GIFT OF SHIVA J I SHIVAJI AND HIS TIMES JADUNATH SARKAR, m.a., Indian Educational Service (Bihar), SECOND EDITION Revised and enlarged. LONGMANS, GREEN AND CO. 39 Paternoster Row, London FOURTH AVENUE AND 30TH STREET. NEW YORK 1920 WORKS BY PROF. JADUNATH SARKAR. History of Aurangzib, based on original sources. Vol. I. Reign of Shah Jahan. ,, II. War of Succession. „ III. Northern India, 1658-1681. „ IV. Southern India, 1645-1689. Shivaji and His Times, an original life based on an exhaustive study of Persian, Marathi and Hindi sources, and English Dutch and Portuguese Records. 2nd edition, revised and enlarged. Studies in Mughal India, 22 historical essays. Economics of British India, 4th edition, brought up to 1917. Anecdotes of Aurangzib, '•.(Pfcrisfai text of Ahkam-i-Alamgiri with English . ... . to&ans.,* notes, and a life of Aurangzib.) Mughal • Administration, a study of its machinery, official duties, policy, procedure, achievements and failure. Chaitanya's Life and Teachings, translated from the saint's 16th century Bengali biography. PREFACE. First Edition, ( April, 1919.) A new and critical study of Shivaji's life and character has long been due, as the last scholarly work on the subject was composed, by Captain James Grant Duff, a century ago, and a vast mass of original material unknown to him has become accessible to the student since then. To put the case briefly, the present work differs from his eminently readable and still valuable History of the Mahrattas, (3 Vols., 1826), in the rigid preference of contemporary records to later compilations, and the exhaustive and minute use of the available sources, both printed and MS. — in Persian, English, Marathi and Hindi, as well as the Dutch Records in the India Office, London. The present work marks an advance on Grant Duff's History in three points in particular : First, among Persian materials his only autho- rities were Khafi Khan, who wrote 108 years after the birth of Shivaji and is admittedly unreliable where he does not borrow faithfully from earlier writers, and Bhimsen, an incorrect and brief transla- tion of whose Journal (by Jonathan Scott, 1794) alone was then available. I have, on the other hand, relied on the absolutely contemporary official histories 44&U3& 6 SHIVAJI. [preface. of Shah Jahan and Aurangzib, Muhammad and Ali Adil Shah, many historical letters in Persian, the entire letter-books of Jai Singh and Aurangzib, daily bulletins of Aurangzib's Court, and the full text of Bhimsen as well as another contemporary Hindu historian in Persian, viz., Ishwardas Nagar, — all of which were unknown to Grant Duff. Secondly, he relied too much on the uncritical and often deliberately false Chitnis Bakhar, written 183 years after Shivaji's birth, while I have preferred the work of Shivaji's courtier, Sabhasad, and also incorporated whatever is valuable and above suspicion in the mass of Marathi materials published by a band of devoted Indian workers at Puna and Satara during the last 40 years. Grant Duff, more- over, worked on single manuscripts of the Marathi chronicles ; but we live in a happier age when these sources have been carefully edited with variations of reading and notes. Thirdly, the English and Dutch Factory Records have been more minutely searched by me and every useful information has been extracted from them. Two minor improvements which, I hope, will be appreciated by the reader, are the exact positions of all the places mentioned, traced with the help of the extremely accurate Government Survey maps, and the chronology, which is the most detailed possible in the existing state of our knowledge and corrects Grant Duff's numerous inaccuracies in this respect PREFACE. 7 From the purely literary point of view, the book would have gained much by being made shorter. But so many false legends about Shivaji are current in our country and the Shivaji myth is developing so fast (attended at times with the fabrication of documents), that I have considered it necessary in the interests of historical truth to give every fact, however small, about him that has been ascertained on unimpeach- able evidence and to discuss the probabilities of the others. The Marathas were only one among the many threads in the tangled web of Deccan history in the Seventeenth century. Therefore, to understand the true causes and full consequences of Shivaji *s own acts and policy, it is necessary to have a detailed knowledge of the internal affairs of the Mughal empire, Bijapur and Golkonda also. The present work is more than a mere biography of Shiva ; it frequently deals with the contemporary history of these three Muslim States, though an exhaustive treatment of the subject belongs to my History of Aurangzib, Vol. IV Second Edition, ( June, 1920.) In the second edition, occasion has been taken to enlarge the book and subject it to a minute revision and correction, — the most noticeable example of the last-mentioned being the position of Ponda in Ch. X. Among the more important additions are a critical examination of the evidence for the Javli and Afzal Khan affairs, a full discussion 8 SHIVAJI. [preface. of the real nature of the Marathi sources and a com- parative estimate of the evidential value of the English, Persian and Marathi records, an account of the very first battle between the English and the Marathas (here published for the first time), Shivajfs letter of protest against the jaziya, and a long note on his personal appearance and extant portraits. I have also inserted at the proper places notes on the extent of his dominion in 1648, 1655, 1660, and 1674-5, which together with their extent at his death (previously given) will enable the reader to remember the broad outlines of his territorial expansion and thus take a bird's-eye view of the growth of his power in successive ages. His most authentic portrait has, also, been reproduced in this edition. Jadunath Sarkar. CONTENTS. Preface ... ... ... v Chapter I. The Land and the People I— 18 Population speaking Marathi, 1 — boundaries of Maharashtra, 2 — rainfall and crops, 3 — isolated valleys of the western belt, 5 — hill-forts, 6 — all people work hard, 7 — character : lack of elegance and taste, 9 — pride, courage and hardiness, 9 — social equality, 10 — religious reformers, 11 — literature and language. 12 — minstrels, 14 — Marathas a nation, 15 — defects of character, 17. Chapter II. Boyhood and Youth ... 19—54 Birth of Shivaji, 19 — neglected by father, 21 — lonely boyhood, 21 — miserable condition of Puna, 23 — Dadaji Kond-dev's improvements, 24 — love of justice, 25 — Shivaji's education, 25 — the Mavals described, 27 — subdued by Dadaji, 28 — Shivaji's Hindu spirit, 29 — love of independence, 30 — decline of Bijapur, 32 — Shiva captures Torna, 32 — seizes Puna district, 33 — gains forts, 34 — invades N. Konkan, 35 — Shahji imprisoned, 37 — Shiva appeals to Murad, 40— nShahji released, why? 41 — Baji Shyamraje's expedition, 42 — Mores of Javli, 43 — Mores murdered, 45 — criticism of Shiva's conduct, 46 — gains from the conquest of Javli, 47 — early officers, 48 — extent of territory, 49 — Appendix I. Murder of the Mores, evidence discussed, 50. Chapter III. First Wars with Mughals and Bijapur ... ... 55 — 81 Shiva's early negotiations with Aurangzib, 55 — raids Junnar and Ahmadnagar, 56 — Mughal defensive measures, 57 — Nasiri Khan defeats Shiva, 56* — 10 SHIVAJI. Aurangzib guards frontier, 59 — Shiva makes peace, 61 — Aurangzib's distrust of him, 62 — Bijapur Govern- ment sends Afzal Khan against Shiva, 63 — his sacrileges, 65 — AfzaTs doings at Wai, 66 — Shiva's perplexity, 67 — envoy from Afzal, 68 — Afzal reaches place of meeting, 71 — the affray, 72 — Afzal's army attacked, 74 — local legends about Afzal, 76 — the "Afzal Khan ballad," 77 — Maratha view of the affair, 78 — Appendix II. Affair of Afzal Khan, evidence discussed, 79. Chapter IV. Strenuous Warfare ... 82— 110 Shaista Khan viceroy of Deccan, 82 — Siddi Jauhar besieges Shiva in Panhala, 83 — Shiva's escape, gallantry of Baji Prabhu, 84 — Shaista Khan's march on Puna, 85 — siege of Chakan, 87 — Firangji Narsala, 89 — Mughals in N. Konkan, 91 — Netaji's disastrous retreat, 91 — night-attack on Shaista Khan, 93 — Surat described, 98 — panic and neglect of defence, 99 — heroic action of English factors, 101 — Shivaji's first sack of Surat, 103 — attempt on his life, 106 — Jaswant's siege of Kondana, 109 — Shiva's movements in 1664, 109. Chapter V. Shivaji and Jai Singh ... Ill— 151 Jai Singh sent to Deccan, 1 1 1 — his character, 1 1 2 — his plan of war, 1 1 5 — unites all the enemies of Shiva, 115 — theatre of war described, 118 — rMughal outposts, 120 — march on Purandar, 121 — Purandar hill described, 124 — Mughal siege-positions, 125 — Vajragarh stormed, 126 — Daud Khan's faithless conduct, 127 — Shiva's villages ravaged, 126* — Marathas make diversions, 130 — outer towers of Purandar stormed, 132 — Murar Baji's death, 135 — Shiva opens negotiations, 136 — visits Jai Singh, 137 — treaty of Purandar : its terms, 139 — Shiva visits Dilir, 141 — forts delivered, 142 — Jai Singh invades Bijapur, 145 — Shiva captures forts for Mughals, 145v CONTENTS. H and fights Bijapuri army, 146 — retreat from Bijapur, 147— Shiva sent against Panhala, why? 148 — fails to storm it, 150— Netaji deserts to Bijapur, 150. Chapter VI. Visit to Aurangzib ... 152—179 Shiva's reluctance to go to Aurangzib's Court, 152 — hopes held out to him, 153 — his arrangements for home defence during his absence, 155 — asserts his dignity at Aurangabad, 156 — his audience with Aurangzib, 157 — is placed under guard, 161 — appeals to prime-minister, 162 — Aurangzib's changes of policy to Shiva, 163 — Jai Singh's advice, 163 — Shiva escapes from Agra by stratagem, 166 — hue and cry, 168— Shiva at Mathura, 169 — adventures during flight, 171 — returns home, 173 — Shambhuji's return, 174 — Jai Singh's anxieties during Shiva's flight, 175 — renewed Maratha hostilities, 176 — Jai Singh's plot to catch Shivaji, 178. Chapter VII. 1667— 1670 ... 180—212 Death of Jai Singh, 180 — disunion in Mughal viceroy's camp, 181 — Shiva makes peace with Emperor again, 183 — Shambhu sent to Aurangabad, 185 — causes of Shiva's rupture with Mughals, 186 — captures Kondana, named Singh-garh, 188 — sieges of Mahuli, 189 — Daud Khan's vigorous campaign, 190 — Dilir disobeys Prince Muazzam, 192 — investigation by Iftikhar Khan, 193 — Dilir pursued by Muazzam, 195 — second loot of Surat, 198 — refugees at Swally, 201 — frequent panic and ruin of commerce at Surat, 203 — Shivaji gains battle of Vani, 205 — sack of Karinja, 208 — Shiva captures Salhir, 21 1 — Chhatra Sal Bundela visits Shiva, 211. Chapter VIII. Struggle with the Mughals, 1670— 1674 ... 213—237 Large armies sent against Shiva, 213 — Daud Khan's campaign in the Chandor range, 214 — 12 SHIVAJI. Mahabat invades Maharashtra, massacre of Puna, 216 — defeat of Ikhlas Khan near Salhir, 217 — Mughals expelled from Puna, 217 — Marathas con- quer Jawhar and Ramnagar, 218 — chauth demanded from Surat, 219 — Koli Rajahs, 221 — Mughal officers desert to Shiva, 222 — raid into Berar, 223 — successful pursuit by Mughals, 223 — Pedgaon, Mughal base, 225 — Shiva fails at Shivner, 226— gains Satara and Panhala, 227 — raids Bijapuri Kanara, 226" — battle of Umrani, 230 — defeat and death of Pratap Rao, 231 — Hambir Rao's raids, 232 — Bahlols victory, 234 — Dilir defeated by Shiva, 234 — Mughal power weakened, 235 — extent of Shiva's territory, 236. Chapter IX. Coronation of Shiva ji ... 238—259 Why Shiva wanted to be crowned, 238 — Gaga Bhatta declares him a Kshatriya, 241 — preparations for coronation, 241 — religious ceremonies, 242 — Shiva performs penance and is "made a Kshatriya," but is denied Vedic mantras, 244 — lavish gifts, 245 — bath on coronation day, 247 — coronation hall described, 247 — enthronement, 249 — Oxinden pre- sented, 250 — street procession at Raigarh, 250 — cost of coronation, 252 — loot of Mughal camp, 253 — raid into Baglana and Khandesh, 254 — into Kolhapur, 255 — Bahadur Khan deceived by pretended negotia- tions, 255 — Maratha activities, 257 — Shiva's illness, 258 — Mughals invade Bijapur, 259. Chapter X. South Konkan & Kanara 260—292 Kanara uplands and coast, 260 — trade and ports, 261 — Rustam-i-Zaman's concert with Shiva, 262 — English collision with Shiva at Rajapur, 264 — English brokers and Mr. Gyffard imprisoned by Marathas, 264 — released, 265 — Englishmen fight against Shiva at Panhala, 266 — Rajapur factors seized, 266 — Adil Shah invades Bednur, 268 — Shiva in S. Konkan coast, 269 — disorders in the coast, 270 — Shiva's CONTENTS. 13 doings in Kanara, 272 — loot of Barcelore and black- mailing of Karvvar, 274 — Bijapuris recover and lose S. Konkan, 277 — siege of Ponda raised, 280 — plot to capture Goa by stratagem, detected, 281 — rebellion of Rustam-i-Zaman, 282 — sack of Hubli, 283 — Bahlol expels Marathas from Karwar district, 284 — Shiva's grand raid into Kanara fails, 285 — Mian Sahib's rebellion in Bijapuri Kanara, 286 — Shiva captures Ponda, 288 — and other forts, 290 — Maratha failure in Sunda and success in Bednur, 291. Chapter XL Naval Enterprises ... 293—321 The Siddis of Janjira, 293 — Shiva's early conflicts with Siddis, 295 — Shiva captures Danda, 296 — Vyankoji Datto viceroy, 297 — Shiva's navy described, 298 — his sailors, 299 — his mercantile marine, 299 — doings of Maratha fleet, 300 — revolution at Janjira : Siddis enter Mughal service, 302 — Portuguese defeat Maratha fleet, 304 — Siddis recover Danda, 305 — Shiva's efforts fail, 307 — naval war 1672-75, 308 — battle of Satavli, 310 — grand assault on Janjira by Marathas, 311— naval war 1676-80, 312— Marathas fortify Khanderi, 315 — naval battles with the English, 316 — English make peace, 319 — Siddis fortify Underi and bombard Khanderi, 320. Chapter XII. Invasion of the Karnatak 322—352 Shiva's need of money, 322 — Karnatak : its wealth, 323 — Vyankoji and his minister quarrel, 325 — Bijapur in disorder, 327 — Shiva secures Mughal neutrality, 328 — and alliance with Golkonda, 329 — strict discipline in Shiva's army, 330 — his grand entry into Haidarabad, 331 — audience with Qutb Shah, 334 — treaty with Golkonda, 335 — feasts and reviews, 336 — pilgrimage to Shri Shaila, 338 — religious frenzy, 339 — marches by Madras city, 339 — Jinji fort captured, 340 — siege of Tiruvadi, 341 — siege of Vellore, 342 — defeat of Sher Khan, 342 — presents 14 SHIVAJI. from Madras factors, 340 and 343 — blackmail from Nayak of Madura, 344 — Shiva invites Vyankoji to interview, 344 — flight of Vyankoji, 345 — Shiva at Vriddhachalam, 347 — asks for siege-engineers from Madras, 347 — enters Mysore plateau, 348 — Vellore capitulates, 349 — value of Shiva's conquests in Karnatak, 349 — Vyankoji attacks Shiva's agent Shantaji, 350 — peace, Madras plains restored to Vyankoji, 352. Chapter XIII. His Last Years ... 353—383 Route of return from Karnatak, 353 — fight with Savitri Bai, 354 — attempt to gain Bijapur fort by bribery, 355 — Shambhuji attacks Goa territory, 356— Peshwa plunders Trimbak-Nasik, 357 — the Mianas of Kopal district, 357 — annexations beyond Tunga- bhadra, 358 — second failure at Shivner, 359— disorder in Bijapur and weakness of Masaud, 361 — Shambhuji deserts to Dilir, 362 — Maratha stratagem to seize Bijapur fort, detected, 363 — Mughals and Bijapuris against Shiva, 364 — Dilir captures Bhupalgarh, 364 — Marathas fight Ikhlas Khan, 365 — and capture a Mughal convoy at Karkamb, 366 — Shivaji's letter to Aurangzib against the jaziya, 366 — Dilir invades Bijapur, 371 — Shiva arrives near Bijapur to help, 372 — Dilir ravages environs of Bijapur, 373 — sacks Athni, 374 — Shambhuji returns to father, 375 — Shivaji defeated by Dilir, 376 — fortifies Panhala as a refuge, 376 — raids Khandesh, 377 — sack of Jalna, 377 — curse of saint, 378 — Shiva defeated by Ranmast Khan, 378— escapes with heavy loss, 379 — anxiety about succession, 380 — lectures to Shambhu, 380 — intrigues among Shiva's wives, 382 — death of Shivaji, 382— was he poisoned? 383. Chapter XIV. Shivaji and the English merchants of the West Coast ... 384—404 Rajapur factors kept in prison, 384 — their CONTENTS. 15 wrangle with Surat Council, 386 — English think of naval reprisal, 386 — prisoners released, 387 — English negotiate for compensation for Rajapur factory, 389 — the secret aims of the two parties, 389 — delicate position of the English, 391 — Ram Shenvi's report, 391 — Maratha envoy at Bombay, 392 — mission of Lt. Ustick, 393 — embassy of Niccolls, 395 — Shiva's letter to Bombay, 396 — his evasiveness, 397 — embassy of Oxinden, 398 — its result, 399 — Rajapur factors interview Shiva, 400 — Austen's embassy, 401 — indemnity in kind, 403 — Rajapur indemnity how far paid, 404. Chapter XV. Government, Institutions, and policy ... ... 405—426 Extent of his kingdom, 405 — three provinces, 405 — belt of territory subject to chauth, 407 — nature of chauth, 407 — his annual revenue, 408 — hoarded treasure, 408 — strength of his army, 409 — elephants and artillery, 410 — early administrative officers, 410 — ashta-pradhans : their powers, 41 1 — their titles and duties, 412 — Kayastha clerks, 413 — Army: organisa- tion of forts, 414 — cavalry, 415 — infantry, 416 — salaries of officers, 416 — how his army subsisted, 417 — Revenue system, 418 — no farming of revenue, no military fiefs, 419 — district administration, 420 — religious policy, 421— Ramdas, 42 1 —practical effect of Shivaji's regulations, 423 — spirit of brigandage, 423 — Aurangzib's despair of subduing Shivaji, 424 — anecdotes, 424 — Shiva's personal appearance, 425 — his portraits, 426. Chapter XVI. Shivaji's achievement, character and place in History ... 427-449 Shivaji's foreign policy like that of Muslim kings, 427 — mulk-giri, 428 — causes of his failure to build an enduring State, 429 — revival of Hindu orthodoxy, 429 — caste quarrels and divisions, 430 — no elevation 16 SHIVAJI. of people, 432 — evils of autocracy, 433 — neglect of the economic factor, 433 — necessity of raids and their ruinous effect, 434 — excess of trickery and intrigue, 435 — failure against Wellesley, 436 — character of Shivaji, 436-— his political ideal, 438 — natural insecurity of kingdom, 439 — readiness for war a condition of his existence, 439 — his relations with Bijapur, 440 — his true greatness, 440 — the last constructive genius among Hindus, 441 — his influence on the Hindu spirit, 443. Appendix III. Character of Marathi records about Shivaji, 445. Bibliography ... ... ... 449-459 Abbreviations ... ... ... 459 SHIVAJI AND HIS TIMES CHAPTER I. The Land and the People. §1. Extent, rainfall, soil and crops. To-day nearly eleven millions of men, forming about half the entire population of the Bombay Presidency (minus its unnatural adjunct, Sindh), speak Marathi, and another nine millions living in the Central Provinces, the Nizam's Dominions, and other parts, claim the same language as their mother- tongue.* This language has been steadily gaining ground since the days of the Peshwas, and its peace- ful annexation of the children of ruder and less literary tongues has gone on unabated even during the British period. But the Maratha country is not coextensive with the land where the Marathi speech prevails to-day. * The Census of 1911 showed a total of 19*8 millions as speaking Marathi (against 18*23 millions in 1901.) Of this total 10*74 millions live in Bombay and its States, 4*8 millions in the C. P., and 3*5 millions in the Haidarabad State. Marathi is spoken by above 86 p. c. of the population of the Konkan division, 85 p.c. of the Deccan division, and nearly 54 p. c. of Bombay city. In the C. P. 31 p. c. and in the Haidarabad State 26 p. c. of the population speak it. ;2 SHIVAJI. [CH. I. Four centuries ago the name Maha-rashtra was con- fined to the western edge of the Deccan plateau, i.e., to a tract bounded on the north by the Tapti, on the south by the upper courses of the Krishna (probably the Warna), and on the east by the Sina.* The cradle-land of Maharashtra was, therefore, formed by the Nasik, Puna and Satara districts, parts of Ahmadnagar and Sholapur, and probably the western corner of Aurangabad, — a rough total of 28,000 square miles. The Maratha race was also settled in Konkan or the narrow land between the Western Ghats and the Indian Ocean. Here the districts of Thana, Kolaba and Ratnagiri and the State of Savant- vadi, — with a total area of over 10,000 square miles, — are now predominantly Marathi-speaking ; but in the 16th century a consi- derable portion of the population, probably one-half, belonged to other races and spoke other tongues. Four centuries ago the population of Maharashtra was very thin and forests covered much of the land. The western edge of the Deccan plateau is subject to a low and uncertain rainfall, cultivation is poor * " The word Dekkan expresses the country watered by the upper Godavari and that lying between that river and the Krishna. The name Maharashtra also seems at one time to have been restricted to this tract. For that country is, in the Puranas and other works, distinguished on the one hand from Northern Konkan and from the regions on either side of the Narmada and the Tapti, as well as from Vidarbha" or Berar. {Bom. Gaz. i. pt. ii. p. 134, 587; xxiv. 81.) STERILE ROCKY COUNTRY. and precarious, and it is only along the narrow margins of the few rivers that the peasant is assured of a good return for his labour. From nearly the whole of the Western Deccan the heavy clouds of the S. W. monsoon are either shut out by the Ghat range, or, if they surmount this barrier, they sail away to the east leaving the land unwatered and untilled, so that "the Deccan, generally speaking, yields to much labour a bare measure of subsistence."* (Moral and Mat. Prog. 1911-12, P. 10.) * The rain is precipitated on the coast-line [i.e., Konkan] at an average of 100 to 120 inches [in the year.] Once the crest [of the Western Ghats] is passed, the precipitation decreases very rapidly, until a belt is reached only 35 miles from the hills where the rainfall is very precarious and averages only about 17 inches. Further east again, the S. W. monsoon is nearly spent, but the influence of the N. E. monsoon begins to be felt and the rainfall improves... South of Khandesh, we get the Deccan proper divided into three tracts [running parallel to the Ghats and called] the Dang or Maval to the west, the Transition in the centre, and the Desk, or black-soil plain to the east. The soil, however, is not fertile, and there are ranges of bare rocky hills running east and west, spurs so to speak of the Ghats, which neither store water for cultivation nor attract the rainfall... The Karnatak [i.e., the Dharwar, Belgaum, and Bijapur districts] has a more certain and more copious rainfall and more fertile soil." (Census of India, 1911, vii. pt. I, pp. 4-6.) The western hilly belt is called Dang in the north (i.e., Baglana), Maval in the centre (i.e., the Nasik, Puna and Satara districts), and Mallad in the south (i.e., Karnatak.) The Konkan, on the other hand, is an area 4 SHIVAJI. [CH. L In such a soil rice cultivation is impossible, and wheat and barley grow in very small quantities. The staple crop of most of this region is the hardy millet, — jawari, bajra and ragi or maize. But even these cannot always be depended upon. One year the rain would fail, the sprouting plants would be scorched by the sun or the young heads of grain would shrink and wither before they can grow to fulness and ripen, and there would be famine throughout the length and breadth of the land. The soil, covered with bare rock at places and with only a thin layer of mould at others, would be baked to a brown dust, not a green blade would be seen anywhere, and in addition to the human victims the cattle would perish by tens of thousand. §2. Isolation of the People. The broken rocky nature of the country and its abundance of forests, while it kept the population * down, also made travelling difficult and unprofitable. There were no rich courts, populous cities or thriving marts to attract merchants. Nor were there regular occasions for the march of large bodies of soldiers, as from one province of a compact and mighty empire to another. The country was cut up by of certain and heavy rainfall, with rice for the predominant crop, "and along the sea-coast, wherever there is any soil... a fringe of palms, mango-gTOves and plaintain orchards add to the beauty of the landscape and the wealth of the inhabitants, Thana and Kanara are forest-clad districts." (Ibid.) SMALL ISOLATED DISTRICTS. 5 Nature into small compartments in which the natives lived isolated self-contained lives, the world forgetting and by the world forgot. This was true in a special degree of the belt lying immediately east of the Ghats. The empires of the central and more level portion of the table- land, both in Hindu times and Muslim, had sent forth their conquering hosts westwards, but the flood of invasion had been broken at the foot of the hills or their numerous spurs, or, where a thin stream of it had poured through the passes, it had retired after a short and unprofitable stay. In their rugged and inhospitable nooks the natives had found safety and peace, while the richer plains had been the scenes of revolution and rapine. This natural isolation of the western belt was / no doubt occasionally broken by the pilgrim, the trader, and the soldier of fortune. Across this rugged tract lay all the routes from the ocean-ports of our western coast to the rich capitals and marts of Central Deccan. Through it alone could the stream of recruits from Persia, Arabia, Turkey, Abyssinia and even Central Asia reach the welcoming Muslim Courts of Kulbarga, Bidar, Ahmadnagar, Bijapur and Golkonda. Through Maharashtra alone could the cloth, metal- ware and spices of the upper Godavari and Krishna valleys reach their ports of embarkation for Europe. Then, again, the sterile soil discouraged its sons from the thankless task of tilling it. Strong muscles 6 SH1VAJI. [CH. I. and stout hearts found greater rewards and a higher position by serving in the armies of the mighty monarchies of the central plateau. An able partisan leader was sure of high pay, noble rank, and it might be the proud position of a king-maker, at any of these Courts, which were constantly at war with their neighbours, and prepared to bid high for the lances of useful condottieri from the Desh tract. But such occasional visitors only brought a breath of the outer world to the sequestered vales of Maharashtra ; they did not disturb the noiseless tenor of the life of the natives, for the natives them- selves had hardly occasion to move. Even when they went abroad as soldiers, they usually settled there in the fiefs given to them and rarely returned to their barren ancestral homes. The Maratha people's inborn love of indepen- dence and isolation was greatly helped by Nature, which provided them with many ready-made and easily defensible forts close at hand, where they could quickly flee for refuge and whence they could offer a tenacious resistance. Unlike the Gangetic plain, this country could not be conquered and annexed by one cavalry dash or even one year's campaigning. Here the natives had the chance of making a long struggle against superior numbers and, it may be, of recovering their own when the invader was worn out. "The whole of the Ghats and neighbouring mountains often terminate towards the top in a wall of smooth rock, the highest points NATURAL FORTS ON HILL-TOPS. / of which, as well as detached portions on insulated hills, form natural fortresses, where the only labour required is to get access to the level space, which generally lies on the summit. Various princes at different times have cut flights of steps or winding roads up the rocks, fortified the entrance with a succession of gateways, and erected towers to com- mand the approaches ; and thus studded the whole of the region about the Ghats and their branches with forts." "In many of them there are springs^ of the finest water, and in all a supply can be secured, in tanks or reservoirs, during the periodical rains from May to October." The soft trap dis- solving has exposed the hard basalt in steep scarped precipices and smooth tops, which form natural §3. Poverty, simplicity and equality of society. In such a country no man can afford to lead a sheltered life. There was no parasite class in ancient Maharashtra. Even the village headmen, who neither sowed nor spun, had to work as collectors of revenue, local judges and parochial policemen, to earn the fee on which they lived. There was hardly a rich man, except the trader who was also the only banker of this primitive society. Even the landlords were rich rather in grain-heaps and armed retainers than in gold and * Elphinstone's History, 6th ed. 615. Duff. i. 7. Bom. Gaz., xviii. pt. 1, pp. 9-10 ; xix. 16. 8 SHIVAJI. [CH. I. silver. Some temples, especially at the chief centres of pilgrimage, had accumulations of wealth, but their income was precarious, entirely dependent on voluntary gift, and incomparably smaller than the riches of the grand Madras temples. yf In a society so circumstanced, every man, and often every woman, has to work and work with the hand. Elegance and refinement cannot grow here. If culture can be rightly defined as the employment of the intellect in pleasure, then there is no room for culture among men who have to sacrifice pleasure to the bare necessaries of life. Where Nature enforces a Spartan simplicity, there can be no luxury, no learned leisure (except among the priests), no aesthetic development, no polished manners even. The Marathas, when they rose to political power, did not impress the subject population favourably. To the over-polished decadents of the Mughal capitals, the warriors from the South appeared as a race of upstarts, insolent in prosperity, and lacking in grace, refinement and even good manners. They had no taste for the fine arts, no elegance of address, no aptitude for the amenities of social life. Even their horsemanship was awkward and graceless, though eminently practical. The •—period of Maratha ascendency has not left India richer by a single grand building, or beautiful picture, or finely written manuscript. Even the palaces of the Peshwas are low, mean-looking, flimsy structures, with small rooms and narrow staircases — relieved RACIAL CHARACTER OF MARATHAS. 9 from utter insignificance only by their richly carved wooden facade. §4. Maratha character. But such a country and climate have their compensating advantages, too. They develop self- reliance, courage, perseverance, a stern simplicity, a rough straightforwardness, a sense of social equality and consequently pride in the dignity of man as man. As early as the 7th century of the Christian era, a learned Chinese traveller thus noted the character of the Maratha people living in the more prosperous Central Deccan : "The inhabitants are proud-spirited and warlike, grateful for favours and revengeful for wrongs, self-sacrificing towards suppliants in distress and sanguinary to death with any who treated them insultingly." (Watters's Yuan Chwang, ii. 239.) "If they are going to seek revenge, they first give their enemy warning." (Beal, ii. 256.) This racial character was somewhat modified in the course of the next ten centuries. The disappear- ance of the protective influence of the large Hindu monarchies of the province, the growing rigour of the Muslim occupation of the country, and the ravages of constant warfare between rival States, forced the remnant of the Maratha population to be more cunning and less chivalrous. Shivaji did not "first give warning" to Afzal or Shaista Khan.* * In 1880 an English observer wrote of the Maratha 10 SHIVAJ1. [CH. I. But the basis of their character remained the same, — activity, courage, self-reliance, self-respect and love of equality. With the loss of their own cities and capitals on the Godavari and the Krishna in the 14th century, they were pressed back to the sterile western edge of the plateau and became poorer and more isolated. In the lonely struggle with Nature and beasts, they developed greater cunning, without losing their valour and hardiness. Indeed, in their combination of courage, cleverness and power of endurance, — in their ability to plan and execute surprises and night- attacks, in the skill of their soldiers to extricate themselves from a tight corner or vary their tactics according to the changing phases of a battle, without waiting for guidance from a superior, — the Marathas resemble the Afghans most among all Asiatic races. Social distinctions were fewer and much less sharp among the 16th century Marathas than among richer and more civilised communities. The rich man was not immeasurably above the poor in such a simple society ; and even the poorest man had his value as a fighter or indispensable labourer ; at least, he preserved his self-respect, because where few had anything to spare, none was tempted to peasantry (of the Kunbi caste), "They are hard-working, temperate, hospitable, fond of their children and kind to strangers. At the same time they are cruel in revenge, and seldom scruple to cheat either Government or their creditors." {Bom. Gaz. xviii. pt. I, 288.) RELIGIOUS REFORMERS. 1 I lead the pampered life of the professional beggars and hangers-on of Agra or Delhi. Poverty and im- memorial custom alike preserved the womankind of Maharashtra (except among those castes that aspired to be Kshatriyas) from seclusion in the harem, and thus the effective strength of society was doubled, while life gained in health and sweetness. §5. Religious teachers. The same sense of equality was fostered by religion. The Brahmans, no doubt, tried to maintain their monopoly of the sacred lore and their aloofness from other castes as a sort of spiritual aristocracy. But strong religious movements arose and swept through the length and breadth of the land, teaching the sanctity of conduct rather than mere birth, the superiority oF a living personal faith to mere ritual, and the oneness of all true believers before God. These popular movements were hostile to the haughty claims of the Brahman hierarchy, and their chief centre was Pandharpur, one of the most famous seats of pilgrimage in the land. " Like the Protestant Reformation in Europe in the 16th century, there was a religious, social, and literary revival and Reformation in India, but notably in the Deccan in the 15th and 1 6th centuries. This religious revival was not Brahmanical in its ortho- doxy ; it was heterodox in its spirit of protest against forms and ceremonies and class distinctions based on birth, and ethical in its preference of a pure heart, 12 SHIVAJI. [CH. I. and of the law of love, to all other acquired merits and good works. This religious revival was the work also of the people, of the masses, and not of the classes. At its head were saints and prophets, poets and philosophers, who sparng chiefly from the lower orders of society, — tailors, carpenters, potters, gardeners, shop-keepers, barbers, and even mahars (scavengers) — more often than Brahmans. The names of Tukaram [born about 1568], of Ramdas [b. 1608], of Vaman Pandit [b. 1636], and of Eknath [b. 1528] still retain their ascendency over the minds of the people of Maharashtra." (Ranade, 10 ; also Bom. Gaz. xx. 473 ; Sardesai, i. 38-78.) The fairs held at the chief places of pilgrimage on particular holy days tended to foster a sense of Hindu unity, like the national games of ancient GreeceTthough to a lesser extent, because caste has always remained with us a disintegrating force. These shrines became distributing centres of cult and culture, and broke down tribal or parochial narrowness, though imperceptibly. §6. Literature and Language. Literature afforded another bond of union in Maharashtra. Its themes were taken from the ancient scriptures and epics which are the heritage of all the Hindus. The devotional songs and moral maxims of popular teachers like Tukaram and Ramdas, Vaman Pandit and Moro Pant, made their way to every home where Marathi letters could be OLD MARATH1 PROSE. 13 read. "In every town and village in the Deccan and Konkan, especially during the rains, the pious Maratha will be found enjoying with his family and friends the recitation of the Pothi of Shridhar [b. 1679], and enjoying it indeed. Except an occasional gentle laugh, or a sigh, or a tear, not a sound disturbs the rapt silence of the audience, unless when one of those passages of supreme pathos is reached, which affects the whole of the listeners simultaneously with an outburst of emotion which drowns the voice of the reader." (Ac worth's Ballads, xxvii.) The simplicity and uniformity of early Maratha society are also reflected in the language. Their poetry consisted of short jingles and apopthegms or monotonous metrical couplets like the epics, — with no lyric outburst, no long-flowing sonorous verses, no delicate play on the whole gamut of sounds. Like the other daughters of Sanskrit, the Marathi verna- cular had no literary prose till well into the 18th century. The prose that was created by the official class in their letters and chronicles, was a barbarous jargon composed nearly three-fourths of Persian words and grotesque literal translations of Persian idioms. The highly Sanskritised, elegant and varied prose that is now used, is a creation of the British period. (Rajwade, viii. Intro, fully discusses the Persian element.) " On the whole it may be said that the written [Marathi] poetry, consisting as it does in such very A H SHIVAJI. [CH. I. large measure of moral disquisitions and reflections, and the praises of this deity or that, is little known to the ryots and the Mavalis of Maharashtra, and that it would not command their attention or admiration if it were known... In Maharashtra, where the immense majority of the peasantry can neither read nor write, it is a mere truism to say that the literature of their country is absolutely unknown to them.* It is not to be supposed, however, that they are without a poetry of their own. With the Marathas, the feelings of the commons have taken shape in the ballads, which are the genuine embodi- ment of national enthusiasm... Over the plains of the Deccan, and the deep valleys and bold ridges of the Sahyadris, from village to village, the humble Gondhali (minstrel) still travels, and still to rapt and excited audiences sings of the great days when the armed fathers of the men around him gave laws at the spear's point to all the princes of India, or retreated wounded and dismayed before the sword of the sea-dwelling stranger." (Acworth and haligram, Powadas, i and ii.) But this national ballad literature was the creation of the age of Shivaji and his successors. Not only was their literature poor, but their popular spoken tongue was a rough practical speech, * But the entire mass of legends and traditions of the race was the common property of all classes of people throughout the land and gave them cultural homogeneity. COMMUNITY OF MARATHA LIFE. 15 incapable of expressing the ceremonious courtesy, indirectness, and delicate shades of meaning of the ?highly developed Urdu language. The democratic temper of the Maratha people is shown by their having no respectful mode of address like the ap ("your honour") of Northern India ; all ranks are theed and thoued. Thus, a remarkable community of language, creed, and life was attained in Maharashtra in the 1 7th century, even before political unity was con- ferred by Shivaji. What little was wanting to the ] solidarity of the people was supplied by his creation I of a national State, the long struggle with the I invader from Delhi under his sons, and the imperial/ expansion of the race under the Peshwas. Thus, in the end a tribe, — or rather a collection of tribes and castes, — was fused into a nation* and by the end of the 18th century a Maratha people in the political and cultural senses of the term had been formed, though caste distinctions still remained. Thus history has moulded society. §7. Maratha soldiers and peasants of to-day. The backbone of Shivaji's army was composed of the peasantry, who belonged to two low castes, named Maratha and Kunbi. The Maratha caste, — a * M The Marathas are a nation, and from the Brahman to the ryot they glory in the fact." (Acworth and Shali- gram's Powadas, iii.) 16 SHIVAJI. [CH. I. name which should not be applied to all Marathi- speaking people in general, — numbered five millions and the Kunbis (of the Bombay Presidency alone), two and a half millions, in 1911, and they bear the following character in our times : "^s.jiclass, Marathas (i.e., the caste so called) are simple, frank, independent and liberal, courteous, and, when kindly treated, trusting. They are a manly and intelligent race, proud of their former greatness, fond of show, and careful to hide poverty ...Stronger, more active, and better made than the Kunbis, many of the Marathas, even among the poorer classes, have an air of refinement. (They take animal food, inc]uding_fowls, and drink toddy and other liquors, like the Kunbis.) No caste supplies the Bombay army with so many recruits as the Ratnagiri Marathas. Others go into the police or find employment as messengers. Like the Kunbis, orderly, well-behaved, and good-tempered, the Marathas surpass them in courage and generosity. Very frugal, unassuming, respectable and temperate,... they are a very religious class." "The Deccan Kunbis are [now] all cultivators, steady and hard~woTk'ffig...A very quiet, easy- tempered and orderly class, singularly free from crime, they have much respect for the gods. In the Deccan they are strong, hardy, enduring and muscular, [but in Konkan, smaller, darker and more slightly made.] The Kunbi women, like their husbands, are strong and hardy, but the veiled MARATHA CHARACTER ANALYSED. 17 Maratha women are generally weak... Widows are generally allowed to marry." (Bomb. Gaz., xxiv. 70; x. 123, 121 ; xviii. pt. i, 285, 307.) §8. Defects of the Maratha character. We shall now turn to the other traits of the Maratha character. When a Government lives on plunder as a regular source of supply, its officers naturally see no immorality in taking bribes for themselves. The ethics of the servant easily slide off into the ethics of the master. These Indian Spartans with their simplicity, hardiness and sense of equality, were no more proof against corruption than the Spartans of ancient Greece. Contemporary travellers have noticed how greedy of bribes the Brahman officers of the Maratha State were, even under the great Shivaji. The chief defect of the Marathas, which has disastrously reacted on their political history, is their ^ack of business capacity. This race has produced no great banker, trader, captain of industry, or even commissariat organiser or contractor. Hence, on the economic side, in the broadest sense of the term, the Maratha administration was very weak. Trie Peshwas, in spite of the dazzling brilliancy of their political success, were bankrupts from the days of the great Baji Rao I. onwards. Even Shivaji had repeated money difficulties during his short reign, — though in his case it was due not so much to real 2 18 SHIVAJI. [CH. I. insolvency, as to his aversion to touch his hoarded treasure for the annual expenses of his army. But the Marathas have a historic advantage of unique importance in the India of to-day. Their near ancestors had faced death in a hundred battle- fields, had led armies and debated in the chamber of diplomacy, had managed the finances of kingdoms and grappled with the problems of empire ; they had helped to make Indian history in the immediate and not yet forgotten past. The memory of these things is a priceless asset to their race. In the combination of intellectual keenness, patient industry, simplicity of life, devotion to the nobler ideals of man, in the courage necessary for translating thought into deed, in the spirit of sacrifice, grit of character, and a diffused sense of democratic equality, the vast middle class of modern Maharashtra have no superior and hardly any equal among the other races of India. Would that they also possessed the organising skill, the power of co-operation, the tact in the management of instruments and colleagues, the foresight, and the saving common sense of the Anglo-Saxon race ! CHAPTER II. Boyhood and Youth. 1627-1656. §1. Shivaji* s birth and infancy. Shahji Bhonsla, a captain of mercenaries, belonged to a Maratha family that had migrated from Daulatabad and entered the service of the Nizam- Shahi Sultans of Ahmadnagar. Some of his kinsmen had joined the Mughals with their retainers and risen to high rank early in 5Kah~Jahan's reign. Shivaji, the second son of Shahji, was born in the hill-fort of Shivner, which towers over the city of Junnar, in the extreme north of the Puna district. His mother Jija Bai (a daughter of the aristocratic Lukhji Jadav of Sindkhed) had prayed to the local goddess, Shiva-Bai, for the good of her expected child, and named him after that deity. Of the exact date of his birth and the incidents of his boyhood, there is no contemporary record. Even Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad, writing in 1694, is silent on these points. The earliest mention of them is found in works composed 150 years after his birth, when the Shivaji myth had been fully developed among the Marathas and baseless legends and deli- berate fabrications had entirely overspread the few historic truths about him that were still preserved in 20 SH1VAJI. [CH. II. unwritten memory. They place his birth on 6th April, 1627 or near about that date.* The stories told in the later Marathi bakhars about the history of his parents during the year pre- ceding his birth and the events of his own life up to the age of twenty, are in many points contrary to authentic history, and in others improbable, or, at all events, unsupported by any evidence. We know from the contemporary Persian histories that Shahji led a roving life, subject to frequent change of place and enemy attacks, during much of the period 1630 to 1636. Under these circumstances he would naturally have left his wife and infant son for safety in a stronghold like Shivner. But, in reality, he seems to have deserted both. A later traditional work asserts that at this time his eldest son Shambhuji was killed at Kanakgiri and he conceived a deep-rooted aversion to Lukhji Jadav and his family, and after saying that his surviving offspring from Jadav's daughter would come to no good, he deserted Jija Bai and Shivaji. (T. S. 9a.) This reasoning is unconvincing and falsified by dates. It is, however, beyond dispute that Jija Bai now lost * T. S. 6a ; Dig. 53 ; Chit. 22. The Zedhe Chronology (in Chaturtha Sam. Britta, 175) is clearly wrong about the year of his birth. The traditions about Shivaji's ancestors : Chit. 14-18, Dig. 31-43, T. S. )a-4b, Sabh. 5 (meagre.) Khan Khan gives some legends about the origin and meaning of Bhonsla (:i. 111-113.) I have narrated the correct history of Shahji's life up to 1636 in Modern Review, Sept. 1917. 1630] JIJA BAI DESERTED. 21 her husband's love, probably with the loss of her youth, and Shahji abandoned her and her new-born son and took a younger and more beautiful wife, Tuka Bai Mohite, on whom and whose son Vyankoji he lavished all his affection and wealth. (Chit. 22 ; Dig. 53 and 64 ; T. S. 9a ; Shed. 15.) It is expressly stated in the contemporary Padishahnamah (I. B. 150) that in March 1636 Shahji's family was living at Shivngr. This shows^ that Shiva did not reside at Puna till after 1636. This view is supported by the Tarikh-i-Shivaji (8a), which states that after entering Bijapur service (October 1636) and securing from that Government a grant of the whole country from Chakan to Indapur and Shirwal, as his jagir, Shahji appointed Dadaji Kond-dev as administrator of the tract and told him, 4 'My wife Jija Bai is living in the fort of Shivner and has brought forth a son named Shivaji. Bring her and her son and keep them in your charge [at Puna] and supply them with money for their necessary expenses." Shivaji was, therefore, practically a stranger to his father for several years after his birth. Her husband's neglect drove the mind of Jij^ Bai inwards and deepened her natural religious spirit, which sh?*IrrTrjartcd to heTsom Shiva grew up in solitude, a matelessTcTiild, without brother sister or father. The isolation of their life drew mother and son very close together and intensified his love for her till it became almost an adoration for a deity. From a very early age, he was naturally thrown on 22 SHIVAJI. [CH. II. his own resources, and learnt to carry out his own ideas unaided, and to take the initiative without any sense of subordination or responsibility to some higher authority. In the condition of the homes of their boyhood, their early life and training, and the development of their character, — even as in the steps by which they mounted to thrones, — the forsaken son of Shahji Bhonsla was the exact parallel of the forsaken son of Hassan Sur. Shivaji and Sher Shah were not only alike in character ancTgeniusTtJut also grew up amidst like circumstances. §2. Condition of the Puna jagir, 1637. When, at the end of October 1636, Shahji made peace with the Mughals, he had to cede to them Shivner, Trimbak and four other forts. He retained in Balaghat or the tableland only his ancestral jagir of Puna and Supa, formerly held under Nizam Shah and henceforth under Adil Shah. The estate included the Puna district from Chakan to Indapur, Supa, Shirwal, Wai (? Walti) and Jadgir, (T. S. 8a), or a tract bounded on the west by the Ghats, on the north by the Ghod river, on the east by the Bhima and on the south by the Nira river. Shahji, when retiring to Bijapur in 1636, placed this jagir in charge of a Brahman named Dadaji Kond-dev, who had gained administrative skill and experience as the land- steward (kulkarni) of Malthan.* Jija Bai and Shiva * Chit. 19 and Dig. 47 call him kulkarni of Malthan in Patas subdivision. But T. S. 8a says that he was formerly 1636] DESOLATION OF PUNA DISTRICT. 23 were now removed from Shivner to Puna and Dadaji was appointed their guardian. The Puna district that Dadaji took over was in a sadly ruined condition. Six years of warfare had desolated the land, and the work of the invading soldiery had been completed after their departure by robber chiefs who tried to profit by the anarchy. Indeed, the province had so recently passed from the Nizam-Shahi ownership to that of Bijapur that the authority of the new Government had not yet been established there. It was only the rule of a strong jagirdar that could have given peace and prosperity to the district ; but during 1630-1636 Shahji had been forced to lead a life of constant movement, danger and warfare. The Puna and Thana districts at the extreme north-western corner of the kingdom of Bijapur, therefore, formed a No man's Land, with none to administer and defend them. In 1630 Shahji had plundered and seized the Nizam-Shahi country round Puna. Soon afterwards a Bijapuri army had looted and burnt Puna, Indapur and other villages of Shahji and "totally desolated them." {B. S. 227.) Next he had recovered posses- sion of them by force. Then had followed the famine of 1631-1632, the most terrible in the sad kulkarni of Hingani Burdi and Dhuligaon. There is a Hingana Buzurg, 3 m. s. w. of Puna. (Ind. Atlas, 39 S. W.) A critic suggests the emendation Hingani Beradi and Devalgaon, which 1 accept. 24 SHIVAJI. [CH. II. history of the Deccan (Pad. I. A. 362.) The Junnar or North Puna tract was the scene of frequent Mughal invasions in 1634-'36. During Khan-i-Zaman's campaign against Shahji (July — October 1636), he penetrated to Puna, but there was probably nothing left for him to plunder or burn there. During the dissolution of the Ahmadnagar sultanate, a revenue farmer (deshpande) named Moro Tandev, "a proud rebel, well acquainted with the country round the Bhima, had raised a tumult and seized the neighbour- hood of Puna. These disorders had devastated the whole kingdom from Ahmadnagar to the boundary of Wai and Shirwal." (T. S. 8a.) The desolation caused by man preying on his species favoured the growth of wild beasts. The Puna district, especially the Sahyadri hill-side forming its western border, was now infested by large numbers of wolves, which thinned the population and hindered cultivation. Dadaji Kond-dev offered rewards to the hillmen for killing the wolves and thus cleared the whole tract of these pests in a short time. He conciliated the hillmen and tempted them to settle in the valleys and extend cultivation by offering very liberal terms. Leases were granted to the effect that the new tenants should pay a rent of only Re. 1 in the first year, Rs. 3 in the second, Rs. 6 in the third, Rs. 9 in the fourth, Rs. 10 in the fifth, Rs. 20 in the sixth and the same rate as the older tenants from the 7th year onwards. Thus the whole country was brought under tillage. M (T. S. 9a; Dig. 113; DADAJI KOND-DEV'S JUSTICE. 25 Chit. 26.) When Dadaji took charge of the Puna jagir, its paper revenue was only 40,000 hurt (or Rs. 1,60,000, according to the current rate of exchange.) (Sabh. 102.) But only a fraction of this amount was actually collected. For the defence of the district he organised a body of local soldiers (barqandazes) and set up out- posts at suitable places. (Chit. 26.) The memory of his able and beneficent administration was long preserved, and a later chronicle tells us, "He did such strict justice that the very name of robbers and usurpers disappeared from the district." (T. S. 9a.) An anecdote illustrates his punctilious sense of justice : "He planted a garden of fruit trees named after Shahji and gave strict orders that if any one plucked even a leaf from the trees, he would be punished. One day Dadaji with his own hand pluck- ed a mango from a tree. For this offence he was about to cut off the hand when the other people prevented him. To show his respect for the rules, however, he wore an iron chain round his neck" (T. S. 9b), — or "kept the offending arm confined in a long glove!" (Chit. 29.) §3. Shivaji's education. On the subject of Shivaji's education, Sabhasad is silent. The Tarikh-i-Shivaji tells us that "Dadaji trained Shivaji and appointed an excellent teacher for him. In a short time Shiva became skilled in 26 SH1VAJI. [CH. 11. fighting, riding* and other accomplishments." (9a.) /The weight of evidence is in favour of the view that ^ Shivaji was unlettered, like three other heroes of mediaeval India, — Akbar, Haidar Ali, and Ranjit Singh. The many Europeans who visited him never saw him write anything ; when they presented any petition to him the Rajah always passed it on to his ministers to be read to him. No piece of writing in his own hand is known to exist. t But though he may not have pored over books, he certainly mastered the contents of the two great * Hindu epics by listening to recitations and story- tellings. The noble examples of doing and suffering, of action and sacrifice, of military skill and statecraft, which the stories of Rama and the Pandavas afford, the political lessons and moral maxims with which these epics are rilled, deeply impressed his young mirid. He loved to distraction religious readings and ^songs (kirtan) and sought the society of Hindu and Muslim saints wherever he went. The want of book- * No mention is made of book-learning. Chitnis, 28, vaguely says that Shivaji at the age of ten became very learned (bahut vidvan.) Dig. 85 gives a long list of every known art and science as mastered by him in boyhood ! t At the conclusion of a letter to Ramdas there are a few words which have been taken by the editor of Ramdasi Patravyavahar (Mr. Dev) as Shivaji's writing. But this letter has not yet been critically examined by any expert or independent historian. These very recent "discoveries" in Maharashtra require corroboration before they can be accepted. MAVLE PEOPLE OF W. GHATS. 27 §4. The Mavals occupied. learning, therefore, did not leave his mind a dull and sterile soil, nor impair his efficiency as a man of action in a world that was mediaeval. The western belt of the Puna district, running along the Western Ghats for a length of 90 miles and a breadth of 12 to 24 miles, is known a^Maval or the Sunset Land. "It is extremely rugged, a series of table- lands cut on every side by deep winding valleys From- the valleys, hills of various heights and forms rise, terrace above terrace, with steep sides often strewn with black basalt boulders Where the trees have been spared, they clothe the hill-sides with a dense growth mixed with almost impassable brush- wood. Here and there are patches of ancient ever- green forests The people in the northern valleys are Kolis and in the southern valleys Marathas. They have a strong strain of hill-blood and are dark, wiry and sallow... The climate is dry and invigorating, the air is lighter, and the heat jess oppressive than in most parts of Western or Southern India." (Bom. Gaz. xviii. pt. 1, pp. 2, 13, 15.) In popular speech, the valleys into which this western belt is divided are collectively known as the twelve Mavals, though their names end with the words net and khore as well as maval, and their number exceeds twelve. A Marathi ballad speaks of 12 Mavals under Junnar and twelve others under Puna. 28 SHIVAJI. [CH. II. (Di ►adaji, established complete mastery over the Mavals. The local chiefs (deshpandes) were mostly won over. Those who defied his authority were defeated* and crushed. Thus peace and prosperity were established in that region and it became a source of wealth and strength to the owner of Puna, instead of being an unprofitable and even dangerous possession. (Sabh. 7 ; Chit. 26.) From this region Shivaji drew his best soldiers, his earliest comrades, and his most devoted followers. Yesaji Kank and Baji Pasalkar were Mavle chieftains of his own age ; they gathered round him very early and were enrolled as his first captains. So, also, was Tanaji Malusare, a young deshmukh of Konkan. (Chit. 32.) §5. Shivaji s choice of a career. In their company young Shivaji wandered over the hills and forests of the Sahyadri range, and along the mazes of the river valleys, thus hardening himself to a life of privation and strenuous exertion, as well * Raj. xv. 316 and 393 records the story of one of his reverses : "Dadaji Kond-dev came to Shivapur. Among the 12 Mavals, Krishnaji Nayak Bandal, the deshmukh of Hirdas Maval, had seized another man's lands and refused to give them up. Dadaji marched against him, but was defeated and forced to retreat to Shivapur. He then sent Kanhoji Nayak Zedhe to persuade Krishnaji and other Maval deshmukhs to come for an interview." Chitnis, 33, says that Bandal refused to come and wait on Shivaji, who marched against him, captured and put him to death. This is incorrect, as the subjugation of the Mavals was completed by Dadaji. SHIVAJl'S EARLY IDEALS. 29 as getting a first-hand knowledge of the country and its people. During his residence at Puna his plastic mind was profoundly influenced by the readings from the Hindu epics and sacred books given by his guardian and other Brahmans, and still more by the teaching of his mother. The deeply religious, almost ascetic, life that Jija Bai led amidst neglect and solitude imparted by its example, even more than by her precepts, a stoical earnestness mingled with religious fervour to the character of Shiva. He began to love independence and loathe a life of servile" luxury in the pay of some Muslim king. It is, how- ever, extremely doubtful if at this time he conceived any general design of freeing his brother Hindus from the insults and outrages to which they were often subjected by the dominant Muslim population.* An independent sovereignty for himself he certainly coveted ; but>he never posed as the liberator of the Hindus in gen^raj, at all pvpnts nnt till Jnnprl^f^r- wards, (Chit. 29; Dig. 100-103, 112.) The inconstancy, intrigue and bloodshed which stained the Court of Bijapur in those days foreboded for it a downfall like that of Ahmadnagar. Mughal service was a no better alternative to Shivaji. The imperialists had killed Kheloji Bhonsla, his grand- * Basatin-i-Salatin, 332 and 334, frankly describes in detail how the Hindus were depressed as a deliberate policy of the State of Bijapur in the palmy days of Muhammad Adil Shah. 30 SHIVAJI. [CH. II. uncle, and their superior resources and organisation made it unlikely for the Hindus of the Deccan to enjoy greater toleration or power under them than under the weaker and smaller sultanates close by. Moreover, to the Deccanis, both Hindu and Muhammadan, Delhi was a far-off city, with an alien speech and an alien ruling race, who would pitilessly discard their southern instruments after service had been taken from them. A career of independence was no doubt risky to Shivaji, but it had undreamt of advantages to compensate for the risks, if only he could succeed. On the question of his future career he came into conflict with his guardian. Dadaji Kond-dev was, no doubt, an able and honest land-steward, a man of methodical habits, leading a sober blameless and humdrum life, but quite incapable of lofty ideals, daring ambition or far-off vision. Shivaji's love of adventure and independence appeared to his guardian as the sign of an untutored and wayward spirit, which would ruin his life's chances. He argued long with /Shivaji, advised him to follow the footsteps of his / ancestors and rise to wealth and position as an \ obedient vassal and captain of mercenaries under I Adil Shah. The young lad's association with the hill brigands and his projects about robbery and surprise of forts filled Dadaji with apprehensions about his future. He complained to Shahji, but without succeeding in effecting a reform. Worn out by anxiety 1647] SHIVAjfs FIRST CONQUESTS. 31 and age, Dadaji Kond-dev died, early in 1647,* and Shivaji became his own master at the age of twenty. §6. Shioaji's early conquest of forts, 1646-1647 '. The death of Dadaji Kond-dev found Shiva ready?) for his task. He had already been trained in martial exercises and civil administration ; he had fami- liarised himself with the troops of his father's western jagir and the people he would have to govern. Initiative and power of command had been freely developed in him without check or interference from his guardian. Administrative orders had for some time before this been issued in his name, as his father's representative, while Dadaji Kond-dev had stood by watching his pupil. Shivaji had also taken part, with his mother or his tutor, in some judicial investigations and public decisions of legal disputes (mahzar.)f The band of officers already gathered round him were men of tried ability and devotion to him. Shyamraj Nilkanth Ranjhekar (the correct form of the name is Rozefyar, according to some modern Maratha scholars) was the Chancellor (peshwa) ; Balkrishna Dikshit was Accountant-General (majmuadar) ; * Letters and Sanads, 111, gives 1647 as the year of Dadaji's death. A mahzar issued by him on 31 May 1646 is extant (Raj. iv. 80; cf. xvi. 36.) T. S. 10b says that in utter disgust at Shivaji's waywardness, Dadaji took poison, when Shiva was 17 years old. Dig. 119 asserts that he died in 1640 (wrong.) Dig. 113-117. Chit. 29-31. t I have missed the reference, and cannot make the above statement with confidence. (Try Raj., xv-xviii.) 32 SHIVAJI. [CH. II. Sonaji Pant was secretary (dabir) and Raghu- nath Ballal Korde was paymaster (sahnis.) These four officers had been sent by Shahji about 1639. To them Shivaji now added Tukoji Chor Maratha as commander-in-chief (sar-i-naubat) and Narayan Pant as divisional paymaster. (Sabh. 7 and 8 ; Chit. 21 ; T. S. 10b.) The year 1646 marks a crisis in the history of Bijapur. The king fell seriously ill, and for some time his life was despaired of. Though he lingered on for ten years more, these years were by popular belief held to be a portion of the life of the saint Shah Hashim Uluvi, given away by that holy man to the king. (B. S. 312.) During this time no serious business was attended to by Muhammad Adil Shah. The expansion of territory in the Karnatak went on under some of the nobles, but at the capital the king was inert, and the administration fell into the hands of the queen Bari Sahiba. The official history of Bijapur is significantly silent about Muhammad Adil Shah's doings from 1646 to his death in 1656. This was Shivaji's opportunity. Even before the 'death of Dadaji, he had begun his annexations. In 1646 he had sent his captains Baji Pasalkar, Yesaji Kank and Tanaji Malusare with a force of Mavle. infantrymen and occupied Torna fort by tricking its Bijapuri commandant. Here he seized Government treasure amounting to 2 lakhs of hurt. The captured fort was newly named Prachandgarh, a name which it soon lost. Five miles east of it, on the crest of the 1647] SHIVA GAINS PUNA DISTRICT. 33 same spur of hills, he built a new fort named Rajgarh, with three walled redoubts (machi) on the successive terraces of the hill-side. (Chit. 30; Dig. 117; T. S. 126.)* These acts of aggression were reported to Bijapur. But Shivaji secured friends at Court by bribing the ministers, and they sided with him against the local jagirdars whom he had dispossessed. (K. K. ii. 1 14.) Shahji also is said to have turned away the king's wrath by similar assertions of Shivaji 's loyal intentions and the negligent administration of the former owner of Torna. At the same time he sent a secret letter of reprimand to his son and warned Dadaji to keep better control over him. (Chit. 31.) Shivaji 's first act after the death of Dadaji was to bring all parts of Shahji's western jagir under his - own control, so as to form one compact State ruled by one authority. Shambhuji Mohite, the brother of Shahji's second wife, had been left by that chief as his agent in the Supa subdivision. On the death of Dadaji, he refused to obey his young nephew and wanted to take his orders direct from Shahji. But Shivaji imprisoned him during a holiday visit, attached all his property, and, on his persisting in his refusal * Sabhasad is silent about the capture of Torna. A. N. 576, and following it K. K. (ii. 115), say that Chandan was the first fort taken by him. The date of the capture of Torna has been conjecturally put as 1646. Shiva loots Bijapuri treasure on the way, Chit. 31 ; Dig. 140. 3 34 SHIVAJI. [CH. II. to serve him, sent him back to Shahji with his personal effects. Thus Supa was annexed. (Sabh. 8, Chit. 32, Dig. 119, T. S. 12a & b.) The fort of Chakan, guarding the road to Puna in the north, had been entrusted by his father to Firangji Narsala. This officer offered obedience to Shivaji and was confirmed in his post. (Chit. 32 ; T. S. 126 ; Dig 120.) The petty officers of the thanahs of Baramati and Indapur on the eastern margin of the jagir, peacefully submitted to Shiva's authority. The fort of Kondana, 1 1 miles south-west of Puna, was next secured by bribing its Adil-Shahi governor. (Sabh. 9.) >-The strong fortress of Purandar, 18 miles s. s. e. of Puna, was held for Bijapur by an old Brahman named Nilo Nilkanth Nayak, whose family had been in hereditary charge of it and its adjacent lands ever since the days of the Ahmadnagar dynasty. Nilo was a stern grasping man who denied his younger brothers, Pilaji and Shankaraji, any share of his power or emolument. They resented this exclusion from their birth-right and appealed to Shivaji to arbitrate between them. He was admitted into the fort at the Feast of Lamps (November) as a guest. On the third day of his stay, the two younger brothers surprised and fettered Nilo and brought him before Shiva, who imprisoned all the three and took possession of the fort for himself! The Nayak's retainers, "all faith- less and disorderly men," were expelled and a Mavle garrison was placed there by Shivaji. According to 1647] INVASION OF KALIAN. 35 the Chitnis Bakhar and Shivadigvijay , he gave the two younger brothers estates elsewhere as compensa- tion. (Sabh. 9 ; Chit. 40 ; Dig. 121-122 ; T. S. 11b- 12a.) Supa, Baramati and Indapur, in the south-eastern corner of the Puna district, had belonged to him from before. And now the occupation of Purandar, Rajgarh, Kondana and Torna secured his territory by a strong chain of hill-forts on the south. Another fort in the same direction was Rohira, gained some time afterwards. North-west of Puna he acquired the forts of Tikona, Lohgarh, and Rajmachi, — the last being on the Sahyadri crest, 6 miles north of the Bhor pass and overlooking the Konkan plain on the west. (Chit. 33-36 ; Dig. 148, a mere list.) §7. Shiva ji enters North Konkan. Next Shivaji crossed the Western Ghats -and ventured into Konkan. The northern part of this coast-strip formed the Kalian (modern, Thana) district and was then held by an Arab foreigner named Mulla Ahmad of the Nawaiyat clan, one of the lead- ing nobles of Bijapur. The protracted illness of Muhammad Adil Shah had detained this governor at Bijapur for a long time, and during his absence the defence of his jagir had grown slack and inefficient. (A. N. 576 ; K. K. ii. 114.) A considerable amount of disaffection and disorder seems to have prevailed among the petty chieftains of the district, which was 36 SHIVAJI. [CH. II.. a recent acquisition from the Nizam-Shahi State and where the authority of the new Government sat loose. A body of Maratha horsemen under Abaji Sondev raided the rich towns of Kalian* and Bhiundy, which were then without walls, and thence they carried off much wealth and costly merchandise. The fort of Mahuli, which had once belonged to Shahji, was next seized. The city of Kalian, with some other parts of the Thana district, thus passed into Shiva's posses- sion, and he got a firm footing in Northern Konkan, which he rapidly improved in the course of the year. His progress southwards into the Kolaba district j seems to have been assisted by the petty local chiefs who were eager to throw off Muslim yoke and wrote inviting him to come. (Chit. 34, 35 and 41 ; Dig. \75 ; T. S. 13a.) Surgarh (8 miles east), Birwadi (5 miles west), Tala (10 miles south), Ghosalgarh (5 m. s. w.), Bhurap or Sudhagarh, 15 miles east of Roha town, Kangori 12 miles east of Mahad, and above all the impregnable fortress of Rairi (Raigarh) which was to be his future capital, all passed into his hands, and thus the Abyssinians of Janjira lost the eastern half of the Kolaba district to him. At Birwadi and Lingana (5 miles east of Raigarh) he built strong forts. * Shivaji's chivalry to a captive Muhammadan girl, Chit. 34 and 41 ; T. 5. 14a ; Dig. 189 (different story.) Chitnis calls the governor of Kalian, Mulla Hayat. Tavernier (ii. 205) tells us that Shiva discovered buried treasure at Kalian; Chit (31) says at Torna, T. S. (14b) at Pradhangarh (evidently a mistake for Prachandgarh or Torna.) 1648] SHIVA CHECKED IN N. KONKAN. 37 But he does not seem to have occupied Mahad or the country south of that town at this time. Abaji Sondev was created viceroy of the province thus won in North Konkan, which included the eastern parts of the Thana and Kolaba districts. The Maratha forces here met with a great j:ejDulse at the hands of the Siddis (abouj: 1648), and Shivaji marked his dis- pleasure with his defeated general Shyamraj Nilkanth Ranjhekar by removing him from the Peshwaship (Chit. 34) and conferring that post on Moro Trimbak Pingle, while a large army under Raghunath Ballal Korde was sent against the Siddis to retrieve the prestige of his arms. The history of Maratha activity in this region will be described in Chapter XI. §8. Adil Shah imprisons Shahji, 1648. Shivaji 's annexations had reached this point by the middle of 1648, when his career of conquest was suddenly checked by alarming news from the Kamatak. On 6th August his father was arrested and all his property and contingent attached by the Bijapuri commander-in-chief, Mustafa Khan, then investing Jinji in the South Arcot district. Later historians have misunderstood the cause of this act. The contemporary Persian historian of Bijapur asserts that Shahji was imprisoned for displaying a spirit of insubordination to the commander-in-chief. The earliest Marathi bakhar, that of Sabhasad, is entirely silent about the affair. But Chitnis writing 160 years after the event, ascribes it to the Bijapuri king's anger 38 SHIVAJI. [CH. II. at Shivaji's usurpations and Shahji's supposed con- nivance at them. Zahur, son of Zahuri, in his Muhammad-namah (pp. 371-372), written by order of Muhammad Adil Shah, gives the following earliest and most correct account of the incident : — "When the siege of Jinji was protracted and fighting continued long, the cun- ning Shahji sent an agent to Nawab Mustafa Khan begging leave to go to his own country and give repose to his troops. The Nawab replied that to retire then would be equivalent to disturbing [the work of the siege.] Then Shahji sent to say that grain was very dear in the camp, that the soldiers could not bear the privation and labour any longer, and that he would retire to his own country without waiting for permission [from the commander-in- chief.] The Nawab, being convinced that Shahji meant mischief and would show fight, had him arrested with such extreme cleverness and good arrangement that no part of his property was plun- dered, but the whole was confiscated to Govern- ment." A later but very reliable Persian history of Bija- pur, viz., Basatin-i-Salatin (309-311), supplies some additional information: — "Shahji, withdrawing his head from obedience to the Nawab Mustafa Khan, began to oppose him, till at last the Nawab decided to arrest him. One day he made Baji Rao Ghorpade and Jaswant Rao Asad-Khani get their forces ready and sent them very early in the morning to Shahji's 1648] SHAHJI ARRESTED IN CAMP. 39 camp. Shahji, having passed the preceding night in mirth and revelry, was still sleeping in bed. As soon as the two Raos arrived and he learnt of their pur- pose, he in utter bewilderment took horse and galloped away from his house alone. Baji Ghorpade gave chase, caught him, and brought him before the Nawab, who threw him into confinement. His contingent of 3,000 cavalry was dispersed, and his camp was thoroughly looted... Adil Shah on hearing of it sent from his Court Afzal Khan to bring Shahji away and an eunuch to attach his property, ...Nov. 1648/* Shahji was brought in chains to Bijapur, and according to a late and very doubtful Maratha tradition the door of his cell was slowly walled up, in order to induce him to compel his son to give up his lawless career and come to Bijapur. (Chit. 37-38 ; Dig. 143-146.) Shivaji was in a terrible dilemma : he could not submit to Bijapur and thereby sacrifice all his gains and hopes of future greatness ; nor, on the other hand, could he leave his father in danger of torture and starvation. By diplomacy alone could he rescue his father, and diplomacy pointed to only one path as open to a man in his position. The Mughal Emperor was the hereditary enemy of Adil Shah A and every rebel against Bijapur was sure to gain the! Emperor's patronage if he could hold forth the chancel of strengthening the imperial cause in the Deccan by \ the adhesion of his followers. The Mughal Emperor \ alone was strong enough to intimidate Adil Shah. 40 SHIVAJI. [CH. II. Shiva ji first wrote to Prince Murad Bakhsh,* the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan, entreating him to secure the Emperors pardon for Shahjis past con- duct and protection for him and his sons in future, and offering to come and join the Mughal service on receiving a written assurance of safety (qaul.) To this Murad replied on 14th March 1649, telling him to send first a trusty agent to report his demands. This was evidently done, and Murad after reporting the case to the Emperor and learning his wishes, wrote to Shiva on 14th August asking him to come to Court with his father and kinsmen, that he might be created a 5-hazari, while Shahji would get back the rank he had once held in the Mughal peerage. Still later, on 31st October, Murad wrote directly to Shahji to inform him that Shivaji's appeal for his release had been received, and that as the Prince was soon going back to the imperial Court, he would there report the prayers of Shahji to the Emperor and take his orders. He asked the Maratha chief to send his agent to Court to receive the Emperor's jarman and assurance of safety, and on his own behalf presented him with a robe of honour. In this * Shivaji neither wrote nor sent any envoy to the Emperor at Delhi. All his negotiations about his father were conducted with Murad, as the four original Persian letters of Murad in Parasnis's possession show. Rajwade, viii. 2-3, wrongly represents these letters as coming from Shah Jahan. The Emperor never interfered for the release of Shahji. i 1649] HOW SHAHJI WAS RELEASED. 41 letter Shambhuji and other sons of Shahji are spoken of as sharing his captivity. Shivaji then sent Raghunath Pant [Korde?] as his envoy to the Prince to ask for the deshmukhi of the Junnar and Ahmadnagar parganahs. Murad, on 30th November, 1649, promised to try to secure these rights for him on reaching the Emperors presence. Whether Shah Jahan really consented to put pressure on Adil Shah to release Shahji is very doubtful. No historian mentions it. Indeed, active Mughal inter vention on behalf of Shahji seems to me very improb able. For one thing, Shah Jahan always treate Muhammad Adil Shah with marked courtesy and kindness, while Shahji was bitterly hated at the Mughal Court for the trouble he had given them in 1633-1636. Then, again, the Mughal Emperor had definitely promised in his treaties with Bijapur not to take into his service or extend his protection to any officer of Adil Shah. I, therefore, hold that Malhar Ram Rao, the hereditary secretary (chitnis) and record-keeper of Shivaji s descendants, is right when he ascribes the release of Shahji to the friendly mediation of Sharza Khan and the bail of Randaula KhanT"twTr leading nobles of Bijapur, and says not a word about any Mughal exertion for his liberation. (Chit. 39 ; Dig. 147.) Shahji was probably kept in prison till the capture of Jinji (17th Dec. 1649) made the Adil-Shahi position in the Karnatak absolutely secure, so that in the event of his return there he could no longer work 42 SHIVAJl. [CH. II. any mischief. On his release he seems to have lived for some time in the Tungabhadra region subduing the rebellious chieftains of his jagir in Northern Mysore. Here his eldest son Shambhuji fell in an attack on Kanakgiri, but he himself afterwards carried the fort by assault. (Chit. 23 ; Dig. 61-62 ; T. S. 8b.) While Shahji was in prison, or after his release, an attempt was made by the Bijapuri Court to cap- ture Shiva. For this purpose a Maratha named Baji Shyamraje was sent into Konkan with 10,000 men. By way of Wai and Javli, in the northern side of the Satara district, he reached the town of Mahad, hoping to surprise Shivaji there. But Shiva was just then at Chaul, looting the port and setting up his own administration there, and so he returned to Rajgarh without being caught. A detachment from his army fell on Baji Shyamraje and sent him quickly back with heavy loss by the same way that he had come.* /* As the release of Shahji had been conditional, fehiva kept quiet during the years 1649 to 1655. He seems to have contented himself with consolidating * Chitnis, 36. But Shed. Bakhar, 19, says that Randaula Khan of Rahamatpur and Baji Ghorpade of Datvad came against Shiva with 8,000 men and halted at Wai, where they were defeated and put to flight by a concerted attack by Shivaji and Netaji from two sides with 10,000 men. But this source of information is usually unreliable. Parasnis's Mahabaleshwar, 19 (legendary.) 1655] JAVLl AND MORE FAMILY. 43 his conquests and organising their administration, instead of giving the Bijapur Government new pro- vocation by fresh annexations. §9. Conquest of Javli, 1655. At the extreme north-western corner of the Satara district lies the village of Javli, which was then the centre of a fairly large principality includ- ing nearly the whole of that district. The subdivision of Javli is "throughout hilly and thickly wooded with evergreen trees... Trie narrow rugged and steep crest of the Sahyadris, rising 4,000 feet or more above sea-level, forms its western wall ; and in the valleys the tree growth is luxuriant, forming high forests." (Bom. Gaz. xix, 3.) Within a length of 60 miles as many as 8 passes cross the range, two of them being fit for carts and now transporting a large traffic from the Deccan plateau to Mahad in Kolaba and Chiplun in Ratnagiri. There are, besides, countless gorges and foot-tracks leading from Javli to Konkan. A Maratha family named More had received grant of the State of Javli from the first Sultan Bijapur early in the 16th century, and made the claim good by their sword. For eight generations they conquered the petty chieftains around and amassed a vast treasure by plunder. They kept 12,000 infantry, mostly sturdy hillmen of the same class as the Mavles, and succeeded in getting possession of the entire district of Satara and parts J 44 SHIVAJI. [ch. B. of Konkan. The head of the family bore the hereditary title of Chandra Rao, conferred by a Bijapur king in recognition of the founder's personal strength and courage. The younger sons enjoyed appanages in the neighbouring villages. Eighth in descent from the founder was Krishnaji Baji, who succeeded to the lordship of Javli about 1652.* The State of Javli, by its situation, barred the path of Shivaji's ambition in the south and south- west. As he frankly said to Raghunath Ballal Korde, "Unless Chandra Rao is killed, the kingdom cannot be secured. None but you can do this deed. I send you to him as envoy." The Brahman entered into the conspiracy, and went to Javli, attended by an escort of 125 picked men, on a pretended proposal of marriage between Shiva and Chandra Rao's dauiKteT (babh. 10, Chit. 41, Dig. 128, Shed. 20-21.) On the first day the envoy made a show of opening marriage negotiations. Finding out that Chandra Rao was fond of drink and usually lived in a careless unguarded manner, Raghunath wrote to his master to come to the neighbourhood in force and be in readiness to take advantage of the murder immediately after it was committed. The second interview with Chandra Rao was held in a private chamber. Raghunath talked for some time on the endless details of a Hindu marriage treaty, and then * Parasnis Itih. Sangr. Sfuta lekh, i. 26. 1655] MURDER OF THE MORES. 45 drew his dagger all of a sudden and stabbed Chandra Rao to death and wounded his brother Surya Rao, who was despatched by a Maratha soldier. The assassins promptly rushed out of the gate, cut their way through the alarmed and confused guards, beat back the small and hurriedly organised band of pursuers and gained a chosen place of hid- ing in the forest. Shivaji had kept himself ready to follow up(^/ his agent's crime ; according to later accounts he had arrived at Mahabaleshwar with an army on the plea of a pilgrimage. Immediately on hearing of the murder of the Mores, he arrived and assaulted Javli. The leaderless garrison defended themselves for six hours and were then overcome. Chandra Rao's two sons and entire family were made prisoners. But his kinsman and manager, Hanumant Rao More, rallied the partisans of the house and held a neighbouring village in force, menacing Shivaji 's new conquest. Shiva found that "unless he murdered Hanumant, the thorn would not be removed from Javli." (Sabh. 10.) So, he sent a Maratha officer of his household named Shambhuji Kavji with a pretended message to Hanumant Rao, who was then stabbed to death at a private interview, (about Oct. 1655 .J The whole kingdom of Javli now passed int< Shivaji's possession and he was free to invade Soutl Konkan with ease or extend his dominion southward? into the Kolhapur district. 46 SHIVAJI. [CH. U. I The acquisition of Javli was the result of deliberate murder and organised treachery on the part of Shivaji. His power was then in its infancy, and he could not afford to be scrupulous in the choice of the means of strengthening himself. In exactly similar circumstances, Sher Shah, his historic parallel, used similar treachery in gaming torts in South Bihar as the first step to a throne. The only redeeming feature of this dark episode in his life is that the crime was not aggravated by hypocrisy. All his old Hindu biographers are agreed that it was an act of pre-meditated murder for personal gain and not a pardonable homicide done in self-defence or during the confusion of an un- expected brawl. Even Shivaji never pretended that the murder of the three Mores was prompted by a desire to found a "Hindu swaraj," or to remove from his path a treacherous enemy beyond the chance of reform. This last touch of infamy it has been left to the present generation to add. Some Maratha writers have recently "discovered" what they vaguely call "an old chronicle," — written nobody knows when or by whom, based nobody knows on what authorities, and transmitted nobody knows how, — which asserts that Chandra Rao had tried to seize Shiva by treachery and hand him over to the vengeance of Bijapur, and that he had at first been pardoned by the latter and had then ungratefully conspired with 1655] SATARA DISTRICT ANNEXED. 47 Baji Ghorpade to imprison Shivaji.* Unfortunately for the credibility of such convenient " discoveries," none of the genuine old historians of Shiva could anticipate that this line of defence would be adopted by the twentieth century admirers of the national hero ; they have called the murder a murder. The two sons of the murdered Chandra Rao were taken to Puna and there put to death. f But some of the Mores remained at large and sought to be avenged on Shivaji, though in vain. In 1665, when Jai Singh opened a campaign against that / Maratha chief, he invited theseJVlqres to join him and / carry on their blood-feud with the Bhonslas with I greater hope of success. ._^S Tfye^armexation of Javli not only opened to Shivaji gi3oor~iter'""the conquest of the south and the west, but brought a very important accession to his strength, in the form of many thousands of Mavle infantrymen from among the subjects and former retainers of Chandra Rao. In short, his recruiting yS ground for these excellent fighters along the Sahyadri range, was now doubled. The Mores had accumu- lated a vast treasure in eight generations of undisturbed and expanding rule, and the whole of it fell into Shivajis hands. Two miles west of Javli he built a new fort * Parasnis Itih. Sangrah, Sfuta lekh, i. 26-29 and ii. II. Mahabaleshwar (Eng.), 17-21. t T. 5. 14a; Dig. 132; Chit. 42. Sabh. silent. 48 SH1VAJI. [CH. II. named Pratapgarh, and here he set up an image of his patron goddess Bhavani, as the more ancient Bhavani of Tuljapur was beyond his reach. On her he lavished his wealth in costly ornaments and trapp- ings and to this shrine he made repeated pilgrimages. (Sabh. 26 ; Chit. 42 ; Hih. Sang. Sfuta lekh, ii. 11 ; Dig. 132.) West of Javli, in the Konkan plain, near the centre of the Ratnagiri district, lay the principal- ity of Shringarpur,* owned by a chieftain named Surve, but virtually ruled by his minister, a Shirke. As Shiva entered the country, the chief fled away and the minister surrendered it and was taken into Shivaji's pay. (Sabh. 11.) Other petty chiefs of the neighbourhood were reduced to submission and their lands annexed. Thus, the eastern half of Ratna- giri became Shiva's, while Rajapur and the ports continued under Bijapur till 1660, and in some cases even later. The greatly expanded Maratha kingdom was ow organised on a stronger^ and more elaborate plan : Moro Trimbak Pingle was appointed as Chancellor (Peshwa) vice the incompetent Shyamraj t * A letter written by the English prisoners at Songarh in June 1661 says, "Shivaji hath lately enlarged his country by overcoming the two Rajahs of Dulvice (? Dalve) and the Rajah of Singapur (sic), by which means he commands all the coast from Danda Rajpuri castle to Kharepatan." (Orme MSS. Vol. 155, pp. 1-21.) "Singapur, 7 gav to the northward of Rajapur." (F. R. Surat, 104.) 1656] shiva's territory & officers. 49 Nilkanth Ranjhekar, Nilo Sondev Accountant- General (majmuadar) vice Balkrishna Pant, and Netaji Palkar as Master of the Horse (sar-i-naubat.) Two new posts, those of Surnis (Superintendent of Correspondence) and Waqnis (News-writer) were created and given to Abaji Sondev and Gangaji Mangaji respectively.* The cavalry now mustered 10,000, out of whom 7,000 were mounted on Govern- ment horses and the rest on their own ; the Mavle infantry numbered 10,000 and their commander was Yesaji Kank. (Sabh. 1 1 .) The forts, new and old, held by Shivaji at this time were TortyT (A. N. 576.) In June 1657 the newly-founded kingdom was blessed with the birth of an heir to the throne, the ill-fated Shambhuji. We may conveniently pause here and take note of the exact size of the infant Maratha kingdom. At the cautious outset of his independenr-career (1647-48), Shivaji's territory consisted of his father's jagirs and his own early annexations from Bijapur. These together covered the southern half of the Puna district, and their northern boundary was the old Mughal frontier, — a line running diagonally from the north-western to near the south-eastern corner of that district and avoiding the Mughal forts Junnar, Visa- pur, and Parnir ; i.e., for some distance the Ghod river * The reading of the Mahad MS. of Sabh. (II n) has been accepted here. Chit. 34 (Annaji Datto and not Abaji Sondev as Surnis) ; Shed. 20. Dig. 186-188 gives a long list in which official appointments of different periods seem to be mixed up. 4 50 shivaji. [Ch. II. divided the two dominions in the north ; Junnar and Chamargunda belonged to the Mughals and Chakan to Shivaji. His southern boundary was marked by the outposts of Indapur, Baramati, and Supa and the forts of Purandar, Rajgarh, Kondana, and Torna. In Konkan or the country west of the Ghats, he had gained Kalian, Mahuli, and some other places in the south-eastern corner of the Thana district and the eastern half of the Kolaba district down to but not including the town of Mahad. The above was his position in 1648. But in 1655 the conquest of Javli extended his dominions in the uplands or Desh to the southern limit of the Satara district, and in Konkan from Mahad to near Rajapur, i.e., over the south-eastern Kolaba and nearly the whole of eastern Ratnagiri districts. Thus he now became master of the whole of Konkan except the ports and adjacent lands on the west coast (which belongedto Bijapur, th"e Siddis, and the Portuguese) and the extreme north of the Thana and the extreme south of the Ratnagiri districts. APPENDIX I. The Murder of the Mores. The earliest Maratha historian of Shivaji, viz., Krishnaji Anant Sabhasad (1694), writes that Shivaji sent Raghunath Ballal as envoy to Chandra Rao, 1655] OLD MARATHI AUTHORITIES. 51 frankly telling him, * 'Unless Chandra Rao is killed, the kingdom cannot be secured. None but you can do this deed," (p. 10), and that Raghunath committed the murder on getting a suitable opportunity. This book was written by a courtier of Shivaji, by order of Shivaji 's favourite son. He had the best means of knowing the truth and no motive for suppressing it. It is inconceivable that such a writer invented a false charge of murder against Shivaji, unless the latter had been notoriously guilty of the crime. A century later, Malhar Ram Rao, the hereditary secretary of Shivajis descendants and keeper of their family re- cords, also tells the same story, (p. 41.) What motive could he have had for calumniating the great founder of his master's family as a murderer? .The Marathi life of Shivaji preserved in Raigarh castle when it was in Maratha possession, and composed much earlier than Chitnis's history, tells us, "Raghunath treacherously assassinated Hanumant Rao. Shivaji was pleased with Raghunath's conduct," (p.l I.) But as the original of this work has been lost, I attach no importance to it. Against the unanimous testimony of such known and authentic witnesses, Rao Bahadur Parasnis puts the evidence of the so-called Mahabaleshwar Bakhar, which exists in a single anonymous undated MS., — discovered some 20 years ago among the papers of the modern Rajahs of Satara, while of Sabhasad and Chitnis's bakhars many MSS. have been found and in different parts of the country. The unique 52 SH1VAJI. [Ch. II. MS. of the Mahabaleshwar Bakhar has not been shown to the public even in Maharashtra, nor ex- amined by experts with a view to judging its date and authenticity. A critic, evidently in the confidence of the Rao Bahadur, now writes that the MS. contains a statement that it was written by order of Rajah Shahu. We do not know the authority for this entry, nor whether the colophon was contemporaneous with the body of the MS. or is a modern addition. Now, Shahu overcame his domestic rivals, curbed his Muslim enemies and became firmly seated on his throne after 1725, and he could have had time to think of rectifying his grandfather's reputation only towards the peaceful close of his reign (which ended in 1749.) This bakhar, if written by Shahu's order at all, was written about 1740 or even later, — i.e., more than 80 years after the murder of the Mores. What were its nameless author's means of knowing the truth better than Shivaji's own courtier? Could any written record about the Javli affair, contemporaneous with the event, have survived till 1740 and then dis- appeared, while the bakhar alleged to have been composed in that year and at the same place has survived ? The Mahabaleshwar Bakhar, therefore, even if written in Shahu's time, had no other basis than unreliable oral tradition or deliberate invention. To accept such a work against Sabhasad and Chitnis is to defy the most elementary laws of historic evidence. And even then, the Mahabaleshwar Bakhar 1655] FALSIFICATION OF HISTORY. 53 never really contradicts Sabhasad ; it does not cate- gorically deny that Shiva's envoy murdered Chandra Rao or that Shiva had authorised the deed. It merely accuses Chandra Rao of implacable hostility to Shivaji, but tells us nothing of what actually happen- ed at the fatal interview. And yet on its slender— or rather non-existent basis, Mr. Kincaid's brilliant imagination builds up the following scene which he presses upon the public ignorant of Marathi as the true and attested story of the Javli affair : "From the recently discovered Mahabaleswar account, it is clear that Shivaji repeatedly strove to win More to his side, that More as often tried treacherously to take Shivaji prisoner, and that he eventually fell in a quarrel between him and Ragho Ballal Atre, while the latter was delivering him an ultimatum. Shivaji was thus clearly innocent of More's death." "What happened [at the interview with More] is obscure. It is probable that Shivaji's envoy charged Balaji [i.e., Chandra Rao More] with double dealing and that the latter complained of Shivaji's invasion [i.e., occupation of Mahabaleshwar in force.] High words were exchanged, swords were drawn and Ragho Ballal Atre and Sambhaji Kavji killed More and his brother... Shivaji had not authorised his envoy's acts." (Kincaid and Parasnis, History of the Maratha People, i. 272, 150-151.) I trust that the astonishing method of appraising evidence and drawing legitimate inferences exhibited 54 SH1VAJI. [Ch. II. by the learned ex-Judge of Satara in the above passage, will not be taken by scholars abroad as typical of the way in which the amateur Judges of the Indian Civil Service deal criminal justice in India. The historian who cares for his reputation has, unfortunately, to place truth above popularity. CHAPTER III. First Wars with Mughals and Bijapur, 1656-1659. §1. Relations with the Mughals up to 1657. For many years after his first assertion of in- dependence, Shivaji carefully maintained pea,cf with the Mughals. For one thing, his power was not yet secure, and it would have been the height of folly to. > provoke both Bijapur and Delhi at the same time. Secondly, from 1653 onwards Mughal Deccan waq governed by Prince Aurangzib with singular *" efficiency and vigour, and his neighbours rightly dreaded giving him any offence. When Aurangzib was involved in war with Golkonda (January-March 1656), Shivaji was too busy organising his conquests in Javli and the northern Ratnagiri district to raid Mughal territory during that Prince's absence from his charge. On the death of Muhammad Adil Shah (4 Nov. 1656), Aurangzib began active preparations for the invasion of Bijapur, and tried to seduce as many Adil-Shahi nobles and vassals as he could. Shivaji then wrote a letter to Multafat Khan, the Mughal ' governor of Ahmadnagar, offering to join the im- perialists if his desires were granted. To this a conciliatory reply was given, in accordance with 56 shivaji. [Ch. III. Aurangzibs policy of "keeping the path of corres^ pondence with him open." An envoy from Shiva approached Aurangzib directly at Aurangabad and reported his demands. The Prince replied in "reassuring and friendly terms, so as to make him more devoted to the imperial cause than before." (Adab. 144b, 145b.) This correspondence seems to have passed in December 1656 or the next month, though the letter to Multafat Khan may have been written as early as the preceding August. §2. Shivaji' s first raid into Mughal Deccan. Shivaji had evidently demanded that the Mughal Government should take him under its protection and legalise his usurpations of Bijapur territory. The vague promises of favour and protection made by the Prince could not satisfy him. Even a less astute man than he must have known that such promises would amount to nothing in practice when the need | of the imperialists would be over. So, when the J war broke out, Bijapur made a higher bid and /{ I induced Shivaji to make a diversion by raiding the / south-western corner of Mughal Deccan, while Aurangzib' s forces were concentrated at the siege of Bidar, beyond his south-eastern frontier. Two Maratha leaders, Minaji Bhonsla at the head of 3,000 horse, and Kashi, crossed the Bhima and plundered the Mughal villages in the Chamargunda and Raisin subdivisions respectively, late in March 1657. They carried devastation and alarm to the very -gates of J 65 7] SHIVA RAIDS MUGHAL CITIES. 57 Ahmadnagar, the most notable city in Mughal Deccan. (Kambu, 3o ; Adab. 148a.) While Minaji was raiding the Ahmadnagar dis- trict in the east, Shivaji was busy looting the Junnar subdivision in the north. One night he silently scaled the walls of Junnar city with rope-ladders and after slaughtering the guards, carried off 300,000 hun in cash, 200 horses, and much costly clothing and jewellery. (Sabh. 8 ; Adab. 153k.) The success of the Maratha raiders was due to the negligence of the local Mughal officers (as the Delhi historian Kambu asserts) and probably also to their military weakness. Aurangzib, on hearing of these disturbances, censured the thanahdars and poured reinforcements into the Ahmadnagar district. §3. Aurangzib' s defensive measures. Nasiri Khan, Iraj Khan and some other officers at the head of 3,000 cavalry were ordered there. Rao Karn, who was coming from Aurangabad to Bidar, was diverted from the way to the same place. Shaista Khan was ordered to detach 1,000 men from his contingent there. But Nasiri Khan's movements were provokingly slow. On 30th April he entered the parganah of Bir and four days later marched towards Ashti.* Thus, there was a great delay in * Bir (or Bid) is 68 m. e. and Ashti is 35 m. s. e. of Ahmadnagar. Chamargunda (or Shrigunda) is 33 m. s. of Ahmadnagar. (Ind. At. 39 N. E.) Raisin is 20 m. s. e. of Chamargunda. 58 SHiVAji. [Ch. hi; his going to Ahmadnagar and Junnar, expelling the enemy, and ravaging Shivajfs territory, as ordered by Aurangzib. (Kambu, 3o ; Adab. 147a, 153a, 154b.) Meantime, Multafat Khan had issued from the fort of Ahmadnagar and relieved the beleaguered outpost at Chamargunda by defeating Minaji, (28th April.) But the Marathas continued to rove about the parganah for some time longer. However, the retainers of Multafat and Mirza Khan followed up their victory and at last cleared the Chamargunda subdivision. (Adab. 110b, 153b, 154a.) Shivaji had stayed in the Junnar subdivision for me time, robbing the villages, as the Mughal rein- orcements were late in arriving there and he found he field clear. But, at the approach of Rao Karn and Shaista Khan, he fled from the neighbourhood of Junnar city and wandered over the district for some time, as he could not be caught and crushed. (Adab. 110b, 111b, 112a.) But when the pressure v Jr became great, he slipped away to the Ahmadnagar district and began to plunder it. By this time (end of May), however, Nasiri Khan had reached the «£ene. By a forced march he surprised Shiva's army and nearly encircled it. Many of the Marathas were slain, many wounded, and the rest put to flight. But there was no pursuit, as the Mughal horses were too tired. (Kambu, 4b ; Adab. 154a, 156a.) Aurangzib's letters to Nasiri Khan and other officers breathed fury and revenge ; they must beat / 1657] MUGHAL REPRISALS. 59 the raiders back from the imperial dominions and make reprisals by entering Shiva's land from all sides, "wasting the villages, slaying the people with- out pity, and plundering them to the extreme" ; Shivaji's possessions, Puna and Chakan, must be utterly ruined, and not the least remissness shown inslaymg- jMuL,enalaving,,.tKe. people ; the village headmen and peasants of the imperial territory who had secretly abetted the enemy, must be slain with- out pity. (A dab. 147a and b, 148a.) Aurangzib's new dispositions for guarding his south-western frontier showed excellent combination and judgment. Kar Talab Khan was posted near Junnar, Abdul Munim at Garh Namuna, and Nasiri Khan and Rao Karn at Panda "opposite Parenda fort," to guard the Chamargunda, Kara and Ashti parganahs.* (A dab. 148b.) These officers stood facing the frontier and barring every path of the enemy's advance, so that the imperial ryots behind them might enjoy safety. The officers were further bidden to make a dash forward across the frontier, whenever they got an opportunity, ravage as much of the enemy's territory in front of them as they * Panda (in Pers. text, Pandeh) is 16 m. n. w. of Parenda and 3 m. s. of Karmala. Kara is 9 m. n. w. of Ashti. I have followed Aurangzib's letters (in Adah) above ; but Kambu omits Garh Namuna and says that Abdul Munim was posted at Chamargunda. I have failed to trace Garh Namuna, unless it was a name given to the old and ruined outpost at Pedgaon, 8 m. s. of Chamargunda. 60 shivaji. [Ch. HI. could, and then quickly return to the defence of their respective posts. (A dab. 147b.) A Maratha attempt to loot the city of Ahmad- nagar was defeated ; Multafat Khan, the qiladar of the fort, took effective steps to defend the city at its foot, and removed the property of the inhabitants for greater safety within the fort. (Adab. 148b.) After Nasiri Khan's victory over Shiva in the Ahmadnagar district, he was ordered by Aurangzib to "pursue the Marathas and extirpate them," (end of May.) But this could not be done. The rains now set in with the full violence of the monsoons, and the campaign had to be closed. Shiva retreated to his own country and the Mughal officers fell back on their appointed stations, watching the frontier. "There was peace in the whole district." (Adab. 156a, 149a.) June, July and August 1657 passed in enforced idleness for the imperial troops. In September the situation was fompli^at^d by the illneps^of Shah Jahanand the preparations for a War of Succession among his sons. Bijapur made peace with the Mughals/Biit throughout the month of September Aurangzib continued to urge his officers not to relax their vigilance, but hold the S. W. frontier in force, lest Shiva should renew his raids. About the middle of October he wrote to the governor of Ahmadnagar to take care of the city and keep his troops in readiness, lest when Nasiri Khan went back, Shiva J 65 7] aurangzib 's letter to shiva. 61 finding the field clear should begin to plunder again (Adah. 14%, 157b.) §4. Shivaji makes peace with the Mughals. When in September his liege-lord, the king of Bijapur, made peace, Shivaji found it useless and even ruinous to himself to continue the war with the Mughal empire single-handed. He must try to save his patrimony. So, he wrote to Nasiri Khan offering submission, and the Khan replied in a con- ciliatory tone. Then Shiva, as requested, sent a trusty agent (probably Raghunath Ballal Korde) to the Khan to state his demands. These were reported to Aurangzib (Adah. 156b, 1 57a) ; but no definite agreement followed. Shivaji now sent Raghunath Pant to Aurangzib directly. The Prince was just starting on his march to Northern India (25 Jan., 1658) and wrote to Shiva in reply, "Though your offences do not deserve pardon, I forgive you as you have repented. You propose that if you are granted all the villages belonging to your home [i.e., Shahji's old jagir] together with the forts and territory of Konkan, after the imperialists have seized the old Nizam-Shahi territory now in the hands of Adil Shah, — you will send Sona Pandit as your envoy to my Court and a contingent of 500 horse under one of your officers to serve me, and you will protect the imperial frontiers. You are called upon to send Sonaji, and your prayers will be granted." (Parasnis MS., Letter 5.) 62 SHIVAJI. [Ch. III. But while Aurangzib received Shiva's submission with outward pleasure, his mind was not really com- posed about him. He omitted no precaution to maintain peace in that quarter by force, for he felt convinced that the young Maratha chief was a raider whose daring was only equalled by his cunning, and an ambitious adventurer who would place self- interest above fidelity to his plighted word or gratitude for favours received. He wrote to Mir Jumla (December, 1657), "At Nasiri Khan's departure that district has been left vaccant. Attend to it, as the son of a dog is waiting for his opportunity." (A dab. 92a) Adil Shah was thus urged by the Prince : "Protect this country. Expel Shiva who has sneaked into the possession of some forts of the land. If you wish to entertain his services, give him jagirs in the Karnatak, far from the imperial dominions, so that he may not disturb them." (Adab. 163a.) <*~ Aurangzib, therefore, left the Deccan without ranting peace and pardon to Shivaji. The iMughals also repaired and garrisoned the old and ruined fort of Pedgaon, as a convenient outpost for operations against Puna. (Adab. 157o.) But Shiva was freed from all fear of the Mughals by' the War of Succes- sion which kepr"Aurangzib busy forHtne next two years, 1658 and 1659. §5. Bijapur plans to subdue Shivaji. After the Mughal invasion of 1657 had rolled 1659] BIJAPURIS AGAINST SHIVAJI. 63 back and Aurangzib had marched away to Northern India, the Bijapur Government gained respite and a sudden accession of vigour. True, the old prime- minister, Khan Muhammad, was murdered on a false suspicion of collusion with Aurangzib during the late war ; but his successor, Khawas Khan, was an able administrator. The Queen Mother, Bari Sahiba, who virtually ruled the State tilTner ■"Fatal journey to Mecca (1660), was a woman of masterful spirit and experienced in the conduct of business. Freed for the time being from the constant menace of the Mughals on the frontier, the Bijapur Government now began to call its refractory vassals to account. Shahji was asked to punish his rebel son, but he frankly rej)iuiial£d>„SliiyjL_^s>Jiis^son and left the Government free to punish him without any consi- deration for his father's feelings. Measures had, therefore, to be taken for crushing Shivaji by force. (Sabh. 12.) This was, however, no easy task. Shiva's military strength was not despicable ; and the Bijapuri nobles shrank from the idea of a campaign among the hills and jungles of the Western Ghats. The command of the expedition against him went abegging at the Bijapur Court, till Afzal Khan accepted it. (Sabh. 13 ; Chit. 54 ; Powadas, 6-7 ; Shed. 24.) §6. Afzal Khan's expedition against Shiva. Abdullah Bhatari, surnamed Afzal Khan, was a 64 shivaji. [Ch. HI. noble of the first rank, who had risen to power and honour under the late Sultan of Bijapur. As a general he was of the highest standing in the king- dom, being the peer of Bahlol Khan and Randaula Khan, and had fought with conspicuous bravery and skill in the recent war with the Mughals. But the resources of Bijapur had been crippled by that war and the disorder and impoverishment natural in a regency under a veiled woman. Only 10,000 cavalry* could be spared to accompany Afzal, while popular report had raised the strength of Shiva's Mavle in- fantry to 60,000 as the result of his conquest of Javli, and he had also enlisted a regiment of valuable Pathan mercenaries from the disbanded soldiery of Bijapur. (Chit. 33 ; T. S. 15b.) «&gal Khan, there- fore, did not prefer an open contest oLJorce with Shiva. Indeed, he was instructed by the Dowager Queen to effect the capture or murder of Shiva by "pretending friendship" with him and offering to secure his pardon from Adil Shah.f * This is the strength of Afzal's army as given by con- temporaries, viz., Tarihh-i-Ali II. 76 and the English letter quoted in the next note. The Maratha accounts, all very much later, put it at 12,000 cavalry besides infantry. (Powadas, 7, Sabh. 13); 30,000 "including 3,000 Mavles familiar with the locality." (Chit. 54.) In A. N. 577, du hazar is evidently a misprint for dah hazar. The letter in Shed. 25 is a fabrication . t "Against Shivaji the Queen this year sent Abdullah Khan with an army of 10,000 horse and foot, and because she knew with that strength he was not able to resist Shivaji, 1659] MARCH OF AFZAL KHAN. 65 The Bijapuri general had accepted the command in a spirit of bravado, and even boasted in open Court that he would bring Shiva back a captive with- out having once to dismount from his own horse. But his mind must have been oppressed by the heaviness of his task. He planned to effect his purpose by a combination of "f rightfulness" and diplomacy. From Bijapur the expedition marched due north to Tuljapur, one of the holiest shrines in Maharashtra and the seat of Bhavani, the guardian goddess of the house of Bhonsla. Afzal's strategy was either to make a sweep round Shiva's line of "southern fortresses and »oenetrate to Puna through Thjfexposed eastern ^ajok\Lib£jVlaratrTa kingdom. or to provoke Shiva, by a gross outrage on his faith. into coming out of his fastnesses and meeting the Bijapuri army^ in the open. At Tuljapur he ordered the atone image of Bhavani to be TSrofcen and.^^ pounded into dust in a hand-mill. (SaEKTTT; Chit. 54 ; Dig. 157.) Then the news reached him that Shiva had left Rajgarh and betaken himself to Pratapgarh in the south-west. Afzal now gave up the objective of Puna (Chit. 54, Dig. 158), and turned due west she counselled him to pretend friendship with his enemy, which he did. And the other [i.e., ShivajiJ, whether through intelligence or suspicion it is not known, dissembled his love toward him &c." (Factors at Rajapur to Council at Surat, 10 Oct., 1659, F. R. Rajapur.) 5 66 SHIVAJI. [CH. III. towards Pratapgarh. On the way he committed fresh sacrileges on the gods and outrages on the Brahmans at Manikeshwar, Pandharpur and Mahadev (Powadas, 8-9), and in a fortnight reached Wai, 20 miles north of Satara. This last town lay within his fief, and here he halted for some days devising means for luring Shiva out of the hills by diplomacy or capturing him by means of local chieftains. (Dig. 158 ; Chit. 54.) He wrote to Vithoji Haibat Rao, the deshmukh of Gunjan-maval, to join with his men near Javli and assist the Bijapuri army as directed. Khandoji Khopde, the rival of Kanhoji Zedhe for the deshmukhi of Rohidkhore, waited on Afzal at Wai and gave a written undertaking to arrest and hand over Shiva on condition of being granted the deshmukhi. (Raj. xvii. 31, xv. 393 and 317 ; Dig. 165 ; T. S. 16a.) While these plots were being hatched at Wai, Afzal sent his land-steward Krishnaji Bhaskar to Shivaj: with a very alluring message, saying, "Your father has long been a greal friend of mine, and you are, therefore, no stranger to me. Come and see me, and I shall use my influence to make Adil Shah confirm your possession of Konkan and the forts you now hold. I shall secure for you further distinctions and military equipment from our Government. If you wish to attend the Court, you will be welcomed. Or, if you want to be excused personal attendance there, you will be exempted.** (Sabh. 13-14.) 1659] MARATHA COUNCIL OF WAR. 67 §7. Shivaji's danger and perplexity. Meantime, the news of Afzal's coming had caused great terror and perplexity among Shiva's followers. Hitherto they had surprised obscure forts, looted isolated convoys, or fought skirmishes with the small irregular forces of private jagirdars. Here was their first encounter with the regular forces of Bijapur, led by a famous general, and numbering 10,000 with artillery, transport, and all fh*e"~Other material *uf~*ke-~b©s4>equipped armies of that age. Moreover, Afzal's march from Bijapur to Wai had been an unbroken success ; the Marathas had not ventured to oppose him in the open, and he had freely looted and laid waste the territory of Shiva that he had crossed. (Tarikfr-i-Ali II. 76-77.) Tales of his irresistible strength and ruthlessness had reached the Maratha camp. Shivaji's officers naturally shrank from the idea of resistance. At the first council of war which he held, they urged him to make peace, as the enemy was strong and hostilities would only cause a great loss of life to their side. (Sabh. 14 ; Chit. 55.) ■ This was the most critical moment in the career of Shivaji. If he capitulated to Afzal Khan, all his hopes of independence and future greatness would be gone for ever, and he would have to end his days as a tame vassal of Bijapur, even if he escaped Lis sovereign's vengeance for his late rebellion. Yet, the open defiance of Bijapur authority now would for ever close the door to reconciliation with that 68 SHIVAJI. [CH. III. State, and he must be prepared ever afterwards to defend his life and independence against the power of that kingdom and of the Mughals and other enemies, without a single friend or protector to turn to in the wide world. His ministers and generals advocated the more ignoble policy. Shiva himself was in a terrible dilemma. For a night he pondered on his life's choice and then chose the manlier part. A legend, as old as his contemporaries, tells us that the care-worn chieftain's sleep was broken by a vision of the goddess Bhavani who urged him to confront Afzal boldly and promised him victory and her full protection. (Sabh. 14.) His mind was made up. Next morning the council met again. Moved by Shiva's manly words, appeal to their sense of honour, and report of the goddess's blessings, they resolved on war. He now made his dispositions for the contest with the utmost forethought and skill. He took counsel of his mother, who blessed him and foretold his success, and then he left minute instructions for carrying on the government in the event of his being killed. The armies under Moro Trimbak Pingle and Netaji Palkar were summoned from Konkan and the Ghats respectively, and ordered to take post within easy reach of Pratapgarh. (Sabh. 15 ; Chit. 55, 57-59.) §8. Plots and counter-plots. Then came Afzal's envoy, Krishnaji Bhaskar, with the invitation to a parley. Shiva treated him 1659] afzal's plan detected. 69 with respect, and at night met him in secrecy and solemnly appealed to him as a Hindu and a priest to tell him of the Khan's real intentions. Krishnaji yielded so far as to hint that the Khan seemed to harbour some plan of mischief. Shivaji then sent the envoy back with Gopinath Pant, his own agent, agreeing to Afzal's proposal of an interview, pro- vided that the Khan gave him a solemn assurance of safety. Gopinath *s real mission was to find out the strength of Afzal's army and other useful in- formation about it and learn for himself what the Khan's real aim was. Through Gopinath Shiva vowed that no harm would be done to Afzal during the interview, and Afzal, on his part, gave similar assurances of his honesty of purpose. But Gopinath learnt by a liberal. USg__of. .bribes that Afzal's officers were convinced that "he had so arranged matters that Shiva would be arrested at the interview, as he was too cunning to be caught by open fight." (Sabh. 18.) On his return, Gopinath told it all to Shiva and urged him to anticipate the treacherous attack on himself by murdering Afzal at a lonely meeting and then sur- prising his army. (Sabh. 16-18; Chit. 55-58; Dig. 159-164.) Shiva, taking the hint from Gopinath, feigned terror and refused to visit Wai, unless the Khan met hi»i nearer home and personally promised him safety and future protection. Afzal agreed to make this concession. By Shiva's orders a path was cut 70 SHIVAJI. [CH. III. through the dense forest all the way from Wai to Pratapgarh and food and drink were kept ready for the Bijapur army at various points of it. By way of the Radtondi pass (below 'Bombay Point' of the Mahabaleshwar plateau), Afzal Khan marched to Par, a village lying one mile below Pratapgarh on the south, and his men encamped there in scattered groups, deep down in the valley near every pool of water at the source of the Koyna. Gopinath was sent up the hill to report the Khan's arrival. The meeting was arranged to take place next day. The place chosen for the interview was the crest of an eminence, below the fort of Pratapgarh, and overlooking the valley of the Koyna. On both sides of the forest-path leading up the hill-side to the pavilion picked soldiers were posted in ambush at intervals by Shivaji. Here he erected tents and set up a richly decorated canopy with gorgeous carpets and cushions worthy of a royal guest. f Then he prepared himself for the meeting. [ Under his tunic he wore a coat of chain armour V and below his turban he placed a steel cap for the Tafotection of the skull. What offensive arms he had, nobody could see ; but concealed in his left hand was a set of steel claws (baghnakfi) fastened to the fingers by a pair of rings, and up his right sleeve lay hidden a thin sharp dagger called the scorpion (bichwa.) His companions were only two, but both men of extraordinary courage and 1659] AFZAL AT MEETING-PLACE. 71 agility, — Jiv Mahala, an expert swordsman, and Shambhuji Kavji, the murderer of Hanumant Rao More. Each of them carried two swords and a shield. As the party was about to descend from the fort a saintly female figure appeared in their midst. It was Jija Bai. Shiva bowed to his mother. She blessed him saying, ' 'Victory be yours ! ' ' and solemnly charged his companions to keep him safe ; they vowed obedience. Then they walked down to the foot of the fort and waited. §9. Interview between Shiva and Afzal. Meanwhile Afzal Khan had started from his camp at Par, with a strong escort of more than a thousand musketeers. Gopinath objected to it, saying that such a display of force would scare away Shiva from the interview, and that the Khan should, therefore, take with himself only two body- guards exactly as Shiva had done. So, he left his troops some distance behind and made his way up the hill-path in a palki accompanied by two soldiers and a famous swordsman named Sayyid Banda, as well as the two Brahman envoys, Gopinath and Krishnaji. Arrived in the tent, Afzal Khan angrily remarked on its princely furniture and decorations as far above the proper style of a jagirdars son. But Gopinath soothed him by saying that all these rich things would soon go to the Bijapur palace as the first fruits of Shiva's submission. 72 SHIVAJI. [CH. HI. Messengers were sent to hurry up Shiva, who was waiting below the fort. He advanced slowly, then halted on seeing Sayyid Banda, and sent to demand that the man should be removed from the tent. This was done, and at last Shiva ji entered the pavilion. On each side four men were present, — the principal, two armed retainers and an envoy. But Shiva was seemingly unarmed,* like a rebel who had come to surrender, while the Khan had his sword at his side. The attendants stood below. Shiva mounted the raised platform and bowed to Afzal. The Khan rose from his seat, advanced a few steps, and opened his arms to receive Shiva in his embrace. The short J slim Maratha nnly^rgrp** up t-n thf> shon^^rfT of his I opponent. Suddenly Afzal tightened his clasp, and held Shiva's neck in his left arm with an iron grip, while with his right hand he drew his long straight- bladed dagger and struck at the side of Shiva. The hidden armour rendered the blow harmless. Shiva groaned in agony as he felt himself being strangled. But in a moment he recovered from the surprise, passed his left arm round the Khan's waist and tore his bowels open with a blow of the steel claws. Then with the right hand he drove the bichwa into * Khafi Khan, ii. 117, states that both Afzal and Shivaji came to the interview unarmed. But \amar wa karda> with no sword girt on the waist," was the customary attitude of the defeated party, so often described in Persian histories. V 1659] AFZAL KHAN KILLED. 73 Afzals side. The wounded man relaxed his hold, and Shivaji wrested himself free, jumped down from the platform, and ran towards his own men outside. The Khan cried out, "Treachery ! Murder ! Help ! Help!" The attendants ran up from both sides. Sayyid Banda faced Shiva with his long straight sword and cut his turban in twain, making a deep dint in the steel cap beneath. Shiva quickly took a rapier from Jiv Mahala and began to parry. But Jiv Mahala came round with his other sword, hacked off the right arm of the Sayyid, and then killed him. Meanwhile the bearers had placed the wounded Khan in his palki, and started for his camp. But Shambhuji Kavji slashed at their legs, made them drop the palki, and then cut off Afzals head, which he carried in triumph to Shiva.* §10. Afzals army routed and plundered. Freed from danger, Shivaji and his two comrades then made their way to the summit of Pratapgarhj and fired a cannon. This was the signal for whichl his troops were waiting in their ambush,,, in the valleys below. At once the armies of Moro Trimbak and Netaji Palkar and the thousands of Mavles * The head was buried beneath a tower (called Abdullah burj) in an outwork on the south-eastern side of the lower fort. A short distance from it is the temple of Bhavani built by Shivaji. (Bom. Gaz. xix, 546-547.) For illustrations, see Parasnis's Mahabaleshwar, 143 and 144. 74 SHIVAJI. [CH. III. rushed on the Bijapuri camp from four sides. Afzal's officers and soldiers alike were panic-stricken at the news of their chief's death and this unexpected attack, in that unknown region, where every bush seemed to be alive with enemies. But the way of escape was closed and they had perforce to fight. For three hours many of the entrapped soldiers made a desperate defence, evidently in isolated groups, without any common plan or superior guidance. The Marathas fought on their own ground, in the full flush of their initial triumph, confident of succour close behind, and led by eminent chiefs. The carnage in the Bijapuri army was terrible. "All who begged quarters holding grass between their teeth were spared, the rest were put to the sword." (3000 men were killed, according to the report that (^reached the English factory at Rajapur a few days later.) The Mavle infantry hacked at the fleeing elephants, "severing the tails, breaking the tusks, or chopping off the legs." Even camels were cut down as they crossed the path of the assailants. The booty taken was immense : all the artillery, waggons, ammunition, treasure, tents and equipage, transport-cattle and baggage of an entire army, fell into the victors' hands. Among them were 65 elephants, 4,000 horses, 1,200 camels, 2,000 bundles of clothing, and 10 lakhs of Rupees in cash and jewellery. The prisoners included one sardar of high rank, two sons of Afzal, and two Maratha chiefs namely 1659] DEFEAT OF AFZAL's ARMY. 75 Lambaji Bhonsla and Jhujhar Rao Ghatge. All the captured women and children ,(Brahmans and_c&mj> f olio weraf were immediately released. One section of the beaten army, consisting of Afzal Khan's wives and eldest son, Fazl Khan, escaped round the source of the Koyna, under the guidance of Khandoji Khopde and his 300 Mavle friendlies.* A grand review was held by Shivaji below Pratapgarh. The captured enemy, both officers and men, were set free and sent back to their homes with money, food and other gifts. The Maratha soldiers who had fought so gallantly were rewarded ; if the fallen warriors had grown-up sons, they were enlisted in their fathers' places ; if otherwise, their widows were given pensions amounting to half their pay. The wounded received rewards ranging from 25 to 200 hun according to the severity of their hurt. The officers were presented with elephants, horses, robes, jewellery and grants of land. (Sabh. 25.) * Meeting with Afzal Khan : Sabh. 19-21 ; Chit. 60-62; Dig. 165-169; T. S. 16a— 17b; A. N. 577; Dilkasha, 19; K. K. ii. 116-118; Rajapur Factory Records; Fryer, ii. 61; Powadas, 12-18; Shed. 29-30. Plunder of his army: Sabh. 23-24; Chit. 62; Dig. 170; T. S. 17b; Powadas, 19-20; Shed. 31-32. Escape of Fazl Khan: Sabh. 24; Chit. 62; Dig. 170-171. Tarikh-i-Ali Adil Shah II., 76-81, contains a maximum of mere words and rhetorical flourishes but few facts. B. S. 352 is even more meagre in details, but concise. Chit. 62 says that Khandoji Khopde was beheaded by Shivaji; Dig. 171. 76 SHIVAJI. [CH. HI. § 11. Legends about Afzal Khan. The tragic fate of Afzal Khan has most pro- foundly stirred the popular imagination in his own country and in that of his enemy. At his village of AfzaJpura, close to Bijapur city, the gloomy legend sprang up that before starting on this fatal expedition, he had a premonition of his coming end, and killed and bungij^M^.^L wives, lest they should share another's bed after his death. The peasants still point to the height from which these hapless victims of man's jealousy were hurled into a deep pool of water, the channel through which their drowned bodies were dragged out with hooks, the place where they were shrouded, and the 63 tombs, of the same shape, size and age, standing close together in regular rows on the same platform, where they were laid in rest. Utter desolation has settled on the spot. Where his mansion once stood with its teeming population, the traveller now beholds a lonely wilderness of tall grass, brambles and broken buildings, the fittest emblem of his ruined greatness. The only form of life visible is the solitary bird, startled by the un- wonted presence of a human visitor.* Other traditions / tell us that i|l-f>mf»ng dogged his steps from the very ^p^itset of his campaign against Shivaji. (Shed. 24 ; Powadas, 7, 11.) * This was the appearance of Afzalpura when I visited it in Oct., 1916. 1659] MARATHI BALLAD ON AFZAL. 77 § 12. Ballad of Afzal Khan. Among the Marathas the destruction of Afzal Khan caused the wildest exultation ; it marked the dawn of their national independence. The defeat of Bijapur was complete : the chief had fallen, his army had ceased to exist, and the victory, both in respect of carnage and of booty, was the most complete possible. The incident caught hold of the public imagination of Maharashtra as the most glorious event in the history of the race. Soon a ballad was coitPN posed by the wandering bards {gondhalis) which ex-/ panded the contest into a Homeric duel with all its) details and supernatural adjuncts. Every class or Marathas, from the officers of Shambhuji's Court to the soldiers in their camps and the peasants in their hamlets, welcomed the minstrel and crowded together to listen to this story of the first triumph of their national hero, set forth with graphic details which made the whole scene live before their eyes. The short ringing lines of the ballad (powada) almost reproduce the tramp of the soldiery, the journeys of the rival chiefs, their meeting, the exchange of taunts, the death-grapple, and the triumph of the Maratha army. As the bard's narrative passes rapidly from stage to stage of the whole contest, the audience follow him with breathless attention ; their blood courses in unison with the verses, and they are wound up to a high pitch of excitement as the spirit of the actual march or fight catches them. To the Marathas the fight with Afzal has always 78 SHIVAJI. [CH. III. i/1 appeared as at once a war of national liberation and a crusade against the desecrator of temples. To them Afzal Khan typifies__the-bold bad man, who combines treachery with f rightfulness, and defies God and man alike. Their historians from the earliest times have seen no element of murder in the incident, but always described it as a glorious example of the sagacity, courage and agility with which their national hero averted a treacherous plot against his own life, made the treachery recoil on the plotter's head, and avenged the outraged shrines of their gods. Shivaji's laureate, Bhushan, calls the slaughter of Afzal a righteous deed of retribution like the slaughter of the licentious ruffian Kichak by Bhim in single combat. A very late legend regards it as a blood-feud waged by Shiva for the treacherous slaughter of his elder brother Shambhuji by the qiladar of Kanakgiri at the instigation of Afzal Khan. (Dig. 61-62 ; Chit. 23 ; Powadas, 15.)* Flushed with their victory over Afzal Khan (September, 1659) and the destruction of his army, the Marathas poured into South Konkan and the Colhapur district, capturing the fort of Panhala, defeating another Bijapuri army, and making exten- sive conquests (Oct., 1659 — Feb., 1660), which will * Is the remark "As he slew Shambhuji," ascribed to Shivaji in Sabh. 14, an interpolation? That history is otherwise absolutely silent about Shivaji's elder brother and totally ignores him. 1659] CRITICISM OF EVIDENCE. 79. be described in Chapter X. But in the April following, Shivaji wa^_rjgcajled_by a dangerous^ attack on hisj own dominions by a combination of enemies. APPENDIX II. Affair of Afzal Khan. Was the slaying of Afzal Khan a treacherous murder or an act of self-defence on the part of Shivaji? No careful student of the sources can deny that Afzal Khan intended to arrest or kill Shivaji by treachery at the interview. The absolutely contem- porary and impartial English factory record (Rajapur letter, 10 Oct. 1659) tells us that Afzal Khan was instructed by his Government to secure Shivaji by "pretending friendship with him" as he could not be resisted by armed strength, and that the latter, learning of the design, made the intended treachery recoil on the Khan's head. This exactly supports the Marathi chronicles on the point that Shivaji's spies learnt from Afzal' s officers of the Khan's plan to arrest him by treachery at the pretended interview, and that Afzal 's envoy Krishnaji Bhaskar was also induced to divulge this secret of his master. Who struck the first blow at the interview? The old Maratha chroniclers (as distinct from the English- educated 20th century apologists of the national hero) 80 SH1VAJI. [CH. HI. all assert that it was Afzal. These genuine old historians never shrink from charging Shivaji with murder or treachery whenever they know him to be really guilty. They wrote long before Grant Duff's book had roused public indignation against Shivaji's alleged murder of an invited guest. It is, therefore, impossible to contend that the story of Afzal having struck the first blow was an invention of the modern Marathas after English education had wakened their conscience to the enormity of pre-meditated political murders. Sabhasad (1694) and Chitnis (1810) at least Cannot be suspected of any design to whitewash their hero's character by falsifying history. In saying / that Afzal_jslruck -the first blow, they truly record a genuine old tradition and not a modern nationalist V invention. ^ The point is further supported by Shivaji's letter to Ramdas in which he says that he gained strength by uttering thename of hisgurujyhile he was feeling himself being strangled in Afzal 's grip. A disem- bowelled man cannot give his adversary a deadly hug, and therefore Afzal was unwounded when he seized Shivaji in his clasp. But I am not at present sure about the genuineness of this letter. Shivaji's elaborate protection of his person before going to the interview and his placing an J ambush round Afzal 's forces cannot be taken as proofs of a treacherous intention. Secret assassination is the favourite weapon of decadent monarchies, and many~Yuch murdersTiad taken place in the sultanates 1659] WHY AFZAL WAS KILLED. 81 of the Deccan before this time, as I showed in detail in the Modern Review, (vol. I. 1907.) Shivaji was fully convinced — and with good reason, as we know, — that Afzal meant treachery. He would have been wanting in common prudence if he had not taken these precautions to save himself. A friend (Prof. A. Rahman) has asked me, "If Afzal meant treachery why did he not keep his troops in readiness for delivering an assault or at least for defending themselves?" My answer is that Afzal believed that the death of Shivaji would lead to the immediate collapse of his upstart power and' no attack on his leaderless troops would be necessary. He was, moreover, ignorant of the position and strength of the enemy's forces and did not know that two large Maratha_ .armies _ had arrived ... by _ rapid marches in his neighbourhood. The weight of recorded evidence as well as the probabilities of the case supports he view that Afzal Khan struck the first blow and that Shivaji only committed what Burke calls, a 'preventive murder'. CHAPTER IV. Strenuous Warfare, 1660-1664. § 1 . Shaista Khan sent against Shivaji. Among the administrative changes made by Aurangzib at his second coronation (July, 1659) was the posting of Shaista Khan to the viceroyalty of the Deccan, in the place of Prince Muazzam. This able and spirited general had already governed Malwa and the Deccan and had taken a distinguished part in Aurangzib's recent invasion of Golkonda. Chief among the tasks entrusted to him was the suppression of Shivaji. And in discharging this duty he was for- tunate enough to secure the hearty co-operation of Bijapur, which forced the Maratha chief to divide his army into two and therefore to be defeated in both the theatres of war. After Shivaji had followed up his victory over Afzal Khan's leaderless army by defeating the com- bined forces of Rustam-i-Zaman and Fazl Khan, and taking Panhala in the Kolhapur district and many places in Ratnagiri, AH Adil Shah II. felt it necessary to march in person against the audacious rebel. But -' just at this time Siddi Jauhar, an Abyssinian slave who had usurped the fief of Karnul and defied the royal authority, wrote to Bijapur offering to make his submission if his position Were recognised. The 1660] SIDDI JAUHAR AGAINST SHIVA. 83 Sultan agreed, gave Jauhar the title of Salabat Khan, and sent him with an army to put down Shiva. The^l campaign was opened about May 1660, the month in J which Shivaji also lost the Puna district in the north I to the Mughals. Jauhar easily swept away the Maratha resistance in the open, and drove Shivaji into Panhala, which he closely invested. §2. Shivaji besieged in Panhala fort. The siege dragged on for nearly four months ; all the paths of ingress and egress were closed to the garrison. Shivaji found himself in a fatal trap. So, he wrote a secret letter to Jauhar, deceitfully begging his protection and offering to make an alliance with him. In order to negotiate for the terms ^^ he asked for a passport. Jauhar, "who was both fool and traitor," swallowed the bait ; he assured Shivaji of his protection, gave him a safe conduct, and flattered himself that with Shiva for an ally he would be able to create a kingdom of his own in independ- ence of Adil Shah. Next day Shivaji with only two or three followers visited Jauhar at midnight, and was received in darbar. After oaths of co-operation had been taken on both sides, Shivaji returned quickly to the fort, and the pretended siege was continued. When the news of Jauhars treacherous coquet- ting with Shiva reached the ears of Ali Adil Shah, that king burst into anger and left his capital (5th August) "to punish both the rebels." An envoy was 84 SHIVAJi. [CH. IV, sent to bring Jauhar back to the right path, but the mission was a failure. When, however, Ali reached Miraj and his Vanguard advanced beyond it still nearer to Panhala, Shivaji slipped out of the fort one night with his family and 5 to 6 thousand soldiers, and Panhala returned to Adil Shah's possession with- out a blow (about 25th August, 1660.) As the Bijapur Court-poet sang in exultation, "Ali took Panhala from Salabat in a twinkle." (Tarikfi~i~Ali, 82-93 ; B. S. 353-357 ; F. R. Rajapur, Kolhapur to Surat, dated 5 June, 1660. Chit. 64 ; Dig. 175-176 ; T. S. 18b-19a.) Shiva's escape from the fort was soon detected, and a strong Bijapuri force under Jauhar's son Siddi Aziz and Afzal Khan's son Fazl Khan set out in pursuit of him. On reaching a narrow ravine (probably near Malkapur), Shiva left 5 thousand men there under Baji Pradhu (the deshpande of Hardis Maval) with orders to hold the mouth of the pass at all costs till the main body of the fugitives had reached Vishalgarh. The Bijapuris delivered three bloody assaults on the heroic rear-guard, all of which were beaten off. But when at last the gun-fire from Vishalgarh gave the anxiously expected signal that Shivaji had reached safety within its walls, the gallant Baji Prabhu was lying mortally wounded with 700 of his followers. The faithful servant had done his appointed duty. The Bijapuris declined to besiege Vishalgarh, and retired to their own territory, after recovering Pavan- garh and some other forts in addition to Panhala. 1660] MUGHAL INVASION OF PUNA. 85 Shiva retained in that quarter only the forts of Ran- gana and Vishalgarh.* In the same month, almost in the same week, in which Shivaji lost Panhala in the extreme south of his dominions, his arms met with another disaster in the extreme north. On 15th August, his Fort of j Chakan, 18 miles north of Puna, was captured by the Mughals. To explain how it happened, we shall have to trace the course of the war in that quarter from its commencement. §3. Shaista Khan occupies Puna. Early in 1660, Shaista Khan opened the campaign against Shivaji from the north, after arranging for an attack upon the Maratha dominions by the Bijapuris from the south at the same time. Leaving Ahmad - nagar with a vast army on 25th February, the Khan marched southwards along the eastern side of the Puna district, methodically capturing and garrisoning all the strongholds that guarded the approaches to PunaorTTtie"~east and south. The Marathas at first retreated before him with- out risking a battle. By way of Sonwadi (close to the Dhond railway station) and Supa (16 miles s. w. •Chit. 64-65; Dig. 182-185; T. S. 19a & b; the name of Siddi Aziz is given by Duff (i. 181) only, while T. S. reads Siddi Halal. The Persian works are absolutely silent about this retreat. Vishalgarh is 27 miles from Panhala via Malkapur. (Ind. At. 40 S. W.) 86 SHIVAJI. [CH. IV. of Dhond), he reached Baramati (18 miles s. e. of Supa) on 5th April. At the last two places were mud-forts which the enemy had evacuated. He next worked his way westwards up the valley of the Nira river, by way of Hoi, reaching Shirwal, 26 miles south of Puna, on 18th April. Like a wise general, Shaista Khan left detachments at all these outposts, to guard his line of communicatiorra!iSTh"6id the forts. A flying column sent from Shirwal sacked the villages round Rajgarh (22 miles due west.) From Shirwal the Mughal army moved along the Nira river 16 miles northwards to Shivapur (near Khed), and thence due eastwards through Garara, arriving at Saswad (13 miles east of Shivapur and 16 miles south-east of Puna) on 1st May. / Up to this point the Mughal advance had been Xmopposed, the Marathas_^)trily .hovering at a distance / to cut off supplies and skirmishing with the foraging I parties. They made their first stand near the pass leading from Shivapur to Garara. On 30th April a body of 3,000 Maratha cavalry threatened the Mughal rear-guard under Rao Bhao Singh, but were attacked and routed after a long fight. From Saswad a small Mughal detachment raided the villages at the foot of Purandar fort. They were attacked by 3,000 of the enemy, but held their ground by fighting desperately at close quarters, though they lost 50 in killed and wounded. Reinforcements arrived, routed the enemy, and pursued them to the pass which was commanded by the guns of Purandar. 1660] SHAISTA khan's SUCCESS. 87 The Mughals, flushed with victory, cleared the pass at a gallop, in the teeth of a hot fire from the fort- walls, and dispersed the enemy assembled beyond it. The victors returned to their camp at Saswad in the evening. Thence, after a four days' halt at Rajwah, they entered Puna on 9th May. Meantime, a force 3,000 strong, detached by Shaista Khan under Ismail, had occupied North Konkan, and that district was now placed under a Mughal faujdar (Salabat Khan Deccani) with a contin- gent of Maratha friendlies, among whom Babaji Bhonsla and Raghuji are mentioned in the official history of Aurangzib (A. N. 584), while the Chitnis Bakhar (p. 97) speaks of Shambhuji Kavji and Babaji Ram Honap, deshpande of Puna, as having joined the Mughals. (A. N. 578-588, our only authority.) §4. Shaista Khan captures Chakan. Shaista Khan had decided to pass the rainy season with his army at Puna, then a small hamlet. But before his arrival there, the enemy had totally destroy ed_the grain and fodder in the country rour^ Puna and Chakan and removed all traces of habita- tion— And now the~rnany rivers between Puna and the Mughal frontier being in flood, no provision reached his camp, and his army had to undergo great hardship from scarcity. He, therefore, decided to remove his camp from Puna to Chakan, 18 miles northwards, as being nearer to Ahmadnagar and the 88 SHIVAJI. [CH. IV. Mughal dominion, whence supplies could more easily reach him. (A. N. 584-'5.) Oinknnji Q_plnrft of £TP«t strategic, itripnrtancft . On the east it is separated from the imperial terri- tory by the shallow upper courses of the Bhima and Ghod rivers only, with no difficult mountain pass to cross. Its possession would have greatly shortened Shaista Khan's line of communication with his base of supplies at Ahmadnagar and also secured his camp against any attack from the north. Moreover, Chakan is only 31 miles due east of the Bhorghat pass and commands the shortest route leading from Ahmad- na^far^rf^oIiEarr Leaving Puna on 19th June, the Khan arrived in the vicinity of Chakan on the 21st, reconnoitred the fort and distributed the lines of investment among his officers. The fort of Chakan is a square enclosure with bastioned fronts and towers at the four corners. The walls are high, with a ditch 30 ft. deep and 15 ft. wide all around. The only entrance is in the eastern face, and passes through five or six gateways. Beyond the walls there is an outwork of mud with a ditch, the remnant of a very old fortification. (Bom. Gaz. xviii. pt. iii., p. 121 ; Ind. Antiq. ii. 43, iv. 352.) Shaista Khan, after throwing up defensive earth- works round the positions taken up by the four divi- sions of his army, began to run trenches towards the fort- walls, construct raised platforms at suitable points, and mount on them large pieces of artillery brought from the Mughal forts in the Deccan. 1660] CHAKAN FORT STORMED. 89 Though the heavy showers of the rainy season ham- pered his work and the defenders kept up a galling fire, he pressejd^the siege vigorously. After 54 days of hard |abour a min^ was carried from his own position in the north to under the tower at the north- eastern corner, and it was exploded at 3 P.M. on 14th August, 1660. The work and its defenders were blown away ; the Mughals rushed to the assault, but found to their surprise that behind the breach the enemy had thrown up a high embankment of earth which they held in force and from the shelter of which they assailed the Mughals with rockets, musket- shots, bombs and stones. The storming party was checked with heavy loss, but clung to the blood- stained ground for the night. Next morning (15th August) they resumed the attack, scaled the wall, and captured the main fort, putting many of the garrison to the sword and driving the rest into the citadel. In a short time even the last-named work capitulated. But the imperialists had to purchase their victory at a heavy price, losing 268 killed and 600 wounded. (A. N. 585-588 ; Chit. 97 ; Dig. 216.) Firangji Narsala, an old officer of the days of Shahji, had been left by Shiva in charge of Chakan, with orders to hold out as long as he could, but to surrender when driven to extremities, because it was impossible for Shiva, then battling with the Bijapuris near Panhala, to divert any force for the relief of Chakan, 140 miles away in the north. For nearly 90 SHIVAJI. [CH. IV. two months Firangji had defended his post with tire- less energy, "incessantly showering shots, bullets and rockets at the besiegers." He had disputed every inch of the ground on the two days of assault. And now, hopeless of his master's aid (Dig. 217), he capi- tulated with honour. Shaista Khan greatly admired the gallant qiladar and pressed him to enter the imperial service on high pay. But Firangji refused to prove false to his salt, and was allowed to go back to Shivaii with his army.* §5. Desultory fighting, 1661-63. The capture of Chakan was followed by the return of Shaista Khan to Puna, where he took up his residence, while his detachments continued to improve the Mughal hold on N. Konkan. This long period of inactivity on the part of the Mughal viceroys main army has been very plausibly ascribed by Grant Duff (i. 194) to reluctance on the part of Shaista Khan to face again the heavy loss inevitable in the siege of Maratha hill-forts. The next time that we hear of the Mughals is * According to Dilkasha, 37, Shivaji had not more than 3,000 cavalry and 5,000 infantry, when besieged in Panhala. Chitnis Bakhar, 97, says that Firangji on returning to Shivaji was at once sent to Bhupalgarh as qiladar. But Digvijay, 217 ', says that, on being dismissed by Shiva for capitulating to a Muslim, Firangji in disgust joined Shaista Khan, who made him a 5-sadi and thanahdar of Malkargaon (parganah Chakan), but Shivaji brought him back by force through Netaji Palkar. 1663] DESULTORY WAR WITH MUGHALS. 91 in the earlier part of 1661, when they took posses- sion of Kalian Bhiundy. Shivaji was reported to be making preparations for recovering these posts during the following rainy season. But either the attempt was not made or it failed, for these two places con- tinued in the hands of the Mughals till February 1670, when the Marathas once more got possession of them. (Dil. 37-38 ; Orme MSS. vol. 155, pp. 1-21.) For more than two years after these successes the Mughals kept their grip on the northern portion of Shivaji's dominions. Of these minor operations we have no exact information either from Persian or from Marathi sources. In March 1663, the Mughals gave a long and vigorous chase to Netaji, the Master of the Horse in Shiva's army. He had led his cavalry in a raid into the imperial territory, but a Mughal force of 7,000 horse pursued him so closely that "he was fain to travel 45 or 50 miles a day and yet [had] much ado to escape with a small [part of the] booty he had got. They left not the pursuit till they came within five leagues of Bijapur." But Rustam-i-Zaman met the Mughals and induced them to give up the pursuit, "by telling them that the country was dangerous for any strange army to march in and also promising to go himself and follow him, by which deceit Netaji got away, though not without loss of 300 horse and himself wounded." (F. R. Surat, vol. 103, Gyffard to Surat, 30 March, and 8 April 1663.) But within a month of meeting with this reverse to 92 SHIVAJI. [CH. IV. his arms, Shivaji dealt a masterly blow at the Mughals, — a blow whose cleverness of design, neat- ness of execution and completeness of success created in the Mughal Court and camp as much terror of his prowess and belief in his possession of magical powers, as his coup against Afzal Khan had done among the Bijapuris. He surprised and wounded \j/t\ie Mughal viceroy of the Deccan in the heart of his camp, in his very bed-chamber, within the inner ring of his bodyguards and female slaves.* §6. Shivaji's night-attack on Shaista Khan. Shaista Khan had, as we have seen, seized Puna in May 1 660 and retired there after the fall of Chakan in August next. He took up his residence in what was then the best house of the future Maratha capital, the unpretentious home of Shivaji's childhood. His harem was with him, and around his mansion lay the quarters of his guards and attendants, the band- room and offices. Further off, across the road leading southwards to Singh-garh lay the camp of his lieute- nant, Maharajah Jaswant Singh and his contingent of 10,000 men. * Night-attack on Shaista Khan : the earliest records are Gyffard to Sural 12 April, 24 May, 1663 (F. R. Sural, vol. 103) containing Shivaji's own version; Bernier, 187; A. N. 819 (only one sentence!); Storia, ii. 104-106; Sabh. 35-37; Dil. 44-46. Khafi Khan (ii. 172-*5) reports the narration of his father, a servant of Shaista Khan, and has been followed by Grant Duff, but Khafi Khan wrote after 1730. Chit. 98-100; Dig. 220-224; T. 5. 19b-20a. Zedhe Chron. for date. 1663] SHIVA ENTERS SHAlSTA's CAMP. 93 The enterprise required no less agility and cunning than braverjc_aiid--da«h. Shivaji picked out a thousand of his bravest and most expert soldiers and took them with him, while two supporting divi- sions of one thousand each (including cavalry and Mavles) under Netaji Palkar and Moro Pant the Peshwa, were directed to take post on the two flanks of the vast Mughal encampment, at a mile's distance from its outer side. Babaji Bapuji and Chimnaji Bapuji, of Khed, accompanied Shiva as his body- guards and right-hand men in this enterprise. The Maratha force, lightly equipped, set out from Singh-garh, covered the intervening eleven miles rapidly in the course of the day, and arrived at Puna after nightfall. With 400 picked men Shivaji entered the limits of the camp, replying to the challenge of the Mughal guards that they were Deccani soldiers of the imperial army going to take up their appointed j>osts. After resting for a few hours in some obscure corner of the camp, the party arrived near the Khans quarters at midnight. Shiva knew the ins and outs of the city and every nook and corner of the house where he had passed his boyhood and youth. It was Ramzan, the month of fasting for Muslims. The servants of the NawalTs household had mostly fallen asleep after their day's abstinence followed by the heavy meal at night. Some cooks who had risen from bed to make a fire and prepare the meal which is taken a little before dawn in the 94 SHIVAJI. [CH. IV. month of Ramzan, were despatched by the Marathas without the least noise being made. The wall divid- ing this outer kitchen from the body-servants' room within the harem once had a small door in it, but the opening had been closed with brick and mud to complete the seclusion of the harem. The Marathas began to take out the bricks and make an opening there. The noise of their pick-axes and the groans of the dying awoke some of the servants, who reported the suspicious noise to the Khan, but that general only rebuked them for disturbing his sleep for a trifle. Soon the breach in the wall was large enough for a man to creep through. Shivaji, with his trusty lieutenant Chimnaji Bapuji, was the first to enter the harem, and was followed by 200 of his men. The place was a maze of canvas, screen- wall after screen- wall and enclosure within enclosure. Hacking a way through them with his sword, Shivaji reached the very bed-room of the Khan. The frightened women roused the Nawab, but before he could use bis weapons Shivaji was upon him and severed his thumb with one stroke of his sword. It was evidently at this time that the lamps in the room were put out by some wise woman. In the darkness two of the Marathas tumbled into a cistern of water ; and the confusion that followed was used by Shaista Khan's slaVe-girls to carry him away to a place of safety. The Marathas continued their work of slaughter in the darkness for some time, killing and 1663] NIGHT ATTACK ON SHAISTA. 95 wounding eight of the Khan's women, probably without knowing their sex. Meantime the other half of Shivaji's force, the 200 men, evidently under Babaji Bapuji, who had been left outside the harem, had rushed the main guard, slaying the sleepers and the awake and crying in derision, "Is it thus that you keep watch?" They next entered the band-room and ordered the bands- men, as if from the Khan, to play. The loud noise of the kettle-drums drowned all voices, and the yells of the enemy swelled the confusion. The tumult in the harem, too, now became so great that the Mughal troops became aware that their general was being attacked. Shouting "The enemy have come," they began to take up their arms. Abul Fath, a son of Shaista Khan, had been the first to hasten to his father's rescue without waiting for others ; but the brave youth was slain after he had struck down two or three Marathas. Another Mughal captain who lodged just behind the harem enclosure, finding its gate closed from within by the wily Marathas, let himself down inside by means of a rope-ladder ; but he was at once attacked and killed. Shivaji, finding his enemies fully awakened and arming, delayed no longer, but promptly left the harem, called his men together, and withdrew from the camp by the direct route, while the Mughals, not knowing where their enemies were, fruitlessly searched all their camp. rX 96 SHIVAJl. [CH. IV. jYhis night-attack was a complete success. The retreat from the camp was unmolested and no pur- suit was made. During the surprise the Marathas lost only six men killed and forty wounded, while they slew a son and a captain of Shaista Khan's, 40 of his attendants and six of his wives and slave- girls, besides wounding two other sons, eight other women and Shaista Khan himself. (Gyffard to Surat.) The daring and cunning of the Maratha hero were rewarded by an immense increase of his prestige^ He was taken to be an incarnation of Satan ; no place was believed to be proof against his entrance and no feat impossible for him. The whole country talked with astonishment and terror of the almost superhuman deed done by him ; and there was bitter humiliation and sorrow in the Emperor's Court and family circle at this disaster to his maternal uncle and the "premier peer" (amir-ul- umara) of his empire. This attack took place on 5th April, 1663. The morning following it, all the imperial officers came to Shaista Khan to condole with him in his loss. Among them was Maharajah Jaswant Singh, who had not raised a finger to defend his chief or to oppose the retreat of his assailant, though he had 10,000 horse under him and lay encamped across the road taken by Shivaji. Shaista Khan, with the polished sneer of a high-bred Mughal courtier, turned to Jaswant and merely remarked, "When the enemy fell upon 1663] SHAISTA KHAN DISGRACED. 97 me, I imagined that you had already died fighting against them!" Indeed, the public, both in the Mughal camp and throughout the Deccan, ascribed Shivaji's exploit to the connivance of Jaswant. Shivaji, however, asserted that this astonishing feat was performed by him under the inspiration of his God and not of any human counsellor. Immediately after his return from it, he wrote to Raoji Rao, his agent at Rajapur, boasting how he had been the chief actor in this business and had himself wounded Shaista Khan. The Mughal viceroy, covered with shame and grief, retired to Aurangabad for greater safety. The Emperor heard of the disaster early in May, when on the way to Kashmir, and ascribed it to the viceroy's negligence and incapacity. As a mark of his dis pleasure, he transferred Shaista Khan to the govern- ment of Bengal, (1 Dec. 1663) which was the regarded as a penal province, or in Aurangzib's own words7~"a hell well stocked with bread," without permitting him even to visit the Emperor on his way to his new charge. The Khan left the Deccan about the middle of January 1664, on being relieved by Prince Muazzam. §7. Surat described. While this change of governors was going on at Aurangabad, ShiVaji peifuinied a feafc of even greater audacity than he had ever displayed before. From 6th to 10th January he looted the city of Surat, 7 98 SHIVAJI. [CH. IV. the richest port of the west coast and "the gateway to the holy places of Arabia" for Indian Muslims, who here embarked for the pilgrimage to Mecca. The fort of Surat stood on the south bank of the Tapti, 12 miles from the sea. It was impregnable to a body of light raiders like Shiva's troopers. But tj*£ city xclose to the fort offerejcL a rich and def ejiceJess prize . It had, at that time, no wall to protect it. Its wealth was boundless. The imperial customs alone yieldeTH-a — revenue of 12 lakhs of Rupees a year (in 1666, ace. to Thevenot, v. 81.) The city of Surat covered nearly four square miles, including gardens and open spaces, and had a population of 200,000 souls. The streets were narrow and crooked ; the houses of the rich were near the river-side and substantially built ; but the town was mainly composed of poor men's huts built of wooden posts and bamboo walls and with floors plastered with mud. "In the greater part of the town scarcely two or three brick-houses were to be seen in a street, and in some parts... not one for many streets together. The whole town was un- fortified either by art or nature and its situation was upon a large plain of many miles' extent. They had only made against the chief avenues of the town some weak and ill-built gates [more for show than for defence.] In some parts there was a dry ditch easily passable by a footman, with no wall on the inner side. The rest was left so open that scarcely any sign of a ditch was perceivable." (Bom. Gaz., 1664] FIRST PANIC IN SURAT. 99 ii. 301, 90-91 ; Letter from the English chaplain Escaliot to Sir T. Browne, in Ind. Antiq. viii. 256.) Early in the morning of Tuesday, 5th January, 3664, Surat was suddenly alarmed by the news that Shivaji had arrived with an army at Gandavi, 28 miles southwards, and was advancing to plunder the town.* At once the people were seized with a panic, and began to flee away with their wives and children, mostly across the river, to save their lives. Rich men found shelter in the fort by bribing its commandant. Later in the day a courier brought the intelligence that Shivaji had come still nearer, and at night it was learnt that he had halted only five miles from Surat. Inayet Khan, the governor of the town — who was quite distinct from the commandant of the fort, — had sent out an agent to treat with Shiva for terms of ransom. But when he heard that the Maratha chief had detained the messenger and was approaching with all speed, he himself fled to the fort, leaving the town at the enemy's mercy. He used to draw from the Treasury the pay of 500 * First sack of Surat : The most minute details and graphic accounts are found in the factory records : Log of the Loyal Merchant (Orme MSS. vol. 263, pp. 23-24); F. R. Surat 2 (Surat Consult. 6 Jan., 1664), vol. 86 (Surat to Persia; Surat to Co. 18 and 28 Jan. and 4 April); Dutch Records, vol. 27, Nos. 711 and 719. Letter of Escaliot very valuable. Bernier. 188-190; Storia, ii. 29, 112, 120, 132, iv. 428. Sabh. 63 and Chit. 72 describe only the 2nd sack. B.S. 371; Ishwardas 52a. (A.N., K.K., and Tavernier silent.) 100 SHIVAJI. [CH. IV„ soldiers, but had so long appropriated the money without maintaining a proper force. His cowardice also prevented him from organising a defence or even from dying at his post. The townspeople were sheep worthy of such a shepherd. A population composed mostly of money-loving traders, poor artisans, punctilious fire- worshippers and tender-souled Jains, cannot readily take to war even in self-derence. The richest merchants, though owning millions of Rupees, had not the sense to hire guards for the protection of their wealth, though they might have done so at only a twentieth part of what they were soon to lose through pillage. § 8. Heroic defence of the English at Surat. The shame of this cowardice in high and low alike was deepened by the contrast afforded by the manly «pjrij_gf a h»n#Jfa| j>f foreigners. The English and Dutch merchants resolved to defend their own factories at all costs, though these were open houses, not built to stand an attack. They might have sought safety by escaping to their ships at Swally on the coast, 10 miles west of Surat ; but "it was thought more like Englishmen to make ourselves ready to defend our lives and goods to the uttermost than by a flight to leave money, goods, house to merciless people." / Sir George Oxenden, the English President, and 1664] DEFENCE OF ENGLISH FACYOHhiV ICM his Council stood at their posts in Surat, and im- provised a defence of the factory. They procured two small brass guns from a merchant in the town and four others from their own vessels. With the armed sailors promptly sent up from the English ships at Swally, they mustered in the factory 150 Englishmen and 60 peons, a total of 210 defenders. Four of the guns were mounted on the roof to scour two broad streets and command the large and lofty house of Haji Said Beg, adjacent to theirs. Two other guns were posted behind the front gate, in which port-holes were cut for firing into the passage leading to the factory. What provisions, water and powder could be got were hurriedly laid in. "Some were set to melt lead and make bullets, others with chisels to cut lead into slugs ; no hand idle but all employed to strengthen every place. Captains were appointed and every man quartered and order taken for reliev- ing one another upon necessity. To secure the approaches to the factory, the English went outside and took possession of a temple just under their house, and cleared it of its refugees, and also shut up a mosque on another side, whose windows looked into the outer courtyard of the factory. President Oxenden at the head of his 200 soldiers "drawn out in rank and file, with drum and trumpet," publicly marched through the town in the morning of the 6th, "declaring that he intended to withstand Shivaji with this handful of men." The Dutch, too, defended their house, though 402 SH1VAJI. [CH. IV. its distance of a mile from the English factory made mutual aid between the two nations impossible. The example of the Europeans also heartened a body of Turkish and Armenian merchants to defend their property in their serai, close to the English factory. § 9. First loot of Surat, 1664. Shivaji had been heard of at Bassein, four miles east of Bombay, only nine days before. But he had made a forced march to Surat with 4,000 men mounted on choice horses with such speed and secrecy that he was at Surat a day after his approach had been detected. His route lay by the forts of Nar-durg (probably Naldurg, s. w. of Nana Ghat), Mahuli, and Kohaj and then across the zamindaris of Jawhar, Ramnagar and Lakdar(?), north of the Thana district. Two Rajahs had joined him on the way with their contingents in the hope of sharing the plunder, and his army now mustered 10,000. At 1 1 o'clock in the morning of Wednesday, 6th January, 1664, Shivaji arrived at Surat and pitched his tent in a garden a quarter of a mile outside the Burhanpur or eastern gate. The night before he had sent two messengers with a letter requiring the governor and the three most eminent merchants and richest men in the city, viz., Haji Said Beg, Baharji Borah, and Haji Qasim, to come to him in person immediately and make terms, otherwise he threatened the whole town with fire and sword. No answer had been given to the demand, and the 1664] SURAT PLUNDERED AND BURNT. 103 Maratha horsemen, immediately after their arrival on the 6th, entered the defenceless and almost deserted\ city, and after sacking the houses began to set fire/ to them. A body of Shivajis musketeers was set "to play upon the castle, with no expectation to take it, but to keep in and frighten the governor and the rest that had got in, as also [to prevent] the soldiers of the castle from sallying out upon them whilst the others plundered and fired [the houses.]' The garrison kept up a constant fire, but the fort-guns inflicted more damage on the town than on the assailants. Throughout Wednesday, Thursday, Friday and Saturday, this work of devastation was continued, every day new fires being raised, so that thousands of houses were consumed to ashes and two-thirds of the town destroyed. As the English chaplain wrote, "Thursday and Friday nights were the most terrible nights for fire. The fire turned the night into day, as before the smoke in the day-time had turned day into night, rising so thick that it darkened the sun like a great cloud." Near the Dutch factory stood the grand mansion of Baharji Borahrthen "reputed the richest merchant in thT^Wortd;"Tiis property having been estimated at 80 IqJzhs of Rupees. The Marathas plundered it at leisure day and night till Friday evening, when having ransacked it and dug up its floor, they set fire to it. From this house they took away 28 seers of large pearls, with many other jewels, rubies, emeralds and "an incredible amount of money." 104 SHIVAJI. [CH. IV. Close to the English factory were the lofty residence and extensive warehouses of another very rich merchant, Haji Said Beg, who, too, had fled away to the fort, leaving his property without a defender. All the afternoon and night of Wednesday and till past the noon of Thursday, the Marathas continued to break open his doors and chests and carry off as much money as they could. Entering one of his warehouses they smashed some casks of quicksilver and spilt a great quantity of it on the floor. But in the afternoon of Thursday the brigands left it in a hurry, on being scared by a sortie which the English had made into the street to drive away a party of 25 Maratha horsemen who seemed intent on setting fire to another house in dangerous proximity to the English factory. In this encounter one Maratha trooper was wounded with a bullet, and two Englishmen with arrow and sword, but slightly. The English merchants next day put a guard of their own in the house of Said Beg and thus he suffered no further loss. Shivaji was angry with the English at being balked of his prey, and in the after- noon of Friday he sent them a message calling upon them to pay him three lakhs of Rupees or else let his men freely loot the Haji's house, and threatening that in case they refused to do either he would come in person, kill every soul in the English factory, and raze their house to the ground. President Oxenden took time to consider the proposal till next morning (Saturday), when he rejected both the demands of 1664] AMOUNT OF SURAT BOOTY. 105 Shivaji and boldly defied the Maratha chief to come and do his worst, saying, "We are ready for you and resolved not to go away. But come when you please ; and [as] you have, as you say, resolved to come, I ask you to come one prahar sooner than you intend." To this challenge Shivaji gave no reply. He was surfeited with booty and was too wise to run a needless risk by facing artillery concealed behind defences and served by resolute and dis- ciplined men, for the sake of a few lakhs more. § 10. How money was extorted. The plunder of Surat yielded him above a k.ror% of Rupees, the city "not having been so rich [asj then] in many years before." The looting was! unresisted, and extended over fully four days and nights, and he "scorned to carry away anything but gold, silver, pearls, diamonds and such precious ware." (Log of the Loyal Merchant.) On reaching Surat, Shivaji had publicly declared that he had not come to do any personal hurt to the English or other merchants, but only to revenge \ himself on Aurangzib for having invaded his country I and killed some of his relations. But money was / really his sole aim.* He had to make the most of * An old merchant who had brought 40 ox-loads of cloth from near Agra but sold none, tried to propitiate Shivaji by offering it to him. But on his answering that he had no ready money, his right hand was cut off by Shivaji's order, he was driven away, and his cloth burnt by the Marathas. (Letter 106 SH1VAJI. [CH. IV. his four days' free run at Surat and shrank from no cruelty to extort money as quickly as possible. As the English chaplain wrote, "His desire of money is so great that he spares no barbarous cruelty to extort confessions from his prisoners, whips them most cruelly, threatens death and often executes it if they do not produce so much as he thinks they may or desires they should ; — at least cuts off one hand, sometimes both." § 11. Attempt to murder Shivaji. The cowardly governor Inayet Khan, who had run into the fort in Tuesday night, formed an in- famous plot from his safe refuge. On Thursday he sent a young follower of his to Shivaji with pretended terms of peace. These were so manifestly unreasonable that Shiva scornfully asked the envoy, "Your master is now cooped up in his chamber like a woman. Does he think of me too as a woman that he expects me to accept such terms as these?" The young man immediately replied, "We are not women ; I have something more to say to you ;" and whipping out a concealed dagger he ran full at Shivaji 's breast. A Maratha bodyguard that stood before the Rajah with a drawn sword, struck off the assassin's hand with one blow. But so great was the force of the desperado's rush that he did not of Escaliot.) Bernier, 190, for the narrow escape of a Jewish ruby-merchant from the death threatened by Shivaji to extort his wealth. 1664] SHIVAJl's PERSON ATTACKED. 107 stop but drove the bloody stump of his arm on Shiva's person and the two rolled on the ground together. The blood being seen on Shiva's dress, his followers imagined that he had been murdered, and the cry ran through the camp to kill the prisoners. But the same guardsman clove the assassin's skull ; Shiva rose up from the ground and forbade any massacre. Then he ordered the prisoners to be brought before him and cut off the heads of four and the hands of 24 others from among them at his caprice, but spared the rest.* At ten o'clock in the morning of Sunday the 10th, Shivaji suddenly departed from Surat with his army, on hearing that a Mughal force was coming to the relief of the town. That night he encamped twelve miles off and then retreated by rapid marches to Konkan. For some days afterwards the fear of his return prevented the townspeople from coming back to * Mr. Anthony Smith, a servant of the English E. I. Company, was seized on landing at the Dutch jetty and kept a prisoner in the Maratha camp for three days. Along with other prisoners, his right hand was ordered to be cut off, at which he cried out to Shivaji in Hindusthani to cut off his head instead. But on his hat being taken off. he was recognised as an Englishman and spared. On Friday afternoon he was sent to the English factory with a message from Shiva, but President Oxenden detained him there. The Log of the Loyal Merchant says that he was ransomed for Rs. 350 ; (also the Eng. President's letter.) 108 SHIVAJI. [CH. IV. their desolated homes. But the imperial army reached Surat on the 17th and then the cowardly governor ventured to return from the fort. The people hooted at him and flung dirt on him, for which his son in anger shot a poor innocent Hindu trader dead. Sir George Oxenden, the English President, won the people's praise and admiration for having made a gallant stand and saved not only the Company's property, but also the quarter of the town situated round the English factory.* The Emperor showed his sympathy with the afflicted citizens by excusing the custom duties for one year in the case of all the merchants of Surat, and he rewarded the valour of the English and the Dutch traders by granting them a reduction of one per cent, from the normal import duties on their merchandise in future. * As he wrote to the Company, 28th January, 1664, (F.R. Surat 86) : "The townspeople cry out in thousands for a reward from the King to the English that had by their courage preserved them. We were with the noblemen of the army that came to our relief, from whom we received great thanks for the good service we did the King and the country, where- upon your President, having a pistol in his hand, laid it before the chief, saying... he now laid down his arms, leaving the future care and protection of the city to them ; which was exceedingly well taken, [the general] telling the President [that] he accepted it, and he must give bum a vest, a horse and girt a sword about him. But your President told him they were things becoming a soldier, but we were merchants and expected favour from the King in our trade." 1664] JASWANT FAILS AT KONDANA. 109 § 12. Shivaji's doings in 1664. The year 1664 that lay between the departure of Shaista Khan and the arrival of Jai Singh, was not marked by any Mughal success. The new viceroy, Prince Muazzam, lived at Aurangabad, caring only for pleasure and hunting. His favourite general, MaharajanJaswant Singh, was posted at Puna. From this place he marched out and besieged Kondana. The Rajputs are proverbially inefficient in sieges, and Jaswant, after wasting some months before the fort, delivered a rash and fruitless assault, in which he lost many hundreds of his soldiers, chiefly owing to a gunpowder explosion. Then he quarrelled with his brother-in-law Bhao Singh Hada, evidently on the question of responsibility for the failure, and the two officers with their armies retired to Aurangabad (in June) to pass the rainy season. The campaign ended with absolutely no gain. (Dil. 47 ; A. N. 867 ; Z. C, siege from Dec. 1663 to June, '64.) The field being clear, Shivaji ranged at liberty in spite of the height of the rainy season, and plundered Ahmadnagar. (Karwar to Surat, 8th, August, 1664. F. R. Surat, vol. 104.) On 26th June the English factors write, "Shivaji is so famously infamous for his notorious thefts that Report hath made him an airy body, and added wings, or else it were impossible he could be at so many places as he is said to be at, all at one time... They ascribe to him to perform more than a Herculean labour that he is become the talk of all 1,0 SHIVAJI. [CH. IV. conditions of people... That he will lay siege to Goa we do hardly believe, in regard it is none of his business to lay siege to any place that is fortified against him, for it will not turn him to account. He is, and ever was, for a running banquet, and to plunder and burn those towns that have neither defence nor guard." (Surat to Karwar. F.R. Surat 86.) And, again, on 26th November, "Deccan [i.e., Bijapur] and all the South coast [i.e., Kanara] are all embroiled in civil wars,... and Shivaji reigns victoriously and uncontrolled, that he is a terror to all the kings and princes round about, daily increasing in strength... He is very nimble and active; imposing strange labour upon himself that he may endure hardship, and also exercises his chiefest men that he flies to and fro with incredible dexterity." (Surat to Co., F.R. Surat 86.) At the end of the monsoons, i.e., in October, he burst into Kanara. (See Ch. X.) CHAPTER V. Shivaji and Jai Singh, 1665. §1. Jai Singh sent against Shivaji. The failure of Shaista Khan and the sack of S Surat caused bitter mortification to Aurangzib ana his Court, and he decided to send his ablest Hindu and iMuhammadan generals to the Deccan. Among the promotions and transfers on his birthday, 30th September, 1664, the Emperor appointed Mirza Rajah Jai Singh to put down Shivaji. Under him were deputed Dilir Khan, Daud Khan Qureshi, Rajah Rai Singh Sisodia, Ihtisham Khan Shaikhzada, Qubad Khan, Rajah Sujan Singh Bundela, Kirat Singh (a son of Jai Singh), iMulla Yahia Nawaiyat (a Bijapuri noble who had come over to the Mughals), and many other officers, with 14,000 troopers. (A. N. 868; Storia, ii. 120.) After making the necessary preparations, and collecting his subordinates, Jai Singh left Upper India and crossed the Narmada at Handia on 9th January, 1665. He pushed rapidly on, never wasting a day by halting, except when strong necessity compelled him. On 10th February he arrived at Aurangabad, where Prince Muazzam was holding Court as viceroy of the Deccan. In three days Jai Singh finished the 112 SH1VAJI. [CH. V. work of waiting on the Prince, receiving and return- ing the visits of the local officers and nobles, and settling some points connected with the expedition. Then, leaving Aurangabad on 13th February, he arrived at Puna on 3rd March and took over charge from Maharajah Jaswant Singh, who immediately afterwards (7th) started for Delhi, as commanded by the Emperor. (H. A. Paris MS. HOo, 112a, 114b, 116a.) §2. Character of Jai Singh. Jai Singh's career had been one of undimmed brilliancy from the day when he, an orphan of twelve, received his first appointment in the Mughal army (1617.) Since then he had fought under the imperial banner in every part of the empire, — from Balkh in Central Asia to Bijapur in the Deccan, from Qanda- har in the west to Mungir in the east. Hardly a year had passed during the long reign of Shah Jahan when this Rajput chieftain had not seen active service somewhere and received some promotion for con- spicuous merit. His marked ability had found recognition in his being given the command of the Van or one of the wings in the Mughal armies led by princes or the blood in campaigns beyond India. Latterly he had commanded in chief. In diplomacy he had attained to a success surpassing even his victories in the field. Wherever there was a difficult or delicate work to be done, the Emperor had only to turn to Jai Singh. A man of infinite tact and 1665] CHARACTER OF J AI SINGH. 113 patience, an adept in the ceremonious courtesy of the Muslims, a master of Turki and Persian, beside* Urdu^and^the Rajput dialect, he was an ideal leade] of the composite army of Afghans and Turks, Rajput and Hindusthajriis, that followed the crescent banner] of the sovereign of Delhi. Age and experience had cooled the impetuous ardour of his youth, — he had once led a forlorn hope, at the storming of Mau, — and he now employed stratagem in preference to force, and bribe in pre- ference to war. His foresight and political cunning, his «Tr>r>nfrkn»coj2f jpnpriiP- «^d c.cicft calculating policy, were in striking contrast with the impulsive generosity, reckless daring, blunt straightforwardness, and im- politic chivalry which we are apt to associate with the Rajput character. And now this veteran of a hundred fights donned his armour at the age of sixty to crush a petty chief- tain, who in less than ten years had grown great enough to baffle all the resources of Bijapur and to challenge the prestige of the empire of Delhi. §3. Jai Singh's anxieties and jar-sighted preparations. It was, however, with no light heart that Jai Singh* set himself to the task of subduing Shivaji, * My account of this war is based upon Jai Singh's copious letters (Haft Anjwnan, Benares and Paris MSS., with a few extra letters in Faiyyaz-ul-qawanin), Aurangzib's letters (given in Paris MS. Suppl. 476, with two stray letters in a 8 114 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. against whom Bijapuris and rival Maratha chiefs, Shaista Khan and Jaswant Singh, had toiled in vain. The Deccan had been the grave of many a reputation, and he* had the failures of his predecessors before him. Shiva had already established a name for stratagem, and his Mavles had measured swords with the best regular troops on more than equal terms. Then, again, there was the likelihood that the arrival of a large Mughal force in the Deccan would alarm Bijapur and Golkonda and throw them into the arms of Shiva to make a common cause against the invader from the north. Jai Singh, therefore, could not give undivided attention to the Marathas : he had to keep an eye on Bijapur too. The problem before him was no easy one. As he wrote to the Emperor, "Not for a moment, in day or night, do I seek rest or ease from being busy about the task on which I have been sent." We see from his letters how he employed every possible device for dealing with an enemy, how wide-awake and full of many-sided activity he was, how he looked far ahead, and how he handled his miscellaneous Delhi MS.) and certain other letters given in Khatut-i-Shivaji (R.A.S. MS.) Some of these have been translated by me in the Modern Review. A.N. 887-907, though contemporary and authentic, has no independent value after the use of the above materials. Storia, ii. 120-125, 132-137, gives Manucci's personal experience of the war. Bernier, 190 (meagre.) The Marathi chronicles, Sabh. 38-46, Chit. 101-107, and Dig. 236-241, contain later and partly legendary accounts, but are our only authority for the doings of the Marathas. 1665] COALITION OF SHIVA'S ENEMIES. 115 force so as to cause distraction to the enemy or deal a concentrated blow at a vital point. In view of his two enemies, Jai Singh very wisely decided to take up a position betweenJbotlL, i.e., in the eastern part of Shivas dominion, whence he coula also easily threaten Bijapur, Instead of pushing the\ war into the Western Ghats or the Konkan plaint further west. So convinced was he of the wisdom of this plan that when Aurangzib urged him to make a descent into Konkan, he strongly objected and succeeded in carrying his point. He knew that if he could strike fatally at the heart of the Maratha king- dom, the distant limbs would drop down of themselves. §4. Coalition of all the enemies of Shivaji. Secondly, he played skilfully upon the hopes and S fears of the Sultan of Bijapur, holding forth the chance of reduction of tribute and removal of the Emperor's displeasure, if Adil Shah aided the Mughals and thus clearly proved his want of connec- tion with Shivaji. Thirdly, he arranged to combine s against Shivaji all his enemies and distract his atten- tion by attacks rrom all possible quarters. As early as January he had sent two Europeans named Francis Mile and Dick (or Diego) Mile,* to the western coast with letters to the chiefs of the European settlements, * Probably Mello, 'a family living in the Mughal country,' according to Manucci (ii. 144.) 116 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. inviting them to help the imperialists by obstructing Shiva, who had collected a fleet of his own. In May he wrote to the Emperor, "Now that Shiva is quite negligent and free from anxiety about the west coast, if our ships from Gujrat make a sudden descent on his maritime possessions much booty can be gained." He also wrote to the Siddis of Janjira inviting their co-operation. (H. A. Paris 114a ; Ben. 78a.) In January he had sent his Brahman emissaries to various Deccani chieftains, to stir them up against Shiva. 1 he zamindars of Karnatak were asked to rielp~the Mughals by threatening Bijapur from the south ; and agents from two such chiefs, namely Shivappa Nayak and the zamindar of Basavapattan, reached Jai Singh's camp with offers of service in April (Paris MS. 132a.)* Towards the end of Janu- ary an envoy from the Rajah of Jawhar had met Jai Singh at Burhanpur with a proposal to join the Mughal side ; he had been conciliated, promised a mansab, and asked to send his son or brother with a contingent of troops. Every one who bore a grudge to Shivaji or envied the sudden rise of the Bhonslas, had been approached by the Mughal general's spies. Baji Chandra Rao and (his brother?) Ambaji Govind Rao More, — the family from which Shivaji had wrested Javli, — in response to Jai Singh's invitation, sent to him a Brahman named Mudha, asking for a * The words Shivappa and Basavapattan are doubtful, the Persian MS. is incorrect. .1665] SOME MARATHAS WON OVER. 117 safe conduct and money help, (middle of February.) These were given, and they reached his camp, along with Mankoji Dhangar, and were enlisted in the Mughal army (4th week of March) (Paris MS. 113a, 123a.) Similarly, Afzal Khan's son, Fazl Khan, solicited from Jai Singh a command and an oppor- tunity of avenging his slaughtered father on Shivaji. (120b.) The adhesion of the petty Rajahs of the Koli country north of Kalian was secured through Niccolao Manucci, then chief of Jai Singh's European artillery. iStoria, ii. 132-133.) Money and promises of high rank in the Mughal service were lavishly employed on Shivaji's officers to corrupt their loyalty (Ben. MS. 54b.), and with some success, as in February Atmaji and Kahar Koli and two other brothers of the former, who commanded 3,000 cavalry and were posted by Shiva at the foot of Purandar in charge of artillery, sent their agent to Jai Singh agreeing toi desert to him. (Paris MS. 113a & b.) Rama and Hanumant,* two captains descended from an ancient line of jagirdars of the Supa subdivision, were called away from the service of the Rajah of Chanda and employ- ed under Jai Singh on account of their familiarity with the seat of war and local influence. (122a.) Above all, Jai Singh concentrated all authority in his own hands, as an indispensable condition of success in war. The Emperor had at first given him the command of the field-operations only, while all administrative work, like the promotion, punishment 118 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. and transfer of officers, the payment of the troops, and the regulation of jagirs, was left in the hands of the viceroy at Aurangabad. Jai Singh rightly insisted that in war there should be only one head, and that the 'man on the spot' should be given full authority, or else the work would suffer. The Emperor yielded to the argument and Jai Singh gained absolute civil and military authority alike. The commandants of the Mughal forts at Ahmad- nagar and Parenda were also placed under his orders. In Western Maharashtra with its heavy rainfall, campaigning is impossible during the monsoons. It was already 3rd March when Jai Singh reached Puna, and if he was to effect anything it must be done in the next three months. From his despatches we learn how he utilised every day, how he struck swiftly and hard, and how he followed up every success to the utmost. The mariner does not scan the sky for the storm-cloud with more anxiety than did this general for the herald of the monsoons which must interrupt his work in the middle and drive him into the forced inactivity of cantonments. §5. The theatre of war described. The Western Ghats form a long towering wall running north to south along the western side of the Deccan. They have thrown off a number of short spurs eastwards, every two of which enclose a valley, the bed of some stream rolling east to join 1665] MILITARY GEOGRAPHY OF PUNA. 119 its sisters and form the mighty rivers of the south, the Godavari and the Krishna. Towards the east the spurs end, the valleys widen out and merge in the vast plains of the kingdom of Bijapur. This land, almost locked among the hills, is the cradle of the Maratha kingdom. Open; — antl--- therefore vnlnftrab)ftf on the east, it JR-^lmof^-imprevetrahlft from the west on account of hills and jungles . And it is in the west that the historic forts of Shivaji are situated, almost every peak being crowned with the Maratha eagle's eyrie. Going southwards from Junnar (which is 55 miles west of Ahmadnagar) and crossing the old Mughal frontier, we have first the valley of the Indrayani, overlooked by the hill-forts of Lohgarh and Tikona in the west and Chakan in the centre. Next comes the valley of the Bhima, in which Puna stands. Further south, across a long range, lies the valley of the slender brook Karha, with the cities of Saswad and Supa in the plain and the forts of Singh-garh on the western hills and Purandar on its southern rocky barrier. Beyond these hills lies the valley of the Nira, with the town of Shirwal on its bank and the forts of Rajgarh and Torna in the west and Rohira in the south-west. Puna is almost the same distance (about 26 miles) from Lohgarh in the north-west and Singh- garh in the south. Saswad was admirably situated for attacking Purandar (6 miles south of it), Singh- garh and Rajgarh (18 and 24 miles in the west), and 120 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. Puna (18 miles north-west of it), — while the widen- ing plain east of it enabled cavalry to make an easy and rapid dash into Bijapur territory, or bar the path of reinforcements coming from that side. Even now five main roads meet at Saswad. §6. Mughals set up outposts. Jai Singh, therefore, with a true general's eye for the ground, made Saswad his base. Puna was strongly garrisoned. An outpost was established opposite Lohgarh to observe and blockade it and guard the road leading north to the Mughal frontier near Junnar. A flying column was organised to ravage the Maratha villages embosomed among the hills to the west and south-west of Saswad. On his eastern side he was quite secure from attack, from the nature of the ground, the position of Saswad close to the boundary line between Shiva's dominion and Bijapur, and the existence of a Mughal advanced post at Supa. After arriving at Puna (3rd March), Jai Singh spent some days in settling the country and establishing outposts, which he regarded as the "first of the pillars supporting the work of this ex- pedition." Qutbuddin Khan was sent with 7,000 cavalry with orders to guard the country from Junnar in the north to the foot of the hills (painghat) of Konkan opposite Lohgarh, to set up one permanent outpost facing Lohgarh (to be garrisoned by 3,000 1665] MUGHAL OUTPOSTS ROUND PUNA. 121 men), another facing fort Nar-durg* (which is also known as Dabhar) with a strong force, and other outposts to bar the paths usually followed by the enemy, and to be constantly touring through his jurisdiction and inspecting his outposts. Ihtisham Khan with 4,000 cavalry was left to guard Puna and its surrounding district. Between Puna and Lohgarh, a distance of some 28 miles, is a difficult pass, where a guard of 2,000 cavalry was posted. Sayyid Abdul Aziz was appointed with 3,000 horse to hold the thanah of Shirwal and prevent aid from reaching Purandar from the south. With him went Baji Chandra Rao, Ambaji Govind Rao (zamindars of Javli), and Mankoji Dhangar. who had joined the Mughals. There was already another thanah at Supa, in charge of Sayyid Munawwar Khan of Barha, and some other Muslim and Hindu officers. §7. Jai Singh opens the campaign. Deciding, for the reasons given above, to take up his position at Saswad and besiege Purandar, Jai Singh marched out of Puna on 14th March. But he had immediately afterwards to make a long halt in its environs, as news came to him that Qutbuddin had gone to Junnar to escort treasure and * In the Persian MS. the word may also be read as Tardurg or Taldurg. Not found in the map. I doubtfully suggest Talegaon Dabhada, at the eastern end of the ridge on which Lohgarh and Visapur stand. 122 SH1VAJI. [CH. V. Shiva had come to Lohgarh to make a dash into the imperial territory as soon as Jai Singh's back would be turned on Puna. Jai Singh quickly recalled Qutbuddin to his post opposite Lohgarh to watch Shiva's movements and resumed his march on the 23rd. Loni,* some 12 miles east of Puna, was next reached ; here a block-house or enclosure for shelter- ing the troops was built in 3 days, and a ihanah established under Rama and Hanumant, with 300 cavalry and 300 foot musketeers, to guard the line of communication with Puna and the two roads which led to the imperial territory. Arriving on 29th March at a place one day's march short of Saswad, he sent on Dilir Khan with the Vanguard and the artillery to cross the pass lying in the way, advance four miles up the hill, and then halt. Next day the Rajah crossed the hill and pushed on to Dilir Khan's camp, leaving Daud Khan below the pass to see to the safe transit of the army up to noon. The rear-guard were to bring up the stragglers. On this very morning (30th March) Dilir Khan went with the Van to select a proper place for encampment. In this reconnaissance he approached * The Persian MS. reads "Tubi (or Tupi) 5 kos from Puna towards Saswad, on the hill of the fort of Purandar." This would give some village near the Bapdeo Ghat, but there is none of the name in the map. I read Lonz, which is about 12 miles east of Puna, but in a plain. 1665] MUGHALS REACH PURANDAR. 123 fort Purandar. A large body of Maratha musketeers, who occupied an enclosure in the waist of the hill — called vadi in the local language, — now came down and attacked the imperialists, who, however, routed them and captured the vadi. The houses there were burnt and the Mughal Van very boldly im- proved their victory by at once pushing on as near Purandar as they could and entrenching just beyond the fire of the fort-guns. Jai Singh on hearing of it, at once sent up 3,000 of the troops of his command under Rai Singh, Kirat Singh, Qubad Khan, Mitrasen, Indraman Bundela and other officers at a gallop. He also despatched an urgent order to Daud Khan to come to him, take charge of the camp, and enable the Rajah to go to supervise the siege. But Daud Khan, on hearing the news, had hastened to join Dilir Khan, without coming to Jai Singh. The day was far spent ; there was no high officer left to guard the camp, and so Jai Singh had to stay there perforce. He had already sent forward a party of pioneers and water-carriers, shot, powder, gun munitions, and entrenching tools for the use of Dilir Khan. Next morning (31st March), Jai Singh carefully escorted the baggage to a permanent camp serving as a base, between Saswad and Purandar, only 4 miles from the latter. Then he reconnoitred the fort from the position of Daud Khan and Kirat Singh. It was not a single fort, but a fortified mass 124 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. of hills ; hence to surround and closely blockade it was impossible. §8. Purandar described. Six miles south of Saswad rises the stupendous mountain mass of Purandar, the highest point of which towers 4,364 feet above sea-level and more than 2,500 feet above the plain at its foot. It is really a double fort, with an independent and very strong sister enclosure, named-— Vajragarh. on a ridge running out east of it. Purandar consists of an upper fort or citadel with precipitous sides all around and a lower fort or machi, 300 feet or more below it. The latter is a ledge running round the waist of the hill with many a winding, the entire circuit being four miles. On the north side tihe ledge widens out into a broad terrace, containing the barracks and offices of the garrison. This terrace is bounded on the east by the high spur named Bhairav Khind, which starts from the base of the steep overhanging north-eastern tower (called Khand-lzala or the Sky-scraper)* of the upper fort, and runs for about a mile eastwards in a narrow ridge, ending in a small tableland (3,618 feet above sea-level), crowned with the fort of Rudramala, (now called Vajragarh.) This Vajragarh commands the machi or lower fort of Purandar on its northern and most important * Molesworth, 2nd ed. 192, explains Kh.adk.al as 'a rocky plateau.' 1665] MUGHAL SIEGE-POSITIONS. 125 face, as the garrison has to live here. It was by seizing Vajragarh that Jai Singh in 1665 and the English in 1817 made Purandar untenable for the Marathas. Jai Singh, like a true general, decided to attack Vajragarh first. (Bom. Gaz. xvii. pt. iii, po. 428-435.) §9. Mughals open the siege. Dilir Khan with his nephews and Afghan troops, Hari Bhan and Udai Bhan Gaur, entrenched between Purandar and Rudramal. In front of him were the chief of the artillery, Turktaz Khan, and the party sent by Jai Singh. Kirat Singh with the 3,000 troopers of the Rajah and a few other mansabdars made a stockade opposite the north gate of Purandar. On the right were the trenches of Rajah Narsingh Gaur, Karn Rathor, Jagat Singh of Narwar, and Sayyid Maqbul Alam. Behind Purandar and facing its postern gate (khirfy) was the position of Daud Khan, Rajah Rai Singh, Md. Salih Tarkhan, Ram Singh [Hada ?] , Sher Singh Rathor, Raj Singh Gaur and others. To the right of this position were posted Rasul Beg Rozbhani and his Rozbhani followers. Opposite Rudramal, Chatur- bhuj Chauhan with a party of Dilir Khan's followers entrenched, and behind these Mitrasen, Indraman Bundela and some other officers. Jai Singh removed his quarters from the camp to the foot of the hill to be nearer the besieged fort, while the soldiers pitched their tents along the 126 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. hill-side. He visited the trenches every day, encouraged his men, and supervised the progress of the siege. At first all his efforts were directed to v dragging guns to the top of the steep and difficult hill. It took three days to raise a ^gun, named Abdullah Khan, and mount it opposite Rudramal. In 3}4 days more a sepond gun, named Fath Lashkar, was taken there. A third, named Haheli, was pain- fully approaching the summit. The incessant bombardment of the Mughals demolished the bases of the tower in front, and pioneers were sent to its foot to dig a hole underneath. § 10. Capture of Vajragarh. At midday, 13th April, Dilir Khan's division stormed the tower and drove the enemy into an enclosure behind it, leaving on the field seven slain and four wounded. Jai Singh reinforced Dilir Khan with a party of his own Rajputs. Next day, the victorious Mughals pushed on to the inner enclosure and tried to capture jt by ^scalade. The garrison, oppressed by their fire, capitulated in the evening (14th April), left the fort, and were disarmed. But Jai Singh very wisely allowed them to return home in order to tempt the garrison of Purandar, by this example of leniency, to surrender instead of fighting to the last. The heroic leaders of the defence were chivalrously given robes of honour by Dilir Khan and Jai Singh alike. The imperialists lost 80 killed 1665] shiva's villages ravaged. 127 and 109 wounded, as the price of this success. (Paris MS. 1266.) §11. Flying columns ravage Shivaji's villages. The possession of Vajragarh was the stepping- stone to the capture of Purandar, or in Jai Singh's own language, "the key that would unlock Purandar." Dilir Khan now turned to the latter- fort, while Jai Singh organised raids into the Maratha 1 country, in order, as he wrote to the Emperor, to » convince Shiva and the Sultan of Bijapur that the Mughal army was large enough to be able to spare troops from the siege, and also to prevent any con- centration of forces round Shivaji by creating constant terror and disturbance in various parts of his kingdom. (Paris MS. 133a.) There was also a secret reason for thus sending away certain generals from the siege-camp. He had some disloyal officers under him, whose presence was worse^thaa-ueeless. Daud Khan Qureshi was posted to watch the postern gate (khirki) . of the fort ; but after a few days it became known that a party of Marathas had entered the fort by that gate, without being opposed by him. Dilir Khan severely rebuked Daud Khan for his failure, and a bitter quarrel broke out between the two. Jai Singh then transferred Daud Khan to his own division and posted Purdil Khan and Subh-Karn Bundela opposite the postern. But matters did not improve : "Subh- Karn did not at all give his heart to the work, but 128 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. preferred above everything else to favour Shiva!** Daud Khan, too, was a source of mischief in his new station. He constantly declared that the capture of Purandar was beyond the range of possibility, and that the siege was a waste of men and money. His intention in talking in this way was, as Jai Singh detected, to discourage the commander-in- chief from heartily supporting the siege-operations, so that Dilir Khan would be left to bear the burden of the fight unaided and would have to retire with failure and disgrace. Jai Singh removed the mischief-maker from the camp by creating an independent flying column and sending him at its head, to make raids daily, or on alternate days, on different places in the district. (Ben. MS. 191 o, Faiyyaz. 592.) On 25th April, the flying column six thousand strong under Daud Khan, accompanied by Rajah Rai Singh, Sharza Khan (a Bijapuri general), Amar Singh Chandawat, Achal Singh Kachhwa (the principal officer of Jai Singh's household troops), and 400 of Jai Singh's own troopers, marched out with orders to enter the region of Rajgarh, Singh-garh and Rohira from two sides and "not to leave any vestige of cultivation or habitation, but make an utter desola- tion." (Paris MS. 133b.) At the same time Qutbuddin Khan and Ludi Khan were ordered to harry the district from the north and thus distract and wear out Shivaji. Daud Khan's party arrived near fort Rohira on 1665] MARATHA VILLAGES RAVAGED. 129 the 27th and burnt and totally ruined about 50 villages. A body of Mughal skirmishers entered four populous villages hidden among the hills, which had never before been visited by an enemy ; the invaders soon received reinforcements, overcame the opposition, occupied the villages, razed them to the ground, and brought away many of the peasants and their cattle and other property as spoils of war. After a day's halt here, the Mughals marched towards Rajgarh on the 30th, burning the villages on the way. Without stopping to besiege the forF\ (for which they were not prepared), they sacked the/ villages around it, — the garrison watching the work of ruin from the shelter of the fort-guns, without venturing to make a sally. The ground in the neighbourhood was hilly and uneven. So, the column retreated four miles to a level place, near the pass of Gunjankhora, where they encamped for the night, and next day (1st May), reached Shivapur. Thence Daud Khan marched towards Singh-garh and harried its environs, return- ing to Puna on 3rd May, by order of Jai Singh. Meantime Qutbuddin Khan, in the midst of his raids into the passes of Pur-khora and Tasi-khora, near fort Kumari, was urgently recalled to Puna, where he joined Daud Khan. The cause of this new order was that Jai Singh had learnt that Shivaji had mustered a large force near Lohgarh, which required to be immediately broken up. The two Mughal columns were, therefore, 9 130 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. diverted to that side (the north-west.) Leaving Puna they halted at Chinchwad (10 or 12 miles north) on the 4th and reached Lohgarh on the 5th. When the Mughal skirmishers arrived near the fort, 500 Maratha horse and 1,000 infantry sallied forth and attacked them. But the imperialists held their ground, were soon reinforced, and routed the enemy with heavy loss after a severe fight. Then they burnt the houses on the skirt of the hill, taking many prisoners and cattle. The villages enclosed by the four forts, — Lohgarh, Visapur, Tikona, and Tangai, — were devastated, and much of Balaghat (high- lands) and Painghat (lowlands) harried. Thereafter they returned, Qutbuddin Khan and his party taking up an outpost near Puna, and Daud Khan and his comrades rejoining the main army on 19th May, after a fortnight's absence. §12. Maratha efforts to raise the siege. /"' Meantime the Maratha captains had not been / idle, but tried hard to harass the Mughals and raise I the seige. Early in April, Netaji Palkar, Shiva's irinsman and cavalry leader, made a dash on Parenda, but a Mughal detachment from Supa hastened in pursuit, and the Maratha host melted away at the news and offered no fight. Late in May, Qutbuddin Khan had to advance up to fort Urouda,* * The Alamgir-namah gives Ur-drug. I suggest Urouda, I \ miles west of Puna. It may also have been Udai-durg. .1665] RAID AND COUNTER-RAID. 131 to break up a gathering of the enemy of which he had got news. The villages on the way were plundered, and the enemy dispersed wherever they assembled round any of their forts. The hill of Lohgarh was scaled, and a body of Marathas on the top slain or routed, Daud Khan returning with 300 captives and nearly 3,000 cattle. Then, again, a body of 300 Maratha cavalry, who were sheltering at Narkot, were dislodged by a detachment sent by Qubad Khan, the new thanahdar of Puna (vice Ihtisham Khan deceased), the victors returning with the captured peasants and cattle. But the Marathas did not invariably fail. As Jai Singh admits, "sometimes we have failed to prevent the enemy from accomplishing their hostile designs." (136b.) Khan Khan is more explicit: " The surprises of the enemy, their gallant successes, attacks on dark nights, blocking of roads and difficult passes, and burning of jungles, made it very ham for the imperialists to~~move about. The Mugha/s lost many men and beasts." (ii. 180.) After the capture of Vajragarh in the middle of April, Dilir Khan advanced along the connecting ridge and laid siege to the machi or lower fort of Purandar. His trenches approached the tower of Khand-kala at the north-eastern angle of the fort. At first, the garrison made sorties to drive back the besiegers. One night they attacked Kirat Singh, who was quite prepared and repulsed them with slaughter. Another attack was made in a dark 132 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. night on the trenches of Rasul Beg Rozbhani : he was caught napping, the guns in his trenches were spiked, and 15 of his soldiers wounded. But rein- forcements, attracted by the din of battle, poured in from the neighbouring trenches, and the enemy were repulsed with loss. Next day there was a sharp skirmish over the removal of the corpses, in which the Mughals lost 8 men. But Dilir Khan sat down before Purandar like grim Death, his men "doing in a day what could not be achieved elsewhere in a month." § 13. Outworks of Purandar stormed. When, in the course of May, the Mughal trenches reached the foot of the two White Towers, which had been dismantled by bombardment, the garrison began to throw down lighted naphtha oil, leather bags full of gunpowder, bombs and heavy stones which effectually stopped the further advance of the Mughals. Jai Singh ordered a high wooden platform of logs and planks to be made, on which guns were to be mounted and parties of gunners and musketeers placed, to command the enemy's position. His first two attempts were frustrated : on the first occasion the upright posts had been just set up, on the second the cross-pieces had been joined, when the enemy burnt them down. On 30th May, however, the parts of the third tower were joined together in the rear and sent to the appointed place in front of the White Tower, in charge of Rup Singh 1665] WHITE TOWER STORMED. 133 Rathor and Giridhar Purohit, with orders to set up a defensive wall in front first of all, and then plant the two rows of posts. Next some Rajput marksmen were to climb to the top and keep the enemy down with their bows and matchlocks while the tower was being completed. This was done two hours before sunset. Then the general's hands were forced by the impetuosity of his men. Before artillery was mounted on the wooden tower and the enemy opposite crushed, with only two hours of daylight remaining, some Rohila soldiers, without informing Dilir Khan, tried to storm the White Tower. The enemy crowded the wall in large numbers and checked them. But reinforcements rapidly arrived : the men of the trenches on both hands scaled the wall with ladders, and ran towards the enemy. Jai Singh's officer Bhupat Singh Puar, a commander of 500, was slain on the right side of the smaller White Tower, with several other Rajputs. On the left side Bal- krishna Sakhawat and some Afghans of Dilir Khan carried on the fight. Just then the line of supports, under Achal Singh and Kirat Singh, arrived on the scene of battle from their shelter behind the wooden structure. After an obstinate struggle at close quarters, the Marathas lost heavily, retreated to behind the Black Tower (formerly known as Shah Burj or Royal Tower), and began to gall the Mughals by discharging bombs, kettles full of gunpowder. 134 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. rockets, stones, etc. Finding further advance im- possible, Jai Singh was contented with the capture of the three bastions made that day and ordered his men to dig trenches exactly where they had reached and to hold the White Tower, without attempting to push on to the Black Tower. In the course of the next two days the wooden structure was completed and two small pieces of cannon were mounted on it. The enemy, unable to reply to this fire from a superior height, evacuated the Black Tower and another bastion near it and took refuge in a stockade adjoining the wall of the tower. But they could not show their heads. The stockade was untenable, and they retired to the trenches behind it. (Ben. MS. 187b— 189a.) Thus five towers and one stockade of the lower fort fell into the hands of the Mughals. Purandar now seemed doomed. And, as if to complete its destruction, the Emperor had at Jai Singh's request despatched a train of very heavy artillery which were now on the way to the fort. The garrison had originally numbered only 2,000* against at least t^n times that number of Mughals, and they had suffered heavy casualties during two months of incessant fighting. Early in the siege they had lost their gallant commandant Murar Baji Prabhu. * Sabhasad, 42 — 43, gives this number, which is evidently an underestimate. Alamgir-namah, 903, says that the fort had 4,000 combatants left in it at capitulation. 1665] DEATH OF MURAR BAJI. 135 §14. Death of Murar Baji Prabhu. Taking seven hundred select men with himself Murar Baji made a sortie on Dilir Khan, who was trying to climb the hill with 5,000 Afghans and some more troops of other races. The Marathas dashed forward, mingled with the enemy on all sides, and there was severe fighting at close quarters. Murar Baji with his Mavles slew 500 Pathans besides many Bahlia infantrymen, and at the head of sixty desperate followers cut his way to Dilir 's camp. His comrades were slain by the overwhelming body of the Mughals, but Murar Baji rushed straight on towards Dilir. The Khan, in admiration of his matchless courage, called uoon him to yield and promised him his life and a high post under him. Murar indignantly refused, and was going to strike at Dilir when the latter shot him down with an arrow. Three hundred Mavles fell with him, and the rest retreated to the fort. But the garrison, with a courage worthy of the mother of Brasidas the Spartan, continued the struggle leader's fall and saying, Murar rJaji is deaili* — We are as brave as he, and we shall fight with the same courage!" (Sabh. 43-44 ; 7. S.) e mother of Brasidas the "-r, [ggle, undismayed bv *;hefr \ yly "What though one man J § 15. Shivaji negotiates for submission. But at last the steady pressure of Jai Singh bore fruit. Purandar was closely invested, the garrison 136 SH1VAJI. [CH. V. had been wofully thinned by two months of fighting, and now the capture of five bastions of the lower fort made the stronghold untenable. Its fall was only a question of time. Shiva found it futile to prolong the resistance. The families of the Maratha officers were sheltered in Purandar, and its capture would mean their captivity and dishonour. He had .also ' failed to prevent the Mughal flying columns from ravaging his country. Failure and ruin stared 'him in the face wherever he looked. With his usual foresight, he had for some time past been sending envoys to Jai Singh to beg for terms, but the astute Rajput did not_take him seriously.* Then, as the Mughal success became more and more evident, Shiva began to rise in his offer of tribute and forts as the price of peace ; but his terms were not proportionate to the military advantage gained by Jai Singh, and were therefore uniformly rejected. * "After the arrived of the imperial army near Pabal. Shiva's agents began to visit me, and by the time of my arrival at Puna they had brought two letters from him. But I gave no answer and sent them back in disappointment.... Then he sent a long Hindi letter with a trusted servant named Karmaji, who repeatedly entreated me to read the contents only once. In it Shiva offered to be lqyal and to help us in a war with Bijapur as more likely to succeed than a war in his hilly and intricate country.... In reply I asked him... to enter the Emperor's service if he desired his life and safety." (Ben. MS. 54a.) 1665] SHIVA VISITS JAI SINGH. 137 The Mughal victory of 2nd June, and the im- pending fall of the lower fort decided Shivaji. He resolved to interview Jai Singh and offer fresh terms for peace with the imperialists, and if these were rejected he would make an alliance with Adil Shah by restoring Konkan and continue the war with the Mughals with renewed vigour. He had about 20th May sent his Chief Justice Raghunath Ballal (Pandit Rao) on a secret mission to learn Jai Singh's terms, which were that Shiva must come in person and make an unconditional surrender, after which imperial mercy would be shown to him.* Shivaji next demanded and secured from Jai Singh an assurance, confirmed with solemn oaths, that he would be allowed to visit Jai Singh and return home in safety, whether his terms were accepted or not. This visit was to be made in strict secrecy, as "the Emperor had forbidden Jai Singh) to hold any negotiations whatever with Shiva . ' * *J § 16. Shivaji interviews Jai Singh. Raghunath Ballal returned to his master on 9th June. On the 10th he sent word that Shivaji would come next day. On the I Ith, at 9 o'clock in the morning, while Jai Singh was holding Court in his tent at the foot of Purandar, Raghunath came in and reported that Shivaji had arrived at hand in a palki * Shiva's next move was to send the Pandit Rao back with an offer to send his son to make the submission. Jai Singh declined. (Ben. MS. 55a.) 138 SHIVAJI. [CH. V, accompanied by six Rrahmans only. Jai Singh immediately sent his secretary Udairaj and Ugrasen Kachhwa to meet him on the way and tell him that if he agreed to surrender all his forts he might come, otherwise he should turn back from the place. Shiva agreed to the terms in general and proceeded forward with the two officers. At the door of the tent he was welcomed by Jai Singh's Paymaster and ushered in. The Rajah advanced a few steps, embraced Shiva, and seated him by his side, while armed Rajputs stood around to guard against any treacher- ous movement on the part of the slayer of Afzal Khan! Jai Singh had got up a little scene to conquer any lingering reluctance that Shiva might still have had. In anticipation of the Maratha chief's arrival he had sent word to Dilir Khan and Kirat Singh, whose trenches were the most advanced, to be ready to deliver an assault on Purandar. After Shiva had entered, Jai Singh gave the signal, the Mughals attacked and captured the remaining part of the Khand-kala defences. The garrison made a sortie to check them, but were driven back with the loss of 80 killed and many wounded. The fighting could be distinctly seen from the interior of the Rajah's tent. Shiva then offered to surrender the fort in order to prevent the useless slaughter of his men. Jai Singh, therefore, sent his Mir Tuzuk, Ghazi Beg, to Dilir Khan and Kirat Singh with an order to stop the fight and allow the garrison to depart unmolested. An 1665] TREATY OF PURANDAR : ITS TERMS. 139" officer of Shiva was sent with Ghazi Beg to order the garrison to capitulate. They begged respite for the night. (A. N. 903.) § 17. Terms of the Treaty of Purandar 1665. Shiva had travelled without any baggage or retinue, and therefore Jai Singh lodged him in his office-tent as his guest. Up to midnight the two sides higgled for the terms of a permanent peace. But Jai Singh knew the strength of his position. As he wrote in his despatches to the Emperor, "I declined to abate a single fort. Gradually, after much discussion, we came to this agreement: — (a)j That 23 of his forts, the lands of which yielded 4 I lakhs of hurt as annual revenue, should be annexed to the empire ; and (b) that 12 of his forts, including Rajgarh, with an annual revenue of 1 lakh of hun, should be left to Shiva, on condition of service and loyalty to the imperial throne." Shivaji, however, begged to be excused from attendingJtheEmperor's Court like other nobles" and Rajahs, and proposed to send his son, as his repre- sentative, with a contingent of 5,000 horse, (to be paid by means of a jagir), for regular attendance and service under the Emperor or the Mughal governor of the Deccan. This was exactly the favour shown to the Maharana of Udaipur. As he pleaded with Jai Singh, "By reason of my late unwise and disloyal acts, I have not the face to wait on the Emperor. I shall depute my son to be His Majesty's servant and 140 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. slave, and he will be created a Commander of Five Thousand with a suitable jagir As for me sinner, exempt me from holding any mansab or serving in the Mughal army. But whenever in your wars in the Deccan, I am given any military duty, I shall promptly perform it." In addition to the above terms, Shivaji made another and a conditional engagement with the Mughals : "If lands yielding 4 lakhs of hurt a year in the lowlands of Konkan and 5 lakhs of hun a year in the uplands (Balaghat Bijapuri), are granted to me by the Emperor and I am assured by an imperial jarman that the possession of these lands will be onfirmed in me after the expected Mughal con- uest of Bijapur, then I agree to pay to the Emperor 40 lakhs of hun in 13 yearly instalments." [He was expected to wrest these lands from the . Bijapuri officers by means of his own troops. (H. A. 1 Ben. MS. 66b-67a.) r* Here we detect the shrewdness of Jai Singh's ( policy in throwing a bone of perpetual contention \between Shivaji and the Sultan of Bijapur. As he wrote to the Emperor, "This policy will result in a threefold gain : first, we get 40 lakhs of hun or 2 krores of Rupees ; secondly, Shivaji will be alienated from Bijapur ; thirdly, the imperial army will be relieved from the arduous task of campaigning in these two broken and jungly regions, as Shiva will himself undertake the task of expelling the Bijapuri garrisons from them." In return for it, Shiva also I 1665] SHIVA IN MUGHAL CAMP. 141 agreed to assist the Mughals in the invasion of Bijapur with 2,000 cavalry of his son Shambhuji's mansab and 7,000 expert infantry under his own command. (Ben. MS. 70a & 6.) § 1 8. Shivaji receives Mughal favours. Dilir Khan was greatly offended at this pacific end of the siege, which robbed him of the chance of military glory, and at Shiva's not having made him the intermediary of the Emperor's pardon. So he refused to move from his trenches or consent to an armistice. The politic Jai Singh now turned to soothe him. On the 12th, as the public did not yet know of Shiva's arrival, he was mounted on an elephant and sent with Rajah Rai Singh to wait on Dilir Khan, who, mollified by this attention, presented him with two horses, a sword, a jewelled dagger, and two pieces of precious cloth. Then Dilir Khan conducted Shiva back to Jai Singh, took his hand, and entrusted him. to the Rajah. The Rajah now presented Shiva with a robe of honour, a horse, an elephant, and an ornament for the turban (jigha.) Shiva, who had come unarmed, with cunning policy girt on the sword for a short time and then put it off saying, "I shall\ serve the Emperor as one of his devoted but unarmea servants." That day (12th June) according to the agreement, 7,000 men and women, (of whom 4,000 were com- batants), left Purandar, and the Mughals entered into possession of it ; all the stores, weapons, artillery, 142 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. and other property found within were attached by the Government. Mughal officers were sent with Shivaji's men to take charge of five other forts to be surrendered by the Marathas. Some time before this, while Shiva had been sending Brahman envoys to Jai Singh, the latter with his usual foresight had written to the Emperor beg- ging him to send to him a gracious imperial jarman (letter) addressed to Shiva. This was to be delivered to Shiva in the event of his making submission. By a happy coincidence the jarman and an ordinary robe of honour sent by the Emperor arrived on the day following Shiva's surrender. By the Rajah's advice he followed the Court etiquette, advanced six miles on foot to welcome the jarman on the way, and put on the robe of honour. (A. N. 904 ; but I doubt its accuracy here, as Jai Singh is silent about this episode.) On the 14th Shiva was presented by Jai Singh with an elephant and two horses, and sent away to Rajgarh with Kirat Singh, after paying a ceremonious visit to Daud Khan. As he begged hard for the full suit of tyielat (robe of honour) worn by Jai Singh, the latter presented it to him. Reaching Kondana at noon of the 14th, Shivaji delivered the fort to Kirat Singh and left for Rajgarh, where he arrived on the 15th. On the 17th he sent away Shambhuji from Rajgarh, in charge of Ugrasen Kachhwa and they arrived in Jai Singh's camp on the 18th. 1665] FORTS GAINED BY MUGHALS. 143 The Maratha forts surrendered to the Emperor by the treaty of Purandar {A. N. 905) were : — in the Deccan : (1) Rudramala or Vajragarh, (2) Purandar, (3) Kondana, (4) Rohira, (5) Lohgarh, (6) Isagarh, (7) Tanki, (8) Tikona ; in Konkan : (9) Mahuli, (10) Muranjan, (11) Khirdurg, (12) Bhandardurg, (13) Tulsi-khul, (14) Nar-durg, (15) Khaigarh or Ankola. (16) Marg-garh or Atra, (17) Kohaj, (18) Basant, (19) Nang, (20) Karnala, (21) Songarh, (22) Mangarh, (23) Khand-kala near Kondana. These terms were reported to the Emperor for ratification, together with a letter of submission and prayer for pardon from Shiva (but really drafted by Jai Singh's secretary Udairaj) and a despatch from Jai Singh recommending the acceptance of the terms and the granting of a robe of honour to Shiva. They reached Aurangzib at Delhi on 23rd June and he was pleased to accede to them all. (Parasnis MS. No. 8.) Thus, in less than three months from the date when he opened the campaign, Jai Singh succeeded in bringing Shiva down on his knees had made this haughty chief cede a large part of his dominions and consent to serve as a dependent vassal of the Emperor. It was a splendid victory. Shiva loyally carried out his promises : in the war with Bijapur he with his contingent rendered distin- guished service under the Mughal banner and was mentioned in the despatches. datej had! ;h and Fath Jang Khan, and with their aid repulsed the enemy. Jadav Rao of Kalian received a musket shot, of which he died in five or six days. Shivaji and his brother Vyankoji fought on opposite sides After a two days' halt, Jai Singh resumed his march on the 27th. The next day, after reaching the camping-ground in the evening, he detached a force to attack and expel the Bijapuri army from the neigh- bourhood. The fight soon became general, and Jai Singh himself had to charge the enemy's largest division. Shivaji and Kumar Kirat Singh, seated on the same elephant, led his Van and dashed into the Deccani ranks. After a hard fight, the enemy were put to flight leaving more than a hundred dead and many more wounded. On 29th December, 1665, Jai Singh arrived at Makhnapur,* ten miles north of Bijapur fort. Here his advance was stopped, and after waiting for a week, he was forced to begin his retreat on 5th January, 1666, as he found his fondly hoped-fo chance of taking Bijapur by a coup de main gone. He was not prepared for a regular siege, because his eagerness "to grasp the golden opportunity" of attacking Bijapur while undefended and torn by domestic factions, he had not brought any big artillery and siege-materials with himself. On the * In the Persian MS. the name may be read either as Makhanah or as Nagthana. The latter is a village 8 miles n. n. e. of Bijapur. d-foV ante. \ e, in J 148 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. other hand, Adil Shah had put the fort of Bijapur in a strong posture of defence ; its walls had been repaired, large quantities of provisions and material laid in, its regular garrison augmented by 30,000 Karnatak infantry, and the country round for a radius of seven miles laid waste, drained of its water-supply, and denuded of its trees. At the same time he had sent a picked force under Sharza Khan and Siddi Masaud to invade the Mughal dominions and make a diversion in Jai Singh's rear. On 27th January, the retreating Mughal army reached a place 16 miles from Parenda, and there halted for 24 days. Here we shall leave it, as the historian of Shivaji is not concerned with its opera- tions any further. § 20. Shivaji fails at Panhala, 1666. On receiving the unexpected check before Bijapur, Jai Singh looked round, to create a diversion. As he writes in a despatch to the Court, "At my request the Emperor had [on 25th Dec] sent a robe of honour and a jewelled dagger for Shiva, who was ready to co-operate at the siege of Bijapur, but I did not deem it expedient. Shiva said to me, — 'If you detach me, I can go- and capture for the Emperor Panhala, of which I know all the exits and entrances, while the garrison are off their guard. I shall raise so much disturbance in that district that the enemy will be compelled to divert a large force from their army to oppose me.' As his words bore promise of J 666] SHIVA ATTACKS PANHALA. 149 action, I sent him away on his promised errand." (H. A., Ben. MS. 846.) But there was a deeper reason for this step, as we learn from Jai Singh's secret correspondence. The unexpected failure before the fort of Bijapur gave rise to dissensions in the Mughal camp. The party hostile to Jai Singh, which was led by Dilir Khan,* ascribed his ill-success to the lukewarmness or treachery of Shivaji, and demanded that he should be imprisoned as a punishment. Jai Singh saw the danger in which Shiva stood among the defeated and sullen Mughal soldiery. To safeguard the liberty of the Maratha chief, and send him out of the reach of his enemies, he gladly accepted the proposal that the Maratha contingent should make a diversion in the western provmces~of BijapurT (H. A., l9Va, 84b, 192a ; hints only.) Shiva left Jai Singh about 11th January, 1666. Five days later he reached the environs of Panhala, * Manucci attests that Dilir Khan several times urged Jai Singh "to take Shivaji's life, or at least to give him (Dilir Khan) leave to do so. He would assume all responsibility, and see that the Rajah was held blameless." {Storia, ii. 137.) The English factory records state, "In a battle between the Mughals and this country people, Shivaji ran away, being afraid that Dilir Khan would put him to death, he having told the said wazir [Dilir] that he would take Bijapur in 10 days' time, upon which persuasion he set forwards with 20,000 horse, but to his cost he found the contrary, being forced quickly to retire." (Deccan News in F. R. Surat, vol. 104.) 150 SHIVAJI. [CH. V. and delivered an assault on it three hours before sunrise. But the garrison were on the alert and offered a stubborn defence. A thousand of Shiva's followers fell down, killed and wounded. When the rising sun lit up the scene, Shiva at last recognised that it was madness to continue the struggle, and drew back sullenly to his own fort of Khelna [ Vishalgarh] , about 25 miles westwards. But his troops continued to ravage that quarter and succeeded in drawing and detaining there a force of 6,000 Bijapuris under Siddi Masaud and Randaula Khan. (H. A. 84b— 85a.) The news of Shivaji's failure at Panhala reached Jai Singh on 20th January. The evil was aggravated by the desertion of Netaji. Taking offence with Shiva for some reason or other, — probably because /he deemed his valuable services and gallant feats of farms inadequately rewarded, — Neta accepted the • Bijapuri bait of 4 lakhs of hun and, deserting to Adil Shah, raided the Mughal territory with great vigour and effect. Jai Singh could not afford to lose such a man ; and so he lured Netaji back (20th March) with many persuasive letters and the granting of all his high demands, viz., the mansab of a Commander of Five Thousand in the Mughal peerage, a jagir in the settled and lucrative old territory of the empire (as distinct from the ill-conquered, unsettled, ever- ravaged recent annexations in the Deccan), and Rs. 38,000 in cash. (H. A. 193.) Netaji's defection at the end of January, 1666v 1666] JAI SINGH DISTRUSTS MARATHAS. 151 coming so soon after the recent reverses, greatly alarmed Jai Singh. If Shiva were to do the same, the entire Maratha army would swell the enemy's ranks and the Mughal invaders would be crushed between the two. As he wrote to the Emperor, "Now that Adil Shah and Qutb Shah have united in mischief, it is necessary to win Shiva's heart by all means and to send him to Northern India to have audience of Your Majesty." (94a.) The Emperor having consented to this proposal, Jai Singh set him- self to induce Shiva to visit the imperial Court. CHAPTER VI. Visit to Aurangzib, 1666. § 1 . Shivaji's fears and hopes from a journey to the Mughal Court. Jai Singh had undertaken to send Shivaji to the imperial Court. But it was no easy task. In the Treaty of Purandar, Shivaji had expressly stipulated that he was not to be called upon to enter the Mughal military service (mansao), nor to attend the imperial Court. There were strong reasons for it. For one thing, he and his countrymen had no faith in Aurangzib's word and believed the Emperor to be capable of any act of treachery and cruelty. Then, again, the Maratha chief had an in- born repugnance to bending his head before a Muslim ; he had been brought up in the freedom and solitude of hill and woodland, away from cities and Courts ; he had imbibed the orthodox Hindu spirit from his mother and his tutor, from the comrades of his boyhood and the saints whom he adored ; and he had risen to independent sovereignty without ever filling any subordinate post as the servant of a higher authority. He was therefore at first averse to visit the imperial Court. But Jai Singh plied him with hopes of high reward and "used a thousand devices" (as he repeatedly wrote in his letters), to induce him to go 1666] HOPES HELD OUT TO SHIVA. 153 to Agra. The Maratha chronicles assert that Jai Singh gave Shiva hopes that after his visit to the Emperor he was likely to be sent back as Viceroy of Mughal Deccan, with sufficient men and money for the conquest of Bijapur and Golkonda. The Emperor never committed himself to any such promise, and the Persian histories and Jai Singh's correspondence are silent about it. But it is vei probable that among the vague hopes which the wilj Rajput general held out to Shiva, was that of beini appointed Viceroy of the Deccan, where all th< preceding imperial representatives, including Jai Singh himself, had failed, and only a born general and renowned conqueror like Shiva could be expected to succeed. The Deccan charge was so heavy and mere generals had so often wasted imperial resources there, that in 1656 and 1666 the Emperor had talked of going there in person and conducting the war against the local Sultans. Shiva's past achievements promised success in such an enterprise, if the vast resources of Delhi were placed under a tried military genius like him. What could be more reasonable (Jai Singh may have argued) than that the Emperor, after seeing Shiva and personally learning of his merits, would appoint him Viceroy of the Deccan* to achieve its conquest and save himself the trouble? * Sabhasad, 46 and 50, says that Shiva himself made the offer of conquering Bijapur and Golkonda for the Emperor, if he were appointed Mughal commander-in-chief in the Deccan, and Jai Singh merely agreed to the proposal. Chit- 113. 154 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. Besides the problematical viceroyalty of the Deccan, Shiva had some humbler but more necessary objects which could be gained only by a personal interview with the Emperor. He had requested that the Emperor should order the Siddi, now an imperial servant, to cede Janjira island to him. According to a modern and unreliable chronicle, (Chit. 107), he had also hopes of gaining the imperial sanction to his plan of exacting chauth from Bijapur territory. On these points the replies from Delhi had been evasive ; but much better result could be expected from an interview and personal representation. In spite of these temptations, Shiva hesitated long. Both he and his friends were as much alarmed at the idea of his going to the Mughal Court as at the prospect of his interview with Afzal Khan. They feared that a visit to Aurangzib would be only rush- ing into the jaws of an ogre (Ravan.) But the sooth- sayers whom he consulted assured him of a safe re- turn home. (Sabh. 47; Chit. 109; Dig. 242; T. S. 226.) Jai Singh took the most solemn oaths possible for a Hindu that Shiva would not be harmed during his visit, while the Rajput Rajah's son and agent at Court, Kumar Ram Singh, similarly pledged his word for the safety of Shiva during his stay at the capital In the Maratha council of ministers the majority favoured the journey. § 2. His arrangements for his absence. Shiva ji's arrangements for the administration of 1666] HOME DEFENCE IN SHIVA'S ABSENCE. 155 his kingdom during his expected absence in Northern India, were a masterpiece of forethought and organisation. His plan was to make his local representatives absolutely independent of any need for his orders or guidance during his absence. The administration of his territories and forts would go on as efficiently as before, even if he were imprisoned or killed at Agra. His mother Jija Bai was left as Regent, with direct control over the Desh country, while Moro Pant the Peshwa, Niloji Sondev the Majmttadar, and Annaji Datto the Keeper of the Seal, were placed in independent charge of the Konkan province. (Sabh. 47, Chit. 110.) The com- mandants of his forts were strictly ordered to be watchful day and night and to follow his rules implicitly, so as to guard against surprise or fraud. The civil officers were to follow his former regulations and practice in all matters. After making a tour of inspection throughout his small kingdom, and even paying surprise visits to some of his forts, and repeating, as his final instructions to his officers, "Act as I had previously laid down," Shiva ji took leave of his family at Rajgarh, and began his journey to Northern India, about the third week of March, 1666, with his eldest son Shambhuji, seven trusty chief officers, and 4,000 troops.* A lakh of Rupees from the Deccan treasury *Sabh. 47; Chit. 108. Dil 57 says 1.000 soldiers, which I consider as more probable. 156 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. was advanced to him by order of the Emperor for his expenses, and Ghazi Beg, an officer of Jai Singh's army, was deputed to act as his guide. § 3. Shivaji journeys to Agra. On the way, he received an imperial letter, dated Agra 5th April, saying, "Received your letter stating that you have started for my Court. Come quickly with composure of mind, and after receiving my favours you will be permitted to return home. I send you a robe of honour [with this.]" (Parasnis MS., Letter No. 10.) When he reached Aurangabad, his fame and splendidly dressed escort drew all the people out of the city to gaze on him. But Saf Shikan Khan, the governor of the place, despising Shiva as a mere zamindar and a Maratha, remained with his officers in the audience-hall, and merely sent his nephew to receive Shiva on the way and ask him to come and see him there. Shivaji was highly offended at this intended slight of the governor and asserted his dignity by riding straight to his appointed quarters in the city, entirely ignoring the governor's exist- ence. Saf Shikan Khan then climbed down and visited Shiva at his residence with all the Mughal officers ! Next day, Shiva returned the visit, showing great politeness and cordiality to all. After a halt of some days, he resumed his march, receiving rations and presents from the local officers along his route, as ordered by the Emperor. (Dil. 57-58.) On 1666] SHIVA MEETS AURANGZ1B. 157 9th May he arrived in the outskirts of Agra, where the Emperor was then holding Court. § 4. Shivaji's interview with Aurangzib. The 12th of the month was appointed as the day of his audience.* It was the 50th lunar birthday of the Emperor. The Hall of Public Audience in Agra Fort was splendidly decorated for the occasion. The courtiers appeared in their most gorgeous robes. All things were ready for weighing the Emperor against gold and silver, which would then be given away in charity. The nobles of the empire and their retainers in thousands stood in marshalled ranks filling that vast hall of pillars and the ground beyond on three sides of it, which was covered with costly canopies. Into this Diwan~i~am, Kumar Ram Singh ushered Shivaji with his son Shambhuji and ten of his officers. On behalf of the Maratha chief, 1500 gold pieces were laid before the Emperor as present (nazar) and Rs. 6,000 as offering (nisar.) Aurangzib graciously cried out, "Come up, Shivaji Rajah!" Shivaji was led to the foot of the throne and made three salams. ♦Shivaji's audience with Aurangzib: A.N. 963, 968-970; H. A. 238a; Surat to Karwar, 8 June, 1666, in F. R. Surat, vol. 86; (all contemporary.) Sabh. 49; Storia, ii. 138; K. K. ii. 189-190; Dil. 58-59; (all reliable.) Chit. 111-112; Dig. 245-7; T. S. 22b-23a (later and legendary.) Bernier, 190, (meagre.) 158 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. Then, at a signal from the Emperor, he was con- ducted back to the place reserved for him among the third-grade nobles, the work of the darbar proceeded, and Shiyajj seemed to have been forgotten. was not the kind of reception he had so long been picturing to himself and expecting* as almost a certainty from his many conversations with Jai Singh. Ever since coming to Agra his mind had been ill at ease. First, he had been welcomed on behalf of the Emperor in the environs of the city by Ram Singh and Mukhlis Khan, two petty officers holding the nominal ranks of 2,500 and 1,500 respectively. No costly present, no high title, no kind word even, had followed his bow to the throne. He found himself standing behind several rows of nobles who almost shut him from the Emperor's view. He learnt from Ram Singh that he was among the commanders of 5,000. "What!" he exclaimed, "my little son of seven years was created a 5-hazari without having had to come to the Emperor's pre- sence. My servant Netaji is a 5-hazari. And am I, * This view is supported by the Persian and English accounts. "Shiva cherished some absurd fancies and hopes. So,... after standing for a while, he created a scene, retired to a corner and told. Kumar Ram Singh that he was disappointed, making unreasonable and foolish complaints." (A. N. 969.) "His spirit could not bear such humiliation as the other Umrahs to wait at a distance with their hands before them, like mutes." (Surat to Karwar.) Also K. K. 3666] SHIVA FEELS INSULTED. 159 after rendering all these services and coming all the way to the Court, to get the same low rank?" Then he asked, who the noble standing in front of him was. Ram Singh replied that it was Rajah Rai Singh* Sisodia. At this Shivaji cried out, "Rai Singh ! a mere subordinate of Rajah Jai Singh 1 Have I been considered only equal to him?" Stung to fury by what he considered a public humiliation, Shivaji expostulated with Ram Singh in a high tone, and even wanted to commit suicide f * Here I follow Dilkasha, 58. The Maratha writers (Sabhasad 49 and Chitnis 111) say that it was Jaswant Singh, on hearing whose name Shiva exclaimed, "Jaswant, whose back my soldiers have seen ! He to stand before me !" But Jaswant was a 7-hazari, and as such he would have stood two rows in front of Shiva. Rai Singh Sisodia (the son of Maha- rana Bhim Singh) was created a 5-hazari for his services at Purandar (M. U. ii. 300; A. N. 868, 989.) By a mistake he is called Rathor in A. N. 891 and once in H. A. Paris MS. 125a. tHere I follow K. K. ii. 190 and Storia, ii. 138. But Sabhasad, 49, says that he begged for Ram Singh's dagger in order to kill Jaswant ! The prolific imagination of the Hindi poet Bhushan has distorted the incident into the following shape: "On the day of the Court festivity [birthday]. Aurangzib sat on the throne like Indra, with his subjects around him. But the sight of all this splendour could not make Shiva tremble. He made no salam, he despised the pomp and force of the Padishah They made him stand in the ranks of the 5-hazari mansabdars, as if he were not distinct from them. Bhushan says that Aurangzib's ministers had no sense of propriety. He (Shivaji) could not get the sword from the belt [of Ram Singh 1 and the Muslim (Aurangzib) saved s& 160 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. rather than outlive such a shame. Ram Singh, alarmed at this unexpected development and the breach of Court etiquette caused by Shiva's loud voice and violent gestures, tried his best to pacify him, but in vain. Swelling with suppressed anger and fretting ithin himself in Jajtterness of mortification, Shivaji fell down in afswoon! (Dil. 59 ; K. K. ii. 190 ; Surat to Karwar.) There was a stir among the courtiers. The Emperor asked what the matter was. Ram Singh diplomatically replied, "The tiger is a wild beast of the forest. He feels oppressed by heat in a place like this and has been taken ill." He also apologised for the Rajah's rude conduct by saying that he was a Deccani unfamiliar with Courts and polished manners. Aurangzib graciously ordered the sick Rajah to be removed to an ante-room and sprinkled with rose-water, and, on his restoration to his senses, gave him leave to go to his quarters without waiting for the close of the darbar. §5. Shivaji placed under guard by order of Aurangzib. On returning from the Court, Shivaji openly taxed the Emperor with breach of faith towards him, and asked to be put to death as a lesser evil. There were men about him who reported his angry words and complaints here and in the darbar hall to himself [by running] into the ghusalkhana." (Bhushan, Granthavali, pp. 66, 70, also 68.) 1666] SHIVA MADE PRISONER AT AGRA. 161 Aurangzib, and it only increased the Emperor's dis- like and distrust of the Maratha chief. Ram Singh was ordered to lodge him in the Jaipur House outside the city- walls, and be responsible for his custody. Shiva was forbidden the Court, though Shambhuji was asked to come now and then. Thus, Shivaji's high! hopes were finally dashed to pieces and he foundl himself a prisoner instead. (Dil. 59 ; A. N. 969.) \ He took counsel with his devoted followers and with Raghunath Pant Korde, his agent at the imperial Court, as to how he could effect his release. They advised him to play on the Emperor's greed of terri- tory and to promise the conquest of Bijapur and Golkonda* as the price of his restoration to liberty. A petition to this effect was presented by the hand of Raghunath Korde, but the Emperor only answered, 'Wait a little and I shall do what you ask for." Shiva knew the answer was evasive. He then begged for a private interview with the Emperor in which he promised to make a secret communication very much to the benefit of the latter. The Maratha chronicles say that the prime-minister Jafar Khan, warned by a letter from Shaista Khan, dissuaded the Emperor from risking his person in a private inter- view with a magician like Shiva. But Aurangzib hardly needed other people's advice in such a matter. He was too wise to meet in a small room with a few guards the man who had slain Afzal Khan almost within sight of his 10,000 soldiers, and wounded * Or Qandahar, according to Dil. 69. 11 162 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. Shaista Khan in the very bosom of his harem amidst a ring of 20,000 Mughal troops, and escaped un- scathed. Popular report credited Shiva with being a wizard with "an airy body," ableto jump across 40 or 50 yards of space upon the personof his victim. The prlvate^audienCB'was refused. Shivaji next tried to win over the prime-minister, and paid him a visit, begging him to use his influence over the Emperor to send him back to the Deccan with adequate resources for extending the Mughal empire there. Jafar Khan, warned by his wife (a sister of Shaista Khan) not to trust himself too long in the company of Shiva, hurriedly ended the inter- view, saying "All right ; I shall do so." Shiva knew that he meant to do nothing. (Sabh. 50-51 .; A. N. 970 ; Chit. 1 13.) He was now thrown entirely upon his own resources. At the same time his position became worse than before. Fulad Khan, the police chief of Agra, by imperial order placed a large guard with artillery round Shiva's mansion, and he now became a prisoner in appearance as well as reality. "This made the Rajah lose heart ; he felt sad and lamented long, clasping Shambhuji to his breast." In this state he passed three months. §6. Mughal policy during Shivaji's confinement at Agra. We now turn to the policy of the imperial Government and the action of Jai Singh during this 1666] MUGHAL POLICY TOWARDS SHIVA. 163 interval. Aurangzib had intended to present Shiva with an elephant, a robe of honour, and some jewels at the end of his first audience. But Shiva's violation of Court etiquette made him change his mind, and as a mark of displeasure he withheld these gifts, at least for the time. (H. A. 238a.) The Maratha chief, on his part, complained that the promises made to him on behalf of the Mughal Government had not been kept. Aurangzib, therefore, wrote to Jai Singh asking him to report fully and exactly what promises he had made. The Rajah replied by repeating and explaining the clauses of the Treaty of Purandar, and solemnly asserting that nothing beyond them had been promised. (A. N. 970. H. A. does not contain Jai Singh's reply.) Jai Singh was placed in a dilemma by this un- expected result of Shiva's visit to the Court. True, he had sent Shiva away to Northern India "by a thousand devices" in order to get him out of the Deccan when the military situation there turned against the Mughals ; but he had also pledged his honour for the safe return of his ally. He, therefore, tried to persuade the Emperor that he would gain nothing by imprisoning or killing Shiva, as the Maratha chief's wise arrangements had made his Government independent of his personality ; on the contrary the imperial interests in thaT~quarter would be best promoted by turning Shiva into a friend, at the same time that such a course would convince the public of the sacredness of the imperial officers* 164 SH1VAJI. [CH. VI. words. All the while Jai Singh continued to write to his Court agent, Ram Singh, to see to it that Shiva's life was safe and the solemn assurances of Jai Singh and his son remained inviolate. (H. A. 234a.) This, however, was no easy matter. It was im- possible for Jai Singh to change Aurangzib's crooked policy, or, at times, even to divine it. The Emperor seemed at first to have played a waiting game — to keep Shiva under surveillance in order to prevent his escape, and to decide after the conclusion of the Deccan campaign if and when he would be released. At first Ram Singh was ordered to stand bail and security for the good conduct and presence of Shiva at Agra. Jai Singh protested against this responsibi- lity being thrown on his son, and urged the latter to try his best to be relieved of it. After a short time, Aurangzib changed his mind, evidently because he distrusted a Hindu prince as the keeper of another Hindu prince, and for a few days talked of taking Shiva out of his bail and sending to him to Afghanis- tan, where he would be beyond the possibility of escape, as was actually done in the case of Netaji Palkar afterwards. But the idea was soon dropped. (H. A. 1966 ; 0(1. 69 ; Surat to Karwar.) Then the Emperor proposed to set out for the Deccan to con- duct the war in person, while Shiva would be left a State-prisoner at Agra in charge of Ram Singh, who would be appointed qiladar for the purpose. Jai Singh vehemently urged his son to avoid this disagreeable J 666] JAI SINGH'S ADVICE. 165 necessity, but advised the Emperor to leave Shiva at Agra. "When I prayed that Shiva might be permitted to return home, affairs [in the Deccan] were in a different condition. Now that they have changed altogether [against us,] it is not at all politic to send him to this side. Please detain him in such a way that his officers may not despair [about his return] , go over to Adil Shah and raise disturbances [against us.] It would be expedient to leave Shiva at Agra. He ought to be conciliated and assured that he would be summoned to the Court after it had arrived in the Deccan. His son should, as a matter of policy, be kept with the Emperor, in order that his followers may not be thrown into despair, but may loyally serve us." [H. A. 194a, 197a.] But the war in the Deccan steadily went against the Mughals, and Shiva's hope of an early release grew dimmer and dimmer. §7. Shioaji's escape from Agra. He, therefore, turned to his own inner resources to effect his liberation.* After a few days of cap- tivity, he made a loud profession of submission and fear and entreated courtier after courtier to intercede with the Emperor for his pardon, but with no success. * Shivaji's escape from Agra: A. N. 971 (one sentence only!) ; Bernier, 190, (same) ; Storia, ii. 139-140 ; Sabh. 52-55 and K. K. ii. 198-201, 217-220, (most detailed); Dil 59-61 ; Chit. 115-118 ; Dig. 249-254 \ T. S. 23a-25a j Fryer, ii. 65 ; Forrest. 166 SH1VAJI. [CH. VI. (Akhbarat, 9-32.) He, however, succeeded in getting permission for his Maratha escort to return to the Deccan. The Emperor felt that he would then have fewer enemies to watch and Shiva would be utterly friendless at Agra. The Maratha civil officers, too, at a hint from their chief, returned home in small parties. Being thus freed from anxiety about his followers, Shivaji set about devising plans for his own escape. He feigned illness and began to send out of his house every evening sweetmeats for Brahmans, religious mendicants and courtiers. These were carried in huge baskets slung from a pole which was borne by two men on their shoulders. The guards searched the baskets for some days and then allowed them to pass out unchallenged. This was the opportunity for which Shivaji had been waiting. In the afternoon of 19th August, he sent word to his guards that he was very ill and had taken to his bed and that they should not disturb him. His half-brother Hiraji Far- zand, who looked somewhat like him, lay down on his cot, with a quilt covering all his body except the outstretched right arm adorned with Shiva's gold wristlet, — while Shiva and his son crouched down in two baskets, which were safely sent out through the line of unsuspecting guards, being preceded and followed by baskets of real sweets, shortly after sunset. The baskets were deposited at a, lonely spot outside the city ; the porters were dismissed ; and 1666] shiva's escape from agra. 167 then Shiva and his son issued forth and made their way to a village six miles from Agra, where the trusty Niraji Ravji (his Chief Justice) was waiting for them with horses. After a hurried consultation in a jungle the party divided ; Shiva with his son and three officers, Niraji Ravji, Datta Trimbak and Raghu- mitra a low-caste Maratha, smeared themselves with ashes like Hindu ascetics, and hastened towards Mathura, while the others took their own way home- wards. §8. His escape discovered by the police. Meanwhile, at Agra, Hiraji lay in bed all that night and well into the afternoon of the next day. The guards who peeped in in the morning were satisfied when they saw Shiva's gold bracelet on the sleeper's wrist, and a servant sitting on the floor massaging the patient's feet. About 3 P.M. Hiraji quietly walked out of the house with the servant, warning the sentries at the gate, "Make less noise ; Shivaji is ill and under treatment." Gradually the guards' suspicion was aroused ; the house seemed strangely deserted ; no crowd of visitors came to see Shiva as usual ; and there was no sound, no stir in the house. They entered his room and found that the bird had flown ! They at once ran with the astounding news to their chief Fulad Khan, who reported it to the Emperor, ascribing Shiva's fight to witchcraft and saving himself from all blame. "The Rajah," so he said, "was in his own room. We 168 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. visited it regularly. But he vanished all of a sudden from our sight. Whether he flew into the sky or disappeared into the earth, is not known, nor what magical trick he has played." Aurangzib was not the man to be taken in by such a tale. A hue and cry was immediately raised, and fast couriers and sergeants-at-arms were sent off to watch the road to the Deccan through Berar and Khandesh, and to warn the local officers to look out for the fugitives. The Maratha Brahmans and other followers of Shivaji were arrested wherever found, at Agra or near it. But by this time Shiva had had twenty-four hours' clear start over his pursuers. The vigorous inquiry made at the capital gradually brought to light the details of the romantic story of the flight. Suspicion naturally fell on Ram Singh, as he had so often tried to avoid the responsi- bility for Shiva's presence at Agra, and it was his interest to effect the Maratha chief's safe return home, for which he and his father had pledged their honour. Some of the Maratha Brahmans who were caught * admitted, probably undeir torture, that their master had fled with the connivance of Ram Singh. (H. A. 201a.) The Rajput prince was punished, first by being forbidden the Court and then being deprived of his rank and pay.* * Three leading Brahmans of Shiva's service were arrested and probably tortured by Fulad Khan. They alleged that the flight of Shivaji was due to the advice of Ram Singh and •resulted from the latter's neglect to watch him well. Jai Singh 1666] SHAMBHUJI LEFT AT MATHURA. 169 §9. Route of Shivaji's flight. With consummate cunning Shiva threw his pur- suers off the scent, by following a route exactly opposite to that which leads to Maharashtra. Instead of moving due south-west Jrom Agra.jdirj?ui^Malwa and Khandesh or Gujrat, he travelled eastwards to Mathura, Allahabad, Benares, Gay a, and Puri, and then south-westwards through Gondwana and Gol- konda, describing a vast loop round India before returning to Rajgarh. Arrived at Mathura, he found the boy Shambhu worn out by fatigue and unable to proceed further. Three Deccani Brahmans, — Krishnaji, Kashi, and Visaji, brothers-in-law of Moro Trimbak (the Peshwa), were living at this holy city. Niraji knew them and confided to them the story of Shiva's escape and his present plight. They nobly responded to the appeal in the name of their country and faiths and braving all risks of imperial vengeance in the event of detec- tion, they agreed to keep Shambhuji* till Shiva should on hearing of this charge exclaims, "May God give death to the man who cherishes the very thought of such an act of faithlessness in his heart!" (H. A. 200a, 20\a.) Eleven months later, on the death of his father, Ram Singh was taken back into favour and created a 4-hazari, but was soon afterwards sent to join the army fighting in Assam, to die of pestilence there. {A. N. 1051.) Z. C, arrest of Brahmans. * According to the Maratha chroniclers, (Sabh. 55, Chit. 117, Dig. 252, T. 5. 25a) also Dil. 61, Shambhuji was left at Mathura in charge of Kashi Pant and his brothers,. But 170 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. reach home and write for him. One of the brothers, Krishnaji, even undertook to guide the fugitives as far as Benares. Shivaji had crammed the hollow core of a sannyasi's staff with gems and gold coins. Some more money was concealed in his shoes, and a diamond of great value and several rubies coated with wax were sewn in the dresses of his servants or carried in their mouths. (K. K. ii. 200 and 217.) At Mathura, which was reached within six hours of leaving Agra, he shaved off his beard and mous- taches, smeared himself with ashes, and put on the disguise of sannyasis. "Travelling in the darkness of the night with swift Deccani couriers, who were prac- tised in the art of moving in various disguises and assumed characters, he rapidly left the capital behind him. Forty or fifty of his servants accompanied him divided into three parties and dressed as monks of the three Hindu orders, Bairagis, Gosains, and Udasis. §10. Adventures of Shivaji during his flight. The fugitives pursued their way, constantly changing their disguise, sometimes passing for reli- gious mendicants, sometimes as petty traders, and escaped detection because no one dreamt of their going to the eastern provinces of India while their destination was the west. They, however, had some hairbreadth escapes. K. K. (ii. 201 & 218) incorrectly says that he was entrusted to Kavi Kulesh at Allahabad. 1666] VISITS HOLY PLACES. 171 In one towp; jaujdar in private, boldly dis- closed his identity and offered him a diamond and a ruby worth a lakh of Rupees as "the price of his liberation. The jaujdar preferred the bribe to his duty. (K. K. ii. 218.) After performing his bath at the junction of the Ganges and Jamuna at Allahabad, Shivaji proceeded to Benares. Here he hurriedly went through all the rites of a pilgrim in the dim morning twilight and slipped out of the town just as a courier arrived from Agra with the proclamation for his arrest and a hue and cry was started.* * In this connection Khafi Khan (ii. 219-220) writes : — "When I was at the port of Surat, a Brahman physician named Nabha [or BabhaJ used to tell the following tale : "I had been serving one of the Benares Brahmans as his pupil, but he stinted me in food. At last, one morning when it was still dark, I went to the river-side as usual ; a man seized my hand, thrust into it a quantity of jewels, ashrafis and hurts, and said, 'Don't open your fist, but quickly finish the bathing rites for me.' I immediately hastened to shave and bathe him, but had not done ministering to him, when a hue and cry was raised and the news spread that sergeants at the mace had arrived [from the CourtJ in search of Shiva. When I became attentive I found that the man to whom I had been ministering had slipped away. I [thenl knew that it was 172 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. Still moving eastwards, he visited the famous shrine of (Hindu) Gaya and was joined by two of his men whom he had sent there beforehand. Then they started for the temple of Jagannath at Puri on the seashore of Orissa. "Through travelling long distances on foot every day, he felt a desire for riding. At the time of buying a pony he had not a sufficient number of Rupees with him. So, opening his purse of gold coins, he gave a few of them to the horse-dealer. The flight of Shivaji had already been noised abroad, and the man cried out, 'You must be Shiva, as you are paying so much for a little pony ! ' At this Shivaji gave him the whole purse [as hush money] and fled from the place." (Dil. 61.) After worshipping Jagannath at Puri, he turned westwards and returned home by way of Gondwana, Haidarabad and Bijapur territories. We have a characteristic anecdote about an incident during this journey. The story runs (Chit. 118; variant in Dig. 254), that the pretended sannyasis one evening took refuge in the house of a peasant in a village on the Godavari.* The old mother of the host apologised to the holy men for the poor Shivaji. He had given me 9 gems, 9 ashrafis and 9 hurts. Then without going to my preceptor I returned to my country and reached Surat. The grand house that I have here was bought with that money." * Probably near Indur, a town 10 m. e. of Dharur and 10 m. n. of the Manjira, an affluent of the Godavari. Dig. 253 names Indur. 1666] VILLAGER CURSES SHIVA. 173 fare placed before them, saying that the troopers of the brigand J>hivaji had recently robbed the villages. She cursed them and theTr master to her heart's con- tent. Shivaji noted the names of the peasant and the village carefully, and on his return home, sum- moned the family of his host and gave them more than what they had lost. A late tradition gives a charming picture of the scene of Shivaji's home-coming. "He went to the gate of Raigarh, where his mother resided, and requested admittance to the presence of Jija Bai. The guards informed her that some strange Bairagis or religious medicants were at the gate of the fort and requested to see her. She desired that they should be admitted. When they came into her pre- sence, Niraji Pant blessed her after the manner of the Bairagis ; but Shiva advanced towards her and threw himself at her feet. She did not recognise him and was surprised that a Bairagi should place his head on her feet Shivaji then placed his head in Jija Bai's lap and took off his cap. She immediately perceived, by a mark on his head, that he was her son and embraced him." (Raigarh Life in Forrest, i. 17.) His return to Rajgarh (towards the end of Decem- ber 1666) was followed by widespread rejoicings among his family, officers and subjects. It was a national deliverance, as providential as it was romantic. He spread a false report that Shambhuji had 174 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. died, and even went into mourning for him. Then, when the suspicion of the Mughal officers on the way had been thus lulled asleep, and some months had elapsed, he wrote to Mathura for him, and the three brothers with their whole family migrated to Maha- rashtra, carrying Shambhuji, disguised as a Brahman kinsman, with them. At a certain outpost on the road, the Mughal officer suspected that Shambhuji was not of their family or caste ; but his Brahman protectors dined with him to prove their kinship, and the danger was passed. (Chit. 120 ; Dig. 255-256 ; T. S. 25a ; Dil. 61 gives a variant.) Shiva royally rewarded the faith- ful three — Krishnaji, Kashi Rao and Visaji, — gave them the title of Vishwas Rao (Lords Fidelity) and a lakh of gold pieces, and settled on them an annual revenue of 10,000 hurt. The devoted companions of his own escape were similarly rewarded. (Sabh. 57.) Shivaji's escape from captivity caused lifelong regret to Aurangzib. As the Emperor wrote in his last will and testament : ' 'The greatest pillar of a Government is the keeping of information about everything that happens in the kingdom, — while even a minute's negligence results in shame for long years. rSee, the flight of the wretch Shiva was due to careless- ness, but it has involved me in all these distracting campaigns to the end of my days." (Anec. §10.) I < §11. Jai Singh's anxieties and plans about Shivaji. We now turn to Jai Singh's anxieties, plans, and 1666] JAI SINGH ON SHIVA'S FLIGHT. 175 measures during Shivaji's absence from the Deccan. His correspondence with the Emperor and with Kumar Ram Singh during the three months of Shiva's captivity has been given before. His position was rendered infinitely worse by Shiva's escape from Agra (19th August.) He had been disgraced in the eyes of the Emperor by tn"e\ failure of his invasion of Bijapur. And now his soni Ram Singh was openly suspected of having connives at Shiva's flight. As he writes in bitterness, "All the plans and devices that I had employed in sending Shiva to Court have been spoiled, and measureless distraction has fallen to my lot. But there is no remedy against Fate and what is written on a man's forehead. I learn from the letters of some Court agents that there is a proposal to dismiss Ram Singh from his rank (mansab) and jagir, because Shiva's Brahman followers, at the instigation of selfish men [my enemies at Court] , have alleged that the flight of Shiva was due to the advice of Ram Singh, and resulted from the latter s omission to watch him well. May God give death to the man who cherishes the very thought of such an act of faithlessness in his heart ! Why should Shiva's men's words be believed against mine, when I had reduced him to such an extremity [in war] ?" [H. A. 201a.] The anticipated return of Shivaji to the Deccan greatly added to Jai Singh's fears. As he wrote on 5th November, 1666: — "The times are bad for me. My anxieties are ceaseless. The lying Bijapuris are 176 SH1VAJ1. [CH. VL wasting time [by delusive negotiations.] There is no trace or news of the fugitive Shiva. My days are passing in distraction and anxiety. I have sent trusty spies, in various disguises, to get news of Shiva.'* [H. A. 200a.] t About this time the officers left by Shiva in the J Deccan when starting for Agra began to display I ominous activity. Sayyid Masaud, the Mughal qttadCtl uf Rdigaih, wrote to Jai Singh's Paymaster complaining of the lack of provisions, etc. in the fort, and the collection of lead, gunpowder, rockets and infantry in the neighbourhood of Raigarh by some men who gave themselves out to be Shiva's followers and pretended that they intended to invade Bijapuri territory. At this alarming news Jai Singh sent orders to provision the fort as a precaution and to< hold it strongly, pending the arrival of Udai-bhan [the permanent qiladar ?] A reinforcement of 500 infantry under Sukh-man Chauhan was also ordered to be thrown into the fort if necessary. [H. A. 234a and o.] At last, in December, 1666, definite news was received of Shiva's arrival at Rajgarh. As Jai Singh's secretary wrote, "Trusty spies have now brought the news that Shiva himself has arrived but is very anxious about his son who has not returned with him. He professes a determination [to submit] to the imperial Government. But who knows what is in his heart? For some time past Mahadji Nimbalkar, the son of Bajaji, the zamindar of Phaltan and son-in-law of 1666] MARATHAS RENEW DISTURBANCES. 177 the infernal Shiva, has been causing disturbances in the region of Puna and other places. My master [i.e., Jai Singh] has appointed the jagirdars of that tract, such as, Tanaji [or Babaji ?] Bhonsla and others to Supa, Halal Khan to Indapur, Ghalib Khan to Chamargunda, Hassan Khan, Abdur Rasul and other Deccanis also to that side, and Trimbakji Bhonsla and others to Raisin. Before the others could arrive at their posts, Tanaji Bhonsla went to his jagir and getting an opportunity attacked Mahadji, sent many of his followers to hell, captured his flag, tor ah, 150 horses, arrows, etc., and returning lived in peace of mind. As the Deccanis have some [unknown] need for the flag and torah, Mahadji trod the path of submission and humility ; but Tanaji declined [to restore them.] At last, four days after- wards, that wretch got help from the Bijapuris and attacked Tanaji by surprise. That loyal and martial officer fought valiantly on foot, till he fell in the Emperor's service. And Anaji (or Dataji) Deshmukh went to hell in the neighbourhood of Pandharpur. It is reported that Mahadji also was wounded Jai Singh at first wanted to march there in person [and retrieve the disaster] , but was persuaded to give up the idea, lest the Bijapuris should take advantage of his absence. So, he has decided to send Abdul Hamid with 5,000 men to that quarter.'* [H. A. 211b.] Then, in a letter to the prime-minister Jafar Khan we have this astounding proposal from Jai Singh to 12 178 SHIVAJI. [CH. VI. entrap Shiva by the false proposal of a marriage between his daughter and Jai Singh's son, and get him murdered during his journey to the Rajput general's camp : — "I have not failed, nor will I do so in future, to exert myself against Bijapur, Golkonda and Shiva in every possible way I am trying to arrange matters in such a way that the wicked wretch Shiva will come to see me once, and that in the course of his journey or return [our] clever men may get a favourable opportunity [of disposing of] that luck- less fellow in his unguarded moment at that place. This slave of the Court, for furthering the Emperor's affairs, is prepared to go so far, — regardless of praise or blame by other people, — that if the Emperor sanc- tions it, I shall set on foot a proposal for a match with his family and settle the marriage of my son with his daughter, — though the pedigree and caste of Shiva are notoriously low and men like me do not eat food touched by his hand (not to speak of entering into a matrimonial connection with him), and in case this wretch's daughter is captured I shall not con- descend to keep her in my harem. As he^is of low irth, he will very lively swallow this bait and be hooked. BuTgreat care should be taken to keep this ^jDlan secret. Send me quickly a reply to enable me to act accordingly." [H. A. 139a.] This letter throws a lurid light on the political morals of the 1 7th century. When people argue that Afzal Khan could not have possibly intended to stab 1667] JAI SINGH S CUNNING PLOT. 179 Shivaji during an interview, they should remember that the sanctimonious Jai Singh was prepared to prove his loyalty by lowenng his family honour and laying a fatal snare for "SEivaji, a brother Hindu. CHAPTER VII. 1667—1670. §1. State of Mughal Deccan, 1667. On returning home from Agra in December 1666, Shivaji found the political situation in the Deccan entirely changed. The Mughal viceroy, Jai Singh, [was no longer in a position to repeat his former suc- I cess over the Marathas. Worn out by age, toil, dis- ' appointment and domestic anxieties, discredited in his master's eyes by the failure of his invasion of Bijapur, and expecting every day to be removed from his post, Mirza Rajah was visibly hastening to his grave. In May 1667 Prince Muazzam, the newly appointed governor, reached Aurangabad and reliev- ed Jai Singh of his charge. The Rajput veteran set out on his homeward journey in extreme misery of mind and sense of public humiliation, and died on the way at Burhanpur on 2nd July. /*" The return of the weak and indolent Muazzam yand the friendly Jaswant to power in the Deccan /(May 1667) relieved Shivaji of all fear from the \Mughal side. It is true that soon afterwards an able and active~~general, bearing implacable hatred to the Marathas, joined the Mughal camp. Dilir Khan re- turned from the Gond country to the side of Prince Muazzam in October 1667, but the coming of this 1667] DISORDERLY RAJPUT TROOPS. 181 famous warrior brought no accession of strength to the imperialists. The Prince was jealous of Dilir's influence and prestige at his father's Court, resented his insubordinate spirit, and regarded him as a spy on behalf of the Emperor. The proud Rohila general, on his part, publicly slighted Maharajah Jaswant Singh, the right-hand man and trusted confi- dant of the Prince. Nor was this the only source of discord in the Mughal army in the Deccan. Rao Karn Rathor, the chief of Bikanir, was an officer in Dilir's contingent. His worthless son Anup Singh, when acting as his father's agent at the imperial Court, influenced the Emperor to transfer the princi- pality of Bikanir to himself. "At the news of this event, the Rao became even more negligent of his duties and reckless than before, disobeying the wishes of the Khan. His Rajputs practised gang- robbery in the camp at night, because, his lands having been given to his son, he ceased to get the necessary money for his expenses from his home. It was proved that his soldiers had looted some villages also. Dilir Khan, to save his credit with the Emperor, reported the matter to Court, and the Emperor [in reply] ordered him to arrest the Rao if he [still] acted in that manner. The Court agent of Rao Bhao Singh Hada, learning of the contents of the imperial letter, wrote to his master about it. When Dilir Khan, on the pretext of hunting, ap- proached the camp of Rao Karn and invited him to join in the chase, the Rao came to him with a *182 SHIVAJI. [CH. VII. few Rajputs. Bhao Singh, on getting news of Dilir Khan having ridden out towards the camp of Rao Kam that morning, arrived there quickly with his own troops and carried off Rao Karn to safety from the midst of Dilir's guards. The two Raos marched together to Aurangabad, 24 miles behind Dilir's army. Dilir Khan did not pull well with Muazzam and Jaswant. He was sent towards Bidar to punish the enemy, but the two Raos remained behind at Aurangabad by order [of the Prince.]" (Dil. 66-68.) The Prince used to help Rao Karn with money in his distress and enforced idleness at Aurangabad. Thus, Dilir's enemies found a ready shelter with Muazzam. After sending Dilir Khan away to Bidar, the Prin.ce freelyjndulged his natural love of hunting and witnessing animal combats, and no attempt was made to crush Shivaji. *~~But even if the viceroy of the Deccan had been a man of greater spirit and enterprise, it would have been impossible for him for some years from this time to get adequate men and money for an attempt to crush Shivaji. The resources of the empire had to be concentrated elsewhere, to meet more pressing dangers. Within a fortnight of Shivaji' s escape from ^Lgra, a large army had to be sent to the Panjab to meet the threat of a Persian invasion, and the anxiety on this point was not removeatill December. But immediately afterwards, in March 1667, the Yusufzai t^rising in Peshawar took place, which taxed the imperial strength for more than a year. 1668] SHIVA PROPOSES SUBMISSION. 183 9 It was, therefore, the Emperor's interest not molest Shivaji at such a time. §2. Shivaji1 s peace with the Mughals, 1668. The Maratha chief, on his part, was not eager for a war with the imperialists. For some years after* his return home from Agra, he lived very quietly,! and avoided giving any fresh provocation to the I Mughals. He wanted peace* for a time to organise 1 his ^inyfmmrntj rrpnvr^jvrrl provision hifr f^rt«r, pi"^ I consolidate ancTextend his power on the western coast ■ at the expense of Bijapur and the Siddis of Janjira. As early as April 1667 he had sent a letter to the Emperor professing terror of the imperial army which was reported to have been despatched against him, and offering to make his submission again and send a contingent of 400 men under his son to fight under the Mughal banners. (Akhbarat, 10-9.) Aurangzib had taken no notice of this letter. Some months later Shivaji made another attempt. He entreated Jaswant Singh to be his intermediary in making peace with the empire. He wrote to the * Shivaji's two years' peace with the Mughals 1668-1669 and the causes of rupture: Sabh. 59-62; Chit. 121-124; Dil. 69-71. The terms of this treaty are nowhere given in detail. F. R. Surat, 105. Zedhe Chron., p. 188, tells us that the peace was made and Shambhuji was sent to Muazzam in Oct. 1667, and the Maratha contingent under Pratap Rao went to Aurangabad in August 1668 and fled from it in December 1669. 184 SHIVAJI. [CH. VII. Maharajah, "The Emperor has cast me off. Other- wise I intended to have begged the task of recovering Qandahar with my unaided resources. I fled (from Agra) in fear of my life. Mirza Rajah, my patron, is dead. If through your intercession I am pardoned, I shall send Shambhu to wait on the Prince and serve as a mansabdar at the head of my followers wherever ordered." (Dil. 69-70.) J as want Singh and Prince Muazzam jumped at the offer and recommended Shiva to the Emperor (9th March 1668), who accepted the proposal, and thus a peace was made which lasted nearly two years. The Emperor recognised Shivaji's title of Rajah, but so far as we can judge did not restore to him any of his forts, except Chakan. For instance, Kalian- Bhiundy continued in the hands of the Mughals. For the next two years Shivaji lived at peace with the Mughal Government. The English factory letters at the close of 1668 and in 1669 describe him as "very quiet" and as "Aurangzibs vassal, (bound) to do whatsoever is commanded by the Prince." His rela- tions with Bijapur also were pacific. "The country all about [Karwar] at present is in great tranquillity. Shivaji keeps still at Rajgarh, and though as yet there is no peace made between this king [Adil Shah] and him, yet both refrain from committing any acts of hostility against one another." [F. R. Surat Vol. 105, Karwar to Surat, 16 Sep., 1668.] Still later, on 1 7th July, 1 669, the English traders at Hubli speak 1668] MARATHAS AT PEACE. 185 of "Shivaji being very quiet, not offering to molest the king's country." (Ibid.) In fact, during these three years (1667-69), he was busy framing a set of very wise regulations, which laid the foundations of his Government broad and deep, and have remained an object of admiration to after ages. (Sabh. 27-33, 58 ; Chit. 78-88.) In terms of the agreement with the Mughals, Shambhuji was sent to the viceroy's Court at Aurangabad with a Maratha contingent of 1 ,000 horse, under Pratap Rao Gujar. He was created a Commander of Five Thousand again and presented with an elephant and a jewelled sword. Jagirs were assigned to him in Berar. Half his contingent attended him at Aurangabad, while the other half was sent to the new jagir to help in collecting the revenue. After some months Shambhu was per- mitted to go back to his father on account of his tender age. For two years the Maratha contingent lived in the jagir, "feeding themselves at the expense of the Mughal dominion," as Sabhasad frankly puts it. (Dil. 70.) But the peace was essentially a hollow truce on both sides. Shivaji's sole aim in making it was to save himself from the possibility of a combined attack by three great Powers and to recover his strength during this respite from war. Aurangzib, ever suspi- cious of his sons, looked upon Muazzam's friendship withj>hiva as a possible menace to his throne, and he -secretly planned to entrap~Shfvaji a second time, or 186 SHIVAJI. [CH. VII. at least to seize his son and general as hostages. (Sabh. 62.) The rupture, inevitable in any case, was pre- cipitated by financial causes. Retrenchment of expenditure had now become a pressing necessity to Aurangzib, and he ordered the Mughal army in the Deccan to be greatly reduced. The disbanded soldiery took service with Shiva, who had to find employment for them. Another ill-judged measure >©£ imperial parsimony was to attach a part of Shiva's new jagir in Berar in order to recover the lakh of Rupees advanced to him in 1666 for his journey to the Court. The news of it reached Shivaji when he had completed his military preparations. He sent a secret message to Pratap Rao to slip away from Aurangabad with his men. The other half of the contingent fled from Berar at the same time, plunder- ing the villages on the way! (Dil. 71.) The Zedhe Chronology and Chhatraprakash, p. 68, indirectly suggest that Shivaji renewed the war as a protest against the temple destruction on which Aurangzib launched in 1669. Sabhasad, however, tells us that Aurangzib wrote to his son to arrest Pratap Rao and Niraji Pant, the Maratha agents at Aurangabad, and attach the horses of their troops, and that the Prince, who had learnt of the order beforehand from his Court agent, revealed it to Niraji and instigated the Marathas to escape, while the imperial order arrived a week 1670] BREACH WITH MUGHALS. 187 afterwards, when it was too late to carry it out. (Sabh. 61-62.) §3. War renewed, 1670. This rupture with the Mughals occurred in January 1670, or a month earlier. On 11th Dec. 1669, the Emperor received a despatch from the Deccari reporting the desertion of four Maratha captains ofl Shiva's clan (biradari) from the imperial service A Aurangzib soon set to strengthening his forces in1 the Deccan. On 26th January 1670 an order was sent to Dilir to leave Deogarh in the Gond country and hasten to Aurangabad. Daud Khan was ordered to arrange for the defence of his province of Khandesh and then go to Prince Muazzam's assistance. Many other officers were transferred from North India to the Deccan. (Altfibarat, year 12.) Shivaji opened his offensive with great vigour* and immediate success.* His roving bands looted! Mughal territory, and he attacked several of the forts' * Sabhasad, 59, says, "In four months he recovered the 27 forts he had ceded to the Mughals." But it is an exaggera- tion. There is a most spirited but legendary ballad on the capture of Singh-garh (PoWadas.) The Akhbarat and Dilkasha have been of invaluable help in the history of the campaigns of 1671 as reconstructed here. Marathi bakhars are silent. Z. C. gives dates in the Hindu lunar year, and says that during 1670 the Marathas gained Kondana, Purandar, Trimbak, Rohira, Mahuli, Lohgarh, Ahivant, Ravla-Javla and Markanda- garh, but that Mahabat Kh. recovered the last three forts in 1671. 188 SHIVAJI. [CH. VII. which he had ceded to Aurangzib by the Treaty of Purandar. "The imperial officers in command of most of these forts fell after fighting heroically. Every day the Emperor got news of such losses. But some of these places defied capture by reason of the strength of their fortifications and abundant supply of war material." (Dil. 64.) His most conspicuous success was the capture of Kondana from Udai-bhan, its Rajput qiladar, (late in January.) Assisted by some Koli guides who knew the place well, one dark night Tanaji Malusare, with his 300 picked Mavle infantry scaled the less abrupt hill-side near the Kalian gate by means of rope-ladders and advanced into the fort, slaying the jnelsv^The alarm was given ; the Rajputs, stupefied with opium, took some time to arm and come out ; but in the meantime the Marathas had made their footing secure. The garrison fought des- perately, but the Mavles with their war cry of Hara I Hara ! Mahadev ! carried havoc into their ranks. The~two chiefs challenged each other and both fell down dead, after a single combat. The Marathas, disheartened by the fall of their leader, were rallied by his brother Suryaji Malusare, opened the Kalian gate to their supporting columns, and took complete possession of the fort. The rest was butchery. Twelve hundred Rajputs were slain, and many more perished in trying to escape down the hill-side. The victors set fire to the thatched huts of the cavalry lines and the signal blaze informed Shivaji at Rajgarh, nine 1670] SHIVA RECOVERS HIS FORTS. 189 miles southwards, that the fort had been taken. He mourned the death of Tanaji as too high a price for the fort, and named it Singh-garh after the lion-heart that had won it. Early in March, he recovered Purandar, capturing its qiladar Razi-ud-din Khan. (M. A. 99.) A few days later he looted the village of Chandor, seizing an elephant, 12 horses and Rs. 40,000 belonging to the imperial treasury, then entered the town and plundered it, while the imperial qiladar was shut up in the fort. At one place, however, he met with repulse. The fort of Mahuli (in North Konkan, 50 miles n. e. of Bombay) was held for the Emperor by a gallant and able Rajput named Manohar Das Gaur, the nephew of Rajah Bithal Das of Shah Jahan's time. Shiva invested it in February 1670 and attempted a surprise at night. He sent up 500 of his men to the ramparts by means of rope-ladders. But Manohar Das, who "used to be on the alert day and night," fell on the party, slew most of the men and hurled the rest down the precipice. Shivaji then raised the siege, turned to Kalian-Bhiundy and recovered it after slaying its thanahdar Uzbak Khan and driving out the Mughal outpost there. (Dil. 65 ; O. C. 3415, Surat to Co., 30 March 1670.) Ludi Khan, the faujdar of Konkan, was wounded in a battle with the Maratha forces, defeated in a second encounter, and expelled from his district. The Mughal faujdar of Nander (?) fled away, deserting his post. 190 SHIVAJI. [CH. VII. About the end of this year (1670) Mahuli too was lost to the Emperor. Manohar Das, conscious of the inadequacy of the garrison and provisions of the fort to repel another attack of the superior Maratha forces, resigned his post in despair of getting reinforcements. Shivaji seized the opportunity, and about December captured Mahuli, slaying its new commandant Alawardi Khan and his garrison of 200 men. (Dil. 65.) By the end of April 1670* he had looted 51 villages near Ahmadnagar, Junnar and Parenda. The only officer who made an attempt to uphold the imperial prestige in the Deccan was Daud Khan Qureshi, who had been second only to Dilir Khan during Jai Singh's Maratha campaign of 1665. Leaving the province of Khandesh in charge of his son, Daud Khan arrived at Ahmadnagar on 28th March 1670. Six days afterwards he set out with 7,000 cavalry to expel Shiva's men who were roving near Parnir, Junnar, and Mahuli. They evacuated Parnir and Junnar and retired before him, while he occupied these two posts. Meantime, Shivaji had invested three Mughal forts in that region, and Daud Khan left Junnar to relieve them. But at the approach of his Van (under his gallant son Hamid and Ludi Khan) the Marathas raised the siege and fled away, * The text of Al^hbarat here is doubtful. The year may be 1671. Z. C. asserts that Shiva recovered Mahuli about the middle of Aug. 1670. J670] DAUD KHAN AGAINST SHIVAJI. 191 and the Mughal advanced division fell back on their main body. Soon afterwards, these two officers went with a detachment and destroyed an old fort which the Marathas were repairing on the frontier, 20 miles from Mahuli. Towards the end of April, Daud Khan himself marched to Mahuli. The Emperor in open Court highly praised Daud Khan for his spirit in invading the enemy's country, regardless of the smallness of his own force, and thereby creating a useful diversion of Shivaji's attention. The hot weather evidently put an end to the campaign soon afterwards. (Akhbarat, year 13.) §4. Quarrel between Muazzam and Dilir. But the Mughal administration of the Deccan w£s*\ in no condition to make a stand against Shivaji.J For half of the year 1 670 it was passing through a civiy war of its own. In obedience to the Emperor's anxious and repeated orders, Dilir Khan* had left the Gond country, where he had been profitably employed in squeezing the local chieftains, and set off for the Deccan. Starting from Nagpur on 19th March 1670, he expected to reach Aurangabad and to * Quarrel between Muazzam and Dilir Khan in 1670 : Dil. 73-75, 80-82 (main source); Ishwardas (important) 59a— 60a; Storia, ii. 161-166; while M. A. 101, Akhbarat, year 13, and English records give dates and a few details. O. C. 3415, F. R. Surat Vol. 3, Vol. 105 (Bombay to Surat. 5 Sep.) &c. Mirat-i-Ahmadi, 290, merely copies Ishwardas. 192 SH1VAJI. [CH. VII. Cwait on the Prince on 12th April. But at his near approach the old quarrel between the viceroy and his general broke out afresh. We have seen how "*fney had disagreed in 1667. So, now too, when Dilir, after pursuing some enemy raiders, reached Pathri, 26 miles w. of Aurangabad (about 8th April) and received an order from the Prince to wait on him, he feared to go to the interview lest he should be treacherously imprisoned or killed by the Prince. "Twice or thrice he took horse for the purpose of visiting the Prince, but returned from the way, and spent some days on the plea of illness." At this act of insubordination, Muazzam and Jaswant wrote to the Emperor accusing Dilir Khan of rebellion. The Khan had already denounced the Prince to the Emperor, saying that he was in collusion with Shivaji and had done nothing to defend the imperial dominions, and offering to crush the Maratha chief if the command of the army in the Deccan were left in his (Dilir's) hands for two years with an adequate supply of artillery and siege-material. I Aurangzib was at this time filled with serious / anxiety at Muazzam's wilful conduct, neglect of the imperial business, and failure to carry out orders. Popular voice in the Deccan could account for the open audacity and easy success of Shivaji 's raids and the Prince's inactivity, only by ascribing to Muazzam a treasonable design to attempt his father's throne In alliance with the Marathas . So, at the end of March 1670 the Emperor had 1670] EMPEROR INVESTIGATES THE DISPUTE. 193 sent his Chamberlain (Khan-i-saman), Iftikhar Khan, to Aurangabad to investigate how matters really stood, — whether Muazzam was really bent on treason and what his relations with Shivaji were. This officer was now instructed to inquire into the Prince's charges against Dilir Khan, and, if the Pathan general was found to be really guilty, to bring him by any means to the Prince's presence and there "do to him what the exigencies of the State required." (Dil. 74.) Iftikhar's brother, a high officer of the imperial Court, learning of this order, wrote secretly to Dilir to be vigilant when visiting the Prince. This message only deepened the alarm and suspicion of Dilir Khan. Iftikhar, after his arrival at Aurangabad, went out to visit Dilir, and listen to his explanations of his conduct. When he tried to dispel the alarm of the general and swore that no disgrace would be done to him in the Prince's presence, Dilir put him to shame and silence by showing him the letter of his brother at Court, reporting the Emperor's instructions. Iftikhar, therefore, could only advise Dilir to keep away from the Prince longer by pretending illness and then march away without seeking an interview or permission from the viceroy. Iftikhar, no doubt moved by kindly intentions, J thus became guilty of double-dealing. As an English gunner in Muazzam's service wrote, "He played the Jack on both sides, and told the Prince that Dilir Khan was his enemy, and went to Dilir Khan and told 13 194 SH1VAJI. [CH. VII. him that the Prince would seize on him if he came to Aurangabad." (John Trotter to President of Surat, 20 Dec. 1670, in F. R. Surat, Vol. 105.) His unfortunate advice to Dilir only prolonged the tension. Iftikhar then returned to the Prince's Court and falsely testified to Dilir 's illness, adding many imaginary details to it. Dilir marched southwards to attack a Maratha force (under Pratap Rao) that was raiding Mungi-Pattan (in May.) s Muazzam complained to the Emperor that Dilir /Khan had openly defied his authority and that the / Khan's Afghan troops used to rob the people and V sack the villages along their line of march ; and the latter charge was borne out by the reports of the news- writers. Then Dilir, finding his position in the Deccan intolerable, wanted to go back to the imperial Court without waiting for permission ; but the Prince ascribed this course to a wicked desire of creating disorder in Northern India. Imperial orders reached him to force Dilir Khan back to the path of obedience. The Prince set himself to raise an army for a war with Dilir and called in the Mughal detachments from the outlying posts to his banners. Dilir Khan was pursuing a Maratha band across the Godavari river, when he heard of the arrival of a farman from the imperial Court, and divined its purport. His former suspicion and anxiety now deepened into alarm and perplexity. Though it was the height of the rainy season (August), the rivers swollen and the roads miry, he burnt his tents and 1670] MUAZZAM PURSUES D1LIR KHAN. 195 stores and fled northwards with his army on horse- back. Marching "in great fear of life, without distinguishing between night and day," he reached the ferry of Akbarpur on the Narmada and swam his horses across the raging stream, losing many men by drowning. Thence he proceeded to Ujjain, the capital of Malwa, to rest for a few days from the fatigues of this march. As soon as he started from the south, Prince\ Muazzam and Jaswant gave him chase with all the j available Mughal troops, calling upon Shivaji to come/ to their aid ! The Deccan was filled with wild rumours of a civil war among the imperialists, which were "so confused that we cannot write them for credible." (O. C. 3470, Bombay to Surat, 1 Sep. 1670.) In the pursuit of Dilir Khan, Prince Muazzam reached the pass of Changdev, six miles from the Tapti, intending to cross the river and enter Burhanpur, the capital of Khandesh, of which Daud Khan was subahdar. This governor refused to let him cross his frontier and prepared for armed resistance. The Prince distributed a month's pay to his soldiers to hearten them for the coming struggle. But this unexpected opposition brought him to a halt for some time, during which a letter came from the Emperor ordering Muazzam back to Aurangabad (September.) The Prince's evil genius, Jaswant Singh, was separated from him and posted at Burhanpur until further orders. 196 SHIVAJI. [CH. VII. For, in the meantime, Bahadur Khan, the governor of Gujrat, had taken Dilir Khan under his protection and written to the Emperor praising Dilir's loyalty and past services, explaining how the un- reasonable antipathy of J as want and the misrepre- sentations of backbiters had turned the Prince's mind against the Khan, and recommending that Dilir might be permitted to serve under him as faujdar of Kathiawad. The Emperor's suspicion and alarm had 'also been excited by Muazzam's approach to Hindusthan ; it looked so very like his own move in 1657 ! Indeed, his own position now was weaker than Shah Jahan's in that year, for, the war with Shivaji had drawn the greater part of the Mughal forces into the Deccan and i&urangzifc> had no army in Nojjhernlndia large enough to confront his sons. It was the talk of the Prince's camp that * if he had marched forward, he would before this have been king of Hindusthan." (Trotter to Surat.) Muazzam promptly obeyed his father's order and returned to Aurangabad at the end of September, 1670.* * We may here conclude this episode in the life of Muazzam. In April his mother, Nawab Bai, was sent from Delhi to visit him and bring him back to the right path by her influence. She returned from her mission in September. Iftikhar Khan, the imperial Chamberlain, had harshly re- primanded the Prince. But when the Emperor learnt that Muazzam's heart was loyal and that his motives had been misrepresented to him by his enemies, the imperial wrath fell upon Iftikhar Khan for having exceeded his instructions and been guilty of double-dealing at Aurangabad. His brother, 1670] DISCORD IN MUGHAL DECCAN. 197 These internal troubles paralysed the Mughal \ arms, and Shivaji made the most of this golden I opportunity. We have seen how he had recovered several of his forts early in the year. His cavalry bands roamed over the country, plundering far and wide. In March the English factors at Surat wrote, "Shivaji marches now not [as] before as a thief, but in gross witR'^iiraliiiy uf 30,000 jnenJL_xonqTiering as he~~goes, and is not disturbed though the Prince lies neaTTumT^TO. C 3415} f §5. Second Loot of Surat. In April Bahadur Khan visited Surat with 5,000 horse, to guard the town against an apprehended attack by Shiva. In August there were false rumours that Muazzam, then supposed to be in rebellion against his father, was coming to Surat, "to take possession of this town and castle." The Mughals demanded from the Court of Bijapur a contingent of 12,000 horse for service against Shivaji, and some ammunition from the English at Bombay for the fort of Koridru ( ?) People were expectant as to what the imperialists would do when the rains would cease and campaigning again become possible. (F. R. Surat, Vol. 3. Consult. 16 and 18 Aug. 1670. O. C. 3457.) But Shivaji, as usual, struck the first blow. Muftakhar Khan, too, was punished for communicating official secrets to Dilir Khan. Both brothers remained deprived of office for some months. (M. A. 101 ; Akhbarat, 13-3.) 198 SHIVAJI. [CH. VII. On 3rd October he\plundered Surat for the second time. """" ' ». — ■ ' .-^^ Throughout September he had been assembling a large body of cavalry at Kalian, evidently to invade Gujrat. (F. R. Surat, Vol. 3. Consult. 12 Sep. 1670.) The matter was so notorious that on 12th September the English factors at Surat* had rightly concluded that "that town would be the first place he would take," and "foreseeing the ensuing danger, [we] had taken a convenient time to empty all our ware- houses at Surat of what goods were ready baled and sent them down to Swally ;" even their entire Council with the President (Gerald Aungier) were at Swally at the beginning of October. And yet the Mughal governor was so criminally negligent as to keep only 300 men for the defence of the city. On 2nd October came successive reports of Shiva's arrival with 15,000 horse and foot within 20 miles of Surat. All the Indian merchants of the city and even the officers of Government fled in the course of that day and night. On the 3rd, Shivaji attacked the city which had recently been walled round by order of Aurangzib. After a slight resistance the defenders fled to the fort, and the Mammas possessed themselyes_of the whole town except only the English, Dutch and French * The second loot of Surat : Surat Council to Co., 20 Nov. 1670. (Hedge's Diary, ii. pp. ccxxvi— ix.) F. R. Surat Vol. 3, (Consult, at Swally Marine, October); Dutch Records, Trans. Vol. 29, No. 763^ M. A. 106 (bare mention.) Sabh. 63-64. Chit. 72, confused and unreliable. 1670] SECOND LOOT OF SURAT. 199 factories, the large New Serai of the Persian and Turkish merchants, ancT the T^rlaf~Serai~ mfdway between the English and French houses, which was occupied by Abdullah Khan, ex-king of Kashgarh, just returned from a pilgrimage to Mecca. The French bought off th^ raider-** by means of ' Valuable presents." The EngHs^„.£aciory, though it was an open house, was defended by Streynsham Master with 50 sailors,' and the Marathas were received with such a hot fire from it that they lost several men, and, leaving the English alone, assaulted the Kashghar king's serai from the advantageous position of some avenues next to the French factory, which they were suffered by the French to occupy. The Tartars made a stout resistance all the day, but finding the post untenable" "tEejT fled with their king to the fort at night, giving up to plunder their house with its valuable property, including a gold palkj and other costly presents from Aurangzib. From the safe shelter of the Tartar Serai the Marathas prepared to open fire on the English factory the next day, but the resolute attitude of the handful \ of Englishmen cowed them, and after an angry parley J they came to an understanding and agreed not tp/ molest the English. The Dutch warehouse was un- touched. "A messenger came from the invader to assure us that no harm would befall us if we remained quiet and gave him our assurances that we would not interfere for or against him." (Dutch Records, Translations, Vol. 29, Surat to Directors, 14 Nov. 2G0 SHIVAJI. [CH. VII. 1670.) The Turks in the New Serai successfully defended themselves, inflicting some loss on the raiders. The Marathas plundered the larger houses of the city at leisure, taking immense quantities of treasure, cloth, and other valuable goods, and setting fire to several places, so that "nearly half the town" was burnt to the ground. They then approached the fortress of Surat, threatening to storm it ; but it was a mere demonstration, as they were not prepared to conduct a siege, and did not venture close to the walls. The third day (5th Oct.) they again appeared before the English factory, threatening to burn it down. Shivaji and his soldiers were greatly enraged at the loss of their men in the first assault on this house, and they clamoured for vengeance. But the wiser among his captains knew that a second attack would result in further loss of life, and at their request two English agents waited on Shivaji in his tent outside the town, with some presents of scarlet cloth, sword blades and knives. The Maratha king /"received them in a very kind manner, telling them /that the English and he were good friends, and putting [his hand into their hands he told them that he would jdo the English no wrong." (Surat to Co., 20 Nov. 1670, in Hedge's Diary.) On 5th October, about noon Shivaji suddenly retreated from the town, though no Mughal army /was near or even reported to be coming. "But he I had got plunder enough and thought it prudent to 1670] SURAT REFUGEES AT SWALLY. 201 secure himself. When he marched away he sent a letter to the officers and chief merchants, saying that if they did not pay him twelve lakhs of Rupees as yearly tribute, he would return the next year and burn down the remaining part of the town. No sooner Shivaji was gone than the poor people of Surat fell to plundering what was left, in so much that there was not a house, great or small, excepting those which stood on their guard, which were not ransacked." Even the English sailors under S. Master took to plundering. , During the three days that Surat was undergoing this fate, the sea-port of Swally marine, ten miles west of it across the Tapti, was not free from alarm. There the English, Dutch and French had built their warehouses and landing-places for ocean-going vessels. Here lay during those days all the members of the English factory, their treasure, and most of the goods bought for Europe. Here the shah~i-bandar (harbour and custom-master), the qazi, and the most eminent merchants (Hindu, Muslim and Armenian) of Surat had taken refuge with the English. Many rich people of the town, too, had fled to the villages north of Surat, across the river and close to Swally. On the 3rd it was reported that Shivaji wanted to send 500 horsemen north of the river to plunder the villages and seize these rich men ; and it was feared that he might even come to Swally to demand the surrender of the Surat refugees and blackmail from the European merchants. But the coming of the 202 SH1VAJI. [CH. VII. pring-tide made it impossible for the Marathas to [cross the river, and Swaljy~"remained safe. So great was the alarm there, however, that on the 3rd the English factors removed their treasure from the shore to one of their ships, and next day loaded all their broadcloth, quicksilver, currall (coral?) &c, on board ship, "to secure them against any attempts of Shivaji." Two other English ships, which were due to sail, were detained at Swally till 10th October, by which time the Marathas were expected to withdraw from the district. The English factors with the help of the ships' carpenters even ran up a wooden platform at one end of the marine yard and mounted eight guns on it, "to defend the Company's estate the best we could." f The manly attitude (if— fctua— English and their ( success in scaring away the Maratha myriads, greatly \ impressed the pei>pla-of.the_c^ountry. These traders had, as a reward of their brave defence of their factory during the loot of 1664, received commercial privileges from the Emperor. And now the son of Haji Said Beg, the richest merchant of Surat, who had found shelter at Swally, publicly swore that he would migrate with his family to Bombay. The fact that all the three European factories at Surat were untouched while evey other shop and house was ransacked by the raiders, naturally excited suspicion/'* Both at Surat and the imperial Court peopje" 'talked of the threeChrjstian nations having le a league with Shivaji when he was here." The 1670] CONFUSION AND LOSS AT SURAT. 203 foreign merchants therefore received no reward fronV the ruler of the land this time. (Master to Swally Marine, 3 Jan. 1671, in F. R. Surat, 105.) An official inquiry ascertained that Shivaji had carried off 66 lakhs of Rupees' worth of booty from Surat, — viz., cash, pearls, and other articles worth 53 lakhs from the city itself and 13 lakhs worth from Nawal Sahu and Hari Sahu and a village near Surat. (Akhbarat, 13-10.) But the real loss of Surat was not to be estimated by the booty which the Marathas carried off. The trade of this, the richest port of India, was practically destroy^dj^JTor several years after Shivajis with- drawal from it, the town used to throb with panic every now and then, whenever any Maratha force came within a few days' march of it, or even at false alarms of their coming. On every such occasion the merchants would quickly remove their goods to ships, the citizens would flee to the villages, and the_^ Europeans would hasten to Swally. Business was effectually scared away from Surat, and inland pro- J ducers hesitated to send their goods to this the greatest ) emporium of Western India. For one month after the second sack, "the town was in so great a confusion that there was neither governor nor Government," and almost every day was troubled by rumours of Shiva's coming there again. "On the 12th (i. e., only a week after his departure) it was again rumoured that he was return- ing with 6,000 horse and 10,000 foot, and that he had 204 SHIVAJl. [CH. VII. already reached Pent, a place about 25 miles distant. At once there was a general exodus and the town was changed from a busy port into the death-like quiet of a desert. The Turkish, English and French merchants abandoned their factories." But the Dutch, 52 men in all, with flags flying and drums beating proceeded from their ship to their factory. This was their belated imitation of the English demonstration of January 1664, when " the English president, at the head of some 200 men, had marched through the town, declaring that he meant to withstand Shivaji with this handful of men !" (Dutch Records, Trans., Vol. 29, letter No. 763 and Vol. 27, No. 719.) At the end of November, and again about 10th December, 1670, the alarm was revived ; and the European merchants met together to concert means of guarding their respective interests. The landward defences of Swally were strengthened by adding a breastwork on the north side of the choultry, and the entrance to the harbour or "hole" was guarded by stationing a ship there. The English used to remove their money and goods from Surat to this place at every such alarm. In June 1672 the success of the Maratha forces under Moro Pant in the Koli State of Ramnagar, on the way to Surat, kept the city in constant terror for a long time. The Maratha general openly demanded chauth from Surat, threatening a visitation if the governor refused payment. There was the same panic again in February and October 1672, September 1670] shiva's return intercepted. 205 1673, October 1674, and December 1679. In short, the destruction of the trade and financial prosperity of Surat was complete. (F. R.) §6. Battle of Vani, Oct. 1670. Having concluded the story of the Maratha dealings with Surat, we turn to Shivaji's activities in other quarters. Prince Muazzam had just returned to Auranga- bad after chasing Dilir Khan to the bank of the Tapti, when he heard of the plunder of Surat. He immediately summoned Daud Khan from Burhanpur and sent him off to attack the Maratha raiders. Meantime, Shivaji had left Surat, entered Baglana, and plundered the villages nestling at the foot of the fort of Mulhir. Daud Khan, after sending his baggage back to Aurangabad, marched westwards with light kit to Chandor, a town at which the road from Nasik to Baglana crosses the hill range. Spies brought him news that Shivaji had started from Mulhir, and intended to cross the Chandor range by the pass of Kanchana-Manchana, ten miles west of Chandor. Arriving at the hamlet of Chandor (below the fort) at about 9 P.M., Daud Khan waited to verify the news of the enemy's movements. At midnight his spies reported that Shiva had already issued from the pass and was rapidly following the road to Nasik with half his forces, while the other half of his army was holding the pass to pick up stragglers. Daud Khan at once resumed his march. 206 SHIVAJI. [CH. VII. But the moon set about three o'clock in the morning, and in the darkness the Mughal soldiers were some- what scattered. Ikhlas Khan Miana (son of Abdul Qadir Bahlol Khan, a former Pathan leader of Bijapur), com- manded the Mughal Vanguard. Ascending a hillock in the early morning, he beheld the enemy standing ready for battle in the plain below. While his men were putting on their armour, which was conveyed on camels, he himself with a handful of followers recklessly charged the enemy. The- Maxajha_rear- guard, which had faced about, was 10,000 strong and" cT^rnrnanofecf By distinguished generals like Pratap Rao Gujar, the Master of the Horse, Vyankoji Datto and Makaji Anand Rao (a natural son of Shahji Bhonsla.) Ikhlas Khan was very soon wounded and unhorsed. After a time Daud arrived on the scene and sent up Rai Makarand and some other officers to reinforce the Van, while he left his elephants, flags and drums at a ruined village on a height, surrounded by nalas, with orders to make his camp and rear-guard halt there when they would come up. For hours together an obstinate and bloody battle raged. Sangram Khan Ghori and his kinsmen were wounded, and many were slain on the Mughal side. The Marathas, "like the Bargis of the Deccan, fought hovering round the imperialists. V But the Bundela infantry of the Mughal army with their abundant firearms kept the enemy back. Daud 1670] MUGHAL REPULSE AT VANI. 207 Khan himself entered the fight, repulsed the enemy with his artillery, and rescued the wounded Ikhlas Khan. Meantime, in another part of the field, Mir Abdul Mabud, the darogha of the divisional artillery, who had been separated from the main army by a fold in the ground, was attacked. He was wounded with one of his sons and some followers, while another son and many soldiers were slain ; and his flags and horses were carried off by the enemy. There was a lull in the fight at noon. At that time Daud Khan had less than 2,000 men with him, while the Marathas outnumbered him fivefold. In the evening they charged him again, but were driven back, evidently by the artillery. At night the Mughals bivouacked under the autumn sky, their camp was entrenched, and they engaged in burying the dead and tending the wounded. The Marathas retreated to Konkan without further opposition. This battle was fought in the VaniX Dindori subdivision late in the month of October-/ 1670.* S^ This battle neutralised the Mughal power for, more than a month. The day after the fight, Dau