position, his troops concealed from view by the woods and from fire by the embankments or cuttings of the railroad, "Stonewall" awaited the attack of his enemy.

That attack was not to be long delayed. Sigel's corps had passed the night on the western slopes of Henry Hill, and before dawn broke its commander had made his plans for the first movement. The enemy he had ascertained

to be in the woods beyond Young's Branch, his left on Catharpin Creek, his right on the hills near the pike, and this front he resolved to assail with his three divisions. Schenck was to take the left attack along the pike; Milroy, in the centre, to seize the hill near Dogan's House and plant his guns there; Schurz, deploying to the north of the road, was to wheel to the left and attack in a north-westerly direction. Steinwehr's single brigade was held back in reserve.

As the cold, grey light of the morning broke behind them, the Union troops moved out towards the dark woods in front, which concealed their watchful foe. In a few minutes dropping shots told them that their advance had been noted; the Federal batteries, dashing up, came into action on the gentle rise, within effective range of the woods, and their roar was answered by the cannon on the ridge a mile distant. The infantry pressed on after them; Schenck, hurried on by the sound of Milroy's guns, went forward south of Young's Branch as far as the patch of woods south-east of Groveton, but the deadly fire from Jackson's artillery, which had driven forward in front of the railroad cut on to the hill north-west of the village, called him to a halt. At the same time Milroy sent an urgent request for aid; two of his regiments had already been despatched to reinforce Schurz and, thus weakened, he was not only unable to advance but could barely hold his ground. Nor did the right attack fare any better. Schurz had brought up his two brigades, deployed in one line, past Mathews' farm into the woods west of it. Arrived here, he found that a wide gap was opening between himself and Milroy, and while he was extending to his left to fill it up, the enemy in the woods beyond were preparing for him a warm reception.

As the brigades, side by side, pressed across the open

space into the wood, Gregg threw a regiment forward to meet them. It fell back in confusion before the Federal line overlapping it on both flanks, but reinforced by two others, advanced again, this time with more success. A fierce fight took place near the cut ; the woods were filled with the smoke and roar of battle, and Germans and South Carolinians fought face to face. The former, however, their cohesion loosened in the rough undergrowth and with little aptitude for wood combats, slowly drew back, and when one of Thomas' regiments opened fire against their left, a vigorous assault in front stove in the centre of their formation, separated the two brigades and sent them staggering out of the wood in disorder.

Time, however, had been gained for the arrival of fresh troops. While Schurz was reforming his broken units near the batteries, Kearny's division had begun to come in on his right and deploy in support of him. Aware of this and also of the fact that Reynolds was now in a position to share in the attack of Schenck, Sigel sent out orders for a renewed advance. But this second attempt fared little better than the first.

Schenck had, as already related, sent off Stahel's brigade to reinforce Milroy ; nevertheless he, with Reynolds, pushed forward in obedience to orders. The latter officer, throwing his left well round, led it across the pike nearly half-a-mile west of Groveton and here brought his guns into action against the Confederate flank at short range. Simultaneously Schurz, reinforced by two regiments from Reno's corps, just arrived on the field, went once more against the front of A. P. Hill. It was nearly noon as the Germans entered the woods and the din of battle reawoke. For a long time the fight raged round the railroad cut ; but this time the attack was not to be denied. Entering by an interval of some 100 yards left

between Gregg's and Thomas' brigades, the Federals, supported by a battery driven right up into the skirmish line, crept down the cut and succeeded in debouching unexpectedly on Gregg's right and partly rolling up his brigade. The latter resisted stubbornly, however, and its commander, with quick decision, brought his left wing regiment at the double to the rescue. Joining with Thomas' left regiment, the line charged forward through the smoke with levelled bayonets and in a single rush hurled back the intruding enemy across the line ; amid the crash of musketry and the hail of bullet and shell they were driven slowly foot by foot to the edge of the open ground. Here they rallied and no effort of the enemy could force them farther.

More to the south Milroy, reinforced by three of Reno's regiments, had gone up into the woods in their front and entered on a vigorous but fruitless fight, in which he lost rather than gained ground. Neither could Reynolds maintain his advantage. About 1 P.M. shells began to fall in his lines from the west ; Schenck, though his brigade had returned to him, could offer no support and presently, as heavy hostile masses were seen to front and flank, and as the guns had already been severely handled, the division fell back southwards towards the Lewis House.

This uncovering of his left naturally brought about the withdrawal of Schenck also ; he retired to the patch of woods just south of the Dogan House, carrying with him, it seems, a reinforcement of two regiments, brought up by General Stevens of Reno's corps in person.

The I. Corps had fought itself out ; nevertheless the object of its attack had been partly accomplished. Jackson had been held to his ground and the way prepared for the main assault to be delivered now by the divisions of

Reno, Stevens, Kearny, and Hooker, under the direction of Pope himself, who reached the field about 1 P.M.

Not all these were still available. Reno's corps, with the exception of four regiments, had been pushed into the first line in order to buttress the hardly pressed fragments of the I. Corps; most of Hooker's and Kearny's brigades, however, had not fought, and Pope now ordered them forward to the attack. Hooker was the first to move. Grover's brigade had already relieved Milroy in the centre, so that the two brigades of Carr and Taylor were left at disposal. The former at once moved forward in the track of its two leading regiments who had relieved some of Schurz's troops in the woods. Sweeping in beautiful order over the open space it plunged into the shade of the trees, and carrying forward the two units with it, got as far as the railroad cut. Here the enemy's skirmishers, driven before it up till now, turned about; the deployed lines in rear reinforced them; the Federals were brought to a stand, and at point-blank range the two forces stood facing each other and firing amid the showers of falling twigs and leaves severed by the bullets. It was now a matter of who could bring up soonest a reserve to settle the issue and to both sides support was coming. Even as the Federal brigades of Taylor and Nagle (of Reno's corps) came crashing through the undergrowth, the Confederate counterblow fell. With a fierce yell the second line (Pender) swept down in an irresistible charge upon the left flank of the attack, which broke and pouring back in terror struck the long blue lines in rear and shattered in a moment their beautiful array. Amid an inferno of cheers and curses, first and second line fled backwards and streamed out of the woods into the open, masking the fire of their own guns; after them came Pender's infantry. One of the Federal batteries, swept by a hail of bullets,

was abandoned by the gunners and seemed a helpless prize to the Confederates. But they had gone too far ; unsupported, fired on from three sides and rent by grape and canister from artillery on right and left, they were compelled to retire in haste to the cut.

As they vanished a fresh Federal force appeared, moving forward majestically to the attack. It was Grover's brigade, which had been ordered to fix bayonets and not to fire till it saw the whites of the enemy's eyes ; then to deliver a single volley and charge. These orders were carried out to the letter. Little fire greeted them, for cartridges were running short in Jackson's line, and dashing forward to the embankment the wave of blue swept up and over. A short, sharp contest ensued ; bayonet and butt were freely used ; but the Confederates, exhausted and without ammunition, could not stem the tide ; they broke and fled in wild confusion ; a second line, trying to support them, was also overrun and dashed to fragments. But the impulse of the attack had been spent, and Jackson, watchful of the fight, had hurried up reinforcements from all points of the line. Archer and Forno, who on the arrival of Longstreet had been brought back from the extreme right to the centre, opposed an iron front to the further course of Grover's men ; and Starke and Bradley Johnson, swinging up their right shoulders, surged up against the Federal left. A gallant attempt to strike their outer flank in turn ended disastrously, and fighting tooth and nail the assailants were compelled to retire, first to the embankment, then beyond it to their starting point. "Never men," wrote Grover himself, "fought more gallantly or efficiently."

More to the right, near Bull Run, Kearny, like Schenck earlier in the day, had remained quiescent. For a little time now a pause in the fighting ensued ; only the incessant

rattle of the skirmishers' musketry and the sounds of a desultory artillery duel showed that the contest was not yet over.

Meanwhile Lee had succeeded in reuniting his forces. Longstreet's head of column had set out early that morning and, its steps quickened by the sound of the guns, reached the field of battle, where Early and Forno were posted, about 10 A.M., after a wait of an hour to allow Stuart to cross from north to south of the road. Before noon all his corps had come up and were deployed, well hidden by the accidents of the ground, in prolongation of Jackson's right flank. Hood's two brigades were across the pike, with Evans' in support. Behind the two wings stood, in echelon, Kemper's and Wilcox's divisions; D. R. Jones' formed the right of the line, extending as far as the Manassas Gap railroad. The batteries took post on the knoll evacuated by Early and Forno, and it was their fire which, as we have seen, caused the hasty retirement of Reynolds.

Of all this Pope knew nothing; but he was much puzzled by the fact that nothing had yet been heard of McDowell and Porter. About 2 P.M. he had caught the sound of firing away towards the south, and concluded that they had become engaged; but nothing further was heard until a message arrived from McDowell, saying that he expected to join the main army at 4 P.M. At 4.30 P.M., then, Pope despatched to Porter a peremptory order to advance at once against the enemy's right and rear, keeping communication with Reynolds; then, after waiting till 5 P.M., and concluding that by that time the message must have arrived, he sent orders to Kearny and Stevens to attack Jackson's left with all the forces not yet engaged.

Kearny, as has been said, had come up into line early in

the day ; but, although one of his brigades had moved up into the woods and become engaged with Gregg's skirmishers about 2 P.M., no real attack had as yet been undertaken by his division. Deploying now in two lines, with Stevens' men somewhat to his left rear, he moved up against the wooded knoll held by Gregg, his right flank resting on Bull Run. The moment was favourable ; all through that long summer day Gregg had fought ; his men were worn out with fatigue, their ammunition was running low, and his dead and dying lay in swathes amid the undergrowth around. Yet he was undaunted. " Tell General Hill," he said, in answer to a message, " that I can hold my ground with the bayonet." The Federal masses now came forward through the trees ; and " the war was waked anew." The Confederates fought doggedly, but in vain ; long lines of blue lapped round their flanks, and step by step they were forced back. The railroad line was lost ; soon after the edge of the knoll went with it. Kearny's men, flushed with victory, pressed their foes right back against the stretch of woods running due west 500 yards south of Sudley Church, but they were not permitted to stay there. Jackson, gathering his reserves from every part of his line, sent them forward at speed to the endangered flanks. Early's brigade arrived first ; then a regiment of Forno's, one of Lawton's, and one of Branch's, and before the rush of their serried ranks the triumphant assailants, disordered by their success, were compelled to loosen their grip on the prize. Once again on this day the victorious " rebel yell," ringing loudly through the glades, proclaimed the inviolability of Jackson's line ; the Federals were pushed back, first to the oft-disputed railroad, then 200 yards beyond it, by Early's veterans. Slowly then the foes drew apart ; Early fell back to the first position of Gregg, now held by Branch ; Kearny and Stevens reformed

their troops in the gathering gloom on the ridge south of Bull Run.

Meanwhile, what had become of Longstreet and Porter? About noon, or a little after, Lee, who was posted on Stuart's Hill, had expressed a wish to throw the I. Corps forward against the enemy's exposed flank; and indeed preparations were already being made for this movement, when Stuart, who was watching Longstreet's right, reported the approach of a strong hostile column, estimated at 10,000 men, marching from Manassas in the direction of Gainesville. It was apparently just before receiving this report that Longstreet rode forward to reconnoitre in the direction of Brewer's Spring. Here, in his front, he saw and was much impressed by the strength of the hostile lines, manned with a strong force of rifles and guns, to the east of Groveton; returning to Lee, he reported the position as "not inviting." The news of the approach of Porter still further inclined him against the proposed attack; rather it was now essential to take measures of defence on the threatened flank. Wilcox's three brigades were therefore sent in haste to take post on Jones' right, so as to extend it across the railroad and the road to Gainesville. The enemy however seemed content to rest in the woods opposite Jones, and, as no sound came from that direction, Lee again urged a movement down the pike. Longstreet, however, was stubborn in his resolve to do nothing of the kind. Not till later, after the enemy had been distinctly seen moving away from before Jones to the northwards, did he consent, and then only to a reconnaissance in force down the pike; indeed at that time it was already growing dark, so that an attack was impracticable. More time was then wasted while Wilcox resumed his former position, and finally the order of movement was conveyed to Hood and Evans only a few minutes before sunset.

Before following out their movements, it is necessary to see what had become of Porter. He had, as before mentioned, moved out along the Gainesville road, in accordance with the order received at 9.30 A.M., and after some two hours' march his leading brigade met hostile scouts in the woods near Dawkins' Branch; clouds of dust beyond the stream towards Gainesville gave unmistakable proof of the presence of the enemy in large force. He at once resolved to attack; his first division was deployed and about to move forward when McDowell rode up from the rear and ordered it to halt. He then showed Porter a despatch from Buford, announcing that three hours before a large column of all arms had passed through Gainesville from the west, and both commanders came to the conclusion that Longstreet must now be on the field.

At this moment arrived a new order from Pope, known as the Joint Order, which, repeating the command to move on Gainesville, enjoined the two corps to get into communication with the main army, and halt in such a position that they could reach Bull Run that night, for it would probably be necessary, on account of supplies, to fall back behind that stream. "If any considerable advantages are to be gained by departing from this order," it added, "it will not be strictly carried out." McDowell and Porter now held a consultation; and it was finally decided that the former should march up behind Porter on the Sudley road, and come in in the interval between him and the main army. Whether the latter should attack at once, or wait for McDowell, or even attack at all, however, was not settled clearly. McDowell then rode off, leaving Porter in complete uncertainty.

Left to himself, the latter resolved to attack the force in front of him, if he could have the support of King. This, however, was refused him, and he was told by McDowell

to stay where he was, and if necessary fall back on his (McDowell's) left. Porter then deployed Morell's division in the woods east of Dawkins' Branch, keeping Sykes in rear near himself at Bethlehem Church, waiting until McDowell should come in on his right. All the afternoon he sent repeated messages to that officer and to Pope, asking for orders, and despatched patrols also, trying to get touch with King, but all were either lost in the difficult country on that flank or else captured. In point of fact, King, as we shall see, never came in on Porter's right at all, as the latter expected he would. The latter general then for the rest of the day did nothing. The enemy were in strong force in front and had a good position ; and nothing in the Joint Order gave any indication of a general battle to be waged that day. Once, when the fire of guns burst out, well to his right rear, Porter imagined that Sigel was being pushed back, and thought of moving to assist him ; but a threatened attack by the enemy in front made him abandon his design and hold on where he was. Soon after this, about 6.30 P.M., arrived the order from Pope enjoining immediate attack against the hostile right and rear ; why this order took two hours to reach him is not clear. It was too late then to do anything, for darkness was coming on ; the force therefore took measures of security and lay down to rest.

Meanwhile McDowell's leading division, formerly King's, now under Hatch, had reached the field and took post on the left of Reynolds'. From here it was moved up towards the centre of the line ; but as it reached the pike a new direction was given it. Pope, misled by the optimistic reports of Kearny from the extreme right and believing the enemy to be in full retreat, ordered Hatch to pursue down the pike in company with Reynolds. Hatch had only three brigades with him, but he hastened forward at once,

deploying first a regiment, then a whole brigade as skirmishers; Reynolds followed with two brigades in first line and one in reserve on Hatch's left and rear. These troops, near Groveton, ran into the brigades of Hood, Law, and Evans, whom Longstreet had sent forward. Darkness had now completely set in, and a most confused fight took place in the copses and hollows, in which the opponents could only see the flashes of each others' rifles to aim at and where the bayonet was freely used. A portion of Hood's men established themselves in the forest south-east of Groveton, and with their fire swept the fields in front so effectively that the Federals, after some three-quarters of an hour's fight, were compelled to fall back, covered by their reserves.

So the battle of the 29th ended. Hardly a foot of ground had been gained by either side, for Hood's men soon evacuated their forward position, and returned to their original line. The sounds of firing had died away, and the exhausted men slept all night on their arms; only about midnight the sounds of the Confederates retiring from opposite their bivouac disturbed the slumbers of Schenck's division, and a brigade had formed and advanced to a defensive position before the error was discovered, and all became quiet again.

When morning broke, the morning of the 30th, which was to witness the second and greater struggle of Manassas, Pope summoned his generals to meet him at his headquarters. His plan was still the same as on the day before—a vigorous attack on Jackson's left, to be conducted this time by McDowell's, Heintzelmann's, and Porter's corps, under the supreme direction of the former officer. Porter, who had been peremptorily summoned to the field the previous night, had started at 4 A.M., and was now moving up towards the Stone House by the Sudley road; his

leading troops were filing on to the ground as McDowell, accompanied by Heintzelmann, rode forward to reconnoitre the hostile lines.

The two generals returned after a short while, reporting to Pope that they had found the position held by the enemy on the 29th abandoned, and that only a few guns and infantry skirmishers had been seen farther back. All indications seemed to point to the fact that Jackson had retreated; for, besides the observations of McDowell, paroled prisoners declared that strong hostile columns had been moving westward all night down the Gainesville road. Despite the reiterated warnings of Porter, who declared that Longstreet had arrived the previous day and was now on the field, Pope concluded that his next move must be not an attack but a pursuit, and the orders were modified to this end. The morning, dull and cold, was well advanced, and had passed quietly. Nothing was to be seen from the Henry Hill but a battery near the pike on a rise some two miles distant, which had spoken once or twice on the appearance of some of Porter's regiments within range. But for the rest, the woods and ridges in front lay dark and sombre, but apparently untenanted; only occasional feeble outbursts of musketry, mostly from the far right near Bull Run, gave any sign of life.

By noon, then, the orders had been issued for a pursuit. The whole army was massed in martial array on the plateau; Kearny and Reno held the right, with Hooker to their left and Ricketts in second line behind; Sigel was in the centre; King and Porter near the pike, and on the extreme left Reynolds, with Bayard's cavalry. The last four units were now placed under McDowell's command and ordered to pursue towards Gainesville; Heintzelmann, with his own men and those of Ricketts, was to take the Sudley Springs-Haymarket road; Sigel and Reno the

commander-in-chief intended to hold back as a reserve, which would, so Porter was informed, reinforce his front if required.

Just as McDowell was in the act of despatching his instructions, there rode up General Reynolds. He affirmed in the most positive manner that the enemy were not retreating, but were massing in great force to the south of the pike, and that if the "pursuit" were pressed, it would run into a hornet's nest. McDowell, only half believing him, did not deem it right to stop the movement; he confined himself therefore to ordering Reynolds to take his own division over to the left of Porter and watch the region mentioned. He also reported the news to Pope, and sent off for part of Ricketts' command to come across to the south of the road.

Meanwhile the V. Corps was preparing to advance. It had assembled near Dogan's House; Morell's two brigades (the third, with Morell himself, had gone off to Centreville by mistake) held the right; Sykes' division stood more to the left and rear. In front of them woods extended far on both flanks, separated by a funnel-shaped tongue of open land about half-a-mile wide and sloping up to the crest, on which were posted the Confederate guns. Butterfield, who had taken over Morell's duties, now received orders to send his troops into the woods to the right and, covered by them, to wheel round to the left and strike the guns in flank; Sykes would support him, and his right would be guarded by the simultaneous advance of Hatch's division.

But the woods in their front still hid the stubborn foe who yesterday had foiled all the Federal assaults. Jackson had in the night rearranged his line; Archer had relieved Field, who had gone far to the right and aligned in rear of the Stonewall division. The latter had brought

up all its brigades into the front line, extending its right under Baylor through the woods to touch Longstreet's left. That flank was further strengthened by the massing of eighteen guns on the hill near the Deep Cut, so as to sweep all the ground in front and cross their fire with Longstreet's artillery near the pike. But all along the line, the railroad embankment and the woods beyond were held only by a thin screen of riflemen; the mass of the troops lay farther back, some 200 yards up the ridge, and sheltered from the view of their enemies by the thickets and copses.

Longstreet's corps still held its position of the previous day. Lee had resolved not to attack. The reports of his corps commander, and the fear that perhaps McClellan had now come up from Washington, decided him rather to wait till nightfall, when, if Pope had not retired, the Confederate army would again move round his left by the Little River pike, and force him to leave his ground. For the present he would watch and wait.

The Federals, however, were about to offer again to him the chance he had missed on the 29th. Butterfield deployed his brigades, side by side, in a deep formation; his own on the left, Roberts' on the right, each in three lines, covered by skirmishers. As he passed into the woods, Sykes' regulars advanced along the pike farther south, two brigades in front and one in reserve. Hatch, who had also reported to Porter, was forming to the right of Butterfield, his four brigades, much thinned by their fights of the 28th and 29th, arrayed in seven lines, two regiments in each. In all, even counting losses, at least 15,000 men were moving to hurl themselves on Jackson's wasted brigades; and these troops were composed of the best men, and led by some of the best officers, in all the Federal army. Confident of meeting nothing but scattered

and beaten foes, they moved gallantly forward, colours flying and bayonets fixed.

Suddenly, as they emerged from the trees into the open, an unexpected sight met their eyes. Bugles rang out and the whole space before them, between the railroad cut and the far woods, was covered by a swarm of grey uniforms streaming down to their position. Before they could recover from their astonishment, a deadly hail of bullets smote them and tore great lanes in their ranks. Butterfield's men, who had outstripped Hatch, found themselves exposed to enfilade fire from their right, which brought the first line to a halt. Not till the latter, struggling in some disorder through the undergrowth, came up level, could the advance be continued. Then, with a deafening cheer, heard even above the roar of cannon and rattle of musketry, Porter's men broke forward in a charge. Dashing across the open, undismayed by their heavy losses, they reached in one rush to within a stone's throw of their goal ; but no farther could they get. In the men of Starke's and Bradley Johnson's brigades they met foes as stubborn and resolute as themselves ; a furious encounter took place ; blue and grey clad soldiers fired fiercely into each others' faces at deadly range ; rocks were used freely when other ammunition was exhausted, and more than one on either side were slain by these novel missiles. The second and third Federal lines swept up to push the attack home, and so critical seemed the situation that Jackson sent an urgent call to Longstreet for aid ; but though the stars and stripes rose high aloft, fell, and rose again within ten paces of the Confederate line, and though individual soldiers actually came to hand grips with the enemy on the edge of the cut, the iron front of the defence remained unbroken. Gradually the tide ebbed back ; and presently the open

field was covered with the broken masses of the attack, seeking again the shelter of the woods. Once there the disorganised men, some from Hatch's division, others from Butterfield's, a few from Sykes', were collected as far as possible, and fell back out of the covert in the direction of their own batteries.

No better success had attended Sykes' attack on the left. As Butterfield moved up, two regiments swung forward to support him and held firm in the woods, until, just at the end of his attack, they were pressed up to his aid; another had seized two buildings farther to the left. But as they emerged into the open a tornado of canister and shell smote their left flank, rent their array and hurled them back to the cover. The battle was about to enter on a new phase. Longstreet, whose troops were sheltered in the woods south of the pike, had ridden forward as on the previous day towards Groveton, and from a position almost in prolongation of Sykes' flank had been an interested spectator of the attack. Instantly he sent for guns; first one battery, then another galloped up and, unlimbering, opened fire on the helpless foe. At the same moment arrived Jackson's call for troops; but Longstreet, realising that direct assistance would mean a long delay, and that a chance for a splendid stroke had offered itself, resolved, without consulting Lee, to go forward with all his force to the attack. Even as he sent out the order, an injunction for the offensive reached him from the commander-in-chief. Hood's two brigades were to move straight down the pike; Kemper and Wilcox were on his flanks, and R. H. Anderson, who had come up twelve hours before, in reserve; D. R. Jones was on the extreme right. The attack was to be pressed right home by a slight change of direction to the left against the heart of the hostile

position, so as to sever Pope's line of retreat by the Stone Bridge.

The heavy blow was to decide the day. For the first few minutes it seemed nothing could resist the Confederate onslaught; they found little in front of them, for Pope, fearing for Porter's corps and incredulous that anything of importance was south of the pike, had drawn over Reynolds' division to support the attack. Thus the Federal left was laid bare at the critical moment; the only force to oppose Longstreet's victorious advance was furnished by the brigade of Warren, who had on his own initiative left Sykes' line, and taken ground to the south, and one of Reynolds', which had about turned on hearing the rebel yell. The efforts of these two little bodies to stem the rush were vain; suffering fearful losses in a few minutes, and surrounded on all sides, they were hurled back over the open ground in front of the Chinn House. But the breathing space gained by their resistance proved precious; for it gave time for Schenck's second brigade, despatched to the left by Pope, to reach the strong post of Bald Hill, where it deployed facing west. To his right was Milroy, behind and north of the Chinn House, and McDowell, seeing the peril, was hurrying up Tower's brigade of Ricketts' division, arrived a few moments back on the Henry Hill. Here the Confederates' rush was checked. Hood, pressing hard after Warren's broken men, was thrown into disorder by the rapid volleys of Milroy's infantry and the steady, accurate firing of the guns posted south of Young's Branch. One battery was wrested from the Federals in the woods north of the Chinn House, but in the open ground beyond the attack was brought to a stand. Meanwhile, Wilcox (who had with him only one brigade, Featherston's and Pryor's having united with Jackson), Kemper and D. R. Jones were

wrestling for the possession of Bald Hill; Kemper's men pressed Schenck in front, the other two commanders enveloped his left. Forced to change front under fire, the Germans, supported just at the critical moment by Tower's fresh troops, opposed a stubborn front to the repeated and persistent attacks of their enemy. The fight in the fast-gathering darkness was maintained by both sides with splendid courage, and it was long ere the numbers of the assailants told on the defence, whose infantry were handled with fine skill, and whose guns were fought recklessly in the very firing line. By the time that the Federals had been driven step by step down the reverse slope of the hill, enough time had been gained to enable their leaders to establish a firm line on the high Henry Hill, where the Confederates had made their stand just a year before. Here had been collected the still available men of Reno's corps and Reynolds' Pennsylvania Reserves; Stahel and Schurz guarded their right, and in rear Porter's corps had assembled; much of it, especially the regulars of Sykes' division, was still in fine trim for the last struggle.

After a gallant attempt by Koltes' and Kryzanowski's brigades of the I. Corps had failed to recapture the crest of Bald Hill, the men of Longstreet closed in from all sides on the last Federal stronghold. But the limit of their success had been reached. Disordered by their rapid charge across country, bewildered in the now total darkness, exhausted, and with cartridges running low, they could make no impression on the defence, whose rifles and cannon, flashing redly through the gloom, crushed back every isolated assault. Wilcox and R. H. Anderson made vain efforts to break that stubborn line; once indeed the latter gained a momentary footing on the eastern crest, but Meade's Pennsylvanians, stiffened by

a regular brigade under Chapman, went at them with the bayonet, and threw them back as far as the Sudley road before they could be checked. D. R. Jones sent repeatedly for one of his brigades, which had gone to the right earlier in the day to guard against an imaginary flank attack ; but it failed to find its way back, and when at last the firing ceased, from sheer weariness on both sides, and the Confederate commanders called off their men, Henry Hill was still in possession of the Union arms.

Behind that stubborn barrier, Pope's army had since 8 P.M. been filing over the Stone Bridge and back along the road towards Centreville. Their retreat had been hastened by Jackson, whose left, under Hill, pressed back the troops of Stevens, acting as rear-guard, and captured six guns. Nevertheless, there was little serious fighting north of the pike, and the retirement was effected in comparative quiet, and in as good order as could reasonably be expected from a beaten army. The cavalry under Buford, after being worsted in a pretty fight with Robertson's horsemen, fell back over Lewis' Ford. At about 10 P.M. the garrison of Henry Hill was quietly drawn back over Young's Branch, and reunited with Schurz's division on the plateau north of it ; Gibbon's brigade was detailed as rear-guard and, covered by it, the shattered remains of the force moved in silence across the Stone Bridge and made the best of its way to Centreville. Gibbon, after firing the bridge, followed them, and by next morning's dawn the Federal army was mustering once more behind the old Confederate works near that village.

Of the Federal losses in this battle it is impossible to speak with any certainty, as in the Official Records all the casualties during the various engagements from Cedar Run (exclusive) to Chantilly are collected together in one table. The total loss during this period was 14,500 men,

and one may say, therefore, with a fair amount of certainty, that of this number at least 11,000 fell on August 29th and 30th, which would be equivalent to 16 per cent. of the army. By far the heaviest loss fell on McDowell's corps, even allowing for the fact that it was engaged before the battle at Gainesville and Thoroughfare Gap. Of the regiments, the 5th New York, of Warren's brigade, lost 298 men out of a total of 490, or the large proportion of 60 per cent. The Confederates had not, of course, suffered so heavily; their casualties numbered 7200, probably about $14\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of their effective. Anderson's brigade of Jones' division lost over 600 men, but though this was the greatest total it is doubtful if it was the greatest proportional loss. Of the individual units, the 5th Texas, of Hood's brigade, suffered to the extent of 239 men disabled, which must have meant over 60 per cent. The material fruits of the victory were claimed by Lee as being 7000 unwounded and 2000 wounded prisoners, 30 guns, 20,000 small arms, many colours, and a considerable amount of stores.

COMMENTS

The battles of Groveton and Manassas, in spite of the increased power of armaments, abound in tactical lessons for to-day, and some of the more obvious of these it is now our task to note. First of all, let us deal with Pope's actions throughout the 29th. Three distinct plans of battle seem to have been formed by him; the first two we have already noted. To begin with, he intended a double attack on front and rear of the enemy, conceiving that the latter had been headed off by the left wing of his army, and that they could hold him there long enough to give time for the main body to take him between two

fires. As this was based on a situation existing only in the imagination of the Federal leader, we need not stop to discuss it, but will pass on to the second plan, which resembled it, but with differences. King having withdrawn from before the enemy, the anvil for Pope's hammer stroke had gone, and it was necessary to substitute another for it; so Porter was directed to march round into the rear of the Confederates, taking King with him, and take post on their line of retreat at Gainesville. Meanwhile Sigel was to fix the enemy by a preparatory action, in order to give Pope time to assemble the main body of the army, and covered by him to manoeuvre for the decisive stroke, at the most suitable time and place; Porter would then be in a position to receive, and utterly to ruin, the defeated foe as he fell back to the west. This was quite a Napoleonic conception, bearing a striking resemblance to the scheme of May 20th, 1813, for the battle of Bautzen, where Ney was ordered to seize Drehsa on the Allies' line of retreat, while the Emperor amused them in front, and only after his turning force was in position struck the decisive blow. But for such a conception to bear full fruit, it was necessary that Porter should move rapidly and with somewhat greater strength than he had actually at his disposal. King's division was therefore assigned and expedition was urged.

The combination however failed. To begin with, Sigel carried out his part badly. His duty was, and the duty of every advance-guard in a similar case must be, to hold the enemy fast to his ground, induce him to reveal his position, employ his reserves, expose himself to loss from the attackers' artillery; in other words, he was entrusted with the *combat d'usure*. Now for such a combat, in contradistinction to a decisive attack, the force at hand must be disposed in great depth; it must, while

using every effort to deceive the enemy into expecting a decisive attack and preparing to meet it, not commit itself to such attack, until the psychological moment arrives, and the signal is given by the commander-in-chief. Even then the decisive movement will probably be entrusted to other and fresher troops. The rôle of the advance-guard consists in long-continued, not sudden, overwhelming efforts.

Sigel's attack however had no depth ; his troops moved out on a very wide front, over two miles long, and did so moreover in divergent directions. The natural results were (1) that nowhere had he any reserves to feed the combat, for Steinwehr's single brigade could hardly be called such ; so that when his troops were once repulsed he could not send them up to attack again until they had been reformed, nor if they came to a halt would it be possible by the impetus of fresh lines to push them on further ; (2) the attack being made in divergent directions was bound to be piecemeal and badly timed ; moreover, gaps tended to open in the line and get wider and wider the farther the troops advanced. Both these consequences in fact ensued ; a gap opened between Schenck and Milroy, which Stahel had to fill up ; then Milroy had to send two of his regiments to Schurz, and even then the latter had to extend to his left to meet him ; and again Schurz's two brigades got separated and gave the Confederates an excellent chance for a counter-stroke, which they took at once. So far from the attacks being simultaneous, Milroy engaged before Schurz, and Schurz before Schenck, who, in fact, never got into action at all. As a result the preparatory action was only a partial success. Time had been gained for the arrival of the rest of the army, certainly ; but the extent of the hostile position had been known to Sigel before he began his

attack, and little fresh information was gained. As for forcing the enemy to engage his reserves, or expose his lines to the Federal guns, the effect of the operation in these respects was quite infinitesimal.

The result of all this was that, instead of the mass of attack (Hooker, Kearny, and Reno) being able to manœuvre for the decisive blow behind the screen formed by the I. Corps, much of it (all but one of Reno's brigades and one of Hooker's) had to be pushed forward into action at various parts of the line to sustain the advance-guard. This not only split up the commands to an amazing degree, Reno especially never having even half of his men at any one time under his orders, but so diminished the numbers available for the decisive attack that Pope, about 10.30 P.M., concluded that success could no longer be hoped for. Sigel seems to have sent rather alarming reports as to the strength of the enemy; Pope himself had ascertained that the army could not be supplied after that day unless fresh stores were sent up from Centreville. Under the influence of these two facts, he made his resolve to abandon the field and retire behind Bull Run. Orders to this effect were sent to Heintzelmann, Reno and Sigel, and the Joint Order was sent to McDowell and Porter. As it was necessary, however, to postpone the retreat of the main army until the latter two generals should be up in line, Pope, about noon, mounted his horse and rode to the front. Whether "the sensuous impression of the battlefield" here exercised a sudden and overwhelming influence on him we do not know; but, at any rate, at 1 P.M. he suddenly changed his mind. He would not retire; he would fight on and see if victory could not be snatched at the last moment. So he drew up his third plan, which was considerably different from those preceding it. Porter and McDowell could no longer be spared

to march round to the rear of the enemy ; the time for such a manœuvre had passed. They must be directed at once against the hostile right ; so that for the design consisting in a turning movement and an attack on the centre of the foe in position was to be substituted another, that of two forces operating convergently against front and flank, of which operation Koniggrätz is the best-known example. Injunctions for this attack were issued at once to Sigel, Reno, and Heintzelmann ; but by an extraordinary oversight, Pope neglected till too late to convey orders to this effect to Porter, who was to give the blow against the right. Hearing gun-fire from that direction about 2 P.M., just as the plan above mentioned had materialised, he seems to have supposed that Porter was about to make, on his own initiative, the outflanking movement required ; in fact, so confidently did he expect this, that he stated, in his first report, dated September 3rd, that he sent orders to that effect. His memory is at fault here, for he sent no such order till 4.30 P.M., but very possibly he did expect that Porter would make some such move ; in fact, if, like a good soldier, he marched to the sound of the guns, he could hardly fail to execute the outflanking attack by the very direction of his march.

As we know, however, Porter had been held up all day by the forces of Longstreet in his front. In face of these, it would have been impossible to execute the attack conceived by Pope, and in fact it was on this rock that all the Federal commander's plans split. He had no idea that Longstreet had come up ; all his schemes were based on the assumption—unwarranted, it seems to us—that that officer was not four but twenty-four hours' march from the field on the morning of the 29th, and that he would have to deal with Jackson alone. But it is curious that for a long time

neither McDowell nor Porter, though they were convinced by noon that Longstreet was in front of them, seem to have thought it necessary to report this rather important fact to their commander-in-chief. Pope remained until late evening ignorant that Lee had actually effected the junction of the two separated parts of his army. This omission is all the less easy to understand, inasmuch as from the Joint Order the two commanders must have believed that Pope intended not to fight, if this junction had already taken place. It must be admitted that by this order Porter was placed in a most peculiar position, and if he did nothing for the whole of the day, it was due to the fact that he did not conceive a battle to be at all a part of Pope's plans; according to the order, he would rather have expected a general retreat behind Bull Run as the next move; McDowell, too, had given him the same impression. It may cause some surprise that, although a furious fight was going on not two miles to the north of him, no musketry was heard by Porter or anyone in his corps till 6.30 P.M. In certain atmospheric conditions, however, especially in thick wooded country, such a phenomenon is easily explicable; students of the Franco-German War will remember that exactly the same thing happened to the German 13th division at Spicheren. Thus it happened that all the afternoon Porter heard nothing, except a cannonade which McDowell had already told him was merely one of Sigel's artillery battles, to induce him to believe that a heavy engagement was taking place near Groveton. Only at 6.30 P.M. did the rattle of small arms become audible, and at the same time an order arrived, enjoining immediate attack. By then the chance had passed away with the daylight. That he did not attack before was simply due to the fact that he had neither orders to do so, nor any cause to suppose that such

a course was expected of him or in accord with the ideas of his chief.

To go back to Pope. We have already noted his third plan of battle and explained why it failed, so far as Porter was concerned. The grand attack in the front by Hooker, Kearny, and Reno failed likewise, chiefly owing to faulty staff work, resulting in bad timing and disconnected assaults. Thus neither the frontal nor flank movements came to anything; and the same lack of unity attended the last attempt of Kearny, which Pope had hoped to combine with a turning movement by Porter. This, in spite of the fact that the order reached the latter too late, and could not in any case have been executed as Pope intended, was within an ace of success; the foothold gained within Jackson's line was only lost because of the want of reserves to ensure it. Over and over again the Federals made this same error right up to the end of war; they were incapable, apparently, of realising the truth so naïvely expressed by Ardant du Picq: "The man, whether he be general or simple captain, who sends all his men, without reserves, to capture a position, must expect to see them turned out again by the vigorous counter-attack of a corporal's guard."

In contradistinction to this, we may well admire the use Jackson made of his reserves. Whenever danger threatened, he collected all the forces he could lay hands on, and hurled them against the intruders to drive them out. For this he did not fear to expose to an apparently dangerous degree the rest of his line, in order that he might concentrate all available forces on the one decisive point, and in this he showed the true general's instinct. His three divisional leaders backed him up splendidly, and their focus in every case met with success. The combats of the 29th afford yet another proof, if proof

were needed, that discipline and united effort can give to the weaker force the power of triumphing over a far greater number of disordered and disorganised enemies.

The action, or rather inaction, of Longstreet deserves a passing mention. No less than three times on this day did Lee express his wish that an attack should be made down the pike against Pope's left; and every time Longstreet refused to execute it. It was not the last occasion on which the modest, unassuming commander-in-chief yielded to the views of his more headstrong subordinate; but although the result here was not so disastrous as at Gettysburg, it might have led to the missing of a great opportunity. "Fortune is a woman: if you miss her to-day, do not expect to find her again to-morrow." No one could have told on the afternoon of the 29th that Pope would remain to the last ignorant that a heavy force lay in prolongation of his left, ready to strike at the first good chance, or that the favourable moment, present to-day, would not have passed before the next morning's dawn. Yet Longstreet preferred to remain in inaction, and Lee, who does not seem to have made any personal reconnaissance himself, quietly accepted his decision, contrary as it was to his own better judgment. It is certain that the Confederate leaders were nervous about Porter on their right; but that general had only 10,000 men with him, and Longstreet admits that he knew this as certainly as is ever possible in war. And yet, while Jones and Wilcox (10,000 men) were watching Porter, 15,000 more were doing nothing on the hills west of Groveton. The inaction of this force, especially in view of Lee's oft-expressed desire for attack, seems inexcusable, and it can hardly be construed, as Napoleon's delays at Austerlitz, into a well-judged waiting until the battle should be ripe. That the Confederates found themselves next day in an even better

position than that afforded them on the 29th for a heavy blow against the Federal left was a rare piece of good fortune, for which they had not themselves to thank in any way. Longstreet was a very great soldier, but he was too enamoured of the defensive, and so timid in attack that he often missed opportunities by hesitating and dallying till the best chances of success were gone.

That the Federal leader did not discover the arrival of the main hostile army until it actually, on the afternoon of the 30th, debouched on his flank, may cause surprise ; but, although it is impossible to acquit Pope of culpable negligence in not endeavouring to discover its presence for certain, particularly after he definitely heard from Porter that Longstreet had in fact arrived the day before, it is quite easy to see the train of thought which led him to conclude that the information given him was false. He had already heard from McDowell and Heintzelmann, who were both most efficient and faithful soldiers, that the enemy had fallen back ; other sources of information, including his own view of the field from headquarters, all tallied with that hypothesis. Is it to be wondered at that, in the face of all this, he should have regarded Porter's report merely as an excuse put forward for his inaction on the previous afternoon, which had little, if any, foundation in fact ? Pope and Porter by this time were almost deadly enemies, and the general-in-chief, incensed beyond measure at his subordinate's bitter and very unjust strictures on his operations, was in no condition to listen to, or judge soberly of the truth of, the allegations made by him as to the arrival of Longstreet. Generals, like other mortals, are very human, and often an action, which in itself may appear nothing less than wrong-headed, may be explained by personal predilections—things which the strategical text-books never touch on, but which usually

have a far greater influence on military operations than the conventional lines of communication or re-entrant angles of the base. We are not to be understood as meaning that Pope was justified in disbelieving Porter; we merely state the fact that he did so, and the reasons which account for, but do not by any means excuse, his conduct. The very least he should have done would have been either to have gone forward himself, or sent a strong reconnaissance under a trusted officer, say McDowell, to see if the report had any foundation in fact. Obstinate in his own preconceived ideas, he did neither, and he paid for this neglect by the loss of the battle.

As for the tactics pursued in this action of the 30th, they were little, if any, better than those of the previous day. It is noteworthy that while Pope had united on his chosen field more than 60,000 fighting men, yet the attack which ensued was executed by at most 15,000, or just one quarter of the army. Moreover even these went in piecemeal, Butterfield having to wait for Hatch and thus losing the impetus of his first rush, and Sykes sending in his troops only after his comrades on the right had spent themselves out. The decisive attack, of which so much is now heard, is easy to plan, less easy to execute. Neither on this day nor for many months after did the Federal leaders carry it out in anything but a most unsatisfactory manner. McClellan in this respect was no better than Pope, or Hooker than Burnside; not until the arrival of Meade and Grant did the Union arms attain to that unity, that common direction, which was so pre-eminently the characteristic of the efforts of their foes.

It may be worth noting, however, that when thrown on the defensive by Lee's sudden counter-attack, Pope, aided by McDowell, handled his men with ability and judgment, Seizing with rare promptitude the decisive importance of

the two ridges of Bald Hill and Henry Hill, he posted on the former a force of two divisions, just large enough to hold its ground for an hour or so, while in the time thus gained he devoted himself to strengthening the second line with all the other available forces. The enemy were thus compelled to waste their strength and disorder their lines against a fraction only of the Federal army, sent out merely in order to gain time; so that when they ran up against the real rallying point of the army on Henry Hill they could make no impression on it. Henderson declares Pope to have been an incapable tactician; but we consider that the skilful way in which he extricated himself in these evening hours from a very awkward and even perilous position show him to have possessed more tactical ability and *coup d'œil* than history has yet accorded to him. Some of the credit is certainly due to McDowell, who supported his chief with whole-hearted vigour; but it is certain that Pope realised the great importance of Bald Hill, and was the first to order its seizure by Sigel, and it is almost equally well established that he superintended the massing of the rest of the army on Henry Hill. To whomsoever the chief merit should be assigned—and we believe it should be Pope—his army backed him up well. The Federal infantry never fought better or more stubbornly than on the evening of August 30th, and the artillery supported them with a recklessness and dash which earlier in the battle might have turned the scale. The pieces were fought in the very forefront of the firing line and the closeness of their support is evinced by the fact that often when the infantry fell back the guns had to be abandoned after firing right up to the very last with ease. The influence of this self-sacrifice on the final result can hardly be measured; but it is a significant fact that Hood's onset along the turnpike itself was checked almost entirely by artillery fire.

In fact, the rear-guard action was well and skilfully fought; the use of successive lines of defence, the mutual co-operation of infantry and guns, the timely use of the counter-attack, the reception of the troops from the first position by those in rear of them—all merit high commendation. As a result of this, the Federal army was enabled to make its escape from the field unmolested by the enemy, well beaten, certainly, but nothing like routed.

The Confederates' attack tactics were very different from those of their opponents. Jackson's men proved, alike on the 29th and 30th, that they could stand as firm as rocks to repel the furious assaults of Pope's army, even when their ammunition had run out, and nothing was left them but the stones which lay about their lines and their bayonets. To the I. Corps fell the more glorious task of completing the victory; and the counter-attack that won the day deserves close study as a model of that form of operation. All arms partook in it; the cavalry watched the flanks, and dashing forward with their guns harassed the rear of the retreating enemy; "the batteries," says Longstreet, "were thrown forward from point to point following the movements of the general line"; and the infantry, 30,000 men in all, went on to the assault, not, as the Federals on the 29th, by brigades, or as on the 30th by divisions, but massed together to deal a shattering blow. Brigadier-General May declares that the four essentials for an effective counter-stroke are a secure pivot of manœuvre, security of the flanks, support of artillery, and, last and greatest of all, united effort and the readiness to stake everything, and throw in the last battalion and the last company, if by it the day can be won. That the success of the attack was not so great as might have been expected was due partly to the lateness of the hour—the first moves cannot have taken place much before 5 P.M., which leaves

only an hour and a half before sunset—partly to the disorder into which the assailants soon fell, owing to their imperfect training for manœuvre in large bodies, which was for all the first three years of the war a defect in both Federal and Confederate armies, and lastly, as has been said, to the stubbornness and ability of their enemies. Even so the fruits of the day were enormous, the victory of the Southerners undoubted.

Manassas has been compared by some of Lee's admirers to Austerlitz, by others to Salamanca. We should hesitate to place it in the same rank with either of those two *chef d'œuvres* of tactics ; for the pure art of the leader Austerlitz has never yet been rivalled ; Salamanca was a battle which shows us at their very best, not merely the electric military instinct of a great general, but also a perfect adaptation of means to ends, rarely combined in war. Nevertheless the second Manassas will remain always among the most perfect examples of the defensive-offensive which history records, and the lightning-like glance which told Lee that his chance had come, and the energy and skill with which he seized that chance, and executed one of the most difficult operations of war, will be quite sufficient to gain for him a high place in the ranks of the world's greatest captains.

CHAPTER VII

CHANTILLY—GENERAL COMMENTS ON POPE'S CAMPAIGN

As Pope was watching, a little before sunset, the wreck of his army still battling manfully near Bald Hill and in rear of it, the news reached him that the corps of Franklin, which had been expected to reach Gainesville forty-eight hours before, was some fourteen miles east of Centreville, and advancing towards the battlefield. It was too late then to be of any use in retrieving the inevitable defeat. How was it that this body had not long ago been up in line with the main army ?

The main part of Franklin's corps had left the Peninsula by August 22nd, destined for Aquia, but, on touching there, received orders to proceed farther and disembark at Alexandria. By the 26th the infantry had been disembarked ; but of the artillery and train practically nothing had yet arrived ; even by the evening of the 27th the horses were not in. Franklin tried hard to procure some from the departments of Washington ; but was told that there were barely enough, as it was, for the service of provisioning the forts. Still, he succeeded in getting together a few. In spite of this dearth of everything necessary for movement, Halleck, at 11.20 A.M. on the 26th, ordered him to march by Centreville to Warrenton ; and this order was repeated next morning.

McClellan had arrived at Alexandria on the 26th and reported for duty, whereupon he was entrusted with the

entire direction of the sending out of the troops from that place, with the authority to determine priority of transportation and such matters. To him then Franklin imparted his orders and difficulties. The former, at 1.15 P.M. on the 27th, supposing that Halleck must be unaware of the facts, reported the troops to be without cavalry or guns, and asked whether they could effect any useful purpose by marching out in that state. He added that it was uncertain how much of Lee's force was between Pope and the enemy. Before this message had been sent off Halleck had despatched a third order, directing that Franklin should move out at once, carrying three or four days' provisions. McClellan thereupon paid a personal visit to Halleck at Washington, which lasted some two hours, and in which the commander-in-chief again urged the great importance of an immediate despatch of reinforcements.

However, the matter was not settled yet. All the next day orders, either to McClellan or to Franklin himself, were passing over the wires, to be answered by pleas that movement was still impossible, unless the command was to be sacrificed. Sumner, who had come up to Alexandria on the 27th, did indeed move out two miles; there he was ordered to halt and camp; Franklin did not stir. At last Halleck, weary of his subordinates' delays, despatched at 8.40 P.M. a categorical order that the troops must go next morning whatever happened.

Accordingly, at 6 A.M. on the 29th, Franklin marched out of Alexandria, with orders to join Pope and guard the latter's communications against raiding cavalry; but he did not get very far. After a march of seven miles, Smith, who commanded the leading division, halted near Annandale, "because he had with him only ten rounds of ammunition per man." McClellan sanctioned this halt, and

wired off to ask Halleck how far Franklin was to go ; the general answered : " Far enough to find out where the enemy is," and admitted the possibility of his having to stop at Annandale ; if not, he was to push on towards Fairfax. Franklin meanwhile stayed where he was, and at 7.50 P.M., Halleck, hearing of this, flew into a rage, and asked in a sarcastic message why Franklin had disobeyed orders. McClellan answered, no less hotly, that he was responsible for the stoppage, and that he did not care to be accused of disobedience, when he had only exercised his lawful discretion.

Next day, the 30th, Franklin intended to move at 6 A.M., but waiting for a train of waggons which he had to escort delayed him till 8.30 A.M. Sumner, who had on the previous afternoon been ordered back to Georgetown, and three hours after to Centreville again, was now not far in his rear. A brigade was detached to Germanton to guard the line of supply in rear of the column, and the whole force pushed slowly forward towards the fight. It was not till 1.30 P.M. that a definite order to join Pope came to hasten their march, and when the column reached Cub Run late in the evening it was too late to do anything more than receive the broken troops of the defeated army.

The blame for this unhappy result has been variously apportioned. Some have declared that Halleck was the chief sinner, either because he did not give clear orders, or because, knowing of Franklin's need of transport and stores, he yet took no steps to supply either of them. This seems to us to be nonsense. Between August 26th and 30th the commander-in-chief sent no less than ten distinct orders, the sense of all of them being, to anyone of average military knowledge, that he should go out and put himself under Pope's orders. If these did not suffice to make clear to McClellan and Franklin what he wanted,

then these two officers were unfit to hold any command at all. But, of course, they understood their instructions perfectly well, and so we are compelled to search for some other cause of their non-execution.

Two reasons are usually put forward. The first we have mentioned above—the lack of cavalry, artillery and transport. With regard to cavalry, there were ten squadrons at McClellan's disposal; the 12th Pennsylvania Regiment, at least three squadrons strong, two belonging to Cox, two which finally went out with Franklin, and three others. These were more than enough to guard Franklin's march to Manassas at any time after the 27th. As for artillery, the dearth of that was certainly a more serious matter; still, Heintzelmann's Corps had joined Pope without artillery or waggons, and some horses at any rate had been procured by the evening of the 28th. As for trains, from Alexandria to Centreville is twenty-five miles, and to assert that a corps cannot march that distance unless it drags after it an enormous column of supplies is absurd. We, in these days, more often than not leave our second-line trains a march in rear of the fighting troops. If necessary, the rations, of which there were an abundance at Alexandria, as we know from a despatch of Franklin's on the morning of August 30th, could have been carried by the men themselves. Lee's soldiers, who had made some of their most famous marches on a diet of green apples and corn, would have been amazed at such scruples as McClellan and Franklin showed.

The other reason is that McClellan had to consider, not merely the reinforcing of Pope's army, but the defence of the capital and that the latter was his primary care. Therefore—his partisans presumably argue—he was amply justified in disobeying the categorical orders of his military chief, and making the false excuse for such disobedience

that Franklin could not go without artillery. We need not stay long over this plea. Granting that it was McClellan's business to see to it that Washington was properly guarded—which is not proved by any authoritative document—then the best way to do it was not to keep small forces hovering about in the fortifications, but to despatch every man and gun as quickly as possible to the decisive point, or in other words, where Pope was fighting the main Confederate army, from which alone any real danger could threaten the capital; the garrison of 30,000 men was more than sufficient to ensure it against a cavalry raid. The same partisans of McClellan, who defend the course he took at Alexandria on such grounds, do not hesitate to assail with the utmost bitterness the War Administration, who in the spring held back McDowell from joining the Army of the Potomac "in order to secure the safety of the capital." If the one was a strategical blunder of the first order—and it undoubtedly was—the other was no less so. It may be that these writers believe that the best method of defending Washington was to divide the forces available into two parts, of which one would only come into action when the other was defeated; but our opinion of McClellan's military ability is not so low as to make us believe that he ever dreamed of any such folly.

We think that the verdict of history has already been passed on this, as on the Porter controversy. It is not necessary to assume that McClellan deliberately held Franklin back in order that Pope might be defeated and the command revert to himself; he simply acted here, as before and after, with his accustomed timidity; and as Franklin was as unenterprising as his chief, and Halleck was not a sufficiently strong man to push them on, they remained hesitating on the brink of the unknown, taking no steps to find out the real state of affairs, until it was too

late. This timidity is shown all the way through. Why did Franklin on the 29th stop at Annandale? He says, because he had not enough ammunition; if so, it was due to his negligence in not obtaining more, for there was more than enough at Alexandria. If he was nervous lest he should run into the whole of Lee's army, why did he not use his two squadrons of cavalry in bold reconnaissance? They could soon have told him that nothing but a few hostile scouts were between him and Pope. However, he did nothing but sit still. Again, his start was delayed for two and a half hours next morning in order that he might guard a supply train; the brigade he detached to Germantown could have guarded it well enough, or, if not, Sumner, who was close behind, might have been entrusted with that important duty. It is impossible to avoid the conclusion that in all this there was displayed culpable slowness and lack of enterprise; and we may take it as certain that, without necessarily desiring that Pope should be disastrously defeated, McClellan and Franklin disliked him, considered him incapable, and felt no very ardent desire to hurry to his aid.

From this necessary digression let us return to the closing scenes of Pope's campaign. When that officer reached Centreville, on the night of the 30th, he was still under the impression that his army was merely repulsed, not defeated, and that it was quite capable of making a stand behind the works there, which had been thrown up by the Confederates after the first battle of Manassas. "Do not be uneasy," he wrote to Halleck, "we will hold our own here." And, with the fresh corps of Sumner and Franklin at his disposal, more than making up for his losses on the two previous days, it might seem that this determination would be carried out.

However, circumstances were by no means so favourable as he imagined. The heavy fighting of the last week, the continuous marching under most unfavourable conditions, and the lack of supplies, which had become acute, had strained the ties binding the force together almost to breaking point. The straggling, always a prominent evil, had attained enormous proportions; two very competent witnesses estimated that on the 1st of September 20,000, and the next day 30,000, disbanded men were streaming along the road to Washington; the army was reduced by these causes to about 62,000 effectives on the morning of the 31st. Worse than that, the officers and men had lost all confidence in their generalissimo; a meeting of the corps commanders on this day showed that fact unmistakably. "You have hardly an idea," wrote Pope, "of the demoralisation among officers of high rank. When there is no heart in their leaders, and every disposition to hang back, much cannot be expected from the men."

The army was posted around Centreville on the morning of the 31st: Porter and Franklin on the north side, with Heintzelmann in rear of them; Sigel and Reno south of the village; Banks farther off, near Bull Run railroad bridge. McDowell was two miles east of the main body of the army, on the pike to Fairfax, and Sumner seems to have been close to his right. The day was spent in supplying the pressing needs of the troops—provisions, ammunition and so forth. While the Federals were quietly resting and recruiting, however, their foes were once again on the march. Lee was not the man to throw away an advantage once gained; he was perfectly well aware of the demoralisation of his foe, and suspected that very little would be necessary to drive him right into Washington. Constant to his design to move round the enemy's right, he ordered Jackson, early on the 31st, to cross Bull Run by Sudley

Ford, move northward to the Little River pike and march along it, to strike Pope's line of supply at Fairfax. This was done, and on the night of August 31st the head of the II. Corps halted some six miles west of Chantilly ; Longstreet was some way in rear at Sudley Springs. Stuart, unwearied as ever, had preceded the infantry, and after ascertaining that the Federals were still resting, in blissful ignorance of their peril, at Centreville, pushed down towards Germanton and, opening fire with two guns on the long stream of waggons going up the pike, threw them into the most terrible confusion. An attack on German-ton itself was, however, repulsed, and the artillery began to suffer from infantry fire ; Torbert's brigade of Franklin's corps was in garrison there, and seeing that he could make no impression, Stuart withdrew to Ox Hill.

Pope was still, however, far from suspecting that this was anything but a small cavalry raid, and it was not till 11 A.M. on the 1st that an inhabitant rode in to his headquarters, and gave him the information that a strong body of Confederates were marching down the Little River pike. He at once issued orders which had the effect of bringing his whole force back to Fairfax. McDowell and Hooker were sent post-haste to Germanton, where Torbert already was ; Heintzelmann, Sigel, Sumner, and Porter were directed to follow along the pike ; Torbert was instructed to send back to Alexandria, and hurry up Couch's division, and all troops there, to his aid. Banks was to take his corps and all the trains back along the Braddock road towards the capital. Lastly, the IX. Corps was ordered to march from its present position on Cub Run to the Little River pike, and there check the threatening hostile advance.

Reno was sick and off duty, so that his corps was now under the command of Stevens. That officer moved off promptly, by Centreville, to a point two miles east of it on

the Warrenton road, and there switched his head of column off to the left along a rough cart track, hoping that he would be in time to head off the Confederates as they advanced towards Fairfax. That hope was not to be fulfilled; he had gone about a mile and a half, and was within 600 yards of the road, when there appeared in front a line of grey skirmishers. Jackson had moved off that morning with Starke's division leading, followed by Lawton and Hill, the infantry on each side of the broad highway, the guns on it; by midday he had reached Chantilly, and since then had been feeling his way cautiously forward, conscious that he was unsupported and that Longstreet was far in rear. It was his flank-guard with which Stevens had come in contact.

The battlefield needs no lengthy description. Right across Stevens' path ran the old railroad, mostly on a level, and beyond it lay an open space, triangular in shape, with the apex opposite the Federals and some 750 yards distant; 1000 yards broad along the railroad, it narrowed rapidly to barely 300 on its northern side, and was surrounded on all three sides by thick woods. A road ran along the eastern edge of the open ground and joined the Little River pike some 1100 yards north of the railroad.

Stevens resolved to attack the enemy at once, and bring him, if he could, to a stand. He had with him his own division of six regiments and the brigade of Ferrero, but the latter was some way in rear; sending for it, and also for reinforcements from the other commanders on the Warrenton pike, he drew up his small force for the assault. The Confederate skirmishers were driven in; the troops crossed the railroad and deployed in the field beyond in three lines of two regiments each. The battery took post on a knoll near the line. It was now about 4.30 P.M., and a dark thundercloud, veiling the glorious afternoon sun, lowered overhead as the Federals set themselves in motion,

Stevens in person leading them on. Across the field they went, not a sound greeting them until they were within 100 yards of the farther woods and the fence surrounding them. Then, suddenly, the front line staggered and halted under a terrific blast of musketry at point-blank range. The pause was but momentary. Cheered on by their leader, the regiments hurled themselves at the two brigades of Branch and Field, who were lining the fence, charged over the barrier, broke the former unit and drove the latter to seek shelter farther back. The gallant Stevens, bearing forward the colours of the 79th New York, his old regiment, met at this moment the soldier's death he would have desired.

This fierce charge did what none of the assaults delivered so gallantly at Manassas had done: it disconcerted the hostile leaders and flurried even Jackson himself. Starke had deployed his division in the woods to the left of Branch, who was now supported on the right, first by Gregg then by Pender, Thomas and Archer. These brigades entered into action confusedly and in disorder, and the furious storm of blinding rain, driving right into their faces, increased the embarrassment of the Confederates. At the same moment Ferrero's brigade, hurrying up, went into the woods on Stevens' right, and engaged in a fierce but aimless conflict with Starke and Lawton. The two generals seem to have lost their head; Starke withdrew from the fight before an attack on his front and left which existed only in his own imagination; Hays' brigade was caught by a small Federal body in the act of changing front and severely handled; and it was only with great difficulty that Early and Trimble succeeded in restoring the fight. Just as Stevens' men were falling back towards the centre of the open field under the pressure of the four brigades of A. P. Hill, new aid came to them. Birney

arrived with his brigade and a battery, accompanied by Kearny, and in a few minutes, pushing across the cornfield on Stevens' left, became hotly engaged in the gloom with Gregg, and a few scattered units of Branch's and Pender's commands. But his advance had uncovered his right, and against this exposed flank Thomas sent his line. The attack was pushed however with little vigour; the darkness, the rain, which had rendered the firearms useless, and, it must be added, the "jumpy" condition of the Southerners' nerves, all combined to render it timid and half-hearted. It was checked by one of Ferrero's regiments opportunely brought up from the extreme right, and Birney held his ground. Kearny, riding recklessly forward into the enemy's lines, fell dead not 100 yards from the body of Stevens.

This was the concluding act of the drama. Very soon after this the two forces drew apart and the conflict ceased. Birney, now left in chief command, occupied the field till 3 A.M. on the 2nd, and then retired unhindered to Fairfax, where, thanks to the time gained by the action at Chantilly, the whole Federal army had assembled in safety. McDowell, with Ricketts and Patrick posted behind Difficult Run, had only a slight skirmish on that same afternoon of the 1st with the Confederate horsemen, and had repelled them without difficulty. Nevertheless Pope reported his men as quite unfit for further service. "There is an intense idea among them," he said, "that they must get behind the intrenchments"; and it is to be conjectured that he himself shared that idea. At any rate the reply to his message of 7.30 A.M., September 2nd, was an order to bring the forces as best he could within the lines of fortification. To this last task he therefore set himself. Banks marched in by Annandale, Franklin and Hooker on the Little River pike to Alexandria, Heintzelmann to Fort

Lyon, McDowell to Fort Craig. Bayard brought up the rear with his cavalry, or what was left of it. Porter, Sigel, and Sumner took the road *via* Vienna to the Chain Bridge; Buford and Sumner furnished the rear-guard. They were not molested, except for a little distant artillery fire from Pelham's horse battery; and by the morning of September 4th all the army was in safety under the guns of Washington. And with their arrival the campaign of General Pope may be said to have ended.

GENERAL COMMENTS ON POPE'S CAMPAIGN

The system adopted throughout of making remarks at the close of each chapter on the military operations described therein appears to leave but little scope for general comments at the end. But before we take our leave of General Pope and his army there is just one point to be mentioned, one factor without which, in our opinion, the campaign can never be properly understood.

Many writers on this campaign have sought to find out the real reason for Pope's failure. Some have attributed it to the fact that he did not fall back from the Rappahannock the same day that he heard of Jackson's march round his right; some to his error in leaving Thoroughfare Gap open to the advance of Longstreet while he concentrated all his men on Jackson; some to his obstinacy in persisting in his attack on the latter while the rest of the Confederate army was only waiting for a chance to strike his left. Others prefer to lay the blame for the disastrous issue on Halleck, who maintained the army too long on the Rappahannock by delusive promises of aid and orders to "fight like the devil"; yet others on McClellan, who held back the promised aid on insufficient

excuses. A certain number sapiently declare that the issue was inevitable from the first, because Lee was a great military genius and Pope was not—a proposition true enough so far as it goes, but which in reality only pushes the question one step further back.

All these reasons seem to us insufficient, if only for the fact that, as a rule, it is very untrue to say that a campaign is ever ruined by one single error of judgment on the part of a general. If Pope's delay on the Rappahannock was injudicious, what are we to say of Jackson's reckless advance into the enemy's zone of concentration before Cedar Run? If Pope, by his abandonment of Thoroughfare Gap, exposed his army to be concentrated against by the whole hostile force, Lee did exactly the same by sending half his army round the Federal right. The Federal army was beaten at Manassas because its general refused to trust his subordinates; Lee missed his opportunity on the 29th because he trusted one of his lieutenants too much. Pope exposed his host on the 30th to disaster from a sledge-hammer blow against his left; but why might not the same sledge-hammer blow have been delivered against Jackson the previous day? All these questions cannot be answered by saying that the above measures of the Confederates were not errors, because they were successful. We wish to know why one side could do what the other could not.

The fact is, that the possibility or impossibility of a given task depends, first of all, on the machine one has at hand to execute it. To cut one's lawn with a lawn mower is a simple matter enough; but if the only instrument available is a pair of scissors, the task may well be regarded as almost insuperable. That, of course, is a very obvious truth; but its application to military affairs is not quite so obvious. We are too apt to regard a unit like a

battalion, a regiment, a battery as a definite thing, whose numbers do not vary, whose capacity for work is constant, whose moral and physical force are in all times and circumstances the same; but such an attitude of mind is hopelessly wrong. Let us take an example; there is nothing like dealing with concrete cases.

On August 2nd, 1813, Barnes' British brigade attacked the height of Zagaramurdi, a rocky, precipitous crag, held by 6000 Frenchmen. Barnes had only 1500 men at his disposal, but these proved quite sufficient to carry the position with slight loss. Here was a time, then, when a given unit was amply adequate for the fulfilment of a given task; but suppose it had attempted the same task a week before, when it was not in pursuit but in retreat, and was oppressed by the sense not of success but of failure, the result would have been very different. And if the temper and capability of the same unit can thus change from day to day, even from hour to hour, how far greater must be the variation of the machine when we turn from one unit to another!—and greater yet when we deal with a different army, which not only fluctuates with the most extraordinary violence in its own corporate spirit, but is composed of smaller units which themselves alter and change in temper with equally remarkable rapidity.

He is the greatest leader, not who most skilfully turns the opponent's flank, or who best appreciates the advantages of interior lines, but who most accurately gauges the temper of his troops and knows how to apportion their tasks to them in due ratio. In a word, that workman who best realises both the power and the weakness of the machine he has to handle will achieve the best results. This is Tolstoy's view exactly; but it is only half the truth.

We have been talking of an army, for convenience

sake, as a machine ; but of course it is clear that it is nothing of the kind ; very far from it. It is an organism ; and an even more complex organism than any in the physical world, because it is made up not merely of so many members, each with their own particular work, but all depending for their life on the all-controlling central power ; but of men, with wills of their own, passions of their own, minds of their own and, above all, fears of their own. And it is these human qualities, existing, latent or openly, in every one of the thousands of human beings that make up an army, that are to so great an extent acted and reacted on by factors such as rain, sun, hunger, thirst, cold, heat, pain, hope, despair, suspense, triumph, honour, lust for the fight, and countless things which we might be inclined to term trivial, were it not that they have sometimes changed the fate of nations.

Some of these human traits make for efficiency in war ; but, as a general rule, it is not these traits that lie on the surface. Most men, for instance, have their fair share of courage ; but usually this needs to be brought out, and will not come out unless it is helped by external factors. The great majority of the influences given above, however, may be regarded as adverse. Excessive heat prompts a man not to go out and fight, but to go and lie down in the shade. Therefore, these influences have to be counteracted by other external factors. We get back anyhow to the same thing. A collection of men will not fight ; it will break up and run ; but an army will fight, with greater or less success, in proportion as the external factors acting on it are stronger or weaker.

What are these external factors ? Various answers may be given ; “ discipline ” is a very favourite one. But discipline is a negative thing, not a positive ; a body of troops surprised on a road will not, if it be well disciplined,

scatter in confusion ; but neither will it of itself rush to attack the foe. It is the same with *esprit de corps*, love of country, mutual knowledge and trust, or fear of the stick. By themselves they are of no positive value. All they do is to prepare the troops for the action of the greatest positive factor of all. This factor is the will of the leader.

It is this which can counteract the human traits making for inefficiency in war ; it is this which can bring out those which heighten the fighting powers of man. It is this which can act on men, surprised in a moment by the stare of death at their very elbows, shocked by the sudden fall of comrades who but a short fraction of time since were standing beside them erect and full of life, torn by every natural instinct counselling flight to shelter ; and cannot merely hold them where they stand, but can bring them, as if unconsciously, forward into the very face of the danger. It is this which, when the sun blazes mercilessly in a sky of copper, when men's eyes smart and sting from the glare of sand, and their throats are parched and choked by the want of water and the rising dust, when the troops stagger forward like men in a dream, ready at every minute to totter and fall, can still keep the column moving forward ; it is this which, in the freezing bivouac, when the rain descends pitilessly from the darkened heavens, and the soldiers crouch close over the miserable smoky fires, waiting for the provisions which do not come, can fill these men with something of its own confidence and hope. It is the living spirit which quickens and overcomes the flesh.

But observe, the success of a campaign is not in direct proportion to the exercise of the will power by the leader ; were it so, many wars would have had a different issue. It is the surplus will-power which alone counts. What

we mean is this: suppose two armies, the one well-disciplined, full of warlike ardour, its leaders war-trained and reliable, its interior services efficient; and the other, half-trained only, half-hearted in its cause, with generals mediocre, with transport and supply systems ill-organised. Of the two men in command, the leader of the latter force may, probably will, exercise far greater energy and will power than the leader of the former; but this has his army ready to back him, to respond to his call, to cooperate with him and render his task easy; that has to expend much of his time and energy in overcoming the resistance of the force he commands; a resistance not conscious, but subconscious, not active but passive, and therefore all the harder to overcome because it is less tangible. And of the two the first army will probably win, because the leader's will-power is left free to exercise all its influence in the defeat of the enemy, while his opponent's is fettered by the fact that it has to be exercised in two directions at once.

This has been a long digression; but if the drift of it has been understood we can return to Pope and Lee with a clearer insight into the inner causes of their respective failure and success.

To take Pope first. He came to his task on June 26th; the first battle took place on August 9th; so that he had just six weeks in which to form his army. That army was composed of three separate units, from three different departments, amalgamated now into one for his especial benefit. These troops had, it appears, never seen each other before they were incorporated into the Army of Virginia. Its I. Corps was composed of Germans, men who formed some of the finest fighting material in the army, but who were notoriously poor marchers, and who needed "strict discipline" to keep them at their best pitch—discipline never enforced in the Union armies till the

arrival of Grant. The state of the corps when Sigel took it over was very bad. The II. Corps was the body which had been entrusted with the safety of the Valley, and had in that task suffered more than one disastrous defeat, and become much disorganised; facts which could not have given them great confidence in their leaders. McDowell's corps, however, was an excellent body, under excellent officers, and the part it played in the campaign was well attested by its heavy losses.

To these were added, at one time or another, units from two more theatres of war, the Peninsula and North Carolina. In themselves these were excellent troops, but most had been severely handled, and were much reduced through sickness and straggling. Thus, so far as the actual fighting forces were concerned, they were of very varying value, nearly all of them under the influence of recent defeat, and with rather smaller effectives than usual. Discipline in some of the units was bad; capable officers were few and far between; and finally not a single corps had since its formation fought side by side with any of its fellows.

The leaders of these corps offered further difficulties to a prospective commander-in-chief. A short enumeration of them will show this clearly. We know what Pope thought of Sigel; "he is perfectly unreliable," he wrote to Halleck, "his corps will never do much service under him." Besides this, he was a self-opinionated man, and extremely jealous of his superiors. Banks was quite incapable, having had no military training whatever, although, as has been caustically remarked, "his undoubted personal bravery, a certain military bearing and a sonorous voice, together with an owl-like appearance of wisdom, enabled him to impose himself on the country as a heaven-born general." As for the generals who

came up from the Peninsula, Hooker, in spite of his undoubted ability, was a subordinate whom nobody, from the first day of the war to the last, succeeded in tolerating far more than six months at a time ; he quarrelled with McClellan, with Burnside, with Grant, with Sherman and with Mr Secretary Stanton ; and it is not likely that he failed to do the same with Pope. Kearny, too, was an able soldier, but in his relations with his superiors he seems to have been little better than Hooker. As for Porter, who was a courteous, gallant gentleman, he could not endure Pope's blustering and violent manner ; further, he was a personal friend of McClellan, whom Pope was considered to have first of all supplanted and then attacked in his proclamation. When we remember that he also had a very bitter tongue, which he allowed to have free play in letters to his friends, it is not hard to understand how from the first the relations between him and his commander-in-chief were of the worst possible kind. Pope could thoroughly trust McDowell, Heintzelmann, and Reno as faithful and able soldiers, but they could not make up for the inefficiency of some of their fellows nor for the constant, if secret, opposition of the clique from the Army of the Potomac.

Lastly, Pope himself was not the man to overcome these difficulties. He was by no means devoid of ability—that much is clear ; but it is clear also that he was a man of no tact, discourteous and overbearing in manner, boastful and arrogant, not at all suited either to smooth down the awkward tempers of his lieutenants or to inspire confidence in and give unity to the troops under him. So it happened that the army for the greater part of the time was all at sixes and sevens ; its movements were slow, and only executed at the cost of tremendous friction ; the want of a good staff made matters still worse, and at

last the whole organism, strained to breaking point by the intolerable stress of a defensive campaign, by the tremendous rapidity and frequency of its movements, by lack of rest, and need of supplies, was rendered utterly useless as a fighting force, at least under its then leader.

Could another man than General Pope—say McClellan—have done what he failed to do? Under his direction, could the heterogeneous elements described above have been welded into an army? Would it have been possible for a man of more tact and courtesy to have overcome altogether the varying moods of the leaders and got them to work harmoniously together? We doubt it very much. Pope had before his first operations only a short six weeks, part of which had to be spent away from his troops; and this was not enough to form that mutual confidence between leaders and troops, that *esprit de corps*, which is as necessary in an army as in a regiment, that knowledge among the leaders of each others' weak points, which alone can enable them to aid and support, instead of thwarting or hindering, each other, that smooth working of every part of the whole, without which much of the energy and ability of its chiefs must be misdirected or thrown away. All these things are slow in coming, and the process cannot be hurried.

An army is never made; it grows.

No man, not the mightiest of mighty geniuses, can make an army in a day, or in a month. He may, if he has the power, take his 200,000 men, and divide them into companies and battalions, then further into brigades, divisions and corps; he may arm them and equip them; mount his cavalry; provide guns for his artillery, and transport for the whole. He may call into being the staffs and the numerous technical services for his forces. The process may even be simplified; the first steps may be spared him;

he may have at his hand countless battalions, regiments and batteries, engineers and trains, transport and ambulances. He may group these, as he pleases, into the higher units, to his own and others' satisfaction. But let him not think that he then has made an army; for he has done nothing of the kind. The framework, the mechanism is there; but the spirit is lacking and no one can make that spirit, or hasten its growth beyond certain well-defined limits.

It is admitted, by those at least whose opinion on military matters is worth the hearing, that a regiment can only be formed and fitted to take its place in the fighting line by slow, gradual, never-wearying care. The same must surely be the case in the higher, more complex organism of an army. No more than 1000 men picked from the street will straightway form a regiment, will two or three brigades from different units at once form a satisfactory division, or five corps from strange theatres of war make an efficient army. It was a collection of troops only that Pope had to fight with; an army he never had, for he was never given time to form one. And hence much of his energy, his will power, the driving force that should have been employed to win him victory, was wasted in holding together his collection of men, in trying to bind them tighter, in overcoming the friction that increased more and more till it finally got beyond his control, and rendered it impossible for the engine to work on while the present engineer remained at the lever.

From all this Lee and his army were happily free. War-hardened, welded together by their pride and trust in their leaders, conducted by men, many of consummate ability, all of experience in the handling of men, and over them all a man who inspired, as much as any commander who ever lived, the love and devotion of all who knew him, they

could endure, better than could the troops of Pope, the trials and strains of war ; they could march and fight and conquer in the midst of starvation, cold, and weariness ; they could answer at any moment to the wills, and even counteract the errors, of the generals who led them. All this they could and did do, because of the spirit within them ; that spirit which, born in the months of monotonous drill and discipline when the enemy was far away, fostered by their great commander, Lee, and established yet more firmly by the victories they had won and the hardships they had endured in common, had rendered irresistible that sacred flame, the will power of the leader acting as a great thought-wave in the minds of his soldiers, which makes cowards brave and brave men heroes ; and without which an army, be it never so well armed and equipped and panoplied, be its individual parts never so gallant, so patriotic and so self-sacrificing, must go absolutely to pieces before an enemy, smaller and feebler to the outward eye, but in whose ranks that fiery spirit burns unquenchably.

CHAPTER VIII

THE INVASION OF MARYLAND AND THE CAPTURE OF HARPER'S FERRY

THE 2nd of September saw the end of Lee's campaign against Pope. The latter commander had gradually been forced back across the stretch of seventy miles between the Rapidan and Washington, and his troops, well beaten, considerably demoralised, destitute and exhausted, were now dragging their weary limbs over the muddy roads which were to lead them, before the day was out, into the safety of the fortified area round the capital. What was to be the next objective of their conquerors ?

It was this problem which now engaged the attention of Lee and his subordinate commanders met in council on this morning. Clearly there was nothing more to be done in front of Washington ; Pope's defeated troops must be left to rest and refit at their leisure beneath the shadow of the forts, for the Army of Northern Virginia, depleted by losses and straggling, far from its base, and unprovided with any artillery of a calibre fit to encounter the heavy guns of the permanent works, could not hope to penetrate the fortified area except at ruinous cost. Nor was an investment any more promising ; not only would such a course, while offering little hope of success, give the enemy time to refit his men, reorganise their scattered array, train the new levies and take the offensive at his own time and place, but the scarcity of munitions, and still more of supplies, rendered it almost impossible of execution. It was of

course feasible to withdraw from before the capital, and await an attack in some favourable position farther south ; but none of the Confederate leaders felt in the least inclined towards such inaction. " We cannot afford to be idle," wrote Lee to Davis, and so the only choice left was a blow against another and more exposed point in Northern territory.

Maryland seemed to the Southern commanders the most suitable objective for the next move, not merely because it lay within easy reach from the present position of the Army of Northern Virginia, but because it had been, and in fact still was, somewhat disaffected towards the cause of the Union. Baltimore, the State capital, was especially turbulent, and even if the appearance of the Confederates did not bring in to their standards any large number of recruits, at least the sympathy of the population must assist their operations as much as it hampered those of their adversary. Even if nothing else were accomplished, the prestige of the South and the confidence of her people must be considerably enhanced by the invasion, and the fair fields of Virginia, wasted by more than a year of war, would be freed for a while from the drain of supporting the army, which could be far more easily and satisfactorily provisioned from the untouched granaries of the North.

It was not, however, the hopes of finding better and more numerous supplies, or the desire to give his enemy a taste of what invasion meant, or the expectation of a noteworthy increase of fighting force, that primarily sent Lee over the Potomac. It was rather the thought that there, in the heart of Northern territory, where the moral effect of a victory would be magnified tenfold by rumour, and spread far and wide by panic terror, he might find the decisive battle he so ardently desired. He was beginning to guess by now the huge resources, the awful

might of his foe, and to appreciate the stubborn resolution of Lincoln and his people. So long as the Confederate successes were won only on their own soil, so long as their sole effect was to repulse the invading hosts and frustrate the aggressive attempts of their enemy, so long would the Northerners harden their hearts, dive into their pockets, and hope for better fortune next time ; but let the terror of war appear at their very doors, let the flower of the Union army suffer disaster in the midst of their own peoples and the whole of the North be left defenceless before the victorious Southern legions, might not the Colossus then be brought to his knees ? At any rate, the chance was worth trying.

Lee, however, was not yet quite decided in his own mind. He knew well the destitution of his army ; its tattered uniforms, its bare feet, its slender supply of ammunition, its scanty stock of provisions. He saw in imagination the weakness of the transport, the dearth of animals and the thousands of stragglers strewn along all the roads in rear ; and he hesitated to throw this little band of ragged, famished soldiery, handicapped as they were in every possible way, into the unknown perils beyond the river. His two subordinates, however, urged him on ; Longstreet especially was insistent that the time had come for an invasion, and that if let slip now it might not return again. Besides, what other course could be followed ? Nevertheless Lee still hesitated, and finally a compromise was adopted. The army, it was arranged, should move off to its left into Loudoun County, where provisions at any rate would be plentiful, and there could either threaten the Federal posts in the Valley, or, if found practicable, cross into Maryland.

As a result of this decision, the troops were ordered to move off to the northward next morning, the division of

D. H. Hill, which had come up that day from Richmond, to lead the way to the Leesburg and Alexandria pike between the former place and Dranesville; McLaws, another new arrival, marching more to the left by Gum Spring to the same rendezvous. The rest of the forces were to follow in rear. These orders were executed punctually; while Fitz Lee was harassing Sumner's rear-guard on the Vienna-Langley roads, Hampton and Robertson camped near Dranesville; Leesburg had been captured the previous day by a small band under Munford, who had a lively and successful skirmish there, and brought off fifty prisoners.

By the 4th Lee had definitely decided to attempt the invasion of Maryland. His natural audacity and Longstreet's reiterated counsels carried the day, and on that morning the army received orders to cross the Potomac. The passage was effected at White's Ferry, the troops splashing through the water in great glee to the lively strains of "Maryland, my Maryland." D. H. Hill was over by sunset that day, and spent the night destroying the locks and the aqueduct of the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal, running alongside the river. Next day the main body of the army and the cavalry, which had been demonstrating with Robertson's brigade in the neighbourhood of Falls' Church, followed Hill. The head of Jackson's corps camped three miles from the railroad; D. R. Jones, of Longstreet's corps, was still left on the south bank. All were across by noon of the 6th, and by evening the advanced troops had reached Frederick City, where on the 7th the column closed up, bivouacking between the town and the railroad bridge over the Monocacy.

Stuart, ordered to cover the right of the advance, had switched his horsemen off on the 5th towards Poolesville. After a sharp brush with some Federal horse, most of whom fell into his hands, the place was occupied by Fitz

Lee. Next morning the command proceeded farther to Urbana, where it was joined by Robertson's men, now under Munford, and Stuart proceeded to dispose his brigades so as to screen the army at Frederick in the direction of Washington. They held a line some seventeen miles long, from Newmarket on the left, by Hyattsville to Poolesville; Munford near the river, to his left Hampton, and Lee on the outer flank, patrolling the roads towards Washington and Baltimore, and watching the country for any sign of the approaching enemy. Behind this screen of horsemen the main body of Lee's army enjoyed for a few days the repose and refreshment to which their exertions, almost unceasing for the last month, had well entitled them.

Here we will leave them for a short space and turn our attention to the course of events in the Federal camp. On September 1st the citizens of Washington were terror-stricken by the news that the great battle, the muttering thunder of which had resounded dully in their ears for the last two days, had ended in disaster, and that only a beaten army intervened between the victorious rebels and their own homes. All was confusion, rendered yet more terrible by the sudden revulsion of feeling from the satisfaction engendered by the triumphant despatches of Pope. All the Administration, even the President himself, lost their heads completely; a steamer was brought up the river opposite the White House, ready to transport the high officials of state to a safer place at any minute, should such a course be deemed necessary; and the evacuation of the arsenal, with its stores of arms and ammunition, was taken in hand early on the morning of the 2nd. Now that no other course was open Lincoln fell back on the same man whom he and his subordinates had thwarted and slighted ever since the failure of the Peninsular campaign, and whom he

now regarded as the only man who could save the country. McClellan must be recalled to the helm.

As the general was sitting at his breakfast on the 2nd he received two early visitors in the shape of the President and the commander-in-chief. The interview was short and to the point; Lincoln, declaring his belief that the capital was lost, asked McClellan if under the circumstances he would "resume command and do the best that could be done." The latter, whose sound military judgment was unaffected by the panic of those about him, and who knew better than his superior the real strength of the fortifications and the real weakness of Lee, did not hesitate to accept the proffered position, pledging himself at the same time to save Washington from an attack which in fact never came, and was never likely to come. His quiet confidence restored the courage of Lincoln, who departed to a Cabinet meeting, which from all accounts was decidedly stormy, Stanton and Chase declaring that the reinstatement of McClellan was a national calamity and as good as giving the capital to the enemy. These, however, are political, not military, matters, and as such hardly enter into the scope of this history.

Meanwhile the general was employed in collecting the scattered and disorganised men who came streaming into the fortified area along all the roads from south and west, and placing them in position to resist attack; the garrisons of the forts were strengthened, and new works thrown up where such seemed needful. Everywhere the old commander of the Army of the Potomac was received by his former troops with tremendous ovations and outbursts of almost delirious joy, which were of themselves of the best possible omen for the safety of Washington. It was late at night before McClellan returned to his quarters for a few short hours; before daybreak on the 3rd he was once

more in the saddle, seeing to the positions of the corps, arranging for the forwarding of supplies, the provision of ammunition, and the satisfaction of all the manifold needs of the troops. It was in such work that his genius found its greatest scope ; as an organiser of victory he was among the greatest known to history, and the change he wrought in the appearance and morale of the army was little short of marvellous. Nevertheless, the work was not half finished ere the situation underwent a change.

By the 3rd it became clear that the main body of the enemy had moved westward from before Washington ; report placed it near Leesburg and Lovettsville, which seemed to point to a proximate attack on Maryland. The movements of the cavalry still left in front the forts were obviously nothing but demonstrations, intended to screen other intentions. The position of McClellan was one of considerable difficulty ; he had, properly speaking, no field army ready for service, for the broken fragments of Pope's command could hardly be called such. The streets and houses of the capital were swarming with stragglers, officers and men from every conceivable unit, resting and enjoying themselves after the hardships of the past campaign, and "waiting for orders." They were being whipped up as fast as possible, and sent to rejoin the colours, but the work was long and thankless. The loss in superior officers had been very great, and their posts had to be filled from somewhere ; Kearny and Stevens were dead, Banks and King were on sick leave, Heintzelmann and McDowell were asking to be relieved of their command, Porter, Franklin, and Griffin were at present under arrest, pending their examination on the charges brought against them by Pope. The last-named might be available for the defence of the capital, but could hardly take the field in the active army which Halleck had been

ordered to prepare. Moreover the supply and transport systems were in utter disorder. The hasty movement from the Peninsula had caused many of the units to go up to the front without any waggons or artillery; some of the missing *matériel* was only now being put on shore; some of it was still back in the Peninsula with Keyes' corps. Lastly, McClellan's own position was, to put it mildly, anomalous. His only orders had been the verbal injunction by the President to save the capital, which had been placed in writing the same evening; but whether he was intended to take command of the field army no one knew, least of all himself. Halleck considered that his jurisdiction only extended to the forts and the garrison of the city, and that as soon as any column left Washington it *ipso facto* passed out of the general's hands. McClellan held the opposite view and announced his intention when the time should come of leading the reconstituted Army of the Potomac again to meet the enemy. This he actually did, but the uncertainty of his position, and the fear of the consequences in case of failure, did not render his difficult mission any the easier.

In any case, some action had to be taken. McClellan resolved to transfer the greater part of the forces which were at present fit to move out to the northern side of Washington, and meanwhile to push on the work of reorganisation. The cavalry, numbering some 4500 sabres under the leadership of Pleasonton, were brought over to the Maryland shore and enjoined to move out in the direction of Poolesville, watch the fords there and, if possible, prevent a passage. The old II. Corps of the Army of Virginia, whose commander, Banks, had given way to Williams, was marched out to Tennallytown; with it went Sumner's corps, one of the best and most intact at disposal. The IX. Corps under Reno was echeloned along

the Leesburg road, but still within the defences of Washington. Next day the I. Corps, McDowell's former command, of which Hooker had assumed the direction, received orders to be prepared for movement on the morrow. Franklin's instructions were much the same, and Couch's division of the IV. Corps was pushed out to join Sumner. Information received confirmed the news of the previous day that the Confederates were moving up to the Potomac fords at Leesburg.

If this were true, the garrison of 10,000 men at Harper's Ferry was now cut off entirely from Washington. McClellan wished to withdraw it altogether, declaring to Halleck that all would be sacrificed if they were shut up there, and that they could do far more service with the main army. Halleck, however, disagreed; he regarded the place as one of great strategic importance, combining as it did a passage over the Potomac and the Shenandoah, and a gap through the mountains into the Valley, which was traversed by a railroad and a canal connecting Washington with the west. Further a great quantity of stores were collected there. For these reasons he declined to move the garrison—a decision of the greatest importance, as we shall see.

On September 5th further information came in, which rendered it certain that a large hostile force, variously estimated at 30,000 to 45,000 men, had crossed into Maryland the previous day. So much was definite; but the further intentions of Lee could only be guessed at. He might move direct on Washington, trusting to beat the hostile army before it had yet recovered from its previous defeats; he might march on Baltimore and raise the flag of rebellion in that city, where he would find sympathy, and possibly active support; or he might strike north into Pennsylvania and carry destruction and terror

into the rich towns of that state. These were his most likely courses ; but it was also possible that the movement on Maryland might be only a feint ; that he might, as soon as he knew McClellan to be well on the move towards the north-west, retire his army from the northern bank and by a rapid march throw himself between the Army of the Potomac and the capital, or even attempt a *coup de main* on the city. Which of these alternative suppositions was the true one only time could show ; for the present the Federal forces must be held ready to meet any eventuality, and information be sought with vigour and persistency.

The army, then, was set in motion along the three main roads leading north and north-west and converging on Frederick City, forty miles distant. The right wing, consisting of the IX. (Reno's) and the I. (Hooker's) Corps, under the higher leadership of Burnside, moved by Leesburg and Brookeville to the National road ; the centre, made up of the XII. (Williams') and the II. Corps (Sumner's), took the direct road *via* Rockville and Clarksburg ; Franklin's (VI.) corps, Couch's and Sykes' divisions, forming the left wing, marched along the banks of the Potomac by Offutt's Cross Roads, and Darnstown. Several causes contributed to render the march a very slow one ; the work of reorganisation had to be pushed forward with all energy, and no doubt some of the speed of the march was sacrificed to this necessity. The large number of raw regiments incorporated in the army, who were unused to rapid movement, caused yet further delay. But there were other external matters which had great influence. The whole of the North was seized with fear and trembling. Wool, the commander at Baltimore, whose troops, according to him, were new and wholly ignorant of their duties, demanded reinforcements to

guard the Baltimore and Ohio line and the National road until such time as they should be covered by the advance of McClellan's army. The citizens of Philadelphia, which was over 120 miles distant from the scene of the invasion, begged for a military governor who "combined the sagacity of the statesman with the acuteness and skill of the soldier," and suggested as a suitable candidate General Meade. Curtin, the governor of Pennsylvania, wired to Lincoln from Harrisburg on the 11th: "You should send here not less than 80,000 disciplined forces and order all available forces from New York and States east to concentrate here at once. It is our only hope to save the North and crush the rebel army." It is doubtful whether at this time there were 80,000 bayonets in the whole Army of the Potomac. At the same time he demanded that Reynolds should be taken away from that army and sent off to take command of the forces at Harrisburg; the request was refused at first, but granted later, to the great wrath of Hooker, who sent McClellan a most fiery letter, observing that "it is only in the United States that atrocities like this are entertained," and adding his belief that "the rebels had no more intention of going to Harrisburg than they had of going to heaven." To these calls for aid from "the old women of both sexes" throughout the whole country within a radius of 150 miles from the actual position of Lee's army, were added the usual absurdities about peril to Washington. On the 7th a wild report got about that 50,000 men were at Dranesville and another 40,000, under Bragg, were advancing up the Valley. Immediately Halleck took alarm; "we must be very cautious," he declared, "about stripping too much the forts on the Virginia side." This rumour was exploded next day, but the fears of the commander-in-chief were still unallayed. A few days later, the news

that Jackson was recrossing the Potomac at Williamsport, sixty-five miles away, threw him into a fresh access of fear, which was increased by an incautious remark of McClellan's that "even if Washington should be taken, it would not bear comparison with the ruin and disaster which would follow a signal defeat of this army." "Until you know more certainly the enemy's force south of the Potomac," Halleck wired back, "you are wrong in thus uncovering the capital. In your letter of the 11th you attach too little importance to it. I assure you that you are wrong. The capture of this place will throw us back six months, if it should not destroy us. Beware," he added querulously, "of the evils I now point out to you. You saw them when here, but you seem to forget them in the distance."

All this was not calculated to increase the rapidity of McClellan's march or to lessen his constitutional caution. On the 9th, the heads of the infantry columns were still no farther forward than the line Brookeville-Middleburg-Darnestown, twenty miles only from the capital. All the news pointed to the fact that the Army of Northern Virginia, in the strength of 110,000 men, was preparing to move northward into Pennsylvania. By the evening, however, fresh reports came in, that Jackson was near Newmarket and Stuart on his flank at Urbana, which seemed to indicate a movement on Baltimore, and Burnside at Brookeville received orders to push a strong reconnaissance next day towards Ridgeville and Damascus and be ready to strike the flank of any hostile column marching east down the National Road.

Pleasanton's troopers on the other flank were held up at Sugar Loaf Mountain, where a stiff engagement on a small scale took place. Munford held the hill with his brigade and two guns, and, all efforts to expel him from his position

failing, the arrival of the infantry had perforce to be awaited. Franklin's leading brigade, under Hancock, drove off the grey troopers on the morning of the 11th, and the cavalry pushed on along the Frederick road. On that place all the army was now converging, Burnside's wing by the National road, the centre column and Sykes' division by the turnpike from Washington and an intermediate road from Damascus. The other division of Porter's corps only received orders at midnight on the 11th to leave Washington next morning and place itself under McClellan's orders.

The situation was still far from clear. Yesterday the Federal commander had received a message from the Governor of Pennsylvania, declaring that the hostile army, now swollen to 200,000 men, was massed at Frederick and intended to march either on Harrisburg or Baltimore, and replied to it: "Everything that we can learn induces me to believe that the information you have received is substantially correct." To-day, however, the picture had altered, and the enemy were now marching westward by Boonsborough to Hagerstown in force, if the reports of cavalry and agents were to be believed. To settle this uncertainty, Burnside's wing of the army, the IX. Corps leading, was ordered to occupy Frederick next day, while Pleasonton was to aid in its capture from Urbana.

It was about noon on the 12th when Cox's division of the IX. Corps was seen by the Confederate pickets marching forward along the National road. Hampton's brigade held the place, with two squadrons at the Monocacy bridge towards Urbana, and two guns on the road facing the advancing enemy. Reinforced by a squadron and a third piece, the pickets held their own until the whole command had been assembled, and then withdrew slowly

through the city, followed closely by Cox's van-guard. Gaining further time by a brilliant little charge in the streets, Hampton evacuated the place about 4 P.M. with little loss, carrying off with him ten captives, one of whom was the colonel of the 28th Ohio, and bivouacking that night at Middletown. The IX. Corps occupied Frederick without further opposition; Hooker closed up behind it to Newmarket. The centre—the II. and XII. Corps and Sykes division—lay at and east of Urbana; Franklin bivouacked near the mouth of the Monocacy, with Couch behind at Barnesville. Porter, whose force had been increased by the addition of Humphreys' division, was far in rear at Leesborough.

The enemy then had clearly left the neighbourhood of Frederick, but whither had they gone? Were they, as McClellan suspected, moving on Hagerstown and Harper's Ferry, in two different directions, and if so, what was their object in so doing? To find the answer, we must see what had become of the Confederates since we last left them at Frederick on the 7th.

As we have said, Lee's army had been reinforced by the divisions of McLaws, D. H. Hill, and Walker, some 11,000 men in all, which should have brought his total effectives up to 65,000 bayonets; but it is very doubtful if more than 55,000 of these were actually with the colours. Since the 7th it had been lying quiescent at Frederick, where supplying the troops was easy, and the work of re-equipping them could be pushed forward. On the 8th Lee had an interview with Walker in which he explained very fully his plan of future action. The enemy's main army were believed to be still concentrating around the capital, and could for a while be neglected; the commander-in-chief was now concerned rather with ensuring the safety of his line of supply. The route *via* Culpeper, Warrenton

and Leesburg being open north of the Rappahannock to the depredations of hostile cavalry, it was resolved to change it, and switch off all the waggons from Culpeper through Thornton's Gap to Luray and thence by the high road up the Valley to Winchester and Shepherdstown; but for this purpose it was essential as a preliminary to drive off or capture the Federal garrisons at Harper's Ferry and Martinsburg, estimated at 13,000 to 15,000 in all, who lay right athwart the new line. Lee had supposed that, in accordance with all the dictates of sound strategy, these troops would evacuate their positions on the news of the approach of his army. As this had not been done, he resolved to get rid of them at once. He would then be at liberty to deal untrammelled with McClellan's host, but he had all along wished to fight it as far away from its base, Washington, as was possible. In order to do this, the army was to be set in motion by Carlisle on Harrisburg; there it would destroy the great railroad bridge over the Susquehanna, sever the Pennsylvania Central R.R., the main artery of communication between east and west, and from that point move rapidly on Washington, Baltimore or Philadelphia, as seemed best. It was a bold, far-reaching scheme, and its boldness astonished Walker, who asked what the hostile army would be doing all this while in the Confederate rear. "Do you know McClellan at all?" was Lee's reply. "He is an able general, but a very cautious one. His enemies among his own people think him too much so. His army is in a very demoralised and chaotic condition, and will not be prepared for offensive operations—or he will not think it so—for some three or four weeks." Meanwhile much might be accomplished.

The preliminary capture of Martinsburg and Harper's Ferry was the first thing to be taken in hand; as to the

method of it, the commander-in-chief and his subordinates were not at one. Neither Longstreet nor Jackson cared to advise a division of forces. The former urged, either that the whole army should be employed in the operation, or else that the line of supply should be left to take care of itself until after the decisive battle. As whichever of these two courses was adopted would involve the death blow to the plan of action outlined above, Lee for once persisted in his resolution to divide the army. Longstreet refusing to have anything to do with the scheme, the chief control of the operations against Harper's Ferry was given to Jackson. He was ordered on September 9th to take his corps by Middletown and Sharpsburg to the ford at Williamsport, and crossing there, to sweep down the right bank, and "corral" all the scattered Federal detachments in the pen formed by the Potomac and Shenandoah peninsula. McLaws was to take his own and Anderson's division to Middletown and by the morning of the 12th seize Maryland Heights and block all escape by the north bank; Walker, who had marched off that morning on a raid against the big aqueduct near the mouth of the Monocacy, was to occupy Loudoun Heights and complete the circle round the place. The rest of the army was directed to fall back slowly over the Catoctin Mountains, leaving only Stuart's horsemen in front of McClellan; Longstreet, with all the trains of the army, had to halt at Boonsborough, D. H. Hill bringing up the rear. It was expected that all these movements would be completed by the morning of the 12th, that Harper's Ferry would surrender at once, and that by the 13th at latest the whole army would be reunited at Boonsborough or Hagerstown, ready to give battle to the enemy as he felt his way cautiously over the mountains.

We will now follow out to its concluding act the drama

enacted round Harper's Ferry. The execution of Lee's order was begun on the 10th, and Jackson, marching ten miles on the first day, and seventeen on the next, reached North Mountain Station, seven miles north-west of Martinsburg, on the evening of the 11th. This little town was held by General White, with a garrison of some 2500 odd men, and naturally could not hope to resist so large a force as that now threatening it; the commandant therefore took instant measures for its evacuation. A small party, which had been sent out to obstruct the road on the first news of Jackson's approach, before his strength was realised, was called in; the stores at the place were loaded up, partly on railway cars, partly on the transport waggons of the troops, and the little band, marching off at 2 A.M. on the 12th, reached Harper's Ferry that afternoon, after a slight brush with Confederate pickets at Halltown.

Harper's Ferry was garrisoned by a body of 12,500 men of all arms, divided into three brigades, under Colonels Ford, Trimble, and D'Utassy, the commander of the whole being Colonel Miles; adding White's little command, the total force available for the defence must have slightly exceeded 15,000 men. White, although ranking officer, declined to relieve Miles of the supreme command—a most unfortunate decision, as it turned out. Harper's Ferry itself had altered little, if at all, since the days when it had sprung into fame as the scene of the raid of John Brown—a name most remembered now, perhaps, as forming the burden of a splendid marching song, which has served for many other armies besides those which fought for the Union. It would be hard to imagine a more indefensible place, surrounded as it is on the north, south, and west by towering, rugged heights, rising sometimes to 1000 feet above the rivers, which wind in and out

between them. The town itself, where a great amount of stores had been dumped down at one time or another, lay on the peninsula formed by the Potomac and the Shenandoah; on the north bank of the former rise the Maryland Heights; on the opposite shore, and somewhat lower, lie the northern spurs of the Blue Ridge, known as the Loudoun Hills. On the west bank of the latter river, and a mile and a half distant, the Bolivar Ridge, and three quarters of a mile beyond that again the more lofty School House Ridge, closed the neck of the little peninsula. Across a depression in the centre of this height ran the turnpike to Halltown; through the little stretch of flat ground between its northern extremity and the Potomac passed the Baltimore and Ohio R.R., which then crossed by a viaduct over to the opposite bank and, still pressed close in on to the water's edge by the spurs of Maryland Heights and the South Mountains, continued its course, *viâ* Berlin and Knoxville, to Frederick City.

On this circle of hills, which were so far apart that no mutual support could be afforded by their garrisons, and between which communication was rendered very difficult by the main and tributary streams, Miles arranged his defence. There had been no works thrown up, no attempt made to strengthen the ground, except by constructing a line of rifle pits on Bolivar Heights, and a fort on the crest of Maryland Heights with an abatis farther down the slope. The latter range, beyond doubt the key of the position, was garrisoned by Colonel Ford's brigade, with seven guns; the other two brigades, with twenty-four guns, held Bolivar Heights; while sixteen guns were left at Camp Hill, an earthwork in the upper part of the town. Loudoun Heights were left untenanted. All these dispositions were executed on the morning of the 13th, and

they were none too soon to meet the concentric advance of the Confederates.

McLaws carried out his part of the programme in a very effective manner. He disposed of ten brigades, about 8000 muskets ; and his task was to block the escape of the enemy to the north and east, seize Maryland Heights, and compel the surrender of the place as soon as possible. On the morning of the 12th he reached the upper end of Pleasant Valley, which separates Maryland Heights from South Mountains, and proceeded to make his dispositions for this end. Two brigades, Kershaw and Barksdale, were sent along the crest of the former ridge, and a third along the eastern slope to guard their left ; another to the southern end of the latter range ; the rest, except two brigades left near Brownsville to watch north and east, moved directly down the valley towards the river. Kershaw advanced slowly and painfully over the rugged track towards the crest overlooking the Ferry ; he met with little resistance save from pickets, and by nightfall was within view of the abatis on the summit. The other forces all reached their appointed posts, and before sunset a continuous line of grey soldiers stretched from Maryland Heights across the valley to the South Mountains, three miles distant. Walker was, however, behindhand with his part of the work ; his men, who had been marching hard for two days and nights, were so exhausted that their commander felt compelled to give them a day's rest. Accordingly the movement was not resumed till the morning of the 12th ; on that day the head of the column reached Hillsboro', still some miles from Loudoun Heights. Jackson bivouacked on the banks of the Opequan Creek, and thus of the three co-operating forces only one was in time at the rendezvous.

On the 14th the circle was closed up. Walker reached

the foot of Loudoun Heights early in the morning, and halting his main force beneath them, sent two regiments to the top. Cautiously they scaled the steep slopes, anticipating the alarm would be given at any moment ; but not a shot or a challenge greeted them, and in a short while signals from the summit told the anxious commander in the valley below that the heights were unoccupied. Their possession being thus secured, Walker moved the rest of the troops to the right, and placed them in a strong position on the lower slopes overhanging the river, thus closing the avenue of escape by the south bank of the Potomac. It was sunset before all this was completed. Jackson spent the whole day in getting forward from the Opequan to Halltown, a distance of barely thirteen miles ; he found the enemy in position on Bolivar Heights, and bivouacked near the village, behind the School House Ridge. Couriers were sent off to the co-operating commanders during the night, and returned with the news that they were in position and ready for action.

The chief work of the day had been done by McLaws. His troops had spent the night of the 13th in line of battle within 100 yards of the Federals and without shelter of any kind. Kershaw's men, in two lines, were in front ; Barksdale's brigade behind them. Against this force Colonel Ford disposed of a number of small units, some distinctly untrustworthy, and amounting in all to some 1500 men. As day broke on the 14th Kershaw's first line advanced to the attack, and soon the clouds of smoke high on the crest and the sounds of war borne faintly down on the breeze told the watchers in the valley below that a stubborn conflict was in progress. By 8.30 A.M. the grey infantry had made substantial advance ; a small breast-work, 400 yards north of the main work, fell into their hands after a stiff resistance, and Ford's men rallied round

the small fort in rear. Reinforcements had already been urgently demanded, and soon after 9 A.M. they arrived, in the strength of about 500 men, from the extreme left of Bolivar Heights, climbed up to the crest and strengthened the already much broken line. The assailants, however, were not to be stayed by such weak means. The first line was reinforced by the second, and Barksdale's brigade ordered to prolong the line to the left or east, and then to envelop the flank of the defence. The movement was badly timed ; Barksdale, delayed by the impracticable nature of the ground, could not get forward easily, and the frontal attack advanced alone. It was checked by the deadly fire of the Federals within 100 yards of the abatis, and a fierce fire fight, accompanied by heavy losses, lasted for some little space before either side would give way. Then, seeing the approach of Barksdale's brigade, and disheartened by the loss of their colonel, a newly formed regiment gave way and bolted, officers and all, down the mountain slope in rear ; the remainder of the troops, shaken by this bad example, gave back in their turn, and by 11 A.M. Kershaw's soldiers had laid hands on the breastwork and the crest of the mountain. Miles rode up to Ford's headquarters, half-way down the hill, to find the heights in the possession of the enemy ; attempts to rally the troops failed, in spite of a new reinforcement of 700 men which arrived about noon, and at 3.30 P.M., in face of the overwhelming numbers of the foe, the guns were spiked and dismantled, and the infantry withdrawn over into the town. Kershaw and Barksdale bivouacked on the mountain they had won ; the line across Pleasant Valley was further contracted, so that its left held Sandy Hook, a small place on the railroad, four miles from Harper's Ferry.


Next day, the 14th, Jackson, whose troops had now come within striking distance of the enemy, resumed

control of the three bodies, who had beenⁿ working independently up till now, and prepared to play his own part in the drama. His plan was to surround the place with a circle of batteries, summon it, and, after a short respite had been granted to permit of the removal of non-combatants, batter it into surrender. Accordingly instructions were sent to McLaws at 7.20 A.M. to establish guns on Maryland Heights, and be ready to open fire at once on further orders; Walker, who reported that he had planted five pieces on his position, also received orders to wait. McLaws found considerable difficulty in getting guns up, as there was no practicable road, and his attention was distracted by a reported hostile advance against his rear by Crampton's Gap; however by 2 P.M. four guns were in position, and Jackson sent orders to begin the bombardment. The artillery on Loudoun Heights opened at once; about an hour later the noise of their discharge began to be echoed by those on Maryland Heights and fire was kept up till late on in the evening. The Federal guns on Camp Hill and the neighbourhood gallantly maintained the struggle, which, however, was unequal; by nightfall some of them were put out of action and ammunition began to run low. Under the circumstances, a gallant dash over the Potomac to recover the artillery abandoned the day previous, which was completely successful, could have but little influence on the ultimate result of the contest. For while the town was being subjected to this heavy bombardment, Jackson, hoping to find the attention of the garrison distracted and their staunchness shaken, had begun his attack, which was to drive home the advantages already gained. In this his anticipations were only partly fulfilled; Bolivar Heights, on and in rear of which Miles had now concentrated his command, could not be reached effectively from the positions occupied by McLaws and

Walker ; the Federals were still full of fight, and in White they had a leader of no small ability. It was late afternoon before the Confederates moved "out" over School House Ridge. Hill was ordered to turn the hostile left and enter the town by the Valley of the Shenandoah ; Lawton, on his left, advanced along the Halltown pike in two lines, three brigades in front and one in rear of the right ; Jones' division, except for one brigade on the left of Lawton, remained in reserve. The centre and left of the attack passed over School House Hill and halted in the valley beyond ; Winder, of Jones' division, seized a small hill near the Potomac, driving off some cavalry who held it ; eight guns were at once brought up there and began fire against Bolivar Heights. Hill's division, to which had been given the most difficult and decisive task, descended to the Shenandoah river under cover of woods and supported by the fire of his artillery ; down by the waterside, he deployed his brigades, Pender, Archer and Brockenborough on the left, and Thomas in rear of them ; their mission was to carry a large bare hill by a frontal attack while Branch and Gregg worked round to the right to flank it. The crest was seized with little difficulty ; but the left of the line, pushing farther forward against the southern slopes of the main Federal position, suffered a decided check at the hands of White, who brought up very timely aid to his threatened wing. Nevertheless the advantage gained was sufficient to seal the doom of Harper's Ferry ; twenty guns were brought up to the height during the night and ten more were sent across the Shenandoah to get a cross fire and take the earthworks in rear ; all Lawton's artillery, eighteen pieces, took post on the School House Hill. Thus fifty-seven guns were ready to open fire on the hapless Federals next morning as soon as it should be light enough to see.

The garrison themselves had no delusions as to the hopelessness of their situation. An officer had been sent out the night previous to warn McClellan of their predicament,

MAP FOR THE CAPTURE OF HARPERS FERRY



ment, but he had not returned, and on this night the cavalry officers besought and obtained permission to try and cut their way through the investing lines. They succeeded beyond all hope, stealing away in the dark-

ness by a very difficult road running west of Maryland Heights and escaping to Greencastle, Pennsylvania. More than this, by a stroke of luck they fell in on the way thither with an unguarded train of sixty waggons belonging to Longstreet's corps, which they destroyed unmolested ; had they been an hour sooner they might have carried off all the Confederate reserve artillery. Such is the fortune of war !

The morning of the 15th dawned very foggy, and it was nearly 7 P.M. before the artillery could open fire. McLaws had been forced by the result of the fight at Crampton's Gap to withdraw his men from Maryland Heights in order to face Franklin ; however, he left a regiment and two guns there to co-operate with Walker and Jackson. The latter now opened a furious fire with all his available pieces at ranges barely more than 1000 yards ; the cross fire against the left of Bolivar Heights was especially effective and in less than an hour the Federal gunners had to abandon their guns. The infantry then moved forward to the attack ; but the hostile fire, reopening with redoubled vigour, checked their advance at once. The grey batteries replied with interest, and two of them, dashing forward to within 400 yards of the entrenchments, silenced the enemy a second time. Before the infantry could be set in motion once more the white flag was displayed.

Miles, on the advice of White, had called his brigadiers together in council, just before 7 A.M. The ammunition was all but exhausted ; an immensely superior force was only awaiting the signal to storm the entrenchments ; some of the troops were unreliable, and all had suffered severely ; so nothing seemed left but surrender. White was entrusted with the duty of arranging terms, and A. P. Hill was detailed by Jackson for the same purpose ; the garrison was paroled^d and not permitted to serve again until regularly exchanged ; the officers retained their side

arms and personal property. Miles was mortally wounded by a shell just after the surrender had been announced, and thus White was left in command of the evacuation. The Confederates did not stay long to enjoy their new prize, for events were moving to a crisis and every man was urgently needed by Lee, now waiting Jackson's arrival to join battle with McClellan. A. P. Hill's division was ordered to remain behind and dispose of the captured property, and before nightfall on the 15th all the other troops had marched away in haste to the northward.

COMMENTS

The invasion of Maryland by Lee marked a complete change in the policy of the Confederate Government and in the strategy of the war. Together with the almost coincident advance into Kentucky by Bragg, it was the first real attempt of the South to retaliate on their powerful adversaries, to exchange the policy of exhausting them by repeated repulses for that of crushing them by a vigorous blow. As such it is of interest, especially to us who hold that attack is the best means of defence. But although few will, we think, dispute the soundness of the policy in itself, whether the time chosen for offensive measures was suitable is another matter.

At first sight the enterprise seems an absolutely hopeless one. With an army poor in armament and equipment, badly fed and clothed, with little of the necessary transport, and reduced in numbers by loss in battle and by straggling, to invade the territory of a mighty foe, who possessed enormous resources in men and money, whose forces lacked nothing that soldiers could desire, and outnumbered their adversaries in a proportion of at least two

to one—this was indeed audacity. Looked at, however, with a more searching glance, the balance of chances is seen to be by no means so unfavourable to the Confederates as appears at first sight. Lee, as usual, put his faith in the moral influences working on his own army and that of his enemy. He knew from old experience the extreme nervousness of the Federal Government; he hoped that the disaffection rife in Maryland, beyond the Potomac, might afford him active aid or, at least, passive goodwill; he counted on the influence of the recent defeat on the morale of the Northern armies and the enterprise of the Northern generals, and strong in this assurance he set foot on the soil of Maryland.

The event did not answer to his expectations. That the North was indeed thrown into a ferment of terror by the invasion, the despatches preserved in the official records fully testify; but the Government themselves were beginning to learn their lesson. There was far less of that scattering of troops in isolated bodies to defend so-called strategic points, which is so common an error among civilian strategists, and which leads only to the defeat of these small fragments one after the other. To the calls for troops raining in from every important town that conceived itself even remotely threatened, the same answer was returned. "The best defence of Harrisburg," wired Stanton to the Governor of Pennsylvania, "is to strengthen the force now marching against the enemy under General McClellan." "The best way to defend Pennsylvania," wrote Halleck to the same personage some days later, "is to concentrate our forces on the enemy, and not to scatter them in weak parties at several points." It is true that these laudable principles were not always put into practice, and the most glaring example of this inconsistency is, of course, the retention of the garrison at Harper's Ferry.

As luck would have it, this very blunder turned out most fortunately for the Federals, leading Lee as it did to split up his army at a very critical moment in the campaign.

Lee's second expectation, that the citizens of Maryland would take up arms on hearing the sound of the Confederate bugles, was even more delusive than the first. Not unnaturally, he had mistaken the temper of the population beyond the river, and imagined them also to be filled with that ardent desire for State rights which he knew so well among his own Virginians. In this he was utterly wrong. It was fairly easy for the South of 1861, knowing nothing of war and all it meant, confident that the Yankee would not fight, despising the combative powers of the Northern artisans, even should they enrol themselves under arms to knit up again the severed Union, to throw down the gage of battle and enter into war *à cœur léger*. But for the peaceful Marylanders, after a year of heavy fighting, desperate in its nature and indecisive in results, the tale of which lost nothing in its telling in the cheap press, to rise, leave their daily life behind them and join the ragged, filthy, half-starved men who were pouring over their ripe fields and swarming in their usually quiet streets, to fight and suffer and die for a cause of which most knew little and a large proportion at least cared less, was a sacrifice beyond ordinary human capability.

But if Lee did not hope for recruits he at least believed that he would find sympathisers, who would help him to supply his men's deficiencies, and would keep him advised of the movements of his foe. The Confederate records are so meagre that it is hard to discover whether this belief was or was not justified by events, but what little we can find out induces us to believe that it was not. On September 7th Lee wrote to the President that the enemy were still in their entrenchments round Washington; in

reality they were some ten to fifteen miles outside them, marching towards Frederick, which advance the Confederate commander seems first to have heard of on the 9th only ; and if we draw the natural inference from his words to Walker on the 8th, quoted above, we must assume him to have supposed all the way through that the Army of the Potomac was a good deal farther from him than was actually the case. On the other hand McClellan's information, which came in to him from outside his own army, was always extensive and usually fairly accurate, so far as could be expected, considering its sources. An examination of it day by day, however, shows very clearly exactly how far reports from civilians can be relied on and where they are most likely to be in error. With regard to the actual positions of the Confederates they were usually quite in accord with actual fact. McClellan knew of Lee's passage of the Potomac on the 4th the same evening ; on the 6th he heard that the enemy were moving on Frederick ; next day, of their arrival at that place ; on the 10th, of Jackson's movement towards Boonsborough ; and on the 11th of his passage at Williamsport and the evacuation of Frederick. On the other hand the estimates of the numbers of Lee's small army were ludicrously exaggerated ; it was reported at various times as being 100,000, 110,000 and 250,000 strong—that is, from twice to four times its real effective. The average civilian, owing to want of practice, and also perhaps to an idea that it is best to be on the safe side in such matters, usually guesses very wide of the truth in this respect, and liberal deductions must be made by the recipient of the information if it is to be of any use to him. Reports as to the probable movements of the enemy emanating from men of no military knowledge, who in turn get their information, in all likelihood, from privates or non-combatants in the opposing ranks, must

also be received with great caution. It is certain that, even if correct information does leak out in this way in some armies, that reproach could never be levelled against that commanded by those masters of secrecy, Lee and Stonewall Jackson.

The Confederate commander-in-chief also counted, as we have said, on the caution and slowness of McClellan. As a matter of fact, the marches of the Union army during this first period, from September 5th to 12th, averaged little more than five miles per day. But it must be remembered, before we reproach the general for his sluggishness, that it was not a question merely of seeking out the enemy and bringing on a battle at the earliest possible moment. The work of reorganisation and restoration of morale was even more important. McClellan could not, in a moment, get all the reins into his hands and bring his army to such a pitch that it would answer effectively to his will. He had to repair the defects in his instrument before thinking of using it. It must, we think, be admitted that, all things considered, he did wonderfully well; one should never forget that an army is a very delicate, sensitive organism, whose vitality and capability vary enormously, and that, like any other organism, it needs time and careful management if it is to recover its former power after a heavy blow. McClellan moved out to meet Lee when his army was, so to say, in a state of convalescence, and it would have been folly to have demanded from this somewhat enervated body the efforts which are usually expected of troops in the usual state of efficiency.

Going back now to the Confederates, the next point for discussion is Lee's division of his army from September 9th onwards. This was a measure which was entirely his own, for Longstreet certainly, and Jackson almost certainly, disapproved of it. The object was, so it is averred, to open

the new line of communication by the Shenandoah Valley and capture the small force at Harper's Ferry before McClellan could succour it. In actual fact, the decision had a very disastrous influence on the result of the campaign ; but that by no means proves that it was unsound at the time.

To appreciate it properly, we must reconstruct the situation as it appeared to Lee when he issued the order. He believed at this time that McClellan's army was a good way farther back than it actually was ; and he also seems to have considerably underestimated the time necessary for the reduction of Harper's Ferry. These two hypotheses led him to assume that by the 12th or the 13th the operation would be completed, and the army reunited, while the Federals were still out of striking distance ; that then, with a clear line of communication in case of victory, an unimpeded retreat in case of failure, and with the prestige of a first success on his side, he could make his preparations for the decisive battle which should seal the fate of the Northern States.

That was his idea, in substance ; and we think that it was unsound. To begin with, McClellan was closer than Lee knew ; and an unfortunate accident was to lead him, before the Confederates were ready, to take unusually vigorous measures for their overthrow. Moreover, the difficulty of combining the movements of the converging columns caused delay in the capture of Harper's Ferry, which by its resistance gained three days more than Lee had reckoned on. But apart from these things, which the commander-in-chief could hardly have foreseen, the detachment of a large force—nearly half the army—on a subsidiary mission at that moment appears unjustifiable. Dividing one's forces is always a perilous manœuvre, and here the object was not worth the risk. Lee's line of com-

munication was not imperilled by the garrison of the Ferry ; the events of 1863 prove this, when the Army of Virginia crossed the Potomac, marched far away into Pennsylvania and left the detached force to look after itself. The true objective of Lee was the main force of the enemy. Had he moved on that force, and defeated it, he could then have had Harper's Ferry at his leisure. But he lost sight of this primary aim and went off to pursue a secondary one, an error which nearly led to disaster. Strategy which neglects the enemy's army in its care for lines of communication and geographical points is invariably unsound. If the foe is well beaten, everything else falls with him ; if he is still undefeated, enormous risks may be run for gains which can never be permanent.

The arguments adduced in defence of Lee's division of his army seem to us rather unconvincing. They may be reduced to two :—(1) That Lee's force was not great enough to meet McClellan with any hope of success. This may or may not be true ; we will return to that question later ; it is sufficient to say here that if it is, then the invasion of Maryland itself was an unsound measure, and Lee's giving battle at Sharpsburg an act of folly. Nor is it easy to discover why an army which cannot fight united, with any hope of success, should be able to do so when divided into two halves. The defence, in short, is simply not a defence. The other plea is :—(2) that Lee preferred to postpone his battle, to draw the enemy farther away from his base, and fight him in the heart of the Northern States, in order to make the moral effect of his defeat more great. The assumption is, of course, tenable ; but we do not think the argument a sound one. If Lee wanted to take advantage of the disorganised state of McClellan's army, and follow up the blow at Manassas by a second and decisive one in Maryland, then the sooner the battle was

fought the better. The Confederates had everything to lose and nothing to gain by waiting till the morale of the Northern army was restored, as was being done every day. Moreover, one would imagine that the effect of a defeat of the Army of the Potomac at the very gates of Washington and Baltimore would be at least as great as a similar event in Pennsylvania and probably a good deal greater. The fact is that Lee suffered here, as he did a year later, from a somewhat overweening contempt of his foe. He took risks and executed movements which were unwise, because he believed that the enemy were far more badly beaten than they were in reality. He failed to appreciate the importance of time; he underrated McClellan's organising ability and the soldierly capacities of the Yankee private; deluded by a secondary aim, he lost from view his first objective, the defeat of the hostile army in the field—the greatest and most fatal of all strategic mistakes. Looked at rightly, this division of the Confederate army on the night of September 9th was the root cause of all the future misfortunes of this campaign.

One concluding remark on the surrender of Harper's Ferry. Some years ago, when there had been a number of British "white flag incidents" in South Africa, from one cause or another, there was, we believe, a very warm discussion in the papers on the ethics of surrender. We admit that we have never read this correspondence, but, judging from analogy, we should imagine that those who pleaded justification for laying down one's arms in certain cases were not soldiers. A few weeks after the end of the Maryland campaign a court-martial sat on the officers of the captured garrison of the Ferry, White, Ford, D'Utassy, and Trimble; its verdict was that "Harper's Ferry was prematurely surrendered," that the defence both of Maryland Heights and of the place itself had been conducted

without ability, and that the decision to raise the white flag, before it was absolutely necessary, had had the most grievous influence on the result of the campaign. In this particular case the condemnation was probably acquiesced in by the whole country ; but to our mind the verdict should have been the same if McClellan's army had been 100 miles distant. One can never consider a surrender solely on its own merits ; the influence it has on the morale of the army as a whole counts for far more than the loss of any given number of troops. In every army there are and must be men whose characters are not of the strongest ; such men will frequently find themselves in charge of posts which, insignificant in most circumstances, assume for the moment an importance out of all proportion to the force guarding them or the rank of the commandant. It is then that the tradition of the army acts most strongly. Once let a precedent be afforded for yielding, once let grounds be given for the belief that surrender may be justified in certain extenuating circumstances, and the weakness of human nature is given a most deadly weapon. The usual plea is that the commander of a fortified post is entrusted with the lives of his men. That is true. He is also entrusted with something else, the reputation of his country and the honour of her arms ; and by consulting the one he may be led unwittingly to betray the other. War cannot be waged without sacrifice and death ; if the cause at stake is not worth shedding blood for, that is the business of the nation who entered on the war but not of the insignificant unit in the great army, whose duty is not to reason why but to fight to the last drop of blood. Humanitarianism is out of place in such a sphere. The honour of the country and the triumph of her flag is at stake ; what do the lives of a few hundred soldiers more or less matter ?

CHAPTER IX

SOUTH MOUNTAIN

WE left the head of McClellan's right wing halted in Frederick City on the night of September 12th, and the rest of the army bivouacked a short distance back on the roads to the south and east of it. The following day the Army of the Potomac continued to advance slowly westward, pressing back before it the stubborn Confederate horsemen. Pleasonton was early on the move; one of his brigades had been detached towards Gettysburg, probably owing to the reported presence of a large body of hostile cavalry on that flank; another regiment kept connection with Franklin at Jefferson; with the rest of his command the general himself set out at daylight along the Middletown pike. Some three or four miles west of Frederick there rises the steep range of the Catoclin Mountains, right athwart the roads, and from the crest on the left Stuart's artillery soon greeted the advance of the pursuers. The latter were compelled to dismount two regiments and bring four horse guns into action to clear the passage; the enemy, consisting at first of only one regiment, later reinforced by all Hampton's brigade, made a somewhat prolonged fight, and it was past noon ere Pleasonton's troopers crowned the ridge, and could look down into the smiling valley at their feet, backed by the South Mountains in the distance. A further stand was made east of Middletown; the artillery soon displaced the enemy from this and another position a little beyond that place, and before

evening the foot of the farther range was reached. Here the pursuit was definitely checked and the cavalry commander, while awaiting the arrival of the infantry, devoted himself to a careful reconnoissance of the ground in his front.

Behind this screen McClellan had massed his army at Frederick, Reno's corps being at Middletown, and Franklin at Buckeystown. McClellan himself reached the first place some time before noon, and not long after that hour—probably about 3 P.M.—there befell him a stroke of luck such as has fallen to the lot of few generals in war. A soldier of the XII. (Williams') Corps brought in to headquarters a paper wrapped round three cigars, which proved to be a copy of Lee's order No. 191 of September 9th, detailing all his movements for the next few days. The copy was addressed to D. H. Hill, and was signed by Colonel Chilton, Lee's adjutant-general, whose handwriting was recognised by one of the staff. There could thus be no doubt about its genuineness, and from it McClellan learned that the Army of Northern Virginia had been divided, that half of it, Jackson's corps and three divisions, was investing Harper's Ferry, and that Longstreet and D. H. Hill, with Stuart's horse and the reserve artillery, were at Boonsborough, covered by the South Mountain range. The point of reunion was Boonsborough or Hagerstown.

The Union commander appreciated the situation at once. The enemy were now split into two fractions, fifteen miles distant from each other, and his own army lay right opposite the great gap between them. This state of affairs called for prompt and vigorous action, if the chance was not to pass away before it could be taken advantage of; the thunder of guns at Harper's Ferry showed that that place still held out, but its powers of resistance must by now be almost exhausted. McClellan's resolution, then, was taken.

Franklin was instructed, at 6.20 P.M., to move by Jefferson and Burkittsville to Rohrersville, destroy the little command of McLaws, bring Miles' troops over to the north bank and move north to block the Potomac fords against the retreat of Lee or the advance of Jackson. With the rest of the army, he intended to defeat the small force at Boonsborough, and if possible destroy it before the besiegers of Harper's Ferry could rejoin. Hooker was to advance at dawn, following hard on the heels of Reno; behind him were to come Sykes and Sumner, in that order. The whole of the army was to be in motion by 7 A.M. Never before had the future seemed so bright for the Union arms.

Meanwhile Lee, since the 10th, had been quietly awaiting the news of the fall of Harper's Ferry. Longstreet had moved to Hagerstown from Boonsborough on the 11th, actuated by a false report of a hostile advance from the north; D. H. Hill still remained at the latter place. The general-in-chief considered that McClellan's slowness would leave plenty of time for the accomplishment of the object in hand, the capture of Miles' little force, and after the reunion of his army he intended, by a slow retreat, or possibly an advance on Harrisburg, to bring about the decisive engagement at a distance from the hostile base at Washington. But on the 13th most alarming news reached him; the enemy had been seized with a sudden paroxysm of energy; the former cautious, tentative feeling forward had given place to a vigorous and rapid advance, and the heads of his columns were already massing at the foot of the South Mountains; 90,000 men were about to throw themselves between the two halves of his little army and stifle them by sheer brute force.

Harper's Ferry was still defiant, and to secure its reduction and to avoid disaster to McLaws in Pleasant Valley it was necessary to gain time by some means or

other. Lee and Longstreet held a short consultation. The former wished to defend the South Mountain passes for one day, with the twelve brigades disposable; the latter, as usual, disagreed. He pointed out that the proposed movement must involve a long and toilsome march for the troops at Hagerstown; that their fighting powers must be seriously impaired thereby; that it would be preferable in his opinion to reunite the two commands, his own and Hill's, at Sharpsburg, where they could either put up a good resistance or else strike the flank of the Army of the Potomac, should it move to relieve Harper's Ferry. Lee, however, in spite of Longstreet's reiteration, did not change his mind; and so orders were sent out to Hill to return to Turner's Gap early next morning and defend it stubbornly until Longstreet should arrive to his aid.

D. H. Hill, informed by Stuart that the pursuing foe only numbered two brigades, had occupied the pass that same evening with the 2000 bayonets and eight guns of Colquitt and Garland, and it was these which had brought the hostile cavalry to a stand. On receiving Lee's order about midnight, the general himself rode back to Turner's Gap and reached it just as the sun rose. Stuart, believing that a greater peril was imminent at Crampton's Gap, five miles to the south, had led his cavalry thither, and the only forces left were the two infantry brigades and a mixed force of dismounted troopers and sharpshooters under Colonel Rosser.

The South Mountains, which were to be the scene of stubborn fighting on this Sunday morning, run from the Potomac river on the south, northwards to within ten miles of Gettysburg, a stretch of some thirty miles. At the point where the fighting took place they average 1000 to 1300 feet in height, and their slopes are covered nearly to the crest with a confused tangle of woods, stone walls,

fields, and boulders. From Middletown to Boonsborough two main roads pass the chain; the National road, rising steeply from the valley some 200 feet to a deeply cut gorge, with sides 100 to 160 feet above the track, and known as Turner's Gap; and 1000 yards southwards another line of communication, the old Sharpsburg road, diverging from the former about a mile from Middletown and passing over Fox's Gap. From here a track runs along the crest of the ridge to the Mountain House on the National pike; northward of this latter the mountain range divides into two parallel ridges, separated by a valley, deeply sunk at first, and rising gradually till the two crests converge in a high peak one mile north of the main road and commanding all the hills for a long distance round. To the northward of this peak runs the old Hagerstown pike, rejoining the National road on the western slope of the ranges 1000 yards or so from Turner's Gap.

Such was the position to be defended. One of Hill's brigades, Garland's, was posted at the Mountain House; the other, Colquitt's, was brought back from the eastern base of the range, up the hill and drawn up across the pike, a little below the crest. The remaining three brigades were still left at Boonsborough for the present.

Meanwhile the Federals had been making good use of their time. The indefatigable Pleasonton was afoot at 6 A.M., with his horsemen and Scammon's infantry brigade, which he had obtained from the IX. Corps to help him clear the way over the mountains to Boonsborough. The force holding the gap was considered to be merely a strong rear-guard which would give ground before a little vigorous pressure. Cox was riding at the head of the infantry columns, and from the incautious exclamation of the paroled colonel of the 28th Ohio, whom he met on the road, first began to suspect that a formidable hostile body

was over against him. Crook's brigade was therefore sent for, and Pleasonton ordered Scammon to take the old Sharpsburg road to the left, move up to the crest and get into the enemy's rear while the dismounted cavalry and the artillery in the valley occupied his attention in front. It was now about 7 A.M., and the two forces were about to join battle; Cox, as senior officer, had assumed command of the field on the Federal side.

Scammon's advance soon attracted the enemy's attention; a battery opened on his marching column from near Fox's Gap, inducing him to swing more to the left. His men progressed slowly, under cover of thick woods veiling the lower slopes, and it was nearly 9 A.M. before all were deployed on the edge of the trees, facing the open ground, beyond which lay the enemy. Here Crook's arrival was awaited; and when the latter came up in rear of the line, dispositions were made for an immediate attack. The left regiment was ordered to enfold the hostile flank, while the rest went forward against his front, the unit on the right to pay special attention to the battery which had annoyed the advance. These orders were well and skilfully executed; dashing through the cornfield, the lines poured over the stone wall, behind which stood Garland's brigade, sent in haste by D. H. Hill to the threatened point, as soon as he perceived the approach of Cox's men; the defence was pushed back out of its lodgment and up the encumbered slope to the crest. Here a desperate rally checked the advance, which was enfiladed by Rosser's band on a small knoll to the left. An attempt on the part of the Federals to bring two guns to the front met with severe loss, and the pieces were forced to retire. Nevertheless the pause was but momentary; two of Crook's regiments prolonged Scammon's front to right and left; the assailants plunged forward with renewed energy, and after a short combat,

in which Garland met his death, sent his men bolting down the western slopes in disorder ; part of them were driven along the crest of the ridge towards Turner's Gap, and but few rallied again that day. By their gallant efforts the Kanawha Division had succeeded thus early in gaining a firm footing on the summit.

While Cox was straightening out his disordered lines and preparing for a renewed attack, help was coming up to the defeated Confederates. G. B. Anderson had been ordered to the field from Boonsborough by Hill when the threatening advance on Fox's Gap was first descried, and he reached the Mountain House a little before the defeat of Garland. Two of his regiments were hurriedly despatched down the track running along the crest and ran up against the hostile centre near the Gap. Their determined rushes to gain ground were shattered by the steady fire of the Kanawha troops ; and after a short tussle the opponents drew apart. Cox, who was isolated on the top of the mountain, far from support and in presence of an array whose strength was concealed by the woods and peaks to his front, considered it unwise to attempt any farther progress with his little division until the rest of Reno's corps should come up. He withdrew his lines slightly, therefore, and prepared to hold what he had gained. It was now about noon, and for some two hours or more there was a pause in the fighting near Fox's Gap, broken only by intermittent skirmishing and artillery fire, which did little damage to either of the combatants.

Reinforcements were nearing the field. On the Federal side Willcox's division, after a good deal of unnecessary wandering, arrived at 2 P.M. and deployed to the north of the old Sharpsburg road ; guns came into position near it, and back in the valley could be seen the long winding columns of Rodman and Sturgis. D. H. Hill, for his part,

had at length decided to concentrate his whole command on the scene of action. Rodes and Ripley reported on the crest about midday; they were at once separated, the former going to occupy the prominent peak on the north of the National road, to check the advance of Hooker's corps, which had just been descried; the latter reinforcing the defence at Fox's Gap. Before this Anderson had moved forward again to the attack. Wilcox's men, many of them very raw, were caught while forming by a severe flank fire and a temporary panic ensued on his right wing. The firm countenance of two regiments on the left checked the disorder as soon as it had begun; the Confederates were held at bay, and after a while pressed gradually back to the crest, through the woods near the road. Sturgis and Rodman were now arriving; the former deployed in two lines, in support of Cox and Wilcox, partially relieving the latter; Rodman's four brigades were divided, two going to the extreme right, two to Cox's left. It was nearly 5 P.M. before all these movements were completed, and meanwhile Longstreet's corps, after a long, hot and dusty march, was gradually entering the fight. The force at Fox's Gap was strengthened by the brigades of Drayton and G. T. Anderson. Ripley had lost his way and was still wandering about at the western foot of the mountain; not a man of his fired a shot all this day. At 5 P.M. the whole of the IX. Corps moved forward to the attack of the last Confederate stronghold north of the Gap. Success crowned their efforts at first; ground was gained slowly but surely; the Confederate line was somewhat irregular and by pressing into the gaps between the units the advance progressed by degrees towards the National road. Drayton's brigade was soon put out of action by a vigorous push against its right; but the commands of Hood and Law, who arrived on the

left of the Confederate line about dusk, regained some of the lost advantage, and when night fell the defence was still in possession of the heights commanding Fox's Gap, although the pass itself and the road through it were held by the Federals. The hostile lines were within 100 paces of each other in some places when the firing ceased about 10 P.M. The losses had been heavy on both sides; Reno, the commander of the IX. Corps, was numbered among the victims of the struggle.

While this bitter combat was raging at Fox's Gap another had burst forth a little distance to the north. We have already said that the approach of strong hostile columns about 1 P.M. had induced D. H. Hill to send his last brigade, that of Rodes, to the commanding height north of Turner's Gap. These threatening columns were the main body of the I. Corps, under "Fighting Joe" Hooker, which had left its bivouac early that morning and was coming over the crest into the Catocin Valley shortly after noon. Burnside, the commander of the right wing of the army, and McClellan himself, were on the scene of action by 1 P.M. and established their headquarters in the valley, not far from the hamlet of Bolivar, whence they could view the whole battlefield. Orders were sent thence to Hooker, immediately on arrival, to send a division up the old Hagerstown pike, with the purpose of carrying the main peak there and sweeping down the crest against the enemy opposing Reno. Meade was selected for this movement, and the other two divisions of Hatch and Ricketts prepared to support him. Artillery opened fire from near the road, and the infantry, switching off to the north, deployed in beautiful order in front of a belt of woods at the foot of the hills. Hatch came up on Meade's left; Ricketts, arrayed in two lines, was held in reserve; a regiment of cavalry watched the country to

the north. This deployment and the subsequent advance through the tangled forest took time, and it was getting late ere the long blue lines, splendid with glittering bayonets and waving standards, emerged from their shelter and swept with calm, even tread up the rough craggy slopes. Meade was on the right of the pike, with Seymour well out to the north to sweep round the enemy's flank, and get in his rear ; Hatch's objective was the southern crest. Rodes' men met the assault of Meade with very ineffective gun fire, then with bullet and bayonet. The struggle was a losing one from the first ; the Federal lines far overlapped those of the defence, and the Confederates, outnumbered and overwhelmed by sheer weight of numbers, gave ground from shelter to shelter, until at length only the solitary rock above-mentioned, no good position in itself owing to the steepness of its sides, remained in their possession.

It was after 5.30 P.M., Longstreet's brigades were on the field, and that commander had now taken over the reins from D. H. Hill ; but he was ignorant of the ground and the situation, and his men, exhausted as they were, wasted much time and energy in useless and unprofitable marches and counter-marches, while their comrades above on the ridge were anxiously awaiting the help that did not come. Only after two hours, spent in wandering in a circle at the mountain's foot, did D. R. Jones' division succeed in getting into action on Rodes' right near the pike. Coming up piecemeal as they did, they could only slacken and not check the rush of the I. Corps. The latter were in irresistible mood this day ; Kemper and Garnett arrived about 6 P.M., and later Evans, but the division of Hatch drove back their attack by file fire at fifteen paces, and some at least of the Confederates behaved very badly, fleeing from the field at the first shock. When Ricketts

came up to the aid of Hatch, and Seymour's turning movement made itself decisively felt, the fate of battle had already definitely declared itself for the Federals. Darkness and the exhaustion of the combatants gradually put an end to the fighting, and the defence finally rallied close on Turner's Gap, leaving Hooker in position of all the ground north of the Hagerstown road and the coveted peak which commanded the passage over the mountains.

On the National road itself Colquitt and Gibbon, of Hatch's division, had been engaged in a separate combat. The Federals had a hard task, struggling uphill all the way against a foe sheltered at the top by a stone wall and backed by artillery; but Gibbon's leading was excellent and his troops some of the best in all the Union army. Fighting their way with dogged resolution from point to point, the Federals by 9 P.M. were well up towards the gorge and within charging distance of the hostile stronghold, which was assaulted several times but unsuccessfully. The counter-strokes of Colquitt's men met with no better fortune, and by 10 P.M. the firing had gradually died down on all points of the battlefield. Sumner's and Williams' corps had now reached the scene of the fight; the former sent a division to take post in rear of Hooker's right, and a brigade to relieve Gibbon's exhausted troops near the Gap. Williams and the rest of Sumner's men halted near McClellan's post at Bolivar; Sykes lay farther back at Middletown. Thus the whole of the Army of the Potomac spent the night, ready to renew the fight on the morrow with an overwhelming force.

Meanwhile another sharp engagement had taken place during this afternoon of the 14th, five miles to the southward at Crampton's Gap. As we have related, Franklin had been ordered, on the evening of the previous day, to

carry this pass by storm, cross his men over into Pleasant Valley, and complete the destruction of McLaws. On the morning of the 14th his corps proceeded to the execution of these injunctions; from the bivouac three miles east of Jefferson it advanced over the Catoctins to that town, and there halted, in order to await the arrival of Couch's division, which as a matter of fact was still far in the rear. After some delay Franklin resolved to execute his orders himself, without any further waiting, and the march was resumed towards Burkittsville, which the head of Bartlett's brigade, forming the advance-guard, reached at noon. Here the corps first got news of the enemy.

The mountain range near Crampton's Gap is much narrower than farther north, but its slopes have the same entangled character, being diversified up to the crest with small copses, cornfields and fences. Two roads cross the hills from Burkittsville, the one running parallel with the mountain for a short distance southwards then bending sharp to the right and passing over Burkittsville Gap to Brownsville; the other going right up to the foot of the ridge, then swinging also to the right and gradually ascending to Crampton's Gap, beyond which it bifurcates, one branch going to Sharpsburg, the other by Brownsville to Harper's Ferry. At both these passes the Confederates had been careful to post troops. McLaws, on the advance of the enemy being reported to him about noon, sent Semmes' brigade at once from Solomon's Gap to occupy Burkittsville Gap; Crampton's, as we know, was held by Munford's cavalry, with two regiments of infantry and eight guns. Cobb was under orders to march to that quarter also, but it was impossible for him to come into line before 4 P.M. at the earliest; from noon onward Munford would have to hold his own without assistance. He posted his men under good cover behind a stone wall

at the foot of the pass on the north of the road, infantry in the centre, cavalry on the flanks, with the artillery in good positions about half-way up the hillside. The total strength of this little force could not have been 1000 men in all, and against them were advancing in serried array the 16,000 odd men of the Federal VI. Corps.


The first guns opened fire a little after midday, and warned Franklin that his objective was held by the enemy. An infantry attack would clearly be necessary to turn them out. While the artillery unlimbered to left and rear of the village and commenced an effective reply to the howitzers upon the high ground, the Federal lines arrayed themselves for the encounter. Slocum's division was entrusted with the movement; Smith's was held in reserve. The former command deployed, with one regiment extended in front, two more 200 yards behind, all from Bartlett's brigade; 200 yards farther back came Newton, then Torbert, each in two lines of two regiments each—a grand and imposing display indeed; and one which must have filled with awe the hearts of the foe, who, however, gallant soldiers as they were, prepared for a desperate defence. Their morale was heightened and their numbers increased by a further reinforcement of two regiments sent from Semmes' command, which strengthened the line behind the stone wall.

A little after 3 P.M. the infantry advance began. The Confederate artillery had moved back to the crest, out of effective range of the assailants' guns, and at once began to incommode Slocum's men by well-directed salvos. Nevertheless the latter did not hesitate; their first rush carried them to within 300 yards of the enemy, and the rattle of sustained musketry fire woke all the mountain echoes and reverberated back and forth from the hills on either side in terrible chorus. Munford's men, under

shelter as they were, had the best of it, and the Federal advance was brought to a stand. Franklin was quick to realise that the business must be finished quickly ; and Smith was instructed to facilitate the work of his comrades on the right by advancing a brigade to dislodge the enemy from the woods south of the road whence they were enfilading Slocum's line. The latter general rapidly took measures to press on his attack. Newton's brigade prolonged the first brigade to the flanks and added the roar of their musketry to the din of the fierce fire duel. Then from the rear was heard the steady tramp of ordered lines, and Torbert's men, sweeping right through the firing line and carrying it on with them, traversed the open space in a single rush at top speed and hurled themselves over the breastwork in an irresistible tide. Before they reached it, the defenders were seen streaming up the hill in disorder, and Franklin's men, never pausing, pursued hotly up towards the crest. The flight was hastened by the bayonets of Brooks, who, keeping pace with Slocum to the south of the road, picked up many prisoners endeavouring to escape to the southwards.

Into the full eddy of this rout came Cobb's brigade from Pleasant Valley. McLaws, at last fully realising the imminent peril to his rear, had sent that officer to Brownsville, with orders to hold the Gap, "if it cost the life of every man in his command." As they passed over the crest the enemy in front had been momentarily checked by the fresher regiments of Parham ; but it was only for a moment. The lines in front gave way again and came pouring back right on the top of the new arrivals. Bufeted by the torrent of fugitives and assailed in ever-increasing strength by the triumphant foe, Cobb's centre shivered and broke. The wings went a few minutes later and the whole Confederate array, in utter disorder,

plunged down the western slope of the range. The herculean efforts of Cobb and of Semmes, who with his



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staff had galloped to the scene of action from Brownsville Pass to rally the affrighted troops, availed nothing; the

whole position was lost, and it was only with the utmost difficulty and by the help of Semmes' and Wilcox's brigades, who came up to aid after darkness had fallen, that the defence could be in some sort re-established in front of Brownsville. The setting sun shone on Franklin's banners waving in triumph on the crest on either side of Crampton's Pass, and his tired men lying down to rest half-way down the western slope. McClellan's strategy was meeting with success, and it appeared now as if nothing could save McLaws from utter ruin and the Confederate army from a staggering defeat.

The prospect for the Confederates on this night of September 14th was black indeed. The plans of Lee seemed utterly overthrown. A day had been gained, but at what a price! The hard struggle at Turner's and Fox's Gaps had reflected little credit on the Southern leadership, and little more on some parts of the Southern army; from Crampton's Gap came other and darker stories of demoralised troops and panic flights. The Federal general on the other hand had shown himself unusually enterprising, and had for once completely nonplussed the predictions of his enemy, while his army, if one could judge from its advance up the slopes of South Mountain, was fighting as well now as it had ever done.

That was not the worst. The object of the whole operation, the capture of Harper's Ferry, was still unfulfilled, and even if it were, on the 15th, the Federals stood a good chance of being able to set over against the loss of Miles' garrison the destruction of the greater part of McLaws' command. It was difficult indeed to see how the latter could escape if McClellan showed any continuance of the energy which had animated him on this

day. As for the distant dream of an invasion of Pennsylvania or a dictation of peace at Washington, that had vanished into thin air ; if Lee could save his army from defeat, he might well regard himself as fortunate. One thing was clear, that the much-tried commands of Hill and Longstreet must be brought back from their present perilous position ; Lee had been informed that all Sumner's and Williams' corps were up in line, and that Porter was not far distant, and the renewal of the fight by these fresh troops at dawn must shatter to pieces the already much shaken defenders of South Mountain. The trains were first removed, and by midnight the fighting troops were swiftly and quickly withdrawn from before the enemy—such of them at least as could be found, for many an exhausted soldier slept through all the movement and woke next morning a captive in the hands of his enemies—and filed off along the Sharpsburg road. Fitz Lee, who had come up to Boonsborough on the afternoon of the 14th, from an abortive expedition against the Federal right, was entrusted with the duty of covering the retreat. The infantry reached the bridges over the Antietam Creek shortly after daylight on the 15th, and took position on the heights around Sharpsburg, Longstreet being on the right and D. H. Hill on the left of the pike : later on in the day Hood was shifted across from the south flank to the neighbourhood of the Dunker Church. Here the men spent the day, enjoying the repose which they so much needed.

Meanwhile Lee and Longstreet were discussing their next move. The latter declared forcibly that the invasion of Maryland had proved a failure, and that the best course was to retire at once across the Potomac, where they could hold their own against McClellan far better than in the hostile territory of Maryland. The army was incom-

pletely concentrated and could hardly be all up in time for a big battle, which must be waged against an enormous disproportion of numbers and with troops demoralised by recent defeat. All this was urged so strongly, and seemed so convincing, that the commander-in-chief could not but admit that his subordinate was right. Accordingly orders were sent to Jackson, if Harper's Ferry should fall that day, to move his corps to Shepherdstown and there cover the retreat of the rest of the army into Virginia. The artillery reserve had been sent to the same place at midnight on the 14th, in view of some such movement becoming necessary. McLaws was urgently enjoined to abandon Maryland Heights at once and effect a junction with the main body at Sharpsburg by the shortest possible route.

Barely had this decision been taken, however, than the situation suddenly changed. A note came from Jackson, dated 8 A.M., announcing the surrender of Harper's Ferry and asking to what point his troops, now become dispensable for further operations, should march. They could move, he added, that evening. On the news of this success, Lee altered his mind, and, spite of the remonstrances of Longstreet, resolved that he would not abandon the invasion of Maryland; that he would not retreat across the river, but that he would put a bold face on the situation, and fight the Union army where he stood. The decision might well seem audacious, almost rash, but the purpose of the Confederate commander was unshaken. Jackson was ordered to rejoin at Sharpsburg as rapidly as his men's legs could carry them; McLaws was to do the same, passing, if necessary, by Harper's Ferry; Walker was to follow hard on Jackson's heels. Before the next morning's dawn, it was hoped, the Army of Northern Virginia would be collected behind the

Antietam Creek, ready for the battle which should decide the fate of the invasion.

Jackson's corps left Harper's Ferry that evening, and by a long night march attained Sharpsburg next day early, and was posted with its two divisions (Hill's had been left to guard the captured place and property) on the left of Hood, facing north. Walker came up in the afternoon and bivouacked for the night in the vicinity of Sharpsburg itself. The movements of McLaws demand rather longer notice; to explain them, we must see what was happening on this day at the Federal headquarters.

McClellan, on the night of the 14th, was quite ignorant of the fact that the enemy had left his front, and expected a renewed fight on the morrow. He therefore gave instructions to the corps commanders to press forward at dawn against the hostile positions; and only when this movement was quite unopposed was it realised that the Confederates had retreated under cover of darkness. Measures were at once taken to follow hard after them; Pleasonton's cavalry trotted off down the National road towards Boonsborough, followed by Sumner, Hooker, and Williams, the latter of whom now surrendered his command to Mansfield; Burnside, with the IX. Corps, and Sykes went by the road from Fox's Gap towards Sharpsburg. They were to be prepared, if necessary, to reinforce Franklin in Pleasant Valley and aid him to relieve Harper's Ferry.

The right wing of the army moved with considerable circumspection—why, it is not easy to discover. McClellan was employed in writing letters to Halleck during the early hours of the morning, in which he spoke of the serious defeat of the rebels, and described them as making for Shepherdstown in a perfect panic. His pursuit, however, was less vigorous than his language. Pleasonton

came up with Fitz Lee's rear-guard at Boonsborough and in a succession of vigorous and well-executed charges drove him through the town and back along the Antietam road. Two miles beyond the Confederates again made a stand, but were rather severely handled and fell back, leaving behind them two guns. Richardson's division, at the head of Sumner's corps, arrived about noon near Keedysville, and from this point saw and felt the fire of the enemy from the crests beyond the Antietam Creek. Pleasonton's guns were brought into action to reply, and a purposeless duel began, and was continued at intervals until nightfall. In rear of the guns Richardson deployed his infantry to the right of the pike; Sykes, leading the centre column, aligned himself a little later on his left. Burnside, who, owing to the fatigue of his men, had not set out till afternoon, was still some way in rear. The sun was sinking behind the Confederate lines when McClellan rode up to inspect the situation in person. He found the rest of the army halted in the road behind the advance-guard, and at once decided that it was too late to execute an attack that night. The troops were assigned to their respective bivouacs, and moved off to them; fires were lighted and provisions cooked by those units who were fortunate enough to be at the head of their columns. All night long the tramp of men and horses and the rumbling of wheels, heard distinctly through the stillness of the autumn night, told the alert Confederate sentries beyond the creek that their foes were moving into position.

Meanwhile, what had been happening to Franklin and McLaws? The former officer had been ordered, early in the morning of the 15th, to move down into Pleasant Valley at dawn next morning, leaving a detachment at Rohrer'sville, destroy the enemy in his front, relieve Miles, and then rejoin the main army at or near Boonsborough. In

accordance with these instructions, Smith started off from Crampton's Gap as the sun rose, and proceeded to a point three miles beyond Rohrersville, whither Couch was sent. Here the march was interrupted, in order to allow the corps to close up and its commander to make his observations. The valley here is about two miles wide, and crossed by a small ridge in rear of the hamlet of Brownsville ; along this crest were to be seen deployed strong hostile masses. At 9 A.M. Franklin estimated these at a brigade, but by the time his whole corps had come up he had had more time to inspect the position from every point of view, and this led him to the conclusion that the enemy outnumbered him two to one. As it was clear from the cessation of the firing in that direction that Harper's Ferry had fallen, Franklin considered that an attack by his own command on so great a numerical superiority in such a strong position "would not answer under the circumstances." He expressed his intention, therefore, of waiting where he was; an attitude which received the entire sanction of the commander-in-chief.

This decision was very gratifying to McLaws at least. The previous night, when he learnt of the loss of Crampton's Gap, he must have believed the situation of his command to be almost hopeless. Caught in that narrow cleft by a force of 15,000 to 25,000 foes, with the river enclosing his rear, and steep hills hindering escape on either flank, the least energy on the part of the enemy must reap a splendid reward. However, he arrayed his men on the ridge facing north near Brownsville ; Kershaw and Barksdale formed the front line, with artillery in the intervals, and in rear of them stood the shattered remnants of Semmes', Cobb's and Mahone's brigades, together with Wilcox. Wright and Pryor were left at Weverton to prevent a movement against the Confederate rear along the river ; Armistead

and Featherston remained near Sandy Hook. Such was the state of affairs at dawn on the 15th. An attack in overwhelming force was momentarily expected, but none came; the enemy made no advance and seemed content with watching the Confederate movements. Every moment passed without event was precious to McLaws, and, about 10 A.M., to his intense relief, he heard of the fall of Harper's Ferry. Orders were at once given to send the trains over the river with all possible speed; and the infantry were to follow later. This was done; the enemy confined themselves to placing batteries in position and made not the slightest attempt to hinder the retirement. By 2 P.M. the only troops left on the north bank were the garrisons of Maryland Heights and Weverton Pass; the rest were in full march for Halltown. Franklin meekly followed them towards the river with a brigade and a battery at a very respectful distance. Thus McLaws escaped absolutely without hurt or hindrance from the trap in which he had appeared to be absolutely enclosed the previous night.

COMMENTS

It has been said that on the night of September 13th the Army of the Potomac found itself in the most favourable position possible for the striking of a great and decisive blow. It was within the bounds of possibility to relieve Harper's Ferry, capture a large fraction of the enemy's army wholesale, separate its two halves and completely defeat one of them before the aid of the other could reach it. Now, as we know, none of these things were done. What was the reason?

For the fact that Harper's Ferry surrendered, when relief was at its doors; for the dilatoriness and timidity of

Franklin on the 15th, McClellan was not responsible ; but for the comparative slowness of his own movements, and for the bad direction given to his forces, he certainly was. Even after the receipt of the fullest possible information as to the enemy's position and designs, his incurable hesitation still prevented him from taking advantage of it. One may imagine how Napoleon would have seized such a chance ; how his corps would have been set in motion that same evening and marched all night, if necessary, to the foot of South Mountain next morning ; how the word would have gone round, " *Activité, activité, vitesse,*" and all the troops been urged forward to their utmost strength ; how part of the army would have been thrown against McLaws, and the main column have been pushed rapidly along the road, passing at Fox's Gap, ready by a change of direction to the right to drive the army of Lee northward, away from its reinforcements, and to pursue it vigorously, at full gallop, until it dissolved into fragments.

All this lay within the reach of an energetic commander ; but McClellan was not such. His plans, such as they were, though susceptible of improvement, were quite good enough, had they been executed with sufficient energy. But the Federal leader, capable soldier as he was, in spite of all his admirable personal and military qualities, in spite of the love he inspired in his men, lacked the one thing needful, the driving force of the will. And it was because of this that now, when little else but energy was needed to pluck the ripe fruit, he failed to grasp it. We have said that Pope had the will power to make his army work, but not the tact to overcome the resultant friction ; McClellan was deficient in the former quality, while being supreme in the latter. And in either case success was not to be hoped for. The one shattered his army to

pieces by demanding too much of it ; the other never made great calls on his men, and therefore never rose to the level of great occasions.

Leaving this point, we find coming next for consideration the battle of South Mountain. Before criticising any battle whatsoever, it is necessary to discover with what object it was fought. On the Federal side this one seems to have been in some sense a surprise to the higher command. It grew out of what was supposed to be a mere strong reconnaissance and was fed by the troops coming in piece by piece on either side, until it assumed the dimensions of a pitched battle. The conduct of the fight, as a whole, was bound to suffer in such circumstances, and, in fact, the battle, if we include the engagement at Crampton's Gap as part of it, consisted of three separate actions fought a considerable distance one from the other, exercising little, if any, mutual influence, and connected in one coherent whole by no single higher leading. The battle was, in fact, a battle of corps, and it was begun, continued, and ended absolutely by the corps commanders. It may be as well to emphasise this, because there has been of late years a greatly increased tendency in this direction. In 1870 the rôle of the higher command consisted very often in watching the course of the nearest isolated fight, and issuing orders which were disobeyed or at least neglected. The Japanese, in 1904, pushing still further the same characteristic, allowed their battles to be fought by their army leaders, and they in their turn by their divisional commanders, practically unhindered by orders from above ; and now among the Germans at least the idea has become crystallised into the principle that the chief command must play no part in the battle and that it can only influence the result by the direction previously given to the marching columns.

We English, to judge from our Field Service Regulations, by no means subscribe to this doctrine ; it seems that to annihilate the rôle of the commander-in-chief must be to reduce the battle to a mere parallel fight, front to front, of so many corps, so as to win with the few bodies overlapping on the wings, against which no enemy can be aligned. The reply to this sort of appeal to brute force and the superiority of numbers can only be the strengthening of the part played by the generalissimo, so as to permit of the fullest use of all the advantages of the ground and all the manœuvring capacity of the army ; with the object of so opposing the greater force by the less along the front, that enough will be left over to counteract and defeat the turning movement on the wing ; in a word, the economy, of forces and the skilful use of the strength thus saved to deliver the decisive blow.

If, however, we are to execute this by no means simple conception with anything approaching success, we must closely and carefully study the operations of the containing force—that is, the portion of the army whose duty consists in holding back by skilful manœuvres, and clever use of ground, the attack of the enemy, so as to gain time for the commander-in-chief to arrange his counterstroke and execute it, with calmness and without undue haste. This operation is one of supreme difficulty, and here again the battle of South Mountain may teach us lessons, for the Confederates fought the action primarily to gain time for the execution of an ulterior object—namely, the capture of Harper's Ferry and the reunion of the army. The handling of their troops was, however, inferior ; owing partly to the incomplete state of concentration in which they found themselves at the beginning of the action, the brigades went into action piecemeal ; a great many of them were badly directed and badly handled ; there was a

lack of clear, precise orders, and a yet greater ignorance of the ground and the general situation, especially in the case of the later arrivals. Undoubtedly the change of command in the middle of the fight exercised a most grievous influence on the course of the action, and contributed much to the confusion on the Confederate side. But, in fact, from the early morning hours there is traceable a general condition, so to say, of fluster among the Southern leaders, and there is nothing which is so well calculated to lead to disaster. Once the commander of a force fighting a detaining action gets hustled, it is usually all over with him and his command. The troops will be marched and countermarched to meet imaginary dangers; reserves will be thrown in prematurely and escape the hand of the commander at the critical moment; conflicting orders will be issued and false movements be made, as a result; and the troops and officers, losing confidence in their general, must very quickly become a prey to demoralisation. A cool head, a resolute heart, and a far-seeing eye are indispensable for the commander of the containing forces, and it is these qualities which were most conspicuously absent among the Confederate leaders at South Mountain.

The question as to the wisdom of Lee's resolve to give battle to McClellan on the banks of the Antietam has been fertile in discussion among Northern and Southern writers. It may be as well to examine the position taken up by the latter. They, one and all, approve of Lee's act, lauding it as one of splendid daring, and of that consummate wisdom which is all the greater because, to the ordinary observer, it is not obvious. The great object of Lee, the object of the invasion of Maryland, was the destruction of the hostile army in the heart of its own country. It was for this that he had run the tremendous risks that

he himself admitted to be involved in the attempt upon Northern territory, and it was this object which he should have kept clear before his eyes. That he did not do so we have already seen ; but it is to be presumed that, now that his secondary aim, the capture of Harper's Ferry, had been attained, his first purpose was resumed. Could he have rightly entertained any hope that the battle on the Antietam, which he now offered to his foe, would end in that foe's utter overthrow ?

If we are to believe the statements of Southern writers, Lee's army, when united, numbered about 30,000 men. McClellan's is always put at close on 90,000 ; and it is therefore said that Lee fought the battle of Sharpsburg against a threefold superiority in numbers, and repulsed with his small band all the attacks of McClellan's mighty host. Now moral force counts in war for much ; it counts for far more than physical force ; but there are limits to its powers, and history records no instance where, with anything like equality of armament and morale, an army has succeeded in overcoming and utterly destroying an enemy of thrice its own numbers. In a word, the dictum that the moral is to the physical as three to one cannot be taken in its most literal meaning. If Lee hoped that his 30,000 men could overcome 90,000, in this day of September 15th, then he must have believed the conditions truly extraordinary.

Henderson, who sees this clearly enough, seeks to prove that these extraordinary conditions in fact existed. He avers (1) that the Federal and Confederate armies in Maryland were by no means equal in quality ; (2) that the true policy for the latter was not to retreat across the Potomac, but to fight McClellan where they were ; (3) that a victory in Maryland was very desirable owing to the situation in the West. With regard to the first contention, he advances

a long string of points, in which the Confederate army was superior to the Federals ; the latter, he says, had suffered severe losses in men and officers, there were a number of new regiments in the ranks, their leaders were incapable, their cavalry and artillery inferior to those of the South. With regard to this, one may say first, that if Lee possessed all this information about the hostile army, he was a singularly fortunate man. How could he have known, for instance, of the number of new regiments in the Federal army ? If the losses of his foe had been heavy, his own had been no less so ; as for the incapacity of their leaders, South Mountain had, as we have said, shown that some of the Confederate commanders were in this respect little better than their opponents. The Confederate artillery, so far from being superior to that of their foes, was distinctly inferior, as more than one report testifies. It is not our intent to deny that the Southern army was, in itself, a better fighting machine than that of McClellan ; the event at Sharpsburg proves that it was ; what we do not believe is that its superiority was so pronounced as to afford Lee justification for the hope that he could gain a decisive victory.

In this connection it should also be remembered, first, that a part at least of the Army of Northern Virginia had been considerably demoralised by its defeat at South Mountain and fought very badly at Sharpsburg ; and secondly, that Lee could not possibly have anticipated McClellan's inaction on the 16th. By all the laws of probability the battle should have been fought that morning ; and, if it had been, the Confederates must have been deprived of the help, on that day, of the divisions of McLaws, R. H. Anderson and A. P. Hill, 11,000 bayonets in all, or one-third of the whole army. Let those who know the battle of Sharpsburg try to

estimate what their concourse was worth to Lee on the 17th.

We conclude then that the Confederate commander, on the morning of the 15th, in resolving to stand and fight at Antietam, could have had absolutely no hope of a decisive success, and that Henderson's "extraordinary conditions" are not extraordinary enough to justify that decision. But if the first of the pleas put forward by the author of "Stonewall Jackson" be disallowed, the others disappear. If there were no hope of real success by fighting at Sharpsburg, it was far better policy to retire across the Potomac. There the army could be reunited in safety, and be reinforced by the enormous number of stragglers still absent from the standards; there it could be rested, fed, and held in readiness to meet and repulse any attempt of the enemy to cross after it; or, if thought better, McClellan could be drawn on to fight, on Virginian soil, it is true, but only just on it and with a broad river in his rear—a river now, be it noted, flowing behind the Confederates. As for the moral effect of the abandonment of the invasion, this was, in the event, incurred anyway, and it is doubtful if the Confederates gained anything more than a very barren prestige from their resistance at Sharpsburg. Against this must be set the terrible loss of gallant men whom the South could ill spare. The results of the battle—or rather its lack of results—might well have been foreseen, and we consider that, if the best that could be hoped for was a mere repulse of the Federal attack—and the disadvantages under which the Confederates laboured rendered any greater gain practically inconceivable—then the object to be achieved was not worth the enormous risks involved.

One word in conclusion. We have protested before this, in another place, against the tendency, too evident in every

department of life, and especially in military criticism, to judge of the worth of any given plan^e by its success or failure. A general's action, if it is to be appraised properly, must be appraised apart from results, on its merits. But in this case we think that the actual course of events fully bears out the contention we have made above. Lee, as is well known, fought as he intended at Sharpsburg; McClellan, of his grace, allowed him one whole day in which to unite his army before the battle; the Federal army was handled neither better nor worse than the Confederate general anticipated; the Southern soldiers, with some exceptions, fought well and gallantly; and Lee's own exercise of command was so perfect that no one has ever yet been captious enough to find fault with it. And yet, in spite of all this, in spite of the fact that from the very first shot fired, Lee was anxiously looking for and awaiting the opportunity for the decisive counterstroke, he never found that opportunity. The battle of Sharpsburg, in a word, was indecisive, and after all that fearful expenditure of blood, the Confederate army was no nearer a real victory—that crushing victory for which Lee had hoped, and which would alone have justified his resolve to give battle—than it was at the beginning of the fight. If with all the advantages on which he had counted working in his favour, and some others besides which he could not have foreseen, the Confederate generalissimo could do no more than barely repulse the Federal onslaughts, then we may safely assert that a decisive victory for the South at Sharpsburg was beyond the limits of the possible, and that this fact of itself proves that on this occasion Lee's courage was greater than his wisdom.

CHAPTER X

SHARPSBURG

ON the morning of September 16th the Northern and Southern armies, which had come into touch on the previous afternoon, were still somewhat widely dispersed. McClellan was the better off in this respect, for he had united the I., II., IX. and XII. Corps, together with part of the V., on the right bank of the Antietam, which must have given him a good 60,000 men in all ; but Franklin was still behind near Rohrsersville, together with Couch ; Morell had just passed Middletown, and Humphreys was farther back yet, east of Frederick. Lee's forces were even more scattered ; D. H. Hill and Longstreet, somewhat depressed by their experience of the 14th, lay in front of Sharpsburg, and the head of Jackson's column was coming up from the Potomac ; but A. P. Hill was at Harper's Ferry, a long march distant, and McLaws, still engaged in passing through the town, was much encumbered by the prisoners and captured material of war.

The field of battle on which Lee intended once more to try conclusions with McClellan was enclosed on the east by the Antietam, on the west and south by the Potomac, which ran in rear of Lee's position and effectively covered his left against a wide turning movement. The creek, running in front of the Confederate line, is crossed by four bridges and, especially in the upper part of its course, by several fords. The lower bridge, known usually as Burnside's, lies about three quarters of a mile south-east of

Sharpsburg itself, and two and a half miles from the junction with the main river ; it is solidly constructed of stone, and carries the Rohrersville and Sharpsburg road over the stream. One mile higher up the Keedysville pike crossed the river ; three quarters of a mile above was a third bridge and a ford near it ; while the fourth passage lay yet one mile further to the north, at Pry's Mills. East of Sharpsburg to the Antietam the ground formed successive crests, each commanding the one in front of it, forming excellent gun positions and permitting of the sheltering and concealment of reserves, while the numerous tracks running north and south from the town afforded lateral communications easily traversable and well under cover. The turnpike at Hagerstown, running due north, passes about one mile from Sharpsburg by a small white schoolhouse, known as the Dunker Church, and from here onwards the country becomes more enclosed, with ploughed fields, corn, and pasture lands, shut in by post and rail fences and stone walls. West of the road, and some 250 yards from and parallel with it, ran the West Wood, extending for three quarters of a mile north and south and some 300 yards east and west, within which sharp ledges of rock afforded successive rallying points and good cover for the defence. Separated from it at the north end by a meadow and stretching right across the pike is a belt of trees known as the North Wood, 1400 yards north of the rise near Dunker Church. The turnpike to Smoketown, breaking off at the church, runs north-easterly and passes, 600 yards from the fork, through another patch of woodland, the East Wood, 600 yards in breadth, and beyond this again, after a stretch of open land, lies the Poffenberger Copses. North of them the ground becomes clearer, and a long east and west ridge, near the Poffenberger Farm, closes the view to the north.

One-third of a mile south of the Dunker Church a sunken road runs with numerous bends to the Keedysville pike near the bridge ; a locality which was to be the scene of furious fighting on the 17th, and to gain for itself the name of the Bloody Lane. From here the ground slopes steeply to the creek, which, beyond Burnside's Bridge, has to curl its way round a high and commanding spur, the position chosen for the Confederate right. The creek itself is a rather formidable obstacle, impassable except at the bridges or fords, but the steep crests east of it were bound to favour in a considerable degree the deployment and action of the assailants' guns.

The whole line from Snavely's house on the right to the West Wood on the left, was practically 5000 yards in length ; well secured on both flanks and affording a good field of fire in front, it still had several disadvantages. The creek itself could easily be passed beyond the left, or in fact at any of the bridges, under cover of artillery fire. The enclosed ground on the north permitted and indeed favoured the approach of strong masses to the attack, and the line of retreat was over a deep and wide river, by a few uncertain fords, rendering confusion certain and disaster probable. Nevertheless Lee was confident in his ability to hold his ground, and on the arrival of Jackson and Walker his dispositions for defence were made as follows :—Longstreet's corps guarded the line from Snavely's farm as far as the Keedysville pike ; D. H. Hill held the Bloody Lane in the centre, and Hood's two brigades, detached from Longstreet, continued the line to the Hagerstown pike near the Dunker Church. On his left was posted Jackson's corps ; J. R. Jones' division, in two lines, of two brigades each, occupied the West Wood and the fields east of it ; of Early's division, Hays' brigade remained in support of Jones, and Early's connected the in-

fantry line in the woods with Stuart's cavalry, posted on a high hill near the Potomac, whence a hostile attack against Jackson's left could be enfiladed. Lawton and Trimble were massed near the church; Walker was for the present aligned on Longstreet's right. The total force of the Confederates approached 45,000 men, with 200 guns; but of this number McLaws and A. P. Hill, with 9500 men and 52 guns, were still in rear and could hardly be expected to arrive that day.

Nevertheless, in spite of the dispersion of his foes, McClellan seemed reluctant to take action. The morning of the 16th dawned misty and a thick fog, continuing till after 7 A.M., hid the valley of the creek and the farther slope from the gaze of the Union army; the artillery seized the opportunity of getting into position undisturbed; and soon sixteen guns were unlimbered between the Keedysville pike and Pry's House, and began exchanging shots with the enemy as the mist slowly lifted. The Confederate gunners fought their pieces well, but were soon reduced to silence by the accurate shooting of the Federals; long before noon the duel had died down. McClellan meanwhile was busily engaged in making extensive observations; fords were reconnoitred, and the positions of the troops rectified. Waggons coming slowly up from the rear disgorged their welcome contents among the regiments, on short rations since South Mountain; others bore more ominous burdens, shot and cartridges for the coming battle.

The autumn day wore on. The men lay about and smoked and slept, their rest only broken by a few stray cannon shots or a desultory outburst of picket firing; but still nothing happened. Staff officers galloped hither and thither, and generals held long confabulations in little groups apart; but not till afternoon was any general

movement made. Then a great deal of bustle, shifting of lines, and moving of waggons commenced among the IX. Corps, and at the same time, on the far wing, Hooker's troops began to show signs of life. Soon the infantry masses unravelled themselves into long columns, which moved off to the northward beyond the pike, and, turning sharply to their left near Pry's Mill, began to file slowly across the still waters of the creek.

McClellan, after careful consideration, had at last formed his plan of battle. Realising that Lee's left was his weakest point, he resolved to attack it by a wide sweep to the west and north with Hooker's corps, aided by Mansfield and Sumner. Meanwhile Burnside, with the IX. Corps, was to assail the Confederate right, hold their attention there, and, if possible, drive them from the high spur, and press along the ridge north towards Sharpsburg ; and Franklin and Porter were summoned to the battlefield, to remain disposable as a reserve in McClellan's own hands, and to be thrown against the centre of Lee's line if the success of either of the wing attacks afforded opportunity. For the present Pleasonton was to confine himself to demonstrations against that part of the position. Such is the plan given in the Federal commander-in-chief's report ; but there is reason to think that it was at first only conceived in part, and that the latter half of it arose gradually out of events. Franklin did not receive his orders to come up until after sunset on the 16th, and could not start off before next morning at 6 A.M. This is hardly consistent with the hypothesis that the intentions sketched above were completely formulated by the afternoon of the 16th. Further, although Mansfield and Sumner were ordered to hold their commands ready to pass the river, orders to do so were only issued to them at midnight, and at 7.20 A.M. on the 17th, respectively. In fact, Hooker's

corps was absolutely isolated beyond the creek on the 16th, from 3 P.M. onwards.

The I. Corps got across at the bridge and ford by about 4 P.M. and began its westward march at once. In front of it, and nearly two miles distant, rose the ridge along which ran the Hagerstown pike, dividing the valleys of the Potomac and the Antietam ; this crest Hooker resolved to gain, in order then, by a change of direction to the south, to sweep down it against the left of the hostile line. Barely one quarter of the distance had been covered before McClellan and his staff rode up from the rear and entered into conversation with Hooker. The latter declared that he considered his position very dangerous and urgently asked for support, expressing a fear that the rebel army might "eat up" his 12,000 odd men if they were left alone. The commander-in-chief promised him Mansfield's corps next dawn, and then rode off. Very soon after this the I. Corps got into touch with the enemy.

Hood, on Jackson's right, had deployed his two brigades on the right and left of the Dunker Church, with skirmishers pushed forward into the cornfield in front. It was these troops who now became engaged, about sunset, with the advance of Meade's column under Seymour ; the latter was soon supported by the remainder of the division deployed in the North Wood, and by some guns on the pike. A warm artillery combat began across the open ground, and Seymour, pushing on in the obscurity into the East Wood, sent Hood's skirmishers hurrying backwards to their supports and effected a lodgement there. So threatening was his advance that Hood momentarily expected an attack on his main line ; but nothing came ; the firing died away as the darkness grew more intense, and the soldiers on both sides lay down to sleep before the dreadful carnage which all expected for the morrow. Hood's troops, who

were almost starving, gave place to Lawton's and Trimble's brigades, and fell back to the rear to cook; the Federals maintained the ground they had gained. All night long fitful outbursts of musketry broke the stillness and disturbed, time and again, the repose of the weary soldiers.

The morning of the 17th dawned clear and bright, but little time had anyone to notice it, for as soon as it was light enough to see, the work of death began. Hooker, from his post near Poffenberger's house, saw in front of him the white turnpike fenced on either side, stretching back over gentle undulations to the Dunker Church, flanked on his right by the West Wood, sunk in a slight hollow, and on the left by the open cornfield and the East Wood beyond it. On the rise near the church and in the field stood the serried lines of grey, interspersed with guns. This rise Hooker assigned as the objective of his divisions.

Immediate orders were issued for the attack. Doubleday was to march on the right, down the pike, direct against the church; Ricketts was given as point of direction, the East Wood on the left; Meade moved in rear of the centre as reserve. As the troops deployed into attack formation, to execute their respective tasks, the Confederate batteries from front and right began a galling, but not very effective, fire. Hooker's guns were not slow to reply, and with more success; some of the troops in the open cornfield, stricken as if by a tornado of shell, lost all their front line, literally mown down in swathes, and were compelled to give ground. At the same time the heavy batteries beyond the Antietam opened against the right of Jackson's line and swept it from end to end at long range. Under cover of this overmastering bombardment Hooker's infantry were hastening to the attack.

Doubleday, on the right, had deployed his brigades one in rear of the other; Gibbon in front, then Phelps, Patrick

and Hoffmann (the last was, however, held back as escort to the batteries). Gibbon, who had been ordered to occupy the West Wood, advanced in beautiful array, his right on the road, until he came up to the edge of the cornfield whence the Confederates had just been driven by the guns; here, without the least warning, his line was smitten by a heavy fire of musketry from the covert on the wing. But neither the troops nor the leader were demoralised by this sudden blow; the right regiments, changing front, charged with a yell into the woods and engaged in a bitter struggle at short range with Jones' riflemen. Phelps followed in close support, and two guns moved up to close combat near Miller's house; Patrick was sent across post-haste to form on Gibbon's right and clear the woods. Plunging forward through the trees, he was close on the first line, when a volley from the left caused the men to swing up their right shoulders and take shelter behind a rocky ledge nearly parallel to the east edge of the wood. All Doubleday's troops were now furiously engaged with Jones and Lawton; but while in the wood the struggle swayed to and fro inconclusively, out in the open the thin line of Confederates were proving too much for the troops in front of them, now aided by the advance of Meade. Hays came up to assist Lawton and, thus strengthened, they and Trimble went forward to the attack. The Federal line, tried severely by the close fighting, bent and shivered; the greyjackets dashed tumultuously into the gap, and for the moment it seemed that the battery near Miller's was in danger. The gunners fell fast under the heavy fire from a little depression in front, and a Confederate column was already nearing the left of the pieces, when suddenly Patrick's men in the West Wood, dashing forward, threw themselves down on the edge of the covert, and sent a hail of lead into the flank and rear of

the victorious foe. The effect was so deadly that the lines simply melted away, and the survivors rushed back in disorder to the church, pursued by the shot and shell of the Federal guns behind them.

The struggle in the West Wood was slowly turning in favour of the Northern arms; the most stubborn resolution could not avail to prevent the defence being driven step by step from one rocky ledge to another by the valiant and repeated attacks of their foes. But the losses were fearful; and the dead and wounded of either side lay weltering in piles among the undergrowth, from which the early morning dew had scarcely vanished. Farther to the east Ricketts had made good progress; the East Wood, after severe efforts, had fallen completely into his hands; his men garrisoned the western edge strongly, and engaged in a prolonged fire combat with the right of Lawton's division, only a few hundred yards distant in the open. The combatants drew apart for a space, only to renew the contest with greater bitterness. The advance of Patrick's line, and its flanking of the Confederate assault in the open ground had unavoidably exposed the right wing end on to the defender's of the wood. His men were sheltering behind the road when the storm burst against their much disorganised array; for at the head of the Confederates Starke had perceived his chance and seized it. The Federals were pushed back northward, their front bent up into an angle, to the line of rocks about the centre of the woods; here they held on with great persistence and the rush of the Southerners was stayed. Nevertheless, the latter had recovered most of the ground lost in the early part of the fight.

The fight had been raging for close on three hours and the two commands, Jackson's and Hooker's, had practically rent each other to pieces. More than one general

officer had gone down ; “ Fighting Joe ” himself had been borne from the field ; J. R. Jones and Starke, his successor, had alike fallen ; Douglass, commanding Lawton’s, and Walker, commanding Trimble’s brigade, were *hors de combat*, and Lawton himself lay severely hurt. The troops, exhausted, physically and morally, by the struggle, their nerves shattered by the roar of the artillery and the whistle of bullets, sickened by the fearful carnage all around them, were absolutely incapable of further effort. Some still lay facing the foe, until the orders reached them to withdraw, the Federals to the shelter of their artillery near Peffenberger’s, the Southerners to the neighbourhood of the Dunker Church ; but only a few shattered remnants rejoined their standards ; most of the gallant fighters lay stretched out among the severed corn-stalks or in the shade of the trees, or else had vanished utterly from the field of battle. Meade, who had taken the command after Hooker’s disablement, collected such men as he could find near his guns to the northward ; some still remained in the woods and fields where they had fought, but they were scattered remnants, good for little. Jackson, on his side, was striving to rectify his line and strengthen it in view of a renewed attack. Support was close at hand ; D. H. Hill reinforced the right and checked in decided fashion the endeavours of Ricketts to get round the flank of “ Stonewall’s ” wing ; Hood had to abandon his half-cooked meal and hasten to the relief of Lawton’s division, and Early, who had been sent to support Stuart’s horse guns on the hill beyond the left, was enjoined to return at speed and buttress the resistance of the little handful of men under Colonels Grigsby and Stafford, who, alone of Jones’ division, still maintained a good face in the blood-soaked West Wood.

Reinforcements were also coming up from the north to

the aid of the attackers. As Hood's men deployed near the Dunker Church, heavy columns were descried approaching from the direction of the East Wood; they were the XII. Corps, Mansfield's, summoned urgently to the field by Hooker. A considerable proportion of them were newly formed troops, and the deployment into battle line therefore took time; but the need for haste was so pressing that the several bodies had to be thrown into the fight one by one as they were ready, and their attacks, though gallantly pressed, were somewhat piecemeal. Crawford's brigade, of Williams' division, got first into action; going forward with his right towards the little patch of copse near Miller's, he saw before him long grey lines advancing through the cornfield, with banners flying, driving steadily in front of them the few helpless remnants of Meade and Ricketts. They were Hood's command, aided on the right by three of D. H. Hill's brigades, Ripley's, Colquitt's and Garland's, some 4500 fresh bayonets in all. Crawford swung up his right to face them, and once again the roar of battle awoke in the cornfield, and men fell fast amid the ripe ears, already crushed by heaps of dead. The Federals could make no progress; Stuart's guns on the western hill and the infantry of Jones' division, aligned behind the fences of the turnpike, checked their right by flank fire, and a regiment of their own, firing by error into their rear, increased the confusion. Into this whirlwind of battle came another Federal brigade, sweeping through the northern part of the East Wood; it was Gordon's, one of the best in the XII. Corps, and under a worthy leader. Crashing through the corn, its line fell with irresistible force on the Confederate infantry who were holding Crawford at bay. A few rapid volleys were delivered on either side, then suddenly an enfilade fire burst forth against the Southern

right and Gordon's troops rose to the charge. Hood's men broke and in an instant the cornfield was cleared, the remnants of the defence flying in rout towards the Dunker Church; and the pursuers, letting them escape, swept forward to the road, due west of the scene of their victory. The fences on either side stemmed the rapid course of their advance, and a hot fire contest began between the remnant of Jones' division in the West Wood, now beginning to receive aid from Early's brigade, and the commands of Crawford and Gordon, whose right Goodrich, of Greene's division, was about to prolong to the north of Miller's house. Neither side could gain ground and the fight came here to a standstill.

Greene had met with even more success. Advancing soon after Gordon, with the two brigades still at his disposal, he had taken as his point of march the Mumma buildings, now in flames. Sweeping round the east side of the woods and bringing his batteries into action, he saw in front and to his right hostile lines of battle moving forwards toward the East Wood; sheltering his men behind a slight rise, he awaited their nearer approach. The foe consisted of D. H. Hill's three brigades, in echelon supporting Hood's right, and on the sight of the apparently unsupported guns, they changed front to rush for them; but their close ranks were torn by the rapid discharges at short distance, and as they wavered, a long blue line, rising as if by magic from the earth, staggered them with deadly volleys at murderous range; at the same moment a vigorous blow fell against their right. The soldiers of D. H. Hill had not yet recovered from their rough handling at South Mountain and the recollection of it, still strong upon them, broke their resistance in a moment. An uncontrollable panic seized the three brigades, and terror stricken, they rushed back in dis-

order, some to the Bloody Lane, where they rallied with much difficulty, the greater part towards the Dunker Church and Sharpsburg itself. Greene's men, with loud cheers, charged after them; the open ground between the East and West Wood was passed in one rush, and the Federals penetrated the latter covert near the Dunker Church; forcing their way into its shades, they held on firmly there against the heavy fire and repeated strokes of Jackson's men, directed from all sides against them. No aid reached them, except one regiment of Gordon's later on in the day; but the men, though reduced to a small if determined band, and dwindling every minute under the counter-blows of their adversary, still clung to what they had gained with unshakable tenacity.

At this moment there ensued a pause in the struggle. Mansfield's corps, whose mortally wounded commander had been replaced by Williams, had won much ground, but in so doing they had exhausted their fighting strength and were unable to do more than hold what they had gained. The defence on their part were equally incapable of vigorous counter-effort, and once more new troops were needed, if the fight was to be renewed with any prospect of success. On either hand then the generals sought about for further corps, McClellan to clinch and drive home his success, Lee to check and repel the threatening advance on his left.

On the Federal side Sumner's corps, still fresh, had been directed to move across the river and support Mansfield's attack, at 7.20 A.M. Its columns were now drawing near to the front. Sedgwick held the advance, and French followed; Richardson, retained to await the arrival of Franklin's corps at the bridge above that on the Keedysville pike, was still in rear. Sumner rode at the head of his lines, and as he came on to the field made rapid dispositions

for the attack. Sedgwick was deployed in three lines, a brigade in each, with about seventy-five yards distance between them, and directed to move due south-west into the West Wood, his left passing through the north-west corner of the East Wood. French was to march in echelon on his left and rear.

As the great mass of blue moved forward, nothing was to be seen either of the enemy or of the troops who had attacked before. A few men of Mansfield's corps were seen lying in the open on the left and a good number had been met on the road, assisting wounded men to the rear; otherwise the battlefield was absolutely empty and silent. Gordon's men were falling back farther to the right, and Meade was reassembling the I. Corps away to the north; Greene on the left held the vicinity of the Dunker Church; but all these troops were hidden from Sumner by inequalities of the ground, and the division moved forward alone over a field tenanted by none but the dead and dying. Not a shot greeted it as it plunged into the West Wood, and its foremost line, going right through, appeared on the edge of the open field beyond. The second line supported it closely; the third halted on the pike outside the covert. Here first the men saw the enemy, and began a rolling fire against the grey infantry posted beyond the woods, and a force (Early's brigade) moving down obliquely against the right front of the line.

Destruction was awaiting the hapless Federals. McLaws' and R. H. Anderson's divisions, after a hot and tiring march, had come up to Sharpsburg early in the morning; the latter had been at once sent to the centre; the former rested near the town; not for long, however. At 8 A.M. orders came to move to Hood's aid. At the same time Walker was hastily summoned from the extreme right for the same purpose; and the two commands moved off

together along the Hagerstown pike and the fields on each side, the latter on the right. Their line of march was bringing them straight against the left of Sedgwick's attacking column. Walker and McLaws both saw the unsuspecting Federals lying quietly in the open and along the edge of the wood, and Hood's men falling back from the Dunker Church; the former detached two regiments, therefore, to hold the open ground to the east of that building, and deployed his other brigade on the west of the road, under cover of the trees; McLaws's men, Kershaw on the right, then Barksdale and Semmes, extended the line in the same direction (Cobb had been sent by error to D. H. Hill).

The blow fell with irresistible force. Sedgwick's men suddenly found themselves enveloped in a girdle of fire from which there was no escape; men fell like leaves in autumn, and in an incredibly short space nearly 1500 went down. Not the best of troops could hold on against such a storm; the stricken lines, in the utmost disarray, moved rapidly off to the north and east, losing all cohesion in the process. When the battered regiments sank down to shelter behind some stone walls beyond the cornfield, not far from where the right of the division had rested, they found that almost half their numbers had been stretched on the ground in those ghastly few minutes. Nor was this all the carnage; Gordon's brigade, which had been forming on the west edge of the East Wood, was hurrying too late to their aid, and the fearful fire of the Southerners exacted heavy toll from them before they recoiled to their former shelter. Encouraged by these successes, McLaws and Walker pressed their lines forward across the open space in front of them; but their foes now had their chance to return on them some of their heavy losses and used it. The Southerners struggled forward under the hail of shell

and bullet, as far as some fences beyond the pike ; farther they could not go. After a few minutes they began to give ground, and flowed back to the woods pell-mell, lines of dead marking the trail of their advance and retreat. Finding respite in the West Wood, they turned their attention to the little handful still fighting under Greene near the Dunker Church ; and after a gallant contest of two hours, the latter officer, who had received no aid, except from one of Gordon's regiments, withdrew his shrunken garrison to the East Wood.

It must have been very shortly after this retirement that Franklin, who had reached the field first at 10 A.M., a few minutes after the repulse of Sedgwick's attack, set in motion one of his brigades, Irwin's, against the Dunker Church. Charging forward at the double the assailants overran the foes in their track, and reached the much contested woods. Here they were brought up sharp by the volleys of McLaws' infantry to the north of them, and the impetus of their rush being lost, the lines sought shelter behind the little ridge in the open field, which post they persistently maintained until the close of the day ; several attempts to turn them out were repulsed with loss.

Meanwhile Franklin, appreciating the fact that one last push must give victory to the Federals, was forming Slocum's division for attack along the path taken by the advance brigade. Already Sumner had informed the general that his own troops were unable to do anything further, and now, fearing for the safety of the right wing, and still affected by the recollection of the awful slaughter in Sedgwick's division, he rode up to the place where the column was massing, and forbade the movement. Franklin demurred, and the matter was referred to McClellan, who came over the river and, after hearing both sides, decided

on the safer course. Enough, he said, had already been gained; and so the assault was not executed. The VI. Corps remained in its positions; Hancock's brigade supporting the guns of Sumner near the woods, and Slocum closed up in his rear; Brooks had been detached to French's right, and Irwin was far in front near the Dunker Church. Thus affairs remained until nightfall, the troops suffering some loss from the guns of the enemy.

The fight in this part of the field had now definitely ended; the infantry lay under cover behind the rocks and ridges in the East and West Woods respectively, leaving the open ground, so often lost and won, to the heaps of dead and wounded who lay everywhere over its whole extent. Only the artillery thundered above them and burst its projectiles over their heads; the troops themselves lay like burnt-out slag, snatching what rest they could amid the roar and crash of the guns. Ever since dawn, for six full hours, men had wrestled and fought and died in that little area of barely 1000 yards each way, and nearly 12,000 human beings, slain or maimed, lay strewn thickly over its surface. But though the tide of battle had here died down it was only to rise as high and with renewed fury farther to the east and south, where Lee's centre lay.

We have said above that Franklin's division had been ordered by Sumner to attack in union with Sedgwick and cover his left. The order, however, was not executed, and for some unknown reason the lines of advance diverged so rapidly from the very start that while the one body passed north of the East Wood towards the Dunker Church, the other moved south of it, and, leaving the wood on its right, came into action in three lines near Roulette's barns. Here hostile skirmishers were encountered, and driven out with little difficulty; but farther progress was not to be so lightly gained. As French's lines swung up the slope of the

hill, an angry fusillade began in front of them, increasing in intensity every minute. Hill, who held command in Lee's centre, had reunited some of the troops of Garland's, Colquitt's and Ripley's broken brigades to the regiments of Rodes and G. B. Anderson and the brigade of Cobb, which had become separated from McLaws, and had posted them in the Bloody Lane, which, sunk below the surface of the ground on either side, formed a natural entrenchment for his line. Here the Confederates lay, well under cover, prepared to greet the advance of the foe with deadly volleys at short range, as he appeared over the crest of the hill some 100 yards in front. At the same time a hot fire from McLaws on the right struck the end of French's array and threw his second line, composed of new regiments, momentarily into confusion. Without hesitation, Kimball, whose brigade was marching in rear, hurried up his men, and took post on the left of Weber, extending the front to a small lane uniting with the sunken road at its westernmost bend. Thus pushed forward, the troops dashed up the steeper slope, sweeping the foes in their path before them, until the fierce fire from the lane stopped them dead, and forced them to seek shelter under the crest. Several partial attempts to resume the onward march were repulsed with slaughter. French seemed to have come to a standstill, but just then a new reinforcement was sighted from the north-east; Richardson was hurrying up his division to the aid of his comrades.

The post of honour in front was entrusted to Meagher's Irish brigade. Advancing in the order of a field day, the gallant Federals pressed majestically forward until they crowned the rise in full view of Hill's men; then there burst forth a terrific and deadly fire contest. Meagher's men stood recklessly in front of their foes, giving as good as they received, and fiercely repulsing an attempt, con-

ducted, it seems, by Rodes' brigade, to penetrate their line on the right. The Confederates had just received strong reinforcements, the whole of R. H. Anderson's division, who aligned themselves on the slope in rear of the lane, whence they secured a tier-wise fire on the foe in front of D. H. Hill. A second assault on the Federal right was foiled by Brooks' brigade, on that flank, and a few minutes later the terribly thinned troops of Meagher gave place to Caldwell's fresh regiments; their first action was to drive in a threatening column on their left, and this done, the whole line, French and Richardson together, came forward with lowered bayonets. Part of the sunken road fell into their hands almost at once; the defence on Richardson's front still held fast with desperate tenacity; but the colonel of the right regiment, Barlow by name, swung up his line and got a deadly enfilade fire right along the lane until its hollow was piled high with Confederate dead, and the survivors raised the white flag. Hill withdrew his shattered lines to a cornfield on the slope higher up—those at least who still had fight left in them, for a great many were not seen again on the field that day; they fled to Sharpsburg, and found safety in the streets and houses there. One regiment of Walker's division, a battery and a few scattered remnants from all of Hill's brigades, and Cobb's, and Anderson's division, were all that could be rallied to guard the Confederate centre. Against such a weak line the Federal advance made some progress; Piper's house and the orchard near it fell into the hands of Richardson after a bitter, to-and-fro contest, in which Barlow again distinguished himself. But the fire of the Southern guns was rapid and effective; the Federal artillery, endeavouring to support the infantry lines, was unable to get into action owing to the accurate shooting of the adversary; Richardson, Meagher and Barlow were

carried off hurt ; and the advance, swaying back to the edge of the cornfield, came to a dead stop. Here, as on the northern part of the field, both sides had fought each other to prostration ; the Federals sought shelter from the hostile guns in the hollows of the ground, and were supported, later in the day, by Brooks' brigade of Franklin's corps. In front of them on the hills above Sharpsburg the wasted grey lines lay on their muskets and waited to repel a further attack ; but none came.

More to the right, near the bridge on the Boonsborough pike, Pleasanton with his horse guns, and aided by a detachment of Porter's corps, had been playing at long bowls with Evans on the farther heights. The latter's skirmishers were early driven from the bridge, and the Federals advanced over the stream and half-way up the slope to the town. Six battalions of Sykes' division and two batteries helped to drive the gunners from a hostile battery and start a partial panic in Evans' lines. The force was too small, however, to effect much, and a demand for a division in order to break the Confederate centre was refused by Porter who, as a matter of fact, had not the troops to send, so much had his corps been frittered away in detachments to support the wings of the army.

On the extreme left of the Army of the Potomac, as above mentioned, McClellan had intended Burnside, as soon as the left attack had gained some ground, to carry the bridge in his front and press up the crest towards Sharpsburg. The IX. Corps was to this end ordered, early in the morning, to prepare for action at a moment's notice, and deployed its guns on the crest overlooking the Antietam, the infantry assembling under cover in rear. The Kanawha division had been selected to lead the attack ; Crook, therefore, lay in front of the right wing, with Sturgis' division in support ; Rodman held the left, and

Ewing behind him; Wilcox's division was in reserve. Thus arrayed, the corps awaited the order for the assault. Meanwhile the Federal batteries succeeded without much difficulty in extinguishing the fire of the guns across the creek, and proceeded therefore to distribute their fire with some effect along the whole of the right of Lee's line of battle.

The time at which the order to advance first reached Burnside is much disputed; but the probability seems to be that the hour was about 9.30 A.M. — that is, after the repulse of Mansfield and Hooker. Burnside, on receipt of it, immediately set his lines in motion to cross the creek; Crook and Sturgis were to pass by the bridge and a ford not far from it; Rodman and Ewing were directed on a ford one-third of a mile below. To dispute this passage there now stood only Toombs's two available regiments and one of Drayton's at the bridge itself, supported by D. R. Jones's remaining troops on their left rear. The ford, which Walker's division had held up till 8.30 A.M., was quite unguarded; but the Federal advance on this side lost its bearings, and did not succeed in getting over the stream until the contest at the bridge was decided.

The Confederate position at the latter place was very strong. A ridge rose in rear of the bridge, encircling it just like a great *tête de pont*, giving enfilade fire from both flanks and affording with its timber-clad slopes good cover for riflemen. Further, the only line of approach on the Federal side was by the road running alongside the stream for nearly 300 yards, along which any column moving must expose its whole length broadside on to the enemy. Under the circumstances the first attempts to cross failed disastrously. Crook's advance, covered by skirmishers, was checked by heavy volleys before he could even get down into the valley, and Sturgis came forward. Two of

his regiments formed up in assaulting column and made a most gallant dash to get over ; but their head was swept away by a storm of bullets and the remainder had to fall back. Nevertheless McClellan, Burnside, and Cox were all insistent in pushing the attacks, and the latter, selecting two regiments from Ferrero's brigade, made another attempt to secure the passages. This time it proved successful, partly owing to the fact that Toombs, disturbed by Rodman's appearance below, had rushed his command off to oppose him, leaving only two regiments at the bridge. The Federals massed their column under cover ; the region round the bridge was swept by a furious fire of artillery and small arms ; and the two regiments, bending low to face the leaden hail, swept over with deafening cheers and planted their banners victoriously on the ridge beyond. Their comrades passed across after them, Crook by the ford on the north, Sturgis by the bridge, Rodman and Ewing by the ford below, Toombs having yielded them the ground without much ado.

It was 1 P.M., and so heavy had been the fight, and so low the store of cartridges remaining, that Cox requested Burnside to relieve Sturgis with Wilcox's division. This was done, but the process took time. For some reason all the forces went over by the bridge ; the artillery coming across caused further delay, and ere all was ready for further advance the hour of 3 P.M. had struck. D. R. Jones had arranged the three brigades left him, Kemper, Drayton, and Jenkins, on the heights between the foe and Sharpsburg ; Garnett had been sent off to the left, and the Federal advance had for the present cut off Toombs from the main body.

When the IX. Corps did move, it did so with great effect. The order had been somewhat altered ; Wilcox and Crook came up the pike to Sharpsburg on either side,

Rodman advanced on the left with Ewing; Sturgis' exhausted men lay back near the bridge. A very bitter fight ensued, principally on the right. Wilcox's right brigade, pressing on with rash gallantry, was temporarily checked in front of the town; but when the second line arrived to their aid, the resistance of the enemy was slowly overpowered. Forced back step by step, the Confederates made a last stand in an orchard north of the pike; artillery opened on them and drove them from it, and the break-up was complete. The troops scattered in all directions, most joining the mob of disorganised men north of the town, into which the foremost skirmishers of the assailants were now pressing. It was 4.30 P.M.; the Federal line, coming round in a half circle, now faced nearly north-west, its right being established in Sharpsburg and on the high ground east of it.

At this critical juncture the tide turned. A. P. Hill's division, left at Harper's Ferry by Jackson, had set off for the battlefield at 7.30 A.M. that morning, and crossing by Boteler's Ford had reached the scene of the fight with its head at 2.30 P.M. A battery was sent forward and the line arrayed for battle. This took some time, and when it was completed the advance was resumed, Pender on the right, then Brockenbrough, Branch, Gregg, and Archer; the command of Toombs also seems to have joined in the movement. Moving forward over a high ridge and a cornfield, the division sighted the enemy in the valley below, divided into two fractions, one fighting with its face north-west towards Sharpsburg, the second on its left fronting west. A. P. Hill was quick to seize his chance. Into the wide gap thus yawning in Cox's line, he sent his left brigade under Archer; against the front and flank of the left portion of the enemy was thrown the rest of the division, and Toombs. Against

this staggering blow the Federals could not stand; fighting stubbornly, they were borne back, their first line shattering into fragments beneath the weight of the counterstroke. A. P. Hill's bayonets pressed hard after them; but the controlling hand of Cox did not falter, and he took rapid measures to repair the damage done; Sturgis, brought up at the double from the creek, filled up the break in the centre, and stayed the onward rush of Archer; Ewing swung back his left and finding temporary cover behind a stone wall covered with coolness the retreat of Rodman until his broken line could be formed in rear and posted in a good position on the crest of a hill; then he also fell back to the new line. Hill's counter-attack in fact never got beyond the road from Sharpsburg to the Antietam Iron Works; here he halted as night was coming on, and firmly established himself in face of the enemy, who held a circular position in front of the bridge, both flanks on the stream in rear.

This was the last act of the sanguinary drama. Neither Lee nor McClellan, for different reasons, were in a position to continue it further. McClellan, as we have seen, had already checked the advance of Franklin on the right, considering that sufficient ground had been gained; the same reason in all likelihood forbade his allowing Porter to move against the hostile centre, as his plan had been. In point of fact, the V. Corps had very little force left with which to execute such an attack, and McClellan was not likely to forget that in it was embodied the last reserve of the army of the Republic. Under the circumstances he preferred to hold it back, rather than risk all for the sake of gaining all.

Lee, on his part, was willing enough to attack, but he had absolutely no force left to do it with. About midday, by his orders, Jackson had instructed Stuart to gather

from all possible directions some 4000 or 5000 men and assault the hostile right, adding that the whole of the left wing would move to co-operate with him. His intention was to drive McClellan into the Potomac. How this rather remarkable feat was to be performed we are not told; in any case, Stuart found the hostile right securely posted, and resting on that river; in face of the overwhelming Federal artillery a frontal attack would have been sheer madness, and the attempt was abandoned.

Late that evening the Confederate leaders met in council. Gloomy were the reports of all; tales of fearful slaughter, riddled ranks, annihilated divisions, and disabled commanders; the burden of them all was, the necessity for immediate retreat across the Potomac, to avoid another such fearful day. Even Jackson, most daring of men, and Hood, sternest of fighters, did not venture to advocate any other course. Lee's resolution never rose higher than at that moment; undaunted by the fearful carnage, he dismissed the council with the heroic words: "Gentlemen, we will not recross the Potomac to-night. If McClellan wants to fight in the morning, I will give him battle again. Go!" And the little knot of horsemen, breaking up in silence, rode away into the night, to prepare for the dread uncertainties of the morrow's dawn.

Meanwhile, the soldiers, on both sides, unrecking of their leader's perplexities and resolutions, lay in long even ranks upon their arms, sleeping, beneath the soft light of the moon, the sleep of the exhausted, or that deeper slumber which on earth knows no waking.

COMMENTS

The plan on which McClellan based his operations at the battle of Sharpsburg has been given above, and as

usual has been criticised in various senses by military writers. Some have regarded it as essentially vicious ; others as quite sound, or at least good enough for the purpose. We ourselves confess to having found some difficulty in understanding it.

It embodied, of course, three quite separate attacks ; one against Lee's left with three corps, another against his right with one corps, and a third in the centre with a force of uncertain strength, but which could not possibly exceed two corps. That was the rough idea of it. Now, every plan of battle that the great masters of war have handed down to us consists of two portions, very distinct one from the other ; arrangements for the holding attacks, frontal attacks, *combat d'usure*, or whatever one likes to call it, and dispositions for the decisive attack, usually against a flank. Looked at from this point of view, which is more or less the standpoint of our Field Service Regulations, the interesting question arises, " Which of these three movements did McClellan regard as the decisive one ? " Whichever of the three is chosen, there are difficulties to be met.

Most people would regard the left attack as being the main one ; and if this be accepted then the obvious criticism is, that it was a great blunder to attempt a decisive movement of the kind so early in the day, without having recourse to the *combat d'usure*. The defence was assailed at the most unfavourable moment for success—that is, when it was fresh and unshaken, either by the attacking artillery or by the exhaustion of the preparatory fight. Further, by the fact that this movement against the left was made right in front of the nose of the enemy, unconcealed and unguarded, the latter was given all possible facility for making timely and thorough preparations to meet it. In a word, McClellan surrendered his

best chances, and rendered the task of his enemy as easy as possible. The greatest advantage of the attacker is that he has the power of manœuvring and of striking surprise blows where he will ; but if he gives up all these and instead prefers to have recourse to mere brute force, he may expect to be well beaten ; for, if any given force moves to attack another front to front without any manœuvring, the odds are that the defence will prevail—other factors, of course, being assumed equal. It is the power of catching the defence off its guard by the skill and secrecy of his combinations that is the chief asset of the assailant ; but, if the above hypothesis be assumed correct, that the left attack was the decisive one, then we must affirm that this, the best weapon in his armoury, McClellan absolutely threw away.

There is, of course, a possible explanation of his neglect to prelude the decisive attack by a preparatory combat to be found in the supposition that he believed Lee's army to be still divided—as it was—and therefore felt it necessary to hasten the catastrophe before the absent fractions could rejoin. But if so, why did he not attack early on the 16th, as might easily have been done ? We know now that such a course might have been attended with the most splendid success. We shall return to this point later ; here we will merely remark that to delay the commencement of a battle and then to hurry the fighting of it, is merely to commit two mistakes which intensify rather than cancel each other.

On the other hand, it is possible to regard the fighting on McClellan's right early in the morning as a preparatory combat pure and simple, and to assume that the attack of the IX. Corps later on was intended to be the decisive effort. To this one can only say, that to entrust the former to three corps and the latter to only one was a

sin against the great principle of the economy of forces. Not a man nor a gun more than absolutely necessary should be deployed in the *combat d'usure*, while, on the other hand, every possible unit must be thrown into the fight, when the critical moment has come. No changes of armament can alter this immutable maxim. Now here, not only did the attack on the left involve far too great an expenditure of forces, but the IX. Corps was allowed to execute its all-important movement alone, without even being reinforced by the troops actually disposable in the hands of the generalissimo at the time.

A third supposition may be brought forward, according to which the decision was to be brought about by the attack in the centre, and which would have us regard all the fighting which actually took place as one great preparatory action. In the event, then, the decisive attack never received even a commencement of execution; the Federal general, appalled by the heavy losses of the day, and fearing that Lee might still have something up his sleeve, feared to throw in his last reserve, and to clinch the results of the *combat d'usure*. But such a criticism deals rather with the execution than the conception; the latter suffered mainly from the same fault remarked above, a neglect of the economy of forces; too little was left in hand for the final "*événement*," as Napoleon called it, and in the end that little was still further reduced to such an exiguous proportion that McClellan could not, if he would, have executed with it any attack worth the name.

As for the actual fighting of the battle, it simply teemed with errors of one kind or another. We have already noted the fact that the loss of all the morning and much of the afternoon of the 16th was a grievous blunder, which did as much as anything to lose McClellan the full fruits of the battle. We may add that the fight itself, when it did

begin, was conducted with an utter lack of superior direction and of any co-ordination of effort whatsoever. The attacks of Hooker, Mansfield, Sumner, and Burnside took place separately, one after the other, and were each beaten off in the same way. Nowhere over the whole battlefield was there any really united movement of all or even a large part of the Army of the Potomac against the enemy's lines; while one attack was being made, all the rest of the Federal forces stood looking on, like spectators at a play, while Lee buttressed the threatened point with fractions drawn from all parts of his front, which the inaction of his foes allowed him to leave for the time unguarded. But the worst error of all was not that; it was that, when victory lay right in his hand and only needed to be grasped, the Federal leader faltered, grew faint-hearted, and let it fall. We think it indisputable that if at, say, 3 P.M. the corps of Franklin and Porter had moved to the attack, the former down the Hagerstown pike, the latter over the Boonsborough road bridge, against Sharpsburg, they would have found absolutely nothing to resist them. But it would for that have been necessary, first, to keep the V. Corps united. Now this was just what was not done. McClellan committed exactly the same error as the Russian leaders in Manchuria in 1904; the reserve, large enough at the start, was wasted away in petty detachments, most of which never fought, or never fought to any effect, but which reduced the fighting strength in the general's hand, in the end, to such an extent that it was not fit for anything worth doing. Those who know the campaigns of Napoleon will remember his words at Lützen to the aide-de-camp of Marmont who asked for support from the reserve, "Your marshal is mistaken; the battle is not to be decided on his wing, but here, where I am," and his refusal to reduce the force destined for the "*coup*

de massue” for the attainment of any secondary object. The assailant gains the day if he triumphs at one point ; little matter then what happens elsewhere. But, as Von Verdy says, it is not enough to form reserves ; a general must know how to use them. One may keep them too long ; there comes a time when the fate of battle hangs in the balance, when the tension on either side has reached its height, when men are wavering and swaying to and fro, ready to rush either forward or backward, and if not the former, then the latter. It is this moment that the instinct of the great commander must seize upon to throw everything, without delay, without hesitation, without faltering, into the scale ; but it is not merely, unhappily, instinct or foresight that is necessary, but also resolution and willingness to stake everything on the final throw. It was this latter quality that was lacking in McClellan ; and it was this deficiency that turned the Antietam into an indecisive battle, and which a few months later was to cost the general his command.

Over against this picture one may well set that of Lee sitting on his horse in the gloaming, surrounded by his subordinates, and, rising superior to all the fearful influences exerted by the slaughter of that dreadful day, the disappointment of his best hopes of victory, and worst of all, the terrors of the unknown morrow, firmly established in his resolution not to admit even to himself that he had been beaten. All through the hours of the 17th Lee had been the outstanding figure of the battlefield ; his eagle eye had watched the assaults of his foe ; his sure hand controlling the fight had found the means to baffle them one after the other ; his indomitable spirit had infused his army with something of its own quenchless fire, and held them in line until the night brought relief, though a quarter of their numbers had been laid low by wounds or

death. But in that hour of council he was perhaps greatest of all. The excitement of the day was over, and only its horrors still remained. The morrow might bring no one knew what, and there was absolutely nothing left wherewith to meet any new onslaught. The voices of his chosen generals, the unspoken volition of the host around him, adjured him to save what he could of his army while there was time. All this only came to reinforce the weaker side of Lee's own nature, that side which is present with all of us, even the greatest, and never more so than in great crises such as this. Over all these foes the iron will of the great commander rose triumphant, and that resolution, which had not quailed before the vast host of the foe, now won a yet more splendid victory over Lee's own army, over his generals, over himself. It is of such stuff that great generals are made ; no technique of the art, no strategic or tactical skill, no personal influence, no mighty intellect are of any profit at all apart from the will to conquer, the resolution which refuses to admit defeat, and the determination which marches unfalteringly towards its end, which no obstacle can daunt, and no danger can terrify or depress.

CHAPTER XI

LEE'S RETREAT FROM MARYLAND—GENERAL COMMENTS AND CONCLUSION

THE 18th September, the day after the battle of Sharpsburg, was a day of well-earned rest for both armies. Marching and fighting as they had been with scarcely any intermission for over a fortnight, the men sorely needed repose, and snatched what they could in the intervals of succouring the wounded or burying the dead, of replenishing their cartridge boxes or supplying their bodily necessities. Only the picket lines lay watchful, facing each other at short distance, ready to espy and report any sign of undue activity in the hostile lines ; but their vigilance was unrewarded, for neither side made any move. McClellan, in fact, had not in the hours of the night come to any decided resolution for the morrow ; and when the morning's grey light revealed to him the host of his enemy still in its position, he was still hesitating whether or not to resume the battle. A ride round the field soon convinced him that discretion was the better part of valour for the present. The fatigue of his troops, the terrible losses, due as much to straggling as to the fire of the enemy, the shaken morale of some, especially the new formations, and last and most important, the realisation of the inevitable disaster which must follow any defeat of the Army of the Potomac, were all so many checks holding him back from resolute action. In addition, the supply of ammunition, especially for the heavy guns, was

dangerously low, and the infantry were getting short of cartridges; it was doubtful if there were enough of either left for a renewed battle. The subordinates of McClellan seem to have been as little confident of success as their leader; Franklin alone advocated another effort; and Burnside was so nervous for his command that he asked for and obtained the assistance of all Morell's division of the V. Corps. The Federal generalissimo resolved therefore to await the arrival of Couch and Humphreys together with some reinforcements promised from Pennsylvania. The former two commanders brought their men on to the field before noon, and posted them respectively on the left and centre of the line of battle; the rest of the new troops never came up at all; in spite of which fact, the Army of the Potomac received orders on the night of the 18th to be prepared to attack their foe next morning at daybreak.

But that foe had other views on the matter. During the 18th Lee still clung to the idea of a counter-attack against McClellan's right, and under Stuart's leadership the movement even received a commencement of execution. When, however, it was found that the front of the Federals was no more assailable than on the previous day, and that their right flank was protected by a great bend of the Potomac, the Confederates had to admit themselves baffled; and at the same time news came in of the approaching reinforcements for McClellan, the strength of which was reported to be no less than 14,000 men. This altered the face of affairs and fearing that, if attacked by a fresh force in front on the 19th, the army might be driven back on to the river in rear and suffer serious disaster, Lee, after taking council with his lieutenants, Longstreet and Jackson, resolved on that same night to withdraw from the soil of Maryland by Boteler's Ford.

Covered by the darkness, and screened by Fitz Lee's cavalry, this delicate movement was executed with perfect success. The trains crossed over first, then Longstreet's corps, which was across by 2 A.M., followed by Jackson, whose rear-guard, under A. P. Hill, got over by 10 A.M. on the 19th. Thirty-three heavy guns, under Pendleton, were left to guard the ford, and were aided by the two brigades of Armistead and Lawton. Stuart, with Hampton's brigade, had crossed the Potomac about Shepherdstown and on the morning of the 19th recrossed at Williamsport to demonstrate on the flank and rear of the pursuing enemy.

The latter were not slow to make their appearance. By daylight McClellan had found the Confederate lines abandoned, and Pleasonton pushed on after the retreating army down the Shepherdstown road, followed by Porter's corps. Some prisoners were picked up on the way, and about 8 A.M. the foremost horsemen came out on to the bluffs above the river. They were greeted immediately with salvoes from the heavy guns on the far side, and the horse batteries, followed later by most of Porter's artillery, came into action to reply to them. The duel lasted the greater part of the day, until Pendleton's pieces almost ran out of ammunition, and some had to be withdrawn. Threats against the flanks had induced him to detach so heavily from his infantry force that only about 300 men were left at his disposal. Under these circumstances the artillery commander resolved to use the discretion given him, and at nightfall withdrew his guns. He did not get off unscathed; in the confusion of the retreat, his infantry broke and ran, and a small party of Federals from Griffin's brigade, sent over the river, laid hands on five guns and two caissons, recrossing, however, that night.

On the 20th Porter and Pleasonton received orders to

make a combined movement across the river at dawn ; the latter, for some reason^{or} or other, did not fulfil his part of the programme, and the V. Corps crossed alone. At 7 A.M. Sykes' division began its advance along the Charlestown road, with Barnes' brigade of Morell's division on his right ; behind them the other troops busied themselves getting the captured guns across the river. At 8 A.M. Porter heard from Sykes that strong hostile columns were advancing to meet him and that he was falling back before them, and in view of the smallness of the force which had passed over, directed him to recross and seek safety on the other shore.

The troops advancing against the V. Corps were A. P. Hill's division, which had been instructed by Jackson, on hearing of the loss of artillery the previous night, to return on its steps and drive back the enemy. Coming within sight of their skirmishers, Hill deployed his command in two lines in a cornfield and proceeded to press them back on to the river. His left met some resistance and had to be reinforced from the second line ; but the Federals merely wished to gain time for their withdrawal, which was affected in almost perfect order, covered by the heavy fire of the artillery beyond the Potomac.

As an instructive example of the way in which military history is sometimes written, we may quote Dabney's account of this affair. He describes it as follows :—“ The two lines charging simultaneously and converging towards the mass of Federalists swept them down the hill and drove them into the river. The troops of Hill rushed down the declivity and, regardless of plunging shot and shell of the opposing batteries, hurled their adversaries by hundreds into the water and as they endeavoured to struggle across picked them off with unerring aim. In this combat General A. P. Hill did not employ a single piece of artillery, but

relied upon the bayonet alone." For sheer nonsense the above story would be hard to beat. As a matter of fact Porter got his men back over the river with much skill and practically no loss, except in one raw regiment armed with defective rifles, which fell into some confusion near the bank. General Palfrey's comment on the Confederate stories of the combat is worth giving in full: "The Confederates," he says, "seem to believe that the affair ended with 'an appalling scene of the destruction of human life.' Jackson, whose words these are, must have been imposed on by A. P. Hill, who had charge of the operation, and whose report contains these assertions; 'Then commenced the most terrible slaughter that this war has yet witnessed. The broad surface of the Potomac was blue with the floating bodies of our foe. But few escaped to tell the tale. By their own account they lost 3000 killed and drowned from one brigade alone.'

"Or art thou drunk with wine, Sir Knight,
Or art thyself beside?"

"The reader with a taste for figures will observe that this tale of deaths in one brigade alone wants only ten of being a thousand more than all the men killed in the Army of the Potomac on the 16th and 17th September." As a matter of fact the Federal losses in the skirmish only amounted to 363 of all ranks.

Here we may leave the two hosts, Northern and Southern, resting each on their own shores of the river, exhausted by their efforts of the past two months, the course of which we have been imperfectly following. McClellan's tenure of chief command is not destined to last much longer, and what is still left of it has already been described in Major Redway's work on "Fredericksburg," in this series. It only remains therefore for us to offer a few

general remarks on the short campaign in Maryland ere we take our final farewell of the Armies of Northern Virginia and of the Potomac.

COMMENTS

The only method by which to arrive at a true verdict on a campaign is, first, to consider carefully the objects of each side in entering upon it, and to discover how far these were fulfilled. Then, having arrived at a decision as to the comparative success or failure of the combatants, one may endeavour to explain the reasons of the one or of the other. Very briefly then let us deal with the Maryland campaign in this manner.

Looked at dispassionately, it must be regarded, from the Confederate point of view, as a failure. Lee's object in attempting the invasion was not, we are convinced, the transference of the scene of hostilities from Southern to Northern territory, or the recruiting and supplying of his army from Maryland, or the occupation of any given piece of ground in permanence. He was too great a general for that ; his eye rested on the main army of the enemy, and by defeating that, at the threshold of the Northern capital, he hoped to bring about peace on his own terms. This he completely failed to do. A battle was indeed fought, which left both armies exhausted, and the greater reserves at the disposal of his foe compelled retreat into Virginia at once before they could be brought into action. Not only was the Federal army not annihilated or even defeated ; it was so far from that that it could afford in the next day or so to renew the fight, whereas Lee's host could not. The decisive battle, in a word, had been indecisive, and that fact of itself sealed the fate of the invasion.

What were the reasons for this failure ? First and fore-

most, the overweening contempt of the foe felt by all the Southern leaders from the generalissimo downwards. Right from the first day of the invasion this feeling can be traced exercising a baneful influence on the operations. We can see it in the belief of Lee that McClellan would not be ready to fight for a month after the defeat of Manassas; that his sluggishness and timidity would allow the Army of Northern Virginia plenty of time to divide itself for the execution of secondary operations and reunite without any danger of defeat in detail; and in the decision to stand and deliver battle at Sharpsburg in the chimerical hope that the Army of the Potomac was so helpless as a fighting force that it could be shattered by the counter-attack of 40,000 Southern soldiers. Lee paid the penalty for these miscalculations in the blood of his bravest soldiers and in the ruin of his highest hopes, just as he was again to pay it nine months later at Gettysburg, and for exactly the same reason. Manassas on the one occasion, Chancellorsville on the other, had given rise to the belief that Northern generals could not lead, and that Northern soldiers could not fight. Now, an army must have confidence in itself and a general in his army if success is ever to be won; but there is a clear line to be drawn between confidence and over-confidence, between pride in one's self, and contempt for the enemy; the latter sentiment makes in no way for efficiency, but rather for sluggish, careless, reckless leading. Nothing is more apt to engender this contempt than a series of easily won successes; men begin to regard it as inevitable that once victorious, they should always be so, that the enemy, so often defeated, should ever flee before them, and thus arises the feeling "In front of a foe like this we can do anything," which is the surest presage of near disaster. War demands the best, and Victory can be won only by assiduous and un-

remitting wooing; woe to the lover who, believing that he has by his attentions permanently attached her to his side, allows himself to slumber, for when he wakes, he will find that she has taken wings and flown.

The second cause of Lee's failure, and one which sprang directly from the first, was his neglect of the primary objective of war, the hostile army. If he hoped to gain a decisive victory over it—and without this hope the invasion of Maryland must be regarded as absolutely unjustifiable—then his best chance was to strike as early as possible before his own army was diminished by straggling, and while the recollection of the victory of Manassas was still strong upon it; while the enemy's forces were still demoralised by defeat and disorganisation, and while the terror of the invasion was still in full tide among all the helpless Northern cities. That such a dash might have been successful we thoroughly believe; at least there was no other hope for Lee. Every day lost added to the efficiency of the hostile forces, allowed the threatened territories time to prepare for defence, and decreased the moral effect of the movement in his own army and outside it. But Lee did not, it seems, realise this; he believed that he could beat and rout McClellan at any time he chose; for the present he had time enough before him which he could devote to secondary aims. His whole action in regard to Harper's Ferry reflects this attitude of mind. His object here, it seems, was twofold; first, to get rid of an important part of the enemy's force; second, to open up his new line of supply up the valley. The criticism must be that there was a more important matter on hand—namely, to defeat McClellan, if possible. That Lee believed it to be possible is shown as clearly as could be wished by his action in fighting at Sharpsburg, when his army was disunited, and part of it somewhat demoralised by defeat;

how much more, then, must he have regarded it as able to defeat McClellan when none of these disadvantages had been incurred. No ; it was not because Lee did not believe that he could destroy the enemy's main army that he did not from the first make the attempt ; it was because he regarded that army as an easy prey whenever he chose to strike at it, and so argued that there was plenty of time to do other things first, to capture outlying fractions of the enemy, and to secure his line of supply in preparation for a long stay in Maryland. But before you can sell the bear's skin you must kill the bear ; you must gain your victory before you think of how you will use it, remembering that once the hostile main army is beaten, everything else can be had for the asking. It was this error that cost Lee the campaign, and, perhaps, cost the Confederacy its independent existence.

Leaving Lee now, and turning to McClellan, what shall we say of his action in this short fortnight of war ? He took command of an army shaken by defeat, lacking confidence in its leaders, ill assorted and ill organised ; with this he marched forth to meet a foe flushed with success and planted firmly on Northern soil ; and in less than two weeks from the first departure from the capital he had solidified this horde of regiments into an army, in the best sense of the word, had gained one undoubted victory and waged another sanguinary and by no means unsuccessful fight, which had resulted in the instant collapse of the hostile invasion.

This he had done, and it was good ; but how much more might he not have done ! On September 13th Fortune, deserting her former favourites, gave McClellan a chance such as he had never had before and could never hope for again. Only those who have in person experienced, and to a less degree those who have by close study of history

tried to place themselves in the position to catch some glimpse of, the fearful uncertainty, the bewildering fog, which shrouds the hostile movements in war, can really appreciate what the sudden unveiling of all the enemy's positions and plans must have meant to the Federal leader. "If we always knew the enemy's intentions beforehand," wrote Frederick the Great, "we should always, even with inferior forces, get the better of him." In such a position McClellan was now placed. How was it that he made so little use of this tremendous stroke of good luck ?

It was not because he did not see the advantage given him ; he was too competent a soldier not to appreciate that to the full ; nor was it that his plan of action formed on this basis was not good ; it might have been improved on, assuredly, but it was amply sufficient for its purpose. The fault lay in the execution of it. The first thing that should have struck McClellan on perusing the lost order was that it was dated four days back and that the favourable situation it disclosed to him could not last for ever ; nay more, that its duration must even now be drawing to an end. And yet he took no really energetic action. The South Mountain passes might have been his by dawn next morning, but he waited till then to make his first move, so that he had to fight for them next day and waste twelve precious hours in the process. He neglected to order Franklin to attack McLaws on the 15th, because the former reported the hostile force twice as great as his own ; did it never strike him that Napoleon might have written : "The more forces you can hold in front of you by a vigorous attack to-day, the less there will be against me on the decisive battlefield to-morrow ?" But the crowning error of all was his waste of all the precious day of the 16th. "A commander who has gained a strategical advantage," say our Field Service Regulations, "may

have to act at once in order to prevent the enemy bringing about conditions more favourable to himself." Such was McClellan's case here; but he never seems to have realised that while he was examining the ground and the enemy, and consulting with his commanders, and choosing the position for his batteries, and what not, along the roads leading up to the hostile position were streaming column upon column of stubborn soldiers, every one of whom would be one more obstacle in the way of victory on the morrow. One may say safely that on the morning of the 16th it did not much matter what McClellan did, so long as he did something and did it with all his heart. But he could not bring himself to take decided action until all was ready; and before then the hour when he might have had success for the asking had fled, never to return.

His last blunder in the conduct of the campaign was the non-renewal of the action on the 18th. Here again it is difficult to find any valid reason for not undertaking the attack once more, at noon at the very latest. At that time there were available Couch's and Humphreys' divisions, absolutely fresh, together with Franklin's and Porter's corps, practically so, in all, close on 35,000 men, while Lee had not a single regiment disposable that had not fought the previous day. But the Federal commander-in-chief could only see his own losses and not those of the enemy; he did not realise that, if you yourself are exhausted, that is the best time to attack, for your foe is probably even more so; he hesitated

"To put it to the touch,
To win or lose it all."

And so the last chance of making the Maryland campaign a real success slipped past, as the previous ones had done, unheeded. It was indeed the last chance for the Union

General ; two months' later he had left the Army of the Potomac, never to return to it again.

The more one studies the career of McClellan, the more one is drawn to the conclusion that he only just failed of being a very great soldier. He had all the advantages that a man could desire ; he had had a splendid military training, one of the best that the world could give ; he had seen war from the inside, both in the Crimea and in Mexico ; and his personal gifts corresponded to the excellence of his education. He had a magnificent intellect, capable of grappling with any problems ; his organising powers were unrivalled in either army ; his *coup d'œil* was sure, his military glance clear and far-reaching. Further, he had in a pre-eminent degree what his predecessor, Pope, conspicuously lacked ; the power of handling and leading men, of winning for himself the respect and love of his generals and forming them around him in a band of close and devoted friends, of grappling his soldiers to himself with hooks of steel, and arousing throughout his army a sentiment of worship and devotion such as has been granted to but a few of the most fortunate characters of history. True, he was not well backed up by his government, but no Federal leader was much better off in this respect until the advent of Grant : he had to deal with some jealousy and friction in the army, but his task was light compared with that of the men who succeeded him. These disadvantages were slight in comparison with the favours fortune had bestowed upon him.

And yet it is impossible to regard his military career as aught but a failure. With all his gifts, all his advantages, all his powers, McClellan yet lacked one thing. It was that quality which made Lee one of the greatest generals of all time ; it was that same quality which, almost alone, enabled Grant to conquer that splendid

leader. The power of the will, the determination to conquer, the driving energy which refused to be turned aside from its chosen object, won for these two men their great triumphs; the absence of that element of character marred McClellan's whole conduct of operations from first to last. The great soldier makes his opportunities by forcing his own will on his enemy; McClellan had not even resolution enough to take opportunities when they were presented to him. His eye saw, but his hand was numb; the soldier conceived, but the man feared to execute. And in the attitudes of McClellan and Lee respectively on the night of Sharpsburg we have epitomised all the career of the two men and the secret of the failure of the one and the success of the other. The Northern commander, appalled by the losses of the day, by the scene of ruin and carnage around him; seeing as in a vision Washington captured, the North laid waste, the Republic rent asunder; hesitating between this fearful dream and that other of his country once more united and prosperous, of her people again knit together into one, of peace and repose and happiness cemented by the victory of his army and the policy of the noble President, and lastly, of himself as the hero of the war, ranking with Washington and Lincoln as the greatest man of the United States; torn with uncertainty, trembling between hope and fear, willing to dare all, yet fearing the consequences of rashness. And then, we turn to the other side of the creek and see there the solitary rider, grey bearded, with the slouch hat, sitting his horse alone in the darkness, with his responsibility and his resolution, conqueror fresh from that most fearful of battles, the battle with self, the self which trembles before danger, before the dimness of the future, before the crushing weight of the burden of men's lives and the country's honour and safety;

by his own iron will, his own unshaken courage, binding himself and his army together in the resolve that, come what might, they would never own themselves beaten; that the enemy might overwhelm them with his mighty masses and lay them low in heaps in the dust, but that their hearts he was powerless to conquer, that their constancy by all his efforts should never be shaken. And, as we gaze at these two figures, we cannot help the feeling coming upon us that the one was less great in his comparative success than the other in his undoubted failure; that, while the victor in this short campaign extorts from us the due tribute of respect and sympathy, it is to the vanquished that we must turn to find a model worthy of our imitation.

It is a raw morning in the early spring of 1865, and in a small clearing in the trees, on the boughs of which the dew of early dawn is still gleaming, a knot of officers are gathered together round a small unpretentious-looking white house, within whose closed doors something of great interest and importance appears to be going on. Well may we stop at the sight of the blue and grey uniforms, for these are the men whom two great nations have chosen to lead their mightiest hosts. But as we gaze on one face and another, how few we shall recognise, how few of those whose deeds we have followed and described have survived those short two and a half years of bitter conflict! Some have left their country's service, honoured or disgraced, some have been drafted to other fields of war; some will never draw sword again in this world. Of the Confederates, Lee, the greatest and best of them all, is within the house, his steed, Traveller, tethered to the fence not far distant; Longstreet, the "old war horse," is in the centre of the group, scarred, but still vigorous as

ever ; Ewell, the crippled soldier of Groveton, is also alive but far away, a prisoner of war in the hands of the enemy. Gordon, only a young colonel at Sharpsburg, is the other officer wearing the stars of a corps commander. And the rest, where are they ? Hood, sternest and most reckless of fighters, has gone to wreck in the West the fair fame won in the East ; A. P. Hill is dead, slain but a few days back in the wreck of Petersburg ; Stuart's plumed hat no longer waves at the head of the grey horsemen, he too has met an all too early fate ; and greatest of all, Stonewall Jackson, the Christian and the hero, has fallen, in the hour of the most splendid of his triumphs, by the unconscious hands of his own soldiery.

And among the Northerners fewer still of our friends are left. McClellan has been banished from his command, and Meade, the first to enter into action at the Antietam, the foiler of Lee's second invasion of the North at Gettysburg, holds the chief command of the Army of the Potomac. Pope has gone, and a new " general from the West," more able and more fortunate than he, is within doors, negotiating with Lee for the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia. Reynolds has met the soldier's death he would have desired ; Sumner, too, is dead, though not on the battlefield. The gallant FitzJohn Porter has fallen a victim to the rancour of his enemies in his own land, and Franklin has fared no better. Burnside has vanished from the scene and so has " Fighting Joe " Hooker ; the men who now command corps and divisions are men whom we knew only as brigadiers or colonels, Humphreys, Wright, Griffin, Gibbon. All these are here met together for a great purpose, no less than the surrender of the Confederate army, " not conquered, but worn out by conquering," into the hands of its long-suffering and at last triumphant foes. A few more weeks and the Army

of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia will be no more ; the men composing them, scattered far and wide to their homes, will exchange the field of battle and death for the forge, the farm, the workshop, there to serve and live for their country, as before they had been willing and ready to die for her. Their names are forgotten, but their deeds will not be forgotten. The two mighty hosts, whose corporate life we have seen drawing to its end, live on still as a memory and an inspiration in the annals of their country's story, and will live, so long at least as, through all these materialistic and matter-of-fact days, heroism and self-sacrifice and devotion to duty are held in honour among men.

APPENDIX I

ORGANISATION of the Army of Virginia, the Army of the Potomac and other co-operating forces under Major-General John Pope, during the operations from June 26th to September 2nd, 1862:

OFFICER COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF

Major-General John Pope

ARMY OF VIRGINIA

I. ARMY CORPS

Major-General Franz Sigel

1ST DIVISION

(1) Brigadier-General Robt. C. Schenck; (2) Brigadier-General Julius Stahel

1st Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General Julius Stahel; (2) Colonel Adolphus Buschbeck.

2nd Brigade. Colonel Nathaniel C. McLean.

2ND DIVISION

Brigadier-General Adolph Von Steinwehr

1st Brigade. (1) Colonel John A. Koltcs; (2) Lieutenant-Colonel Gust. A. Mühleck.

3RD DIVISION

Brigadier-General Carl Schurz

1st Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General Henry Bohlen; (2) Colonel A. Schimmelfennig.

2nd Brigade. Colonel W. Kryzanowski.

Independent Brigade. Brigadier-General Robert H. Milroy.

Cavalry Brigade. Colonel John Beardsley.

RESERVE ARTILLERY

Captain Louis Schirmer

II. ARMY CORPS

Major-General Nathaniel P. Banks

1ST DIVISION

Brigadier-General Alpheus S. Williams

1st Brigade. Brigadier-General S. W. Crawford.

3rd Brigade. Brigadier-General George H. Gordon.

2ND DIVISION

(1) Brigadier-General C. C. Augur ; (2) Brigadier-General H. W. Prince ; (3) Brigadier-General George S. Greene

1st Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General John W. Geary ; (2) Colonel Charles Candy.

2nd Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General H. W. Prince ; (2) Colonel M. Schlandecker ; (3) Colonel T. B. Van Buren.

3rd Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General George S. Greene ; (2) Colonel James A. Tait.

Cavalry Brigade. Brigadier-General John Buford.

RESERVE ARTILLERY

Captain C. L. Best

III. ARMY CORPS

Major-General Irvin McDowell

1ST DIVISION

(1) Brigadier-General Rufus King ; (2) Brigadier-General John P. Hatch ; (3) Brigadier-General Abner Doubleday

1st Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General John P. Hatch ; (2) Colonel T. Sullivan.

2nd Brigade. Brigadier-General Abner Doubleday.

3rd Brigade. Brigadier-General M. R. Patrick.

4th Brigade. Brigadier-General John Gibbon.

2ND DIVISION

Brigadier-General James B. Ricketts

- 1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General A. Duryea.
2nd Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General Z. B. Tower ; (2) Colonel
 W. H. Christian.
3rd Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General G. L. Hartsuff ; (2) Colonel
 J. W. Stiles.
4th Brigade. Colonel Joseph Thoburn.
Cavalry Brigade. Brigadier-General George D. Bayard

RESERVE ARTILLERY

Captain J. B. Campbell

REYNOLDS' DIVISION (PENNSYLVANIA RESERVES)

- Brigadier-General John F. Reynolds
1st Brigade. Brigadier-General George G. Meade.
2nd Brigade. Brigadier-General Truman Seymour.
3rd Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General C. F. Jackson ; (2) Lieu-
 tenant-Colonel R. Anderson.

ARTILLERY

Captain D. R. Ransom

RESERVE CORPS

- Brigadier-General S. D. Sturgis
Piatt's Brigade. Brigadier-General A. S. Piatt.

ARMY OF THE POTOMAC

III. ARMY CORPS

Major-General Samuel P. Heintzelmann

1ST DIVISION

- (1) Major-General Philip Kearny ; (2) Brigadier-General David
 B. Birney
1st Brigade. Brigadier-General John C. Robinson.
2nd Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General David B. Birney ; (2)
 Colonel J. H. H. Ward.
3rd Brigade. Colonel Orlando M. Poe.

2ND DIVISION

Major-General Joseph Hooker

- 1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General C. Grover.
2nd Brigade. Colonel N. Taylor.
3rd Brigade. Colonel J. B. Carr.

V. ARMY CORPS

Major-General FitzJohn Porter

1ST DIVISION

Major-General George W. Morell

- 1st Brigade.* Colonel C. W. Roberts.
2nd Brigade. Brigadier-General Charles Griffin.
3rd Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General Daniel Butterfield; (2)
Colonel H. S. Lansing; (3) Colonel H. A.
Weeks; (4) Colonel J. C. Rice.

2ND DIVISION

Major-General George Sykes

- 1st Brigade.* Lieutenant-Colonel R. C. Buchanan.
2nd Brigade. Lieutenant-Colonel W. Chapman.
3rd Brigade. Colonel Gouverneur K. Warren.

RESERVE ARTILLERY

Captain S. H. Weed

VI. ARMY CORPS

Major-General William B. Franklin

1ST DIVISION

- 1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General G. W. Taylor.

IX. ARMY CORPS

Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside

1ST DIVISION

Brigadier-General Isaac I. Stevens

- 1st Brigade.* Colonel B. C. Christ.
2nd Brigade. Colonel D. Leasure.
3rd Brigade. Colonel A. Farnsworth.

2ND DIVISION

Major-General Jesse L. Reno

- 1st Brigade.* Colonel J. Nagle.
2nd Brigade. Colonel E. Ferrero.

A detachment of four regiments from the Kanawha Division,
Major-General Jacob. D. Cox.

APPENDIX II

ORGANISATION of the Army of Northern Virginia, during the operations from June 26th to September 2nd, 1862 :

OFFICER COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF

Major-General Robert E. Lee

RIGHT WING

Major-General James Longstreet

ANDERSON'S DIVISION

Major-General R. H. Anderson

Armistead's Brigade. Brigadier-General L. A. Armistead.

Mahone's Brigade. Brigadier-General W. Mahone.

Wright's Brigade. Brigadier-General A. R. Wright.

JONES' DIVISION

Brigadier-General D. R. Jones

Toombs' Brigade. (1) Colonel H. L. Benning ; (2) Brigadier-General R. T. Toombs.

Drayton's Brigade. Brigadier-General T. F. Drayton.

Jones' Brigade. Colonel G. T. Anderson.

WILCOX'S DIVISION

Brigadier-General Cadmus M. Wilcox

Wilcox's Brigade. Brigadier-General Cadmus M. Wilcox.

Pryor's Brigade. Brigadier-General R. A. Pryor.

Featherston's Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General W. S. Featherston ; (2) Colonel C. Posey.

HOOD'S DIVISION

Brigadier-General John B. Hood

Hood's Brigade. Brigadier-General John B. Hood.

Whiting's Brigade. Colonel E. M. Law.

ARTILLERY

Major W. Frobel

KEMPER'S DIVISION

Brigadier-General James L. Kemper

Kemper's Brigade. Colonel M. D. Corse.*Jenkins' Brigade.* (1) Brigadier-General M. Jenkins ; (2)
Colonel J. Walker.*Pickett's Brigade.* Colonel E. Hunton.*Evans' Brigade.* Brigadier-General N. G. Evans, Colonel
P. F. Stevens.

ARTILLERY OF THE RIGHT WING

Washington (Louisiana) Artillery. Colonel J. B. Walton*Lee's Battalion.* Colonel S. D. Lee.

LEFT WING

Major-General Thomas J. Jackson

JACKSON'S DIVISION

(1) Major-General Charles S. Winder ; (2) Brigadier-General
W. B. Taliaferro ; (3) Brigadier-General W. E. Starke*1st Brigade (Stonewall's).* (1) Colonel C. A. Ronald ; (2) Colonel W. S. H.
Baylor ; (3) Colonel A. J. Grigsby.*2nd Brigade (Garnett's).* (1) Colonel H. F. Campbell ; (2) Colonel Bradley
T. Johnson.*3rd Brigade.* (1) Brigadier-General W. B. Taliaferro ; (2)
Colonel A. G. Taliaferro.*4th Brigade.* (1) Brigadier-General W. E. Starke ; (2) Colonel
Leroy A. Stafford.

CAVALRY BRIGADE

Brigadier-General Beverly H. Robertson

ARTILLERY

(1) Major Andrews ; (2) Major Shumaker

LIGHT DIVISION

Major-General Ambrose P. Hill

- Branch's Brigade.* (1) Brigadier-General L. O'B. Branch; (2) Brigadier-General J. H. Lane.
Archer's Brigade. Brigadier-General J. J. Archer.
Thomas' Brigade. Brigadier-General E. L. Thomas.
Field's Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General C. W. Field; (2) Colonel J. M. Brockenbrough.
Pender's Brigade. Brigadier-General W. D. Pender.
Grigg's Brigade. Brigadier-General Maxcy Gregg.

ARTILLERY

Lieutenant-Colonel R. L. Walker

EWELL'S DIVISION

- (1) Major-General Richard S. Ewell; (2) Brigadier-General A. R. Lawton
Early's Brigade. Brigadier-General Jubal A. Early.
Lawton's Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General A. R. Lawton; (2) Colonel M. Douglass.
Trimble's Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General I. R. Trimble; (2) Captain W. F. Brown.
Hays' Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General H. T. Hays; (2) Colonel H. Forno; (3) Colonel H. B. Strong.

ARTILLERY

Major A. R. Courtney

CAVALRY

Major-General James E. B. Stuart

- Hampton's Brigade.* Brigadier-General Wade Hampton.
Lee's Brigade. Brigadier-General Fitz Lee.

ARTILLERY

1ST VIRGINIA REGIMENT

Colonel J. T. Brown

SUMTER (GEORGIA) BATTALION

Colonel A. S. Cutts

APPENDIX III

ORGANISATION of the Army of the Potomac, under Major-General George B. McClellan, during the operations from September 3rd to 20th, 1862 :

OFFICER COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF

Major-General George B. McClellan

RIGHT WING

Major-General Ambrose E. Burnside

I. ARMY CORPS

(1) Major-General Joseph Hooker ; (2) Brigadier-General George G. Meade

1ST DIVISION

(1) Brigadier-General Rufus King ; (2) Brigadier-General John P. Hatch ; (3) Brigadier-General Abner Doubleday

1st Brigade. Colonel Walter Phelps.

2nd Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General Abner Doubleday ; (2) Colonel William P. Wainwright ; (3) Lieutenant Colonel J. W. Hoffmann.

3rd Brigade. Brigadier-General Marsena R. Patrick.

4th Brigade. Brigadier-General John Gibbon.

2ND DIVISION

Brigadier-General James B. Ricketts

1st Brigade. Brigadier-General Abram Duryea.

2nd Brigade. (1) Colonel W. A. Christian ; (2) Colonel P. Lyle.

3rd Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General George L. Hartsuff ; (2) Colonel R. Coulter.

3RD DIVISION

(1) Brigadier-General George G. Meade ; (2) Brigadier-General Truman Seymour

1st Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General Truman Seymour ; (2) Colonel R. B. Roberts.

2nd Brigade. Colonel D. L. Magilton.

3rd Brigade. (1) Colonel T. F. Gallagher ; (2) Lieutenant-Colonel R. Anderson.

IX. ARMY CORPS

(1) Major-General Jesse L. Reno ; (2) Brigadier-General Jacob D. Cox

1ST DIVISION

Brigadier-General O. B. Wilcox

1st Brigade. Colonel Benj. C. Christ.

2nd Brigade. Colonel T. Welsh.

2ND DIVISION

Brigadier-General Samuel D. Sturgis

1st Brigade. Brigadier-General James Nagle.

2nd Brigade. Brigadier-General Edward Ferrero.

3RD DIVISION

Brigadier-General Isaac P. Rodman

1st Brigade. Colonel H. S. Fairchild.

2nd Brigade. Colonel Edward Harland.

KANAWHA DIVISION

(1) Brigadier-General Jacob D. Cox ; (2) Colonel Eliakim P. Scammon

1st Brigade. (1) Colonel Eliakim P. Scammon ; (2) Colonel Hugh Ewing.

2nd Brigade. Colonel George Crook.

CENTRE

Major-General Edwin V. Sumner

II. ARMY CORPS

Major-General Edwin V. Sumner

1ST DIVISION

(1) Major-General Israel B. Richardson ; (2) Brigadier-General Winfield S. Hancock

1st Brigade. Brigadier-General John C. Caldwell.

2nd Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General T. F. Meagher ; (2) Colonel J. Burke.

3rd Brigade. Brigadier-General John R. Brooke.

2ND DIVISION

(1) Major-General John Sedgwick ; (2) Brigadier-General Oliver O. Howard

1st Brigade. Colonel Willis A. Gorman.

2nd Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General Oliver O. Howard ; (2) Colonel J. T. Owen ; (3) Colonel De W. C. Baxter.

3rd Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General Napoleon J. T. Dana ; (2) Colonel N. J. Hall.

3RD DIVISION

Brigadier-General William H. French

1st Brigade. Brigadier-General Nathan Kimball.

2nd Brigade. Colonel Dwight Morris.

3rd Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General Max Weber ; (2) Colonel J. W. Andrews.

XII. ARMY CORPS

(1) Major-General Joseph K. F. Mansfield; (2) Brigadier-General Alpheus S. Williams

1ST DIVISION

(1) Brigadier-General Alpheus S. Williams; (2) Brigadier-General Samuel W. Crawford; (3) Brigadier-General George H. Gordon.

1st Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General Samuel W. Crawford; (2) Colonel J. F. Knipe.

2nd Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General George H. Gordon; (2) Colonel T. H. Ruger.

2ND DIVISION

Brigadier-General George S. Greene

1st Brigade. (1) Lieutenant-Colonel H. Tyndale; (2) Major O. B. Crane.

2nd Brigade. Colonel Henry J. Stainrook.

3rd Brigade. (1) Colonel W. B. Goodrich; (2) Lieutenant-Colonel J. Austin.

RESERVE ARTILLERY

Captain Clermont Best

RIGHT WING

Major-General William B. Franklin

VI. ARMY CORPS

Major-General William B. Franklin

1ST DIVISION

Major-General Henry W. Slocum

1st Brigade. Colonel Alfred T. A. Torbert.

2nd Brigade. Colonel Joseph J. Bartlett.

3rd Brigade. Brigadier-General John Newton.

ARTILLERY

Captain Emery Upton

2ND DIVISION

Major-General William F. Smith

- 1st Brigade.* (1) Brigadier-General Winfield S. Hancock ; (2)
Colonel A. Cobb.
- 2nd Brigade.* Brigadier-General W. T. H. Brooks.
- 3rd Brigade.* Colonel William H. Irwin.

ARTILLERY

Captain Romeyn B. Ayres

V. ARMY CORPS

Major-General FitzJohn Porter

1ST DIVISION

Major-General George W. Morell

- 1st Brigade.* Colonel J. Barnes.
- 2nd Brigade.* Brigadier-General Charles Griffin.
- 3rd Brigade.* Colonel T. H. W. Stockton.

2ND DIVISION

Brigadier-General George Sykes

- 1st Brigade.* Lieutenant-Colonel Robt. C. Buchanan.
- 2nd Brigade.* Major C. S. Lovell.
- 3rd Brigade.* Colonel Gouverneur K. Warren.

3RD DIVISION

Brigadier-General Andrew A. Humphreys

- 1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General E. B. Tyler.
- 2nd Brigade.* Colonel P. H. Allabach.

RESERVE ARTILLERY

Lieutenant-Colonel Wm. Hays

IV. ARMY CORPS (I DIVISION)

1ST DIVISION

Major-General Darius N. Couch

- 1st Brigade.* Brigadier-General Charles Devens.
2nd Brigade. Brigadier-General A. P. Howe.
3rd Brigade. Brigadier-General John Cochrane.

CAVALRY DIVISION

Brigadier-General Alfred Pleasanton

- 1st Brigade.* Major C. J. Whiting.
2nd Brigade. Colonel J. F. Farnsworth.
3rd Brigade. Colonel R. H. Rush.
4th Brigade. Colonel A. T. McReynolds.

APPENDIX IV

ORGANISATION of the Army of Northern Virginia, under General Robert E. Lee, during the operations from 3rd to 20th September, 1862 :

OFFICER COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF

General Robert E. Lee

I. CORPS

Major-General James Longstreet

MCLAWS' DIVISION

Major-General Lafayette McLaws

- Kershaw's Brigade.* Brigadier-General J. B. Kershaw.
Cobb's Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General Howell Cobb ; (2)
Lieutenant-Colonel C. C. Sanders ;
(3) Lieutenant-Colonel W. McRae.
Semmes' Brigade. Brigadier-General Paul J. Semmes.
Barksdale's Brigade. Brigadier-General William Barksdale.

ARTILLERY

Major S. C. Hamilton

ANDERSON'S DIVISION

Major-General R. H. Anderson

- Wilcox's Brigade.* Colonel A. Cumming.
Mahone's Brigade. Colonel W. A. Parham.
Featherston's Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General Winfield S.
Featherston; (2) Colonel C. Posey.
Armistead's Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General L. A. Armistead ;
(2) Colonel J. G. Hodges.
Pryor's Brigade. Brigadier-General R. A. Pryor.
Wright's Brigade. Brigadier-General A. R. Wright.

ARTILLERY

Major J. S. Saunders

JONES' DIVISION

Brigadier-General David R. Jones

- Toombs' Brigade.* (1) Brigadier-General Robt. Toombs ; (2) Colonel H. L. Benning.
- Drayton's Brigade.* Brigadier-General T. F. Drayton.
- Pickett's Brigade.* (1) Colonel E. Hunton ; (2) Brigadier-General R. B. Garnett.
- Kemper's Brigade.* Brigadier-General J. L. Kemper.
- Jenkins' Brigade.* Colonel J. Walker.
- Anderson's Brigade.* Colonel G. T. Anderson.

WALKER'S DIVISION

Brigadier-General John G. Walker

- Walker's Brigade.* (1) Colonel Van H. Manning ; (2) Colonel E. D. Hall.
- Ransom's Brigade.* Brigadier-General Robt. Ransom.

HOOD'S DIVISION

Brigadier-General John B. Hood

- Hood's Brigade.* Colonel W. T. Wofford.
- Law's Brigade.* Colonel E. M. Law.

ARTILLERY

Major B. W. Frobel

- Evans' Brigade.* (1) Brigadier-General Nathan P. Evans ; (2) Colonel P. F. Stevens.

ARTILLERY

- Washington Artillery.* Colonel J. B. Walton.
- Lee's Battalion.* Colonel S. D. Lee.

II. CORPS

Major-General Thomas J. Jackson

EWELL'S DIVISION

- (1) Brigadier-General A. R. Lawton ; (2) Brigadier-General Jubal A. Early
- Lawton's Brigade.* (1) Colonel M. Douglass ; (2) Major J. H. Lowe ; (3) Colonel J. H. Lamar.
- Early's Brigade.* (1) Brigadier-General Jubal A. Early ; (2) Colonel W. Smith.
- Trimble's Brigade.* Colonel J. A. Walker.
- Hays' Brigade.* Brigadier-General H. T. Hays.

ARTILLERY

Major A. R. Courtney

LIGHT DIVISION

Major-General A. P. Hill

- Branch's Brigade.* (1) Brigadier-General L. O'B. Branch ; (2) Colonel J. H. Lane.
- Gregg's Brigade.* Brigadier-General Maxcy Gregg.
- Field's Brigade.* Colonel Brockenbrough.
- Archer's Brigade.* (1) Brigadier-General J. J. Archer ; (2) Colonel P. Turney.
- Pender's Brigade.* (1) Brigadier-General W. D. Pender ; (2) Colonel R. H. Brewer.
- Thomas' Brigade.* Colonel E. L. Thomas.

ARTILLERY

Major R. L. Walker

JACKSON'S DIVISION

- (1) Brigadier-General John R. Jones ; (2) Brigadier-General W. E. Starke ; (3) Colonel A. J. Grigsby
- Winder's Brigade.* (1) Colonel A. J. Grigsby ; (2) Lieutenant-Colonel R. D. Gardner ; (3) Major H. J. Williams.
- Taliaferro's Brigade.* (1) Colonel E. T. H. Warren ; (2) Colonel J. W. Jackson ; (3) Colonel J. L. Sheffield.

Jones' Brigade. (1) Colonel Bradley T. Johnson; (2) Brigadier-General J. R. Jones; (3) Captain J. E. Penn; (4) Captain A. C. Page; (5) Captain R. W. Withers.

Starke's Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General W. E. Starke; (2) Colonel L. A. Stafford; (3) Colonel E. Pendleton.

ARTILLERY

Major L. M. Shumaker

HILL'S DIVISION

Major-General D. H. Hill

Ripley's Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General R. S. Ripley; (2) Colonel G. Doles.

Rodes' Brigade. Brigadier-General R. E. Rodes.

Garland's Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General S. Garland; (2) Colonel D. K. McRae.

Anderson's Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General G. B. Anderson; (2) Colonel R. T. Bennett.

Colquitt's Brigade. Colonel A. H. Colquitt.

RESERVE ARTILLERY

Brigadier-General W. N. Pendleton

Brown's Battalion. Colonel J. T. Brown.

Cutts' Battalion. Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. Cutts.

Jones' Battalion. Major H. P. Jones.

Nelson's Battalion. Major W. Nelson.

CAVALRY DIVISION

Major-General J. E. B. Stuart

Hampton's Brigade. Brigadier-General Wade Hampton.


Lee's Brigade. Brigadier-General Fitz Lee.

Robertson's Brigade. (1) Brigadier-General Beverly H. Robertson; (2) Colonel T. T. Munford.

HORSE ARTILLERY

Captain J. Pelham

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