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W. T. Sherman

U. S. Army, Gen. W. T. Sherman

S H E R M A N

AND

HIS CAMPAIGNS:

A MILITARY BIOGRAPHY.

BY

COL. S. M. BOWMAN AND LT.-COL. R. B. IRWIN.

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CHARLES B. RICHARDSON.

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P R E F A C E .

THIS history of SHERMAN'S army is written in the single interest of truth.

Using the authentic sources of information at our command, we have endeavored to render full and exact justice to all, and to perpetuate no errors that, under the circumstances, it was possible to avoid.

It is hoped that the disadvantages usually attending the publication of a biography during the lifetime of its subject, are to some extent neutralized, in the present instance, by the co-operation in our task of many of those who themselves made the history we propose to recount.

Nevertheless, and in spite of the most friendly offers of material assistance from Lieutenant-General GRANT and Major-General SHERMAN; from the army commanders, THOMAS, HOWARD, SLOCUM, and SCHOFIELD; from Major-Generals LOGAN, BLAIR, and JEFFERSON C. DAVIS; brevet Major-General KILPATRICK, brevet Brigadier-General HICKENLOOPER, of the staff of the lamented MCPHERSON, and from very many other officers whose names we cannot now give at length, several of whom generously tendered free access to their reports, journals, and private letter-books; the editors cannot but feel that, on many points of interest, their work is lacking in those details essential to historical completeness, which time alone can supply.

The events treated are, in some instances, perhaps too recent for enlightened and impartial criticism; in others, respect for the living or for the honored dead, whose memories are yet green, may have imposed reticence or silence upon the lips of those on whose evidence depends our knowledge of the truth; in still others, it will probably require the careful collection and severe analysis, in the future, of minute fragments of evidence, to-day widely scattered, neglected, or inaccessible, in order to refute errors now prevalent, but unsuspected.

The editors believe, however, that laboring with a sincere and constant desire to attain correctness, they have, at least, succeeded in establishing the essential outlines which the criticism and controversy, hostile as well as friendly, they cannot hope to escape, and the new testimony that will thereby be elicited, will enable them or their more favored successors to perfect and finish.

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SHERMAN AND HIS CAMPAIGNS.

CHAPTER I.

BEFORE THE WAR.

WILLIAM TECUMSEH SHERMAN was born in Lancaster, Ohio, on the 8th of February, 1820. The branch of the Sherman family to which he belongs is descended from the Honorable Samuel Sherman, of Dedham, in the County of Essex, England, who came to Massachusetts in the year 1634, in company with his brother, the Reverend John Sherman, and their cousin, Captain John Sherman. The two latter settled at Milford, in Connecticut, and became the founders of useful and influential families. Roger Sherman was a descendant of the captain's. Samuel Sherman, after residing for a time at Wethersfield, Connecticut, removed to Stamford, and finally to Stratford, in the same State. His son, Deacon John Sherman, went early in life to Woodbury, Connecticut, where the family remained until the death, in 1815, of his great grandson, Taylor Sherman, for many years judge of one of the courts of his native State. His widow removed, with her children, to what is now the town of Lancaster, in Fairfield County, in the State of Ohio. Charles Robert Sherman, the son of Taylor Sherman, and the father of the subject of this sketch, was born on the 26th of September, 1788. He was an accomplished lawyer, very successful as an advocate, and from 1823 to 1829, when he died of cholera, was one of the judges of the

Superior Court of the State of Ohio. On the 8th of May, 1810, he married Mary Hoyt, by whom he had eleven children; first, Charles Taylor, a prominent lawyer, formerly of Mansfield, Ohio, now of Washington City; second, Mary Elizabeth; third, James; fourth, Amelia; fifth, Julia; sixth, William Tecumseh; seventh, Parker; eighth, John, for many years an influential member of the House of Representatives from Ohio, now senator from the same State; ninth, Susan; tenth, Hoyt; and eleventh, Frances.

His death left this large family in very moderate circumstances. Shortly afterwards, being then but little past nine years of age, William Tecumseh was adopted by the Honorable Thomas Ewing, one of his father's most intimate friends, as a member of his own family. Mr. Ewing sent him to school in Lancaster until the spring of 1836, when having, as a member of Congress from Ohio, the privilege of nominating a youth from his congressional district for appointment as a cadet at the United States Military Academy at West Point, he exercised this right by procuring the warrant for his youthful charge.

In June, 1836, Cadet Sherman entered the Academy, where, with the exception of the months of July and August, 1838, which his class was permitted to spend at home on furlough, he remained, pursuing the course of studies and military duties then in force, until the 30th of June, 1840, when he graduated, standing sixth in the order of general merit of his class of forty-two members—all that were left of a hundred and forty who had entered the institution with him. Among his classmates were Stewart Van Vliet, George H. Thomas, Richard S. Ewell, George W. Getty, William Hays, Bushrod R. Johnson, and Thomas Jordan.

His letters to his friends during the four important if uneventful years of cadet life, are very interesting, as exhibiting the variety and force of his thoughts, and the energy and decision of his character, at that early age. Through them all runs the elastic spirit of youth, and a manly candor and directness of speech that have never left

him since. In one of these letters, dated February 17, 1839, he writes :—

“ Bill is very much elated at the idea of getting free of West Point next June. He does not intend remaining in the army more than one year, then to resign, and study *law*, probably. No doubt you admire his choice; but, to speak plainly and candidly, I would rather be a blacksmith. Indeed the nearer we come to that dreadful epoch, graduation-day, the higher opinion I conceive of the duties and life of an officer of the United States Army, and the more confirmed in the wish of spending my life in the *service of my country*. Think of that. The church bugle has just blown, and in a moment I must put on my sidearms and march to church, to listen to a two-hours' sermon, with its twenty divisions and twenty-one subdivisions; . . . but I believe it is a general fact, that what people are compelled to do they dislike.”

“ As we have, then, two or three dancing-parties each week, at which the gray bobtail is sufficient recommendation for an introduction to any one, you can well conceive how the cadets have always had the reputation, and have still, here in the East, of being great gallants and ladies' men. God only knows how I will sustain that reputation !”

Speaking of the appointment, by the War Department, of the Board of Visitors to attend the annual examination, he says, May 18, 1839 :—

“ There is but little doubt of its being nearly as well selected as circumstances would admit of. Party seems to have had no influence whatever; and, for my part, I am very glad of it. I hope that our army, navy, or the Military Academy may never be affected by the party rancor which has for some time past, and does now, so materially injure other institutions.”

Here is a glimpse of his tastes and occupations :—

“ The last encampment, taken all in all, I think was the most pleasant one I have ever spent, even to me, who did not participate in the dances and balls given every week by the different classes; besides, the duties were of altogether a different nature from any of the previous ones, such as acting as officers

upon guard and at artillery drills, practising at target firing with long twenty-fours and thirty-twos, mortars, howitzers, &c., as also cavalry exercise, which has been introduced this year. As to lording it over the plebs, to which you referred, I had only one, whom I made, of course, tend to a pleb's duty, such as bringing water, policing the tent, cleaning my gun and accoutrements, and the like, and repaid in the usual and cheap coin—advice; and since we have commenced studying I make him bone (study), and explain to him the difficult parts of algebra and the French grammar, since he is a good one and fine fellow; but should he not carry himself straight, I should have him found in January and sent off, that being the usual way in such cases, and then take his bed, table, and chair, to pay for the Christmas spree. . . .

“I presume you have seen the register of cadets for the last year, and remarked that I still maintain a good stand in my class; and if it were not for that column of ‘demerit’ it would be still better, for they are combined with the proficiency in study to make out the standing in general merit. In fact, this year, as well as the last, in studies alone, I have been among the stars. . . . I fear I have a difficult part to act for the next three years, because I am almost confident that your father's wishes and intentions will clash with my inclinations. In the first place, I think he wishes me to strive and graduate in the engineer corps. This I can't do. Next, to resign, and become a civil engineer. . . . Whilst I propose, and intend, to go into the infantry, be stationed in the far West, out of the reach of what is termed *civilization*, and there remain as long as possible.”

He had already imbibed from his association with Mr. Ewing the doctrines of the Whig party, but his nature and education compelled him to repel with indignation the trickery and shams even of his own side. Thus, he writes, April 13, 1840, of the approaching presidential election:—

“You, no doubt, are not only firmly impressed, but absolutely certain, that General Harrison will be our next president. For my part, though of course but a ‘superficial observer,’ I

do not think there is the least hope of such a change, since his friends have thought proper to envelop his name with log cabins, gingerbread, hard cider, and such humbugging, the sole object of which plainly is to deceive and mislead his ignorant and prejudiced, though honest, fellow-citizens; whilst his qualifications, his honesty, his merits and services are merely alluded to."

In the same letter is this dash of descriptive humor:—

"Sometimes it appears that war with England is inevitable; books are thrown in the corner, and broadswords and foils supply their place. Such lunging, cutting, and slashing—enough to dispose of at least a thousand British a day; but the mail or recitation soon destroys the illusion with—'It's all a hoax;' or, 'Sir, you've been neglecting your studies.'"

Immediately after his graduation, Cadet Sherman was appointed, in accordance with the customary recommendation of the Academic Board, to a second lieutenancy in the Third Regiment of Artillery, then commanded by Colonel William Gates, and was assigned to Company A of that regiment. After enjoying the usual furlough of three months granted to cadets on graduating, he was ordered to join his company at Fort Pierce, in East Florida, where he served until November, 1841, when the company was removed to Fort Lauderdale. In January, 1842, he received his commission as a first lieutenant in the same regiment, dating from November 30, 1841, and also an order from the War Department transferring him to Company G, stationed at Saint Augustine. This was rapid promotion for those days, when six or seven years were often required for a second lieutenant to obtain the next grade. Lieutenant Sherman was now placed in command of a small detachment of his new company engaged in guarding the post of Picolata, situated on the Saint John's River, opposite the town of Saint Augustine.

The service in Florida was not of a very inviting character. The summer was generally passed in idleness, the heat of the almost tropical sun and the swarms of mosquitoes rendering active exertion nearly impossible; and the winter was spent in

frequent incursions against the hostile Seminoles, under the leadership of the wily and cruel chief Sam Jones. These expeditions, sometimes scouting on foot, sometimes penetrating the everglades in boats, were always attended by severe labors, and involved no slight degree of risk, the numbers of our troops being small, and unceasing vigilance being necessary to guard against an ambuscade. The climate during the long summer season was exceedingly unhealthy. Lieutenant Sherman was, however, contented, as long as there was a prospect of activity, and, fortunately, continued to enjoy good health during his entire tour of duty in this section. From the outset, he conceived a clear and decided opinion of the policy that should govern the war against the Seminoles. He was earnestly opposed to parleys or truces, believing that no reliance could be placed in the promises of the Indians; and was strongly in favor of the energetic exertion of the whole military power in the Territory in combined operations, having in view the prompt and relentless extermination of all the Indians who should continue to carry on hostilities, and the removal, in accordance with treaty stipulations, of those who should sue for peace. By such a course, he considered, and events have fully justified the opinion, that the war would be ended in a single campaign, thousands of human lives saved, both of whites and Indians, and peace permanently given to the Territory. The Government should then endeavor, he thought, to attract to the country a better class of white settlers, organize them into small communities, and require them to defend themselves for the future. Thus the army could be withdrawn from Florida, with the exception of small garrisons at the more important permanent posts.

Here is a view of his life in quarters at Fort Pierce, written April 10, 1841 :—

“Now that we are at peace, and our minds withdrawn from those pleasant excursions and expeditions in which we have been engaged for the four past months, we are thrown upon our ingenuity to devise means of spending the time. Books

we have few, but it is no use, you cannot read any but the lightest trash; and even the newspapers, which you would suppose we would devour, require a greater effort of mind to search than we possess. We attribute it to the climate, and bring up these native lazy Minorcans as examples, and are satisfied. Yet, of course, we must do something, however little. Well, in this, each pursues his own fancy. The major and I have a parcel of chickens, in which we have, by competition, taken enough interest to take up a few minutes of the day; besides, I have a little fawn to play with, and crows, a crane, &c.; and if you were to enter my room you would hesitate whether it was the abode of man or beasts. In one corner is a hen, sitting; in another, some crows, roosted on bushes; the other is a little bed of bushes for the little fawn; whilst in the fourth is my bucket, wash-basin, glass, &c. So you see it is three to one."

In a subsequent letter he touches the same vein:—

"I've got more pets now than any bachelor in the country—innumerable chickens, tame pigeons, white rabbits, and a full-blood Indian pony—rather small matters for a man to deal with, you doubtless think, but it is far better to spend time in trifles such as these than drinking or gambling."

His desire for the freedom of frontier life is thus again shown:—

"We hear that the new Secretary of War intends proposing to the next Congress to raise two rifle regiments for the Western service. As you are at Washington, I presume you can learn whether it is so or not, for I should like to go in such a regiment, if stationed in the far West; not that I am the least displeased with my present berth, but when the regiment goes North, it will, in all likelihood, be stationed in the vicinity of some city, from which God spare me."

His indignation at any thing not perfectly straightforward, shows itself in an energetic remonstrance to a friend:—

"If you have any regard for my feelings, don't say the word 'insinuation' again. You may abuse me as much as you please, but I'd prefer, of the two, to be accused of telling a

direct falsehood than stating any thing evasively or underhand; and if I have ever been guilty of such a thing, it was unintentionally."

In March, 1842, his company was removed to Fort Morgan, situated on Mobile Point, at the entrance of the Bay of Mobile, and twenty miles from the city. Here Lieutenant Sherman remained, performing garrison service, varied, in the intervals of duty, by fishing, boating, and occasional, though not frequent, visits to the city, until the following June, when the station of the company was again changed to Fort Moultrie, on Sullivan's Island, Charleston Harbor. Moultrieville, on Sullivan's Island, quite near the fort, was, at that time, a place of fashionable resort during the summer season for the wealthy families of Charleston and South Carolina generally, many of whom had temporary residences there, to which they removed on the approach of hot weather, to escape from the malarious influences of the city and lower country, and enjoy the cool breezes and the sea-bathing. Officers of the army were at that time sought after, and hospitably entertained by nearly all of the better classes of society in the South, and Lieutenant Sherman was thus, upon his arrival at Fort Moultrie, ushered into a life entirely new to him. During the summer he made many agreeable and some valuable acquaintances, which were cemented and extended during the following winter, when he, in common with the other officers, was almost overwhelmed with invitations to accept the hospitalities of the citizens of Charleston, to whom they had been attentive at the fort.

Hunting was always a favorite amusement with him, and while stationed at Fort Moultrie, he enjoyed frequent opportunities of indulging this taste. Thus, with boating and drum-fishing, were passed his leisure hours during the first year of his stay. In the fall of 1843, he availed himself of a four-months' leave of absence to visit his home at Lancaster, and while there became engaged to Miss Ellen Ewing, the accomplished daughter of his guardian, and the friend and companion of his school-days. At the expira-

tion of his leave, in December, 1843, he rejoined his post, making an interesting detour down the Mississippi river to New Orleans, and thence by way of Mobile and Savannah. During the months of February, March, and April, 1844, he was associated with Colonel Sylvester Churchill, on a board of three officers, appointed by the War Department, to investigate a large number of claims for horses lost by the Georgia and Alabama militia, in the Florida war in 1837 and 1838. Most of these claims were supposed by the Government to be fraudulent, and the members of the board were required to hear and patiently sift the evidence on the spot, and afterwards report the facts and their opinions to the War Department. During the course of the investigation the board was in session at Marietta, Georgia, at Bellefonte, Alabama, and at several other places in the central and northern sections of those States. Their report gave great satisfaction to the Department, and was considered by it as the means of saving vast sums of money to the treasury, while, at the same time, awarding justice to all concerned.

All this time the young officer was not unmindful of the necessity of professional study and improvement. He took care to inform himself of the topographical features of the country in which he was stationed or through which he travelled, as well as in regard to the occupations, character, social organization, and sentiments of the inhabitants. The value of geography he specially appreciated. He wrote to his friend, Philemon Ewing :—

“Every day I feel more and more in need of an atlas, such as your father has at home; and as the knowledge of geography, in its minutest details, is essential to a true military education, the idle time necessarily spent here might be properly devoted to it. I wish, therefore, you would procure for me the best geography and atlas (not school) extant.”

After the adjournment of the Board, he began to turn his attention to such legal studies as might prove useful to him in his profession. Thus he writes, under date of June 12, 1844, from Fort Moultrie :—

“Since my return, I have not been running about in the city or the island, as heretofore, but have endeavored to interest myself in Blackstone, which, with the assistance of Bouvier’s Dictionary, I find no difficulty in understanding. I have read all four volumes, Starkie on Evidence, and other books, semi-legal and semi-historical, and would be obliged to you if you would give me a list of such books as you were required to read, not including your local or State law. I intend to read the second and third volumes of Blackstone again, also Kent’s Commentaries, which seem, as far as I am capable of judging, to be the basis of the common-law practice. This course of study I have adopted, from feeling the want of it in the duties to which I was lately assigned.”

And again, on the 20th of October :—

“I have no idea of making the law a profession, by no means ; but, as an officer of the army, it is my duty and interest to be prepared for any situation that fortune or luck may offer. It is for this alone that I prepare, and not for professional practice.”

Early in 1845, he again paid a brief visit to his home in Ohio, to recover from the effects of illness. After his return to the South, he was, for a short time, stationed on detached service at the arsenal at Augusta, Georgia ; and, on another occasion, was detailed as a member of a general court-martial sitting at Wilmington, North Carolina, where he had the pleasure of meeting once more with his old comrades of Company A, Third Artillery.

On the breaking out of the Mexican war, Lieutenant Sherman was assigned to duty as recruiting officer at Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. He remained there, however, but little more than a month, when his repeated applications for active service were met by an order from the War Department, transferring him to Company F, of his regiment, then about to sail for California, to meet Colonel Kearny’s expedition across the plains. The first intimation he received of this change was conveyed by a letter, which reached him on the 28th of June, 1846, from his friend, Lieutenant E. O. C. Ord, who was

attached to his new company. On the 29th of June he received the official orders, and on the following day, without seeking to visit his home and friends, pausing only to make a few hasty arrangements with regard to his private affairs, he set out for New York. The company sailed from New York about the middle of July, in the ship *Lexington*, and after a voyage marked by no special incidents, touching at Rio de Janeiro and Valparaiso, landed at San Francisco. Contrary to the anticipations of active service entertained at the outset, the career of the company in California, far away from the theatre of war, proved uneventful. During his service there, Lieutenant Sherman was detailed as acting assistant adjutant-general of the forces in the Tenth Military Department, under the command of Brigadier-General Stephen W. Kearny, afterwards under that of Colonel Richard B. Mason, First Dragoons; and in this capacity attracted the notice of his brother officers by the efficiency, clearness, and administrative ability he showed in the discharge of the responsible duties confided to him. In 1850 he returned to the Atlantic States, and on the 1st of May, in the same year, was married to Miss Ellen Ewing, at the residence, in Washington City, of her father, then Secretary of the Interior under President Taylor. In the following September he received what was, in those days, considered one of the highest prizes the military profession had in store for the subaltern, being appointed a commissary of subsistence with the rank of captain. He was immediately assigned to duty, as such, upon the staff of the commanding officer of the military department of the West, and stationed at St. Louis. In March of the following year he received from the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, a commission as captain, by brevet, to date from May 30, 1848, "for meritorious services in California during the war in Mexico."

On the 6th of September, 1853, Captain Sherman resigned his commission in the army, and like many of his companions at that time, sought for such advancement in civil life as the army seemed little likely to afford. He was offered and

accepted the position of manager of the branch banking-house of Messrs. Lucas, Turner & Company, at San Francisco, California, and accordingly went a second time to the Pacific, intending now to establish his home there.

During all this time the seeds of discord had been ripening in the hot soil of slavery. The Southern statesmen, accustomed to rule, began to perceive that the country would not always submit to be ruled by them; that hostility to slavery was a sentiment deeply rooted in the minds of the people of the Free States, and daily spreading its influence; and that the accession of men holding these opinions to power in the national councils and the national executive, meant nothing less than such a limitation of the further extension of slavery as would be fatal to its existence, even where it was already established. Slavery, they believed, could not thrive in contact with freedom; and they had come to regard slavery as essential to their political and social existence. Without a slave caste, they could have no aristocratic caste. No class can enjoy exclusive rights except at the expense of another, whose rights are curtailed or extinguished. They began to isolate themselves from the North, as they termed the Free States; from its dangerous opinions, by refusing to read or hear them; from its society, by withdrawing their sons and daughters from Northern schools and colleges, and by declining to associate with Northern men and women who were not well known to be free from the pernicious doctrines; and finally, they prepared to throw off their political allegiance to the Government of the United States the moment it should have passed beyond their control. The Northern politicians, accustomed to follow the lead of their Southern associates, generally believed that the defeat of Fremont, in 1856, as the Republican candidate for the presidency, had insured the perpetuity of the Union; the Southern politicians, generally, believed that the date of its dissolution was postponed during the next presidential term, and that four years and a facile President were given them to prepare for it. And they began to do so.

The pro-slavery leaders were well aware that the attempted overthrow of the National Government would be likely, even in the disguise of peaceable secession, to be resisted by force. They accordingly got every thing in readiness to carry out their plans by force. The wiser heads among them hoped, if they did not altogether expect, to be allowed to secede in peace, but they were as determined as the rest to appeal to war in the last resort. Accordingly, during Mr. Buchanan's Administration, there was set on foot throughout the slaveholding States a movement embodying the reorganization of the militia, the establishment and enlargement of State military academies, and the collection of arms, ammunition, and warlike materials of all kinds. The federal Secretary of War, Mr. Floyd, thoroughly in the interests of the pro-slavery conspirators, aided them by sending to the arsenals in the Slave States large quantities of the national arms and military supplies; the quotas of the Southern States under the militia laws were anticipated, in some cases by several years; and he caused large sales of arms to be secretly made, at low prices, to the agents of those States. The pro-slavery leaders then began, quietly, to select and gather round them the men whom they needed, and upon whom they thought they could rely. Unable always to explain to these men their purposes, they were often compelled to trust to circumstances and the force of association to complete the work; and in doing so, they occasionally, though not often, made mistakes.

Among the men they fixed upon was Captain Sherman. Recognizing his aptitude in military art and science, the leaders in Louisiana determined to place him at the head of the new State Military Academy at Alexandria. It was explained to him that the object of establishing the school was to aid in suppressing negro insurrections, to enable the State to protect her borders from the Indian incursions, then giving trouble in Arkansas and Texas, and to form a nucleus for defence, in case of an attack by a foreign enemy.

It is rare, indeed, that a man whose youth has been spent in the army does not, in his maturer years, retain a lurking de-

sire for the old life, the old companions, the old ways. Let the temptation be offered in a moment when the cares and details of civil life look more than ordinarily dull, when the future seems clouded, and the warm memories of former days may present a contrast too vivid for most men to resist. Cincinnati leaves the plough and returns with the senators to the camp. So it was with Captain Sherman. Messrs. Lucas Turner & Company had broken up their branch-house at San Francisco. The offer was in a line with his associations, his tastes, and his ambition. He accordingly accepted the office, and entered upon his duties as Superintendent of the Louisiana State Military Academy, early in the year 1860. The liberal salary of five thousand dollars a year was attached to the office.

The efficiency which Captain Sherman here displayed confirmed the leaders in that State in the correctness of their choice, and satisfied them that he was a man to be kept at any price. They were met at the outset by a deep-seated loyalty, by a deep-rooted attachment and fidelity to the Union, upon which they had by no means calculated. Every effort was expended to convert him to their way of thinking, but in vain. Surface opinions change with the wind, but it is useless to argue against fundamental beliefs. And such was the character of Sherman's attachment to the Union.

As events ripened, he saw clearly that the election of Mr. Lincoln to the presidency would be followed by the general secession of the Southern States, and that secession meant war. When, at length, after using his influence to its fullest extent in favor of the Union, he perceived that the result could no longer be avoided, he decided upon his own course, and communicated his decision to the Governor of the State in this clear and straightforward letter, dated January 18, 1861 :

“SIR—As I occupy a *quasi*-military position under this State, I deem it proper to acquaint you that I accepted such position when Louisiana was a State in the Union, and when the motto of the seminary, inserted in marble over the main door, was :

*'By the liberality of the General Government of the United States :
The Union—Esto Perpetua.'*

"Recent events foreshadow a great change, and it becomes all men to choose. If Louisiana withdraws from the Federal Union, I prefer to maintain my allegiance to the old Constitution as long as a fragment of it survives, and my longer stay here would be wrong in every sense of the word. In that event, I beg you will send or appoint some authorized agent to take charge of the arms and munitions of war here belonging to the State, or direct me what disposition should be made of them.

"And furthermore, as President of the Board of Supervisors, I beg you to take immediate steps to relieve me as superintendent the moment the State determines to secede; for on no earthly account will I do any act, or think any thought, hostile to or in defiance of the old Government of the United States."

His resignation was, of course, promptly accepted, and he at once returned to St. Louis. In consequence of the uncertain aspect of political affairs, he had deemed it most prudent that his family should not accompany him to the South.

He was not destined to remain long inactive. The crisis for which the pro-slavery leaders had been so long preparing was precipitated by the rashness of the more incautious among themselves, and hurried forward by the frenzy of the people. The far-sighted conspirators had proposed to themselves to capture Washington before the North should be able to organize resistance, and to proclaim themselves the true and lawful Government of the United States. They would have declared Mr. Lincoln's election, with the avowed purpose, among others, of disregarding what they considered as their constitutional right of holding slaves in the Territories, as unconstitutional, and therefore null, and would have based their assumption of power on the right of self-preservation. From their knowledge of the disposition of most of the foreign ministers resident at the Federal capital, they expected their recognition by the leading European powers to follow closely upon the act. They counted

upon the trade-loving and the peace-loving instincts of the people of the Free States to keep the North inert. The great Central and Western States would probably be with them, and New England they would gladly leave, as they were accustomed to say, "out in the cold." But while the cool-headed conspirators plotted thus skilfully, one element of their calculation failed. It had been necessary to their plans to fire the Southern heart to the point of rebellion: the Southern brain took fire as well. Events took the bit in their teeth. On the 12th of April, 1861, Mr. Davis gave the order to open upon Fort Sumter. At noon the first gun was fired, and the war was begun.

Sherman had gone to Washington about the time of Mr. Lincoln's inauguration, and had talked of the state of affairs with characteristic freedom. He believed that war was inevitable; that it would be no pantomime of wooden swords, but a long and bitter struggle. He endeavored in vain, in earnest nervous language, to impress his convictions upon the Administration. Nobody listened to him except the President, who listened to everybody. Sherman went to him to offer his services in any capacity. His strong words and strong thoughts elicited a smile from Mr. Lincoln. "We shall not need many men like you," he said; "the affair will soon blow over." Some of Sherman's friends in the army, who knew his talents, and, like him, believed there would be a war, urged his appointment to the chief clerkship of the War Department, a position which at that time was always held by a confidential adviser of the Secretary of War; and somewhat later he was strongly recommended for the position of quartermaster-general of the army, made vacant by the resignation of Brigadier-General Joseph E. Johnston. Neither application was successful.

Sherman knew the Southern people; the Administration did not, nor did the people of the North in general. In his own words, we were sleeping upon a volcano.

On the 15th of April, 1861, the President called for seventy-five thousand men to serve for three months, to be employed for the purpose of enforcing the laws of the United States, and

to hold and occupy the forts, arsenals, navy-yards, and other public places belonging to the National Government which had been seized by the rebels. Sherman was urged by his friends to go home to Ohio, and raise one of the three months' regiments. He declined to have any thing to do with such a trifling expedient, as he considered it. He did not believe that the three months' men would do any good, or that they could do any good. This affair was no riot, but a revolution. It was not a mob, to be put down by the *posse comitatus*, but a war, to be fought by an army. "Why," he said, "you might as well attempt to put out the flames of a burning house with a squirt-gun."

He used all the influence at his command to induce the authorities to recognize his view of the case, and, by at once organizing the whole military force of the country, to crush the rebellion in its infancy. But the authorities still believed there would be no fight, that the rebellion would succumb at the sight of the power of the Union.

When the Government presently decided to add a regiment of artillery, one of cavalry, and nine of infantry to the regular army, Sherman at once applied for a command in this force, and, on the 13th of June, received a commission as colonel of the Thirteenth Regiment of Infantry, to date from May 14th. As very little was done, just then, in regard to the organization of the new regiments, beyond the appointment of officers and a little feeble recruiting, Colonel Sherman's services were, like those of most of the newly-appointed officers who were known to possess military skill, made use of in another direction. Richmond had been made the capital of the Confederate States. A force was collected to move on that city, capture it, and so suppress the rebellion at a blow. Major Irvin McDowell, assistant adjutant-general on the staff of Lieutenant-General Scott, had been appointed a brigadier-general in the regular army, and was assigned to the command of these troops. Colonel Sherman was ordered to report to him, and received the command of a brigade in the division of Brigadier-General Daniel Tyler.

CHAPTER II.

AN EXPERIMENT.

THE troops which were to move "on to Richmond," in accordance with the popular cry, were encamped in some sort of order on the south bank of the Potomac, from the Chain Bridge to Alexandria, and were thrown together, with more or less haste, into what were called five divisions, of two, three, or four brigades each. Brigadier-General Daniel Tyler, of the Connecticut Volunteers, commanded the First Division, Colonels David Hunter, Sixth Cavalry, Samuel P. Heintzelman, Seventeenth Infantry, and Dixon S. Miles, Second Infantry, the Second, Third, and Fifth, respectively, and Brigadier-General Theodore Runyon, of the New Jersey militia, the Fourth Division. Three of these were old and experienced officers of the regular army, who had seen service in Mexico and in many Indian fights. Brigadier-General Robert C. Schenck commanded the First Brigade of Tyler's division; Colonel Erasmus D. Keyes, Eleventh Infantry, the Second; Colonel Sherman the Third Brigade, composed of the Thirteenth, Sixty-ninth, and Seventy-ninth New York, and Second Wisconsin regiments of infantry, with Captain Ayres's Battery E, Third Regular Artillery; and Brigadier-General Israel B. Richardson commanded the Fourth Brigade. The troops were all raw. Most of them had volunteered for three months. As the end of that period approached, these men naturally thought more of home than they did of battle, more of living to see their friends than of dying for their country. Many of the volunteers had never fired a gun before, and felt nearly as much trepidation in loading their own pieces, and as much

alarm in discharging them, as the most deadly fire of the enemy could have occasioned. Captains knew little or nothing of tactics beyond the manual of arms and the facings. Colonels could not put their regiments through the simplest manœuvres. Regimental commanders did not know their brigade commanders, and brigade commanders made the acquaintance of their division commanders upon the field of battle. According to the ideas of those days, there was a deficiency of transportation; that is to say, each regiment had not a score of wagons: and the quartermasters in Washington were at their wits' end to supply the demand. Wagons intended for General McDowell's army went to General Patterson's, and General McDowell's army must therefore wait. The District of Columbia was embraced in a separate military department, called the Department of Washington. Its commander was overwhelmed by office details; so the troops which were to go to the Army of Northeastern Virginia got mislaid, and had to be hunted up and hurried into brigades at the fifty-ninth minute of the eleventh hour. Every thing that was done was rushed into the newspapers, and most things that were intended to be done. The railroad lines leading South, with only slight breaks, were still in use, and passes over them were freely issued, so that the rebel authorities might read the plan of to-day's operations at breakfast. But the people, drunk with hope, saw none of these things, or saw them double; and those who might have led the people, ran after them.

It may be said, in defence of the delusions of the hour, that our army was numerically stronger, as well officered, better equipped, and as well instructed as the rebel forces; and so indeed it was. But the rebel army was to act upon the defensive, ours upon the offensive. The advantage of ground would be with the enemy, the advantage of surprise, and the great advantage of cohesion at the moment of attack. On the other hand, our troops would have to move, to find the enemy, and to attack him in his chosen position, or sustain his fire delivered from behind cover or behind earthworks. But the salient point of this question is, that the result of any move-

ment, by either side, was left to chance; no man could have indicated the causes which would determine the result. It was purely chance whether any movement ordered from headquarters would be made at all; a rare chance whether it would be made at the time designated in orders; a miraculous chance if it were made exactly as ordered. By waiting a very little while, the result might have been reasonably assured. We could not wait. In the American character, Hope crowds Patience to the wall.

After much public discussion and excitement, the order was given to General McDowell to move forward.

The enemy had a force of about twenty-two thousand men, organized in eight brigades, with twenty-nine guns, encamped and intrenched at Manassas Junction, and commanded by General Gustave T. Beauregard. They had outposts at Fairfax Courthouse, and at Centreville, seven miles from the Junction. The brigades were commanded by Brigadier-Generals Ewell, Holmes, D. R. Jones, Longstreet, and Bonham, and Colonels Cocke, Evans, and Early.

General Joseph E. Johnston was at Winchester, with about twelve thousand men, watching our forces under Major-General Robert Patterson, one of the Pennsylvania three months' militia. Generals Bee and Bartow and Colonel Jackson commanded the brigades of General Johnston's army. General Patterson's force amounted to twenty-three thousand men of all arms, chiefly three months' militia.

General McDowell was to move directly upon Manassas on the 9th of July, and, turning the enemy's right flank, cut off his forces from Richmond. The movement began on the 16th. The men, unaccustomed to marching, moved very slowly. Long years of peace had nourished in the minds of our citizens a reluctance to endure pain and privation, and the citizens had not become soldiers by a mere change of clothing. The men stopped every few moments to pick blackberries, stepped aside to avoid mud-puddles, crossed fords gingerly, emptied their canteens and filled them with fresh water whenever they came to a stream. Thus the army did not reach Centreville

until the night of the 18th. Two days were spent here in reconnoissances, and on the 21st the final movement began. All this time the enemy, fully advised of our movements by the daily papers, was busily engaged in concentrating his available forces to meet our attack. That he would do so was obvious. General Scott had undertaken to guard against this, so far as the army under Johnston was concerned, by instructing General Patterson to observe him. Accordingly, after many delays, General Patterson moved from Martinsburg to Bunker Hill, nine miles from Winchester, and then turned aside and marched to Charlestown. At the very moment when Johnston was withdrawing with all speed from Winchester, and hurrying to Beauregard's aid, Patterson was retreating to the Potomac.

Tyler's division, which had marched from its camp near the Chain Bridge, on the extreme right of our lines, by the Vienna Road, was the first to reach Centreville. General Tyler's orders were to seize and hold this position, but not to bring on an engagement. He had no sooner arrived there than, elated at finding our progress undisputed by the enemy, he took the road to the left and pushed on, with Richardson's brigade, Ayres's battery, and a few cavalry, to Blackburn's Ford, where the Manassas and Centreville road crosses Bull Run. The ground on the left bank of that stream is, just here, open and gently undulating; on the other side it becomes at once heavily wooded, and ascends rather abruptly to the elevated plateau on which Manassas Junction is situated. General Tyler was surprised to find that the enemy had not occupied the left bank at the ford; and still more, that they permitted our men to approach it unmolested. Nor was the enemy to be seen on the opposite bank. He deployed the infantry, and caused Captain Ayres to open fire from his battery on the woods opposite. Instantly a hot fire, as if from four thousand muskets at once, says the general, was opened from the woods. Our troops replied for a short while, and then retired. This movement was contrary to orders; had no object worth mentioning; and its result had a most dispiriting effect upon the whole

army of General McDowell. Before it, the men had been all enthusiasm. They either would not meet the enemy at all, they dreamed, or they would whip him and chase him to Richmond. The enemy had been met, had not fled at the sight of us, and had not been whipped. The enthusiasm, which had been at the boiling point, was chilled by a doubt. The delay of the 19th and 20th, while waiting for the subsistence to come up, spread and increased the flatness.

The original plan was to turn the enemy's right, and so cut off his communication with Richmond. General McDowell had objected to moving by his right to turn the enemy's left, because the movement would be indecisive. At the eleventh hour, this indecisive course was adopted, for the reasons that the roads on the left appeared impracticable, that the enemy's attention had been attracted to Blackburn's Ford by the blunder of the 15th, and that it had now become an object to guard against the expected arrival of Johnston, by occupying his line of railway communication.

On the night of Saturday, the 20th of July, General McDowell issued his orders for the attack. Runyon's Fourth Division was left in the rear near Fairfax Courthouse. Tyler's division—except Richardson's brigade, which was to remain at Blackburn's Ford and report to Colonel Miles—was to march at half-past two o'clock on Sunday morning down the Warrenton road, and threaten the Stone Bridge. Schenck's and Sherman's brigades were encamped on the Warrenton road, about a mile beyond Centreville; Keyes's brigade, which had become separated from the rest of the division, had gone into camp half a mile east of Centreville. Hunter's division, which was about a mile and a half beyond Keyes's, was to move at two o'clock, and close up on Tyler. Heintzelman's division, which was encamped on the Braddock road, two miles east of Centreville, was to march at half-past two, and fall in in the rear of Hunter. Under cover of Tyler's attack, Hunter and Heintzelman were to move to the right, cross Bull Run at Sudley's Springs, and turn the enemy's left. Miles's division was held in reserve at Centreville, to guard

against a movement of the enemy by Blackburn's Ford, to cut off our rear.

These dispositions, except as to Runyon's division, were well made. Had they been executed, the result of the day must have been very different.

At a blacksmith's shop, about a mile in advance of Tyler's position, a branch road leads from the Warrenton pike towards Sudley's Springs. If Tyler had marched boldly forward, the rear of his division should have cleared that point in an hour, or, at the very latest, in an hour and a half. This would have enabled Hunter to file to the right certainly by four o'clock. In fact, the rear of Tyler's division did not pass the junction of the roads until half-past five, or fully an hour and a half later than it should have done. Schenck's brigade, which led the advance, started punctually at the time fixed in orders, but, as General Tyler himself explains, he felt called upon to move slowly and with caution, feeling his way down to the Stone Bridge. Thus occurred a fatal delay.

The head of Schenck's brigade reached the Stone Bridge about six o'clock, and the artillery of his and Sherman's brigades opened fire about half an hour later. Hunter's division could not find the road by which it was to march, and having been led by its guide by a wide detour through the woods, did not reach the ford until between half-past nine and ten o'clock, and occupied more than an hour in passing, so that it was after eleven o'clock before Heintzelman began to cross. The head of Hunter's column became engaged almost immediately after crossing Bull Run, and drove the enemy steadily until about noon. While Hunter was crossing, orders were sent to Tyler to press his attack. Colonel Sherman, with his brigade, accordingly crossed Bull Run at a ford just above the Stone Bridge, and pushed forward down the Warrenton road until he joined the left of Burnside's brigade of Hunter's division, then hotly engaged; Ayres's battery, being unable to cross the ford, was left behind. Sherman came into action about half-past twelve, and was at once ordered by General McDowell to join in the pursuit of the enemy, then falling

back on the left of the Groveton road. Placing Colonel Quimby's Thirteenth New York regiment in front, in column by division, Colonel Sherman ordered the other regiments to follow in line of battle, in the order of the Second Wisconsin, Seventy-ninth New York, and Sixty-ninth New York.

Thus far the tide of success had been unbroken. Our troops had effected the passage of Bull Run, had driven the enemy before them in confusion a mile and a half, and we had succeeded in uniting three divisions under the crest of the hill, which was to be the decisive point of the battle. On the left Keyes was driving back the enemy, enabling Schenck to cross and remove the obstructions in his front, and to turn the enemy's right. The crisis was at hand.

In his official report, Colonel Sherman thus graphically describes the operations of his brigade at this time: "Quimby's regiment advanced steadily down the hill and up the ridge, from which he opened fire upon the enemy, who had made another stand on ground very favorable to him; and the regiment continued advancing as the enemy gave way, till the head of the column reached the point near which Ricketts's battery was so severely cut up. The other regiments descended the hill in line of battle, under a severe cannonading; and the ground affording comparative shelter against the enemy's artillery, they changed direction by the right flank and followed the road before mentioned. At the point where this road crossed the bridge to our left the ground was swept by a most severe fire by artillery, rifle, and musketry, and we saw in succession several regiments driven from it, among them the Zouaves and battalion of Marines. Before reaching the crest of the hill the roadway was worn deep enough to afford shelter, and I kept the several regiments in it as long as possible; but when the Wisconsin Second was abreast of the enemy, by order of Major Wadsworth, of General McDowell's staff, I ordered it to leave the roadway by the left flank and to attack the enemy. This regiment ascended to the brow of the hill steadily, received the severe fire of the enemy, returned it with spirit, and advanced, delivering its fire. This regiment is uni-

formed in gray cloth, almost identical with that of the great bulk of the secession army, and when the regiment fled in confusion, and retreated towards the road, there was a universal cry that they were being fired upon by our own men. The regiment rallied again, passed the brow of the hill a second time, and was again repulsed in disorder. By this time the New York Seventy-ninth had closed up, and, in like manner, it was ordered to cross the brow of the hill and drive the enemy from cover. It was impossible to get a good view of the ground. In it there was one battery of artillery, which poured an incessant fire upon our advancing column, and the ground was irregular, with small clusters of pines, affording shelter, of which the enemy took good advantage. The fire of rifles and musketry was very severe. The Seventy-ninth, headed by its colonel (Cameron), charged across the hill, and, for a short time, the contest was severe. They rallied several times under fire, but finally broke, and gained the cover of the hill. This left the field open to the New York Sixty-ninth, Colonel Corcoran, who, in his turn, led his regiment over the crest, and had a full, open view of the ground so severely contested. The firing was very severe, and the roar of cannon, musketry, and rifles incessant. It was manifest the enemy was here in great force, far superior to us at that point. The Sixty-ninth held the ground for some time, but finally fell back in disorder."

It was now half-past three o'clock in the afternoon. The men had been up since two in the morning, had been on their legs ever since, had been engaged for four hours, and had eaten nothing. The day was intensely hot. The troops, unused to any of these things, were fagged.

There was a slight lull on the extreme right. Porter's brigade of Hunter's division, and Griffin's and Ricketts's batteries, were sent forward to occupy the crest of the hill, from which the enemy had been pushed. Hardly had they reached the position, when a murderous volley was poured into them, at pistol range, from the clump of pines that skirted the hill. Early's brigade, of Johnston's army, had arrived,

and thrown itself on our right flank. Our line began to melt. The movement was taken up reluctantly by some regiments, but soon became general. The retreat became confused, and, beyond Bull Run, the confusion became a rout. The enemy did not pursue. That night, while a council of war was discussing the expediency of holding Centreville, the sea of panic-stricken fugitives was making for Washington. Orders were issued for the coherent remains of the army to follow.

Colonel Sherman says, of his own command: "This retreat was by night, and disorderly in the extreme. The men of different regiments mingled together, and some reached the river at Arlington, some at Long Bridge, and the greater part returned to their former camps at or near Fort Corcoran. I reached this point at noon next day, and found a miscellaneous crowd crossing over the aqueduct and ferries. Conceiving this to be demoralizing, I at once commanded the guard to be increased, and all persons attempting to pass over to be stopped. This soon produced its effect. Men sought their proper companies, comparative order was restored, and all are now (July 25) posted to the best advantage."

The loss in Sherman's brigade was one hundred and eleven killed, two hundred and five wounded, two hundred and ninety-three missing; total, six hundred and nine. Our total loss in this engagement, exclusive of missing, was four hundred and eighty-one killed, one thousand and eleven wounded. The loss in killed and wounded in Sherman's brigade was nearly a fourth of that of the entire army. The enemy lost, in all, three hundred and seventy-eight killed, fourteen hundred and eighty-nine wounded, and thirty missing. His loss in killed and wounded was considerably greater than ours, but he picked up many prisoners from among the wounded and the lagging stragglers.

The prime causes which led to this disgraceful defeat are to be sought in the many delays attending the commencement and execution of the movement, in consequence of which our forces had to contend with the combined forces of Beauregard and Johnston.

The panic which followed the defeat must be traced to internal defects ; to the utter absence of coherence or cohesion in the masses of militia ; to the want of confidence of men in their officers, of officers in themselves and in their men ; to the sudden apparition of a new and undefined terror in place of the confidently expected triumph. The mass easily became a jumbled crowd of individuals, because it had never been an army.

As to the general plan of campaign, it was certainly a fatal mistake that our army clung to the banks of the Potomac a long month after it should boldly have seized upon Centreville and Manassas ; and equally so, that a force of nearly eighty thousand should have been wasted by breaking it up into three fractions, destined to stand still on exterior lines, watching the enemy concentrate on the key-point.

But the mortifying and humiliating disaster was necessary, by crushing the shell at once, to show us in a moment our weakness and utter want of solidity. Disguised until the rebellion had developed and established its strength, the disease would have been incurable. Laid bare at a stroke, the reaction set in at once, and the life of the nation was saved.

Trust in every thing and everybody around the capital was for the moment destroyed. Major-General George B. McClellan, who had been successful in his operations in Western Virginia, an accomplished officer, well known in the army, and possessing the confidence of the lieutenant-general, was at once summoned to Washington, and assigned to the command of all the troops for its defence. At the end of July, he found a few scattered regiments cowering upon the banks of the Potomac. The militia went home. The North rose. Four months later, the Army of the Potomac counted two hundred thousand soldiers ready for their work.

The sharpness with which Colonel Sherman criticised the conduct of some of the officers and men of his brigade at Bull Run, both in his official report and in his free conversations, made him many enemies ; but the vigor he had displayed on the field, added to the influence of his brother, the Honorable John Sherman, led the Ohio delegation in Congress to recom-

mend his promotion. He was commissioned as a Brigadier-General of Volunteers on the 3d of August, 1861, to date back to the 17th of May, as was the custom at that time. For a short time after this he had command of a brigade in the Army of the Potomac, but early in September, upon the organization of the Department of Kentucky, he was transferred to that theatre of operations, and ordered to report, as second in command, to Brigadier-General Robert Anderson, who was placed at the head of the department.

CHAPTER III.

THE SECESSION JUGGLE IN KENTUCKY.

THE legerdemain by which the extreme Southern States were juggled out of the Union to feed the ambition of their leaders, had proved eminently successful. A Confederate dictionary had been made, in which slavery was called "the South;" rebellion, "secession;" the execution of the laws, "coercion;" and the desires of the conspirators, "the Constitution." A Confederate logic had been constructed, in which a system of postulates was substituted for the old-fashioned syllogism, and every thing taken for granted which it was impossible to prove. Only let it be granted that where thirteen or more parties have entered into an agreement with each other, any one of them can rightfully withdraw from the arrangement whenever he chooses, without the consent of the others, and you can prove any thing. A man whose mind is so organized that he can believe that, can believe any thing. And the Southern people were carefully taught to believe it.

It followed, of course, that while those States which chose to "secede" could not rightfully be "coerced" to remain in the Union, those States which chose to stay must be forced to secede.

Unexpectedly, Kentucky chose to stay. Then the inventors of the Confederate dictionary and the Confederate logic put their heads together and hatched a new lie. They called it Neutrality.

It meant that Kentucky was to be neutral until the rebellion should become strong enough to swallow her at a mouthful. She was to arm herself to resist invasion from the South or

from the North. The governor, Beriah Magoffin, a secessionist, organized the State militia in the interest of his faction, and issued a proclamation declaring that Kentucky would remain neutral. A few prominent gentlemen, still retaining an attachment for the Union, suffered themselves to be lulled to rest by the tranquil sound of the new word. Their names had great weight at Washington. The unconditional Union men were few in numbers and weak in influence. The Government could not make up its mind what to do. The secessionists prepared for war.

Governor Magoffin called a special meeting of the Legislature, and urged that body to assemble a State Convention to consider the crisis. The Legislature met on the 28th of April. Two days afterwards the governor issued a proclamation declaring in effect that Kentucky would assume a position of belligerent neutrality, and would defend herself against invasion from any quarter. On the 22d of May, the Legislature resolved that the governor's proclamation of neutrality was not a true exponent of the views of the people. The State Militia law was so amended as to require the State Guard to take the oath of allegiance to the United States. On the 24th of May, the last day of the session, the Senate passed resolutions declaring that "Kentucky will not sever connection from the National Government, nor take up arms for either belligerent party, but arm herself for the preservation of peace within her borders, and tender their services as mediators to effect a just and honorable peace." The resolutions were lost in the House by a vote of forty-nine to forty-three. The secessionists began to be seriously alarmed. Their fears were not diminished when the result of the election for members of Congress, held on the 1st of July, showed a majority for the Union candidates of more than fifty-five thousand.

The Legislature met again on the 3d of September. In the mean time, the Government had authorized Lovell H. Rousseau to raise a brigade in Kentucky for the United States service, and the Confederate troops, under Polk, had just invaded the State and occupied Hickman and Chalk Bluffs. General Grant,

who had been watching the progress of affairs, immediately took the responsibility of occupying Paducah. The secessionists, headed by the governor, loudly demanded that both belligerents should withdraw their forces. They hoped to frighten the Government of the United States into compliance, while the rebel authorities, being under no obligation to listen to them, should absorb the State. On the 11th, the Legislature, by a vote of 71 to 26, requested the Governor to order the Confederate troops to evacuate the State. A series of test resolves was at once introduced, declaring that the neutrality of Kentucky and the rights of her people had been invaded by the so-called Southern Confederate forces, requesting the governor to call out the military force of the State to expel the invaders, and invoking the assistance of the United States to that end. In the Assembly, the vote stood sixty-eight to twenty-six. On the 13th, the governor vetoed the resolutions. The Legislature promptly repassed them over his veto, by more than a two-thirds vote.

The Confederate tactics changed at once. The men who had declared they must go with their State found they were under no obligation to stay with their State. The men who had protested that it was a crime to coerce a State to remain in the Union, discovered that it was their sacred duty to coerce Kentucky to leave the Union. Buckner and Breckinridge fled, and at once took commands as general officers in the Confederate service. They were followed by their fellow-conspirators, and by all whom their arguments or promises had seduced.

On the 17th of September, Buckner seized a railway-train, and moved from Bowling Green upon Louisville. An accident to the train delayed him within forty miles of the city, and by the time he was ready to move again, Rousseau's brigade and a battalion of Home-guards was ready to oppose him; so he abandoned the attempt.

In compliance with the call of the Legislature, and by order of the President, Brigadier-General Robert Anderson assumed command of the Military Department of Kentucky on the 21st

September, and immediately made preparations for organizing the full quota of troops which the State had been called upon to furnish for the national service. The invasion of the State by the Confederate troops had torn the mask from the designs of the secessionists, and it was no longer possible to favor them openly. A strong pressure was, however, still exerted, in more or less secrecy, to keep men out of the Union army, to encourage their enlistment in the Confederate army, and to obstruct the operations of the Union authorities. The young men had nearly all been seduced into the rebel service, at first by the cry that they must fight for their State, and next by the cry that they must fight for slavery, under the name of "the South," against their State. Recruiting for the Union army went on very slowly, and meanwhile, at Bowling Green and Nashville, Polk and Zollicoffer were gathering large bodies of rebel troops to invade and hold Kentucky.

Brigadier-General Anderson, finding his health, already delicate, unequal to the demands made upon his strength by the cares and responsibilities of his position under these trying circumstances, asked the War Department to relieve him from command. His request was complied with, and on the 7th of October he was relieved by Brigadier-General Sherman, then in command of a brigade at Lexington.

General Sherman at once set to work with great energy to organize his department, and prepare the troops for the task before them.

The quota of volunteers which Kentucky was called upon to raise was forty thousand, and with these General Sherman was expected by the War Department to defend the State and drive the enemy from her soil. They were raised very slowly, and but few reinforcements came from any quarter. At the close of October, Sherman had succeeded in collecting and organizing a force of nine thousand men at Lexington, and ten thousand in front of Louisville. The enemy had at the same time about fifteen thousand at Bowling Green, under Buckner, and a strong force at Cumberland Gap, under Zollicoffer. Bowling Green is the key to the military possession of Cen-

tral Kentucky, and Cumberland Gap to that of Eastern Kentucky.

General McClellan, who succeeded to the chief command of the army on the 1st of November, immediately adopted a general plan of campaign, in which the operations in the Department of the Cumberland were subordinate to and formed a co-operative part of those of the principal army on the Potomac ; but the people, the press, and the Administration had become impatient of the general inactivity of our forces, and were clamoring for their advance. On the 16th of October, the Secretary of War, Mr. Cameron, accompanied by Brigadier-General Lorenzo Thomas, Adjutant-General of the Army, visited General Sherman at Louisville, for the purpose of ascertaining, in a personal interview, the precise condition and prospect of affairs in this quarter. Sherman shared the objections entertained by Lieutenant-General Scott, and now by Major-General McClellan, to what the former termed "a little war," and believed, with them, with all the ardor of his temperament, in the necessity of concentrated and decisive movements by armies large enough not merely to undertake a successful advance, but to finish the war. He did not, however, as General McClellan seems to have done, overlook the importance of schooling his troops by minor operations, and keeping up their spirits by minor successes ; but he looked further ahead than was agreeable in a subordinate commander. Short views, generally the happiest, are often the wisest ; but it is not always possible for a man of powerful nervous organization, and strong perceptions of cause and effect, to take short views. He frequently sees the future too clearly to contemplate the present with calmness. So it was now with Sherman.

The secretary of war asked him how many troops he would require in his department. Sherman replied, "Sixty thousand to drive the enemy out of Kentucky ; two hundred thousand to finish the war in this section." Convinced of the inutility of advancing against the enemy until our strength would render success decisive as well as reasonably certain, while defeat

would not be irreparable, and aware of the ease with which the enemy, driven out of Kentucky, could concentrate and recuperate in Tennessee, and calling to his aid the vast reserves then at his command, would finally compel us hastily to summon to the field at the eleventh hour, and concentrate upon an advanced and exposed position, a much larger force than would have been required in the first instance ; perceiving these things clearly and sharply, he could not sympathize with, or even comprehend the spirit of his superiors, who were all for present success, and for trusting to-morrow entirely to the future. On the other hand, the secretary of war and the adjutant-general could not understand Sherman, nor see the utility of a delay which they regarded as merely temporizing. Looking only at the force of the enemy then actually in arms in Sherman's immediate front, they considered that he vastly overestimated the obstacles with which he would have to contend. Calculations of difficulties generally seem to earnest men, not thoroughly familiar with the subject-matter, to spring from timidity or want of zeal. In a few days the report of the adjutant-general, embracing full particulars of the condition of all the Western armies, as shown by this inspection, was given to the public in all the newspapers. In referring to General Sherman, General Thomas simply stated that he had said he would require two hundred thousand men. Great excitement and indignation was occasioned in the popular mind by this announcement. A writer for one of the newspapers declared that Sherman was crazy. Insanity is hard to prove ; harder still to disprove, especially when the suspicion rests upon a difference of opinion ; and then the infirmities of great minds are always fascinating to common minds. The public seized with avidity upon the anonymous insinuation, and accepted it as an established conclusion.

On the 12th of November, Brigadier-General Don Carlos Buell was ordered by Major-General McClellan to relieve Brigadier-General Sherman from the command of the Department of the Cumberland ; and the latter was ordered to report to Major-General Halleck, commanding the Department of the

West. General Buell was at once strongly reinforced, so as to enable him to take the offensive during the latter part of winter.

These events embody the same useful lesson of tolerance for the conflicting opinions of others that has been pointedly taught us again and again during this war. At this distance of time, Sherman's views seem scarcely so extraordinary as they did to the public in 1861. Many more than two hundred thousand men have been required to hold permanently Kentucky and Tennessee; for, indeed, here as elsewhere, we have had to contend not alone against the force which the enemy has actually had in the field at any given time, but against that force augmented by the whole able-bodied male population behind it.

Fortunately, indeed, under a powerful nervous organization, in spite of the workings of a myriad of irritable fibres, there lay at the bottom the germs of a patience that was to render the genius of Sherman still useful to the republic.

Although thus suffering in the popular estimation and in the confidence of the War Department, General Sherman did not altogether lose the hold he had so long maintained upon the respect of his brother officers. The general-in-chief thought he might still be useful in a subordinate capacity, although he had failed to give satisfaction in command of an important department. Major-General Halleck, to whom he now reported, considered him competent to the charge of the rendezvous for volunteers at the Benton Barracks, near St. Louis, and assigned him to that duty. With the monotonous and endless details of such a camp, Sherman was occupied during the winter of 1861.

General Halleck's command was the largest in extent of any of the departments, as organized at the time, and was considered by the general-in-chief as only inferior in importance to that of the Potomac, to which his personal attention was given. It embraced two distinct theatres of operations, extending from the line of the Cumberland River westward towards Kansas; and divided by the Mississippi River. Of these, the chief in

importance was east of the Mississippi. The enemy held Columbus on the Mississippi, Forts Henry and Donelson on the Tennessee, and Bowling Green in the adjoining Department of the Cumberland. These positions gave him the control of Western and Central Kentucky, and each of them was strongly fortified and occupied in large force. Major-General Leonidas Polk commanded at Columbus, Brigadier-General John B. Floyd at Fort Donelson, and Brigadier-General Simon B. Buckner at Bowling Green. The Cumberland was the dividing line between the Department of the Ohio, commanded by General Buell, and the Department of the West. It was determined to endeavor to break through the centre of the enemy's long line by ascending the Cumberland and Tennessee rivers, aided by a flotilla of gunboats which had been prepared at Cairo and at St. Louis, under the command of Captain A. H. Foote, of the navy. To Brigadier-General Ulysses S. Grant, then commanding at Paducah, was assigned the chief direction of the movement. Very little was known of this officer. He had graduated at West Point in 1843, had served in the Fourth Infantry until 1854, when having risen to the grade of captain, he resigned his commission and settled, in private life, in Illinois, as a surveyor. On the breaking out of the war, having offered his services to Governor Yates in any capacity in which he could be useful, he was for some time engaged in assisting the adjutant-general of the State in organizing the three months' volunteers. On the organization of the three years' troops, he accepted the colonelcy of the Sixty-Third Illinois regiment, and exhibited such marked efficiency in its instruction and discipline, that he was soon commissioned as a brigadier-general of volunteers. He had commanded the brigade engaged in the demonstration against Belmont, Missouri, on the 7th of November, 1861.

Suddenly the gloom of that dark winter, during which our large armies slept, our small forces encountered defeat, and the signs of anarchy gathered ominously from every quarter, was broken by a victory. Fort Henry was taken by Brigadier-General Grant on the 6th February, 1862. On

the 16th of the same month, Fort Donelson surrendered unconditionally to the same officer, with a garrison of about twelve thousand men. In answer to the request of the rebel commander Buckner, for a parley and more favorable terms, Grant replied that he could consent to no terms but those of unconditional surrender, and tersely added, "I propose to move immediately upon your works." A shout of joy rang throughout the land. Grant was made a major-general without an hour's delay. In a fervid letter to the *New York Tribune*, the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, vented his enthusiasm in raptures over the unconditional surrender, and cited with admiration the proposal to move immediately upon the enemy's works. Grant was the hero of the hour.

By the President's War Order, No. 3, dated March 11, 1862, relieving Major-General McClellan from the chief command of the army, Major-General Halleck was assigned to the command of the Department of the Mississippi, embracing all the troops west of a line drawn indefinitely north and south through Knoxville, Tennessee, and east of the western boundaries of Missouri and Arkansas. Major-General Grant was shortly afterwards assigned by General Halleck to the command of the army in the field, operating on the line of the Tennessee River.

When Grant moved upon Fort Donelson, Sherman was ordered to Paducah, to take charge of the duty of forwarding supplies and reinforcements from that point. He set to work with a characteristic energy that must have found room enough to expand itself, for troops were hard to move in those days, and supplies, owing to the greenness of some and the rustiness of other officers of the quartermaster's department, harder still. General Grant took occasion to acknowledge the great importance of the services thus rendered.

The Army of the Tennessee, after some changes, was finally organized in six divisions, of which Major-General John A. McClernand commanded the first; Major-General Charles F. Smith, the second; Brigadier-General Lewis Wallace, the third; Brigadier-General Stephen A. Hurlbut, the fourth;

Brigadier-General William T. Sherman, the fifth; and Brigadier-General B. M. Prentiss, the sixth. The fifth division was composed almost entirely of the rawest troops, hastily gathered together and thrown into brigades, none of whom had ever been under fire, or, indeed, under discipline. Sherman took command of his division at Paducah early in March.

During all this time the public heard nothing of Sherman. The press said nothing against him; it had ostracised and then forgotten him. He was under a cloud still, but it was about to lift for a brief period.

CHAPTER IV.

SHILOH.

THE enemy's forces under General A. S. Johnston, consisting of the corps of Polk, Bragg, and Hardee, of two divisions each, and the reserve division of Brigadier-General Breckinridge, having successively evacuated Columbus and Nashville, and abandoned Tennessee and Kentucky, with the exception of Memphis and Cumberland Gap, had concentrated at Corinth, in Mississippi, and were there awaiting the development of our plans, ready to act according to circumstances, on the offensive or defensive, and to take advantage of any error we might make. The position was well chosen for observing our movements, for covering the line of the Mississippi, or for menacing the flank and rear of an army invading Mississippi and Alabama.

General Halleck decided to advance up the Tennessee River as far as practicable by water; then to debark on the west bank, attack the enemy at Corinth, and endeavor to cut him off from the East, and compel his surrender either at Corinth or on the banks of the Mississippi. Grant was ordered to move up the Tennessee, and Buell to march from Nashville and join him near Savannah, Tennessee.

On the 14th of March, Sherman, with the leading division of Grant's army, passed up the Tennessee on transports, and after making a feint of landing at Eastport, dropped down the stream and disembarked at Pittsburgh Landing. It was Sherman's intention to march from this point seven miles in the direction of Iuka, and then halting his infantry, to dispatch the cavalry to the nearest point on the Memphis and Charles-

ton railway. The attempt was made, but the enemy was encountered in greater force than had been expected, and it did not succeed. In the mean while, Major-General Charles F. Smith, who had command of the advance, having landed his own second division at Savannah, had selected Pittsburgh Landing as the most favorable position for the encampment of the main body of the army, and under his instructions Sherman and Hurlbut, who, with the fourth division, had closely followed him, went into camp there. In the course of a few days they were joined by the first and sixth divisions of McClelland and Prentiss, and by Smith's own division from Savannah; and Major-General Grant himself arrived and took command in person. During the last week of March, the Army of the Tennessee only waited for the Army of the Ohio. General Buell had informed General Grant that he would join him before that time; but he had encountered great delays, and on the morning of the sixth of April the Army of the Ohio had not yet come. It was hourly expected. Instructions had been sent by General Grant to expedite its advance, and to push on to Pittsburgh. The importance of the crisis was apparent, for Johnston would naturally seek to strike Grant before Buell's arrival; but Buell marched his troops with the same deliberation as if no other army depended upon his promptness. By express orders he even caused intervals of six miles to be observed between his divisions on the march, thus lengthening out his column to a distance of over thirty miles.

Pittsburgh is not a village, but simply a steamboat landing, containing a log hut or two, and is situated in a deep ravine, down which the Corinth road leads to the Tennessee River. The distance to Corinth is twenty miles. The ground in front of Pittsburgh is an undulating table-land, about a hundred feet above the road bottom, lying between two small tributaries of the Tennessee, Lick Creek on the south, and Snake Creek on the north, and having a front of about three miles between the two streams. Owl Creek rises near the source of Lick Creek, and flowing northeasterly, empties into Snake

Creek. Towards the river the bank is broken into abrupt ravines, and rises gradually to a range of low hills, which form the steep north banks of Lick Creek. The country is covered with a heavy forest, easily passable for troops, except where the dense undergrowth now and then constitutes an obstruction, and is sparsely broken by a few small cleared farms of about eighty acres each. The soil is a tenacious clay. About two miles from the landing the road to Corinth forks into two branches, forming the Lower Corinth road and the Ridge Corinth road; and another road leads off, still further to the left, across Lick Creek to Hamburg, a few miles up the Tennessee River. On the right, two roads lead almost due west to Purdy, and another in a northerly direction across Snake Creek, down the river to Crump's Landing, six miles below. Innumerable smaller roads intersect these.

On the front of this position, facing to the south and southwest, five divisions of the Army of the Tennessee were encamped on the morning of the 6th of April. On the extreme left lay Stuart's brigade of Sherman's division, on the Hamburg road, behind the abrupt bank of Lick Creek. Prentiss's small division, facing to the south, carried the line across a branch of the main Corinth road, nearly to Sherman's left. Sherman facing to the south, with his right thrown back towards the landing, extended the front to the Purdy road, near Owl Creek. This advanced line was about two miles from the landing. Near the river, about a mile in rear of Prentiss and Stuart, Hurlbut's division was encamped; McClelland's was posted to the left and rear of Sherman, covering the interval between him and Prentiss; and C. F. Smith's division, commanded during his severe illness at Savannah by Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace, was on the right of Hurlbut. Lewis Wallace's division was six miles distant, at Crump's Landing. Our whole force in front of Pittsburgh was about thirty thousand men.

On Friday, the 4th of April, the enemy's cavalry had made a demonstration upon the picket line, drove it in on Sherman's centre, and captured a lieutenant and seven men. They were

driven back by the cavalry of Sherman's division, and pursued for a distance of about five miles, with considerable loss. The next day the enemy's cavalry had again showed itself in our front, but there was nothing to indicate a general attack until seven o'clock on Sunday morning, when the advance guard on Sherman's front was forced in upon his main line. Sherman at once got his men under arms, sent a request to General McClelland to support his left, and informed Generals Prentiss and Hurlbut that the enemy was before him in force. Sherman's division was posted as follows: The first brigade, under Colonel J. A. McDowell, consisting of his own regiment, the 6th Iowa; 40th Illinois, Colonel Hicks; 46th Ohio, Colonel Worthington, and Captain Behr's "Morton" Battery held the right, guarding the bridge over Owl Creek, on the Purdy road. The fourth brigade, commanded by Colonel Buckland of the 72d Ohio, and including that regiment; the 48th Ohio, Colonel Sullivan, and the 70th Ohio, Colonel Cockerill, continued the line, its left resting on Shiloh meeting-house. The third brigade, commanded by Colonel Hildebrand of the 77th Ohio, was composed of that regiment, the 53d Ohio, Colonel Appler, and the 57th Ohio, Colonel Mungen, and was posted to the left of the Corinth road, its right resting on Shiloh meeting-house. Taylor's battery of light artillery was in position at the meeting-house, and Waterhouse's on a ridge to the left commanding the open ground between Appler's and Mungen's regiments. Eight companies of the 4th Illinois cavalry, Colonel Dickey, were placed in a large open field in rear of the centre of the division. Stuart's second brigade was, as we have seen, detached, and on the extreme left of the army.

The enemy formed under cover of the brush that lines the Owl Creek bottom, and at eight o'clock opened fire from his artillery, and moved forward his infantry across the open ground and up the slope that separated him from our lines. It now became evident that a general and determined attack was intended. Under cover of the advance on Sherman's front, the enemy was seen moving heavy masses to the left to

attack Prentiss. About nine, the firing told that Prentiss was giving ground, and presently Colonel Appler's Fifty-third Ohio and Colonel Mungen's Fifty-seventh Ohio regiments broke in disorder, exposing Waterhouse's battery. A brigade of McClermand's division, which had been promptly moved forward by General McClermand to the support of Sherman's left, formed the immediate supports of this battery; but the enemy advanced with such vigor, and kept up so severe a fire, that the three regiments composing it were soon also in disorder, and the battery was lost. McDowell's and Buckland's brigades, and the remaining regiment of Hildebrand's brigade, maintained the position at Shiloh for an hour longer; but ten o'clock found the enemy pressing heavily upon Sherman's front, their artillery supported by infantry entirely in rear of the left flank of the division, and Hildebrand's own regiment broken up also; so that it was found necessary to change position at once, and Sherman accordingly gave orders to retire his line to the Purdy and Hamburgh road, near McClermand's first position, and there continue the defence. Taylor's battery was sent to the rear at once to take up the new position, and hold the enemy in check while the movement was in progress. Riding across the angle, General Sherman met, at the intersection of this road with the Corinth road, Captain Behr's battery, attached to Colonel McDowell's brigade, and ordered it to come into battery. The captain had hardly given the order to his men, when he was struck by a musket-ball and fell from his horse. Dismayed, the drivers and gunners incontinently fled without firing a single shot, carrying with them the caissons and one gun, and abandoning the other six to the enemy, who was vigorously pressing forward. General Sherman being thus reduced to the necessity of again choosing a new line, and of abandoning the attempt to maintain his old one, promptly moved the coherent remainder of his division, consisting of Colonel McDowell's and Colonel Buckland's brigades, Captain Taylor's battery, and three guns of Captain Waterhouse's battery, to the support of General McClermand's right, which was just

then seriously menaced. At half-past ten the enemy made a furious attack on the whole front of McClermand's division, and for some time pressed it hard; but the opportune movement of Colonel McDowell's brigade directly against his left flank, forced him back, and relieved the pressure. Taking advantage of the cover which the trees and felled timber afforded, and of a wooded ravine on the right, Sherman held this position for four hours, stubbornly contesting it with the enemy, who continued to make the most determined efforts to drive us back upon the river. General Grant visited this part of the lines about three in the afternoon, conversed with McClermand and Sherman, and informed them of the condition of affairs on the other parts of the field, where our resistance had been less successful. An hour later it became evident to both the division commanders, from the sounds heard in that direction, that Hurlbut had fallen back towards the river; and having been informed by General Grant that General Lewis Wallace was on his way from Crump's Landing with his entire division, they agreed upon a new line of defence, covering the bridge over Snake Creek, by which these reinforcements were expected to approach. The retirement to the position so selected was made deliberately, and in as good order as could have been expected. Many stragglers and fragments of troops were encountered during the movement, and united with the two divisions. The enemy's cavalry attempting a charge was handsomely repulsed. The Fifth Ohio cavalry arriving upon the ground, held the enemy in check for some time, until Major Ezra Taylor, chief of artillery of Sherman's division, came up with Schwartz's battery of McClermand's division, and opened an effective fire upon the enemy's flank as he pressed forward against McClermand's right. McClermand having now deployed his division on its new line, ordered a charge, which was handsomely executed, driving the enemy from his front, and forcing them to seek cover in the ravines in advance of our right. It was now five o'clock. The new line had been well selected, and afforded us a decided advantage, the ground along its front being open for a distance of

about two hundred yards. The enemy's momentum was spent, and he did not afterwards attempt to cross this open space.

On the left the day had scarcely gone so well. The weight of the enemy's attack was chiefly directed against this wing. The two brigades of Prentiss gave way early in the morning, and drifted to the rear as Hurlbut advanced to their support, and by ten o'clock the division had melted away. Hurlbut made a gallant fight, obstinately contesting the ground with varying success, until four o'clock in the afternoon, when his division also was pressed to the rear, and the whole line compelled to retire. Smith's division, under the command of Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace, had been moved upon Hurlbut's right, and had materially aided in holding our ground there, but had in its turn been forced back. Colonel Stuart's brigade held the extreme left until the pressure of the enemy on its front, and the exposure of its flank by the disaster to Prentiss, forced it successively to take up new lines of defence on the ridges which broke the ground towards the river. Our troops held this last line firmly. It was now after six o'clock in the afternoon. The battle had lasted nearly twelve hours. Our troops had been driven from all their camps of the morning, except Wallace's, to the line of woods in the rear, had been dislodged from that position, and again pressed back, and now held a line perpendicular to the river, with its left resting on the bluff behind which the landing was situated, and only half a mile from it. The enemy gathered up his forces, and made a last desperate effort to gain this position. But his losses had been very heavy, his troops were much shaken by the hard fighting they had encountered, and the spirit which characterized their first onset in the morning had burned out. Cheatham's division and Gladden's brigade, which now held the extreme right of the Confederate line on the river, lay directly under the fire of our artillery. They attempted to take it, but were repulsed in great disorder.

A galling fire of artillery and musketry was poured into them; and the gunboats "Lexington" and "Tyler" swept the flanks with their nine-inch shell. Their troops were re-formed with

difficulty. Night was closing in. General Beauregard gave the orders to retire out of range, and the battle was over.

Darkness fell upon the disordered and confused remnants of two large armies. In each the losses had been very heavy, the straggling fearful, and the confusion almost inextricable. But the enemy had failed. He had attempted to force us back upon the river and compel our surrender, and had not done so. In the morning we would attack him and seek to drive him from the field. General Grant had given verbal orders to that effect to General Sherman about 3 P. M., before the last repulse of the enemy.

General Albert Sidney Johnston, the Confederate commander-in-chief, was mortally wounded in front of Sherman's division, and died shortly afterwards at half-past two o'clock. Two regiments of Nelson's division, of the Army of the Ohio, crossed the river, and arrived upon the extreme left of the field about six o'clock, in time to fire a few shots just before the final repulse. As Nelson's troops came up, they met an appalling sight. A crowd of from seven to ten thousand panic-stricken wretches thronged the landing, crouching behind trees and under the bluff to avoid the enemy's shell, which had begun to drop in among them, and giving vent to the most sickening cries that we were whipped, and cut to pieces, and imploring their newly-arrived comrades to share their shame. But the gallant men of Nelson's division were unmoved by the scene, and greeted the loathsome pack with jeers and sarcasm. It is perhaps natural enough that those who saw only the stragglers should have found it hard to believe that any one had fought. Yet the greater portion of the Army of the Tennessee had stood to their arms, and had repulsed the enemy.

The troops slept that night in good spirits, although about midnight they were drenched by the heavy rain which began to fall. They knew that the enemy had failed, that Lewis Wallace would be up during the night, that Buell was arriving, and that in the morning these fresh battalions would be hurled against the shaken and broken foe. The "Lexington"

dropped a shell into the enemy's lines every ten minutes, until 1 A. M., when the "Tyler" took her turn at the same task, firing every quarter of an hour till daylight. The demoralizing shriek of the navy shells, while it robbed the enemy of rest, was inspiring music to the ears of our wearied troops. During the night the remainder of Nelson's division crossed the river, and took position in the left front; and later came Crittenden's division, followed by McCook's, successively extending the line to the right and connecting with Hurlbut's left. Lewis Wallace arrived about 1 A. M., and came into position on Sherman's right.

Daybreak of the 7th found the enemy out of sight in our front. He showed no signs of advancing. Beauregard did not know that Buell had come, and yet he did not attack. As soon as it was fairly light, the division commanders received the orders promised by General Grant at the close of the previous day's battle, to move upon the enemy and drive him from our front. By six o'clock our artillery opened fire on the left. About seven, Nelson, Crittenden, and McCook pushed forward, and by ten were warmly engaged with the enemy in a contest for the possession of the old camps. Hurlbut, McClernand, Sherman, and Wallace now moved steadily forward. The open fields in front of the log church of Shiloh were reached. The enemy's position here was a strong one, and he contested it obstinately. For more than three hours he held his ground in the scrub-oak thicket. But by one o'clock his weakness had become apparent. He was yielding everywhere, and giving palpable signs of exhaustion. General Beauregard gave orders to withdraw from the contest. About 2 P. M. his right retired, and two hours later his left followed. The movement was made in tolerable order. Near the junction of the Hamburg and Pittsburgh road with the Hamburg and Corinth road, his rear-guard under Breckinridge made a stand; and the next day his retreat was continued to Corinth. On the 8th, Sherman, with two brigades, followed Breckinridge to the point where he made his first stand. But our troops were worn out, disorganized, out of supplies, and

in no condition to enter upon a campaign. They returned to Pittsburgh to refit and reorganize. Sherman lost 318 killed, 1,275 wounded, and 441 missing; total, 2,034. Brigadier-General W. H. L. Wallace was killed during the first day, and Brigadier-General B. M. Prentiss taken prisoner, and their divisions broken up and distributed.

The enemy went into battle on the 6th with forty thousand three hundred and fifty-five effective men. His losses, as stated by General Beauregard in his official report, were, in killed, 1,728; wounded, 8,012; missing, 959; total, 10,699. General Beauregard says: "On Monday, from exhaustion and other causes, not twenty thousand men could be brought into action on our side." If we suppose two-thirds of the casualties to have occurred on Sunday, there should still have been over thirty-eight thousand men with the rebel colors on Monday; and even imagining, for the sake of illustration, that all the losses took place on the first day, the enemy should have had nearly thirty-five thousand fighting men on the second. Yet that number was less than twenty thousand. Here are from fifteen to eighteen thousand men to be accounted for, or about half of his remaining force. These are the stragglers.

General Beauregard, in his official report, estimate the Union forces engaged on Sunday at forty-five thousand, the remnant of General Grant's forces on Monday morning at twenty thousand, and the reinforcements received during the preceding night at thirty-three thousand, making fifty-three thousand arrayed against him on that day, or seventy-eight thousand on both days; and he set down our aggregate losses at twenty thousand.

The enemy's troops were comparatively old. Bragg's corps had been under fire at Pensacola; Polk's, at Columbus; and Hardee's, at Mill Spring, in Kentucky. A considerable portion of them had been organized and drilled since the summer of 1861, but there was also a large infusion of new regiments and new men, troops which had never been under fire, and militia just from the States. The commander-in-chief, General Albert Sidney Johnston, was one of the ablest officers of

the old regular army of the United States. General Beauregard, his second in command, had been known as a skilful officer of engineers, and by the exercise of his popular talents had suddenly achieved a reputation which his subsequent history has failed to sustain. Of Grant's army only two divisions had been under fire. Sherman's, Prentiss's, Hurlbut's, and Lewis Wallace's were all new and raw.

The Union soldiers showed that they could fight, and that they would. They proved themselves superior to defeat. General Sherman says in his official report :—

“My division was made up of regiments perfectly new, all having received their muskets for the first time at Paducah. None of them had ever been under fire, or beheld heavy columns of an enemy bearing down on them, as this did on last Sunday. To expect of them the coolness and steadiness of older troops would be wrong. They knew not the value of combination and organization. When individual fear seized them, the first impulse was to get away. My third brigade did break much too soon, and I am not yet advised where they were Sunday afternoon and Monday morning. Colonel Hildebrand, its commander, was as cool as any man I ever saw, and no one could have made stronger efforts to hold his men to their places than he did. He kept his own regiment, with individual exceptions, in hand an hour after Appler's and Mungen's regiments had left their proper field of action. Colonel Buckland managed his brigade well. I commend him to your notice as a cool, intelligent, and judicious gentleman, needing only confidence and experience to make a good commander. His subordinates, Colonels Sullivan and Cockerill, behaved with great gallantry, the former receiving a severe wound on Sunday, and yet commanding and holding his regiment well in hand all day; and on Monday until his right arm was broken by a shot, Cockerill held a larger proportion of his men than any colonel in my division, and was with me from first to last. Colonel J. A. McDowell, commanding the first brigade, held his ground on Sunday till I ordered him to fall back, which he did in line of battle; and when ordered, he con-

ducted the attack on the enemy's left in good style. In falling back to the next position he was thrown from his horse and injured, and his brigade was not in position on Monday morning. His subordinates, Colonels Hicks and Worthington, displayed great personal courage. Colonel Hicks led his regiment in the attack on Sunday, and received a wound which is feared may prove fatal. He is a brave and gallant gentleman, and deserves well of his country. Lieutenant-Colonel Walcutt, of the Ohio Forty-sixth, was severely wounded on Sunday, and has been disabled ever since. My second brigade, Colonel Stuart, was detached near two miles from my headquarters. He had to fight his own battle on Sunday against superior numbers, as the enemy interposed between him and General Prentiss early in the day. Colonel Stuart was wounded severely, and yet reported for duty on Monday morning, but was compelled to leave during the day, when the command devolved on Colonel T. Kilby Smith, who was always in the thickest of the fight, and led the brigade handsomely. . . . Lieutenant-Colonel Kyle, of the Seventy-first was mortally wounded on Sunday. . . . Several times during the battle cartridges gave out, but General Grant had thoughtfully kept a supply coming from the rear. When I appealed to regiments to stand fast although out of cartridges, I did so because to retire a regiment for any cause has a bad effect on others. I commend the Fortieth Illinois and Thirteenth Missouri for thus holding their ground under heavy fire, although their cartridge-boxes were empty. Great credit is due the fragments of men of the disordered regiments, who kept in the advance. I observed and noticed them, but until the brigadiers and colonels make their reports, I cannot venture to name individuals, but will in due season notice all who kept in our front, as well as those who preferred to keep back near the steamboat landing."

Sherman was everywhere; encouraging his troops, rallying the stragglers, directing the batteries with his own hands, advising with other commanders, superintending every movement in person. Those who still fancied him crazy did not, after

this, deny his energy, coolness, courage, skill, and perseverance upon the battle-field. This was his first battle, and yet so ingrained were the details of war upon his mind, that his spirit leaped at once above the novelty of the situation, and wore the new experience like an old habit. On Sunday, he was wounded by a bullet through the left hand, but bandaged it, and went on with his work. On Monday, he was again wounded, and had three horses shot under him, but mounted a fourth and stayed on the field.

General Grant says, in his official report, otherwise sufficiently formal: "I feel it a duty to a gallant and able officer, Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman, to make special mention. He not only was with his command during the entire two days of the action, but displayed great judgment and skill in the management of his men. Although severely wounded in the hand on the first day, his place was never vacant."

A few days later, Major-General Halleck, not given to unmixed praise, having arrived upon the ground, went so far as to observe, "It is the unanimous opinion here that Brigadier-General W. T. Sherman saved the fortunes of the day on the 6th, and contributed largely to the glorious victory of the 7th. . . . I respectfully recommend that he be made a major-general of volunteers, to date from the 6th instant."

And on the 26th of July, 1863, in urging Sherman's promotion as a brigadier-general in the regular army, General Grant wrote to the War Department: "At the battle of Shiloh, on the first day, he held, with raw troops, the key point of the landing. It is no disparagement to any other officer to say, that I do not believe there was another division commander on the field who had the skill and experience to have done it. To his individual efforts I am indebted for the success of that battle."

CHAPTER V.

CORINTH.

IMMEDIATELY after the battle of Shiloh, Major-General Halleck left Saint Louis, proceeded to Pittsburgh Landing, and there took personal command of the forces, which he caused to be reinforced from other parts of his department. Major-General Pope was placed in command of the left wing, Major-General Buell of the centre, Major-General Thomas of the right wing, and Major-General McClelland of the reserve, while Major-General Grant was assigned, by General Halleck, to nominal duty as second in command.

After his repulse at Shiloh, Beauregard concentrated his army at Corinth, and, strongly fortifying that position, and summoning to his aid all the available troops in the southwest, including the armies of Price and Van Dorn, from Missouri and Arkansas, as well as the militia of the States of Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, prepared for a determined defence. "Soldiers of Shiloh and Elkhorn!" he said to his troops, "we are about to meet once more in the shock of battle the invaders of our soil, the despoilers of our homes, the disturbers of our family ties, face to face, hand to hand. . . . With your mingled banners, for the first time during this war, we shall meet the foe in strength that should give us victory. Soldiers, can the result be doubtful? Shall we not drive back into Tennessee the presumptuous mercenaries collected for our subjugation? One more manly effort, and, trusting in God and the justness of our cause, we shall recover more than we have lately lost."

Bragg, too, addressed his men in the same strain, telling them: "You will encounter him in your chosen position, strong

by nature and improved by art, away from his main support and reliance—gunboats and heavy batteries—and for the first time in this war, with nearly equal numbers.”

Corinth, ninety-three miles west-southwest from Memphis, and twenty-nine miles from Pittsburgh, is the junction of the Mobile and Ohio and the Memphis and Charleston railroads. These two great lines intersecting each other at right angles, connect the Mississippi with the Atlantic and the Ohio with the Gulf.

On the 13th of May, having three thousand four hundred and ten absent, sick, and wounded, out of a total of five thousand four hundred and sixty men, Sherman found it necessary to consolidate his division into three brigades, as follows: First brigade, to be commanded by Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith, Eighth Missouri, Fifty-fifth Illinois, Fifty-fourth Ohio, and Fifty-seventh Ohio; second brigade, Colonel J. A. McDowell, Sixth Iowa, Forty-sixth Ohio, Fortieth Illinois, and Seventy-seventh Ohio; third brigade, Colonel R. P. Buckland, Seventy-second Ohio, Seventieth Ohio, Forty-eighth Ohio, and Fifty-third Ohio. On the following day, however, Brigadier-General James W. Denver arrived, reported to General Sherman for duty, and was assigned to the command of the third brigade.

General Halleck advanced cautiously and by slow marches, intrenching at every step. On the afternoon of 17th of May, in conformity with instructions previously received by him from the commander-in-chief, General Sherman made dispositions to drive the enemy from his position at Russell's house, on a hill situated about a mile and a quarter from the outer intrenchments of Corinth, and about two miles in advance of the main camps of our army. Requesting General Hurlbut to put in motion two regiments and a battery of artillery, at three o'clock p. m., on the road which passes the front of his line and runs to Russell's house, Sherman ordered General Denver to take a right-hand road with two regiments of his brigade and one battery of light artillery, namely, the Seventieth and Seventy-second Ohio, and Barrett's battery, and

gave him a guide so to conduct his march as to arrive on the left of the enemy's position by the time he was engaged in front; and ordered General Morgan L. Smith's brigade, with Bouton's battery, to follow the main road, drive back a brigade of the enemy's forces that held the position at Russell's, with their skirmishers and pickets, down to the causeway and bridge across a small stream about eight hundred yards east of Russell's house.

All these forces were put in motion at three P. M., General Denver's forces taking the right-hand road, and General Smith's the direct main road. On reaching the causeway, General Smith deployed his skirmishers forward, and sent out his advance-guard. The column advanced, and the skirmishers became engaged at once. The firing was very brisk, but the enemy's pickets were driven steadily back till they reached the position of their brigade at Russell's house, where their resistance was obstinate.

The ground was unfavorable to artillery till the skirmishers had cleared the hill beyond the causeway, when Major Taylor, chief of artillery, of Sherman's division, advanced first one of Bouton's guns, and very soon after the remaining three guns of the battery. These, upon reaching the hill-top, commenced firing at Russell's house and outhouses, in which the enemy had taken shelter, when their whole force retreated, and full possession was obtained of Russell's house and the ground for three hundred yards in advance, where the roads meet. This being the limit to which the brigade was intended to go, it was halted. The head of General Denver's column reached its position as the enemy was beginning to retreat.

General Morgan L. Smith conducted the advance of his brigade handsomely, and the chief work and loss fell upon his two leading regiments, the Eighth Missouri and Fifth-fifth Illinois. He held the ground till about daylight next morning, when, by General Sherman's order, he left a strong picket there, and placed his brigade back a short distance in easy support, where it remained until relieved.

No loss was sustained by Hurlbut's or Denver's commands

in their flank movements on Russell's; the loss in General Morgan L. Smith's brigade was ten killed and thirty-one wounded.

The position thus gained proved to be one of great natural strength, and Sherman at once proceeded to fortify it. Lines were laid off by the engineers, and although the advance on Corinth had witnessed their first experiment with intrenching tools, the troops in Sherman's division succeeded in constructing a parapet that met the approval of the critical eye of the commander-in-chief. The dense woods and undergrowth were cleared away in front, to give range to the batteries. The work went on day and night without interruption. The division continued to occupy the intrenched camp at Russell's until the night of May 27th, when an order was received from General Halleck by telegraph—through which means regular communication had been established between general headquarters and the several division commanders—directing General Sherman to send a force the next day to drive the rebels from his front on the Corinth road, to drive in their pickets as far as possible, and to make a strong demonstration on Corinth itself. Under authority conferred upon him by the same order, Sherman called upon Major-General McClelland, commanding the Reserve Corps, and Major-General Hurlbut, who commanded one of the adjacent divisions, to furnish one brigade each, to co-operate in the proposed movement with the two brigades of Denver and Morgan L. Smith, detached from Sherman's own division for the same purpose. Colonel John A. Logan's brigade of Judah's division, of McClelland's reserve corps, and Brigadier-General J. C. Veatch's brigade of Hurlbut's division, accordingly reported to General Sherman for this duty.

The house referred to was a double log building, standing on a high ridge on the upper or southern end of a large field, and was used by the enemy as a block-house, from which to annoy our pickets. The large field was perfectly overlooked by this house, as well as by the ridge along its southern line of defence, which was covered by a dense grove of heavy oaks

and underbrush. The main Corinth road runs along the eastern fence, whilst the field itself, about three hundred yards wide by about five hundred yards long, extended far to the right into the low land of Phillip's Creek, so densely wooded as to be impassable. On the eastern side of the field the woods were more open. The enemy could be seen at all times in and about the house and the ridge beyond, and our pickets could not show themselves on our side of the field without attracting a shot.

Sherman ordered General J. W. Denver, with his third brigade, and the Morton battery of four guns, to march in perfect silence at eight A. M., keeping well under cover as he approached the field; General Morgan L. Smith's first brigade, with Barrett's and Waterhouse's batteries, to move along the main road, keeping his force well masked in the woods to the left; Brigadier-General Veatch's brigade to move from General Hurlbut's lines through the woods on the left of and connecting with General M. L. Smith's; and General John A. Logan's brigade to move down to Bowie's Hill Cut of the Mobile and Ohio railroad, and thence forward to the left, so as to connect with General Denver's brigade on the extreme right; all to march at eight A. M., with skirmishers well to the front, to keep well concealed, and, at a signal, to rush quickly on to the ridge, thus avoiding as much as possible the danger of crossing the open field, exposed to the fire of a concealed enemy.

The preliminary arrangements having thus been made, two twenty-pounder Parrot rifle-guns of Silfversparre's battery, under the immediate supervision of Major Taylor, chief of artillery of Sherman's division, were moved silently through the forest to a point behind a hill, from the top of which could be seen the house and ground to be contested. The guns were unlimbered, loaded with shell, and moved by hand to the crest. At the proper time he gave the order to commence firing and demolish the house. About a dozen shells well directed soon accomplished this; then designating a single shot of the twenty-pound Parrot-gun of Silfversparre as a signal for the

brigades to advance, he waited till all were in position, and ordered the signal, when the troops dashed forward, crossed the field, drove the enemy across the ridge and field beyond into another dense and seemingly impenetrable forest. The enemy was evidently surprised. By ten A. M. we were masters of the position. Generals Grant and Thomas were present during the affair, and witnessed the movement, which was admirably executed.

An irregular piece of cleared land lay immediately in front of General Denver's position, and extended obliquely to the left, in front of and across Morgan Smith's and Veatch's brigades, which were posted on the right and left of the main Corinth road, leading directly south. About three P. M. Sherman's troops were startled by the quick rattle of musketry along our whole picket-line, followed by the cheers and yells of an attacking column of the enemy.

Sherman's artillery and Mann's battery of Veatch's brigade had been judiciously posted by Major Taylor, and before the yell of the enemy had died away arose our reply in the cannon's mouth. The firing was very good, rapid, well-directed, and the shells burst in the right place. Our pickets were at first driven in a little, but soon recovered their ground and held it, and the enemy retreated in utter confusion. On further examination of the ground, with its connection on the left with General Hurlbut, and right resting on the railroad near Bowie Hill Cut, it was determined to intrench. The lines were laid out after dark, and the work substantially finished by morning. All this time Sherman was within one thousand three hundred yards of the enemy's main intrenchments, which were concealed by the dense foliage of the oak forest, and without a battle, which at that time was to be avoided, Sherman could not push out his skirmishers more than two hundred yards to the front. For his own security he had to destroy two farmhouses, both of which had been loopholed and occupied by the enemy. By nine A. M. of the twenty-ninth our works were substantially done, and our artillery in position, and at four P. M. the siege-train was brought forward, and

Colonel McDowell's second brigade had come from the former lines at Russell's, and had relieved General John A. Logan's brigade.

Sherman then had his whole division in a slightly curved line, facing south, his right resting on the Mobile and Ohio railroad, near a deep cut known as Bowie Hill Cut, and left resting on the main Corinth road, at the crest of the ridge, there connecting with General Hurlbut, who, in turn, on his left connected with General Davies, and so on down the whole line to its extremity. So near was the enemy that the Union troops could hear the sound of his drums, and sometimes of voices in command, and the railroad cars arriving and departing at Corinth were easily distinguished. For some days and nights cars had been arriving and departing very frequently, especially in the night. Before daybreak, Sherman instructed the brigade commanders and the field-officers of the day to feel forward as far as possible, but all reported the enemy's pickets still in force in the dense woods to our front. But about six A. M. a curious explosion, sounding like a volley of large siege-pieces, followed by others singly and in twos and threes, arrested Sherman's attention; and soon after a large smoke arose from the direction of Corinth, when he telegraphed General Halleck to ascertain the cause. The latter answered that he could not explain it, but ordered Sherman "to advance his division and feel the enemy, if still in his front." Sherman immediately put in motion two regiments of each brigade, by different roads, and soon after followed with the whole division, infantry, artillery, and cavalry.

Somewhat to his surprise, the enemy's chief redoubt was found within thirteen hundred yards of our line of intrenchments, but completely masked by the dense forest and undergrowth. Instead of being, as had been supposed, a continuous line of intrenchments encircling Corinth, the defences consisted of separate redoubts, connected in part by a parapet and ditch, and in part by shallow rifle-pits, the trees being felled so as to give a good field of fire to and beyond the main road. General M. L. Smith's brigade moved rapidly down the

main road, entering the first redoubt of the enemy at seven A. M. It was completely evacuated, and he pushed on into Corinth, and beyond, to College Hill. General Denver entered the enemy's lines at the same time, seven A. M., at a point midway between the wagon and railroad, and proceeded on to Corinth, and Colonel McDowell kept further to the right, near the Mobile and Ohio Railroad. By eight A. M. all Sherman's division was at Corinth and beyond.

On the whole ridge extending from Sherman's camp into Corinth, and to the right and left, could be seen the remains of the abandoned camps of the enemy, flour and provisions scattered about, and every thing indicating a speedy and confused retreat. In the town itself many houses were still burning, and the ruins of warehouses and buildings containing commissary and other confederate stores were still smouldering; but there still remained piles of cannon-balls, shells, and shot, sugar, molasses, beans, rice, and other property, which the enemy had failed to carry off or destroy.

From the best information obtained from the few citizens who remained in Corinth, it appeared that the enemy had for some days been removing their sick and valuable stores, and had sent away on railroad-cars a part of their effective force on the night of the 28th. But, of course, even the vast amount of their rolling-stock could not carry away an army of a hundred thousand men. The enemy was therefore compelled to march away, and began the march by ten o'clock on the night of the 29th—the columns filling all the roads leading south and west all night—the rear-guard firing the train, which led to the explosions and conflagration. The enemy did not relieve his pickets that morning, and many of them were captured, who did not have the slightest intimation of the proposed evacuation.

Finding Corinth abandoned by the enemy, Sherman ordered General M. L. Smith to pursue on the Ripley road, by which it appeared they had taken the bulk of their artillery.

General Smith pushed the pursuit up to the bridges and narrow causeway by which the bottom of Tuscumbia

Creek is passed. The enemy opened with canister on the small party of cavalry, and burned every bridge, leaving the woods full of straggling soldiers. Many of these were gathered up and sent to the rear, but the main army had escaped across Tuscumbia Creek. Sherman says, in his official report of the siege :

“The evacuation of Corinth, at the time and in the manner in which it was done, was a clear back-down from the high and arrogant tone heretofore assumed by the rebels. The ground was of their own choice. The fortifications, though poor and indifferent, were all they supposed necessary to our defeat, as they had had two months to make them, with an immense force to work at their disposal. If, with two such railroads as they possessed, they could not supply their army with reinforcements and provisions, how can they attempt it in this poor, arid, and exhausted part of the country?”

From the time the army moved on Corinth, up to the date of its evacuation, the troops of Sherman's division had constructed seven distinct lines of intrenchments. Scarcely had one line been completed before they were called upon to advance a short distance, take up a new position, and construct another line. Occupying as it did the extreme right flank of the army, this division was necessarily more exposed, and was compelled to perform harder work, and furnished heavier details than any other single division in the entire command. But every task was performed with a cheerfulness and alacrity that elicited the highest encomiums from the division commander.

“But a few days ago,” he says in his congratulatory order of May 31st, “a large and powerful rebel army lay at Corinth, with outposts extending to our very camp at Shiloh. They held two railroads extending north and south, east and west, across the whole extent of their country, with a vast number of locomotives and cars to bring to them speedily and certainly their reinforcements and supplies. They called to their aid all their armies from every quarter, abandoning the sea-coast and the great river Mississippi, that they might over-

whelm us with numbers in the place of their own choosing. They had their chosen leaders, men of high reputation and courage, and they dared us to leave the cover of our iron-clad gunboats to come to fight them in their trenches, and still more dangerous swamps and ambuscades of their Southern forests. Their whole country, from Richmond to Memphis and Nashville to Mobile, rung with their taunts and boastings, as to how they would immolate the Yankees if they dared to leave the Tennessee River. They boldly and defiantly challenged us to meet them at Corinth. We accepted the challenge, and came slowly and without attempt at concealment to the very ground of their selection; and they have fled away. We yesterday marched unopposed through the burning embers of their destroyed camps and property, and pursued them to their swamps, until burning bridges plainly confessed they had fled, and not marched away for better ground. It is a victory as brilliant and important as any recorded in history, and every officer and soldier who lent his aid has just reason to be proud of his part.

“No amount of sophistry or words from the leaders of the rebellion can succeed in giving the evacuation of Corinth, under the circumstances, any other title than that of a signal defeat, more humiliating to them and their cause than if we had entered the place over the dead and mangled bodies of their soldiers. We are not here to kill and slay, but to vindicate the honor and just authority of that government which has been bequeathed to us by our honored fathers, and to whom we would be recreant if we permitted their work to pass to our children marred and spoiled by ambitious and wicked rebels.

“The general commanding, while thus claiming for his division their just share in this glorious result, must, at the same time, remind them that much yet remains to be done, and that all must still continue the same vigilance and patience, industry and obedience, till the enemy lays down his arms, and publicly acknowledges, for their supposed grievances, they must obey the laws of their country, and not attempt its

overthrow by threats, by cruelty, and by war. They must be made to feel and acknowledge the power of a just and mighty nation. This result can only be accomplished by a cheerful and ready obedience to the orders and authority of our leaders, in whom we now have just reason to feel the most implicit confidence. That the fifth division of the right wing will do this, and that in due time we will go to our families and friends at home, is the earnest prayer and wish of your immediate commander."

The ability and untiring energy displayed by General Sherman during the siege elicited the warm praise of General Grant, who afterwards, in an official dispatch to army headquarters, wrote: "His services as division commander in the advance on Corinth, I will venture to say, were appreciated by the now general-in-chief (General Halleck) beyond those of any other division commander."

On the 2d of June, Sherman was ordered by General Halleck to march with his own division and Hurlbut's through Corinth and dislodge the enemy, supposed to be in position near Smith's bridge, seven miles southwest of Corinth, where the Memphis and Charleston railway crosses Tuscumbia Creek. He set out immediately, his own division in advance; but on the morning of the 3d, Colonel T. Lyle Dickey, Fourth Illinois Cavalry, who was sent forward to reconnoitre, returned and reported the bridge burned, and no enemy near it. Sherman then went into bivouac near Chewalla, and set to work to save such of the rolling-stock of the railway as could probably be rendered serviceable, and by the 9th, chiefly through the exertions of the Fifty-second Indiana, Major Main, which was generally known as "the railroad regiment," succeeded in collecting and sending to Corinth seven locomotives in tolerable order, a dozen platform-cars, over two hundred pairs of truck-wheels, and the iron-work of about sixty cars.

On the 26th of May, Sherman had received from the War Department, and had accepted, a commission as Major-General of Volunteers, dating from May 1st.

CHAPTER VI.

MEMPHIS.

GRAND JUNCTION, fifty-two miles west of Memphis, and one hundred and fifty-four south from Cairo, is the junction of the Memphis and Charleston with the Mississippi Central Railway. Ninety-nine miles from Memphis, and a hundred and two from Grand Junction, the latter road joins the Mississippi and Tennessee Railway at Grenada. An army operating from Memphis as a base, and holding in force Corinth, Holly Springs, and some such point as Hernando, on the Mississippi and Tennessee Railway, are in a position to defend West Tennessee from the Tennessee River to the Mississippi, and to take the offensive against an enemy protecting Northern Mississippi.

No sooner was Corinth occupied, and the semblance of a pursuit of the enemy ended, than General Halleck ordered General Buell to march with the Army of the Ohio by Huntsville and Stevenson on Chattanooga, Tennessee, and seize the key of the debouches from the mountain region of the centre; while General Grant, again restored to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, was left in command of the District of West Tennessee and Northern Mississippi, and General Pope's troops were sent back to Missouri. The enemy was concentrated at Tupelo, Mississippi, forty-nine miles below Corinth, on the line of the Mobile and Ohio Railroad, under the command of General Braxton Bragg, who had relieved Beauregard in consequence of the latter's illness.

On the 9th of June, at Chewalla, Sherman received General Halleck's orders to march with his own division and Hurlbut's Fourth division to Grand Junction, to repair the Memphis and

Charleston Railway west of that point, and then to assume the duty of guarding the road against any attempt of the enemy to interrupt its operations. Sending forward Denver's third brigade of the fifth division, and the whole of Hurlbut's division in advance, to repair the bridges on the road, Sherman marched on the 11th with the remainder of his command, reached Grand Junction on the night of the 13th, and, finding no water there, occupied La Grange, three miles further west, on the morning of the 14th. While engaged here in repairing two pieces of broken trestle-work, he sent Veatch's brigade, of Hurlbut's and Morgan L. Smith's brigade of his own division, to Holly Springs to clear his flanks of the enemy. After driving a small force of the enemy out of the town, and as far south as Lamar, the detachment remained two days at Holly Springs, and then rejoined the main body. On the 21st, Sherman marched from Holly Springs; on the 23d, three miles west of Lafayette, met a railway train from Memphis; and on the 25th, having built two long sections of trestle-work at La Grange, two large bridges at Moscow, and two small ones at Lafayette, was able to report his task accomplished, and the railway in running order from Memphis to Grand Junction. His force was then disposed so as to protect the line of the railway, Hurlbut's division at Grand Junction and La Grange, his own at Moscow and Lafayette.

On the 29th of June, in accordance with instructions received by telegraph from General Halleck, leaving one regiment and a section of artillery at each of these points, Sherman marched on Holly Springs, twenty-five miles equidistant from La Grange and Moscow, to co-operate with Hamilton's division, of Rosecrans' corps, which he was informed would reach there at a given time. Concentrating at Hudsonville by converging roads, the two divisions reached the Coldwater, five miles from Holly Springs, early on the morning of the appointed day. Denver's brigade, and the Fourth Illinois Cavalry, the latter two hundred strong, were sent forward, and drove the enemy, consisting of about fifteen hundred cavalry, through and beyond the town of Holly Springs. Nothing was

heard of Hamilton, who had approached within nineteen miles of Holly Springs and then retired to Corinth; but, on the 6th, orders were received from General Halleck to fall back to the railway and protect it, and the command accordingly returned to its former position.

Early in July, upon the appointment of General Halleck as general-in-chief of the Armies of the United States, the Department of the Mississippi was broken up, and General Grant was assigned to the command of the Department of the Tennessee, embracing the theatre of his previous operations. That officer taking advantage of the period of inactivity which now followed, turned his attention to the condition of the country occupied by his command. Memphis in particular was in a sad plight. Nearly all of its young men were in the rebel army, many of its old men had fled upon the approach of the Union troops, or in anticipation of such an event, and in their places appeared a horde of unscrupulous traders, eager to make money in any legitimate way, and deeming any way legitimate that brought them large profits. They struck hands with other men of the same stamp whom they found in Memphis ready for their use, and the city became a nest of contraband trade. Commerce and war are mortal foes. Wherever they meet or cross each other's path, one of them must die. If the trader's gold is stronger than the soldier's honor, the soldier's honor trails in the dust, war grows languid, barter dulls the sword, treason flourishes, and spies reign. If the soldier spurns the bribe, in whatever innocent shape it may creep, trade perishes, merchants walk the streets idly, or crowd the headquarters uselessly, storehouses gape vacantly or turn into hospitals, women and children starve, and the provost-marshal is king. And these things are necessarily so. War itself is so cruel that those means are most truly humane which tend to bring the contest soonest to a close, regardless of every intermediate consideration apart from its object. The general must think only of his army.

On 15th of July, from Corinth, General Grant sent tele-

graphic orders to Sherman, to march at once, with his own and Hurlbut's division, to Memphis, relieve Brigadier-General Hovey in command of that place, and send all the infantry of Wallace's division to Helena, Arkansas, to report to General Curtis. Accordingly, on Monday, July 21st, Sherman assumed command of the district of Memphis, stationing his own division in Fort Pickering, and Hurlbut's on the river below, and on the 24th sent the other troops to Helena.

General Grant had strongly impressed upon him the necessity of immediately abating the evils and disorders prevailing within the limits of his new command. He was to put Memphis in a thorough state of defence. With regard to civil matters, his instructions were few. When the head of a family had gone South, the family must be made to follow. The quartermaster was to seize, and rent for account of whom it may concern, all buildings leased or left vacant and belonging to disloyal owners. All negroes working for the United States were to be registered, and an account kept of their time, so that an adjustment could afterwards be made with their owners, if the Government should decide on taking that course. It will be remembered that the Government had not yet declared, or even adopted, any definite policy with respect to the slaves in the country occupied by our forces.

Memphis was a camp of the Confederate Army, was captured by the United States Army, and was occupied and held by it as a military post. In a country, or in any part of it, held by an army in time of war, whether offensively or defensively, there is no law but the law of war. The law of war is the will of the commander. He is accountable only to his superiors. Nothing exists within the limits of his command, except by his choice. With respect to his army, he is governed by the Articles of War and the army regulations; with regard to all others, his power is unlimited, except to the extent that it may be abridged or controlled by the instructions of his Government.

Sherman permitted the mayor and other civil officers of the city to remain in the exercise of their functions, restricting

them to the preservation of law and order among the citizens, and the lighting and cleaning of the streets, and confining the action of the provost-marshal and his guards to persons in the military service and to buildings and grounds used by the army. The expenses of the local government were to be defrayed by municipal taxes. Sherman held that all persons who remained in Memphis were bound to bear true allegiance to the United States, and, therefore, did not always exact an oath of loyalty; that they must make their choice at once between the rebellion and the Union; and that if they stayed and helped the enemy in any way, they were to be treated as spies. He required no provost-marshal's passes for inland travel, but restricted it to the five main roads leading from the city, and stationed guards on them to minutely inspect all persons and property going in or out. No cotton was allowed to be bought beyond the lines and brought in, except on contracts to be paid at the end of the war, so that the enemy might get no aid therefrom. Gold, silver, and treasury notes, when sent into the Confederate lines in exchange for cotton, always found their way, as he knew, sooner or later, voluntarily or by force, into the Confederate treasury, and were used to buy arms for the Confederate army in the British colonies. He, therefore, absolutely prohibited their use in payment. He forbade the exportation of salt, because it was used to cure bacon and beef, and thus to mobilize the Confederate army. A strict search was also made for arms and ammunition, which were often employed by the rapacious and unscrupulous traders as a means of accomplishing their ends. All able-bodied male negroes were required to work, either for their masters or for the Government, and the women and children, as well as the feeble, he refused to support or feed; but in no case did he permit any intimidation or persuasion to be used, with those who chose to leave their masters, to compel or induce them to return. With regard to all these subjects, he preferred not to meddle with details or individual cases, but laid down full, clear, and precise rules, in the form of written instructions for the guidance of his subordinates, and left the execution to

them. His constant endeavor was to apply severe and exact justice to all, and to avoid the entanglements and anomalies of exceptions in favor of particular persons. Shortly afterwards, when the Government issued orders removing the military restrictions imposed on the purchase of cotton, Sherman yielded a ready acquiescence, but at once addressed strong remonstrances on the subject to the authorities at Washington, assuring them that the measure would greatly strengthen the hands of the Confederate forces. He also turned his attention to the depredations of the guerrillas who had hitherto infested the district, harbored and assisted by the more evil-disposed of the inhabitants, protected against capture by the vicinity of a large friendly army, and secured against punishment by threats of retaliation upon the persons of our prisoners of war in the hands of the enemy. A guerrilla is a person who, alone or in company with a few comrades, wages war within or behind the lines of an enemy, for the purpose of inflicting incidental injury upon the persons or property of isolated persons or parties belonging to the opposing forces, adhering to the cause, or not adhering to the cause, of the army by which the guerrilla is sustained. He is careless as to the means he employs and the persons against whom he employs them. He wears no uniform. Robbery, arson, and murder he commits as a soldier. When in danger of capture, he throws away his arms and becomes a citizen. When captured, he produces his commission or points to his muster-roll, and is again a soldier. A few guerrillas endanger the lives and property of the thousands of non-combatants from whom they cannot be distinguished by the eye. The rebel government and the rebel commanders seem to have considered every thing justifiable that could be done by them in connection with the war: so they justified guerrillas and upheld them. Sherman regarded them as wild beasts, hunted them down and destroyed them. Where Union families were harassed, he caused the families of secessionists to be punished. Where steamboats, engaged in peaceful commerce, were fired upon, he caused the property of secessionists to be destroyed, and he finally an-

nounced that, for every boat attacked by guerrillas, ten secession families should be exiled from the comforts of Memphis. If, however, the inhabitants would resist the guerrillas, he would allow them to bring in produce and take out supplies. Thus, order and quiet were, for the time being, restored throughout the limits of his command.

During the fall several important expeditions were sent out from Memphis. Early in September, Hurlbut moved with his division to Brownsville, for the purpose of threatening the flank of any force moving from the line of the Tallahatchie against General Grant's position at Bolivar; while, at the same time, Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith with his brigade, a battery of artillery, and four hundred cavalry under Colonel B. H. Grierson, Sixth Illinois Cavalry, moved to Holly Springs, destroyed the road and railway bridges over the Coldwater, and then returned, having held in check and diverted the enemy's forces assembling at Holly Springs to threaten Grant's communications, and by destroying the bridges having prevented the enemy from harassing the flank of a column moving eastward from Memphis.

In the latter part of October, General Grant summoned General Sherman to meet him at Columbus, Kentucky, to arrange the plan of the coming campaign. Grant's army occupied, substantially, the line from Memphis eastward along the Chattanooga railway to Corinth. The Army of the Potomac remained inactive in Western Maryland; the Army of the Ohio, having defeated Bragg's invasion by the decisive victory at Richmond, Kentucky, held the passive defensive; and in Missouri, General Curtis was preparing to resist invasion from Arkansas. The great work before the Army of the Tennessee was the capture of Vicksburg. But the enemy, about forty thousand strong, under Lieutenant-General Pemberton, must first be dislodged from the line of the Tallahatchie, which they held in force, with all the fords and bridges strongly fortified. Grant was to move his main army direct from Jackson by Grand Junction and La Grange, following generally the line of the Mobile and Ohio Railway. Sherman was to move

out of Memphis with four brigades of infantry on the Tchulahoma road, to strike the enemy at Wyatt's simultaneously with Grant's arrival at Waterford. Major-General C. C. Washburne, over whom Grant had been authorized to exercise command in case of necessity, was instructed by Sherman to cross the Mississippi with above five thousand cavalry from Helena, Arkansas, and march rapidly on Grenada, to threaten the enemy's rear. Precisely on the day appointed, the three columns moved as indicated. While Pemberton was intent in preparations to meet Grant and Sherman behind his fortifications, he learned that Washburne, with a force of which he could not conjecture the size, source, or destination, had crossed the Tallahatchie, near the mouth of the Yallabusha, and was rapidly approaching the railways in his rear. There was no time to hesitate. Abandoning his works, Pemberton relinquished the line of the Tallahatchie without a battle, and hastily retreated on Grenada.

During the fall, and in preparation for the movement on Vicksburg, a sufficient number of the regiments called out by the President, after the failure of the summer campaign in Virginia, reported to General Sherman, to swell his division to six brigades; and by persistent and repeated applications he finally succeeded in adding the only organized battalion of his own regular regiment, the Thirteenth Infantry, under the command of Captain Edward C. Washington. Early in November, the division, which in the latter part of October had been renumbered as the First Division of the Army of the Tennessee, was organized as follows:

The first brigade, Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith, consisted of the Sixth Missouri, Eighth Missouri, Fifty-fourth Ohio, *One Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois*, and *One Hundred and Twentieth Illinois*.

Second brigade, Colonel John A. McDowell, of the Sixth Iowa; Sixth Iowa, Fortieth Illinois, Forty-sixth Ohio, Thirteenth U. S. Infantry, and *One Hundredth Indiana*.

Third brigade, Brigadier-General James W. Denver; Forty-

eighth Ohio, Fifty-third Ohio, Seventieth Ohio, *Ninety-seventh Indiana*, and *Ninety-ninth Indiana*.

Fourth brigade, Colonel David Stuart, of the Fifty-fifth Illinois; Fifty-fifth Illinois, Fifty-seventh Ohio, *Eighty-third Indiana*, *One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois*, and *One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Illinois*.

Fifth brigade, Colonel R. P. Buckland of the Seventy-second Ohio; Seventy-second Ohio, *Thirty-second Wisconsin*, *Ninety-third Illinois*, and *One Hundred and Fourteenth Illinois*.

Sixth, or reserve brigade; the *Thirty-third Wisconsin*, and *One Hundred and Seventeenth Illinois*.

Besides these regiments of infantry, there were attached to the division, and unassigned to brigades, seven batteries of light artillery, and the Sixth Illinois Cavalry, Colonel Benjamin H. Grierson. The new regiments are designated in italics.

Early in the winter of 1862, the organization of army corps commenced in the Army of the Potomac, just before its spring campaign was introduced in the West. In December, the troops serving in the Department of the Tennessee were designated as the Thirteenth Army Corps, and Major-General Grant as the commander. He immediately subdivided his command, designating the troops in the district of Memphis as the right wing of the Thirteenth Corps, to be commanded by Major-General Sherman, and to be organized for active service in three divisions. Sherman assigned Brigadier-General Andrew J. Smith to the command of the first division, consisting of the new brigades of Burbridge and Landrum; Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith to the second division, including the brigades of Colonel Giles A. Smith, Eighth Missouri, and David Stuart, Fifty-fifth Illinois, formerly the first and fourth brigades; and Brigadier-General George W. Morgan to the third division, comprising the new brigades of Osterhaus and Colonels Lindsay and De Courcey. The other brigades remained as the garrison of Memphis.

CHAPTER VII.

THE ATTEMPT ON VICKSBURG.

GENERAL GRANT directed General Sherman to proceed with the right wing of the Thirteenth Corps to the mouth of the Yazoo River, and there disembark and attempt the capture of Vicksburg from the north side, while he himself, with the left wing, should move on Jackson, against the enemy from the rear, and, uniting the two columns, proceed to invest the place, in the event of the first part of the plan proving impracticable.

Before entering upon the duty now confided to him, Sherman issued the following characteristic orders, dated Memphis, December 18, 1862 :

“I. The expedition now fitting out is purely of a military character, and the interests involved are of too important a character to be mixed up with personal and private business. No citizen, male or female, will be allowed to accompany it, unless employed as part of a crew, or as servants to the transports. Female chambermaids to the boats, and nurses to the sick alone, will be allowed, unless the wives of captains and pilots actually belonging to the boats. No laundress, officer's or soldier's wife must pass below Helena.

“II. No person whatever, citizen, officer, or sutler, will, on any consideration, buy or deal in cotton, or other produce of the country. Should any cotton be brought on board of any transport, going or returning, the brigade quartermaster, of which the boat forms a part, will take possession of it, and invoice it to Captain A. R. Eddy, chief quartermaster at Memphis.

“III. Should any cotton or other produce be brought back

to Memphis by any chartered boat, Captain Eddy will take possession of the same, and sell it for the benefit of the United States. If accompanied by its actual producer, the planter or factor, the quartermaster will furnish him with a receipt for the same, to be settled for on proof of his loyalty at the close of the war.

“IV. Boats ascending the river may take cotton from the shore for bulkheads to protect their engines or crew, but on arrival at Memphis it must be turned over to the quartermaster, with a statement of the time, place, and name of its owner. The trade in cotton must await a more peaceful state of affairs.

“V. Should any citizen accompany the expedition below Helena, in violation of those orders, any colonel of a regiment, or captain of a battery, will conscript him into the service of the United States for the unexpired term of his command. If he show a refractory spirit, unfitting him for a soldier, the commanding officer present will turn him over to the captain of the boat as a deck-hand, and compel him to work in that capacity, without wages, until the boat returns to Memphis.

“VI. Any person whatever, whether in the service of the United States or transports, found making reports for publication which might reach the enemy, giving them information, aid, and comfort, will be arrested and treated as spies.”

Sherman embarked at Memphis on the 20th of December, 1862, two days later than the time originally designated, having been delayed by the great want of steamboat transportation.

The three divisions of A. J. Smith, M. L. Smith, and Morgan, reported a grand aggregate of thirty thousand and sixty-eight officers and men of all arms for duty. At Helena his force was increased by the division of Brigadier-General Frederick Steele, twelve thousand three hundred and ten strong, comprising the brigades of Brigadier-Generals C. E. Hovey, John M. Thayer, Wyman, and Frank P. Blair, Jr. The place of rendezvous was at Friar's Point, on the left bank of the Mississippi, below Helena. The fleet reached Milliken's

Bend on the night of the twenty-fourth. On Christmas day Brigadier-General Burbridge landed with his brigade of A. J. Smith's division, and broke up the Vicksburg and Texas railway for a long distance near the crossing of the Tensas; and without waiting for his return, Sherman pushed on to a point opposite the mouth of the Yazoo, landed on the west bank, and sent Morgan L. Smith with his division to break up the same road at a point eight miles from Vicksburg. On the 26th, the transports, led and convoyed by the gunboat fleet, under Acting Rear Admiral D. D. Porter, ascended the old mouth of the Yazoo about twelve miles. Of the transport fleet, Morgan's division led the advance, followed in order by Steele, Morgan L. Smith, and A. J. Smith. By noon on the 27th, the entire command had disembarked on the south bank of the river, near the mouth of the Chickasaw bayou, a small stream, which, rising near the town of Vicksburg, finds its way across the bottom land about midway between the bluffs and the river. The clay bluffs, which are about three hundred feet high, and very steep, recede from the Mississippi on the north side of the town, and follow the course of the river at a distance of about four miles, the intermediate space being an alluvial swamp, full of lagoons, bayous, and quicksands, and covered with cottonwood, cypress, and a dense undergrowth of tangled vines. The Yazoo was very low, and its banks were about thirty feet above the water. On reaching the point of debarkation, De Courcey's, Stuart's, and Blair's brigade, were sent forward in the direction of Vicksburg about three miles, and as soon as the whole army had disembarked it moved out in four columns, Steele's above the mouth of Chickasaw bayou; Morgan, with Blair's brigade of Steele's division, below the same bayou; Morgan L. Smith's on the main road from Johnson's plantation to Vicksburg, with orders to bear to his left, so as to strike the bayou about a mile south of where Morgan was ordered to cross it, and A. J. Smith's division on the main road.

All the heads of columns met the enemy's pickets, and drove them towards Vicksburg. During the night of the

27th, the ground was reconnoitred as well as possible, and it was found to be as difficult as it could possibly be from nature and art. Immediately in front was a bayou, passable only at two points, on a narrow levee and on a sand-bar, which were perfectly commanded by the enemy's sharpshooters that lined the levee or parapet on its opposite bank. Behind this was an irregular strip of beach or table-land, on which were constructed a series of rifle-pits and batteries, and behind that a high abrupt range of hills, whose scarred sides were marked all the way up with rifle-trenches, and the crowns of the principal hills presented heavy batteries. The county road leading from Vicksburg to Yazoo City ran along the foot of these hills, and served the enemy as a covered way along which he moved his artillery and infantry promptly to meet the Union forces at any point at which they attempted to cross this difficult bayou. Nevertheless, that bayou, with its levee parapet backed by the lines of rifle-pits, batteries, and frowning hills, had to be passed before they could reach firm ground, and meet their enemy on any thing like fair terms.

Steele, in his progress, followed substantially an old levee back from the Yazoo to the foot of the hills north of Thompson's Lake, but found that in order to reach the hard land he would have to cross a long corduroy causeway, with a battery enfilading it, others cross-firing it, with a similar line of rifle-pits and trenches before described. He skirmished with the enemy on the morning of the 28th, while the other columns were similarly engaged; but on close and critical examination of the swamp and causeway in his front, with the batteries and rifle-pits well manned, he came to the conclusion that it was impossible for him to reach the county road without a fearful sacrifice of life.

On his reporting that he could not cross from his position to the one occupied by the centre, Sherman ordered him to retrace his steps and return in steamboats to the southwest side of Chickasaw bayou, and support Morgan's division. This he accomplished during the night of the 28th, arriving in time to support him, and take part in the assault of the 29th.

Morgan's division were evidently on the best of existing ways from Yazoo to firm land. He had attached to his trains the pontoons with which to make a bridge, in addition to the ford or crossing, which was known to be in his front, and by which the enemy's picket had retreated.

The pontoon bridge was placed during the night across a bayou, supposed to be the main bayou, but which turned out to be an inferior one, and it was therefore useless; but the natural crossing remained, and Morgan was ordered to cross with his division, and carry the line of works to the summit of the hill by a determined assault.

During the morning of the 28th a heavy fog enveloped the whole of the country. General Morgan advanced De Courcey's brigade and engaged the enemy: heavy firing of artillery and infantry was sustained, and his column moved on until he encountered the real bayou, which again checked his progress, and was not passed until the next day.

At the point where Morgan L. Smith's division reached the bayou was a narrow sand strip with abattis thrown down by the enemy on our side, having the same deep boggy bayou with its levee parapet and system of cross-batteries and rifle-pits on the other side.

To pass it in the front by the flank would have been utter destruction, for the head of the column would have been swept away as fast as it presented itself above the steep bank. While reconnoitring it on the morning of the 28th, during the heavy fog, General Morgan L. Smith was shot in the hip by a chance rifle-bullet, and disabled, so that he had to be removed to the boats, and thus at a critical moment was lost one of the best and most daring leaders, a practical soldier and enthusiastic patriot. Brigadier-General David Stuart, who succeeded to his place and to the execution of his orders, immediately studied the nature of the ground in his front, saw all its difficulties, and made the best possible disposition to pass over his division as soon as he should hear General Morgan engaged on his left.

To his right General A. J. Smith had placed General Bur-

bridge's brigade of his division, with orders to make rafts and cross over a portion of his men, to dispose his artillery so as to fire at the enemy across the bayou, and produce the effect of a diversion.

Landrum's brigade of A. J. Smith's division occupied a high position on the main road, with pickets and supports pushed well forward into the tangled abattis within three-fourths of a mile of the enemy's forts, and in plain view of the town of Vicksburg.

The boats still lay at the place of debarkation, covered by the gunboats and four regiments of infantry, one of each division. Such was the disposition of Sherman's forces during the night of the 28th.

The enemy's right was a series of batteries or forts seven miles above us on the Yazoo, at the first bluff near Snyder's house, called Drumgould's Bluff; his left the fortified town of Vicksburg; and his line connecting these was near fourteen miles in extent, and was a natural fortification, strengthened by a year's labor of thousands of negroes, directed by educated and skilful officers.

Sherman's design was by a prompt and concentrated movement to break the centre near Chickasaw Creek, at the head of a bayou of the same name, and once in position, to turn to the right, Vicksburg, or left, Drumgould's. According to information then obtained he supposed the organized force of the enemy to amount to about fifteen thousand, which could be reinforced at the rate of about four thousand a day, provided General Grant did not occupy all the attention of Pemberton's forces at Grenada, or Rosecrans those of Bragg in Tennessee.

Nothing had yet been heard from General Grant, who was supposed to be pushing south; or of General Banks, who was supposed to be ascending the Mississippi, but who in reality had but very recently reached New Orleans, and was engaged in gathering his officers there and at Baton Rouge, and in regulating the civil details of his department. Time being all-important, Sherman then determined to assault the hills in

front of Morgan on the morning of the 29th,—Morgan's division to carry the position to the summit of the hill, Steele's division to support him and hold the county road. General A. J. Smith was placed in command of his own first division, and M. L. Smith's second division, with orders to cross on the sand-spit, undermine the steep bank of the bayou on the further side, or carry at all events the levee parapet and first line of rifle-pits, to prevent a concentration on Morgan. It was nearly noon when Morgan was ready, by which time Blair's and Thayer's brigades of Steele's division were up with him, and took part in the assault, and Hovey's brigade was also near at hand. All the troops were massed as closely as possible, and the supports were well on hand.

The assault was made, and a lodgment effected on the hard table-land near the county road, and the heads of the assaulting columns reached different points of the enemy's works; but here met so withering a fire from the rifle-pits, and cross-fire of grape and canister from the batteries, that the columns faltered, and finally fell back to the point of starting, leaving many dead, wounded, and prisoners in the hands of the enemy.

General Morgan at first reported that the troops of his division were not at all discouraged, though the losses in Blair's and De Courcey's brigades were heavy, and that he would renew the assault in half an hour.

Sherman then urged General A. J. Smith to push his attack, though it had to be made across a narrow sand-bar, and up a narrow path in the nature of a breach, as a diversion in favor of Morgan, or a real attack, according to its success. During Morgan's progress, he crossed over the Sixth Missouri, covered by the Thirteenth Regulars deployed as skirmishers up to the bank of the Bayou, protecting themselves as well as possible by fallen trees, and firing at any of the enemy's sharpshooters that showed a mark above the levee. All the ground was completely swept beforehand by the artillery, under the immediate supervision of Major E. Taylor, chief of artillery. The Sixth Missouri crossed rapidly by companies, and lay

under the bank of the Bayou with the enemy's sharpshooters over their heads within a few feet, so near that these sharpshooters held out their muskets and fired down vertically upon our men. The orders were to undermine this bank and make a road up it; but it was impossible, and after the repulse of Morgan's assault, Sherman ordered General A. J. Smith to retire this regiment under cover of darkness, which was successfully done, though with heavy loss.

Whilst this was going on, Burbridge was skirmishing across the Bayou in his front, and Landrum pushed his advance through the close abattis and entanglement of fallen timber close up to Vicksburg. When the night of the 29th closed in we stood upon our original ground, and had suffered a repulse. During the night it rained very hard, and our men were exposed to it in the miry, swampy ground, sheltered only by their blankets and rubber ponchos, but during the following day it cleared off, and the weather became warm.

After a personal examination of the various positions, Sherman came to the conclusion that he could not break the enemy's centre without being too much crippled to act with any vigor afterwards. New combinations having therefore become necessary, he proposed to Admiral Porter that the navy should cover a landing at some point close up to the Drumgould's Bluff batteries, while he would hold the present ground, and send ten thousand choice troops to attack the enemy's right, and carry the batteries at that point; which, if successful, would give us the substantial possession of the Yazoo River, and place Sherman in communication with General Grant. Admiral Porter lent his hearty concurrence to this plan, and it was agreed that the expeditionary force should be embarked immediately after dark on the night of the 31st of December, and under cover of all the gunboats, proceed before day slowly and silently up to the batteries; the troops there to land, storm the batteries, and hold them. Whilst this was going on, Sherman was to attack the enemy below, and hold him in check, preventing reinforcements going up to the bluff, and, in case of success, to move all his force thither.

Steele's division and one brigade of Morgan L. Smith's division were designated and embarked; the gunboats were all in position, and up to midnight every thing appeared favorable.

The assault was to take place about four A. M. Sherman had all his officers at their posts, ready to act on the first sound of cannonading in the direction of Drumgould's Bluff; but about daylight he received a note from General Steele, stating that Admiral Porter had found the fog so dense on the river, that the boats could not move, and that the expedition must be deferred till another night. Before night of January 1, 1863, he received a note from the admiral, stating that inasmuch as the moon would not set until twenty-five minutes past five, the landing must be a daylight affair, which in his judgment would be too hazardous to try.

Thus disappeared the only remaining chance of securing a lodgment on the ridge between the Yazoo and Black rivers, from which to operate upon Vicksburg and the railway to the east, as well as to secure the navigation of the Yazoo River.

One third of the command had already embarked for this expedition, and the rest were bivouacked in low, swampy, timbered ground, which a single night's rain would have made a quagmire. Marks of overflow stained the trees from ten to twelve feet above their roots. A further attempt against the centre was deemed by all the brigade and division commanders impracticable.

It had now become evident to all the commanders that for some cause unknown to them, the co-operating column under General Grant had failed. A week had elapsed since the time when it should have reached the rear of Vicksburg, yet nothing was heard from it. Sherman accordingly decided to abandon the attack and return to Milliken's Bend, which had a large extent of clear land, houses for storage, good roads in the rear, plenty of corn and forage, and the same advantages as any other point for operating against the enemy inland, on the river below Vicksburg, or at any point above where he might attempt to interrupt the navigation of the Mississippi River.

On the morning of the 2d of January, the troops and *materiel* were embarked, and at 3 o'clock that afternoon the last of the transports, under convoy and protection of the gunboats, passed out of the Yazoo. At the mouth of that river, General Sherman met and reported to Major-General McClernand, who had come down on the steamer "Tigress," with orders to assume command of the expedition. On arriving at Milliken's Bend, on the 4th of January, 1863, Sherman at once relinquished the command to General McClernand, and announced the fact to the army in the following farewell order :

"Pursuant to the terms of General Order No. 1, made this day by General McClernand, the title of our army ceases to exist, and constitutes in the future the Army of the Mississippi, composed of two 'army corps,' one to be commanded by Gen. G. W. Morgan, and the other by myself. In relinquishing the command of the Army of the Tennessee, and restricting my authority to my own 'corps,' I desire to express to all commanders, to the soldiers and officers recently operating before Vicksburg, my hearty thanks for the zeal, alacrity, and courage manifested by them on all occasions. We failed in accomplishing one great purpose of our movement, the capturing of Vicksburg; but we were part of a whole. Ours was but part of a combined movement, in which others were to assist. We were on time. Unforeseen contingencies must have delayed the others.

"We have destroyed the Shreveport road, we have attacked the defences of Vicksburg, and pushed the attack as far as prudence would justify, and having found it too strong for our single column, we have drawn off in good order and good spirits, ready for any new move. A new commander is now here to lead you. He is chosen by the President of the United States, who is charged by the Constitution to maintain and defend it, and he has the undoubted right to select his own agents. I know that all good officers and soldiers will give him the same hearty support and cheerful obedience they have

hitherto given me. There are honors enough in reserve for all, and work enough too. Let each do his appropriate part, and our nation must in the end emerge from this dire conflict purified and ennobled by the fires which now test its strength and purity."

The disgraceful surrender of Holly Springs, on the 20th of December, with its immense depot of supplies, essential to the movement of the column under General Grant, had delayed the march of that officer, and unexpectedly demanded his attention in another quarter, while the enemy was thus enabled to concentrate for the defence of Vicksburg, behind positions naturally and artificially too strong to be carried by assault. Thus it was that the expedition under Sherman failed. In an official communication, written after the capture of Vicksburg, General Grant says: "General Sherman's arrangement as commander of troops in the attack on Chickasaw Bluffs, last December, was admirable. Seeing the ground from the opposite side from the attack, afterwards, I saw the impossibility of making it successful."

CHAPTER . VIII.

ARKANSAS POST.

MAJOR-GENERAL McCLEARNAND brought with him an order, issued by the War Department, dividing the Army of the Tennessee into four separate army corps, to be known as the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth, and to be respectively commanded by Major-Generals John A. McClernand, William T. Sherman, Stephen A. Hurlbut, and James B. McPherson, while General Grant was to retain command of the whole. The army corps had now become the unit of administration and of field movements. Completely organized, generally possessing within itself all the elements of a separate army, its commander was enabled to dispose promptly of the great mass of administrative details without the necessity of carrying them up to general headquarters, to breed delay and vexation and to distract the mind of the general-in-chief from the essential matters upon which his mind should have leisure to concentrate its energies.

Immediately on assuming command, General McClernand assigned Brigadier-General George W. Morgan to the immediate command of his own corps, the Thirteenth, composing the left wing, and consisting of A. J. Smith's division and Morgan's own division, now to be commanded by Brigadier-General P. J. Osterhaus.

Sherman's Fifteenth Corps, which was to constitute the right wing, comprised the First Division, under the command of Brigadier-General Frederick Steele, and the Second Division, temporarily under the command of Brigadier-General David Stuart, in the absence of Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith.

Steele's first division was now organized as follows :

First brigade, Brigadier-General Frank P. Blair—Thirteenth Illinois, Twenty-ninth Missouri, Thirty-first Missouri, Thirty-second Missouri, Fifty-eighth Ohio, Thirtieth Missouri.

Second brigade, Brigadier-General C. E. Hovey—Seventeenth Missouri, Twenty-fifth Iowa, Third Missouri, Seventy-sixth Ohio, Thirty-first Iowa, Twelfth Missouri.

Third brigade, Brigadier-General John M. Thayer—Fourth Iowa, Thirty-fourth Iowa, Thirtieth Iowa, Twenty-sixth Iowa, Ninth Iowa, infantry.

Artillery—First Iowa, Captain Griffiths ; Fourth Ohio, Captain Hoffman, and First Missouri horse artillery.

Cavalry—Third Illinois, and a company of the Fifteenth Illinois.

The second division, formerly Sherman's fifth division, of the Army of the Tennessee, consisted of the following named troops :

First brigade, Colonel G. A. Smith, commanding—Eighth Missouri, Sixth Missouri, One Hundred and Thirteenth Illinois, One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois, Thirteenth United States.

Second brigade, Colonel T. Kilby Smith, commanding—Fifty-fifth Illinois, One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Illinois, Fifty-fourth Ohio, Eighty-third Indiana, Fifty-seventh Ohio, infantry.

Artillery—Companies A and B, First Illinois Light Artillery, and Eighth Ohio battery.

Cavalry—Two companies of Thielman's Illinois battalion, and Company C, Tenth Missouri.

On the 4th of January, 1863, the expedition sailed on the same transports that had brought them from Vicksburg, convoyed by Admiral Porter's fleet of gunboats, to attack Fort Hindman, commonly known as Arkansas Post, an old French settlement situated on the left or north bank of the Arkansas River, fifty miles from its mouth and one hundred and seventeen below Little Rock. This fort was a very strong bastioned work, constructed by the rebels at the head of a horse-shoe bend, on an elevated bluff which here touches the river and defines for some distance its left bank. The work has four

bastion fronts, inclosing a space about one hundred yards square, and a line of rifle-pits extended three-quarters of a mile across a neck of level ground to a bayou on the west and north. In the fort three heavy iron guns, one three-inch rifled gun, and four six-pounder smooth bores were mounted at the salients and flanks, and six twelve-pounder howitzers and three-inch rifles were distributed along the rifle-pits. The garrison consisted of about five thousand men, under Brigadier-General T. J. Churchill, of the Confederate army. He was ordered by Lieutenant-General Holmes, commanding the rebel forces in Arkansas, to hold the post "till all are dead."

The expedition was suggested by General Sherman, and the idea was promptly adopted by General McClelland. Its object was to employ the troops, which would otherwise have remained idly waiting for the full development of the combinations against Vicksburg, in opening the way to Little Rock; thus placing the Arkansas River under the control of the Union armies, and putting an end to the dangerous detached operations carried on from that point against our communications on the Mississippi. The former river traversing and nearly bisecting Arkansas from northwest to southeast, is the key to the military possession of the State.

The expedition moved up the White River through the cut-off which unites its waters with those of the Arkansas, up the latter stream to Notrib's farm, three miles below Fort Hindman, where the troops began to disembark at five o'clock on the afternoon of January 9th. By noon on the 10th the landing was completed, and the troops were on the march to invest the post. Sherman's Fifteenth Corps took the advance, and was to pass round the rear of the enemy's works, and form line with his right resting on the river above the fort. The Thirteenth Corps, under Brigadier-General Morgan, was to follow, and connecting with General Sherman's right, complete the investment on the left. The gunboats opened a terrific fire upon the enemy during the afternoon, to distract his attention. By nightfall the troops were in position, Steele on the right, resting on the bayou, Stuart next, A. J. Smith's division on Stuart's

left, and Osterhaus's division on the extreme left near the river. During the night of the 9th and the following day Colonel D. W. Lindsay's brigade of Osterhaus's division had landed on the right bank of the river below Notrib's farm, and marching across the bend had taken up a position and planted a battery on that bank above the fort, so as to effectually prevent the succor of the garrison, or its escape by water.

Admiral Porter kept up a furious bombardment until after dark. Early on the morning of the 11th, Sherman moved his corps into an easy position for assault, looking south, across ground encumbered by fallen trees and covered with low bushes. The enemy could be seen moving back and forth along his lines, occasionally noticing our presence by some ill-directed shots which did us little harm, and accustomed the men to the sound of rifle-cannon. By ten A. M. Sherman reported to General McClelland in person that he was all ready for the assault, and only awaited the simultaneous movement of the gunboats. They were to silence the fort, and save the troops from the enfilading fire of its artillery along the only possible line of attack.

About half-past twelve notice was received that the gunboats were in motion. Wood's Battery, Company A, Chicago Light Artillery, was posted on the road which led directly into the Post; Banett's Battery B, First Illinois Artillery, was in the open space in the interval between Stuart's and Steele's divisions, and Steele had two of his batteries disposed in his front. Sherman's orders were, that as soon as the gunboats opened fire all his batteries in position should commence firing, and continue until he commanded "cease firing," when, after three minutes' cessation, the infantry columns of Steele's and Stuart's divisions were to assault the enemy's line of rifle-pits and defences.

The gunboats opened about one P. M., and our field-batteries at once commenced firing, directing their shots at the enemy's guns, his line of defences, and more especially enfilading the road which led directly into the fort, and which separated Morgan's line of attack from Sherman's. The gunboats could

not be seen, and their progress had to be judged by the sound of their fire,—at first slow and steady, but rapidly approaching the fort and enveloping it with a storm of shells and shot. The field-batteries continued their fire rapidly for about fifteen minutes, the enemy not replying, when Sherman, having withdrawn the skirmish line, ordered the firing to cease and the columns to advance to the assault. The infantry sprang forward with a cheer, rapidly crossed the hundred yards of clear space in their immediate front, and dashed into a belt of ground about three hundred yards wide, separating them from the enemy's parapets, slightly cut up by gulleys and depressions, and covered with standing trees, brush, and fallen timber. There they encountered the fire of the enemy's artillery and infantry, well directed from their perfect cover. The speed of our advance was checked, and afterwards became more cautious and prudent. By three p. m. Sherman's lines were within one hundred yards of the enemy's trenches, and flanking him on our right, and completely enveloping his position. The gunboats could be seen close up to the fort, the admiral's flag directly under it. All artillery fire from the fort had ceased, and only occasionally could be seen a few of the enemy's infantry firing from its parapets; but the strongest resistance continued in our immediate front, where the enemy's infantry was massed, comparatively safe from the gunboats, which were compelled to direct their fire well to the front, lest it should injure our own troops. A brisk fire of musketry was kept up along our whole front with an occasional discharge of artillery through the intervals of the infantry lines until four p. m., when the white flag appeared all along the enemy's lines. Sherman immediately ordered General Steele to push a brigade down the bayou on his right, to prevent the escape of the enemy.

Simultaneously with Sherman's assault, Burbridge's brigade with the One Hundred and Eighteenth Illinois and Sixty-ninth Indiana, of Landrum's, and the One Hundred and Twentieth Ohio, of Colonel Sheldon's brigade, dashed forward under a deadly fire quite to the enemy's intrenchments; the Sixteenth

Indiana, Lieutenant-Colonel John M. Orr, with the Eighty-third Ohio, Lieutenant-Colonel Baldwin, of Burbridge's brigade, and the One Hundred and Twentieth Ohio, Colonel D. French, of Colonel Sheldon's brigade, being the first to enter the fort. Presenting himself at the entrance of the fort, General Burbridge was halted by the guard, who denied that they had surrendered, until he called their attention to the white flag, and ordered them to ground their arms.

Colonel Lindsay, as soon as a gunboat had passed above the fort, hastened with his brigade down the opposite shore, and opened an oblique fire from Foster's two twenty, and Lieutenant Wilson's two ten pounder Parrott's, into the enemy's line of rifle-pits, carrying away his battle-flag and killing a number of his men.

The fort had surrendered. With cheers and shouts our troops poured into the works.

As soon as order could be restored, Brigadier-General A. J. Smith was assigned to the command of the fort itself, and Brigadier-General David Stuart to the charge of the prisoners and the exterior defences.

Our entire loss in killed was 129 ; in wounded, 831 ; and in missing, 17 ; total, 977. Sherman's corps lost 4 officers and 75 men killed, and 34 officers and 406 men wounded ; making a total of 519.

General Churchill, in his official report, dated Richmond, May 6, 1863, to Lieutenant-General Holmes, commanding the Department of Arkansas, states that his loss "will not exceed — killed, and 75 or 80 wounded." He estimates the Union force at 50,000, his own at 3,000, and our loss at from 1,500 to 2,000.

By the surrender there fell into our hands 5,000 men, including three entire brigades of the enemy, commanded respectively by Colonels Garland, Deshler, and Dunnington ; seventeen pieces of cannon ; three thousand serviceable small-arms ; forty-six thousand rounds of ammunition ; and five hundred and sixty-three animals.

After sending the prisoners to St. Louis, having destroyed

the defences and all buildings used for military purposes, on the 15th of January the troops re-embarked on the transports and proceeded to Napoleon, Arkansas, whence on the 17th, in obedience to orders received from Major-General Grant, they returned to Milliken's Bend. Sherman had been in favor of taking advantage of a rise in the Arkansas to threaten Little Rock, and force all scattered bands of the enemy to seek safety south of that river ; but General McClermand was unwilling to take so great a responsibility in addition to that he had already incurred, by entering upon so important an enterprise without orders.

In noticing the services of the subordinate commanders, General McClermand remarks : " General Sherman exhibited his usual activity and enterprise ; General Morgan proved his tactical skill and strategic talent ; while Generals Steele, Smith, Osterhaus, and Stuart, and the several brigade commanders displayed the fitting qualities of brave and successful officers."

At Napoleon, Sherman was joined by the brigade of Brigadier-General Hugh Ewing, which had been on the way to join General Rosecrans ; but that officer having just defeated Bragg in the desperate and decisive action of Stone River, no longer needed reinforcements. Ewing's command was assigned to Morgan L. Smith's second division, as the third brigade of that division. The effective force of the Fifteenth Corps was now fifteen thousand nine hundred and nine men of all arms.

CHAPTER IX.

THE SIEGE AND FALL OF VICKSBURG.

ON the 19th of January, Sherman proceeded with his corps to Young's Point, opposite Vicksburg, and reported to Grant. Here he was joined by the division of Brigadier-General J. M. Tuttle, consisting of Mower's, Buckland's, and Woods' brigades. From the moment of taking personal command of the army at Milliken's Bend, General Grant became convinced that Vicksburg could only be taken from the south. He immediately caused work to be prosecuted on the canal begun the previous summer by Brigadier-General Thomas Williams, under the orders of Major-General Butler, with the view of effecting an artificial cut-off across the peninsula opposite Vicksburg, through which transports, troops, and supplies might safely pass to the river below the enemy's batteries at that place. Somewhat later he also caused a channel to be cut through the west bank into Lake Providence, with the design of passing down through Bayou Baxter, Bayou Macon, and the Tensas, Wachita, and Red rivers; and a third canal through the Yazoo Pass into the Coldwater by means of which troops might enter the Tallahatchie, and thence descending the Yazoo, land on the high ground above Haines' Bluff. For various reasons, none of these plans succeeded.

While the gunboats and troops sent through Yazoo Pass were delayed near Greenwood at the junction of the Yallahusha and Tallahatchie, where the rebels had taken advantage of a bend in the river to construct a formidable work, Admiral Porter reconnoitred still another route. Seven miles above the mouth of the Yazoo, Steele's bayou empties into

that river ; thirty miles up Steele's bayou, Black bayou enters it from Deer Creek, six miles distant ; ascending Deer Creek eighteen miles, Rolling Fork connects it with the Big Sunflower River, ten miles distant ; and descending the Big Sunflower forty-one miles, you again enter the Yazoo, sixty miles from its mouth. By taking this course, the troops and gunboats would reach a strong position between Haines' Bluff and Greenwood ; the enemy's forces at the latter point would be placed between two strong columns of the Union army, and would be compelled to fall back on Vicksburg ; one of the most important sources of supplies would be lost to the enemy, and a valuable line of operations gained for us. Satisfying himself by a personal reconnoissance, in company with Admiral Porter, that the chances of success were sufficient to warrant so important an undertaking, on the 16th of March, General Grant ordered General Sherman to take Stuart's second division of the Fifteenth Corps, open the route, in co-operation with the gunboats, and seize some tenable position on the east bank of the Yazoo, whence to operate against Vicksburg and the forts at Haines' Bluff. Sherman started immediately with the Eighth Missouri regiment, and a detachment of pioneers, to open the bayou, and the next morning was followed by the remainder of the troops, who, in order to economize transportation, ascended the Mississippi to Eagle's Bend, where Steele's bayou approaches within a mile of the river, connected with it by Mud bayou, and there disembarking, marched across by land to Steele's bayou. The 18th and the forenoon of the 19th were spent in bridging Mud bayou, which was greatly swollen by a crevasse. Marching to Steele's bayou, but one transport was found there, and the three following days were spent in transporting the troops up the bayou, in such boats as became available. At the mouth of Black bayou the troops were transferred from the steamers to coal barges and taken in tow by a tug. Admiral Porter had started on the 14th of March with the gunboats *Louisville*, Lieutenant-Commander Owen ; *Cincinnati*, Lieutenant-Commanding Bache ; *Carondelet*, Lieutenant-Commanding Murphy ; *Mound City*, Lieuten-

ant-Commanding Wilson; *Pittsburgh*, Lieutenant-Commanding Hoel, four mortar-boats, and four tugs. The fleet easily passed up Steele's bayou, which, though very narrow, contained thirty feet of water; but Black's bayou was found to be obstructed by fallen and overhanging trees, which had to be pulled out by the roots and pushed aside before the gunboats could pass, and the frequent bends were so abrupt that the boats had to be heaved around them, with hardly a foot of room to spare. Twenty-four hours were occupied in going four miles into Deer Creek. The gunboats entered Deer Creek safely, and pushed their way through the overhanging branches of cypress and willow, with which it was obstructed, at the rate of about a mile an hour at first, gradually diminishing as the difficulties increased, to half a mile an hour. When within seven miles of the Rolling Fork, the Confederate agents and some of the planters forcibly compelled the negroes to cut down immense trees directly across the Creek, for the purpose of delaying the advance. Removing these artificial obstructions, in addition to the natural ones, with almost incredible labor, when within three miles of Rolling Fork, smoke was discovered in the direction of the Yazoo, and information reached Admiral Porter that the enemy was advancing with five thousand men, to dispute his progress. The *Carondelet*, Lieutenant-Commanding Murphy, was sent ahead to hold the entrance to Rolling Fork, and on the night of the 20th March found the gunboats within eight hundred yards of that stream, with only two or three trees and a narrow lane of willows between them and open navigation. The next morning about six hundred of the enemy, with a battery of field-pieces, made their appearance, and began to annoy the fleet by sharpshooters, and to fell trees in front and rear. Sherman had not yet arrived. The road lay along the banks of the bayous, and he had found the banks overflowed below Hill's plantation on Deer Creek, at the head of Black bayou, so that the troops had to be transported twenty-eight miles to the mouth of Black bayou, on two small steamers, there transferred to a single coal-barge, and towed by a small tug two miles, to the

first dry ground. The wooden transports encountered the same difficulties that met the iron-clad gunboats, without the same means of overcoming them. It was a slow process. Sherman was now at Hill's plantation, with only three regiments. But upon receipt of a note from Admiral Porter, stating his condition, on the morning of the 21st, Colonel Smith, with the Sixth and Eighth Missouri and One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois regiments of his brigade, was at once sent forward, and by a forced march of twenty-one miles over a terrible swamp road, succeeded in reaching the gunboats, to find them almost completely surrounded by the entire force sent out by the enemy through the Yazoo, and unable to move in either direction. The creek was so narrow that the broad-side guns were quite useless, and only one bow-gun could be brought to bear by either of the gunboats, and the steep banks required this to be fired at too great an angle to have much effect. The enemy had established a battery of fifteen guns in front. Colonel Smith disposed his force to protect the fleet, and prevent the felling of trees in the rear. On the morning of the 22d, after removing about forty of the felled trees, the enemy appeared in large force in rear of the gunboats, and opened fire with artillery. The gunboats replied, and soon drove them off. The enemy then attacked Colonel Smith's brigade, and after a sharp skirmish, was again repulsed. When the firing began, Sherman, who had by great exertions succeeded in getting up the remainder of Colonel Giles A. Smith's brigade, consisting of the Thirteenth Regulars and One Hundred and Fifteenth Illinois, as well as the Eighty-third Indiana, One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois, Fifty-fourth and Fifty-seventh Ohio, of Colonel T. Kilby Smith's brigade, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Rice, Fifty-seventh Ohio, was advancing with them by a forced march, having led the troops by candlelight through the dense canebrake, and was six miles distant. Hearing the guns, he pressed rapidly forward in the direction of the sound, and arrived just in time to meet and disperse the enemy, who were preparing to pass round the rear of the boats, and again dispute their movement. The

fleet was saved. The expedition might now have been continued, but officers and men of army and navy were alike exhausted; the army had not brought rations for so long a work, and the navy provision-boat was too large to get through; moreover, the enemy had had time to prepare, and full indications of the direction and progress of the movement. There was nothing to do but to return. All of the 22d and 23d, and part of the 24th of March, was consumed in tediously retracing the route to Hill's plantation. The enemy, kept at bay by the army, did not molest the gunboats further. At Hill's the expedition rested on the 25th, and on the 26th the fleet passed down, and in accordance with orders received from General Grant, Sherman returned with his troops to Young's Point.

"The expedition failed," says General Grant, "more from want of knowledge as to what would be required to open this route than from any impracticability in the navigation of the streams and bayous through which it was proposed to pass. Want of this knowledge led the expedition on until difficulties were encountered, and then it would become necessary to send back to Young's Point for the means of removing them. This gave the enemy time to remove forces to effectually checkmate further progress, and the expedition was withdrawn when within a few hundred yards of free and open navigation to the Yazoo."

Admiral Porter also, in his official report, speaks of the want of means of moving the troops through the bayous as the chief difficulty; "for," he remarks, "there were never yet any two men who would labor harder than Generals Grant and Sherman to forward an expedition for the overthrow of Vicksburg." He continues: "The army officers worked like horses to enable them to accomplish what was desired. . . . No other general could have done better, or as well, as Sherman, but he had not the means for this peculiar kind of transportation."

General Grant now determined to march his army by land to New Carthage, twenty-three miles below Milliken's Bend, to run the transports past the batteries or through the canal,

should the latter course prove feasible, to cross the river, and to attack Vicksburg from the south. The movement was commenced by McClernand's Thirteenth Army Corps on the 29th of March. New Carthage was found to be an island, in consequence of the breakage of the levees, and the march had to be continued twelve miles further to Perkins' plantation. The roads were found to be level, but very bad, and the movement was necessarily slow. Over these roads the supplies of ordnance and provisions had to be transported thirty-five miles in wagons.

On the night of the 16th April, Acting Rear-Admiral Porter, who had entered with alacrity and energy into the general's plans, ran the Vicksburg batteries with his fleet and three transports carrying stores, and protected by hay and cotton. One of the transports only was lost, though all the boats were frequently struck. A few days later, five more transports, similarly prepared, and towing twelve barges, ran the batteries safely, a sixth being sunk, and half the barges disabled. The crews of the transports consisted of volunteers from the army, picked out of many hundreds of officers and men of the army, who offered themselves for this dangerous service. The limited amount of water transportation available below Vicksburg now rendered it necessary for the army to march by a circuitous route, avoiding the flooded lands, thirty-five miles further to Hard Times, thus lengthening the line of communication with Milliken's Bend to seventy miles. The final orders of General Grant for the movement, issued on the 20th of April, gave McClernand's Thirteenth Corps the right, McPherson's Seventeenth Corps the centre, and Sherman's Fifteenth Corps the left, and directed the army to move by the right flank, no faster, however, than supplies and ammunition could be transported to them. On the 26th of April, when it was discovered that the march must be continued below New Carthage, General Grant sent orders to General Sherman to wait until the roads should improve, or the canals be finished; and, on the 28th, he notified Sherman that the following day was fixed upon for attacking Grand Gulf, and suggested that

a simultaneous feint on the enemy's batteries on the Yazoo, near Haines' Bluff, would be most desirable, provided it could be made without the ill-effect on the army and the country of an apparent repulse. The object was to make as great a show as possible, in order to prevent reinforcements being sent from Vicksburg to the assistance of the forces which would have to be encountered at Grand Gulf. "The ruse," says General Grant, "succeeded admirably." In his official report, dated May 21st, 1863, convinced that the army could distinguish a feint from a real attack by succeeding events, and that the country would in due season recover from the effect, Sherman gave the necessary orders, embarked Blair's second division on ten steamboats, and about 10 A. M. on the 29th April, proceeded to the mouth of the Yazoo, where he found the flag-boat Black Hawk, Captain Breese, with the Choctaw and De Kalb, iron-clads, and the Tyler, and several smaller wooden boats of the fleet, already with steam up, prepared to co-operate in the proposed demonstration against Haines' Bluff.

The expedition at once proceeded up the Yazoo in order; lay for the night of April 29th at the mouth of Chickasaw bayou, and early next morning proceeded to within easy range of the enemy's batteries.

The gunboats at once engaged the batteries, and for four hours a vigorous demonstration was kept up. Towards evening, Sherman ordered the division of troops to disembark in full view of the enemy, and seemingly prepare to assault; but he knew full well that there was no road across the submerged field that lay between the river and the bluff. As soon as the troops were fairly out on the levee, the gunboats resumed their fire, and the enemy's batteries replied with spirit. The enemy could be seen moving guns, artillery, and infantry back and forth, and evidently expecting a real attack. Keeping up appearances until night, the troops were re-embarked. During the next day similar movements were made, accompanied by reconnoissances of all the country on both sides of the Yazoo.

While there, orders came from General Grant to hurry for-

ward to Grand Gulf. Dispatching orders to the divisions of Steele and Tuttle at once to march for Grand Gulf *via* Richmond, Sherman prolonged the demonstration till night, and quietly dropped back to his camp at Young's Point. No casualties were sustained, except one man of the Eighth Missouri, slightly wounded.

In the mean time, as many of the Thirteenth Army Corps as could be got on board the transports and barges were embarked, and were moved down to the front of Grand Gulf, for the purpose of landing and storming the enemy's works as soon as the navy should have silenced the guns. Admiral Porter's fleet opened at eight A. M. on the 29th of April, and gallantly kept up a vigorous fire at short range for more than five hours; by which time General Grant, who witnessed the engagement from a tug-boat, became convinced that the enemy's guns were too elevated to be silenced, and his fortifications too strong to be taken from the water-front. He at once ordered the troops back to Hard Times, there to disembark and march across the point to the plain immediately below Grand Gulf. During the night, under cover of the fire of the gunboats, all the transports and barges ran safely past the batteries. They were immediately followed by the fleet, and at daylight, on the 30th, the work of ferrying the troops over to Bruinsburg was commenced. The Thirteenth Corps was started on the road to Port Gibson as soon as it could draw three days' rations, and the Seventeenth Corps followed as fast as it was landed on the east bank. The enemy was met in force near Port Gibson at two o'clock on the afternoon of the 1st of May, was driven back on the following day, was pursued across the Bayou Pierre, and eight miles beyond the north fork of the same bayou, both which streams were bridged by McPherson's corps; and on the 3d of May, with slight skirmishing all day, was pushed to and across the Big Black River, at Hankinson's Ferry. Finding here that the enemy had evacuated Grand Gulf, and that we were already fifteen miles from that place on the direct road to either Vicksburg or Jackson, General Grant halted his army to wait for wagons, supplies, and Sherman's corps,

and went back to Grand Gulf in person, to move the depot of supplies to that point.

Sherman reached Young's Point on the night of May 1st. On the following morning, the second division, now commanded by General Blair, moved up to Milliken's Bend to garrison that place until relieved by troops ordered from Memphis for that purpose; and at the same time, General Sherman himself, with Steele's and Tuttle's divisions, took up the line of march to join General Grant. They reached Hard Times at noon on the 6th, crossed the Mississippi to Grand Gulf during the night and the following day, and on the 8th marched eighteen miles to Hankinson's Ferry, relieving Crocker's division and enabling it to join McPherson's corps. General Grant's orders for a general advance had been issued the day previous, and the movement had already begun. McPherson was to take the right-hand road by Rocky Springs and Utica to Raymond, and thence to Jackson; McClermand, the left-hand road, through Willow Springs, keeping as near the Black River as possible; Sherman to move on Edwards' Station, and both he and McClermand to strike the railroad between Edwards' Station and Bolton. At noon on the 10th, Sherman destroyed the floating bridge over the Big Black and marched to Big Sandy; on the 11th he reached Auburn, and on the morning of the 12th encountered and dispersed a small force of the enemy endeavoring to obstruct the crossing of Fourteen Mile Creek. Pausing for the pioneers, to make a new crossing in lieu of a bridge burned by the enemy's rear-guard, towards evening Sherman met General Grant on the other side of Fourteen Mile Creek, and was ordered to encamp there, Steele's division towards Edwards' Depot and Tuttle's towards Raymond. During the night, news was received that McPherson, with the Seventeenth Corps, had the same day met and defeated two brigades of the enemy at Raymond, and that the enemy had retreated upon Jackson, where reinforcements were constantly arriving, and where General Joseph E. Johnston was hourly expected to take personal command.

Determining to make sure of Jackson, and to leave no enemy in his rear, if it could be avoided, General Grant at once changed his orders to McClernand and Sherman, and directed them to march upon Raymond. On the 13th, McPherson moved to Clinton, Sherman to a parallel position at Mississippi Springs, and McClernand to a point near Raymond. Having communicated during the night, so as to reach their destination at the same hour, on the 14th, Sherman and McPherson marched fourteen miles, and at noon engaged the enemy near Jackson. At this time McClernand occupied Clinton, Mississippi Springs, and Raymond, each with one division, and had Blair's division of Sherman's corps near New Auburn, and had halted, according to orders, within supporting distance. The enemy marched out with the bulk of his forces on the Clinton road and engaged McPherson's corps about two and a half miles from Jackson, while a small force of artillery and infantry took a strong position in front of Sherman, about the same distance from the city, on the Mississippi Springs road, and endeavored by unusual activity, aided by the nature of the ground, to create the appearance of great strength, so as to delay Sherman's advance until the contest with McPherson should be decided.

During the day it rained in torrents, and the roads, which had been very dusty, became equally muddy, but the troops pushed on, and about 10 A. M. were within three miles of Jackson. Then were heard the guns of McPherson to the left, and the cavalry advance reported an enemy in front, at a small bridge at the foot of the ridge along which the road led.

The enemy opened briskly with a battery. Hastily reconnoitring the position, Sherman ordered Mower's and Matthie's, formerly Woods', brigades of Tuttle's division, to deploy forward to the right and left of the road, and Buckland's to close up. Waterhouse's and Spohre's batteries were placed on commanding ground and soon silenced the enemy's guns, when he retired about half a mile into the skirt of woods in front of the intrenchments at Jackson. Mower's brigade followed him up, and he soon took refuge behind the intrenchments.

The stream, owing to its precipitous banks, could only be passed on the bridge, which the enemy did not attempt to destroy, and forming the troops in similar order beyond the bridge, only that Mower's brigade, from the course he took in following the enemy, occupied the ground to the left of the road, and Matthie's brigade to the right, the two batteries in the centre, and Buckland's brigade in reserve.

As the troops emerged from the woods in their front, and as far to their left as they could see, appeared a line of intrenchments, and the enemy kept up a brisk fire with artillery from the points that enfiladed the road. In order to ascertain the nature of the flanks of this line of intrenchments, Sherman directed Captain Pitzman, acting engineer, to take the Ninety-fifth Ohio, and make a detour to the right, to see what was there. While he was gone Steele's division closed up. About one p. m. Captain Pitzman returned, reporting that he found the enemy's intrenchments abandoned at the point where he crossed the railroad, and had left the Ninety-fifth Ohio there in possession. Sherman at once ordered General Steele to lead his whole division into Jackson by that route, and as soon as the cheers of his men were heard, Tuttle's division was ordered in by the main road. The enemy's infantry had escaped to the north by the Canton road, but we captured about two hundred and fifty prisoners, with all the enemy's artillery (eighteen guns), and much ammunition and valuable public stores. Meanwhile, after a warm engagement, lasting more than two hours, McPherson had badly defeated the main body of the enemy, and driven it north. The pursuit was kept up until nearly dark.

Disposing the troops on the outskirts of the town, in obedience to a summons from General Grant, Sherman met him and General McPherson near the State-house, and received orders to occupy the line of rifle-pits, and on the following day to destroy effectually the railroad tracks in and about Jackson, and all the property belonging to the enemy. Accordingly, on the morning of the 15th of May, Steele's division was set to work to destroy the railroad and property to

the south and east, including Pearl River Bridge, and Tuttle's division to the north and west. The railroads were destroyed by burning the ties and warping the iron for a distance of four miles east of Jackson, three south, three north, and ten west.

In Jackson the arsenal buildings, the government foundry, the gun-carriage establishment, including the carriages for two complete six-gun batteries, stable, carpenter and paint shops, were destroyed. The penitentiary was burned, as is supposed, by some convicts who had been set free by the Confederate authorities. A valuable cotton factory was also burned to the ground, as machinery of that kind could so easily be converted into hostile uses; and the United States could better afford to compensate the owners for their property, and feed the poor families thus thrown out of employment, than to spare the property. Other buildings were destroyed in Jackson by some mischievous soldiers, who could not be detected, including the Catholic church and the Confederate hotel—the former accidentally, and the latter from malice.

Immediately on entering Jackson, General Grant had ordered McClermand with his corps and Blair's division of Sherman's corps to face towards Bolton, and march by roads converging near that place to Edward's Station. McPherson was also directed to retrace his route to Clinton and follow McClermand. Early on the morning of the 16th, hearing that Pemberton, with a force estimated by the enemy at ten batteries of artillery and twenty-five thousand men, was taking up positions to attack him, General Grant, who had intended to leave one division of the Fifteenth Corps a day longer in Jackson, ordered Sherman to bring up his entire command at once, and move with all possible dispatch until he should come up with the main body near Bolton. At the same time McClermand was ordered to move from the position reached on the night of the 15th, near Bolton, upon Edward's Station, and McPherson was ordered to join him.

Sherman received his orders at ten minutes past seven A. M. In an hour his advance division, Steele's, was in motion, Tuttle's followed at noon, and by night the corps had marched twenty

miles to Bolton. During the day the main body met the enemy in strong force at Champion Hills, and after a terrible contest of several hours' duration, fought chiefly by Hovey's division of McClernand's corps, and Logan's and Quimby's divisions of McPherson's corps, defeated him, capturing a large number of guns and prisoners, and cutting off the whole of Loring's division from Pemberton's army. That night Sherman was ordered to turn his corps to the right and move on Bridgeport, where Blair's division was to join him. On the morning of the 17th, McClernand and McPherson continued the pursuit along the railroad, the former in advance. In a brilliant affair, Lawler's brigade, of Carr's division, McClernand's corps, stormed the enemy's works on the east bank of the Big Black, defending the crossing of that stream, and captured the entire garrison, with seventeen guns. The enemy immediately burned the bridge over the Big Black, and thus finally isolated his forces on the west bank. At noon, Sherman reached Bridgeport, where Blair met him with his division and the pontoon train, which was the only one in the entire army. With trifling opposition the pontoon bridge was laid by night, and Blair's and Steele's divisions passed over, followed by Tuttle's division in the morning. During the night of the 17th, McClernand and McPherson bridged the Big Black, and by eight A. M., on the 18th, began to cross, the former on the Jackson and Vicksburg road, the latter above it. McClernand marched to Mount Albans and there turned to the left, on the Baldwin's Ferry road. McPherson came into the same road with Sherman, and turned to the left, where, as will be presently seen, the latter turned to the right, at the fork of the Bridgeport road, within three and a half miles of Vicksburg.

Starting at daybreak, Sherman pushed rapidly forward, and by half-past nine A. M., of May 18th, the head of his column reached the Benton road and commanded the Yazoo, interposing a superior force between the enemy at Vicksburg and the forts on the Yazoo. Resting a sufficient time to enable the column to close up, Sherman pushed forward to the point

where the road forks, and sending out on each road the Thirteenth Regulars to the right, and the Eighth Missouri to the left, with a battery at the fork, awaited General Grant's arrival. He very soon came up, and directed Sherman to operate on the right, McPherson on the centre, and McClermand on the left. Leaving a sufficient force on the main road to hold it till McPherson came up, Sherman pushed the head of his column on this road till the skirmishers were within musket-range of the defences of Vicksburg. Here he disposed Blair's division to the front, Tuttle's in support, and ordered Steele's to follow a blind road to the right till he reached the Mississippi. By dark his advance was on the bluffs, and early next morning he reached the Haines' Bluff road, getting possession of the enemy's outer works, camps, and many prisoners left behind during their hasty evacuation, and had his pickets up within easy range of the enemy's new line of defences. By eight A. M. of May 19th we had encompassed the enemy to the north of Vicksburg, our right resting on the Mississippi River, within view of our fleets at the mouth of the Yazoo and Young's Point; Vicksburg was in plain sight, and nothing separated the two armies but a space of about four hundred yards of very difficult ground, cut up by almost impracticable ravines and the enemy's line of intrenchments. Sherman ordered the Fourth Iowa Cavalry to proceed rapidly up to Haines' Bluff and secure possession of the place, it being perfectly open to the rear. By four P. M. the cavalry were on the high bluff behind, and Colonel Swan, finding that the place had been evacuated, dispatched a company to secure it. Communication was opened with the fleet at Young's Point and the mouth of the Yazoo, and bridges and roads made to bring up ammunition and provisions from the mouth of the Chickasaw bayou, to which point supply-boats had been ordered by General Grant. Up to that time, Sherman's men had literally lived upon the country, having left Grand Gulf May 8th with three days' rations in their haversacks, and having received little or nothing from the commissary until the 18th.

The three corps being in position, and Vicksburg as completely invested as our strength admitted, and, relying upon the demoralization of the enemy, in consequence of his repeated and disastrous defeats outside of the works, General Grant ordered a general assault to take place at two o'clock in the afternoon of the 19th. At that hour, Blair's division moved forward, Ewing's and Giles Smith's brigades on the right of the road, and Kilby Smith's brigade on the left, with artillery disposed on the right and left to cover the point where the road enters the enemy's intrenchments. Tuttle's division was held on the road, with Buckland's brigade deployed in line to the rear of Blair and the other two brigades under cover. At the appointed signal the line advanced, but the ground to the right and left was so impracticable, being cut up in deep chasms, filled with standing and fallen timber, that the line was slow and irregular in reaching the trenches. The Thirteenth Infantry, on the left of Giles Smith, reached the works first, and planted its colors on the exterior slope; its commander, Captain Washington, was mortally wounded, and five other officers, and seventy-seven men, out of two hundred and fifty, killed or wounded. The Eighty-third Indiana, Colonel Spooner, and the One Hundred and Twenty-seventh Illinois, Colonel Eldridge, attained the same position nearly at the same time, held their ground, and fired upon any head that presented itself above the parapet; but it was impossible to enter. Other regiments gained position to the right and left close up to the parapet; but night found them outside the works, unsuccessful. As soon as darkness closed in, Sherman ordered them back a short distance, where the formation of the ground gave a partial shelter, to bivouac for the night. McClernand and McPherson only succeeded in gaining advanced positions under cover.

Spending the 20th and 21st in placing the artillery in commanding positions, in perfecting communications, and in bringing up supplies to the troops—who, having now been marching and fighting for twenty days on about five days' rations from the commissary department, were

beginning to suffer for want of bread—on the afternoon of the latter day, General Grant issued orders for a second assault to be made simultaneously, by heads of columns, at ten o'clock on the morning of the 22d of May. The three corps commanders set their time by his. Precisely at the appointed hour, and simultaneously along the whole front, the assault commenced.

In Sherman's corps, Blair's division was placed at the head of the road, Tuttle's in support, and General Steele was to make his attack at a point in his front about half a mile to the right. The troops were grouped so that the movement could be connected and rapid. The road lies on the crown of an interior ridge, rises over comparatively smooth ground along the edge of the ditch of the right face of the enemy's bastion, and enters the parapet at the shoulder of the bastion. No men could be seen in the enemy's works, except occasionally a sharpshooter, who would show his head and quickly discharge his piece. A line of picked skirmishers was placed to keep them down. A volunteer storming party of a hundred and fifty men led the column, carrying boards and poles to bridge the ditch. This, with a small interval, was followed in order by Ewing's, Giles Smith's, and Kilby Smith's brigades, bringing up the rear of Blair's division. All marched by the flank, following a road by which the men were partially sheltered, until it was necessary to take the crown of the ridge and expose themselves to the full view of the enemy. The storming party dashed up the road at the double-quick, followed by Ewing's brigade, the Thirtieth Ohio leading, while the artillery of Wood's, Barrett's, Waterhouse's, Spoor's, and Hart's batteries kept a concentric fire on the bastion constructed to command this approach. The storming party reached the salient of the bastion, and passed towards the sally-port. Then rose from every part commanding it a double rank of the enemy, and poured on the head of the column a terrific fire. It halted, wavered, and sought cover. The rear pressed on, but the fire was so hot that very soon all followed this example. The head of the column crossed

the ditch on the left face of the bastion, and climbed up on the exterior slope. There the colors were planted, and the men burrowed in the earth to shield themselves from the flank fire. The leading brigade of Ewing being unable to carry that point, the next brigade of Giles Smith was turned down a ravine, and, by a circuit to the left, found cover, formed line, and threatened the parapet about three hundred yards to the left of the bastion; while the brigade of Kilby Smith deployed on the further slope of one of the spurs, where, with Ewing's brigade, they kept up a constant fire against any object that presented itself above the parapet.

About two p. m., General Blair having reported that none of his brigades could pass the point of the road swept by the terrific fire encountered by Ewing's, but that Giles Smith had got a position to the left in connection with General Ransom, of McPherson's corps, and was ready to assault, Sherman ordered a constant fire of artillery and infantry to be kept up to occupy the attention of the enemy in his front, while Ransom's and Giles Smith's brigades charged up against the parapet. They also met a staggering fire, before which they recoiled under cover of the hill-side. At the same time, while McPherson's whole corps was engaged, and having heard from General Grant General McClelland's report, which subsequently proved inaccurate, that he had taken three of the enemy's forts, and that his flags floated on the stronghold of Vicksburg, Sherman ordered General Tuttle at once to send to the assault one of his brigades. He detailed General Mower's, and while General Steele was hotly engaged on the right, and heavy firing could be heard all down the line to his left, Sherman ordered their charge, covered in like manner by Blair's division deployed on the hill-side, and the artillery posted behind parapets within point-blank range. General Mower carried his brigade up bravely and well, but met a fire more severe, if possible, than that of the first assault, with a similar result. The colors of the leading regiment, the Eleventh Missouri, were planted by the side of those of Blair's



Blair

Frank P. Blair
Major Genl Commanding
17th Regt

C. B. Richardson, Publisher.



storming party, and there remained till withdrawn, after night-fall, by Sherman's orders. General Steele, with his division, made his assault at a point about midway between the bastion and the Mississippi River. The ground over which he passed was more open and exposed to the flank fire of the enemy's batteries in position, and was deeply cut up by gulleys and washes, but his column passed steadily through this fire, and reached the parapet, which was also found to be well manned and defended by the enemy. He could not carry the works, but held possession of the hill-side till night, when he withdrew his command to his present position. The loss in Sherman's corps in this attack was about six hundred killed and wounded.

In the mean while portions of each of the storming columns on McPherson's and McClernand's fronts planted their columns on the exterior slope of the parapet, where they kept them till night. But the assault had failed. The enemy's works were naturally and artificially too strong to be taken in that way. The enemy was able to maintain at each point assailed, and at all simultaneously the full force the position admitted; and the nature of the ground was such that only small columns could be used in the assault.

General Grant now determined to undertake a regular siege. The troops worked diligently and cheerfully. On the evening of the 3d of July the saps were close to the enemy's ditch, the mines were well under his parapet, and every thing was in readiness for a final assault. Meanwhile the investing force had been strengthened by Landrum's division from Memphis; Smith's and Kimball's divisions of the Sixteenth Corps, under Major-General C. C. Washburne; Herron's division from Arkansas, and two divisions of the Ninth Corps, under Major-General John G. Parke, from the Department of the Ohio. By the 25th of June, our intrenchments being now as formidable against a sortie as the enemy's works were against assault, and there being more troops than were needed for the investment, General Grant placed Sherman in command of the Ninth Corps at Haines' Bluff, Landrum's division, and one division each from

the Thirteenth, Fifteenth, and Seventeenth corps, and assigned to him the duty of watching the movements of Johnston, who had collected a large army at Jackson, and was apparently about to attack the rear of the investing force, with the design of raising the siege. Our position was a strong one. The Big Black covered us from attack, and would render Johnston's escape in the event of defeat impossible. Nevertheless the condition of affairs with his army was so desperate that he moved from Jackson on the 29th of June; but while he was making reconnoissances to ascertain the best point for crossing the river, on the 4th day of July, 1863, Vicksburg surrendered.

General Grant in his official report of the siege, dated July 6th, thus alludes to Sherman's operations while guarding the rear: "Johnston, however, not attacking, I determined to attack him the moment Vicksburg was in our possession, and accordingly notified Sherman that I should again make an assault on Vicksburg at daylight on the 6th, and for him to have up supplies of all descriptions ready to move upon receipt of orders, if the assault should prove a success. His preparations were immediately made, and when the place surrendered on the 4th, two days earlier than I had fixed for the attack, Sherman was found ready, and moved at once with a force increased by the remainder of both the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Army corps, and is at present investing Jackson, where Johnston has made a stand."

Johnston occupied the lines of rifle-pits covering the front of Jackson with four divisions of Confederate troops, under Major-Generals Loring, Walker, French, and Breckinridge, and a division of cavalry, under Brigadier-General Jackson, observing the fords.

After toiling for nearly two months in the hot and stifling trenches, without pausing to share the general outbreak of joy for the national triumph which crowned their labors, Sherman's men marched fifty miles in the heat and dust through a country almost destitute of water, to meet the enemy.

The advance of his troops appeared before the enemy's

works in front of Jackson on the 9th of July, and on the 12th had invested that place, until both flanks rested upon Pearl River. Constant and vigorous skirmishing was kept up in front, while a cavalry expedition was sent off to the east of Jackson to destroy the railroads, until the night of the 16th of July. Sherman now had all his artillery in position, and a large ammunition train for which he had been waiting had arrived during the day. Learning this fact, and perceiving the impossibility of longer maintaining his position, Johnston having previously removed the greater portion of his stores, marched out of Jackson the same night, and destroyed the floating-bridges over the Pearl River. Early on the morning of the 17th, the evacuation was discovered, and Sherman's troops entered and occupied the city. Johnston continued the retreat to Morton, thirty-five miles east of Jackson. Two divisions of our troops, with the cavalry, followed as far as Brandon, through which place they drove the enemy's cavalry on the 19th. General Sherman at once sent out expeditions in all quarters, to thoroughly and permanently destroy all the bridges, culverts, embankments, water-tanks, rails, ties, and rolling-stock of the railways centring in Jackson. Our loss during the operations before Jackson was about one thousand in all; the enemy's was estimated by General Johnston at 71 killed, 504 wounded, and about 25 stragglers. We took 764 prisoners on entering the city. Leaving a small garrison in Jackson, Sherman returned to the line of the Big Black, to recuperate.

Thus terminated, in one hundred and nine days from its first inception, a campaign which resulted in the surrender of an entire army of thirty-seven thousand prisoners, including fifteen general officers; the discomfiture and partial dispersion of a second large army under a leader of approved skill; the capture of Vicksburg; the opening of the Mississippi River; and the division of the rebellion in twain.

Of Sherman's part in the campaign General Grant remarks: "The siege of Vicksburg and last capture of Jackson and dispersion of Johnston's army, entitle General Sherman to

more credit than usually falls to the lot of one man to earn. His demonstration at Haines' Bluff, in April, to hold the enemy about Vicksburg, while the army was securing a foothold east of the Mississippi; his rapid marches to join the army afterwards; his management at Jackson, Mississippi, in the first attack; his almost unequalled march from Jackson to Bridgeport, and passage of Black River; his securing Walnut Hills on the 18th of May, attest his great merit as a soldier."

The army now rested.

CHAPTER X.

THE LULL AFTER VICKSBURG.

IMMEDIATELY after the surrender, while waiting for the movement of his columns, Sherman seized a few moments to write these hasty lines to his friend Admiral Porter :—

“I can appreciate the intense satisfaction you must feel at lying before the very monster that has defied us with such deep and malignant hate, and seeing your once disunited fleet again a unit; and better still, the chain that made an inclosed sea of a link in the great river broken forever. In so magnificent a result I stop not to count who did it. It is done, and the day of our nation’s birth is consecrated and baptized anew in a victory won by the united Navy and Army of our country. God grant that the harmony and mutual respect that exists between our respective commanders, and shared by all the true men of the joint service, may continue forever and serve to elevate our national character, threatened with shipwreck. Thus I muse as I sit in my solitary camp out in the wood far from the point for which we have justly striven so long and so well, and though personal curiosity would tempt me to go and see the frowning batteries and sunken pits that have defied us so long, and sent to their silent graves so many of our early comrades in the enterprise, I feel that other tasks lie before me, and time must not be lost. Without casting anchor, and despite the heat and the dust and the drought, I must again into the bowels of the land to make the conquest of Vicksburg fulfil all the conditions it should in the progress of this war. Whether success attend my efforts or not, I know that Admiral Porter will ever accord to me the

exhibition of a pure and unselfish zeal in the service of our country.

“Though further apart, the navy and army will still act in concert, and I assure you I shall never reach the banks of the river or see a gunboat but I will think of Admiral Porter, Captain Breese, and the many elegant and accomplished gentlemen it has been my good fortune to meet on armed or unarmed decks of the Mississippi Squadron.”

There was now a lull in the war. After the great struggles which closed the summer campaign of 1863, the combatants relaxed their grasp for a moment, to breathe. The Army of the Potomac rested upon the Rapidan. The Army of the Cumberland, gathered for the leap, lay in front of Tullahoma. The Army of the Tennessee reposed on the banks of the river it had won. Steele was sent to occupy Little Rock. Ord with the Thirteenth Corps, went to New Orleans. By the remainder of Grant's army the interval was spent in reorganizing and recuperating. The Fifteenth Corps was reorganized so as to consist of four divisions. The First, commanded by Brigadier-General P. J. Osterhaus, was composed of two brigades, led by Brigadier-General C. R. Woods and Colonel J. A. Williamson, of the Fourth Iowa. The Second, commanded by Brigadier-General Morgan L. Smith, comprised the brigades of Brigadier-Generals Giles A. Smith and J. A. D. Lightburn. The Third, commanded by Brigadier-General J. M. Tuttle, consisted of three brigades, under Brigadier-Generals J. A. Mower, and R. P. Buckland, and Colonel J. J. Wood, of the Twelfth Iowa. The Fourth, commanded by Brigadier-General Hugh Ewing, included the brigades led by General J. M. Corse, Colonel Loomis, of the Twenty-sixth Illinois, and Colonel J. R. Cockerell, of the Seventieth Iowa. Major-General Frank P. Blair was temporarily relieved from duty with the corps, and Major-General Steele's division accompanied that officer to Arkansas.

We may now avail ourselves of the lull to glance briefly at General Sherman's correspondence, during this period and the

campaign just ended, relating to other matters than the movements and battles of his corps.

While the new levies of 1863 were being raised, in a letter to the governor of his native State he took occasion to urge the importance of filling up the ranks of the veteran regiments rather than raising new ones. "I believe," he said, "you will pardon one who rarely travels out of his proper sphere to express an earnest hope that the strength of our people will not again be wasted by the organization of new regiments, whilst we have in the field skeleton regiments, with officers, non-commissioned officers, and men, who only need numbers to make a magnificent army.

"The President of the United States is now clothed with a power that should have been conferred just two years ago, and I feel assured he will use it. He will call for a large mass of men, and they should all be privates, and sent so as to make every regiment in the field equal to one thousand men. Time has convinced all reasonable men that war in theory and practice are two distinct things. Many an honest patriot, full of enthusiasm, zeal, and thirst for glory, has in practice found himself unequal to the actual requirements of war, and passed to one side, leaving another in his place; and, now, after two years, Ohio has in the field one hundred and twenty-six regiments, whose officers *now* are qualified, and the men of which would give tone and character to the new recruits. To fill these regiments will require fifty thousand recruits, which are as many as the State could well raise. I therefore hope and pray that you will use your influence against any more new regiments, and consolidation of old ones, but fill up all the old ones to a full standard. Those who talk of prompt and speedy peace know not what they say."

Reverting to the enlarged scope of the war, and its probable future, he continues: "The South to-day is more formidable and arrogant than she was two years ago, and we lose far more by having an insufficient number of men than from any other cause. We are forced to invade—we must keep the war South; they are not only ruined, exhausted, but humbled in

pride and spirit. Admitting that our armies to the front are equal to the occasion, which I know is not the case, our lines of communication are ever threatened by their dashes, for which the country, the population, and character of the enemy are all perfectly adapted.

“Since the first hostile shot the people of the North has had no option, they must conquer or be conquered. There can be no middle course. I have never been concerned about the copperhead squabbings; the South spurns and despises this class worse than we do, and would only accept their overtures to substitute them in their levies, in the cotton and corn-fields, for the slaves who have escaped. I do not pretend, nor have I ever pretended to foresee the end of all this, but I do know that we are yet far from the end of war. I repeat that it is no longer an open question; we *must* fight it out. The moment we relax, down go all our conquests thus far. I know my views on this point have ever been regarded as extreme, even verging on insanity; but for years I had associated with Bragg, Beauregard, and extreme Southern men, and long before others could realize the fact that Americans would raise their hands against our consecrated government, I was forced to know it, to witness it. Two years will not have been spent in vain if the North now, by another magnificent upheaving of the real people, again fill the ranks of your proven and tried regiments, and assure them that, through good report and evil report, you will stand by them. If Ohio will do this, and if the great North will do this, then will our army feel that it has a country and a government worth dying for. As to the poltroons, who falter and cry quits, let them dig and raise the food the army needs—but they should never claim a voice in the councils of the nation.”

A general order, issued from the adjutant-general's office, directed that all regiments which had fallen below one half their maximum strength should be consolidated by reducing the number of companies, and mustering out such of the field and staff officers as should thereby be rendered super-numerary. Strictly carried out, the effect of this order would

have been to reduce a very large proportion of the regiments composing the army to the condition of feeble battalions, with impaired powers for the assimilation of recruits, and with the loss of many of the ablest and bravest officers. In many cases this actually occurred. To the policy of this order, Sherman felt called upon to object. "If my judgment do not err," he wrote to Adjutant-General Thomas, "you have the power to save this army from a disintegration more fatal than defeat.

"You will pardon so strong an expression, when I illustrate my meaning; and if I am in error I shall rejoice to know it.

"The Act of Congress, known as the 'Conscript Bill,' though containing many other provisions, was chiefly designed to organize the entire available military strength of the nation, and provide for its being called out to the assistance of the armies now in the field. These armies are composed in great part of regiments which, by death in battle, by disease, and discharges for original or developed causes, have fallen far below the minimum standard of law, and many even below 'one-half of the maximum strength.' Yet all these regiments, as a general rule, have undergone a necessary and salutary purgation. Field-officers have acquired a knowledge which they did not possess when first called to arms by the breaking out of the war; they have learned how to drill, to organize, to provide for and conduct their regiments. Captains, lieutenants, sergeants, and corporals, have all been educated in the dear but necessary school of experience, and begin to have a knowledge which would enable them to make good companies, had they the proper number of privates. We had all supposed the conscript law would furnish these privates, and that at last we would have an army with a due proportion of all grades. The receipt of General Orders No. 86 dispels this illusion, and we must now absolutely discharge the colonels and majors, and assistant-surgeons of all regiments below the standard of 'one-half the maximum.' This will at once take the very life out of our army. The colonels and majors of our reduced

regiments are generally the best men, and are the fruit of two years' hard and constant labor. Then the *ten* companies must be reduced to *five*, and of course there will be discharged in each regiment—field and staff, three; captains, five; lieutenants, ten; sergeants, twenty; corporals, forty; aggregate, seventy-eight. So that each regiment will be reduced in strength by seventy-eight of its chosen and best men. Extend this to the whole army, for the army is now or must soon fall below the standard, and the result will be a very heavy loss, and that confined to the best men.

“Then, after regiments are made battalions, and again are restored to their regimental organization, will come in a new set of colonels, majors, captains, etc., etc., and what guarantee have we but the same old process of costly elimination will have to be gone over? . . . A new set of colonels and majors, and a strong infusion of new captains and lieutenants, will paralyze the new organization. The army is now in about the right condition to be re-enforced by recruits—privates; but if this consolidation is effected, I have no hesitation in saying that my army corps is and will be paralyzed by the change. It will be all loss and no gain. Regiments will lose their identity, their pride, their *esprit*. If there be no intention to enlarge the present volunteer army, I admit that consolidation is economical and right; but when we all feel the armies must be filled up, it does seem strange we should begin by taking out of our small but tried regiments some of the very best materials in them, especially their colonels.”

To a lady whose sight and hearing were shocked by the conduct and language of some of the troops, and who took occasion to represent the matter at length, he replied, defending his men against the charges of misconduct, which, as in all other portions of the army, were continually brought against them in terms so vague and general that no civil magistrate would have given them an instant's thought; and himself against the allegation that he tolerated irregularities.

“Mrs. Z—— has fallen into a common error in saying it was useless to complain of a whole regiment to Brigadier-General Smith or Major-General Sherman. We naturally demanded more specific complaint against incendiary acts than a mere vague suspicion that the —— did all iniquitous things, when twenty other regiments were camped round about Memphis, six thousand vagabonds and refugees hanging about, and the city itself infested by gangs of thieves and incendiaries, turned loose upon the world, and sheltered in their deeds of darkness by charging them upon soldiers. Neither General Morgan L. Smith or myself ever failed to notice a specific complaint against any soldier of our command, if accompanied by reasonable proofs; but we did, and rightfully too, resent a mere general charge, that every fire originating from careless chimneys, careless arrangement of stove-pipes, and the designing acts of wicked incendiaries, should without even an attempt at proof be charged to the ——.

That regiment is one of the bravest and best disciplined in our service, and being composed mostly of young and energetic men from the city of ——, is somewhat famous for its acts of fun, frolic, mischief, and even crime, with a perfect skill in evading detection and pursuit. They are lawless and violent, and, like all our volunteer soldiers, have for years been taught that the people, the masses, the majority, are ‘king,’ and can do no wrong. They are no worse than other volunteers, all of whom come to us filled with the popular idea that they must enact war, that they must clean out the secesh, must waste and not protect their property, must burn, waste, and destroy. Just such people as Mrs. Z—— have taught this creed, sung this song, and urged on our men to these disgraceful acts; and it is such as Morgan L. Smith and W. T. Sherman who have been combating this foul doctrine. During my administration of affairs in Memphis, I know it was raised from a condition of death, gloom, and darkness, to one of life and comparative prosperity. Its streets, stores, hotels, and dwellings were sad and deserted as I entered it, and

when I left it, life and business prevailed, and over fourteen hundred enrolled Union men paraded its streets, boldly and openly carrying the banners of our country. No citizen, Union or secesh, will deny that I acted lawfully, firmly, and fairly, and that substantial justice prevailed with even balance. I do feel their testimony better than the hearsay of any would-be notoriety."

To General Steele, while temporarily detached from the main body of his command, Sherman thus wrote respecting the destruction of the enemy's property:—

"I most heartily approve your purpose to return to families their carriages, buggies, and farming tools, wherewith to make a crop. War at best is barbarism, but to involve all—children, women, old and helpless—is more than can be justified. Our men will become absolutely lawless unless this can be checked. The destruction of corn or forage and provisions in the enemy's country is a well-established law of war, and is as justifiable as the destruction of private cotton by the Southern Confederacy. *Jeff. Davis*, no doubt, agrees that they have a right to destroy their people's cotton, but the guerrillas do not stop to inquire whose cotton they burn; and I know, as you know, the Confederate Government claim the war-right to burn *all* cotton, whether belonging to their adherents or to Union men. We surely have a similar right as to corn, cotton, fodder, &c., used to sustain armies and war. Still, I always feel that the stores necessary for a family should be spared, and I think it injures our men to allow them to plunder indiscriminately the inhabitants of the country."

Near Jackson, Miss., at a house called "Hurricane," formerly occupied as a residence by Jefferson Davis's brother, Joseph Davis, some men of Ewing's division discovered, in a garret, only reached through a trap-door in the ceiling, a box of letters and papers. By the time the box reached Sherman's headquarters, whither it was forwarded, many of the contents had

been abstracted, but the remainder were found to consist of letters addressed to Jefferson Davis by various persons during the preceding ten years. After attempting to arrange them in convenient shape for examination, Sherman found the task too great a tax on his time, and early in August forwarded them to the adjutant-general's office at Washington.

The circumstances which form the groundwork of some of Whittier's finest verses are thus related, in an official dispatch to the secretary of war, dated August 8th, 1863:—

“I take the liberty of asking, through you, that something be done for a young lad named Orion P. Howe, of Waukegan, Illinois, who belongs to the Fifty-fifth Illinois, but is at present at his home wounded. I think he is too young for West Point, but would be the very thing for a midshipman. When the assault at Vicksburg was at its height, on the 19th of May, and I was on foot near the road which formed the line of attack, this young lad came up to me wounded and bleeding, with a good healthy boy's cry: ‘General Sherman, send some cartridges to Colonel Walmbourg, the men are all out.’ ‘What is the matter with my boy?’ ‘They shot me in the leg, but I can go to the hospital; send the cartridges right away.’ Even where we stood, the shot fell thick, and I told him to go to the rear at once, I would attend to the cartridges, and off he limped. Just before he disappeared over the hill, he turned, and called, as loud as he could, ‘Calibre 54.’

“I have not seen the boy since, and his colonel, Walmbourg, on inquiry, gives me his address as above, and says he is a bright intelligent boy, with a fine preliminary education.

“What arrested my attention then, was—and what renews my memory of the fact now, is—that one so young, carrying a musket-ball wound through his leg, should have found his way to me on that fatal spot, and delivered his message, not forgetting the very important part, even, of the calibre of the musket, which you know is an unusual one.

“I'll warrant that the boy has in him the elements of a man,

and I commend him to the Government as one worthy the fostering care of some one of its national institutions.”

On the 14th of August he received from the War Department a commission as brigadier-general in the Regular Army of the United States, dating from the 4th of July, 1863, and thus acknowledged his indebtedness to General Grant for this new honor :—

“I had the satisfaction to receive last night the appointment as brigadier-general in the regular army, with a letter from General Halleck very friendly and complimentary in its terms. I know that I owe this to your favor, and beg to acknowledge it, and add, that I value the commission far less than the fact that this will associate my name with yours and McPherson’s in opening the Mississippi, an achievement the importance of which cannot be over-estimated.

“I beg to assure you of my deep personal attachment, and to express the hope that the chances of war will leave me to serve near and under you till the dawn of that peace for which we are contending, with the only purpose that it shall be honorable and lasting.”

President Lincoln had at the same time conferred on General Grant himself a commission as major-general in the regular army from the same date; and Meade for Gettysburg, and McPherson for Vicksburg, had also been added to the list of the regular brigadier-generals. To understand the nature of the compliment thus bestowed by the Government upon its faithful servants, it must be remembered that the major-generals of the regular army number but five, and the brigadier-generals but nine.

It has been alleged in some of the newspapers of the day, that while the army was encamped at Young’s Point, General Sherman handed to General Grant a written protest against the proposed movement on Grand Gulf, and the statement has been coupled with such a show of circumstances as to

obtain ready credence in many quarters. In fact, General Sherman never protested, either in writing or verbally, against any movement ever proposed or adopted by General Grant; and throughout the entire campaign these two commanders acted together in perfect harmony and cordiality; the commander-in-chief freely and constantly availing himself of Sherman's advice, the subordinate promptly and faithfully carrying out the orders of his superior. But the movement on Grand Gulf was not Sherman's plan. It was the conception of General Grant's own mind, and was adopted by him, against the opinion, though with the full consent and support of the Executive. Sherman considered the north front of Vicksburg the true point of attack, and the line of the Yallahusha the best base of operations. On the 8th of April he frankly expressed this opinion to General Grant in the following communication:

"I would most respectfully suggest that General Grant call on his corps commanders for their opinions, concise and positive, on the best general plan of campaign.

"My own opinions are—

"1st. That the Army of the Tennessee is far in advance of the other grand armies.

"2d. That a corps from Missouri should forthwith be moved from St. Louis to the vicinity of Little Rock, Arkansas, supplies collected while the river is full, and land communication with Memphis opened *via* Des Ark, on the White and Madison, on the St. Francis rivers.

"3d. That as much of Yazoo Pass, Coldwater, and Tallahatchee rivers as can be regained and fortified be held, and the main army be transported thither by land or water; that the road back to Memphis be secured and reopened, and as soon as the waters subside, Grenada be attacked, and the swamp road across to Helena be patrolled by cavalry.

"4th. That the line of the Yallahusha be the base from which to operate against the points where the Mississippi Central crosses Big Black above Canton, and, lastly, where the Vicks-

burg and Jackson Railroad crosses the same river. The capture of Vicksburg would result.

"5th. That a force be left in this vicinity not to exceed ten thousand men, with only enough steamboats to float and transport them to any desired point. This force to be held always near enough to act with the gunboats, when the main army is known to be near Vicksburg, Haines' Bluff, or Yazoo City.

"The chief reason for operating *solely* by water was the season of the year, and high-water in Tallahatchee and Yallahusha. The spring is now here, and soon these streams will be no serious obstacle, save the ambuscades of forest, and whatever works the enemy may have erected at or near Grenada. North Mississippi is too valuable to allow them to hold and make crops.

"I make these suggestions with the request that General Grant simply read them, and simply give them, as I know he will, a share of his thoughts. I would prefer he should not answer them, but merely give them as much or as little weight as they deserve."

And he added in conclusion :—

"Whatever plan of action he may adopt will receive from me the same zealous co-operation and energetic support as though conceived by myself."

CHAPTER XI.

THE MARCH TO CHATTANOOGA AND THE BATTLE OF MISSIONARY RIDGE.

WHILE Sherman's corps was resting on the Big Black, the situation of affairs in the central region became such as to require the concentration of all available troops for operations in that theatre of war. Rosecrans had in August expelled the enemy from Middle Tennessee, and, by the 9th of September, by a brilliant series of flank movements, had compelled Bragg to evacuate his strong fortified position at Chattanooga, and fall back behind the Lookout and Mission mountains. Burnside had, at the same time, driven the rebels from East Tennessee, and had occupied Knoxville and Cumberland Gap. Having lost the Mississippi, the enemy was now endeavoring to save Tennessee, and was bringing troops from the east and from the west to reinforce Bragg, so as to enable him to take the offensive, and drive the Union army to the Ohio. Longstreet's corps was on its way from Virginia, and Loring's division had arrived from Johnston's army.

On the 13th September, orders were sent from Washington to Burnside to move down the Tennessee towards Chattanooga, and to Hurlbut at Memphis and Grant and Sherman at Vicksburg, to send all their available forces to Corinth and Tusculumbia to co-operate with Rosecrans, in case Bragg should attempt to turn his right flank and invade Tennessee. On the 23d, Howard's eleventh corps and Slocum's twelfth corps were detached from the Army of the Potomac, united under the command of Major-General Hooker, and ordered to Nashville.

On the 22d, having received a telegram from General Grant, directing him to detail one division to march to Vicksburg, and there embark for Memphis, Sherman dispatched Osterhaus with his first division. At four o'clock that afternoon it was on the march, and embarked the next day. On the 23d, Sherman was called in person to Vicksburg, and instructed to prepare to follow with his whole corps, except Tuttle's third division, which was to be left with General McPherson to guard the line of the Big Black, and to be replaced in the Fifteenth Corps by John E. Smith's division of the Seventeenth Corps, consisting of three brigades, commanded respectively by Brigadier-General Matthias, Colonel G. B. Baum, Fifty-sixth Illinois, and Colonel J. J. Alexander, Fiftieth Illinois. This division was already on the way, and, by the 27th, at the earliest moment when it was possible to procure steamboat transportation, Sherman followed in person, with Morgan L. Smith's second division, and Ewing's fourth division. Owing to the low stage of water in the river and the scarcity of wood on the banks, the last of the fleet did not reach Memphis until the 4th of October. There Sherman found orders from the general-in-chief, General Halleck, to conduct the Fifteenth Army Corps, with all other troops which could be spared from the line of the Memphis and Charleston railway, to Athens, Alabama, and thence report for orders to General Rosecrans, at Chattanooga. He was substantially to follow the railway eastwardly, repairing it as he moved, looking to his own lines for supplies, and was in no event to depend for them upon Rosecrans, the roads in whose rear were already overtaxed to meet the wants of his own army. Osterhaus' first division was already in front of Corinth, and John E. Smith's, styled the third, at Memphis, moving out by rail, but the capacity of the railroad was so limited that it was soon found that animals and wagons could be moved more rapidly by the common road, and the whole of Ewing's fourth division moved in the same manner.

On the 11th of October, having put in march the rear of the column, Sherman started for Corinth by railway, in a special

train, escorted by the battalion of the Thirteenth Regular Infantry, and reached Collierville station at noon. The Sixty-ninth Indiana, under Colonel D. C. Anthony, was at that moment gallantly defending the post against the attack by the rebel General Chalmers with a force of nearly three thousand cavalry and eight field-guns, and Sherman's escort arrived just in time to assist in his defeat. The next day Sherman reached Corinth, and ordered General Frank P. Blair, who had again reported to him at the outset of the march, and whom he had assigned to duty as his second in command, to take charge of the advance, and push forward to Iuka with the first and second divisions of Osterhaus and Morgan L. Smith, while he himself remained behind a few days to push forward the troops as they came up, and to direct the repairs. On the 19th, he reached Iuka, and on the following day, in accordance with a previous agreement with Rear-Admiral Porter, two gunboats and a decked coal-barge reached Eastport to assist in crossing the Tennessee. While the repairs of the railway were progressing, Sherman ordered General Blair to push forward with the two divisions under his command, and drive the enemy, consisting of Roddy's and Ferguson's cavalry brigades, and a number of irregular cavalry, in all about five thousand strong, under the command of Major-General Stephen D. Lee, beyond Tuscumbia. After a short engagement, Blair drove the enemy from his front, and entered Tuscumbia on the 27th of October.

In the mean time, on the 19th and 20th of September, Rosecrans, endeavoring to concentrate his scattered columns in the presence of the enemy, had been attacked by Bragg, had fought the bloody battle of Chickamauga, had retreated to Chattanooga, and was there practically invested. On the 18th of October, Major-General Grant, who had been sent for some time before, arrived at Louisville, and in pursuance of orders issued by the War Department on the 16th, and delivered to him by the secretary of war in person, assumed command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, comprising the departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, and the Tennessee, and the three large armies operating therein. Upon his

recommendation, the secretary of war immediately issued orders assigning Major-General Thomas to the command of the Department of the Cumberland, and Major-General Sherman to that of the Department of the Tennessee. Sherman received these orders at Iuka, on the 25th of October, accompanied by instructions from General Grant to retain personal command of the army in the field. Investing Major-General McPherson, at Vicksburg, with full authority to act in his stead in regard to the State of Mississippi, and conferring upon Major-General Hurlbut a similar authority as to West Tennessee, he at once published the following instructions for the guidance of the officers and soldiers of his department in their relations with the citizens :—

“ All officers in command of corps and fixed military posts will assume the highest military powers allowed by the laws of war and Congress. They must maintain the best possible discipline, and repress all disorder, alarms, and dangers in their reach. Citizens who fail to support the Government have no right to ask favors and protection ; but if they actively assist us in vindicating the national authority, all commanders will assist them and their families in every possible way. Officers need not meddle with matters of trade and commerce, which by law devolve on the officer of the Treasury Department ; but whenever they discover goods contraband of war being conveyed towards the public enemy, they will seize all goods tainted by such transactions, and imprison the parties implicated ; but care must be taken to make full records and report such case. When a district is infested by guerrillas, or held by the enemy, horses and mules, wagons, forage, etc., are all means of war, and can be freely taken, but must be accounted for as public property. If the people do not want their horses and corn taken, they must organize and repress all guerrillas or hostile bands in their neighborhood.

“ It is represented that officers, provost-marshals, and others in the military service, are engaged in business or speculation on their own account, and that they charge fees

for permits and passes. All this is a breach of honor and law. Every salaried officer of the military service should devote every hour of his time, every thought of his mind, to his Government, and if he makes one cent profit beyond his pay, it is corrupt and criminal. All officers and soldiers in this department are hereby commanded to engage in no business whatever, save their sworn duty to their Government.

“Every man should be with his proper corps, division, brigade, and regiment, unless absent, sick, wounded, or detached by a written order of a competent commander. Soldiers when so absent must have their descriptive rolls, and when not provided with them the supposition is that they are improperly absent. Mustering officers will see that all absentees not away by a written order from their proper commander are reported on the muster-rolls as deserters, that they may lose their pay, bounty, and pensions, which a generous Government and people have provided for soldiers who do their whole duty. The best hospitals in the world are provided for the wounded and sick, but these must not be made receptacles for absentees who seek to escape the necessary exposures and dangers of a soldier’s life. Whenever possible, citizens must be employed as nurses, cooks, attendants, stewards, etc., in hospitals, in order that enlisted men may be where they belong—with their regiments. The medical inspectors will attend to this at once. The general commanding announces that he expects the wounded and sick to have every care possible; but this feeling must not be abused to the injury of the only useful part of an army—a soldier in the field.

“In time of war and rebellion, districts occupied by our troops are subject to the laws of war. The inhabitants, be they friendly or unfriendly, must submit to the controlling power. If any person in an insurgent district corresponds or trades with an enemy, he or she becomes a spy; and all inhabitants, moreover, must not only abstain from hostile and unfriendly acts, but must aid and assist the power that protects them in trade and commerce.”

Major-General Blair was placed in immediate command of the Fifteenth Army Corps, and Brigadier-General George M. Dodge was summoned from Corinth to organize and assume command of a picked column of eight thousand men from the Sixteenth Army Corps, and with it to follow Sherman eastward as rapidly as possible. Having made these dispositions, Sherman pushed forward with the advance of his troops.

On the 27th of October, General Blair being, as has been already seen, at Tusculumbia, with the first and second divisions, Sherman ordered General Ewing, with the fourth division, to cross the Tennessee, by means of the gunboats and scow, as rapidly as possible, at Eastport, and push forward to Florence; and the same day a messenger from General Grant floated down the Tennessee over the Muscle Shoals, landed at Tusculumbia, and was sent to headquarters at Iuka, bearing this short message: "Drop all work on the railroad east of Bear Creek. Put your command towards Bridgeport till you meet orders." Instantly the order of march was reversed, and all the columns directed to Eastport, the only place where the crossing of the Tennessee was practicable. At first the troops had only the gunboats and coal-bergs, but two transports and a ferry-boat arrived on the 31st of October, and the work of crossing was pushed with all the vigor possible. Sherman crossed in person, and passed to the head of the column on the 1st of November, leaving the advance division of Osterhaus, now become the rear, to be conducted by General Blair to Rogersville and the Elk River. This stream was found impassable, and there was no time to bridge it or to cross in boats, so that no alternative remained but to ascend the Elk to the stone bridge at Fayetteville, where the troops crossed and proceeded to Winchester and Decherd. At Fayetteville, having received orders from General Grant to repair to Bridgeport with the Fifteenth Corps, leaving Brigadier-General Dodge's detachment of the Sixteenth Corps at Pulaski and along the railroad from Columbia to Decatur, to protect it, Sherman instructed General Blair to follow in order with the second and first divisions of Morgan L. Smith and

Osterhaus, by way of Newmarket, Larkinsville, and Bellefonte, while he himself should conduct the third and fourth divisions of John E. Smith and Ewing, by Decherd. Sherman reached Bridgeport on the night of the 13th, reported by telegraph to General Grant, was immediately summoned to his headquarters, left on the first boat, and on the morning of the 15th of November rode into Chattanooga.

Previous to this, on the night of the 27th of October, Brigadier-General W. F. Smith, chief engineer of the Army of the Cumberland, had rapidly thrown a pontoon bridge across the Tennessee. On the following morning, before the enemy could recover from his surprise, Hooker with his two corps had crossed, seized the heights rising from Lookout Valley at its outlet to the river, emerged into the valley, and taken up positions defending the road over which he had marched, and the roads leading to and connecting the ferries; and thus two lines of supplies had been gained at the moment when, after more than ten thousand horses and mules had perished in supplying half rations to the troops over seventy miles of terrible roads, the remaining animals were so reduced that they could not have supplied the army a week longer. After vainly endeavoring to regain the advantage thus lost, Bragg detached Longstreet to drive Burnside out of East Tennessee, and in order to compel the rebel commander to retain all his force, as well as to recall the troops he had sent away, it was Grant's intention to attack Missionary Ridge the moment Sherman should arrive with his army and trains. The constraint imposed by the immediate presence of the enemy in his strong positions, with his cavalry constantly threatening our exposed and heavily-tasked communications, was severely felt, and the anxiety for Burnside's safety was acute.

Sherman was to cross the Tennessee, effect a lodgment on the end of Missionary Ridge, and with a part of his command demonstrate against Lookout Mountain, near Trenton. By General Grant's orders, pontoons had already been prepared for laying a bridge over the Tennessee, and all other necessary arrangements perfected.

Ordering Ewing to march, with his fourth division leading the advance, by way of Shell Mound to Trenton and to demonstrate against Lookout Mountain, but to be prepared rapidly to change direction on Chattanooga, Sherman got in a small boat at Kelly's, rowed down to Bridgeport, there put his troops in motion, and, on the afternoon of the 20th, upon arriving at General Hooker's headquarters, received General Grant's orders for a general attack the following morning. But the third division of John E. Smith was the only one in position; Osterhaus' first and Morgan L. Smith's second division were slowly making their way over a terrible road from Shell Mound to Chattanooga; and Ewing's fourth division had not left Trenton. Learning these facts, General Grant postponed the attack.

On the 21st, Morgan L. Smith's second division crossed the bridge at Brown's Ferry, in spite of frequent accidents to that frail structure, and Ewing reached the head of the bridge with his fourth division, but was unable to cross by reason of its breakage, in spite of repeated attempts to repair it, until the 23d. The bridge having again broken, leaving Osterhaus still on the left bank, at Brown's Ferry, Sherman then proposed to the general-in-chief to go into action with the three divisions already with him, supported by Jefferson C. Davis' division of the Fourteenth Corps, while Osterhaus' first division should report to General Hooker, and act with him against Lookout Mountain. On the same day, Morgan L. Smith's and John E. Smith's divisions being behind the hills opposite the mouth of the Chickamauga, Sherman caused Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith, with his second brigade of the former division, to march under cover of those hills to a point opposite the North Chickamauga, there to man the pontoon boats; at midnight to drop silently down to a point above the South Chickamauga, land, move along the river, capture the enemy's pickets along its banks; and then to re-embark, drop quickly down below the mouth of the Chickamauga, take position there on the left bank, and dispatch the boats to the opposite side for reinforcements. This having been done, the remainder of Morgan

L. Smith's division was rapidly ferried across, followed by that of John E. Smith, and by daylight of the 24th, these two divisions, numbering eight thousand men, were across the Tennessee, and had thrown up a line of rifle-pits to cover the crossing. As soon as it was light, some of the boats were taken from the ferry for use in the construction of a pontoon bridge, under the direction of Major-General William F. Smith, chief engineer of the military division, and by noon a fine bridge, thirteen hundred and fifty feet in length, had been laid down, and was practicable for all arms. A steamer having arrived during the morning to assist in the crossing, all three divisions were now concentrated on the left bank; and, at the same time, General Jefferson C. Davis reported himself ready to take the Missionary Hills.

At one P. M. the troops marched from the river in three columns in echelon; the left, Morgan L. Smith, the column of direction, following substantially Chickamauga Creek; the centre, John E. Smith, in column, doubled on the centre at full brigade intervals to the right and rear; the right, Ewing, in column at the same distance to the right and rear, prepared to deploy to the right, to meet an enemy in that direction. Each head of column was covered by a line of skirmishers, with supports. A light drizzling rain prevailed, and the clouds hung low, cloaking the movement from the enemy's tower of observation on Lookout Mountain. The foot of the hills was soon reached, the skirmishers continued up the face followed by their supports, and at half-past three P. M. the ridge was gained without loss. Not until a brigade of each division was pushed up rapidly to the top of the hill did the enemy seem to realize the movement, but it was then too late, for our troops were in possession. The enemy opened with artillery, but General Ewing soon got some of Captain Richardson's guns up the steep hill, and returned the fire, and the enemy's skirmishers made one or two ineffectual dashes at General Lightburn, who with his brigade had swept around and gained the real continuation of the ridge.

Up to this time it had been supposed, from the map, that

Missionary Ridge was a continuous hill, but Sherman now found himself on two high points, with a deep depression between them, and a third hill immediately over the tunnel, which was his chief objective. The ground gained, however, was so important that nothing could be left to chance, and it was therefore fortified during the night. One brigade of each division was left on the hill, one of General Morgan L. Smith's closed the gap to Chickamauga Creek, two of General John E. Smith's were drawn back to the base in reserve, and General Ewing's right was extended down into the plain, thus crossing the ridge in a general line facing southeast.

The enemy felt Sherman's right flank about four p. m., and a sharp engagement with artillery and muskets ensued, when he drew off. Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith was severely wounded, and the command of the brigade devolved on Colonel Tupper, One Hundred and Sixteenth Illinois. Just as Sherman himself had crossed the bridge, General Howard had appeared, having come with three regiments from Chattanooga along the east bank of the Tennessee, connecting Sherman's new position with that of the main army in Chattanooga. The three regiments were attached temporarily to General Ewing's right, and General Howard returned to his corps at Chattanooga. As night closed, Sherman ordered General Jefferson C. Davis to keep one brigade at the bridge, one close up to the main body of the Fifteenth Corps, and one between the two. Heavy details were kept at work on the intrenchments until morning.

During the night the sky cleared away bright, a cold frost filled the air, and the camp-fires revealed to the enemy, and to the army in Chattanooga, Sherman's position on Missionary Ridge. About midnight, orders came from General Grant to attack the enemy at dawn of day, with notice that General Thomas would attack in force early in the morning. Accordingly, before light, Sherman was in the saddle, and, attended by all his staff, rode to the extreme left of his position, near Chickamauga, thence up the hill held by General Lightburn, and round to the extreme right of General Ewing.

Catching as accurate an idea of the ground as was possible by the dim light of morning, he saw that his line of attack was in the direction of Missionary Ridge, with wings supporting on either flank. A valley lay between him and the next hill of the series, and this latter presented steep sides; the one to the west partially cleared, the other covered with the native forest. The crest of the ridge was narrow and wooded. The further point of the hill was held by the enemy with a breast-work of logs and fresh earth, filled with men and mounting two guns. The enemy was also seen in great force on a still higher hill beyond the tunnel, giving a plunging fire on the ground in dispute. The gorge between, through which several roads and the railway tunnel pass, could not be seen from Sherman's position, but formed the natural citadel where the enemy covered his masses, to resist the contemplated movement to turn his right and endanger his communications with the depot at Chickamauga.

The brigades of Colonel Cockerell, of Ewing's division, Colonel Alexander, of John E. Smith's, and General Lightburn, of Morgan L. Smith's divisions, were to hold their hill as the key point; General Corse, with as much of his brigade of Ewing's division as could operate along the narrow ridge, was to attack from the right centre; General Lightburn was to dispatch a regiment from his position to co-operate with General Corse; and General Morgan L. Smith was to move along the east base of Missionary Ridge, connecting with General Corse, and Colonel Loomis, of Ewing's division, in like manner, to move along the west base, supported by Matthias' and Baum's brigades, of John E. Smith's division, in reserve.

The sun had already risen before General Corse had completed his preparations, and his bugle sounded the "forward." The Fortieth Illinois, supported by the Forty-sixth Ohio, on the right centre, with the Twentieth Ohio, Colonel Jones, moved down the face of the hill, and up that held by the enemy. The line advanced to within about eighty yards of the intrenched position, where General Corse found a secondary crest, which he gained and held. To this point he called

his reserves, and asked for reinforcements, which were sent, but the space was narrow, and it was not well to crowd the men, as the enemy's artillery and musketry fire swept the approach. As soon as General Corse had made his preparations he assaulted, and a close, severe contest ensued, lasting more than an hour, giving and losing ground, but never the position first obtained, from which the enemy in vain attempted to drive him. General Morgan L. Smith steadily gained ground on the left spur of Missionary Ridge, and Colonel Loomis got abreast of the tunnel and the railroad embankment on his side, drawing the enemy's fire, and to that extent relieving the assaulting party on the hill-crest. Captain Calander had four of his guns on General Ewing's hill, and Captain Wood his battery of Napoleon guns on General Lightburn's; and two guns of Dillon's battery were with Colonel Alexander's brigade. The day was bright and clear. The columns of the enemy were streaming towards Sherman, and the enemy's artillery poured its concentric fire upon him from every hill and spur that gave a view of any part of his position. All Sherman's batteries directed their fire as carefully as possible to clear the hill to the front without endangering our own men. The fight raged furiously about ten A. M., when General Corse received a severe wound, and was carried off the field, and the command of the brigade, and of the assault at that key-point, devolved on Colonel Wolcott, of the Forty-sixth Ohio, who continued the contest, pressing forward at all points. Colonel Loomis had made good progress to the right; and at about two P. M. General John E. Smith, judging the battle to be severe on the hill, and being required to support General Ewing, ordered Colonel Baum's and General Matthias' brigades across the fields to the disputed summit. They moved up under a heavy fire of cannon and musketry, and joined Colonel Wolcott, but the crest was so narrow that they necessarily occupied the west face of the hill. The enemy at the time being massed in great strength in the tunnel gorge, moved a large force, under cover of the ground and the thick bushes, and suddenly appeared on the right and rear of this

command. The two reserve brigades of John E. Smith's division, being thus surprised, and exposed as they were in the open ground, fell back in some disorder to the lower end of the field, and reformed. This movement, seen from Chattanooga, five miles distant, gave rise to the report that Sherman was repulsed on the left. The enemy made a show of pursuit, but were caught in flank by the well-directed fire of the brigade on the wooded crest, and hastily sought cover behind the hill. About three p. m., a white line of musketry fire in front of Orchard Knoll, extending further right and left and front, and a faint echo of sound, satisfied Sherman that General Thomas was moving on the centre. The attack on the left had drawn vast masses of the enemy to that flank, so that the result on the centre was comparatively assured.

The advancing line of musketry fire from Orchard Knoll disappeared behind a spur of the hill, and could no longer be seen, and it was not until night closed that Sherman knew that Thomas had swept across Missionary Ridge, and broken the enemy's centre.

The victory was won, and pursuit was the next step. Sherman ordered General Morgan L. Smith to feel the tunnel, which was found vacant, save by the commingled dead and wounded of both armies.

The reserve of General Jefferson C. Davis was ordered to march at once, by the pontoon bridge across the Chickamauga at its mouth, and push forward for the depot. General Howard had reported to Sherman, in the early part of the day, with the remainder of his corps, the Eleventh, and had been posted to connect the left with Chickamauga Creek. He was ordered to repair an old broken bridge about two miles up the Chickamauga, and to follow General Davis at four a. m. The Fifteenth Army Corps was to march at daylight. But General Howard found the repairs too difficult, and all were compelled to cross the Chickamauga on the new pontoon bridge. By eleven a. m., Jefferson C. Davis' division appeared at the depot, just in time to see it in flames. He entered with one brigade, and found the enemy occupying two hills partially in-

trenched just beyond the depot. These he soon drove away. Corn-meal and corn, in huge burning piles, broken wagons, abandoned caissons, two thirty-two pounder rifled guns with carriages burned, pieces of pontoons, balks, chesses, etc., destined for the invasion of Kentucky, and all manner of things, were found burning and broken. A good supply of forage for the horses, and meal, beans, and the like, for the men, were also discovered in good condition.

Pausing but a short while, Sherman pressed forward, the road lined with broken wagons and abandoned caissons, till night. Just as the head of his column emerged from a dense, miry swamp, it encountered the rear-guard of the retreating army. The fight was sharp, but the night closed in so dark that our troops could not move. Here Sherman was overtaken by General Grant.

At daylight the march was resumed, and at Greysville, where a good bridge spanned the Chickamauga, the Fourteenth Corps of General Palmer was met on the south bank. From him Sherman learned that General Hooker was on a road still further south. His guns could be heard near Ringgold. As the roads were filled with all the troops they could accommodate, Sherman then turned to the east to fulfil another part of the general plan, by breaking up all communications between Bragg and Longstreet.

General Howard was ordered to move to Parker's Gap, and thence send a competent force to Red Clay, or the Council Ground, and there destroy a large section of the railway which connects Dalton and Cleveland. This work was most successfully and completely performed that day. The division of General Jefferson C. Davis was moved up close to Ringgold, to assist General Hooker, if needed, and the Fifteenth Corps held at Greysville, to take advantage of circumstances. About noon a message came from General Hooker, saying that he had had a hard fight at the mountain pass just beyond Ringgold, and wanted Sherman to come forward and turn the position. Howard, by passing through Parker's Gap towards Red Clay, had already done so. Sherman therefore rode

forward to Ringgold, to find that the enemy had fallen back to Tunnel Hill, abandoned the valley of Chickamauga and the State of Tennessee, and was descending the southern slopes, whose waters flow to the Atlantic and the Gulf.

At Ringgold Sherman again met General Grant, and received orders, after breaking up the railroad between that point and the State line, to move slowly back to Chattanooga.

On the following day, the Fifteenth Corps effectually destroyed the railroad from a point half-way between Greysville and Ringgold, back to the State line; and General Grant, coming to Greysville, consented that, instead of returning to Chattanooga, Sherman might send back his artillery, wagons, and impediments, and make a circuit to the north as far as the Hiawassee River.

Accordingly, on the morning of November 29th, General Howard moved from Parker's Gap to Cleveland, General Davis by way of McDaniel's Gap, and General Blair, with two divisions of the Fifteenth Army Corps, by way of Julian's Gap; all meeting at Cleveland that night. Here another effectual break was made in the Cleveland and Dalton road. On the 30th, the army moved to Charleston, General Howard approaching so rapidly that the enemy evacuated in haste, leaving the bridge but partially damaged, and five car-loads of flour and provisions on the north bank of the Hiawassee.

The losses in Sherman's own corps during this brief campaign were as follows: Osterhaus' first division, 87 killed, 344 wounded, and 66 missing; M. L. Smith's second division, 10 killed, 90 wounded, and 2 missing; John E. Smith's third division, 89 killed, 288 wounded, and 122 missing; Ewing's fourth division, 72 killed, 535 wounded, and 21 missing; total, 258 killed, 1,257 wounded, and 211 missing. The loss in Jefferson C. Davis' division of the Fourteenth Corps was small. Bushbeck's brigade of the Eleventh Corps lost 37 killed, 145 wounded, 81 missing; total, 263. Among the killed were Colonels Putnam of the Ninety-third Illinois, O'Meara of the Ninetieth Illinois, Torrence of the Thirtieth Iowa, Lieutenant-Colonel Taft of the Eleventh Corps, and Major Bushnell of

the Thirteenth Illinois Volunteers ; while in the list of wounded appeared the names of Brigadier-Generals Giles A. Smith, J. M. Corse, and Matthias ; Colonel Baum, Fifty-sixth Illinois ; Colonel Wangeline, Twelfth Missouri Volunteers ; Lieutenant-Colonel Patridge, Thirteenth Illinois Volunteers ; Major P. J. Welch, Fifty-sixth Illinois Volunteers ; and Major M. Allen, Tenth Iowa Volunteers. Lieutenant-Colonel Archer, Seventeenth Iowa, was reported missing.

The army which eight days before had lain besieged, and barely subsisting behind the Missionary range, had shaken off its enemy, broken his strength and his spirit, pushed his shattered forces out of reach, and was returning to its camps holding the keys of the whole central region, and of the gates of Georgia.

CHAPTER XII.

THE RELIEF OF KNOXVILLE.—REORGANIZING.

It was General Grant's desire to continue the pursuit, but Burnside was closely beleaguered at Knoxville and Longstreet was steadily pushing his approaches. The commander-in-chief had instructed Burnside to hold on to the last. "I can hardly conceive," he wrote, "the necessity of retreating from East Tennessee. If I did it at all, it would be after losing most of the army, and then necessity would suggest the route. I will not attempt to lay out a line of retreat."

On the 3d of December, according to General Burnside's report, the supplies would be exhausted. Elliott's division of cavalry had already started for Knoxville, and Granger had been ordered thither with the Fourth Corps. Finding that the latter moved slowly and without energy, on the 28th of November, General Grant decided to send Sherman with his command, and accordingly gave him orders to take Granger's troops and his own, and go with all possible dispatch to the relief of the besieged garrison.

A large part of Sherman's command had marched from Memphis, had gone into battle immediately on arriving at Chattanooga, and had had no rest since. In the late campaign officers and men had carried no luggage or provisions. The week before, they had left their camps, on the right bank of the Tennessee, with only two days' rations, without a change of clothing, stripped for the fight, each officer and man, from the commanding general down, having but a single blanket or overcoat. They had now no provisions, save what had been gathered by the road, and were ill-supplied for such a march.

Moreover, the weather was intensely cold. But twelve thousand of their fellow-soldiers were beleaguered in a mountain town eighty-four miles distant: they needed relief, and must have it in three days. This was enough. Without a murmur, without waiting for any thing, the Army of the Tennessee directed its course upon Knoxville.

On the night of November 28th, General Howard repaired and planked the railroad bridge, and at dawn the army passed the Hiawassee, and during the day marched to Athens, a distance of fifteen miles. Granger, who was then near the mouth of the Hiawassee, was at first ordered to join the main column at Kingston; but on reaching Athens, Sherman sent him directions to meet him at Philadelphia. The small force of cavalry which was, at the time of the receipt of General Grant's orders, scouting near Benton and Columbus, overtook the column at Athens during the night.

On the 2d of December, the army moved rapidly north, towards Loudon, twenty-six miles distant. About 11 A. M., the cavalry passed to the head of the column, and was ordered to push to Loudon, and, if possible, save the pontoon bridge across the Tennessee, held by a brigade of the enemy, commanded by General Vaughn. The cavalry moved with such rapidity as to capture every picket; but Vaughn had artillery in position, covered by earthworks, and displayed a force too large to be dislodged by a cavalry dash, and darkness closed in before General Howard's infantry arrived on the ground. The enemy evacuated the place in the night, destroying the pontoons, running three locomotives and forty-eight cars into the Tennessee, and abandoning a large quantity of provisions, four guns, and other material, which General Howard took at daylight. But the bridge being gone, Sherman was forced to turn east, and trust to the bridge at Knoxville.

It was now all-important that General Burnside should have notice of Sherman's approach, and but one more day of the time remained. Accordingly, at Philadelphia, during the night of December 2d, Sherman sent an aid-de-camp forward to Colonel Long, commanding the brigade of cavalry,

ordering him to select the best material of his command, to start at once, ford the Little Tennessee, and push into Knoxville at whatever cost of life and horseflesh. The distance to be travelled was about forty miles, and the roads villanous. Before day the cavalry marched. At daylight the Fifteenth Corps was turned from Philadelphia to the Little Tennessee, at Morgantown, where the maps represented the river as very shallow ; but it was found impossible to ford it, as the water was, in some places, five feet deep, and freezing cold, and the stream was two hundred and forty yards wide. A bridge was indispensable. Brigadier-General James H. Wilson, who accompanied Sherman, undertook to superintend the work, and with only such tools as axes, picks, and spades, working partly with crib-work and partly with trestles made of the houses of the late town of Morgantown, by dark of December 4th the bridge was completed, and by daylight of the 5th the Fifteenth Corps, General Blair, was over, and General Granger's corps and General Davis' division were ready to pass ; but the diagonal bracings were imperfect, for want of proper spikes, and the bridge broke, causing delay.

General Blair had been ordered to march out on the Marysville road five miles, there to await notice that General Granger was on a parallel road abreast of him. At the fork of the road a messenger rode up to General Sherman, bringing a few words from General Burnside, dated December 4th, stating that Colonel Long had arrived at Knoxville with his cavalry, and all was well there ; that Longstreet still lay before the place, but there were symptoms of a speedy departure.

As soon as the bridge was mended, all the troops moved forward. General Howard had marched from Loudon, had found a good ford for his wagons and horses at Davis, seven miles from Morgantown, and had made a bridge of the wagons left by Vaughn at Loudon. He marched by Unitia and Louisville. On the night of the 5th, all the heads of column communicated at Marysville, where an officer of General Burnside's staff arrived with the news that Longstreet had, the night before, retreated on the Rutledge, Rodgersville, and

Bristol roads, towards Virginia; and that General Burnside's cavalry was on his heels; and with word that the general desired to see General Sherman in person as soon as he could come to Knoxville. Ordering all the troops to halt and rest, except the two divisions of General Granger, which were directed to move forward to Little River and report to General Burnside, on the morning of December 6th Sherman rode from Marysville into Knoxville, and there met General Burnside.

The siege had been already raised. Longstreet had hurled three brigades against the works, and met with a bloody repulse. The intelligence of Bragg's defeat, and the arrival of Colonel Long's cavalry, as the forerunners of the army known to be marching for the relief of the besieged garrison, had shown Longstreet the necessity of prompt movement, and he had taken the only line of retreat that continued practicable. General Burnside now asked for nothing but General Granger's command, and suggested to Sherman, in view of the large force he had brought from Chattanooga, that he should return with due expedition to the line of the Hiawassee, lest Bragg, re-enforced, might take advantage of his absence to assume the offensive.

In the following communication General Burnside took occasion to express his thanks for the timely relief :

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE OHIO,
Knoxville, December 7, 1863.

"Major-General W. T. Sherman, Commanding, etc. :

"GENERAL—I desire to express to you and your command my most hearty thanks and gratitude for your promptness in coming to our relief during the siege of Knoxville; and I am satisfied your approach served to raise the siege.

"The emergency having passed, I do not deem for the present any other portion of your command but the corps of General Granger necessary for operations in this section; and inasmuch as Genera. Grant has weakened the force immediately with him in order to relieve us, thereby rendering the

position of General Thomas less secure, I deem it advisable that all the troops now here, save those commanded by General Granger, should return at once to within supporting distance of the forces in front of Bragg's army.

"In behalf of my command, I desire again to thank you and your command for the kindness you have done us.

"I am, general, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

A. E. BURNSIDE,

Major-General commanding."

Having seen the forces of General Burnside move out of Knoxville in pursuit of Longstreet, and General Granger's move in, Sherman put his own command in motion to return.

General Howard was ordered to move, by way of Davis' Ford and Sweetwater, to Athens, with a guard formed at Charleston, to hold and repair the bridge which the enemy had retaken after the passage of the army up the river. General Jefferson C. Davis moved to Columbus on the Hiawassee by way of Madisonville, and the two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps moved to Telire Plains, in order to cover a movement of cavalry across the mountain into Georgia to overtake a wagon train of the enemy's which had escaped by way of Murphy. Subsequently, on a report from General Howard that the enemy still held Charleston, Sherman directed General Ewing's division on Athens, and went in person to Telire with General Morgan L. Smith's division. By the 9th, all the troops were in position, holding the rich country between the Little Tennessee and the Hiawassee. The cavalry under Colonel Long passed the mountains at Telire, and proceeded about seventeen miles beyond Murphy, when, deeming his further pursuit of the wagon train useless, he returned on the 12th to Telire. Sherman then ordered him and the division of General Morgan L. Smith to move to Charleston, to which point he had previously ordered the corps of General Howard.

On the 14th of December, all of the command lay encamped along the Hiawassee. Having communicated to General Grant the actual state of affairs, Sherman received orders

to leave on the line of the Hiawassee all the cavalry and proceed to Chattanooga with the balance of his command. Leaving at Charleston the brigade of cavalry commanded by Colonel Long, re-enforced by the Fifth Ohio cavalry, Lieutenant-Colonel Heath, which was the only cavalry properly belonging to the Fifteenth Army Corps, with the remainder Sherman moved by easy marches by way of Cleveland and Tymus Depot into Chattanooga. There he received orders from General Grant to transfer back to the appropriate commands the Eleventh Corps of General Howard and the division of the Fourteenth Corps, commanded by General Jefferson C. Davis, and to conduct the Fifteenth Army Corps to its new field of operations in Northern Alabama.

In closing his report of the memorable campaign thus closed, Sherman wrote to General Grant :—

“It will thus appear that we have been constantly in motion since our departure from the Big Black, until the present moment.

“In reviewing the facts, I must do justice to my command for the patience, cheerfulness, and courage which officers and men have displayed throughout, in battle, on the march, and in camp. For long periods, without regular rations or supplies of any kind, they have marched through mud and over rocks, sometimes barefooted, without a murmur, without a moment's rest. After a march of over four hundred miles, without stop for three successive nights, we crossed the Tennessee, fought our part of the battle of Chattanooga, pursued the enemy out of Tennessee, and then turned more than one hundred miles north, and compelled Longstreet to raise the siege of Knoxville, which gave so much anxiety to the whole country.

“It is hard to realize the importance of these events without recalling the memory of the general feeling which pervaded all minds at Chattanooga prior to our arrival. I cannot speak of the Fifteenth Army Corps without a seeming vanity, but as I am no longer its commander, I assert that there is no better





O. O. Howard
My son

body of soldiers in America than it, or who have done more or better service. I wish all to feel a just pride in its real honors. To General Howard and his command, to General Jefferson C. Davis and his, I am more than usually indebted for the intelligence of commanders and fidelity of command. The brigade of Colonel Buschbeck, belonging to the Eleventh Corps, which was the first to come out of Chattanooga to my flank, fought at the Tunnel Hill in connection with General Ewing's division, and displayed a courage almost amounting to rashness: following the enemy almost to the tunnel gorge, it lost many valuable lives, prominent among them Lieutenant-Colonel Taft, spoken of as a most gallant soldier.

"In General Howard throughout I found a polished and Christian gentleman, exhibiting the highest and most chivalrous traits of the soldier.

"General Davis handled his division with artistic skill, more especially at the moment we encountered the enemy's rear-guard near Greysville, at nightfall. I must award to this division the credit of the best order during our marches through East Tennessee, when long marches and the necessity of foraging to the right and left gave some reasons for disordered ranks.

"I must say that it is but justice that colonels of regiments who have so long and so well commanded brigades, as in the following cases, should be commissioned to the grade which they have filled with so much usefulness and credit to the public service, namely: Colonels J. R. Cockerell, Seventieth Ohio volunteers; J. M. Loomis, Twenty-sixth Illinois; C. E. Wolcott, Forty-sixth Ohio; J. A. Williamson, Fourth Iowa; G. B. Baum, Fifty-sixth Illinois; J. J. Alexander, Fifty-ninth Indiana."

Taking advantage of the inactivity at Chattanooga, Sherman now turned his attention to his own immediate department, and returned to Memphis and Vicksburg to inspect and reorganize his command. He reached Memphis on the 10th of January.

While preparing for future military operations, it was necessary for him to meet and dispose of many questions of a civil nature presented to him by his subordinates. With regard to the treatment of the inhabitants of a conquered country, he wrote on the 24th January, 1864, to Lieutenant-Colonel R. M. Sawyer, assistant adjutant-general at department headquarters at Huntsville :—

“The Southern people entered into a clear compact of government, but still maintained a species of separate interests, history, and prejudices. These latter became stronger and stronger, till they have led to a war which has developed fruits of the bitterest kind.

“We of the North are, beyond all question, right in our lawful cause, but we are not bound to ignore the fact that the people of the South have prejudices, which form a part of their nature, and which they cannot throw off without an effort of reason or the slower process of natural change. Now, the question arises, should we treat as absolute enemies all in the South who differ from us in opinion or prejudice,—kill or banish them? or should we give them time to think and gradually change their conduct, so as to conform to the new order of things which is slowly and gradually creeping into their country?

“When men take arms to resist our rightful authority, we are compelled to use force, because all reason and argument cease when arms are resorted to. When the provisions, forage, horses, mules, wagons, etc., are used by our enemy, it is clearly our duty and right to take them, because otherwise they might be used against us.

“In like manner, all houses left vacant by an inimical people are clearly our right, or such as are needed as storehouses, hospitals, and quarters. But a question arises as to dwellings used by women, children, and non-combatants. So long as non-combatants remain in their houses and keep to their accustomed business, their opinions and prejudices can in no wise influence the war, and, therefore, should not be noticed.

But if any one comes out into the public streets and creates disorder, he or she should be punished, restrained, or banished, either to the rear or front, as the officer in command adjudges. If the people, or any of them, keep up a correspondence with parties in hostility, they are spies, and can be punished with death, or minor punishment.

“These are well-established principles of war, and the people of the South, having appealed to war, are barred from appealing to our Constitution, which they have practically and publicly defied. They have appealed to war, and must abide *its* rules and laws.

“The United States, as a belligerent party claiming right in the soil as the ultimate sovereign, have a right to change the population; and it may be, and is, both politic and just, we should do so in certain districts. When the inhabitants persist too long in hostility, it may be both politic and right we should banish them and appropriate their lands to a more loyal and useful population. No man will deny that the United States would be benefited by dispossessing a single prejudiced, hard-headed, and disloyal planter, and substituting in his place a dozen or more patient, industrious, good families, even if they be of foreign birth. I think it does good to present this view of the case to many Southern gentlemen, who grew rich and wealthy, not by virtue alone of their industry and skill, but by reason of the protection and impetus to prosperity given by our hitherto moderate and magnanimous Government. It is all idle nonsense for these Southern planters to say that they made the South, that they own it, and that they can do as they please,—even to break up our Government and to shut up the natural avenues of trade, intercourse, and commerce.

“Whilst I assert for our Government the highest military prerogatives, I am willing to bear in patience that political nonsense of slave-rights, State-rights, freedom of conscience, freedom of press, and such other trash, as have deluded the Southern people into war, anarchy, bloodshed, and the foulest crimes that have disgraced any time or any people.

“I would advise the commanding officers at Huntsville, and such other towns as are occupied by our troops, to assemble the inhabitants and explain to them these plain, self-evident propositions, and tell them that it is for them *now* to say whether they and their children shall inherit the beautiful land which by the accident of nature has fallen to their share. The Government of the United States has in North Alabama any and all rights which they choose to enforce in war,—to take their lives, their homes, their lands, their every thing; because they cannot deny that war does exist there; and war is simply power, unrestrained by Constitution or compact. If they want eternal war, well and good: we will accept the issue and dispossess them and put our friends in possession. I know thousands and millions of good people who, at simple notice, would come to North Alabama and accept the elegant houses and plantations now there. If the people of Huntsville think differently, let them persist in war three years longer, and then they will not be consulted. Three years ago, by a little reflection and patience, they could have had a hundred years of peace and prosperity, but they preferred war. Very well. Last year they could have saved their slaves, but now it is too late: all the powers of earth cannot restore to them their slaves, any more than their dead grandfathers. Next year their lands will be taken,—for in war we can take them, and *rightfully* too,—and in another year they may beg in vain for their lives. A people who will persevere in war beyond a certain limit ought to know the consequences. Many, many people, with less pertinacity than the South, have been wiped out of national existence.”

On the 26th, in a hasty reply to a letter from a citizen, on the same subject, with special reference to the treatment of slavery, the cultivation of abandoned plantations, and the proposed calling of a convention of the people of Tennessee, he wrote:

“Slavery is already dead in Tennessee.

“The moment a negro cannot be bought and sold, or when

he can run off without danger of recapture, the question is settled. Conventions cannot revive slavery. It should be treated as a minor question.

“If a Convention is called in Tennessee it should be without regard to slavery, or any other single question. When assembled, the members would naturally discuss any and all questions, and no doubt would waste more sound on the history of Greece and Rome than on the commonplace business before it.”

Under date of the 27th he addressed a full letter of instructions to Brigadier-General R. P. Buckland, who was to be left in command of the district of Memphis. In the course of it he said :

“You know how much stress I have put on honesty in the character of a United States officer.

“Merchants naturally make gains. It is their calling, but an officer has a salary, and nothing else, and if you see by an officer’s style of living, or any external symptoms, that he is spending more than his pay, or if you observe him interested in the personal affairs of business men, stop it, and send him to some other duty. Don’t let officers settle down into comfortable houses, but make camps, and collect in them all this floating mass, and send them to their regiments. . . .

“You can confer in the most friendly spirit with the people here and in the country. Assure them that if they act in good faith to the United States, we will fully reciprocate. They must, however ACT,—good faith of itself is of no value in war.

“As an army we will take care of all large hostile bodies, but cannot undertake to do the work of local police.

“We have heretofore done too much of this, and you can, in your own way, gradually do less and less of it, till finally the city and county authorities can take it all off our hands.

“Memphis as a military depot must be held with the tenacity of life! The fort must be impregnable, the river secure, and the levee, and incidentally the town, or so much of it as gives storage and offices; but if these are at all in danger, move them to the cover of the fort.

“Encourage the militia in all manner of ways. I know the poorer classes, the working men, are Union, and I would not mind the croaking of the richer classes. Their power is passing from their hands, and they talk of the vulgarity of the new regime ; but such arguments will be lost on you. Power and success will soon replace this class of grumblers, and they will gradually disappear as a political power.”

CHAPTER XIII.

THE MERIDIAN RAID.—A NEW COMMAND.

McPHERSON'S seventeenth corps was still at Vicksburg: part of Hurlbut's sixteenth corps, with Smith's and Grierson's divisions of cavalry, at Memphis. Lieutenant-General Polk, who commanded the Confederate forces in Mississippi, was at Meridian with French's division, and had Loring's division at Canton; Forrest was, with twenty-five hundred irregular cavalry, in the northern part of the State; Cash's and Whitfield's brigades of cavalry patrolling from Yazoo City, along the Big Black to Port Gibson; and Wirt Adams' brigade doing similar duty in the rear of Port Hudson and Baton Rouge.

To the Army of the Tennessee was assigned by General Grant the duty of keeping open the Mississippi River and maintaining intact our control of the east bank.

Sherman decided to do this by occupying prominent points in the interior with small corps of observation, threatening a considerable radius; and to operate against any strong force of the enemy seeking to take a position on the river, by a movable column menacing its rear. To destroy the enemy's means of approaching the river with artillery and trains, he determined to organize a large column of infantry and move with it to Meridian, effectually breaking up the Southern Mississippi railway; while a cavalry force should move from Memphis to meet him, and perform the same work with respect to the Mobile and Ohio railway.

Brigadier-General William Sovy Smith, chief of cavalry on General Grant's staff, was placed in command of all the cavalry

of the department, and instructed to move with it from Memphis on or before the 1st of February, by way of Pontotoc, Okalona, and Columbus, to Meridian, a distance of two hundred and fifty miles, so as to reach that place by the 10th. General Smith was specially instructed to disregard all small detachments of the enemy and all minor operations, and striking rapidly and effectually any large body of the enemy, to be at his destination precisely at the appointed time. Simultaneously the Eleventh Illinois Volunteers and a colored regiment, under Colonel Coates, of the former regiment, with five tin-clad gunboats under Lieutenant-Commander Owen, were sent up the Yazoo to ascend that stream and its tributaries as far as possible, so as to create a diversion and protect the plantations on the river ; and Brigadier-General Hawkins was directed to patrol the country in the rear of Vicksburg towards the Big Black, and to collect some fifty skiffs, by means of which detachments of two or three hundred men might be moved at pleasure through the labyrinth of bayous between the Yazoo and the Mississippi, for the purpose of suppressing the depredations of the horde of guerillas then infesting that region.

Having made all these arrangements, Sherman himself, with two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps under Hurlbut, two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps under McPherson, and a brigade of cavalry under Colonel E. F. Winslow, Fourth Iowa Cavalry, marched from Vicksburg on the 3d of February. The expedition moved out in two columns, Hurlbut's corps by Messenger's, McPherson's along the railway. The former met the enemy at Joe Davis' plantation, the latter at Champion Hills, on the 5th, and for eighteen miles kept up a continual skirmish, without delaying the march of the troops, and entered Jackson the same night ; thus entirely disconcerting the enemy's plan, which was at that moment in process of execution, of concentrating at that place Loring's and French's divisions, and Lee's division of cavalry. On the 6th, both columns being united, and McPherson taking the lead, crossed the Pearl River on a pontoon

bridge captured from the enemy the day before ; on the 7th marched into Brandon ; on the 8th reached Live Creek, five miles west of Morton ; and on the 9th entered Morton, where McPherson's corps halted to destroy the railways for five miles around, and Hurlbut took the advance. From this point the troops moved by easy marches, with no greater opposition than the annoyance of foraging parties and stragglers by the enemy's cavalry hovering on the flanks, through Hillsboro' and Decatur to the Tallahatchie River, twenty-five miles west of Meridian, where the road was found obstructed by felled trees. Leaving the trains under sufficient guard, Sherman pushed on over these obstructions for the Ocktibeha River, where he found the bridge burning ; but in two hours the troops had built a new one, and at three and a half o'clock on the afternoon of the same day entered Meridian, with slight opposition. French's and Loring's divisions, of the Confederate troops, with General Polk in person, had evacuated the place during the morning and the preceding night, Lee's cavalry covering their retreat ; and all the locomotives and cars, except one train found burning, had been removed towards Mobile and Selma. It was evidently impossible to overtake the enemy before they should cross the Tombigbee. The army therefore rested on the 15th, and on the 16th commenced the destruction of the railways centring in Meridian. The depots, storehouses, arsenals, offices, hospitals, hotels, and cantonments in the town were burned, and during the next five days, with axes, sledges, crowbars, clambers and fire, Hurlbut's corps destroyed on the north and east sixty miles of ties and iron, one locomotive, and eight bridges ; and McPherson's corps, on the south and west, fifty-five miles of railway, fifty-three bridges, 6,075 feet of trestle-work, nineteen locomotives, twenty-eight steam-cars, and three steam saw-mills. Thus was completed the destruction of the railways for one hundred miles from Jackson to Meridian, and for twenty miles around the latter place, in so effectual a manner that they could not be used against us in the approaching campaigns.

The cavalry, under General W. Sovy Smith, had not arrived. As was afterwards learned, that officer had not left Memphis until the 11th of February; and had proceeded no further than West Point, from which place he turned back on the 22d, and rapidly retraced his steps to Memphis.

Ascertaining that the enemy's infantry had crossed the Tombigbee on the 17th of February, and hearing nothing of Smith, on the 20th General Sherman ordered McPherson to move slowly back on the main road, while he himself, with Hurlbut's corps and the cavalry, marched north, to feel for Smith. Sherman moved through Marion and Muckalusha-Old-Town to Union, whence he dispatched Colonel Winslow with three regiments of cavalry to Philadelphia and Louisville, fifty miles distant, towards Columbus, on the road by which Smith was expected to come; while the main body moved to Hillsboro', where, on the 23d, it was joined by McPherson's corps. On the 24th the army continued the march on two roads, and on the 25th and 26th crossed the Pearl River at Ratcheliffe Ferry and Edwards' Station, and bivouacked near Canton, leaving a division at the crossing to look for the cavalry. From Louisville, Colonel Winslow sent out two scouts to seek for Smith, and, swinging round through Kosciusko as ordered, rejoined the army at Canton, without news of the missing cavalry. The return march was unmolested.

About one thousand white refugees, four hundred prisoners, five thousand negroes, three thousand animals, and a large number of wagons, were brought in by the troops on their return. Our total loss was in killed, twenty-one; wounded, sixty-eight; missing, eighty-one; total, one hundred and seventy. During the entire expedition, the army subsisted chiefly upon the stores belonging to the enemy, and such as were found in the country. In spite of the failure of the cavalry, the isolation of Mississippi, which was the main object of the expedition, was accomplished, and after marching from three hundred and sixty to four hundred and fifty-three miles, and driving the enemy out of the State, within four weeks the army returned in better health and condition than when it

started, confident in itself, and schooled for the trying campaigns before it.

On the 28th of February, leaving the army at Canton, Sherman went to Vicksburg; thence sent back orders to Hurlbut to come in on the 3d of March, and at once proceeded to New Orleans, to confer with General Banks and Admiral Porter, in regard to the details of the combined movement up the Red River.

General Banks had asked General Sherman for a force of ten thousand men, to leave Vicksburg on the 7th of March, and remain with him thirty days, and Sherman had promised to comply with this request. His idea was for a heavy column, supported by the iron-clad gunboats, to move up the Red River during high-water to Alexandria, and thence, if the gunboats could pass the rapids as far as Shreveport, to fortify and hold in force one or the other of those places; and thus to perform for the west bank of the river the same service, in preventing any large body of the enemy from reaching the Mississippi, that the destruction of the railroads and the occupation of the line of the Big Black was expected to accomplish on the east bank. General Banks now informed him that he would in person march on the 5th or 7th from Franklin, Louisiana, up the Bayou Teche, with a picked force of seventeen thousand men, and would reach Alexandria by the 17th of March, and requested that the troops from the Army of the Tennessee and Admiral Porter's fleet should meet him there at that time. Simultaneously, Steele was to move from Little Rock on Shreveport or Natchitoches, with ten thousand men.

Sherman at once returned to Vicksburg, and on the 6th of March gave the necessary instructions to Brigadier-General A. J. Smith, who had been previously directed to organize and command the expedition, which was to consist of seven thousand five hundred men of Hurlbut's sixteenth corps, and twenty-five hundred men of McPherson's seventeenth corps. General Smith was to report to General Banks, and obey his orders. He was to move up the river on transports, while the

troops from the Department of the Gulf marched by land. The duration of his absence was not to extend beyond thirty days. At the end of that time he was to return to Vicksburg, gather up all the detachments, equipage, and transportation of the Sixteenth Corps, and conduct the troops under his command belonging to that corps to Memphis, where he was told he would probably find orders to join the Army of the Tennessee at Huntsville or Bridgeport.

We need not follow the steps of this expedition in detail. General Smith landed at Simmesport, on the west bank of the Atchafalaya, on the 13th of March, took Fort De Russy by assault on the 14th, and reached Alexandria on the 16th. The advance-guard of the cavalry of the Army of the Gulf arrived the same day, and the main body of that army several days later. The river was very high. The head of the column left Alexandria on the 27th. The army marched from Grand Ecore, where it had halted, on the 6th of April;—the main body by land; one division under General T. Kilby Smith on transports accompanying Admiral Porter, who started on the same day, aiming to reach Springfield Landing on the 10th, where General Banks undertook to be at that time. On the 8th, General Banks was met near Mansfield, and his attenuated column beaten in detail, by an inferior but concentrated force of the enemy, under General E. Kirby Smith. The army retreated in considerable disorder to Pleasant Hill, thirty-five miles distant, and there on the 9th again encountered the enemy, checked his pursuit, and routed him. The next day General Banks continued the retreat to Grand Ecore. Admiral Porter and General Smith reached Springfield Landing at the appointed time, heard of the disaster, and returned, with difficulty, to Grand Ecore. Here the army waited nearly three weeks, when having been re-enforced by all the available troops in the Department of the Gulf, General Banks continued the retreat to Alexandria. The river had fallen. The gunboats and transports could not pass the rapids. By means of a dam, constructed at the suggestion and under the supervision of Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Bailey, Fourth Wisconsin Cavalry,

the water in the river was raised sufficiently to allow the boats to descend, and on the 14th of May the army marched on Simmesport. On the 21st it reached Morganzia Bend, on the west bank of the Mississippi. General Smith at once embarked his command and returned to Vicksburg, after an absence of just two months and a half, instead of the thirty days originally agreed upon.

In the mean while, nearly ten thousand veteran volunteers of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps, and the local garrisons, had been furloughed for thirty days, on condition of re-enlisting, and had returned with the ranks of their regiments swelled by recruits. Early in March, Veatch's division of the Sixteenth Corps had been ordered to report to General Dodge at Huntsville.

On the 4th of March, at Nashville, Major-General Grant received telegraphic orders to report in person at Washington. Congress had passed an act authorizing the appointment of a lieutenant-general to command the armies of the United States, and the president had nominated General Grant for the appointment. Before starting on his journey, Grant seized his pen, and in the very moment of his greatest elevation, filled with generosity towards those others, to whose exertions he modestly chose to ascribe his own deserved reward, hastily wrote these touching lines:—

“DEAR SHERMAN—The bill reviving the grade of lieutenant-general in the army has become a law, and my name has been sent to the Senate for the place. I now receive orders to report to Washington immediately *in person*, which indicates a confirmation, or a likelihood of confirmation.

“I start in the morning to comply with the order.

“Whilst I have been eminently successful in this war, in at least gaining the confidence of the public, no one feels more than I how much of this success is due to the energy, skill, and the harmonious putting forth of that energy and skill, of those whom it has been my good fortune to have occupying subordinate positions under me.

“There are many officers to whom these remarks are applicable to a greater or less degree, proportionate to their ability as soldiers; but what I want is to express my thanks to you and McPherson, as the men to whom, above all others, I feel indebted for whatever I have had of success.

“How far your advice and assistance have been of help to me, you know. How far your execution of whatever has been given you to do entitles you to the reward I am receiving, you cannot know as well as I.

“I feel all the gratitude this letter would express, giving it the most flattering construction.

“The word *you* I use in the plural, intending it for McPherson also. I should write to him, and will some day, but starting in the morning, I do not know that I will find time just now.

“Your friend,

“U. S. GRANT,

“Major-General.”

Sherman received this letter near Memphis, on the 10th of March, and immediately replied:—

“DEAR GENERAL:—I have your more than kind and characteristic letter of the 4th inst. I will send a copy to General McPherson at once.

“You do yourself injustice and us too much honor in assigning to us too large a share of the merits which have led to your high advancement. I know you approve the friendship I have ever professed to you, and will permit me to continue, as heretofore, to manifest it on all proper occasions.

“You are now Washington’s legitimate successor, and occupy a position of almost dangerous elevation; but if you can continue, as heretofore, to be yourself, simple, honest, and unpretending, you will enjoy through life the respect and love of friends and the homage of millions of human beings, that will award you a large share in securing to them and their descendants a government of law and stability.

“I repeat, you do General McPherson and myself too much honor. At Belmont you manifested your traits—neither of us

being near. At Donelson, also, you illustrated your whole character. I was not near, and General McPherson in too subordinate a capacity to influence you.

“Until you had won Donelson, I confess I was almost cowed by the terrible array of anarchical elements that presented themselves at every point; but that admitted a ray of light I have followed since.

“I believe you are as brave, patriotic, and just, as the great prototype, Washington—as unselfish, kind-hearted, and honest as a man should be—but the chief characteristic is the simple faith in success you have always manifested, which I can liken to nothing else than the faith a Christian has in the Saviour.

“This faith gave you victory at Shiloh and Vicksburg. Also, when you have completed your best preparations, you go into battle without hesitation, as at Chattanooga—no doubts—no reserves; and I tell you, it was this that made us act with confidence. I knew, wherever I was, that you thought of me, and if I got in a tight place, you would help me out, if alive.

“My only point of doubts was, in your knowledge of grand strategy, and of books of science and history; but, I confess, your common sense seems to have supplied all these.

“Now as to the future. Don't stay in Washington. Come West: take to yourself the whole Mississippi Valley. Let us make it dead-sure—and I tell you, the Atlantic slopes and Pacific shores will follow its destiny, as sure as the limbs of a tree live or die with the main trunk. We have done much, but still much remains. Time, and time's influences, are with us. We could almost afford to sit still, and let these influences work.


“Here lies the seat of the coming empire; and from the West, when our task is done, we will make short work of Charleston and Richmond, and the impoverished coast of the Atlantic.

“Your sincere friend.”

On the 12th of March, 1864, the President relieved Major-General Halleck from duty as general-in-chief, and assigned

Lieutenant-General Grant to the command of the armies of the United States, with headquarters in the field, and also at Washington, where General Halleck was to remain as chief-of-staff. By the same order, Sherman was assigned to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, and Major-General McPherson to the command of the Department and Army of the Tennessee.

Sherman received this order at Memphis, on the 14th, while on his way to Huntsville, to prepare for the great campaign in Georgia. In accordance with the request of General Grant, accompanying the order, he immediately proceeded to Nashville, where he arrived on the 17th, and accompanied the lieutenant-general as far on his way to Washington as Cincinnati. During the journey, they had a full and free conference as to the plan of operations in the approaching campaign, and a complete understanding of the work to be done by each. In a parlor of the Burnet House, at Cincinnati, bending over their maps, the two generals, who had so long been inseparable, planned together that colossal structure whereof the great campaigns of Richmond and Atlanta were but two of the parts, and, grasping one another firmly by the hand, separated, one to the east, the other to the west, each to strike at the same instant his half of the ponderous death-blow.





*Am Schrifte
Wey Guel*

CHAPTER XIV.

THE ARMY OF THE CENTRE.

As the army corps had relieved the commanders of departments from the care of the great mass of minor and personal details relating to the troops under them, so the organization of military divisions, now for the first time introduced into our service—although something similar had been intended when General McClellan was first called to Washington—left the generals selected to command them entirely free to devote their minds to the organization, administration, and movement of their armies against the enemy. Tactical details devolved upon the department commanders. The unit habitually contemplated by the commander of the military division became an army; his detachments were army corps.

The military division of the Mississippi, in the personal command of which Sherman had just relieved the lieutenant-general, consisted of the four large departments of the Ohio, the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and Arkansas. Embracing the great central belt of territory from the Alleghanies to the western boundary of Arkansas, it included the entire theatre of war from Chattanooga to Vicksburg. Four large Union armies occupied this central zone.

The army of the Ohio, consisting of the Ninth and Twenty-third Army Corps, was at Knoxville. Major-General John M. Schofield had just taken command of it. Longstreet had disappeared from its front, and was retreating into Virginia to join Lee, and the Ninth Corps was on the way to re-enforce the army of the Potomac. The Twenty-third Corps, as it presently took the field, consisted of the divisions of Brigadier-Generals Miles S. Hascall and Jacob D. Cox. Three divisions remained to garrison East Tennessee and Kentucky.

The Army of the Cumberland was at Chattanooga, under the command of Major-General George H. Thomas. It consisted of the Fourth, Fourteenth, and Twentieth corps, commanded respectively by Major-Generals Oliver O. Howard, John M. Palmer, and Joseph Hooker. The Fourth Corps included the divisions of Brigadier-Generals D. S. Stanley, John Newton, and Thomas J. Wood; the Fourteenth, those of Jefferson C. Davis, R. W. Johnson, and Absalom Baird; and the Twentieth, those of A. S. Williams, John W. Geary, and Daniel Butterfield.

The Army of the Tennessee, comprising the Fifteenth, and portions of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth corps, under Major-Generals John A. Logan, George M. Dodge, and Frank P. Blair, Jr., was at Huntsville, commanded by McPherson. The remaining divisions of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Corps were at Memphis and Vicksburg, under Hurlbut and Slocum, except those absent on the Red River expedition. The Fifteenth Corps embraced the divisions of Generals P. J. Osterhaus, Morgan L. Smith, John E. Smith, and Harrow; the Sixteenth, those of Thomas E. G. Ransom, John M. Corse, and Thomas W. Sweeney; and the Seventeenth, those of Charles R. Woods and Miles D. Leggett.

The cavalry consisted of McCook's division of the Army of the Ohio, Kilpatrick's and Garrard's divisions of the Army of the Cumberland, and Edward McCook's brigade of the Army of the Tennessee.

The Department of Arkansas, including the whole of that State, was commanded by Major-General Frederick Steele, who, with the main portion of his troops, was at Little Rock, holding the line of the Arkansas River, with the object of keeping an army of the enemy away from the Mississippi and out of Missouri. This department, however, did not long continue attached to Sherman's command, being added to the Military Division of West Mississippi, under Canby, when that organization was formed in May.

John McAllister Schofield, the son of a clergyman, the Reverend James Schofield, residing in Chatanooga County, in

the State of New York, was born there on the 29th of September, 1831. When about twelve years of age his father took him to reside at Bristol, Illinois, whence, in 1845, they removed to Freeport, in the same State. In June, 1849, young Schofield entered the Military Academy at West Point, and graduated four years later, standing seventh in the order of general merit in the same class with Generals McPherson, Sheridan, Sill, Terrill, R. O. Tyler, and the rebel General Hood. He was appointed a brevet second-lieutenant, and attached to the Second Regiment of Artillery, on the 1st of July, 1853, and in regular course of promotion advanced to the grades of second-lieutenant in the First Regiment of Artillery on the 30th of August in the same year; first-lieutenant in the same regiment on the 1st of March, 1855; and captain on the 14th of May, 1861. After serving for two years with his company in South Carolina and Florida, in the fall of 1855, Lieutenant Schofield was ordered to West Point, as Assistant Professor of Natural and Experimental Philosophy; which position he held until June, 1860, when he obtained leave of absence for twelve months to accept the Chair of Physics in Washington University, at St. Louis, Missouri, intending to quit the army at the end of the leave. This design he abandoned immediately upon the publication of the President's proclamation of the 15th of April, 1861, calling for seventy-five thousand volunteers, and waiving the remainder of his leave, reported himself for orders and was assigned to duty as mustering officer at St. Louis. Shortly afterwards, by permission of the War Department, Lieutenant Schofield accepted the position of major of the First Regiment of Missouri Volunteers, offered him by the governor of the State, and in that capacity participated with his regiment in the bold capture and dispersion of the nest of secessionists at Camp Jackson on the 10th of May, planned and executed by Captain, afterwards Brigadier-General Nathaniel Lyon. Major Schofield soon afterwards became General Lyon's principal staff-officer, and served with that gallant commander throughout the campaign which ended in his death. In the

fall, the First Missouri Volunteers was converted into a heavy artillery regiment, and Major Schofield charged with its equipment. At Fredericktown, Missouri, he participated with Battery A, the first one mounted, in the defeat of Jeff. Thompson, by Plummer and Carlin. On the 20th of November, 1861, Major Schofield was appointed by the President a brigadier-general of volunteers—and at the same time received from the governor of Missouri a corresponding commission in the Missouri Militia, with orders to organize, equip, and command a force of ten thousand militia, to be called into the service of the United States, within the limits of Missouri, during the war. With this force General Schofield was enabled to relieve the main armies for active service in more important fields. In the spring of 1862, he was designated by Major-General Halleck, commanding the Department of the West, as commander of the district of Missouri, and in the fall organized and took personal command of the Army of the Frontier, serving in the southwestern portion of the State. He relinquished the former command in September, to give his undivided attention to the suppression of the terrible guerrilla warfare which then raged in Missouri. On the 29th of November, 1862, the President appointed him a major-general of volunteers, but his straightforward, decided, and just administration of affairs as commander of the district of Missouri having greatly dissatisfied the local politicians, they made a combined and determined effort to defeat his nomination, and so far succeeded that the Senate failed to act upon it, and his commission consequently expired on the 3d of March, 1863, by constitutional limitation. Immediately relieved, at his own request, from duty in Missouri, Brigadier-General Schofield was now ordered to report to Major-General Rosecrans, commanding the Army of the Cumberland, at Murfreesboro', Tennessee, by whom he was assigned to the command of Thomas' old division of the Fourteenth Army Corps. A month later, President Lincoln reappointed him a major-general of volunteers, and sent him back to St. Louis, to relieve Curtis, in command of the Department

of Missouri. In May, 1863, he assumed command, and realizing the paramount importance of the operations before Vicksburg, suspended all active operations in his own department and lent himself heartily to a co-operation with the plans of General Grant, then merely the commander of an adjacent department, by furnishing him with Major-General F. J. Heron's fine division of the Army of the Frontier, and all other troops not necessarily required for a strictly defensive attitude in Missouri. After the capture of Vicksburg, Schofield was re-enforced by General Grant with Steele's division, lately of Sherman's corps. Sending a division of cavalry under Brigadier-General J. W. Davidson to join Steele at Helena, he ordered the latter forthwith to move on Little Rock, the key to the military possession of the line of the Arkansas River and the control of the State, while he sent another column from Kansas, under Brigadier-General Blunt, to occupy Fort Smith and open communication with Little Rock. Both movements having proved successful, Missouri being thus secured from the ravages of a border war, and his army holding securely the line of the Arkansas, while menacing offensively the forces of the enemy between that river and the Red, General Schofield was engaged in concerting with Major-General Banks, commanding the Gulf department, the details of a joint occupation of Shreveport and the line of the Red River, when, in January, 1864, the President appointed Major-General Rosecrans to relieve him from command. There were then three principal political parties in Missouri, which, under different names or various pretences, had existed ever since the outbreak of the war. The entire control of affairs in Missouri necessarily rested with the military commander of the department. As it was impossible to please all parties, so, in looking only upon his duty and his orders from a standpoint different from that of either, he generally ended by pleasing none. Fremont, Hunter, and Curtis had been successively relieved from command; Schofield himself had been degraded for a time; and now he was again to give way to the demands of the dissatisfied politicians. Perceiving at last

that the hostility of these gentlemen was indeed directed against himself, and not against his subordinates, President Lincoln, although he indorsed and supported Schofield's entire policy and acts, yielded to the demands of the politicians for the purpose of demonstrating their motives, and gave them a new commander of their own choice. In a few weeks, the howls against Rosecrans were as loud as those previously raised against any of his predecessors. At the request of General Grant, Schofield was now assigned to the command of the Army of the Ohio, which he assumed on the 9th of February.

George H. Thomas, born in Southampton County, Virginia, on the 31st of July, 1816, of wealthy and respectable parents, entered West Point in June, 1836, and graduated twelfth in a class of forty-five members; on the first of July, 1840, was appointed a second-lieutenant in the Third Regiment of Artillery, attained by regular promotions the grades of first-lieutenant, on the 17th of May, 1843, captain in the month of December, 1853, and on the 12th of May, 1855, was selected as major of the newly raised Second Regiment of Cavalry. On the 25th of April, 1861, by regular promotion, consequent upon the resignation of the disloyal officers, he became lieutenant-colonel and on the 5th of May colonel of the same regiment, then and since known as the Fifth Cavalry. During this time, he served eighteen months in Florida, was brevetted first-lieutenant, on the 6th of November, 1841, for gallantry in the war against the Seminoles; served some time with his company at New Orleans Barracks, Fort Moultrie, in Charleston Harbor, and Fort McHenry, near Baltimore; in July, 1845, was sent to Corpus Christi, Texas, to report to General Taylor; took part in the defence of Fort Brown against a short siege by the Mexicans, and in the battle of Resaca de la Palma; was brevetted captain for gallant conduct at the battle of Monterey, September 23, 1846; commanded Company E, Third Artillery, during the following winter; was brevetted major for highly distinguished service with his battery in the decisive action at Buena Vista; recrossed the Rio

Grande at the conclusion of the war and was placed in charge of the commissary depot at Brazos Santiago; served in Florida, in command of Company B, of his regiment, in 1849 and 1850; served at Fort Independence, Boston Harbor, during the first three months of 1851; was stationed at West Point as instructor of artillery and cavalry from that time until the spring of 1854, when he was ordered to California with a battalion of his regiment and stationed at Fort Yuma, until July, 1853; served with the Second Cavalry, into which he had now been promoted, until early in 1856, when it went to Texas, where he commanded it for three years; and in April, 1861, was ordered to Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, to remount his regiment, which had been betrayed and robbed of its outfit and equipment by Twiggs, in his infamous surrender of the entire department under his command, after he had received orders relieving him, and with indecent haste to anticipate the hourly expected arrival of his successor. In May, 1861, Colonel Thomas took command of a brigade in the Department of Pennsylvania, under Major-General Patterson, afterwards the Department of the Shenandoah, under Major-General Banks, and continued to hold that position until the end of August. On the 17th of August he was appointed a brigadier-general of volunteers, and shortly afterwards ordered to Kentucky to report to Brigadier-General Anderson, who gave him the command of Camp Dick Robinson with about six thousand new troops. On the 26th of October, a brigade sent out by him under Brigadier-General Schoepf defeated the enemy under Zollicoffer, in the battle of Wildcat. On the 18th of January, after a march of nineteen days, over nearly impassable roads, with part of the first division of the Army of the Ohio, to which General Buell assigned him, he met the fierce attack of Zollicoffer, near Mill Spring, Kentucky, repulsed it, attacked in his turn, broke the enemy and pursued the disordered remnants to the Cumberland River, which they crossed during the night, abandoning all their artillery and baggage. In March, Thomas with his division, now forming the reserve of Buell's army, occupied Nash-

ville, and in April joined the rest of that army after the battle of Shiloh, and moved with it and Grant's army on Corinth. On the 25th of April, 1862, he was promoted to be a major-general of volunteers, and on the 1st of May his own division was transferred to the Army of the Tennessee, and he was assigned by General Halleck to command the five divisions, including Sherman's, constituting the right wing of the forces before Corinth. After the evacuation of that place by Beauregard, Thomas returned to the Army of the Ohio and was placed on duty as second in command of that army, during Bragg's invasion and the remarkable series of movements by which Buell manœuvred it out of Tennessee, through Kentucky, and back to Louisville. On the 1st of October he was assigned to the command of the right wing of that army, and in that capacity took part in Buell's nominal pursuit of Bragg. On the 5th of November, 1862, he was assigned by General Rosecrans, who had just relieved Buell, to the command of a corps comprising his own third division, now under Rousseau, and Negley's division. At Stone River, on the 31st of December, 1863, when Bragg impetuously hurled his entire army against Rosecrans' right and routed it, Thomas, with Rousseau's division unbroken, stood firm, held his ground, and aided in the selection of the new line, whose strength enabled Rosecrans to turn back the enemy's second attack on the following day. On the 20th of September, 1863, at the battle of Chickamauga, when McCook and Crittenden on either flank yielded to the fury of the enemy's assault, and streamed back in such utter rout to Chattanooga that even Rosecrans gave up the day as lost, and hastened thither in person to prepare a new line of defence, Thomas with his corps, somewhat later augmented by Granger's division, stood like a lion at bay, and resting his flanks upon the sides of the mountain gap, resisted and severely punished every attempt of Bragg, either to force his position in front or to turn his flanks. Falling back in the night three miles to a better position, he again formed line of battle and waited all the day of the 21st for Bragg's expected attack, which never came. Having

alone saved the Army of the Cumberland from destruction, Thomas was very justly selected as the successor of General Rosecrans, when on the 19th of October it was determined to relieve the latter. On the 27th of the same month he was made a brigadier-general in the regular army. Faithful over all things and free from all petty desires, when Sherman, his junior in years, in experience, in commission, and at no remote period his subordinate, was elevated to the command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, Thomas yielded a ready acquiescence in the selection, and a thorough, efficient, and essential co-operation in all the plans of his new superior. It is characteristic of Thomas, that in the twenty-five years that have elapsed since his graduation he has had but two short leaves of absence, one in 1848, and one in 1860, and has never been on favored duty of any kind. In his most marked traits, Thomas is the antithesis of Sherman, his habitual repose of mind and temper being, perhaps, only less strongly marked than Sherman's electric restlessness.

James Birdseye McPherson was born in Sandusky County, Ohio, on the 14th of November, 1828, entered the Military Academy towards the close of his twenty-first year, in June, 1849, graduated at the head of the same class with Schofield, and on the 1st of July, 1853, was appointed a brevet second-lieutenant, and assigned to the corps of engineers. By regular promotion, he attained the grades of second-lieutenant, on the 1st of December, 1854, first-lieutenant, December 13, 1858, and captain, August 6, 1861. Upon the expiration of his graduating furlough, he was stationed at West Point as assistant instructor of practical engineering, and remained there until September, 1854, when he was detailed as assistant engineer of the harbor defences of New York. From January to July, 1857, he was in charge of the construction of Fort Delaware, in the Delaware River. In December, 1857, he took charge of the erection of the fortifications on Alcatraz Island, in the Bay of San Francisco, California. In August, 1861, he was detailed to superintend the construction of the

fortifications of Boston Harbor. On the 12th of November, of the same year, Captain McPherson was, at the request of Major-General Halleck, appointed an additional aid-de-camp, with the rank of lieutenant-colonel, and, on reporting to him at St. Louis, was assigned to engineer duty on his staff. Lieutenant-Colonel McPherson served as chief engineer on General Grant's staff, at Forts Henry and Donelson, and at Shiloh, and was brevetted major in the regular army for the two former and lieutenant-colonel for the latter. On the 1st of May he was promoted to be additional aid-de-camp, with the rank of colonel, and served on General Halleck's staff as chief engineer of the army before Corinth. He was soon afterwards promoted to be brigadier-general of volunteers, from May 15th, 1862. After serving under Grant as general superintendent of the military railways in the Department of the Tennessee and upon the staff of that general in the battle of Iuka, he saw his first service in command of troops early in October, when, with a division, he fought his way through the rebel General Price's lines, then investing Corinth, marched in to the relief of the garrison, and the next day joined in the attack and pursuit of the enemy. In recognition of his continued meritorious services, he was, upon General Grant's request, promoted to be a major-general of volunteers on the 8th of October, 1862. In December, 1862, he was assigned to the command of the Seventeenth Army Corps. He was appointed a brigadier-general in the regular army, to date from the capture of Vicksburg. His share in the campaign which resulted in the conquest of the Mississippi River, in the battles of Port Gibson, Raymond, Jackson, and Champion's Hill, and in the siege of Vicksburg, we have already noticed, as well as his subsequent assignment to the command of the district of Vicksburg, and the control of operations on that part of the river, and his part in Sherman's Meridian raid. He was tall in person, being over six feet in height, well proportioned and erect; easy and agreeable in his manners; frank in conversation; accessible to all; gallant and dashing in action; regardless of danger;

strictly honorable in all his dealings with men and with the Government.

Schofield, young but matured, well poised, thoroughly scientific by education, thoroughly practical by contact with men, habituated to command; McPherson, in the full flower of his life, bold and enthusiastic, just emerging from a complete mastery of the science of defensive war into the wider field of the offensive, trained to command under the eye, and by the example of Grant and Sherman; Thomas, the ripe growth of years and experience, of balanced and crystallized mind, strong and patient, steadfast and prudent, a true soldier, no genius, but a master of his profession, exhaustive in preparation, deliberate in action, ponderous and irresistible in execution: such were the men upon whom, under the leadership of Sherman, the destiny of the campaign was to rest.

On the 25th of March, Sherman set out to inspect his command, and prepare it for action. He visited Athens, Decatur, Huntsville, and Larkin's Ferry, Alabama; and Chattanooga, Loudon, and Knoxville, Tennessee. Meeting General McPherson at Huntsville, General Thomas at Chattanooga, and General Schofield at Knoxville, he arranged with them in general terms the lines of communication to be guarded, and the strength of the columns and garrisons, and fixed the first of May as the date when every thing throughout the entire command was to be ready for a general movement. Leaving the department commanders to complete the details of organization and preparation, Sherman returned to his headquarters at Nashville, to look after the vital question of supplies. Two parallel lines of railway from the Tennessee River on the east, and a third line from the Ohio at Louisville, bring supplies to Nashville. Thence by the Nashville and Decatur Railroad they are carried south to Decatur, and by the Nashville and Chattanooga Railroad southeast to Chattanooga, passing through Huntsville, Stevenson, and Bridgeport. The Memphis and Charleston Railroad forms the base of a triangle, one hundred and twenty-one miles from Decatur to Chattanooga; from near Decatur to Bridgeport it lies north of the Tennessee.

Thus in case of accident or destruction to either of the direct lines, there was generally communication by the circuitous route, and during the season of navigation the Tennessee River added a third. The railways were in fine condition, in spite of the repeated injuries inflicted upon them by the enemy's cavalry in their frequent raids, but the people in East Tennessee were so impoverished that the Union commanders had hitherto felt obliged to issue rations to them from the military stores. Sherman at once found that the army and the people could not both be fed by the railways. The army must be supplied, must remain, and must move forward; the people could bring supplies by private means or could migrate to other parts of the country. Sherman's first duty was the success of his army. He accordingly issued orders stopping the issue of stores to the citizens, and made strenuous exertions to increase the carrying capacity of the railways. "At first," he says, in his official report of the campaign, "my orders operated very hardly, but the prolific soil soon afforded early vegetables, and ox-wagons hauled meat and bread from Kentucky, so that no actual suffering resulted, and I trust that those who clamored at the cruelty and hardships of the day have already seen in the result a perfect justification of my course." By the 1st of May the storehouses at Chattanooga contained provisions for thirty days, the ammunition-trains were fully supplied, the re-enlisted veterans had come forward, and all was ready.

On the 10th of April, Sherman received his final instructions from the lieutenant-general. From them he learned that Grant would march with the Army of the Potomac from Culpepper on the 5th of May, against Lee. Sherman was to move against Johnston at the same time, with Atlanta as his immediate objective. He immediately replied, giving the details of his plans, and concluding:

"Should Johnston fall behind Chattahoochee, I would feign to the right but pass to the left, and act on Atlanta or its eastern communications, according to developed facts. This is about as far ahead as I feel disposed to look; but I would

ever bear in mind that Johnston is at all times to be kept so busy that he cannot in any event send any part of his command against you or Banks. If Banks can at the same time carry Mobile and open up the Alabama River, he will in a measure solve a most difficult part of my problem—*provisions*. But in that I must venture. Georgia has a million of inhabitants. If they can live, we should not starve. If the enemy interrupt my communications, I will be absolved from all obligations to subsist on my own resources, but feel perfectly justified in taking whatever and wherever I can find. I will inspire my command, if successful, with my feelings, and that beef and salt are all that are absolutely necessary to life; and parched corn fed General Jackson's army once, on that very ground."

On the 27th of April, Sherman issued orders to all the troops that were to form part of the moving columns to concentrate towards Chattanooga, and on the 28th removed his headquarters thither.

On the morning of the 6th of May the Army of the Tennessee was near Gordon's Mill, on the Chickamauga Creek, the Army of the Cumberland at and near Ringgold on the railway, and the Army of the Ohio near Red Clay on the Georgia line, directly north of Dalton. It had been Sherman's desire and intention to move with one hundred thousand men and two hundred and fifty guns; fifty thousand men in the Army of the Cumberland, thirty-five thousand in that of the Tennessee, and fifteen thousand in that of the Ohio. His actual force was ninety-eight thousand seven hundred and ninety-seven men, and two hundred and fifty-four guns, distributed as follows:—

Army of the Cumberland.—Infantry, 54,568; artillery, 2,377; cavalry, 3,828: total, 60,773; guns, 130.

Army of the Tennessee.—Infantry, 22,437; artillery, 1,404; cavalry, 624: total, 24,465; guns, 96.

Army of the Ohio.—Infantry, 11,183; artillery, 679; cavalry, 1,697: total, 13,559; guns, 28.

A. J. Smith's and Mower's divisions, which were to have

joined the Army of Tennessee early in April, were still detained on the Mississippi, in consequence of the unexpected length and disastrous end of the Red River expedition.

The Confederate army under Johnston, now numbering, according to his official report, forty thousand nine hundred infantry, in the three corps of Hardee, Hood, and Polk, and four thousand cavalry, under Wheeler, was grouped around Dalton, on the line of the Chattanooga and Atlanta Railway, Johnston's plan was to take the initiative, with his own force increased from other sources as largely as practicable; but while Mr. Davis and General Bragg, then stationed in Richmond, as general-in-chief of the Confederate armies, were engaged in discussing details, and objecting to General Johnston's suggestions, Sherman advanced.

CHAPTER XV.

BEYOND THE MOUNTAINS.

THE two hostile armies were separated by an inaccessible spur of the Alleghanies, called Rocky Face Ridge, cloven by Buzzard's Roost Gap, through which run the railway and Mill Creek. This narrow pass was strongly fortified, was flooded by the waters of the creek, artificially raised by means of a dam, and was swept by strong batteries on the projecting spurs and on a ridge at the southern extremity. To assault the enemy in this almost unapproachable position, formed no part of Sherman's plan. He decided to turn the enemy's left. McPherson was ordered to move rapidly by Ship's Gap, Villanow, and Snake's Creek Gap, on the railway at Resaca, eighteen miles below Dalton, or a point nearer than that place, make a bold attack, and after breaking the railway well, to retire to a strong defensive position near Snake Creek Gap, ready to fall on the enemy's flank when he retreated, as it was thought he would do.

On the 7th of May, with slight opposition, Thomas occupied Tunnel Hill, directly in front of Buzzard's Roost Gap. On the 9th, Schofield moved down close to Dalton, from his camps at Red Clay, and Thomas renewed his demonstration against Buzzard's Roost and Rocky Face Ridge with such vigor, that Newton's division of Howard's fourth corps carried the ridge, but turning south, found the crest too narrow and too well protected by rock epaulements to enable it to reach the gorge. Geary's division of Hooker's twentieth corps, made a bold push for the summit, but the narrow road was strongly held by the enemy, and could not be carried.

Meanwhile McPherson had reached Snake Creek Gap on the 8th, completely surprising a brigade of Confederate cavalry which was coming to watch and hold it. The next day he approached within a mile of Resaca, but finding that place very strongly fortified, and no road leading across to it, without exposing his left flank to an attack from the north, he retired to Snake Creek Gap and there took up a strong position.

Leaving Howard's Fourth Corps and a small force of cavalry, to occupy the enemy's attention in front, on the 10th, Sherman ordered General Thomas to send Hooker's twentieth corps over to McPherson, and to follow with Palmer's fourteenth corps, and Schofield was directed to march by the same route. On the 12th, the whole army, except Howard's corps, moved through Snake's Creek Gap on Resaca;—McPherson, in advance, by the direct road, preceded by Kilpatrick's division of cavalry; Thomas to the left, and Schofield to the right.

General Kilpatrick, with his division, led, and drove Wheeler's division of the enemy's cavalry from a cross-road to within two miles of Resaca, but received a wound which disabled him, and gave the command of his brigade to Colonel Murray, who, according to his orders, wheeled out of the road, leaving General McPherson to pass. General McPherson struck the enemy's infantry pickets near Resaca, and drove them within their fortified lines, and occupied a ridge of bald hills, his right on the Oostanaula, about two miles below the railway bridge, and his left abreast the town. General Thomas came up on his left, facing Camp Creek. General Schofield broke his way through the dense forest to General Thomas' left. Johnston had left Dalton on the night of the 12th and morning of the 13th, and General Howard entered it and pressed his rear. Rocky Face Mountain and the southern extremity of Snake Creek Gap had effectually concealed the flank movement of the Union army, and nothing saved Johnston's army at Resaca but the impracticable nature of the country, which made the passage of troops across the valley almost impossible. This enabled him to reach Resaca from Dal-




OPERATIONS AROUND RESACA

Prepared by Brvt. Brig Genl O. M. Poe.

Engraved for "Sherman and His Campaigns."

T E N N E S S E E



ton along the comparatively good roads constructed beforehand, by his own foresight. On the 14th of May, the whole rebel army was met in a strong position behind Camp Creek, occupying the forts at Resaca, the right on some high hills to the north of the town. Sherman at once ordered a pontoon bridge to be laid across the Oostanaula at Lay's Ferry, in the direction of Calhoun; Sweeney's division of the Sixteenth Corps, to cross and threaten Calhoun, and Garrard's cavalry division to move from its position at Villanow towards Rome, cross the Oostanaula, and break the railway below Calhoun and above Kingston, if possible, while the main army pressed against Resaca at all points. General McPherson got across Camp Creek near its mouth, and made a lodgment close up to the enemy's works, driving Polk's corps from the hills that commanded the railroad and trestle bridges; and General Thomas pressing close along Camp Creek Valley, threw Hooker's corps across the head of the creek to the main Dalton road, and down it close to Resaca.

General Schofield came up on his left, and a heavy battle ensued during the afternoon and evening of the 15th, during which General Hooker drove the enemy from several strong hills, capturing a four-gun battery and many prisoners. That night Johnston escaped, retreating south across the Oostanaula, and the next morning Sherman entered the town in time to save the road bridge, but not the railway bridge, which had been burned.

The whole army started in pursuit, General Thomas directly on the heels of Hardee, who was bringing up the Confederate rear, General McPherson by Lay's Ferry, and General Schofield by blind roads to the left. In Resaca another four-gun battery and a considerable quantity of stores were found.

During the 16th the whole of Sherman's army crossed the Oostanaula and on the 17th moved south by as many different roads as practicable. General Thomas had sent Jefferson C. Davis' division along the west bank of the Oostanaula, to Rome. Near Adairsville, the rear of the rebel army was again encountered, and about sunset of that day General Newton's

division, in the advance, had a sharp encounter with his rear guard, but the next morning he was gone, and the Union troops pushed on through Kingston, to a point four miles beyond, where they found the enemy again formed on ground comparatively open, and well adapted for a great battle. General Schofield approached Cassville from the north, to which point General Thomas had also directed General Hooker's corps, and General McPherson's army had been drawn from Woodland to Kingston in order to be in close support. On the 19th the enemy was in force about Cassville, strongly intrenched, but as our troops converged on him again he retreated, in the night-time, across the Etowah River, burning the road and railway bridges near Cartersville, but leaving us in possession of the valuable country about the Etowah River.

That morning Johnston had ordered Polk's and Hood's corps to advance and attack the Fourteenth Corps, General Palmer's, which had followed them from Adairsville, but Hood, who led the advance, being deceived by a report that the union troops had turned his right, delayed until the opportunity was lost. On the night of the 19th, the Confederate army held a commanding situation on a ridge before Cassville, but acting upon the earnest representations of Lieutenant-Generals Polk and Hardee, that their positions were untenable, Johnston crossed the Etowah on the following morning.

Holding General Thomas's army about Cassville, General McPherson's about Kingston, and General Schofield at Cassville's depot, and towards the Etowah bridge, Sherman gave his army a few days' rest, and time to bring forward supplies for the next stage of the campaign. In the mean time General Jefferson C. Davis, with his division of the Fourteenth Corps, had got possession of Rome, with its forts, eight or ten guns of heavy calibre, and its valuable mills and foundries. Two good bridges were also secured across the Etowah River near Kingston. Satisfied that the enemy would hold him in check at the Allatoona Pass, Sherman resolved, without even attempting it in front, to turn it by a circuit to the right, and

having loaded the wagons with forage and subsistence for twenty days' absence from the railway, left a garrison at Rome and Kingston, on the 23d put the army in motion for Dallas.

General McPherson crossed the Etowah at the mouth of Conasene Creek, near Kingston, and moved for his position to the south of Dallas by way of Van Wert. Davis' division of the Fourteenth Corps moved directly from Rome for Dallas by Van Wert. General Thomas took the road by Euharlee and Burnt Hickory, while General Schofield moved by other roads more to the east, aiming to come up on Thomas' left. The head of Thomas' column skirmished with the enemy's cavalry, under Jackson, about Burnt Hickory, and captured a courier with a letter of General Johnston, showing that he had detected the move, and was preparing to take a stand near Dallas. The country was very rugged, mountainous, and densely wooded, with few and obscure roads.

On the 25th May, General Thomas was moving from Burnt Hickory for Dallas, his troops on three roads, Hooker's corps having the advance. When he approached the Pumpkin Vine Creek, on the main Dallas road, he found Jackson's division of the enemy's cavalry at the bridge to his left. Rapidly pushing across the creek, he saved the bridge, though on fire, and following eastward about two miles, encountered and drove the infantry some distance, until he met Hood's corps in line of battle, and his leading division, General Geary's, had a severe encounter. Williams' and Ward's (late Butterfield's) divisions of Hooker's corps, were on other roads, and it was nearly four o'clock P.M. before General Hooker got his whole corps well in hand, when he deployed, and, by Sherman's order, made a bold push to secure possession of New Hope Church, where three roads from Ackworth, Marietta, and Dallas meet. Here a hard battle with Stewart's division of Hood's corps was fought, lasting two hours, but the enemy being covered by hastily constructed earthworks, and a stormy dark night having set in, General Hooker was unable to drive him from these roads. The next morning General McPherson was moved up to Dallas, General Thomas

deployed against New Hope Church, and General Schofield directed towards the left, so as to strike and turn the enemy's right. General Garrard's cavalry operated with General McPherson, and General Stoneman's with General Schofield. General McCook looked to the rear. Owing to the difficult nature of the ground and dense forests, it took several days to deploy close to the enemy, when Sherman resolved gradually to work towards our left, and as soon as all things should be ready to push for the railway east of Allatoona. In making the development before the enemy about New Hope, many severe encounters occurred between parts of the army. On the 28th, General McPherson was on the point of closing to his left on General Thomas, in front of New Hope Church, to enable the rest of the army to extend still more to the left, and to envelop the enemy's right, when suddenly the enemy made a bold and daring assault on him at Dallas. Fortunately our men had erected good breastworks, and gave the enemy a terrible and bloody repulse. After a few days' delay, for effect, Sherman renewed his orders to General McPherson, to move to the left about five miles, and occupy General Thomas' position in front of New Hope Church, and directed Generals Thomas and Schofield to move a corresponding distance to their left. This was effected without resistance on the 1st of June, and by pushing the left well around, all the roads leading back to Allatoona and Ackworth were occupied, after which Sherman sent General Stoneman's cavalry rapidly into Allatoona, at the east end of the Pass, and General Garrard's cavalry around by the rear to the west end of the Pass. This was accomplished, Allatoona Pass was turned, and Sherman's real object gained.

Ordering the railway bridge across the Etowah to be at once rebuilt, Sherman continued working by the left, and by the 4th of June had resolved to leave Johnston in his intrenched position at New Hope Church, and move to the railway about Ackworth, when the latter abandoned his intrenchments, and fell back to Lost Mountain. The Union army then moved to Ackworth and reached the railway on the 6th.

On the 7th the Confederate right was extended beyond the railway, and across the Ackworth and Marietta road. On examining the Allatoona Pass, Sherman found it admirably adapted for use as a secondary base, and gave the necessary orders for its defence and garrison. As soon as the railway bridge was finished across the Etowah, stores came forward to camp by rail. At Ackworth, General Blair came up on the 8th of June with two divisions of the Seventeenth Corps, that had been on furlough, and one brigade of cavalry, Colonel Long's, of General Garrard's division, which had been awaiting horses at Columbia. This accession of force nearly compensated for the losses in battle, and the detachments left at Resaca, Rome, Kingston, and Allatoona.

CHAPTER XVI.

ACROSS THE CHATTAHOOCHEE.

ON the 9th of June, his communication in the rear being secure and supplies ample, Sherman moved forward to Big Shanty.

Kenesaw Mountain lay before him, with a high range of hills, covered with chestnut-trees, trending off to the north-east, terminating in another peak, called Brushy Mountain. To the right was a smaller hill, called Pine Mountain, and beyond it, in the distance, Lost Mountain. All these, though links in a continuous chain, present a sharp, conical appearance, prominent in the vast landscape that presents itself from any of the hills that abound in that region. Pine Mountain forms the apex, and Kenesaw and Lost Mountains the base of a triangle, perfectly covering the town of Marietta and the railway, back to the Chattahoochee. On each of these peaks the enemy had his signal-stations. Hardee's corps held the left of the enemy's line, resting on Lost Mountain, Polk's the centre, and Hood's the right, across the Marietta and Ackworth road. The enemy's line was fully two miles long—more than he had force to hold. General McPherson was ordered to move towards Marietta, his right on the railroad; General Thomas on Kenesaw and Pine Mountains, and General Schofield off towards Lost Mountain: General Garrard's cavalry on the left, General Stoneman's on the right; and General McCook looking to the rear and communications. The depot was at Big Shanty.

By the 11th of June Sherman's lines were close up, and he made dispositions to break the enemy's line between Kenesaw

and Pine Mountains. General Hooker was on its right and front, General Howard on its left and front, and General Palmer between it and the railroad. During a sharp cannonading from General Howard's right and General Hooker's left, Lieutenant-General Polk, of the Confederate army, was killed on the 14th, and Major-General Lovell succeeded to the command of his corps. On the morning of the 15th Pine Mountain was found abandoned by the enemy. Generals Thomas and Schofield advanced, and found him again strongly intrenched along the line of rugged hills connecting Kenesaw and Lost Mountains. At the same time General McPherson advanced his line, gaining substantial advantage on the left. Pushing the operations on the centre as vigorously as the nature of the ground would permit, Sherman had again ordered an assault on the centre, when, on the 17th, the enemy abandoned Lost Mountain, and the long line of breastworks connecting it with Kenesaw. Our troops continued to press at all points, skirmishing in dense forests of timber, and across most difficult ravines, until, on the 19th, they found him again strongly posted and intrenched, his right wing, composed of Hood's corps, thrown back to cover Marietta, resting on the Marietta and Canton road; the centre on Kenesaw Mountain, held by Loring's corps; and the left, Hardee's corps, across the Lost Mountain and Marietta road, behind Nose's Creek, and covering the railroad back to the Chattahoochee.

From Kenesaw the enemy could look down upon the Union camps, and observe every movement, and his batteries thundered away, but did little harm, on account of the extreme height, the shot and shell passing harmlessly over the heads of the men. During the operations about Kenesaw the rain fell almost continuously for three weeks, rendering the narrow wooded roads mere mud gulleys, so that a general movement would have been impossible; but the men daily worked closer to their intrenched foe, and kept up an incessant picket firing to annoy him.

General McPherson was watching the enemy on Kenesaw and working his left forward; General Thomas swing-

ing, as it were, on a grand left wheel, his left on Kenesaw connecting with General McPherson; and General Schofield all the time working to the south and east, along the old Sandtown road. On the 21st, Hood's corps was moved to the left of the Confederate lines, and his former position on the right filled by Wheeler's cavalry. On the 22d, General Hooker had advanced his line, with General Schofield on his right, when Hindman's and Stevenson's divisions of Hood's corps suddenly sallied forth, attacked Williams' division of Hooker's corps and a brigade of Hascall's division of General Schofield's army, and drove in their skirmish lines, but on reaching the line of battle received a terrible repulse and fell back, leaving dead, wounded, and many prisoners in our hands. Upon studying the ground, Sherman now considered that he had no alternative but to assault the enemy's lines or turn his position. Either course had its difficulties and dangers; and he perceived that the enemy, as well as his own officers, had settled down into a conviction that he would not assault fortified lines. All expected him to "outflank." An army, to be efficient, must not settle down to one single mode of offence, but must be prepared to execute any plan which promises success. Desiring, therefore, for the moral effect, to make a successful assault against the enemy behind breastworks, Sherman resolved to attempt it on the left centre; reflecting that if he could thrust a strong head of column through at that point, by pushing it boldly and rapidly two and a half miles, it would reach the railway below Marietta, cut off the enemy's right and centre from its line of retreat, and then, by turning on either fragment, that fraction could be overwhelmed and destroyed. On the 24th of June, he ordered that an assault should be made at two points south of Kenesaw on the 27th, one near Little Kenesaw by McPherson, and the other about a mile further south by Thomas. On the 27th of June, the two assaults were made exactly at the time and in the manner prescribed in Sherman's orders, and both failed, costing us many valuable lives, among them those of Generals Harker and McCook—Colonel Rice, and others badly wounded; our

aggregate loss being nearly three thousand, while we inflicted comparatively little loss to the enemy, behind his well-formed breastworks. The losses in Hardee's and Loring's corps, by which the brunt of the assault was sustained, are reported by General Johnston at about five hundred and forty. In his official report, Sherman says: "Failure as it was, and for which I assume the entire responsibility, I yet claim it produced good fruits, as it demonstrated to General Johnston that I would assault, and that boldly; and we also gained and held ground so close to the enemy's parapets that he could not show a head above them."

On the 1st of July, Sherman ordered General McPherson to be relieved by General Garrard's cavalry in front of Kenesaw, and rapidly to throw his whole army by the right to threaten Nickajack Creek and Turner's Ferry across the Chattahoochee; and he also pushed Stoneman's cavalry to the river below Turner's. General McPherson commenced his movement on the night of July 2d, and, at the same moment, Johnston, finding his left turned, and in danger of being cut off from Atlanta, abandoned his strong position at Kenesaw Mountain, and fell back to Smyrna Church, five miles from Marietta. The next morning General Thomas' whole line was moved forward to the railway, and turned south in pursuit towards the Chattahoochee. General Logan's corps, of General McPherson's army, was ordered back into Marietta by the main road, and General McPherson and General Schofield were instructed to cross Nickajack and attack the enemy in flank and rear, and, if possible, to catch him in the confusion of crossing the Chattahoochee; but Johnston had covered his movement too well, by a strong *tête-de-pont* at the Chattahoochee and an advanced intrenched line across the road at Smyrna Church, to admit of this.

Leaving a garrison in Marietta, and ordering General Logan to join his own army near the mouth of Nickajack, Sherman overtook General Thomas at Smyrna. On the 4th of July, Thomas pushed a strong skirmish line down the main road, capturing the entire line of the enemy's pits, and made strong

demonstrations along Nickajack Creek and about Turner's Ferry. This had the desired effect, and during the night Johnston fell back to the Chattahoochee, covering the crossings from Turner's Ferry to the railway bridge, and sending Wheeler's and Jackson's cavalry to the left bank to observe the river for twenty miles above and below. The next morning, Sherman advanced to the Chattahoochee, General Thomas' left flank resting on it near Price's Ferry, General McPherson's right at the mouth of the Nickajack, and General Schofield in reserve. Heavy skirmishing along the whole front, during the 5th, demonstrated the strength of the enemy's position, which could alone be turned by crossing the main Chattahoochee River, a rapid and deep stream, only passable at that stage of water by means of bridges, except at one or two very difficult fords.

Conceiving that this would be more easy of execution before the enemy had made more thorough preparation or regained full confidence, Sherman ordered General Schofield to cross from his position on the Sandtown road to Smyrna camp ground, and next to the Chattahoochee, near the mouth of Soap's Creek, and effect a lodgment on the east bank. This was most successfully and skilfully accomplished on the 7th of July, General Schofield capturing a gun, completely surprising the guard, laying a good pontoon bridge and a trestle bridge, and effecting a strong lodgment on high and commanding ground, with good roads leading to the east. At the same time, General Garrard, with his cavalry division, moved rapidly on Roswell, and destroyed the cloth factories which had supplied the rebel armies. General Garrard was then ordered to secure the shallow ford at Roswell, and hold it until he could be relieved by infantry; and, as Sherman contemplated transferring the Army of the Tennessee from the extreme right to the left, he ordered General Thomas to send a division of his infantry that was nearest to Roswell to hold the ford until General McPherson could send a corps from the neighborhood of Nickajack. General Newton's division was sent, and held the ford until the arrival of General Dodge's



corps, which was soon followed by the remainder of General McPherson's army. General Howard had also built a bridge at Powers' Ferry, two miles below General Schofield, and had crossed over and taken position on his right. Thus, during the 9th, we had secured three good and safe points of passage over the Chattahoochee above the enemy, with good roads leading to Atlanta. Learning these facts, Johnston crossed the river on the night of the 9th, and burned the bridges in his rear; and thus, on the morning of the 10th, Sherman's army held undisputed possession of the right bank of the Chattahoochee; one of the chief objects of his campaign was gained; and Atlanta lay before him, only eight miles distant. It was too important a place in the hands of an enemy to be left undisturbed with its magazines, stores, arsenals, workshops, foundries, and converging railways. But the men had worked hard and needed rest.

In anticipation of this contingency, Sherman had collected a well-appointed force of cavalry, about two thousand strong, at Decatur, Alabama, with orders, on receiving notice by telegraph, to push rapidly south, cross the Coosa at the railroad bridge or the Ten Islands, and thence by the most direct route to Opelika, for the purpose of breaking up the only finished railway connecting the channels of trade and travel between Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, running from Montgomery to Opelika, and thereby to cut off Johnston's army from an important source of supply and re-enforcement. Major-General Lovell H. Rousseau, commanding the district of Tennessee, had asked and received permission to command the expedition. As soon as Johnston was well across the Chattahoochee, and Sherman had begun to manœuvre on Atlanta, the requisite notice was given. General Rousseau started punctually on the 10th of July, fulfilled his orders and instructions to the very letter, passed through Talladega, reached the railway on the 16th, about twenty-five miles west of Opelika, and effectually broke it up to that place, as well as three miles of the branch towards Columbus, and two miles towards West Point. He then turned north, and, on the 22d, joined

Sherman at Marietta, having sustained a loss of about thirty men.

The interval to the 16th of July, was employed in collecting stores at Allatoona, Marietta, and Vining's Station, strengthening the railway guards and garrisons, and in improving the pier bridges and roads leading across the river. Generals Stoneman's and McCook's cavalry had scouted well down the river to draw attention in that direction, and all things being ready for a general advance, on the 17th, Sherman ordered it to commence. General Thomas was to cross at Powers' and Price's ferry bridges, and march by Buckhead; Schofield, who, as has been seen, was already across at the mouth of Soap's Creek, to march by Cross Keys; and General McPherson to direct his course from Roswell directly against the Augusta road at some point east of Decatur, near Stone Mountain. General Garrard's cavalry acted with General McPherson, and Generals Stoneman and McCook watched the river and roads below the railway. On the 17th the whole army advanced from their camps, and formed a general line along the old Peach-tree road.

The same day, Jefferson Davis relieved General Johnston from the command of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee, and designated Lieutenant-General J. B. Hood as his successor. The telegram from General Samuel Cooper, adjutant-general of the Confederate army, communicating this order assigned as a reason for it that Johnston had failed to arrest the advance of the Union army to the vicinity of Atlanta, and expressed no confidence that he could defeat it. From the moment that stiffly bending to the pressure of public opinion, unmistakably uttered through the lips of the rebel Congress, Jefferson Davis had, against his will, restored General Johnston to command in the west, that wrong-headed man, ever warped by his private griefs to the injury of his own cause, had sullenly refrained from giving to his subordinate any assistance whatever, had spent the time for action in cavilling at details, had withheld the troops needed to render either offence or defence successful, and had left Johnston in entire igno-

rance as to the approval or condemnation of his plans until their consummation afforded the hungrily watched chance for his disgrace. With an army less than half the size of Sherman's, a victory by Johnston on the banks of the Tennessee, by no means probable would even if possible, have proved indecisive; while defeat, which he ought to have regarded as certain, would have been his utter destruction. Falling back successively to the strong mountain positions at Resaca, Allatoona, Ackworth, and Kenesaw, and in turn interposing between himself and the Union army three large rivers, the Oostanaula, Etowah, and Chattahoochee, Johnston had forced Sherman to consume seventy-two days in passing over the hundred miles that measured the distance between Ringgold and Atlanta, and there, behind secure fortifications, with an army larger than at the start, was preparing to attack the Union army, largely reduced by losses, by detachments, and by expiration of enlistments, in a position south of all the barriers it had passed, where a defeat would be so far decisive for Sherman as to cost him all the fruits already gained and months of delay, but indecisive for the Confederates, who could retire behind their works, too strong for assault and too extensive for investment. At this crisis of the campaign, Johnston, prudent, wary, and exhaustive in his plans, brave and skilful in their execution, was displaced by a successor, brave indeed but also rash, capable of fighting, but incompetent to direct. The Confederate tactics changed at once and the battle which Johnston, at the very moment he was relieved, was about to deliver upon the decisive point with thorough preparation was delivered by Hood, upon the first point that presented itself, with rash impetuosity.

The Confederate army, numbering forty-one thousand infantry and artillery and ten thousand cavalry, was now strongly posted, about four miles in front of Atlanta, on the hills which form the south bank of the broad channel known as Peach-tree Creek, holding the line of that stream and the Chattahoochee for some distance below the mouth of the creek.

On the 18th, continuing on a general right wheel, General McPherson reached the Augusta railway, at a point seven miles east of Decatur, and with General Garrard's cavalry and General Morgar. L. Smith's division of the Fifteenth Corps, broke up a section of about four miles. General Schofield reached the town of Decatur the same day.

On the 19th, General McPherson turned along the railway into Decatur. General Schofield followed a road towards Atlanta, leading by Colonel Howard's house and the distillery, and General Thomas crossed Peach-tree Creek in force by numerous bridges in the face of the enemy's intrenched lines. All found the enemy in more or less force and skirmished heavily.

On the 20th, all the armies had closed in, converging towards Atlanta, but as a gap existed between Generals Schofield and Thomas, two divisions of General Howard's corps of General Thomas' army were moved to the left to connect with General Schofield, leaving Newton's division of the same corps on the Buckhead road. During the afternoon of the 20th, about 4 P. M., the enemy sallied from his works in force, and fell in line of battle against Sherman's right centre, composed of Newton's division of Howard's corps, on the main Buckhead road, of Hooker's corps, next towards the south, and Johnson's division of Palmer's corps. The blow was sudden and somewhat unexpected, but General Newton had hastily covered his front by a line of rail-piles, which enabled him to meet and repulse the attack on him. General Hooker's corps, although uncovered, and compelled to fight on comparatively open ground, after a very severe battle, drove the enemy back to his intrenchments. The action in front of Johnston's division was comparatively light, as the position was well intrenched. Sherman's entire loss was about fifteen hundred killed, wounded, and missing,—chiefly in Hooker's corps, by reason of its exposed condition.

On the morning of the 22d, to his surprise, Sherman discovered that the Confederate army had, during the succeeding night, abandoned the line of Peach-tree Creek, where he should have interposed an obstinate resistance, and fallen back

to a strong line of redoubts, forming the immediate defences of Atlanta, and covering all the approaches to that town. These works had been long since prepared, and the enemy was now engaged in connecting the redoubts with curtains strengthened by rifle-trenches, abattis, and chevaux-de-frise. The whole of Sherman's army crossed Peach-tree Creek and closed in upon Atlanta,—McPherson on the left, Schofield next, and Thomas on the right.

General McPherson, who had advanced from Decatur, continued to follow substantially the Augusta railway, with the Fifteenth Corps, General Logan, and Seventeenth, General Blair, on its left, and the Sixteenth, General Dodge, on its right; but as the general advance of all the armies contracted the circle, the Sixteenth Corps was thrown out of line by the Fifteenth connecting on the right with General Schofield near the Howard House. General McPherson, the night before, had gained a high hill to the south and east of the railway, where the Seventeenth Corps had, after a severe fight, driven the enemy, and it gave him a most commanding position within view of the very heart of the city. He had thrown out working parties to it, and was making preparations to occupy it in strength with batteries. The Sixteenth Corps, General Dodge, was ordered from right to left to occupy this position and make it a strong general left flank. General Dodge was moving by a diagonal path or wagon-track leading from the Decatur road in the direction of General Blair's left flank.

About noon Hood attacked boldly. At the first indications of a movement, on his flank, General McPherson parted from General Sherman, with whom he was engaged in discussing the state of affairs and the plans for the future, and with his staff rode off to direct matters on the field. In a few moments, the sounds of musketry to McPherson's left and rear, growing in volume and presently accompanied by artillery, indicated to Sherman Hood's purpose of throwing a superior force against his left, while his front would be checked by the fortifications of Atlanta; and orders were accordingly at once dispatched to the centre and right to press forward and give full employ-

ment to all the enemy in his lines, and for General Schofield to hold as large a force in reserve as possible, awaiting developments. About half-past twelve o'clock, Lieutenant-Colonel William T. Clark, assistant-adjutant-general, rode up and communicated to General Sherman the appalling intelligence that General McPherson was either dead or a prisoner, that he had ridden to General Dodge's column, which was then moving as heretofore described, and had sent off nearly all his staff and orderlies on various errands, and himself had passed into a narrow path or road that led to the left and rear of General Giles A. Smith's division, which was General Blair's extreme left; that a few minutes after he had entered the woods a sharp volley was heard in that direction, and his horse had come out riderless and wounded in two places. There was no time to yield to the grief caused by this terrible calamity. Not an instant was to be lost. Sherman instantly dispatched a staff-officer to General Logan to tell him what had happened and that he must assume command of the Army of the Tennessee, and hold stubbornly the ground already chosen, more especially the hill gained by General Leggett the night before.

Already the whole line was engaged in battle. Hardee's corps had sallied from Atlanta, and, by a wide circuit to the east, had struck General Blair's left flank, enveloped it, and had swung round to the right until it struck General Dodge in motion. General Blair's line was substantially along the abandoned line of rebel trench, but it was fashioned to fight outwards. A space of wooded ground of near half a mile intervened between the head of General Dodge's column and General Blair's line, through which the enemy had poured. The last order known to have been given by General McPherson was to hurry Colonel Wangelin's brigade of the Fifteenth Corps across from the railway to occupy this gap. Opportunely, it came on the double-quick and checked the enemy. While Hardee assailed our left flank, Lieutenant-General A. P. Stewart, who had been placed in command of Polk's corps,

on the 7th, was intended to move directly out from his main works and fall upon McPherson in front, but fortunately both attacks were not made simultaneously. The enemy swept across the hill which our men were fortifying, captured the pioneer company, its tools, and almost the entire working party, and bore down on our left until he encountered General Giles A. Smith's division of the Seventeenth Corps, who being somewhat in air, was forced to fight first from one side of the old rifle parapet and then from the other, gradually withdrawing, regiment by regiment, so as to form a flank to General Leggett's division, which held the important position on the apex of the hill. General Dodge received and held in check the attack of Hardee's corps, and punished him severely, capturing many prisoners. General Giles A. Smith had gradually given up the extremity of his line, and formed a new one, connected on the right with General Leggett, and the left refused, facing southeast. On this ground and in this order the men fought well and desperately for nearly four hours, checking and repulsing all the enemy's attacks. The execution on the enemy's ranks at the angle was terrible, and great credit is ascribed by Sherman to Generals Leggett and Giles A. Smith and their men for their hard and stubborn fighting. The enemy made no further progress on that flank, and by four P. M. had almost given up the attempt. In the mean time, Garrard's cavalry division having been sent off to Covington, Wheeler, with his Confederate cavalry, had reached Decatur and attempted to capture the wagon trains, but Colonel Sprague covered them with great skill and success, sending them to the rear of Generals Schofield and Thomas, and not drawing back from Decatur till every wagon was safe except three, which were abandoned by the teamsters. On our extreme left the enemy had taken Murray's regular battery of six guns, with its horses, as it was moving along unsupported and unapprehensive of danger in a narrow wooded road in the unguarded space between the head of General Dodge's column and the line of battle on the ridge above, but most of

the men escaped to the bushes. Hardee also captured two other guns on the extreme left flank, that were left on the ground as General Giles A. Smith drew off his men. About four P. M. there was a lull, during which the enemy advanced on the railway and the main Decatur road, and suddenly assailed a regiment which, with a section of guns, had been thrown forward as a picket, moved rapidly forward, and broke through our lines at that point. The force on this part of the line had been materially weakened by the withdrawal of Colonel Martin's brigade, sent by General Logan's orders to the extreme left, and Lightburn's brigade fell back in some disorder about four hundred yards, to a position held by it the night before, leaving the enemy for a time in possession of two batteries, including a valuable 20-pounder Parrott battery of four guns, and separating the two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps, which were on the right and left of the railway. Being in person close by the spot, and appreciating the vast importance of the connection at that point, Sherman ordered several batteries of Schofield's army to be moved to a position commanding the interval by a left-flank fire, and ordered an incessant fire of shells on the enemy within sight, and in the woods beyond to prevent his re-enforcing. Orders were also sent to General Logan to cause the Fifteenth Corps to regain its lost ground at any cost, and to General Woods, supported by General Schofield, to use his division and sweep the parapet down from where he held it until he saved the batteries and recovered the lost ground. With soldierly instinct, Logan had anticipated these orders, and was already in motion. The whole was executed in superb style, our men and the enemy at times fighting across the narrow parapet; but at last the enemy gave way, and the Fifteenth Corps regained its position and all the guns except the two advanced ones, which were out of view, and had been removed by the enemy within his main work. With this terminated the battle of the 22d, which cost us 3,722 officers and men in killed, wounded, and prisoners.

But among the dead was one whose loss no numbers can fitly represent. The accomplished, the brave, the noble McPherson had fallen!

The Army of the Tennessee had lost its commander, every man in its ranks a friend, America a great soldier, and humanity a bright ornament.

CHAPTER XVII.

ATLANTA WON.

ON the 23d, General Garrard, with his division of cavalry, returned from the expedition sent to Covington to break up the Augusta railway, and reported that, with the loss of only two men, he had succeeded in accomplishing that object, in such a manner as to render the road useless to the enemy during the pending operations, having effectually destroyed the large bridges across the Ucofauhachèe and Yellow rivers, which are branches of the Ocmulgee.

The Macon railway, running at first almost due south, was now the only line by which the Confederate army in Atlanta could receive the supplies requisite to maintain the defence of the place. The problem before Sherman was to reach that road. Schofield and Thomas had closed well up, holding the enemy behind his inner intrenchments, and Logan, with the Army of the Tennessee temporarily under his command, was ordered to prepare to vacate the position on the left of the line and move by the right to the opposite flank, below Proctor's Creek, while General Schofield should extend up to and cover the Augusta road. General Rousseau, who had arrived from his expedition to Opelika, bringing about two thousand good cavalry, of course fatigued with its long and rapid march, was ordered to relieve General Stoneman in the duty of guarding the river near Sandtown, below the mouth of Utoy Creek. Stoneman was then transferred to the extreme left of the line, and placed in command of his own division and Garrard's, numbering in all about five thousand effective troopers. The new cavalry brought by General Rousseau, and which was

THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN

furnished by


Brevet Brig. Gen. O. M. Poe.

Chief Engineer.

— SIEGE OF ATLANTA.

Engraved for "Sherman and his Campaigns."





commanded by Colonel Harrison, of the Eighth Indiana Cavalry, was added to the command of Brigadier-General Edward M. McCook, making with it a division of about four thousand.

The plan now was that while the Army of the Tennessee should move by the right on East Point to seize the Macon railway, Stoneman and McCook, with their well-appointed columns, were to march in concert, the former by the left around Atlanta to McDonough, and the latter by the right on Fayetteville, and, on the night of July 28th, to meet on the Macon railway, near Lovejoy's, and destroy the road in the most effectual manner. At the moment almost of starting, General Stoneman addressed a note to General Sherman, asking permission, after fulfilling his orders and breaking the railway, to proceed with his command proper to Macon and Andersonville, and release our prisoners of war confined at those points, thirty thousand in number, suffering the extremities of starvation, and rotting by hundreds from the loathsome diseases that follow in its train. "There was something captivating in the idea," says Sherman, and deeming the execution within the bounds of probable success, he consented that after the defeat of Wheeler's cavalry and breaking the road, General Stoneman might make the attempt with his cavalry proper, sending that of General Garrard back to the army. Both cavalry expeditions started at the time appointed.

General McCook, in the execution of his part of the movement, went down the west bank of the Chattahoochee to near Rivertown, where he laid a pontoon bridge with which he was provided, crossed his command, and moved rapidly on Palmetto station, on the West Point railway, where he tore up a section of track, leaving a regiment to create a diversion towards Campbelltown, which was successfully accomplished. McCook then rapidly moved to Fayetteville, where he found a large number of wagons belonging to the rebel army in Atlanta, killed eight hundred mules, and captured two hundred and fifty prisoners. He then pushed for the Macon railway, reached it at Lovejoy's station at the time appointed, burned

the depot, tore up a section of the road, and continued to work until forced to leave off to defend himself against an accumulating force of the enemy. He could hear nothing of General Stoneman, and, finding his progress east too strongly opposed, moved south and west, and reached Newman on the West Point road, where he encountered an infantry force coming from Mississippi to Atlanta, and which had been stopped by the break he had made at Palmetto. This force, with the pursuing cavalry, hemmed him in and forced him to fight. He was compelled to drop his prisoners and captures and cut his way out, losing some five hundred officers and men; among them Colonel Harrison, Eighth Indiana Cavalry, a valuable officer, who was taken prisoner while fighting his men as skirmishers on foot. McCook succeeded, however, in cutting his way out, reached the Chattahoochee, crossed the river, and got to Marietta without further loss.

Sherman says in his official report:—

“General McCook is entitled to much credit for thus saving his command, which was endangered by the failure of General Stoneman to reach Lovejoy’s. But on the whole, the cavalry raid is not deemed a success, for the real purpose was to break the enemy’s communications, which, though done, was on so limited a scale that I knew the damage would soon be repaired.”

Pursuant to the general plan, the Army of the Tennessee drew out of its lines on the left, near the Decatur road, during the night of July 26th, and on the 27th moved behind the rest of the army to Proctor’s Creek, the extreme right beyond it, to prolong the line due south, facing east. On the same day, by appointment of the President, Major-General Oliver O. Howard assumed command of the Army of the Tennessee, relieving General Logan, who had exercised the command with great ability since the death of McPherson on the 22d, and who now returned to the immediate charge of his own Fifteenth Corps. Dodge got into line on the evening of the 27th, and Blair came into position on the right early on the morning of the 28th, his right reaching an old meeting-house,

called Ezra Church, on the Bell's Ferry road. Here Logan's fifteenth corps joined on and formed the extreme right flank of the army before Atlanta, along a wooded and commanding ridge. About ten A. M., all the army was in position, and the men were busy in throwing up their accustomed piles of rails and logs, which, after awhile, assumed the form of a parapet. In order to be prepared to defeat the enemy if he should repeat his game of the 22d, Sherman had, the night before, ordered Jefferson C. Davis' division, of Palmer's fourteenth corps, which, by the movement of the Army of the Tennessee, had been left in reserve, to move down to Turner's Ferry, and thence towards White Hall or East Point, aiming to reach the flank of Howard's new line. The object of this movement was that in case of an attack this division might in turn catch the attacking force in flank or rear at an unexpected moment. Brigadier-General Morgan, who commanded the division during the temporary illness of General Davis, marched early for Turner's Ferry, but many of the roads laid down on the maps did not exist at all; and from this cause, and the intricate nature of the wooded ground, great delay was experienced. About noon, Hardee and Lee sallied forth from Atlanta by the Bell's Ferry road, and formed their masses in the open fields behind a swell of ground, and after some heavy artillery firing, advanced in parallel lines against the Fifteenth Corps, expecting to catch it in air. The advance was magnificent; but Sherman had prepared for this very contingency; our troops were expecting this attack, and met it with a galling and coolly delivered fire of musketry that swept the ranks of the enemy and drove him back in confusion. But they were rallied again and again, as often as six times at some points, and a few of the rebel officers and men reached our lines of rail piles only to be hauled over as prisoners. About four P. M., the enemy disappeared, leaving his dead and wounded in our hands. General Logan on this occasion was again conspicuous, his corps being chiefly engaged. Our entire loss was less than six hundred. Had Davis' division not been delayed by causes beyond control, what was simply a complete repulse of the

enemy would have been a disastrous rout. Instructed by the terrible lessons of the 22d and 28th of July, Hood abandoned his rash offensive and assumed a strict defensive attitude, merely meeting Sherman's successive extensions of his right flank by continuing his own line of works to the south.

Finding that the right flank of the Army of the Tennessee did not reach to East Point, Sherman was forced to transfer Schofield to that flank also, and afterwards Palmer's fourteenth corps of Thomas' army. Schofield moved from the left on the 1st of August, and Palmer's corps followed at once, taking a line below Utoy Creek, which Schofield prolonged to a point near East Point.

About the 1st of August, General Hooker, deeming himself aggrieved by the promotion of General Howard, who had served under him in the Army of the Potomac and had but recently come to the West as his subordinate, to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, was, at his own request, relieved from command of the Twentieth Corps and ordered to report to the adjutant-general at Washington. Major-General Henry W. Slocum, then at Vicksburg, was sent for to assume the command, which, until his arrival, devolved upon Brigadier-General A. S. Williams. Brigadier-General Jefferson C. Davis was promoted to the command of the Fourteenth Corps, in lieu of General Palmer, relieved at his own request; and Major-General D. S. Stanley succeeded to the command of the Fourth Corps, vacated by General Howard.

From the 2d to the 5th, Sherman continued to extend to the right, demonstrating strongly on the left and along the whole line. Reilly's brigade of Cox's division of Schofield's army, on the 5th, tried to break through the enemy's line about a mile below Utoy Creek, but failed to carry the position, losing about four hundred men, who were caught by the entanglements and abattis; but the next day this position was turned by General Hascall, and General Schofield advanced his whole line close up to and facing the enemy below Utoy Creek. Still he did not gain the desired foothold on either the West Point or Macon railway. The enemy's line at that time was nearly



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*Wm G Davis
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C. B. Richardson, Publisher.



fifteen miles in length, extending from near Decatur to below East Point. He was enabled to hold this long and attenuated front by the use of a large force of State militia, and his position was so masked by the shape of the ground that it was impossible for the Union commanders to discover the weak parts.

To reach the Macon road, Sherman now saw he would have to move the whole army; but, before beginning, he ordered down from Chattanooga some four-and-a-half-inch rifled guns, which arrived on the 10th, and were put to work night and day, and did execution on the city, causing frequent fires and creating confusion.

On the 16th of August, Sherman issued orders prescribing the mode and manner of executing the grand movement by the right flank, to begin on the 18th. This movement contemplated the withdrawal of the Twentieth Corps, General Williams, to the intrenched position at the Chattahoochee bridge, and the march of the main army to the West Point railway, near Fairburn, and thence to the Macon road, at or near Jonesboro', with wagons carrying provisions for fifteen days. About the time of the publication of these orders, Wheeler, with his corps of ten thousand cavalry, was detached by General Hood to break up the Union communications. Passing round by the East and North, Wheeler made his appearance on the Chattanooga railway, near Adairsville, captured nine hundred beef-cattle, and made a break in the road near Calhoun. Hood could not have more distinctly evinced his want of mental perspective than by detaching so large a force on the eve of a battle momentarily to be expected. At the best, Wheeler could only annoy Sherman; his absence might destroy Hood. Sherman was not slow to take advantage of a blunder so well-timed for his plans. Suspending the execution of his orders for the time being, he directed General Kilpatrick to make up a well-appointed force of about five thousand cavalry, to move from his camp about Sandtown during the night of the 18th to the West Point railway, and effectually break it near Fairburn; then to proceed across to the Macon

railway, and thoroughly destroy it; to avoid, as far as possible, the enemy's infantry, but to attack any cavalry he could find. Sherman expected that this cavalry expedition would save the necessity of moving the main army across, and that in case of success it would leave him in a better position to take full advantage of the result.

Kilpatrick got off at the time appointed, broke the West Point road, and afterwards reached the Macon road at Jonesboro', where he whipped Ross' cavalry, and got possession of the railway, which he held for five hours, damaging it considerably; but a brigade of the enemy's infantry, which had been dispatched below Jonesboro' in cars, was run back and disembarked, and, with Jackson's rebel cavalry, made it impossible for him to continue his work. He drew off to the east, made a circuit, and struck the railway about Lovejoy's Station, but was again threatened by the enemy, who moved on shorter lines; when he charged through their cavalry, taking many prisoners, of whom he brought in seventy, and captured a four-gun battery, of which he brought in one gun and destroyed the others. Returning by a circuit north and east, Kilpatrick reached Decatur on the 22d. He estimated the damage done to the railway as sufficient to interrupt its use for ten days; but, upon learning all the details of the expedition, Sherman became satisfied that it had not accomplished the chief object in view, and accordingly at once renewed his original orders for the movement of the whole army.

This involved the necessity of raising the siege of Atlanta, taking the field with the main force, and using it against the communications of Atlanta, instead of against its intrenchments. The army commanders were immediately notified to send their surplus wagons, encumbrances, and sick back to the intrenched position at the bridge over the Chattahoochee, and that the movement would begin during the night of the 25th. Accordingly, all things being ready, the Fourth Corps, General Stanley, drew out of its lines on the extreme left, and marched to a position below Proctor's

Creek, while the Twentieth Corps, General Williams, moved back to the river. Both movements were effected without loss. On the night of the 26th the Army of the Tennessee broke camp, and moved rapidly by a circuit towards Sandtown and across Camp Creek, a small stream about a mile below Proctor's Creek; the Army of the Cumberland moved below Utoy Creek, while the Army of the Ohio remained in position to mask the movement, which was attended with the loss of but a single man in the Army of the Tennessee, wounded by a shell. On the 27th, the Army of the Tennessee moved to the West Point railway, above Fairburn; the Army of the Cumberland to Red Oak, and the Army of the Ohio closed in near Diggs' and Mims'. The three columns were thus massed on the line of the West Point railway from Diggs', two miles below East Point, to within an equal distance of Fairburn. The 28th was consumed in destroying the road. For twelve and a half miles the ties were burned, and the iron rails heated and twisted with the utmost ingenuity of old hands at the work. Several cuts were filled up with the trunks of trees, logs, rock, and earth, intermingled with loaded shells, prepared as torpedoes, to explode in case of an attempt to clear them out. Having personally inspected this work, and being satisfied with its execution, Sherman ordered the whole army to face eastward and move the next day by several roads; General Howard, on the right, towards Jonesboro', General Thomas in the centre to Couch's, on the Decatur and Fayetteville road, and General Schofield on the left, by Morrow's Mills. The railway from Atlanta to Macon follows substantially the ridge which divides the waters of the Flint and Ocmulgee Rivers, and from East Point to Jonesboro' makes a wide bend to the east. The position now selected by Sherman, parallel to the railway, facing eastwardly, was therefore a very important one, and he was anxious to seize it as a necessary preliminary to his ulterior movements.

The several columns moved punctually on the morning of the 29th. General Thomas, who encountered little opposition or difficulty, save what resulted from the narrow roads, reached

his position at Couch's early in the afternoon. General Schofield, being closer to the enemy, who still clung to East Point, moved cautiously on a small circle around that point, and came into position towards Rough and Ready; and General Howard, having the outer circle, and consequently a greater distance to move, encountered cavalry, which he drove rapidly to the crossing of Shoal Creek. Here a short delay occurred, and some cannonading and skirmishing, but Howard soon drove the enemy, passed the Renfrew House, on the Decatur road, which was the point indicated for him in the orders of the day, and wisely pushed his march towards Jonesboro', saved the bridge across Flint River, and halted only when the darkness compelled him, within half a mile of Jonesboro'. Here he rested for the night, and on the next morning, finding himself in the presence of a heavy force of the enemy, he deployed the Fifteenth Corps, and disposed the Sixteenth and Seventeenth on its left and right flanks. The men covered their front with the usual parapet, and were soon prepared to act offensively or defensively as the case called for.

As soon as Sherman, who made his headquarters with Thomas at Couch's, learned that General Howard had passed Renfrew's, he directed General Thomas to send to that place a division of General Jefferson C. Davis' fourteenth corps, to move General Stanley's fourth corps, in connection with General Schofield, towards Rough and Ready, and then to send forward due east a strong detachment of General Davis' corps to feel for the railway. General Schofield was also ordered to move boldly forward and strike the railroad near Rough and Ready. These movements were progressing during the 31st, when Stephen D. Lee's and Hardee's corps of the enemy came out of the works at Jonesboro', and attacked General Howard in the position just described. After a contest of over two hours, the attack was repulsed, with great loss to the enemy, who withdrew, leaving his dead and many wounded on the ground.

In the mean while, Sherman was aiming to get his left and centre between Stewart's corps remaining in Atlanta and the

corps of Hardee and Lee engaged in Howard's front. General Schofield had reached the railway, a mile below Rough and Ready, and was working up the road, breaking it as he went; General Stanley, of General Thomas' army, had also struck the road below General Schofield, and was destroying it, working south; and Baird's division of Davis' corps had struck it still lower down, within four miles of Jonesboro'.

The Confederate forces being thus divided, orders were at once given for all the army to turn on the fraction at Jonesboro; General Howard to keep the enemy busy, while General Thomas should move down from the north, with General Schofield on his left. The troops were also ordered as they moved down to continue the thorough destruction of the railway, as it was impossible to say how soon our hold of it might be relinquished, from the necessity of giving attention in other quarters. General Garrard's cavalry was directed to watch the roads to the north, and General Kilpatrick was sent south, to the west bank of the Flint, with instructions to attack or threaten the railway below Jonesboro'. On the 1st of September Davis' corps, having a shorter distance to travel, was deployed, facing south, his right in connection with General Howard, and his left on the railway; while General Stanley and General Schofield were coming down the Rough-and-Ready road, and along the railway, breaking it as they came. When General Davis joined to General Howard, Blair's corps, on General Howard's left, was thrown in reserve, and was immediately sent well to the right below Jonesboro', to act on that flank in conjunction with General Kilpatrick's. About 5 P. M., General Davis assaulted the enemy's lines across open fields, carrying them very handsomely, and taking as prisoners the greater part of Gowan's brigade, including its commander, with two four-gun batteries. Repeated orders were sent to Generals Stanley and Schofield to hasten their movements, but owing to the difficult nature of the country and the absence of roads, they did not get well into position for attack before night rendered further operations impossible. About 2 o'clock that night, the sounds of heavy explosions were heard

in the direction of Atlanta, distant about twenty miles, with a succession of minor explosions, and what seemed like the rapid firing of cannon and musketry. These sounds continued for about an hour, and again about 4 A. M. occurred another series of similar discharges, apparently nearer, which could be accounted for on no other hypothesis than of a night attack on Atlanta by General Slocum, or the blowing up of the enemy's magazines. At daybreak it was discovered that Hardee and Lee had abandoned their lines at Jonesboro', and Sherman ordered a general pursuit south; General Thomas following to the left of the railway, General Howard on its right, and General Schofield diverging two miles to the east. Near Lovejoy's Station the enemy was again overtaken in a strong intrenched position, with his flanks well protected, behind a branch of Walnut Creek to the right, and a confluent of the Flint River to his left. Pushing close up and reconnoitring the ground, Sherman found he had evidently halted to cover his communication with the McDonough and Fayetteville road, and presently rumors began to arrive, through prisoners captured, that Atlanta had been abandoned during the night of September 1st, that Hood had blown up his ammunition trains, which accounted for the unexplained sounds so plainly heard; that Stewart's corps was then retreating towards McDonough, and that the militia had gone off towards Covington. It was then too late to interpose and prevent their escape, and Sherman being satisfied with the substantial success already gained, ordered the work of destroying the railway to cease, and the troops to be held in hand, ready for any movement that further information from Atlanta might warrant.

On the same night, a courier arrived from General Slocum, reporting the fact that the enemy had evacuated Atlanta, blown up seven trains of cars, and retreated on the McDonough road, and that he himself with the Twentieth Corps had entered and taken possession on the morning of 2d of September.

Atlanta being won, the object of the movement against

the railway being therefore already concluded, and any pursuit of the enemy with a view to his capture being futile in such a country, Sherman gave orders, on the 4th, for the army to move back slowly to Atlanta. On the 5th, the army marched to the vicinity of Jonesboro', five miles, where it remained a day. On the 7th, it moved to Rough and Ready, seven miles, and the next day to the camps selected. The Army of the Cumberland was then grouped round about Atlanta, the Army of the Tennessee about East Point, and the Army of the Ohio at Decatur, all in clean and healthy camps, at last enabled to enjoy a brief period of rest, so much needed for reorganization and recuperation.

To return to the erratic movements of Wheeler, whom, in the presence of the campaigns of two large armies, we have almost forgotten. He succeeded in breaking the railway about Calhoun, made his appearance at Dalton, where Colonel Leibold held him in check until General Steedman arrived from Chattanooga and drove him off, then passed up into East Tennessee, and remained a short while at Athens; but on the first show of pursuit he moved beyond the Little Tennessee, and crossing the Holston, near Strawberry Plains, reached the Clinch near Clinton, passed over towards Sequatchee and McMinnville, and thence to Murfreesboro', Lebanon, and Franklin. From Franklin he was pursued towards Florence, and out of Tennessee, by Generals Rousseau, Steedman, and Granger. He did great injury to many citizens, and destroyed the railway nearly as fast as the construction parties were able to repair it; but, except by being absent from Hood's army at the critical moment, had no influence whatever upon the campaign.

Thus ended, four months after its inception, one of the greatest campaigns of the war; a campaign which doubly secured the possession of the mountain regions of the centre, and laid the Atlantic and Gulf slopes at the mercy of the Union commander. Divided in twain by the conquest of the Mississippi, the domain of the rebellion was quartered by the capture of Atlanta. A vital spot had been reached; the granary of

Georgia was lost; and there was suddenly presented to the Confederate authorities the alternative, to concentrate their two remaining armies or to perish.

Two dangers had menaced the success of Sherman's campaign. The first was the question of supplies. This was in great part solved by the energetic and successful management of the superintendent of military railways, Colonel W. W. Wright. "No matter when or where a break has been made," says Sherman, "the repair train seemed on the spot, and the damage was generally repaired before I knew of the break. Bridges have been built with surprising rapidity, and the locomotive whistle was heard in our advanced camps almost before the echoes of the skirmish fire had ceased. Some of these bridges, those of the Oostanaula, Etowah, and Chattahoochee, are fine, substantial structures, and were built in inconceivably short time, almost out of the materials improvised on the spot." But the solution was mainly due to the forethought exercised by Sherman himself in successively establishing secondary depots, strongly garrisoned, as at Chattanooga, Resaca, Rome, and Allatoona, and by great exertions accumulating at each stores sufficient to render the army independent of the rear during any temporary interruption of the communications. The second danger ever present consisted in the rapid diminution of the army, not only by the heavy casualties incidental to offensive warfare, but also by the expiration of the terms of service of a large number of the regiments. This was prevented from becoming fatal, by the bravery of the army in attacking; by the skill of its commander, in turning obstacles too great to be surmounted by direct approach; by the patriotism of the veterans, in re-enlisting; by the noble exertions of the governors of the Western States, in encouraging and expediting re-enlistments, and pushing the veterans to the front; and by the folly of Hood, in attacking the Union troops in strong positions, protected by earthworks, instead of attempting to take them at a disadvantage, as in crossing Peach-tree Creek. On the 12th of August, President Lincoln conferred upon General Sher-

man a commission as major-general in the regular army, as a reward for his services in this campaign.

Stoneman marched from Decatur on the day appointed, with the whole effective strength of his division, numbering about two thousand in all, organized in three brigades, commanded by Colonels Adams, Biddle, and Capron. The first brigade consisted of the First and Second regiments of Kentucky cavalry; the Second, of the Fifth and Sixth Indiana; the third brigade, of the Fourteenth Illinois, Eighth Michigan, and a squadron of Ohio cavalry under Captain McLoughlin.

Stoneman moved out along the line of the Georgia Central railway to Covington, and thence turned South and pushed by way of Monticello, Hillsboro', and Clinton, for Macon. A battalion of the Fourteenth Illinois cavalry of Capron's brigade succeeded in entering Gordon, destroying eleven locomotives and several trains of cars laden with munitions of war. The bridge over the Oconee was also destroyed by General Stoneman's orders, by another detachment from his command.

On arriving within fifteen miles of Macon on the evening of the 30th of July, General Stoneman ascertained from reliable sources that, in anticipation of such an attempt, the probability of which had been freely discussed in the Northern newspapers, the Confederate authorities had taken the precaution to remove all the Union prisoners previously confined in the military prisons at Macon and Millen, in the direction of Florence, South Carolina; and that this movement had only been completed on the preceding day. The prime object of the expedition being thus, unfortunately, frustrated, Stoneman reluctantly determined to return to the main body. But in the mean while the enemy had concentrated in heavy force, and was now moving upon his line of retreat.

On the morning of Sunday, the 31st of July, finding what seemed to be a heavy force of the enemy in his front, Stoneman deployed a strong line of skirmishers, which soon developed the fact that, taking advantage of the unfavorable nature of the country for the operations of cavalry, Allen's brigade of Confederate infantry had passed around his flank

and taken up a strong position directly across the line of his homeward march, while Armstrong's brigade of the enemy's cavalry, in connection with Allen's infantry, was dangerously menacing his left flank. With the Oconee in his rear and a formidable enemy in his front, Stoneman had evidently no resource but to destroy that enemy or be himself destroyed.

Dismounting the troopers of one brigade, he caused them repeatedly to charge the enemy on foot, but they were as often repulsed with heavy loss. Rallying the broken columns by his personal exertions and with the assistance of the gallant Major Keogh and other officers of his staff, Stoneman placed himself at the head of his men, and again charged, but without more favorable result. At the critical moment, Armstrong's brigade assailed his left flank. The Union cavalry gave way before the combined opposition, and were with difficulty reformed. By this time the enemy had completely surrounded them.

Perceiving this, and deeming all further resistance useless, Stoneman gave permission to such of his officers and men as wished to try the apparently desperate chance of cutting their way through the opposing lines, to make the attempt, and then, causing hostilities to cease on his part, sent in a flag of truce, and unconditionally surrendered the remainder of his force.

Among those who cut their way through the enemy's lines, and thus escaped and rejoined the main army, was the bulk of Colonel Adams' brigade and a number of Colonel Capron's men. The entire number captured was less than fifteen hundred.

The failure to unite with McCook, which was the prime cause of this disaster, undoubtedly occurred in consequence of false, but apparently reliable, information concerning the roads and the crossings of the Ocmulgee River, whereby General Stoneman was led to believe he could prolong his easterly march to Covington without sacrificing the combination. Yet in all concerted operations, the co-operative movements are of the first importance; all others, no matter how great their intrinsic value, must be deemed secondary. Great success alone can excuse, while not even success can justify, any departure from the primary features of the plan.

CHAPTER XVIII.

TAKING BREATH.

FROM Lovejoy's Station, Hardee and Lee retreated to the line of the West Point railway at Palmetto Station, twenty-five miles southwest from Atlanta, and situated at about the same distance from the Chattahoochee as that city is. Here Hood joined them with Stewart's corps, took up a position confronting Sherman, threw a pontoon bridge across the Chattahoochee, and sent a cavalry detachment beyond the river, twenty-five miles westward to Carrollton, and another in a northerly direction to Powder Springs, about ten miles south of Lost Mountain, and an equal distance west of the Chattanooga railway. He also occupied Jonesboro' in some force. Lieutenant-General Stephen D. Lee succeeded Hardee in the command of his corps, the latter officer being relieved by orders from Richmond, and sent to Charleston to replace Beauregard. Lieutenant-General B. F. Cheatham had command of Hood's old corps, and Lieutenant-General A. P. Stewart still retained his assignment to Polk's old corps. The cavalry was largely reinforced and united in one corps, under the command of Major-General James Wheeler. General Beauregard was summoned from Charleston, and placed at the head of all the Confederate armies operating in the central region.

During the month of September, Sherman's army remained grouped about Atlanta. The terms of enlistment of many of his regiments had expired, a large number went home on furlough, and others, previously furloughed on condition of re-enlisting, returned to the field with their ranks swelled by

additions of stragglers, convalescents, and recruits. Many changes were thus rendered necessary in the composition of the different commands. The Army of the Tennessee was consolidated into two corps, the Fifteenth and Seventeenth, respectively commanded by Major-General P. J. Osterhaus and Brigadier-General Thomas E. G. Ransom; the former comprising the four divisions of Brigadier-Generals Charles R. Woods, William B. Hazen, John E. Smith, and John M. Corse; the latter those of Major-General Joseph A. Mower, and Brigadier-Generals Miles D. Leggett and Giles A. Smith, with the First Alabama Cavalry, and the First Missouri engineer regiment, having in charge a large pontoon-bridge train. This organization was effected by transferring all the troops of the Seventeenth Corps remaining on the Mississippi to the Sixteenth Corps, breaking up the detachment of the latter corps in the field, and transferring Ransom's division, now commanded by Brigadier-General Giles A. Smith, and Corse's division to the Seventeenth Corps. Major-Generals Logan and Blair were temporarily absent, engaged in the important political canvass then in progress. Major-General Schofield returned to the headquarters of the Department of the Ohio, at Knoxville, to give his personal attention to affairs in that quarter, leaving Brigadier-General Jacob D. Cox in command of the Twenty-third Corps. The cavalry was reorganized so as to consist of two divisions under Brigadier-Generals Kenner Garrard and Judson Kilpatrick.

As stated in the last chapter, the Army of the Cumberland, under Major-General Thomas, held Atlanta; the Army of the Tennessee, commanded by Major-General Howard, was at East Point; and the Army of the Ohio occupied Decatur. Garrard's cavalry division was also at Decatur, and Kilpatrick's at Sandtown watching for any westward movement of the enemy. To render the communications more secure, with a view to the present wants of the army and possible future operations, Sherman sent Newton's division of Stanley's fourth corps, and Morgan's division of Jefferson C. Davis' fourteenth corps, of the Army of the Cumberland, to Chattanooga, and

Corse's division of Osterhaus' fifteenth corps, of the Army of the Tennessee, to Rome, to garrison those places.

The topography of the country in the immediate vicinity of Atlanta was carefully studied, and a new line of works constructed for the defence of the place, capable of being maintained by a much smaller garrison than was contemplated by the Confederate authorities when laying out the old line.

Sherman now determined to make Atlanta exclusively a military post. On the 4th of September, he issued the following orders :—

“The city of Atlanta belonging exclusively for warlike purposes, it will at once be vacated by all except the armies of the United States and such civilian employes as may be retained by the proper departments of the Government. . . . At a proper time full arrangements will be made for a supply to the troops of all the articles they may need over and above clothing, provisions, &c., furnished by Government, and on no pretence whatever will traders, manufacturers, or sutlers be allowed to settle in the limits of fortified places; and if they manage to come in spite of this notice the quartermaster will seize their stores, apply them to the use of the troops, and deliver the parties, or other unauthorized citizens who thus place their individual interest above that of the United States, over to the hands of some provost-marshal, to be put to labor on forts or conscripted into one of the regiments or battery already in service. The same military principles will apply to all military posts south of Atlanta.”

This order fell upon the ears of the inhabitants of Atlanta like a thunderbolt. Though they had lent all the moral and physical assistance in their power to the cause of the rebellion, they had begun to dream of the advent of the Federal troops as the commencement of an era of quiet. They had never imagined that the war would reach Atlanta. Now that it had come, and kept its rough, hot hand upon them for so many

days, they were beginning to look forward to a long period when they might enjoy at once the advantage of the protection of a just and powerful government, and the luxury of considering the means whereby that protection was enforced against their chosen friends as a grievance. On the 11th of September the town authorities addressed the following petition to General Sherman, praying the revocation of his orders :—

“SIR—The undersigned, mayor, and two members of council for the city of Atlanta, for the time being the only legal organ of the people of the said city, to express their wants and wishes, ask leave most earnestly, but respectfully, to petition you to reconsider the order requiring them to leave Atlanta.

“At first view, it struck us that the measure would involve extraordinary hardship and loss, but since we have seen the practical execution of it, so far as it has progressed, and the individual condition of many of the people, and heard their statements as to the inconveniences, loss, and suffering attending it, we are satisfied that it will involve, in the aggregate, consequences appalling and heartrending.

“Many poor women are in an advanced state of pregnancy ; others now having young children, and whose husbands are either in the army, prisoners, or dead. Some say : I have such a one sick at home ; who will wait on them when I am gone ? Others say : What are we to do ? we have no houses to go to, and no means to buy, build, or to rent any—no parents, friends, or relatives to go to. Another says : I will try and take this or that article of property, but such and such things I must leave behind, though I need them much. We reply to them : General Sherman will carry your property to Rough and Ready, and General Hood will take it from there on. And they will reply to that : But I want to leave the railway at such a point, and cannot get conveyance from there on.

“We only refer to a few facts to try to illustrate in part how this measure will operate in practice. As you advanced, the people north of us fell back, and before your arrival here a

large portion of the people had retired south, so that the country south of this is already crowded, and without houses to accommodate the people, and we are informed that many are now starving in churches and other out-buildings. This being so, how is it possible for the people still here (mostly women and children) to find any shelter? and how can they live through the winter in the woods—no shelter nor subsistence—in the midst of strangers who know them not, and without the power to assist them, if they were willing to do so?

“This is but a feeble picture of the consequences of this measure. You know the woe, the horror, and the suffering cannot be described by words. Imagination can only conceive of it, and we ask you to take these things into consideration.

“We know your mind and time are constantly occupied with the duties of your command, which almost deters us from asking your attention to this matter; but thought it might be that you had not considered the subject in all its awful consequences, and that on more reflection you, we hope, would not make this people an exception to all mankind, for we know of no such instance ever having occurred; surely none such in the United States; and what has this helpless people done that they should be driven from their homes, to wander as strangers, outcasts, and exiles, and to subsist on charity?

“We do not know, as yet, the number of people still here. Of those who are here, we are satisfied a respectable number, if allowed to remain at home, could subsist for several months without assistance, and a respectable number for a much longer time, and who might not need assistance at any time.

“In conclusion, we must earnestly and solemnly petition you to reconsider this order, or modify it, and suffer this unfortunate people to remain at home and enjoy what little means they have.

“Respectfully submitted,

“JAMES M. CALHOUN, Mayor.

“E. E. RAWSON, Councilman.

“L. C. WELLS, Councilman.”

To this General Sherman replied, in full and clear terms, on the following day :

“GENTLEMEN: I have your letter of the 11th, in the nature of a petition to revoke my orders removing all the inhabitants from Atlanta. I have read it carefully, and give full credit to your statements of the distress that will be occasioned by it, and yet shall not revoke my order, simply because my orders are not designed to meet the humanities of the case, but to prepare for the future struggles in which millions, yea hundreds of millions of good people outside of Atlanta have a deep interest. We must have peace, not only at Atlanta, but in all America. To secure this we must stop the war that now desolates our once happy and favored country. To stop the war, we must defeat the rebel armies that are arrayed against the laws and Constitution, which all must respect and obey. To defeat these armies, we must prepare the way to reach them in their recesses, provided with the arms and instruments which enable us to accomplish our purpose.

“Now, I know the vindictive nature of our enemy, and that we may have many years of military operations from this quarter, and therefore deem it wise and prudent to prepare in time. The use of Atlanta for warlike purposes is inconsistent with its character as a home for families. There will be no manufactures, commerce, or agriculture here for the maintenance of families, and sooner or later want will compel the inhabitants to go. Why not go *now*, when all the arrangements are completed for the transfer, instead of waiting until the plunging shot of contending armies will renew the scenes of the past month? Of course I do not apprehend any such thing at this moment, but you do not suppose this army will be here till the war is over. I cannot discuss this subject with you fairly, because I cannot impart to you what I propose to do, but I assert that my military plans make it necessary for the inhabitants to go away, and I can only renew my offer of services to make their exodus in any direction as easy

and comfortable as possible. You cannot qualify war in harsher terms than I will.

“War is cruelty, and you cannot refine it; and those who brought war on our country deserve all the curses and maledictions a people can pour out. I know I had no hand in making this war, and I know I will make more sacrifices to-day than any of you to secure peace. But you cannot have peace and a division of our country. If the United States submit to a division now, it will not stop, but will go on till we reap the fate of Mexico, which is eternal war. The United States does and must assert its authority wherever it has power; if it relaxes one bit to pressure, it is gone, and I know that such is not the national feeling. This feeling assumes various shapes, but always comes back to that of *Union*. Once admit the Union, once more acknowledge the authority of the National Government, and instead of devoting your houses, and streets, and roads to the dread uses of war, I and this army become at once your protectors and supporters, shielding you from danger, let it come from what quarter it may. I know that a few individuals cannot resist a torrent of error and passion such as has swept the South into rebellion; but you can point out, so that we may know those who desire a government and those who insist on war and its desolation.

“You might as well appeal against the thunder-storm as against these terrible hardships of war. They are inevitable, and the only way the people of Atlanta can hope once more to live in peace and quiet at home, is to stop this war, which can alone be done by admitting that it began in error and is perpetuated in pride. We don't want your negroes or your horses, or your houses or your land, or any thing you have; but we do want, and will have, a just obedience to the laws of the United States. That we will have, and if it involves the destruction of your improvements, we cannot help it.

“You have heretofore read public sentiment in your newspapers, that live by falsehood and excitement, and the quicker you seek for truth in other quarters the better for you. I repeat, then, that by the original compact of govern-

ment, the United States had certain rights in Georgia which have never been relinquished, and never will be; that the South began the war by seizing forts, arsenals, mints, custom-houses, etc., etc., long before Mr. Lincoln was installed, and before the South had one jot or tittle of provocation. I myself have seen, in Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Mississippi, hundreds and thousands of women and children fleeing from your armies and desperadoes, hungry, and with bleeding feet. In Memphis, Vicksburg, and Mississippi, we fed thousands upon thousands of the families of rebel soldiers left on our hands, and whom we could not see starve. Now, that war comes home to you, you feel very differently—you deprecate its horrors, but did not feel them when you sent car-loads of soldiers and ammunition, and moulded shells and shot to carry war into Kentucky and Tennessee, and desolate the homes of hundreds and thousands of good people, who only asked to live in peace at their old homes, and under the government of their inheritance. But these comparisons are idle. I want peace, and believe it can only be reached through Union and war, and I will ever conduct war purely with a view to perfect and early success.

“But, my dear sirs, when that peace does come, you may call upon me for any thing. Then will I share with you the last cracker, and watch with you to shield your home and families against danger from every quarter. Now, you must go, and take with you the old and feeble; feed and nurse them, and build for them in more quiet places proper habitations to shield them against the weather, until the mad passions of men cool down, and allow the Union and peace once more to settle on your old homes at Atlanta.”

As soon as his arrangements were completed, General Sherman wrote to General Hood, by a flag of truce, notifying him of his orders, and proposing a cessation of hostilities for ten days, from the 12th of September, in the country included within a radius of two miles around Rough and Ready Station, to enable him to complete the removal of those families

electing to go to the south. Hood immediately replied on the 9th, acceding to the proposed truce, but protesting against Sherman's order. He concluded:—

“Permit me to say, the unprecedented measure you propose transcends in studied and iniquitous cruelty all acts ever before brought to my attention in this dark history of the war. In the name of God and humanity, I protest, believing you are expelling from homes and firesides wives and children of a brave people.”

To this Sherman answered on the same date:—

“GENERAL:—I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this date, at the hands of Messrs. Ball and Crew, consenting to the arrangement I had proposed to facilitate the removal south of the people of Atlanta who prefer to go in that direction. I inclose you a copy of my orders, which will, I am satisfied, accomplish my purpose perfectly.

“You style the measures proposed ‘unprecedented,’ and appeal to ‘the dark history of war for a parallel as an act of studied and ingenious cruelty.’ It is not unprecedented, for General Johnston himself very wisely and properly removed the families all the way from Dalton down, and I see no reason why Atlanta should be excepted. Nor is it necessary to appeal to ‘the dark history of war,’ when recent and modern examples are so handy. You yourself burned dwelling-houses along your parapet; and I have seen, to-day, fifty houses that you have rendered uninhabitable because they stood in the way of your forts and men. You defended Atlanta on a line so close to the town that every cannon-shot, and many musket-shots from our line of investment, that overshot their mark, went into the habitations of women and children. General Hardee did the same thing at Jonesboro’, and General Johnston did the same last summer at Jackson, Mississippi.

“I have not accused you of heartless cruelty, but merely in-

stance these cases of very recent occurrence, and could go on and enumerate hundreds of others, and challenge any fair man to judge which of us has the heart of pity for the families of 'brave people.' I say it is kindness to these families of Atlanta to remove them at once from scenes that women and children should not be exposed to; and the 'brave people' should scorn to commit their wives and children to the rude barbarians who thus, as you say, violate the rules of war as illustrated in the pages of its 'dark history.'

"In the name of common sense, I ask you not to 'appeal to a just God' in such a sacrilegious manner—you who, in the midst of peace and prosperity, have plunged a nation into war, dark and cruel war; who dared and badgered us into battle; insulted our flag; seized our arsenals and forts that were left in the honorable custody of a peaceful ordnance sergeant; seized and made prisoners even the very first garrisons sent to protect your people against negroes and Indians, long before any other act was committed by the, to you, 'hateful Lincoln government;' tried to force Missouri and Kentucky into rebellion, in spite of themselves; falsified the vote of Louisiana; turned loose your privateers to plunder unarmed ships; expelled Union families by the thousands, burned their houses, and declared by acts of your Congress the confiscation of all debts due Northern men for goods had and received. Talk thus to the Marines, but not to me, who have seen these things, and who will this day make as much sacrifice for the peace and honor of the South as the best-born Southerner among you. If we must be enemies, let us be men, and fight it out as we propose to-day, and not deal in such hypocritical appeals to God and humanity.

"God will judge us in due time, and he will pronounce whether it will be humane to fight with a town full of women and the families of 'a brave people' at our back, or to remove them in time to places of safety among their own friends and people."

During the truce, four hundred and forty-six families were

moved south, comprising seven hundred and five adults, eight hundred and sixty children, and seventy-nine servants, with an average of sixteen hundred and fifty-one pounds of furniture and household goods of all kinds to each family.

On the 8th, General Hood wrote to General Sherman proposing an exchange of prisoners captured by both armies since the commencement of the campaign just closed. Sherman replied on the same day, agreeing to this proposition, on the basis of the old cartel, made by Generals Dix and Hill in 1862, but stating that he feared most of the prisoners in his hands were already beyond Chattanooga on their way north, and in custody of the commissary-general of prisoners. The next day he again wrote :—

“GENERAL—As I engaged yesterday, I consent to an actual exchange of prisoners, man for man, and equal for equal, differences or balance to be made up according to the cartel of 1862. I have appointed one of my inspector-generals, Lieutenant-Colonel W. Warner, to carry out this exchange, and will empower him to call for the prisoners, and all such guards as he may need to affect the actual transfers. We have here twenty-eight officers and seven hundred and eighty-two enlisted men; and *en route* for Chattanooga, ninety-three officers and nine hundred and seven men, making one thousand eight hundred and ten on hand that I will exchange for a like number of my own men, captured by you in this campaign, who belong to regiments with me, and who can resume their places at once, as I take it for granted you will do the same with yours. In other words, for these men I am not willing to take equivalents belonging to other armies than my own, or who belong to regiments whose times are out and who have been discharged.

“By your laws all men eligible for service are *ipso facto* soldiers, and a very good one it is; and, if needed for civil duty, they are simply detailed soldiers. We found in Atlanta about a thousand of these fellows, and I am satisfied they are fit subjects of exchange; and if you will release an equal num-

ber of our poor fellows at Anderson I will gather these together and send them as prisoners. They seem to have been detailed for railroad and shop duty, and I do not ask for them an equal number of my trained soldiers, but will take men belonging to any part of the United States army subject to your control.

“We hold a good many of your men styled ‘deserters,’ who are really stragglers, and would be a good offset to such of our stragglers and foragers as your cavalry pick up of our men; but I am constrained to give these men, though sorely against the grain, the benefit of their character, pretended or real.

“As soon as Colonel Warner agrees upon a few points with the officer you name, I will send the prisoners to the place appointed, and recall those not beyond Chattanooga; and you may count on about two thousand in the aggregate, and get ready to give me a like number.

“I am willing to appoint Rough and Ready or Jonesboro’ as the place of exchange, as also for the place of delivering the citizens, male and female, of Atlanta, who start to go south.

To this Hood answered on the 11th:—

“SIR—I had the honor, on the 9th instant, to propose to you an exchange of prisoners—officers and men captured by both armies since the commencement of the present campaign.

“On the same day you answered my communication, stating that you accepted my offer ‘to exchange prisoners of war in hand at this moment.’ There being no condition attached to the acceptance, on your part, of my offer to exchange prisoners, I regarded it as obligatory to the extent of the number of prisoners represented by you to be within your jurisdiction.

At the meeting on the 11th instant between our respective staff officers, Major J. B. Eustis and Lieutenant-Colonel Warner, intended to arrange such preliminaries as the time

and place of delivery, etc., a communication was received from you rendering, I regret to inform you, an exchange of prisoners impossible.

“Your refusal to receive, in exchange, your soldiers belonging to ‘regiments whose times are out, and who have been discharged,’ discloses a fixed purpose on the part of your Government to doom to hopeless captivity those prisoners whose term of service have expired, or will soon expire.

“The new principle which you seek to interpolate on the cartel of our respective governments, as well as upon the laws and customs of war, will not be sanctioned by me. All captives taken in war, who owe no obligations to the captors, must stand upon the same equal footing. The duration of these terms of service can certainly impose no duties or obligations on the captors. The volunteer of a day, and the conscript for the war, who may be captured in war, are equally subject to all the burdens, and equally entitled to all the rights secured by the laws of nations. This principle is distinctly conceded in the cartel entered into by our respective governments, and is sanctioned by honor, justice, and the public law of all civilized nations.

“My offer to exchange the prisoners captured during the campaign precludes an intention on my part in the delivery to discriminate between your prisoners, as all would have been delivered; and even had it been intended, this discrimination between your men, whose term of service had and had not expired, would have been impossible, and could not have been effected, as I had no reliable means of ascertaining what portion of your men were entitled to their discharge.

“Your avowal that this class of your soldiers will not be exchanged, but will be rewarded by the sufferings and privations incident to military imprisonment because their boldness and courage subjected them to capture, although their terms of service had nearly expired, is deeply regretted by me, as I have the earnest desire of my Government to release from prolonged confinement the large number of prisoners held by both parties.

“Permit me to hope that this declared policy of your Government will be reconsidered, as it is unjustly oppressive to those whom the hazards of military service have rendered prisoners, and is violative of the well-understood obligations of a Government towards those who are enlisted in its service.

“As was proper, I notified my Government of my offer to you to effect an exchange of prisoners captured during this campaign; and not only was my action approved, but my Government placed at my entire disposal for immediate exchange, man for man, all the prisoners at Andersonville.

“I have the honor to renew my offer to exchange prisoners as proposed in my first communication, and remain your obedient servant,

“J. B. HOOD,
“General.”

By gathering up all the Confederate prisoners at Chattanooga and Atlanta, and all small squads in various quarters, Sherman succeeded in collecting about two thousand of them, and, notwithstanding the difficulties raised in the foregoing correspondence, a special exchange of these for an equal number of Union prisoners in the hands of the enemy was presently agreed upon and carried into effect.

It was found necessary to confine the operations of the long lines of military railways connecting Atlanta with the Ohio River to the transportation of troops and materials of war. Sherman gave the most stringent orders on this subject to all his subordinates having charge of the matter. They were not to allow a person or thing not needed and intended for the army to come to the front, nor a person or thing not sent from the army to go to the rear, without passes from himself or one of the three army commanders. Such passes were very sparingly given, and only in clearly exceptional cases. Every ton of freight, animate or inanimate, not strictly necessary for the immediate purposes of his army, diverted just so much power and occupied just so much space absolutely needed for those

purposes. The railways had not sufficient capacity to serve both the army and the citizens, and the army alone was now to be considered.

We may now glance briefly at Sherman's correspondence during this interval and the preceding campaign.

With regard to the treatment of guerrillas he wrote to General Burbridge in June :—

“Even on the Southern State-rights theory, Kentucky has not seceded. Her people, by their vote and by their action, have adhered to their allegiance to the National Government and the South would now coerce her out of our Union and into theirs,—the very dogma of coercion upon which so much stress was laid at the outset of the war, and which carried into rebellion the people of the Middle or Border Slave States. But politics aside, these acts of the so-called partisans or guerrillas are nothing but simple murder, horse-stealing, arson, and other well-defined crimes which do not sound as well under their true names as the more agreeable ones of warlike meaning. Now, before starting on this campaign, I foresaw, as you remember, that this very case would arise, and I asked Governor Bramlette to at once organize in each county a small trustworthy band, under the sheriff, if possible, and at once arrest every man in the community who was dangerous to it, and also every fellow hanging about the towns, villages, and cross-roads who had no honest calling, the material out of which guerrillas are made up; but this sweeping exercise of power doubtless seemed to the governor rather arbitrary. The fact is, in our country *personal liberty* has been so well secured, that *public safety* is lost sight of in our laws and constitutions; and the fact is we are thrown back a hundred years in civilization, law, and every thing else, and will go right straight to anarchy and the devil, if somebody don't arrest our downward progress. We, the military, must do it, and we have right and law on our side. All governments and communities have a right to guard against real or even supposed danger. The whole people of Kentucky must not be kept in a state of sus-

pense and real danger, lest a few innocent men should be wrongfully accused.

“1st. You may order all your post and district commanders, that guerrillas are not soldiers, but wild beasts, unknown to the usage of war. To be recognized as soldiers, they must be enlisted, enrolled, officered, uniformed, armed, and equipped by some recognized belligerent power, and must, if detached from a main army, be of sufficient strength, with written orders from some army commander, to do some military thing. Of course, we have recognized the Confederate Government as a belligerent power, but deny their right to our lands, territories, rivers, coasts, and nationality, admitting the right to rebel and move to some other country, where laws and customs are more in accordance with their own ideas and prejudices.

“2d. The civil power being sufficient to protect life and property, ‘*ex necessitate rei*,’ and to prevent anarchy, ‘which nature abhors,’ the military steps in, and is rightful, constitutional, and lawful. Under this law, everybody can be made to ‘stay at home, and mind his or her own business,’ and if they won’t do that, can be sent away where they won’t keep their honest neighbors in fear of danger, robbery, and insult.

“3d. Your military commanders, provost-marshals, and other agents, may arrest all males and females who have encouraged or harbored guerrillas and robbers, and you may cause them to be collected in Louisville; and when you have enough, say three hundred or four hundred, I will cause them to be sent down the Mississippi, through their guerrilla gauntlet, and by a sailing ship send them to a land where they may take their negroes and make a colony, with laws and a future of their own. If they won’t live in peace in such a garden as Kentucky, why we will kindly send them to another, if not a better land, and surely this would be a kindness and a God’s blessing to Kentucky. I wish you to be careful that no personalities are mixed up in this; nor does a full and generous love of country, ‘of the South,’ of their State or country, form a cause of banishment, but that devilish spirit which will not be satisfied, and that makes war the pretext for murder,

arson, theft in all its grades, and all the crimes of human nature.

“My own preference was and is ‘that the civil authorities of Kentucky would and could do this in that State; but if they will not, or cannot, then we must, for it must be done. There must be an ‘end to strife,’ and the honest, industrious people of Kentucky, and the whole world, will be benefited and rejoiced at the conclusion, however arrived at. I use no concealment in saying that I do not object to men or women having what they call ‘Southern feelings,’ if confined to love of country, and of peace, honor, and security, and even of little family pride; but these become ‘crimes’ when enlarged to mean love of murder, of war, desolation, famine, and all the horrible attendants of anarchy.’ ”

A few days later, on the 5th of July, Sherman’s representations to the War Department, to the like effect, induced President Lincoln to order the declaration of martial law and the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus* throughout Kentucky.

With regard to the use of torpedoes, concerning which he apprehended trouble, he wrote in advance to General Steedman, left in command at Chattanooga :—

“As the question may arise, and you have a right to the support of any authority, I now decide that the use of the torpedo is justifiable in war, in advance of an army, so as to make his advance up a river or over a road more dangerous and difficult. But after the adversary has gained the country by fair warlike means, then the case entirely changes.

“The use of torpedoes in blowing up our cars and the road after they are in our possession, is simply malicious. It cannot alter the great problem, but simply makes trouble. Now if torpedoes are found in the possession of an enemy to our rear, you may cause them to be put on the ground, and tested by wagon loads of prisoners, or if need be, by citizens implicated in their use. In like manner, if a torpedo is suspected on any part of the road, order the point to be tested

by a car-load of prisoners, or citizens implicated, drawn by a long rope. Of course an enemy cannot complain of his own traps."

At this time Sherman considered the expediency of enlisting negroes in the army as an open question, which he was, indeed, willing and desirous to have decided by a fair test, but still an open one; while their adaptation to service as teamsters and laborers he regarded as demonstrated by experience, and the necessity for their use in some capacity as obvious. Northern Georgia having been almost denuded of its able-bodied colored population by their removal by their former masters to the southern portion of the State, and the number still available not being more than sufficient to fill up the ranks of the existing colored regiments already belonging to his army, he opposed the practice, just then begun, of sending commissioners to his command to recruit for men to fill the quotas of the Northern States. Under date of July 30, he wrote to Mr. John A. Spooner, agent for the State of Massachusetts, then at Nashville :—

"On applying to General Webster, at Nashville, he will grant you a pass through our lines to those States; and, as I have had considerable experience in those States, I would suggest recruiting depots to be established at Macon and Columbus, Mississippi; Selma, Montgomery, and Mobile, Alabama; and Columbus, Milledgeville, and Savannah, Georgia.

"I do not see that the law restricts you to black recruits, but you are at liberty to collect white recruits also. It is waste of time and money to open rendezvous in northwest Georgia, for I assure you I have not seen an able-bodied man, black or white, there, fit for a soldier, who was not in this army or the one opposed to it.

"You speak of the impression going abroad that I am opposed to the organization of colored regiments. My opinions are usually very positive, and there is no reason why you should not know them. Though entertaining profound rever-

ence for our Congress, I do doubt their wisdom in the passage of this law :

“ 1. Because civilian agents about an army are a nuisance.

“ 2. The duty of citizens to fight for their country is too sacred a one to be peddled off by buying up the refuse of other States.

“ 3. It is unjust to the brave soldiers and volunteers who are fighting as those who compose this army do, to place them on a par with the class of recruits you are after.

“ 4. The negro is in a transition state, and is not the equal of the white man.

“ 5. He is liberated from his bondage by act of war, and the armies in the field are entitled to all his assistance in labor and fighting, in addition to the proper quotas of the States.

“ 6. This bidding and bartering for recruits, white and black, has delayed the re-enforcement of the armies at the times when such re-enforcements would have enabled us to make our successes permanent.

“ 7. The law is an experiment which, pending war, is unwise and unsafe, and has delayed the universal draft, which I firmly believe will become necessary to overcome the wide-spread resistance offered us ; and I also believe the universal draft will be wise and beneficial, for, under the providence of God, it will separate the sheep from the goats, and demonstrate what citizens will fight for their country, and what will only talk.

“ No one will infer from this that I am not a friend of the negro as well as the white race. I contend that the treason and rebellion of the master freed the slave, and the armies I have commanded have conducted to safe points more negroes than those of any general officer in the army ; but I prefer negroes for pioneers, teamsters, cooks, and servants ; others gradually to experiment in the art of the soldier, beginning with the duties of local garrisons, such as we had at Memphis, Vicksburg, Natchez, Nashville, and Chattanooga ; but I would not draw on the poor race for too large a proportion of its active, athletic young men, for some must remain to seek new

homes, and provide for the old and young, the feeble and helpless.

“These are some of my peculiar notions, but I assure you they are shared by a large proportion of our fighting men.”

In further explanation of these views, he subsequently wrote to Adjutant-General Thomas, then in special charge of the duty of raising colored troops in the West and Southwest:—

“My preference is to make this radical change with natural slowness. If negroes are taken as soldiers by undue influence or force, and compelled to leave their women in the uncertainty of their new condition, they cannot be relied on; but if they can put their families in some safe place, and then earn money as soldiers or laborers, the transition will be more easy and the effect more permanent. What my order contemplated was the eagerness of recruiting captains and lieutenants to make up their quota, in order to be commissioned. They would use a species of force or undue influence, and break up our gangs of laborers, as necessary as soldiers. We find gangs of negro laborers, well organized, on the Mississippi, at Nashville, and along the railroads, most useful, and I have used them with great success as pioneer companies attached to divisions; and I think it would be well if a law would sanction such an organization, say of one hundred to each division of four thousand men. The first step in the liberation of the negro from bondage will be to get him and family to a place of safety; then to afford him the means of providing for his family, for their instincts are very strong; then gradually use a proportion, greater and greater each year, as sailors and soldiers. There will be no great difficulty in our absorbing the four millions of slaves in this great industrious country of ours; and, being lost to their masters, the cause of the war is gone, for this great money interest then ceases to be an element in our politics and civil economy. If you divert too large a proportion of the able-bodied men into the ranks, you will leave too large a class of black paupers on our hands.

“The great mass of our soldiery must be of the white race, and the black troops should for some years be used with caution, and with due regard to the prejudice of the races. As was to be expected, in some instances they have done well, in others, badly ; but, on the whole, the experiment is worthy a fair trial, and all I ask is, that it be not forced beyond the laws of natural development.”

On the 29th of August he issued the following comprehensive order on the subject of trade within the limits of his command, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of the act of Congress, approved July 2, 1864, and the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury, made in pursuance thereof :—

“I. All trade is prohibited near armies in the field, or moving columns of troops, save that necessary to supply the wants of the troops themselves. Quartermasters and commissaries will take such supplies as are needed in the countries passed through, giving receipts, and taking the articles up on their returns. When cotton is found, and transportation to the rear is easy and does not interfere with the supplies of the army dependent on the route, the quartermaster will ship the cotton to the quartermaster at Nashville or Memphis, who will deliver it to the agent of the Treasury Department. It will be treated as captured property of an enemy, and invoiced accordingly. No claim of private interest in it will be entertained by the military authorities.

“II. In departments and military districts, embracing a country within our military control, the commanders of such departments and districts may permit a trade in articles not contraband of war or damaging to the operations of the army at the front, through the properly appointed agents and sub-agents of the Treasury Department, to an extent proportionate to the necessities of the peaceful and worthy inhabitants of the localities described ; but as trade and the benefits of civil government are conditions not only of the fidelity of the people, but also of an ability to maintain peace and order in their dis-

trict, county, or locality, commanding officers will give notice that all trade will cease where guerrillas are tolerated and encouraged; and moreover, that in such districts and localities, the army or detachments sent to maintain the peace must be maintained by the district or locality that tolerates or encourages such guerrillas.

“III. All military officers will assist the agents of the Treasury Department in securing the possession of all abandoned property and estates subject to confiscation under the law.

“IV. The use of weapons for hunting purposes is too dangerous to be allowed at this time, and therefore the introduction of all arms and powder, percussion-caps, bullets, shot, lead, or any thing used in connection with firearms, is prohibited absolutely, save by the proper agents of the United States; and when the inhabitants require and can be trusted with such things for self-defence, or for aiding in maintaining the peace and safety of their families and property, commanding officers may issue the same out of the public stores in limited quantities.

“V. Medicines and clothing, as well as salt, meats, and provisions, being quasi-contraband of war, according to the condition of the district or locality, when offered for sale, will be regulated by local commanders, in connection with the agents of the Treasury Department.

“VI. In articles non-contraband, such as the clothing needed for women and children, groceries and imported articles, the trade should be left to the Treasury agents, as matters too unimportant to be noticed by military men.

“VII. When military officers can indicate a preference to the class of men allowed to trade, they will always give the preference to men who have served the Government as soldiers, and are wounded or incapacitated from further service by such wounds or sickness. Men who manifest loyalty by oaths, and nothing more, are entitled to live, but not to ask favors of a Government that demands acts and personal sacrifices.”

CHAPTER XIX.

HOOD'S INVASION.

THE condition of affairs in the several theatres of war in the month of September, 1864, may be summed up in a few words.

Grant held Lee firmly at Petersburg, with a large force under Sheridan stopping the debouches from the Valley of the Shenandoah, and showed an evident purpose of persisting in his operations until a decisive result should be reached. In North and South Carolina matters were passive. Sherman, as we have seen, was at Atlanta and Hood southwest of that place, both watching each other; each preparing to take the initiative. Along the Mississippi and west of that river no operations of importance were in progress. Mobile was constantly threatened, more to compel the Confederates to keep a garrison there than with any intention of resorting to decisive measures. For practical purposes, all the troops of the enemy west of the Mississippi might be considered out of the war, since, unless by some unlikely accident, they were powerless to influence the decisive campaigns about to commence.

In point of fact, the issue of the war was now concentrated upon the result of the approaching campaigns of the two main armies on either side. It was obvious that the Union armies would, if allowed to complete all their preparations and select their time and direction, continue the offensive. Should Sherman move to the southeast, while Hood maintained his present position, it would be in the power of the former, should he be able to reach the sea-coast in safety, to place himself in communication with Grant, and thus wrest from the Confederates their great advantage of interior lines. Under these circumstances, it was evidently Hood's true policy to abandon all attempts to hold the line of the Chattahoochee or the country west

of it, and placing his army east of Atlanta, to be prepared to resist an advance of Sherman down the Atlantic slope, or to operate upon his flanks in case he should essay a movement towards the Gulf. At the same time the Confederate cavalry should have been constantly engaged in destroying the railways leading to the north, thus interrupting Sherman's communications, and retarding, if not entirely preventing, the accumulation of the ammunition and other stores requisite to enable him to push the invasion. Had Hood's army been held between Lee and Sherman, the Confederates could, at some favorable moment, have concentrated the bulk of both their main armies, augmented by numerous garrisons and detachments, upon either theatre of war, according to circumstances, and placing one army on the strict defensive, suddenly assume the bold offensive with the other, with greater chances of success than were presented by any other course.

But Jefferson Davis saw only a foe to be destroyed and but one speedy means of destroying him. To have followed the course we have indicated, might have appeared to the public and the press of the Confederacy as an indorsement of Johnston's mode of warfare. Such a thing could not be tolerated for an instant. Hurrying from Richmond to the West, Davis visited his army, conversed with his generals, and gave his orders for their future government. To the army he promised that their feet should again press the soil of Tennessee. To the citizens he avowed that within thirty days the barbarous invader would be driven from their territory. The retreat of Sherman from Atlanta, he said, should be like Napoleon's from Moscow.

About the 20th of September, Forrest, with his cavalry, crossed the Tennessee near Waterloo, Alabama, destroyed a portion of the railway between Decatur and Athens, and on the 23d appeared before the latter place, and drove the garrison, consisting of six hundred men of the One Hundred and Sixth, One Hundred and Tenth, and One Hundred and Eleventh regiments of colored troops, and Third Tennessee Cavalry, the whole under command of Colonel Campbell, of the One

Hundred and Tenth, into the fort constructed for the defence of the place. On the 24th, Forrest having completely invested the fort, succeeded in persuading Colonel Campbell, in a personal interview which that officer granted him, after refusing to comply with his summons to surrender, that it was useless to resist the odds against the garrison; and Colonel Campbell accordingly capitulated. Half an hour afterwards the Nineteenth Michigan and One Hundred and Second Ohio regiments arrived, but Forrest being now at liberty to use his entire force against them, they were soon compelled to yield, after a hard fight. Forrest then moved on, destroying the railway as he went, until the 27th, when he arrived before Pulaski, where he was confronted and successfully resisted by a garrison hastily collected by Major-General Lovell H. Rousseau. Finding his progress barred in this direction, on the 29th Forrest swung round to the Nashville and Chattanooga railway and began to break it up between Tullahoma and Decherd; but General Rousseau, divining this plan, moved so rapidly by rail through Nashville to Tullahoma that he reached that place before the main body of Forrest's command could come up, and Major-General Steedman with five thousand men from Chattanooga, having crossed the Tennessee on the same day to check his movements, Forrest fell back through Fayetteville during the night. The next day the railway was again in running order. Forrest then divided his command into two columns, one under Buford being four thousand strong, and the other, commanded by himself in person, numbering three thousand. Buford appeared before Huntsville on the evening of the 30th, demanded the surrender of the garrison that night and again on the following morning, and being on both occasions refused, moved on Athens and attacked that place on the afternoon of October 1st and the morning of the 2d, but was gallantly repulsed by the Seventy-third Indiana, under Lieutenant-Colonel Slade, which Brigadier-General R. S. Granger had just sent to reoccupy the place. Buford then abandoned his portion of the expedition and recrossed the Tennessee on the 3d at Brown's Ferry. Forrest, with his own column, appeared

before Columbia on the 1st of October, but did not attack, and on the morning of the 3d he too turned his face to the south, passed through Lawrenceburg on the night of the 4th, and on the 6th, though closely pressed, succeeded in effecting his escape across the Tennessee at Bainbridge. Meanwhile, dangers had been thickening in his path, for Newton's division of Stanley's fourth corps, now under Brigadier-General Wagner, left Atlanta on the 26th and replaced Steedman at Chattanooga two days later; Morgan's second division of Jefferson C. Davis' fourteenth corps started north on the 29th, reached Stevenson early on the 1st of October and Huntsville the same night, Athens on the night of the 2d, Rogersville on the 4th, and came up and skirmished with Forrest's rear-guard at Shoal Creek bridge; Rousseau, with four thousand cavalry and mounted infantry, followed Forrest from Columbia, at Pulaski was joined by Major-General C. C. Washburne with three thousand cavalry from Memphis, and together they reached Waynesboro' on the 6th. Moreover, on the 28th of September, as soon as he became convinced of the enemy's designs, Sherman had dispatched Major-General Thomas to Nashville to take personal command of the rear, and on the 3d, Thomas had reached that place and put in motion this combination, which but for unforeseen causes, such as the rise of Elk River in front of Morgan, must, in all probability, have resulted in Forrest's destruction.

On the 1st of October, Hood began his fatal march to the north. Sending his cavalry in advance to move rapidly against Sherman's communications beyond Marietta, he crossed the Chattahoochee with his three corps of infantry, and pushed north by way of Dallas.

Leaving Slocum with his Twentieth Corps to hold Atlanta and the railway bridge over the Chattahoochee, on the 4th of October, in accordance with his previous intentions and arrangements, Sherman marched with the remainder of his army to Smyrna Camp Ground, and on the following day to a strong position at Kenesaw Mountain. The enemy's cavalry and French's division of Stewart's corps had struck the rail

way at Big Shanty, effectually destroyed it and the telegraph for a distance of twenty miles, and was now moving on Allatoona Pass, where were stored a million of rations, guarded by the Ninety-third Illinois regiment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Tourtellotte, behind the redoubts previously constructed. The telegraph wires being broken by the enemy, and the intermediate country occupied by his troops, Sherman sent a message by signals to Brigadier-General Corse, who, as we have seen, was at Rome with his division of the Fifteenth Corps, directing that officer to re-enforce the threatened post without delay. Corse started immediately by railway with the Fourth Minnesota and Seventh Illinois, and reached Allatoona at one o'clock, A. M., on the 5th of October; but, owing to an accident to the train, it was so late in returning that no more troops had arrived when, an hour after Corse's arrival, French with his division appeared before the place and opened a brisk skirmish fire. By daylight, the works at Allatoona, manned by one thousand nine hundred and forty-four men, were completely invested by French's entire division of the Confederate army. At half-past eight, on the 5th, after a sharp cannonade of two hours' duration, General French sent a note to General Corse, under a flag of truce, intimating that he would give the garrison just five minutes to surrender, in order to spare the unnecessary effusion of human blood. Corse instantly replied that he should not surrender, and that he was prepared for this unnecessary effusion of blood as soon as his assailant chose to begin it. The enemy immediately assaulted with great fury; and again and again, during the day, his columns surged madly up against the parapets, only to be as often hurled back with great slaughter by the intrepid little garrison, standing as grim and immovable as the rock itself; until at night the shattered remnants of the enemy were at length driven from every position, and the possession of Allatoona was secure. At ten o'clock in the morning Sherman in person reached Kenesaw Mountain, eighteen miles distant, and

thence saw and faintly heard, but only too fully comprehended, what was transpiring at his depot. The distance was too great to offer any hope of being able to render direct assistance before the struggle should be decided, but Sherman at once sent the Twenty-third Corps, under Cox, out on the Burnt Hickory road, towards Dallas, to move against the flank and rear of the forces threatening Allatoona. From mountain to mountain the little signal flags, spelling their message in quiet defiance of hostile force, waved from Sherman to Corse the words few and simple, but of thrilling import, which announced to him the presence of the commander-in-chief on the overlooking height of Kenesaw, the movement of troops for his relief, and exhorted him to hold out to the last. Quickly the flags moved again with Corse's brave reply, which would show his commander, even if there had been misgivings on the subject, that here was a captain who would fight to the death for Allatoona and the safety of the army, resting at that moment upon the unaided strength of his single arm. But there were no such doubts. No sooner did the flags speak Corse's name, than Sherman exclaimed, "If Corse is there he will hold out. I know the man!" In this stubborn defence against apparently overwhelming odds, the garrison, numbering less than two thousand, lost seven hundred and seven officers and men killed and wounded; among the latter, Brigadier-General Corse himself, who, though struck in the face by a bullet about noon, declined to leave the field, and by his own energy and spirit imbued his command with the strength that gave them the victory. Colonel Richard Rowell, Seventh Illinois, and Lieutenant-Colonel Tourtellotte, Ninety-third Illinois, both of whom behaved with remarkable gallantry, were also wounded. The garrison captured eight hundred muskets, three stands of colors, and four hundred and eleven prisoners, and after the enemy retired, buried two hundred and thirty-one of their men, who were killed outright. The arrival of the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps at Pine Mountain, and the movement of the Twenty-third Corps on

Dallas, hastened French's withdrawal towards the latter place, after his severe defeat.

Hood now moved rapidly to the northwest, aiming to reach the railway at Resaca. On the 6th and 7th, holding his army about Kenesaw, Big Shanty, and Kenesaw Mountain, Sherman sent his cavalry towards Burnt Hickory and Dallas, and discovered this movement of the enemy. Accordingly, on the afternoon of the 10th, he put the troops in motion through Allatoona Pass, on Kingston. By a forced march of thirty-eight miles, the three armies reached Kingston on the 11th. On the 12th, the march was continued to Rome, a brigade of Hazen's division of Osterhaus' fifteenth corps being sent in advance, by railway, from Allatoona, to occupy the place, in anticipation of Hood's movement against it. Sherman pushed Garrard's division of cavalry and the Twenty-third Corps across the Oostanaula, to menace the enemy's flanks, and Garrard succeeded in driving a brigade of the enemy through the narrow entrance of the valley of the Chattooga, capturing two guns, while, at the same time, Corse crossed the Etowah with his division, and the brigade of Hazen's division that had come forward by rail, and made a reconnoissance with a view to develop the force of the enemy guarding their pontoon bridge, sixteen miles below. Having thus ascertained that Hood's movement upon Rome had been merely a feint, and that he had in fact crossed the Coosa with his entire army, and was hastening with all speed towards Resaca and Dalton, Sherman put his command, except Corse's division, left to hold Rome, in motion, on the 13th, towards the former place, and ordered Howard to send forward Belknap's division of Ransom's seventeenth corps by railway to the relief of the garrison, arriving about midnight. From Kingston, Sherman had sent two regiments of Howard's army, under Colonel Weaver, to occupy Resaca, and had afterwards caused them to be re-enforced by Baum's brigade of John E. Smith's division of the Fifteenth Corps. Hood appeared before the small garrison with his entire army, but General Baum showed so bold and extended a front that, probably retaining a vivid recollection

of Allatoona, and knowing the contagious effect of such an example both upon besieged and besiegers, Hood contented himself with an attack by a skirmish line, and a summons to surrender, coupled with a threat that no prisoners would be taken in case he were compelled to carry the place by assault. During the parley, portions of Hood's army were engaged in effectually destroying the railway for twenty miles to the northward, and in capturing the small and unresisting garrisons at Tilton and Dalton. On the evening of the 14th, Sherman, with the main body of the army, arrived in Resaca, and on the 15th, directing the Army of the Tennessee to move to Snake Creek Gap, and hold the enemy there, he caused Stanley, with the Fourth and Fourteenth Corps, to move by Tilton, across the mountains towards Villanow, in order to strike Hood in flank or force him to fight. But Hood evidently considered it his policy, at this time, to avoid a battle, for his lines gave way about noon before the advance of Howard's skirmishers, and, followed by Howard, he escaped through Snake Creek Gap before Stanley had time to reach the other end of the Pass, and rapidly retreated, in a south-westerly direction, down the valley of the Coosa, to the vicinity of Gadsden, and occupied the narrow gorge formed by the Lookout Mountains abutting against the river. On the 16th, Sherman moved towards Lafayette with the view of cutting off Hood's retreat, and found him intrenched at Ship's Gap; but Woods' division of Osterhaus' fifteenth corps, having the advance, rapidly carried the advanced posts, capturing two companies of a South Carolina regiment, and driving the remainder back on the main body at Lafayette. That night the armies went into camp at Taylor's Ridge, where Ship's Gap divides it.

On the 17th, the Army of the Tennessee moved to Lafayette, while the other corps remained in camp at the Ridge.

On the 18th, Howard crossed the Chattooga at Tryon's Factory, and encamped near Summerville. Stanley moved in the same direction, through Mattock's Gap, in Taylor's Ridge, crossed the river at Penn's Ford, and halted four miles be-

yond it. On the 19th, the Army of the Tennessee reached Alpine, and the Army of the Cumberland, after a short march, encamped at Summerville, and, on the 20th, both these commands marched into Gaylesville; while Cox, with the Twenty-third Corps and Garrard's division of cavalry, having moved by Villanow, Dirt Town, and Gover's Gap, arrived on the same day.

In the mean while, Thomas had disposed of his small forces so as to oppose the greatest resistance in his power to Hood's movement on Bridgeport and Chattanooga, both of which places were seriously menaced by the direction of his advance. Leaving Decatur, Huntsville, Stevenson, and the rest of Northern Alabama to the care of their ordinary garrisons, Thomas caused Rousseau to recall his mounted troops from the pursuit of Forrest and concentrate at Athens; Croxton's brigade of cavalry to observe and protect the crossings of the Tennessee River from Decatur to Eastport; Morgan's division of Jefferson C. Davis' fourteenth corps to move by rail to Chattanooga, where, it will be remembered, Wagner already was with Newton's division of Stanley's fourth corps, and Steedman to follow Morgan to Bridgeport. On the 14th, Morgan reached his designated position, and Steedman's destination was also changed to Chattanooga.

The Army of the Tennessee was now posted near Little River, with orders to support the cavalry engaged in watching Hood; the Army of the Ohio was at Cedar Bluff, with orders to lay a pontoon bridge across the Coosa, and feel towards Centre and Blue Mountains; and the Army of the Cumberland was held in reserve at Gaylesville. In this position, in the heart of the rich valley of the Chattooga, in a country abounding with food, Sherman determined, while living upon the country, to pause in his pursuit of his erratic enemy, and giving him sufficient rope wherewith to entangle himself, to watch his movements. Communications were established with Rome, and a large force put to work, under Colonel W. W. Wright, chief engineer of the United States military railways in this division, in repairing the damages inflicted by

Hood upon the railway. Slocum at Atlanta was ordered to send out strong foraging parties, collect all the corn and fodder possible, and put his trains in condition for service. As early as the 21st, telegraphic communication was restored between Chattanooga and Atlanta, and by the 28th, although thirty-four miles of rails and ties had been destroyed, and several important bridges carried away by floods, trains began running through on the railway.

Hood had turned westward from Gadsden towards Decatur, and taken up a position threatening the Chattanooga and Atlanta railway, and at the same time menacing Tennessee. His movements and strategy had conclusively demonstrated that he had an army at all times capable of endangering Sherman's communications, but unable to meet and cope with him in battle. To follow Hood indefinitely towards the west and north would, without much prospect of overtaking and overwhelming his army, be for Sherman equivalent to being decoyed out of Georgia. To remain on the defensive, on the other hand, would be to lose the main effectiveness of the great Army of the Centre. Sherman had previously proposed to General Grant, in the early stages of the pursuit, to break up the railway from Chattanooga to Atlanta, and strike out for Milledgeville, Millen, and Savannah. "Until we can repopulate Georgia," he wrote, "it is useless to occupy it; but the utter destruction of its roads, houses, and people will cripple their military resources. By attempting to hold the roads we will lose a thousand men monthly, and will gain no result. I can make the march, and *make Georgia howl.*" And again: "Hood may turn into Tennessee and Kentucky, but I believe he will be forced to follow me. Instead of being on the defensive I would be on the offensive. Instead of guessing at what he means, he would have to guess at my plans. The difference, in war is full twenty-five per cent. I can make Savannah, Charleston, or the mouth of the Chattahoochee. I prefer to march through Georgia, smashing things, to the sea." He now proposed to the lieutenant-general to modify these plans, so far

as to give him the choice of either of the three alternative just named.

"I must have alternatives," he said; "else being confined to one route the enemy might so oppose that delay and want would trouble me; but having alternatives, I can take so eccentric a course that no general can guess at my objective. Therefore, when you hear I am off, have lookouts at Morris Island, S. C.; Ossabaw Sound, Georgia; Pensacola and Mobile bays. I will turn up somewhere, and believe me I can take Macon, Milledgeville, Augusta, and Savannah, Georgia, and wind up with closing the neck back of Charleston, so that they will starve out. This movement is not purely military or strategic, but it will illustrate the vulnerability of the South."

General Grant promptly authorized the proposed movement, indicating, however, his preference for Savannah as the objective, and fixing Dalton as the northern limit for the destruction of the railway. Preparations were instantly undertaken and pressed forward for the consummation of these plans.

On the 26th of October, Sherman detached the Fourth Corps under Major-General Stanley, and ordered him to proceed to Chattanooga and report to General Thomas at Nashville. On the 30th of October, he also detached the Twenty-third Corps, Major-General Schofield, with the same destination, and delegated to Major-General Thomas full power over the troops, except the four corps with which he himself designed to move into Georgia. This gave Thomas the two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps, under A. J. Smith, then in Missouri but on the way to Tennessee, the Fourth and Twenty-third corps, as just mentioned, and all the garrisons in Tennessee, as well as all the cavalry of the Military Division, except the division under Brigadier-General Kilpatrick, which was ordered to rendezvous at Marietta. Brevet Major-General Wilson had arrived from the Army of the Potomac to assume command of the cavalry of the Army of the Centre, and he was sent back to Nashville with all dismounted detachments,

and orders as rapidly as possible to collect the cavalry serving in Kentucky and Tennessee, to mount, organize, and equip them, and report to Major-General Thomas for duty. These forces, Sherman considered, would enable General Thomas to defend the railway from Chattanooga back, including Nashville and Decatur, and give him an army with which he could successfully cope with Hood, should the latter cross the Tennessee northward. The entire plan of the campaign was communicated to General Thomas, and he was instructed that, as an essential portion of it, he was expected to defend the line of the Tennessee River, to hold Tennessee, in any event, and to pursue the enemy should Hood follow Sherman.

On the 26th, the enemy appeared in some force before Decatur, but after skirmishing for three days withdrew. On the 31st, in spite of all the efforts to the contrary of Croxton's brigade of cavalry, which, as has been seen, was engaged in guarding the river, the enemy succeeded in effecting a lodgment on the north bank of the Tennessee, about three miles above Florence. On the 28th November, Forrest, coming from Corinth with seventeen regiments of cavalry and nine pieces of artillery, having captured a gunboat and two transports, and burned a third at Fort Heiman, seventy-five miles from Paducah, planted batteries above and below Johnsonville, and after cannonading that place for three days, during which our troops burned their transports and stores, withdrew and crossed the Tennessee just above the town.

The same day Schofield, with the Twenty-third Corps, reached Nashville and was hurried on to Johnsonville; and arriving there the night after Forrest's withdrawal, was sent on to join the Fourth Corps at Pulaski, leaving a garrison at Johnsonville. General Schofield was charged with the immediate direction of the operations of these two corps, with instructions to watch Hood's movements, and delay them as much as possible, without risking a general engagement, so as to allow time for A. J. Smith to arrive from Missouri and for Wilson to remount his cavalry. Thomas' effective force, at this moment, numbered twenty-two thousand infantry

and seven thousand seven hundred cavalry, exclusive of the numerous detachments garrisoning Murfreesboro', Stevenson, Bridgeport, Huntsville, Decatur, and Chattanooga, and distributed along the railways to guard them. With these he had to oppose Beauregard, with Hood's three corps and Forrest's, Wheeler's, and Roddy's cavalry, now grouped about Florence, threatening the invasion of Middle Tennessee.

Meanwhile, Sherman, having completed his preparations, received his final instructions, and explained his plans in detail, under strict confidence, to his corps commanders and heads of staff departments, had changed front to the rear and was once more marching towards the south.

During the campaign just closed, the army and the country were called upon to lament the death of the gallant commander of the Seventeenth Corps, Brigadier-General Thomas Edward Greenfield Ransom. He had been suffering at the outset from the fatal dysentery which caused his death, but esteeming it as merely a temporary malady, and unwilling to quit his post at such a time, he had remained in command, continuing to exert himself day and night to the utmost of his power, until, on the 20th, on arriving at Gaylesville, the aggravated nature of his symptoms compelled him to yield his inclinations and go to the rear. On the 29th of October, his end being evidently nigh at hand, he was taken from the stretcher on which he was being carried to Rome, and borne into a house by the roadside, where shortly afterwards he breathed his last.

Born in Norwich, Vermont, on the 29th of November, 1834, and graduating at Norwich University in his seventeenth year, he removed to Lasalle County, Illinois, in 1851, and entered upon the practice of his profession as civil engineer. In 1854, he embarked in the real estate business, at Peru, Illinois, in connection with an uncle, Mr. Gilson, and in December, 1855, joined the house of Galloway and Company, at Chicago, who were largely engaged in land operations. When the rebellion broke out he was living in Fayette County, Illinois, acting as an agent of the Illinois Central Railway Company. Imme-

diately after the issue of the President's proclamation of April 16, 1861, calling for seventy-five thousand three months' militia, Ransom raised a company, which was presently attached to the Eleventh Regiment of Illinois Volunteers, whereof, by a vote of the company officers, he was elected major, and duly commissioned accordingly by the governor of the State. On the reorganization of the regiment for the three years' service at the end of July, 1861, Ransom was made its lieutenant-colonel. On the 19th of August he was severely wounded in the shoulder, in a charge at Charleston, Missouri. He took part in the capture of Fort Henry, and led his regiment in the assault on Fort Donelson, where he was again severely wounded, and narrowly escaped death, his clothing being pierced by six bullet-holes, and his horse being shot under him. Though suffering from prolonged sickness, consequent upon his wound and continued exposure, he insisted on remaining with his command, and being soon promoted to the position vacated by the appointment of Colonel W. H. L. Wallace as a brigadier-general, led the regiment through the battle of Shiloh, though again wounded in the head in the early part of the engagement. In January, 1863, he was appointed a brigadier-general, dating from the 29th of November previous, and as such commanded a brigade of Logan's division of McPherson's seventeenth corps during the siege of Vicksburg. Early in August his brigade was sent to occupy Natchez, and was soon afterwards transferred to the Thirteenth Corps, under Major-General Ord, when that corps was assigned to the Department of the Gulf, and he was placed in command of a division. He took part in the brief occupation of the Texas coast by General Banks in the winter of 1863, and in the ill-fated Red River expedition, being so severely wounded in the knee at the battle of Sabine Cross-roads, on the 8th of April, 1864, that the surgeons were divided in opinion on the question of amputation. General Ransom himself decided the dispute in favor of retaining the leg, and recovered, though suffering with a stiff knee, in time to join

Sherman and take command of a division of Blair's seventeenth corps, just before the capture of Atlanta.

By his talents, his patience, his courage, his aptness for command, he had rapidly mounted almost to the highest rewards of his profession, when death closed a career of honor apparently without other limit. Young, enthusiastic, and untiring, brave and skilful, in Ransom's death the Army of the Tennessee lost a jewel second only in lustre to that which fell from its diadem in the death of McPherson.

CHAPTER XX.

THE COLORS POINT TO THE SOUTH.

SHERMAN moved the Fifteenth and Seventeenth Corps by slow and easy marches on the south of the Coosa back to the neighborhood of Smyrna camp-ground, and the Fourteenth Corps to Kingston, whither he repaired in person on the 2d of November. From that point he directed all surplus artillery, all baggage not needed for the contemplated march, all the sick and wounded, refugees and other encumbrances to be sent back to Chattanooga, and the three corps above-mentioned, as well as Kilpatrick's cavalry, and the Twentieth Corps, then at Atlanta, to be put in the most efficient condition possible for the long and difficult march before them. This operation consumed the time until the 11th of November, when, every thing being ready, General Corse, who still remained at Rome, was directed to destroy the bridges there, as well as all foundries, mills, shops, warehouses, and other property that could be useful to the enemy, and to move to Kingston. At the same time the railway in and about Atlanta, and between the Etowah and the Chattahoochee, was ordered to be utterly destroyed. General Steedman was also instructed to gather up the garrisons from Kingston northward, and to draw back to Chattanooga, taking with him all public property and all railway stock, and to take up the rails from Resaca back, preserving them, that they might be replaced whenever future interests should demand it. The railway between the Etowah and the Oostanaula was left untouched, in view of General Grant's instructions, and because Sherman thought it more than probable that

General Thomas would find it necessary to reoccupy the country as far forward as the line of the Etowah, which, by reason of its rivers and other natural features, possesses an enduring military importance, since from it all parts of Georgia and Alabama can be reached by armies marching down the valleys of the Coosa and Chattahoochee.

On the 11th of November, Sherman sent his last dispatch to General Halleck, at Washington, and, on the 12th, his army stood detached and cut off from all communication with the rear.

For the purpose of the great march, it had been divided into two wings: the right, commanded by Major-General Oliver O. Howard, comprising the Fifteenth Corps, under Major-General P. J. Osterhaus, and the Seventeenth Corps, under Major-General Frank P. Blair, Jr., who had now rejoined the army; the left, under Major-General Henry W. Slocum, consisting of the Fourteenth Corps of brevet Major-General Jefferson C. Davis, and the Twentieth Corps, to which Brigadier-General A. S. Williams was assigned. The aggregate force of infantry was sixty thousand; the cavalry division, under Brigadier-General Judson Kilpatrick, numbered fifty-five hundred men; and there was one field-gun to every thousand men.

The Fifteenth Corps consisted of the divisions of Brigadier-Generals Charles R. Woods, William B. Hazen, John E. Smith, and John M. Corse. Hazen's second division, though greatly changed in all its parts by time and hard service, was substantially the same division which Sherman organized at Paducah and commanded at Shiloh, and whose history we have followed in these pages, successively under the leadership of David Stuart, Morgan L. Smith, and Blair.

The Seventeenth Corps comprised three divisions, under Major-General John A. Mower and Brigadier-Generals Miles D. Leggett and Giles A. Smith, besides the detachments above mentioned.

The Fourteenth Corps was composed of three divisions, led by Brigadier-Generals William P. Carlin, James D. Morgan, and Absalom Baird.

The Twentieth Corps, which it will be remembered was formed by consolidating the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps from the Army of the Potomac, included the divisions of Brigadier-Generals Norman J. Jackson, John W. Geary, and William T. Ward.

Kilpatrick's division of cavalry consisted of two brigades, commanded by Colonels Eli H. Murray, Third Kentucky Cavalry, and Smith D. Atkins, Ninety-second Illinois Mounted Infantry.

This whole force moved rapidly, and on the 14th of November was once more grouped about Atlanta.

Here let us pause to glance at such of the more prominent actors in the approaching scenes, as we have not already sketched.

Oliver O. Howard was born in Leeds, in Kennebec County, Maine, on the 8th of November, 1830, the eldest of three children of parents in independent but moderate circumstances. He worked on his father's farm until his tenth year, when his father died, leaving him to the care of his uncle, the Honorable John Otis, of Hallowell. He enjoyed the advantages of a good common-school education until, at the age of sixteen, he entered Bowdoin College, at Brunswick, Maine. Upon finishing the collegiate course, after some hesitation he decided to avail himself of the opportunity just then offered of completing his education at the United States Military Academy at West Point. He accordingly entered that institution in 1850, and graduated in 1854, ranking fourth in the order of general standing of his class. He was appointed brevet second lieutenant in the Ordnance Department, and two years later served in a campaign against the Indians in Florida, as chief ordnance officer of the department. The 1st of July, 1855, by regular promotion, he became second lieutenant and on the 1st July, 1857, first lieutenant of ordnance, and held the latter rank at the opening of the war, when he was stationed at West Point as assistant professor of mathematics. At an early date his services were offered to the governor of Maine, who, on the 28th of May, 1861, commissioned him as colonel of the

Third Maine Volunteers, the first three years' regiment that left the State.

At the battle of Bull Run he commanded a brigade as senior colonel, and on the 3d of September, 1861, was commissioned brigadier-general of volunteers, and was soon afterwards assigned to the command of a brigade of Sumner's division of the Army of the Potomac, which, in March, 1862, became a part of Sumner's second army corps, Brigadier-General Israel B. Richardson succeeding to the command of the division. General Howard was with the Army of the Potomac on the Peninsula until the battle of Fair Oaks, where he lost his right arm while leading his brigade in a charge against the enemy. Two bullets entered the arm, one near the wrist and the other at the elbow; but he did not leave the field until, on being wounded the second time, his strength gave out, and he was obliged to go to the rear, and submit to an amputation. After an absence of two months, he returned to the army in season to be with his corps at the second battle of Bull Run, and on the retreat from Centreville he commanded the rear-guard. At the battle of Antietam, when General Sedgwick was wounded, and compelled to quit the field, General Howard succeeded him in command of his division of Sumner's corps.

At the battle of Fredericksburg this division formed the right of the line, and lost heavily.

On the 29th November, 1862, he was appointed major-general of volunteers, and on the 1st April, 1863, took command of the Eleventh Army Corps, relieving General Sigel. He led his corps at Chancellorsville and Gettysburg. He took a gallant part in the capture of Lookout Mountain and the battle of Mission Ridge, and accompanied Sherman in his march to the relief of Burnside at Knoxville. His services in the Atlanta campaign, in command of the Fourth Army Corps, and, after McPherson's death, at the head of the Army of the Tennessee, have already been fully illustrated in these pages.

Thoroughly educated, an accomplished scholar, a true gentleman, and a brave soldier, General Howard is eminently calculated to inspire the confidence of his superiors, the respect

and obedience of his followers, the affection and esteem of all with whom he may be associated. Quiet and unassuming in his deportment; a fervent and devoted Christian, not only in his belief but in his daily life; conscientious to a degree in the performance of the smallest duty; careless of exposing his person in battle, to an extent that would be attributable to rashness or fatalism if it were not known to spring from religion; strictly honorable in all things; warm in his sympathies and cordial in his friendships, Howard presents a rare combination of qualities, no less grand than simple, equally to be imitated for their virtue and loved for their humanity.

Judson Kilpatrick was born in New Jersey, in 1838. In June, 1856, as a reward for his political services in the support of the re-election of the member of Congress from the district wherein he resided, he was selected by that gentleman to represent the district at West Point. In April, 1861, he graduated fifteenth in his class, and was immediately appointed a second-lieutenant in the First Regiment of Artillery, but soon afterwards received permission from the War Department to accept a captaincy in the Fifth Regiment of New York Volunteers, generally known as Duryea's Zouaves, and served with that regiment in the skirmish or battle, in June, at Big Bethel, where he was slightly wounded.

In the fall, Kilpatrick succeeded in obtaining a commission as lieutenant-colonel of the Second Regiment of New York Cavalry, or "Harris Light Cavalry," commanded by Colonel J. Mansfield Davies. Participating in command of that regiment, and afterwards at the head of a brigade of Gregg's division, in nearly all the principal operations of the cavalry of the Army of the Potomac, under Generals McClellan, Burnside, and Hooker, in May, 1863, he was promoted to be a brigadier-general for gallant and distinguished services in the battle of Brandy Station, and was soon afterwards, on the appointment of General Meade to relieve Hooker, placed in command of Stahl's division, which, with the divisions of Buford and Gregg, now constituted Pleasonton's cavalry corps. This command he continued to hold until, on the failure of the ill-

considered raid for the relief of the Union prisoners at Richmond, wherein he and the brave young Dahlgren were jointly engaged, he was relieved and ordered to report to General Sherman, who readily discovered in Kilpatrick those sterling qualities which, though marred and partially concealed by an extravagant craving for admiration and a ceaseless straining after dramatic effect, nevertheless constituted him, when his judgment was properly strengthened and developed by contact with a master mind, and his love of daily popularity strongly restrained by a master will, a valuable and deserving cavalry commander.

Frank P. Blair, Jr., the son of Francis P. Blair, Sr., of Montgomery County, Maryland, was born in Lexington, Kentucky, on the 19th of February, 1821. After completing his education at Princeton College, he applied himself to the study of the law in his native town, and after being admitted to the bar, removed to St. Louis, and commenced practice in 1843. He served in Mexico, during the war with that country in 1846-47, as a lieutenant of volunteers, and returned to St. Louis after the peace, resumed the practice of his profession, and entered into politics with the activity characteristic of his family, supporting Mr. Van Buren for the Presidency in 1848, on the Buffalo platform. Becoming from that time identified with the free-soil party, opposed to the extension of slavery into the territories, he was elected to the Legislature of Missouri in 1852, as a delegate from St. Louis, and re-elected in 1854. At the expiration of his second term, in 1856, as the candidate of the Republican party, he was chosen representative in Congress from the St. Louis district, and has been successively re-elected as such in the years 1858, 1860, and 1862.

From the spring of 1861 until he left his seat in Congress, he was chairman of the Committee on Military Affairs in the House of Representatives.

On the breaking out of the rebellion, he raised the First Infantry Regiment of Missouri Volunteers, and on the 7th of August, having in the mean time attended the special session of Congress in his civil capacity, and immediately afterwards

returned to Missouri and raised a brigade, he was appointed by the President a brigadier-general of volunteers. On the 29th of November, 1862, he was promoted to be a major-general.

General Blair's military record while in command of a brigade at Chickasaw Bayou and Arkansas Post; of Sherman's old division of the Fifteenth Corps in the siege of Vicksburg and the capture of Jackson; of the Fifteenth Corps in its marches from Iuka to Chattanooga, and thence to Knoxville, and the battle of Missionary Ridge; and of the Seventeenth Corps in the Atlanta campaign, we have already followed, step by step.

When the Army of the Tennessee went into winter-quarters at Huntsville, in 1863, General Blair, at the personal request of President Lincoln, returned to Washington, and resumed his place in Congress. At the reopening of active operations he hastened back to the army, and was assigned the command of the Seventeenth Army Corps, in place of General McPherson, who had succeeded General Sherman at the head of the Army of the Tennessee.

Peter Joseph Osterhaus was a native of Prussia, and held a commission in the Prussian army, but afterwards emigrated to the United States, and took up his residence at St. Louis, in Missouri. During the winter of 1860, in anticipation of the war, he organized and commanded a company of militia, and subsequently took part with it in the capture of the secession camp near the city by General Lyon, in May, 1861. His company being mustered into the service of the United States, on the 17th of July, 1861, he took part, under General Lyon, in the battle of Booneville; on the 2d of August fought at Dug Springs, in Southwestern Missouri, and on the 10th of the same month was engaged in the battle of Wilson's Creek, during which Lyon was killed. He was then promoted to be colonel of the Twelfth Missouri Volunteers, and at the head of that regiment took part in the brief campaign under Fremont. At the battle of Pea Ridge, on the 7th and 8th of March, 1862, Colonel Osterhaus commanded with ability the





W. M. Slocum
Major Genl

first brigade of General Sigel's division, and was wounded and compelled to leave the field. He, however, soon rejoined his regiment and took part in the arduous march of General Curtis' troops through Arkansas to Helena, where the forces arrived in July, 1862. On the 9th of June, 1862, he was promoted to be a brigadier-general of volunteers, and in that capacity took part, as we have already seen, in command of a brigade, in Sherman's attempt on Vicksburg, in December, 1862, at the head of a division of the Thirteenth Army Corps, in the capture of Arkansas Post, the siege of Vicksburg, where he was again wounded, and subsequently in Sherman's capture of the town of Jackson. From that time, as the commander of the first division of the Fifteenth Army Corps, his history has been fully traced in these pages. It may be said of General Osterhaus, that no officer of foreign birth and education so successfully exercised, during the late war, commands of equal extent and responsibility.

Henry Wadsworth Slocum was born in Syracuse, in Onondaga County, in the State of New York. Entering the Military Academy at West Point as a cadet in June, 1848, he graduated four years later, seventh in the general standing of his class, and on the 1st of July, 1852, was commissioned a brevet second-lieutenant and attached to the First Regiment of Artillery. In the following year he attained, by regular promotion, to a full second-lieutenancy in the same regiment, and in March, 1855, became a first-lieutenant. On the 31st of October, 1856, he resigned his commission in the army, settled in his native place, and embarked in the practice of the law as a profession, at the same time taking an active part in political affairs. His resignation was accepted in the height of the excitement attending the contest of 1856 between Buchanan and Breckinridge and Fremont and Dayton, as opposing candidates for the Presidency and Vice-Presidency of the United States. Slocum became a warm supporter of the principles and nominees of the Republican party, then just organized, and continued from that time to act with it.

On the outbreak of the war, Slocum applied for a commission as captain of artillery in the regular army, that being the highest grade for which, as he then considered, his experience qualified him; but failing to receive the appointment, he shortly afterwards yielded to the current of events, and accepted the colonelcy of the Twenty-seventh Regiment of New York Volunteers, raised in Onondaga County. This regiment was among the first troops sent from the State for three years, or during the war. At the battle of Bull Run it formed a part of Franklin's brigade of Hunter's division, and did good service. In the organization of the Army of the Potomac, in the fall of 1861, by General McClellan, Franklin received the command of a division on the left of the line, in front of Alexandria, and Colonel Slocum, being promoted to be a brigadier-general of volunteers, succeeded to the command of Franklin's brigade. In March, 1862, when the army was divided into army corps, Franklin's division became a part of McDowell's first corps, and remained with it on the lines of the Potomac and the Rappahannock, but in April was sent to join the main army before Yorktown.

Arriving there just before the conclusion of the siege, General Franklin was presently placed by General McClellan in command of the Sixth Provisional Army Corps, afterwards regularly constituted the Sixth Army Corps, consisting of W. F. Smith's division detached from Keyes' fourth corps and of Franklin's own, to the command of which Slocum succeeded. The division took part on the Peninsula in the battles of West Point, Goldings' Farm, Gaines' Mill, Savage Station, White Oak Swamp, Glendale, and Malvern Hill. For his services in this campaign Slocum was promoted to be a major-general from the 4th of July, 1862. In the Maryland campaign, in the fall of the same year, Slocum led the division with great distinction in the battles of South Mountain and Antietam. After the latter he was selected, in consideration of the high qualities he had displayed, for the command of the Twelfth Army Corps, made vacant by the fall of General Mansfield, and continued to command it with ability and gallantry

throughout the campaigns of Burnside, Hooker, and Meade of 1862 and 1863, including the three great battles of Fredericksburg, Chancellorsville, and Gettysburg. At Chancellorsville, Slocum, by his bold and rapid change of front, saved the army from the disastrous consequences that might have followed the rout of the Eleventh Corps. In the fall of 1863, when the Eleventh and Twelfth corps, united under Hooker, were sent to Nashville to re-enforce Thomas' army at Chattanooga, General Slocum, preferring not to serve again under General Hooker, was, at his own request, relieved from command of the corps and ordered to Vicksburg. Here he fell under the keen eye and appreciating judgment of General Sherman, and was wisely selected by him for the command of the Twentieth Corps, when Hooker, indignant in his turn at the promotion of Howard, quitted the Army of the Cumberland.*

On the 9th of November, at Kingston, Sherman issued the following orders for the government of his subordinate commanders :—

“I. The habitual order of march will be, whenever practicable, by four roads, as nearly parallel as possible, and converging at points hereafter to be indicated in orders. The cavalry, Brigadier-General Kilpatrick commanding, will receive special orders from the commander-in-chief.

“II. There will be no general trains of supplies, but each corps will have its ammunition and provision train, distributed habitually as follows : Behind each regiment should follow one wagon and one ambulance ; behind each brigade should follow a due proportion of ammunition wagons, provision wagons, and ambulances. In case of danger, each army corps commander should change this order of march by having his advance and rear brigade unencumbered by wheels. The separate columns will start habitually at seven A. M., and

* General Slocum, having been nominated by the Democratic party of New York for Secretary of State, resigned his commission in the army.

make about fifteen miles per day, unless otherwise fixed in orders.

“III. The army will forage liberally on the country during the march. To this end, each brigade commander will organize a good and sufficient foraging party, under the command of one or more discreet officers, who will gather near the route travelled corn or forage of any kind, meat of any kind, vegetables, corn-meat, or whatever is needed by the command; aiming at all times to keep in the wagon trains at least ten days' provisions for the command and three days' forage. Soldiers must not enter the dwellings of the inhabitants, or commit any trespass: during the halt or at camp they may be permitted to gather turnips, potatoes, and other vegetables, and drive in stock in front of their camps. To regular foraging parties must be intrusted the gathering of provisions and forage at any distance from the road travelled.

“V. To army commanders is intrusted the power to destroy mills, houses, cotton-gins, etc., and for them this general principle is laid down: In districts and neighborhoods where the army is unmolested, no destruction of such property should be permitted; but should guerrillas or bushwhackers molest our march, or should the inhabitants burn bridges, obstruct roads, or otherwise manifest local hostility, then army corps commanders should order and enforce a devastation more or less relentless according to the measure of such hostility.

“VI. As for horses, mules, wagons, etc., belonging to the inhabitants, the cavalry and artillery may appropriate freely and without limit, discriminating, however, between the rich, who are usually hostile, and the poor or industrious, usually neutral or friendly. Foraging parties may also take mules or horses to replace the jaded animals of their trains, or to serve as pack-mules for the regiments or brigades. In all foraging, of whatever kind, the parties engaged will refrain from abusive or threatening language, and may, when the officer in command thinks proper, give written certificates of the facts, but no receipts; and they will endeavor to leave with each family a reasonable portion for their maintenance.

“VII. Negroes who are able-bodied, and can be of service to the several columns, may be taken along; but each army commander will bear in mind that the question of supplies is a very important one, and that his first duty is to see to those who bear arms.

“VIII. The organization at once of a good pioneer battalion for each corps, composed, if possible, of negroes, should be attended to. This battalion should follow the advance guard, should repair roads, and double them if possible, so that the columns will not be delayed after reaching bad places. Also, army commanders should study the habit of giving the artillery and wagons the road, and marching their troops on one side; and also instruct their troops to assist wagons at steep hills or bad crossings of streams.

“IX. Captain O. M. Poe, chief engineer, will assign to each wing of the army a pontoon-train, fully equipped and organized, and the commanders thereof will see to its being properly protected at all times.”

Captain Poe had thoroughly destroyed Atlanta, save its mere dwelling-houses and churches; General Corse had done the same with regard to Rome; and the right wing, with General Kilpatrick's cavalry, was put in motion in the direction of Jonesboro' and McDonough, with orders to make a strong feint on Macon, to cross the Ocmulgee about Planters' Mills, and rendezvous in the neighborhood of Gordon in seven days, exclusive of the day of march. On the same day, General Slocum was to move with Williams' twentieth corps, by Decatur and Stone Mountain, with orders to tear up the railroad from Social Circle to Madison, to burn the large and important railway bridge across the Oconee, east of Madison, and turn south and reach Milledgeville on the seventh day, exclusive of the day of march. Sherman in person left Atlanta on the 16th, in company with Jefferson C. Davis' fourteenth corps, marching by Lithonia, Covington, and Shady Dale, directly on Milledgeville. All the troops were provided with good wagon-trains, loaded with ammunition, and supplies

approximating forty days' bread, sugar, and coffee, a double allowance of salt for the same period, and beef-cattle equal to forty days' supplies. The wagons were also supplied with about three days' forage in grain. All the commanders were instructed, by a judicious system of foraging, to maintain this order of things as long as possible, living chiefly, if not solely, upon the country, which was known to abound in corn, sweet potatoes, and meats. The first object was, of course, to place the army in the very heart of Georgia, interposing between Macon and Augusta, and obliging the enemy to divide his forces, in order to defend not only those points, but also Millen, Savannah, and Charleston.

Howard, with the right wing, marched from Whitehall on the 15th of November, dividing his army into two columns. The right-hand column, consisting of Osterhaus' fifteenth corps, General Howard's headquarters train, and the cattle-herds, marched by Rough and Ready, turning to the left towards McDonough when about five miles from Jonesboro'. The left-hand column, comprising Blair's seventeenth corps, the bridge train, and First Missouri Engineer Regiment, Kilpatrick's supply train and the First Alabama Cavalry leading the advance, marched on McDonough by the direct road. Kilpatrick, who accompanied the right wing during this stage of the campaign, met the enemy's cavalry skirmishers near East Point, and drove them before him to the crossing of Flint River; and Osterhaus also met them near Rough and Ready, and again near Stockbridge.

On the 16th, Howard marched to the vicinity of McDonough by three routes. At the crossing of the Cotton River, Osterhaus once more met the enemy's cavalry, who retreated rapidly, setting fire to the bridge. Some mounted infantry in advance drove them off in time to put out the fire, and save every thing but the planking, and the bridge was immediately repaired, having detained the column but forty minutes. Kilpatrick crossed the Flint River at the bridge near Jonesboro', at 7 A. M. Finding the enemy had left that place, he followed them to Lovejoy's, where they occupied a strong position,

having two brigades of cavalry and two pieces of artillery, and holding the old rebel works. Dismounting Murray's brigade, Kilpatrick charged the works, and carried them, driving back the enemy, whose artillery was subsequently overtaken by Atkins' brigade; charged, and captured. Kilpatrick drove the enemy beyond Bear Station, capturing over fifty prisoners, and then moved to the left, and encamped on the Griffin and McDonough road.

On the 17th the right wing moved to Jackson and its vicinity in three columns, Osterhaus encamping near Indian Springs, Blair at Hendrick's Mill, and Kilpatrick at Towaligo Creek. Some cavalry of the enemy crossed the creek, burning the bridges.

The nearest division was pushed to Hatting's or Planters' Factory, on the Ocmulgee River, early next morning, and a part of it crossed over by the ferry. The bridge-train arrived at about 10 A. M., was laid, and the troops commenced crossing at 1 P. M. During that day and night, Blair's seventeenth corps, John E. Smith's division of the Fifteenth Corps, and all the cavalry had crossed. The hill on the east side was steep, and the heavy rain during the night rendered the ascent extremely difficult.

On the morning of the 19th, regiments were detailed in each division to assist the trains in getting up the hill. Osterhaus, with the Fifteenth Corps, following the cavalry, took country roads to Hillsborough. Blair, with the Seventeenth Corps, moved in the vicinity of Hillsborough, by way of Monticello. The roads now becoming very heavy, the progress was slow. The two bridges at the point of crossing were filled with troops and trains all day, yet the crossing was not completed by the rear-guard until the following morning.

On the 20th, the right wing moved on Gordon in two columns, Kilpatrick, with his cavalry, taking the Clinton road and the river road towards Macon, Osterhaus moving towards Clinton, and Blair by way of Blountsville. The head of the right column encamped at Clinton, and the left near

Fortville. Kilpatrick waited at Clinton until the arrival of the head of the infantry column at 12 m., when he moved out towards Macon, on the left-hand road met the enemy's cavalry about four miles from Macon, drove them in, and charged their works, defended by infantry and artillery. The head of his column got inside the works, but could not hold them. He succeeded in reaching the railway, and destroyed about one mile of the track. The road was struck in two or three other places by the cavalry, and a train of cars burned. It rained hard during the entire night.

On the 21st, the cavalry took up an advance position covering all the roads debouching from Macon. Blair continued his march direct on Gordon, reaching that place with his leading division. Osterhaus' column was subdivided; two divisions, with small trains, taking the road towards Irwinton, and the rest, with headquarters, bridge-train, and cattle, the direct Gordon road. The centre and left column met at a point six miles from Gordon, called Pitt's Mill, where the centre took a parallel road into Gordon. The division of General Giles A. Smith reached Gordon the same day.

On the 22d the troops and trains were closed up towards Gordon, excepting Woods' division of the Fifteenth Corps, which was directed to take up a strong position on the Irwinton road, and demonstrate towards Macon. The demonstration was made by General Walcott's brigade, in conjunction with the cavalry on the different roads. The rebel cavalry, in force, made a charge early in the morning, capturing one of our cavalry picket-posts. After a sharp engagement the enemy were driven from the field in confusion, Walcott's infantry deployed as skirmishers taking part in the repulse. In the afternoon, Walcott had taken up a position two miles in advance of his division, towards Macon, having two pieces of artillery, and had thrown up rail barricades, when he was attacked by a large body of infantry, accompanied by a battery of four guns. The assault was made with great vigor, but was met and completely repulsed. The action continued for some three hours. Walcott was assisted by a regiment of cavalry on

either flank. General Woods was present during the action, and General Osterhaus part of the time. In this affair, General Walcott was wounded. On arriving at Gordon, General Howard directed General Blair to send forward the First Alabama Cavalry and Giles A. Smith's division eight or ten miles towards the Oconee bridge, with instructions to move forward at once, and, if possible, to secure that bridge and plank it over for infantry to cross. Corse's fourth division of the Fifteenth Corps, with the bridge-train, having found the roads almost impassable, did not reach the vicinity of Clinton until night.

On the morning of the 23d, the right wing was in and near Gordon, Woods' and Corse's divisions of the Fifteenth Corps occupying that place, Hazen's division of the Fifteenth Corps marching on Irwinton, and Blair moving along the Macon and Savannah railway, engaged in destroying it.

* Let us now turn to the left wing under Slocum and follow its movements down to the same period.


Williams' twentieth corps marched out of Atlanta on the morning of the 15th of November, on the Decatur road, and encamped that night near the Augusta railway, south of Stone Mountain. On the 16th it marched to Rock Bridge, on the 17th to Cornish Creek, and on the 18th to within three miles of Madison. There Geary's division was detached and sent, without wagons or baggage, to destroy the Georgia Central railway bridge over the Oconee; while Jackson's and Ward's divisions, with the trains, taking the Milledgeville road, moved the same day to a point four miles beyond Madison, on the 20th to Eatonton, and on the 21st to Little River, a branch of the Oconee. There Geary rejoined the corps, which on the 22d crossed Little River on a pontoon bridge and moved forward to the suburbs of Milledgeville, Jackson's and Geary's divisions encamping on the east and Ward's on the left bank of the Oconee, near the bridge on the Augusta road; while the Third Wisconsin and One Hundred and Seventh New York regiments, under Colonel Hawley, were placed in the town as a garrison.

Jefferson C. Davis' fourteenth army corps moved from At-

lanta on the morning of the 16th of November, by Decatur, on Covington, and by night had marched fifteen miles. On the 17th this corps marched to the west bank of the Yellow River; crossed that stream on the 18th, on two pontoon bridges, and passing through Covington took the road leading to Milledgeville, by way of Shady Dale, and encamped on the west side of the Ulcofauhatchee River; on the 19th crossed and marched to Shady Dale, on the 20th reached Eatonton Factories; on the 21st deflected to the right, in order to avoid coming in contact with the Twentieth Corps on the main Milledgeville road, and moved with difficulty, owing to a heavy rain, to cross Murder Creek; reached Cedar Creek on the next day; and on the 23d went into camp in the vicinity of Milledgeville.

During the movement of both wings the railway had been effectually destroyed wherever the line of march touched or approached it. The Georgia Central line was broken up from Lithonia to Yellow River, a distance of fifteen miles, for seventeen miles between Social Circle and Madison, and at several points between the last-named town and the Oconee; the Atlanta and Macon line at various places above Lovejoy's, and the road from Macon to the east between that city and Gordon.

Sherman himself had thus far accompanied the Fourteenth Corps. He now ordered Howard to move eastward from Gordon, destroying the railway line leading to Millen as far as Tennille Station, and Slocum to march by two roads on Sandersville, four miles north of Tennille; while Kilpatrick should move from Gordon to Milledgeville, thence rapidly towards the east, break up the railway between Millen and Augusta, and then turn upon Millen and rescue the Union prisoners there confined under torture.



CHAPTER XXI.

THE LOST ARMY.

DURING this march the commander-in-chief made his headquarters with the Twentieth Corps.

On the 24th of November, the right wing marched from Gordon in two columns, Osterhaus' fifteenth corps by way of Irwinton to Ball's Ferry, and Blair's seventeenth corps along the railway, with instructions to cross the Oconee at Jackson's Ferry, two and a half miles north of the railway bridge. General Giles A. Smith, who had preceded his column with the First Alabama Cavalry, drove quite a force of the enemy from two stockades and across the bridge, and found that Jackson's Ferry was an old abandoned route through the swamp, completely impracticable. General Howard therefore directed Blair's corps to move to Ball's Ferry, where the two heads of column arrived about the same time on the 25th inst. A detachment of the First Alabama had the day before reconnoitred the ferry, finding a small force of the enemy, made a raft, crossed the river, and drove the enemy back, but were, subsequently, themselves forced to recross the river with some loss. On arriving at the river the enemy was found entrenched behind barricades, with an extended line of skirmishers. Osterhaus and Blair confronted them with a line which extended beyond the enemy's flanks both up and down the river; the former placed artillery in position and made a demonstration on the front, along the road, while the latter sent a detachment some two miles up the river to cross in boats, but the current being too swift for rowing, the boats were finally swung over, after the fashion of a flying ferry.

After working through the bayous and swamps till near morning the detachment reached the road in the rear of the enemy's position; but the enemy had retreated. The Oconee at this place is narrow, but the current is very swift, and there are some two miles of swampy ground on the right bank. The immediate approach to the ferry on the left bank is, however, very good. The bridges were laid so that the troops commenced crossing in two columns about noon, and by night Corse's and Woods' divisions reach Irwin's Cross-roads, about ten miles east of the ferry, and the remainder of the Fifteenth Corps crossed on the 26th, during which day the Seventeenth Corps took up a position near the fork of the road leading to Station No. 14, and General Blair detached a division to destroy the railway from the Oconee to a point north of Irwin's Cross-roads, and General Osterhaus caused the destruction to be continued thence as far east as Station No. 13.

Slocum marched from Milledgeville on the 24th, the Fourteenth Corps taking the right, by Black Spring, Fair Play, and Long's Bridge, and the Twentieth Corps the more direct road by Hebron; and both corps entered Sandersville by parallel roads, almost simultaneously, on the morning of the 26th. The advanced guard of Wheeler's cavalry was encountered near the town, and skirmished with, but offered no serious opposition.

The two wings being now abreast of each other, General Slocum was ordered to tear up and destroy the Georgia Central Railroad, from Tennille Station, No. 13, to Station No. 10, near the crossing of Ogeechee; one of his corps substantially following the railway, the other the more circuitous route to the left by Louisville, in support of Kilpatrick's cavalry.

Sherman himself now changed his headquarters to the right wing, and accompanied Blair's seventeenth corps on the south of the railway, till abreast of Barton Station, or No. 9½; General Howard, in person, with the Fifteenth Corps, keeping further to the right, and about one day's march ahead, ready to turn against the flank of any enemy who should oppose his progress.

On the 27th, Osterhaus' corps was divided into two columns. The left, consisting of Woods' and Corse's divisions, marched from Irwin's Cross-roads, by the Louisville road, to its intersection with the road leading from Sandersville to Johnson, and thence to the latter place. The right, consisting of Hazen's and John E. Smith's divisions, was to follow the next morning, by plantation roads, to Johnson.

On the 28th the right column of the Fifteenth Corps encamped at Wrightsville, the left column at Riddleville. Blair marched with the Seventeenth Corps from Irwin's, on the Louisville road, and turning into cross-roads on the Sandersville and Savannah road, at the intersection, encamped abreast of Riddleville.

On the 29th the two lower columns nearly formed a junction; the advance, under General Woods, encamping near Summer-ville, and the rest along the lower Savannah road and near Sunderland's Mill, about Sebastopol, or seven miles to the rear of General Woods. The Seventeenth Corps encamped on the upper Savannah road, abreast of Station No. 10, on the Georgia Central railway. The country was covered with open pine woods and wire-grass. Numerous swamps were found along the Ochospee River and its tributaries, and there were very few clearings or plantations. Quite a number of mules and horses were captured in the swamps, the citizens having run them off in the hope of escaping the Union army and Wheeler's cavalry, both equally dreaded.

Let us now turn to the left wing. On the afternoon of the 26th of November, Jackson's and Geary's divisions of Williams' twentieth corps were moved down to Tennille Station, leaving Ward's division to cover the train. The First Michigan Engineers reported for duty with the corps.

On the 27th, 28th, and 29th, the Central railway, and all the wagon-bridges over Williamson's Swamp Creek, were destroyed from Tennille Station to the Ogeechee River, including the long railway bridge over that stream, by Jackson's and Geary's divisions, and the Michigan Engineers. Ward's division marched with the trains, by way of Davisboro', across the

Ogeechee and Rocky Comfort rivers, and encamped near Louisville.

On the 30th, Jackson and Geary moved up the Ogeechee to Coward's Bridge, which was found partly destroyed, but easily repaired, and the whole corps encamped about three miles south of Louisville.

Meanwhile, on the 27th of November, the trains of the Fourteenth Corps, under escort of Carlin's division, moved by the way of Davisboro' upon Louisville, while Baird's and Morgan's divisions, unencumbered, moved on the Finn's Bridge road; thus protecting the left flank from any demonstrations the enemy's cavalry might make from that direction upon the trains.

These two divisions, united under the command of Brigadier-General Baird, marching on a road between the Ogeechee River and Rocky Comfort Creek, reached Louisville early in the afternoon of the 28th, immediately laid a pontoon bridge across the creek, and commenced the passage of troops. Owing to the movements of Ward's division of the Twentieth Corps with the trains, occupying the main road from Davisboro' to Louisville, Carlin's division and the trains of the Fourteenth Corps moving on that road were only able to reach the Ogeechee about three o'clock, p. m. The Fifty-eighth Indiana Pontoniers, under Colonel G. P. Buell, under the personal supervision of General Slocum, immediately commenced laying their bridges, and repairing the roads destroyed by the enemy, and before night the troops and trains were passing both streams into their camps around Louisville.

The road, running as it does here through an immense cypress swamp, required considerable labor to put and keep it in condition for the passage of trains, and it was not until noon the next day that the entire column succeeded in getting into camp. Early on the morning of the 29th, a report was received from General Kilpatrick that he was about ten miles from Louisville, on the road leading direct to Buckhead Bridge, hard pressed by Wheeler.

Kilpatrick, having received his instructions from General Sherman, had also started from Milledgeville on the 25th, and marching by Sparta, crossed the Ogeechee River at the shoals, and thence continuing his course by Spread Oak, Woodburn, and St. Clair, struck the railway on the 27th at Waynesboro'; the advance, under Captain Estes, assistant-adjutant-general, having destroyed a portion of the track, and partly burned the railway bridge over Briar Creek the day previous. During the march, Kilpatrick's flanks and rear had been repeatedly attacked by Wheeler's cavalry, but without delaying the movement. Passing through Waynesboro', Kilpatrick encamped his division in line of battle on the railway, three miles south of the town. Several attacks were made during the night upon Colonel Murray's line, but they were easily repulsed, and did not prevent the destruction of the track, one battalion being detailed from each regiment for that purpose. Here Kilpatrick learned that our prisoners had been removed from Millen two days previous, and the great object of his movement in that direction being thus frustrated, after destroying sufficient track to prevent transportation on the road for a few days, he deemed it prudent to retire to the support of the infantry. Accordingly, Colonel Atkins' brigade was ordered to move out to the intersection of the Waynesboro' and Louisville road, and there take up position, while Colonel Murray should move past him and take up position in his rear, and so on in succession retire from any force that might be sent in pursuit. By some misunderstanding, Colonel Atkins moved on without halting as directed, and the consequence was, that two regiments, the Eighth Indiana, Colonel Jones, and Ninth Michigan Cavalry, Colonel Acker, together with General Kilpatrick himself and all his staff, were cut off and partly surrounded. But these two regiments, by their splendid fighting, led by Kilpatrick, broke through the rebel lines, and slowly fell back, repulsing every attack of the enemy, until the main column was again reached. The cavalry moved on, crossed Buckhead Creek, burned the bridge, and halted two miles from the creek, where information soon reached Kil-

patrick that Wheeler was crossing with his entire force. Parties sent out having ascertained this report to be true, Kilpatrick took up a strong position, and constructed a long line of barricades, with his flanks thrown well to the rear. These dispositions were scarcely completed ere the enemy came in sight and made a most desperate charge, but was handsomely repulsed at all points, and with but slight loss. The cavalry moved on a few miles further, and encamped at the first place where forage could be obtained, the enemy making no further attempts to follow.

Immediately on receipt of General Kilpatrick's message, General Jefferson C. Davis sent a brigade of Baird's division of his corps, under Colonel Morton C. Hunter, to the support of the cavalry; but Wheeler having been already repulsed in the thorough manner just narrated, these re-enforcements were not needed.

During the 29th Kilpatrick came in and took position near the Fourteenth Corps, on the east bank of Big Creek.

Having successfully, and almost without opposition, passed the last of the three large rivers, the Ocmulgee, the Ocoee, and the Ogeechee, that crossed its path and formed the strong natural lines of defence against its movements, Sherman's army now lay with its left wing and the cavalry on the east bank of the latter stream, its right in close communication with it on the other side, and on the morrow would begin the easy and unbroken descent to the sea.

CHAPTER XXII.

TO THE SEA.

WE shall first follow the movements of the right wing down the Ogeechee. Osterhaus, with the Fifteenth Corps, kept the right, and Blair, with the Seventeenth Corps, still accompanied by General Sherman, the left.

On the 30th of November, 1864, Woods' and Corse's divisions, of the Fifteenth Corps, pushed on through Summer-ville northward, till they reached the upper Savannah road, and encamped near Deep Creek. Blair moved forward to Barton, or Station No. $9\frac{1}{2}$; he rebuilt the partially destroyed wagon bridge, laid a pontoon bridge, and crossed the Ogeechee at that point.

On the 1st of December, the three columns moved as follows: the lower one, consisting of Hazen's and John E. Smith's divisions, on the Statesborough road; the middle column, comprising Woods' and Corse's divisions, upon the Savannah road; and Blair's seventeenth corps, constituting the left, along the Georgia Central railway, destroying it as it marched. The two right columns encamped opposite Station No. 8, General Woods securing and repairing the wagon bridge across the Ogeechee at that point; and a small force crossed over, made, break in the railway, and destroyed the depot. The Seventeenth Corps succeeded in reaching Station No. 9.

On the 2d the column preserved the same order of march. General Blair reached Millen, having completely destroyed the railway up to that point, including the depot and a large quantity of lumber, ties, etc. The middle column encamped

near Clifton's Ferry, having thrown a bridge over the Ogeechee at that point, and sent a brigade of Corse's division to assist the Seventeenth Corps in breaking up the railway. Scull's Creek, a wide stream, too deep to be forded, was carefully bridged in two places. Scouting parties hurried on to Scarborough, a little below, and seized a mail with Savannah papers of that day.

On the 3d, the Fifteenth Corps remained in position, excepting that two brigades of Corse's division crossed the river, and aided the Seventeenth Corps in destroying the railway from Millen to Scarborough. The Seventeenth Corps came up abreast, encamping near Scarborough, or Station No. 7.

On the 4th the central column, Woods and Corse, marched to Wilson's Creek; the left, Blair and part of Corse's division, reached Station No. 5 $\frac{1}{2}$, having continued the destruction of the railway up to that point; and the right, Hazen and John E. Smith, proceeded as far as Statesborough. Hazen's division, leading, encountered a small body of the enemy's cavalry, said to be four hundred strong, and had a successful skirmish with them. The road being boggy, Hazen was obliged to corduroy several long stretches during the day.

On the 5th the two columns of the Fifteenth Corps moved along their respective roads to a position nearly opposite Guyton, or Station No. 3. General Howard, who was with the central column, hearing that some resistance was offered to General Blair near Ogeechee Church, caused a feint of crossing the Ogeechee to be made at Flat Ford. Some men were thrown over in boats, but no bridge was laid. General Sherman detained General Blair near Station No. 4 $\frac{1}{2}$, for the left wing to come up.

On the 6th, reconnoissances were made towards Wright's Bridge and Jenks' Bridge at Eden Station with a view of saving them, if possible. Colonel Williamson's brigade of General Woods' division reached the former in time to save much of the timber, but all the planking and several of the trestles were already burned. He, however, constructed a foot-bridge and crossed over a small force which he pushed forward towards the

railway. A small detachment went as far as the Twenty-Mile Station and returned, skirmishing all the way. Colonel Oliver's brigade, of Hazen's division, made the reconnoissance to Jenks' Bridge, but found it destroyed. General Howard sent an officer, Lieutenant Harney, with a select party to strike the Gulf railway, but he found the bridge across the Cannouchee burned and the approaches were guarded by rebels, so that he was compelled to return without doing the work.

On the 7th, Woods remained at Wright's Bridge, except one brigade of infantry, that crossed the foot-bridge and marched down the east bank of the Ogeechee towards Eden Station. On the arrival of the pontoons at Jenks' Bridge, Captain C. B. Reese, chief-engineer of the Army of the Tennessee, finding the enemy on the other bank, threw over a regiment of Colonel Oliver's brigade and cleared the way. The bridge was immediately laid. General Corse's division had arrived by this time. One brigade, General Rice commanding, crossed over, met the enemy's skirmishers some five hundred yards beyond, drove them in, and in a very handsome manner routed a battalion of rebels behind rail-piles, capturing seventeen prisoners, and killing and wounding several more. The brigade lost two killed and two or three wounded. It then formed a junction with a brigade of Woods' division from Wright's Bridge, at Eden Station. Hazen's division moved on to Black Creek, sending forward Colonel Oliver's brigade to the Cannouchee. The rest of the Fifteenth Corps encamped near Jenks' Bridge. The Seventeenth Corps encamped in the vicinity of Guyton, or Station No. 3, ceasing to destroy the railway after leaving Ogeechee Church.

On the 8th of December, as the enemy was reported in some force near the twelve-mile post, having a line of works in his front, General Howard resolved to turn his position by sending two divisions of the Fifteenth Corps down the west bank of the Ogeechee to force a crossing of the Cannouchee, and throw forward sufficient detachments to break the Gulf railway, and, if possible secure King's Bridge over the Ogeechee, about a mile above the railway, and also to reconnoitre with one

division between the Big and Little Ogeechee rivers. The movement on the right bank began first, led by General Osterhaus in person, with Woods' and Hazen's divisions. General Howard himself accompanied General Corse, who found a good ridge road down the left bank of the main Ogeechee, and came upon some carefully constructed but abandoned works three miles and a half from Eden, or Station No. 2. The road was obstructed with felled trees at several points, but the impediments were so quickly removed by the pioneers that the column did not halt. On reaching the Savannah Canal, the bridge over it was found to have been burned, but a new one was made in less than half an hour. The Ogeechee bridge, near the mouth of the canal, at Dillen's Ferry, was found practicable for a pontoon bridge. General Corse sent forward a reconnoissance, which discovered the enemy in force at the junction of this road and the King's Bridge and Savannah road. General Osterhaus effected a crossing of the Cannouchee with two brigades, as directed. The Seventeenth Corps, meanwhile, moved up abreast of Eden, or Station No. 2, having much corduroying to do and many obstructions to clear away. After reaching the canal, General Howard returned to Station No. 2, and communicated with General Sherman in person, who directed him to allow General Blair to continue on the Louisville road.

The next day, December 9th, the Seventeenth Corps came upon the enemy in rifle-pits, three and a half miles from Station No. 2. General Blair drove the rebels from them, but soon came upon an intrenched line with guns in position. At this place the road led through a swamp densely covered with the wood and undergrowth peculiar to this region, and apparently impassable; but General Blair moved three lines of battle, preceded by a skirmish line, along on the right and left of the road for some two or three miles, occasionally in water knee-deep, drove the enemy from every position where he made a stand, and encamped for the night near Pooler, or Station No. 1. The detached brigades of the Fifteenth Corps succeeded in reaching the Savannah and

Gulf railway at different points, and destroying it. The third division, General John E. Smith, closed up on Corse's at the canal. As soon as he was within supporting distance, General Corse moved forward towards Savannah. He encountered about six hundred rebel infantry with two pieces of artillery near the cross-roads. His advance brigade quickly dislodged them, capturing one piece of artillery and several prisoners. He followed them up across the Little Ogeechee, and by General Howard's direction took up a strong position about twelve miles from Savannah, and thence sent out a detachment to break the Gulf railway. His advance crossed the Little Ogeechee, and halted about eight miles from the city. King's Bridge had been burned by the rebels. All the enemy's force was withdrawn from Osterhaus' front in the morning, except the independent garrison at Fort McAllister, situated on the right bank and near the mouth of the Ogeechee. During the day that section of the pontoon-bridge which had been with General Blair's column, was sent to Dillen's Ferry, near Fort Argyle, and laid across the Ogeechee, thus substantially uniting the two right columns of Howard's army.

To return to the left wing.

Williams' twentieth corps marched from Louisville on the 1st of December. From that time to the 8th, its line of march was down the Peninsula between the Ogeechee and Savannah rivers, following the Louisville and Savannah road, encamping on the 1st on Baker's Creek ; on the 2d at Buckhead Church , on the 3d at Horse Creek ; on the 4th at Little Ogeechee ; on the 5th at Sylvania Cross-roads ; on the 6th near Cowpens Creek ; on the 7th on Jack's Branch, near Springfield ; and on the 8th near Eden Cross-roads. As the coast neared, the surface of the country became flat and swampy. Large ponds or pools were met every mile or so, and the creeks spread out into several miry branches. The roads between the creeks and ponds, though apparently of sand, and of substantial character, proved to be upon a thin crust, which was soon cut through by the long trains into the deep quicksand, thus

requiring miles of corduroy. At several of the swamps, the enemy had attempted to obstruct the march by felling timber.

On the 9th the direction of march was changed to the east, taking the road from Eden to Monteith Post-office, on the Charleston railway. At the large Monteith swamp, the enemy, besides obstructing the road for nearly a mile by felling trees, had built two small earthworks, and with a single gun and about four hundred infantry made a show of stopping the march of the corps. Jackson's division being in advance, was ordered to throw out several regiments on each flank, while a brigade in the centre should make a feint, to engage attention and enable the pioneers to clear the obstructions. As soon as a portion of Robinson's brigade, under Colonel West, Thirty-first Wisconsin Volunteers, could cross the swamp the enemy fled, leaving behind a considerable quantity of new clothing and accoutrements. Jackson's loss was one man killed and four wounded.

On the morning of the 10th, the corps moved down to Monteith Station, on the Charleston railway, and after destroying some miles of the road, marched to a point near the five-mile post, on the Augusta and Savannah railway. Here, meeting the enemy's strong line of defences behind swamps and artificial ponds, the corps was ordered to encamp for the night. During the afternoon a party of foragers, with some cavalry, succeeded in capturing, near the foot of Argyle Island, a rebel dispatch-boat called the *Ida*, having on board Colonel Clinch, of General Hardee's staff, with dispatches for the rebel gunboats on the river above. The boat was unfortunately set on fire and burned.

On the 30th of November, Carlin's division of Jefferson C. Davis' fourteenth corps marched to Sebastopol, with a view to uncovering the crossing of the Ogeechee by other troops advancing in that direction. The next day, in the general advance of the army upon Millen, Davis was ordered to cross Buckhead Creek, at some point between Waynesboro' and Birdsville, for which place the Twentieth Corps was moving.

Baird's division, with Kilpatrick's cavalry, was ordered to move in the direction of Waynesboro', and after crossing Buckhead Creek, to move down the east bank of that stream and take position near Reynolds, not far from Buckhead bridge.

Morgan's division, in charge of the whole corps train, moved on the direct road to the bridge, and encamped ten miles from Louisville.

On the 2d of December, Baird and Kilpatrick completed the movement just indicated, Carlin's division joined the column from the direction of Sebastopol, and the whole corps went into camp at the crossing of the Birdsville and Waynesboro' roads, about two miles from the bridge.

The change in the direction of march of the Twentieth Corps to the Louisville and Springfield road again caused a deflection in the line of march of the Fourteenth Corps; and on the morning of the 3d, pontoon bridges were laid across the creek, at a point about five miles higher up the stream, and the troops and trains began crossing at half-past ten o'clock. Jacksonboro' had by this time been designated, by General Sherman, as the next objective point for the concentration of the corps; and General Davis ordered Baird and Kilpatrick to move from Reynolds, in the direction of Waynesboro', with a view to leading the enemy to believe that the next advance would be upon Augusta. Carlin and Morgan, after a hard day's work upon the roads, went into camp at Lumpkin's Station, where the Jacksonboro' road crosses the Augusta and Savannah railway. Baird and Kilpatrick took position near Thomas' Station, where the enemy was found in considerable force.

On the 4th, Carlin's and Morgan's division, with the three corps trains, after destroying three miles of railway, moved in the direction of Jacksonboro', and encamped thirteen miles beyond Lumpkin's Station. Baird and Kilpatrick, after some fighting with Wheeler's cavalry, drove the enemy from Waynesboro', and across Brier Creek. Baird, in the mean time, destroyed three miles of railway near Thomas' Station.

On the 5th, after a hard day's march over country roads,

which required much repairing, the whole corps, with Kilpatrick's cavalry, encamped in the vicinity of Jacksonboro', the advance being at Buck Creek Post-office, on the Savannah road.

During the night, the bridge across Beaver-dam Creek, at Jacksonboro', which had been destroyed, was rebuilt by Colonel Buell, of the Fifty-eighth Indiana, and his pontoniers; and early on the morning of the 6th, the whole column marched on the river-road, and went into camp at and in advance of Hudson's Ferry, on the Savannah River, making an average march of about twenty miles.

On the 7th, the column moved in the same order of march, Baird and Kilpatrick, with Colonel Atkins' brigade, unencumbered by the trains, covering the rear. Morgan's division, with the pontoon train, reached Ebenezer Creek late in the evening, and began cutting away the fallen timber which obstructed the roadway through the immense swamp which skirts the creeks on both sides at this point. Notwithstanding an exceedingly hard day's march, the pontoniers, under Colonel Buell, set to work at once to reconstruct the bridge, and by noon the next day the column commenced crossing this formidable defile; but in spite of the immense amount of labor expended upon the road and bridge, to make them passable, much was still required to maintain them in condition, and it was not until daylight on the 9th that the rear of the column had completed the crossing.

During the 8th, the enemy's cavalry made several attempts to drive in the rear pickets of the Fourteenth Corps, but did not succeed. The loss in the corps during these attacks was but slight, although at times the skirmishing was quite animated.

On the morning of the 9th, the crossing of Ebenezer Creek being now completed, as already stated, the corps marched from its camp at Ebenezer Church to Cuyler's plantation, where General Morgan, who was in the advance, found the enemy occupying a strongly-erected field-work, and disposed to dispute his advance. Morgan immediately placed two field-pieces in position and opened fire upon the work. His

infantry was soon deployed for an attack, but the near approach of night, and the impossibility of assaulting the position, through the impassable swamp in the front, caused General Davis to defer the attack until morning, when it was discovered the enemy had abandoned his position.

On the 10th, Morgan's and Carlin's divisions, with trains, moved to the Ten-mile House, and went into camp, giving the road to the Twentieth Corps, advancing from Monteith and intersecting the Augusta road. Baird's division was left to cover the rear, and tear up the railway track in the vicinity of the crossing of the Savannah River, and if possible to destroy the bridge at that point.

To preserve the historical sequence, it is necessary to glance separately at the movements of the cavalry division under Kilpatrick, already briefly touched upon so far as they were directly connected with the operations of the several corps.

On the 2d of December, as has been seen, Kilpatrick moved from the vicinity of Louisville, on the Waynesboro' road, supported by Baird's division of the Fifteenth Corps, to cover the movement of several columns on Millen. A small force of the enemy was encountered and dispersed by the Eighth Indiana, Colonel Jones, and the Fifth Kentucky, Colonel Baldwin, nine miles from Waynesboro', not without a severe skirmish. On reaching Rocky Creek, the enemy was found in considerable force on the opposite bank. Baird's division came up, and a force of both cavalry and infantry crossed the creek and simultaneously charged the enemy, who rapidly retreated towards Waynesboro' and Augusta, closely pursued for some distance by the cavalry.

On the 3d, Kilpatrick marched to Thomas' Station and encamped for the night, having made such disposition of his forces as to protect Baird's division, then deployed along the railway and engaged in its destruction. Wheeler, who had been encamped between Waynesboro' and Brier Creek, moved in the early part of the evening to Waynesboro', and, with a portion of his command, made a vigorous

attack upon one of Colonel Atkins' regiments, stationed upon the railway, three miles south of the town. This attack was easily repulsed, as were several others, made during the night. Having received orders that day from General Sherman to make a strong reconnoissance in the direction of Waynesboro', and to engage Wheeler whenever he might be met, Kilpatrick directed his brigade commanders to send the surplus animals and all non-combatants to the wagon-trains, and notify them that in the morning he would move to engage, defeat, and rout the rebel cavalry encamped at Waynesboro'.

At daylight on the 4th the cavalry moved out of camp, Atkins' brigade leading the advance. The enemy's skirmish line was met, quickly driven in, and finally retired upon his main line, consisting of dismounted cavalry, strongly posted behind long lines of barricades, with their flanks well secured. Colonel Atkins was directed to move forward and take the barricades; but the enemy was found to be more strongly posted than was anticipated, and the first attempt was a failure. The Ninety-second Illinois Mounted Infantry was dismounted; the Tenth Ohio and Ninth Michigan Cavalry, in columns of fours, by battalions, were sent in on the right, and the Ninth Ohio Cavalry was placed in the same order on the left; the Tenth Wisconsin battery, Captain Beebe, was brought up to within less than six hundred yards, and opened upon the barricades, and the enemy's artillery, in all five pieces, was forced to withdraw. At this moment, all being ready, the charge was sounded; the whole line moved forward in splendid order, and never halted for one moment until the barricades were gained and the enemy routed. A few hundred yards beyond, the enemy made several counter-charges, to save his dismounted men and check Kilpatrick's rapid advance. At one time he had nearly succeeded, when the Eighth Ohio Cavalry, Colonel Heath, which had been sent out on Kilpatrick's right, charged the enemy in flank and rear, and forced them to give way at all points, and rapidly to fall back to the town of Waynesboro'. Here the enemy was found occupying a second line of barricades, with artillery, as before, and his flanks

so far extended that it was useless to attempt to turn them. Kilpatrick therefore determined to break his centre. Colonel Murray, having the advance, was directed to make a disposition accordingly. The Eighth Indiana, Colonel Jones, was dismounted and pushed forward as skirmishers; the Ninth Pennsylvania, Colonel Jordan, in columns of fours, by battalions, had the left; the Third Kentucky, Lieutenant-Colonel King, the centre; the Fifth Kentucky, Colonel Baldwin, and Second Kentucky, Captain Foreman, the right. The advance was sounded, and in less than twenty minutes the enemy was driven from his position, the town gained, and Wheeler's entire force completely routed. The Fifth Ohio, Fifth Kentucky, and a portion of the Ninth Pennsylvania Cavalry, followed in close pursuit to Brier Creek, a distance of eight miles from the point from where the first attack was made. After burning the bridges above and below the railway bridge, as well as the latter, the cavalry marched to Alexander, on the Waynesboro' and Jacksonboro' road, and encamped for the night.

On the 5th, Kilpatrick marched from Alexander to Jacksonboro', covering the rear of the Fourteenth Army Corps, as already stated.

On the 6th, Colonel Murray's brigade marched to Springfield, moving in rear of the Twentieth Corps, and Colonel Atkins' brigade moved to Hudson Ferry.

On the 7th, when near Sister's Ferry, the Ninth Michigan, Colonel Acker, acting as rear-guard of Colonel Atkins' brigade, received and repulsed an attack made by Ferguson's brigade of Confederate cavalry.

On the 8th, Atkins' brigade crossed Ebenezer Creek, and the whole division united on the Monteith road, ten miles south of Springfield. From this point the cavalry moved in rear of the Seventeenth Corps, covering the rear of the other corps by detachments.

Thus, on the 10th of December, 1864, the enemy's forces under Hardee were driven within the immediate defences of Savannah, and Sherman's entire army having leisurely marched over three hundred miles in twenty-four days with trifling

opposition through the vitals of the enemy's country, subsisting upon his stock-yards and granaries, was massed in front of the city, entirely across the peninsula lying between the Ogeechee and Savannah rivers, and occupying all the lines of railway communication and supply.

CHAPTER XXIII.

A CHRISTMAS GIFT.

THE defensive works constructed by the enemy to cover the rear of Savannah, and now garrisoned by the Confederate forces under Lieutenant-General Hardee, followed substantially a swampy creek which empties into the Savannah River about three miles above the city, across to the head of a corresponding stream flowing into the Little Ogeechee. These streams proved singularly favorable to the enemy as a cover, being very marshy and bordered by rice-fields, which were flooded either by the tide-water or by inland ponds, the gates to which were controlled and covered by his heavy artillery. The only approaches to the city were by five narrow causeways, namely, the two railways, and the Augusta, the Louisville, and the Ogeechee roads, all of which were commanded by the enemy's heavy ordnance.

To assault an enemy of unknown strength at such a disadvantage appeared to Sherman unwise, especially as he had brought his army, almost unscathed, so great a distance, and could surely attain the same result by the operation of time. He therefore instructed his army commanders closely to invest the city from the north and west, and to reconnoitre well the ground in their respective fronts, while he gave his personal attention to opening communications with the fleet, which was known to be waiting in Tybee, Wassaw, and Ossabaw sounds, in accordance with the preconcerted plan. Williams' twentieth corps held the left of the Union line, resting on the Savannah River, near Williamson's plantation; Jefferson C. Davis' fourteenth corps was on its right, extending from the Augusta railway, near its junction with the Charles-

ton railway, to Lawton's plantation, beyond the canal; Blair's seventeenth corps next, and Osterhaus' fifteenth corps on the extreme right, with its flank resting on the Gulf railway, at Station No. 1. General Kilpatrick was instructed to cross the Ogeechee by a pontoon bridge, to reconnoitre Fort McAllister, and to proceed to St. Catherine's Sound, in the direction of Sunbury or Kilkenny Bluff, and open communication with the fleet. General Howard had previously sent Captain Duncan, one of his best scouts, down the Ogeechee in a canoe for a like purpose; but it was also necessary to have the ships and their contents, and the Ogeechee River, close to the rear of the camps, as the proper avenue of supply.

The enemy had burned King's Bridge, over the Ogeechee, just below the mouth of the Cannouchee; but although a thousand feet long, it was reconstructed in an incredibly short time, and in the most substantial manner, by the Fifty-eighth Indiana, Colonel Buell, under the direction of Captain C. B. Reese, of the Engineer Corps; and on the 13th of December, Hazen's division of Osterhaus' fifteenth corps crossed the bridge, gained the west bank of the Ogeechee, and marched down the river with orders to carry by assault Fort McAllister, a strong inclosed redoubt, manned by two companies of artillery and three of infantry, numbering in all about two hundred men, and mounting twenty-three barbette guns and one mortar.

On the morning of the 13th of December, General Sherman and General Howard went to Dr. Cheves' rice-mill, whence Fort McAllister was in full view. At the rice-mill a section of De Grass' battery was firing occasionally at the fort opposite, three miles and a half distant, as a diversion, having for its principal object, however, to attract the attention of the fleet. During the day the two commanders watched the fort and the bay, endeavoring to catch glimpses of the division moving upon the work, and of vessels belonging to the fleet. About noon, the rebel artillery at McAllister opened inland, firing occasionally from three or four different guns. By their glasses the generals could observe Hazen's skirmishers firing on the fort; and about the same time a movable smoke, like that from a

steamer, attracted their attention near the mouth of the Ogeechee.

Signal communication was established with General Hazen, who gave notice that he had invested the fort, and also that he observed the steamer. General Sherman signalled him from the top of the mill that it was important to carry the fort by assault that day.

The steamer had approached near enough to draw the fire of the fort when her signal-flag was descried. Captain McClintock, of the Signal Corps, aided by Lieutenant Sampson, speedily communicated with the vessel, and ascertained that she was a tug, sent by General Foster and Admiral Dahlgren for the purpose of communicating with the army. The signal-officer of the steamer inquired, "Is McAllister ours?"

Just at that moment a brisk firing was observed at the fort. Hazen had sounded the charge, and instantly his brave division had rushed through the torpedoes and abattis which obstructed the approach to the fort, and gaining the parapet, after a hand-to-hand struggle of a few moments' duration, the garrison had surrendered.

From their position at the rice-mill, Sherman and Howard could see the men discharge their pieces in the air, and hear their shout of triumph as they took possession of the fort and raised the old flag over their conquest.

Hazen's loss in killed and wounded was about ninety men, while the garrison lost between forty and fifty, killed and wounded; and the remainder, about one hundred and fifty in number, were captured, together with twenty-two pieces of artillery and a large quantity of ammunition.

The substantial fruit of this victory, however, was to be found in the fact that communication with the sea was established, and the prompt receipt of supplies secured.

As soon as he saw the Union colors planted upon the walls of the fort, Sherman ordered a boat, and, accompanied by General Howard, went down to the fort, and there met General Hazen, who had not yet communicated with the steamer, nor indeed seen her, as the view was interrupted by some trees.

Determined to communicate that night with the fleet, Sherman got into another boat, and caused himself to be rowed down the Ogeechee, until he met the navy tug-boat *Dandelion*, commanded by Lieutenant-Commander Williamson, who informed him that Captain Duncan, who, it will be remembered, was sent down the river a few days previously by General Howard, had safely reached Major-General Foster and Rear-Admiral Dahlgren, commanding the land and naval forces on the South Atlantic coast, and that these officers were hourly expected to arrive in Ossabaw Sound, where the *Dandelion* was then lying.

At midnight, Sherman wrote brief notes to General Foster and the admiral, and a dispatch to the secretary of war, recounting the main facts of the campaign, and the present situation.

"The weather has been fine," he said to Mr. Stanton, "and supplies were abundant. Our march was most agreeable, and we were not at all molested by guerrillas. . . . We have not lost a wagon on the trip, but have gathered in a large supply of negroes, mules, horses, etc., and our trains are in far better condition than when we started. My first duty will be to clear the army of surplus negroes, mules, and horses. . . . The quick work made with McAllister, and the opening of communication with our fleet, and the consequent independence for supplies, dissipates all their boasted threats to head me off and starve the army. I regard Savannah as already gained."

He then returned to Fort McAllister, and before daylight was overtaken by Major Strong, of General Foster's staff, with intelligence that General Foster had arrived in the Ogeechee, near Fort McAllister, and was very anxious to meet General Sherman on board his boat. Sherman accordingly returned with the major, and met General Foster on board the steamer *Nemaha*; and, after consultation, determined to proceed with him down the sound, in hopes of meeting Admiral Dahlgren, which, however, they did not do until about noon, in Wassaw Sound. General Sherman there went on board the admiral's flagship, the *Harvest Moon*, after having arranged with General Foster to send from Hilton Head some siege ordnance and boats suitable for navigating the Ogeechee River. Ad-

miral Dahlgren furnished all the data concerning his fleet and the numerous forts that guarded the inland channels between the sea and Savannah; and Sherman explained to him how completely Savannah was invested at all points, save only the plank-road on the South Carolina shore, known as the "Union Causeway," which he thought he could reach from his left flank across the Savannah River. The general also informed the admiral that if he would simply engage the attention of the forts along Wilmington Channel, at Beaulieu and Rosedew, the army could carry the defences of Savannah by assault as soon as the heavy ordnance arrived from Hilton Head.

On the 15th, Sherman returned to the lines in the rear of Savannah.

Having received and carefully considered all the reports of division commanders, he determined to assault the lines of the enemy as soon as the heavy ordnance should arrive from Port Royal, first making a formal demand for surrender. On the 17th, a number of thirty-pounder Parrott guns having reached King's Bridge, Sherman proceeded in person to the headquarters of Major-General Slocum, on the Augusta road, and dispatched thence into Savannah, by flag of truce, a formal demand for the surrender of the place, accompanied by a copy of Hood's threat, at Dalton, to take no prisoners, and on the following day received an answer from General Hardee conveying his refusal to accede thereto. In his reply, General Hardee pointed out that the investment was still incomplete.

In the mean time, further reconnoissances from the left flank had demonstrated that it was impracticable and unwise to push any considerable force across the Savannah River, since the enemy held the river opposite the city with iron-clad gunboats, and could destroy any pontoons laid down between Hutchinson's Island and the South Carolina shore, and thereby isolate any force sent over from that flank. Sherman, therefore, ordered General Slocum to get into position the siege-guns, and make all the preparations necessary to assault, and to report the earliest moment when he could be ready.

General Foster had already established a division of troops

on the peninsula or neck between the Coosawhatchie and Tullifinney rivers, at the head of Broad River, whence he could reach the railway with his artillery. Sherman himself went to Port Royal, and made arrangements to re-enforce that command by one or more divisions, so as to enable it to assault and carry the railway, and thence turn towards Savannah until it should occupy the causeway. He made the voyage on board Admiral Dahlgren's flag-ship, the *Harvest Moon*, which put to sea the night of the 20th; but the wind was high, and increased during the night, so that the pilot considered Ossabaw Bar impassable, and ran into Tybee, whence the steamer proceeded through the inland channels into Wassaw Sound, and thence through Romney Marsh. But the ebb-tide having caught the *Harvest Moon*, so that she was unable to make the passage, Admiral Dahlgren took the general in his barge, and pulling in the direction of Vernon River, the army-tug *Red Legs* was there met, bearing a message from Captain Dayton, assistant-adju-tant-general, dated that morning, the 21st, to the effect that the troops were already in possession of the enemy's lines, and were advancing without opposition into Savannah. Admiral Dahlgren proceeded up the Vernon River in his barge, while General Sherman went on board the tug, in which he proceeded to Fort McAllister, and thence to the rice-mill, whence he had viewed the assault, and on the morning of the 22d rode into the city of Savannah.

After firing heavily from his iron-clads and the batteries along the lines, all the afternoon, and late into the evening of the 20th, Hardee had evacuated the city during that night, on a pontoon bridge, and marched towards Charleston on the causeway road. The night being very dark, and a strong westerly wind blowing, although the sounds of movement were heard in Geary's front, it was impossible to make out its direction or object, and when the pickets of that division advanced early on the morning of the 21st the evacuation had been completed, and nothing remained but to occupy the city.

Immediately on his arrival, Sherman dispatched the follow-

ing brief note to President Lincoln, announcing this happy termination of the campaign:—

“I beg to present you, as a Christmas gift, the city of Savannah, with one hundred and fifty heavy guns and plenty of ammunition, and also about twenty-five thousand bales of cotton.”

The number of pieces of artillery captured, as subsequently ascertained by actual inspection and count, was one hundred and sixty-seven.

Thus, as the result of this great campaign, was gained the possession of what had from the outset been its chief object.

Its present value was mainly as a base for future operations.

The army marched over three hundred miles in twenty-four days, directly through the heart of Georgia, and reached the sea with its subsistence trains almost unbroken. In the entire command, five officers and fifty-eight men were killed, thirteen officers and two hundred and thirty-two men wounded, and one officer and two hundred and fifty-eight men missing; making a total list of casualties of but nineteen commissioned officers and five hundred and forty-eight enlisted men, or five hundred and sixty-seven of all ranks. Seventy-seven officers, and twelve hundred and sixty-one men of the Confederate army, or thirteen hundred and thirty-eight in all, were made prisoners. Ten thousand negroes left the plantations of their former masters and accompanied the column when it reached Savannah, without taking note of thousands more who joined the army, but from various causes had to leave it at different points. Over twenty thousand bales of cotton were burned, besides the twenty-five thousand captured at Savannah. Thirteen thousand head of beef-cattle, nine million five hundred thousand pounds of corn, and ten million five hundred thousand of fodder, were taken from the country and issued to the troops and animals. The men lived mainly on the sheep hogs, turkeys, geese, chickens, sweet potatoes, and rice, gathered by the foragers from the plantations along the route of each day's

march. Sixty thousand men, taking merely of the surplus which fell in their way as they marched rapidly on the main roads, subsisted for three weeks in the very country where the Union prisoners at Andersonville were starved to death or idiocy. Five thousand horses and four thousand mules were impressed for the cavalry and trains. Three hundred and twenty miles of railway were destroyed, and the last remaining links of communication between the Confederate armies in Virginia and the West effectually severed, by burning every tie, twisting every rail while heated red-hot over the flaming piles of ties, and laying in ruin every depot, engine-house, repair-shop, water-tank, and turn-table.

From the time that the army left Atlanta, until its arrival before Savannah, not one word of intelligence was received by the Government or people, except through the Confederate newspapers, of its whereabouts, movements, or fate; and it was not until Sherman had emerged from the region lying between Augusta and Macon, and reached Millen, that the authorities and the press of the Confederacy were able to make up their minds as to the direction of his march.

Marching in four columns, on a front of thirty miles, each column masked in all directions by clouds of skirmishers Sherman was enabled to continue till the last to menace so many points, each in such force that it was impossible for the enemy to decide whether Augusta, Macon, or Savannah were his immediate objective; the Gulf or the Atlantic his destination; the Flint, the Oconee, the Ogeechee, or the Savannah his route; or what his ulterior design.

Immediately upon receipt of Sherman's laconic message, President Lincoln replied:—

“EXECUTIVE MANSION,
“WASHINGTON, D C., Dec. 26, 1864.

“MY DEAR GENERAL SHERMAN:

“Many, many thanks for your Christmas gift,—the capture of Savannah.

“When you were about to leave Atlanta for the Atlantic

coast, I was *anxious*, if not fearful; but feeling you were the better judge, and remembering that 'nothing risked nothing gained,' I did not interfere. Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours, for I believe none of us went further than to acquiesce. And taking the work of General Thomas into the count, as it should be taken, it is indeed a great success.

"Not only does it afford the obvious and immediate military advantages, but in showing to the world that your army could be divided, putting the stronger part to an important new service, and yet leaving enough to vanquish the old opposing forces of the whole--Hood's army--it brings those who sat in darkness to see a great light.

"But what next? I suppose it will be safe if I leave General Grant and yourself to decide.

"Please make my grateful acknowledgments to your whole army, officers and men.

"Yours very truly,

"A. LINCOLN."

In concluding his official report, Sherman thus speaks of the services rendered by his subordinate commanders, and of the character of his army:—

"Generals Howard and Slocum are gentlemen of singular capacity and intelligence, thorough soldiers and patriots, working day and night, not for themselves, but for their country and their men. General Kilpatrick, who commanded the cavalry of this army, has handled it with spirit and dash to my entire satisfaction, and kept a superior force of the enemy's cavalry from even approaching our infantry columns or wagon-trains. All the division and brigade commanders merit my personal and official thanks, and I shall spare no efforts to secure them commissions equal to the rank they have exercised so well.

"As to the rank and file, they seem so full of confidence in themselves, that I doubt if they want a compliment from me;

but I must do them the justice to say that, whether called on to fight, to march, to wade streams, to make roads, clear out obstructions, build bridges, make 'corduroy,' or tear up railroads, they have done it with alacrity and a degree of cheerfulness unsurpassed. A little loose in foraging, they 'did some things they ought not to have done,' yet on the whole they have supplied the wants of the army with as little violence as could be expected, and as little loss as I calculated. Some of these foraging parties had encounters with the enemy which would, in ordinary times, rank as respectable battles.

"The behavior of our troops in Savannah has been so manly, so quiet, so perfect, that I take it as the best evidence of discipline and true courage. Never was a hostile city, filled with women and children, occupied by a large army with less disorder, or more system, order, and good government. The same general and generous spirit of confidence and good feeling pervades the army which it has ever afforded me especial pleasure to report on former occasions."

CHAPTER XXIV.

THE END OF HOOD.

IN order fully to comprehend how it was possible for a campaign so vast in its magnitude, so decisive in its results, to be conducted to a successful termination with only nominal opposition, it is necessary to recur to the position of Hood's army, which we left at Florence in the early part of November, confronted by the Union army under Thomas, then concentrated at Pulaski, under the immediate command of Major-General Schofield.

It will be remembered that, in view of the numerical inferiority of his army, comprising the Fourth and Twenty-third Corps, Hatch's division, and Croxton's and Capron's brigades of cavalry, amounting to less than thirty thousand men of all arms, General Thomas had decided to maintain a defensive attitude, until the arrival of A. J. Smith with two divisions of the Sixteenth Corps from Missouri and the remnant of dismounted cavalry should enable him to assume the offensive, with equal strength, against Hood's forces, consisting of the three old corps of the Confederate army of the Tennessee, under Lee, Stewart, and Cheatham, estimated at thirty thousand strong, and Forrest's cavalry, supposed to number twelve thousand. In preparation for his great invasion of Middle Tennessee, with the declared intention of remaining there, Hood had caused the Mobile and Ohio railway to be repaired, and occupied Corinth, so that his supplies could now be brought from Selma and Montgomery by rail to that point, and thence to Cherokee Station, on the Memphis and Charleston railway.

On the afternoon of the 12th of November the last telegram was received from General Sherman, and all railway and telegraphic communication with his army ceased. From that time until the 17th of November was an anxious period for Thomas, uncertain whether he should have to pursue Hood in an endeavor on his part to follow Sherman, or defend Tennessee against invasion; but on that day Cheatham's corps crossed to the south side of the Tennessee, and suspense was at an end. Hood could not follow Sherman now if he would, for Sherman was already two days' march from Atlanta on his way to the sea.

On the 19th of November, Hood began his advance, on parallel roads from Florence towards Waynesboro'.

General Schofield commenced removing the public property from Pulaski preparatory to falling back towards Columbia.

Two divisions of Stanley's fourth corps had already reached Lynnville, fifteen miles north of Pulaski, to cover the passage of the wagons and protect the railway. Capron's brigade of cavalry was at Mount Pleasant, covering the approach to Columbia from that direction; and in addition to the regular garrison, there was at Columbia a brigade of Ruger's division of the Twenty-third Corps. The two remaining brigades of Ruger's division, then at Johnsonville, were ordered to move, one by railway around through Nashville to Columbia, the other by road *via* Waverley to Centreville, and occupy the crossings of Duck River near Columbia, Williamsport, Gordon's Ferry, and Centreville. About five thousand men belonging to Sherman's column had collected at Chattanooga, comprising convalescents and furloughed men returning to their regiments. These men had been organized into brigades, to be made available at such points as they might be needed. Thomas had also been re-enforced by twenty new one-year regiments, most of which, however, were absorbed in replacing old regiments whose terms of service had expired.

On the 23d, in accordance with directions previously given him, General R. S. Granger commenced withdrawing the garrisons from Athens, Decatur, and Huntsville, Alabama, and

moved off towards Stevenson, sending five new regiments of that force to Murfreesboro', and retaining at Stevenson the original troops of his command. This movement was rapidly made by rail, and without opposition on the part of the enemy.

The same night General Schofield evacuated Pulaski, and reached Columbia on the 24th. The commanding officer at Johnsonville was directed to evacuate that post and retire to Clarksville. During the 24th and 25th, the enemy skirmished with General Schofield's troops at Columbia, and on the morning of the 26th his infantry came up and pressed Schofield's line strongly during that day and the 27th, but without assaulting. As the enemy's movements showed an undoubted intention to cross, General Schofield withdrew to the north bank of Duck River, during the night of the 27th. Two divisions of the Twenty-third Corps were placed in line in front of the town, holding all the crossings in its vicinity; while Stanley's fourth corps, posted in reserve on the Franklin pike, was held in readiness to repel any vigorous attempt the enemy should make to force a passage; and the cavalry, under Wilson, held the crossings above those guarded by the infantry.

About 2 A. M. on the 29th, the enemy succeeded in pressing back General Wilson's cavalry, and effected a crossing on the Lewisburg pike: at a later hour part of his infantry crossed at Huey's Mills, six miles above Columbia. Communication with the cavalry having been interrupted, and the line of retreat towards Franklin being threatened, General Schofield made preparations to withdraw to Franklin. General Stanley, with one division of his Fourth Corps, was sent to Spring Hill, fifteen miles north of Columbia, to cover the trains and hold the road open for the passage of the main force; and dispositions were made, preparatory to a withdrawal, to meet any attack coming from the direction of Huey's Mills. General Stanley reached Spring Hill just in time to drive off the enemy's cavalry and save the trains; but he was afterwards attacked by the enemy's infantry and cavalry combined, who nearly succeeded in dislodging him from the position. Although not attacked from the direction of Huey's Mills, General Schofield was

busily occupied all day at Columbia resisting the enemy's attempts to cross Duck River, which he successfully accomplished, repulsing the enemy many times with heavy loss. Giving directions for the withdrawal of the troops as soon as covered by the darkness, at a late hour in the afternoon General Schofield, with Ruger's division, started to the relief of General Stanley at Spring Hill, and when near that place came upon the enemy's cavalry, bivouacking within eight hundred yards of the road, but easily drove them off. Posting a brigade to hold the pike at this point, General Schofield, with Ruger's division, pushed on to Thompson's Station, three miles beyond, where he found the enemy's camp-fires still burning, a cavalry force having occupied the place at dark, but subsequently disappeared. The withdrawal of the main force in front of Columbia was safely effected after dark on the 29th; Spring Hill was passed without molestation about midnight, and, making a night march of twenty-five miles, the whole command got into position at Franklin at an early hour on the morning of the 30th, the cavalry moving on the Lewisburg pike, on the right or east of the infantry.

At Franklin, General Schofield formed line of battle on the southern edge of the town, and hastened the crossing of the trains to the north side of Harpeth River.

The enemy followed closely after General Schofield's rear-guard in the retreat to Franklin, and repeatedly assaulted his works until ten o'clock at night; but Schofield's position was excellently chosen, with both flanks resting on the river, and his men firmly held their ground, and repulsed every attack along the whole line. Our loss was one hundred and eighty-nine killed, one thousand and thirty-three wounded, and one thousand one hundred and four missing, making an aggregate of two thousand three hundred and twenty-six. Seven hundred and two prisoners were captured, and thirty-three stands of colors. Major-General Stanley was severely wounded while engaged in rallying a portion of his command which had been temporarily overpowered by an overwhelming attack of the enemy. The enemy lost seventeen hundred and fifty killed,

three thousand eight hundred wounded, and seven hundred and two prisoners, making an aggregate loss to Hood's army of six thousand two hundred and fifty-two, among which number were six general officers killed, six wounded, and one captured.

On the evacuation of Columbia, General Thomas sent orders to General Milroy, at Tullahoma, to abandon that post and retire to Murfreesboro', joining forces with General Rousseau at the latter place, but to maintain the garrison at the block-house at Elk River bridge. Nashville was placed in a state of defence, and the fortifications manned by the garrison, re-enforced by a volunteer force which had been previously organized into a division under brevet Brigadier-General J. L. Donaldson, from the employes of the quartermaster's and commissary departments. This latter force, aided by railway employes, the whole under the direction of Brigadier-General Tower, worked assiduously to construct additional defences. Major-General Steedman, with the five thousand men isolated from General Sherman's column, and a brigade of colored troops, started from Chattanooga by rail on the 29th November, and reached Cowan on the morning of the 30th, where orders were sent him to proceed direct to Nashville. At an early hour on the morning of the 30th the advance of Major-General A. J. Smith's command arrived at Nashville by transports from St. Louis. Thus, General Thomas had now an infantry force nearly equal to that of the enemy, though still outnumbered in effective cavalry; but as soon as a few thousand of the latter arm could be mounted he would be in a condition to take the field offensively and dispute the possession of Tennessee with Hood's army.

Not willing to risk a renewal of the battle on the morrow, and having accomplished the object of the day's operations, namely, to cover the withdrawal of his trains, General Schofield, by direction of General Thomas, fell back during the night to Nashville, and formed line of battle on the surrounding heights on the 1st of December, connecting with the rest of the army, A. J. Smith's corps occupying the right, resting

on the Cumberland River, below the city ; the Fourth Corps, temporarily commanded by Brigadier-General Thomas J. Wood, in consequence of General Stanley's wound, the centre ; and Schofield's twenty-third corps the left, extending to the Nolensville pike. The cavalry under General Wilson took post on the left of Schofield, thus securing the interval between that flank and the river above the city.

General Steedman's troops reached Nashville on the evening of the 1st, and on the 3d, when the cavalry was moved to the north side of the river at Edgefield, occupied the space on the left of the line vacated by its withdrawal.

On the morning of the 4th, after skirmishing during the two preceding days, the enemy succeeded in gaining a position with its salient on the summit of Montgomery Hill, within six hundred yards of the Union centre, his main line occupying the high ground on the southeast side of Brown's Creek, and extending from the Nolensville pike, on the enemy's extreme right, across the Franklin and Granny White's roads, in a westerly direction to the hills south and southwest of Richland Creek, and down that creek to the Hillsboro' road, with cavalry extending from both flanks to the river.

Between this time and the 7th of December, the enemy, with one division each from Cheatham's and Lee's corps, and two thousand five hundred of Forrest's cavalry, attempted to take the blockhouse at the railway crossing of Overall's Creek, and Fort Rosecrans at Murfreesboro', but were repulsed with loss by Generals Milroy and Rousseau, commanding the garrisons.

Buford's Confederate cavalry entered Murfreesboro,' but was speedily driven out by a regiment of infantry and a section of artillery, and on retiring moved northward to Lebanon and along the south bank of the Cumberland, threatening to cross to the north side of the river and interrupt the railway communication with Louisville, at that time the only source of supplies for Thomas' army, the river below Nashville being blockaded by batteries along the shore. The gunboats under Lieutenant-Commanding Le Roy Fitch patrolled the Cumber-

land above and below Nashville, and prevented the enemy from crossing. General Wilson sent a cavalry force to Gallatin to guard the country in that vicinity.

The position of Hood's army around Nashville remained unchanged, and nothing of importance occurred from the 3d to the 15th of December, both armies being ice-bound during the latter part of the time. In the mean while Thomas was preparing to take the offensive without delay; the cavalry was being remounted and new transportation furnished.

On the 14th, Thomas called together his corps commanders, announced his intention of attacking on the morrow, should the weather prove propitious, and explained his plan of operations. A. J. Smith, holding the right, was to form on the Harding road and make a vigorous attack on the enemy's left, supported by three divisions of Wilson's cavalry, ready to assail the enemy as occasion might serve. Wood, with the Fourth Corps, leaving a strong skirmish line on Laurens' Hill, was to form on the Hillsboro' road, supporting Smith's left, and act against the left and rear of the enemy's advanced post on Montgomery Hill. Schofield was to be in reserve, covering Wood's left. Steedman's troops from Chattanooga, the regular garrison of Nashville, under Brigadier-General Miller, and the quartermaster's employes, under Brevet Brigadier-General Donaldson, were to hold the interior line constituting the immediate defences of the city, the whole under command of Major-General Steedman.

On the appointed day, every thing being favorable, the army was formed and ready at an early hour to carry out this plan. The formation of the troops was partially concealed from the enemy by the broken nature of the ground, as also by a dense fog, which only lifted towards noon. The enemy was apparently totally unaware of any intention on the part of Thomas to attack his position, and especially did not seem to expect any movement against his left.

General Steedman had, on the previous evening, made a heavy demonstration against the enemy's right, east of the Nolensville pike, succeeding in attracting the enemy's attention

to that part of his line and inducing him to draw re-enforcements from his centre and left. As soon as Steedman had completed this movement, Smith and Wilson moved out along the Harding pike, and commenced the grand movement of the day by wheeling to the left and advancing against the enemy's position across the Harding and Hillsboro' roads. Johnson's division of cavalry was sent at the same time to look after a battery of the enemy's on the Cumberland River, at Bell's Landing, eight miles below Nashville. The remainder of General Wilson's command, Hatch's division leading and Knipe in reserve, moving on the right of A. J. Smith, first struck the enemy along Richland Creek, near Harding's house, and rapidly drove him back, capturing a number of prisoners; and continuing to advance, while slightly swinging to the left, came upon a redoubt containing four guns, which was splendidly carried by assault at one P. M. by a portion of Hatch's division, dismounted, and the captured guns turned upon the enemy. A second redoubt, stronger than the first, was next assailed and carried by the same troops that captured the first position, taking four more guns and about three hundred prisoners. McArthur's division of A. J. Smith's corps, on the left of the cavalry, participated in both of the above assaults, and reached the position nearly simultaneously.

Finding General Smith had not taken as much distance to the right as he had expected, General Thomas directed General Schofield to move his Twenty-third Corps to the right of General Smith, thereby enabling the cavalry to operate more freely in the enemy's rear. This was rapidly accomplished by General Schofield, and his troops participated in the closing operations of the day.

The Fourth Corps formed on the left of A. J. Smith's corps, and as soon as the latter had struck the enemy's flank, assaulted and carried Montgomery Hill, Hood's most advanced position, at one P. M., capturing a considerable number of prisoners. Connecting with Garrard's division, forming the left of Smith's troops, the Fourth Corps continued to advance, carried the enemy's entire line in its front by assault, and

captured several pieces of artillery, about five hundred prisoners, and several stands of colors. The enemy was driven out of his original line of works and forced back to a new position along the base of Harpeth Hills, still holding his line of retreat to Franklin by the main road through Brentwood and by the Granny White road.

At nightfall, General Thomas readjusted his line parallel to and east of the Hillsboro' road; Schofield's command on the right, Smith's in the centre, and Wood's on the left, with the cavalry on the right of Schofield; Steedman holding the position he had gained early in the morning.

During the day sixteen pieces of artillery and twelve hundred prisoners were captured. The enemy was forced back at all points with heavy loss, while the Union casualties were unusually light. The behavior of Thomas' troops was unsurpassed for steadiness and alacrity in every movement.

The boastful invasion of Tennessee was ended. In the morning nothing would remain for Hood but flight.

The whole command bivouacked in line of battle during the night on the ground occupied at dark, while preparations were made to renew the battle at an early hour on the morrow.

At six A. M. on the 10th, Wood's corps pressed back the enemy's skirmishers across the Franklin road to the eastward of it, and then swinging slightly to the right, advanced due south from Nashville, driving the enemy before him until he came upon a new main line of works constructed during the night, on Overton's Hill, about five miles south of the city and east of the Franklin road. General Steedman moved out from Nashville by the Nolensville pike, and formed his command on the left of General Wood, effectually securing the latter's left flank, and made preparations to co-operate in the movements of the day. A. J. Smith's corps moved on the right of the Fourth Corps, and establishing connection with it, completed the new line of battle. General Schofield's troops remained in the position taken up by them at dark on the day previous, facing eastward and towards the enemy's left flank,

the line of the corps running perpendicular to that of Smith's corps. General Wilson's cavalry, which had rested for the night at the six-mile post on the Hillsboro' road, was dismounted and formed on the right of Schofield's command, and by noon of the 16th had succeeded in gaining the enemy's rear, and stretched across the Granny White pike, one of the two outlets towards Franklin.

As soon as these dispositions were completed, and having visited the different commands, General Thomas gave directions that the movement against the enemy's left flank should be continued. The entire line approached to within six hundred yards of the enemy at all points. His centre was weak as compared with his right at Overton's Hill, or his left on the hills bordering the Granny White road; but still General Thomas had hopes of gaining his rear and cutting off his retreat from Franklin.

About three P. M., Post's brigade of Wood's corps, supported by Streight's brigade, was ordered by General Wood to assault Overton's Hill. This intention was communicated to General Steedman, who ordered the brigade of colored troops commanded by Colonel Morgan, Fourteenth United States colored troops, to co-operate. The ground on which the two assaulting columns formed being open and exposed to the enemy's view, he was enabled to draw re-enforcements from his left and centre to the threatened points. The assault was made, and received by the enemy with a tremendous fire of grape, canister, and musketry, the Union troops moving steadily onward up the hill until near the crest, when the reserves of the enemy rose and poured into the assaulting column a most destructive fire, causing it first to waver and then to fall back, leaving dead and wounded, black and white indiscriminately mingled, lying amid the abattis. General Wood at once reformed his command in the position it had previously occupied, preparatory to a renewal of the assault.

Immediately following the effort of the Fourth Corps, Generals Smith's and Schofield's commands moved against the enemy's works in their respective fronts, carrying all before

them, breaking his lines in a dozen places, and capturing all of his artillery and thousands of prisoners, among the latter four general officers. The Union loss was scarcely mentionable. All of the enemy that did escape were pursued over the top of Brentwood and Harpeth Hills. General Wilson's cavalry dismounted, attacked the enemy simultaneously with Schofield and Smith, striking him in reverse, and gaining firm possession of the Granny White pike, thus cut off his retreat by that route. Wood's and Steedman's troops hearing the shouts of victory coming from the right, rushed impetuously forward to renew the assault on Overton's Hill, and although meeting a very heavy fire, the onset was irresistible. The artillery and innumerable prisoners fell into our hands. The enemy, hopelessly broken, fled in confusion through the Brentwood pass, the Fourth Corps in a close pursuit for several miles, when darkness closed the scene, and the troops rested from their labors.

As the Fourth Corps pursued the enemy on the Franklin pike, General Wilson hastily mounted Knipe's and Hatch's divisions, and directed them to pursue along the Granny White pike and endeavor to reach Franklin in advance of the enemy. After proceeding about a mile they came upon the enemy's cavalry under Chalmers, posted across the road and behind barricades. The position was charged and carried by the Twelfth Tennessee Cavalry, Colonel Spalding, scattering the enemy in all directions, and capturing quite a number of prisoners, among them Brigadier-General E. W. Rucker.

During the two days' operations there were four thousand four hundred and sixty-two prisoners captured, including two hundred and eighty-seven officers of all grades from that of major-general, fifty-three pieces of artillery, and thousands of small-arms. The enemy abandoned on the field all of his dead and wounded.

Wilson's cavalry, closely followed by Woods' corps, and by easy marches by Smith and Schofield, pursued the flying and demoralized remnants of Hood's army across the Harpeth River, Rutherford's Creek, and Duck River, all much swollen

by heavy rains and very difficult to cross, and only discontinued the pursuit on the 29th of December, when it was ascertained by General Thomas that, aided by these obstructions to our movement, and by the vigorous resistance of his rear-guard under Forrest, Hood had successfully recrossed the Tennessee at Bainbridge.

“With the exception of his rear-guard,” says Thomas, “his army had become a disheartened and disorganized rabble of half-armed and barefooted men, who sought every opportunity to fall out by the wayside and desert their cause, to put an end to their sufferings.”

Thus ended Hood. A week before, the victorious columns of the army he had set out to destroy entered Savannah. Sherman's army passed on to future and final victories: Hood's, as an organized force, disappears from history.

When Jefferson Davis ordered Hood to destroy the railways leading north and invade Tennessee, and assured his followers that in thirty days the Yankee invader would be driven out of Georgia, he had counted, with a mind obscured by long concentrated hate, upon Sherman's being compelled to follow Hood. “If Hood will go into Tennessee,” Sherman had exclaimed, halting at the last stage of his northward march, “I will give him his rations.” And so saying, he changed front to the rear and marched down to the sea. He knew that Davis had thus thrown away the last chance of success, the last hope even of prolonging the war, and for the phantom of an invasion had exchanged the controlling advantage of interior lines.

In order that the Union arms should profit by this advantage, however, it was an essential condition that Hood should be held in check. To this end Sherman left behind him an equal army and Major-General Thomas. Slowly and doggedly retiring with inferior numbers, while waiting for the re-enforcements which were to render them equal to the force of the enemy, and drawing Hood after him far beyond the barrier of the Tennessee, Thomas saved his concentration by Schofield's masterly battle of Franklin, and gathering up his force

and completing his preparations with such deliberation that it seemed to many the hour for action would never come, in the full time he hurled his irresistible blow squarely against the weak front of the enemy and crushed it. Then the machinery so carefully studied and thoroughly organized seized the fragments and ground them to irrecoverable atoms.

CHAPTER XXV.

SAVANNAH.

WHILE in Savannah, General Sherman received a visit from the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, and had the satisfaction of obtaining the promotions he had recommended on his subordinate commanders.

General Sherman placed General Geary in temporary command of the city of Savannah, and directing him to restore and preserve order and quiet, adopted at the same time a policy of conciliation and justice which soon bore its fruits in the altered tone of the former adherents of the Confederate cause. The mayor, R. D. Arnold, who but a short time before had called upon the inhabitants to arm and go to the trenches to defend their city against the invader, now invoked the citizens to recognize the existing condition of affairs and to yield a ready obedience to the actual authorities. The mayor was continued in the exercise of his functions, so far as they were exclusively connected with persons not in the military or naval service.

A large public meeting of the citizens was held, at which Mayor Arnold's views were substantially adopted and Governor Brown requested to take measures for restoring the State to the Union. A National Bank was established, and active measures taken to resume trade with the North and foreign nations so soon as the military restrictions should be removed. Divine service was resumed in the churches, and soon Savannah was more tranquil than it had been at any time since its capture was first threatened in 1862.

On the 14th of January, General Sherman issued the following orders in regard to internal trade, the conduct of the citizens, and the outrages of the Confederate guerrillas :—

“ It being represented that the Confederate army and armed bands of robbers, acting professedly under the authority of the Confederate government, are harassing the people of Georgia and endeavoring to intimidate them in the efforts they are making to secure to themselves provisions, clothing, security to life and property, and the restoration of law and good government in the State, it is hereby ordered and made public :—

“ I. That the farmers of Georgia may bring into Savannah, Fernandina or Jacksonville, Florida, marketing such as beef, pork, mutton, vegetables of any kind, fish, etc., as well as cotton in small quantities, and sell the same in open market, except the cotton, which must be sold by or through the treasury agents, and may invest the proceeds in family stores, such as bacon and flour, in any reasonable quantities, groceries, shoes, and clothing, and articles not contraband of war, and carry the same back to their families. No trade-stores will be attempted in the interior, or stocks of goods sold for them, but families may club together for mutual assistance and protection in coming and going.

“ II. The people are encouraged to meet together in peaceful assemblages to discuss measures looking to their safety and good government, and the restoration of State and national authority, and will be protected by the national army when so doing ; and all peaceable inhabitants who satisfy the commanding officers that they are earnestly laboring to that end, must not only be left undisturbed in property and person, but must be protected as far as possible consistent with the military operations. If any farmer or peaceful inhabitant is molested by the enemy, viz., the Confederate army of guerrillas, because of his friendship to the National Government, the perpetrator, if caught, will be summarily punished, or his family made to suffer for the outrage ; but if the crime cannot be traced to the

actual party, then retaliation will be made on the adherents to the cause of the rebellion. Should a Union man be murdered, then a rebel selected by lot will be shot ; or if a Union family be persecuted on account of the cause, a rebel family will be banished to a foreign land. In aggravated cases, retaliation will extend as high as five for one. All commanding officers will act promptly in such cases, and report their action after the retaliation is done."

A large delegation of colored men called upon the Secretary of War, Mr. Stanton, to represent their views as to the condition and requirements of their race. Twenty of the number were clergymen of various denominations. In the presence of General Sherman and the acting adjutant-general of the army, Brevet Brigadier-General E. D. Townsend, the secretary put a number of questions to them, in order to develop the extent of their knowledge and comprehension of their legal and moral rights and duties under the existing state of affairs. These questions were answered with great clearness and force by the Reverend Garrison Frazier, one of the number. General Sherman having left the room for the purpose, the secretary inquired their opinion of him. Mr. Frazier replied :—

"We looked upon General Sherman prior to his arrival as a man in the providence of God specially set apart to accomplish this work, and we unanimously feel inexpressible gratitude to him, looking upon him as a man that should be honored for the faithful performance of his duty. Some of us called on him immediately upon his arrival, and it is probable he would not meet the secretary with more courtesy than he met us. His conduct and deportment towards us characterized him as a friend and a gentleman. We have confidence in General Sherman, and think whatever concerns us could not be under better management."

Immediately afterwards, with the approval of the secretary, General Sherman issued the following orders, devoting the

abandoned sea-islands and rice-fields to the exclusive use of the freedmen :—

“ I. The islands from Charleston south, the abandoned rice-fields along the rivers for thirty miles back from the sea, and the country bordering the St. John’s River, Florida, are reserved and set apart for the settlement of the negroes now made free by the acts of war and the proclamation of the President of the United States.

“ II. At Beaufort, Hilton Head, Savannah, Fernandina, St. Augustine, and Jacksonville the blacks may remain in their chosen or accustomed vocations ; but on the islands, and in the settlements hereafter to be established, no white person whatever, unless military officers and soldiers detailed for duty, will be permitted to reside, and the sole and exclusive management of affairs will be left to the freed people themselves, subject only to the United States military authority, and the acts of Congress. By the laws of war and orders of the President of the United States, the negro is free, and must be dealt with as such. He cannot be subjected to conscription or forced into military service, save by the written orders of the highest military authority of the department, under such regulations as the President or Congress may prescribe ; domestic servants, blacksmiths, carpenters, and other mechanics will be free to select their own work and residence ; but the young and able-bodied negroes must be encouraged to enlist as soldiers in the service of the United States, to contribute their share towards maintaining their own freedom, and securing their rights as citizens of the United States.

“ Negroes so enlisted will be organized into companies, battalions, and regiments under the orders of the United States military authorities, and will be paid, fed, and clothed according to law. The bounties paid on enlistment may, with the consent of the recruit, go to assist his family and settlement in procuring agricultural implements, seed, tools, boats, clothing, and other articles necessary for their livelihood.

“ III. Whenever three respectable negroes, heads of families,

shall desire to settle on lands, and shall have selected for that purpose an island or a locality clearly defined within the limits above designated, the inspector of settlements and plantations will himself, or by such subordinate officer as he may appoint, give them a license to settle such island or district, and afford them such assistance as he can to enable them to establish a peaceable agricultural settlement. The three parties named will subdivide the land, under the supervision of the inspector, among themselves and such others as may choose to settle near them, so that each family shall have a plot of not more than forty acres of tillable ground, and, when it borders on some water-channel, with not more than eight hundred feet water-front, in the possession of which land the military authorities will afford them protection until such time as they can protect themselves, or until Congress shall regulate their title.

“The quartermaster may, on the requisition of the inspector of settlements and plantations, place at the disposal of the inspector one or more of the captured steamers to ply between the settlements and one or more of the commercial points heretofore named in orders, to afford the settlers the opportunity to supply their necessary wants, and to sell the products of their land and labor.

“IV. Whenever a negro has enlisted in the military service of the United States, he may locate his family in any one of the settlements at pleasure, and acquire a homestead and all other rights and privileges of a settler as though present in person.

“In like manner, negroes may settle their families and engage on board the gunboats, or in fishing, or in the navigation of the inland waters, without losing any claim to land or other advantages derived from this system. But no one, unless an actual settler as above defined, or unless absent on Government service, will be entitled to claim any right to land or property in any settlement by virtue of these orders.

“V. In order to carry out this system of settlement, a general officer will be detailed as inspector of settlements and

plantations, whose duty it shall be to visit the settlements to regulate their police and general management, and who will furnish personally to each head of a family, subject to the approval of the President of the United States, a possessory title in writing, giving, as near as possible, the description of boundaries, and who shall adjust all claims or conflicts that may arise under the same, subject to the like approval, treating such titles altogether as possessory. The same general officer will also be charged with the enlistment and organization of the negro recruits, and protecting their interests while absent from their settlements, and will be governed by the rules and regulations prescribed by the War Department for such purposes."

On the 26th of December, he issued the following orders in regard to the government of the city of Savannah during its occupancy by the army:—

"The city of Savannah and surrounding country will be held as a military post and adapted to future military uses, but as it contains a population of some twenty thousand people who must be provided for, and as other citizens may come, it is proper to lay down certain general principles, that all within its military jurisdiction may understand their relative duties and obligations.

"I. During war, the military is superior to civil authority, and where interests clash, the civil must give way: yet, where there is no conflict, every encouragement should be given to well-disposed and peaceful inhabitants to resume their usual pursuits. Families should be disturbed as little as possible in their residences, and tradesmen allowed the free use of their shops, tools, etc. Churches, schools, all places of amusement and recreation, should be encouraged, and streets and roads made perfectly safe to persons in their usual pursuits. Passes should not be exacted within the line of outer pickets; but if any person shall abuse these privileges by communicating with the enemy, or doing any act of hostility to the

Government of the United States, he or she will be punished with the utmost rigor of the law.

“Commerce with the outer world will be resumed to an extent commensurate with the wants of the citizens, governed by the restrictions and rules of the Treasury Department.

“II. The chief quartermaster and commissary of the army may give suitable employment to the people, white and black, or transport them to such points as they choose, where employment may be had, and may extend temporary relief in the way of provisions and vacant houses to the worthy and needy, until such time as they can help themselves. They will select, first, the buildings for the necessary uses of the army; next, a sufficient number of stores to be turned over to the treasury agent for trade-stores. All vacant storehouses or dwellings, and all buildings belonging to absent rebels, will be construed and used as belonging to the United States until such times as their titles can be settled by the courts of the United States.

“III. The mayor and city council of Savannah will continue and exercise their functions as such, and will, in concert with the commanding officer of the post and chief quartermaster, see that the fire companies are kept in organization, the streets cleaned and lighted, and keep up a good understanding between the citizens and soldiers. They will ascertain and report to the chief commissary of subsistence, as soon as possible, the names and number of worthy families that need assistance and support.

“The mayor will forthwith give public notice that the time has come when all must choose their course, namely, to remain within our lines and conduct themselves as good citizens, or depart in peace. He will ascertain the names of all who choose to leave Savannah, and report their names and residence to the chief quartermaster, that measures may be taken to transport them beyond the lines.

“IV. Not more than two newspapers will be published in Savannah, and their editors and proprietors will be held to the strictest accountability, and will be punished severely, in

person and property, for any libellous publication, mischievous matter, premature news, exaggerated statements, or any comments whatever upon the acts of the constituted authorities : they will be held accountable even for such articles though copied from other papers."

On the 15th of January, Sherman established the following trade regulations for Savannah :—

"The Department of the South having been placed within the sphere of this command, and it being highly desirable that a uniform policy prevail touching commerce and intercourse with the inhabitants of the South, the following general rules and principles will be adhered to, unless modified by law or the orders of the War Department :

"I. Commerce with foreign nations cannot be permitted or undertaken until the national authority is established to an extent that will give the necessary courts and officers to control and manage such matters. Trade will be confined to a mere barter and sale proportioned to the necessary wants of the army, and of the inhabitants dependent on it for the necessaries of life ; and even that trade must be kept subject to strict military control or surveillance.

"II. Trade-stores will be permitted at Beaufort, Hilton Head, Savannah, Fernandina, St. Augustine, and Jacksonville, in all articles of food and clothing, groceries, ladies' and children's goods generally, and articles not contraband of war.

"III. To trade is a privilege, and no person will be allowed to buy and sell for profit unless he be a citizen of the United States, and subscribe to any legal oath or obligation that is or may be prescribed by law ; and at points threatened by an enemy, the officer commanding may further exact as a condition, that the trader shall himself engage to serve in some military capacity, to aid in defence of the place.

"IV. Persons desiring to trade will apply to the commanding officer of the post, and obtain his written consent, specify-

ing the kind, nature, and extent of the trade, and when he requires importations from Northern cities, he will, in like manner, apply for his permit. The commanding officer of the post may appoint some good officer to supervise these matters, who will frequently inspect the stores, and when there is not sufficient competition, will fix the prices of sale. These stores will, in like manner, be subject to the supervision of the commanding general of the Department of the South, by himself or an inspector-general.

“V. In order that purchases may be made with economy, the commanding officer of each post will make reports of his action in regard to trade, with the names of traders, amounts of goods desired for sale, etc., to the commanding general of the department, who will, in like manner, make full report to the secretary of the United States treasury, to the end that he may instruct the collectors of ports, from which shipments are expected, as to the necessary permits and clearances. It being utterly impracticable that a general commanding military operations should give his personal attention to such matters, it is desirable that as much power as possible should be delegated to post commanders, and they should be held to the strictest account that no trade is permitted injurious to the military interests of the United States.

“VI. Sales of cotton will be restricted absolutely to the United States treasury agents, and no title in cotton or bill of sale will be respected until after the cotton is sold at New York. Country people having small lots of cotton are permitted to bring the same in to be exchanged for food and clothing for their families. The quartermaster will set aside a store or warehouse, to which each wagon bearing cotton will, after entering the military lines, proceed direct, where an agent of the Treasury Department will receive and weigh the same, and pay for it the price fixed in the eighth section of the Act of Congress, approved July 2, 1864—namely, three-fourths the value of cotton as quoted in the New York market; and the secretary of the treasury is hereby requested to make appointments of agents to carry out the provisions

of said act at the posts of Hilton Head, Savannah, Fernandina, and Jacksonville.

“VII. In order that the duties hereby imposed on commanding officers of posts may not be neglected or slighted by the changes incident to rank and changes of troops, the commanding general of the Department of the South will appoint a special officer to command at each of said posts, with a small garrison, not to be changed without his order; and when other troops, commanded by a senior, are added or arrive, the command of the post will not change, but the additional troops will be encamped near by and act according to special instructions.”

In reply to a gentleman who addressed him a note asking his views as to the present relations of Georgia to the Federal Government, Sherman wrote, on the 8th of January :

“DEAR SIR—Yours of the 3d instant is received, and in answer to your inquiries, I beg to state I am merely a military commander, and act only in that capacity; nor can I give any assurances or pledges affecting civil matters in the future. They will be adjusted by Congress when Georgia is again represented there as of old.

“Georgia is not out of the Union, and therefore the talk of ‘reconstruction’ appears to me inappropriate. Some of the people have been and still are in a state of revolt; and as long as they remain armed and organized, the United States must pursue them with armies, and deal with them according to military law. But as soon as they break up their armed organizations and return to their homes, I take it they will be dealt with by the civil courts. Some of the rebels in Georgia, in my judgment, deserve death, because they have committed murder, and other crimes, which are punished with death by all civilized governments on earth. I think this was the course indicated by General Washington, in reference to the Whisky Insurrection, and a like principle seemed to be recognized at the time of the Burr conspiracy.

“As to the Union of the States under our Government, we have the high authority of General Washington, who bade us be jealous and careful of it; and the still more emphatic words of General Jackson, ‘The Federal Union, it must and shall be preserved.’ Certainly, Georgians cannot question the authority of such men, and should not suspect our motives, who are simply fulfilling their commands. Wherever necessary, force has been used to carry out that end; and you may rest assured that the Union will be preserved, cost what it may. And if you are sensible men you will conform to this order of things or else migrate to some other country. There is no other alternative open to the people of Georgia.

“My opinion is, that no negotiations are necessary, nor commissioners, nor conventions, nor any thing of the kind. Whenever the people of Georgia quit rebelling against their Government and elect members of Congress and Senators, and these go and take their seats, then the State of Georgia will have resumed her functions in the Union.

“These are merely my opinions, but in confirmation of them, as I think, the people of Georgia may well consider the following words referring to the people of the rebellious States, which I quote from the recent annual message of President Lincoln to Congress at its present session:—

“‘They can at any moment have peace simply by laying down their arms and submitting to the national authority under the Constitution. After so much, the Government would not, if it could, maintain war against them. The loyal people would not sustain or allow it. If questions should remain, we would adjust them by the peaceful means of legislation, conference, courts, and votes. Operating only in constitutional and lawful channels, some certain and other possible questions are and would be beyond the executive power to adjust; as, for instance, the admission of members into Congress, and whatever might require the appropriation of money.’

“The President then alludes to the general pardon and amnesty offered for more than a year past, upon specified and

more liberal terms, to all except certain designated classes, even these being 'still within contemplation of special clemency,' and adds:

"It is still so open to all, but the time may come when public duty shall demand that it be closed, and that in lieu more vigorous measures than heretofore shall be adopted.'

"It seems to me that it is time for the people of Georgia to act for themselves, and return, in time, to their duty to the Government of their fathers."

This letter, which was immediately made public through the local newspapers, was shown by General Sherman, before its publication, to the secretary of war, who read and returned it, simply remarking that, like all the general's letters, it was sufficiently emphatic, and not likely to be misunderstood. The views contained in it afterwards assumed a special importance, arising out of this circumstance.

To the secretary of war he wrote on the 2d of January, 1865:—

"SIR—I have just received from Lieutenant-General Grant a copy of that part of your telegram to him of 26th December, relating to cotton, a copy of which has been immediately furnished to General Eaton, my chief quartermaster, who will be strictly governed by it.

"I had already been approached by all the consuls and half the people of Savannah on this cotton question, and my invariable answer has been that all the cotton in Savannah was prize of war, and belonged to the United States, and nobody should recover a bale of it with my consent; and that as cotton had been one of the chief causes of this war, it should help pay its expenses; that all cotton became tainted with treason from the hour the first act of hostility was committed against the United States, some time in December, 1860, and that no bill of sale subsequent to that date could convey title.

"My orders were, that an officer of the quartermaster's department, United States army, might furnish the holder,

agent, or attorney a mere certificate of the fact of seizure, with description of the bales, marks, etc. ; the cotton then to be turned over to the agent of the Treasury Department, to be shipped to New York for sale. But since the receipt of your dispatch, I have ordered General Eaton to make the shipment himself to the quartermaster at New York, where you can dispose of it at pleasure. I do not think the Treasury Department ought to bother itself with the prizes or captures of war.

“Mr. Barclay, former consul at New York—representing Mr. Molyneux, former consul, but absent since a long time—called on me in person with reference to cotton claims by English subjects. He seemed amazed when I told him I should pay no respect to consular certificates, and that in no event would I treat an English subject with more favor than one of our own deluded citizens ; and that for my part I was unwilling to fight for cotton for the benefit of Englishmen openly engaged in smuggling arms and munitions of war to kill us ; that, on the contrary, it would afford me great satisfaction to conduct my army to Nassau and wipe out that nest of pirates. I explained to him, however, that I was not a diplomatic agent of the General Government of the United States ; but that my opinion so frankly expressed was that of a soldier, which it would be well for him to heed. It appeared also that he owned a plantation on the line of investment to Savannah, which, of course, is destroyed, and for which he expected me to give him some certificate entitling him to indemnification, which I declined emphatically.

“I have adopted in Savannah rules concerning property, severe but just, founded upon the laws of nations and the practice of civilized governments ; and am clearly of opinion that we should claim all the belligerent rights over conquered countries, that the people may realize the truth that war is no child’s play.

“I embrace in this a copy of a letter dated December 31, 1864, in answer to one from Solomon Cohen, a rich lawyer, to General Blair, his personal friend, as follows :—

* 'MAJOR-GENERAL F. P. BLAIR, *commanding Seventeenth Army Corps* :

" 'GENERAL—Your note, inclosing Mr. Cohen's of this date, is received, and I answer frankly, through you, his inquiries.

" 'First—No one can practise law as an attorney in the United States without acknowledging the supremacy of our Government. If I am not in error, an attorney is as much an officer of the court as the clerk, and it would be a novel thing in a Government to have a court to administer law that denied the supremacy of the Government itself.

" 'Second—No one will be allowed the privileges of a merchant—or rather, to trade is a privilege which no one should seek of the Government, without in like manner acknowledging its supremacy.

" 'Third—If Mr. Cohen remains in Savannah as a denizen, his property, real and personal, will not be disturbed, unless its temporary use be necessary for the military authorities of the city. The title to property will not be disturbed in any event, until adjudicated by the courts of the United States.

" 'Fourth—If Mr. Cohen leaves Savannah under my Special Order, No. 143, it is a public announcement that he 'adheres to the enemies of the United States,' and all his property becomes forfeited to the United States. But as a matter of favor, he will be allowed to carry with him clothing and furniture for the use of himself, family, and servants, and will be transported within the enemy's lines—but not by way of Port Royal.

" 'These rules will apply to all parties, and from them no exception will be made.

" 'I have the honor to be, general, your obedient servant,

" 'W. T. SHERMAN,

" 'Major-General.'

" This letter was in answer to specific inquiries ; it is clear and specific, and covers all the points, and should I leave before my orders are executed, I will endeavor to impress upon my successor, General Foster, their wisdom and propriety.

" I hope the course I have taken in these matters will meet your approbation, and that the President will not refund to parties claiming cotton or other property without the strongest evidence of loyalty and friendship on the part of the claimant, or unless some other positive end is to be gained."

And again on the 19th :—

" SIR—When you left Savannah a few days ago, you forgot the map which General Geary had prepared for you, showing the route by which his division entered the city of Savannah—

being the first troops to occupy that city. I now send it to you. I avail myself of the opportunity also to inclose you copies of all my official orders touching trade and intercourse with the people of Georgia, as well as for the establishment of the negro settlements. Delegations of the people of Georgia continue to come, and I am satisfied a little judicious handling, and by a little respect being paid to their prejudices, we can create a schism in Jeff. Davis' dominions. All that I have conversed with realize the truth that slavery, as an institution, is defunct, and the only questions that remain are, what disposition shall be made of the negroes themselves. I confess myself unable to offer a complete solution for these questions, and prefer to leave it to the slower operations of time. We have given the initiative, and can afford to wait the working of the experiment.

“As to trade matters, I also think it is to our interest to keep the people somewhat dependent on the articles of commerce to which they have been hitherto accustomed. General Grover is now here, and will, I think, be able to manage this matter judiciously, and may gradually relax and invite cotton to come in in large quantities.

“But at first we should manifest no undue anxiety on that score, for the rebels would at once make use of it as a power against us. We should assume a tone of perfect contempt for cotton and every thing else, in comparison with the great object of the war—the restoration of the Union, with all its rights and powers. If the rebels burn cotton as a war measure, they simply play into our hands, by taking away the only product of value they now have to exchange in foreign ports for war-ships and munitions. By such a course, also, they alienate the feelings of the large class of small farmers, that look to their little parcels of cotton to exchange for food and clothing for their families. I hope the Government will not manifest too much anxiety to obtain cotton in large quantities, and especially that the President will not indorse the contracts for the purchase of large quantities of cotton. Several contracts, involving from six to ten thousand bales, in-

dorsed by Mr. Lincoln, have been shown me, but were not in such a form as to amount to an order for me to facilitate their execution.

“As to Treasury trade-agents, and agents to take charge of confiscated and abandoned property, whose salaries depend on their fees, I can only say that, as a general rule, they are mischievous and disturbing elements to a military government, and it is almost impossible for us to study the law and regulations so as to understand fully their powers and duties. I rather think the quartermaster's department of the army could better fulfil all their duties, and accomplish all that is aimed at by the law. Yet, on this subject, I will leave Generals Foster and Grover to do the best they can.”

CHAPTER XXVI.

NORTHWARD.

Hood's army being effectually broken up, Tennessee and Kentucky being secure, and no considerable force occupying the Atlantic slope except Lee's army, held at Petersburg by Lieutenant-General Grant, the next move for Sherman was obviously Northward. His proposal for the march through Georgia had looked forward another step to this contingency. At Savannah, he was accordingly met by instructions from the lieutenant-general to embark his army on transports and hasten to the James River to participate in the final combination for the destruction of the main army of the rebellion. Upon Sherman's earnest representations of the difficulty of moving sixty thousand infantry and ten thousand cavalry, with their due proportion of artillery, so great a distance by water; of the great length of time that would be consumed in the operation; of the comparative immunity the enemy would enjoy in his intermediate combinations; and finally, on his assurance that he could place his army at the desired point sooner, in better condition, and with more injury to the enemy by marching overland; General Grant consented to this modification and gave the necessary orders to Sherman to act upon it, and to the other commanders concerned to co-operate with him in the manner we shall presently perceive. All the details were left entirely to Sherman.

A division of Emory's nineteenth corps, under Brevet Major-General Cuvier Grover, was drawn from Sheridan's Army of the Shenandoah, and sent to Savannah as a garrison, and General Grover was appointed to the command of the city. This



FROM SAVANNAH TO GOLDSBORO


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
Brvt. Brig. Gen. O. M. Poe.

Chief Engineer.

Engraved for "Sherman and His Campaigns."

- 15th Army Corps
- 17th " "
- 14th " "
- 20th " "
- Cavalry







John A. Logan
Maj. Gen.

W. P. Richardson, Publisher.

J. & W. Wilson, P. & S.

division, and the troops previously serving in the Department of the South, were placed under the command of Major-General Foster, the department commander, to whom General Sherman imparted the plan of campaign, instructing him to follow its successful progress by occupying Charleston and any other points along the coast that circumstances might render important. This enabled Sherman to take with him the entire army with which he had made the campaign through Georgia.

Sherman determined to make but one stride from Savannah to Goldsboro', North Carolina.

A month was consumed in preparations. By the 15th of January, 1865, all was ready, and the movement began.

In the mean time, Major-General John A. Logan returned from the North and resumed the command of the Fifteenth Corps, relieving General Osterhaus.

John Alexander Logan, the eldest son by an American wife of Doctor John Logan, a native of Ireland who emigrated to Illinois in 1823, was born near Murphysboro', in Jackson County, Illinois, on the 9th of February, 1826. His parents had eleven children. Until his fourteenth year, in consequence of the unsettled condition of the State, he enjoyed few of the advantages of education. At the breaking out of the war with Mexico, in 1846, he entered the army as a second-lieutenant in the First Regiment of Illinois Volunteers, and served with credit until the peace. In 1848, being then twenty-two years of age, he returned to his native State, and commenced the study of the law. In November, 1849, he was elected clerk of his native county, and held the position until 1850. In that year he attended a course of law studies at Louisville, and in 1851 received his diploma. Upon his return home he at once commenced the practice of his profession, with his maternal uncle, Judge Alexander M. Jenkins. The practical character of Logan's mind, and his pleasant manners, connected with his rare abilities as a ready speaker, soon gained for him great popularity among the voters of his county. Success quickly followed. In 1852 he was elected prosecuting attorney of the third judicial district, and estab-

lished his residence at Benton, in Franklin County; and in the autumn of the same year was elected to the State Legislature, to represent Franklin and Jackson counties. On the 27th November, 1855, he married, at Shawneetown, Miss Mary Cunningham, daughter of John W. Cunningham. In May, 1856, he was appointed presidential elector for the Ninth Congressional District on the Democratic ticket, and in that capacity cast his vote for James Buchanan for President, and John C. Breckinridge for Vice-President, and the following November was re-elected to the Legislature. In 1858, as the candidate of the Democratic party, he carried the Ninth Congressional District for Congress by a large majority over his Republican opponent. In 1860 he was re-elected as the nominee of the Douglas wing of the same party.

While occupying his seat in the House of Representatives, the battle of Bull Run was fought, and Logan took part in it as a volunteer, shouldering a musket in the ranks of Colonel Israel B. Richardson's Second Michigan regiment. In September, 1861, he returned home, and by his energy, aided by his popularity, succeeded in two weeks in raising the Thirty-first Regiment of Illinois Volunteers, whereof he was appointed colonel on the 18th of that month. On the 7th of November he led his regiment, then forming a part of McClelland's brigade, with conspicuous gallantry in the battle of Belmont, where he had his horse shot under him. At Fort Donelson he was severely wounded by a musket-ball in the left arm and shoulder, and was twice wounded in the thigh; but remained on the field, exhorting his men, until removed by the surgeon. On the 5th of March, 1862, he was promoted to be a brigadier-general of volunteers; and returning to the field in April, shortly after the battle of Shiloh, held command of a brigade of McClelland's division in the siege of Corinth. Succeeding to the command of a division, he participated in General Grant's campaign in Northern Mississippi in the winter of 1862-'63, and was rewarded for his services therein by a commission as major-general, dating from the 29th of November, 1862. Upon the organization of McPherson's seventeenth army corps,

in December, 1862, General Logan was assigned to the command of its third division, which he led with marked ability and bravery throughout the campaign of Vicksburg. After the surrender of that stronghold, he obtained a leave of absence, visited the North, and made a series of stirring and effective speeches in aid of the cause of the war-party in the then pending elections, and in bitter denunciation of the peace agitators, or "Copperheads." On the 27th of October, 1863, he was assigned to the command of the Fifteenth Army Corps, rendered vacant by the promotion of General Sherman to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, and the temporary retirement of General Frank P. Blair to take part in political affairs. His military services since that time have already been traced in these pages. Suddenly called by the calamitous death of its gallant leader to the command of the Army of the Tennessee, at a critical moment in the battle of the 22d of July, 1864, Logan threw himself with fire into the action, re-established his broken line, and dashing along the front, exclaiming, "McPherson and revenge!" hurled his excited troops against the enemy and swept them from the field with terrible slaughter.

His warm, impulsive character gives him a powerful hold on the affections of his men, and a high courage and indomitable spirit enable him to lead them to victory.

Logan is the most notable illustration of the success that has attended the efforts of those officers who, entering the army from civil life, have been content, instead of grasping at once at the highest honors, to learn the duties of their new profession in the subordinate grades, and to rise step by step according to their talents and experience. Beginning as a colonel of volunteers, for which position his Mexican services qualified him, he successively rose through the command of a brigade and division to that of Sherman's old corps, and being temporarily placed at the head of a separate army, discharged the high responsibilities of that post, at an important period, with signal ability. While others, more ambitious but less patient or less deserving, fell from the height which, in a

moment of laxity and want of knowledge they had been permitted to attain, Logan mounted steadily.

Only less remarkable is the case of Major-General Blair ; but Logan abandoned politics at the outbreak of the war and refused to be a candidate for any civil office, while Blair adhered to his position as a member of the lower House, and continued to discharge its duties until Congress interfered by a direct legislative prohibition.

Howard, with Blair's seventeenth corps, embarked on transports at Thunderbolt, proceeded to Beaufort, South Carolina, and there disembarking, struck the Charleston and Savannah railway near Pocotaligo station, and effected a lodgment, Leggett's division driving away the enemy, and established a secure depot of supplies at the mouth of Pocotaligo Creek, within easy water communication by the Broad River, having the main depot at Hilton Head. Logan's fifteenth corps moved partly by land and partly by water ; Woods' and Hazen's divisions following the Seventeenth Corps to Beaufort ; John E. Smith's marching by the coast road ; and Corse's, cut off by the freshets, being compelled to move with the left wing.

Slocum, with the left wing and Kilpatrick's cavalry, was to move on Coosawhatchie, South Carolina, on the Charleston and Savannah railway, and Robertville, on the Columbia road. A good pontoon bridge had been thrown across the Savannah River, opposite the city, and the Union causeway, leading through low rice-fields, had been repaired and corduroyed ; but before the time fixed for the movement arrived, the river became swollen by heavy rains, so that the pontoons were swept away, and the causeway was four feet under water.

General A. S. Williams, with Jackson's and Geary's divisions of the Twentieth Corps, crossed the Savannah at Purysburg, and marched to Hardeeville, on the Charleston railway, where they were in communication with Howard at Pocotaligo ; but the rains presently cut these divisions off from the rest of the left wing at Savannah, which was compelled by the freshet to seek a crossing higher up at Sister's Ferry, opposite which

point, on the Carolina side, the two divisions indicated accordingly directed their course; while Slocum, with Jefferson C. Davis' fourteenth corps, Geary's division of the Twentieth Corps, and Corse's division of the Fifteenth Corps, temporarily separated from the right wing by the flood, marched up on the Georgia side, leaving Savannah on the 26th January. The gunboat Pontiac, Lieutenant-Commander S. B. Luce, was detailed by Admiral Dahlgren to move up to the ferry in advance of the troops, and cover the passage. When Slocum at length reached the river, he found the bottom three miles in width, so that it was only on the 7th of February, and with great difficulty and labor, that the crossing was completed, and the wing concentrated and in full march for the Charleston and Augusta railway. Williams, with Jackson's and Ward's divisions of the Twentieth Corps, reached the railway at Graham's Station, fourteen miles west of Branchville, on the 8th of February, and Slocum, with Davis' fourteenth corps and Geary's division, arrived at Blackville, seven miles further west, on the 10th. Kilpatrick's cavalry, which was the first of this wing to cross at Sister's Ferry, immediately took the advance on Blackville, by Barnwell, and kept the extreme left flank from this time forward.

To return to the right wing. On the 19th of January, all his preparations being complete, and all his orders for the march published, Sherman instructed his chief quartermaster and chief commissary, Brevet Brigadier-Generals L. C. Easton and Amos Beckwith, to fill their depots at Sister's Ferry and Pocotaligo, and then to quit the army, go to Morehead City, North Carolina, and stand ready to forward supplies thence to Goldsboro' about the 15th of March.

On the 22d of January, Sherman embarked at Savannah for Hilton Head, where he held a conference with Admiral Dahlgren, United States navy, and Major-General Foster, commanding the Department of the South, and next proceeded to Beaufort, riding out thence on the 24th to Pocotaligo, where the Seventeenth Corps was encamped. On the 25th a demonstration was made against the Combahee Ferry and railroad

bridge across the Salkehatchie, to amuse the enemy, who had evidently adopted that river as his defensive line against Sherman's supposed objective, the city of Charleston. The general reconnoitred the line in person, and saw that the heavy rains had swollen the river so that water stood in the swamps for a breadth of more than a mile, at a depth of from one to twenty feet. As he had no intention of approaching Charleston, a comparatively small force was able, by making a semblance of preparations to cross, to keep in their front a considerable force of the enemy disposed to contest the advance on Charleston. On the 27th, Sherman rode to the camp of General Hatch's division of Foster's command, on the Tullifinny and Coosawhatchie rivers, and directed those places to be evacuated. Hatch's division was then moved to Pocotaligo, to keep up the feints already begun, until the right wing should move higher up and cross the Salkehatchie about River's or Broxton's Bridge. By the 29th of January, three divisions of the Fifteenth Corps—Woods', Hazen's, and John E. Smith's—had closed up at Pocotaligo, and the right wing had loaded its wagons and was ready to start. Sherman therefore directed General Howard to move the Seventeenth Corps along the Salkehatchie to River's Bridge, and the Fifteenth Corps by Hickory Hill, Loper's Cross-roads, Anglesey Post-office, and Beaufort's Bridge, while Hatch's division was ordered to remain at Pocotaligo, feigning on the Salkehatchie railway bridge and ferry, until the movement should have turned the enemy's position, and forced him to fall back behind the Edisto.

Blair's seventeenth and Logan's fifteenth corps drew out of camp on the 31st of January, but the real march began on the 1st of February. All the roads northward had for weeks been held by Wheeler's cavalry, who had, by details of negro laborers, felled trees, burned bridges, and made obstructions to impede our march. But so well organized were the pioneer battalions, and so strong and intelligent our men, that felled trees were removed and bridges rebuilt by the heads of columns before the rear could close up. On the 2d of February,

Logan's fifteenth corps reached Loper's Cross-roads, and Blair's seventeenth corps was at River's Bridge. From Loper's Cross-roads Sherman communicated with General Slocum, who was then still struggling with the floods of the Savannah River at Sister's Ferry, and instructed him to overtake the right wing on the South Carolina railway. General Howard, with the right wing, was directed to cross the Salkehatchie, and push rapidly for the South Carolina railway at or near Midway. The enemy held the line of the Salkehatchie in force, having infantry and artillery intrenched at River's and Beaufort's bridges. Blair, with the Seventeenth Corps, was ordered to carry River's bridge, and Logan, with the Fifteenth Corps, Beaufort's bridge. The former position was carried promptly and skilfully by Mower's and Corse's divisions of the Seventeenth Corps; the latter under Giles A. Smith, on the 3d of February, by crossing the swamp, nearly three miles wide, with water varying from knee to shoulder deep. The weather was bitter cold. Generals Mower and Smith led their divisions in person, on foot, waded the swamp, made a lodgment below the bridge, and turned on the rebel brigade which guarded it, driving it in confusion and disorder towards Branchville. Our casualties were one officer and seventeen men killed, and seventy men wounded, who were sent to Pocotaligo. The line of the Salkehatchie being thus broken, the enemy retreated at once behind the Edisto at Branchville, and the whole army was pushed rapidly to the South Carolina railway. Blair's corps and General Howard in person, at Midway, seven miles west of Branchville; Logan's corps at Bamberg, three miles further west; and at Graham's Station, Blair's seventeenth corps, by threatening Branchville, forced the enemy to burn the railway bridge and Walker's bridge below, across the Edisto. The whole army was at once set to work to destroy railway track. From the 7th to the 10th of February this work was thoroughly prosecuted by the Seventeenth Corps from the Edisto up to Bamberg, and by the Fifteenth Corps from Bamberg up to Blackville. In the mean time, General Kilpatrick had brought his cavalry rapidly by Barnwell to

Blackville, and had turned towards Aiken, with orders to threaten Augusta, but not to draw needlessly into a serious battle. This he skilfully accomplished, skirmishing heavily with Wheeler's cavalry, first at Blackville and afterwards at Williston and Aiken. The left wing being now up, the Twentieth Corps at Graham's Station and the Fourteenth at Blackville, the destruction of the railway was continued by that wing from Blackville up to Windsor. All the army was thus on the railway from Midway to Johnson's Station, thereby dividing the enemy's forces, which still remained at Branchville and Charleston, on the one hand, and Aiken and Augusta, on the other.

The enemy was all this time uncertain as to Sherman's destination or immediate objective. He might turn on Charleston, Augusta, or Columbia, and at neither, nor at all combined, had the Confederates an army able to oppose him. Hardee was at Charleston, with a force estimated at fifteen thousand men, compelled to hold the place until it should be untenable, or the object of maintaining it should have passed. Wheeler, with that portion of his cavalry so frequently met and defeated by Kilpatrick during the Georgia campaign, was at and near Columbia, strengthened by Wade Hampton's division from Lee's army. Augusta was occupied by the Georgia militia. Meanwhile, the remnants of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee were being hurried East; but the road from Mississippi was a long one, stripped of food for a great portion of the route, the railways generally useless, and the bridges destroyed. To use the figurative expression of the soldiers, "A crow could not fly from Atlanta to Savannah without a haversack."

CHAPTER XXVII.

THROUGH SOUTH CAROLINA.

LEAVING the left wing to complete the work of destroying the Charleston and Savannah railway west of Branchville, Sherman himself, with the right wing, moved on Orangeburg, situated thirteen miles north of Branchville, on the State road, between Charleston and Columbia, near its intersection with the railway connecting the latter with Branchville. Until this point should be reached and passed, the direction of Sherman's movement would not be fully developed, for he still continued to menace Charleston, Augusta, and Columbia; and the position of the left wing might equally satisfy the conditions of either theory, as well as the supposition that he might move by his right by Florence or Cheraw directly on Wilmington or Fayetteville.

Blair's seventeenth corps crossed the South Fork of the Edisto River at Binnaker's Bridge, and moved straight on Orangeburg; while Logan, with the Fifteenth Corps, crossed at Holman's Bridge, and moved to Poplar Springs in support.

On the 12th of February, the Seventeenth Corps found the enemy intrenched in front of the Orangeburg Bridge, but swept him away by a dash, and followed him, forcing him across the bridge, which was partially burned. Behind the bridge was a battery in position, covered by a cotton and earth parapet, with wings as far as could be seen. General Blair held Giles A. Smith's division close up to the Edisto, and moved the other two to a point about two miles below, where he crossed Force's division by a pontoon bridge, holding Mower's in support. As soon as Force emerged from the swamp the

enemy gave ground, and Giles A. Smith's division gained the bridge, crossed over, and occupied the enemy's parapet. He soon repaired the bridge, and by four P. M. the whole corps was in Orangeburg, and had begun the work of destruction on the railway. Blair was ordered to destroy this railway effectually up to Lewisville, and to push the enemy across the Congaree, and force him to burn the bridges, which he did on the 14th.

Hardee now perceiving Sherman's immediate objective, evacuated Charleston, retreating on Florence, parallel to the line of march just passed over by Sherman's army, and General Gillmore's troops entered and occupied the city on the 18th.

Blair's seventeenth corps followed the State road, and Logan's fifteenth corps crossed the North Edisto from Poplar Springs at Schilling's Bridge, above the mouth of Cawcaw Swamp Creek, and took a country road which entered the State road at Zeigler's.

On the 15th, the Fifteenth Corps found the enemy in a strong position at the bridge across Congaree Creek, with a *tête-de-pont* on the south side, and a well-constructed fort on the north side, commanding the bridge with artillery. The ground in front was very bad, level and clear, with a fresh deposit of mud from a recent overflow. General Charles R. Woods, who commanded the landing division, succeeded, however, in turning the flank of the *tête-de-pont* by sending Stone's brigade through a cypress swamp to the left; and following up the retreating enemy promptly, got possession of the bridge and the fort beyond. The bridge had been partially damaged by fire, and had to be repaired for the passage of artillery, so that night closed in before the head of the column could reach the bridge across Congaree River in front of Columbia. That night the enemy shelled the camps of the right wing from a battery on the east side of the Congaree above Granby.

Early on the morning of the 16th the head of the column reached the bank of the Congaree, opposite Columbia, but too late to save the fine bridge which spanned the river at that point, and which was burned by the enemy. While waiting

for the pontoons to come to the front, people could be seen running about the streets of Columbia, and occasionally small bodies of cavalry, but no masses. A single gun of Captain De Grass' battery was fired at their cavalry squads, but General Sherman checked his firing, limiting him to a few shots directed at the unfinished State House walls, and a few shells at the railway depot, to scatter the people engaged in carrying away sacks of corn and meal. There was no white flag or manifestation of surrender. Sherman directed General Howard to cross the Saluda at the Factory, three miles above the city, and afterwards Broad River, so as to approach Columbia from the north.

Slocum, with the left wing, crossed the South Edisto on the 15th of February, at New and Guignard's bridges, and moved to a position on the Orangeburg and Edgefield road, there to await the result of the movement of the right wing upon the former place; Howard having entered Orangeburg on the 12th, and being then in march on Columbia. On the 14th Slocum crossed the North Edisto, the Twentieth Corps at Jones' Bridge, the Fourteenth Corps at Horsey's Bridge, and Kilpatrick at Gunter's Bridge; and, all three columns uniting at and below Lexington, the advance appeared at the Saluda, within an hour after the head of Howard's column reached the river on the 16th.

General Howard effected a crossing of the Saluda, near the Factory, on the 16th, skirmishing with cavalry, and the same night threw a flying-bridge across Broad River, about three miles above Columbia, by which he crossed over Stone's Bridge Woods' division of the Fifteenth Corps. Under cover of this force a pontoon bridge was laid on the morning of the 17th. Sherman was in person at this bridge, and at eleven A. M. learned that the mayor of Columbia had come out in a carriage and made a formal surrender of the city to Colonel Stone, Twenty-fifth Iowa regiment, commanding the third brigade of Woods' division of the Fifteenth Corps. About the same time, a small party of the Seventeenth Corps had crossed the Congaree in a skiff, and entered Columbia from a point immediately west of the city.

In anticipation of the occupation of the city, Sherman had given written orders to General Howard touching the conduct of the troops. These instructions were, to destroy absolutely all arsenals and public property not needed for our own use, as all railways, depots, and machinery useful in war to an enemy, but to spare all dwellings, colleges, schools, asylums, and harmless private property. Sherman was the first to cross the pontoon bridge, and, in company with General Howard, rode into the city. The day was clear, but a perfect tempest of wind was raging. The brigade of Colonel Stone was already in the city, and was properly posted. Citizens and soldiers were on the streets, and general good order prevailed. General Wade Hampton, who commanded the Confederate rear-guard of cavalry, had, in anticipation of the capture of Columbia, ordered that cotton, public and private, should be moved into the streets and fired, to prevent the Yankee invaders from benefiting by its use. Bales were piled every where, the rope and bagging cut, and tufts of cotton were blown about in the wind, lodged in the trees and against houses, so as to resemble a snow-storm. Some of these piles of cotton were burning, especially one in the very heart of the city, near the courthouse, but the fire was partially subdued by the labor of the Union soldiers.

During the day, Logan, with the Fifteenth Corps, passed through Columbia and out on the Camden road. The Seventeenth Corps did not enter the town at all.

Before a single public building had been fired by orders, the smouldering fires, lighted by Hampton's men, were rekindled by the wind, and communicated to the buildings around. About dark, the flames began to spread, and got beyond the control of the brigade on duty within the city. The whole of Woods' division was brought in, but it was found impossible to check the progress of the fire, which, by midnight, had become unmanageable, and raged until about four A. M., when, the wind subsiding, it was got under control. Sherman himself was up nearly all night, and with Generals Howard, Logan, Hazen, Woods, and others, labored hard to save houses and

protect families thus suddenly deprived of shelter and of bedding and wearing apparel. In his official report, Sherman says :—

“ I disclaim on the part of my army any agency in this fire, but, on the contrary, claim that we saved what of Columbia remains unconsumed. And, without hesitation, I charge General Wade Hampton with having burned his own city of Columbia, not with a malicious intent, or as the manifestation of a silly ‘Roman stoicism,’ but from folly and want of sense, in filling it with lint, cotton, and tinder. Our officers and men on duty worked well to extinguish the flames ; but others not on duty, including the officers who had long been imprisoned there, rescued by us, may have assisted in spreading the fire after it had once begun, and may have indulged in unconcealed joy to see the ruin of the capital of South Carolina.”

During the 18th and 19th, the arsenal, railway depots, machine-shops, foundries, and other buildings were properly destroyed by detailed working parties, and the railway-track torn up and destroyed to Ringsville, and the Wateree or Catawba Bridge in the direction of Winnsboro’.

On the 16th, as soon as the head of Slocum’s column appeared within two miles of Columbia, as already stated, Sherman directed him to march by the left again directly upon Winnsboro’. Accordingly, Slocum crossed the Saluda at Hart’s Ferry, and on the 17th, marching by Oakville and Rockville, reached the Broad River, near Alston. Encamping there on the 18th, on the 19th the left wing crossed the Broad, entered Alston, and began breaking up the railways near that place. The Spartansburg railway was destroyed for fourteen miles to the northward of Alston, as far as and including the bridge over the Broad River. On the 20th, Slocum crossed Little River and reached Winnsboro’ on the 21st.

Sherman, with the right wing, having destroyed all that remained of Columbia likely to be of any use for military purposes, marched on the 20th directly on Winnsboro’, the Fifteenth Corps moving along the railway and destroying it,

and the Seventeenth Corps on a parallel road. On the 21st, Howard reached Winnsboro'.

The movements of the cavalry acting separately on the extreme left flank of the army, and concealing as well as covering the movements of the infantry columns, must now be brought down to the same period. Kilpatrick, as we have already seen in following the march of the infantry, reached Robertville on the 3d of February, and thence marched on the 4th to Lawtonville, on the 5th to Allandale, and on the 6th, having demonstrated well towards Augusta, driving a brigade of the enemy's cavalry before him, turned short to the right and crossed the Salkehatchie just below Barnwell.

The enemy, about three hundred strong, occupied a well-chosen position, behind earthworks on the opposite side of the river, commanding the bridge, which was already on fire; but the Ninth Ohio Cavalry, Colonel Hamilton, and the Ninety-second Illinois Mounted Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel Van Baskirk, dashed through the swamp, the men wading in the water up to their arm-pits, crossed the stream on trees felled by the pioneers, and under cover of a rapid fire of artillery, gallantly carried the works, driving the enemy in confusion towards the town of Barnwell. Only a portion of the bridge being destroyed, the fire was extinguished, and it was quickly repaired, and Kilpatrick entered the town of Barnwell at four P. M.

On the morning of the 7th, he struck the Charleston and Atlanta railway at Blackville, driving a brigade of Wheeler's cavalry from the town. The advance was engaged alone with the enemy at this point, in a very spirited affair, wherein Colonel Jordan, Captain Estes, assistant-adjutant-general, and Captain Northrope greatly distinguished themselves.

Here the cavalry rested, destroying track during the 7th and 8th, and on the evening of the 8th moved up the railway in the direction of Augusta, as far as Williston Station. After posting pickets on the various roads leading from the town, and before going into camp, an attack was made on Spencer's brigade, holding the direct road to Augusta. Kilpatrick directed Colonel Spencer at once to move out with his brigade, feel

the enemy and ascertain his strength. A spirited fight ensued, in which six regiments of Allen's division of Wheeler's cavalry, namely, the First, Third, Seventh, Ninth, Twelfth, and Fifty-first Alabama, were totally routed. Colonel Spencer conducted the fight unaided, and displayed skill and gallantry. One officer and many men of the enemy were killed, a large number wounded, several prisoners were taken, and five battle-flags captured. Colonel Spencer pressed the pursuit so closely, for a distance of seven or eight miles, that the enemy was finally forced to leave the road and scatter through the woods and swamps, in order to escape. At Williston, Kilpatrick remained till ten A. M. next day, one-third of his entire command being employed in tearing up the track, three miles of which were effectually destroyed, together with the depot and two cars.

On the 9th of February, he moved along the railway to Windsor, and thence to Johnson's Station, destroying portions of the track up to that point.

The cavalry had moved from Blackville in such a manner, and Kilpatrick had so manœuvred, as to create the impression on the minds of the enemy in Augusta, that his movement was the advance of the main army directly on that place. On the morning of the 11th, it was found that this feint was a complete success. Wheeler having left the Edisto unguarded and uncovered Columbia, had, by marching day and night, reached Aiken at daylight that morning with his entire command. To make certain of this, Atkins' brigade was directed to move from Johnson's Station, and reconnoitre in the direction of Aiken. His advance entered the town without opposition, and a moment afterwards, being furiously attacked by Wheeler's entire force, fell back, gallantly fighting and disputing every foot of ground to the position of the main body at Johnson's, thus giving Kilpatrick sufficient time to make all necessary arrangements to check Wheeler's further advance. At eleven A. M., Wheeler, with one brigade, feigned upon Kilpatrick's left flank, and charged, mounted, with his entire command, but was handsomely repulsed with a loss on his part of thirty-one killed, one hundred and sixty wounded, and sixty taken

prisoners. Wheeler made no further attack, but fell back to his former position at Aiken.

Kilpatrick remained at Johnson's, destroying the railway and constantly demonstrating towards Augusta, till the night of the 12th, when he left Wheeler's front, crossed the South Fork of the Edisto at Guignard's Bridge, and encamped four miles beyond, picketing the river as high up as Pine Log Bridge.

On the 14th, the cavalry encamped on the south bank of the North Edisto, crossed on the 15th, and moved well in on the left of Davis' fourteenth corps, and marching parallel with it, struck the Lexington and Augusta road, northward of and nine miles from the former place. Only fifteen hundred of Wheeler's cavalry had then passed over the road in the direction of Columbia, the majority of his command being intercepted by Kilpatrick's movement, as Cheatham's corps was by that of the infantry.

On the 17th, Kilpatrick crossed the Saluda River, moved north, and found that Wheeler had already crossed and was moving for the railway bridge over the Broad River at Alston's.

All day on the 18th, Kilpatrick marched parallel to Cheatham's corps, moving on Newberry, and at some points not over three miles distant from it, a bad stream alone preventing him from striking the enemy in flank. Kilpatrick struck the railway at Pomaria Station, destroyed a portion of the track, the depot, and several bridges between that point and Broad River, and reached Alston's Station, on Broad River, on the evening of the 18th.

On the 19th he crossed the Broad River, and on the evening of the 20th reached Monticello, and found that Wheeler had already crossed the river and was moving on Chesterfield.

Winnsboro', where Sherman's infantry was now massed, is situated on the Charlotte and South Carolina railway, seventy miles south of Charlotte, North Carolina, and thirty-nine miles north of Columbia. Monticello is nearly opposite, between Winnsboro' and the Broad River. The movement of the entire army so far in this direction served to support the theory

that Sherman was aiming to reach Virginia by the inland route, by way of Charlotte.

In the mean while, Beauregard had been relieved from the chief command of the Confederate forces operating against Sherman, and the Confederate Congress, stung into activity by the presence of an unexpected and alarming danger threatening to overwhelm their cause, had wrung from Jefferson Davis the reappointment of General Johnston to the supreme control of all the troops west of the Chattahoochee River and south of Virginia. Johnston had taken up a position at Charlotte, concentrating there the forces with which Beauregard had evacuated Columbia and the local garrisons and militia of North Carolina, re-enforced to some extent from Lee's army, and was awaiting the arrival of the remnants of the Confederate Army of the Tennessee. The remains of Cheatham's corps had reached Branchville as Sherman pushed rapidly past that place and on to Orangeburg, and had been cut off from Johnston by the direction of Sherman's march and the burning of the bridges over the Saluda.

With an army so greatly inferior, not only in numbers, but now also in spirit and *morale*, Johnston's task was an exceedingly difficult one. The abandonment of Columbia was the turning point of the campaign. That gained, Sherman could choose his line of march and feint, on Charlotte while moving on Fayetteville or Wilmington, or march on the former place while feigning on the latter, at his pleasure. That lost, the Confederate commander must choose Charlotte or Goldsboro' as his defensive point. They are too far distant to warrant the attempt to defend both. If he chose Goldsboro', he would not only seriously expose his rear and flank to a movement from the direction of Newbern or the Roanoke, but Sherman would be able to march quietly through Charlotte to the James. If, on the contrary, he decided to defend Charlotte, the defence of Goldsboro' and the seaboard must be left to chance. An army too weak to hold Columbia against an enemy moving from Georgia on North Carolina would almost necessarily lose the whole country

south of the Roanoke. Davis took no steps to restore the campaign until Columbia was abandoned. Then the campaign was lost.

Sherman pushed his advantage to the utmost. On the 22d of February, Slocum continued his march towards Charlotte, thoroughly destroyed the railway as far as Blackstock, or Blackstakes Station, fifteen miles from Winnsboro' and fifty-five from Charlotte, and then facing to the right, marched for the Wateree or Catawba River, and reached it that night at Rocky Mount. During the night a pontoon bridge was laid across the Catawba, and Williams' twentieth corps crossed on the morning and afternoon of the 23d, followed in the night by Kilpatrick's cavalry, which moved rapidly on Lancaster, distant about forty miles from Charlotte, with the object of keeping alive the idea entertained by the Confederates that the army was moving on the latter place. On the evening of the 23d, a heavy rain began to fall, lasting until the 26th, and swelling the rivers so that the pontoons were carried away, and it was impossible for the troops to cross, and rendering the roads almost impracticable. Williams' twentieth corps reached Hanging Rock on the 26th, and there waited until the 1st of March for Jefferson C. Davis to come up with the Fourteenth Corps, which had been left on the left bank of the Catawba by the flood and the consequent destruction of the pontoon bridge.

Howard's right wing having destroyed the railway up to Winnsboro', marched thence on the 22d of February, crossed the Catawba at Peay's Ferry, and moved on Cheraw, Blair's seventeenth corps on the right, by Tiller's and Kelly's bridges over Lynch's Creek, and Logan's fifteenth corps taking the direct road on the left by way of Young's Bridge. A detachment of Logan's fifteenth corps, by a detour to the right, entered Camden on the 28th of February, and burned the bridges over the Catawba, and the depot of the Camden Branch railway. A small force of mounted men, under Captain Duncan, sent out to break the Wilmington and Manchester railway, was met by Butler's division of Confederate cavalry,

at Mount Clio, and after a sharp skirmish returned unsuccessful. At Lynch's Creek, Sherman halted the right wing for three days to give time for Slocum with the left wing to come up.

From Monticello, the cavalry moved to Blackstock, or Blackstakes, on the Columbia and Charlotte railway, and demonstrated strongly in the direction of Chester until the main army had secured the passage of the Catawba, then drew off across that river, moved to Lancaster, and again demonstrated in the direction of Charlotte. Wheeler and Hampton had now combined their forces well in Kilpatrick's front, but by demonstrations, feints, and well-planned devices, were deceived as to his real movements for several days; and it was not until the main army had crossed Lynch's Creek and reached the Great Pedee that they discovered their mistake.

Williams' twentieth corps having waited at Hanging Rock from the 26th to the 28th of February, for Davis' fourteenth corps to come up, on the 1st of March the left wing, united, moved to Horton's Ferry on Lynch's Creek; and on the 2d, the Twentieth Corps entered Chesterfield, skirmishing with Butler's division of the enemy's cavalry.

At noon, on the 3d, Blair's seventeenth corps entered Cheraw, capturing twenty-five pieces of artillery and a large quantity of ammunition and material, which had been removed from Charleston when that city was evacuated. The guns and stores were destroyed, and the trestles and bridges of the Cheraw and Darlington railway burned as far as the latter place; but a mounted force sent out to destroy the communication between Florence and Charleston encountered a superior body of the enemy, comprising both cavalry and infantry, and was compelled to return without accomplishing its chief object. Logan's fifteenth corps met with great difficulties in crossing Lynch's and Black creeks, four days being occupied in the passage of the former stream, which rose to such an extent immediately after Corse's division, leading, reached the east bank, that the other three divisions could not have followed at once without swimming the animals more than three-quarters of a mile. Upon the occupation of Cheraw

by Blair the enemy retreated beyond the Great Pedee River, and burned the bridge over that stream.

On the 5th of March, the army began to cross the Great Pedee, the right wing at Cheraw, the left wing and the cavalry at Sneedsboro'.

On the 6th, both wings were massed on the east bank of the Great Pedee, and the army began its movement directly on Fayetteville; Blair's seventeenth corps leading the right wing, and Davis' fourteenth corps taking the right of the left wing, and moving by Love's Bridge over the Lumber River, so as to be the first to enter the town, while Kilpatrick's cavalry was kept well out on the left flank.

From the time of leaving Cheraw and Chesterfield, the heavy rains, which had previously so greatly obstructed the movements of the army, continued without intermission until Fayetteville was reached. The numerous small streams became swollen by the floods and very difficult to pass, and the loose soil was soon worked, by the passage of troops and trains, into a quicksand of unknown depth, in which the animals became hopelessly mired, and many were even lost. The days were spent by the soldiers in wearily dragging through the mud; the nights, in corduroying to make a way for the trains.

Davis, with the Fourteenth Corps, reached Love's Bridge over the Lumber River on the 7th of March, crossed, marched to within twenty miles of Fayetteville on the 9th, ten miles nearer on the 10th, and on the 11th entered the town.

Blair's seventeenth corps reached Laurel Hill on the 8th, Gilchrist's Bridge over the Lumber on the 9th, and marched into Fayetteville on the 12th.

As the army approached this point both wings moved more cautiously, expecting Hardee to make a fight in front of the town, and to defend the crossing of the Cape Fear River; but, undoubtedly in consequence of his inferiority in numbers, he retired without offering any serious opposition, retreated beyond the river, and burned the bridge after him.

Kilpatrick, having sent out a part of his command to Mon-

roe and Wadesboro', crossed the Great Pedee on the night of the 6th of March, and occupied Rockingham on the 7th, after a skirmish with Butler's division of Hampton's Confederate cavalry.

On the 8th, Kilpatrick crossed the Lumber River at Love's Bridge, and at Solemn Grove came upon the rear of Hardee, who was then in full retreat on Fayetteville, on the Charlotte road. Learning from prisoners that Hampton's cavalry was still in the rear of Hardee's troops, but rapidly moving in the same direction, Kilpatrick now determined to intercept him.

Hampton was marching upon two roads; the Morgantown road, and one three miles further to the north and parallel with it. Directly south and east from Solemn Grove, Kilpatrick posted upon each road a brigade of cavalry; and learning that there was a road still further north, upon which the enemy's troops might move, he made a rapid night's march with Colonel Spencer's brigade, increased by four hundred dismounted men and one section of artillery, and took post at a point where the road last mentioned intersects the Morgantown road. During the early part of the evening, Kilpatrick with his staff had left General Atkins and joined Colonel Spencer, and actually ridden through one division of Hampton's cavalry, which by eleven o'clock had flanked General Atkins, and was encamped within three miles of Colonel Spencer. Kilpatrick's escort, consisting of fifteen men and one officer, was captured, but the general himself escaped with his staff.

General Atkins and Colonel Jordan discovered, about nine o'clock, that while Hampton was amusing them in front, he was passing with his main force on a road to the right. These officers at once made every effort to reach Kilpatrick before daylight, but failed to do so owing to the bad roads and almost incessant skirmishing with the enemy, who were marching parallel with them, and at some points scarcely a mile distant.

Hampton had marched all day, and rested his men about three miles from Colonel Jordan's position. At two o'clock in the morning, just before daylight, he suddenly and furiously charged Kilpatrick's position with Horner's, Allen's, and

Butler's divisions. Hampton led the centre division, Butler's, and in an instant had driven back the Union troops, taken possession of the headquarters, and captured all the artillery, and Kilpatrick's whole command was in full flight. Colonel Spencer and a large portion of the general's staff were taken prisoners.

Kilpatrick succeeded in escaping on foot and gaining the cavalry camp, a few hundred yards in the rear, where he found the men fighting with the Confederate cavalry for their camp and animals. Finally they were forced back five hundred yards further to an impassable swamp, and there, while the enemy, eager for plunder, was engaged in pillaging the captured camp, Kilpatrick rallied them. Inspired by his example, and led by the general in person, on foot, they advanced upon the enemy, retook their camp, and, encouraged by this success, charged the enemy in the act of harnessing the battery horses and plundering the headquarters, retook the artillery, turned it upon the enemy, hardly twenty paces distant, and finally forced them out of the camp with great slaughter. Kilpatrick then immediately re-established his line, and for an hour and a half foiled every attempt of Hampton to retake it. At about eight o'clock, General Mitchell, with a brigade of infantry, came within musket range, having rapidly marched across the country from the plank-road to the assistance of the cavalry, and at once moved into position and remained there until half-past one o'clock, rendering every assistance possible, though the battle was now over.

In this engagement Kilpatrick lost four officers and fifteen men killed, sixty-one men wounded, and one hundred and three of all ranks taken prisoners.

On the 11th of March the cavalry moved into Fayetteville, in advance of the Fourteenth Corps, and on the 12th the entire army was massed at that place.

From Laurel Hill, on the 8th of March, Sherman had dispatched a brief note, by two picked couriers, through the enemy's country, down the Cape Fear River to Wilmington, to apprise the commander of the Union forces on the North

Carolina coast of his progress. "We are all well," it said, "and have done finely. Details are, for obvious reasons, omitted." Both of these scouts reached Wilmington safely, and on the 14th of March these glad tidings, the very first received from the army since it swung loose from Savannah and Beaufort, were spread before the country in an official bulletin from the secretary of war.

On the 12th, the army-tug Davidson, Captain Ainsworth, and the gunboat Eolus, Lieutenant-Commander Young, of the navy, reached Fayetteville from Wilmington, with full intelligence of the important events that had transpired in other quarters, in the eventful six weeks during which Sherman's army was burrowing through the Carolinas. The same day the Davidson carried back to Wilmington detailed information of the movements and condition of the army, and full instructions concerning Sherman's future plans, to General Terry, who had captured Wilmington, and now commanded there, and to General Schofield, who was at Newbern.

While in South Carolina the troops exercised scarcely any restraint with respect to the property of the inhabitants; plundering and destroying without stint. They regarded the people of this State, as a body, and practically without exception, as life-long enemies of the Union, and conceived that upon the army devolved the duty of punishing them for their sins. So general and deeply-seated was this impression, on the part of officers and men, that it was often impossible for their commanders to control the manifestation of it; but from the moment of entering North Carolina the whole demeanor of the army changed, and the men yielded with alacrity to the customary restraints of discipline.

During the campaign General Wheeler addressed the following communication to General Howard, on the subject of destroying houses and cotton:—

"GRAHAMS, S. C., February 7, 1865.

"GENERAL—I have the honor to propose that, if the troops of your army be required to discontinue burning the houses of our citizens, I will discontinue burning cotton.

"As an earnest of the good faith in which my proposition is tendered, I leave at this place about three hundred bales of cotton unburned, worth, in New York, over a quarter of a million, and in our currency, one and a half millions. I trust my having commenced will cause you to use your influence to insure the acceptance of the proposition by your whole army.

"I trust that you will not deem it improper for me to ask that you will require the troops under your command to discontinue the wanton destruction of property not necessary for their sustenance.

"Respectfully, general, your obedient servant,

"J. WHEELER,

"Major-General C. S. A.

"Major-General O. O. HOWARD,

"United States Army, Commanding, etc."

To this General Sherman chose to reply himself, in the following characteristic terms:—

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the field, February 8, 1865.

"GENERAL—Yours, addressed to General Howard, is received by me.

"I hope you will burn all cotton, and save us the trouble. We don't want it; and it has proven a curse to our country. All you don't burn I will.

"As to private houses, occupied by peaceful families, my orders are not to molest or disturb them, and I think my orders are obeyed. Vacant houses, being of no use to anybody, I care little about, as the owners have thought them of no use to themselves. I don't want them destroyed, but do not take much care to preserve them.

"I am, with respect, yours truly, etc.

"Major-General J. WHEELER,

Commanding Cavalry Corps Confederate Army."

On the 24th of February, after some sharp, but ineffectual, correspondence between Kilpatrick and Wheeler, in regard to the murder of the Union prisoners and foragers, Sherman wrote to General Wade Hampton :—

“GENERAL—It is officially reported to me that our foraging parties are murdered, after being captured, and labelled, ‘Death to all Foragers.’ One instance is that of a lieutenant and seven men near Chester, and another of twenty, near a ravine eighty rods from the main road, and three miles from Easter-ville. I have ordered a similar number of prisoners in our hands to be disposed of in like manner. I hold about one thousand prisoners captured in various ways, and can stand it as long as you, but I hardly think these murders are committed with your knowledge, and would suggest that you give notice to your people at large that every life taken by them simply results in the death of one of your confederates.

“Of course, you cannot question my right to forage in an enemy’s country. It is a war right, as old as history. The manner of exercising it varies with circumstances, and if the country will supply my requisitions, I will forbid all foraging ; but I find no civil authorities who can respond to calls for forage or provisions, and therefore must collect directly of the people.

“I have no doubt this is the occasion of much misbehavior on the part of our men, but I cannot permit an enemy to judge or punish with wholesale murder. Personally, I regret the bitter feelings engendered by this war, but they were to be expected, and I simply allege that those who struck the first blow, and made war inevitable, ought not, in fairness, to reproach us for the natural consequences. I merely assert our war-right to forage, and my resolve to protect my foragers to the extent of life for life.

“I am, with respect, your obedient servant.”

To this General Hampton replied at great length, and with acrimony, denying his knowledge of any such murders, and

instead of investigating the circumstances, declaring his fixed intention of executing two federal prisoners, preferably commissioned officers, for every one put to death by Sherman. As a beginning, he stated that he should hold fifty-six Union prisoners as hostages for the safety of the twenty-eight Confederates ordered to be executed by Sherman.

"The army," Sherman wrote to the lieutenant-general, "is in splendid health, condition, and spirit, although we have had foul weather, and roads that would have stopped travel to almost any other body of men I ever heard of. Our march was substantially what I designed. . . . I could leave here to-morrow, but want to clean my columns of the vast crowd of refugees and negroes that encumber me. . . . I hope you have not been uneasy about us, and that the fruits of this march will be appreciated."

CHAPTER XXVIII.

CO-OPERATIVE MOVEMENTS IN NORTH CAROLINA.

As soon as Sherman had reached Savannah, reported the condition of his army, developed his plans, and received the assent of General Grant to his proposal to march through the Carolinas, instead of moving by water directly to the support of the armies before Richmond, as had been originally intended and ordered, the lieutenant-general proceeded to put in motion the parallel combination necessary to insure the success of the campaign.

Sherman's objective being Goldsboro', the first step to be taken obviously was to secure possession of Wilmington, and the control of the Cape Fear River, so that supplies might, if needful, be sent up that stream, and likewise in order that no formidable and strongly fortified garrison might be left to menace the flank and rear of the moving column.

In anticipation of the occasion for such an operation, and desiring to secure control of the mouth of the Cape Fear River, at a time when attention was less strongly directed in that quarter than would be the case when the execution of his plans should be more fully developed, General Grant had, in December, sent a large force from the Army of the James, under Major-General Godfrey Weitzel, and the Navy Department had dispatched a powerful fleet, under Rear-Admiral David D. Porter, to co-operate in the reduction, first of Fort Fisher and its adjacent works on Federal Point, and afterwards of Wilmington.

Major-General Benjamin F. Butler, the commander of the

Army of the James, accompanied the land forces, and assumed control of their movements. After numerous delays and misunderstandings, the navy opened a furious bombardment on the afternoon of the 24th of December, 1864, and kept it up until nightfall, and all Christmas-day, at the rate of about one shot in every two seconds. During the afternoon of the 25th, under cover of this fire, a portion of the troops landed and made a reconnoissance of the Confederate works ; but a storm coming up, General Butler, after consulting with General Weitzel, and ascertaining that the opinion of that officer coincided with his own, ordered the troops already landed to re-embark, and, on the 27th, withdrew his command on the transport fleet and returned to the James River. Admiral Porter, however, decided to remain and continue the naval operations as opportunity might offer.

General Grant immediately selected Major-General Alfred Howe Terry to command the expedition, and directed him to renew the attempt without delay, while the enemy were evidently counting on its abandonment. The choice was an excellent one. General Terry was a young, brave, and accomplished officer, who had entered the army in the earliest period of the war as colonel of the Tenth Regiment of Connecticut Volunteers ; and by active service, zeal, fidelity, and gallantry, had, step by step, won his promotion to his present position, for which, by study and careful attention to duty, he had taken pains to qualify himself. The troops placed under his orders for the present movement, including those which had taken part in the previous failure, consisted of a division of thirty-three hundred picked men from Ord's twenty-fourth army corps, under Brigadier-General Adelbert Ames ; a division of like strength from Weitzel's twenty-fifth corps, under Brigadier-General Charles J. Paine ; a brigade fourteen hundred strong, also from Ord's corps, commanded by Colonel J. C. Abbott, of the Seventh New Hampshire ; and two detached batteries of light artillery.

The expedition sailed from Hampton Roads on the 6th of January, 1865, but, owing to a severe storm, followed by con-

tinuous unfavorable weather, did not reach its destination off Federal Point and begin the disembarkation until the morning of the 13th. By three o'clock that afternoon, however, through a heavy surf, eight thousand men, with three days' rations in their haversacks and forty rounds of ball cartridges in their boxes, had been landed on the beach above the fort, under cover of the admirable disposition and effective fire of Admiral Porter's fleet, and every thing was in readiness for an attack. After some time lost in endeavoring to find a suitable point for the establishment, across the peninsula whereon Fort Fisher is situated, of a line of defence against reinforcements seeking to aid the garrison from the direction of Wilmington, by two o'clock on the 14th, Paine, with his own division and two brigades of Ames' division, reached a favorable position for that purpose, and by eight o'clock had thrown up a secure line of intrenchments. During the day the enemy's works were thoroughly reconnoitred, and General Terry determined on his plan of attack for the morrow. Into this Admiral Porter entered heartily.

Accordingly, at eight o'clock on the morning of the 15th of January, all the fleet, except one division left to support the line of defence across the neck, went into action, and opened a powerful and accurate fire upon the fort. Withdrawing the two brigades of Ames' division, and leaving Paine to hold this defensive line with his own division and Abbott's brigade, at twenty-five minutes past three o'clock in the afternoon Terry gave the order for Ames to move to the assault of the western front. Simultaneously, by a concerted signal, the direction of the fire of the navy was changed, and Curtis' brigade of Ames' division sprang to the assault, while a battalion of marines and seamen, under Commander Breese of the navy, rushed forward to storm the northeast bastion. The naval assault was soon repulsed with heavy loss, but, aided by a well-directed and effective flank fire of the fleet, continued against the fort up to six o'clock P. M., Ames, afterwards re-enforced by Abbott's brigade and the Twenty-seventh United States Colored regiment, of Paine's division, succeeded in effecting an entrance

into the work, and, fighting hand to hand across the embankments, from traverse to traverse, over nine in succession, by nine o'clock at night the last opposition of the enemy died out, the entire work was in undisputed possession of General Terry and his gallant troops, and the garrison were prisoners.

Hoke's division of the Confederate army came down from Wilmington during the fight, and observed Paine's line, but did not attack it.

On the 16th and 17th of January, the enemy blew up Fort Caswell, and abandoned it and the extensive works on Smith's Island, at Smithville and Reeve's Point. These points were immediately occupied by General Terry, and the fleet took up position in the river and along the coast, to defend his flanks.

Thus the mouth of Cape Fear River was in the secure possession of the combined land and naval forces under General Terry and Admiral Porter. The next step was to take Wilmington.

In the mean while, other troops were moving in the same direction from the far west. As soon as the crushing defeat of Hood, and the substantial destruction of the offensive power of his army by Thomas, had liberated a portion of the Union armies defending Tennessee and Kentucky for active operation in other quarters, the lieutenant-general had detached Schofield with his Twenty-third Corps, and ordered him to Annapolis. The order to this effect was received by General Schofield on the 14th of January, at Clifton, on the Tennessee River, where water transportation had been collected to move the command to Eastport, in accordance with previous plans, and on the following day the movement began.

The troops moved with their artillery and horses, but without wagons, by steam transports to Cincinnati, Ohio, and thence by railway to Washington and Alexandria, Virginia; a second order from Washington having, in the mean time, changed the destination from Annapolis. Although in mid-winter, and the weather unusually severe, even for that season, the movement was effected without delay, accident, or suffer-

ing on the part of the troops, and by the 31st of January the whole command had arrived at Washington and Alexandria.

At the latter place great and unavoidable delay was caused by the freezing of the Potomac, which rendered its navigation impossible much of the time for several weeks. Meanwhile General Schofield went to Fort Monroe, met General Grant, and proceeded with him to the mouth of Cape Fear River to consult with Admiral Porter and General Terry relative to future operations. On their return to Washington an order was issued from the War Department creating the Department of North Carolina, and assigning General Schofield to its command, and he now received General Grant's instructions charging him with the conduct of the campaign in that department, and indicating its plan and objects.

As soon as it became possible to navigate the Potomac, Schofield started from Alexandria with Major-General Cox's division of the Twenty-third Corps, reached the mouth of Cape Fear River on the 9th of February, and landed upon the peninsula near Fort Fisher.

The enemy still occupied Fort Anderson on the west bank of the river, with a collateral line running to a large swamp about three-quarters of a mile distant, and a line opposite Fort Anderson running across the peninsula from Cape Fear River to Masonboro' Sound. This position was impregnable against direct attack, and could be turned only by crossing Masonboro' Sound above the enemy's left, or passing around the swamp which covered his right.

The force which General Schofield then had was evidently too small for so extended a movement as either of these ; but time being all-important, he determined to make the attempt without waiting for the arrival of reinforcements.

On the 11th of February, he pushed forward General Terry's line, supported by General Cox's division, drove in the enemy's pickets, and intrenched in a new position, close enough to the enemy's line to compel him to hold the latter in force. He then made preparations to send a fleet of navy boats and pontoons by sea to a point on the beach above the enemy's posi-

tion, while a force composed of Cox's division of the Twenty-third Corps and Ames' division of the Twenty-fourth Corps, was to march along the beach in the night to the point where the boats were to land, haul them across into the sound, and cross the latter to the main-land in rear of Hoke's position at Wilmington.

The weather, however, became so stormy as to render the execution of this plan impossible. On the night of February 14th, Schofield attempted to move the pontoons upon their wagons along the beach with the troops, but the unusually high tides caused by the heavy sea-wind made it impracticable to reach the point of crossing before daylight in the morning, when the movement would be discovered by the enemy before a crossing of the sound could be secured. Hence, after a hard night's work, the attempt was abandoned, and Schofield turned attention to the enemy's right, where the difficulties of both land and sea would not have to be jointly encountered.

Cox's and Ames' divisions were crossed over to Smithville, where they were joined by Colonel Moore's brigade of Couch's division of the Twenty-third Corps, which had just debarked, and advanced along the main Wilmington road until they encountered the enemy's position at Fort Anderson and the adjacent works. Here two brigades were intrenched to occupy the enemy, while General Cox, with his other two brigades and Ames' division, marched around the swamp covering the enemy's right, to strike the Wilmington road in rear of Fort Anderson. The distance to be travelled was about fifteen miles.

The enemy, warned by his cavalry of General Cox's movement, hastily abandoned his works on both sides of the river during the night of the 19th of February, and fell back behind Town Creek on the west, and to a corresponding position, covered by swamps, on the east. Thus, with but trifling loss and without serious opposition, General Schofield gained the main defences of Cape Fear River and of Wilmington, with ten pieces of heavy ordnance and a large amount of ammunition.

On the following day General Cox pursued the enemy to Town Creek, behind which he was found intrenched, having destroyed the only bridge across that stream. General Terry also encountered the enemy in his new position, and in force superior to his own. Ames' division was recrossed to the east bank, and joined Terry during the night of the 19th.

On the 20th, General Cox crossed Town Creek below the enemy's position, by the use of a single flat-boat found in the stream ; and, by wading through swamps, reached the enemy's flank and rear, attacked and routed him, capturing two pieces of artillery, three hundred and seventy-five prisoners, besides the killed and wounded, and dispersed the remainder. During the night General Cox rebuilt the bridge, crossed his artillery, and the next morning pushed on towards Wilmington without opposition. General Terry was unable to make any further advance, but occupied the attention of all of Hoke's force, so that he could not send any to replace that which Cox had destroyed.

On the 21st, General Cox secured a portion of the enemy's pontoon bridge across Brunswick River, which they had attempted to destroy, placed a portion of his troops on Eagle Island, and threatened to cross the Cape Fear above Wilmington. The enemy at once set fire to their steamers, cotton, and military and naval stores, and abandoned the town of Wilmington. General Terry's troops entered it without opposition early in the morning of the 22d of February, and pursued the enemy across Northeast River.

The total loss of General Schofield's troops in the operations from February 11th to the capture of Wilmington was about two hundred officers and men, killed and wounded. Fifty-one pieces of heavy ordnance, fifteen light pieces, and a large amount of ammunition fell into the hands of the captors.

The next thing to be done was to take and hold Goldsboro'. The instructions given to General Schofield by the lieutenant-general contemplated, in the event of a failure to reach that place, the occupation of some point as far as possible from the coast on the railway lines connecting it with Goldsboro', and

the reconstruction of the railways leading to the rear. Either Wilmington or Newbern would be the base according to circumstances. The object was twofold: Firstly, to render material assistance to Sherman, if necessary, in his northward march; Secondly, to open a secure base of supplies for him on line of that march.

Having no rolling-stock at Wilmington, and being nearly destitute of wagon transportation, Schofield was compelled to operate from Newbern alone for the capture of Goldsboro'. He had already sent thither about five thousand troops belonging to Sherman's army, and directed Brigadier-General Innis N. Palmer, commanding the garrison, to move, with as little delay as practicable, with all his available force towards Kinston, to cover the workmen engaged in repairing the railway. As soon as Wilmington was secured, Ruger's division of the Twenty-third Corps, which was then arriving at Cape Fear inlet, was also sent by sea to Morehead City, to re-enforce the column moving from Newbern.

On the 25th, finding that General Palmer, instead of moving promptly, had come to Wilmington to consult in regard to details and difficulties, General Schofield ordered Major-General Cox to take command at Newbern, and push forward at once.

Couch's division of the Twenty-third Corps, which had nearly completed its debarkation when Wilmington was captured, was brought to that place, and with Cox's, temporarily commanded by Brigadier-General Reilly, was prepared as rapidly as possible to join the column moving from Newbern by a land march. These arrangements were made because of the scarcity of both land and sea transportation. It was not until March 6th that wagons enough became available, including those belonging to General Terry's command, to move the two divisions from Wilmington to Kinston.

On the 6th, General Couch set out with his own and Cox's divisions of the Twenty-third Corps, and marched by Onslow and Richland's for Kinston.

On the same day General Schofield went by sea to More-

head City, and joined General Cox beyond Newbern on the 8th. General Cox had advanced to Wise's Forks, about one and a half miles below Southwest Creek, and the railway was in rapid progress.

The force in front of General Cox, which, from the best information at hand, was supposed to consist of Hoke's division and a small body of reserves, had fallen back behind Southwest Creek, and General Cox had sent two regiments, under Colonel Upham, Fifteenth Connecticut Volunteers, to secure the crossing of the creek on the Dover road. The enemy, having been re-enforced by a portion of the old Confederate Army of Tennessee, recrossed the creek some distance above the Dover road, came down in rear of Colonel Upham's position, and surprised and captured nearly his entire command, numbering about seven hundred men. The enemy then advanced, and endeavored to penetrate between Carter's and Palmer's divisions, respectively occupying the Dover road and the railway, but was checked by Ruger's division of the Twenty-third Corps, which was just arriving upon the field. There was no further engagement during the day beyond light skirmishing, and the loss on either side, with the exception of the prisoners captured with Colonel Upham, were insignificant.

It being evident that the enemy's force was at least equal to that of General Cox, and that reinforcements were reaching them as rapidly as they could be brought by rail, General Schofield directed General Cox to put his troops in position, intrench them securely, and await the arrival of General Couch.

On the 9th of March, the enemy pressed Schofield's line strongly, and felt for its flanks. Heavy skirmishing was kept up during the day, but no assault was made.

On the 10th, the enemy having been largely re-enforced, and doubtless learning of the approach of General Couch's column, made a heavy attack upon General Cox's left and centre, but was decisively repulsed, and with heavy loss. Both attacks were met mainly by Ruger's division of the Twenty-third Corps, a portion of which had been rapidly transferred from

the centre to the left to meet the attack there, and then returned to the centre in time to repel the attempt on that portion of the line. The enemy retreated in confusion from the field, leaving his killed and wounded, as well as a large number of arms and intrenching tools, and during the night fell back across the Neuse, and burned the bridge over that river. The loss of Schofield's army in this engagement was about three hundred killed and wounded.

On the 11th, without further opposition, General Couch arrived with his two divisions of the Twenty-third Corps, and effected a junction with the forces under General Cox.

Having no pontoon train, Schofield was unable to cross the Neuse until the bridge could be repaired, or the pontoons, which had just arrived from the North, could be brought by railway from Morehead City. The crossing was effected without opposition on the 14th, the enemy having abandoned Kinston, and moved rapidly towards Smithfield to join the force under Johnston, who was then actively engaged in concentrating all his available force to oppose Schofield's advance from Fayetteville.

General Schofield showed equal energy in pushing his advance straight on its destination in spite of obstacles, and skill in resisting the attempt of the enemy to break up his concentration on Kinston. The junction at that place, in the presence of the enemy, though behind the Neuse, of two columns moving simultaneously from Wilmington and Newbern was not only justified but demanded, at once by the lack of transportation for a preparatory concentration at Newbern, and by the necessity for avoiding a moment's delay; but it was an operation of exceeding delicacy, and in the hands of a commander less skilful in his designs, less mature in judgment, less prompt in decision, or less complete in execution, might have produced the most unfavorable results. The manner in which it was accomplished proved the wisdom displayed by the lieutenant-general in the selection of General Schofield for this important command.

CHAPTER XXIX.

T O G O L D S B O R O ' .

THE 12th, 13th, and 14th of March were passed by Sherman's army at Fayetteville, in totally destroying the United States arsenal and the extensive machinery which had formerly belonged to the old United States armory at Harper's Ferry, and which had been removed thence after the attempted destruction of the works by fire in April, 1861, and used since that time in the manufacture and repair of arms for the Confederate troops. Every building was knocked down and burned, and every piece of machinery utterly broken up and ruined, by the First Regiment Michigan Engineers, under the immediate supervision of Colonel O. M. Poe, chief-engineer of the Military Division. Much valuable property of great use to an enemy was here destroyed, or cast into the river.

Up to this period, Sherman had perfectly succeeded in interposing his superior army between the scattered parts of the enemy. But the fragments that had left Columbia under Beauregard had been re-enforced by Cheatham's corps from the West and the garrison of Augusta, and ample time had been given to move them to Sherman's front and flank about Raleigh. Hardee had also succeeded in getting across Cape Fear River, and could therefore complete the junction with Hoke. These forces, when once united, would constitute an army, probably superior to Sherman's in cavalry and formidable enough in artillery and infantry to justify him in extreme caution in taking the last step necessary to complete the march. Sherman accordingly sent orders to Schofield to move immediately, with all his available force, directly on Goldsboro',

aiming to reach that place nearly simultaneously with the main army on the 20th of March. While the work of destruction was going on at Fayetteville, two pontoon bridges were laid across Cape Fear River, one opposite the town, the other three miles below it.

General Kilpatrick was ordered to move up the plank-road to and beyond Averysboro'. He was to be followed by four divisions of Slocum's left wing, with as few wagons as possible; the rest of the train, under escort of the two remaining divisions of that wing, to take a shorter and more direct road to Goldsboro'. In like manner, General Howard was ordered to send his trains, under good escort, well to the right, toward Faison's Depot and Goldsboro', and to hold four divisions light, ready to go to the aid of the left wing if attacked while in motion.

The weather continued very bad, and the roads had become a mere quagmire. Almost every foot of them had to be corduroyed to admit the passage of wheels. Still, time was so important, that punctually, according to orders, the columns moved out from Cape Fear River on Wednesday, the 15th of March.

General Sherman himself accompanied General Slocum, who, preceded by Kilpatrick's cavalry, moved up the river or plank-road that day to Kyle's Landing, Kilpatrick skirmishing heavily with the enemy's rear-guard about three miles beyond, near Taylor's Hole Creek. At General Kilpatrick's request, General Slocum sent forward a brigade of infantry to hold a line of barricades.

Next morning, the 16th, the column advanced in the same order, and developed the enemy, with artillery, infantry, and cavalry, in an intrenched position in front of the point where the road branches off towards Goldsboro' through Bentonville.

Hardee, in retreating from Fayetteville, had halted in the narrow swampy neck between Cape Fear and South rivers, in the hope of holding Sherman there, in order to save time for the concentration of Johnston's armies at some point to his rear, such as Raleigh, Smithfield, or Goldsboro'. Hardee's force



2. 1864

J. M. Patton's
Bt. Major Gen. Vol.



was now estimated by General Sherman at twenty thousand men. It was necessary to dislodge him, that the advancing army might have the use of the Goldsboro' road, as also to keep up the feint on Raleigh as long as possible. General Slocum was therefore ordered to press and carry the position, only difficult by reason of the nature of the ground, which was so soft that horses would sink everywhere, and even men could hardly make their way over the common pine-barren.

Williams' twentieth corps had the lead, and Ward's division the advance. This was deployed, and the skirmish line developed the position of Rhett's brigade of Confederate Heavy Artillery, armed as infantry, posted across the road behind a light parapet, with a battery of guns enfilading the approach across a cleared field. General Williams sent Case's brigade by a circuit to his left, turned this line, and by a quick charge broke Rhett's brigade, which rapidly retreated to a second line better constructed and more strongly held. Winnegar's battery of artillery, well posted, under the immediate direction of Major Reynolds, chief of artillery of Williams' corps, did good execution on the retreating brigade, and, on advancing Ward's division of the Twentieth Corps over this ground, General Williams captured three guns and two hundred and seventeen prisoners, of whom sixty-eight were wounded and left in a neighboring house with a rebel officer four men, and five days' rations. As Ward's division advanced, the enemy developed a second and stronger line, when Jackson's division was deployed forward on the right of Ward, and the two divisions of Jefferson C. Davis' fourteenth corps on the left, well towards the Cape Fear River. At the same time, Kilpatrick, who was acting in concert with General Williams, was ordered to draw back his cavalry, and mass it on the extreme right, and, in concert with Jackson's right, to feel forward for the Goldsboro' road. He got a brigade on the road, but it was furiously attacked by McLaws' rebel division, and though it fought well and hard, was compelled to return to the flank of the infantry. The whole line advanced late in the afternoon, drove the enemy well within his intrenched line, and pressed

him so hard, that next morning he was gone, having retreated in a very stormy night over the worst of roads.

The aggregate loss of the left wing, in the battle of Averysboro', was twelve officers and sixty-five men killed, and four hundred and seventy-seven wounded.

Ward's division followed to and through Averysboro', developing the fact that Hardee had retreated, not on Raleigh, but on Smithfield. Sherman had the night before directed Kilpatrick to cross South River at a mill-dam to the right rear, and move up on the east side towards Elevation.

Leaving Ward's division to keep up a show of pursuit, Slocum's column was turned to the right, built a bridge across the swollen South River, and took the Goldsboro' road, Kilpatrick crossing to the north in the direction of Elevation, with orders to move eastward, watching that flank. In the mean time, the wagon-trains and guards, as also Howard's column, were wallowing along the miry roads towards Bentonville and Goldsboro'. The enemy's infantry, as before stated, had retreated on Smithfield, and his cavalry retired across Sherman's front in the same direction, burning the bridges over Mill Creek.

Sherman continued with the head of Slocum's column, and encamped, on the night of the 18th, with him on the Goldsboro' road, twenty-seven miles from Goldsboro' and about five miles from Bentonville, at a point where the road from Clinton to Smithfield crosses the Goldsboro' road. Howard was at Lee's Store, only two miles south of that place, and both columns had pickets thrown three miles forward to the point where the two roads unite and become common to Goldsboro'.

Every indication conduced to the belief that the enemy would make no further opposition to Sherman's progress, and would not attempt to strike him in flank while in motion. Accordingly, directing Howard to move his right wing by the new Goldsboro' road, by way of Falling Creek Church, Sherman in person joined Howard's column, with a view to open communication with General Schofield, coming up from Newbern, and Terry from Wilmington. He found General Howard's

column well strung out, owing to the very bad roads, and did not overtake him in person until he had reached Falling Creek Church, with one regiment thrown forward to the cross-roads near Cox's Bridge across the Neuse. The general had reached a distance of about six miles from General Slocum when he heard artillery in that direction, but was soon made easy by one of his staff-officers overtaking him, explaining that Carlin's division of the Fourteenth Corps, leading, had encountered Dibbrell's division of rebel cavalry, which it was easily driving. But soon other staff-officers came up, reporting that Slocum had developed near Bentonville the whole of the rebel army under General Johnston himself. Sherman immediately sent orders to Slocum to call up the two divisions guarding his wagon-trains, and Hazen's division of the Fifteenth Corps, still back near Lee's Store; and to fight defensively until Blair's corps, then near Mount Olive Station, with the three remaining divisions of the Fifteenth Corps, came up on Johnston's left rear from the direction of Cox's Bridge.

In the mean time, while on the road, Sherman received a courier from General Schofield, who reported himself in possession of Kinston, somewhat delayed by want of provisions, but able to march so as to make Goldsboro' on the 21st. A dispatch also arrived from General Terry, who was at or near Faison's Depot.

Sherman at once sent orders to Schofield to push for Goldsboro', and to make dispositions to cross Little River in the direction of Smithfield as far as Millard; to General Terry to move to Cox's Bridge, lay a pontoon bridge, and establish a crossing; and to General Blair to make a night march to Falling Creek Church; and at daylight, the right wing, under General Howard, less the necessary wagon guards, was put in rapid motion on Bentonville. General Slocum's head of column had advanced from its camp of March 18th, and first encountered Dibbrell's cavalry, but soon found his progress impeded by infantry and artillery. The enemy attacked his advance guard, gaining a temporary advantage, and took

three guns and caissons from Carlin's division of Davis' fourteenth corps, driving the two leading brigades back on the main body. As soon as General Slocum realized that he had in his front the whole Confederate army, he promptly deployed the two divisions of Davis' fourteenth corps, and rapidly brought up on their left the two divisions of Williams' twentieth corps. These he arranged on the defensive, and hastily prepared a line of barricades. General Kilpatrick also came up at the sound of artillery, and massed on the left. In this position, the left wing received six distinct assaults by the combined forces of Hoke, Hardee, and Cheatham, under the immediate command of General Johnston himself, without giving an inch of ground, and doing good execution on the enemy's ranks, especially with artillery, whereof the enemy had little or none.

Johnston had moved by night from Smithfield with great rapidity, and without unnecessary wheels, intending to overwhelm Sherman's left flank before it could be relieved by its co-operating columns. But Sherman had all along expected just such a movement, and was prepared for it.

During the night of the 19th, General Slocum got up his wagon-train with its guard of two divisions, and Hazen's division of the Fifteenth Corps, which re-enforcement enabled him to make his position impregnable. The right wing found the Confederate cavalry watching its approach, but unable to offer any serious opposition until the head of column encountered a considerable body behind a barricade at the forks of the road near Bentonville, about three miles east of the battlefield of the day before. This force was, however, quickly dislodged, and the intersection of the roads secured. On moving forward the Fifteenth Corps, General Logan found that the enemy had thrown back his left flank, and had constructed a line of parapet connecting with that towards General Slocum, in the general form of a bastion, having its salient on the main Goldsboro' road, interposed between General Slocum on the west and General Howard on the east, while the flanks rested on Mill Creek, covering the road back to Smithfield.

Sherman instructed General Howard to proceed with due caution until he should have made a strong connection on his left with General Slocum. This he soon accomplished, and, by four p. m. of the 20th, a complete and strong line of battle confronted the enemy in his intrenched position, and General Johnson, instead of catching Sherman's army in detail, as he had designed, was himself on the defensive, with Mill Creek in his rear, spanned by but a single bridge. Nevertheless, Sherman having no object to accomplish by a battle, unless at an advantage, continued to press steadily forward with skirmishers alone, using artillery freely on the wooded space held by the enemy, and feeling strongly the flanks of his position, which were as usual covered by the endless swamps of this region of country. He also ordered all empty wagons to be sent at once to Kinston for supplies, and all other impediments to be grouped near the Neuse, south of Goldsboro', holding the main army in close contact with the enemy, ready to fight him if he should venture outside of his parapets and obstructions.

Immediately upon the occupation of Kinston, General Schofield put a large force of troops to work upon the railway, in aid of the Construction Corps under Colonel W. W. Wright, rebuilt the wagon-bridge over the Neuse, and brought forward supplies, preparatory to a further advance.

Schofield moved from Kinston on the morning of the 20th, and entered Goldsboro' with but slight opposition on the evening of the 21st.

The portion of his command which had remained at Wilmington, under Major-General Terry, moved thence on the 15th of March, reached Faison's Depot on the 20th, and in compliance with the orders just cited, moved from that point to Cox's Bridge, and secured a crossing of the Neuse on the 22d.

Thus, the main army, under Sherman in person, being at Bentonville in the situation described, General Schofield occupying Goldsboro', and General Terry holding the Neuse River, ten miles above, the three armies were in actual connec

tion, holding both banks of the Neuse and having free communication with the sea, by the river and the double line of railway to Newbern and Wilmington, and the great object of the campaign was accomplished.

On the 21st of March, a steady rain prevailed, during which Mower's division of Blair's seventeenth corps, on the extreme right of the main army, worked well to the right around the enemy's flank, and nearly reached the bridge across Mill Creek, the only line of retreat open to the enemy. Of course, there was extreme danger that the enemy would turn on him all his reserve, and, it might be, let go his parapets to overwhelm Mower. Accordingly, Sherman at once ordered a general attack by the skirmish line from left to right. Quite a noisy battle ensued, during which General Mower was enabled to regain his connection with his own corps by moving to his left rear. He had developed a weakness in the enemy's position of which advantage might have been taken; but that night the enemy retreated on Smithfield, leaving his pickets to be taken prisoners, with many dead unburied, and wounded in his field hospitals.

At daybreak of the 22d, pursuit was made two miles beyond Mill Creek, but checked by Sherman's order.

Slocum's left wing lost at Bentonville nine officers and one hundred and forty-five men killed, fifty-one officers and eight hundred and sixteen men wounded, and three officers and two hundred and twenty-three men missing—taken prisoners by the enemy; total, twelve hundred and forty-seven.

Howard's right wing lost two officers and thirty-five men killed, twelve officers and two hundred and eighty-nine men wounded, and one officer and sixty men missing; total, three hundred and ninety-nine.

Kilpatrick's cavalry was held in reserve. His loss was trifling. The aggregate loss of the army at Bentonville was sixteen hundred and forty-six.

Two hundred and sixty-seven of the Confederates were buried on the field by the two wings, and sixteen hundred and twenty-five made prisoners.

Leaving General Howard with the right wing and Kilpatrick's cavalry at Bentonville during the 22d, to bury the dead and remove the wounded, on the following day all the armies moved to the camps assigned them about Goldsboro', there to receive the clothing and supplies of which they stood in need. Sherman went in person on the 22d to Cox's Bridge to meet General Terry, and on the following day rode into Goldsboro', where he found General Schofield and his army. The left wing came in during the same day and next morning, and the right wing followed on the 24th, on which day the cavalry moved to Mount Olive Station and General Terry back to Faison's.

In the mean time the Railway Construction Corps, under the superintendence of the indefatigable Colonel Wright, had been actively at work repairing the railways leading to Wilmington and Newbern. As early as the 25th of March, only four days after the occupation of Goldsboro', the latter line was finished and the first train of cars came in, and the ample supplies provided at Morehead City, by the forethought of General Grant, began to come forward to the army.

Sherman, in his official report of the campaign, thus sums up its results :—

“I cannot, even with any degree of precision, recapitulate the vast amount of injury done the enemy, or the quantity of guns and materials of war captured and destroyed. In general terms, we have traversed the country from Savannah to Goldsboro', with an average breadth of forty miles, consuming all the forage, cattle, hogs, sheep, poultry, cured meats, corn-meal, etc. The public enemy, instead of drawing supplies from that region to feed his armies, will be compelled to send provisions from other quarters to feed the inhabitants. A map herewith, prepared by my chief engineer, Colonel Poe, with the routes of the four corps and cavalry, will show at a glance the country traversed. Of course the abandonment to us by the enemy of the whole sea-coast from Savannah to Newbern, North Carolina, with its forts, dock-yards, gun-

boats, etc., was a necessary incident to our occupation and destruction of the inland routes of travel and supply. But the real object of this march was to place this army in a position easy of supply, whence it could take an appropriate part in the spring and summer campaigns of 1865. This was completely accomplished on the 21st of March by the junction of the three armies and occupation of Goldsboro'.

"In conclusion, I beg to express, in the most emphatic manner, my entire satisfaction with the tone and temper of the whole army. Nothing seems to dampen their energy, zeal, or cheerfulness. It is impossible to conceive a march involving more labor and exposure, yet I cannot recall an instance of bad temper by the way, or hearing an expression of doubt as to our perfect success in the end. I believe that this cheerfulness and harmony of action reflects upon all concerned quite as much real honor and fame as 'battles gained' or 'cities won,' and I therefore commend all, generals, staff, officers, and men, for these high qualities, in addition to the more soldierly ones of obedience to orders and the alacrity they have always manifested when danger summoned them 'to the front.'"

We have already remarked that the failure to defend Columbia was the turning point of the campaign, and necessarily involved its loss, since it enabled Sherman to move either on Charlotte or Fayetteville at his pleasure, and compelled Johnston to sacrifice one of these lines to the defence of the other. In like manner, the inability to cripple Sherman's army in detail, and thus prevent his occupation of Goldsboro', carried with it the impossibility of preventing his junction with the Army of the Potomac. For, should Johnston attempt to oppose Sherman in his progress to the Roanoke, on the Weldon road, he must necessarily expose himself to the danger of having his right turned and being compelled to fight a battle between the Neuse and the Roanoke, with his back to the sea. Should he retire behind the Roanoke to dispute its passage, his rear would be at the mercy of Grant,

and with a large river and a powerful enemy in his front, he must then choose whether to abandon the attempt or submit to be hemmed in without supplies. Again, if Johnston should decide to refuse his left and retire on Raleigh or on the south bank of the Neuse, he would, by that very act, abandon all hope of being able to restrain the accomplishment of his adversary's purpose. The last alternative, though ineffectual to oppose Sherman, was the best of the three, being the only one that did not point to immediate destruction, and it was the one which General Johnston promptly and very properly adopted.

CHAPTER XXX.

THE LAST STROKE.

SHERMAN immediately began to prepare for the new campaign.

On the 24th of March, the day after his arrival at Goldsboro', he issued the following orders for the reorganization and supply of the army as the first step in that direction :—

“I. Major-General Schofield, commanding the Department of North Carolina, will, out of the troops of his command, organize a force equivalent to two corps, or five divisions, and proceed to equip them in the most complete manner for field service. This force, while operating with the other armies in the field, will be styled the ‘Centre.’ For the present, General Schofield will post his command to hold Goldsboro', and cover the railroad back to Wilmington and Morehead City. He will also aid the railroad department with details, to enable it to finish, in the shortest possible time, the two roads, and equip them for service.

“II. Colonel W. W. Wright, of the railroad department, will use extraordinary means, night and day, to complete the two railroads from Goldsboro' back to Morehead City and Wilmington, and to equip them to the capacity of three hundred tons per day of freight.

“He may pay any price for labor, call for details of soldiers, and draw rolling-stock from Savannah, Charleston, or any point within this command, and all commanding officers and quartermasters will give preference to the shipment of such stock over any other work whatever, not involving life. The

work of these railroads is limited and restricted to the transportation in the order following: 'Army stores'—1. Ammunition; 2. Food for men; 3. Clothing for men; 4. Grain for animals; 5. Camp and garrison equipage; 6. Hay and long forage.

"Until there is an accumulation of supplies at Goldsboro', enough to fill the wagons of the army, no officer, soldier, or citizen, or any private stores whatever, will be carried on the up trip, unless it be mail matter, and officers or couriers bearing orders for army headquarters, nor these to exceed one car-load per day. All else must march or use horses and wagons, from the salt-water to Goldsboro', until the army is thoroughly clothed and equipped. Return cars may load according to the discretion of the quartermaster in charge, provided there be no delay.

"To facilitate the completion of these roads, Colonel Poe will cause the First Michigan Engineers to work back towards Newbern. General Howard will cause to be built the railroad over the Neuse, near Goldsboro'; General Slocum, the wagon-road bridge on the Mount Olive road, and General Schofield the railroad-bridge over Northeast Branch, near Wilmington, leaving Colonel Wright with his working parties to look after the laying or ballasting the track, and getting the cars in motion.

"III. The chief quartermaster and commissary of the army in the field, Generals Easton and Beckwith, will repair at once to Goldsboro', and there control the movement of supplies according to the necessities of the army and orders issued at these headquarters. All estimates and requisitions will be addressed accordingly.

"IV. The right wing of the army will group to the front and right of Goldsboro', looking north; the left wing, in front and left of Goldsboro'; the centre to Goldsboro', with detachments to cover the railroads to the rear. The cavalry will be posted at or near Mount Olive Station. All will send foraging-parties into the country, being careful to have them strong enough and well guarded."

Slocum's left wing now adopted the title of the Army of Georgia, and Major-General Joseph A. Mower succeeded General Williams in the command of the Twentieth Corps.

The centre, under Schofield, composed of the Tenth and Twenty-third Army Corps, respectively commanded by Major-General Alfred H. Terry and Jacob D. Cox, perpetuated the use of the name of the Army of the Ohio, hitherto belonging only to the latter organization. Terry's tenth corps consisted of the divisions of Brigadier and Brevet Major-General Adelbert Ames and Brigadier-General Charles J. Paine. Cox's twenty-third corps comprised the divisions of Brigadier-Generals Darius N. Couch, Thomas H. Ruger, and John T. Reilly.

The right wing, under Howard, still retained its original designation as the Army of the Tennessee, and was composed, as during the preceding campaign, of Logan's fifteenth and Blair's seventeenth army corps.

Having given the directions just quoted, Sherman turned over the chief command of his army to Major-General Schofield, the next in rank, and hastened to City Point, to have an interview with Lieutenant-General Grant, for the purpose of arranging the time and manner of their co-operation during the coming campaign. He arrived at General Grant's headquarters on the evening of the 27th of March, and there met President Lincoln, for the first time since the year 1861, General Grant himself, and Generals Meade and Ord, commanding the Armies of the Potomac and James. After a long and full conference as to the campaign just closed, and the final operations now proposed, General Sherman received his instructions from General Grant, and set out on the naval dispatch-boat *Bat*, to return, by way of Hatteras Inlet and Newbern, to his headquarters at Goldsboro', where he arrived on the night of the 30th of March.

General Sherman had informed General Grant that the 10th of April would be the earliest date at which he could be ready to move, and all things were now arranged accordingly.

The troops were still busy in repairing the wear and tear of their recent hard march from Savannah, and in replenishing

clothing and stores necessary for a further progress. Owing to a mistake in the railway department in sending locomotives and cars of the five-foot guage, the army was now limited to the use of the few locomotives and cars of the four-foot eight-and-a-half-inch guage already in North Carolina, with such of the old stock as was captured by Major-General Terry at Wilmington and on his way up to Goldsboro'. Yet such judicious use was made of them, and such industry displayed in the railway management by Generals Easton and Beckwith, Colonel Wright and Mr. Van Dyne, his assistant, that by the 10th of April all the men were clad, the wagons reloaded, and a sufficient amount of forage accumulated for the proposed march.

On the 5th of April, Sherman issued the following orders for the guidance of his army and corps commanders, and heads of staff departments :—

“The next grand objective is to place this army with its full equipment north of Roanoke River, facing west, with a base of supplies at Norfolk and at Wynton, or Murfreesboro' on the Chowan, and in full communication with the Army of the Potomac, about Petersburg, and also to do the enemy as much harm as possible *en route*.

“I. To accomplish this result, the following general plan will be followed, or modified only by written orders from these headquarters, should events require a change :—

“1st. On Monday, the 10th of April, all preparations are presumed to be completed, and the outlying detachments will be called in, or given directions to meet on the next march. All preparations will also be completed to place the railway stock back of Kinston on the one road, and below the Northeast Branch on the other.

“2d. On Tuesday, the 11th, the columns will draw out on their lines of march, say about seven miles, and close up.

“3d. On Wednesday, the march will begin in earnest, and will be kept up at the rate say of about twelve miles a day, or according to the amount of resistance. All the columns will

dress to the left, which is the exposed flank, and commanders will study always to find roads by which they can, if necessary, perform a general left wheel; the wagons to be escorted on to some place of security on the direct route of march.

“Foraging and other details may continue as heretofore, only more caution and prudence should be observed, and foragers should not go in advance of the *advance* guard, but look more to our right-rear for corn, bacon, and meal.

“II. The left wing, Major-General Slocum commanding, will aim straight for the railway bridge near Smithfield, thence along up the Neuse River to the railway bridge over Neuse River, northeast of Raleigh (Powell’s), thence to Warrenton, the general point of concentration. The centre, Major-General Schofield commanding, will move to Whitley’s Mill, ready to support the left until it is past Smithfield, when it will follow up, substantially, Little River to Rolesville, ready at all times to march to the support of the left, after passing Tar River, *en route* to Warrenton.

“The right wing, Major-General Howard commanding, preceded by the cavalry, will move rapidly on Pikeville and Folk’s Bridge, ready to make a junction with the other armies in case the enemy offers battle this side of Neuse River about Smithfield, thence, in case of no serious opposition on the left, will work up towards Earpsboro’, Andrews’ Bridge, and Warrenton.

“The cavalry, General Kilpatrick commanding, leaving its encumbrances with the right wing, will push as though straight for Weldon, until the enemy is across Tar River and that bridge burned; then it will deflect towards Nashville and Warrenton, keeping up a general communication with general headquarters.

“III. As soon as the army starts, the chief quartermaster and commissary will prepare a supply of stores at some point in Pamlico and Albemarle sounds, ready to be conveyed to Kinston, or Wynton and Murfreesboro’, according to developments. As soon as they have satisfactory information that the army is north of the Roanoke, they will forthwith establish a depot at Wynton with a sub-depot at Murfreesboro’.

“Major-General Schofield will hold, as heretofore, Wilmington, with the bridge across Northeast Branch as an outpost, Newbern and Kinston as its outpost, and will be prepared to hold Wynton and Murfreesboro’ as soon as the time arrives for that move. The navy has instructions from Admiral Porter to co-operate, and any commanding officer is authorized to call on the navy for assistance and co-operation, always in writing, setting forth the reasons,—of which, of necessity, the naval commander is the judge.

“IV. The general-in-chief will be with the centre habitually, but may in person shift to either flank where his presence may be needed, leaving a staff-officer to receive reports. He requires absolutely a report of each army or grand detachment each night, whether any thing material has occurred or not: *often* the absence of an enemy is a very important fact in military prognostication.”

In the mean time, Major-General George Stoneman, in command of a division of cavalry, operating from East Tennessee in connection with Major-General Thomas, in pursuance of Sherman’s previous orders, had reached the railway about Greensboro’, N. C., had utterly destroyed it, and had pushed along it to Salisbury, destroying in his march bridges, culverts, depots, and all kinds of rebel supplies, and had extended the breach in the railway down to the Catawba Bridge. This was fatal to the hostile armies of Lee and Johnston, who depended on that road for supplies, and as their ultimate line of retreat.

Brevet Major-General J. H. Wilson, in command of the cavalry corps organized by himself, under the orders issued by Sherman before turning south from his pursuit of Hood into Tennessee, had started from the neighborhood of Decatur and Florence, Alabama, and moved straight into the heart of Alabama, on a route prescribed for General Thomas after he had defeated General Hood at Nashville, Tennessee. But the road being too heavy for infantry, and General Thomas being already greatly weakened by detachments

for service in other quarters, he had devolved the duty on that most energetic young cavalry officer, General Wilson, who, imbued with the proper spirit, thus struck one of the best blows of the war at the waning strength of the Confederacy. His route by Tuscaloosa, Selma, Montgomery, Columbus, and Macon, being one never before traversed by the Union troops, afforded him ample supplies for men and animals as long as his column was in motion.

Meanwhile, Grant was intently watching Lee, seeking to fathom his course under the new combinations now being developed. If Lee should remain behind his lines at Petersburg, in the passive defensive attitude he had for so many months successfully maintained, his defeat and destruction would be almost mathematically certain the moment Sherman should cross the Roanoke; and this, as we have shown, Johnston was powerless to prevent. On the other hand, the Confederate general might summon Johnston, by forced marches, to his aid, while Sherman was refitting and getting ready to move, and then, with the two armies united, strike Grant a vigorous blow; but the two armies united would not possess sufficient strength to overpower Grant's army, behind its secure intrenchments: and before even the semblance of a siege could be undertaken, even supposing the Confederates to possess the means for such a task, Sherman would arrive, and the game would be lost, for the only remaining Confederate forces would find themselves in a *cul-de-sac*, without present means of subsisting so large a number of men, and without a possibility of escape. Lee's best alternative was undoubtedly to be sought in a junction with Johnston at Raleigh or on the north bank of the Neuse, and a vigorous blow for Sherman's destruction before Grant could follow.

It was for the first signs of the adoption of such a course that Grant now looked with sleepless eyes. There was but one way to meet it—to strike the evacuating column in air, in the first moment of retreat, and force it to a battle. Accordingly, on the last day of March, thinking he saw the symptoms of such a movement, Grant struck. After a series of battles,

among the most determined and sanguinary of the entire war, on the 3d of April his line crushed Lee's shell at all points, and by the next morning Petersburg and Richmond were evacuated; Lee, with the remnants of his army, was in full flight, his men scattering like chaff before the wind; and the officers of the Confederate government were individual fugitives, vainly seeking the protecting wing of the remains of their armies.

The news of the battles about Petersburg reached Sherman at Goldsboro', on the 6th of April. Up to that time his purpose was, as we have already seen, to move rapidly northward, feigning on Raleigh, and striking straight for Burkesville, thereby interposing between Johnston and Lee. But the problem was now greatly changed, and, in the expressive language of Lieutenant-General Grant in his instructions to Sherman, the Confederate armies of Lee and Johnston became the strategic points. General Grant was fully able to take care of the former, and Sherman's task was to destroy or capture the latter.

Johnston at that time had his army well in hand about Smithfield. Sherman estimated his infantry and artillery at thirty-five thousand, and his cavalry from six to ten thousand. Thus deeming his adversary superior in cavalry, General Kilpatrick was held in reserve at Mount Olive, with orders to recruit his horses, and be ready to make a sudden and rapid march on the 10th of April.

At daybreak on the day appointed all the heads of columns were in motion against the enemy;—Major-General Slocum taking the two direct roads for Smithfield; Major-General Howard making a circuit by the right, and feigning up the Weldon road to disconcert the enemy's cavalry; and Generals Terry and Kilpatrick moving on the west side of the Neuse River, aiming to reach the rear of the enemy between Smithfield and Raleigh. General Schofield followed General Slocum in support. All the columns met, within six miles of Goldsboro', more or less cavalry, behind the usual rail barricades, which were swept before them, and by ten A. M. of the

11th Davis' fourteenth corps entered Smithfield, closely followed by Mower's twentieth corps.

Johnston had rapidly retreated across the Neuse River, and having his railway to lighten up his trains, could fall back faster than Sherman could pursue. The rains had also set in, making the resort to corduroy absolutely necessary for the passage even of ambulances. The enemy had burned the bridge at Smithfield, and as soon as possible General Slocum got his pontoons up, and crossed over a division of the Fourteenth Corps.

"Then," says Sherman, "we heard of the surrender of Lee's army at Appomattox Courthouse, Virginia, which was announced to the armies in orders, and created universal joy. Not one officer or soldier of my army but expressed a pride and satisfaction that it fell to the lot of the Armies of the Potomac and James so gloriously to overwhelm and capture the entire army that had held them in check so long; and their success gave us new impulse to finish up our task."

Without a moment's hesitation, Sherman gave orders to drop all trains, and the army marched rapidly in pursuit to and through Raleigh, reaching that place at half-past seven A. M. on the 13th, in a heavy rain.

The next day the cavalry pushed on through the rain to Durham's Station, Logan's fifteenth corps following as far as Morrisville Station, and Blair's seventeenth corps to John's Station. On the supposition that Johnston was tied to his railway, as a line of retreat by Hillsboro', Greenboro', Salisbury, and Charlotte, Sherman had turned the other columns across the bend in that road towards Ashboro'. Kilpatrick was ordered to keep up a show of pursuit towards the Company's Shops, in Alencer County; Howard to turn the left by Hackney's Crossroads, Pittsburg, St. Lawrence, and Ashboro'; Slocum to cross Cape Fear River at Avon's Ferry and move rapidly by Carthage, Caledonia, and Cox's Mills; while Schofield was to hold Raleigh and the road back, with spare force to follow by an intermediate route.

By the 15th, though the rains were incessant, and the roads

almost impracticable, Major-General Slocum had Jefferson C. Davis' fourteenth corps near Martha's Vineyard, with a pontoon bridge laid across Cape Fear River at Avon's Ferry, and Mower's twentieth corps in support; and Major-General Howard had Logan's fifteenth and Blair's seventeenth corps stretched out on the roads towards Pittsboro'; while General Kilpatrick held Durham's Station and Capitol Hill University.

Johnston's army was retreating rapidly on the roads from Hillsboro' to Greensboro', he himself being at Greensboro'.

Thus matters stood when General Sherman received a communication from General Johnston that arrested all hostile movements for the time being.

CHAPTER XXXI.

D A W N .

FROM Smithfield, on the 12th of April, Sherman wrote to General Grant :—

“I have this moment received your telegram announcing the surrender of Lee’s army. I hardly know how to express my feelings; but you can imagine them. The terms you have given Lee are magnanimous and liberal. Should Johnston follow Lee’s example, of course I will grant the same. He is retreating before me on Raleigh, and I shall be there to-morrow. Roads are heavy and bad; but under the inspiration of the news from you we can march twenty-five miles a day. I am twenty-eight miles from Raleigh, but a part of my army is eight miles behind. If Johnston retreats south I will follow him; but I take it he will surrender at Raleigh. I shall expect to hear from General Sheridan in case Johnston does not surrender, for in such case I will need a little more cavalry. I would make sure to capture the whole army.”

When Sherman entered Raleigh, on the 13th, he found that the inhabitants had not heard of Lee’s surrender, and could hardly credit the report. Johnston had retreated westward, and Sherman dispatched to Grant that he would move at once to Ashboro’, Saulsbury, or Charlotte, according to circumstances.

Kilpatrick, with most of the cavalry, had been left ten miles to the south and west of Smithfield, busy after the enemy’s locomotives and railway trains, and had reported some captures. He was now ordered to “keep pushing the enemy.”

“To-night,” writes Assistant Adjutant-General Dayton, “the general will inform you of the coming move. The columns are closing up here now.”

Late on the same day, General Sherman wrote to Kilpatrick:—

“I have been out and am just back, and hasten to answer yours of to-day. I will send a locomotive to bring up the cars you have captured. Send pickets along the road to advise the conductor where to stop. It will take all day to-morrow to close up our trains, and to draw out on the new line of operations. Rest your animals, and confine your operations to mere feints, and get ready for work by day after to-morrow.”

On the 14th, Sherman had information that Johnston was about Greensboro' and Saulsbury, and had his troops ready to move in that direction. And again he writes to Kilpatrick:—

“I sent you orders to-day, by which you will see I am to put my army where, if Johnston tries to pass out by Charlotte, I can strike him in flank, or, if he remains at Greensboro', I can capture the whole. All I expect of you is to keep up the delusion that we are following him *via* the University and Hillsboro' until I get my infantry heads of column across the Haw River, when I want you to cross also, and feel out towards Greensboro' till I get to Ashboro', where, if he remains at Greensboro', I can approach him from the south, and force him to battle, to surrender, or disperse. You will perceive we will save a couple of days by cutting across the bend in the direction of Saulsbury. I am anxious to prevent his escape towards Georgia.”

In the same letter General Sherman informed his chief of cavalry that on the following day General Howard would have one corps at Jones' Station, and another corps at Morrison's, and that on the day after all would move by separate roads

for Ashboro'; and added: "The people here manifest more signs of subjugation than I have yet seen; but Jeff. Davis has more lives than a cat, and we must not trust him. If you reach the university do not burn its library, buildings, or specific property."

On the 14th of April, after all the dispositions for the advance on Raleigh had been completed, General Sherman received a communication from General Johnston, by a flag of truce, requesting an armistice, and a statement of the best terms on which he could be permitted to surrender the army under his command. General Sherman instantly dispatched his answer, and sent it through General Kilpatrick with a note of instruction, as follows: "The letter by flag of truce was from General Johnston, which is the beginning of the end. Herewith is my answer; send it at once, and do not advance your cavalry beyond the university, or to a point abreast of it on the railway. I will be at Morrisville to-morrow."

"I am fully empowered to arrange with you," he wrote to General Johnston, "any terms for the suspension of hostilities as between the armies commanded by you and those commanded by myself, and am willing to confer with you to that end.

"That a basis of action may be had, I undertake to abide by the same terms and conditions entered into by Generals Grant and Lee at Appomattox Courthouse, Virginia, on the 9th instant."

On the evening of the same day, the three army commanders were informed of the communication just received from the enemy, and that under existing circumstances it was probable the long march contemplated, and for which such careful preparation had been made, might become unnecessary. General Schofield was nevertheless ordered to place one corps of the Army of the Ohio at Holly Springs, and the other just outside of Raleigh, in the direction of the proposed route, and there await further instructions.

General Howard was directed to put one corps of the Army of the Tennessee at Morrisville, and the other at Jones' Station,

and then expect the arrival of the commander-in-chief at Morrisville ; and General Slocum was ordered to remain as he then was until further orders.

General Sherman then immediately prepared copies of his correspondence with General Johnston, and wrote to General Grant on the same day, as follows :—

“I send copies of a correspondence begun with General Johnston, which I think will be followed by terms of capitulation. I will accept the same terms as General Grant gave General Lee, and be careful not to complicate any points of civil policy. If any cavalry has started towards me, caution them that they must be prepared to find our work done. It is now raining in torrents, and I shall await General Johnston’s reply here, and will propose to meet him in person at Chapel Hill. I have invited Governor Vance to return to Raleigh with the civil officers of his State. I have met ex-Governor Graham, Mr. Badger, Moore, Holden, and others, all of whom agree that the war is over, and that the States of the South must reassume their allegiance, subject to the constitution and laws of Congress, and that the military power of the South must submit to the national arms. This great fact once admitted, all the details are easy of arrangement.”

Meanwhile, Major McCoy, of General Sherman’s staff, then at Durham’s Station, was directed by General Sherman to remain with Kilpatrick until Johnston’s second communication should be brought within the lines ; so that, in case of necessity, the contents of the message could be sent over the telegraphic wires, and an answer returned forthwith. But no message came from Johnston on that day. On the 16th, Sherman wrote to Brevet Brigadier-General Easton, assistant quartermaster-general at Newbern :—“I expect every hour an answer from Johnston, and unless he makes clear and satisfactory terms to-day, I will start to-morrow towards Ashboro’. Hold yourself in readiness to give us forage here (at Raleigh) when the railway is done.” On the same day, General Kil-

patrick having telegraphed to General Sherman that he suspected bad faith on the part of Johnston, and suggested possible surprise, and having described certain movements of the enemy, not consonant with the maintenance of the condition of things existing at the time of the commencement of the armistice, Sherman replied :—"I have faith in General Johnston's personal sincerity, and do not believe he would resort to a subterfuge to cover his movements. He could not well stop the movement of his troops until he got my letter, which I now hear was delayed all day yesterday. . . . in sending it forward. But if Johnston does gain time on us by such we will make up for it at the expense of North Carolina. We will be all ready to move to-morrow if necessary."

Later on the same day, the message from General Johnston was received by General Sherman, and the result made known to Generals Slocum, Howard, and Schofield, viz., that General Johnston desired an interview with General Sherman, near Durham's Station, with a view to arrange terms of capitulation. Sherman fixed the time at twelve o'clock on the next day, the 17th.

The meeting was had according to appointment. Sherman frankly tendered the same terms accorded by General Grant to General Lee. Johnston acknowledged the terms to be both fair and liberal, but asked the consideration of additional facts. He suggested the treaty between Generals Grant and Lee had reference to a part only of the Confederate forces, whereas he proposed the present agreement should include all the remaining armies of the Confederacy, and thus the war should be at an end. He admitted, frankly and candidly, there was no longer any ground for hope of success on the part of the Confederacy, "that the cause was lost," and that this admission included slavery, State rights, and every other claim for which the war had been inaugurated. And now he desired the fragments of the Confederate armies to preserve their company and regimental organizations, that they be marched to the States where they belonged in such order that they might not be broken up into predatory bands, to overrun

the country and vex the inhabitants ; and urged that that was the favorable occasion to inaugurate the beginning of a period of peace and good-will between all the people destined to live under the same Government.

Sherman declared that while he honored the motives of Johnston, and would be most happy to promote the results suggested, he had grave doubts whether he, Johnston, had the power to make a binding treaty beyond the usual capitulation entered into by and between commanders of armies when one surrenders, on terms, to the other. And if the needed authority did exist, so far as Johnston was concerned, he, Sherman, did not deem himself in possession of the necessary power to bind the Government of the United States to such terms.

As to the first objection, the lack of power on his part, General Johnston replied that he felt sure he could satisfy General Sherman he had all necessary power in the premises, and suggested that the conference might be adjourned over until the next day, to enable him to confer with General Breckinridge, the Confederate secretary of war. And as to the second objection, he urged the repeated declarations of President Lincoln, that he was willing, at all times, to negotiate a peace with any person or persons who could control the Confederate armies. Finally, the convention was adjourned until the next day at twelve o'clock at the same place. On the same day General Sherman wrote a letter to Colonel Webster at Newbern, to be telegraphed to General Grant, as follows :—

“ I have returned from a point twenty-seven miles up the railroad, where I had a long interview with General Johnston, with a full and frank interchange of opinions.

“ He evidently seeks to make terms for Jeff. Davis and his cabinet.

“ He wanted to consult again with Mr. Breckinridge at Greensboro', and I have agreed to meet him at noon to-morrow at the same place.

"We lose nothing in time, as, by agreement, both armies stand still; and the roads are drying up, so that if I am forced to pursue, will be able to make better speed.

"There is great danger that the Confederate armies will dissolve, and fill the whole land with robbers and assassins, and I think this is one of the difficulties that Johnston labors under.

"The assassination of Mr. Lincoln shows one of the elements in the rebel army which will be almost as difficult to deal with as the main armies. Communicate substance of this to General Grant; and also, that if General Sheridan is marching down this way, to feel for me before striking the enemy.

"I don't want Johnston's army to break up into fragments."

It will be remembered that during his hurried visit to City Point to confer with General Grant, General Sherman also had the good fortune to meet President Lincoln, and freely interchange views with him. Any one who knows any thing of the personal opinions and desires of Mr. Lincoln, knows that, above all things, he desired an end of the war on any terms that proposed a permanent peace. He was now, more than ever, impressed by the sacrifices and sufferings of the people on both sides of the contest. Here, in the neighborhood of Petersburg, he had seen war for the first time, and it harrowed his generous soul to the very bottom. He walked over ground covered with the bodies of the slain, more numerous than he could count or cared to count; he saw living men with broken heads and mangled forms, and heard the hopeless groans and piteous wails of the dying, whom no human hand could save; he witnessed the bloody work of the surgeons—those carpenters and joiners of human frames—and saw amputated legs and arms piled up in heaps to be carted away like the offal of a slaughter-house; and he turned from the horrid sight, exclaiming: "*And this is war—horrid war—the trade of barbarians!*" And, appealing to his principal officers, he inquired: "Gentlemen, is there no way by which we can put a stop to this fighting?"

The President was in this frame of mind when General Sherman reported to him at City Point. He had infused the same feeling among all the officers who were near him. He was willing to recognize the existence of State governments, to convene rebel State legislatures, to confer with rebel State civil officers, and to exercise the pardoning power to the utmost extent ; in fact, to concede any thing that he could safely concede, and to do any thing that he could safely do, to end the war and restore the supremacy of the Government of the United States.

Deeply impressed with these views, General Sherman returned to his command in North Carolina.

On the 17th of April, the army was shocked by the appalling intelligence of President Lincoln's assassination on the evening of the 14th. The deep gloom which settled upon the hearts of men overshadowed a terrible determination. If there were those in the South who did not thoroughly detest this infamous and cowardly act, for them there need be no appeal for mercy.

Sherman at once announced the melancholy news to the army in the following general orders :—

“ HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field, Raleigh, April 17, 1865.

SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, NO. 50.

“The general commanding announces with pain and sorrow that, on the evening of the 11th instant, at the theatre in Washington City, his Excellency, the President of the United States, Mr. Lincoln, was assassinated by one who uttered the State motto of Virginia. At the same time the secretary of state, Mr. Seward, whilst suffering from a broken arm, was also stabbed by another murderer in his own house, but still survives, and his son was wounded, supposed fatally.

“It is believed by persons capable of judging, that other high officers were designed to share the same fate. Thus it seems that our enemy, despairing of meeting us in manly warfare, begin to resort to the assassin's tools. Your general does not wish you to infer that this is universal, for he knows

that the great mass of the Confederate army would scorn to sanction such acts, but he believes it the legitimate consequence of rebellion against rightful authority. We have met every phase which this war has assumed, and must now be prepared for it in its last and worst shape, that of assassins and guerrillas; but woe unto the people who seek to expend their wild passions in such a manner, for there is but one dread result.

“By order of MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN.

“L. M. DAYTON, Major and Asst. Adjt.-Gen.”

On the 18th of April negotiations were resumed. After the first meeting General Sherman conferred with his principal officers, all of whom favored a treaty on the basis proposed by Johnston. The course pursued at Richmond, the general tone and spirit of the newspaper press, private letters from home, all indicated a general spirit of amnesty and forgiveness. It is a singular fact that soldiers who suffer privation, wounds, and death in the cause of their country, are much more forgiving, generous, and considerate towards their enemies than their friends at home, who live in comfort and read their patriotic sentiments reflected in the morning papers. Finally, the following memorandum, or basis of agreement, was drawn up by General Sherman himself, which, for the time being, was satisfactory to all present as a proposition to be submitted to the President of the United States for ratification or rejection:—

“Memorandum, or basis of agreement, made this, the 18th day of April, A. D. 1865, near Durham’s Station, in the State of North Carolina, by and between General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate army, and Major-General W. T. Sherman, commanding the Army of the United States, both present.

“I. The contending armies now in the field to maintain the *status quo* until notice is given by the commanding general of any one to his opponent, and reasonable time, say forty-eight hours, allowed.

“II. The Confederate armies now in existence to be disbanded and conducted to their several State capitals, there to deposit their arms and public property in the State arsenal; and each officer and man to execute and file an agreement to cease from acts of war, and to abide the action of both State and Federal authorities. The number of arms and munitions of war to be reported to the chief of ordnance at Washington City, subject to the future action of the Congress of the United States, and in the mean time to be used solely to maintain peace and order within the borders of the States respectively.

“III. The recognition by the executive of the United States of the several State governments, on their officers and legislatures taking the oath prescribed by the constitution of the United States; and where conflicting State governments have resulted from the war, the legitimacy of all shall be submitted to the Supreme Court of the United States.

“IV. The re-establishment of all Federal courts in the several States, with powers as defined by the constitution and laws of Congress.

“V. The people and inhabitants of all States to be guaranteed, so far as the Executive can, their political rights and franchise, as well as their rights of person and property, as defined by the constitution of the United States and of the States respectively.

“VI. The executive authority or Government of the United States not to disturb any of the people by reason of the late war, so long as they live in peace and quiet, and abstain from acts of armed hostility, and obey the laws in existence at the place of their residence.

“VII. In general terms, it is announced that the war is to cease; a general amnesty, so far as the Executive of the United States can command, on condition of the disbandment of the Confederate armies, the distribution of arms, and the resumption of peaceful pursuits by officers and men hitherto composing said armies.

“Not being fully empowered by our respective principals to fulfil these terms, we individually and officially pledge ourselves

to promptly obtain authority, and will endeavor to carry out the above programme."

Immediately General Sherman made his arrangements to send the agreement to Washington with all possible haste, and wrote the following private letter of advice and explanation, directed to both General Grant and General Halleck :—

"I inclose herewith a copy of an agreement made this day between General Joseph E. Johnston and myself, which, if approved by the United States, will produce peace from the Potomac to the Rio Grande. Mr. Breckinridge was present at our conference, in his capacity as major-general, and satisfied me of the ability of General Johnston to carry out to the full extent the terms of the agreement ; and if you will get the President to simply indorse the copy, and commission me to carry out the terms, I will follow them to the conclusion.

"You will observe that it is an absolute submission of the enemy to the lawful authority of the United States, and disperses his armies absolutely ; and the point to which I attach most importance is, that the dispersion and disbandment of these armies is done in such a manner as to prevent their breaking up into guerrilla bands.

"On the other hand, we can retain just as much of our army as we please. I agreed to the mode and manner of the surrender of arms set forth, as it gives the States the means of repressing guerrillas, which we could not expect them to do if we stripped them of all arms.

"Both Generals Johnston and Breckinridge admitted that slavery was dead, and I could not insist on embracing it in such a paper, because it can be made with the States in detail. I know that all the men of substance South sincerely want peace, and I do not believe they will resort to war again during this century. I have no doubt but that they will in the future be perfectly subordinate to the laws of the United States.

"The moment my action in this matter is approved, I can spare five corps, and will ask for orders to leave General Scho-

field here with the Tenth Corps, and to march myself with the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-third corps *via* Burkesville and Gordonsville to Frederick or Hagerstown, there to be paid and mustered out.

“The question of finance is now the chief one, and every soldier and officer not needed should be got home at work. I would like to be able to begin the march north by May 1st. I urge on the part of the President speedy action, as it is important to get the Confederate armies to their homes as well as our own.”

On the same day General Sherman wrote the following private note to General Halleck in regard to the assassination of Mr. Lincoln, and the man Clark, supposed to have been detailed to murder himself:—

“GENERAL—I received your dispatch describing the man Clark detailed to assassinate me. He had better be in a hurry, or he will be too late.

“The news of Mr. Lincoln’s death produced a most intense effect on our troops. At first I feared it would lead to excesses, but now it has softened down, and can easily be guided.

“None evinced more feeling than General Johnston, who admitted that the act was calculated to stain his cause with a dark hue. And he contended that the loss was most serious to the people of the South, who had begun to realize that Mr. Lincoln was the best friend the South had.

“I cannot believe that even Mr. Davis was privy to the diabolical plot; but think it the emanation of a set of young men at the South, who are very devils. I want to throw upon the South the care of this class of men, who will soon be as obnoxious to their industrial classes as to us.

“Had I pushed Johnston’s army to an extremity, these would have dispersed, and would have done infinite mischief.”

All things being now ready, Major Hitchcock, a staff-officer,

was sent forward with directions to keep his own counsel ; to proceed as fast as possible direct to Washington, and deliver his charge to the new President, await his pleasure, and return with his answer. The messenger arrived at Washington at a moment ill suited to the favorable consideration of liberal terms of peace. Mr. Lincoln had been cruelly murdered by a dastardly wretch in the supposed employ of the rebel government ; another conspirator had stealthily entered the domicile of Mr. Seward, who was then ill and helpless in his bed, and, after hewing his way over the prostrate forms of the attendants of the sick-chamber and of the members of the family present, to the bedside of the helpless minister, pounced upon him with all the ferocity of a fiend with a purpose to destroy his life. It had been discovered that the conspiracy not only compassed the life of Mr. Lincoln and Mr. Seward, but that of other high officials of the Government, and in the army as well. Such indignation was never felt in this country before ; and the sorrow experienced by reason of the death of the great and good Mr. Lincoln, as all were wont now to call him, was spontaneous, deep, and universal. Every head was bowed down, every heart was sad, and every mind was occupied with thoughts of the awful crime.

It was under such circumstances that the newly inaugurated President and the panic-stricken members of the old cabinet met to break the package sent by General Sherman, and to deliberate on terms of peace !

The document was read, but a funeral sermon would have sounded better. Every paragraph, every line, and every word of the unfortunate document, when read by the light of surrounding circumstances, and listened to by men in such frame of mind, appeared like an amnesty for unpardonable sins, and a pardon in advance for the assassins. Nay more, the liberal spirit of the soldier which pervaded the entire document, so discordant with the sentiment of the hour, was suggestive of complicity with treason itself. Under the circumstances, any terms short of utter annihilation of all rebels and rebel sym-

pathizers, were not to be considered for a moment. Peace itself was treason, and only vengeance loyalty.

It was the desire of the secretary of war, Mr. Stanton, to relieve General Sherman from command at once, but General Grant, who was present at the cabinet meeting, himself volunteered to take the answer of the President to General Sherman; and to him was accordingly confided full control and discretion in the matter.

General Grant proceeded at once to North Carolina, and on the evening of the 23d arrived at Morehead City, whence he sent word to General Sherman that the truce with Johnston had been disapproved, and notified him of the contents of the following letter of instructions from the secretary of war:—

“WAR DEPARTMENT,
“Washington City, April 21, 1865.

“GENERAL—The memorandum or basis agreed upon between General Sherman and General Johnston having been submitted to the President, they are disapproved. You will give notice of the disapproval to General Sherman, and direct him to resume hostilities at the earliest moment.

“The instructions given to you by the late President, Abraham Lincoln, on the 3d of March, by my telegram of that date addressed to you, express substantially the views of President Andrew Johnson, and will be observed by General Sherman. A copy is herewith appended.

“The President desires that you proceed immediately to the headquarters of General Sherman, and direct operations against the enemy.

“Yours truly,

“EDWIN M. STANTON,
“Secretary of War.

“TO LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT.”

This dispatch was received on the morning of the 24th. General Sherman instantly gave notice to General Johnston as follows:—

“You will take notice that the truce or suspension of hostilities agreed to between us on the 18th instant will close in forty-eight hours after this is received at your lines.”

At the same time he wrote :—

“I have replies from Washington to my communications of the 18th. I am instructed to limit my operations to your immediate command, and not attempt civil negotiations. I therefore demand the surrender of your army on the same terms as were given to General Lee at Appomattox, Va., on the 9th April, instant, purely and simply.”

Within an hour after the reception of General Grant's dispatch, a courier was riding with all haste towards Durham's Station with this notice and demand for General Johnston. Immediately on the return of the messenger, General Sherman issued orders to his troops terminating the truce on the 26th, at twelve o'clock M., and ordered all to be in readiness to march at that time, on routes previously prescribed in the special field-orders of April 14th, from positions held April 18th. These dispositions were already made when General Grant arrived at Raleigh. He then informed General Sherman that he had orders from the President to direct all military movements, and General Sherman explained to him the exact position of the troops. General Grant was so well satisfied with the situation, that he concluded not to interfere with the arrangements already made, and to leave their execution in the hands of General Sherman.

As for General Johnston, he was powerless ; he could neither fight nor retreat. He must either disperse his army or surrender it on the terms proposed. On the 25th he invited General Sherman to another conference, with a view to surrender. It was now the province of General Grant to take the lead in the negotiations, but he preferred that the entire business should be consummated by General Sherman. Nevertheless, he recommended and even urged General Sherman

to afford General Johnston another interview, which was finally appointed to take place at the hour designated for the termination of the truce.

At this conference final terms were soon concluded, and the second grand army of the Confederacy was surrendered to the power of the United States upon the following terms :—

“Terms of a military convention entered into this twenty-sixth (26th) day of April, 1865, at Bennett’s house, near Durham’s Station, North Carolina, between General Joseph E. Johnston, commanding the Confederate Army, and Major-General W. T. Sherman, commanding the United States Army in North Carolina.

“All acts of war on the part of the troops under General Johnston’s command to cease from this date. All arms and public property to be deposited at Greensboro’, and delivered to an ordnance officer of the United States Army. Rolls of all officers and men to be made in duplicate, one copy to be retained by the commander of the troops, and the other to be given to an officer to be designated by General Sherman. Each officer and man to give his individual obligation in writing not to take up arms against the Government of the United States until properly released from this obligation. The side-arms of officers, and their private horses and baggage, to be retained by them.

“This being done, all the officers and men will be permitted to return to their homes, not to be disturbed by the United States authorities so long as they observe their obligations and the laws in force where they may reside.

“W. T. SHERMAN, Major-General,
“Commanding the Army of the United States in
North Carolina.

“J. E. JOHNSTON, General,
“Commanding Confederate States Army
in North Carolina.

“Approved: U. S. GRANT, Lieutenant-General.

“RALEIGH, N. C., April 26, 1865.”

General Sherman says, in his report :—

“ And although undue importance has been given to the so-called negotiations which preceded it, and a rebuke and public disfavor cast on me wholly unwarranted by the facts, I rejoice in saying it was accomplished without further ruin and devastation to the country ; without the loss of a single life of those gallant men who had followed me from the Mississippi to the Atlantic ; and without subjecting brave men to the ungracious task of pursuing a fleeing foe that did not wish to fight. And I challenge the instance, during the last four years, when an armed and defiant foe stood before me, that I did not go in for a fight ; and I would blush for shame if I had ever struck or insulted a fallen foe.”

It will now become necessary to recur to events transpiring at Washington and Richmond during the absence of the lieutenant-general.

CHAPTER XXXII.

CORRESPONDENCE DURING THE TRUCE.

IN order to a more perfect understanding of the intentions of the framers of the original memorandum of agreement, in proposing and consenting to the terms of the armistice, it is now necessary to refer to the correspondence that took place during the period that intervened between the signature of the agreement by General Sherman and General Johnston on the 18th of April, 1865, and the night of the 23d of the same month, when General Sherman received the first notification that the Government had refused to ratify his action.

Immediately on signing the truce, Sherman dispatched the following order, by a flag of truce, through the lines of the Confederate army to General Stoneman, commanding the cavalry in Johnston's rear :—

“GENERAL—General Johnston and I have agreed to maintain a truce in the nature of *statu quo*, by which each agrees to stand fast till certain propositions looking to a general peace are referred to our respective principals. You may, therefore, cease hostilities, but supplies may come to me near Raleigh.

“Keep your command well in hand, and approach Durham's Station or Chapel Hill, and I will supply you by our railroad. As soon as you reach the outer pickets report to me in person or by telegraph.”

This was indorsed by General Johnston for the guidance of his troops, as follows :—

“The above order is given by agreement between Major-General Sherman and myself. The march of Major-General Stoneman’s command under it is not to be interfered with by Confederate troops.

“J. E. JOHNSTON,
“General.”

At the same time the following communication was dispatched, through the same channels, addressed to the commanding general of the armies of the United States in Virginia :—

“GENERAL—I have agreed with General Joseph E. Johnston for a temporary cessation of active hostilities, to enable me to lay before our Government at Washington the agreement made between us, with the full sanction of Mr. Davis, and in the presence of Mr. Breckinridge, for the disbandment of all the armies of the Confederacy from here to the Rio Grande.

“If any of your forces are moving towards Johnston, I beg you to check them where they are, or at the extremity of any railroad where they may be supplied, until you receive orders from General Grant, or until I notify you that the agreement is at an end and hostilities resumed.”

On the 19th, orders were sent to General Gillmore to cease active operations in South Carolina.

“You may now recall General Hatch to the Santee,” Sherman wrote to General Gillmore. “Keep pickets about Branchville and the Santee Bridge, and await the further developments. I have no doubt that a general surrender of all the Confederate armies is arranged, and only awaits a confirmation from Washington. All is well with us and everywhere.”

Thus far, however, no measures had been taken to check the devastation caused by the bold Wilson’s unembarrassed raid through Georgia and Alabama. General Johnston, therefore, wrote to General Sherman as follows :—

“GREENSBORO’, April 19, 1865.

“GENERAL—As your troops are moving from the coast towards the interior of South Carolina, and from Columbus towards Macon, Georgia, I respectfully suggest that you send copies of your orders announcing the suspension of hostilities for transmittal to them, supposing the interior route to be the shortest.

“Most respectfully, your obedient servant,

“J. E. JOHNSTON,

“General C. S. A.”

To this General Sherman replied on the 20th :—

“GENERAL—At your request I send you, by Major Saunders, several written and printed copies of an order I have made to this army, which announces the cessation of hostilities, etc. I dispatched a steamer from Morehead City yesterday, for Charleston, with orders to General Gillmore to cease all acts of destruction, public or private, and to draw Generals Hatch and Potter back of the frontier. Also, by half-past eleven A. M. yesterday, Major Hitchcock was on a fleet steamer at Morehead City, carrying a request to General Meade to check the movement of his army on Danville and Weldon; so that I hope your people will be spared in the Carolinas. But I am apprehensive of Wilson, who is impetuous and rapid. If you will send by telegraph and courier a single word, he will stop, and then the inclosed order will place his command at a point convenient to our supplies.

“I send you a late paper, showing that in Virginia the State authorities are acknowledged and invited to resume their lawful functions.”

On the 20th, while this dispatch was on the way, Wilson appeared before Macon and demanded the surrender of the city. Being informed by the commanding officer of the existence of the armistice, he sent the following dispatch, under flag of truce, to be telegraphed to Sherman :—

“TO MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,

Through headquarters of GENERAL BEAUREGARD :

“My advance received the surrender of this city with its garrison this evening. General Cobb had previously sent me, under a flag of truce, a copy of the telegram from General Beauregard, declaring the existence of an armistice between all the troops under your command and those of General Johnston. Without questioning the authority of this dispatch, or its application to my command, I could not communicate orders in time to prevent the capture. I shall therefore hold the garrison, including Major-Generals Cobb and G. W. Smith and Brigadier-General McCall, prisoners of war.

“Please send me orders. I shall remain here a reasonable length of time to hear from you.

“J. H. WILSON,

“Brevet Major-General U. S. A.”

This dispatch was transmitted by telegraph by General Beauregard to General Johnston, and by the latter forwarded through General Wade Hampton, by flag of truce, to its destination, accompanied by the following letter from General Johnston :—

“HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,
April 21, 1865—9.30 A. M.

“MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,

Care LIEUTENANT-GENERAL HAMPTON, *via Hillsboro' :*

“I transmit a dispatch, just received by telegraph from Major-General Wilson, United States Army. Should you desire to give the orders asked for in the same manner, I beg you to send them to me through Lieutenant-General Hampton's office.

“I hope that, for the sake of expedition, you are willing to take this course. I also send, for your information, a copy of a dispatch received from Major-General Cobb.

“J. E. JOHNSTON.”

With this letter General Johnston also transmitted a copy

of the following telegram from Major-General Howell Cobb, commanding the Confederate troops at Macon :—

“To GENERAL G. T. BEAUREGARD :

“On receipt of your dispatch at eleven o'clock to-day, I sent a flag of truce to General Wilson, with copy of the same, and informing him that I had issued orders to carry out armistice, desisting from military operations. The flag met the advance fourteen miles from the city. Before hearing from it the advance moved on the city, and having moved my picket, were in the city before I was aware of their approach.

“An unconditional surrender was demanded, to which I was forced to submit, under protest. General Wilson has since arrived, and holds the city and garrison as captured, notwithstanding my protest. He informs me he will remain in his present position a reasonable length of time to hear from his dispatch to General Sherman, sent to your care.

“HOWELL COBB,
“Major-General.”

Sherman immediately issued the following orders to General Wilson, and caused them to be transmitted through the same channels by which he had received the report of that officer :—

“HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field, Raleigh, N. C., April 21, 1865.

“GENERAL JAMES H. WILSON,
Commanding Cavalry Division Mississippi, Macon, Ga. :

“GENERAL—A suspension of hostilities was agreed on between General Johnston and myself, on Tuesday, April 18, at twelve noon. I want that agreement religiously observed, and you may release the generals captured at Macon. Occupy ground convenient, and contract for supplies for your command, and forbear any act of hostility until you hear or have reason to believe hostilities are resumed. In the mean time, it is also agreed the position of the enemy must not be altered to our prejudice.

“You know by this time that General Lee has surrendered to General Grant the rebel Army of Northern Virginia, and that I only await the sanction of the President to conclude terms of peace coextensive with the boundaries of the United States. You will shape your conduct on this knowledge, unless you have overwhelming proof to the contrary.”

At the same time Sherman wrote to General Johnston:—

“GENERAL—I send you a letter for General Wilson, which, if sent by telegraph and courier, will check his career. He may distrust the telegraph, therefore better send the original, for he cannot mistake my handwriting, with which he is familiar. He seems to have his blood up, and will be hard to hold. If he can buy corn, fodder, and rations down about Fort Valley, it will obviate the necessity of his going up to Rome or Dalton.

“It is reported to me from Cairo that Mobile is in our possession, but it is not minute or official.

“General Baker sent in to me, wanting to surrender his command, on the theory that the whole Confederate army was surrendered. I explained to him, or his staff-officer, the exact truth, and left him to act as he thought proper. He seems to have disbanded his men, deposited a few arms about twenty miles from here, and himself awaits your action. I will not hold him, his men, or arms subject to any condition other than the final one we may agree on.

“I shall look for Major Hitchcock back from Washington on Wednesday, and shall promptly notify you of the result. By the action of General Weitzel in relation to the Virginia Legislature, I feel certain we will have no trouble on the score of recognizing existing State governments. It may be the lawyers will want us to define more minutely what is meant by the guarantee of rights of person and property. It may be construed into a compact for us to undo the past as to the rights of slaves and ‘leases of plantations’ on the Mississippi,

of 'vacant and abandoned' plantations. I wish you would talk to the best men you have on these points; and, if possible, let us in our final convention make these points so clear as to leave no room for angry controversy.

"I believe if the South would simply and publicly declare what we all feel, that slavery is dead, that you would inaugurate an era of peace and prosperity that would soon efface the ravages of the past four years of war. Negroes would remain in the South, and afford you abundance of cheap labor, which otherwise will be driven away; and it will save the country the senseless discussions which have kept us all in hot water for fifty years.

"Although, strictly speaking, this is no subject for a military convention, yet I am honestly convinced that our simple declaration of a result will be accepted as good law everywhere. Of course, I have not a single word from Washington on this or any other point of our agreement, but I know the effect of such a step by us will be universally accepted."

Johnston immediately replied, suggesting a modification of Sherman's orders to Wilson:—

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE TENNESSEE,
"April 22, 1865—2.30 P. M.

"MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,
Commanding U. S. Forces, Raleigh, N. C.:

"Your telegram to brevet Major-General Wilson is just received. I respectfully suggest that the sentence, 'In the mean time it is also agreed that the position of the enemy's forces must not be altered to our prejudice,' be so modified as to read, 'In the mean time it is also agreed that the position of the forces of neither belligerent shall be altered to the prejudice of the other;' and on this principle you direct Major-General Wilson to withdraw from Macon and release its garrison.

"J. E. JOHNSTON,
General."

To this General Sherman felt impelled to decline acceding, and accordingly answered on the 23d :—

“GENERAL—Your communication of twenty minutes past two P. M. of yesterday is received. My line of communication with General Wilson is not secure enough for me to confuse him by a change in mere words. Of course the *status quo* is mutual, but I leave him to apply it to his case according to his surroundings. I would not instruct him to undo all done by him between the actual date of our agreement and the time the knowledge of it reached him. I beg, therefore, to leave him free to apply the rule to his own case. Indeed, I have almost exceeded the bounds of prudence in checking him without the means of direct communication, and only did so on my absolute faith in your personal character.

“I inclose a dispatch for General Wilson, in cipher, which, translated, simply advises him to keep his command well together, and to act according to the best of his ability, doing as little harm to the country as possible, until he knows hostilities are resumed.”

Meanwhile, General Sherman had received, through General Johnston, a dispatch written in the cipher of the War Department, and on causing it to be translated, read as follows :—

“HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY CORPS, MILITARY DIVISION
OF THE MISSISSIPPI, Macon, Ga., April 21, 1865.

“MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN,

Through GENERAL JOHNSTON :

“Your dispatch of yesterday is received. I shall at once proceed to carry out your instructions. If proper arrangements can be made to have sugar, coffee, and clothing sent from Savannah to Augusta, they can be brought thither by the way of Atlanta by railroad, or they can be sent by boat directly to this place from Darien. I shall be able to get forage, bread, and meat from Southeastern Georgia. The rail-

road from Atlanta to Dalton or Cleveland cannot be repaired in three months. I have arranged to send an officer at once, *via* Eufala, to General Canby, with a copy of your dispatch. General Cobb will also notify General Taylor of the armistice. I have about three thousand prisoners of war, including Generals Cobb, Smith, McCall, Mercer, and Robertson. Can you arrange with General Johnston for their immediate release? Please answer at once. I shall start a staff-officer to you to-morrow.

“ J. H. WILSON,
“ Brevet Major-General commanding.”

He immediately replied as follows, on the 23d :—

“ Cipher dispatch received. There is a general suspension of hostilities, awaiting the assent of our new President to certain civil points before making a final military convention of peace. Act according to your own good sense until you are certain the war is over. Keep possession of some key-point that will secure your present advantages, rest your men and horses, and in a few days you will receive either positive information of peace, or may infer the contrary. My messenger should be back from Washington to-morrow.”

On the 22d, Sherman reported his action as follows to Lieutenant-General Grant, sending the dispatch by telegraph to Morehead City to be forwarded by a fleet steamer to Fort Monroe, and thence telegraphed to Washington :—

“ General Wilson held Macon on the 20th, with Howell Cobb, G. W. Smith, and others as prisoners; but they claimed the benefit of my armistice, and he has telegraphed to me through the rebel lines for orders. I have answered him that he may draw out of Macon, and hold his command for further orders, unless he has reason to believe that the rebels are changing the status to our prejudice. A brigade of rebels offered to surrender to me yesterday; but I prefer to make one grand finale,

which I believe to be perfectly practicable. There will be no trouble in adjusting matters in North Carolina, Georgia, and Alabama, and I think South Carolina ought to be satisfied, with Charleston and Columbia in ruins. All we await is an answer from you and the President. Weather fine; roads good. Troops ready for fight or home."

On the 23d, he wrote to Generals Johnston and Hardee:—

"I send a bundle of papers for you jointly. These are the latest. Telegraph dispatches are here to 19th. Young Fred. Seward is alive, having been subjected to the trepan, and may possibly recover.

"There appears no doubt the murder of Mr. Lincoln was done by Booth, and the attempt on Mr. Seward by Surratt, who is in custody. All will sooner or later be caught. The feeling North on this subject is more intense than any thing that ever occurred before. General Ord, at Richmond, has recalled the permission given for the Virginia Legislature, and I fear much the assassination of the President will give a bias to the popular mind which, in connection with the desire of our politicians, may thwart our purpose of recognizing 'existing local governments.' But it does seem to me there must be good sense enough left on this continent to give order and shape to the now disjointed elements of government. I believe this assassination of Mr. Lincoln will do the cause of the South more harm than any event of the war, both at home and abroad, and I doubt if the Confederate *military* authorities had any more complicity with it than I had. I am thus frank with you, and have asserted as much to the War Department. But I dare not say as much for Mr. Davis or some of the civil functionaries, for it seems the plot was fixed for March 4th, but delayed, awaiting some instructions from '*Richmond.*' You will find in the newspapers I send you, all the information I have on this point.

"Major Hitchcock should be back to-morrow, and if any delay occurs it will result from the changed feeling about

Washington, arising from this new and unforeseen complication.”

On the night of the 23d, Major Hitchcock returned from Washington with the dispatches which we read in the preceding chapter, and Lieutenant-General Grant arrived in person to direct operations.

On the 25th General Sherman wrote to Admiral Dahlgren :—

“I expect Johnston will surrender his army to-morrow. We have had much negotiation, and things are settling down to the terms of General Lee’s army.

“Jeff. Davis and cabinet, with considerable specie, are making their way towards Cuba. He passed Charlotte going south on the 23d, and I think he will try to reach Florida coast, either Cedar Keys or lower down. Catch him if you can. Can’t you watch the east coast and send word round to the west coast ?

“Copy for General Gillmore, who has the cipher.”

And on May 2d he wrote to General Thomas :—

“Captain Hasea is here *en route* for Nashville, from General Nelson, now at Macon. He got possession of that place just as he learned of the suspension of hostilities that preceded the final surrender of Johnston’s army at Greensboro’. I have sent word to General Nelson to parole his prisoners there on the same terms as prescribed to Johnston and Lee, and to return to the neighborhood of Decatur, Alabama, and then report to you or me. I came to Savannah from Raleigh to send stores up to Augusta by boat for Nelson, and to take steps to occupy Augusta.

“I will have much to tell you, at some future time, of the details of my negotiations with Johnston, which have been misconstrued by the people at the North ; but I can afford to let them settle down before telling all the truth. At my first interview with Johnston he admitted the Confederate cause

was lost, and that it would be murder for him to allow any more conflicts ; but he asked me to help him all I could to prevent his army and people breaking up into guerrilla bands. I deemed that so desirable, that I did make terms, subject to the approval of the President, which may be deemed too liberal. But the more I reflect, the more satisfied I am that by dealing with the people of the South magnanimously we will restore four-fifths of them at once to the condition of good citizens, leaving us only to deal with the remainder. But my terms were not approved, and Johnston's present surrender only applies to the troops in his present command, viz., east of Chattahoochee.

“The boat is in motion, and I write with great difficulty, and will wait a more convenient season to give you fuller details.”

CHAPTER XXXIII.

THE REJECTED AGREEMENT.

ON the 22d day of April the secretary of war, Mr. Stanton, caused to be prepared and published in the daily newspapers of the city of New York the following bulletin :—

“ MAJOR-GENERAL DIX, *New York* :

“ Yesterday evening a bearer of dispatches arrived here from General Sherman. An agreement for a suspension of hostilities, and a memorandum of what is called ‘a basis of peace,’ had been entered into on the 18th instant, by General Sherman with the rebel General Johnston, the rebel General Breckinridge being present at the conference.

“ A cabinet meeting was held at eight o’clock in the evening, at which the action of General Sherman was disapproved by the President, by the secretary of war, by General Grant, and by every member of the cabinet. General Sherman was ordered to resume hostilities immediately, and he was directed that the instructions given by the late President, in the following telegram, which was penned by Mr. Lincoln himself, at the Capitol, on the night of the 3d of March, were approved by President Andrew Johnson, and were reiterated to govern the action of military commanders.

“ On the night of the 3d of March, while President Lincoln and his cabinet were at the Capitol, a telegram from General Grant was brought to the secretary of war, informing him that General Lee had asked for a conference to make arrangements for terms of peace. The letter of General Lee was published in a message of Davis to the rebel Congress. General

Grant's telegram was submitted to Mr. Lincoln, who, after pondering a few minutes, took up his pen, and wrote with his own hand the following reply, which he submitted to the secretary of state and the secretary of war. It was then dated, addressed, and signed by the secretary of war, and telegraphed to General Grant.

“ WASHINGTON, March 3, 1865—12.30 P. M.

‘ LIEUTENANT-GENERAL GRANT :

“ The President directs me to say to you that he wishes you to have no conference with General Lee, unless it be for the capitulation of General Lee's army, or some minor and purely military matters. He instructs me to say you are not to decide or confer upon any political questions. Such questions the President holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military conference or conditions. Meantime you are to press to the utmost your military advantages.

“ EDWIN M. STANTON,
“ Secretary of War.’

“ The orders of General Sherman to General Stoneman to withdraw from Salisbury and join him, will probably open the way for Davis to escape to Mexico, or Europe, with his plunder, which is reported to be very large, including not only the plunder of the Richmond banks, but previous accumulations. A dispatch received by this department from Richmond says :

“ It is stated here by respectable parties, that the amount of specie taken south by Jefferson Davis and his partisans is very large, including not only the plunder of the Richmond banks, but previous accumulations. They hope, it is said, to make terms with Sherman, or some other Southern commander, by which they will be permitted, with their effects, including the gold plunder, to go to Mexico or Europe. Johnston's negotiations look to this end.’

“ After the cabinet meeting last night, General Grant started for North Carolina, to direct future operations against Johnston's army.

“ EDWIN M. STANTON,
“ Secretary of War.’

To this dispatch was appended in the newspapers the following remarks :—

“It is reported that this proceeding of General Sherman was disapproved for the following, among other reasons :—

“First.—It was an exercise of authority not vested in General Sherman, and on its face shows that both he and Johnston knew that General Sherman had no authority to enter into any such arrangement.

“Second.—It was an acknowledgment of the rebel government.

“Third.—It is understood to re-establish rebel State governments that had been overthrown at the sacrifice of many thousands of loyal lives and immense treasure, and placed arms and munitions of war in the hands of rebels, at their respective capitals, which might be used as soon as the armies of the United States were disbanded, and used to conquer and subdue loyal States.

“Fourth.—By the restoration of the rebel authority in their respective States, they would be enabled to re-establish slavery.

“Fifth.—It might furnish a ground of responsibility, by the Federal Government, to pay the rebel debt, and certainly subjects loyal citizens of the rebel States to debts contracted by rebels in the name of the States.

“Sixth.—It put in dispute the existence of loyal State governments, and the new State of Western Virginia, which had been recognized by every department of the United States Government.

“Seventh.—It practically abolished the confiscation laws, and relieved rebels of every degree who had slaughtered our people from all pains and penalties for their crimes.

“Eighth.—It gave terms that had been deliberately, repeatedly, and solemnly rejected by President Lincoln, and better terms than the rebels had ever asked in their most prosperous condition.

“Ninth.—It formed no basis of true and lasting peace, but relieved the rebels from the pressure of our victories, and left them in condition to renew their effort to overthrow the United States Government, and subdue the loyal States, whenever

their strength was recruited, and any opportunity should offer."

The agreement between General Sherman and General Johnston was in perfect accord with President Lincoln's policy at that time, so far as it was known to his generals or the public. The telegram dated 3d of March, and sent by Mr. Stanton to General Grant, was a special instruction intended to govern the conduct of General Grant alone at that particular time and in that particular case. It was not communicated to General Sherman for his guidance, and was wholly unknown to him. Whatever may have been the reasons for that instruction, it was entirely ignored a month afterwards by Mr. Lincoln himself. After Lee's surrender, Mr. Lincoln concluded to recognize the existing Legislature of Virginia, and authorized the then military commandant at Richmond to permit it to assemble. On the 6th day of April, while at City Point, he made this memorandum and handed it to Senator Wilkinson, who delivered it to General Weitzel on the 7th :—

" MAJOR-GENERAL WEITZEL, *Richmond, Virginia* :

" It has been intimated to me that the gentlemen who have acted as the Legislature of Virginia, in support of the rebellion, may now desire to assemble at Richmond and take measures to withdraw the Virginia troops and other support from resistance to the General Government. If they attempt it, give them permission and protection, until, if at all, they attempt some action hostile to the United States, in which case you will notify them, give them reasonable time to leave, and at the end of which time arrest any who remain. Allow Judge Campbell to see this, but do not make it public.

" Yours, etc.,

" A. LINCOLN."

General Weitzel, so authorized, approved a call for the meeting of the Legislature at Richmond on the 11th. The call was in these words :—

“The undersigned, members of the Legislature of the State of Virginia, in connection with a number of citizens of the State, whose names are attached to this paper, in view of the evacuation of the city of Richmond by the Confederate government and its occupation by the military authorities of the United States, the surrender of the Army of Northern Virginia, and the suspension of the jurisdiction of the civil power of the State, are of the opinion that an immediate meeting of the General Assembly of the State is called for by the exigencies of the situation. The consent of the military authorities of the United States to a session of the Legislature in Richmond, in connection with the governor and lieutenant-governor, to their free deliberation upon the public affairs, and to the ingress and departure of all its members under safe conduct, has been obtained.

“The United States authorities will afford transportation from any point under their control to any of the persons before mentioned.

“The matters to be submitted to the Legislature are the restoration of peace to the State of Virginia, and the adjustment of the questions, involving life, liberty, and property, that have arisen in the State as a consequence of war.

“We, therefore, earnestly request the governor, lieutenant-governor, and members of the Legislature to repair to this city by the 25th of April, instant.

“We understand that full protection to persons and property will be afforded in the State, and we recommend to peaceful citizens to remain at their homes and pursue their usual avocations with confidence that they will not be interrupted.

“We earnestly solicit the attendance in Richmond, on or before the 25th of April, instant, of the following persons, citizens of Virginia, to confer with us as to the best means of restoring peace to the State of Virginia. We have secured safe conduct from the military authorities of the United States for them to enter the city and depart without molestation.”

The foregoing was published in the Richmond papers on the 12th, and announced in hand-bills, posted in all conspicuous places. On the same day the Richmond Whig contained the following editorial article, congratulating the country on this pleasing state of things:—

“It is understood that this invitation has been put forth in pursuance of the plan of proceeding assented to by President Lincoln. At all events, it will be hailed by the great body of the people of Virginia as the *first step towards the reinstatement of the Old Dominion in the Union*. It is probable that some of the members of the Legislature may decline to come. In every such case the people of the county or senatorial district should select some influential and intelligent citizen, who is willing to take part in this business, and commission him, as far as they can, to represent them at the conference.

“The views and purposes of the members of the Legislature should be ascertained at once. Every one can foresee difficulties in the way of formal action: in the beginning several complex questions are to be met at the threshold; but “where there is a will there is a way,” and whatever the difficulties presented, the important business must be undertaken.

“In this connection we may say that the recent interview between the President and Judge Campbell related to the restoration of peace in all the States, and not to Virginia alone, as might be inferred from the brief notice of the ‘consultation of citizens’ published in the Whig of Saturday. Whilst every one will rejoice at the restoration of peace and prosperity in all the States, we cannot refrain from the expression of the hope that the public men who are to take part in the reinstatement of Virginia to her ancient position in the sisterhood of States, will address themselves to that business without unnecessary delay. Virginia was not consulted nor waited for when secession became the determined policy of the ‘cotton States,’ and there is no sound reason why ‘co-operation’ with them, in accepting the President’s terms of peace, should be the rule of proceeding now. Let Virginia lead the way

back to the Union, and present an example of prompt action to the other States of the late 'Confederacy.' ”

These publications were made in Richmond six days before the agreement between Sherman and Johnston was concluded, and the facts were well known in both armies, were freely commented upon, and the movement highly approved by the commanding officers, who generally regarded the policy thereby indicated as wise and of universal application. This call and the Richmond comments were reproduced by the leading newspapers of the United States, with approving comments, on the 14th of April, the very day of the assassination, and four days anterior to the agreement. The New York Herald of that date contained a leading article vindicating the policy indicated, and claiming for Mr. Lincoln great credit for inaugurating it. Other leading journals, such as the New York Tribune, Post, and World, all concurred in the most liberal terms of peace. The Herald article says :—

“The rebellion is indeed demolished. Read the call which we publish to-day from congressmen, assemblymen, editors, judges, lawyers, planters, etc.—a powerful body of the most conspicuous rebels of old Virginia—inviting the rebel governor, lieutenant-governor, and Legislature of that State to meet in Richmond, under the protection of the ‘old flag,’ to consider their present situation. Old Virginia, the head and front of the rebellion, surrenders, and, broken up, disorganized and exhausted, all her confederates in the service of Jefferson Davis, under the same protection, will speedily follow her good example.

“This is a shrewd and sagacious movement on the part of President Lincoln. He not only pardons the leading rebels of Virginia, from the governor down, but invites him and them, and their late rebel Legislature, to meet in council at Richmond, to deliberate upon the ways and means for the restoration of the State to the blessings of the Union, under the new condition of things produced by this tremendous war. The

assemblage thus convened cannot fail to be influenced by the generous spirit of President Lincoln. It will realize the fact that Virginia having been, like a brand from the flames, rescued from the Moloch of her Southern Confederacy, vengeance is at an end, charity prevails, and that the 'Old Dominion' must prepare for a new State charter, upon new ideas, and for the new life of regeneration and prosperity that lies before her. At the same time, while the moral influence of this great and wise concession in behalf of reconstruction in Virginia will have a powerful effect upon the leading spirits of all the other rebellious States, we may expect from the debates of the meeting thus assembled, that the administration will derive much valuable information, and will be greatly assisted in the solution of the difficult details of reconstruction in all the reconquered States.

"We are inclined to suspect that Mr. Lincoln, in this exhibition of the spirit of conciliation, did not forget a certain anecdote in the life of Herod the Great, of Judea, as the king of that country under the supreme authority of Rome. In the war of the Roman factions which followed the death of Julius Cæsar, Herod took the side of the unfortunate Brutus and Cassius. Marc Antony, then falling into the possession of Judea, called Herod to an account, and asked him what he had to say in his defence. Herod replied: 'Only this: if I have been troublesome as your enemy, may I not be useful as your friend?' Marc Antony took the hint, and Herod continued useful as a servant of Rome to the day of his death. The same idea, we infer, influenced the President in those recent consultations at Richmond, to which we may trace the experiment of this extraordinary call for the meeting of the rebel Legislature of Virginia. He wants to make those men useful as friends of the Union who have been so energetic and troublesome as its enemies."

Such was the published policy of Mr. Lincoln, as it came under the notice of General Sherman, and such the arguments by which it was sustained. With his opportunities for correct

information, Sherman approved of both. He had the most satisfactory evidence of the complete overthrow of the power of the Confederacy and the subjugation of the spirit of the rebellion. For four long years he had been constantly employed in destroying the armies of the Confederacy and wasting its power of resistance. He had just marched his grand army from the mountains, in Georgia, to the sea, and from the sea back to the mountains, in North Carolina; he had overcome every foe, laid waste every field, destroyed every article of subsistence, every instrument of war, and every means of transportation, in his desolate track; and now, with his grand army well in hand, he stood amid a wilderness of ruin, with no resolute foe willing to accept the gage of battle. He knew the power of the enemy was broken, and every particle of the spirit of war taken out of the Southern people.

General Sherman is no petty dealer of small wares; he fights an enemy with all his might, and having conquered, he forgives with all his heart; and in the spirit of Mr. Lincoln, whose teachings he followed, he was willing to say to General Johnston: "Take your army home in good order, turn over your arms at the State capitals, there to remain subject to the disposition of the Congress of the United States; let your men go to work to repair your desolate country, under the ample folds of the flag of the Union;—go and sin no more, and may God bless you!"

To denounce Sherman's truce, therefore, is to denounce the policy of Mr. Lincoln; and to condemn Sherman, is to defame the memory of the man the nation mourns. If Sherman was slow in mastering radical ideas, so was Mr. Lincoln. Indeed, Sherman moved faster than Lincoln; for while Lincoln was contemplating the effect of his emancipation proclamation, and comparing it to the "pope's bull against the comet," Sherman declared that the subject-matter of the proclamation was within the war-power of the President, and that nothing remained to make it effective but the triumph of our arms; and this reduced the question to one of material power. If the rebellion triumphed, the nation was conquered and slavery

survived; if the nation conquered, slavery died as an incident of the war, by force of a lawful proclamation, issued by proper authority during the war. If Sherman had been a politician and not a soldier, his political ideas might have developed and improved more rapidly: but if his political progress was slow, his army moved fast, and brought home peace; and if he erred, it was on the side of magnanimity, and the attributes of Deity prescribe no penalty for such sins.

It is important to remember that General Sherman concluded his agreement with General Johnston while filled with the spirit of President Lincoln's policy with respect to the Virginia Legislature, and that no notice of the change of that policy or the revocation of the order to General Weitzel, of April 6th, reached him until the agreement had been already disapproved.

Mr. Stanton deemed that General Sherman had transcended his authority. The surrender of all rebels in arms, as proposed to Johnston by him, was, however, a purely military question, and he treated it as a soldier; but when the terms proposed by Johnston were found to embrace political subjects, he neither finally accepted nor decidedly rejected them, but promptly referred them to his superior, the President. If he had been invested with the requisite authority to conclude a treaty on purely civil matters, he would not have referred the stipulations to the President for his approval, but would have closed the matter at once. Sherman declared to Johnston he had no authority, and Johnston knew he had no authority, to make a final agreement without the approval of the President, and it was so stated in the instrument itself as a reason for sending it to Washington for the consideration and action of the President.

Furthermore, it was objected that it was a "practical acknowledgment of the rebel government." It has ever been an unpleasant thing to do, to acknowledge even the actual existence of the rebel government; nevertheless we had previously done so in many ways: by declaring the ports of the Southern States blockaded, by sending flags of truce to rebel com-

manders to obtain leave to carry off our wounded and bury our dead, by appointing commissioners to arrange a cartel for the exchange of prisoners, and by fighting its armies on a hundred battle-fields at an expense of hundreds of millions of treasure and hundreds of thousands of lives. But the agreement did not in any way recognize the rightful existence of the rebel government, and never since the war began was it proposed to recognize its actual existence under such agreeable circumstances. Its condition was utterly hopeless. General Johnston, at the head of the only formidable military force belonging to it, presented himself to General Sherman and made this proposition: "I propose to stop the war and surrender all the armies of the Confederacy, on condition that the Southern people shall be allowed to live like other respectable people under the free and enlightened Government of the United States." All he asked besides was a receipt. Sherman promptly wrote out a voucher, and sent it to Washington for approval. It was not the acknowledgment of the existence of the rebel government so much as a receipt for the rebel government itself, soul and body, which Johnston was to deliver into the hands of Sherman. And it could make no difference in whose name the voucher was given, since the rebel government was to perish the instant it was delivered.

Again: "By the restoration of the rebel authority in their respective States, they would be enabled to re-establish slavery."

This objection is well founded, and, indeed, as we shall presently perceive, occurred to General Sherman himself on further reflection. It would have constituted a valid reason for requiring the amendment of the agreement by the insertion of a distinct declaration on this subject, if it had not been already decided by the administration not to permit any terms except those necessarily involved in the surrender of the Confederate armies. But the ruling conviction of General Sherman's mind, that slavery had received its death-blow beyond the power of resurrection, caused him to lose sight of the

necessity for a formal recognition of a fact, as he thought, already patent to all. Johnston so admitted at his conference with Sherman, and Sherman so believed. Sherman was of opinion that slavery was abolished by act of war, and that it was wiped out of existence by the President's proclamation. As far back as the 1st of January, 1864, he wrote, for the information of the people of Alabama: "Three years ago, by a little reflection and patience, you could have had a hundred years of peace and prosperity, but you preferred war. Very well. Last year you could have saved your slaves, but now it is too late: *all the powers of earth cannot restore your slaves any more than your dead grandfathers.*"

On his march from Atlanta, in Georgia, to Goldsboro', in North Carolina, the negroes came in crowds to see him, and to inquire if it was true "Massa Lincoln," as they designated the President, had really made them free; when General Sherman gave them every assurance that they had been made free, they and their children forever, but advised them to remain at home and work, and do their best to make a living for themselves, until President Lincoln should send them word what else to do.

It appears, however, that after the messenger left for Washington with the agreement, General Sherman reflected that an article declaring slavery abolished should properly have been inserted; when he immediately addressed a letter to General Johnston, with the view to framing such a clause, to be added when the agreement should be returned. This letter, dated on the 21st of April, and given in full on page 407, proceeds:—

"The action of General Weitzel in relation to the Legislature of Virginia, indicates that existing State governments will be recognized by the General Government. It may be, however, the lawyers will want us to define more minutely what is meant by the *guarantee of the rights of persons and property*. It may be construed into a compact for us to undo the past as to the rights of slaves, and leases of plantations on the Mississippi, of vacant and abandoned plantations, etc.

“I wish you would talk to the best men you have on these points, and, if possible, let us, in the final convention, make them so clear as to leave no room for angry controversy. I believe, if you would simply and publicly declare what we all feel and know, *that slavery is dead*, that you would inaugurate an era of peace and prosperity that would soon efface the ravages of the past four years of war. Negroes would remain in the South, and afford you an abundance of cheap labor, which otherwise will be driven away; and it will save the country the unhappy discussions which have kept us all in hot water for fifty years. Although, strictly speaking, this is no subject of a military convention, yet I am honestly convinced that our simple declaration of a result will be accepted as good law everywhere.”

This letter was written under the full belief that his agreement with Johnston would be approved, for nothing had occurred as yet to cast a shadow of doubt upon the matter. There was no question in his own mind that slavery was a dead institution, and there seemed to be no question on the subject in the minds of Johnston and Breckinridge. Johnston admitted it frankly, and declared Davis himself had settled that matter when he called upon the negro for help; and Breckinridge said, at the interview on the 18th: “The discussion of the slavery question is at an end. The constitutional amendment forever forbidding slavery is perfectly fair, and will be accepted in that spirit by the people of the South.” Hence Sherman had no doubt the additional article would be conceded, and he thought it might do good. But the utter rejection of the agreement by the President and cabinet, put an end to all further efforts in that direction. If the administration at Washington had accepted the stipulations as an initiatory proceeding, to be altered and amended to suit all the exigencies of the new peace, and had sent them back with amendments and instructions, an opportunity seemed presented for at once establishing a peace on an enduring basis. It is to be regretted that Sherman’s after-thought, on the

slavery subject, had not been his fore-thought. It was fit and proper that the question of slavery, the substantial cause of the war, should be then and there settled by an express stipulation, declared in the presence of the two armies by their commanders. This would have settled the matter forever; an amendment of the constitution forbidding slavery would then have been unnecessary, except for the benefit of the border States not in rebellion, and to prevent any of the States from reviving the institution at some future day, and the new era would immediately have been inaugurated.

It was our misfortune during the war, from first to last, that we had no leading head that could rightly comprehend the situation, and at the same time grasp and organize the power and resources of the country, so as to put down the rebellion by a short, sharp, and vigorous conflict. At first our rulers undertook to do it by three months' militia—by a mere show of power and by moral suasion; but the people saw, in advance of the Government, it required a great effort, and, under the inspiration of the hour, two hundred thousand volunteers tendered their services for the war. A few of these were accepted, and many rejected, and the golden moment was past. Afterwards, when they were called for, they could not be had. The first two years of the war were literally frittered away. Then the Government offered and paid large bounties, and obtained raw recruits, and also many mercenaries who deserted,—all costing the Government more money for actual services rendered than would have been necessary to pay the same number of men from the beginning; and the war was prolonged. Then came a law for a draft, with a commutation clause attached which rendered it inoperative, so far as raising men for the army was concerned. Then came a little trick of a policy for raising negro troops in Maryland; and then more negro troops; and then another draft. As to the treatment of the inhabitants of conquered territory, and as to trade in cotton, there was no policy. No one knew, and none could tell whether the rebel States were to be considered in the Union or out of the Union. If any thing like a policy for the army

was ever thought of, it was first urged upon the Government by officers in the field, or committees or individuals of the people at home : if by the former, it was usually rejected, and the authors rebuked ; if by the latter, it was ventilated first in newspapers, and if found sufficiently popular, it was accepted, to be in its turn thrown aside, like the old iron of a machine-shop.

The Government, in fact, felt itself unprepared to make an ultimate decision on the complex question of a final peace, and preferred, by a temporizing policy, to gain time for a more mature consideration of its perplexing problems. Grant's terms to Lee were liberal, but, in some respects, indefinite. Lee's men were to lay down their arms and go home, where they should be protected in their persons and property so long as they remained there and obeyed the laws. But whether the word *property* meant slave property, or the word *laws* meant the laws passed by the rebel State of Virginia, does not appear by the treaty, and must be left to judicial construction, or to the arbitrary decision of the Government. But that was a partial arrangement, and related to the submission of one of the armies of the Confederacy only ; whereas General Johnston offered to act on behalf of eight millions of people, whose military head he practically was, and proposed, nay, insisted, as far as it was in his power to insist, that terms of peace should then and there be agreed upon and forever settled. Here was an opportunity for statesmanship. The armies of the United States had fought the armies of the Confederacy as long as the latter were willing to fight—they could do no more ; it remained now for diplomacy to do the rest, and Sherman held up the opportunity.

The administration, however, desired no compact, demanded simply the absolute surrender or destruction of the military power of the rebellion, and reserved to itself the control of the entire subject of reorganization in all its parts. Both methods had and still have many zealous partisans. Time alone can decide between them.

That Mr. Stanton and General Sherman should differ in

opinion is not strange. Two men beholding the same object from different points of observation are apt to describe it diversely ; and yet neither may see it aright : and it is to be regretted that, at such a crisis, the administration should momentarily have lost sight of the consideration manifestly due to Sherman's great and patriotic services, and should have permitted that disapproval of his action to be presented to the people in such a manner as naturally to arouse their indignation and distrust against him. The excitement of that moment may indeed excuse what nothing can fully justify. General Sherman had given most noble testimony in favor of the Union cause ; every thought of his mind and every aspiration of his heart were given to the best interests of his country. He never failed us in the hour of need ; and on the very date of this bulletin, April 21st, he wrote a letter to an old personal friend in North Carolina, which is here reproduced, and which has the same ring of intense patriotism which characterized every act and every thought of his eventful career, and shows how foreign from his mind all unworthy motives were at that time.

“ I have before me your letter addressed to General Hawley, inclosing a paper signed by John Dawson, Edward Kiddon, and others, testifying to your feelings of loyalty and attachment to the Government of the United States. Of course, I am gratified to know the truth as to one for whom I entertained friendship, dated far back in other and better days. I will be frank and honest with you. Simple passive submission to events, by a man in the prime of life, is not all that is due to society in times of revolution. Had the Northern men residing at the South spoken out manfully and truly at the outset, the active secessionists could not have carried the masses of men as they did.

“ It may not be that the war could have been avoided, but the rebellion would not have assumed the mammoth proportions it did. The idea of war to perpetuate slavery in 1861 was an insult to the intelligence of the age. As long as the

South abided by the conditions of our fundamental compact of government, the constitution, all law-abiding citizens were bound to respect the property in slaves, whether they approved or not; but when the South violated that compact openly, publicly, and violently, it was absurd to suppose we were bound to respect that kind of property, or in fact any kind of property.

“I have a feeling allied to abhorrence towards Northern men resident South, for their silence or acquiescence was one of the causes of the war assuming the magnitude it did; and, in consequence, we mourn the loss of such men as John F. Reynolds, McPherson, and thousands of noble gentlemen, any one of whom was worth all the slaves of the South, and half the white population thrown in.

“The result is nearly accomplished, and is what you might have foreseen, and in a measure prevented—desolation from the Ohio to the Gulf, and mourning in every household.”

Of General Sherman's military ability, vigor, enterprise, patriotism, and zeal for the public good, no generous or just mind can entertain a doubt. Of the general soundness of his judgment, he has also given conspicuous proofs. His policy in regard to trade in cotton, and in regard to the proper treatment of the inhabitants of conquered territory during the existence of war, was much in advance of the President and cabinet; and his personal knowledge of the condition, temper, and spirit of the Southern people entitled his opinions to greater weight than those of any other general officer in the field. Nevertheless, conditions of peace which may appear fair to a soldier, may, in the view of a statesman, appear inadmissible; but the fact that an able and experienced soldier entertains them, ought to shield them from that sort of condemnation which belongs to voluntary complicity with treason.

Nor did this unfortunate affair begin and end with Mr. Stanton alone. On the 26th of April, General Halleck, then at Richmond, in command of the Military Division of the James, dispatched a telegram to the War Department at

Washington, amongst other things, advising that instructions be given to General Sherman's subordinate officers to obey no orders given by him. This telegram was immediately communicated by the secretary of war to General Dix, and made public through the daily newspapers. Meeting Sherman's notice a fortnight later, it excited his indignation to the highest pitch. In his anger, he would listen to no excuse for what he deemed the treachery of his former friend. He considered the action of General Halleck as uncalled for and unpardonable; and when the fact became known to him, on the 10th of May, wrote to General Halleck: "After your dispatch to Mr. Stanton, of April 26th, I cannot have any friendly intercourse with you. I will come to City Point to-morrow, and march with my troops, and I prefer we should not meet." Further correspondence ensued between the same officers, but General Sherman seems to have felt that his honor had been assailed through design or indifference, and that in either case the act was too gross for pardon. He curtly declined a complimentary review tendered his troops by General Halleck, and caused his troops to march through the city without taking any notice whatever of that officer.

Neither Grant or Sherman knew of Mr. Stanton's bulletin until several days after its publication. Indeed, General Sherman was profoundly ignorant of it, and of the storm of indignation it had raised at home against him, until on his way home from Savannah, whither he had gone to make sundry dispositions for the government of his subordinate commanders, while his army was on the march to Richmond, and not knowing of the instructions issued from the War Office to disregard his orders, and at a moment when, unconscious of having done wrong, happy that the war was over, justly proud of the honorable part he had acted in it, and delighted with the prospect of soon meeting his family and friends from whom he had been long separated, he was on his way home to rest from his hard labors. Instead of commendation for having done his country some service, it seemed to his sensitive mind that he could read of nothing and hear of nothing

but abuse or suspicion. Instead of coming home filled with a soldier's pride and happiness, he felt he was returning like a culprit to defend himself against the unjust suspicions of a Government and people he had so faithfully served. Smarting under the rebuke of the Government and the comments of the press, he attributed both to personal hostility and a settled prearranged design of undermining his influence and destroying his popularity, and resented both on all occasions, public and private. The most offensive part of the entire matter to him was that General Halleck should have recommended and Mr. Stanton published, that subordinate officers should be instructed in the same manner and to the same effect of General Washington's orders after the defection of Benedict Arnold!

CHAPTER XXXIV.

HOMEWARD.

THE historian who shall hereafter chronicle, in full, the events of the civil war in America, and sketch the men who therein figured most prominently, will find the path by which General Sherman ascended as straight as it was difficult of ascent. His patriotism was not of that doubtful character which seeks reward through the forms of Government contracts. He was born with the instincts of a soldier, was educated for a soldier, and was ambitious to do the work of a soldier. He loved the Union, and ever set himself against the dangerous heresy that would admit of its peaceful dissolution. A resident of the South before the war, as soon as he divined the purposes of the secessionists, he broke away and arranged himself with the friends of the Union. While Mr. Stanton was yet a member of Mr. Buchanan's cabinet, and while such men as Jefferson Davis, Judah P. Benjamin, and Jacob Thompson were yet in office under the Government of the United States, and all-powerful in their influence over President Buchanan, Sherman had already determined to resign an honorable position in the State of Louisiana and offer his services to sustain the cause of the Union. On the 18th of January, 1861, as we have already seen, he wrote to Governor Moore: "If Louisiana withdraws from the Federal Union, I prefer to maintain my allegiance to the old constitution as long as a fragment of it remains, and my longer stay here would be wrong in every sense of the word." He saw the war coming, and gave the alarm, whilst others cried, "Peace! be still!"

As soon as Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated, he visited him, and warned him that the South was organizing a formidable rebellion, that the Southern people were united and in earnest, and that they would take us all unprepared. He declared to his countrymen they were sleeping on a volcano, all unconscious of the danger. He scouted the idea of putting down the rebellion with three months' militia. The disastrous result of the battle of Bull Run confirmed him in his views of the utter inutility of the temporary expedients of the Government, and he so declared. Sent to the West, he called for an army of two hundred thousand men, to operate from Kentucky as a base, and reclaim the navigation of the Mississippi River. As early as 1862, he declared cotton prize of war, long in advance of the Government; and in 1863 he established trade regulations for Memphis and other places within his department; and finally, after aiding in that series of brilliant military operations which opened the Father of Waters "to go unvexed to the sea," he assisted Lieutenant-General Grant in planning the two conclusive campaigns of the war—the one towards Richmond, and the other towards Atlanta—so eventful of result; and in executing his part of the programme, fought Joe Johnston one hundred and twenty-five days successively, and at length captured Atlanta, at a moment when our natural resources were well-nigh exhausted, and the national heart sick with long watching and waiting for success. Striking out boldly from Atlanta to the sea, guided solely by his own judgment, against the advice of General Halleck, and with the approbation of General Grant alone, he cut loose from his base, descended into Georgia, struck terror into the heart of the rebellion, captured Savannah, and planted our victorious standards on the shore of the Atlantic. Striking out again, he captured Pocotaligo and Columbia, compelled the evacuation of Charleston, laid waste the State of South Carolina, again met and whipped Joe Johnston, and after marching and fighting for twelve months, without rest, he halted his victorious army at the capital of North Carolina, in time to witness the funeral ceremonies of the Confederacy

and the complete triumph of our cause. And for what?—to be the subject of such utterly unfounded suspicions, as to be by some even suspected for a traitor! History furnishes no example of such cruel ingratitude and injustice.

Immediately on the conclusion of the definitive cartel of surrender, General Sherman issued the following orders, for the future movement of his army. Its work was done, and nothing remained for the greater portion of it, not required to garrison the conquered territory, but to return home and disband.

“HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
“ In the Field, Raleigh, N. C., April 27, 1865.

“SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, No. 66.”

“Hostilities having ceased, the following changes and dispositions of the troops in the field will be made with as little delay as practicable:—

“I. The Tenth and Twenty-third corps will remain in the Department of North Carolina, and Major-General J. M. Schofield will transfer back to Major-General Gillmore, commanding Department of the South, the two brigades formerly belonging to the division of brevet Major-General Grover, at Savannah. The Third division, cavalry corps, brevet Major-General J. Kilpatrick commanding, is hereby transferred to the Department of North Carolina, and General Kilpatrick will report in person to Major-General Schofield for orders.

“II. The cavalry command of Major-General George Sherman will return to East Tennessee, and that of brevet Major-General J. H. Wilson will be conducted back to the Tennessee River, in the neighborhood of Decatur, Alabama.

“III. Major-General Howard will conduct the Army of the Tennessee to Richmond, Virginia, following roads substantially by Lewisburg, Warrenton, Lawrenceville, and Petersburg, or to the right of that line. Major-General Slocum will conduct the Army of Georgia to Richmond by roads to the left of the one indicated for General Howard, viz., by Oxford, Boynton, and Nottoway Courthouse. These armies will turn

in at this point the contents of their ordnance trains, and use the wagons for extra forage and provisions. These columns will be conducted slowly and in the best of order, and aim to be at Richmond, ready to resume the march, by the middle of May.

“IV. The chief-quartermaster and commissary of the military division, Generals Easton and Beckwith, after making proper dispositions of their departments here, will proceed to Richmond and make suitable preparations to receive those columns, and to provide them for the further journey.”

On the 10th of March, Sherman himself set out for Alexandria, Virginia, whither he arrived on the 19th. During those nine days of dreary march along the war-paths and across the battle-fields of the Army of the Potomac, he had ample opportunity for reflection on the vanity of all human glory. He thought much and anxiously upon his own peculiar situation, reviewed carefully all his former relations with Mr. Stanton, to discover, if possible, what motive he had for turning upon him ; and looked into the newspapers hoping to find some disavowal or note of explanation, on the part of Mr. Stanton, that would disabuse the public mind of the false impressions he had himself created ; but all in vain. The public mind had settled down into the opinion that General Sherman was not quite as bad as had been supposed ; but still there was something, it was believed, in regard to his case, very inexplicable. Under such circumstances it was some relief to his sense of injury, to write and forward to a personal friend the following letter, dated at Camp Alexandria,—the first word to the public from him in regard to the matter :—

“I am just arrived. All my army will be in to-day. I have been lost to the world in the woods for some time, yet, on arriving at the ‘settlements,’ find I have made quite a stir among the people at home, and that the most sinister motives have been ascribed to me. I have been too long fighting with real rebels with muskets in their hands to be scared by mere

non-combatants, no matter how high their civil rank or station. It is amusing to observe how brave and firm some men become when all danger is past. I have noticed on field of battle brave men never insult the captured or mutilate the dead; but cowards and laggards always do. I cannot now recall the act, but Shakspeare records how poor Falstaff, the prince of cowards and wits, rising from a feigned death, stabbed again the dead Percy, and carried his carcass aloft in triumph to prove his valor.

“Now that the rebellion in our land is *dead*, how many Falstaffs appear to brandish the evidence of their valor, and seek to appropriate honors and the public applause for deeds that never were done!

“As to myself, I ask no reward, no popularity; but I submit to the candid judgment of the world, after all the facts shall be known and understood.

“I do want peace and security, and the return to law and justice from Maine to the Rio Grande; and if it does not exist *now*, substantially, it is for State reasons beyond my comprehension. It may be counted strange that one who has no fame but as a soldier should have been so careful to try and restore the civil power of the Government, and the peaceful jurisdictions of the federal courts; but it is difficult to discover in that fact any just cause of offence to a free and enlightened people. But when men choose to slander and injure, they can easily invent the necessary facts for the purpose when the proposed victim is far away engaged in public service of their own bidding. But there is consolation in knowing that though truth lies in the bottom of a well, the Yankees have perseverance enough to get to that bottom.”

General Sherman now determined not to visit Washington, but to remain in camp with his army until he should receive further orders from General Grant. Afterwards, on being invited by General Grant, he visited him at his headquarters in Washington; and, on being informed by him that the President had expressed a desire to see him, he called immediately on

the President, and then learned, for the first time, that the telegram published by Mr. Stanton on the 22d of April, and the "nine reasons" given as those of the President and cabinet were the work of Mr. Stanton alone. This fact settled, there was now no ill-feeling between General Sherman and the officers of the Government, and the matter thus became a personal affair between him and Mr. Stanton alone. General Sherman did not complain that his agreement with Johnston was disapproved. The merits and demerits of that agreement were matters of opinion and judgment, and the President had the right, and it was his duty, to exercise his best judgment, and his action in the premises could be no just ground of complaint. It was the publication that constituted the *gravamen* of the offence; its tone and style, the insinuations it contained, the false inferences it occasioned, and the offensive orders to the subordinate officers of General Sherman, which succeeded the publication—these were the causes of the trouble, and for these Mr. Stanton was alone responsible.

On the 20th of May, both the grand armies of the Union were encamped in the vicinity of the national capital. The war was over, and our noble volunteers were about to be disbanded. Before these grand armies should be dispersed, however, the lieutenant-general proposed to give them a handsome review. The wide streets of Washington were admirably adapted for such purpose. The review of the Army of the Potomac was ordered for the 23d, and that known as Sherman's army, for the 24th. Thousands of people, from all parts of the country, flocked to Washington to witness the grand pageant, and to express their admiration for the noble men who had brought home peace. The most ample preparations had been made for the occasion. The President was seated on an elevated stand, surrounded by his cabinet officers, foreign ministers, distinguished strangers, their wives and daughters and personal friends; Pennsylvania Avenue was lined on both sides, and from end to end, with admiring people; every window presented its tableau of fair spectators; and the occasion was such as never before was witnessed on the

American continent. Those great armies now passing in review within sight of that vast assemblage were, surely, calculated to impress all beholders with a profound sense of the greatness and power of the United States; and were it not for those tattered banners, which tell us of the distant battle-fields on which these regiments contended for the mastery, of the hand to hand conflict, and of comrades slain, we might rejoice without a feeling of sorrow. Nevertheless we may rejoice, for those brave men by their marching and fighting brought home to their distracted land the blessing of peace, and we can now look up to heaven and bless God that it is so! From end to end, from side to side, along the shore, amid the valley and on the mountain-top—all are at peace!

As before mentioned, the review of General Sherman's army was on the 24th of May. The day was exceedingly beautiful. The army was uniformed and equipped as on the march; there was no attempt at mere military display. Commanders appeared to take pride in presenting their respective commands as they served on the march and in the field. The foragers were out in force, with their pack-trains loaded with forage and provisions; the pioneer corps, composed of black men, carried their axes, spades, and shovels; while the cavalry, infantry, and artillery made an imposing display of the three arms of the service. General Sherman rode at the head of the column, and as he moved slowly along the avenue, he was greeted with cheers on every side; the ladies in the exuberance of their joy waved their congratulations, covered him with bouquets of flowers, and bedecked his horse with evergreens. None were so much surprised at these manifestations of respect as himself. Arriving opposite the headquarters of Major-General Augur, the chief was observed to turn aside, halt, and lift his hat, in token of the most profound respect. This was an act of courtesy from the soldier to the statesman. Mr. Seward, too ill to take his place beside the President, had been brought to General Augur's headquarters, and wrapped in the robes of the sick-chamber, stood for a moment at the

window to exchange salutations with the great military chief. It was a touching sight.

The President's stand was erected in front of the White House ; from it wings had been extended to the right and left, so that the grounds of the White House, fronting on Pennsylvania Avenue, were nearly covered. These were all soon passed by the head of the column, when the general wheeled out, dismounted, and ascended the stairs, to take his place near the lieutenant-general. On making his appearance on the stand, he was cordially met by the President, Lieutenant-General Grant, and Messrs. Dennison, Speed, and Harlin of the cabinet, and received their hearty congratulations while his veteran army moved on in their triumphal march. Mr. Stanton rose also and offered his hand, as if pleased to congratulate General Sherman ; *but the latter affected not to see him !*

There are those who, lightly estimating injuries to character and reputation, especially when their own are not involved, who regretted General Sherman should have taken that occasion to resent what he deemed a personal insult ; and will still more regret to find the memory of the event herein perpetuated ; yet there is some consideration due to the sensitiveness of a soldier who felt his honor had been questioned : and since, under the circumstances, he could not, without hypocrisy, receive Mr. Stanton's congratulations, it was well he did not observe their tender.

General Sherman now prepared to take leave of his army. There is something exceedingly touching in the exhibition of that ardent attachment which always exists between the officers and men of a well-ordered and properly disciplined army. All General Sherman's dispatches show his high estimate of the valor of his troops ; and on the other hand, his officers and men were equally proud of their chief. In truth, the material of that army was never surpassed in any age or country. Lord Melville once declared in parliament, that "bad men made the best soldiers," and we are told the unworthy sentiment had many admirers in England. But not so in this country. The men who fought the battles of the

Union were among the best in the land, and in the general, were improved by their patriotic experience. They now understand better the unspeakable blessings of peace; they know better the value of friendships; they can better submit to hardships; they are better qualified to preserve order and obey the laws, and are better Christians than when they first entered the military service. Bad men are made worse by military service, but good men are made better. And it is confidently believed that "Sherman's men," as they are familiarly called, and as they are proud to call themselves, will prove to be as distinguished in the pursuits of peace as they were renowned in the feats of war.

We conclude this chapter with General Sherman's farewell order to his troops. To be the author of such an order, with such good cause to write it, is a happiness but few soldiers ever enjoyed.

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the field, Washington, D. C., May 30, 1865.

"SPECIAL FIELD ORDERS, No. 76.

"The general commanding announces to the Armies of the Tennessee and Georgia, that the time has come for us to part. Our work is done, and armed enemies no longer defy us. Some of you will be retained in service until further orders. And now that we are about to separate, to mingle with the civil world, it becomes a pleasing duty to recall to mind the situation of national affairs when, but little more than a year ago, we were gathered about the twining cliffs of Lookout Mountain, and all the future was wrapped in doubt and uncertainty. Three armies had come together from distant fields, with separate histories, yet bound by one common cause—the union of our country and the perpetuation of the Government of our inheritance. There is no need to recall to your memories Tunnell Hill, with its Rocky Face Mountain, and Buzzard Roost Gap, with the ugly forts of Dalton behind. We were in earnest, and paused not for danger and difficulty, but dashed through Snake Creek Gap, and fell on Resaca, then

on to the Etowah, to Dallas, Kenesaw; and the heats of summer found us on the banks of the Chattahoochee, far from home and dependent on a single road for supplies. Again we were not to be held back by any obstacle, and crossed over and fought four heavy battles for the possession of the citadel of Atlanta. That was the crisis of our history. A doubt still clouded our future; but we solved the problem, and destroyed Atlanta, struck boldly across the State of Georgia, secured all the main arteries of life to our enemy, and Christmas found us at Savannah. Waiting there only long enough to fill our wagons, we again began a march, which for peril, labor, and results will compare with any ever made by an organized army. The floods of the Savannah, the swamps of the Combahee and Edisto, the high hills and rocks of the Santee, the flat quagmires of the Pedee and Cape Fear rivers, were all passed in midwinter, with its floods and rains, in the face of an accumulating enemy; and after the battles of Averysboro' and Bentonsville, we once more came out of the wilderness to meet our friends at Goldsboro'. Even then we paused only long enough to get new clothing, to reload our wagons, and again pushed on to Raleigh, and beyond, until we met our enemy, suing for peace instead of war, and offering to submit to the injured laws of his and our country. As long as that enemy was defiant, nor mountains, nor rivers, nor swamps, nor hunger, nor cold had checked us; but when he who had fought us hard and persistently, offered submission, your general thought it wrong to pursue him further, and negotiations followed which resulted, as you all know, in his surrender. How far the operations of the army have contributed to the overthrow of the Confederacy, of the peace which now dawns on us, must be judged by others, not by us. But that you have done all that men could do has been admitted by those in authority; and we have a right to join in the universal joy that fills our land because the war is over, and our Government stands vindicated before the world by the joint action of the volunteer armies of the United States.

“To such as remain in the military service, your general

need only remind you that successes in the past are due to hard work and discipline, and that the same work and discipline are equally important in the future. To such as go home, he will only say, that our favored country is so grand, so extensive, so diversified in climate, soil, and productions, that every man may surely find a home and occupation suited to his tastes ; and none should yield to the natural impotence sure to result from our past life of excitement and adventure. You will be invited to seek new adventure abroad ; but do not yield to the temptation, for it will lead only to death and disappointment.

“Your general now bids you all farewell, with the full belief that, as in war you have been good soldiers, so in peace you will make good citizens ; and if, unfortunately, new war should arise in our country, Sherman’s army will be the first to buckle on the old armor and come forth to defend and maintain the Government of our inheritance and choice.

CHAPTER XXXV.

DIGRESSIVE.

IN preparing the foregoing pages, in order to avoid those digressions which often mar the continuity of a narrative, we have omitted several letters of interest which will be given in this chapter.

During the first year of the war, the newspaper press unwittingly occasioned great embarrassment to the army. Such was the public greed for news, that publishers had their correspondents in every camp, who did not hesitate to give publicity to any and all operations of the army; so that, while the people were merely gratified, the enemy was advised and greatly benefited. General Sherman was among the first to perceive and attempt to reform this evil. It required a bold man to run counter to the wishes of the newspaper press. Nevertheless he did not hesitate to do so, when he judged that the best interests of the country required it. In 1861, while in command in Kentucky, he was not only embarrassed but alarmed, in finding all his operations telegraphed and published in the daily papers, even his plans foreshadowed, and the number and strength of his forces given. At that time, the allegiance of Kentucky was hollow and compulsory. In fact, many of her young men had gone into the armies of the Confederacy, leaving their relatives and friends behind to act the part of spies and informers. Kentucky was then our point of support for the operations of the Valley of the Mississippi, and we were obliged to draw our lines through counties and districts whose people were only bound to us by a fear that was taciturn,

supple, and treacherous, and which, like the ashes of volcanoes, concealed terrific flames, the eruption of which might be induced or provoked by the slightest cause. General Sherman, conscious of his weakness, and of the dangers by which he was surrounded, banished every newspaper correspondent from his lines, and declared summary punishment for all who should in future give information of his strength, position, or movements. A proceeding so unusual was ill-appreciated by the press, and the result was a lively fire in the rear, which was somewhat annoying to him. Nevertheless he persisted in this policy throughout the war; and the further our lines were advanced into the enemy's country, the more valuable became the rule. The following letter was written, early in 1863, in vindication of his policy:—

“When John C. Calhoun announced to President Jackson the doctrine of secession, he did not bow to the opinion of that respectable source, and to the vast array of people of whom Mr. Calhoun was the representative. He saw the wisdom of preventing a threatened evil by timely action. He answered instantly: ‘Secession is treason, and the penalty for treason is death.’ Had Jackson yielded an inch, the storm would then have swept over this country.

“Had Mr. Buchanan met the seizure of our mints and arsenals in the same spirit, he would have kept this war within the limits of actual traitors, but by temporizing he gave the time and opportunity for the organization of a rebellion of half the nation.

“So in this case. Once establish the principle asserted by you, that the press has a right to keep paid agents in our camps, independent of the properly accredited commanders, and you would be able soon to destroy any army; we would then have not only rebellion on our hands, but dissensions and discord in our armies, mutiny in our camps, and disaster to our arms. In regard to this matter I may be mistaken, but for the time being I must be the judge.

“I am no enemy to freedom of thought, freedom of speech

and of the press ; but the army is no proper place for controversies. When armies take the field all discussion should cease. No amount of argument will move the rebellion ; the rebels have thrown aside the pen and taken the sword. We must do the same, or perish or be conquered, and become the contempt of all mankind."

But newspaper correspondents are not so easily put down by the pen alone, although it may be wielded by the hand that holds the sword as well. During the forepart of 1863, Mr. Thomas W. Knox, a correspondent for the New York Herald, was excluded from our lines in the department commanded by General Grant, in consequence of offensive language used by him in letters published in the newspaper with which he was connected. Mr. Knox appealed to the President, who, after hearing his statement of the case, allowed him to return to General Grant with a letter, as follows :—

"Whereas, it appears to my satisfaction that Thomas W. Knox, a correspondent of the New York Herald, has been, by the sentence of court-martial, excluded from the military department of Major-General Grant, and also that General Thayer, president of the court, and Major-General McClelland, in command of a corps of that department, and many other respectable persons, are of opinion that Mr. Knox's offence was technically rather than wilfully wrong, and that the sentence should be revoked, therefore said sentence is hereby revoked, so far as to allow Mr. Knox to return to General Grant's headquarters, and to remain, if General Grant shall give his express assent, and to again leave the department if General Grant refuse such assent."

Whereupon General Grant addressed Mr. Knox :—

"The letter of the President of the United States authorizing you to return to these headquarters, and to remain with

my consent, or leave if such consent is withheld, has been shown to me.

“ You came here first in violation of a positive order from General Sherman. Because you were not pleased with his treatment of army followers who had violated his orders, you attempted to break down his influence with his command and to blast his reputation with the public ; you made insinuations against his sanity, and said many things which were untrue, and so far as your letter had influence, it was calculated to injure the public service. General Sherman is one of the purest men, and one of the ablest soldiers in the country ; you have attacked him and have been sentenced to expulsion from the department for such offence. Whilst I would conform to the slightest wish of the President, where it is founded on a fair representation of both sides of any question, my respect for General Sherman is such, that in this case I must decline, unless General Sherman first gives his consent for your remaining.”

Mr. Knox then addressed General Sherman :—

“ Inclosed please find copy of the order of the President, authorizing me to return to this department, and to remain, with General Grant’s approval. General Grant has expressed his willingness to give such approval, provided there is no objection from yourself.

“ Without referring in detail to past occurrences, permit me to express my regret at the want of harmony between portions of the army and the press, and the hope there may be a better feeling in future. I should be pleased to receive your assent in the present subject-matter. The eyes of the whole North are now turned upon Vicksburg, and the history of the events soon to culminate in its fall will be watched with great eagerness. Your favor in the matter will be duly appreciated by the journal I represent as well as myself.”

The secular press of this country is a great power, for both good and evil, and the man who can show us how we may

have the one without the other, will prove himself a great benefactor of his race. But this is impossible. Honest truth is too slow for enterprising error; truth stays at home, and waits to entertain such friends as come to seek her counsels, while error, with her specious promises and plausible theories, advertises in the newspapers, and careers through the world. The reason why the press is not an unmixed good, is because all editors, publishers, and correspondents are not cultivated, high-toned, honest, and honorable men. But if they were so, and if they earnestly and faithfully set themselves to work to teach the people virtue, and to publish nothing but unvarnished truth, such is the character of mankind, they would have but few pupils. The stream can rise no higher than its fountain, and a people are no better than the newspapers they read.

The calling of the editor, in this country, is as high and honorable as that of any of the learned professions. If his errors and follies are more apparent than those of the lawyer, it is because they are more exposed to observation. The editor speaks every day to the public—the lawyer speaks but seldom, and then carefully before the judges. The man who talks much, is apt sometimes to talk unwisely. But the standard of each is elevated or lowered according to the public demand. During the early part of the war, the public demand was for the sensational, and army correspondents were, for the most part, as deficient in good sense and judgment as in good manners. Subsequently, the public demand was for truth and fact, and only such as might be consistent with the public interests; and then, the letters from army correspondents became valuable contributions to authentic history. But the following letter to Mr. Knox in reply to the one just cited, bears on the former period, and the action in this case ended all controversy between General Sherman and army correspondents.

“Yours of April 6th, inclosing a copy of the President's action in your case, and General Grant's letter to you, is received.

I am surprised to learn that the officers named in the President's letter have certified to him that the offence, for which you were tried and convicted, was merely technical—viz., disobedience of orders emanating from the highest military authority, and the publication of wilful and malicious slanders and libels against their brother officers. I cannot so regard the matter.

“Aside from the judgment of a court, and upon your own theory of your duties and obligations alone, you must be adjudged unfit to be here. After having enumerated to me the fact that newspaper correspondents were a fraternity, bound together by a common interest, that must write down all who stand in their way, and bound to supply the public demand for news, even at the expense of truth and fact, if necessary, I cannot consent to the tacit acknowledgment of such a principle by tolerating such a correspondent. Come with a musket or sword in your hand, prepared to share with us our fate in sunshine and in storm, in success and in defeat, in plenty and in scarcity, and I will welcome you as a brother and associate. But come as you now do, expecting me to ally the honor and reputation of my country and my fellow-soldiers with you as a representative of the press,—you who, according to your own theory, will not carefully distinguish between truth and falsehood,—and my answer is, never!”

The military student of this day will find a new element in his calculations, of which the campaigns of Napoleon will furnish no illustrations—namely, the value of the railway. It was the fortune of General Sherman, in his Atlanta campaign, to furnish an illustrious example of this interesting problem.

Previous to that campaign, a single track, with suitable switches and turnouts, was estimated as being capable of transporting supplies and ammunition sufficient for an army, duly proportioned, one hundred thousand strong, one hundred miles from its base. Sherman's problem was to make it do the work for such an army at a distance of five hundred miles from its base. He started with three thousand and five hun-

dred wagons, ambulances included. He had thirty-five thousand horses besides the cavalry. The line of march was across a mountainous region, furnishing no supplies of provisions or forage. It was estimated the cavalry could gather sufficient forage for its own use, but forage for all other animals had to be transported. All the beef was to be carried on the hoof. Baggage was economized to the last pound. Non-combatants of every character and description, except such as pertained to the medical department, were denied transportation. Even the agents of the Christian Commission, whose mission it was to administer to the bodily and spiritual wants of the dying soldier, were left in the rear, because they could not march on foot and carry their own supplies. But the problem was one of logistics and not of benevolence. It was a strictly mathematical calculation of food for a hundred thousand men, whose business it was to march and fight, and of ammunition with which to fight, and of forage for animals necessary and in constant use, with no margin for accidents or unusual misfortunes; it was a problem of pure war, to which all other matters must yield. And in nothing did General Sherman display the high qualities of a great commander more conspicuously, than in the firmness with which he adhered to the logic of his own calculations. When the agents of the Christian Commission presented a petition for transportation of themselves and supplies, he indorsed on it:—"Certainly not—oats and gunpowder are more indispensable at the front than benevolent agents. The weight of every non-combatant transported deprives me of so many pounds of bread that I must have. Each regiment has its chaplain, and these must do the work desired."

In 1863-4, our Government adopted the humane and liberal policy of issuing rations to the non-combatants of Eastern and Middle Tennessee, impoverished by the war, a policy which gave some embarrassment to military commanders in that region. General Sherman found it so prejudicial to the military service that he discontinued it; whereupon President Lincoln,

at the request of influential citizens of that State, expressed a desire the policy should be resumed. The Atlanta campaign had been planned without reference to the business of feeding the inhabitants of Tennessee, and it was evident, if the means of transportation were to be used for this purpose, the campaign must stop. General Sherman received the President's dispatch on the 5th of May, the day before his troops were put in motion, and dispatched the following answer :—

“ We have worked hard with the best talent of the country, and it is demonstrated the railroad cannot supply the army and the people both. One or the other must quit eating rations, and the army must be the last to quit, and don't intend to quit unless Joe Johnston makes us quit. The issue to citizens has been enormous, and the same weight in corn or oats would have saved thousands of mules whose carcasses now corduroy the roads in Tennessee, and which we need so much. We have paid Tennessee ten for one of provisions taken in war. I am now about to move, and cannot change the order. Let the petitioners hurry into Kentucky and make up a caravan of cattle and wagons, and come over the mountains by Cumberland Gap and Somerset to relieve their suffering friends, as they used to do before a railroad was built. I am willing to relieve all actual cases of suffering within our reach by appropriating the savings from soldiers' rations, which are considerable. A people long assisted by a generous Government are apt to rely more on the Government than on their own exertions.”

The earnestness which characterized all of General Sherman's dispatches about this time, and the tenacity with which he adhered to military rules, show he felt he had work to do, and that he had resolved to do it. He thought of nothing but his army ; all others must take care of themselves.

In all wars of long duration there are periods of reaction and irresolution among the people at home, whose duty it is to sustain the war. Our great civil war turned out to be a

greater affair than was at first supposed. The exhibitions of confidence and enthusiasm with which our early volunteers were greeted on their way to the field will not soon be forgotten. How the people cheered! how the bells pealed out! how the flags waved! Even the little boys and girls waved their tiny bunting in token of patriotic zeal. But when the tug of war came, and the contending armies, wrestling like giants for the mastery, after years of terrible struggling, marching, and fighting without success, needed re-enforcements in order to secure eventual triumph, and none seemed willing to help, our troops in the field were not a little disheartened, and some deserted. Nor was this all. There were those at home who tried to arrest the war, and tried to discourage recruiting, and tried to promote desertions; and, availing themselves of a free press, spread their vicious sentiments through the army itself. It was to prevent such results that General Milroy applied to General Sherman for a remedy, which application called forth the following response, addressed to Major-General Thomas:—

“IN THE FIELD, NEAR ATLANTA, August 5, 1864.

“General Milroy’s letter of July 26, with your indorsement, is now before me. He asks to suppress the sale and circulation, in his district, of certain mischievous and treasonable newspapers, and transmits to me certain slips as proofs of the mischievous character of such papers. I would willingly suppress them were it possible to do so, but in human nature there is so much of the mule left, that prohibition of a newspaper only increases its circulation. The press is a power in the land. For a quarter of a century past it had been sowing the whirlwind, and now we reap the storm. It is my opinion that the freedom of the press to publish mischievous matter, like personal slander, libel, false statements of facts, or other matter calculated to promote desertions in the army, or designed to give information to the enemy, should be regulated by statute law. At present we are going through the expensive but natural process which may result in a resort to the knife and pistol for the defence of reputation. It is already demon-

strated, we must use the military power to put down the circulation of newspapers hurtful to the public service.

“The suppression of the few papers mentioned by General Milroy would be something like undertaking to dam up the tributaries of the Ohio to stop the flood of the Mississippi. If General Milroy finds anybody selling mischievous publications within the sphere of his authority, he might give him a good thrashing, or put him in the stocks; but he cannot reach the editors and publishers, who are making money by the publication in New York, Chicago, or Louisville.

“Each military commander, subject to me, may suppress all disorders and immoralities in the sphere of his command as best he can: but my belief is, the proper remedy is to punish the men who publish the objectionable matter, if residing in his jurisdiction; or if absent, then the party who circulates the papers. Give a good horsewhipping to any man who would dare advise a soldier to desert. This is all the notice I would take of such things at this epoch of the war.”

In May, 1863, the Union Club at Memphis, Tennessee, passed some resolutions commemorative of the restoration of law and order in that city, which were transmitted to General Sherman by a gentleman of that place, to which he responded as follows:—

“WALNUT HILLS, MISSISSIPPI, May 25, 1863.

“Yours of 18th instant is received. I thank you for the kind sentiments expressed, and desire you to express to the Union Club the assurance of my continued regard and interest.

“In union are strength, power to do good, power to repress evil—honor, fame, and glory to our beloved country. In disunion are weakness, discord, suspicion, ruin, and misery. How any well-balanced mind can hesitate in a choice between these passes my comprehension. Therefore, on all proper occasions, do honor to that day which saw our national emblem restored to its proper place in Memphis. Rejoice, and let your children rejoice, at each anniversary of the day which

beheld the downfall, in your city, of that powerful faction which had for a long period usurped all the functions of government, and made patriots tremble for their personal safety in the very centre of the republic. Now all is changed; rightful government once more prevails. The great Valley of the Mississippi comprises the principal interests of this country; and Memphis is in the centre, and, like the heart, must regulate the pulsation of life throughout the more remote arteries and veins. Let me exhort you to be calm, magnanimous, and patient. Boast not over your fallen neighbors, but convince them of their delusion, and that the Union men are above petty malice, and will even respect their prejudices, if not incurable.

“I deplore the devastation and misery that attend the progress of the war; but all history teaches that war, pestilence, and famine are the usual means by which the Almighty arrests the progress of error, and allays the storm of human passion.”

The long duration of the war, and the necessity of more troops to re-enforce our wasting armies, compelled Congress to pass a conscript law. The idea of a universal draft was especially unwelcome to the people of New England. Their representatives were on the sharp lookout for expedients to save their people from the sweeping operations of a general draft. To satisfy them, it was provided in the law that any State might raise volunteers in rebel States, to be credited to the quota of the States raising them, respectively; and as the negroes were the only loyal people available in the rebel States, of course the only prospect of obtaining volunteers was in that direction. Recruiting agents soon presented themselves to commanders of armies, duly certified from their respective States, full of confidence and zeal, and well assured that for every negro sent to the war, one white man would be left at home. General Sherman, like many others, did not like that provision of the law. There was something about it unmanly; it showed a disposition to shirk the duties of the citizen in a time of danger; it showed that the desire of ease and the love

of gain were beginning to prevail against the suggestions of patriotism and honor ; and the idea of shifting on the shoulders of the poor negroes the sacred duty of fighting the battles of the country, to the extent suggested, was offensive to our brave white men, who had been fighting hard and long to sustain our common Government, leaving all others home to profit by the war ; and they felt that those they left at home should now bear a hand. Besides this, the thing was wholly impracticable. General Sherman submitted his objections, and the impracticable features of the measure, to the President, who, in answer, sent the following dispatch :—

“ EXECUTIVE CHAMBER, July 18, 1864.

“ I have seen your dispatch, and objections to agents of Northern States opening recruiting near your camps. An act of Congress authorizes this, giving the appointment of agents to the States, and not to the executive government. It is not for the War Department or myself to restrain or modify the law in its execution, further than actual necessity may require. To be candid, I was for the passage of the law, not apprehending at the time it would produce such inconvenience to armies in the field as you now cause me to fear. Many of the States were very anxious for it. I hoped that, with State bounties and active exertions, they would get out substantial additions to our colored forces, which, unlike white troops, help us where they come from as well as where they go to. I still hope for advantage from the law, and being a law, it must be treated as such by all. We here will do all we can to save you from difficulties arising from it. May I ask, therefore, that you will give it your hearty co-operation ?”

This letter of the President's was sufficient. There was the law, and there the expression of Mr. Lincoln's desire to see it carried out. It could make no difference that the law was not practicable of execution—it must be obeyed, and Sherman proceeded to give directions to carry it out.

General Sherman did not always write in the vehement style.

Some of his letters have a spice of humor in them quite refreshing, as the following specimen will show. The gentleman to whom it was addressed was a chaplain in the rebel army, who had been captured at Chattanooga, and relieved from capture, and, as it would seem, was relieved of his horse at the same time, which latter fact he felt to be a great hardship; and when Sherman arrived at Atlanta the chaplain applied by letter, sent through our lines, for an order to compel the fellow who deprived him of his horse to restore him, or the general to send him another one in his stead. This was the general's decision, dated at Atlanta, on the 16th of September, 1864 :—

“DEAR SIR—Your letter of September 14th is received. I approach a question involving a title to a ‘horse’ with deference for the laws of war. That mysterious code, of which we talk so much but know so little, is remarkably silent on the ‘horse.’ He is a beast so tempting to the soldier,—to him of the wild cavalry, the fancy artillery, or the patient infantry,—that I find more difficulty in recovering a worthless, spavined beast than in paying a million of ‘greenbacks;’ so that I fear I must reduce your claim to one of finance, and refer you to the great Board of Claims in Washington, that may reach your case by the time your grandchild becomes a great-grandfather.

“Privately, I think it was a shabby thing in the scamp of the Thirty-first Missouri who took your horse, and the colonel or his brigadier should have restored him. But I cannot undertake to make good the sins of omission of my own colonels or brigadiers, much less those of a former generation. ‘When this cruel war is over,’ and peace once more gives you a parish, I will promise, if near you, to procure, out of one of Uncle Sam’s corrals, a beast that will replace the one taken from you so wrongfully; but now it is impossible. We have a big journey before us, and need all we have, and, I fear, more too; so look out when the Yanks are about and hide your beasts, for my experience is that all soldiers are very careless in a search

for title. I know that General Hardee will confirm this my advice."

It will be recollected that Chief-Justice Chase, in the spring of 1865, doffed his official robes, and, like a true American, made a journey South in search of a cure for the national distemper. The civil war had come to a pause. The leaders of the rebellion had been overthrown, and were now, like a community of pirates, cast upon a desolate island in mid ocean, cursing each other, and dividing their ill-gotten gains amid thunder, and lightning, and storm. Abstract justice was on a tour of observation and inquiry; and the presiding officer of the highest civil tribunal in the land met a leader of armies, when the two friends talked together. The topic of discussion was, the healing of the nation. The following letter indicates the convictions of the soldier.

" STEAMER PRUSSIA, BEAUFORT HARBOR,

May 6, 1865—6 A. M.

" On reaching this ship late last night, I found your valued letter, with the printed sheet, which I have also read.

" I am not yet prepared to receive the negro on terms of political equality, for the reason it will raise passions and prejudices at the North, which, superadded to the causes yet dormant at the South, might rekindle the war, whose fires are now dying out, and which by skilful management might be kept down. As you must observe, I prefer to work with known facts, rather than to reason ahead to remote conclusions. By way of illustration, we are now weather-bound. Is it not best to lay quiet at anchor till those white-cap breakers look less angry, and the southwest winds shift? I think all old sailors will answer yes; whilst we, impatient to reach our goal, are tempted to dash through at risk of life and property. I am willing to admit that the conclusions you reach by pure mental process may be all correct; but don't you think it better first to get the ship of State in some order, that it may be handled and guided? Now, all at the South is *pure anarchy*.

The military power of the United States cannot reach the people who are spread over a vast surface of country.

“We can control the local State capitals, and, it may be, slowly shape political thoughts, but we cannot combat existing ideas with force. I say honestly, that the assertion openly of your ideas of universal negro suffrage, as a fixed policy of our General Government, to be backed by physical power, will produce new war, sooner or later, and one which, from its desultory character, will be more bloody and destructive than the last.

“I am rejoiced that you, upon whom devolves so much, are aiming to see facts and persons with your own eye.

“I think the changes necessary in the future can be made faster and more certain, by means of our constitution, than by any plan outside of it. If now we go outside of the constitution for a means of change, we rather justify the rebels in their late attempt. Whereas now, as General Schofield tells us, the people of the South are ready and willing to make the necessary changes without shock or violence. I have felt the past war as bitterly and keenly as any man could, and I frankly confess myself ‘afraid’ of a new war ; and a new war is bound to result from the action you suggest, of giving to the enfranchised negroes so large a share in the delicate task of putting the Southern States in practical working relations with the General Government. The enfranchisement of the negro should be exceptional and not general, founded upon a standard of intelligence, or by reason of valuable military service during the war or hereafter.”

At the close of the war General Howard was made chief of the Freedmen’s Bureau, headquarters at Washington. His duties were, “to correct that in which the law, by reason of its universality, was deficient.” He was placed at the head of a species of Poor Law Board, with vague powers to define justice, and execute loving-kindness between four millions of emancipated slaves and all the rest of mankind. He was to be not exactly a military commander, nor yet a judge of a

Court of Chancery, but a sort of combination of the religious missionary and school commissioner, with power to feed and instruct, and this for an empire half as large as Europe. But few officers of the army would have had the moral courage to accept such appointment, and fewer still were as well fitted to fill it, and discharge one-half its complicated and multifarious duties. As soon as General Howard concluded to accept his new appointment, he apprized his old commander of the fact by a friendly letter, and received the following in answer:—

“IN THE FIELD, DUMFRIES, Va., May 17th, 1865—9 P. M.

“Your letter of May 12, inclosing General Orders, War Department, No. 91, of May 12, reached me here, on arrival at camp, about dark.

“Colonel Strong is camped just behind me, General Logan about two miles back, and the Fifteenth Corps at Acquia Creek, eight miles back. Copies of orders No. 91 are being made, and will be sent back to them. I hardly know whether to congratulate you or not, but of one thing you may rest assured, that you possess my entire confidence, and I cannot imagine that matters that may involve the future of four millions of souls could be put in more charitable and more conscientious hands. So far as man can do, I believe you will, but I fear you have Hercules' task. God has limited the power of man, and though, in the kindness of your heart, you would alleviate all the ills of humanity, it is not in your power; nor is it in your power to fulfil one-tenth part of the expectations of those who framed the bureau for the freedmen, refugees, and abandoned estates. It is simply impracticable. Yet you can and will do all the good one man may, and that is all you are called on as a man and Christian to do; and to that extent count on me as a friend and fellow-soldier for counsel and assistance. I believe the negro is free by act of master and by the laws of war, now ratified by actual consent and power. The demand for his labor, and his ability to acquire and work land, will enable the negro to work out that amount of freedom and political consequence to which he is or may be en-

titled by natural right and the acquiescence of his fellow-men.

“There is a strong prejudice of race, which over our whole country exists. The negro is denied a vote in all the Northern States, save two or three, and then qualified by conditions not attached to the white race; and by the constitution of the United States, to States is left the right to fix the qualification of voters. The United States cannot make negroes vote in the South, any more than they can in the North, without revolution; and as we have just emerged from one attempted revolution, it would be wrong to begin another. I notice in our country, one class of people make war and leave others to fight it out.

“I do believe the people of the South realize the fact that their former slaves are free, and if allowed reasonable time, and are not harassed by confiscation and political complications, will very soon adapt their condition and interests to their new state of facts.

“Many of them will sell, or lease on easy terms, parts of their land to their former slaves, and gradually the same political state of things will result as now exists in Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri. The people cannot afford to pay the necessary taxes to maintain separate colonies of negroes, or the armies needed to enforce the rights of negroes dwelling in the Southern States, in a condition antagonistic to the feelings and prejudice of the people, the result of which will be internal war, and the final extermination of the negro race. But I am not familiar with the laws of Congress which originated your bureau, but repeat my entire confidence in your pure and exalted character, and your ability to do in the premises all that any one man can do.”

CHAPTER XXXVI.

A T H O M E .

RELIEVED from the cares and responsibilities of his command, and while awaiting the further orders of the Government, Sherman sought and obtained permission from the lieutenant-general to visit his home, his family, and his friends.

On his arrival at his old home, at Lancaster, Ohio, on the 24th of June, 1865, General Sherman was met at the railway station by several thousands of his friends, neighbors, and veteran soldiers, and was welcomed by Judge Hunter, on the part of the citizens, and Colonel Connell, on behalf of the veterans.

The general replied :—

“ FRIENDS OF MY BOYHOOD :

“ I thank you for this most hearty welcome. I am especially thankful for the kind words of the tried and valued friend of my family, Mr. Hunter, and for the warmth with which Colonel Connell and the soldiers have received me. With the latter, I can deal in very few words, for they know that with us words are few and mean much, and that when the time comes again, we will go where the stars and stripes lead, without asking many questions.

“ My old friends and neighbors, I knew your fathers before you better than yourselves, for it is near thirty years since I left here a boy ; and now, in full manhood, I find myself again among you, with a name connected with the history of our country.

“During the past four years my mind has been so intent upon but one thing—the success of our arms—that I have thought of nothing else. I claim no special honor, only to have done a full man’s share ; for when one’s country is in danger, the man who will not defend it, and sustain it, with his natural strength, is no man at all. For this I claim no special merit, for I have done simply what all the boys in blue have done. I have only labored with the strength of a single man, and have used the brains I inherited and the education given by my country. The war through which we have just passed has covered a wide area of country, and imposed upon us a task which, like a vast piece of machinery, required many parts, all of which were equally important to the working of the whole. Providence assigned me my part, and if I have done it, I am well satisfied.

“The past is now with the historian, but we must still grapple with the future. In this we need a guide, and, fortunately for us all, we can trust the constitution which has safely brought us through the gloom and danger of the past. Let each State take care of its own local interests and affairs—Ohio of hers, Louisiana of hers, Wisconsin of hers—and the best results will follow. You all know well that I have lived much at the South, and I say that though we have had bitter and fierce enemies in war, we must meet this people again in peace. The bad men among them will separate from those who ask for order and peace, and when the people do thus separate we can encourage the good, and, if need be, we can cut the head of the bad off at one blow. Let the present take care of the present, and with the faith inspired by the past, we can trust the future to the future. The Government of the United States and the constitution of our fathers have proven their strength and power in time of war, and I believe our whole country will be even more brilliant in the vast and unknown future than in the past.

“Fellow-soldiers and neighbors, again I thank you. I do not wish you to consider this a speech at all, for I do not profess to be a man of words. I prefer to see you separately, at

your leisure, in a social way. I shall be with you for some days, and shall be pleased to have you call in whenever you feel like it, in the old familiar way, without any of the formality and reserve which were proper enough in the midst of the armies."

He remained with his family but a few days when an invitation from his old comrades of the Army of the Tennessee to attend their barbecue at Louisville, on the approaching 4th of July, in honor of victory and peace, again drew him from his retirement. On his way to Louisville, he passed through Cincinnati, arriving there on the night of the 30th of June, to find that the citizens had hastily arranged a formal welcome.

On making his appearance on the balcony of the Burnett House, General Sherman was greeted with deafening cheers. Mr. Stanberry, in a pleasant and courteous speech, formally tendered the welcome of the city, and then, with a brief reference to the general's extraordinary career, introduced him to the citizens. Mr. Stanberry was frequently interrupted by applause, and at the close of his address three cheers were given for Sherman, who, in response, said :—

"FELLOW CITIZENS—I am not so accustomed to speaking as my friend Stanberry, and therefore you must be a little more silent as to noise, and charitable as to words. I am very proud that he, before every other man, has received me here on this portico, for, as he says, he knew my father before me, and all my family. He knew me when I was a little red-headed boy, running about Lancaster stealing his cherries. I am thankful that he has introduced me, for I believe he understands the workings of my heart as well as I do myself, and I know that he can tell it better than I can, therefore I accept his version without qualification.

"While we are here together to-night let me tell you, as a point of historical interest, that here, upon this spot, in this very hotel, and I think almost in the room through which I reached this balcony, General Grant and I laid down our maps

and studied the campaign which ended our war. I had been away down in Mississippi finishing up an unfinished job I had down there, when he called for me by telegraph to meet him in Nashville. But we were bothered so much there that we came up here, and in this hotel sat down with our maps and talked over the lines and the operations by means of which we were to reach the heart of our enemy. He went to Richmond, and I to Atlanta. We varied as to time; but the result was just as we laid it out in this hotel, in March, 1864.

“General Grant and I had only one object to fulfil. Our hearts and feelings are one: we were determined the United States should survive this war with honor; and that those who came after us, in future years and centuries, should never turn upon this generation and say we were craven cowards. Now what is the truth? Are you not proud? You are not proud of me, but you are proud of the result. General Grant, and General Sherman, and every other patriot think of but one thing; we don't bother ourselves about local details; we think of only one idea—the supremacy of our country represented by Congress, the judiciary, and the executive—the people being a part of the grand whole. We may think differently about the roads, the mud, about horses and mules; but in one thing we do not differ—that this country shall survive, and be honored not only here but all over the world.

“When our thoughts are of this character, don't let us bother ourselves about little things. There are great thoughts abroad in America, and you and I and all of us are charged with them, and let us see that our country stands unchanged as to boundaries. We have the best country on earth. Our history in the past is beautiful, and her future is in our keeping. I hope and pray that the present generation will maintain the present; and I know that those who come after us will make that present more glorious than it now is. We have but begun the work. I have travelled from one part of the country to the other, and I know that we are almost in a state of wilderness yet. Not one acre in ten in Ohio, and not one in forty in Tennessee, is improved as it ought to be. When we are as popu-

lous as Europe, it will be time to tread upon our neighbor's heels. You in Ohio have the most lovely country the sun ever shone upon; and every returned Ohio soldier, I hope, will take my advice and go to his farm and cultivate it the best he can, rather than wander away into new enterprises. For fifty years to come, at least, I never want to hear a word about war in America. If anybody, at home or abroad, treads upon our coat-tails we will be ready for a fight. But I am for peace now. The Army of the Tennessee is now peaceably disposed. We simply warn our friends not to tread upon our coat-tails; that is all."

The general then thanked the people for the interest they had taken in his presence, and bid them good-night.

The army received their old leader with cordial and unrestrained enthusiasm. After spending an agreeable anniversary among his old fellow-soldiers, Sherman went to St. Louis to assume formal command of his new military division, preparatory to availing himself of a more extended holiday.

At a public dinner given to him by the citizens at St. Louis he spoke as follows:—

"Here, in St. Louis, probably began the great centre movement which terminated the war—a battle-field such as never before was seen, extending from ocean to ocean almost, with the right wing and the left wing; and from the centre here I remember one evening, up in the old Planters' House, sitting with General Halleck and General Cullum, and we were talking about this, that, and the other. A map was on the table, and I was explaining the position of the troops of the enemy in Kentucky when I came to this State. General Halleck knew well the position here, and I remember well the question he asked me—the question of the school teacher to his child—'Sherman, here is the line: how will you break that line?' 'Physically, by a perpendicular force.' 'Where is the perpendicular?' 'The line of the Tennessee River.' General Halleck is the author of that first beginning, and I give him

credit for it with pleasure. Laying down his pencil upon the map, he said, 'There is the line, and we must take it.' The capture of the forts on the Tennessee River by the troops led by Grant followed. These were the grand strategic features of that first movement, and it succeeded perfectly.

"General Halleck's plan went further—not to stop at his first line, which ran through Columbus, Bowling Green, crossing the river at Henry and Donelson, but to push on to the second line, which ran through Memphis and Charleston; but troubles intervened at Nashville, and delays followed; opposition to the last movement was made, and I myself was brought an actor on the scene.

"I remember our ascent of the Tennessee River: I have seen to-night captains of steamboats who first went with us there. Storms came, and we did not reach the point we desired. At that time General C. F. Smith was in command. He was a man indeed: all the old officers remember him as a gallant and excellent officer; and had he lived, probably some of us younger fellows would not have attained our present positions. But that is now past. We followed him the second time, and then came the landing of forces at Pittsburg Landing. Whether it was a mistake in landing them on the west instead of the east bank, it is not necessary now to discuss. I think it was not a mistake. There was gathered the first great army of the West, commencing with only twelve thousand, then twenty, then thirty thousand, and we had about thirty-eight thousand in that battle; and all I claim for that is, that it was a contest for manhood: there was no *strategy*. Grant was there, and others of us, all young at that time, and unknown men, but our enemy was old, and Sidney Johnston, whom all the officers remembered as a power among the old officers, high above Grant, myself, or anybody else, led the enemy on that battle-field, and I almost wonder how we conquered. But, as I remarked, it was a contest for manhood—man to man—soldier to soldier. We fought, and we held our ground, and therefore accounted ourselves victorious.

“The possession of the Mississippi River is the possession of America, and I say that had the Southern Confederacy (call it by what name you may)—had that power represented by the Southern Confederacy held with a grip sufficiently strong the lower part of the Mississippi River, we would have been a subjugated people; and they would have dictated to us if we had given up the possession of the lower Mississippi. It was vital to us, and we fought for it and won. We determined to have it; but we could not go down with our frail boats past the batteries of Vicksburg. It was a physical impossibility; therefore what was to be done? After the Tallahatchie line was carried, Vicksburg was the next point. I went with a small and hastily collected force, and repeatedly endeavored to make a lodgment on the bluff between Vicksburg and Haines’ Bluff, while General Grant moved with his main army so as to place himself on the high plateau behind Vicksburg; but ‘man proposes and God disposes,’ and we failed on that occasion. I then gathered my hastily collected force and went down further; and then, for the first time, I took General Blair and his brigade under my command.

“On the very day I had agreed to be there I was there, and we swung our flanks around, and the present governor of Missouri fell a prisoner to the enemy on that day. We failed. I waited anxiously for a co-operating force inland and below us, but they did not come, and after I had made the assault I learned that the depot at Holly Springs had been broken up, and that General Grant had sent me word not to attempt it. But it was too late. Nevertheless, although we were unable to carry it at first, there were other things to be done. The war covered such a vast area there was plenty to do. I thought of that affair at Arkansas Post, although others claim it, and they may have it if they want it. We cleaned them out there, and General Grant then brought his army to Vicksburg. And you in St. Louis remember well that long winter—how we were on the levee, with the waters rising and drowning us like muskrats; how we were seeking channels through Deer Creek and Yazoo Pass, and how we finally cut a canal across the

peninsula, in front of Vicksburg. But all that time the true movement was the original movement, and every thing approximating to it came nearer the truth. But we could not make any retrograde movement. Why? Because your people at the North were too noisy.

“We could not take any step backward, and for that reason we were forced to run the batteries at Vicksburg, and make a lodgment on the ridges on some of the bluffs below Vicksburg. It is said I protested against it. It is folly. I never protested in my life—never. On the contrary, General Grant rested on me probably more responsibility even than any other commander under him; for he wrote to me, ‘I want you to move on Haines’ Bluff to enable me to pass to the next fort below—Grand Gulf. I hate to ask you, because the fervor of the North will accuse you of being rebellious again.’ I love Grant for his kindness. I did make the feint on Haines’ Bluff, and by that means Grant ran the blockade easily to Grand Gulf, and made a lodgment down there, and got his army up on the high plateau in the rear of Vicksburg, while you people here were beguiled into the belief that Sherman was again repulsed. But we did not repose confidence in everybody. Then followed the movements on Jackson, and the 4th of July placed us in possession of that great stronghold, Vicksburg, and then, as Mr. Lincoln said, ‘the Mississippi went unvexed to the sea.’

“From that day to this the war has been virtually and properly settled. It was a certainty then. They would have said, ‘We give up;’ but Davis would not ratify it, and he had them under good discipline, and therefore it was necessary to fight again. Then came the affair of Chickamauga. The Army of the Mississippi, lying along its banks, were called into a new field of action, and so one morning early I got orders to go to Chattanooga. I did not know where it was, hardly. I did not know the road to go there. But I found it, and got there in time. And although my men were shoeless, and the cold and bitter frosts of winter were upon us, yet I must still go to Knoxville, one hundred and thirteen miles further, to relieve Burnside. That march we made. Then winter forced

us to lie quiet. During that winter I took a little exercise down the river, but that is of no account."

General Buell has since published a lengthy reply to this speech, showing, by official documents: I. That as early as the 3d of January, 1862, he himself proposed to General Halleck the identical plan of operations that was subsequently followed; II. That General Halleck had at that time neither formed nor adopted any plan of operations for the ensuing campaign. General Buell also endeavors to prove that the delays which occurred in the execution of the plan were not chargeable to him.

The prime object of General Sherman's remarks, however, was simply to award credit which he supposed due to one who had become his enemy. To that end he stated the facts as they came within his knowledge, and could hardly have been expected to be cognizant of the confidential dispatches quoted by General Buell.

From St. Louis, General Sherman went to Chicago, Columbus, and other places, on his way home, everywhere heartily greeted by the people and the returned soldiers, and everywhere compelled, in spite of himself, to satisfy the desire of the crowd for a speech.

After his return to St. Louis, General Sherman was present, with General Grant, at a banquet given to a party of English capitalists, consisting of Mr. James McHenry, the Hon. T. Kinnaird, Sir Morton Peto, and others, at the Southern Hotel, on Thursday night, September 14th, 1865. General Grant, who was present, having been in vain called upon to reply to a toast, General Sherman said:—

"GENTLEMEN—I regret exceedingly that my commanding general will not respond to the sentiment. As a citizen of St. Louis, rather than as an officer in the army, I will thank these gentlemen for the kindly mention they have made of General Grant, the whole army, and myself. I believe it is sincere. I believe they appreciate and realize the fact that General

Grant, as the representative of the Army of the United States has had, from the beginning to the end, but one single purpose in view. He has not sought to kill, slay, and destroy, but resolved on the first day of the war that this country should live one and inseparable forever. He felt as we all should feel, prepared for this very occasion, when honorable gentlemen may come from abroad, and not have occasion to blush that the sons of Englishmen permitted anarchy and downfall in the country intrusted to them. And notwithstanding the spirit of the press at one time in England, I believe then and now every true Anglo-Saxon, every Irishman, and every Scotchman rejoiced, and rejoice now, that we are men, and that we did not permit our country to break in two or many sections. And, moreover, I believe every foreign nation—France, Spain, Germany, and Russia—have as much interest in our national existence as we have ourselves; and now, that peace is once more attained, these gentlemen come of their own accord, generously and kindly, to see for themselves whether we merit the assistance which they have in abundance to develop the resources of our country, yet new, with forests still standing on nine-tenths of it. They seem to be impressed favorably, and I have no doubt, in their influential stations abroad, they will induce thousands and millions to think and feel as they do. They have seen this day the iron-clads stripped of their armor. They have seen your levee for three miles lined with peaceful steamboats loaded with corn and oats to go to that Southern country with which we have been at war. They see the lieutenant-general of all our armies dressed as a citizen at this table, and they will carry abroad a perfectly comprehensive, clear, and mathematical intelligence that we are at peace, that we want peace, and that we will have it, even at the expense of war.

“But I am well assured that there is no nation that desires war with us; that every question that can possibly arise can be adjusted by statesmen, by merchants, by men of intelligence and public citizens, assembled together just as you are, discussing just as you would the affairs of the Pacific Railroad,

or any thing else—adjusting differences, striking the balance, and paying it out in bank when called for. Therefore, gentlemen, I am glad to see you among us, and I know the people of St. Louis are glad to see you. You can see in one hour what you could not procure by reading one thousand columns of closely printed matter in the London Times. There are things seen, things felt within, which cannot be described. Even Shakspeare fails to convey a full and intelligent description of many thoughts, and no author can convey a description of a place or locality that will give you in a month of reading what you acquire to-day by simply running back and forth by our city, and traversing it right and left in carriages.

“You have seen the streets of the city and the form and manner of building, and the character of the buildings; and you have seen where but a few years ago there was nothing but a wild prairie, and where, as has been stated, forty years ago there was but a French village of four thousand inhabitants, and you find yourself in a palace—in a room which will compare favorably with any on earth. From these facts, you can arrive at conclusions in regard to the future. Whether vivid or not, it is for the future. The present you have seen for yourselves. You have seen the material resources of the country. The people of the country have heard the kindly words which you have spoken, and I know we receive it in the plain British meaning. I, therefore, simply, gentlemen, beg to assure you of my respect—a respect which all educated officers in the army bear to England, and all nations that act fairly, manfully, and without concealment.”

CHAPTER XXXVII.

CONCLUSION.

WHEN Count Segur, in giving his graphic account of Napoleon's great Russian campaign, declared it was impossible to comprehend the great events of history without a perfect knowledge of the character and manners of the principal actors, he disclosed a profound knowledge of his art. Such knowledge of Sherman, however, can only be had by being associated with him both at home and in the field. If we form our estimate of General Sherman's character and manners from his brilliant but hasty letters and military reports alone, or from the record of his military career, or from such descriptions of him as have been given by army correspondents, or from all these sources of information together, we will be likely to have a very imperfect idea of the man. The country, however, and the world will probably agree in according him military genius of a high order. Indeed, this judgment can hardly be withheld without obliterating the most brilliant achievements of the war, still fresh in the memory of all.

It has been the fortune of but few eminent men like General Sherman, to receive both the applause and abuse usually accorded to greatness, in the short space of four years. It is too early to write his history. Fifty or a hundred years hence he will be better understood than now, and more appreciated.

In personal appearance and manners, General Sherman is not essentially different from other men of American education and culture. At this writing, he is past forty-five years of age, of tall and commanding form; and a stranger, introduced to him for the first time, without any previous knowledge of his

real character, would be more impressed by his individuality than by his personal presence. His head is large and well-developed, and covered with straight auburn hair. His eyes are dark hazel, large and piercing. He wears his hair carelessly, and his beard short-cropped. The pictures of him in the shop windows hardly do justice to his actual personal appearance, the deep lines of his face giving him the aspect of a man of rather harsh and repulsive manners, not consonant with his ordinary habits and character.

General Sherman always aims at what is practical, solid, and useful, and not to what is merely specious and attractive. His historical researches have, accordingly, been of greater use to him in actual experience than those of many a more widely-read student. He seems to have read history for the useful lessons it imparts; to learn what men have said and done in the past, which may be used as guides for the future, just as he would judge of the topography of a country on the far side of a river, which he cannot see, by carefully surveying the side he can see. In conversation he is clear, direct, comprehensive, and intelligent. In social life he is exceedingly agreeable, polite, and hospitable, and is very fond of children, generally selecting a dancing partner from the little girls. His action in the case of the boy Howe, wounded at Vicksburg, and who showed such remarkable presence of mind amid danger, illustrates his appreciation of boys who give evidence of uncommon ability and promise. Young Howe was sent to a naval school, at his suggestion; and two other youths were selected by him, for meritorious conduct in the field, and sent to the Government academy at West Point.

During the autumn of 1863, General Sherman sent for his family to visit him at his military camp on the Big Black, in Mississippi, to enjoy their society for a month or more, while his corps was being prepared for other operations. On the way back his eldest boy, Willie, was taken ill and died. He had been made, by vote of the Thirteenth Regiment United States Infantry (his father's old regiment), an honorary sergeant at nine years of age. This regiment escorted the re-

mains of the little sergeant, and bestowed the same honors as if he had been such officer in fact, which so touched the heart of the father that he wrote the following letter of acknowledgment, which is worthy of preservation :—

“GAYOSO HOUSE, MEMPHIS, TENN.,
October 4th—Midnight.

“CAPTAIN C. C. SMITH,

Commanding Battalion, Thirteenth Regulars :

“MY DEAR FRIEND—I cannot sleep to-night till I record an expression of the deep feelings of my heart to you and to the officers and soldiers of the battalion for their kind behavior to my poor child. I realize that you all feel for my family the attachment of kindred, and I assure you all of full reciprocity.

“Consistent with a sense of duty to my profession and office I could not leave my post, and sent for my family to come to me in that fatal climate and in that sickly period of the year ; and behold the result ! The child that bore my name, and in whose future I reposed with more confidence than I did in my own plans of life, now floats a mere corpse, seeking a grave in a distant land, with a weeping mother, brother, and sisters clustered about him. But for myself, I can ask no sympathy. On, on I must go to meet a soldier’s fate, or see my country rise superior to all factions, till its flag is adored and respected by ourselves and all the powers of the earth.

“But my poor Willie was, or thought he was, a sergeant of the Thirteenth. I have seen his eye brighten and his heart beat as he beheld the battalion under arms, and asked me if they were not real soldiers. Child as he was, he had the enthusiasm, the pure love of truth, honor, and love of country which should animate all soldiers.

“God only knows why he should die thus young. He is dead ; but will not be forgotten till those who knew him in life have followed him to that same mysterious end.

“Please convey to the battalion my heartfelt thanks ; and

assure each and all that if in after years they call on me or mine, and mention that they were of the Thirteenth Regulars when my poor Willie was a sergeant, they will have a key to the affections of my family that will open all it has—that we will share with them our last blanket, our last crust.

“Your friend,

“W. T. SHERMAN,

‘Major-General.’”

General Sherman is a thorough organizer, and believes in the necessity of adapting means to proper ends. He is no fatalist; but, like Napoleon, seems to think “the gods generally favor the strongest battalions;” nevertheless, he prefers to have them well appointed, disciplined, and handled in battle, lest the gods might happen to help the other side. But he is not one of those cool, scientific, methodical, and tenacious men, bent on owing every thing to tactics and nothing to fortune, and calculating every thing, even the chances of hazard; nor yet does he rush into battle relying chiefly on the inspiration of his own genius and the happy chances of fortune. Different from all this, his theory is, so far as it can be deduced from his military operations, first to have a properly appointed and duly proportioned army equal to the undertaking in hand; next, to school his army in tactics, so as to make it capable of quick and accurate movement; then to accustom it to battle in minor engagements and secondary victories; and finally, to strike home for grand results. And in doing this, General Sherman hesitates at no detail of preparation however trifling, and never loses sight of the idea that every thing, after all, must depend on the head that plans and the hand that guides the whole. He has a constitution of iron and nerves of steel; and his thoughts come to him with the quickness of the lightning and as clear as the light. Before starting out for battle or on a campaign, he always makes himself acquainted with every road, stream, and farm-house on his line of march; and having these, he calculates, with surprising accuracy, the topography of the country though he never saw it. He was

three years studying the route of his campaigns through Georgia and the Carolinas ; not that he had any reason to believe he would be called upon to lead an army over it, but because he saw in the dim future such a campaign would eventually be necessary to put down the rebellion. He was so impressed with this idea at the very beginning of the war, that he obtained from the Census Bureau in Washington a map, made at his own request, of the Cotton States, with a table showing the cattle, horses, and products of each county, according to the last census returns reported from those States ; so that afterwards, when the time for such enterprise arrived, he was practically familiar with the resources of the whole country on his line of march.

General Sherman's military orders and letters are models of composition ; and those written and issued by him during his operations from Chattanooga to Raleigh would, without much alteration, make an instructive hand-book of war. His habit is to look at every thing from a military standpoint ; and he invariably touches the salient point of his subject in the centre. By both natural gift and education a soldier, he possesses a soldier's strength, and a soldier's high sense of honor ; and is not without a soldier's foibles. Straight-forward, high-minded, just, and honorable himself, he has no patience with such as resort to trickery or subterfuge to accomplish their ends. Of the trade of politicians he knows but little, and ever seemed careless to learn. He was once nominated for public office, some years ago, in California. His good-natured but sarcastic reply was : "Gentlemen, I am not eligible ; I am not properly educated to hold office." To understand the full force of the expression, it must be remembered it was uttered in San Francisco ten years ago. This nomination was the commencement of his political career, and his reply was the end of it.

General Sherman's master qualities are of the military order. His military estimate of men requires the most heroic proportions ; his written orders are luminous of the inspiration of his own matchless genius ; and when his directions to sub-

ordinates in command are given orally, they are absolutely irresistible ; and, estimating difficulties by his own ability to overcome them, he usually winds up by saying : " And this must be done at any expense of life or horseflesh." He speaks rapidly and distinctly, without hesitation, and using the fewest words possible. He is no orator, but with practice could easily become a public speaker of more than ordinary power.

General Sherman, in moral resources and in that peculiar power to inspire confidence and command men, is not unlike the popular idea of Andrew Jackson, who, as all the world knows, never hesitated to " take the responsibility," and do what he thought to be right, no matter who opposed. His marvellous power over his troops in the field consists in his being able to make them feel they are the best troops in the world, taking good care to make them so by never allowing them to be unnecessarily beaten, and by being himself equal to the high courage of his army and the occasion at the proper moment. When he commanded the Fourth Corps, *it* was, in his estimation, the best corps in the Armies of the United States ; afterwards the Army of the Tennessee was the best army in the West, because it was his ; and, finally, when he had two other armies under his command, they were all best. " Show me," said Napoleon, " the best officer in the regiment." " Sire, they are all good." " Well, but point out to me the best." " Sire, they are all *equally* good." " Come, come, that is not an answer ;—say, like Themistocles, ' I am the first, my neighbor is the second.' " " Sire, I mention Captain Moncey, because he is absent—he was wounded." " What," said Napoleon, " Moncey, my page, the son of the marshal? Mention another." " Sire, he is the best." " Well, then, he shall have the decoration."

General Sherman seems to have had a similar regard for such as were wounded or disabled while serving in his command. His letter-books show many instances of this, which the following extract from a letter written to a wounded officer will sufficiently illustrate :—

“I see you desire promotion, and to be returned to duty in the field. Indeed will I aid you all in my power to obtain what you merit and must have. The loss of your hand is no objection, and in your case is an evidence of title to promotion—with your one arm you are worth half a dozen ordinary men. Your left hand, guided by a good head and willing heart, can wield the sword to good purpose. I inclose you a strong letter to Governor Todd, urging your promotion.”

General Sherman's favorites among his officers were such as could do the best. He was always severe on such as sought personal advancement by unfair means. The following letter written by him from Atlanta, under date of July 25th, 1864, directed to Colonel Hardie at the War Office in Washington, is of itself more descriptive of General Sherman's method of treatment in such cases than any description we could give :—

“I have your dispatch of yesterday announcing the appointment of General —— as major-general. I am not objecting to this appointment, but I wish to put on record this my emphatic opinion, that it is an act of injustice to officers who stand at their post in the day of danger to neglect them and advance such as Generals —— and ——, who left us in the midst of bullets to go to the rear in search of personal advancement. If the rear be the post of honor, then we had better change front on Washington.”

In further illustration of General Sherman's characteristics in the field, the following incident is given. When General Halleck ordered a junction of the Armies of the Ohio and Tennessee at Pittsburg Landing, in the spring of 1862, it was a part of his plan to destroy as much as possible of the Charleston and Memphis Railroad between Corinth and Iuka, in order to embarrass the enemy in collecting his forces and supplies at the former place. This had been twice attempted by General Sherman without success. It was now determined to make another attempt, and break the road east of Iuka,

when he started for that purpose up the river with two gunboats and a detachment of infantry under command of General Fry, and a hundred picked cavalry selected from the third battalion of the Fourth Illinois Cavalry, under command of Major Bowman, on transports, and landed in the night at Chickasaw, above the mouth of Bear Creek, and quietly invested the town while the inhabitants were asleep. Before daylight General Sherman had succeeded, by some means, in finding an intelligent negro acquainted with the country and the roads, and from information derived from him quickly sketched a map of the country for the use of the cavalry. All things being arranged for the start, he called General Fry and Major Bowman one side and gave them their orders: "The object of this expedition is," said Sherman, "to destroy the railroad-bridge across Bear Creek and the tressel-work on this side. I have tried twice to break that road—it must be done now at any cost—it is worth millions to the Government—to fail now will be a disgrace to us all. Major, I expect you to surprise the guards, seize the bridge and burn it. I will look for the smoke about noon. General Fry, you march out on the pike and prevent the enemy from sending forces from Iuka, to cut off the retreat, and if you hear fighting by the cavalry, burn the turnpike bridge and hurry on to the support of the cavalry."

The work was done precisely as ordered, and our troops returned to the gunboats the same night, a part of the infantry having marched thirty-four miles.

It will be seen, by the foregoing, there is much in Sherman's manner and style of command to remind the reader of Soult: "I have chosen you," said that consummate general, addressing himself to that most daring officer, Major Dulong—"I have chosen you, from the whole army, to seize the Ponte Neva, which has been cut by the enemy. Select a hundred grenadiers and twenty-five horsemen; endeavor to surprise the guards and secure the passage of the bridge. If you succeed, say so; but send no other report—your silence will suffice."

General Sherman seems to comprehend the value of time in war. Every thing that he says in the presence of his officers, and all that he does, inspires all around him with the idea *that not a moment must be lost*. Above all his other excellences shine his promptitude, celerity, and immeasurable activity. Always ready for the start, indefatigable on the march, omnipresent in battle, relentless in pursuit, unfailing in mental resources, fruitful of expedients, enthusiastic in victory, he seems to carry his army in his hand and push it forward with irresistible power. In all military movements his strict punctuality is observable. In his own words, he "is always on time;" whether starting from Vicksburg to Chattanooga on an hour's notice, or turning to the relief of Knoxville, or moving down on Dalton on the very day appointed, or in the great marches to the sea and through the Carolinas.

"Tell my old friend, D. D. Porter, to look out for me about Christmas," he wrote from Gaylesville; four days before that time his army occupied Savannah. His chief quartermaster and chief commissary were told to expect him on the North Carolina coast on the 15th of March. On the 14th he entered Fayetteville and communicated with the sea.

It will probably be the judgment of history that the deliverance of the country was not due so much to the foresight and ability of the administration and Congress as to the skill of our generals in the field, and the courage of our troops, whom no dangers could daunt and no hardships dishearten. Grant was made lieutenant-general to remedy the internal errors of the War Department at Washington, and Sherman's capture of Atlanta saved the presidential election and stimulated the patriotism of the people. While Sherman was leading his conquering legions to the sea, Congress was hesitating about filling up our decimated ranks by a general draft, rendering the great result doubtful at the very threshold of eventful triumph. "Give us a universal draft," wrote Sherman from the battle-field near Atlanta; "any man who can fight and won't fight now, ought to be made to fight, or be banished or denationalized."

Mr. Lincoln, Mr. Stanton, and General Halleck had jointly and severally managed the war until the military establishment had been well-nigh destroyed, and the resources of the country well-nigh exhausted. No one understood this better than Mr. Lincoln himself, and none were more free to acknowledge it. "You know," he declared to Mr. Stanton, "we have been trying to manage this war thus far, but without success. I promised General Grant, when he accepted his present office, he should not be interfered with in his military plans and operations by mere civilians. I think we will be obliged to let Mr. Grant (as Mrs. Grant calls him) have his own way;" and this simple declaration was worth forty thousand men in the field.

"When you were about to leave Atlanta for the Atlantic," wrote Mr. Lincoln to General Sherman, "I was *anxious*, if not fearful. Now, the undertaking being a success, the honor is all yours, for I believe none of us went further than to acquiesce." "Not only, he continued, "does it afford the obvious and immediate military advantages," etc., but "it brings those who sat in darkness to see a great light."

The preacher tells us, "no man can serve two masters," and the maxim is as true in war as in religion. General Sherman found it comparatively easy to co-operate with the President his honest, candid, out-spoken, and enterprising character were such as Mr. Lincoln most needed and most admired. Sherman's practical character, his knowledge of business, his quickness of perception, and rapidity of execution, his clear statement, his ready answers, his accurate and varied intelligence on all subjects, whether as to the qualities of a horse, the proper keel of a steamboat, the length and depth of a river, the outfit of an army, or the laws of war, were precisely those qualities that charmed Mr. Lincoln, whose mind ever recurred to what was useful rather than ornamental. Even Sherman's frank, bold, and honest opposition to measures favored by Mr. Lincoln himself pleased him, especially in regard to matters connected with the army, such as trade in cotton and negro recruiting by Massachusetts agents; and no

one enjoyed Sherman's peculiar spice more than he did. Mr. Lincoln sought that light which comes from above, but he did not arrogantly despise the wisdom of man. He greatly admired Sherman, and Sherman in turn strove earnestly and honestly to execute his policy.

But not so with Mr. Stanton, who is liable to false impressions beyond most men, is arrogant and proud of his arrogance, as if it were a virtue; fond of power, and unscrupulous in its exercise; tenacious of his opinions, and holding on to them with a tenacity in proportion to their grossness, and often rash in the exercise of his enormous power, he will appear to the reader in strange contrast with the mild and judicious character of Mr. Lincoln. But he was probably the man for the place for the time being. It was the boast of Prince Metternich that he served, during the period when Napoleon was upturning thrones, as the grand high-constable for all the crown-heads of Europe, and Mr. Stanton has been ours during our own great civil war. Such a man was necessary, and he will take his place in the history of the country. But if Sherman disliked Stanton because he could not understand him, Stanton in turn hated Sherman; and the personal collision which came at last makes it necessary for the reader to make the acquaintance of both. Like Castor and Pollux among the constellations, it is difficult to look at one without seeing the other. If Mr. Stanton is a great organizer of war—"like Carnot"—he fights battles like a Brutus. "I little dreamed," wrote Sherman to General Halleck, "when you warned me of the assassin Clark being on my track, he would turn up in the direction and guise he did." Cæsar's last speech—"Et tu Brute"—was more terse, but not more expressive than this.

General Sherman was born of New England parents, and descended from New England stock. He was probably all the better for being born in the then far West, amid the wilds, the hardships, and primitive people of the frontier. The children of New England, like cereals, are often improved by trans-

planting. On the western slope of the Alleghany Mountains the lands are richer, the rivers larger and longer, the lakes are magnificent, the prairies are almost boundless, and the climate is salubrious. There is ample room for all, food for all, work for all, and happiness for all. It was good fortune and happiness to be born in such a country. Society there was less conventional than in any other section of the country; religious denominations were more tolerant, religious creeds pinched the conscience less, and the population was more transient. In early times in the West, men seemed to forget for awhile the creeds to which they were educated. Presbyterians often became Methodists or Baptists, and Baptists became Presbyterians; and some of each became Catholics, and Catholics, in turn, became Protestants, according to the circumstances of each case. The ways to heaven were regarded like railways—the traveller ready to start on his momentous journey would generally take the first train of cars that came along, without special inquiry as to the character of the parties who owned the stock and run the road, taking his chances of making connections with the great “highway” as he neared his eternal home. Sherman’s parents were Episcopalians, but the Episcopal Church was not well adapted to small settlements in the backwoods; or if well adapted, was unable to keep track of all its flock scattered throughout the broad expanse, and hence the family availed themselves of such pious advantages, for awhile, as the Presbyterian Church could afford. But General Sherman, while he has a sincere admiration for good Christians, has a most provoking disregard for religious creeds, regarding them as a sort of relative good or necessary evil, depending more or less upon the intelligence, honesty, and general excellence of the men who instruct, lead, and control the religious impulses of the human heart in their respective “commands.” His appreciation of a Christian soldier may be inferred from the following.

“At my last interview with Mr. Lincoln,” he wrote to Mr. James E. Yeatman of the United States Sanitary Commission, May 21, 1865, “on his boat anchored in James River, in the

midst of the army, your name came up as one spoken of to fill the office of commissioner of refugees, freedmen, etc., and I volunteered my assertion that if you would accept office, which I doubted, the bureau could not go into more kind and charitable hands ; but since that time the office has, properly enough, been given to General Howard, who has held high command under me for more than a year ; and I am sure you will be pleased to know that he is as pure a man as ever lived, a strict Christian, and a model soldier, the loss of an arm attesting his service. He will do all that one man can do, if not forced to undertake impossibilities," etc.

General Howard, it is well known, has been pious and exemplary from his boyhood, was ever faithful and devoted in the discharge of his religious duties, and this even while a student at West Point. He carried his religious principles with him into the army, and was guided and governed by them in all his relations with his officers and men. No matter who was permitted to share his mess or partake of his repast, whether the lowest subaltern of his command or General Sherman himself, no one thought to partake, if General Howard were present, without first the invocation of the Divine blessing, himself usually leading, like the head of a family. General Sherman seems greatly to have admired the Christian character of General Howard, making frequent mention of him in his correspondence in terms similar to those above quoted ; and not only as a Christian but as a soldier, preferring him and promoting him to the command of one of his armies.

From the same letter from which the last extract was taken, we make a further extract in regard to the Andersonville prisoners and the conclusion of the war :—

“I was as glad as you could have been to learn that those boxes of stores, prepared by you with so much care and promptness for the Andersonville prisoners, reached them at last. I don't think I ever set my heart so strongly on any one thing as I did in attempting to rescue those prisoners ; and I had almost feared instead of doing them good I had

actually done them harm, for they were changed from place to place to avoid me, and I could not with infantry overtake railroad trains. But at last their prison-doors are open; and I trust we have arrived at a point when further war or battle, or severity, other than the punishment of crime by civil tribunals, is past.

“You will have observed how fiercely I have been assailed for simply offering to the President ‘terms’ for his approval or disapproval, according to his best judgment—terms which, if fairly interpreted, mean, and only mean, an actual submission by the rebel armies to the civil authority of the United States. No one can deny I have done the State some service in the field, but I have always desired that strife should cease at the earliest possible moment. I confess, without shame, I am sick and tired of fighting—its glory is all moonshine; even success the most brilliant is over dead and mangled bodies, with the anguish and lamentations of distant families, appealing to me for sons, husbands, and fathers. You, too, have seen these things, and I know you also are tired of the war, and are willing to let the civil tribunals resume their place. And, so far as I know, all the fighting men of our army want peace; and it is only those who have never heard a shot, never heard the shrieks and groans of the wounded and lacerated (friend or foe), that cry aloud for more blood, more vengeance, more desolation. I *know* the rebels are whipped to death, and I declare before God, as a man and a soldier, I will not strike a foe who stands unarmed and submissive before me, but would rather say—‘*Go, and sin no more.*’”

In another letter, to Chief-Justice Chase, written about the same time, General Sherman says:—

“I have had abundant opportunities of knowing these people (the people of the South), both before the war, during its existence, and since their public acknowledgment of submission to the national authority, and I have no fear of them, armed or disarmed, and believe that by one single stroke of the pen,

nine-tenths of them can be restored to full relations with our Government, so as to pay taxes and live in peace ; and in war I would not hesitate to mingle with them and lead them to battle against our national foes. But we must deal with them with frankness and candor, and not with doubt, hesitancy, and prevarication. The nine-tenths would, from motives of self-interest, restrain the other mischievous tenth, or compel them to migrate to some other country, like Mexico, cursed with anarchy and civil war."

And in a letter to General Schofield, under date of May 28, 1865, General Sherman wrote on the same subject:—

"I have watched your course in North Carolina and approve it. Maintain peace and good order, and let law and harmony grow up naturally. I would have preferred to leap more directly to the result, but the same end may be attained by the slower process you adopt.

"So strong has become the National Government, by reason of our successful war, that I laugh at the fears of those who dread that rebels may regain some political power in their several States. Supposing they do, it is but local, and can in no way endanger the whole country.

"I think I see already signs that events are sweeping all to the very conclusion I jumped at in my 'terms,' but I have refrained from discussing them on their merits, till in after times when it may be demonstrated that the plan sketched by me was at least in the right direction and constitutional, whether popular or not. The people of this country are subject to the constitution, and even they cannot disregard it without a revolution, the very thing we have been fighting against."

Such were General Sherman's views and sentiments, as stated by himself, in the midst of stirring events of the times. They may be popular or unpopular, but no one will dispute the sincerity with which they were uttered. A more honest man than General Sherman does not live, and he is as gen-

erous as he is honest. Let those who shall come after us judge the man and his actions. To this test all men must submit. Time ever withers the laurels of the selfish and base, but freshens the beauty of virtue. Sherman can afford to wait.

APPENDIX.

I.

TESTIMONY OF GENERAL SHERMAN

BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON THE CONDUCT OF THE WAR, RELATIVE
TO THE TRUCE.

EXAMINED BY THE CHAIRMAN :

Question. What is your rank in the army ?

Answer. I am major-general in the regular army.

Q. As your negotiation with the rebel General Johnston, in relation to his surrender, has been the subject of much public comment, the committee desire you to state all the facts and circumstances in regard to it, or which you wish the public to know.

A. On the 15th day of April last I was at Raleigh, in command of three armies, the Army of the Ohio, the Army of the Cumberland, and the Army of the Tennessee ; my enemy was General Joseph E. Johnston, of the Confederate army, who commanded fifty thousand men, retreating along the railroad from Raleigh, by Hillsboro', Greensboro', Salisbury, and Charlotte. I commenced pursuit by crossing the curve of that road in the direction of Ashboro' and Charlotte. After the head of my column had crossed the Cape Fear River at Aven's Ferry, I received a communication from General Johnston, and answered it, copies of which I most promptly sent to the War Department, with a letter* addressed to the secretary of war, as follows.

* * * * *

* See page 391.

I met General Johnston in person, at a house five miles from Durham's Station, under a flag of truce. After a few preliminary remarks, he said to me, since Lee had surrendered his army at Appomattox Courthouse, of which he had just been advised, he looked upon further opposition by him as the greatest possible of crimes ; that he wanted to know whether I could make him any general concessions ; any thing by which he could maintain his hold and control of his army, and prevent its scattering ; any thing to satisfy the great yearning of their people. If so, he thought he could arrange terms satisfactory to both parties. He wanted to embrace the condition and fate of all the armies of the Southern Confederacy to the Rio Grande,—to make one job of it, as he termed it.

I asked him what his powers were,—whether he could command and control the fate of all the armies to the Rio Grande. He answered that he thought he could obtain the power, but he did not possess it at that moment ; he did not know where Mr. Davis was, but he thought if I could give him the time, he could find Mr. Breckinridge, whose orders would be obeyed everywhere, and he could pledge me his personal faith that whatever he undertook to do would be done.

I had had frequent correspondence with the late President of the United States, with the secretary of war, with General Halleck, and with General Grant, and the general impression left upon my mind was, that if a settlement could be made, consistent with the constitution of the United States, the laws of Congress, and the proclamation of the President, they would not only be willing, but pleased to terminate the war by one single stroke of the pen.

I needed time to finish the railroad from the Neuse Bridge up to Raleigh, and thought I could put in four or five days of good time in making repairs to my road, even if I had to send propositions to Washington. I therefore consented to delay twenty-four hours, to enable General Johnston to procure what would satisfy me as to his authority and ability, as a military man, to do what he undertook to do. I therefore

consented to meet him the next day, the 17th, at twelve o'clock noon, at the same place.

We did meet again; after a general interchange of courtesies, he remarked that he was then prepared to satisfy me that he could fulfil the terms of our conversation of the day before. He then asked me what I was willing to do. I told him, in the first place, I could not deal with anybody except men recognized by us as "belligerents," because no military man could go beyond that fact. The attorney-general has since so decided, and any man of common sense so understood it before; there was no difference upon that point as to the men and officers accompanying the Confederate armies. I told him that the President of the United States, by a published proclamation, had enabled every man in the Southern Confederate army, of the rank of colonel and under, to procure and obtain amnesty, by simply taking the oath of allegiance to the United States, and agreeing to go to his home and live in peace. The terms of General Grant to General Lee extended the same principles to the officers, of the rank of brigadier-general and upward, including the highest officer in the Confederate army, viz., General Lee, the commander-in-chief. I was, therefore, willing to proceed with him upon the same principles.

Then a conversation arose as to what form of government they were to have in the South. Were the States there to be dissevered, and were the people to be denied representation in Congress? Were the people there to be, in the common language of the people of the South, slaves to the people of the North? Of course, I said "No; we desire that you shall regain your position as citizens of the United States, free and equal to us in all respects, and wish representation upon the condition of submission to the lawful authority of the United States, as defined by the Constitution, the United States courts, and the authority of the United States supported by those courts." He then remarked to me that General Breckinridge, a major-general in the Confederate army, was near by, and if I had no objection, he would like to have

him present. I called his attention to the fact that I had, on the day before, explained to him that any negotiations between us must be confined to belligerents. He replied that he understood that perfectly. "But," said he, "Breckinridge, whom you do not know, save by public rumor as secretary of war, is, in fact, a major-general; I give you my word for that. Have you any objection to his being present as a major-general?" I replied, "I have no objection to any military officer you desire being present as a part of your personal staff." I, myself, had my own officers near me at call.

Breckinridge came, a stranger to me, whom I had never spoken to in my life, and he joined in the conversation; while that conversation was going on a courier arrived and handed to General Johnston a package of papers; he and Breckinridge sat down and looked over them for some time, and put them away in their pockets: what they were, I know not, but one of them was a slip of paper, written, as General Johnston told me, by Mr. Reagan, postmaster-general of the Southern Confederacy: they seemed to talk about it *sotto voce*, and finally handed it to me. I glanced over it: it was preceded by a preamble and closed with a few general terms. I rejected it at once.

We then discussed matters; talked about slavery, talked about every thing. There was a universal assent that slavery was as dead as any thing could be; that it was one of the issues of the war long since determined; and even General Johnston laughed at the folly of the Confederate government in raising negro soldiers, whereby they gave us all the points of the case. I told them that slavery had been treated by us as a dead institution, first by one class of men from the initiation of the war, and then from the date of the emancipation proclamation of President Lincoln, and finally by the assent of all parties. As to reconstruction, I told them I did not know what the views of the administration were. Mr. Lincoln, up to that time, in letters and telegrams to me, encouraged me by all the words which could be used in general terms, to believe, not only in his willingness, but in his desires that I

should make terms with civil authorities, governors, and legislatures, even as far back as 1863. It then occurred to me that I might write off some general propositions, meaning little or much, according to the construction of parties—what I would term “glittering generalities”—and send them to Washington, which I could do in four days. That would enable the new President to give me a clue to his policy in the important juncture which was then upon us : for the war was over ; the highest military authorities of the Southern Confederacy so confessed to me openly, unconcealedly, and repeatedly. I therefore drew up the memorandum (which has been published to the world)* for the purpose of referring it to the proper executive authority of the United States, and enabling him to define to me what I might promise, simply to cover the pride of the Southern men, who thereby became subordinate to the laws of the United States, civil and military. I made no concessions to General Johnston’s army, or the troops under his direction and immediate control ; and if any concessions were made in those general terms, they were made because I then believed, and now believe, they would have delivered into the hands of the United States the absolute control of every Confederate officer and soldier, all their muster-rolls, and all their arms. It would save us all the incidental expense resulting from the military occupation of that country by provost-marshals, provost-guards, military governors, and all the machinery by which alone military power can reach the people of a civilized country. It would have surrendered to us the armies of Dick Taylor and Kirby Smith, both of them capable of doing infinite mischief to us, by exhausting the resources of the whole country upon which we were to depend for the future extinguishment of our debt, forced upon us by their wrongful and rebellious conduct. I never designed to shelter a human being from any liability incurred in consequence of past acts to the civil tribunals of our country, and I do not believe a fair and manly interpreta-

* See the original truce, page 396.

tion of my terms can so construe them, for the words "United States courts," "United States authorities," "limitations of executive power," occur in every paragraph. And if they seemingly yield terms better than the public would desire to be given to the Southern people, if studied closely and well it will be found that there is an absolute submission on their part to the Government of the United States, either through its executive, legislative, or judicial authorities. Every step in the programme of these negotiations was reported punctually, clearly, and fully, by the most rapid means of communication that I had. And yet I neglected not one single precaution necessary to reap the full benefits of my position, in case the Government amended, altered, or absolutely annulled those terms. As those matters were necessarily mingled with the military history of the period, I would like, at this point, to submit to the committee my official report, which has been in the hands of the proper officer, Brigadier-General Rawlins, chief of staff of the Army of the United States, since about the 12th instant. It was made by me at Manchester, Virginia, after I had returned from Savannah, whither I went to open up the Savannah River, and reap the fruits of my negotiations with General Johnston, and to give General Wilson's force in the interior a safe and sure base from which he could draw the necessary supply of clothing and food for his command. It was only after I fulfilled all this that I learned for the first time, through the public press, that my conduct had been animadverted upon, not only by the secretary of war,* but by General Halleck and the press of the country at large. I did feel hurt and annoyed that Mr. Stanton coupled with the terms of my memorandum, confided to him, a copy of a telegram to General Grant, which he had never sent to me. He knew, on the contrary, that when he was at Savannah, I had negotiations with civil parties there, for he was present in my room when those parties were conferring with me; and I wrote him a letter, setting forth many points of it, in which I said I

* See page 418.

aimed to make a split in Jefferson Davis' dominions, by segregating Georgia from their course. Those were civil negotiations, and, far from being discouraged from making them, I was encouraged by Secretary Stanton himself to make them.

By coupling the note to General Grant with my memorandum, he gave the world fairly and clearly to infer that I was in possession of it. Now I was not in possession of it, and I have reason to know that Mr. Stanton knew I was not in possession of it. Next met me General Halleck's telegram,* indorsed by Mr. Stanton, in which they publicly avowed an act of perfidy—namely, the violation of my terms, which I had a right to make, and which, by the laws of war and by the laws of Congress, is punishable by death, and no other punishment. Next, they ordered an army to pursue my enemy, who was known to be surrendering to me, in the presence of General Grant himself, their superior officer; and, finally, they sent orders to General Wilson and to General Thomas—my subordinates, acting under me, on a plan of the most magnificent scale, admirably executed—to defeat my orders, and to thwart the interests of the Government of the United States. I did feel indignant—I do feel indignant. As to my own honor, I can protect it. In my letter of the 15th of April, I used this language: "I have invited Governor Vance to return to Raleigh, with the civil officers of his State." I did so because President Lincoln had himself encouraged me to a similar course with the governor of Georgia, when I was at Atlanta. And here was the opportunity which the secretary of war should have taken to put me on my guard against making terms with civil authorities, if such were the settled policy of our Government. Had President Lincoln lived, I know he would have sustained me.

The following is my report,† which I desire to have incorporated into, and made part of, my testimony:

* * * * *

* See page 433.

† See Chapters XXVI. to XXX., *ante*.

Q. Did you have, near Fortress Monroe, a conference with President Lincoln; and if so, about what time?

A. I met General Grant and Mr. Lincoln on board a steamboat, lying at the wharf at City Point, during the evening of the 27th of March; I resumed my visit to the President on board the same steamer anchored in the stream the following day, General Grant being present on both occasions.

Q. In those conferences was any arrangement made with you and General Grant, or either of you, in regard to the manner of arranging business with the Confederacy in regard to terms of peace?

A. Nothing definite; it was simply a matter of general conversation, nothing specific and definite.

Q. At what time did you learn that President Lincoln had assented to the assembling of the Virginia rebel Legislature?

A. I knew of it on the 18th of April, I think; but I procured a paper with the specific order of General Weitzel, also a copy of the amnesty proclamation on the 20th of April.

Q. You did not know, at that time, that that arrangement had been rescinded by the President?

A. No, sir; I did not know that until afterwards; the moment I heard of that I notified General Johnston of it.

Q. Then at the time you entered into this arrangement with General Johnston, you knew that General Weitzel had approved of the calling together of the rebel Legislature of Virginia, by the assent of the President?

A. I knew of it by some source unofficially; I succeeded in getting a copy of the paper containing General Weitzel's order on the 20th or 21st of April.*

Q. But at the time of your arrangement you did not know that that order had been rescinded?

A. No, sir; I learned that several days afterwards, and at once sent word to General Johnston.†

Q. At the time of your arrangement you also knew of the surrender of Lee's army, and the terms of that surrender?

*. See page 420.

† See page 426.

A. I had that officially from General Grant ; I got that at Smithfield, on the 12th of April.

Q. I have what purports to be a letter from you to Johnston, which seems to imply that you intended to make the arrangement on the terms of Lee's surrender. The letter is as follows.*

* * * * *

A. Those were the terms as to his own army ; but the concessions I made him were for the purpose of embracing other armies.

Q. And the writings you signed were to include other armies?

A. The armies of Kirby Smith and Dick Taylor, so that afterwards no man within the limits of the Southern Confederacy could claim to belong to any Confederate army in existence.

Q. The President addressed a note to General Grant, perhaps not to you, to the effect of forbidding officers of the army from entering into any thing but strictly military arrangements, leaving civil matters entirely to him ?

A. I never saw such a note signed by President Lincoln. Mr. Stanton made such a note or telegram, and says it was by President Lincoln's dictation : he made it to General Grant, but never to me ; on the contrary, while I was in Georgia, Mr. Lincoln telegraphed to me encouraging me to discuss matters with Governor Brown and Mr. Stephens.

Q. Then you had no notice of that order to General Grant.

A. I had no knowledge of it, officially or otherwise.

Q. In the published report of your agreement there is nothing about slavery, I believe ?

A. There was nothing said about slavery, because it did not fall within the category of military questions, and we could not make it so. It was a legal question, which the President had disposed of, overriding all our action. We had to treat the slave as *free*, because the President, our commander-in-

* See page 390.

chief, said he was free. For me to have renewed the question when that decision was made, would have involved the absurdity of an inferior undertaking to qualify the work of his superior.

Q. That was the reason why it was not mentioned?

A. Yes, sir; subsequently I wrote a note to Johnston, stating that I thought it would be well to mention it for political effect, when we came to draw up the final terms with precision: that note was written pending the time my memorandum was going to Washington, and before an answer had been returned.

Q. At the time you entered into these negotiations was Johnston in a condition to offer any effective resistance to your army?

A. He could not have resisted my army an hour, if I could have got hold of him; but he could have escaped from me by breaking up into small parties, or by taking the country roads, travelling faster than my army, with trains, could have pursued.

Q. Then your object in negotiating was to keep his army from scattering into guerrilla bands?

A. That was my chief object; I so officially notified the War Department.

Q. And not because there was any doubt about the result of a battle?

A. There was no question as to the result of a battle, and I knew it; every soldier knew it. Johnston said, in the first five minutes of our conversation, that any further resistance on his part would be an act of folly, and all he wanted was to keep his army from dispersing.

BY MR. LOAN:

Q. In your examination by the chairman you stated that you were acting in pursuance of instructions from Mr. Lincoln, derived from his letters and telegrams at different times?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Have you any of these letters and telegrams which you can furnish to the committee?

A. I can furnish you a copy of a dispatch to General Halleck from Atlanta, in which I stated that I had invited Governor Brown and Vice-President Stevens to meet us ; and I can give you a copy of Mr. Lincoln's answer, for my dispatch was referred to him, in which he said he felt much interested in my dispatch, and encouraged me to allow their visit : but the letter to which I referred specially was a longer letter, which I wrote to General Halleck from my camp on Big Black, Mississippi, at General Halleck's instigation, in September, 1863, which was received in Washington, and submitted to Mr. Lincoln, who desired to have it published, to which I would not consent. In that letter I gave my opinions fully and frankly, not only upon the military situation, but also the civil policy necessary. Mr. Lincoln expressed himself highly pleased with my views, and desired to make them public, but I preferred not to do so.

Q. And by subsequent acts he induced you to believe he approved of these views?

A. I *know* he approved of them, and always encouraged me to carry out those views.

BY THE CHAIRMAN :

Q. The following is a letter published in the newspapers, purporting to have been addressed by you to Johnston, dated April 21, 1865.*

* * * * *

This is the letter in which you say that it would be well to declare publicly that slavery is dead?

A. Yes, sir ; that is the letter.

BY MR. LOAN :

Q. Will you furnish the committee a copy of the letter

written by you to Mr. Stanton, in January last, from Savannah?

A. I will do so.

THE CHAIRMAN :

Q. And when the manuscript of your testimony is prepared it will be remitted to you for revision, and you can add to it any statement or papers that you may subsequently desire or consider necessary.

A. I have the above, and now subjoin copies of letters from my letter-book, in the order of the bringing in the questions revised by this inquiry :—

“ HEADQUARTERS MIDDLE DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field, Raleigh, N. C., April 18, 1865.

“ *To* LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, *or* MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK,
Washington, D. C. :

“ GENERAL—I inclose herewith a copy of an agreement made this day between General Joseph E. Johnston and myself, which, if approved by the President of the United States, will produce peace from the Potomac to the Rio Grande. Mr. Breckinridge was present at the conference in the capacity of a major-general, and satisfied me of the ability of General Johnston to carry out to the full extent the terms of this agreement; and if you will get the President to simply indorse the copy, and commission me to carry out the terms, I will follow them to the conclusion. You will observe that it is an absolute submission of the enemy to the lawful authorities of the United States, and disperses his armies absolutely; and the point to which I attach most importance is, that the disposition and dispersement of the armies is done in such a manner as to prevent them breaking up into a guerrilla crew. On the other hand, we can retain just as much of an army as we please. I agree to the mode and manner of the surrender of armies set forth, as it gives the States the means of suppressing guerrillas, which we could not expect them to do if we strip them of all arms.

“ Both Generals Johnston and Breckinridge admitted that slavery was dead, and I could not insist on embracing it in such a paper, because it can be made with the States in detail. I know that all the men of substance South sincerely want peace, and I do not believe they will resort to war again during this century. I have no doubt but that they will in the future be perfectly subordinate to the laws of the United States.

The moment my action in this matter is approved, I can spare five corps, and will ask for and leave General Schofield here with the Tenth Corps, and go myself with the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Seventeenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-third corps, *via* Burkesville and Gordonsville, to Frederick or Hagerstown, there to be paid and mustered out.

"The question of finance is now the chief one, and every soldier and officer not needed ought to go home at once. I would like to be able to begin the march North by May 1.

"I urge on the part of the President speedy action, as it is important to get the Confederate armies to their homes, as well as our own.

"I am, with great respect,

"Your obedient servant,

"W. T. SHERMAN,

"Major-General commanding."

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field, Raleigh, N. C., April 18, 1865.

"GENERAL H. W. HALLECK, *Chief of Staff, Washington, D. C. :*

"GENERAL—I received your dispatch describing the man Clark detailed to assassinate me. He had better be in a hurry or he will be too late. The news of Mr. Lincoln's death produced a most intense effect on our troops. At first I feared it would lead to excesses, but now it has softened down, and can easily be quieted. None evince more feeling than General Johnston, who admitted that the act was calculated to stain his cause with a dark hue; and he contended that the loss was most severe on the South, who had begun to realize that Mr. Lincoln was the best friend the South had.

"I cannot believe that even Mr. Davis was privy to the diabolical plot, but think it the emanation of a lot of young men of the South, who are very devils. I want to throw upon the South the care of this class of men, who will soon be as obnoxious to their industrious class as to us.

"Had I pushed Johnson's army to an extremity, it would have dispersed and done infinite mischief. Johnston informed me that General Stoneman had been at Salisbury, and was now about Statesville. I have sent him orders to come to me.

"General Johnston also informed me that General Wilson was at Columbus, Ga., and he wanted me to arrest his progress. I leave that to you. Indeed, if the President sanctions my agreement with Johnston, our interest is to cease all destruction. Please give all orders necessary, according to the views the Executive may take, and inform him, if possible, not to vary the terms at all, for I have considered every thing, and

believe that the Confederate armies are dispersed. We can adjust all else fairly and well.

“ I am yours, etc.,

“ W. T. SHERMAN,

“ Major-General commanding.”

Lest confusion should result to the mind of the committee by the latter part of the above letter, I state it was addressed to General Halleck, as chief of staff, when he was in the proper “line of order” to the commander-in-chief. The whole case changed when, on the 26th of April, he became the commander of the separate division of the James.

As stated in my testimony, General Grant reached Raleigh on the 24th, and on the 25th, on the supposition that I would start next day to chase Johnston’s army, I wrote to him the following letter, delivered in person :—

“ HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field, Raleigh, N. C., April 25, 1865.

LIEUTENANT-GENERAL U. S. GRANT—*Present* :

“ GENERAL—I received your letter of April 21, with inclosures, yesterday, and was well pleased that you came along, as you must have observed that I held the military control, so as to adapt it to any phase the case might assume.

“ It is but just that I should record the fact that I made my terms with General Johnston under the influence of the liberal terms you extended to the army of General Lee, at Appomattox Courthouse, on the 9th; and the seeming policy of our Government, as evinced by the call of the Virginia Legislature and governor back to Richmond, under yours and President Lincoln’s very eyes. It now appears that this last act was done without any consultation with you, or any knowledge of Mr. Lincoln, but rather in opposition to a previous policy well considered.

“ I have not the least desire to interfere in the civil policy of our Government, but would shun it as something not to my liking. But occasions arise when a prompt seizure of results is forced on military commanders not in immediate communication with the proper authority. It is possible that the terms signed by General Johnston and myself were not clear enough on the point well understood between us—that our negotiations did not apply to any parties outside the officers

and men of the Confederate armies, which could easily have been remedied.

“No surrender of any army, not actually at the mercy of the antagonist, was ever made without ‘terms,’ and those always define the military status of the surrendered. Thus you stipulated that the officers and men of Lee’s army should not be molested at their homes so long as they obeyed the laws at the place of their residence. I do not wish to discuss these points involved in our recognition of the State governments in actual existence, but will merely state my conclusion, to await the solution of the future..

“Such action, on one point, in no manner recognizes for a moment the so-called Confederate government, or makes us liable for its debts or acts. The laws and acts done by the several States during the period of rebellion are *void*, because done without the oath prescribed by the constitution of the United States, which is a condition precedent. We have a right to use any sort of machinery to produce military results; and it is the commonest thing for military commanders to use the civil government, *in actual existence*, as a means to an end. I do believe we could and can use the present State governments lawfully, constitutionally, and as the very best possible means to produce the object desired, viz., entire and complete submission to the lawful authority of the United States.

“As to punishment of past crimes, that is for the judiciary, and can in no manner or way be disturbed by our acts; and, so far as I can, I will use my influence that rebels shall suffer all the personal punishment provided by law, as also the civil liabilities accruing from their past acts.

“What we now want is the new form of law, by which common men may regain their position of industry, so long disturbed by the war.

“I now apprehend that the rebel army will disperse, and instead of dealing with six or seven States, we will have to deal with numberless bands of desperadoes, headed by such men as Moseby, Forrest, Red Jackson, and others, who know not and care not for danger and its consequences.

“I am, with great respect,

“Your obedient servant,

“W. T. SHERMAN,

“Major-General.”

On the same day I wrote and mailed to the secretary of war the following:—

"HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field, Raleigh. N. C., April 25, 1865.

"HON. E. M. STANTON, *Secretary of War, Washington* :

"DEAR SIR—I have been furnished a copy of your letter of April 21st, to General Grant, signifying your disapproval of the terms on which General Johnston proposed to disarm and disperse the insurgents, on condition of amnesty, etc. I admit my folly in embracing, in a military convention, any civil matter ; but, unfortunately, such is the nature of our situation, that they seem inextricably united, and I understood from you at Savannah that the financial state of the country demanded military success, and would warrant a little bending to policy.

"When I had my conference with General Johnston, I had the public example before me of General Grant's terms to Lee's army, and General Weitzel's invitation to the Virginia Legislature to assemble. I still believe the general government of the United States has made a mistake ; but that is none of my business. Mine is a different task ; and I had flattered myself that by four years of patient and unremitting and successful labor, I deserved no reminder such as is contained in the last paragraph of your letter to General Grant.

"You may assure the President that I heed his suggestion.

"I am, truly, etc.,

"W. T. SHERMAN,

"Major-General commanding."

The last sentence refers to the fact that General Grant had been sent to Raleigh to direct military movements. That was the first time in my life I had ever had a word of reproof from the Government of the United States, and I was naturally sensitive. But all I said to any one was to General Meigs, who came with General Grant : "It was not kind on the part of Mr. Secretary Stanton." The fact known did not gratify my military conduct. The first interview with General Johnston followed, and the terms of capitulation were agreed upon and signed, and General Grant started for Washington bearing the news.

When, on the 28th of April, I received, in the New York Times, the most extraordinary budget of Mr. Stanton, which for the first time startled me, I wrote to General Grant this letter :

“HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field, April 28, 1865.

“LIEUT.-GENERAL U. S. GRANT, *General-in-Chief, Washington, D. C. :*

“GENERAL—Since you left me yesterday, I have seen the New York Times of the 24th inst., containing a budget of military news, authenticated by the signature of the secretary of war, which is grouped in such a way as to give very erroneous impressions. It embraces a copy of the basis of agreement between myself and General Johnston, of April 18th, with commentaries, which it will be time enough to discuss two or three years hence, after the Government has experimented a little more in the machinery by which power reaches the scattered people of the vast country known as the South. But, in the mean time, I do think that my rank (if not past services) entitle me, at least, to the respect of keeping secret what was known to none but the cabinet, until further inquiry comes to be made, instead of giving publicity to documents I never saw, and drawing inferences wide of the truth.

“I never saw, or had furnished me, a copy of Mr. Stanton’s dispatch to you of the 3d of March, nor did Mr. Stanton, or any human being, ever convey to me its substance, or any thing like it; but, on the contrary, I had seen General Weitzel’s in relation to the Virginia Legislature, made in Mr. Lincoln’s very person, and had failed to discover any other official hints of the plan of reconstruction, or any idea calculated to allay the fears of the people of the South, after the destruction of their armies and civil authorities would leave them without any government at all.

“We should not drive a people to anarchy, and it is simply impossible for one military power to waste all the masses of this unhappy country.

“I confess I did not want to drive General Johnston’s army into bands of armed men, going about without purpose, and capable only of indefinite mischief.

“But you saw, on your arrival at Raleigh, that I had my armies so disposed, that his escape was only possible in a disorganized shape; and, as you did not choose to direct military operations in this quarter, I infer that you were satisfied with the military situation.

“At all events, the moment I learned, what was proper enough, the disapproval of the President, I wished in such manner to compel the surrender of Johnston’s whole army on the same terms as you had prescribed to General Lee’s army, when you had it surrounded, and in your absolute power.

“ Mr. Stanton, in stating that my order to General Stoneman was likely to result in the escape of ‘ Mr. Davis to Mexico or Europe,’ is in deep error.

“ General Stoneman was not at Salisbury then, but had gone back to Statesville. Davis was supposed to be between us, and Stoneman was beyond him.

“ By turning towards me he was approaching Davis ; and, had he joined me as ordered, I then would have had a mounted force needed for that and other purposes. But even now I don’t know that Mr. Stanton wants Davis caught. And as my official papers, deemed sacred, are hastily published to the world, it will be imprudent for me to state what has been done in this respect.

“ As the editor of the Times has (it may be) logically and fairly drawn the inference from this singular document, that I am insubordinate, I can only deny the intention. I have never in my life questioned or disobeyed an order, though many and many a time I have risked my life, my health, and reputation in obeying orders, or even hints, to execute plans and purposes not to my liking. It is not fair to withhold from me plans and policy (if any there be), and expect me to guess at them ; for facts and events appear quite different from different stand-points. For four years I have been in camp, dealing with soldiers, and I can assure you that the conclusion at which the cabinet arrived with such singular unanimity differs from mine. I have conferred freely with the best officers in this army as to the points involved in this controversy, and, strange to say, they were singularly unanimous in the other conclusion, and they will learn with pain and sorrow that I am deemed insubordinate and wanting in common sense ; that I, who have labored day and night, winter and summer, for four years, and have brought an army of seventy thousand men in magnificent condition across a country deemed impassable, and placed it just where it was wanted almost on the day appointed, have brought discredit on the Government.

“ I do not wish to boast of this, but I do say that it entitled me to the courtesy of being consulted before publishing to the world a proposition rightfully submitted to higher authority for adjudication, and then accompanied by statements which invited the press to be let loose on me.

“ It is true that non-combatants—men who sleep in comfort and security, while we watch on the distant lines—are better able to judge than we poor soldiers, who rarely see a newspaper, hardly can hear from our families, or stop long enough to get our pay. I envy not

the task of reconstruction, and am delighted that the secretary has relieved me of it.

“As you did not undertake to assume the management of the affairs of this army, I infer that, on personal inspection, your mind arrived at a different conclusion from that of Mr. Secretary Stanton. I will therefore go and execute your orders to the conclusion, and when done, will, with intense satisfaction, leave to the civil authorities the execution of the task of which they seem to me so jealous; but, as an honest man and soldier, I invite them to follow my path, for they may see some things and hear some things that may disturb their philosophy.

“With sincere respect,

“W. T. SHERMAN,

“Major-General commanding.

“P. S.—As Mr. Stanton’s singular paper has been published, I demand that this also be made public, though I am in no way responsible to the press, but to the law and my proper superiors.

“W. T. SHERMAN,

“Major-General commanding.”

Since my arrival at Washington, I have learned from General Grant that this letter was received, but he preferred to withhold it until my arrival, as he knew I was making towards Washington with my army. Upon my arrival, I did not insist on its publication till it was drawn out by this inquiry. I also append here the copy of a letter from Colonel T. S. Bowers, assistant adjutant-general, asking me to modify my report as to the point of violating my truce, with my answer.

“HEADQUARTERS ARMIES OF THE UNITED STATES
Washington, May 25, 1865.

“MAJOR-GENERAL W. T. SHERMAN, *Commanding Military Division of the Mississippi* :

“General Grant directed me to call your attention to the part of your report in which the necessity of maintaining your truce at the expense of many lives is spoken of. The general thinks that in making a truce the commander of an army can control only his own army, and that the hostile general must make his own arrangements with other armies acting against him.

“While independent generals acting against a common foe would naturally act in concert, the general claims that each must be the judge of his own duty, and responsible for its execution.

“If you should wish, the report will be returned for any change you may deem best.

“Very respectfully,

“Your obedient servant,

“T. S. BOWERS,

“Assistant Adjutant-General.”

“HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
Washington, D. C., May 26, 1865.

“COL. T. S. BOWERS, *Assistant Adjutant-General, Washington, D. C.:*

“COLONEL—I had the honor to receive your letter of May 25, last evening, and I hasten to answer. I wish to precede it by renewing the assurance of my entire confidence and respect for the President and Lieutenant-General Grant, and that in all matters I will be most willing to shape my official and private conduct to suit their wishes. The past is beyond my control, and the matters embraced in the official report to which you refer are finished. It is but just the reasons that actuated me, right or wrong, should stand on record; but in all future cases, should any arise, I will respect the decisions of General Grant, though I think them wrong.

“Suppose a guard has prisoners in charge, and officers of another command should aim to rescue or kill them, is it not clear the guard must defend the prisoners as a safeguard? So jealous is the military law to protect and maintain *good faith* when pledged, that the law adjudges death, and no alternative punishment, to one who violates a safeguard in foreign ports. (See Articles of War, No. 55.) For murder, arson, treason, and the highest military crimes, the punishment prescribed by law is death, or some minor punishment; but for the violation of a “safeguard,” death, and death alone, is the prescribed penalty. I instance this to illustrate how, in military stipulations to an enemy, our Government commands and enforces “good faith.” In discussing the matter I would like to refer to many writers on military law, but am willing to take Halleck as the text. (See his chapter, No. 27.)

“In the very first article he states that *good faith* should always be observed between enemies in war, because when our faith has been pledged to him, so far as the promise extends, he ceases to be an

enemy. He then defines the meaning of *compacts* and *conventions*, and says they are made sometimes for a general or a partial suspension of hostilities for the "surrender of an army," etc. They may be *special*, limited to particular places or to particular forces, but of course can only bind the armies subject to the general who makes the truce, and co-extensive only with the extent of his command. This is all I ever claimed, and it clearly covers the whole case; all of North Carolina was in my immediate command, with General Schofield, its department commander, and his army present with me. I never asked the truce to have effect beyond my own territorial command. General Halleck himself, in his Order, No. 1, defines his own limits clearly enough, viz., 'Such part of North Carolina as was not occupied by the command of Major-General Sherman.' He could not pursue and cut off Johnston's retreat towards Salisbury and Charlotte without invading my command; and so patent was his purpose to defy and violate my truce, that Mr. Stanton's publication of the fact, not even yet recalled, modified, or explained, was headed, 'Sherman's truce disregarded,' that the whole world drew but one inference. It admits of no other. I never claimed that that truce bound Generals Halleck or Canby within the sphere of their respective commands as defined by themselves.

"It was a partial truce of very short duration, clearly within my limits and right, justified by events; and as in the case of prisoners in my custody, or the violation of a safeguard given by me in my own territorial limits, I am bound to maintain good faith. I prefer not to change my report, but again repeat that in all future cases I am willing to be governed by the interpretation of General Grant, although I again invite his attention to the limits of my command, and those of General Halleck at the time, and the pointed phraseology of General Halleck's dispatch to Mr. Stanton, wherein he reports that he had ordered his generals to pay no heed to *my orders* within the clearly defined area of my command.

"I am, yours,

"W. T. SHERMAN,

"Major-General U. S. A., commanding."

I now add two letters written to Mr. Stanton* at Savannah, and the dispatch from Atlanta mentioned in the body of my testimony, with Mr. Lincoln's answer:

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* See pages 325 and 327.

“HEADQUARTERS MILITARY DIVISION OF THE MISSISSIPPI,
In the Field, Atlanta, Ga., September 15, 1864.

“MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK, *Washington, D. C.* :

“My report is done, and will be forwarded as soon as I get a few more of the subordinate reports. I am now awaiting a courier from General Grant. All well, and troops in fine healthy camps, and supplies coming forward finely. Governor Brown has disbanded his militia, to gather the corn and sorghum of the State. I have reason to believe that he and Stephens want to visit me, and I have sent them a hearty invitation. I will exchange two thousand prisoners with Hood, but no more.

“W. T. SHERMAN,

“Major-General commanding.”

“WASHINGTON, D. C., September 17, 1864—10 A. M.

“MAJOR-GENERAL SHERMAN :

“I feel great interest in the subjects of your dispatch mentioning corn and sorghum, and contemplate a visit to you.

“A. LINCOLN.”

I have not possession here of all my official records, most of which are out West, and I have selected the above from my more recent letter-books, and I offer them to show how prompt and full have been my official reports, and how unnecessary was all the clamor made touching my action and opinions at the time the basis of agreement of April 18 was submitted to the President.



