MODERN EUROPE

A SHORT HISTORY OF MODERN EUROPE

FROM THE FRENCH REVOLUTION TO THE GREAT WAR

BY

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PREFACE

THIS short volume has been designed to serve as an introduction to the study of recent European History. Stress is laid throughout upon the main currents of political development, in order that the story of Europe since 1789 may present itself as an intelligible and harmonious whole. For this purpose the chronological method of treatment has been to a certain extent abandoned, and no attempt has been made to trace the separate development of each state, events being viewed—except in the last chapter—from a European and not from a sectional standpoint. Nor does this book make any pretensions to serve as a compendium of information. Much that has hitherto figured prominently in historical textbooks is omitted; attention has been confined almost entirely to those facts which best illustrate the progress of the main factors in the history of Europe from the French Revolution to the outbreak of the Great War in 1914.

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INTRODUCTION

The great historians of the eighteenth century were accustomed to divide the history of Europe into three great eras, which they called by the names of the Ancient Era, the Mediæval Era, and the Modern Era. The period of the ancient era was one of early civilisation, and culminated in the age of the great Empire of Rome, whose rule and civilisation spread over a large part of Europe and some parts of Asia and Africa. The mediæval era, or period of the Middle Ages, was that which saw the decay of the old civilisation of Rome and the formation in Europe of a large number of separate states, each under its own ruler and all of a very much lower state of civilisation than had been seen in the days of the Roman Empire. During this era the general state of the people was worse than in the ancient era, but civilisation gradually developed more and more, until by the sixteenth century we may say that the condition of the more flourishing states of Europe was equal to that of the Roman Empire of antiquity. At this time, too, the sixteenth century, progress became more marked, and a number of important changes came about, changes which so altered conditions of life that they are held to mark the beginning of a new age, and thus we have the modern era.

This division of past history into three periods was quite in accordance with truth, and became everywhere accepted by historical writers. But at the end of the eighteenth century there became noticeable a further series of very great changes, which have had the effect of altering the state of the people of Europe to a far greater degree than any previous changes in recorded history. Life at the present day differs more from life in the days of Napoleon than life in that period differed from life under the Roman Empire. This last series of changes, then, constitutes the greatest revolution that history records. It is obvious that historians must add yet another era to the former three, and commence this most recent era at the time when these enormous changes began to be felt—that is, at the end of the eighteenth century. Historians have not yet agreed upon a special name for the new era—perhaps we may call it the Recent Era.

Now, of course, no historical period begins suddenly. Life is much too complicated to allow of that. Changes only come about gradually, and we cannot take a date and say "this date marks the end of the one period and the beginning of the other." The ideas of the old days, the institutions of the old days, the people of the old days, are still with us for a long time after any date so chosen, while one will also find that there are new ideas and new things in existence for some time before this date as well. But it is customary, for convenience, to take some date as a dividing line, and in the case of the change to the recent age the date selected is usually the year 1789. The reason for this is that in that year there began that striking series of events which we

call the French Revolution, the first indication of the coming of a new era which arrested the attention of the world. Other changes had already occurred which had come quietly, without making very much stir, and without impressing people in general with the fact that Europe was being revolutionised, but the noisy and violent scenes of the French Revolution evoked the attention and interest of every one, and hence we take the beginning of this political movement as marking a convenient starting-point for our new era.

Before we begin to consider the changes and the events which have taken place between the year 1789 and the present day, it may be as well to see first of all in what respects life and things differed at that time from what they are at this present time. In studying history we must always beware of reading back into the past modern things and institutions and ideas which did not then exist at all, or which existed in a very different form.

Let us first consider the everyday life of the people of the year 1789. The sights which regularly and normally met their eyes were very different from those of to-day. In towns, the streets were narrow, the buildings on an average smaller and meaner than those of present-day towns, the roadways ill kept, pavements often entirely absent, traffic scanty, though occasionally becoming jammed and confused in the narrow thoroughfares, and shops small, with little window space. The countryside, of course, has changed less, though here again we should find meaner cottages and a larger amount of waste land, marsh and wood, roads in general very bad, muddy, and hard to negotiate, and a much larger number of

travellers on horseback. There were no railway lines, with their strings of telegraph poles, no complicated agricultural machines, and of course no motor traffic other than the steam car which occasionally appeared as a novelty and a curiosity. The bicycle did not exist except as a form of amusement, being then worked by striking the feet on the ground, and having neither tyres nor pedals.

The lower classes were dressed in a manner not unlike that of the workman and the peasant of to-day, though frequently wearing the faded cast-off suits and gowns of the gentry. The upper classes, and to a certain extent the middle classes, dressed in magnificent costumes of bright colour, intricate workmanship, and often extravagant eccentricity. "Fashions" changed as rapidly as they do now, though some, such as those of hair powder, pigtails and long-tailed coats were of long duration. But the people of that time were as accustomed to the sight of their "fashions" as we are to the sight of ours, and would have laughed at our modern costumes as we are inclined to laugh at theirs.

As regards what we call the conveniencies and comforts of life there was an even greater contrast between then and now. Lamps, candles and rush-lights did the work of our gas and electricity. To light them the tinder-box did the work of our matches. The big fires on the hearth were hardly sufficient to keep out the cold of winter from the rooms even of royal palaces. Doors and window-frames admitted great draughts of cold air, and occasioned the use of ingle-screens and bed-curtains. Water had to be fetched from well, fountain or conduit, except in a few favoured towns. The

streets were ill paved, ill kept, and either badly lighted (by oil) or not at all. Diet was far more limited than it is now, foreign foodstuffs and products were hard to obtain and consequently dear, and a varied menu was only possible for the well-to-do. Tea, coffee and cocoa were still what we should call expensive, though beer was plentiful and cheap in the northern countries, and wine equally plentiful in the southern countries. In country districts trade was still mainly local, and it was difficult to get things that had been produced at a distance.

Most striking, perhaps, are the differences in methods of communication. There were no railways, no motor cars, no steamboats, no electric telegraphy. The horse was still the main engine of communication by land, the sailing-ship by sea. It took several days to cross France; it was considered wonderful when Napoleon got from Warsaw to Paris in eight days in 1812, and when he got from Paris to Mainz in three in 1806. Messages had, as a rule, to be carried by hand, though England and France shortly adopted a system of semaphore signal stations along some of the main roads by means of which news of importance could be transmitted rapidly. The sea voyage to America took some six weeks, and sailing-vessels were exposed to all the risks of storm, shipwreck, contrary winds, exhaustion of water and provisions, and piracy.

Again, when in 1792 the great European War broke out, it was waged under far different conditions than a war of the present time. Owing to the enormous difficulties of transport and commissariat movements were slow and the size of armies was comparatively small. Artillery had an extreme

effective range of a mile, though a few cannon had been known to do good work at longer distance. The musket was still unreliable for anything but volley firing at a range exceeding a few dozen yards. Cavalry still played an effective and often a decisive part in battles. At sea, naval battles consisted of cannonades at short range, followed not infrequently by boarding and hand-to-hand fights with pike, musket and cutlass.

But if the material conditions of life were so different in 1789 to what they are now, the ideas of that age were equally strange to those of ours. Nowadays we are accustomed to see almost every man a voter—that is to say, in most of the European countries a large part of the men of the country are able to help to elect the members of the governing body. If the people are not satisfied with the doings of their Government, the voters can turn out that Government by voting against it at the next election. In some countries almost all the adult men have votes, in others only a part of them can vote, but everywhere the idea prevails that the government of the people should be carried on by persons who have been definitely chosen by the people to govern them. This state of things, where the majority of the men of a country have the right to elect the governing body or Parliament, is called Democracy.

Now in 1789 Democracy did not exist in Europe, except in some of the tiny Swiss cantons. Great Britain and Ireland had Parliaments, in which some of the members were elected by the people, but in both cases the majority of the members were chosen by the wealthy landowners and nobles, so that the

English and Irish Parliaments were by no means Democratic. The Netherlands, too, had a Parliament, but for some time it had had little power, and it was elected chiefly by the wealthy classes. Great Britain was an oligarchy—that is to say, it was ruled by only a few of its people, the wealthy landowners, and there were some other states in Europe, such as the republics of Venice and Genoa, which were controlled by a small wealthy section of the population. In nearly all the other countries of Europe the government was that of an absolute monarchy, where an hereditary sovereign appointed the ministers and dictated the laws and the policy of the country without reference to any other power than his own will. There are two states which call for special mention. Central Italy formed what was called The States of the Church, and was ruled by the Pope, who was elected for life by the chief bishops of the Roman Catholic Church, the cardinals. Poland was a limited monarchy, where the king's power was hedged round with restrictions, but as Poland ceased to exist as an independent state after 1795, we need not stop to consider its government in detail.

Most European countries, then, were governed despotically by kings and princes. We at the present day, accustomed to Democratic freedom, can hardly understand at first how the men of that age could have tolerated such a state of things. Yet it is undoubtedly true that they did tolerate it—until the French Revolution started the great wave of Democracy. Why, then, was it that the people in 1789 consented to be governed despotically by absolute princes? The reasons are these. In the first place, government then was not nearly so

important and all-embracing a business as it is now. By making use of our modern methods of manufacture and communication Governments can do now far more than they ever used to accomplish. They can train and support huge armies; they can construct public works, docks, roads, railways, canals, public buildings, on a scale before impossible; they can carry through great schemes of national insurance and accident insurance; they can supervise great movements like the creation of small holdings and the organisation of public education. A century ago the means at the disposal of Governments in the way of money and national energy were far too small to allow of these things being attempted except on a very small scale. Governments then concerned themselves with the raising of taxes to pay for the expenses of administration and for the army and navy, the general regulation of special grievances in the country, and the regulation of foreign policy. The taxes, except in war time, were not expected to be altered to any extent, new laws were infrequent in an age when change had not yet become rapid, foreign policy was beyond the grasp of the masses. Hence the doings of the Government, "matters of State," were not of such keen interest to the ordinary man as they now are, and, generally speaking, folk were willing to leave these things entirely in the hands of those whose business it was to look after them. It was the King's business to look after the Government, he was allowed to draw his big salary from the country for that very purpose.

Secondly, the mass of the people at that time was quite unfitted to take a part in the government. Many people to-day doubt if the working men and

agricultural labourers are really capable of giving a sound judgment on matters of national importance or of subordinating the temptation to seek for personal gains to a wholesome patriotism. If this idea is sometimes expressed about our present-day working men, with all their advantages of material prosperity and education, what could have been said for the lower classes of the eighteenth century, uneducated, poor, and utterly ignorant of matters outside their own daily round? Here again, government was a matter for the skilled politicians, for the scholars, for those who knew; the lower classes, as a rule, were content to leave politics alone. It was only in time of exceptional stress or excitement—a famine, a new tax, a bad harvest, a national defeat in war—that "the masses" became turbulent, and threatened their rulers with rebellion.

Thirdly, these occasional risings and murmurs of discontent in themselves tended to put a brake on absolute monarchy. A king could not go too far in oppression or in opposing the wishes of his people, or there would be rebellion, or he might be assassinated. Though kings were generally backed by their standing armies of hired soldiers, a rising, or a threat of one, frequently sufficed to paralyse royal action, and thus the fear of provoking disorders helped to keep the ruler more or less in sympathy with his people.

Fourthly, we must remember that a despotic king does not necessarily abuse his power. He will certainly have some interest in the prosperity of his kingdom, if only with a view to increasing its revenues. And the century preceding the French Revolution was notable for its benevolent and well-meaning

sovereigns. Some historians have called it "the age of benevolent despots" and "the age of paternal despotism." The most celebrated of these rulers are Frederick the Great of Prussia, the Emperor Joseph II, and Catharine the Great of Russia.

Lastly, we must not forget the force of habit. Seeing that kings had existed for over a thousand years, and that the people had during all this time been forced to submit to the rule either of a feudal oligarchy of nobles or to the despotism of kings, there was no pressing reason for a change until the economic situation, the material world around them, should have first changed. That material change, as we shall see, was developing all through the later part of the eighteenth century, and this at last brought about the change.

So far from the mass of the people having a share in the government, in most parts of Europe they were subjected to a distinct social suppression. In Prussia the mass of the population were mere serfs; they could not marry or leave their village without their lord's consent, they had to labour without wages several days a week on their lord's land. In eastern Germany, in Hungary, in Poland, in Russia, the position of the lower classes was no better. In western Europe things were somewhat better, and the peasants of the Rhineland, of France, and of northern Italy were virtually free men. It has been said that slaves do not rebel until they become partially free, and certainly the peasants of eastern Europe remained passive under their yoke of serfdom while the peasants of the west broke out into revolution. The eastern serfs, poor and oppressed, thought themselves lucky if they got the means of subsistence,

the peasantry of France, supported and led by a strong middle-class element from the numerous small towns, were eager in their prosperity to snatch complete political freedom.

There was another political idea which has come into prominence only since 1789—the idea of Nationality. During the last century we have constantly heard the cry that men of one nationality and race should not be ruled by men of another. We shall see that this idea was at the bottom of a great deal of the history of the nineteenth century. But in 1789 this idea was hardly recognised at all in theory or practice. It was not considered wrong that the German family of Hapsburg should rule over Hungarians and Czechs and Belgians and Roumans besides ruling over Germans. It was not considered wrong that the Danish king should rule over Germans in Schleswig and Holstein, or that the Swedish king should rule the Finns of Finland. Recent historians have condemned the partition of Poland between the rulers of Russia, Prussia and Austria as an offence against the natural law of racial independence; at the time of the partition of Poland it was condemned merely as an instance of the grasping greed of the three rulers. The idea of Nationality, then, has also grown up since 1789.

A word must be said as to the religious ideas of the eighteenth century. The age of universal Catholicism, and of universal Christianity even, had passed away. Outwardly religion still held an important position in life. The churches were rich and numerous, there were plenty of clergy, services were held with regularity. But for a long time disbelief had been spreading. Though outwardly conforming to

the religion of their country very many nobles and gentlemen had ceased to believe in Christianity at all, and there were thousands of atheists among the lower classes, particularly in the towns of western Europe. France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, Austria and Poland were mainly Catholic, as was also Ireland; Great Britain, Holland, the northern kingdoms and Prussia were Protestant. Germany was divided, the north-east being mainly Protestant and the south-west mainly Catholic. Russia had her own Greek Church, which was akin to that of the subject Christians in the Turkish empire. But religious strife was almost dead, the clergy of all countries were lifeless and worldly; there was no keen religious activity. Some French bishops openly confessed themselves as atheists, and were not reproved for it. The Prussian bishops, Lutheran Protestants, refused to take action against a pastor who denied the truth of Christianity. Everywhere the same spiritual deadness was to be observed. It required the storms of the Revolution to stir up a fresh and purer life among those responsible for the care of the souls of the people.

And now let us turn to the map of Europe as it stood in the year 1789. With comparatively small differences, France, Spain and Portugal occupied the same areas as they do at the present day, Great Britain and Ireland, though under separate Parliaments, were yet ruled by one King and one Government as they are to-day. But while the changes of frontier have been so small here in the west as to be almost imperceptible at first sight, the map of central and eastern Europe has been very considerably changed.


EUROPE
1789
English Miles
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
N. SCOTLAND
IRELAND
ENGLAND
NORTH SEA
DENMARK AND NORWAY
SWEDEN
BALTIC SEA
RUSSIA
PRUSSIA
POLAND
ATLANTIC OCEAN
THE EMPIRE
FRANCE
AUSTRIA
HUNGARY
SWITZERLAND
REPUBLIC OF VENICE
PIEDMONT
ADRIATIC SEA
SEA OF AZOV
BLACK SEA
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
Corsica
TUSCANY
PAPAL STATES
MONTENEGRO
TURKEY
Balearic Is
SARDINIA
KINGDOM OF THE TWO SICILIES
TURKEY IN ASIA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Cyprus
Candia or Crete

Italy was a collection of little states, such as the Republic of Venice, the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, and the States of the Church. Foreign powers exercised great influence in Italy, for Milan and Mantua belonged to the ruler of Austria, whose brother ruled Tuscany, while the Two Sicilies and Parma belonged to two princes of the Spanish royal family.

Germany, as then constituted, was a collection of disjointed states, some large and some small, including a total number of three hundred and forty-three. These were all under the nominal authority of the Holy Roman Emperor, who was elected for life by eight of the leading princes, who on this account were styled Electors. Our King, George III, was the Elector of Hanover. As a matter of fact both the election and authority were nominal. The Electors always chose the most powerful prince of Germany—namely, the head of the Austrian house of Hapsburg, and the dignity of Holy Roman Emperor was really hereditary. The power of the Emperor, too, was very weak (though as ruler of the Hapsburg lands he was always a powerful prince), for he could do little in the Empire without the consent of the clumsy Diet or feudal Parliament of Germany, and this power was slow to sanction or encourage anything which might tend to make the Emperor's overlordship a real one. When German rights were threatened it was possible for the Diet to authorise a declaration of war, and to raise an Imperial army, but this force was small and usually wretchedly equipped, so that for all practical purposes the Empire was a collection of states each more or less influenced by the ruler of Austria.

The position of the Holy Roman Empire was further complicated by the fact that some of the most powerful of its members held lands outside its boundaries. Austria, for instance, besides holding Belgium and other lands within the bounds of the Empire, ruled Hungary and Milan which were outside. Prussia proper was outside Germany altogether. Holstein was held by the King of Denmark. The Elector of Saxony had sometimes been King of Poland. Thus the Empire was a very complicated and clumsy institution, badly in need of reform.

Proceeding further east we find the kingdom of Poland still occupying a large area between the Empire and Russia, which latter state was consequently smaller than at the present day. Finland, too, at that time was not Russian, but Swedish, while Denmark and Norway were united under one sovereign. Finally, in the south-east of Europe, instead of the modern collection of Balkan States, we find the great Empire of the Ottoman Turks stretching northwards to Odessa and Belgrade.

This, then, was the Europe of 1789, the Europe that was to be so violently stirred by the outbreak of the French Revolution and which was to form the basis of the Europe which we ourselves know at the present day. In this book we shall trace how the great changes of the recent era occurred, and how they have brought about and led up to the state of affairs at the beginning of the twentieth century.

CHAPTER I

THE FRENCH REVOLUTION

Since the achievement of unity by France, that country had been growing in population, in wealth and in prosperity. It shared with England and Holland the greatest material welfare which any land of that age could show. Its culture was the model for the whole of Europe. Its peasants, though oppressed by severe taxation, were industrious, prosperous, and virtually free. Along with the development of civilisation and prosperity came naturally an increase in the means of the Government. The revenues increased, there were more opportunities for public action, and the administration became more complex and busier. But while France was developing in this way, the institutions by which France was governed remained the same as they had been a century before. The old central Government became overworked with the increase of business, for a great deal of what we now do by means of local councils had then to be done in France by the central power. The collection of the taxes was carried out in a wasteful and old-fashioned way, by allowing private firms or business men to do the collecting and to make a profit on it, instead of having the money collected by the Government officials. Old-fashioned laws and regulations interfered with pro-

gress, such, for instance, as that which forbade a man to change over from one trade to another without a long and costly legal process, or that which put taxes on goods passing from one province to another. In many ways the old system of government was becoming obsolete; it needed reform.

Along with the growth of commerce and manufactures there had sprung up in France a numerous and influential middle class, a class which was active, businesslike, and on the whole well educated; and it was this middle class which took the lead in demanding reforms in their country. There was, in fact, plenty to complain of and plenty to ridicule in the old system. As one would expect, books and pamphlets soon appeared to attack the old system and to suggest alterations, and it became quite the fashion for educated people to regard the age in which they lived as one of unnatural abuses and ridiculous wrong. Two authors became particularly famous for their works on the government of states. These were Françoise de Voltaire and Jean Jacques Rousseau. Voltaire began to write satirical pamphlets as a young man of twenty, and he continued to write books on a variety of subjects until his death at the age of eighty-four in 1778. Rousseau came from Geneva, though his family was French, and was nearly forty before he began to write; his most famous work, *The Social Contract*, appeared in 1762, when he was fifty, and he died in 1778, a few weeks after Voltaire. Of the two, Voltaire was far the more brilliant, his works are noted for their wit and their sarcasm; Rousseau was more stolid in his style, and was not so popular among the educated classes. But Rousseau, in his *Social Contract*,

worked out a theory which can best be summarised in the idea that the people of the past have made kings and the people of the present can depose them, and that if the king no longer governs in accord with the will of his people he need no longer be obeyed. This doctrine became very popular, and Rousseau's famous book became a sort of gospel for the reforming party in France.

Besides being influenced by the theories of writers like Voltaire and Rousseau, the people of France were also much influenced by the practical example of the Americans. The year that saw the death of these two writers also saw the embarkation of France on a war against England in alliance with the revolted American colonies. That war ended in the establishment of the independent republic of the United States. Hundreds of Frenchmen had been over to America to help the colonists against the English troops, and these returned after the peace of 1783, full of admiration for the democratic institutions of the States. Thus the tide of reform was reinforced by waves from across the Atlantic, and we find the most celebrated of the French volunteers who served under Washington, the Marquis de Lafayette, taking a leading part in the early stages of the French Revolution.

But there were also more urgent and practical reasons which led to the outbreak of Revolution. There were grievances which imposed not merely annoying inconvenience on the people but positive hardship. Let us take a few instances of these. First and foremost was the enormous injustice in the arrangement of taxation. The main source of revenue of the French government was a tax called

the "taille." From the payment of this tax the wealthy classes were exempt, so that the entire burden fell on the shoulders of those who could least afford to pay. How came it about that the wealthy were exempt? For the answer to this question we have to go back to the middle ages. The taille was originally intended to be used for the support of troops. Now the mediæval nobility of France had to serve in the King's army in person, and at their own expense, and were consequently excused from payment. With the great increase in the size of the French army in the sixteenth century the free-serving nobles became a very small and insignificant fraction of the forces, and in the course of time the King ceased to trouble about summoning them, as their period of compulsory service was too short to be effective in a campaign of that period. Thus the nobility neither served nor paid. It soon occurred to businesslike men that if they could persuade the King to make them nobles, they too might become exempt from paying taxes, and from the beginning of the seventeenth century it became a practice to offer a sum of money to the King in order to be made a nobleman. When the King was hard pressed for money the temptation proved too great to resist, and hundreds of people had, by paying a big lump sum cash down, been ennobled, thus securing exemption from payment of taxes for themselves and for their descendants. For the Government, of course, this was killing the goose that laid the golden eggs, and by the time of King Louis XVI, who came to the throne in 1774, it was found that almost all the wealthy class people had as a matter of course bought or inherited the rights of nobility. Thus

it came about that those who best could pay avoided the greatest of all the taxes levied in the country.

Then there were the surviving feudal customs. Peasants were compelled to work without wages to keep the local roads and bridges in repair; they were irritated by the obligation to pay dues at stated times to the lords, dues which usually took the form of chickens, wheat, eggs or other produce; they were plagued with destructive game which attacked their crops and which the laws would not allow them to kill under plea of preserving them for the lord's hunting; they were irritated at the neglect shown towards them by the wealthy landlords who, in most districts, had moved their residence to the capital; they were further disturbed by local tolls and customs barriers which forced them to pay customs dues on goods going from one part of the kingdom to another; the guild regulations made it extremely difficult for a man to transfer himself from one trade to another; commissions in the army were reserved exclusively for the noble classes; preferment to high places in the Church was in practice also reserved to the sons of noble families.

The Church, as represented by its higher dignitaries, was particularly obnoxious to reformers. For, besides being often idle, profane, and vicious men, these Churchmen were, like the nobles, exempt from taxation, for ever since the middle ages the Church had claimed financial independence, only granting a "free gift" to the Government when it thought fit. The unfair distribution of wealth in the Church, where dissolute bishops were rolling in money while hardworking parish priests were barely able to live

on their income, was provocative of great discontent and much criticism.

One of the most objectionable of all the imposts was the "gabelle," or salt tax. Salt, a necessary article of human food, was a Government monopoly, like tobacco and matches at the present day in France. It was heavily but unequally taxed, the price being enormously high in some districts and quite low in others, according to the different arrangements made in the past by local administrative officials. In a few places there was no tax at all, salt being sold at cost price. Thus it happened that a sou's worth of salt in a "salt-free" town cost twenty-four sous in another highly taxed town. Smuggling salt from cheap districts into dear districts was heavily punished, nevertheless it went on wholesale. In 1783 more than 10,000 persons were arrested in France for salt-smuggling. As a partial guard against smuggling, everyone was compelled to purchase two or three litres of salt every year at the Government store, whether they consumed it or not. Finally, we may observe that the nobility were exempt from the gabelle.

Another grievance frequently heard of in the days preceding the Revolution was that of "lettres de cachet" or "letters of the seal." By issuing one of these, the Government could obtain the arrest and imprisonment of any person whatsoever, and could keep him in prison as long as they liked without trial. This right of the Government was much abused; ministers and their friends used these "letters of the seal" to strike at their own private and personal enemies. For instance, one of the leaders of the outbreak of the Revolution, the Count

of Mirabeau, had as a young man been imprisoned without charge or trial for two years by a "lettre de cachet" obtained from a minister by his father, with whom he had quarrelled.

It can be understood, then, how ready, how anxious, how eager France was for reform. Even as early as 1753, the Earl of Chesterfield, visiting France, wrote that he found 'all the symptoms which he had ever met with in history previous to great changes and revolutions in government.' The advance of time did nothing to stem the rising tide, for the nobility and the governing classes were loth to tamper with a system which favoured them with such great privileges. The people's murmurings grew greater and greater, but it was dangerous to rebel and to risk defeat by the royal troops and death at the hands of the executioner. There were serious riots in Paris in 1775, but they ended with the appearance of the troops and the public execution of the ringleaders. It needed some special crisis to open up the way for this Revolution which had been for so long brewing. The occasion arose through the approach of "national bankruptcy."

The expenses of Government were growing year by year as the activities of France developed, and by the middle of the eighteenth century it became apparent that the strictest economy would be necessary to make both ends meet. For the Government had to pay, not only the annual cost of administration and other current expenses, but also the interest on the loans raised for the great wars of the past half-century, the wars of Louis XIV and Louis XV. The Austrian Succession war had left behind a considerable debt, the Seven Years War left behind a

very heavy one. Louis XVI's Government could not resist the temptation to get its revenge on England by joining in the American war; France had the satisfaction of seeing England beaten and of regaining Tobago, but the war cost France nearly 1,200,000,000 francs (nearly £50,000,000), a large amount for those days, and added heavily to the debt. Hence by the time the American war was over, in 1783, the Government found itself absolutely unable to meet the expenses of administration in addition to the interest on the loans. In 1783 the deficit, that is the excess of expenditure over revenue, was, in English money, £3,000,000; by 1785, the deficit had reached £4,000,000; meanwhile new loans to the amount of £9,000,000 had been raised. It was obvious that this state of things could not go on.

It was useless to say "Impose more taxes." To make up for the absence of revenue from the wealthy classes, the poorer had been taxed up to the hilt—to have added still further to their burdens would have driven them to the workhouse and they could then have paid no taxes at all. There was but one obvious and necessary way out—to tax the rich. But the rich would not consent to be taxed; they had never in their generation paid taxes, and they were resolved not to start doing so. The rich controlled the administration, the rich surrounded the King. Every suggestion for the taxation of the wealthy classes, such as the scheme drawn up by Turgot, was thrown out by the influence of the courtiers. And so things drifted on from bad to worse, the Government raising new loans at high interest to pay the interest on old loans. This, of course, could not continue. The inevitable day must

come when the rich would have to pay their share of the public burdens, but the only thought of the courtiers was to postpone the evil day as long as possible. Had King Louis XVI been a strong-minded, politic man, he would have put himself on the side of reason, safety, and popularity by calling on his people to join with him in forcing through the changes required. But the opposition of the courtiers, whose point of view was throughout supported by the Queen, Marie Antoinette of Austria, was sufficient to overcome the weak mind of the King, and the reforms remained uncarried out.

But something had to be done, as the Government, faced with an ever-increasing annual deficit, was rapidly heading towards bankruptcy. At last, when pressure was put on the wealthy classes to consent to a change of system, they suggested, in hopes of still further averting the day when their privileges would cease, that before doing anything definite the advice of the old French Parliament, the "States-General," should be taken. This body had never met since 1614, getting on for two centuries ago, but it was theoretically supposed to represent the nation, and as such would doubtless command respect. It was divided into three Houses or "Estates," Lords, Clergy, and Commoners, and as no measure could pass without the consent of all, the wealthy courtiers felt fairly safe against revolutionary changes. The writs were therefore issued, and on May 5, 1789, the States-General opened its deliberations.

We must now summarise very briefly the chief events of the Revolution. The whole period of the twenty-five years which follow is intensely interesting,

as it is full of movement and action. It is a favourite period of study for many historical readers and its events should certainly be read in detail in some larger work. Here we can only point out the general features in the development of the history of the time.

As soon as the States-General assembled at Versailles, close to the royal palace outside Paris, it was evident that the members elected by the Commons or Third Estate meant business. They grasped at once the essential fact that as long as the veto of the other Estates remained, any reforms they might propose would necessarily fail, and so they immediately took up the firm position that they must have the assembly recast in such a way as to place the reactionary courtiers in a minority. There were about 500 commoners to about 250 priests and 250 nobles, but as a large number of the priests and some of the nobles were on the side of reform, while there was hardly a supporter of the old system among the Third Estate, the union of all three Houses in one would have the desired effect of giving the reformers a majority in the assembly. There was evidence that on occasions in the middle ages the Estates had met as a single body, so the Third Estate now demanded the union of the Houses in a single body, and refused to transact business until their wishes were complied with. They were not going to waste time in debating measures which were sure to be rejected by a separate House of Lords.

We now have a contest between the nobles of the Court on the one side and the representatives of the vast majority of the nation on the other, while the King flutters hesitatingly between the two.

Generally speaking, the personal influence of his daily companions inclined Louis XVI, against his better judgment, to the side of the courtiers, and thus the resources of the Government were placed at the disposal of the reactionaries. In a case of this sort it would be strange if matters were not pushed to the extreme of armed conflict, in which case the possession of a large standing army gave the reactionary party a decided point of vantage; but the reformers relied upon the universal discontent with the existing system which was known to have permeated the soldiery to a very considerable extent, and also upon the pugnacity of the Paris mob, which, against an army weakened by disaffection, might achieve something.

The contest first centred round the question of the separation of the three Estates. The commoners obstinately refused to transact business till their wishes were complied with, and business remained at a standstill for five weeks. Then they grew bolder; being joined by a few of the clergy, they declared themselves to be "the National Assembly," and proceeded to business on the assumption that the remaining clergy and the lords were merely absentee members of their own body. The stroke was bold, but met with great approval in Paris, and in the country at large. A fortnight later King Louis came over in person and commanded them to revoke their action. But the members of the Third Estate, strengthened by the effect of an oath taken among themselves at a meeting in a neighbouring tennis court (an oath which declared that they would not separate till France had been reformed), boldly refused to obey the King, and matters reached a

crisis. The weak King, however, vacillated; he was at first paralysed by the unexpected resistance, and tamely gave way, ordering the other Estates to join the self-constituted "National Assembly." But a few days later he altered his tone, troops were marched into Paris and Versailles, and preparations were made for a blow at the rebellious members. Then occurred the decisive episodes of the 14th of July.

The news of the approaching attack roused the Parisians to fury. When they heard that Necker, a minister who was known to be inclined to favour reform, had been dismissed and banished, they rushed to arms. The mob seized the public buildings and attacked the Bastille, a great prison-fortress corresponding to our Tower of London. Meanwhile, the troops were ordered up, and a street battle seemed imminent. The great crisis had come. But at the fateful moment of conflict some of the troops joined the people, and others refused to act against them; the whole scheme of crushing the reformers by force collapsed, and from that moment, when it appeared that the army could not be relied on to act against the people, the success of the Revolution was assured. The Bastille, not being victualled for a siege, surrendered that same afternoon, and the mob celebrated their victory by wild rejoicings, and by the murder of some of the garrison.

The events of July 14 were decisive. It was not the fall of the Bastille, but the declaration of the troops for the popular side which proved the decisive factor in the situation, but the former event, being taken as symbolical and as typifying the fall of the old oppressive system before the onslaught of the

enraged nation, was soon elevated to the rank of the red-letter day of the Revolution, and as such its anniversary is still celebrated as the great national holiday in France.

The King at once gave way. Necker was recalled; the troops were withdrawn; the National Assembly was allowed to proceed to its work of reform. On August 4 the privileges of the nobility were declared abolished amidst a scene of great enthusiasm, and the Assembly then set itself to the tasks of reconstructing the whole system of administration and drawing up a Constitution which was to form the basis of the future government of France. This important work kept the Assembly busy for two full years, until at last, on September 21, 1791, the King gave his final sanction to the new Constitution, and the Revolution was presumed to have come to an end.

So far the proceedings of the revolutionary party, though there had been some ugly scenes in Paris, and though their Constitution contained many flaws and weaknesses, had been on the whole moderate. The National Assembly had swept away all the main abuses of what soon came to be called the "ancien régime," the old system. Its leaders had been men of talent, wealth, and education, many of them, notably Mirabeau and Lafayette, drawn from the ranks of the reforming party among the nobility. But the events of these two years had not been altogether conducive to peace and settlement in the future. Public opinion now had free vent, and a spirit of discussion, debate, and universal dabbling in politics had grown up which was all the more fierce and keen from the fact that public opinion

had for so long been muzzled. This in itself might have cooled down in time, and the weak points in the new Constitution might have been amended gradually, had it not been for two things. In the first place, the King regretted the establishment of the new Constitution because it enormously reduced his power and made the new elective Parliament the real ruler of the kingdom, and, led on by the Queen and his friends, he plotted its speedy overthrow. In the second place, the country became involved in a great war, and thus the critical first years of the revolutionary settlement were fated to fall in the abnormal times of a serious and perilous national struggle against foreign enemies.

The opposition of the King was a great bar to the smooth working of the new Constitution. The people felt that they could not trust the King, and on several occasions had shown their fears in a remarkable manner. About three months after the fall of the Bastille, news reached Paris that Louis had appeared at a banquet of officers at Versailles during which the tricolour, the red, white and blue badge adopted by the reformers, had been trampled under foot. Fearing another attempt at armed interference with the National Assembly, a mob, largely consisting of women, marched out to Versailles, murdered some of the guards of the palace, and forced the royal family to remove their residence to the Tuileries palace in the centre of Paris. Some time after, at Easter 1791, when the King attempted to remove to the suburb of St. Cloud, his coach was stopped by the mob and he was compelled to return. For by this time it had become rumoured that Louis intended to flee from the capital, either to the army

of his brother-in-law, the Emperor Leopold II, or more likely to the French army stationed at Metz, which, being largely composed of German-speaking troops, was less sympathetic towards the people than were the other armies of France. This suspicion was confirmed in June of that year, when the royal family succeeded in escaping from Paris and hurrying off towards Metz, leaving behind a proclamation annulling all the measures of the National Assembly. They were stopped and seized before they were able to reach the troops on whom they relied, and they were brought back to Paris. An incident of this sort could not fail to leave a very bad impression on everybody, though when the King agreed to accept the completed Constitution, and it was proclaimed on September 21, people hoped that royal opposition would now cease.

But hardly had the new Parliament been assembled, elected by all Frenchmen of the upper and middle classes, when the country found itself drifting towards war. The causes of this, and the history of the war, will be dealt with in the next chapter, but we must here examine what the effects of this war were upon the course of the Revolution. The war proved a long one — it lasted from 1792 to 1802, and it ended not only creditably but splendidly for France. But at its outset it was otherwise, for the French armies, weakened by the slackening of discipline which accompanied the Revolution and by distrust of their noble officers, collapsed hopelessly at the first shock of arms, and it was two years before victory really began to declare for the French. Twice the country was in the greatest danger; first in the summer of 1792, and again in the summer of

1793. The situation demanded national unity and a solid front towards the invading foes. In neither case did national unity appear; in the first crisis it was marred by the attitude of the King and the Court, in the second crisis it was marred by the bitter strife of parties within France itself.

Now Louis XVI, and still more his Austrian wife Marie Antoinette, so far from wishing success to the arms of France, were cordially hoping that the Austrians and their allies the Prussians would win. For the Governments of Austria and Prussia were decidedly alarmed at the spread of democracy in France, and feared a similar outbreak in their own dominions. If King Louis asked for the help of Austrian troops to suppress the new Parliament and Constitution there was no doubt that his request would be granted. Scores of the nobles of France had emigrated into Germany in disgust at the overthrow of their old system, and those who remained with the King were all anxious that their country might be beaten in order that they might reap a personal advantage in the restoration of the *ancien régime*. In the circumstances, when the King and Queen sympathised with the invaders, and betrayed the French military plans to the enemy, success was improbable. The cry arose that the unpatriotic sovereign must go, and that the traitor courtiers should be cast into prison as national enemies.

Again we find the Paris mob responding to the stimulus of fear. In June 1792 came news that the French armies, which had invaded the Austrian province of Belgium, were retreating in panic over the frontier; the mob rose, burst into the Tuileries palace, and for some hours mocked and threatened

the King and Queen. Nothing definite, however, was done on this occasion, but at the end of July there arrived a proclamation couched in high and dictating language from the commander of the invading Prussian army. The Parisians were stirred to fury, and on August 10 there took place a rising secondary in importance only to that of July 14, 1789. The Tuileries was again stormed, the King's Swiss Guards were massacred, and the royal family sent as prisoners to the Temple gaol. At the end of the month came news of the fall of the frontier fortress of Longwy to the Prussians. Three or four thousand priests, nobles, officers and other royalists were seized and conveyed to the Paris prisons. On September 3 came news of the fall of the fortress of Verdun. The road to Paris lay open to the Prussians, save for Dumouriez's army and the hills of the Argonne. Panic set in in Paris. There followed a scene of terrible massacre and bloodshed; a crowd of enraged men took possession of the prisons, and as the cells were emptied the unhappy victims were butchered. In Paris alone 1400 persons were massacred in this way, including many women and young boys. These atrocious murders were repeated in many provincial towns. Curiously enough, the King and his family escaped the fate of their supporters. While the September massacres were going on in Paris, the Prussians were preparing for their march on that city, but the unexpected resistance of Dumouriez's army in the Argonne hills and the advent of heavy rains which made the roads almost impassable to the invaders caused progress to be slow, and when, on September 20, their advance guard was repulsed at Valmy, they began to fall back. Two days later,

on September 22, 1792, a new revolutionary assembly, elected hurriedly by the whole adult male population of France, and styled "the Convention," declared France a Republic.

The first crisis of the war was over, and it had resulted in the overthrow of the monarchy. One can hardly see how, in the circumstances, the nation could have acted otherwise than to get rid of the authority of Louis XVI and his friends, who were nothing less than traitors to their country, though in their estimation the King *was* the country personified. The fall of Louis dragged down the whole system of monarchy, and left France a Democratic Republic. The Convention proceeded to draw up a new Constitution, the establishment of which it wisely postponed until after the war, and a Government was set up by the appointment of a Committee of Public Safety, consisting of nine members. Once more people hoped that the Revolution was over, and that the country would now settle itself down to finish the war, and to establish its new Republican Constitution in peace.

But again hopes were to be disappointed. The French people were not going to settle down in unity and peace, and the war was by no means over. Parliamentary government was new to France, and party struggles were carried on with an extreme of bitterness. In England, where the Parliamentary Constitution had had free play for a century, parties had ceased to carry on war to the knife against one another; the party defeated at a general election resigned itself to its fate as a matter of course, and hoped for the best at the next election. But in France, where Parliamentary life was new, defeated

politicians had not the patience to wait for the swing of the pendulum in their favour; they wanted to control things, by hook or by crook, and to gain and secure power they were willing to resort to violence, intimidation, proscription of enemies, and gerrymandering of elections. The times, too, were not suitable for the development of quiet party government of the English pattern. The country was engaged in a serious and critical war, while the treacherous conduct of the royalists towards the country had sown the seeds of what the historian Carlyle calls "preternatural suspicion,"—a fear that your neighbour, particularly your enemy, is plotting secretly against you, and that he is possibly leagued with the national foe. In such circumstances, French politics became mere struggles of force, violence cloaked under the formulas of peaceful politics.

In the new French Parliament of 1792, the Convention, strife was not long in breaking out. Two parties appeared: the Girondins or Moderates, whose leaders were men from the Gironde district in the south of France, and the Jacobins or extreme Revolutionaries, who took their name from the old Jacobin convent in whose great hall the members of this party had established a political club which exercised powerful influence in Paris, and which had numerous "daughter-clubs" in the provincial towns. These two parties, Girondins and Jacobins, soon fell out and began to attack each another in bitter speeches. Their first point of dispute was as to the treatment to be dealt out to the deposed King. The Jacobins were for putting him to death, the Girondins wished to spare his life. After much debate, the death of Louis XVI was voted in the Convention by 366 to

355, and on January 21, 1793, he was executed by the newly invented guillotine in the great square which is now the Place de la Concorde.

The second great crisis of the war came with the spring of 1793. The French army in Belgium had suffered a severe defeat at Neerwinden, and the allies proceeded to invade the north-east of France. But the national danger had no effect on party strife. Girondins and Jacobins attacked one another with bitter hatred. Then came violence. At the beginning of June the Jacobins, obtaining the supremacy in the Convention, ordered the arrest of the Girondin leaders. Sooner than submit to this, the Girondins took up arms, and a fierce civil war broke out. Normandy rose; thousands of Bretons and Vendeans declared against the Republic; Bordeaux, Lyons, Marseilles, Toulon, all were in revolt. No wonder the Government turned to severe measures. The Norman rebels were routed at Pacy, Lyons and Toulon faced lengthy sieges; the rebels of La Vendée proved harder to hunt down, and the district was left a prey to anarchy for months. Meanwhile, by tremendous efforts, the Government raised the means of prosecuting the war against the invaders with vigour, and by the end of the year the victories of Hondschoote, Wattignies, and the Geisberg had secured the frontiers from attack.

But the result of this civil war was the establishment of the Reign of Terror. The Revolutionary Tribunal set to work to punish the victims sent to it by the Committee of General Security, while the Committee of Public Safety approved and supervised this policy of securing domestic unity by violence and terrorism. Suspected malcontents were arrested

in scores and, after a mockery of a trial, sent to the guillotine. And this went on for a whole year. The Terror was at its height in June and July 1794, when the executions in Paris alone averaged 196 a week. Similar things went on in the provinces, where Jacobin leaders sent down by the Committee of Public Safety carried out wholesale massacres of possible rebels. The infamous Jean-Baptiste Carrier had upwards of 15,000 persons slaughtered in and around the city of Nantes, and when the guillotine could not work fast enough, he sent his prisoners out in large batches on board the barges of the Loire, sinking the boats and drowning the unfortunate wretches within. Collot d'Herbois and Fouché had hundreds of Lyonese shot down in batches. At Arras, Bordeaux, Marseilles, similar scenes took place. It is impossible to estimate with exactitude the total number of victims. We have the records of the Paris tribunal containing mention of 2,625 persons executed; the total for the whole of France must have been enormous.

Meanwhile the victorious Jacobins had begun to split into factions. Within the party itself it soon became a great scramble of rival politicians to secure power to themselves. The fallen Royalists, including the Queen, and the fallen Girondins were put to death before the end of the year 1793, and for some time yet the Jacobin party hung together. The chief leaders of the party were now Robespierre, Danton, and Hébert, between whom there existed much mutual dislike and suspicion. In March 1794, the parties of Robespierre and Danton combined against the Hébertists, who were arrested, tried and guillotined—twenty of them. Two months

later Robespierre's group secured the destruction of their rivals, the Dantonists, of whom six prominent leaders were sent to the scaffold. Robespierre was then left supreme in the Committee of Public Safety, and under his direction the Terror reached its worst phase. But this deluge of blood could not go on for ever. The vast mass of the nation was horrified and disgusted at the bloodthirsty excesses of the Jacobins; but the Terror was effective, people were afraid to take the first steps in rebellion for fear of instant arrest and execution. At last, however, the politicians themselves began to be appalled at the extent of the bloodshed, and both in and out of the Convention men secretly longed for the fall of Robespierre and the system he represented.

In the Committee of Public Safety, meanwhile, there had occurred a further split. The majority of the Committee began to tire of Robespierre's supremacy, and prepared to attack him. The attack took place on July 27; Robespierre found himself under arrest, he refused to submit and escaped to the Hôtel de Ville, or Town Hall of Paris, where he was joined by his friends. Robespierre's enemies, however, marched against the town hall, seized it, and took "the tyrant" prisoner, and next day he was executed in the Place de la Concorde. The fall of Robespierre was the turning-point of the Reign of Terror. The victorious party still consisted of Terrorists, but on the news of the fall of "the tyrant" so great a cry of delight went up at the destruction of the man who was held to typify the Terror, that the men who now obtained control of the Government, themselves sick of the system, took the opportunity to end it. The victories of Fleurus, Kaisers-

lautern and Saorgio had ended the critical period of the war, and the national danger, which had been the sole excuse for the Reign of Terror, no longer existed. After being used to destroy ninety-five of Robespierre's supporters, the guillotine was set in motion only fourteen times in the following month, and by the end of the year it stood practically idle.

The Reign of Terror was over. But the fall of Robespierre, though it was the beginning of a decided reaction, did not close the period of violent politics. For some years to come changes of Government could be brought about only by force. By the summer of 1795 the victory of France in the war seemed assured; Prussia and Spain had made peace, Holland had been conquered, the English army had been driven ignominiously from the Continent. It was considered time that the Republic should settle down under a permanent Constitution, but the Convention decided that the ultra-democratic Constitution drawn up in the first days of the Republic would not be satisfactory, for the lower classes were discredited by the excesses of the Paris mob. The Convention therefore drew up a third French Constitution, establishing two Houses of Parliament, both elected, but differing in the property and age qualifications of the members. The vote was given on a property qualification which excluded the lower classes, and the system of election was to be indirect—that is, the voters did not choose the actual members of Parliament, but chose committeemen who afterwards met to select members according to their own choice. The Government was to consist of a committee of five Directors, chosen by the members of the Houses. Finally, and here we may note the

reluctance of French parties to submit patiently to the verdict of elections, it was decided that two-thirds of the old Convention should be retained as members of the first of the new Parliaments.

And now we have a return to violence. The party that had overthrown Robespierre had separated itself entirely from the Jacobin Club, which had, in fact, been closed by the orders of this party. The remnants of the Jacobin party, the remaining Terrorists, and the mob of Paris which found itself deprived of the vote by the new Constitution now made common cause to overthrow the Moderate party which ruled the Convention. Twice in the spring of 1795 they attempted a rising, but on both occasions they were beaten and the ringleaders punished. Hardly had the last of these revolts been put down when a new rising took place, led this time by Royalists, reactionaries, and those who were irritated at the attempt of the Convention to retain power over the new Parliament. This movement, however, was put down as easily as the two former, after a fierce cannonade in the streets in which the young Napoleon Bonaparte distinguished himself.

The new Constitution then came into force, and with the establishment of the two new Houses of Parliament and the Directory the country did at last settle down into something like quiet. Every one wished for peace, every one was tired of politics; stable, firm government without the abuses of the *ancien régime* was all people wanted. The political contests under the Directory did not excite very much interest. There was a continuous struggle between the Democrats, who tended towards Jacobinism, and the Moderates, who leaned towards

Royalism. The first Directors were decidedly Democrat, and when in 1797 the Moderates gained a majority in the Houses, the Democrats, calling in the help of the most Democratic regiments of the army, resorted to violence, and seized and transported no less than fifty-five Moderate members. Thus again violence really ruled the roast in France. The elections of next year (one-third of the Houses resigned annually) were flagrantly gerrymandered, and in the next year quarrels between the Houses and the Directors led to what was virtually the forced reconstruction of the Directory, three of its members being turned out, and three others put in. Finally, in November 1799, Napoleon Bonaparte, returning from his campaigns in Egypt and Syria, collected round him a sufficient number of troops on whom he could rely, and overthrew the whole Constitution. The members of the Lower House were turned out of their hall at the point of the bayonet, and Bonaparte then drew up a new Constitution—the fourth French Constitution of the Revolutionary Period—which virtually created him sovereign of France.

By this Constitution the Government was entrusted to three Consuls, of whom the First Consul (Bonaparte) had all the real power. The Consuls were advised and assisted by four bodies: a Council of State, a Senate which prepared the laws, a Tribunate which discussed the laws, and a Legislative Assembly which voted on the laws, passing or rejecting them without discussion. To get these bodies, the middle and upper classes were to elect electors who in turn met to elect other electors, who proceeded to elect men called "Notabilities of the Nation," of whom there were to be five or six

thousand. The Consuls chose the Council of State and the entire Senate, and the Senate then elected the entire Tribunate and Legislative Assembly by choosing men who were among the "Notabilities of the Nation." This extremely complicated system was designed by Bonaparte and his friend Sieyès with the sole purpose of leaving as little influence as possible to the people and as much as possible to the First Consul. The new Constitution was submitted to the approval of the people, who were asked to go before the local officials and vote either for or against it. The result showed that three million had accepted it while only fifteen hundred had voted against it. Apart from political pressure and the gerrymandering of votes, there is no doubt that most people accepted the Constitution and the rule of Bonaparte as a rather welcome deliverance from the party struggles and unsettled state of affairs which had sprung from the Revolution. The recent reverses in the field, and the retreat of the French armies from Italy, combined with the fame of Bonaparte as a successful general, also had a great influence on public opinion.

From the close of 1799 onwards for fifteen years Napoleon Bonaparte was the despotic sovereign of France. He was far more powerful that Louis XVI had ever been, for his realm was organised on a businesslike footing, and he was not driven to consider the feelings of the aristocracy. France had achieved her Revolution. The old grievances had been swept away, and the country had returned to the rule of a powerful centralised monarchy, whose sovereign was the greatest political genius living, perhaps the greatest political genius of all time. In 1802 the Consulate, which had at first been given

him for ten years, was awarded him for life; in 1804 he took the title of Emperor, and was crowned in the Cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris, the Pope officiating at the ceremony. Various amendments in the Constitution, such as the abolition of the Tribunate in 1808, made his power still more despotic. His vast energy found expression in many works of domestic reform and in his great wars of conquest. His codes of law, his religious settlement, his public works, bore lasting testimony to his devotion to France, while the names of his victories still evoke thrills of patriotic pride in the hearts of modern Frenchmen.

Under his rule the material benefits of the Revolution became part of the regular system of France. The new division of the provinces into Departments established in 1789 took firm root, and the Government became still further centralised. The Roman Catholic faith once more became the national religion, after the atheistic interlude of the Reign of Terror, though the Church was strictly subordinated to the supervision of the State. The chaotic systems of provincial law gave place to a new series of national Codes. The extraordinary new Calendar established by the Republic, divided into new months named after the seasons, the weather and agricultural operations, with its weeks of ten days, its national festivals and its reckoning of the years from the establishment of the French Republic instead of from the birth of Christ—this extravagancy of the Revolution was swept away in 1806, and the old Calendar restored.

It appears, then, as though the great revolutionary outbreak had ended in nothing but the removal of

the material grievances which had done so much to provoke it. The enthusiastic hopes of Democracy—Liberty, Equality, Fraternity—had ended in the Napoleonic despotism. But as a matter of fact Democracy had not been crushed; it still smouldered beneath the surface even of the Napoleonic empire, and with the further development of the Economic Revolution it was once more to raise its head.

CHAPTER II

THE REVOLUTIONARY AND NAPOLEONIC WARS

We have seen how the course of the French Revolution was influenced by the course of the great war which France was waging at the time. It was one of the ironies of fate that the new age of "liberty" and "universal brotherhood" should begin with a war the like of which had not yet been seen by Europe. Let us examine the causes which led to the outbreak of this great war.

In the first place, we may safely say that both sides were quite willing, if not eager, for war. The French people, in the first flush of excitement at their new-found liberty, imagined that a new age had dawned upon the world, and that as their own political life was now so different from what it had been in the days of the *ancien régime*, so the other peoples of Europe would also experience a similar regeneration, inspired by the example of France. The great and hopeful enthusiasm of this time led the French to think, not only that they were to set the example of democratic liberty, but that they were to become the active champions or crusaders of that liberty. Many enthusiasts, therefore, cried out for a great democratic crusade, in which France was to raise the other nations in rebellion against their despotic sovereigns and help them to freedom. And in the excitement

of the moment it was generally believed in France that such a crusade was possible.

On the other side, the other nations of Europe were led to believe exactly the reverse—that France, instead of being strengthened by her Revolution, had been seriously weakened by it. The French army was known to be in a very slack state of organisation and discipline, and if war broke out there was known to exist an influential party of reactionaries who would do all they could to hinder the success of a democratic war. The other European monarchs, too, were alarmed at the triumph of Democracy in the neighbouring kingdom, and were somewhat afraid of its spreading to their own dominions. In fact, the example of France had already stirred up a serious revolt in Belgium, where the Austrian rule was unpopular; the Belgians had driven out the Austrian garrisons and proclaimed their independence as a Republic—the "United Belgian States"—and had only been suppressed with difficulty by a concentration of troops on the revolted province. A war with France, then, from their point of view would serve the double purpose of beating an old rival and enemy and of destroying the poison of Democracy at its source. It was generally thought in the rest of Europe that France must necessarily be severely beaten and that it was a good opportunity of humbling her. Thus both sides were confident of success and desirous of a war.

There were other minor causes which led to war. A strong party in France believed that a war was the best means of settling the contest between the King and the nation by compelling the former either to side with his people against a foreign foe or to become a

declared enemy of the people's cause. A strong party at the Austrian court wished for war against the new democratic France because it had showed a strong inclination to break off the Austro-French alliance, which had been of great service to Austria since 1756 and which King Louis XVI and his Austrian Queen supported.

Both sides had given some occasion for the other side to declare war. France had annexed certain towns which, though surrounded by French territory, were themselves part of the Holy Roman Empire, and had thus violated the rights of some score of German princes—a provocation which the Austrian sovereign as Holy Roman Emperor might easily use as a *casus belli*, or reason for war. On the other hand, the Emperor Leopold II had not only issued declarations in language both insulting and threatening to France, but had allowed the assembling on Imperial territory of an armed force of emigrated French nobles whose avowed aim was to overturn the French Constitution by violence. At the beginning of 1792 the French Government demanded the withdrawal of Leopold's suggestions of a right to interfere in the internal affairs of France, and the Austrian reply proving unsatisfactory and defiant, France declared war in April 1792. Austria was at once joined by Prussia and Sardinia as allies, and preparations were made for a great invasion of France.

The great Revolutionary War, which engaged the forces of France for ten years, opened badly for the champions of Democracy. Their armies were ignominiously hurled back from the frontier, and the Allies commenced a march on Paris. It was thought that the war was virtually settled. But the Allies


CENTRAL EUROPE
TO SHOW REVOLUTIONARY AND
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Eylau
WARSAW
CARPATHIANS
R. Danube
Austerlitz
Aspern
Wagram
Essling
Pressburg
VIENNA
Neumarkt
BERLIN
Bautzen
Dresden
Leipsig
Jena
Lutzen
Auerstadt
Altenkirchen
Kaiserlautern
The Geisberg
Ulm
Stockach
Eckmuhl
Hohenlinden
R. Rhine
ALSACE
Basle
Zurich
SWITZERLAND
Luneville
Valmy
Camperdown
Bergen
Boxtel
ANTWERP
BRUSSELS
Neerwinden
Waterloo
Fleurus
Ligny
BELGIUM
Dunkirk
Hondschoote
Tourcoing
Jemmappes
Wattignies
PARIS
Pacy
FRANCE
LA VENDÉE
PIEDMONT
Marengo
Lodi
Castiglione
Milan
Cassano
Rivoli
Caldiero
Arcola
Mantua
Campo Formio
Bologna
APENNINES
Genoa
Nice
Toulon
Millesimo
Montenotte
ROME
PYRENEES
SPAIN

had not started the campaign until fairly late in the year, and the advent of bad, wet weather at the end of September put a stop to operations. The unexpected resistance of General Dumouriez against the Duke of Brunswick's Prussians at Valmy decided the Allies to fall back, and the conquest of the new Republic was postponed till the following year. But the recent reverses had fired the French to an effort. When every one thought that the campaign had ceased, for winter operations were almost always considered at that time too difficult for armies to attempt, the French came pouring back towards the frontiers and, taking the Allies by surprise, rolled in a great wave of conquering triumph over Belgium, the Palatinate, and Savoy, Dumouriez defeating the Austrians under Duke Albert of Saxe-Teschen at Jemmappes, near Mons.

Carried away by this wave of success, the French proceeded upon actions which gave an increased bitterness to the war and added to the number of their enemies. After promising to the peoples of the occupied territories liberty and democratic freedom, they proceeded to annex Belgium, Savoy and Nice to France, while in defiance of the Treaty of Westphalia, which had been observed in this respect since 1648, they opened the river Scheldt to navigation and prepared the way for the foundation of a naval base at Antwerp. At the same time, a boastful proclamation promised French aid to all peoples that chose to rebel against their monarchs. The result of these reckless actions was to bring on war with the Netherlands and with England, and a great anti-French coalition was formed, which was soon joined by Spain, Portugal, and some of the small Italian states. At

the beginning of 1793 France found herself fighting, not merely against her eastern neighbours, but against a ring of enemies.

For a second time the French armies collapsed. The Prince of Coburg beat Dumouriez at Neerwinden and reconquered Belgium; the Germans drove the French back through the Palatinate and entered Alsace; the Sardinians came back into Savoy; the Spanish armies poured round the ends of the Pyrenees, the English besieged Dunkirk and occupied Toulon. In addition to all this, civil war broke out within the nation itself. Again it seemed as if France were about to be overwhelmed by the foes she had so recklessly provoked into attacking her. But again the nation responded to the appeal of danger. We have seen how ruthlessly domestic dissensions were quelled. A conscription law, the first of its kind, filled up the depleted ranks of the army, and another great effort was made to free the country of the invaders. Possessing the advantages of the central position and unity of command, the French were again remarkably successful. The Anglo-Austrian forces in Belgium were repulsed at Hondschoote and Wattignies, the victory of the Geisberg drove the Germans back to the Rhine, and the Spaniards were pressed back into their own country. This progress continued during the next campaign, that of 1794. The Anglo-Austrians were defeated by Jourdan at Tourcoing, separated, and driven out of Belgium, after further defeats at Boxtel and Fleurus. The main Prussian army was defeated at Kaiserslautern, the Sardinian army at Saorgio; the eastern Pyrenees were turned. By the end of the year the French held everything up to the Rhine, the Alps, and the

Pyrenees. In another vigorous winter campaign General Pichegru conquered the whole of the Netherlands, and the English army withdrew to its own shores.

The task of crushing France, instead of appearing easy as in 1792 and 1793, now seemed hopeless, and the Allies showed signs of weakness. In February 1795 the Grand Duke of Tuscany, brother of the Emperor Francis II (who had succeeded Leopold in 1792), set the example of making peace with France. Prussia withdrew from the war by the Treaty of Basle in April, and Spain followed suit in July. Of her six most important foes of two years ago, France now saw Prussia and Spain beaten, the Netherlands conquered, and England repulsed from the Continent; there remained Austria and Sardinia still with armies in the field.

The reduction of these two remaining states to submission was mainly the work of the rising General Napoleon Bonaparte. During 1795 little had been done save the reduction of some of the Rhine fortresses and the occupation of Genoa by the French. But in 1796 the war minister Carnot planned a strong forward move on two lines, one through Germany and the other through northern Italy to the land of Austria itself. The northern army was repulsed by the able generalship of the Austrian Archduke Charles, who defeated half the French army at Altenkirchen and drove the other half, which narrowly escaped capture, back to the Rhine. But Bonaparte, in a campaign of wonderful brilliance, carried out his part of the programme in Italy, and penetrated the Austrian lands to the north-east. He first forced the Apennines at Montenotte, separated the Sardi-

nians from the Austrians, and compelled the former to sue for peace; then, hurrying east, he beat the Austrians at Lodi and laid siege to Mantua. While covering the siege of this fortress, Bonaparte won a series of extraordinary victories over highly superior numbers, victories of which the most noted are those of Castiglione, Arcola, and Rivoli. Continuing his campaign throughout the winter, in what was now becoming the usual French fashion, he drove the Austrians out of Italy, and after the fall of Mantua he invaded Austria, defeated the Archduke Charles in a series of battles of which Neumarkt is the most noted, and finally compelled the Emperor Francis to ask for peace. After some negotiation, the Treaty of Campo Formio, 1797, brought the war of the First Coalition to an end, though some of the smaller German princes obstinately kept the field for a few weeks longer.

The Treaty of Campo Formio gave to the French Republic the simple boundaries of the Rhine, the Alps, and the Pyrenees, boundaries which the French at once hailed as the "natural frontiers" of their country. But besides this, the victories of Bonaparte in Italy secured for France a foothold in that country, where a new state called the Cisalpine Republic was erected, including the cities of Milan, Mantua and Bologna, and under the virtual protection of the French Republic. Austria received some compensation for the loss of Belgium and Milan by the annexation of the greater part of the dominions of Venice, which now disappeared as an independent state.

The Continent was now at peace; of all the enemies of France England alone kept up the struggle, protected from attack by her naval supremacy. Between

these two there seemed no satisfactory means of settling the war, for France had little chance of winning at sea while the English had little chance of effecting much against the French forces on land. To obtain something like naval equality with England, the French Republic sought the alliance of other states that possessed fair-sized navies; in 1795 the Netherlands, conquered by Pichegru, were formed into a new "Batavian Republic" and entered into alliance with France, while in the following year Spain was persuaded to take up the cudgels against her old colonial rival and to join the alliance against England. The coalition of the three navies of France, Spain, and Holland against England threatened to be effective, but the British naval victories of St. Vincent and Camperdown shattered the hopes based on this new alliance. Britain's naval supremacy remained unimpaired, and in 1798 its effectiveness was demonstrated in a very striking manner. Bonaparte was sent in command of a French expeditionary force to Egypt with the ultimate idea of cutting a way through to attack the English possessions in India. Though the transports landed their men in safety, the escorting French Mediterranean fleet was caught and almost annihilated by Nelson in the great battle of the Nile, and the expedition, thus cut off from supplies and reinforcements, was left to be worn down by Turks and British until it had to surrender after the battle of Alexandria in 1801.

The news of Nelson's victory at the Nile had the effect of renewing the Continental war. When it became known that the best of the French soldiers, with their best general, were cut off in the distant country of Egypt, a new coalition sprang into being.

But this coalition was defensive besides being aggressive, for the French Republic had been steadily increasing its hold on Italy since the peace of Campo Formio, violently and almost without excuse taking possession of the small states, Sardinia, Tuscany, the Papal dominions, and Naples, as well as seizing control of Switzerland. Hence it was to stop the further spread of French power and influence, as well as to attempt to regain what had been previously lost, that the Second Coalition was formed. Austria, Sardinia, and the Two Sicilies at once joined England in her struggle against France, and this time Russia, alarmed at the rapid increase in the power of the new French Republic, joined actively in the league. Prussia had, since her retirement from the war in 1795, been swayed by a pacifist party that thought her interests would be best served by keeping out of warfare at all costs, and when invited to join the coalition she refused to break away from an attitude of rigid neutrality.

The war of the Second Coalition lasted for two years only. It began with a wave of French disasters and ended with a recovering wave of French triumphs, and it is significant for the history of France that the turning-point coincided with the return from Egypt of General Bonaparte. The Austro-Russian armies came into conflict with the French in Germany, Switzerland, and Italy, defeating them with heavy losses at Stockach, Cassano, the Trebbia, and other places. The French were driven from almost the whole of Italy, their army in Germany was driven back, and a force of English and Russians landed in Holland to raise that country against its conquerors.

But the wave then set in the opposite direction.

The Anglo-Russians were defeated at Bergen and driven out of the Netherlands; the Russians in Switzerland were decisively checked at Zürich; and above all, Bonaparte, secretly leaving Egypt, returned to France and took possession of the reins of government. Once more the French arms were carried forward. Bonaparte himself crossed the Great St. Bernard pass in the rear of the Austrians and routed then after a severely contested battle at Marengo; Moreau pursued a successful campaign through South Germany and crowned it with the victory of Hohenlinden over the Austrian Archduke John. Once more, as in 1797, the French moved towards Vienna, and again the vanquished Austrians declared it impossible to continue the struggle. By the Treaty of Lunéville, 1801, the war of the Second Coalition was brought to an end. The settlement of Campo Formio was again recognised, but in addition France secured the annexation of the continental dominions of Sardinia, and the establishment of a French protectorate over the Genoese (now called the Ligurian) Republic. Once more Revolutionary France had proved her vigour, and a second stage in the expansion of her dominions had been reached.

The collapse of the Second Coalition too, had a profound effect in England, where a loud outcry for at least a temporary peace now began to be heard. Hence, in 1802, the Addington Ministry signed with the French Republic the Treaty of Amiens, by which England recognised the French conquests in Belgium and elsewhere on the Continent in return for the acquisition of the colonies of Ceylon and Trinidad, given up at the expense of France's allies, Holland and Spain. Thus the French Revolutionary war,

which had lasted for ten years, came to an end triumphantly for France and the Revolution.

But the interval of peace was not destined to be a long one. The power of France had grown too great to allow the other states of Europe to tolerate the new settlement for long. And France was not even contented with what she had already got. Under the able direction of the First Consul Bonaparte she aimed more and more at the supremacy over the whole of Europe. Of course, had all the rest of Europe been firmly and solidly united in its determination to check the growing power of France it must have been able to overwhelm the single country against which it was struggling; but as yet there was no such firm unity among the European states, petty jealousies and selfish interests prevented an effective co-operation of the other Powers against the Republic, and it was not until they had learnt in the school of experience the bitter results of disunion and disagreement in the face of a powerful common foe that the Allies were able to co-operate effectively for a real victory.

The most persistent of France's enemies had been Great Britain, and it was Great Britain that commenced the second great war of this period, a war that is generally known as the Napoleonic war. Fearing the further peaceful development of French military and naval resources, England forced on the reopening of hostilities at an earlier date than had been anticipated. In 1803 Great Britain declared war on France, and naval operations commenced which soon involved the fleets of England, France, Holland, and Spain, as in the previous war. Bonaparte, who became Emperor in 1804, prepared to invade England itself, a plan

which British naval supremacy never allowed of carrying into effect, and also struck at British commerce by the decrees issued from Berlin and Milan in 1806, forbidding France and her allies to trade with Britain; England occupied herself with capturing French colonies and sweeping French commerce from the seas, while she did all she could to stir up the continental Powers to the formation of a third coalition against her enemy.

By the year 1805 Austria and Russia were again ready to enter the lists. A Third Coalition was formed, and war began. Prussia, still swayed by the peace party, hesitated, anticipating more advantages from a benevolent neutrality towards France than from a costly war. The French plan of campaign resembled those of 1796 and 1800. Two great armies moved through south Germany and Italy respectively, with the aim of uniting before the Austrian capital. This time Bonaparte took charge of the northern force, and commenced his operations with the brilliant capture of one of the Austrian field armies at Ulm. So complete was this victory that the French were able to march on without opposition to Vienna, which surrendered to Napoleon. At the same time Masséna, the victor of Zürich in 1799, beat the Austrians in Italy at Caldiero, and opened up the other road to Vienna. Reinforced by the arrival of the first Russian army, the Austrians again gave battle at Austerlitz in Moravia, where, in sight of the three emperors of France, Austria and Russia, the French gained a splendid victory. In spite of the Russian desire to continue fighting, the defeated Austrians now sued for peace, and by the Treaty of Pressburg they withdrew from the war, ceding Venice, the Tyrol

and part of the Adriatic coast at the demand of the victorious Napoleon.

At this point Prussia, which had so far preserved her neutrality, discovered that her inaction had only resulted in a loss of prestige and evoked the contempt of Napoleon. It had been hoped by the Prussians, and indeed Napoleon had promised, that Prussia was to receive Hanover as the price of her good will towards France, but in 1806 it was discovered that Napoleon had no intention of keeping this promise. The Prussians were furious, and at last joined the coalition. But it was too late. Had they struck before Austerlitz they might have changed the course of the war, but now Austria was crushed and unwilling to risk another conflict, and Napoleon could deal with Prussia alone. The reaction from the peace spirit, however, ran high in Prussia, so much so that the Prussians advanced to attack the French without waiting for the support and co-operation of the Russian armies, and in the twin battles of Jena and Auerstadt the Prussians were thoroughly routed. Once more the armies of Napoleon Bonaparte marched on from triumph to triumph. Berlin fell, Warsaw fell, the Russians were repulsed at Eylau and severely defeated at Friedland, and then the Emperor of Russia sued for peace. The ensuing Treaty of Tilsit, 1807, crowned this wonderful series of successes. The Austrian cessions of the Treaty of Pressburg were recognised, a large part of Poland, including Warsaw, was erected into a Grand Duchy for Napoleon's friend the King of Saxony, and the most important of the Prussian fortresses were handed over to the keeping of the French. Thus ended the war of the Third Coalition.

Napoleon was now the admitted dominator of

the Continent. His power was supreme in France, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy. Prussia and Austria appeared helpless before him, and Russia had been beaten and forced into acquiescence in his annexations. Spain was his faithful ally, and was shortly to fall beneath the heel of his power. The obstinate and gallant resistance of Sweden was overcome by Russian aid. Britain alone remained unconquered and hurled successful defiance at him.

Since the British naval victories at Finisterre and Trafalgar it had been recognised as impossible for a French invasion of England to be seriously undertaken. But Napoleon continued to strike at British trade by his enforcement of the Berlin Decrees, and he exerted himself to force the other continental states to accept them and to enter what he called his "Continental System" for the destruction of British trade. Portugal's sympathy and friendliness towards England led him in 1807 to dispatch an army which overran and occupied that country, while in the following year he gained the opportunity of increasing his hold on Spain. A series of domestic quarrels in the Government of that country led to the royal family submitting the settlement of the problem of Spanish government to their ally Napoleon. Of this he took advantage, and settled Spanish questions by declaring the old dynasty of Spain deposed and appointing his own brother Joseph Bonaparte to be King of Spain. This provoked a breach of the Franco-Spanish alliance, and war began between Spain and France, Portugal also taking the opportunity to rise against the oppressors. The time for a fourth coalition had come. Prussia, kept down by the French garrisons, refused to join, but Austria once more took up arms. Russia

might have given valuable assistance, but jealousy of her neighbour Austria and the fact that France had not yet taken any territory from Russia (except the recently acquired Ionian Islands in 1807) and seemed inclined to be friendly to her prevented the great eastern Power from opposing Napoleon.

The Fourth Coalition, then, included Austria, Spain, Portugal and Great Britain. But once more the power of Napoleon triumphed. After the victory of Eckmühl the French Emperor pressed on into Austria and again Vienna fell, though at Aspern-Essling, where he tried to cross the Danube, he suffered his first defeat in a great two days' battle. Napoleon then waited for the arrival of the second army, which as usual was coming through Italy, and then made a further attempt to cross the Danube. This time he was successful, and at Wagram the Austrians were so severely defeated that they were once more obliged to sue for peace. By the Treaty of Vienna, 1809, Austria had to give up West Galicia to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, and her possessions on the Adriatic and in the Inn Valley to France and her ally Bavaria.

A fourth coalition had failed, and France was more powerful than ever. The Spaniards and Portuguese, backed by an English army, still kept up a resistance in the Peninsula, but, though Lisbon and Cadiz seemed impregnable, Napoleon did not consider "the Spanish ulcer" a very serious matter at that time. He felt he could leave the affairs of the Peninsula in the hands of his brother Joseph and his generals; he had greater work elsewhere. That work was to complete his conquest of Europe by the thorough reduction of Russia. France already dominated the Continent, but Napoleon felt that his rule would not be complete until

he had overthrown Russia as thoroughly as he had overthrown Austria and Prussia. That conquest was planned for the year 1812.

Napoleon was now at the summit of his power. Throughout the western and central parts of the Continent he was supreme. To France itself he added provinces until it included within its limits Holland, north-west Germany, and north-west Italy; Amsterdam, Bremen, Hamburg, Turin, Genoa, Florence, and Rome being all cities of France. There was also an isolated province along the eastern shore of the Adriatic Sea, including the cities of Trieste and Spalato. Around the empire were clustered a series of subject states: Spain under his brother Joseph, Naples under his brother-in-law Joachim Murat, the kingdom of Westphalia under his brother Jerome, the Grand Duchy of Berg under his nephew Napoleon Louis, the kingdom of Italy held by Napoleon himself, the subject Swiss Confederation, the lesser German states bound up with Westphalia and Berg in the Confederation of the Rhine with Napoleon as Protector. Further out lay Prussia, still bridled with French garrisons, and Austria, humbled with four successive defeats and shorn of many of its former provinces. The Grand Duchy of Warsaw, held by the King of Saxony (a member of the Confederation of the Rhine), carried Napoleon's influence as far as the walls of Kovno and Brest-Litovsk. All these lands were kept in subjection to Napoleon's will by a splendidly organised Imperial system centred at Paris, a large and magnificent army, and the directing genius of the great Emperor himself.

The great Russian campaign of 1812 opened with an advance up the valley of the Niemen. The Russians,


EUROPE
1810.
English Miles
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
SCOTLAND
IRELAND
ENGLAND
NORTH SEA
DENMARK AND NORWAY
SWEDEN
BALTIC SEA
RUSSIA
ATLANTIC OCEAN
PRUSSIA
WARSAW
WEST-PHALIA
CONFEDERATION OF THE RHINE
FRENCH EMPIRE
AUSTRIA
SWITZERLAND
ITALY
FRENCH
SEA OF AZOV
BLACK SEA
PORTUGAL
SPAIN
Corsica
Balearic Is
SARDINIA
NAPLES
ADRIATIC SEA
TURKEY
MONTENEGRO
TURKEY IN ASIA
Ionian Is
SICILY
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Candia or Crete
Cyprus

outnumbered by the 450,000 that Napoleon had brought with him, had no alternative but to fall back. The French proceeded with the invasion, aiming for Moscow, the old capital and true centre of Russia, as their objective. When the invaders had been weakened by the placing of many thousands on their increasingly long line of communication, the Russians under Kutusoff ventured to oppose them in the field. A fearful battle at Borodino ensued, in which Napoleon was victorious. The French then advanced on Moscow, which was thereupon evacuated, not merely by the military, but by the civilian population as well. When the invaders occupied the city, it was set on fire by the Russians, and a great part of Moscow was burnt down. Napoleon now hoped that the occupation of their old capital would force the Russians to submit, but this was not so, and on the approach of winter he decided to retreat. Owing to the cold weather and the exhaustion of supplies in the districts already traversed by his troops, he decided to retreat by a more southerly route, but when this became apparent the Russians prepared to resist this southward march by all means in their power. A second battle now took place at Malo-Jaroslavetz, and the French vanguard was severely cut up. The Russians, however, fell back, but prepared for another fight. Anxious to get back to safety before the advent of the cold, Napoleon now changed his plans, and went back to his former road. Disasters now set in. The cold became intense, hordes of Cossacks raided and destroyed the food depôts prepared for the returning troops, with lamentable effects, and the Grand Army of Napoleon, swelled by numerous reinforcements who brought no food or supplies with them, soon became

a straggling line of famished and shivering sufferers, who might easily have been destroyed at a single blow from the Russian army. Kutusoff, however, preferred to let Nature do his work for him, and only once, at the Beresina, was any serious attack on the retreating host made. But of over 600,000 men who crossed the frontier as invaders, more than 500,000 either perished or were made prisoners. It was the greatest military disaster of modern times.

The retreat from Moscow was the signal for the downfall of Napoleon. It would be almost impossible to replace the half-million men who had been lost. No sooner had the news become known than Prussia, in spite of the garrisons, declared war on France. Sweden followed suit, and dispatched an army across the Baltic. Austria prepared to join them, and declared war later in 1813. A Fifth Coalition had arisen. Against this new combination of foes Napoleon exerted himself in a most wonderful manner. New conscripts were raised, and at the head of a quarter of a million men he advanced into Germany to meet his enemies. There followed a fierce struggle in the centre of Germany. Many battles were fought; wherever Napoleon himself commanded, as at Lützen, Bautzen, and Dresden, the French were successful, but when his generals were in command the fortune of war declared against them. At last the main forces on either side were concentrated at Leipzig, where a tremendous three days' battle, "the Battle of the Nations," ended in the total defeat of the French Emperor.

But Napoleon was not yet daunted. Rallying every available man round him, he stood at bay on the soil of France itself against overwhelming odds, while Marshal Soult did his best to keep the Duke of

Wellington's armies from crossing the Pyrenees. In the early months of 1814 Napoleon fought ten fierce battles for the defence of Paris, of which he won six, but with each fight his numbers diminished, the foe closed in on him, and at last, after his last remnant of 28,000 had held 200,000 of the enemy at bay for ten hours on the outskirts of the city, Paris surrendered, and the great Emperor declared himself willing to submit.

The Treaty of Paris followed. France was reduced to its limits of 1792, at the outbreak of the Revolutionary War. Napoleon, while retaining the title of Emperor, was to retire to the island of Elba, and never to leave it. As a guarantee against the aggressive policy of conquest symbolised by Napoleon, Louis XVIII, of the old royal family of France, was restored to the throne, his nephew Louis, who had died during the Republic, being reckoned as Louis XVII. The difficult questions arising out of the reconstruction of the map of Europe were referred to a European congress which was to meet at Vienna.

But before the ambassadors at Vienna could complete their arrangements, the armies of Europe were once more to be called into the field. Napoleon did not remain in Elba for a year. Encouraged by the dissatisfaction which was produced in France by the reactionary proposals of King Louis XVIII's advisers, he slipped away from his island in 1815, landed in France, and called the army to his side. The army responded, and though it cannot be said that the French nation as a whole were at all enthusiastic for him, the support of the armed men carried him back to his throne. King Louis fled the country, and had to appeal for foreign help. Meanwhile Napoleon

issued a proclamation declaring that he wished only to rule over the French people, and denying any idea of future wars of conquest. He hoped that the other states would not want the trouble of another war merely to restore Louis XVIII. and also reckoned on the jealousies that had appeared among the Powers at the Congress of Vienna to prevent united action against him. But the fear of Napoleon was so great that it was felt that to allow him to remain ruler of France would be to allow him the means of preparing for the day when he could conquer them all again, and forthwith it was decided to concentrate the troops of the Fifth Coalition once more upon France.

Napoleon's cause looked hopeless, and his only chance lay in winning a few victories over small detachments before the larger armies came into the field. A few such defeats might possibly frighten the Allies into making peace on easy terms. He therefore marched into Belgium, where were a Prussian force under Blücher and a mixed army of English, Dutch and others, under the Duke of Wellington. The campaign, however, was soon over. After a victory over Blücher at Ligny, Napoleon attacked Wellington at Waterloo; he failed to drive him from his positions, and when Blücher's force arrived on the battlefield later in the day the French rout was made complete. Napoleon's fate was sealed. It availed him little that he abdicated the throne and declared his infant son emperor as Napoleon II. He fled across France, but eventually gave himself up to the captain of an English warship. This time he was dispatched as a prisoner to the distant island of St. Helena, where he died in 1821. For the offence of having received back Napoleon, France had to pay an indemnity of

£28,000,000, to allow foreign troops to garrison some of her fortresses for five years, and to pay another £50,000,000 for the support of the unwelcome visitors.

The Congress of Vienna had meanwhile reconstructed the map of Europe, and the resulting Treaty of Vienna of 1815 fixed the boundaries of the European States according to the general agreement of the Powers. The chief provisions of this settlement may be summarised thus : Russia secured Finland and the greater part of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw; Prussia received the Polish province of Posen and extended her domains by the grant of part of Saxony and a big province on the Rhine; Austria regained the Tyrol and the Adriatic Coast, along with both Venice and Milan; the old Holy Roman Empire was reconstructed as the German Confederation, under the presidency of Austria; Belgium and Holland were united under the Dutch royal family; Sweden and Norway were united under the rule of the Swedish king; Italy was again subdivided into a number of petty states; Spain and Portugal were restored to their former dynasties; and Great Britain received Malta, the Ionian Islands, Heligoland, and several distant colonies, of which the most important was the Cape of Good Hope.

The long period of European upheaval and change was at last over. It was a period of tremendous action and effort, and it left every country more or less exhausted and anxious for peace and repose. The war, as we have seen, originated in the self-assertive and aggressive spirit of revolutionary France, a spirit which was well maintained after the Republican Government had collapsed. The domination of the Emperor of France was thrown off only after a gigantic struggle, in the course of which the Powers of Europe


EUROPE
1815.
English Miles
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
KINGDOM OF SWEDEN AND NORWAY
FINLAND
Aland
NORWAY
SWEDEN
SCOTLAND
NORTH SEA
BALTIC SEA
IRELAND
DENMARK
RUSSIA
ENGLAND
ATLANTIC OCEAN
PRUSSIA
NETHERLANDS
Aix la Chapelle
GERMAN CONFEDERATION
Brussels
Troppau
Plombieres
Vienna
FRANCE
Basle
Berne
SWITZERLAND
Zurich
AUSTRIA
SEA OF AZOV
Crimea
LOMBARDY VENETIA
Laibach
SARDINIA
BLACK SEA
Sinope
TUSCANY
PAPAL STATES
ADRIATIC SEA
TURKEY
MONTENEGRO
SPAIN
Madrid
PORTUGAL
Corsica
Balearic Is
SARDINIA
KINGDOM OF THE TWO SICILIES
TURKEY IN ASIA
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Candia or Crete
Cyprus

learned the advantages and the necessity of united action. The constant call for unity and co-operation gradually accustomed the rulers of Europe to look at things from a general European as well as from a national and a personal point of view, and this led, in the days of the Vienna Congress, to the formulating of those ideas of a "Holy Alliance," and of the "Concert of Europe" which were so marked a feature of the views of the statesmen of the generation succeeding the Treaty of Vienna and which have profoundly influenced European politics down to the present day.

CHAPTER III

THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION

While the attention of Europe was being concentrated on the violent episodes of the French Revolution and the activities of the great wars, another revolution was slowly developing in the industrial world — a revolution which, though attracting comparatively small notice at the time, was to exert a far more permanent influence than that of the political revolution in France. This Industrial Revolution consisted in a series of changes resulting from the discovery of new processes in manufacture, and its first developments can be traced for some time earlier than the French Revolution.

There have always been inventors who discover new processes or who improve on old processes in trade, but up to the middle of the eighteenth century there had not been many of them. Change was very slow, and people were accustomed to go on doing things in the same way as their fathers had done them. But in the latter part of the century there appeared a number of inventors who devised a remarkable series of improvements on old methods, and most of these new inventors were Englishmen. Hargreaves, Arkwright, Crompton, Cartright and Horrocks made their name by their great improvements in the arts of spinning and weaving; James

Watt immortalised his name by the invention of his steam engine in 1782; Cort and others devoted their attention to the art of iron smelting and working; while Brindley, Metcalfe, Telford and Macadam worked wonders with canals, bridges and roads.

This great outburst of industrial improvement, centred in Great Britain, had far-reaching effects. For it was but the beginning of a long series of such improvements, a series which has gone on without intermission to the present day. In fact, every new invention or improvement since the end of the eighteenth century seems to have suggested two or three more, until we find the output of such inventions enormous. If we go to a big factory and take a glance at one of the great machines now in use—a spinning machine, a weaving machine, a printing machine, for instance—the whole thing seems so stupendously wonderful and complicated that we can hardly conceive how such an engine could have come to be invented. But we must remember that the machine we see to-day is the ultimate result of some scores, and perhaps some hundreds of small inventions and improvements, and is the combined work of many people's brains. The spinning machine of the present-day Lancashire cotton mill bears little resemblance to Hargreaves' spinning jenny which created such a stir in 1767, but it is directly developed from that earlier machine by a process of continual improvement, adjustment and adaptation.

This vast output of mechanical inventions, which may be termed the result of Applied Science, has revolutionised the world. It is this which has caused the great modern change in material con-

ditions of life. We have said that life to-day differs more from life a hundred years ago than life at that period differed from life under the Roman Empire. The reason for this lies entirely in the Industrial Revolution. It has not only altered our material conditions, it has allowed the development of ideas and ways of thought which were more or less impossible in the previous age.

The list of inventions of first-rate importance which have appeared since the end of the eighteenth century is a very long one. The first that suggest themselves are, of course, the railway, the steamboat, the electric telegraph, the telephone and the petrol engine. Then we have such things as lighting by gas and lighting by electricity, the electric motor, the typewriter, the bicycle, photography, electrotyping, not to speak of such very modern inventions as the aeroplane and the submarine boat. In a smaller way we have such things as matches, petroleum, indiarubber, coal dyes, tinned foods, beef extract, beet sugar, and hundreds of other things quite unknown to our ancestors of a century ago. And in addition to these new things, articles which, on account of distance and the difficulties of transport, were rarely to be obtained in Europe then, have been brought plentifully within our reach at the present day.

The effects of this great Industrial Revolution have been manifold. In the first place, the world has been reduced very much in practical size for its inhabitants. The crossing of the Atlantic, formerly a matter of some five or six weeks, is now a matter of as many days. We can go by rail from Paris to the far ports of Asia in a fraction of the time formerly required. And as regards the communication of

intelligence the electric telegraph has virtually annihilated distance altogether; the result of the Derby is known in Calcutta five minutes after the race has been won, though the distance is some four thousand miles.

One result of this shortening of distance is the tendency towards union and cosmopolitanism among people of various nations. National quarrels and wars are doubtless as violent as ever, but there no longer exists so violent an antipathy towards foreigners as used to be found in the minds of people a hundred years ago. Another result is the increased facility for tracking down and capturing criminals. By means of the telegraph we can make sure that a fugitive criminal shall be preceded by the news of his crime and particulars necessary for his seizure, a fact which makes crime less easy to perpetrate with impunity; while the existence of fast-going ironclad cruisers makes piracy impossible at the present day in times of peace.

The improvement in material conditions was accompanied by the spread of education and culture. Schools multiplied enormously all over Europe, and a demand arose for national schools and compulsory education in most of the European states. Scientific knowledge and literary culture spread from the aristocratic few to large numbers of middle-class and even of lower-class men and women. Compulsory national education was adopted in England between 1870 and 1876, by France in 1882, and by Germany in 1871 and 1880.

A further result of the Industrial Revolution is the massing together of people in large manufacturing towns. The necessity and convenience of keeping the great modern machines in special factory buildings

and collected at special centres has led to the development of towns in a manner previously rare. The majority of European towns and cities in the eighteenth century were tiny places compared with those we call towns to-day. The collection of vast masses of labourers in one place, too, gives opportunities for mutual discussion, organisation, and political action to the working classes, opportunities that were not to be had in the life of scattered agricultural nations. The mobs of great cities have always wielded great power in history, from the mob of ancient Rome to the mob of revolutionary Paris, and despotic Governments have always had to humour such mobs, either by "bread and games," or by spectacular public executions on a wholesale scale. The Industrial Revolution developed so many great towns that many of the European peoples became largely collections of town mobs, organised for political action more thoroughly than in the old days, and, by means of the modern methods of communication, in touch with one another and ready for concerted action in a way unknown to those of a century ago. Here we get some insight into the power of modern Democracy. It is worth observing that Russia, the least industrial country in Europe, is also the least democratic.

The enormous advantages conferred on civilisation by the development of modern machinery and methods of communication have given far more power of action to the Governments of states than they had before. Formerly a nation had not enough capital or spare labour to allow its Government to undertake works on a very large scale. But now the ordinary bread-winning work of the nation can be carried on so much more rapidly and economically as regards energy, time and labour, that there is

plenty of energy left over for extra work at the direction of the Government. The Government can call upon more labourers than before for public works, and still be certain that the food supplies of the community will be procured in abundance; the Government can raise rapidly and without difficulty far more money for its purposes of government than it ever could have extracted from a hard-working nation of a century ago; while hundreds of persons are now available for employment as Government servants and officials, who could not have been spared from more necessary forms of labour in the old days. Hence the great power and effectiveness of modern Governments compared with those of the previous era. In the year of the Waterloo campaign the United Kingdom contained about 20,000,000 inhabitants, and paid £74,500,000 in taxation; a hundred years later, Mr. Lloyd George estimated his war budget at £1000,000,000, to be levied among the 50,000,000 inhabitants of the kingdom.

The increasing expenditure of the European Governments naturally provoked a greater demand from the peoples to know how their money was being spent, and to obtain some sort of control over its spending. The development of the cities gave force to this rising demand. Democratic control was everywhere being demanded. As the Industrial Revolution spread over Europe the outcry became louder, until in every country there existed a party which advocated the overthrow of the old despotic system of royal government and the establishment of a Parliament responsible to the mass of the people and powerful enough to control the actions of the Government. It was not the French Revolution that brought about the rise of Democracy in Europe; the

lamentable termination of that political movement rather set back the forces of Democracy for a generation. It was the slow development of the new conditions brought about by the Industrial Revolution which gave the impetus to modern Democracy.

We have said that the increase in facilities of communication gave to the people of Europe a broader and more cosmopolitan outlook on life. But in another sense the new era brought with it a reaction towards separatism. In 1789 we find people living in quiet and comparative content under the rule of men of another race; for instance, we have the Belgians ruled by the Austrian Hapsburgs, the Holstein Germans ruled by the Danish king, and the Czechs of Bohemia and the Italians of Milan paying taxes to and suing in the courts of the Austrian ruler. During the century following the settlement of Europe by the Treaty of Vienna we find no such tendency to submit to alien rule. We see the Belgians rising in rebellion against the Dutch, the Italians against the Austrians, the Poles against the Russians, the Greeks and Bulgars against the Turks. Why is this? The reason is twofold. In the first place, the nationalist movement is often one aspect of the democratic movement. The mass of the people is beginning to demand liberty and self-government. The classes that have hitherto monopolised the government of the country are exerting themselves to prevent their monopoly being taken from them. If the governors are aliens there is an additional ground of hatred for the people, and the cry arises, "Out with the foreigners, who have come here to oppress us and keep us down!" In the second place, as Democracy comes to power, and the influence and authority of the sovereign shrinks,

there appears another cause for national animosity which did not exist before. Under the old system, the despot's hand lay equally heavy on all his subjects, and the despotic ruler of a state which comprised more than one people might be expected to guide his rule more or less impartially over all his subjects, standing aloof in his high position from any special sympathy with one race against another. But when the power of the people was substituted for the power of the sovereign, the race that found itself in the minority was exposed to the mercy of the people of the race that found itself numerically superior, and the people who thus wielded power over a smaller race could not be expected to display the same benevolent impartiality to both races that was expected from a despotic sovereign.

Nationalism has always been some sort of a force in history, though in some ages it has not been so actively conspicuous as in others. The oppressive exactions and restrictions of Napoleon's despotism stirred up a great wave of Nationalism in Europe in the decade preceding his fall, but with the removal of the tyrant it began to ebb for a short time. With the development of Democracy it began to appear again under the influence of the causes above outlined, and it is one of the most important factors in the history of the nineteenth century.

The political history of Europe during the century following the Vienna Settlement may be said to consist mainly in the interplay of three great forces : Democracy, Nationalism and International Rivalry. In the following chapters we shall trace the development of these forces, and see what changes they have brought about since 1815.

CHAPTER IV

THE GROWTH OF DEMOCRACY

The Vienna Settlement of 1815 had taken no particular account of either democratic or nationalist ideals. There were some people who would have liked to see the sovereigns of Europe settle down to a programme of domestic reforms in which their people would be called upon to join with their assistance and advice. But the kings were by no means inclined to encourage the establishment of parliamentary institutions, wishing to retain as far as possible their old unfettered sway. France, alone of the continental Powers, now enjoyed some share of self-government, for King Louis XVIII, anxious to remove the unfavourable impression resulting from his return at the head of a conquering host of aliens, had issued in 1814 a charter, granting his kingdom a Parliament of two Houses with certain limited rights of controlling the actions of the Government.

The restored Government of the Bourbon dynasty, however, was by no means democratic. There was a high financial qualification for electors, which excluded the lower classes altogether from the franchise, while the Crown reserved the right of unlimited creation of peers to control the Upper House and exercised it freely, seventy-six, for instance, being

created in a batch in 1827. When Parliament became at all restless, the Court resorted to fresh elections, new electoral laws, and all sorts of tricks to secure pliant members. It was not long before the forces of Democracy began to gather head. Opposition to the King appeared both in Parliament and out, newspapers were filled with attacks on the Government, especially after the mild and good-natured Louis XVIII had been succeeded by his harsh brother Charles X in 1824. Charles was the resolute enemy of all that savoured of Democracy and "the Revolution." "I had rather hew wood than be a king on the conditions of the King of England," was one of his sayings, and he exercised the most rigid control over Parliament and the Press. Those in the civil service or in the army who expressed any sympathy with Democracy were at once dismissed; newspapers that had been too free in their criticisms were stopped.

This severity at last provoked a revolt. In July 1830 the King issued four Ordinances or decrees, dissolving Parliament, calling a new one, altering the electoral law, and placing further restrictions on the Press. This was the signal for rebellion. The city of Paris rose, and after three days' street fighting, the old King despaired of reducing the mob, gave up the struggle in disgust, abdicated the throne and crossed over to England; he died in Austria, six years later, at the ripe age of seventy-nine. Left to themselves, the Parisians proceeded to discuss what sort of Government should be established, and, though many were for a Republic, the memories of the Reign of Terror and the hostile attitude of the other Powers of Europe led them to establish a

Constitutional Monarchy of the English pattern. The crown was offered to Louis Philippe, Duke of Orleans, a descendant of Louis XIII of France, and he was forthwith raised to the throne as "King of the French." The most noted leaders of this "July Revolution" were Lafayette (an old hero of the great Revolution), Guizot and Thiers.

Louis Philippe, the "citizen king," had a hard task before him. He had neither the prestige of the old line of kings, nor the military glory of Napoleon, nor the support of the lower classes which had kept up the Republic. From the first days of his reign the Republicans, many of them now Socialists, raised riots and insurrections against him. The young Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, son of the Emperor's brother Louis, tried to raise the old supporters of the empire against him. The aristocratic friends of the late king snubbed him. Yet he managed to keep his throne in safety for no less than eighteen years. His conduct was a mixture of mildness and severity. He would amble round Paris, shaking hands with the workmen and shopkeepers and talking to them, while he entertained all classes on a great scale; on the other hand, he ordered the severe suppression of the Socialist riots in Paris, Lyons and elsewhere, and, capturing the young Bonaparte, imprisoned him in a fortress, from which, however, that adventurous young man contrived to make an exciting escape.

But he was not destined to keep his throne. The Revolution of 1830, while removing the more severe restrictions on liberty, did not extend the franchise to any extent, and as the democratic party increased in numbers and in power the restlessness of the

masses grew greater, especially in the growing towns. The overturn came as suddenly as in 1830. The democratic party had been in the habit of holding big political banquets at which many speeches were delivered. One of these banquets was forbidden by order of the King in February 1848, and this provoked the outburst. As in the previous revolution, there was fierce street fighting for three days. As before, the King gave up the fight as hopeless, abdicated, and withdrew to England disguised as "Mr. Smith"; he died at Claremont Park in Surrey in 1850. This time all were agreed that France should be a republic and that it should be governed by a Parliament elected by universal suffrage, every adult man being entitled to a vote. But when the first Assembly met a furious contest broke out between the Socialists under Louis Blanc, who were strong in Paris, and the anti-Socialists under Lamartine, who commanded a large majority in the Assembly. As in the days of the great Revolution the minority refused to submit to the decision of the majority, and bloodshed ensued. Before the Assembly met, the Socialists of Paris had opened what they called "National workshops," where all who professed themselves unemployed could receive a franc a day at the nation's expense on condition of declaring themselves willing to undertake work if required by the Government. These places were soon supporting a mob of 100,000 armed proletariats, eager for further upheavals in the hope of gain and plunder. One of the first measures of the new National Assembly was to order the closing of these places; the effect was to let loose this horde of violent men upon themselves, and upon the unfortunate city. A second

three days of bloodthirsty street fighting followed, but at last the forces of the Assembly, led by General Cavaignac, crushed the Socialists, and order was restored. The year closed in quiet, the new Republican Constitution was completed, and the elections were held for the first President of the French Republic. The result of the elections was startling. While General Cavaignac came second with 1,400,000 votes, the successful candidate was Louis Napoleon Bonaparte, whose great name secured him the suffrage of no less than 5,400,000 voters.

Democracy had at last triumphed, and the rule of the masses was inaugurated. Yet the situation was hardly one for rejoicing. The restored age of "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" had begun with a civil war in the streets of Paris, and this without the excuse of national danger from without, and the first act of the people after the establishment of their new Constitution had been the election to the chief magistracy of the representative of the despotic Bonapartist *régime*. There were many who said that history would repeat itself, and that the unrestrained violence of parties would lead up to another Napoleonic despotism in which all parties would be subdued. The Napoleon was ready to hand; the French parties played into his hands. The Socialist party tried another revolt in Paris in 1849, but without success. The anti-Socialists thereupon, fearful of Socialist gains at the next elections, brought in and passed a new electoral law, the effect of which was reckoned as disfranchising some three million of the lower-class voters. The President watched all this with satisfaction, and meanwhile did all he could to ingratiate himself with

the soldiers and officers of the army. At last, on the night of December 1, 1851, the new Napoleon struck his blow. Seventy-eight of the leaders of the parliamentary majority found themselves suddenly seized in their beds and hurried off to prison. Next day a proclamation summoned the nation to help the President against the self-seeking Assembly, and denounced the recent electoral law. The Socialists were delighted, and rushed to help the President, and after a further three days of rather desultory street fighting, Napoleon, supported by the army and the lower classes, remained the victor. A new Constitution, based on the artfully complicated one of 1799, was produced by the President. By 7,500,000 votes to 640,000, the people approved of the suggestion that Napoleon should be deputed to draw up a new Constitution. Blinded by their delight at the overthrow of the middle-class Assembly, and gulled by the promise of universal suffrage for a fettered and impotent Legislative Assembly, the French people accepted the new situation. Under the new Constitution Louis Napoleon became President for ten years, but a year later, in 1852, he assumed the title of Napoleon III, Emperor of the French, gaining the assent of the nation to this change by a further vote of 7,800,000 against 250,000. History had repeated itself.

The Second Empire maintained itself for eighteen years, during which the internal history of France is almost a blank. Safe in the support of the army, Napoleon III kept the people loyal by allowing them to take part in the elections for the Parliament, though the complications of the Constitution enabled him to control the composition and actions of the

Legislature. The Emperor also sought popularity by a revival of his uncle's schemes of aggrandisement and by a series of military enterprises of which the Crimean war was the first and the Franco-German war the last. He also favoured the Pope and the Church, and thus received the support of the clerical influence. The nation as a whole was contented with the revived Imperial system, but there existed a strong body of opinion which opposed it, and with the further development of the Industrial Revolution the working classes began to clamour once more for a real instead of a nominal influence on the Government's actions. But Napoleon III, unlike Charles X and Louis Philippe, was assured of the enthusiastic support of the soldiers, and when the trained fighting men were on his side he felt he had little to fear from the mob.

But with the collapse of the army Napoleon's power also fell. This did not occur until the Franco-German war of 1870. The news of the first defeats in Alsace and Lorraine encouraged the Democrats to prepare another Revolution; the news of the total defeat and capture of the Emperor at Sedan settled their action. A rising in Paris ensued, and, without the shedding of blood, the Emperor was declared deposed and a Republic once more restored. A provisional Government was appointed by the Republican leaders, Favre and Gambetta, to carry on the war against Germany, and it was arranged that an Assembly should be summoned to draw up a new French Constitution. Peace with Germany was arranged early in the following year, but when the Assembly met there were ominous threats of civil discord. Four parties contested the elections:

the Republicans, the Bonapartists, and the supporters of the dynasties of Charles X and Louis Philippe, called the Bourbonists and Orleanists respectively. Though the Republicans won the largest separate number of seats, it was found that between them the three parties that believed in some form of monarchy had a majority in the Assembly. The fact that the three monarchist parties were naturally irreconcilable was really sufficient to secure the Republic from overthrow by either of them, but the fact that the Republicans were in a minority made things very awkward and difficult for them. The situation would have taxed the statesmanship of a people less ready to shed blood than the French. As it was, the Paris Republicans thought the best way of settling the question was to use the persuasion of force on the monarchist members. But the army, trained in the Bonapartist tradition, was far from Republican, and rallied to the defence of the national Assembly. And then occurred a strange passage of history. With the victorious Germans still encamped outside their capital, and under their very eyes, the French proceeded to indulge in a civil war of the most atrocious kind between the Socialist Republicans of the City or "Commune" of Paris, and the forces of the national Assembly of France. For six weeks the fighting raged in and out of the city, until, after a bombardment far more severe and destructive than that of the Germans, the Communists were overpowered and peace was restored. The Communists had shown no mercy to their political enemies in Paris, and when the city fell they paid the penalty with the death of 20,000 of their number. Such was the dreadful inauguration of the Third French Republic.

For many years after the fall of the Commune the Third Republic was on its trial, and no one felt sure that a fresh revolution was not due to break out in the near future. The deadlock in the Assembly, due to the irreconcilable nature of the four parties, prevented the establishment of a settled Constitution until, in 1875, the existing form of government was allowed to become recognised, at least for the time being, in default of anything different being practicable. In 1875, then, the Republic was definitely established, and Thiers, the hero of the 1830 Revolution, was elected its first President.

The Monarchist parties continued to assail the Republic; as late as 1885, the elections showed that forty-five per cent. of the seats were held by Monarchist members. But the Republicans had obtained a definite majority, and the division among their opponents was an additional security for them. Napoleon III died in 1873, at Chislehurst in England, and his only son Eugène was killed as a volunteer in the Zulu war of 1879; the "dynasty" is now "represented" by Victor Napoleon Bonaparte, grandson of Jerome, King of Westphalia. The extinction of the elder male line of the Bourbons on the death of the Count of Chambord in 1883, united both Bourbonist and Orleanist claims in the person of the Count of Paris, whose claims passed at his death in 1894 to his son Louis, the present "Duke of Orleans." But the Monarchist parties by now have shrunk to insignificance, and nothing short of a national disaster would lead to the overthrow of the Republic.

Since the fall of the Second Empire, France has enjoyed democratic government, with universal male suffrage and a Republican Constitution. We must

now turn to some of the other more important continental states and trace the progress of Democracy in them.

Democracy in Germany had a very bad time of it for a generation after the Vienna Settlement. For though the rulers of the thirty-nine states of the German Confederation had promised some measure of democratic freedom to their people, and the Constitution of the Confederation provided that Parliaments should be set up in the constituent states, very little was done to fulfil these hopes. Some of the smaller states received Parliaments by grant of their rulers, notably Bavaria, Württemberg, Hanover and Baden, but the two leading states, Austria and Prussia, were ruled by sovereigns who frowned on "the Revolution" and all its works. The "Liberals," too, brought down upon themselves a marked reaction owing to the extravagance of their ideas and language. For instance, when a well-known anti-revolutionary writer named Kotzebue was murdered by a Liberal student, the democratic Press of Germany hailed the crime in language hardly compatible with good taste. The result of this reaction was the passing by the majority of the Central Council or Diet of Germany (a body chosen by the rulers of the states) of the Carlsbad Decrees, 1819, a series of laws which established a strict censorship of the Press, suppressed the Liberal clubs of the university students, and established a new court to punish democratic agitators. Under the activities of this court, which sat at Mainz, some thousands of persons were sentenced to imprisonment and exile.

The Carlsbad Decrees and the Mainz Commission

were only partially successful. Discontent was everywhere manifest, particularly in the larger towns and among the hot-headed young students of the universities. Liberal plots were continually coming to light, affording more work for the judges at Mainz, riots occurred from time to time at Frankfort and other places. In 1830, the news of the French Revolution of July caused something like a revolt in Hesse, Hanover and Saxony, and the Duke of Brunswick was forced to flee from his dominions. But the forces of the reaction were too strong, being backed by the might of the Austrian and Prussian Governments—and directed by the genius of the Austrian statesman, Prince Metternich. By the year 1848, however, the forces of Democracy had gathered sufficient strength in Germany to win a brief hour of triumph. That year was one of popular upheavals all over Europe, and was long remembered as "the year of revolutions." The ball was set rolling by the February Revolution which turned Louis Philippe off the throne of France. In almost all the German states there followed a simultaneous outburst of Revolution. Frederick William IV of Prussia had recently made the experiment of summoning a very narrow and aristocratic Parliament in Berlin, and had found it impossible to submit to the criticisms and claims of even this body; the population of that city now rose in arms and demanded a fully free democratic Assembly. A fight began between the King's troops and the populace, and the Revolution was on the point of suppression, when the King, in a fit of weakness, gave way, recalled his troops, and placed himself at the mercy of the democratic mob, while his sterner brother William, who had led

the troops against the rebels, was forced to flee the country, execrated by the German Liberals as the "Cartridge Prince." Meanwhile the mob of Vienna had carried out a similar revolution in the Austrian capital. Prince Metternich fled to England and the Austrian Emperor was obliged to yield to the insurgents and to order the meeting of a democratic Assembly for the Austrian empire (excluding Hungary and Austrian Italy). While as head of this state he was forced to consent to the assembling of an Austrian Parliament, as head of the German Confederation he was compelled to consent to the assembling of another democratic Assembly for that state.

The work of consolidating the Revolution in Germany and the Austrian empire now fell upon the two Assemblies that were now met, the one at Frankfort, the other at Vienna. Both bodies were destined to fail. The causes of the failure were somewhat different in each case; the German Parliament embarked on a series of lengthy debates on constitutional theory and fundamental laws, debates which merely wasted time until the enthusiasm of the revolutionaries had cooled down; the deliberations of the Austrian Assembly were marred by Nationalist disputes. The leaders of the Democrats at the Vienna Parliament were German Austrians, drawn from the capital and its neighbourhood, and as such they were anxious in any new constitutional arrangement to preserve that predominance in the empire which its German-speaking subjects had hitherto enjoyed. This, of course, did not satisfy the representatives of the other races of the Hapsburg empire, and dissensions soon became furious. The Imperial

Government artfully took advantage of these dissensions to keep the Assembly busy while the Emperor concentrated his faithful troops on Vienna. The murder of Latour, the Minister of War, by the mob, served as an opportunity for the adoption of severe measures. General Windischgrätz, who had already reduced the rebellious Czechs of Prague to submission in a similar manner, bombarded the city, and when a force of Magyar rebels hurried up to its relief from Pressburg, the Austrian general defeated it at Schwechat and forced the capital to surrender. The Austrian Assembly was then forced to adjourn to the distant country town of Kremsier, while Windischgrätz proceeded to make an example of the rebel leaders, twenty-four of whom were put to death. The revolution was crushed, as far as Austria was concerned, and when the Emperor Ferdinand resigned the throne to his son, the present Austrian emperor, at the end of 1848, he could feel assured that the power of the Crown was still undiminished.

The example of Austria had its immediate effect in Prussia. Regaining his courage, King Frederick William summoned his troops to his aid, forcibly turned out the Prussian Parliament at Berlin, and restored the absolute rule of the sovereign. As usual, events in Austria and Prussia decided events in the lesser states. One of the first acts of the new Austrian emperor had been to withdraw all the Austrian delegates from the Frankfort Parliament, and when Prussia too became hostile its days were obviously numbered. In vain the Assembly offered to make the Prussian king "Emperor of Germany," Frederick William would have nothing to do with a proposal originating from a revolutionary Assembly,

and when the Prussian delegates withdrew the German Assembly simply broke up and disappeared.

The great Revolution of 1848 did not pass over Germany and Austria altogether without lasting effect. The Austrian emperor, in 1849, granted a limited Constitution to his dominions, and though it was repealed in 1851, it was the beginning of a series of parliamentary Constitutions granted by the free will of the Emperor, the fourth and last of which, that of 1867, is the present Constitution of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. The King of Prussia, in 1850, also granted a Constitution to his dominions which, though far from democratic, has remained in force to the present day. The new Prussian Parliament often proved refractory, notably in opposition to Bismarck's military measures, but it was never strong enough to obtain the real direction of affairs.

In the years 1866 to 1871, Germany and Austria underwent a thorough reconstruction as the result of the Austro-Prussian and Franco-German wars. The Austrian empire was entirely separated from the other German states, which became bound together with Prussia as the new German empire, while the clumsy old German Confederation disappeared altogether. In making the arrangements for the government of these new organisations the rulers of both Austria and Germany were considerably influenced by democratic ideas. The steady progress of the Industrial Revolution and the continuous development of democratic theories and ideas was having its effect. The Lower House of the German Parliament, the Reichstag, was to be elected directly by universal suffrage, and the adoption of this system in the

Constitution of the North German Confederation in 1866 marks an epoch in the history of German Democracy. The new Austrian Constitution of 1867 only provided for the enfranchisement of the middle classes, but even this limited form of Democracy was an enormous advance on what would have been granted a generation earlier. Hungary received a separate Constitution at this time, a Constitution which only enfranchises a small fraction of the people, but which is still in force in that country.

Further progress towards Democracy has, however, since been made in Austria. To the 353 members elected by the middle-class voters there were added in 1896 another seventy-two members, elected by universal suffrage. Eleven years later, in 1907, the electoral system was completely remodelled, and Austria now possesses a Lower House elected entirely by universal suffrage. It is significant that what could not be secured by rebellion and bloodshed sixty years before was granted almost as a matter of course at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Turning to Italy, we see the same struggle for democratic freedom. Here again we find the democratic ideal closely influenced by the nationalist ideal; but whereas in Austria the two interfered with one another and each tended to mar the success of the other, in Italy they joined hands and made common cause. For in the latter country the population belonged entirely to one race, and the subjects of the various states into which the land was divided were stirred by a common desire to be free from tyrannical rule and a common desire to rid themselves of the control of the alien Hapsburg. The petty despots of the Italian peninsula, in constant fear of

rebellion and revolution, were accustomed to look for support to the powerful Austrian emperor, just as the lesser German princes looked to Austria and Prussia to support them against the threatening tide of popular tumult. Where the despots were forced to rely on Austria, the powerful protector could dictate their policy, so the Italians felt that the real ruler of Italy was the Emperor of Austria, and the desire for national independence was thus grafted onto the desire for political freedom.

We shall trace the history of Italian Nationalism in a later chapter; we must here observe only the democratic movements which accompanied the achievement of national unity. There was great discontent throughout the peninsula at the Vienna Settlement, for the new rulers allowed their subjects far less liberty than they had enjoyed under the Emperor-King Napoleon and King Joachim of Naples. Everywhere the reaction against "the Revolution" was carried to excess. The excellent codes of laws imposed by the Napoleonic administrators were replaced by the old-fashioned collections of local law; those who had served the French in any capacity were refused admission to office in the civil services of the restored states; we even find that the King of Sardinia laid waste the Botanical Gardens made by the French at Turin and refused to issue passports for the fine new road over the Mont Cénis Pass because it had been built by Napoleon's orders, while Pope Pius VII abolished street lighting in Rome as an undesirable alien innovation. The restored Governments were almost all of them reactionary, harsh and despotic.

The first blow for freedom came from the Two

Sicilies. The city of Naples burst into revolt in 1820, and King Ferdinand I was forced to grant a Constitution to his subjects. No sooner, however, was the King able to escape from the city than he fled to Austria, calling upon the Emperor Francis I to restore him by force of arms. His wish was granted, and at the battle of Rieti the Neapolitan revolution was crushed. Three days after this battle a revolution occurred in Piedmont against the King of Sardinia. After the crushing of the Neapolitans this new revolt had little chance of success, particularly as part of the army remained loyal to the King. The loyal troops, reinforced by the Austrians, overthrew the rebels at Novara, 1821, and the old *régime* was restored. After this Naples and Piedmont kept quiet for a generation, but in 1830 a revolt broke out in the Papal States, in Parma, and in Modena. Again the Austrian army was called on, and the rebellions were stamped out. There were further outbreaks against the oppressive temporal rule of the Pope in 1832 and 1846 (in the latter of which Louis Napoleon Bonaparte served as a volunteer with the Democrats), and again Austrian troops were called in for the work of restoring order.

Meanwhile the oppression and persecution carried on by the Italian Governments was enormous. Austria set the example, thousands of malcontents from the Austrian provinces in the north-east being carried away to the dungeons of the Spielberg and other prisons. Relentless persecution begat secret societies of plotters, the most noted of which took the name of the Carbonari (the charcoal burners), meeting in woods, cellars, and attics to plan risings. The secret societies were hunted down by the secret

police with their armies of spies, and to such a pitch had mutual suspicion grown that Austria employed a special set of police whose task was to spy upon the ordinary police. Thousands of arrests were made annually, and those who were convicted met with no light treatment. When Gladstone visited the Neapolitan prisons in 1850, he saw the political prisoners lying chained two and two together; and there were sometimes as many as six thousand political offenders at once in the gaols of the city.

The "year of revolutions" found all the Italian states ripe for rebellion, with one exception. King Charles Albert of Sardinia, ascending the throne in 1831, had administered his realm for seventeen years with clemency and sympathy for his people. He would have granted a Constitution long before had he not been informed that to set so bad an example would be treated as a *casus belli* by Austria. The outburst of 1848 was his opportunity. All Italy was rising round him against its rulers; his own dominions alone were loyal. He seized the opportunity to issue a Constitution and prepare for war with the powerful Austrian empire. Circumstances were in his favour. Naples had risen, Milan and Venice had risen, the Papal States and Tuscany, Parma and Modena were rising. Austria, too, seemed to be for the moment paralysed by the insurrection in Vienna and by the nationalist movements in the other parts of her dominions.

But the power of Austria was greater than at first sight appeared. She possessed strong fortresses in her Italian provinces, the troops could be thoroughly trusted when fighting against enemies of Italian race, while the armies of the Pope and of the King of

the Two Sicilies were known to be more favourably disposed to their paymasters than to the democratic Liberals of Rome and Naples. The Italians fought well: 6000 Tuscans forced 35,000 Austrians to retreat after a six hours' battle at Curtatone. But the main Austrian army under Radetzky beat the main Sardinian army at Custozza, and drove them back into their own territory. During the following winter the Austrian insurrections at home were largely suppressed, and in the following spring Radetzky was able to crush the Sardinian army at Novara (the scene of the battle of 1821), overthrow the newly formed Tuscan and Roman republics, and force the remaining Italian revolutionists to abandon the struggle. Sardinia only preserved her dominions from dismemberment by paying an indemnity of £3,000,000 and by the abdication of Charles Albert. One great point, however, Sardinia had gained: the Austrians neglected to insist on the abolition of the Constitution, and the Sardinian Parliament continued to sit; the Constitution of Italy to-day is the Sardinian Constitution of 1848.

The further history of Italian Democracy is the history of the union of Italy. As each successive state and province was added to the dominions of the Sardinian monarch, it received the full advantages of the Constitution of 1848, with its political liberty and universal suffrage. With the occupation of Rome in 1870 the whole of Italy was brought under the sway of an Italian Parliament elected by the Italian people.

When we turn to the great eastern empire of Russia we find that the forces of Democracy made far less progress there than in the other great states of Europe. Russia was the last of the great states

to feel the effects of the Industrial Revolution, for in this empire the really big cities were so few and the proportion of the population dwelling in towns so small that the organised power of the working men was far less than in the more industrial countries. As we have seen in the recent history of France, the conservative influence of the country districts has often been able to counterbalance the extreme revolutionary tendencies of the capital and the great towns, so in Russia the dead weight of the vast agricultural population has been the best security of the "little Father of the Russians" against the revolutionary movements in the few and isolated industrial towns. The great growth of these towns in the later nineteenth century and the influence of democratic progress in the other nations has led the Czar to grant some sort of a Constitution to the Russian people, but Russia still remains by far the least democratic of the great states of Europe.

There was an early development of Liberalism among the more educated Russians in the few years following the overthrow of Napoleon. The Czar Alexander I himself favoured Liberal ideas, and there was much talk of a Russian Constitution. But the over-eager enthusiasm of the Russian Liberals, who plotted an armed rising, spoilt the whole plan; Alexander dropped his democratic ideas, and the empire remained an absolute monarchy. In 1861 Russia followed the example of Prussia and Austria, which earlier in the century had abolished the surviving feudal rights of the landowners over their serfs (Prussia in 1807 and Austria in 1848), and all Russians were declared to be free men, but this edict was not accompanied by any grant of political liberty. During

the later part of the century there was a marked growth of democratic sentiment in the towns, but its most striking manifestation was the upgrowth of the extravagant political group called the Anarchists, with whom hatred of despotic government developed into a dislike of all legally constituted government whatsoever. The members of this group, whose ideal was a state in which there should be no laws, police, compulsory taxation or army, indulged their hatred of the existing system by frequent acts of violence, many Government officials of high and low rank being assassinated by their agents. These murders culminated in the assassination of the Czar Alexander II in 1881 by a bomb, and they remained a feature of Russian political life right on into the next century. In 1904 Plehve, the Prime Minister, was assassinated by an Anarchist bomb, and in the following year the Grand Duke Sergius, uncle of the present Czar, fell a victim to the Socialist assassin Kalayeff.

The outbreak of the Russo-Japanese war was taken as the opportunity for a great series of Socialist and democratic movements. Riots, strikes and assassinations took place in all the cities of Russia. The Government retaliated by wholesale arrests, executions, and the dispatch of hundreds of the Revolutionaries to the distant penal settlements of Siberia. The most serious crisis was that of Bloody Sunday in St. Petersburg, when the presentation of a petition to the Czar by the Democrats led to a series of scuffles which ended in the repulse of the mob by the troops after some bloodshed.

This was in January 1905; before the end of the year the Czar took a step in the direction of conciliation by the granting of a moderate Constitution providing

for the election of a Russian Parliament or "Duma" which was to assist the Government by its advice, though it was given little actual power. The system of election was indirect—that is, the voters chose electors who in turn chose the members, and the arrangements for constituencies and electing were very complicated. The first Russian Parliament met in 1906, but its first action was to demand so much larger powers that it was promptly dissolved. A second Duma, elected early in the next year, proved equally refractory and met with a similar fate. The Czar now issued an edict amending the Constitution by redistributing the constituencies of the Duma and disfranchising large numbers of former voters. At the same time the members of the late Duma were visited with severe retribution for their independence, thirty-one being sent off to Siberia and many others being imprisoned in Russia. When the new Duma met it was found to be, as was expected, far less revolutionary and self-assertive than its predecessors, and under the amended Constitution of 1907, with its Duma controlled by the wealthy classes, Russia has settled down into something resembling quiet.

We have now traced the fortunes of Democracy in the greater continental states. It is now time to turn to the second of the great forces which have specially moulded the history of recent Europe, the force of Nationality. Some of the peoples of Europe, such as the French, the Russians and the Spaniards had already attained national unity by the beginning of the nineteenth century, but in those that had not, such as Italy and Germany, the force of Nationalism was to play a powerful part in their history during the ensuing hundred years.

CHAPTER V

THE UNION OF ITALY

The Treaty of Vienna of 1815 once more subdivided the Italian peninsula into a collection of small states. In the north-west lay the kingdom of Sardinia, which included the island which gave its title to the sovereign, and the districts of Savoy and Nice across the Alps. The north-eastern provinces of Lombardy and Venice belonged to Austria. Farther south came the small duchies of Parma, Modena and Lucca (the first of these given in 1815 to the wife of the Emperor Napoleon). Then came the Grand Duchy of Tuscany, under the younger brother of the Austrian Emperor, and the Papal States, the temporal dominions of the Pope. The south of the peninsula was united with the island of Sicily in a kingdom which since the Middle Ages had borne the rather curious name of "the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies"—the island dominions and the mainland dominions of the King of Sicily. Corsica, the birthplace of the great Napoleon, belonged to France, and the Maltese Islands to the United Kingdom.

Under the domination of Napoleon, Italy had enjoyed something like unity, being only divided into three parts and those all administered under the same Imperial system, and many people regretted the return of the old state of affairs in 1815. Soon

there appeared clubs and societies which aimed at bringing about the "*risorgimento*" — the "resurrection" of federated Italy. One of the most ardent workers in the cause of unity was Joseph (Giuseppe) Mazzini, who was also a Democrat of an extreme type. Mazzini founded a society called "Young Italy" and tried to stir up a great Italian rebellion. Banished in turn from Sardinia, France and Switzerland as a dangerous revolutionary, he came to England—the common refuge of continental exiles—and thence helped to keep aflame the spirit of Italian liberty.

We have seen how the peoples of the little states tried in vain to shake off the rule of the despots and the overlordship of Austria, and how Democracy and Nationalism learned to support each other in Italy. It is significant that when the Piedmontese revolted in 1821 they proclaimed their king, Victor Emmanuel I, as king of Italy, and had the Austrians been beaten in the war of 1848 large parts of the country would undoubtedly have been annexed to Sardinia. As it was, the Italian war of 1848 was a hopeless failure, and the only effective step that had been taken towards the union of the states was the union of the Duchy of Lucca with the Grand Duchy of Tuscany in 1847, an arrangement that had been stipulated for in the Treaty of Vienna of 1815. The transfer was due to the inheritance of Parma by the Duke of Lucca.

But while Mazzini and his friend and pupil Giuseppe Garibaldi were keeping alive the flame of rebellion in the hearts of the people, there appeared on the scene the cool and clear-headed statesman who was to achieve by statecraft what the fanatical and hot-

headed Mazzini and Garibaldi would never have accomplished alone. This man, the creator of modern Italy, was Count Camillo di Cavour, founder of the newspaper *Il Risorgimento* and a leading Sardinian patriot. He entered the Sardinian Cabinet in 1849, and three years later became Prime Minister of his country. The aim of his life was the liberation and the union of Italy under the leadership of the Sardinian royal family.

Cavour's statesmanship was deep-laid and persevering. While doing his utmost to prepare the Sardinian army for the next war, he realised that the enormous strength of the great Austrian empire could not be overcome without the aid of some ally. Of the other great Powers of Europe, France, then ruled by Napoleon III, was the most likely to afford the required assistance. Napoleon was anxious for opportunities of military glory, and might be induced to repeat his uncle's exploits against the vanquished of Marengo, Austerlitz, and Wagram. France was jealous of the Austrian supremacy which had replaced that of France in Italy; besides, France might be won over by more tangible prizes, and Cavour was willing to sacrifice the transalpine provinces of Savoy and Nice in order to gain the much greater prize of the whole Italian peninsula. In another striking and curious way Cavour bid for the alliance of France. When the Crimean war broke out, and it was rumoured that Sardinia was going to join Russia against the impending entrance of Austria into the war, Cavour proceeded to reassure the Emperor Napoleon by declaring war *against* the Russians and placing 15,000 Sardinian troops at the disposal of the French commanders.

The Franco-Sardinian *entente* was thus cemented, and in Italy men began openly to hail the French emperor as the restorer of Italian liberty. But as time went on and nothing further was done, the Italian patriots began to grow impatient, and one of their number, Orsini, displayed his disappointment by going to Paris and hurling a bomb at Napoleon. This was one of the very few successful political crimes of history, for the Emperor, escaping unhurt from the explosion which killed and injured 166 other people, was so scared by the dying threats of the criminal that unless Napoleon acted promptly there were more bombs to follow, that he at once entered into negotiations with Cavour for the signing of a definite treaty. The Emperor and the Sardinian Prime Minister met at Plombières a few months after, and there the outlines of a treaty of alliance against Austria were drawn up.

The war began in the spring of 1859. The Sardinian army was fully mobilised; Austria sent an ultimatum demanding instant demobilisation; Sardinia refused; Austria declared war on Sardinia; and France then declared war on Austria. For six weeks the campaign raged over the Lombard plain, the Allies steadily beating back their enemy. Defeated at Montebello, at Palestro, at Magenta, and finally in a furious battle at Solferino, where the three monarchs of France, Sardinia and Austria watched the victory of the Allies in a tremendous thunderstorm, Austria sued for peace, offering to cede Milan and to allow Sardinia to seize the Duchy of Parma. To the great surprise and mortification of the Italians, Napoleon accepted these terms, and ordered his troops to withdraw from the war. Two reasons

ITALY

TO ILLUSTRATE THE UNION.

Scale of Miles

0 50 100 200

actuated him in this resolve: in the first place, what he had seen of the Sardinian army had convinced him that a liberated Italy would not be the mere helpless puppet in the hands of France that he hoped; in the second place, Prussia was seriously considering joining in the war with the purpose of weakening her great western neighbour, France. He therefore eagerly accepted the opportunity of making a peace which did not leave Sardinia too strong and which freed him from the menace of an attack on his north-eastern frontier. As for the Sardinians, when the French withdrew they had no option but to accept the peace which Napoleon thus thrust upon them. Cavour himself, disappointed and chagrined, momentarily lost his usual cool-headedness and resigned his post in a fit of passion. King Victor Emmanuel II, however, wisely accepted the inevitable, and made haste to take possession of his new province of Lombardy.

When the war broke out in the spring of 1859, the duchies of the north, Parma, Modena, and Tuscany, had risen in the name of Italian unity, and a similar movement had broken out in the Papal States, though here the pope, Pius IX, was able to suppress some of the rebels, his troops putting Perugia to a brutal sack. When peace was concluded at the Treaty of Zürich the attitude of Sardinia towards these revolutionists became rather ambiguous. The natural impulse was to encourage the demand for union, but Victor Emmanuel hardly knew whether France and Austria would allow him to annex the revolted districts beyond the limits of the Duchy of Parma. Cavour returned to office at the beginning of 1860, and his first action was to sound his late ally as to

the terms on which further territorial extension could be allowed to Sardinia. At Plombières it had been proposed that the acquisition of the whole north of Italy by Sardinia should be paid for by the cession of Savoy and Nice to France, and this bait was once more held out by Cavour, though Venice was no longer to be counted among the lands within his grasp. Napoleon accepted the bribe, and, secure in the support of France against any attempt of Austria to stop him, Cavour proceeded to carry out the annexation of Parma, Modena, Tuscany and the papal province of Romagna, all of which welcomed, with virtual unanimity, their union with the kingdom of Sardinia in March 1860.

The " Young Italy " party of Mazzini and Garibaldi now urged that the war of liberation should be carried into the unredeemed south. Overawed by the armies of the Pope and the King of the two Sicilies, many of whose regiments were composed of hired Swiss, the people of the two southern states were for the moment quiet, but it was well known that the appearance of a Sardinian army would bring on a southern revolution against which the hated Governments of Rome and Naples could not possibly stand. But again the question was, " How far will our powerful neighbours allow us to go? " France had given no pledge as regards the south, and would be almost sure to object to another Sardinian war of conquest. Austria had allowed the annexation of the duchies only because France had guaranteed the act.

The Sardinian Government was again in a dilemma. The precipitate enthusiasm of the " Young Italy " party, however, suggested to Cavour a course of

action. His plan was to send Garibaldi into the south to stir up revolution, giving him all the help he possibly could short of openly declaring war on the southern states; at the same time he determined openly to disapprove of Garibaldi's expedition, and to represent to France that the annexation of the south was far from the minds of the Sardinian Government. In this way he hoped to overthrow the existing Governments in the south without giving France or Austria an immediate ground for war.

In May the expedition of Garibaldi and his thousand "redshirts" slipped out of Genoa harbour. The governor of Genoa received orders from Cavour to prevent their departure, orders which were, much to Cavour's pretended annoyance, not carried out successfully. It was six days before the expedition landed safely at Marsala, and Cavour was anxious lest the warships of the King of the Two Sicilies should catch the "redshirts" at sea. "Monsieur le Comte," he secretly wrote to the Sardinian admiral, Persano, "try to place your ships between Garibaldi and the Neapolitan cruisers; I hope you understand me." The admiral's celebrated reply ran, "Monsieur le Comte, I think I understand you. In case of need, send me prisoner to the fortress of Fenestrella."

Once landed, Garibaldi's progress was wonderful. After a pitched battle against greatly superior numbers at Calatafimi, he stormed the city of Palermo, and six weeks after his landing he was in possession of the greater part of the island of Sicily. By the month of August he was ready to invade the mainland with Sicily subdued in his rear. His march from Reggio to Naples was a triumphal pro-

gress, and the King withdrew from the city to an entrenched position on the Volturno. Here Garibaldi met with a serious check; and after a fortnight's fierce fighting he was obliged to settle down before the fortifications of Capua.

Just at this time Cavour's enemies played right into his hands. The salvation of the old *régime* in Rome and Naples depended on the attitude of France. If Napoleon III cried halt to the King of Sardinia, and lent help to the papacy, as he was inclined to do, the revolution would in all probability be crushed. If, on the other hand, Cavour could manage to get the consent of France to come to the aid of the Garibaldians the cause of Pope Pius IX and Francis II of Naples was lost. At this crisis the Pope took the mad step of declaring his intention of restoring the Bourbons to the throne of France. Nothing more was needed to secure Napoleon's consent to the invasion of the south by Sardinia. The army of Victor Emmanuel crossed the frontier, encouraged, it is said, by Napoleon's message, "Make haste, and good luck to you!" The Pope's army, swelled by large numbers of Catholic volunteers from Ireland and Belgium and by Bourbonist Frenchmen, was routed at Castelfidardo; the Sardinian army forced its way down the Volturno valley to the rear of the Neapolitan positions; and the King of the Two Sicilies, defeated in every engagement, shut himself up in the coast fortress of Gaeta, where he held out for several months longer. In February 1861, Gaeta surrendered to General Cialdini and the deposed king retired to his mansion in Rome.

Meanwhile Cavour hastened to secure the fruits of his labour. As had been done in the case of the

northern duchies, a "plébiscite" or vote of the people was taken in the liberated lands on the question of union with Sardinia. In the former case less than 2 per cent. of the voters opposed the Union, in the south less than 1 per cent. of the two million voters declared for the old *régime*. The Roman Campagna was not included in the plébiscite, for on the speedy collapse of Pius IX's Bourbon restoration scheme Napoleon reverted to his former policy of friendship to the Pope, and forbade Victor Emmanuel to advance into the immediate neighbourhood of the Eternal City. The annexation of the rest, however, was an accomplished fact. The Parliament that met at Turin, the Sardinian capital, five days after the fall of Gaeta, included deputies from all the lands of the recent plébiscite, and on March 17, 1861, the King of Sardinia was proclaimed Victor Emmanuel I, King of Italy.

In less than two years the map of Italy had been completely altered. But the new map of the liberated kingdom showed two ugly blank gaps — the one round Rome, the other in the north-east corner. It now became the aim of Italian policy to complete the unity of the peninsula by the acquisition of the missing territories. The great Cavour did not live to see the completion of this work; in June 1861 he died, at the age of fifty-one. As for Garibaldi, his idea was to force on the conquest of Rome and Venice at once, without any consideration for the probable actions of France and Austria. With him the question was not "Is this course of action possible and practicable?" but always "Is this course of action right and in accordance with justice?" It was in reference to him and Mazzini that Cavour

had shortly before written: "Italy must be saved from foreigners, evil principles, and — *madmen*." Thus, as soon as he was able, Garibaldi collected a band of volunteers and set out from Sicily to march to the conquest of Rome. The Government, fearful of driving Napoleon III into hostility, at once took serious steps to stop the expedition; unfortunately, the Garibaldians showed fight when the Government troops came to disarm them, and in a combat on the Aspromonte Garibaldi was wounded and captured, 1862. In 1864, by a treaty with Napoleon III the Italians guaranteed not to attack Rome, and as a token that the idea of its occupation was given up the city of Florence was declared the capital of the kingdom of Italy.

Meanwhile, unable to make further headway towards Rome owing to the opposition of France, the Government turned to the question of Venice and the Austrian province. In 1865 the Italian Government offered to buy the province from the Austrian empire for a payment of £4,000,000—not a bad bargain. When this plan failed, Italy once more adopted Cavour's policy and looked round for an ally. That ally fortunately came to hand early in 1866. The Austro-Prussian war was on the point of breaking out, a war in which Prussia would be assailed, not only by the Austrian empire, but by numerous smaller members of the German Confederation, such as Hanover and Saxony and possibly, thought Bismarck, by France. Prussia stood in need of an effective ally, and the desire of Italy for Venice fell in with Bismarck's schemes against Austria. Thus, when the war broke out in June 1866, Italy entered the field as an ally of Prussia.

As a bait for Italian neutrality, Austria forthwith offered to cede Venice free to Italy as the price of her neutrality, just as she did with Istria and the Trentino when Italy joined the Allies in 1915. But on both occasions the Italian Government felt that it was better to secure the desired lands from a vanquished foe in concert with powerful allies than to accept them without fighting for them at the price of allowing Austria to return triumphant from the war and demand them back again from a dishonoured and friendless state.

In the war which followed, Italy did not play a successful part. Her army was beaten, on the anniversary of the great day of Solferino, at Custozza, where she had suffered an earlier reverse in 1848; her fleet was defeated off the island of Lissa in the Adriatic. But the overwhelming victory of her ally Prussia at Sadowa saved her, and in spite of the Austrian victories the Hapsburg emperor found himself compelled to grant away the Venetian province to his defeated foe by the peace of Prague. Thus the policy of relying upon an ally was again successful.

One blank patch had now been filled up in the map of the kingdom of Italy; there remained the Roman state. In 1867 Garibaldi made another attempt to defy the power of France by a raid into the papal territory. Leaving his quiet home in the Sardinian island of Caprera, he entered the Roman state at the head of a force of eager volunteers, but the Italian Government dared not help him, and he was routed at Mentana by a force of French troops which had been sent by Napoleon to defend Rome. The chance of the Italians, however, came with the

fall of the monarch whose actions and attitude had so profoundly influenced the recent history of the peninsula. On the news of Sedan, in September 1870, the spell which had kept the Italian tricolour from waving over Rome was broken, and a force of 60,000 men, under General Raffaele Cadorna, advanced upon the city. After a show of resistance, Pope Pius IX retired into the palace of the Vatican, and the Eternal City became once more the capital of the united kingdom of Italy. In 1878 the popular King Victor Emmanuel died, and the visitor to Rome can see to-day in the great central square of the city the magnificent monument erected by the Italian nation to the *re galantuomo* (the cavalier king) who had done so much for it, and in the Church of the Pantheon the worthy tomb with its simple epitaph, "Victor Emmanuel, Father of the Country."

Since 1870 there has appeared in Italy a party which demands that all those lands where the people speak Italian shall be added to the Italian kingdom. This party aims at the eventual occupation of the Italian Tyrol, Istria and Trieste, Corsica and Nice, the Maltese islands, and the Swiss canton of Ticino—lands which it calls "unredeemed Italy"—*Italia irridenta.* It was largely the ambition of reclaiming the unredeemed districts in the Austrian dominions that led Italy to embrace the cause of the Allies against the central empires in 1915.

Before leaving the subject of Italian Nationalism, a word must be said as to the present position of the Pope. On the fall of Rome in 1870, Pius IX withdrew into the Vatican palace, and declared that he would never again leave it until his states were

restored to him, a declaration which has influenced succeeding popes. An arrangement was, however, made by which the papal states should still be reckoned as having a nominal existence, and at the present day Pope Benedict XV rules over a miniature state comprised within the outer walls of the Vatican grounds, with its own court, its own standing army of papal guards, and its own diplomatic service. The Pope, of course, still remains the spiritual head of the great Roman Catholic Church, and as such his power has been increased to an unprecedented height by the decree of July 1870, which declared the will of the successor of St. Peter absolute and supreme in all ecclesiastical matters. It is often said that the prestige and influence of the Pope has never been greater among Catholics than it has been since the papacy rid itself of the encumbrance of the temporal dominion of the States of the Church.

CHAPTER VI

THE UNION OF GERMANY

The condition of Germany after the Vienna Settlement was somewhat different from that of Italy, for whereas the latter had no central authority to symbolise the unity of its people, the German Confederation gave to the former some semblance of common organisation. There were, however, serious drawbacks to this nominal union besides those arising from the long-standing independence and local patriotism of the individual states. The chief of these drawbacks arose from the fact that several states occupied territories which were partly within and partly without the boundaries of the Confederation. In some cases, such as those of Danish Holstein, Dutch Luxemburg and English Hanover, the main interests of the rulers lay outside the Confederation; in the case of the two leading states, Austria and Prussia, the main interest of the rulers lay within Germany. The efficient working of a confederation whose leading princes were being continually called away by affairs in Hungary, Dalmatia, Galicia, Italy, Prussia, Poland, Denmark, the Netherlands, Great Britain, Ireland, Canada, India, South Africa and Australia, was almost impossible. Hence from the very first the German Confederation was virtually of no effect as a European state at all.

Beneath the surface of the German Confederation of the Treaty of Vienna the real situation was this. Two powerful states, Austria and Prussia, ruled by German dynasties and controlled mainly by German interests, disputed the leadership of the German race. Under their wing were grouped a number of smaller states of varying size, all of them purely German, too weak to do without the overlordship of a greater Power and too independent to submit readily to absorption by another state. Add to these three territories which, though populated by Germans, were ruled by foreign sovereigns, and we have the Germany of 1815.

Now had there been only one great Power in the German Confederation it might have been a fairly easy matter to build up a German nation round that Power. But the even balance between Austria and Prussia gave Germany two different centres, and acted for long as a bar to the achievement of national unity. Again, if either Austria or Prussia succeeded in attracting to itself the other German states and thus forming a united German empire, the new national state would find itself tied up in a political organism which would include large numbers of people who were not of German race at all, unless in accepting the leadership of Germany the Austrians were willing to throw over their rule in Hungary, Lombardy, and their other non-German provinces, or the Prussians were willing to throw over the Polish districts of the east. Clearly the union of Germans in one state with Hungarians, Poles or Italians would be far from the Nationalist ideal, and it was not to be expected that a great Power would voluntarily abandon extensive provinces for the sake of an ideal.

Of the two leading states it was obviously Prussia that had the best claim to be *the* German state, for since the loss of Warsaw in 1807 the Polish population of the Prussian kingdom had been comparatively small, and would hardly weigh at all against the population of a united Germany, while the non-German population of the Hapsburg dominions far outweighed the German Austrians in numbers, and would be a serious drag on the German population of a united Germany and Austria. Hence there arose three different Nationalist parties. The first, represented by the society called the "National Verein" (the National Union), advocated a united Germany of the type actually now in force—that is, including Prussia and the smaller states, and excluding Austria altogether. The second, represented by the "Reform Verein" society, wanted a united Germany which would include the Austrian lands already within the borders of the Confederation; the whole of Prussia *might* be included, but the remaining Austrian dominions must be kept apart from Germany and given a separate administration. The third, which had but few supporters, aimed at a huge central European state, dominated by the German race, but including the whole of both Prussia and the Austrian empire. From the point of view of the Nationalist ideal the last of these plans was hideous, the second highly desirable, and the first was good but incomplete. The scheme of the Reform Verein would undoubtedly have been carried out had it not been for two factors: the undesirability of including in the German National state a country whose Government was so closely bound up with and interested in a large state or collection of states outside Germany,

and the inveterate jealousy and competition that existed between Austria and Prussia. During the nineteenth century these two Powers were destined to come into violent conflict. The triumph of Austria might have made possible the second or the third of the Nationalist plans—as it was, the triumph of Prussia resulted in the victory of the scheme of the National Verein.

For half a century after the formation of the German Confederation Austria and Prussia watched one another with anxious and jealous eyes. Austria held the nominal leadership of Germany, as she had done in the days of the old Holy Roman Empire, but since the wars of Frederick the Great it had been recognised that Prussia was a Power strong enough to act as her equal in many respects. But while the balance of the two Powers resulted for long in a political deadlock and the maintenance of the *status quo*, Prussia managed to obtain an advantage of first-rate importance in the economic and commercial sphere. The Prussian minister Von Maasen devised a scheme for binding some of the smaller German states more closely to Prussia by means of a *Zollverein* or Customs Union. By this arrangement Prussia entered into agreements with some of the smaller states by which for purposes of trade the countries were to be considered as one; goods were to pass freely between the members of the Customs Union, and duties were only to be levied on those boundaries which adjoined states which did not belong to it. The first of these agreements was that made between the kingdom of Prussia and the tiny county of Schwarzburg-Sondershausen in 1819; Hesse-Darmstadt and Anhalt followed in 1828; and so successful


DENMARK
Helgoland
Oldenburg
NECKLEBURG
HANOVER
THE NETHERLANDS
BERLIN
Frankfort
Warsaw
POLAND
ANHALT
Wilhelmshohe
Aix-la-Chapelle
HESSE
Emo
Nassau
Frankfort
Mainz
Darmstadt
Coburg
Carlsbad
Prague
BOHEMIA
Dresden
Sadowa
Koniggratz
Troppau
Olmutz
GALICIA
PRUSSIA
RHENISH PROVINCE
PALATINATE
BAVARIA
WURTEMBERG
Kremsier
VIENNA
Schwechat
Pressburg
BUDA PESTH
AUSTRIA HUNGARY
TRANSYLVANIA
THE TYROL
Laibach
Trieste
ISTRIA
BOSNIA
CENTRAL EUROPE
TO SHOW THE GERMAN CONFEDERATION OF 1815
AND THE GERMAN EMPIRE OF 1871.
Scale of Miles
Boundary of German Confederation
Empire

was this policy that by the year 1836 the Zollverein included all Germany except Austria, Luxemburg and a group of states round Hanover in the north-west. Austria was soon roused to jealousy by events which seemed so likely to bind the Zollverein states closer to Prussia, and in 1841 she demanded that she should be included in the Zollverein. The admission of Austria would have knocked the bottom out of the political idea of the Customs Union, and fortunately for Prussia the Austrian demand was made easy to reject by the insistence of Metternich that the non-German provinces of Austria should be included. The scheme for the admission of Austria thus fell through, not by any means to the disappointment of the Prussian statesmen.

The revolutions of 1848, violently upsetting the old systems, brought the matter of German Nationalism to the surface. As has been stated, two democratic Assemblies or "Diets" met, one for Austria at Vienna and the other for the German Confederation at Frankfort. It was here that the advocates of the three different schemes of Union had their best opportunity of canvassing their views. On the whole, the plan received with most favour was that which suggested the reform of the confederation as a democratic National state. But beyond electing the Archduke John of Austria as Regent of Germany the new Diet did little to consolidate its ideas, and, as we have seen, with the collapse of the revolution in Vienna and Berlin the Assembly itself fell to pieces. Just before the withdrawal of the Austrian delegates, the Frankfort Diet offered to place itself under the protection of the King of Prussia and offered him the title of Emperor of Germany, but Frederick William

IV had no wish to accept from the hands of a revolutionary and democratic body a crown which would certainly involve him in a war with Austria for which he was not prepared, and the offer was declined.

As usual, however, while appearing to have left things in the same state as before, the revolutionary movement had real results on the fortunes of German Nationalism. For while contemptuously scorning the crown offered by the disheartened deputies of the German Diet, Frederick William of Prussia at once set to work to gain the same reward by a different method—namely, by quiet negotiations with the smaller states. Before the end of 1849 Prussia announced the formation of a League of the North, including Saxony, Hanover, Baden, Hesse-Cassel, Oldenburg and other smaller states. The action, however, proved too precipitate; Austria took up a threatening attitude, the larger members of the League began almost at once to fear for their independence, and when the first Diet of the League met, in March 1850, Saxony and Hanover had dropped out of the new federation. The crisis of this episode of German history came when the Emperor of Austria, summoning the other German states to send up their usual members to the old Diet of the Confederation, ordered troops to march into the territory of the new League to suppress some disorders which had occurred there. This obvious threat of war had its effect, and Frederick William's house of cards came tottering down. Before the end of the year, by an agreement with Austria signed at Olmütz, the Prussian League of the North was dissolved.

The Convention of Olmütz restored the old state of affairs to Germany, and in 1851 the Confederation

was again in working order as before. But Prussia did not forget what she considered "the humiliation of Olmütz." She was soon to find a leader who would take steps to avenge that humiliation.

In 1861 Frederick William IV was succeeded by his brother, William I, and one of the new king's first actions was to give the chief Ministry of Prussia to Otto von Bismarck, a statesman of great genius and force, who was destined to do for Germany all that Cavour had done for Italy, and more. The keynote of Bismarck's policy was the efficacy of force and the ultimate power of the sword. "The German problem," he declared, in a celebrated speech made a few days after his appointment, "cannot be solved by parliamentary decrees, but only by blood and iron!" As a commencement he demanded that the Prussian army should be increased and improved by the passing of a more severe conscription law than had yet existed and by the devotion of a much larger sum than was customary to military equipments. These measures met with violent opposition from the Prussian people and from the Prussian Parliament as well. But Bismarck was determined to make his country a strong military Power in spite of itself, and his reforms were forced upon the nation without receiving the consent of Parliament. Two general elections returned majorities increasingly adverse to Bismarck, but the King believed in him and ignored their violent protests. It was not until the great victory of Bismarck's new army at Sadowa that the nation came round to agree with the desirability of the recent measures of military reform.

When Bismarck, aided by the War Minister von Roon and the Commander-in-Chief von Moltke, had

got his army into readiness, he prepared for the blow which was to place Prussia at the head of a united Germany and drive Austria outside the limits of the Confederation. As a prelude, he sent the Prussian army to gain experience in actual warfare (which none of the existing soldiery had seen) by taking part with Austria in a little war for the object of liberating the Germans of Holstein from Danish control.

There had long been disputes between the inhabitants of Holstein and their Danish ruler, and the question was complicated by the fact that that duchy was united for purposes of administration with the neighbouring duchy of Schleswig, which lay outside the bounds of the German Confederation, though its population was largely German. The Holsteiners, as subjects of the Confederation, were constantly appealing to the Diet against their sovereign the King of Denmark, and the tendency of the Germans to resent the presence of a Danish ruler in Germany had led to two wars already, that of 1848 and that of 1849–50, on both of which occasions the absorption of the German states in their own domestic troubles prevented them from gaining any advantage. In 1863 Charles IX of Denmark issued a new decree by which Schleswig and Holstein were separated; the effect of this was to leave the Danish Government free to deal with the Schleswig Germans as they liked, whilst the protectorate of the Confederation over Holstein still acted as a check upon its actions in the southern duchy. Before this decree was issued, the fact that Schleswig enjoyed the same administration as Holstein guaranteed the Schleswig Germans from Danish aggression because of the control exercised by the Confederation over Holstein, since acts of government intended for

Schleswig used to have effect throughout the united province of Schleswig-Holstein. This, reduced to its essence, was the German grievance, but it was so covered over with other disputes about the succession to the duchies and treaty rights that the Schleswig-Holstein question was one of the most difficult and complicated in Europe. As Lord Palmerston, the British Prime Minister, said, there were only three people in Europe who had ever thoroughly understood it: one (the late Prince Consort) was dead, another (a Danish statesman) had gone mad, and the third (himself) had forgotten it.

The Schleswig-Holstein knot was now, however, to be cut by the swords of Austria and Prussia. Both professed to act as the protector of German interests; both marched to war with sidelong glances of mutual suspicion. The actual war was soon over. Though the Danish fleet gained a naval victory over the Prussian fleet off Heligoland, by land the invaders were, of course, irresistible by so small a state as Denmark, and the war was brought to a rapid conclusion by the Treaty of Vienna of 1864, by which both Schleswig and Holstein were ceded to the conquerors to dispose of as they thought fit. Here lay the apple of discord which was to bring on the long-impending war between the two great German states. For though by a temporary agreement which, said Bismarck, "papered over the cracks," Prussia took charge of Schleswig while Austria took charge of Holstein, no permanent agreement could be reached owing to the Prussian desire to get hold of the whole of the ceded territory.

The military preparations of Prussia had meanwhile alarmed the local patriotism of the lesser German

states; Austria at least had left them alone, and they did not like this new attitude of Prussia. When Bismarck threw aside the suggestions of Austria for an equal partition of the duchies it became apparent that Prussia was out for something more than the safeguarding of German interests in Schleswig, and Austria began to hint at the necessity for war. This was exactly what Bismarck wanted, and when Austria presented an ultimatum demanding the acceptance of her settlement and the reduction of the Prussian forces under arms she scornfully rejected it. Meanwhile he had secured the alliance of Italy with the bait of Venice, while Austria secured the support of the majority in the Diet of the Confederation and of most of the lesser states of Germany. Napoleon III thought of taking part, but he preferred to wait, with the idea of coming in at the critical moment to rescue Prussia (who, it was almost universally believed, was sure to be defeated) and to secure something for France in the process.

The Austro-Prussian war was a revelation to Europe. It was now that Bismarck's wonderful preparation became manifest. For, before the Austrian forces could be set in motion, the Prussians were mobilised, over the frontiers and in the capitals of their enemies. Dresden fell, Cassel fell, Hanover fell, in rapid succession, and the Hanoverian army, surrounded and captured at Langensalza before it hardly had time to move, was put out of action at a single blow. Meanwhile, von Moltke concentrated the main Prussian forces for the invasion of Austria, and, crossing into Bohemia, he met the main Austrian army under Benedek at Sadowa, before the fortress of Königgrätz, on July 3, 1866. The forces opposed numbered

about 220,000 a side, but part of the Prussian army, under the Crown Prince Frederick, did not come up until late in the day. The enormous superiority acquired by the Prussian infantry, owing to the adoption of the new breech-loading musket, over the Austrian infantry with their muzzle-loaders, decided the day, and with the arrival of the Crown Prince the Austrian rout was complete.

So overwhelming was this defeat that the Austrian Government, in spite of the victory of Custozza over the Italians, at once opened negotiations for peace. Though many Prussians demanded a triumphal march into Vienna, the news that Napoleon III was preparing for action, and this time in the interests of defeated Austria, led Bismarck to advise the wiser counsel of securing a satisfactory and speedy termination of the war. Austria was ready to withdraw her claims to supremacy in Germany, as long as the German territories of the Austrian empire remained untouched and independent. Hence, without any further fighting, the Austro-Prussian war ended with the Treaty of Prague of August 1866.

The settlement thus effected, though it did not establish Bismarck's ideal of a Prusso-German empire, had at least the advantage of paving the way for such a creation by the definite exclusion from Germany of the great Power that had for many ages dominated her. The Treaty of Prague may be divided into two parts, the one dealing with the territorial changes affecting the individual states, the other dealing with the political organisation of Germany. As regards territory, Austria itself suffered only in the loss of Venice, which was ceded to the kingdom of Italy. But to the lesser German princes who had taken the

field against Prussia a stern retribution was meted out: Hanover, electoral Hesse, Nassau and the city of Frankfort were extinguished as independent states and became mere provinces of Prussia; Bavaria and Hesse-Darmstadt lost small pieces of territory; and the whole of Schleswig-Holstein became Prussian. As regards the new political grouping, the old German Confederation of 1815 was abolished; Austria became a separate state, altogether divorced from the rest of Germany; the states north of the Main were joined with Prussia in a new North German Confederation (similar to the League of the North planned by Frederick William IV); and the rest of Germany, consisting of Bavaria, Württemberg, Baden and southern Hesse-Darmstadt, became a separate South German Confederation.

It may be asked why the Prussian League was not extended to cover the southern states. The reason was that, as in the case of the Italian national kingdom, the attitude of France had to be considered. For though the result of what was called the "Seven Weeks War" (though the campaign was really over in five) had shown the efficiency of the Prussian forces, it was still generally believed that the army of Napoleon III was the best in Europe. The weaker and more divided Germany was, the more influence the power of France was likely to have, and Napoleon viewed with dismay the prospect of the erection on his eastern frontier of a strong and united German state. The exclusion of Prussia from the south was carried out in response to the threats of France, which Power would almost certainly have declared war to prevent the complete union of the German states. As it was, Napoleon III felt that the new North German

Confederation was too strong a neighbour and began immediately to prepare his army for action against Prussia and to enter into an alliance with the states of South Germany.

The next four years witnessed a contest between Napoleon and Bismarck to secure the prospect of success in the inevitable Franco-Prussian war. And here we get a striking example of the influence of the *personal* element in history, for whereas Bismarck's moves were uniformly sound and successful, Napoleon III's were incomplete, slovenly and bungling. We can feel sure, as we read the history of these years, that had he been pitted against the first Napoleon instead of against his nephew, Bismarck's task would have been far harder, if not doomed to failure. Let us compare some of their measures of preparation.

In the first place, Bismarck took immediate steps to consolidate and conciliate the subjects of the new North German state. In 1867 King William proclaimed the Constitution of the Confederation, a constitution acceptable to the lesser princes and to the mass of the people. For, while giving great powers to the King of Prussia as President of the Confederation, it established a Parliament of two Houses, of which one, the Bundesrath, represented the separate Governments of the Confederation, and the other, the Reichstag, was elected by universal suffrage. This liberal measure of popular freedom coming from the man of "blood and iron," with whom people knew that it was dangerous to attempt to trifle, contrasts greatly with the domestic policy of the French Emperor, who, in these critical years of preparation, shifted irresolutely between occasional outbursts of despotic rule and fits of conciliation

which irritated the Democracy of France rather than pleased it. Turn again to foreign policy: Bismarck exerted himself to the utmost to secure the friendship or the neutrality of other Powers. Austria might be expected to take the first opportunity of avenging Sadowa, while the activities of the Pan-Slav party in Russia, who aimed at the conquest of the Polish provinces of Prussia, made the attitude of the Czar Alexander II doubtful. The key of the situation here Bismarck found in the mutual jealousies of Austria and Russia in the Balkan peninsula. Bismarck took advantage of these to offer Russia his alliance and support in all matters relating to the Balkans. Aggression at the expense of decaying Turkey had always seemed more practical to Russia than aggression against powerful Prussia, and Bismarck's offer was accepted. Bismarck pledged Prussia to support Russia against Austria in the Balkans, and particularly to support Russia in the rather dangerous act of repudiating her treaty obligations regarding the Black Sea, in return for a Russian alliance in case of Austria joining France. Thus the possible intervention of Austria as Napoleon's ally was counteracted by the assurance of Russian support in that event. Napoleon showed the same unreliable vacillation in his diplomatic relations with foreign states as he did in his domestic policy. Though he sought the alliance of Austria, Italy and Denmark, he met with little encouragement, largely because these states were half afraid to commit themselves to engagements with so uncertain and shifty a schemer. In his relations with the South German states, too, Napoleon played into Bismarck's hands. Napoleon's aim was to rouse their local patriotism

against the threatened absorption by Prussia. Bismarck's aim was to represent Napoleon as the real aggressor and Prussia as the protector of the small German states against French aggression. Twice the Emperor allowed himself to be fooled into drawing up suggestions for a Franco-Prussian partition of the plunder of South Germany, and on both occasions Bismarck published the proposals with telling effect in the South German states. This was sufficient to place the South German armies at the disposal of Prussia when the war broke out.

Finally, in the material preparations for fighting, the superiority of the German organisation became manifest from the first days of the war. Just as the breech-loading musket had given Prussia a pull over Austria in 1866, so now the breech-loading cannon, recently adopted by Prussia, gave the Germans a decided advantage in 1870. The French equipment and organisation, in spite of extravagant declarations to the contrary, had been carried out in the most slipshod and unbusinesslike manner, while the methods of mobilisation were far behind the rapid system devised by von Roon and von Moltke. The training of the officers, the previous study of the probable areas of operations, the organisation of the General Staff, and the effective use of cavalry were other points in which the German army far excelled that of France. Last, but not least, the wonderful German spy system organised by Stieber, who controlled no less than 36,000 spies in France, belonging to all ranks, trades and professions, enabled the Germans to act with a minuteness of certain information about the enemy that was totally lacking on the French side.

The war opened in a curious manner. A revolution in Spain had deposed the old dynasty of sovereigns, and the Spanish revolutionaries offered the crown to Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern, a distant relative of the Prussian king. Though this young man's chances of ever inheriting the crown of Prussia were hopelessly remote, Napoleon III declared that his accession in Spain could not be allowed by France as threatening to upset the balance of power by the union of Prussia and Spain. Unwilling to become the cause of war, Leopold withdrew his acceptance of the Spanish crown. But this victory tempted Napoleon to humiliate the Prussian royal family further, and he now demanded that King William should give a pledge that he would never at any future time allow any renewal of Leopold's candidature for the throne of Spain. The King courteously declined to make such a pledge, and Napoleon determined to make this the excuse for war. Knowing that Prussia was ready for an immediate blow at France, Bismarck made hostilities certain by publishing the King's telegram describing his interview at Ems with the French ambassador and abbreviated in such a way as to give the impression that the King had insulted the French ambassador. This had the desired effect in Paris, and war was declared by France on July 19, 1870.

At the beginning of August the French crossed the German frontier and won a skirmish at Saarbrücken, where the Prince Imperial distinguished himself. Two days later the main German armies, fully mobilised and moving over ground every kilometre of which had been studied on the maps for three years by the officers, began their invasion of

France. Taken utterly by surprise by the rapidity of the German concentration and advance, the French fell back, being defeated time after time whenever they attempted to check the advance of the invaders. The successive defeats of Weissenburg, Wörth, Spicheren, Colombières, Vionville and Mars-la-Tour, Gravelotte and Saint Privat resulted not only in the general repulse of the French, but in the cutting off and besieging of the main Imperial army, with its Commander-in-Chief, Marshal Bazaine, in the fortress of Metz. The news of all this provoked a wild outburst of frenzy in Paris, similar to the panics of the Revolutionary war in 1792 and 1793, though, fortunately, the rising of 1870 was carried out without bloodshed. The Paris mob threatened to overthrow the Imperial Government and depose the Emperor unless Bazaine was immediately relieved. Prudence dictated that the attempt to regain communication with Metz should not be made until time had been allowed for a reorganisation and reinforcement of the French armies, but the fear of a Republican revolt in Paris forced the hand of the Emperor. Though he knew that the task was virtually hopeless, Napoleon preferred to hazard an advance towards Metz rather than face the certainty of losing his crown at the hands of the Parisians; and the Imperial forces under the Emperor and Marshal Macmahon, the hero of Magenta, moved out to their doom. On September 1 they were surrounded by superior numbers at Sedan, near the Belgian frontier, and after a desperate struggle, in which Napoleon exposed himself in the thickest of the fight, the whole French army surrendered. Next day the two chief actors in the Franco-German struggle, Bismarck and Napoleon,


FRANCE
TO ILLUSTRATE THE FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.
English Miles
50 25 0 50 100
BELGIUM
GERMANY
R. Rhine
Bapeaume
Amiens
St. Quentin
R. Oise
R. Aisne
Sedan
R. Seine
R. Marne
PARIS
St. Privat
Gravelotte
Metz
Saarbrücken
Weissenburg
Mars-la-Tour
Monville
LORRAINE
Worth
Vosges Mts
ALSACE
R. Rhine
Le Mans
Coulmiers
Beaune la Rolande
Orleans
Beaugency
Tours
Villersexel
Montbéliard
SWITZERLAND
R. Saône
Lyons
R. Rhone
R. Rhone

met; the more skilful player had won the game, and the Emperor, defeated by the Germans and disowned by the French, went as a prisoner to Wilhelmshöhe in Prussia.

The disaster of Sedan and the declaration of the Republic which followed it at Paris did not end the war, as many thought these events would do. For the victorious Germans would not consent to make peace merely on condition of their being allowed to complete the unity of Germany and to put forward Prince Leopold as a candidate for the throne of Spain; they demanded the cession of territories by France, those provinces of Alsace and Lorraine which were the last relics of that "natural frontier of the Rhine" about which Frenchmen had formerly boasted so much. To these terms the Republican Government at Paris refused to agree, and under the name of the "Government of National Defence" they proceeded to undertake the continuance of the war, even under the adverse circumstances of the loss of their two best armies, Macmahon's at Sedan and Bazaine's at Metz (which surrendered in October). As usual in French history, the invasion of *La Patrie* stirred a national resistance of enormous vigour, but the Germans of 1870 were not the Germans of 1792, and the campaign of that next terrible winter was to show that even the most gallant and devoted patriotic enthusiasm will not avail against superior organisation, armament, and equipment.

After Sedan the Germans met with no resistance in their march to Paris until they reached the fortifications of the capital. But while von Moltke was busy forming his lines round the city, the Government of National Defence, inspired by the energies of Léon

Gambetta, a Republican organiser who escaped from the besieged capital by balloon, undertook the task of rallying round itself the forces of France. Before many weeks had passed, several new armies were in the field, and these were directed by Gambetta, from the Government headquarters first at Tours and then at Bordeaux, with the purpose of relieving Paris and expelling the invaders from France. While Trochu defended the capital, de Paladines, Chanzy, Bourbaki, Cambriels and Faidherbe formed a ring of armies north, west, and south of the German positions round Paris, and a series of engagements followed in which the German forces were led by the Crown Prince Frederick, the King's nephew Prince Frederick Charles, the Grand Duke of Mecklenburg-Schwerin, and Generals Von der Tann, von Werder, Manteuffel, Steinmetz and Goeben.

In these battles the Germans, by their superior organisation and equipment, as well as by their strategic advantage of holding the inner side of the ring, were usually successful. The chief operations took place in the neighbourhood of Orleans, where a determined attempt was made to cut a way through to Paris. Defeated before the town in October, the French recaptured it by de Paladines' victory at Coulmiers in November, the only real success gained by France in the war. Before the end of the year, however, the German victories of Beaune la Rolande, Loigny and Beaugency drove the French back and placed Orleans once more in German hands. In the northern sector the German victories at Amiens, Bapeaume and Saint Quentin secured the control of the country north of Paris, while in the extreme south-east of the line of operations the battles of Villersexel

and Montbéliard resulted in the flight of Bourbaki's 85,000 into Switzerland, where they were interned. This disaster, combined with Faidherbe's defeat at Saint Quentin and the rout of the central French army under Chanzy by Prince Frederick Charles, at Le Mans, made it impossible for the French to retain hopes of winning, and with the fall of Paris at the end of January 1871, the Provisional Government opened negotiations for peace.

The terms demanded were high, for, besides the cession of Alsace and eastern Lorraine, the French were required to pay a war indemnity of £200,000,000 and to submit to a military occupation of the north-east of France until the whole of this large sum had been paid. The French, however, were obliged to submit to these terms, and by the Treaty of Frankfort the war was brought to an end. Though no specific mention of it occurred in the treaty, the real prize of the war had been grasped on January 18, 1871, when, by the unanimous consent of the German princes, William I, King of Prussia, was proclaimed Emperor of a united Germany. The Constitution of the North German Confederation was extended to cover the whole of the new Imperial state, and the newly-won province of Alsace-Lorraine was declared the common possession of the empire, to be administered by the Chancellor of the Imperial Government.

The union of Germany presented in its completion somewhat different features from the contemporary union of Italy. Though both had to be accomplished by force, the " blood and iron " theory was carried to far greater extremes in Germany than in the southern kingdom. This was due partially to the circumstance that a considerable section of the German

people were for long averse to the union; no plébiscites were taken on the annexation of Hanover and Saxony, Alsace-Lorraine, or even Schleswig-Holstein. The kingdom of Italy is composed of people of one race only; the German empire, while excluding the ten millions of Austrian Germans, includes some two million Poles, and a smaller though appreciable number of Danes and Frenchmen. Altogether, from the Nationalist point of view, the German empire is a far less satisfactory state than the Italian kingdom, though under the circumstances which attended its formation it is hard to see how the result could have been different.

CHAPTER VII

NATIONALISM IN AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

In the history of Germany and of Italy we have been dealing with countries where the force of Nationalism exerted a unifying influence. We shall now turn to two countries where the same force of Nationalism has exerted an influence in exactly the opposite direction, tending to split the state up into fragments, instead of bringing many fragments together into one state. These countries are Austria-Hungary and the Turkish empire.

Now if we look at the map which shows the races of Europe, we shall see how extraordinarily complex a state the Austrian empire of 1815 was. In the lands that were included in the German Confederation, the majority of the people were of German race, though in two or three districts there were large groups which were not German. There were the Czechs, who occupied the valleys of Bohemia and the province of Moravia; there were the Slovenes at the head of the Adriatic; there were the Italians overlapping from the Venetian coastland and the Adige valley. Beyond the limits of Germany the divisions were more complicated still. The great Hungarian plain was mainly occupied by the Magyars or Hungarians, though all round they were fringed by other smaller races which were not Magyar or

anything like the Magyars. Up in the Carpathians to the north there lived the Slovaks and the Ruthenians; up in the Carpathians to the east, and in the valleys sloping down from them, lived the Roumans; while in the mountains of Dalmatia to the south-west and in the broad slopes coming down from those heights lived the closely similar Croats and Serbs. Even so we have not got all the races of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, for across the Carpathians to the north, very much intermingled with the Ruthenians, were large numbers of Poles. This description gives the broad outlines of the distribution of races, but the situation was complicated by the existence of large border-districts where people of two or three races were intermixed, and of some isolated settlements such as those of the Germans in the far south-east.

When we consider these facts, we can understand the question that was always forcing itself upon the Government of this polyglot empire: "If the Nationalist ideal now so rapidly gaining force aims at the formation of states coincident with racial boundaries, what is to become of the Austrian empire?"

A word must be said as to the grouping of these various races. The eleven distinct groups which we have named were divided among four great racial families. The Germans were of Teutonic origin, and were akin to their neighbours of Prussia, Bavaria, Saxony and the rest of the Confederation. The Italians and the Roumans, separated though they were by many miles of distance, were substantially of the same race and spoke languages which resembled each other very closely. The

Magyars have a distinct individuality of their own, being considered by some ethnologists (or students of race) rather Asiatics than Europeans. The remainder, Czechs, Slovenes, Slovaks, Croats, Serbs, Ruthenians and Poles, are all Slavonic, being akin to the Russians, the Bulgars and the Serbs of the Balkan peninsula. For, while a German, a Magyar and an Italian would be mutually unintelligible in speech, it would be comparatively easy for an educated Serb to understand the language of a Slovene, a Czech or a Pole, without having to undergo a course of instruction in it. This fact, at any rate, makes one bond of union between the seven races above mentioned, but the Slavonic peoples of Austria are divided geographically into two groups by the great wedge of Germans, Magyars and Roumans thrust out along the Danube valley.

It may be asked how this conglomeration of peoples came to be joined together in a single state. The answer is that the three chief political units which existed here in the Middle Ages—the archduchy of Austria, the kingdom of Bohemia and the kingdom of Hungary—came to be united by political marriages of heirs and heiresses. As for the lesser peoples, they were mostly conquered by the Government either of the archduchy of Austria, the kingdom of Hungary, or of the two combined. Much of the south of the empire was conquered from the Turks, who played a very important part in the history of the Austrian dominions. It was, in fact, the common danger of the Turk that kept the Hapsburg dominions so closely bound together. During the eighteenth century the power of the Ottoman empire rapidly declined, and it was at the beginning


AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
1914.
DISTRIBUTION OF RACES.
Prague
BOHEMIA
Cracow
GALICIA
MORAVIA
Vienna
Schwechat
Pressburg
Gödöllö
Kapolna
Budá
Pesth
HUNGARY
TRENTINO
Vilagos
TRANSYLVANIA
LOMBARDY
Milan
Adige
Venice
Trieste
ISTRIA
Temesvar
SLAVONIA
ADRIATIC SEA
BOSNIA
DALMATIA
Serajevo
SERBIA
HERZEGOVINA
Germans
Slovenes
Magyars
Poles
Ruthenes
Rumans
Czechs and Slovaks
Italians
Serbs and Croats

of the nineteenth century, when the Turks were no longer a serious menace to any of the inhabitants of the Hapsburg dominions, that the separatist spirit first began to show itself in the Austrian empire.

The Imperial Government naturally opposed this tendency with all its might, and it may be said that as the nineteenth century progressed the question of how to preserve the fabric of the Austrian empire rose to the foremost place in the minds of its rulers. To counteract separatism, the Government relied, first, on the fidelity of a powerful army, and secondly on the lack of sympathy and co-operation between the different races. Had each section aimed merely at independence the combined effort of all the various groups might have proved successful, but their policy was complicated by the desire of some of the races to retain an ascendency over some of the others; thus the Magyars, while desirous of independence for themselves, were anxious to have control over the neighbouring Roumans, Serbs and Croats, the Poles wanted to rule the Ruthenians, and the Germans of Vienna were loth to yield their supremacy over the Czechs of Bohemia. The difficulty of fixing definite boundaries between the territories of the races was another cause of disagreement between them. Well might the Austrian Emperor adopt as his motto the Latin maxim, "*divide et impere*" (divide and rule).

In the earlier part of the century the chief cause for anxiety came from the Magyars of Hungary; in the later part, after the Magyars had been pacified by the settlement of 1867, the greatest danger came from the Slavonic peoples. This was the result of

the spread of the Pan-Slav movement, which aimed at the union of all the Slavonic peoples in a great federation where they would be free from the rule of any foreign race. The Pan-Slav, or All-Slav, movement was at first confined to a few intellectual and literary men, but it gradually spread its influence among the Slav peoples generally, and in 1848 a Pan-Slav Congress was held, under the protection afforded by the Bohemian Revolution, at Prague. The support of the Russian Prime Minister Gortschakoff gave a great fillip to the movement, and in 1867 another Pan-Slav Congress was held at Moscow, under the patronage of the Russian Government. By the end of the century the Slavonic danger was the greatest problem of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, and it was the Slav movement in the south which led to the outbreak of the great European war in 1914.

During the later nineteenth century people were always expecting and prophesying the break-up of the Austrian empire, and the Government had to make great exertions to prevent this taking place. Early in the century the Emperor Francis had laid it down as a principle that the best means of preventing dissolution was to prevent any partial change in the empire, for, just as the English Tories of 1832 felt that any tampering with the Constitution would pave the way for unbridled Democracy, so he felt that the first step towards change would open the gate for the Nationalist ideal to triumph. "My realm," he said, "is like a worm-eaten house; if one part is removed, one cannot tell how much will fall."

By dint of watchful severity, the Nationalist

forces were kept in check for thirty years after the Vienna Settlement. The chief unrest came from Hungary, where it was largely an aristocratic movement of the Magyar nobles, and from the Italian provinces, where it was purely democratic. Italy had enjoyed a certain amount of liberty and self-government in the days of the Cisalpine Republic and the Napoleonic kingdom of Italy, and the Lombardo-Venetians resented bitterly the entire suppression of local liberties by Austria. But the first open rebellion against the rule of the Hapsburg was in Galicia, where the Poles raised the standard of independence in 1846. The Austrian Poles were few in number, and their mutual antipathy to the neighbouring Ruthenians provided the Government with ready allies on the spot. The defeated Poles sought refuge in the tiny republic of Cracow (a state established by the Vienna treaty of 1815), but the city was taken by Benedek (later in command at Sadowa), and the republic annexed to Austria.

This rising was, however, but the prelude to the convulsions of the "year of revolutions," 1848. While the forces of Democracy were bursting out on all sides, the Nationalist movement found expression in many places. Hungary demanded a self-governing Constitution, and Bohemia declared its separation from the Government of Austria. The Hungarian movement was immediately followed by a Slavonic movement in the south, where Serbs, Croats and Slovenes combined to form a "Triune Kingdom" with a separate administration, a movement at once frowned upon by the Magyars, who wished to gain control of this outlet to the Adriatic. The three new revolutionary states—Bohemia, Hun-

gary and the Triune Kingdom—still professed loyalty to the Hapsburg dynasty, and it was only when the Emperor Francis Joseph showed his determination to crush their efforts for liberty that the Magyars threw off his authority altogether and proclaimed their independence. It was otherwise with the Italian rebels of the south-west; the Venetians and Milanese from the outset declared their separation from the Hapsburg dominions.

The failure of these four Nationalist revolutions well illustrates how mutual antagonism marred the success of the efforts of the subject races of the Austrian empire. The Emperor could at once call upon his German-speaking troops to move against the Czechs and the Italians, while the claims of the Magyars to rule over their neighbours provided him with willing allies in the Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Roumans. Windischgrätz reduced the Czechs to submission by the bombardment of Prague, Radetzky restored Hapsburg rule in the Italian provinces by the victories of Custozza and Novara. Hungary was invaded by a force of Germans which received the active assistance of the Roumans and the southern Slavs.

The Magyars of Hungary, however, were to put up a splendid resistance to their enemies. At the beginning of 1849 Windischgrätz defeated their forces under Dembinski at Kapolna, and the Hungarian capital, Buda-Pesth, was left in the hands of the Austrians. But under the able leadership of Arthur Görgei, the Magyar forces recovered their position in a series of victories of which Gödöllö was the most important, and the invaders were driven from the country. So severe was the Austrian

defeat that, although by this time the rest of the empire was secure, the Government despaired of reducing the Magyars without the assistance of an ally. The Czar Nicholas I had watched the Magyar progress with alarm as an encouragement to his own Polish subjects to do likewise; earlier in the campaign he had allowed 3000 Russians to give some help to the Austrian garrisons in Transylvania; he now came forward to offer the assistance for which Austria asked. Eighty thousand Russian troops under Paskievich now poured over the Carpathian passes, and large reinforcements soon followed. Against the overwhelming superiority of the Austro-Russian forces the Magyars could no longer hold out. A series of defeats culminated in their overthrow by the Austrian commander von Haynau at Temesvar, and five days later the Magyar forces surrendered to the Russians at Vilagos. Louis Kossuth, the political organiser of the Hungarian Revolution, fled into the Turkish dominions, and the independence of Hungary was crushed out with great severity by the thorough methods of von Haynau.

By the end of 1849 the Austrian empire had triumphed over the forces of Nationalism, and the "worm-eaten house" had been buttressed up once more. It might have been expected that the Triune Kingdom would have received some recompense for its assistance against the Magyars, but it was held inadvisable to make any concessions whatever to Nationalism, and the independence of that creation disappeared with the triumph of Austria. For a dozen years the empire enjoyed a period of domestic quiet, broken only by the enforced cession of Lombardy after the war with Napoleon III in 1859.

Hungary continued to be a source of alarm to the Emperor, and when he thought to conciliate the country by the restoration of the old Hungarian Constitution in 1860, the act was taken as a sign of weakness, and preparations for revolt once more began. By rigorous measures and a declaration of martial law the threatened revolt was suppressed, but the Magyars remained disloyal and ready for the opportunity of rising. There were many who thought that the Hungarians would have revolted during the war against Prussia and Italy in 1866, and for some time the King of Italy had been intriguing with them for a rebellion which would give him an opportunity of seizing Venice. Though there were unmistakable signs that the Magyars wished for the defeat of Austria, there was no actual rising, though as soon as the war was over, and the Austrian army had returned shattered and discredited from the Sadowa campaign, the national leaders of Hungary, Francis Deák and Julius Andrassy, at once demanded an independent administration for their country.

It was almost certain that a refusal would mean armed rebellion, and after Sadowa the Emperor Francis Joseph felt very uncertain as to the efficacy of his army. At this juncture the Hungarian leaders appeared with the draft of a new Constitution which, though it deprived Austria of her supremacy over Hungary, at least promised that the two countries should be ruled by a common Government in matters of foreign, military and financial policy. Fearing the result of a war, the Emperor accepted their proposals, and in 1867 the empire was reconstructed as what came to be known as the Dual Monarchy.

By this compromise the empire was divided into two parts, each with its own Parliament and administration; the Austrian section included the lands just released from the German Confederation and the provinces of Galicia and Dalmatia; the Hungarian section comprised the rest of the Hapsburg dominions. The empire of Austria and the kingdom of Hungary, thus separated, were to have a common minister of foreign affairs, a common minister of finance, and a common minister for war, while the Hapsburg ruler was to take the title of Emperor-King and be crowned at Buda-Pesth. Below the surface of this agreement between the two leading peoples of the Hapsburg dominions lay the understanding that they should each in their own sphere of influence dominate over the lesser peoples. To make the work of the common central Government easier, it was arranged that each Parliament should elect a committee of sixty members who were to meet together annually to advise the ministers and to receive the instructions of the Emperor.

Such in fact was the Constitution of 1867. It has several times been revised, but it has on the whole worked unexpectedly well. The two sections of the Dual Monarchy have still certain interests in common; both are exposed to Russian aggression, both have large subject populations of discontented Slavs. By the arrangements of 1866, the Hapsburg dynasty had become more of a real protector to the Hungarians than formerly. Up to that date it had been primarily a German family; its interests were centred in Germany and the Germans, and the other races only occupied a secondary place in its policy. But after Sadowa it found itself shut out from the rest of

Germany and from Italy, and its face was hence turned eastward and southward. It has, in fact, been said that since 1867 Austrian foreign policy has been largely subordinated to Hungarian foreign policy, particularly in the efforts made by the Emperor Francis Joseph to conquer the Serbians of the Balkan peninsula and to cut a way through to Salonica and the Aegean.

Since 1867 a further factor has been introduced into the Austro-Hungarian nationality problem by the acquisition of the provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. These districts were taken over by the Dual Monarchy at the Berlin Treaty of 1878, and administered by the common Government of the Monarchy as a Protectorate. In 1908, by a treaty with Turkey, the rights of Protectorate were superseded by a definite annexation to the dominions of Austria-Hungary, and in this way some million and a half more Slavs were included within the limits of the Hapsburg dominions.

This annexation coincided with the rise to self-reliance of the Balkan nations. Four years after there came the Balkan wars, in which the neighbouring state of Serbia achieved a double triumph, first over Turkey and then over Bulgaria. A new danger threatened the Dual Monarchy. For the victorious Serbians, coming back from their successes in the south, turned their faces northwards, and openly declared their purpose of eventually absorbing their kinsmen across the Danube and the Drina, who were to be rescued by the Serbian arms from the yoke of Austria-Hungary as their other kinsman had just been rescued from the Ottoman tyranny. This boastful language evoked an enthusiastic response

in Bosnia and Slavonia, and a corresponding alarm at Buda-Pesth and Vienna. The sudden emergence of Serbia as a rising military state was objectionable to Austria-Hungary for another reason. There had long been a scheme on foot for the extension of Austro-Hungarian influence, if not of the dominions of the Monarchy, southwards along the valleys of the Drina, the Morava, the Drin and the Vardar to Durazzo and Salonica; and this sudden rise of a go-ahead military state across the way south threatened to put an extinguisher on these plans of expansion. Austrian influence had prevented the extension of Serbia to the sea, for she had threatened war if the Treaty of Bucharest (which ended the Balkan struggle) stipulated for such an extension of Serbian power. The open propaganda of the "Narodna Odbrana," or Serbian patriotic society, which preached a crusade against Austria as the enemy of Serbia, completed the determination of the Government of the Dual Monarchy that Serbia must feel the weight of Austrian arms.

These facts made an Austro-Serbian war almost inevitable, and Serbia made haste to assure herself of a powerful ally, without whose aid she must necessarily collapse before the might of her great northern neighbour. That support was extended to her by the empire of Russia, one of the Powers of the Triple Entente, and thus the Serbian national movement became dovetailed into the greater political rivalries of Europe.

The occasion of the declaration of war between Austria and Serbia was to be very striking. The Emperor Francis Joseph had reached the age of eighty-three, and his death had been for some years

expected. His heir was his nephew, the Archduke Francis Ferdinand, who was generally believed to be admirably fitted, by a long course of political experience, for the task of handling the difficult problems of the Dual Monarchy. The next heir was this man's nephew, a much younger man without very much political experience and almost unknown in Austria-Hungary, who it was believed would require some years' more experience before he could be considered really capable of a secure handling of Austro-Hungarian policy. As the old emperor, who had held the reins of power for sixty-five years, was not expected to live long, it was universally hoped by the supporters of the Dual Monarchy that the life of the Archduke Francis Ferdinand would be prolonged until his successor should have time to gain a greater acquaintance with the problems of his future dominions. These hopes were rudely shattered when, on June 28, 1914, the Archduke was assassinated at Serajevo by Princip, a young Serbian enthusiast whose hatred of the prince as a strong anti-Serbian dictated this great crime. Fury against the nation to which the murderer belonged and in whose interest the crime had been committed now rose to its height in Austria-Hungary, and an ultimatum was dispatched to Serbia demanding a disavowal of the anti-Austrian policy, the dissolution of the *Narodna Odbrana*, the institution of proceedings against those suspected of complicity in the Serajevo crime, and, above all, permission for Austro-Hungarian officials to enter Serbia and "collaborate in the suppression of the subversive movement directed against the territorial integrity of the Monarchy." This last demand was

rejected by the Serbian Government, who, however, agreed to the other articles of the ultimatum. Austria, nevertheless, insisted on the debated clause, which would have imposed a great humiliation on a free and independent kingdom, and, on the refusal of Serbia to comply, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia on July 28, 1914. The ultimate problem of Austro-Hungarian Nationalism was left to be solved by the issue of the great European war.

CHAPTER VIII

THE EASTERN QUESTION

Turning from Austria-Hungary to the Balkan peninsula we find the same state of affairs, but with very important local differences. And in tracing the history of Nationalism in this part of Europe we shall see how its forces were successful in disintegrating a large and united empire.

In only a very small part of the Turkish empire of 1815 was the bulk of the population Turkish, namely in the immediate neighbourhood of Constantinople and in the flat lands of the Dobrudja. The Greeks occupy the southern parts of the peninsula and a large portion of the Ægean and Black Sea coastlands. In the west are the Albanians. Between the Ægean and the Danube the bulk of the population are Bulgars, while the north-west is occupied by the Serbs. Across the Danube are the Roumans of Wallachia and Moldavia. Of these races, which are very much intermixed in the border districts, the Greeks and Albanians are very much akin to one another, and both are considered distant relatives of the Roumans in the north, though the similarity is remote. The Serbs and Bulgars, however, are very much alike, though there has always existed a jealousy between the two races which has been intensified by their recent political separation and the wars of 1885 and 1913.

The Turks bear no resemblance to any of the other races of the Balkans.

This last fact is one of great importance. For in consequence the Turks have been detested by their subject peoples in a way that the Hapsburgs and their German friends never were in Austria-Hungary. This hatred has been intensified by religious differences. In the Hapsburg empire the religious question has not complicated the problem of Nationalism, as all its subjects have been united under the wing of the Catholic Church, but in the Balkans the Turks have always been represented, not merely as an intruding Asiatic people, but as the enemies of the Christian religion. Some of the Albanians, known as the Arnauts, have embraced the Mohammedan faith, but elsewhere in the Balkans a common Christianity has acted as the strongest bond of union between the subject peoples and has prevented the Ottoman Government from adopting the Hapsburg device of using one subject race to crush another. This extreme racial and religious bitterness, too, in combination with the wild and backward nature of the mountainous Balkan lands, has given to Balkan warfare a character of ferocity and barbarity which has often aroused the horror of the more civilised countries of Europe.

It must always be remembered that the Balkan provinces were only part of the Turkish empire, which extended over Asia Minor, Armenia, the valleys of the Euphrates and Tigris, Syria, the coasts of the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf, Egypt, Tripoli, and nominally over Algiers and Tunis as well. Hence came the large supplies of men who filled the Turkish army and kept the Christian populations down. It

was as though the Hapsburg emperor had been able to command the armies of the whole German Confederation for the suppression of his Magyar, Italian and Slavonic revolts.

The recent history of the Turkish Empire, too, has a special character in that it has been so frequently exposed to the single or collective interference of the great European Powers. Partly because of their natural antipathy to an Asiatic and Mohammedan intruder, partly as a result of the system of collective benevolent supervision instituted by the Holy Alliance (see p. 172), but mainly on account of the self-seeking greed and mutual rivalries of the Powers, the great states of Europe have, since 1815, constantly interfered in the affairs of the Ottoman empire. The decline of Turkish power had been rapid during the eighteenth century, and by the beginning of the nineteenth it was generally believed that the Ottoman empire was rotten and ready to fall to pieces at the first blow from a strong European Power. The anticipated scramble of the Powers for the spoils of Turkey kept European Governments uneasily busy all through the century, and it always came as a great surprise when the Turks managed to show by their successful defensive operations in war that, although their capacity for aggression was gone, they still possessed vigour enough to put up a stout defence.

The two Powers most interested in the Turkish empire were naturally Russia and Austria, whose dominions abutted on those of the Sultan. The Russians were anxious to increase their territories at Turkey's expense, both towards the lower Danube and along the other end of the Black Sea in the Caucasus region. A fictitious document known as

"the will of Peter the Great" called upon the successors of that monarch to carry the Russian standard to Constantinople, an achievement which the great Napoleon had once declared would give Russia the mastery of the world. Russia, too, had put herself forward as the special protector of the Balkan Christians, which she had a good claim to do, seeing that the latter belonged to that Greek Church which was established in Russia alone of the great European states. By the Treaty of Kutchuk Kainardji of 1774 the Czarina Catherine II had secured concessions for the Christians of the Balkan provinces, and this fact was later on to give Russia an excuse for extending a claim to a virtual protectorate over them. Austria's aims lay further west, in Serbia and Bosnia, though she was fearfully jealous of any extension of her eastern neighbour's influence towards Constantinople. England and France, though not particularly ambitious of annexing Turkish provinces, were nevertheless anxious to prevent any other Power, especially the great eastern empire of Russia, from annexing any. Prussia, until the later part of the century, expressed little interest in the distant Balkans.

At the time of the Treaty of Vienna the Turkish empire was distracted with the revolt of the Serbs in the north-west, who were trying to attain the independence enjoyed by their kinsmen of the little mountain principality of Montenegro, which had never been annexed to the Ottoman dominions. This revolt, which had been slowly bubbling up and down for a dozen years, was ended in 1817 by the grant of local self-government to the most resolute of the rebels, those of the Morava valley, which was now formed into an independent principality under the


THE BALKAN PENINSULA
SHEWING DISTRIBUTION OF RACES.
English Miles
0 50 100 150 200
Bulgarians
Serbs & Croats
Greeks
Rumans
Osmanli (Turks)
Illyrians (Albanians)
BOSNIA
BELGRADE
SERVIA
ROUMANIA
BUCHAREST
BLACK SEA
ADRIATIC SEA
MONTENEGRO
CETIGNE
SOFIA
BULGARIA
ALBANIA
DURAZZO
TURKEY
CONSTANTINOPLE
ITALY
THESSALY
AEGEAN SEA
TURKEY IN ASIA
IONIAN SEA
ATHENS
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Candia or

successful swineherd Kara George. Four years later the Balkans were convulsed by the terrible Greek rebellion.

This revolt, which on account of its occurrence in the land of the Classics excited an extraordinary interest throughout Europe, was organised by the "Hetaireia Philike," a patriotic society which aimed at the restoration of Greek independence. The first outbreak, under Hypsilanti, failed because the rebel leaders organised their forces on the friendly soil of Russia and tried to cut their way through the Rouman and Bulgar districts before they reached Greece. But the second outbreak of 1821, centring in the Morea, was immediately successful, the Turkish troops being driven back into Albania. The massing of Mohammedan troops upon the revolted districts then followed, but the mountainous and difficult nature of the land, and the occupation by the Greek sailors of the numerous islands of the Ægean, enabled the rebels to carry on a guerilla warfare which seemed to defy suppression. For six years the war raged under conditions of hideous ferocity on both sides, thousands of non-combatants being put to the sword without mercy. By the year 1827, however, the rebellion seemed to be at last on the point of suppression, the task of reducing the brigand bands of the Morea being entrusted to the Egyptian contingent under Ibrahim Pasha.

At this juncture Russia entered the arena, declaring that she came to rescue the Christians of Greece from Mohammedan oppression. The other Powers at once took alarm; they sympathised with Greece, yet they did not want to see Russian influence increase in the Balkans. England and France therefore declared that they had as much right to have a finger in the

pie as Russia had, and proposed a joint intervention. Russia did not see her way to refuse co-operation, and by the Treaty of London of 1827 the three Powers undertook to effect a settlement in the revolted areas. Turkey chose gallantly to face war rather than to allow outside Powers to interfere with her domestic concerns, and military and naval operations at once commenced. In 1827 the allied fleet, under the English admiral Codrington, shattered the Turkish squadron off Navarino, and in the following year a French army of 14,000 landed in the Morea. This saved the Greeks but did not reduce Turkey to submission. It was not until the Russian general Diebitsch, in the summer of 1829, marched into the heart of Turkey and forced the Balkan passes that the Sultan Mahmud II accepted the Peace of Adrianople. By this treaty the southern portion of Greece, including the classic city of Athens, was erected into a self-governing kingdom, but under Turkish protection. At the same time Russia secured for the Roumans of the north the establishment of two self-governing principalities, Moldavia and Wallachia, which were to be ruled by native Rouman princes. This arrangement was made with the idea of weakening Turkey's power of resistance on the north-eastern frontier. As the Treaty of Adrianople was negotiated entirely by Russia, the other two Powers felt slighted and discredited. They therefore insisted upon asserting their influence by gaining for Greece still better terms; after long negotiations the Sultan was prevailed upon to grant the total independence of Greece in 1832. The Greeks chose as their first king Otto, son of the King of Bavaria, but after a long reign he fell out with his new subjects, and in 1862 was deposed; the crown of

Greece was then conferred upon George, son of the Danish heir-presumptive and brother of the English Queen Alexandra.

Though Nicholas I of Russia prophesied the speedy decease of Turkey, "the sick man of Europe," there were no further risings of importance in the Balkan provinces of the Ottoman empire for more than a generation. It was fortunate for the Turks that there were not, for during this period they had to face other revolts in Egypt and Syria and a serious war with Russia in 1853. This arose out of the Russian claim to a protectorate over the Balkan Christians. In the course of some negotiations about the rights of Christian pilgrims at Jerusalem, Russia put forward this extravagant interpretation of the treaty of 1774. To enforce his claims, Nicholas I occupied the Rouman principalities with an army, and Turkey forthwith declared war. As a protest against Russian aggression England and France joined the Turks, and the Crimean War was the result. The Russians were defeated on the Danube and in the Crimea, and were obliged to yield their extreme claims by the Treaty of Paris of 1856.

The year 1875 saw the beginning of a great Slavonic revolt against the Turkish rule. The rising began in the province of Herzegovina and spread into Bosnia and Macedonia; the rebels defeated the Turkish troops at Nevesinje and captured the fortress of Nikshich. Encouraged by these successes, the Prince of Serbia declared war against his suzerain the Sultan and placed his troops at the disposal of the rebel cause. Not to be outdone by a rival Serb dynasty, the Prince of Montenegro (now King Nicholas) declared war also against Turkey. The Bulgars then joined in the

rebellion, while the Greeks and the Roumans began to make warlike preparations. It was said that the last hours of the "sick man of Europe" had come. But that hardy old invalid had a good deal of fight left in him; summoning up troops from his Asiatic dominions, the Sultan Abdul Hamid II, who had just succeeded to the throne after a domestic revolution at Constantinople which added still further to the Turkish difficulties, struck hard at the rebels. The Serbs were routed after a five days' battle at Alexinatz, and the Prince of Serbia made peace, leaving the Bulgars to be suppressed with atrocities as dreadful as those they had themselves perpetrated on the Turks. By the beginning of 1877 the triumph of Turkey seemed complete, when there appeared once more upon the scene the benevolent friend of the Balkan Christians—Russia.

The advance of the Russian army changed the aspect of affairs. Though the Turks put up a brave defence on the Danube, when Osman Pasha distinguished himself by a five months' resistance behind the mud walls of Plevna, their lines were forced and the enemy pushed on to the Balkan mountains. Roumania, which had become a single state by the voluntary union of the principalities in 1862 (ruled by a relative of the King of Prussia), joined the Russians on their first appearance on the frontier, the Serbs again rose, and early in 1878 Greece also declared war on the unfortunate Sultan. The Russian hosts proved too strong for the Ottomans; Gourko forced the Balkan passes and descended into the plains of Roumelia. There a ten days' battle at Philippopolis ended in the defeat of the Turks, and the Porte (the Turkish Government) sued for peace. With the

Russian army within sight of the towers of Constantinople, the Sultan accepted the Treaty of San Stefano in March 1878.

The terms of the Treaty of San Stefano were briefly as follows : Russia got a slice of Roumania and a new province beyond the Caucasus; Roumania, Serbia and Montenegro were all to receive a considerable extension of territory, while the overlordship of the Sultan over the two former was abolished; Bulgaria became a self-governing principality, dependent on Turkey, but with a constitution framed by Russia; Bosnia and Herzegovina were to form a self-governing state under the joint protection of Russia and Austria; finally, the fortifications on the Danube, which had proved an obstacle in the way of the Russian advance on Constantinople, were to be razed.

But if the rebel races had found an ally in one Power, the Turks were now to find an ally in other Powers, for the triumph of Russia, as always, evoked the active opposition of Austria and England. It was declared that this treaty, by cutting European Turkey into two irregular and separate fragments, would virtually annihilate her as a European state, while the " Big Bulgaria " was declared to be a mere cloak for a Russian protectorate which would come within striking distance of Constantinople. Time was to show that when once their independence of Turkey was assured, the small Balkan states would not be the docile puppets which Russia hoped they would be, but in 1878 it was universally believed on both sides that this subservience would be the result; hence the violent opposition of Austria and England. For a time the situation looked serious and war seemed imminent. A congress of the Powers was called, and


THE BALKAN PENINSULA
ACCORDING TO THE TREATY OF SAN STEFANO.
English Miles
0 50 100 150 200
MOLDAVIA
ROUMANIA
R. Danube
BUCHAREST
WALLACHIA
DOBRUDJA
Kutchuk Kainardji
BOSNIA
BELGRADE
Nevesinje
SERVIA
Alexinatz
Plevna
BULGARIA
Nikshich
MONTENEGRO
CETIGNE
SOFIA
Balkan Mountains
BLACK SEA
ADRIATIC SEA
Philippopolis
Adrianople
TURKEY
CONSTANTINOPLE
San Stefano
ITALY
Albania
GREECE
AEGEAN SEA
TURKEY IN ASIA
IONIAN SEA
ATHENS
MOREA
Navarino
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Candia or Crete

met at Berlin. Here it became certain that persistence with the Russian plans would mean a war against Austria, England and Turkey, and on second thoughts Russia agreed to a modification of the San Stefano treaty.

The result was the Treaty of Berlin of July 1878: Russia kept her territorial gains, though the port of Batum was to be unfortified; Roumania, Serbia, and Montenegro were to be enlarged and independent, but their territories were to be considerably less than under the earlier treaty; Bulgaria was reduced to less than half her originally intended size, but a portion of the Bulgar territory was formed into a second Bulgar state called Eastern Roumelia, whose governor was to be nominated by the Sultan; Bosnia and Herzegovina were to become an Austrian protectorate, and the seaport of Spizza was to be annexed to Austria-Hungary. A supplementary treaty, not signed till 1881, brought the Greek boundary north to include Thessaly and part of Albania. Thus was established that political settlement of the Balkans which was not essentially altered till another generation had elapsed.

The Bulgarian Constitution was completed, under Russian direction, in 1879, and Prince Alexander of Battenberg (brother of Admiral Prince Louis), a German, but a nephew of the Czar, was elected Prince of Bulgaria. From the first, however, the new state adopted an independent attitude, refusing to be guided by Russian advice and aiming at the creation of a strong, self-supporting Bulgar empire. After some years of military preparation, the Prince opened negotiations with the smaller Bulgar state, Eastern Roumelia, which resulted in the union of the two


THE BALKAN PENINSULA
ACCORDING TO THE BERLIN TREATY, 1878.
English Miles
0 50 100 150 200
ROUMANIA
BUCHAREST
BOSNIA
BELGRADE
SERVIA
BULGARIA
Slivnitza
SOFIA
MONTENEGRO
CETIGNE
Kumanovo
Eastn Roumelia
Philippopolis
Kirk Kilisseh
Adrianople
Lule Burgas
CONSTANTINOPLE
Scutari
Skoplye
ALBANIA
TURKEY
MACEDONIA
Salonica
Gribovo
THESSALY
ADRIATIC SEA
ITALY
IONIAN SEA
AEGEAN SEA
TURKEY IN ASIA
GREECE
ATHENS
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Candia or Crete
BLACK SEA
DARDANELLES
BOSPHORUS

countries and the expulsion of the Turkish Governor under circumstances of unnecessary and childish insult. A war with Turkey was expected, but, to every one's surprise, the Sultan contented himself with protests, while it was Serbia that drew the sword. Neither of these two Slavonic states had been contented with the frontier assigned them by the Powers at Berlin, and jealousy of this new success of Bulgaria drove King Milan of Serbia (who had adopted the royal title in 1882) to a declaration of war. The Serbians, however, were defeated at Slivnitza, and peace was restored on the mediation of Austria-Hungary. Meanwhile in Russia a burst of annoyance had occurred at the ungrateful independence of the Balkan *protégé*, and plans were formed for the reconstruction of the Bulgarian Constitution. A rather foolish plot to kidnap the Prince succeeded in terrifying him into abdication in 1886, but the Bulgarians proceeded to elect as their ruler Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg, another German who had no ties to Russia. Under his rule the independent spirit of the country increased to such an extent that a few years later, when it was suggested that Russia should create a self-governing principality on the borders of Turkey in Asia, the Government of Nicholas II declared that they did not wish to see "a new Bulgaria in Armenia." It is this fact, and not the sentimental sympathy for the harassed Bulgarians, that makes the "Jingo" war-policy of 1878 seem absurd to present-day statesmen.

Meanwhile the Nationalist spirit began to develop a further forward movement in the newly liberated states. Serbia, Bulgaria, Greece, all declared that they would not be content until they had united all

their kinsmen under their sway. Troubles broke out again in the Turkish provinces, particularly in Macedonia, where brigand bands terrified whole districts and worked no end of havoc. In 1897 Greece went so far as to declare war on Turkey, with the object of securing control of the island of Crete, now in revolt against the Sultan's rule. The Greek troops were easily routed by the Turks, but once more the Powers interfered and saved Greece from the consequences of her rashness. Crete received self-government, under a high commissioner selected by the Powers. But the collapse of the Greek army in 1897 did not dismay the Government of King George, and preparations were made for another struggle in the near future.

It was, however, obvious that any movement against Turkey must, to be successful, be either concerted by all the Balkan states or else supported, as in 1877, by some outside Power. These little countries had never quite liked the thought of having had their independence presented to them by outsiders, when their own efforts to win freedom by the sword had met with an ignominious end. They now determined to form a league among themselves which would be sufficiently strong and well prepared to tackle the Turkish empire without any help from the Powers. This league was formed by the states of Bulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro; Roumania had no more to gain from Turkey, and was not included in this alliance. Bulgaria, meanwhile, had come into line with her allies by the adoption of a royal title by Prince Ferdinand, who in 1908 took the title of "Czar of Bulgaria" (since altered to "Czar of the Bulgars").

At the end of 1912 the Balkan League took up arms for the achievement of its Nationalist aims. Their

success, due to their long preparation for the struggle, was as remarkable as, and in fact bore many resemblances to, the victorious career of the Germans in France in 1870. The Turks were defeated in every engagement. While the Serbs routed one of their armies at Kumanovo and occupied Skoplje, the Greeks won the victory of Gribovo and forced their way to Salonica, and the Bulgars, after a preliminary success at Kirk Kilisseh, completely defeated the main Turkish army at Lule Burgas. Overthrown in the open field, the Turks retired to the security of their fortifications, behind the lines of which they made a more stubborn defence. After great efforts the Bulgars, assisted by the Serbs, reduced the great fortress of Adrianople, while the Montenegrin army, after an equally severe struggle, compelled the surrender of Scutari. The main forces of the Sultan were now reduced to holding Gallipoli and the little peninsula on which their capital is situated, and here, after tremendous efforts of the Allies to pierce through, the Tchatalja lines proved an effective barrier to further progress. Finding it a harder task than they had looked for to get to Constantinople, the League now opened negotiations for peace, and a treaty was drawn up by which the Turks agreed to hand over all their territory in Europe, with the exception of the coastlands of the Sea of Marmora and the important fortified posts which command the entrances of the Dardanelles and the Bosporus.

No sooner did the Allies see the fruits of their labour within their grasp than they at once proceeded to quarrel over the spoils. There had been an ugly race between the Bulgar and Greek troops to be the first to seize the important seaport of Salonica, and when both

forces were cantoned in the town there occurred some unpleasant incidents of friction between the two races. The Bulgars now brought down the wrath of the other members of the League on their heads by demanding more of the conquered territory than the others thought fair; and when the others refused to agree to the Czar Ferdinand's plans they were told that Bulgaria would secure their accomplishment with the sword. Bulgaria had an army which was almost as large as the combined forces of all the other allies, but the balance was definitely cast against them by the sudden entrance of Roumania upon the scene. The second Balkan war was soon over. Driven in at all points, the too-ambitious Bulgars were forced to submit, and after a vast amount of further argument and haggling the Treaty of Bucharest was drawn up and signed in the summer of 1913. One event of ironical bitterness robbed the League of part of its spoils. Whilst the Allies were engaged in cutting each other's throats, the Turks quietly marched a strong force out from the Tchatalja lines and took possession of that fortress of Adrianople that had cost the League so much blood.

The Treaty of Bucharest recognised the restoration of Turkish rule at Adrianople; Bulgaria was given the rest of Roumelia; Greece took southern Macedonia and Salonica, with the island of Crete; Serbia was awarded northern Macedonia, with Skoplje; Montenegro got a few small inland towns; Roumania was compensated for her share in the recent operations by a slice out of the north-east of Bulgaria, including the fortress of Silistria. The Albanian districts, which, divided among the Christian and the Mohammedan population, had hardly shown any real desire

for a national organisation, would have been partitioned out between Serbia, Greece and Montenegro, had it not been for the warning voice of Austria. Under threat of war, the Balkan states were obliged to agree to the Austrian plans for the settlement of Albania. This province, which was to include the hard-won fortress of Scutari and to shut out Serbia from the sea, was raised into an independent state, under a ruler called the "Mpret" or Prince. The throne was offered to and accepted by a German, Prince William of Wied, but, after a brief experience of attempting to govern a land which was distracted by civil strife between Christians and Mohammedans, that gentleman abdicated the uneasy throne, leaving his kingdom a prey to mere anarchy.

The treaty concluded in 1913 satisfied hardly any one in the peninsula, and it was considered on all hands to be merely a temporary settlement. But it must be considered as another great step in the evolution of the Balkan nationalist question, as it has brought the national ideal nearer of achievement. The new frontiers of the states coincide, if not exactly, at least roughly with racial boundaries, though the bitter feeling which exists in the mixed border districts is a factor which does not make for permanent peace in the land. The outbreak of the European war in 1914 found the Balkan states alive with unfulfilled ambitions, and there was a universal feeling that the general conflict would soon embrace the whole of the peninsula. Serbia, whose relations with Austria initiated the great struggle, was dreaming of a Serb empire which would embrace Bosnia, Herzegovina and Slavonia, with an outlet westwards to the Adriatic Sea; Montenegro was burning to


THE BALKAN PENINSULA
ACCORDING TO THE TREATY OF BUCHAREST, 1913
English Miles
0 50 100 150 200
RUSSIA
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
ROUMANIA
BOSNIA
Serajevo
BELGRADE
R. Save
R. Morava
SERVIA
R. Morava
BUCHAREST
R. Danube
Silistria
BLACK SEA
HERZEGOVINA
MONTENEGRO
CETIGNE
ADRIATIC SEA
SOFIA
BULGARIA
Scutari
Skoplye
R. Vardar
TURKEY
CONSTANTINOPLE
THE BOSPHORUS
DURAZZO
ALBANIA
ITALY
Salonica
THE DARDANELLES
TURKEY IN ASIA
IONIAN SEA
GREECE
AEGEAN SEA
ATHENS
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
Candia or Crete

regain Scutari; Bulgaria was smarting under her recent defeat, and specially vindictive against Serbia; Roumania was turning eager eyes to her kinsmen across the Carpathians. Turkey, too, who had recently found a new friend in the German empire, was inclined to strike a blow to regain what she had lost, and the advantages promised by the Kaiser William from the formation of a Turko-German alliance soon led to the entrance of the Ottoman empire into the war as the ally of Germany and Austria-Hungary.

The opening of the war, then, which almost at once involved three Balkan states—Serbia, Montenegro, and Turkey—seemed to presage a further violent reconstruction of the political balance in the peninsula, and we cannot say that the "Eastern Question"—as it has always been called by the statesmen of Europe—had yet by any means been brought to a final and a satisfactory solution.

CHAPTER IX

THE CONCERT OF EUROPE

We have just been considering some of the main developments of two of the great forces which have moulded the recent history of Europe—Democracy and Nationalism. We must now turn to the third great force of the age—International Rivalry. This, of course, has always existed since the beginning of things, though since the beginning of the Recent Period it has received some new characteristics from the development of the Industrial Revolution and the working of the forces of Democracy and Nationalism.

At the end of the eighteenth century the chief factor in international politics was the rapid and vigorous expansion of the power of France. Under the First Republic, and later under the Emperor Napoleon, France became the leading Power of Europe, and in fact threatened to become the ruler of the whole Continent. This dangerous upsetting of the Balance of Power provoked the combination of all the other states in a great effort to throw off the supremacy of the upstart empire, and the result was the overthrow of Napoleon and the restriction of the boundaries of France under the Treaty of Vienna in 1815. The history of the late wars had shown the necessity for co-operation between the great states, and

the lessons learnt in this period were remembered after the conclusion of peace.

The result was the development of the idea of the "Concert of Europe." Under this theory the great Powers were to be linked together in an amicable federation for the preservation of peace and order; expensive and wasteful wars were to be thus avoided, and mutual discussions of the whole European society were to take the place of the self-interested snarling-matches which led up to and provoked hostilities; the lesser states could be kept in order by the common protectorate of their powerful neighbours; the forces of disorder and revolution could be kept down by a common and united effort of the leading Governments. These results were sincerely hoped for by many enthusiasts when, in 1815, the Czar Alexander I, at the suggestion of the religious revivalist, Baroness von Krüdener, proposed the formation of a "Holy Alliance" between the great Powers which was to be cemented by the recognition of a common Christianity. The Czar's proposals met with some support and resulted in the establishment of a league which was to include all the sovereigns of Christendom, great and small alike. The Holy Alliance was joined by almost all the European princes, most of whom regarded it as a mere pious formality without any serious meaning. It was rejected alone of the Christian states by the United Kingdom and the Papacy, our Government adopting the view of Lord Castlereagh that it was "a piece of sublime mysticism and nonsense," while the Pope refused to join a league founded by a prince who was not a Roman Catholic.

But while the Holy Alliance was no more than a ceremonial expression of an ideal, there was at the

same time a movement among the great Powers which seemed to promise the establishment of the ideals of the " Concert of Europe." This was an alliance signed by Russia, Austria, Prussia and the United Kingdom, while it was intended that as soon as France had paid up her war indemnity she too should be included. This Quadruple Alliance of 1815 thus became a Quintuple Alliance in 1818, and was familiarly known as " the Pentarchy." One of the proposals of the Czar Alexander was for periodical congresses, at which the current European questions could be discussed between the Powers, to the avoidance of isolated attempts at aggrandisement which usually led to war.

The only chance this plan had of succeeding was if it could be agreed among all the Powers that the decisions of the majority should always be accepted, and that such decisions should be enforced if necessary against refractory members of the Alliance by the united forces of the others. But while it was comparatively easy to gain the consent of all to a common action in the settlement of questions mainly affecting the little states of the Continent, it was quite another matter when the affairs of one of the members of the Alliance came under discussion. A great Power could not be expected to give up its domestic freedom, or its liberty of action in foreign policy either, for the sake of a new ideal of universal peace; the Alliance, too, was so small that the " minority " on any question was usually strong enough to defy coercion except at the expense of a great and costly war. It was obvious, then, that as soon as the national interests of any of its members were seriously threatened by the decisions of the Alliance, the Pentarchy would fall to pieces at once.

For a few years, however, the Alliance seemed to work fairly smoothly. Four congresses were held, all of which resulted in the adoption of resolutions which were actually carried out. The first of these congresses, held in 1818 at Aix-la-Chapelle, debated the question of the admission of France to the Alliance and matters relating to the war indemnity and the military occupation of that country. The other three were summoned to deal with the revolutionary unrest in the south of Europe; the Congress of Troppau of 1820 authorised Austria to undertake the suppression of the Neapolitan Revolution by force; the Congress of Laibach of 1821 confirmed the action of Austria in Naples and directed the Hapsburg army to march to the assistance of the King of Sardinia against his rebellious subjects; the Congress of Verona of 1822 authorised France to suppress the Spanish Revolution. So far the "Concert of Europe" seemed to have been singularly successful.

But there were already, before the conclusion of the Congress of Verona, signs of the real weakness of the Concert of Europe. When the Greek insurrection broke out, Russia asked that she might be allowed to intervene in the Balkan peninsula, in the same way that Austria and France asked for the right of invading Italy and Spain. Here, however, she at once ran up against Austrian jealousy; Metternich declared that the Turkish empire was on a different footing to Naples, Sardinia or Spain, and that the Greek revolt was to be regarded as "beyond the pale of civilisation." Russia's plans of intervention were defeated for the time being, but as the Greek revolt continued, Russia's patience could no longer be controlled. The conciliatory Czar Alexander I died in

1825, and the more resolute and pushing Nicholas I declared his intention of intervening in the Balkans in despite of any protests of the other Powers. The result was the compromise of 1827, by which England, France, and Russia were recognised as jointly empowered to intervene in Turkey, but the Eastern Question had definitely broken up the effective co-operation of the Pentarchy.

And yet, though it was the Eastern Question that wrecked the smooth course of the Concert of Europe, it was strangely enough in connection with that same Eastern Question that the fiction of the Concert was longest maintained. For the prospect of the dissolution of the Ottoman empire and a scramble for the spoils between the great Powers kept all the diplomats of Europe active, and each Power was so jealous of its rivals and afraid of other Powers taking an undue share in the destruction of Turkey and the partition of its provinces that the theory of the European Concert was always invoked to prevent isolated action by rival Powers. We may follow up this Eastern Question and see how it affected the international relations of the Powers of Europe.

The joint intervention of the three Powers in Greece in 1827 resulted in the Treaty of Adrianople, in which Russia stole a march on her allies. Public attention was now switched away from European Turkey to the Asiatic provinces, where Mehemet Ali, the Khedive or hereditary Governor of Egypt, was trying to build up a southern Mohammedan state. After some striking military successes the rebel prince advanced through Asia Minor towards the Bosporus, and for a moment it seemed as if Mehemet Ali would totally overthrow the Sultan Mahmud II

and establish himself, not merely as ruler of Egypt, Syria and Asia Minor, but of the whole Turkish empire, which would be thus united more strongly than under the existing Sultan's rule. A curious political phenomenon now startled and amused the public of Europe. In the previous few years Russia had appeared as the enemy of Turkey, desirous only of weakening and partitioning her, while France and England had for forty years more or less consistently upheld the integrity of Turkey against Russian aggression. But since the triumph of Mehemet Ali would mean the consolidation of the Turkish empire under a strong and bold ruler, his success was ardently wished for by France and England, who gave him a considerable amount of encouragement in his campaign against the Sultan. Mahmud II, despairing of defending himself against the victorious rebel, looked round for an ally, whom he found in Russia, to whom the triumph of Mehemet Ali meant the strengthening of the state she herself wished to weaken. "A drowning man," said Mahmud, "will clutch at a serpent," and the world beheld the unusual spectacle of Russia supporting the Sultan of Turkey against a rebel whose banners were upheld by England and France. In reality there was no change of policy, for Russia had always supported the idea of a weak Turkey while the other two Powers were the consistent supporters of a strong Turkey.

The Russo-Turkish alliance enabled Mahmud to arrange a satisfactory treaty with Mehemet Ali, who had to content himself with the provinces of Egypt, Syria, Cilicia and Crete. There was now peace for some years, broken only by a petty war in Cilicia between the two rival Mohammedan princes, but

during these years England underwent a change of policy. Seeing that her support of the Egyptian Khedive had been unavailing, and that Russia had committed herself to the support of the old Turkish empire, England suddenly abandoned Mehemet Ali and called upon Russia to act with her in support of a strong Turkish empire under its old dynasty. This encouraged the Porte to declare war on Mehemet Ali, but the Turkish forces were again beaten. England now joined Turkey in arms, and Russia, not wishing to crush the Khedive too much but keep the Turkish dominions divided, rather unwillingly followed suit; Austria and Prussia were induced to give their approval to the Sultan's cause, and a fleet and army of English and Austrians were sent to the help of the Turks. France alone, which had entered into very friendly relations with the new Egyptian state, held aloof. The Anglo-Austrians captured Acre and Beyrout, Mehemet Ali was reduced to submission, and the Treaty of London of 1841 confined him to his old province of Egypt.

The next phase of the Eastern Question was that arising from the Russo-Turkish quarrel over the meaning of the Treaty of Kutchuk-Kainardji. Russia insisted upon her protectorate over the Balkan Christians being recognised by Turkey, and in 1853 war resulted (see p. 154). As usual, the Turks put up a good defensive fight, and held the line of the Danube, but the Russian naval victory at Sinope in the Black Sea exposed the shores of Turkey to an invasion at any point, and the Turks felt obliged to ask help from France, Austria and England. In 1854 Napoleon III of France, anxious to initiate his empire with a wreath of military glory, only too

readily declared war on Russia "to avenge 1812," and England, seriously alarmed for Constantinople, joined him. Sardinia, for reasons before mentioned, came into the alliance in 1855, while Austria, half afraid to expose her frontiers to invasion and half grateful for the Russian help against the Magyars five years before, but jealous as ever of Russian influence in the Balkans, adopted a curious attitude of pro-Turkish neutrality.

The plans of the Allies—England, France, Turkey, and, later, Sardinia—were to destroy the Russian commerce and navy and then to make a series of raids all round the fringe of that vast eastern empire. The example of 1812 prevented any attempt at an invasion of the inner parts of Russia. And indeed the Allies found quite enough to occupy them in the work they had undertaken. Though in the Baltic the Aland Islands were captured and the Finnish port of Kola was destroyed, the allied squadrons were repulsed from Kronstadt and distant Petropavlovsk, while in Armenia the Russians crossed the Turkish frontier and captured Kars. The main forces, however, were concentrated on the Crimean peninsula, where the Russian fortress of Sebastopol made a famous defence. The city held out for nearly a year, during which several pitched battles were fought in its neighbourhood—at the Alma, at Balaclava, at Inkermann, at the Tchernaia—in all of which the Allies were successful. On the fall of Sebastopol the Russians agreed to treat for peace, and the result was the Treaty of Paris of 1856. The Russian claims over the Balkan Christians were repudiated; the Black Sea was closed to both Turkish and Russian warships, and all fortifications on its shores were to

be dismantled; Russia ceded to the principality of Moldavia (subject to the Turkish Protectorate), a strip of territory along the lower Danube; and the navigation of the Danube was to be free to all nations, under the regulation of an International Committee appointed by the Powers. The Black Sea restrictions were afterwards removed by the Treaty of London of 1871.

The next occasion on which the Eastern Question brought about a European crisis was in 1877, when the revolt of the subject nationalities brought Russia once more into the field. As we have seen, the Russo-Turkish war of that year ended in the Treaty of San Stefano, which brought England and Austria into the field. War with these two Powers was only avoided by Russia's timely concessions, and the Treaty of Berlin terminated the crisis. The rivalry

of Austria and Russia now became more acute than ever, for there now occurred a definite shifting of the balance of political influence in the Balkans. By the independent movement in Bulgaria Russia was deprived of her influence in the east, while the annexation of Bosnia and the formation of the Albanian state gave Austria a footing in the west such as Russia had not enjoyed in the palmiest days of her influence in the peninsula. It was the Eastern Question, too, that led to the opening of the great war of 1914, though the situation in the Balkans only provided part of the grounds of conflict which were to embroil the greater part of Europe.

While at one end of Europe the Eastern Question formed a subject of perpetual discord among the Powers, at the other end of the Continent there was another centre of disturbance, namely France. It may seem strange to suggest that after the wonderful period of the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars the France of the ensuing period was a danger to Europe, but it was precisely because of the memory of the great days of Austerlitz and Jena, of Wagram and Borodino that the other Powers thought that France was still a dangerous neighbour long after the defeats of Leipzig and Waterloo. As long as Louis XVIII and his brother reigned the Powers felt a certain amount of trust in them, though not in the nation they ruled, and when in 1830 the people rose and set up a new popular sovereign in the person of Louis Philippe, there was a general feeling of apprehension at what France was going to do in foreign policy. This alarm was all the greater in that the accession of the Orleanist king coincided with the Belgian Revolution, when the southern Netherlands threw off the rule of the Dutch royal family and declared their

independence. The rebels offered to confer the crown of Belgium on a prince of King Louis Philippe's family, and the old apprehensions of French aggression in the Netherlands once more arose. In the face of the protests of Europe the offer was declined, and the crown of Belgium conferred upon a German prince. Alarm was renewed when, in 1831, French troops entered Belgium to assist the rebels against the Dutch, and particularly when France suggested that she might be allowed to "rectify her frontier" by annexing some of the Belgian towns. On this occasion Lord Palmerston declared that England could never consent to allow France to annex even "a cabbage garden or a vineyard" in Belgium. Louis Philippe, however, did not press the question, and the fears of Europe over the Belgian matter died down. Great Britain even went so far as to allow the river Scheldt to be opened and Antwerp to become once more a great seaport, on condition that Belgium remained independent of foreign control.

As Louis Philippe began his reign with alarming the fears of Europe, so he ended his reign with another incident of this sort. This time the scene of action was Spain. An arrangement was made for the marriage of an Orleanist prince to the heiress-presumptive of the Spanish throne, and Europe was once more in a state of wild alarm. Shortly after this, however, occurred the revolution which drove the Orleanist dynasty into exile, and there remained no fear that the court of Spain would act readily in concert with the revolutionary Government of the Second Republic. All these things, however, tended to keep alive the fear of a revival of French aggression.

The accession to power of the nephew of the great

Napoleon did nothing to soothe these apprehensions. In fact the new ruler of France deliberately adopted a policy of military enterprise. He first interfered in the dominions of the Sultan, where he claimed for France certain rights of protection over the Christian Churches of Jerusalem, and when Russia entered upon war with the Turks he organised the Alliance which conducted the war of the Crimea from 1854 to 1856. When this war was concluded Napoleon III looked round for further opportunities of fighting, and in 1858, by the compact of Plombières, agreed to interfere in Italy for the benefit of Sardinia. There followed the Italian war of 1859, the battles of Magenta and Solferino, and the Treaty of Zürich. The ambition of the new Napoleon now turned across the Atlantic, where an opportunity arose for the invasion of Mexico. That turbulent republic found itself unable to pay its debts, and so in 1861 a joint intervention was planned by Great Britain, France and Spain. The troops thus sent out remained on the Mexican coast until a satisfactory financial settlement was made, but when the English and Spanish soldiers went home, the French remained, and it was soon seen that Napoleon had further designs on the country. In 1863 he obtained the consent of a party of Mexican malcontents to the establishment of a Mexican empire, under a nominee of Napoleon's, Maximilian of Austria, brother of the Emperor Francis Joseph. The new sovereign, supported by the French troops, made his entrance into the city of Mexico in 1864, and a war commenced between his supporters and those of the republic. For three years Maximilian retained a precarious position on the Mexican throne, until in 1867 the United States entered the lists. The Americans

had, since 1823, adopted the principle of President Monroe, that no further increase of European influence in America should be allowed: when the French troops established themselves in Mexico the United States had been engaged in civil war, but as soon as these domestic troubles were over, President Johnson demanded the withdrawal of the French from North America. Unwilling to embark in a distant war with so powerful a country as the United States, with its seasoned and victorious army of that time, Napoleon ignominiously withdrew his support from Maximilian, who was forthwith defeated by the Mexican republicans, captured and put to death.

We have seen how France intended to intervene in the Austro-Prussian war of 1866, and how the rapid victory of the Prussians ended the war before Napoleon had an opportunity of coming in. Disappointed by this rebuff and humiliated by the crowings of boastful Yankees over the Mexican fiasco, the French Emperor devoted himself to the task of preparing for a big war with Prussia. That war came in 1870, and resulted in the total defeat of the French and the overthrow of the Emperor Napoleon III. The fears which had not been dispelled by Leipzig and Waterloo at last disappeared after Sedan and the Treaty of Frankfort.

But the same shifting of the balance of power which reduced the strength of France to moderate proportions brought about a corresponding increase in the strength of another Power—the new consolidated empire of Germany. Until after the Franco-German war it had not been realised how strong Germany was growing. Had the other Powers had any insight into the consequences of the iron system of Bismarck, they would never have allowed Prussia

to obtain control over the South German states and annex Schleswig-Holstein and Alsace-Lorraine to the new empire. But it was not to be foreseen at that time that after the victory over France and the consolidation of the new empire Germany would set itself down to a quiet, leisurely, persevering and thorough preparation for the day when she should startle and convulse the globe with an almost superhuman effort to grasp the sceptre of the world. Just as the statesmen of the early seventeenth century, stirred by the memories of Philip II, persisted in regarding decadent Spain as the danger of Europe whilst France was rising under the guidance of Richelieu and Mazarin to a position of supremacy on the Continent, so the statesmen of the later nineteenth century, looking backwards at the days of Napoleon I, failed to realise that it was no longer France but Germany that was a menace to the balance of power.

The rise of Prussia to the supremacy of Germany has already been traced through the steady progress of the Danish war of 1864, the Austrian war of 1866 and the French war of 1870. After the last of these struggles, it was generally anticipated, both within Germany and without, that the new empire, having obtained its unity and its freedom from foreign intervention from north, east or west, would settle down to peaceful commercial, literary and musical pursuits. Both Bismarck and the old Kaiser William I repeatedly declared their satisfaction and content with the boundaries and power of the new state. As always in history, aggressive developments have a defensive side to them, and the passage of the new comprehensive Conscription law by France in 1875 led to a further increase in German armaments and

talk of an immediate war to prevent France strengthening herself for "the revenge" about which so many French statesmen were talking. But no new war took place, and when Bismarck presided over the Congress of Berlin, after the Russo-Turkish war in 1878, Germany only appeared as an unambitious and disinterested mediator among a set of grasping and greedy Governments. It was universally felt that there was no danger to be apprehended from Germany.

And as long as Bismarck retained the reins of power, the opinion of Europe on this point was probably correct. Like Cavour in Italy, the "Iron Chancellor" felt that he had a mission in life, and when that mission, the union of Germany under Prussian leadership, was fulfilled, he did not wish to embark in new schemes of wild aggression. He formed the Triple Alliance with Germany and Italy as a defensive measure against the attempted revenge of France and the threat of Russian Pan-Slavism. He entered into a separate treaty with Russia in order to prevent a war with that Power. He always expressed the firmest friendship for England. Had not France been exasperated by the loss of Alsace-Lorraine he would have doubtless tried to establish an agreement with the Government of the Republic. As it was, he gave cordial support to the development of the French colonial empire in Asia and Africa, and urged France to find compensation in big new provinces abroad for the loss of a district which, he declared, had only been taken by Germany to secure her Rhenish frontier from attack.

In 1888 died the Kaiser William I, at the advanced age of ninety. He was followed to the tomb in a few weeks by his son, the Emperor Frederick, who

left the crown to his son William II, then twenty-nine years of age. It soon became apparent that a change of policy was going to take place. After a series of disputes with the minister who had made Germany what she was, the new Kaiser dismissed Bismarck from office in March 1890. At the same time the Emperor refused to renew Bismarck's treaty with Russia, and initiated a course of naval expansion and preparation the first stroke of which was the acquisition of the British island of Heligoland, in exchange for the German rights over Zanzibar and the adjacent African coast. This treaty evoked in England the self-satisfactory observation that we had got a new suit in exchange for a trouser button; twenty-five years later it was discovered how useful a trouser button may be on occasion.

The developments of the next two decades gave a decided indication how things were going with Germany. Whilst the population and prosperity of the country increased by leaps and bounds, the army and navy were still further extended. The German Navy League organised a great movement for the building of warships, and Germany for the first time became a sea Power, under the naval administration of von Tirpitz, appointed Minister of Marine in 1897. A German squadron appeared in the Far East, where in the same year the port of Tsing-tao was acquired by treaty with China. German emissaries appeared in the Turkish empire with railway schemes and commercial plans, and steps were taken to secure the alliance of the state that held Constantinople and the Dardanelles. By the beginning of the twentieth century it was clear that the danger to the European balance of power now came from Germany.

CHAPTER X

COLONIAL RIVALRIES

While the Powers of Europe were engaged in watching one another's movements on the Continent, there was another sphere of rivalry in which conflict took place—the colonial sphere. At the beginning of the century England alone of the Great Powers had anything like a colonial empire. Of the second-rate states Spain, Portugal and Holland possessed extensive colonies; no other European state had more than a few isolated posts abroad. The old colonial system still held good, namely that all colonial trade remained entirely in the hands of the country to which the colony belonged. This restriction was very irksome to the colonists, and a vast amount of contraband trade between the colonies of different states went on. One set of settlements, those planted by the English on the Atlantic seaboard of America, had thrown off the rule of the mother country altogether, and thus had secured, besides political independence, liberty of trade with all nations as well. The example of the United States of America undoubtedly suggested a similar movement in other colonial communities, and when Napoleon conquered Spain and set up Joseph Bonaparte as king, the Spanish colonies took advantage of the fact to revolt, at the same time opening their ports to foreign commerce.

So popular in the Spanish colonies was the new system, that when the Treaty of Vienna restored the legitimate dynasty of Spain, the colonists demanded the continuance of their trade with foreign countries. The Spanish Government, however, refused to consent to this, in the interests of the Spanish shipowners, and the result of this refusal was a colonial revolt. Unfortunately for Spain, she had not the resources for conquering the vast, thinly peopled and unmapped areas of Central and South America, and not being willing to relax her commercial system, she lost her colonies. One after another, in the years following 1815, her dominions on the mainland raised the standard of revolt, until the loss of Peru in 1826 left her without a foothold on the American continent. The revolted colonies were formed into separate and independent republics, now represented by the fifteen states of Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, San Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica, Panama, Colombia, Venezuela, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile, Argentina and Uruguay.

The neighbouring Portuguese colony of Brazil acted with the Spanish colonies. When Napoleon's armies overran Portugal, the Portuguese royal family sought refuge in their colonies, and even after the restoration of their European kingdom they still continued to reside in Brazil until 1821, when the clamours and threats of their subjects at home compelled King John VI to return to his palace in Lisbon. The thought of being again governed from Europe and perhaps losing their trade privileges now in turn drove the colonists to rebel, and as the King could not conveniently live in two places at once and had not the means of reducing Brazil with Portuguese troops

or Portugal with Brazilian troops, he was obliged to consent to the separation of his dominions. To make the separation as little effective as possible, he persuaded the Brazilians to accept as their ruler his son Pedro, who was crowned Emperor of Brazil in 1822, while it was arranged that Pedro's son and daughter should inherit Brazil and Portugal respectively. Although the separation of the countries was thus perpetuated, the Brazilians were never quite satisfied with even this slight tie with the mother country; the new emperor and his son were somewhat despotic men; the former was compelled to abdicate the throne in his son's favour in 1831, and the latter (who rejoiced in the imposing name of Pedro John Charles Leopold Salvador Bibiano Francis Xavier de Paul Leocadio Michael Gabriel Raphael Gonzaga), was also driven out of the country by a revolution which took place in 1889. Since that date Brazil has been a republic. The republic of Paraguay, originally part of the Portuguese dominions, established its independence under the adventurer Francia in 1815.

When Spain and Portugal had lost their colonies in America, the position of the European states as regards oversea dominions was as follows: Great Britain had her Canadian settlements, a large part of India, Ceylon, Cape Colony, New South Wales and British Guiana, along with smaller places such as Gambia, Sierra Leone, Jamaica and the other British West Indies; Holland ruled over the Spice Islands, Sumatra, Java and much of the Malay Archipelago, with part of Guiana; Portugal had settlements on the east and west coasts of Africa, with smaller colonies like Goa and Madeira; Spain still held Cuba,

the Philippines and the Adrar coast in West Africa; France held Cayenne in South America, and a couple of West Indian islands. Prussia and Austria were not colonising Powers, and the Russian expansion over Siberia can hardly be called colonial.

During the greater part of the nineteenth century Great Britain had no serious rival in the colonial sphere. She increased her dominions in India; she occupied the whole of the continent of Australia; she took over New Zealand; she pushed the Canadian boundary across to the Pacific; she founded new colonies in Ashanti, Natal, Hong-Kong, the Straits Settlements. In fact, the only other power that seemed to have any interest in oversea colonising was France, who occupied Algeria in 1830, Tahiti in 1842, Senegambia in 1860 and Cochin-China in 1862, besides other settlements of minor importance, like Nossi Bé and the Marquesas. By land, Russia pushed on her conquests in Asia, reaching Vladivostok in one direction in 1860, and Samarkand in another in 1868. The advance of Russia into Central Asia caused great alarm in the minds of English statesmen, who saw in this advance a menace to India, but the other Powers paid little attention to it.

The year 1884 marks an epoch in the history of European colonisation. For at this date Bismarck initiated a policy of annexations which was to develop into a scramble for land in the other continents which soon left hardly any parts of Africa, and as little as could be managed of Asia, under their original native rulers. These annexations were suggested to him by the renewed colonial activity of France and England. In 1881 France extended her sway over the African state of Tunis, and in the


ASIA
SHEWING EUROPEAN POSSESSIONS
British
Russian
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Portuguese
RUSSIAN EMPIRE
ASIA
CHINESE EMPIRE
MONGOLIA
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TIBET
NEPAL
INDIA
BURMA
SIAM
ANNAM
COCHIN CHINA
KOREA
JAPAN
KURILE Is.
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS (U.S.A)
Hong Kong (BRI)
Kiao-chau (GER)
TIMOR (POR)
BORNEO
SUMATRA
NEW GUINEA
Ceylon
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Yanaon (FR)
(FR) Mahe
(POR) Goa
(POR) Diu
AFGHANISTAN
BALUCHISTAN
Kabul
Merv
Samarkand
Penjdeh
PERSIA
RUSS. SPHERE
BRIT. SPHERE
ARABIA
TURKEY IN ASIA
Caspian Sea
Black Sea
Red Sea
EUROPE
AFRICA
INDIAN OCEAN
PACIFIC OCEAN

following year England secured control over Egypt, while France embarked on a scheme for extending her influence in the neighbourhood of Cochin-China. In 1882 the German Colonial Union was formed to encourage colonisation. In 1884 the first German colony was established at Angra Pequena Bay, in South-West Africa.

Anxious that Germany should not be left in the lurch while other Powers were increasing their territory, Bismarck now looked round for other opportunities of German colonisation. The settlement at Angra Pequena was organised as German South-West Africa, the occupation of Togoland and the Cameroons followed. Next year, in 1885, German East Africa was founded, and extended northwards into the Witu district. At the same time the north-east coast of New Guinea was annexed, and the Marshall Islands occupied. In 1888 the Bismarck Archipelago was added to the German empire, and named after its greatest statesman. Under the rule of William II Germany obtained Heligoland, in exchange for her rights over Witu and Zanzibar, Tsing-tao in China, and the Caroline, Pelew and Marianne Islands by purchase from Spain in 1899.

The sudden advent of Germany as a colonial Power awoke the jealousy of France. A force was at once dispatched to seize the untouched strip of coast between the Cameroons and the Portuguese colony of Angola. This part of Africa was formed into the colony of French Congo. In other directions, too, French enterprise found scope for extension. In 1894 a French column occupied Timbuktu; two years earlier another force reduced the natives of Dahomey, while other settlers raised the tricolour on

the Ivory Coast. The whole of the western Sudan was soon under the influence of France, and means were found of joining this area up with the French Congo. In 1885 a protectorate was established over Madagascar, which was definitely annexed ten years later. In Asia the Republic extended its control over Annam in 1883 and Tonkin in the next year, while somewhat later a treaty with Siam increased the French possessions in the valley of the Mekong, much to the irritation of England. This Anglo-French colonial jealousy came to a crisis in 1898, when the occupation of the Sudanese fort of Fashoda by Major Marchand, a French explorer, threatened to upset the planned annexation of the whole district recently conquered from the Mahdi by England. The withdrawal of the French left the eastern Sudan to Great Britain, but it was some years before the ill-feeling arising out of this incident was forgotten.

At the beginning of the twentieth century France began to make advances towards the conquest of Morocco. This was treading on the toes of Germany, who had also decided upon advances in Morocco. The result of the ensuing dispute was the calling of a Conference of the Powers at Algeciras in 1905, which left Morocco open to the peaceful penetration of all-comers, but recognised the right of France and Spain to a sort of joint protectorate there. The claims of Germany were again raised in 1911, and were only bought off by the cession of an enormous slice of French Congo. At the price of losing 100,000 square miles of territory elsewhere France at last obtained a definite protectorate over the greater part of Morocco.

Colonising energy spread from France to the kingdom of Italy, whose thoughts were first turned to this

sphere of action by the establishment of the French protectorate in Tunis. In fact, the Italians felt themselves cheated of a possible field for expansion by this move of the French Republic, and for some years the incident caused bitter ill-feeling between the two countries, an ill-feeling which was one of the causes of the formation of the Triple Alliance. A rush to secure some part of the African continent now took place. In 1882 Italians occupied the harbour of Assab, three years later Massowa was taken from the natives, and in 1890 the colony of Eritrea was constituted. The native Arabs resisted, but were no match for the European invaders. In 1889 a second colony had been formed on the southern Somali coast. There followed an intermittent war with the Abyssinian highlanders of the hinterland, in the course of which Italy experienced a defeat which made a profound impression throughout the world as a symptom of the virility of the non-European races. In 1896 General Baratieri led a force of 20,000 Italians against an enemy four times as numerous at Adowa; the result, which the disparity of numbers did something to account for, was a terrible defeat, the invaders losing 6000 men and all their artillery. The battle of Adowa secured the independence of Abyssinia, which was recognised by a treaty of peace shortly after.

At the beginning of the new century plans were formed for the conquest of Tripoli, which was still administered by officials of the Sultan; a Turko-Italian war followed in 1911, when the naval predominance of Italy secured the conquest. Before Turkey had agreed to recognise the Italian victory the Balkan war broke out, and the Sultan, now



threatened by dangers nearer home, at last ceded Tripoli, subject to a nominal suzerainty, in 1912.

One of the places where the Abyssinian victory of Adowa made an impression was in distant Japan, where a non-European race was likewise threatened by the advances of a European Power. In 1875 Russia had occupied the island of Sakhalin, though she withdrew her claims to the neighbouring Kurile Islands on the protest of the Japanese. After the war between Japan and China in 1894, the Russians stepped in to prevent the fortress of Port Arthur falling into Japanese hands, and, much to the Mikado's disgust, then proceeded to occupy the town herself. The presence of the Russians in Port Arthur was regarded by Japan alike as a mark of humiliation and a menace, and, like Germany in 1862, she set herself steadily to prepare for a life-and-death struggle with the great European intruder. Meanwhile the Russians completed their great Trans-Siberian railway which was connected up with both Vladivostok and Port Arthur. At last, when Russia, having established a protectorate over Manchuria in 1900, attempted to do the same thing in Korea, the Japanese declared war, in 1904.

It was at first much doubted if the oriental state was capable of standing against Russia's might, but for the last thirty years Japan had opened her gates to the full flood of modern European influence, and had adopted the machinery, the methods and the system of a Western state. And, though the magnificent old nobility, the Samurai, had been shamefully deposed from their position of martial pre-eminence, owing to the introduction of European democratic ideas, their brave spirit still animated many of the officers and soldiers of the Mikado Mutsu-Hito. The Russians, operating in a district many hundreds of

miles from their homeland, were defeated in engagement after engagement, at Liao-Yang, at the Sha-Ho, at Mukden, whilst their fleet proved equally unable to beat the Japanese. When Port Arthur fell to General Nogi, the Far Eastern squadron fell into Japanese hands, and when the Russian Baltic fleet, after a long journey round the Cape of Good Hope, reached the Far East, it was annihilated by Admiral Togo in the great naval battle of Tsu-Shima. After this, Russia, who had little heart in the war, professed herself ready to negotiate for peace, and by the Treaty of Portsmouth (in the United States) the war was brought to an end in 1905. The Japanese obtained Port Arthur and the southern half of Sakhalin, with a protectorate over Korea and southern Manchuria. Thus after a cost of over 200,000 Japanese casualties, Russian progress in the Far East was brought to a check.

In other directions, however, the Russians continued to extend their sphere of influence. In 1884 Merv in the Turcoman district was occupied, and in the next year the seizure of the Afghan town of Penjdeh nearly led to war with Great Britain, who again felt uneasy about her Indian possessions. In 1893 the greater part of the Pamir plateau was added to the dominions of the Czar, and Russian influence began to make itself felt in Persia. Here again, by approaching India from the west, British interests appeared to be threatened. But in 1907, when a common fear of Germany had brought the two Powers nearer together, a treaty between Great Britain and Russia was signed at Petersburg, by which their interests in the Middle East were defined. Both nations were excluded from aggression in Tibet, Afghanistan was recognised as an

English protectorate, Persia was divided into three parts—a Russian sphere of influence in the north, a British sphere of influence in the south-east, and a joint sphere of influence over the rest of the country.

Austria-Hungary alone of the Powers has not become a colonising nation; her oversea dominions consist of the ice-bound rocks of Franz Josef Land, ten degrees under the north pole, discovered by the Austrian explorer Payer in 1872. But there has been one noteworthy new colonial development which has been directed by one of the minor states of Europe. In 1876 the International African Association was formed under the direction of Leopold II, King of the Belgians, for the development of the Congo basin. In 1885, at a conference held at Berlin, the Belgian king obtained the permission of the Powers to erect its settlements into a "Congo Free State" under Leopold's protection. The administration of this sovereign was characterised by a slackness which allowed a great deal of unnecessary cruelty to the natives, but his death in 1909 resulted in the establishment of direct Belgian control under an agreement concluded twenty years earlier.

By the beginning of the twentieth century there was hardly any part of the land surface of the globe that was not under the influence and direction either of European states or of states of European origin. The largest of the remaining areas, where the native peoples still retained independence, was the Chinese empire, where, with the exception of northern Manchuria, the Asiatic rulers still held unfettered sway. Japan alone of the non-European states can be held to rank as a Power. Siam retains an independent existence, while the mountain tribes of Nepal and

Bhotan in the Himalayas, also preserve a nominal independence. The Turkish empire can hardly be called a European state, and the deserts of central Arabia have not been taken under European control. In Africa Abyssinia keeps the flag of native independence flying. We must not forget to add the two republics of Liberia and Hayti, in West Africa and the West Indies respectively, formed for the benefit of liberated negro slaves.

A word must be said as to the colonial states that have thrown off their connection with Europe. The struggling republics of South and Central America have never yet been powerful enough to exert much influence in the world, but the United States of America, with its vast population and its tremendous natural resources, must be reckoned one of the Powers. Though not a military nation, the "Americans"—for they have succeeded in monopolising the continental adjective—have developed a powerful navy, and they have shown excellent fighting qualities on occasion. The gradual consolidation and centralisation of the states, especially since the great Civil War between North and South in 1861–1867, has increased their united influence enormously, as their expulsion of the French from Mexico, their conquest of Cuba, Porto Rico and the Philippines from Spain in 1898, and their efforts to effect the transference of the Dominion of Canada from the British empire to their own have conclusively shown.

The great developments of the Industrial Revolution have so altered and improved our means of communication that the furthest parts of the habitable globe are now within easy and rapid reach of Europe. Colonies are now no longer far-away lands with

but little influence on continental politics; they are living members of the European states system, and as such have more and more to be taken into account by the statesmen of the age. When war broke out in 1914 fighting was seen, not only in France and Belgium, in Poland and Galicia, but all over the face of the globe—in West Africa, in East Africa, in South Africa, in the Far East, in the Malay Archipelago, in the South Atlantic, in the Pacific. The Foreign Ministers of Europe no longer confine their attention mainly to territorial adjustments on the Continent; the age of World-Politics has begun.

CHAPTER XI

THE ARMED PEACE

One of the chief characteristics of recent European history has been the development of huge military establishments, to such an extent, indeed, that the period from 1871 to 1914 has been called that of the Armed Peace. In earlier centuries the resources of the European states allowed none of them to keep up a very large army in time of peace, and even during a war there were not the facilities for equipping, feeding and managing more than a limited number of men. It was considered wonderful, for example, that France should be able to get together a quarter of a million men in the eighteenth century. But with the development of resources under the influence of the Industrial Revolution it became possible to increase the forces at the disposal of Governments to a hitherto undreamt-of size.

France set the example, during the Revolutionary war, of first applying a law of Conscription. Attacked on all sides by what looked like an invincible coalition of European states, forced to stand up against the united strength of Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, Italy, Spain and Great Britain, the French found salvation in the adoption of the principle that for the preservation of the safety and the forwarding of the interests of the state it is the duty of the citizens to fight for their country. At first this principle was

announced merely as a theoretical proposition, as it was hoped that the ensuing response of the nation to provide volunteers would be enough to secure the safety of the Republic. In 1792 thousands of men presented themselves as volunteers at the army depôts of France, and many new regiments were formed. But the result was far from what had been expected; the men who offered their services contained among their number many sincerely patriotic and self-sacrificing enthusiasts, but by far the greater number consisted of unemployed, wastrels, and adventurers, filled with political zeal for the Revolution and amenable to no real discipline. The new troops refused to obey their officers, behaved badly on the field of battle and deserted in large numbers. The general report of the commanders was that the volunteers of 1792 were altogether unsatisfactory, if not worthless.

The Government now fell back upon more business-like measures. Already the principle of national service had been declared by an order to the army officials to make a return of able-bodied citizens suitable for the army; in 1793 the first real Conscription law was passed. All Frenchmen between the ages of eighteen and forty were to be held ready for service, and the recruiting officers were to make a preliminary selection of half a million conscripts. The danger of the military situation justified the measure, but so new was the idea that it provoked an outburst of opposition from hundreds who preferred the risk of national defeat to the risk of personal injury or death. In the Royalist districts, where the people had no sympathy with the Republic and hoped for the success of the enemy, the attempt to force them to risk their lives for a Government

they hated provoked a rebellion—this was the chief cause of the insurrection in La Vendée. The Jacobin Government compromised; while insisting on the carrying out of the Conscription, they passed a new law later in the year restricting the choice of the recruiting officers to men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. By the beginning of 1794 France thus had 770,000 men under arms. The total collapse of the Coalition followed.

The troops thus raised proved sufficient for the occasion, and no fresh conscription was held for five years. The war ended, except as against England, whose troops dared not at that time show their noses on the Continent. The army was allowed to dwindle owing to losses, dismissals, desertions and the dispatch of Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt, until it was reduced to its normal peace establishment.

On September 5, 1798, accordingly, a new Conscription law was passed, by which all French subjects between the ages of twenty and twenty-five were made liable to be called up. This famous law formed the basis of the French system of national defence until the year 1870. The rigour of its application varied with the times. Napoleon I in his last years of power called up not only the conscripts legally due for service at the time of action, but anticipated the course of time by calling out those who would become old enough for service in succeeding years. This accounts for the youth of the soldiers seen in the French ranks in 1813, 1814 and 1815. In times of peace and economy vast numbers of exemptions were granted, and Napoleon III preferred to have a smaller but better trained army rather than a larger and less expert force.

In response to the new system established in France the other Powers had to follow suit, if they wanted to be able to meet France on equal terms. Prussia and Austria adopted the Conscription system after the campaigns of Austerlitz and Jena, the Prussian army being reorganised by Scharnhorst, the Austrian by Count Stadion and the Archduke Charles. Russia then adopted a system of compulsory recruiting which her vast population made comparatively easy. In 1812 one recruit was taken out of every twenty-five heads of the population, and in later and more peaceful days the proportion of conscripts was very much smaller. Britain alone of the Powers did not adopt compulsion.

The period from the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars to the Franco-German war may be termed the period of the old Conscription. The period of the new Conscription begins with Bismarck's army reforms of 1862. At that date it was computed that of 156,000 Prussian subjects who annually became of military age only 40,000 were recruited. The new law provided for the enrolment of some 25,000 more annual conscripts, and at the same time the period of service was lengthened. We have seen how bitterly the people and the Parliament of Prussia opposed these measures, but after Sadowa a reaction set in, and the nation expressed its approval of what Bismarck had done by a parliamentary vote of 230 to 75. After the war of 1870, France declared it necessary for her security that she should increase her forces, and immediately after the conclusion of peace measures were taken to include as many young Frenchmen as possible in the lists of the Conscription. On March 13, 1875, was passed the law which corre-

sponds in the new Conscription to the law of September 5, 1798, in the old Conscription. Virtually universal service was established, and this being imitated in Germany and other states of Europe, it became the custom to pass, by means of a short-service system, the whole of the manhood of the country through the national army. Almost every European state adopted the theory and practice of universal service, Great Britain alone, placing her entire reliance on her fleet, refusing to fall in with the general current.

When the available armies of the nations now numbered millions, it was obvious that warfare would be a more enormous and terrible business than ever, and there were many who saw in the common exposure of whole nations to the " moving accidents of flood and field " the best security for the keeping of the peace. But the mutual fears and conflicting interests of nations were to prove more powerful than the airy philanthropic philosophy of idealogues and the short-sighted materialism of individuals, and in the result the rival states were able to fling at each other vaster masses of armed men than on any previous occasion in history.

After the Franco-German war Bismarck's aim was to prevent France from being able to have that " revenge " about which her people were almost at once talking. To secure this result, Bismarck aimed at isolating France by coming to a good understanding with all the other Powers of Europe. England, the traditional enemy of France, was friendly; Italy, her ally of 1866, was also friendly and even disposed for the renewal of the alliance; Russia dreaming of Pan-Slavism, and Austria-Hungary still smarting from Sadowa, were the dangerous Powers. Again

Bismarck's statecraft achieved a remarkable triumph. As in 1870. he made the most of the rivalry of these two states in the Balkan peninsula. Austria was now being violently nudged by her emancipated partner Hungary to attract her attention to Russia's schemes of aggrandisement in the direction of Constantinople, and the Russo-Turkish war of 1877 very conveniently opened out to Bismarck the means of diverting Austria from her vindictive broodings over Sadowa. At the Berlin Congress of 1878 Bismarck presided impartially and benevolently, though by refusing to support the extravagant demands of the Czar Alexander II he incurred the wrath of Russia. This, however, correspondingly brought with it the approval of Austria, and in 1879 a treaty was signed between Germany and Austria by which each bound herself to support the other against any possible attack by Russia, whilst if either were attacked by any other Power, each bound herself to preserve a benevolent neutrality towards the other. Thus Bismarck assured himself of an ally in case of a Russian attack, and of a free hand against France in case of a French attack. France alone he did not fear; it was an alliance of France and Austria, of France and Russia, or of all three that he dreaded.

As a set-off against her promise of neutrality in the case of another Franco-German war, Austria gained the promise of German neutrality in case of an attack by Italy. Bismarck now felt secure on the side of Austria, but what if circumstances brought about a coalition of France, Russia, and Italy? Germany felt confident of being able to deal with France, but could Austria hold Russia at bay while her flank was being assailed by Italy? To prevent such a

dubious crisis from arising Bismarck at once set out, with his extraordinary cleverness, to attach Italy definitely to his own side. But in view of the recent Austrian alliance the task was difficult. Italy was still anxious to occupy those Italian-speaking districts in Istria and the Trentino which still obeyed the rule of Vienna, and though she felt grateful to the victor of Sadowa she felt the bitterest hatred towards the victor of Custozza and Lissa. The question was: Could Italy be persuaded to forego the opportunity of avenging these defeats and gaining the desired territories (which a Russian attack on Austria would hold out to her) by any corresponding advantages held out by Germany? Fortunately for Bismarck, Istria and the Trentino were not the only unredeemed lands. Italy had always regretted the loss of Nice and Savoy, ceded to Napoleon III in 1859, for Nice was an undoubtedly Italian town, and Savoy was the original home of the dynasty—the "House of Savoy." Corsica, too, according to the Nationalist principle should belong to Italy. If only France could be made in some way to quarrel with Italy, it might be possible for Bismarck to foment a regular antipathy between the two nations, an antipathy that might, as more recent, be got to outweigh the old antipathy to Austria. To further his plan, he egged on France to occupy Tunis, which it was known the Italians were thinking of taking for themselves. Unable to resist the bait, France forthwith, in 1881, hoisted the tricolour over the African city. A furious outburst of indignation convulsed Italy. The Press vigorously assailed France and her rulers; the French Press replied in equally vigorous terms; the quarrel was made; the trick was done.

Negotiations between Germany and Italy at once began. Bismarck offered the support of the allied Teutonic powers against France; the Italian Government was only too pleased. But the prospect of an alliance with the traditional foe, the victor of Custozza and Lissa, was not very acceptable to the Italian people in general. They hated France, but they hated Austria as much or even more. It was necessary to apply pressure on King Humbert to secure the completion of the alliance. "If you will not accept our friendship"—this is what Bismarck said in effect to Italy—"you will have to face our enmity. The German army, by its victory of Sadowa, saved you from a catastrophe in 1866; we shall now leave you to the mercy of Austria and perhaps may even help our ally to conquer you." This prospect appalled the Italian Government. A few months ago they might have appealed to France to resume her rôle of 1859 and repeat the services rendered at Magenta and Solferino, but the Tunisian crisis prevented that; France was at the moment more like fighting against the Italians than for them. There seemed no satisfactory alternative, and Italy gave way. In May 1882 the treaty between Germany, Austria and Italy was signed, and the Triple Alliance came into existence.

Having thus safeguarded Germany against attack in the near future, Bismarck turned his attention to his remaining rivals, Russia and France. Somewhat alarmed at the prospect of a joint attack from Austria and Prussia, Russia now seemed inclined to make the very alliance which the Austro-German combination had been designed to checkmate, but before any agreement could be come to between France and Russia Bismarck had again stepped in. By the

Treaty of Czernowitz (where in 1884 the German and Russian emperors were enjoying the hospitality of Francis Joseph of Austria) Germany and Russia agreed to remain neutral in the case of any other Power attacking them, thus guaranteeing the former against a Franco-Russian aggression and the latter against an Austro-German aggression. The treaty was defensive only, and so did not break through the Austro-German Treaty of 1879. France now remained friendless and isolated, and by the German grab for colonies in Africa had her attention distracted from her European frontiers, where for some years she had, as her War Minister Jules Louis Lewal remarked, been "staring, as if hypnotised, into the gap in the Vosges." From the year 1884 Bismarck felt satisfied that the peace and security of his newly created empire was at last assured for some time to come.

But where Bismarck wished only for security and independence, William II aimed at expansion and supremacy, and soon after the fall of Bismarck in 1890 it was apparent that the new Kaiser was about to embark in ventures which would upset many European apple-carts. In the first place he refused to renew the Treaty of Czernowitz, which was due to expire in 1890, thus showing that he had no fears of the results of a possible Franco-Russian alliance and that he might join Austria in an attack on the Czar's dominions. His internal policy was equally threatening and bellicose; more and more money was spent on the army, a great navy began to appear in the Baltic and the North Sea, to join which the Kiel Canal was built across the territory annexed from Denmark.

Russia took alarm, and turned to France for support.

In 1891 the French Atlantic fleet paid a visit to Kronstadt, and it soon became known that at the festivities attending the entertainment of the visitors a Franco-Russian alliance was discussed and agreed to shortly after. But since Germany seemed, by the abandonment of her Russian agreement, to be able to defy the combined forces of France and Russia, these two Powers eagerly looked round for further support. Their thoughts naturally turned to Great Britain, while it was also suggested that the French quarrel with Italy might be patched up in the hopes of breaking the Triple Alliance, unpopular as it had always been in Italy.

The task of bringing over England and Italy was a hard one. England had for long stood ostentatiously aloof from binding herself to any alliances, always preferring to retain a free hand in European crises; and besides, England was on none too friendly terms with either France or Russia over colonial questions. A dispute over the Siamese frontier brought about much ill-feeling between England and France in 1893, and the Fashoda incident of 1898 nearly brought on a war. England and Russia, too, had only just got over the Penjdeh incident, and they were still bickering over the Pamir frontiers. Italy was still sore over Tunis, and numerous " incidents " in the shape of riots and insults kept ill-feeling between France and Italy at a height. It required some diplomatic skill to adjust the difficulties which lay in the path of an agreement which would include France, Russia, Great Britain and Italy.

But the rapid rise of the commerce, the navy and the military force of Germany at last caused so much alarm that Great Britain found herself drawn irresis-

tibly towards an agreement with France and Russia, whilst Italy, knowing that the unsubstantial nature of the Treaty of 1882 was fully appreciated in Berlin and Vienna, feared the extension of the Austro-German power almost as much as France and Russia did. The result was seen at the beginning of the twentieth century. In 1901 France and Italy came to an understanding on African questions; in 1904 an Anglo-French agreement adjusted colonial relations; in 1907 an Anglo-Russian treaty defined the position of those two Powers in the Middle East. The road was clear for the completion of the Quadruple Alliance. But Italy was still nominally bound by her attachment to the Triple Alliance of 1882, while the English Government resolutely refused to bind itself by anything more than general agreements. It became customary at this time to speak of England, France and Russia as the Triple Entente, while Italy was still supposed to be united with Germany and Austria-Hungary in the Triple Alliance. But it will be far simpler and nearer the truth to speak of the Quadruple Entente and the Dual Alliance. For the impending struggle was to be one of the four outer Powers against the two Central Empires.

Let us pause for a moment to see what were the special aims of the six European Powers who were shortly to join in deadly combat. Great Britain desired to check the advance of a Power which openly boasted its intended destruction of British naval supremacy on "the Day"; France was again gazing into the gap in the Vosges and hungering for Alsace-Lorraine; Italy cast longing eyes on Istria and the Trentino; Russia aimed at foiling Austrian schemes in the Balkans and, more remotely, the spread of Pan-

Slavism. It must be remembered, too, that France and Italy were still keen on revenge for past defeats. But apart from these special aims there lay at the back of the minds of the Quadruple Entente the fear of the undue aggrandisement of the powerful empire now ruled by the ambitious Kaiser William II. On the other side we find Austria-Hungary intent chiefly on extending her influence down the western side of the Balkan peninsula, while Germany, the source and origin of the whole strife, demands, under the specious title of "a place in the sun," nothing less than the supremacy of the world.

And so the diplomatic situation developed, and the armaments kept mounting up, and the warships were launched in dozens every year; the only question was "When will the crash come?" Three times the God of War gave a runaway ring, but at last he put in his appearance in real earnest.

The first crisis came in 1905, when the Kaiser William landed on the coast of Morocco and declared that France and Spain should no longer monopolise the north-west corner of Africa. As the two threatened states had just concluded an agreement as to the advance of their influence in that country, this German attack was an unexpected intrusion, and much debate followed. Germany had hitherto exercised no political influence in Morocco, and it was a decided victory for her that France, unprepared for an immediate war (whilst her ally Russia was engaged in the struggle with Japan), agreed to submit Moroccan questions to a congress of the Powers. This was held at Algeciras in 1906, but meanwhile the Russo-Japanese war came to an end, and France showed a firmer front. England and Italy both

supported the French view of the questions at issue. The result was to check the German claims to political influence in the country, and the Kaiser's intended humiliation of France failed. The manner in which the attack was made, however, and particularly the enforced dismissal of the French Foreign Minister Delcassé by order of a German ultimatum, had stung French pride to fury, and the day of "la revanche" came considerably nearer.

The second crisis came in 1908, when Austria, taking advantage of a revolutionary movement among the Turks at Constantinople, suddenly annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina, which by the Treaty of Berlin she held only as protectorates. Russia, France, and Great Britain at once protested, and there was talk of war. The Kaiser then declared that if the action of his ally were opposed by Russia he would at once attack her with all his forces. The Entente was once more caught napping, and the Austrian act of aggression was tamely agreed to. This time it was Russia's pride that was stung to fury, especially when the triumphant Kaiser proclaimed in boastful terms how his appearance "in shining armour" had terrified the Czar into submission.

The third crisis came in 1911. The anarchic condition of the interior of Morocco led France to dispatch an expedition to occupy Fez, a seizure which greatly strengthened the French position in that country. Suddenly there appeared off the coast of Morocco the German gunboat *Panther*, followed a little later by the cruiser *Berlin*. Whilst these vessels took up their position at Agadir, Germany declared that the occupation of Fez had

altered the balance of power in the north of Africa so materially that it would be necessary to have a fresh treaty drawn up to secure German "interests." Again there was talk of armed resistance to this forceful interference. But again it seemed as if the Entente were afraid of a fight; the French agreed to negotiate, and the German "interests" in Morocco were abandoned by the Kaiser in return for the cession of 100,000 square miles of territory in French Congo.

Three times had the aggressions of the central empires brought Europe within sight of war, and three times had the Entente swallowed its resentment and yielded to the aggressor. But the time had come when it was felt that another humiliation would be intolerable, and when the next provocation came the challenge was accepted. In 1913 Austria-Hungary interfered in the deliberations of the Balkan ambassadors at Bucharest, and frustrated the Serbian plans for the annexation of Albania and the extension of Serbian influence to the Adriatic. Burning with resentment, Serbia at once turned to stirring up the rebellious spirits of the Bosnian Serbs, who were subjects of Austria-Hungary. The Serbian society of the "Narodna Odbrana" was the instrument of this work, and the excessive zeal of one of its enthusiastic members, Princip, led to the assassination of the Austrian heir-presumptive—the Archduke Francis Ferdinand—at Serajevo, on June 28, 1914. Here was a splendid excuse for the conquest of Serbia. An ultimatum was dispatched by Austria demanding a humiliating abandonment of the Serbian hopes of one day including in their kingdom their kinsmen of Bosnia, and demanding also a free hand for Austrian officials to enter Serbia and suppress

the anti-Austrian movement. This combination of humiliations was too much for Serbia to accept, and she appealed for help to Russia, Russia, however, was by no means anxious for war and urged Serbia to concede much in the hopes of avoiding bloodshed. Serbia accordingly agreed to everything but the demand for the Austrian officials to be given authority within the kingdom. Austria-Hungary declared that this refusal showed an intention of continuing secretly to plot against her and accordingly declared war on Serbia on July 28, 1914.

There followed a week of tremendous diplomatic activity and universal anxiety. Serbia had offered to submit all the points at issue to the decision of a European Congress, but Austria had refused this tardy means of settling the dispute. Immediately after the Austrian declaration of war, which it was felt would involve all the great Powers in strife, Sir Edward Grey, Foreign Minister of the United Kingdom, again proposed a European Congress. Again Austria refused to allow the other Powers a voice in her own quarrel. Matters now looked very serious. It was certain that Russia would not stand another rebuff like that of 1908, that she would not stand idly by and see Serbia crushed by the might of Austria. It was equally certain that Germany would once more appear "in shining armour" to fulfil her pledges of the Triple Alliance. It was certain, too, that in that case France would join Russia. Italy would in that event be nominally bound to join Germany and Austria, but public feeling in Italy was bitterly hostile to the central empires, and no Government favourable to those Powers could stand in that country; Italy might

even join the other side, to avoid the revenge of her late allies which a victory over France and Russia would enable them to take. Great Britain was pacific but uneasy, and if British interests were threatened, she too might come in.

The German Government, however, had no fears of defeat. Germany knew how thoroughly prepared she was for the long-premeditated struggle. She knew, or thought she knew, other things, too, which might enable her ally to gain the great material advantage of conquering Serbia without the risk of a European war at all. Russia had recently been troubled by democratic upheavals and a series of ugly strikes in the big towns; it had just been rather too freely admitted in the French Parliament that the army of the Republic was in no condition for immediate war, especially in the important branch of the artillery; the United Kingdom seemed on the verge of becoming a disunited kingdom by the threat of civil war in Ireland over the Home Rule question. The Kaiser, therefore, felt no scruples about letting loose the dogs of war. Russia, as expected, came to the assistance of Serbia; Germany joined Austria against Russia; and France came to the help of Russia against the central empires. The great European war had begun.

Thus the great conflict began with Germany and Austria-Hungary facing France, Russia, and Serbia (who was at once joined by the little state of Montenegro). Great Britain and Italy remained at first neutral, though France and Russia appealed for their assistance against the common enemy of the world. But so confident were the Germans of success, that they seemed to deliberately force Great Britain into war. Here again, while confident of a superiority


EUROPE
1914.
English Miles
0 50 100 200 300 400 500
NORWAY
SWEDEN
Kronstadt
St. Petersburg
SCOTLAND
NORTH SEA
Jutland
DENMARK
Esbjerg
Copenhagen
BALTIC SEA
Moscow
RUSSIA
IRELAND
ENGLAND
ATLANTIC OCEAN
HOLLAND
BELGIUM
GERMANY
FRANCE
SWITZERLAND
AUSTRIA-HUNGARY
Czernowitz
ROUMANIA
SEA OF AZOV
BLACK SEA
Bordeaux
Oporto
Lisbon
PORTUGAL
Alcolea
SPAIN
Madrid
Barcelona
Corsica
Balearic Is
SARDINIA
ITALY
ADRIATIC SEA
MONTENEGRO
SERVIA
BULGARIA
TURKEY
ALBANIA
GREECE
Ionian Is
TURKEY IN ASIA
Algeciras
MEDITERRANEAN SEA
SICILY
Cyprus
Candia or Crete

even over the whole united forces of the Quadruple Entente, the Kaiser hoped that he might overawe or trick Great Britain into remaining neutral until France and Russia had been separately crushed. The United Kingdom was ruled by a Liberal Government which had always professed a love of peace, and many both at home and abroad feared that Mr. Asquith's Government would sacrifice national honour and security for the dangerous ideal of keeping out of war at any price. Fortunately these fears proved wrong. The country was disturbed by the threatened outbreak of civil war in Ireland, where two hosts of armed citizens stood ready to embark in internecine strife; the insignificance of the Irish danger in the face of a united and resolute Great Britain remained again to be proved. There were ominous upheavals among the English lower classes, particularly where the trade unions had strength, and it was known that English Socialism had always been anti-militarist; some Labour leaders and some Cabinet ministers were known to be in favour of "peace at any price." Under these circumstances the Kaiser judged it safe to defy English opinion.

The German plan of campaign was to first paralyse France by a rapid and overwhelming blow at Paris, and then to turn with all her strength against Russia. The chief obstacle to this plan was the line of very strongly fortified positions which lay directly across their path on the Franco-German frontier. As it would take weeks to reduce these fortresses, it was determined to avoid them by an invasion through Belgium, for the Franco-Belgian frontier was guarded only by a few comparatively small and weak fortresses. But the invasion of Belgium would violate a treaty signed by the Powers in 1839, when the king-

dom of Belgium was recognised as an independent and neutral state. By this treaty the Powers agreed that they would all respect the neutrality of Belgium; and Germany (who now represented Prussia) could not send her armies through Belgium without violating that neutrality. This would give a *casus belli* to the other signatory Powers. As Germany was already at war with France and Russia, and Austria was her ally, this would not matter as far as those Powers were concerned, but Great Britain too had signed the treaty, and the breach of it might give her a really good excuse for joining in the attack against the grasping ambition of the Germans. Nevertheless Germany took the risk, and declaring that they would not allow "a scrap of paper" to prevent them from "hacking their way through" to Paris, the Germans crossed the Belgian frontier.

The effect of this was a real surprise for Germany. The Irish struggle and the anti-militarist vapourings were alike relegated to the background of English politics, and the Government sternly declared its intention of opposing the violation of the Belgian treaty by force of arms. Unable to overawe the British Government, Germany next tried to trick it into compliance with her wishes. There followed what Mr. Asquith described as "the infamous proposal" to buy English neutrality by a promise to rob France only of her colonial possessions, and not of her European territories, after she had been beaten. The offer was scornfully rejected, and when the appeals of the Belgians to save their country from invasion and conquest came across the Channel, the United Kingdom declared war on the German Empire, on August 4, 1914.

CHAPTER XII

COSMOPOLITAN TENDENCIES

We have seen how the rivalries of the nations have led to struggles and wars of great magnitude during the last century. Throughout this period, and in fact at almost all periods of history, there were large numbers of people who believed it possible so to arrange matters that there would be no more wars and that the nations would settle down as comrades to establish a new world of peace and prosperity. These ideas are doubtless great and noble, and therefore should not be given up because of the vast difficulties in the way of their fulfilment, but the history of the Peace movement has been one of continual disappointments and failures.

When the French Revolution broke out, the Democrats were filled with grand ideas of the brotherhood of man. A certain Anacharsis Clootz on one occasion collected a large number of men of all different nations and races, and brought them as a deputation to the French Parliament, which declared forthwith that the day of universal brotherhood had arisen. "Fraternity" was one of the catchwords of the Revolution, and the enthusiasts sincerely believed that if only Democracy could have free sway there would be no more wars at all. At this date, then, arose the belief that wars are entirely caused by the despotism of sovereigns

and the ambition of princes. This theory has many adherents even at the present day. Like most political theories it is based on a partial truth. There have undoubtedly been some wars that have arisen out of the ambitions of ruling princes. But it must always be remembered that the most despotic king has got to consider the feelings of his subjects to some extent, and it is usually found that the peoples have supported their rulers in most of the wars of history. A king doubtless often has at his disposal the means of plunging the country into war, but so does the Government of a democratic country; national ambition finds a better means of expression in the policy of a single man than in the policy of a committee or of a parliament, but parliaments as well as sovereigns have often been under the sway of a war spirit. The establishment of Democracy did not prevent the Balkan states from attacking each other in 1913; the establishment of Democracy did not prevent the United Kingdom and the South African republics from fighting in 1899; the establishment of Democracy did not prevent the great European war of 1914. The French Republicans of the end of the eighteenth century showed themselves as warlike, as ambitious and as despotic towards other weaker peoples as any king of France; the Germans as a whole were heart and soul in the movement for the extension of "Deutschtum," or German power, over the whole world. The ambitions of a single man are simpler to grasp than the ambitions of a whole people, and to say that wars are due merely to the grasping machinations of a few crowned heads and that popular war enthusiasm is merely the result of artful deception and instigation on the part of the sovereigns may be

an easy solution of the problem, but it is not a correct one.

The French Republic, as soon as victory attended its armies, soon showed that "Fraternity" was to be strictly subordinated to French national interests. The Belgians were forced, much against their will, to give up their ideas of independence and become French citizens. The Cisalpine Republic was from the first kept in strict subordination to the French Republic. The same thing happened to the Helvetian Republic; the same thing happened to the Batavian Republic. Not a single one of the new fraternal democracies but was not groaning under the iron heel of France after a few weeks of imaginary independence. Napoleon merely continued the work of the Republic in this respect. It was not the ambitious conquests of the Emperor that turned the French nation against him; it was the costly failures of the Russian campaign of 1812 and of the three following years.

As has been pointed out before, the common danger of Napoleonic aggression evoked a community of interest and effort among the other Powers of Europe. The result was Alexander I's "Holy Alliance" of 1815. How that came to grief we have already seen. But in spite of this failure much had been done. The Powers were far more ready to discuss matters than before the days of the Holy Alliance, and there was a feeling of common sympathies and common interests that had not existed in the eighteenth century. One of the causes of this was the danger which was still supposed to threaten all the rest of Europe from French Imperialism. Another cause was the common danger actually experienced by all the Governments

from the democratic movement. These common interests tended to keep up a good understanding between the great Powers.

There was another cause which led to the perpetuation of the " Concert of Europe " idea. At the Congress of Vienna the whole map of Europe had been reconstructed in a manner never before done at any conference of ambassadors. When the final agreements as to boundaries and other matters had been reached, instead of each state making a series of separate treaties with its neighbours, the whole settlement was written down in one treaty—the Treaty of Vienna—and signed by the ambassadors of all the states concerned. Now the signature of a treaty by a number of states makes all and each of those states responsible for seeing the terms of that treaty observed, and if one state afterwards breaks the treaty, the other signatories have a *casus belli*, or recognised right to declare war against the defaulter. Hence, by the action of the European states in drawing up a settlement of Europe attested by the signatures of all their ambassadors, those states obtained a common and mutual interest in all the arrangements made in the Treaty of Vienna. Thus, if Russia and Prussia agreed to shift their boundary in Poland a few miles east or west, Spain, France or the United Kingdom could quite logically claim a right to forbid it; if Spain ceded a single village to France, it would give occasion for Russia, or Austria, or Sardinia, or Naples or any other of the signatory states, to intervene. This common interest of all in the affairs of each led every threatened upsetting of the Vienna settlement to be discussed more or less peacefully throughout the whole of Europe, and the jealousies

of the Powers found a ready means of checking the aggressions of their rivals in an appeal to "the treaties" of 1815. And for fifty years "the treaties" were a real force for preserving the equilibrium, and with it the peace, of Europe.

The idea of the Concert of Europe received its first serious blow in 1866. The settlement of Belgium in 1832 had been considered a matter for all the great states; the settlement of Russo-Turkish questions after the Crimean war was relegated to a big congress at Paris; but the very important modifications in the European system which followed Sadowa were carried out by a simple treaty between the belligerent states of Central Europe. "The treaties" were set at defiance, and it was in vain that France urged that these breaches of the mutual agreement of 1815 were fit subjects for a European congress. The spell was now broken, and when the Franco-German war was over the transference of Alsace-Lorraine to Germany was effected by a treaty between France and Germany alone. The Concert of Europe as a working idea was dead.

Moral and religious teachers had criticised the Concert as being based on selfish and sordid motives. In spite of the pious professions of the Holy Alliance, it was an undoubted fact that the idea of the Concert was mainly to preserve their territories to the reigning dynasties and to keep a check on the aggressions of rival nations. The idea of fraternity, the idea of universal peace and goodwill, had little to do with it. But when the very practical Concert of Europe collapsed the more ideal conception of a universal brotherhood of the nations came forward again, and resulted in a definite international movement for the

avoiding of war as a human evil as opposed to a national evil. The movement had some rather important results, among them being the institution of the system of arbitration in national disputes.

The first important instance of the application of this system was in 1871, when the United States agreed with Great Britain to submit certain questions to the decision of a committee selected by five rulers, three of whom were to be "impartial." These three were the King of Italy, the Emperor of Brazil, and the President of Switzerland; the Queen of England and the American President were the others. The questions to be decided concerned the liability of Great Britain to pay damages for alleged help given to the southern "rebels" in the American Civil War. The meetings of the committee were distracted by some severe friction, especially when the American member wished to make England responsible for almost the whole cost of the war she was supposed to have abetted. Had the committee accepted this American claim there is no doubt that the attempt at arbitration would have failed—England would have withdrawn her consent to obey the decisions of the committee. As it was, the arbitrators decided that Great Britain was liable for the payment of £3,250,000 to the United States. This was accepted by Gladstone's Government, and war was avoided.

The example was repeated in 1873, when the same two Powers allowed the German Emperor to decide as to the ownership of San Juan Island off the American coast; the result was unfavourable to Great Britain. In 1893 there was another arbitration between the same two states, over the question of the Behring Sea seal fishery. There was a committee of seven—

two English, two American, one French, one Italian and one Swedish. This time the result was favourable to Great Britain.

In 1898 there appeared a document of great importance in the development of international agreements. The Czar Nicholas II issued a note to the other rulers of the world suggesting the possibility not only of establishing arbitration as a regular institution but of cutting down and perhaps eventually abolishing the great armaments now maintained by the Powers. The result of the Czar's note was the meeting of the first Peace Conference at The Hague, in 1899. Twenty-six states sent ambassadors to this Conference, including such distant ones as China, Japan, Persia and Siam. Three suggestions were made at this conference : for the establishment of aregular court and system of international arbitration, for the modification and regulation of the methods of fighting, and for the reduction or abolition of armaments. The first of these suggestions was adopted, and a regular international court was established at The Hague ; this court was to be open for the settlement of all disputes, but it was not made compulsory that disputes should be carried there. It offered a ready means for the peaceful solution of questions where otherwise war might result. As regards the second suggestion, the conference drew up and agreed to a list of rules intended to make warfare somewhat less barbarous and more humane : peaceful non-combatants were not to be massacred or mutilated, expanding bullets were not to be used, wells were not to be poisoned. On the third suggestion no agreement was found possible.

The results of the Hague Conference of 1899 were

disappointing to some people, but a great deal had been accomplished. The reduction of armaments was undoubtedly a practical impossibility, for while so many national ambitions and grievances remained unsatisfied the Powers could never agree to abandon the means of one day fulfilling their desires by force of arms. The reduction or abolition of armies and navies would mean a virtual acceptance of the permanence of existing territorial arrangements, unless entire reliance could be placed on The Hague tribunal to satisfy all the conflicting ambitions and aims of the various states. Could France abandon the army with which she hoped to regain Alsace-Lorraine? Could the Balkan states abandon the armies with which they hoped to conquer Turkey? Could Italy abandon the army with which the unredeemed lands were to be restored? Could Germany abandon the army with which she intended to conquer the world? Agreement on matters of disarmament was impossible, and the scheme had to be abandoned. As regards the regulation of warfare a good deal of effect was possible; though individual instances of the breach of The Hague conventions might occur, it was quite probable that civilised countries would agree as a rule to observe them. The chief result, however, of The Hague Conference was the establishment of the court or tribunal. Though there were some deep-seated rivalries and feuds which it appeared could only be solved by war, there were numerous minor questions which might easily lead to war if there did not exist a court, more or less impartial, ready to hand for their settlement.

A second Peace Conference was held at The Hague in 1907, and a few more regulations for the conduct

of war were passed, with other laws for the conduct of arbitration. Between 1899 and 1914 a fair number of disputes between different nations had been settled by resort to arbitration.

The early years of the twentieth century witnessed the spectacle of the European nations in arms at the same time as talk of peace was on every one's lips. After all, in spite of the colossal piling up of armaments, there had been no war between European states of the first magnitude since 1871. Thirty years passed, forty years passed, and still there was no great European war. The Hague Court was busy settling international disputes; the nations were busy exporting and importing goods from one to the other in peaceful commerce; the democratic parties were ringing with talk of universal brotherhood and peace. No wonder that the prospect of war was looked upon as a "scare" and a "bogey." The Anglo-Boer war was passed over as a distant scuffle in the wilds of Africa; the Russo-Japanese war failed to arouse the fears of the peoples of Europe—it, too, was thousands of miles away; even the Balkan wars passed by without awakening the mass of people to the proximity of warfare on a large scale in Europe.

It was still said that war on a serious scale between the great European nations was impossible. War under modern conditions, with the terrible death-dealing implements now in the hands of armies and navies, would be too disastrous to human life for any Power to undertake. It was said that it would be impossible for a great nation to consent that its entire youth and the flower of its manhood, ill-educated and well-educated, navvy, tinker, merchant, artist and poet, should be thrown into the furnace of war, to be

mangled and destroyed by the lyddite shell, the deadly Maxim gun and the torpedo. It was said by some military experts that under modern conditions the Defence had so great a superiority over the Attack that with anything even approaching equal numbers no combatant could make any impression on any other combatant. It was said that international trade had grown to such vast proportions that its suspension by a great war would be too ruinous to be borne for a month; that the collapse of financial credit would wreck the intending combatants before operations had started; that the vast amount of foreign investments owned by each Power would prevent too great a straining of friendly relations. It was said that the withdrawal of the manhood of Europe to fight would leave so great a dearth of labour in every country engaged in war that commerce would perish and the nation could not even be fed. It was said that the working classes all over Europe, inspired by the divine genius of Democracy, would rise in revolt to stop the hideous game. It was said that the spread of education, the increased intercourse of men of different races and nations, would broaden the human mind against a suicidal outburst of conflict among the peoples. It was said that the invitations of The Hague tribunal would be irresistible. It was said that the "Yellow Peril," the danger of eventual conquest by the millions of yellow men from China and Japan, would prevent the white nations from fighting amongst each other. It was said that a "Black Peril" from Africa would do the same thing. In short, the great majority of educated people believed that a great European war was impossible.

Unfortunately these speculative hypotheses turned

out to be idle dreams. The conflict of national aims was too much for cosmopolitan humanitarianism; the ambitions of a powerful people, grown inordinately proud and self-confident, laid the train to the huge heap of combustibles that had been piling up since the Franco-German war; the bullet of Princip set the spark to the train—and Europe was ablaze.

CHAPTER XIII

THE LESSER STATES

In this book we have been considering the historical development of the Continent of Europe. We have seen how the new era introduced by the Industrial Revolution and proclaimed by the French Revolution resulted in a political system in which the chief factors of movement were Democracy, Nationalism, and International Rivalry. In discussing these things our illustrations have naturally been drawn from the greater countries of the Continent, from France and from Germany, from Italy and from Austria, from Russia and from the Turkish empire. But these great factors in recent history have had their effects also on the lesser states of Europe, and it will be worth while to turn to the history of those lesser states and take a few examples of those effects. It must always be remembered, however, that in studying the history of Europe we are studying the history of the Continent as a whole, and not the history of each separate state. Every European country has a separate history of its own, and in al. countries we find that their recent history makes interesting reading, but in this book we are not taking the story of Europe from the point of view of each separate state but from the point of view of Europe as a whole. Anything that we shall here

deal with in the history of the lesser states, then, must needs be illustrative merely of general tendencies and not of the domestic history of the states concerned.

Perhaps in no country can the effects of the Industrial Revolution be traced so clearly and strikingly as in the case of Denmark. At the beginning of the nineteenth century Denmark was not in a very flourishing condition. She drew her chief wealth and power from her carrying trade in the Baltic, to protect which she had built a powerful navy. Owing to her having this navy Napoleon saw the advantage of getting Denmark as an ally against Great Britain, and the result was Nelson's victory at Copenhagen in 1801 and Gambier's seizure of the fleet in 1807. During the nineteenth century Denmark's internal prosperity leaped up with astonishing rapidity. Politically she was weaker, for whilst at the settlement of 1815 her king lost Norway, the war of 1864 against Russia and Austria lost her the provinces of Schleswig and Holstein. But economically she made great strides.

Up to the middle of the nineteenth century the mainland possessions of the kingdom of Denmark were for the most part waste and barren. But with the advance of agricultural machinery and the introduction of new methods the Danes took seriously in hand the development of the soil of Jutland. Under the direction of the "Hedeselskabet"—a society for reclaiming the heaths—hundreds and thousands of acres have been brought under cultivation. The Danish farmers enjoy at the present day almost the highest reputation in the world. Corn was always grown in fair quantities, but the

later nineteenth century saw the production of cheese, butter, bacon, eggs and other farm produce on a very large scale; the collection, packing and distribution of all these products were organised in a methodical way under the direction of farming unions. Manufactures developed too—a third of the population is now supported by them. Under the direction of the United Steamship Company of Denmark her commerce has still further increased. The new port of Esbjerg, founded in 1868, already has a population of 15,000 and a great trade. The Industrial Revolution has raised the prosperity of Denmark manyfold.

Illustrations of the development of Democracy may be drawn from Spain, Portugal and Switzerland. After the fall of Joseph Bonaparte, Spain fell back under the influence of its native ruler, Ferdinand VII, a despotic man without any sympathy for popular institutions. The Cortes, or Parliament, was suppressed, and a period of absolute rule began. In spite of the noble way in which the nation had fought for six years against the intruder who had usurped the throne of their ancient dynasty, while Ferdinand VII had been enjoying himself in France on his large pension from Napoleon, the restored king would allow no form of parliamentary freedom. Not only that; the "Liberal" leaders were arrested, imprisoned and in many cases put to death. The natural result was an insurrection. Under the lead of General O'Donnell, an Irish adventurer who had become Count of La Bisbal, the Liberals rose in 1820; the King became a virtual prisoner, the Cortes was summoned and a number of reforms were passed. But Spanish Democracy was no less oppressive than

French Democracy of the same period; the Church and the landed interest were violently attacked, heavy taxes were levied and a reactionary party quickly made its appearance. It was not long before a civil war between Reactionary Moderates and Revolutionary Liberals broke out, and this opened up the opportunity for a renewal of French intervention. The Congress of Verona gave Louis XVIII permission to invade the country, and in a few months the whole of Spain was overrun, in 1823. The King was restored to liberty, the Cortes was abolished and a Royalist reign of terror stamped out for the time all signs of democratic unrest.

The unpopular Ferdinand VII retained the services of the French troops until 1827; he was able to keep his throne unaided from that date until his death in 1833. He left the throne to his daughter Isabella, an infant three years old, and her succession was immediately challenged by her uncle Don Carlos. The majority of Spaniards accepted the infant Queen, for her Council (guided by the Queen Mother) bid for popularity by promising a Liberal Constitution; Don Carlos, on the other hand, rallied round him the reactionary elements in Spain, and a civil war began. Some of the leading "Carlists" were nobles from the Basque provinces of the north, and it was this district that formed the Pretender's headquarters; the war dragged on among the wilds and mountains of the north for seven years, and was marked by horrible barbarities on both sides; at last, in 1840, the Pretender was hunted right over the frontier into France.

For some time Spain enjoyed a period of rest, though the loss of the colonies and the devastations

of the Carlist war had made her a very poor country, and brigandage was rife in many parts of the land. But as the Queen grew up she adopted her father's opinions, and a severe repression of Liberalism began. The Cortes was suppressed, and under the direction of the Prime Minister, Gonzalez Bravo, the Liberal party was exposed to a severe repression and persecution. In 1868 this resulted in a second Spanish revolution; the Royalist troops were defeated by the rebel regiments at Alcolea, and Queen Isabella fled to France. There followed one of those interludes of turbulence and anarchy which disgraced continental Democracy and provided the best excuse for royal despotism. First it was intended to establish a republic, but the majority of the revolutionary leaders thought that a constitutional monarchy of the Belgian pattern would be both more acceptable to the nation and more secure. The crown of Spain was then offered to several European princes, of whom Prince Leopold of Hohenzollern accepted the offer; this, however, provoked the intervention of Napoleon III, at whose demand, as we have seen, the acceptance was withdrawn. Meanwhile the Regency had been conferred on Marshal Prim, who at last secured for his country a king in the person of Amadeus of Savoy, a son of the King of Italy. Though he was half-unwilling to take the dangerous and bankrupt throne, Amadeus was raised to the throne in 1870, and on the day of his landing Marshal Prim was murdered by a political fanatic. The reign thus unfavourably started did not last long, and in 1873 the Italian prince resigned the unwelcome throne. The state of the country at this time was appalling. The

Carlists, under another Don Carlos, grandson of the former one, were up in arms in the north; the treasury was empty; brigandage and violence were rampant all over the land. Under these circumstances the revolutionary party fell back upon a republic. This did not improve matters, and Spain relapsed into almost total anarchy. Taxes could not be collected, whole provinces refused obedience to the Cortes and appointed local independent administrative bodies, and bands of brutal marauders terrorised the people of the country districts. At last, in 1874, when it seemed that the country had been brought to the lowest depths of barbaric anarchy, Manuel Pavia, one of the military leaders, resolved to be the General Monk of Spain. His soldiers expelled the Cortes from their hall, and Queen Isabella's young son was proclaimed as Alfonso XII.

Under Alfonso XII Spain settled down into something approaching quiet. The Carlists were crushed, and their leader driven out, in 1876. A moderate Constitution, issued in that year, rallied the Liberals to the cause of the old dynasty. The country accepted the Constitution, and under the mild rule of Alfonso the country gradually recovered its prosperity, such as it was. Though universal suffrage was granted in 1889, the extreme Revolutionary party continued to intrigue against the monarchy, and during the reign of Alfonso XIII some very unpleasant incidents occurred. Strikes, riots and bomb-throwing became more prevalent than in any European country save Russia. When the young King was married in 1906, to a granddaughter of Queen Victoria of England, a bomb was thrown at his carriage; in 1909 the city of Barcelona was disgraced by atrocious riots in

which the mob burnt many religious buildings and ill-treated the inmates. It was evident that the triumph of Democracy had not brought peace and content to Spain.

The history of Portugal during the century following the fall of the Napoleonic empire in 1815 bears considerable resemblance to that of Spain. King John VI, who had taken refuge in Brazil when the French invaded Portugal, remained in his new home long after his country regained peace and security. This absence of the sovereign irritated the Portuguese, who talked of the indignity of being governed from a mere colony of their own founding. In 1820 Lisbon broke out into revolt, and the rebels would not submit until they received a promise that the King would return. The result has been already described; the Portuguese got back their King but lost their colony, which in its turn refused to be governed from across the Atlantic. In 1821 King John issued a Constitution, but the loss of Brazil in the next year caused a violent reaction against the Liberal party, whose action in demanding the recall of the King had led to the loss of the largest of the Portuguese colonies. There followed numerous riots and disturbances in Portugal, and on one occasion the King had to flee for refuge on board a British warship in the Tagus. John VI died in 1826, leaving the crown of Portugal to his granddaughter Maria da Gloria, while his grandson Pedro was to be heir of Brazil. The accession of a woman, though it had been allowed on a previous occasion in Portuguese history, was opposed by her uncle Dom Miguel, just as the accession of Isabella of Spain, seven years later, was to be opposed by her uncle Don Carlos;

in 1828 the Portuguese Pretender declared himself King and seized Lisbon with the aid of the Reactionary party. The young Queen escaped to England, and the leaders of the Liberal party were put to death. A Liberal reaction occurred in 1832, and a civil war broke out, encouragement being given to the rebels by the success of the French and Belgian revolutionists two years before. For two years this "Miguelist war" raged, and in the end the Pretender was expelled and Queen Maria returned. The victory lay with the Liberal party, and the Constitution was restored.

There followed a period of violent unrest in Portugal. There were constant riots and revolts both of the Democratic Radicals and of the Reactionary Moderates. Almost every change of Ministry was accompanied by riot and bloodshed. Portuguese politics were nothing if not bloodthirsty. In 1846 both the parties combined to overthrow the Ministry of Saldanha, who was trying to keep a balance between them, and the country was given over to anarchy for some months. After the collapse of this rising things went a little better, slowly improving as the century went on.

There was a return of unrest at the end of the century. A republican movement appeared, and a rising in Oporto in 1891 attempted to overthrow the Monarchy. Universal suffrage was granted in 1901, but this failed to satisfy the extreme Radical party. In 1906 King Carlos and his Prime Minister Joao Franco attempted to quell discontent by severe measures. The Cortes was suppressed and an absolute *régime* began, but in 1908 the King and his eldest son were murdered in the streets of Lisbon.

Franco fled the country, and there was an immediate rising. The Cortes was restored and the murdered King's second son Manuel was declared king. But his reign was short. The republicans rose in Lisbon in 1910, the young king fled to England, and the Portuguese republic was proclaimed. Thus far had Democracy advanced in Portugal.

In Switzerland we have the same struggle between Revolution and Reaction, though the question was not in this case concerned with the institution of Monarchy. Switzerland was a federal republic, of which the separate cantons enjoyed a large measure of self-government. The July Revolution of 1830 in France stirred up a strong democratic movement in Switzerland, and most of the cantons adopted very Liberal Constitutions. Fighting between Aristocrats and Democrats took place in Basle, and the result was that several cantons declared their intention of seceding from the Swiss Confederation if the recent democratic changes were not suppressed. After much negotiation a civil war broke out, and the five reactionary cantons were forced to abandon their plans of secession. Ill-feeling still remained, and in 1845 seven cantons formed a "Sonderbund," or separate league, for the defence of old institutions in Church and State. Another civil war followed, and again the reactionary cantons were suppressed, in 1847. In 1848 a new Swiss Constitution increased the powers of the central Government at the expense of those of the separate cantons, and the capital, which had formerly been shifted from one city to another from time to time, was now fixed at Berne. In 1874 a new and extremely democratic measure was adopted in Switzerland. This was the Referendum;

under this system, any bill brought in by the Swiss Parliament must, if 30,000 voters petition against it, be submitted for the approval of the entire electorate, a special poll for or against the bill being held for the occasion. This democratic experiment has not been imitated in any other European state.

Turning to the question of Nationalism, we may draw excellent examples of the effects of this movement from the states of Belgium and Norway, while important results have also been caused by the Nationalist movement in the Russian provinces of Poland and Finland.

The settlement of Vienna formed the whole of the Netherlands into one kingdom under the House of Orange. This arrangement, however, did not suit the Belgians, who differed very considerably in race, language, pursuits and religion from their Dutch neighbours. There were four million Belgians and only half that number of Dutch in the new kingdom, but in the States-General or Parliament of the Netherlands the two races were represented by an equal number of members. The majority in Parliament, consisting of Dutchmen and friends of the ministers, was accustomed to carry by small parliamentary majorities laws adverse to the interests and feelings of the majority of the nation; Belgian agriculture was taxed for the benefit of Dutch commerce; the Dutch language superseded Flemish and French in the public offices, the Catholic schools and institutions of Belgium were opened for the inspection of Dutch Protestant officials and reporters. This state of affairs lasted for fifteen years, during the whole of which time the Belgians continuously agitated for redress of grievances, but without success. Belgium

had never had a really independent existence since very distant ages, but the experience of Spanish, Austrian and French rule had not dulled the local patriotism of her inhabitants.

As elsewhere in Europe, the French Revolution of 1830 evoked a corresponding movement in Belgium. A riot took place in Brussels, and the population took up arms. The Dutch troops advanced to restore order in the city, but found its entrances barred against them; they therefore resorted to a bombardment of Brussels, a bombardment which only stirred the spirit of liberty still further. Then the Dutch offered to give the Belgians a separate Parliament if they would consent to the maintenance of the House of Orange on the throne. Had this offer come before the bombardment of Brussels it would doubtless have been agreed to, but now passions were inflamed and nothing short of complete independence would satisfy the Belgians. A regular war now began between Dutch and Belgians, in which the latter were worsted, being defeated in the battles of Hasselt and Tirlemont. Meanwhile, after it had been declined by a French prince, the crown of Belgium was accepted by a German prince, Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, in 1831. The Powers now stepped in to supervise the new settlement. Whilst French troops marched to the assistance of the Belgians, negotiations were opened for the termination of the war. King William of the Netherlands was greatly chagrined at the way in which the Powers forbade him to suppress the revolted Belgians, but his protests were overridden. France was violently pro-Belgian, and the other Powers were not anxious for another European war; while stipulating against

any increase of French territory, therefore, they agreed to recognise the independence of Belgium, and by the treaties of 1832 and 1839 Belgium became an independent and neutral state, while the River Scheldt was opened to trade. Thus was finally established the Belgian kingdom, by the treaty whose violation, seventy-five years later, involved Great Britain in war with the German Empire.

Turning to Norway, we have the same impatience with the anti-national settlement of Vienna. The treaty of 1815 had taken Norway away from the sovereign of Denmark and transferred the kingdom to Sweden. This transfer, which broke through the tradition of centuries, was most unpopular in Norway, and all through the nineteenth century there was friction between the two countries. The Government consisted almost entirely of Swedes, and the King was almost invariably to be found in the Swedish parts of his dominions. Some concessions were made during the century, particularly when the Norwegians secured a regular parliamentary system of government in 1871. The establishment of the Storthing or Norwegian Parliament only encouraged the development of the national principle, and long disputes and negotiations took place between the Crown and the Norwegian ministers. It was even thought, in the last decade of the century, that war would break out between the two parts of the Monarchy. In 1898 the Storthing ordered the adoption of a distinct national flag, and three years later it commenced a series of fortifications along the Swedish border. In 1905, on the refusal of the King, Oscar II, to appoint a separate diplomatic service for Norway, the Storthing proclaimed the deposition of their

sovereign and proceeded to elect a new one. So unanimous was the public opinion of Norway that opposition seemed to King Oscar a hopeless task, negotiations were opened, and the independence of Norway was peacefully recognised by treaty with Sweden before the end of the year. The Norwegian crown was offered to and accepted by a son of the Crown Prince of Denmark, who forthwith ascended the throne as Haakon VII. The nationalist principle had once more triumphed in Europe.

Finland and Poland provided the empire of Russia with a nationalist problem of some magnitude. The province of Finland was taken over from Sweden during the Napoleonic wars, and was confirmed to Russia by the treaty of Vienna. Though the Russians were not popular in the country, there was little real agitation or discontent until the later part of the nineteenth century. Finland possessed its own Diet, and after 1860 its own coinage; the army was restricted to service at home, and the Finnish language was legalised. But an era of repression set in with the reign of the Czar Alexander III. Russian officials were appointed to censor the Finnish newspapers, the Russian language was made obligatory for all officials. A retaliatory agitation for more complete independence began, but did not reach the height of insurrection, though it produced the assassination of the Russian Governor-General Bobrikoff in 1904.

In Poland, however, the spirit of Nationalism was much stronger. A word must be said as to the history of the overthrow of this once extensive Monarchy. Poland, in the middle of the eighteenth century, was a large and populous kingdom, but

its organisation was very loose and its Government had hardly any power. It was, in fact, a mere congeries of feudal estates, each governed more or less independently by its lord. Without any effective national organisation, this extensive state invited aggressions from its powerful neighbours, aggressions which were made easy by the open character of its clumsy frontiers and for which opportunity was given by the religious differences of the Polish people. Hence there occurred, in the later eighteenth century, a series of aggressions which resulted in the total extinction of Poland as an independent state. In 1772 a combined aggression of Russia, Austria, and Prussia resulted in the first partition of Poland: Russia took a long strip which included Mohilev, Vitebsk and Dvinsk; Austria took Galicia, with Lemberg, Przemysl and Tarnopol; Prussia took the district known as West Prussia, with Elbing, Marienburg and Bromberg. In 1793, while Austria was concentrating all her energies on the Revolutionary war with France, Russia and Prussia stole a march on her in Poland, and the second partition took place. Russia now secured a very large piece, including Minsk, Pinsk and Berdichev; while Prussia took the whole valley of the Warta, with Thorn, Posen and Kalisch. The last partition took place in 1795; Russia got Mittau, Kovno, Vilna, Grodno and Brest-Litovsk; Austria got Lublin, Radom, and Cracow; Prussia got Bialystok, Ostrolenka, and Warsaw. Such resistance as the Poles thought fit to give was easily overcome by the armies of the spoilers.

When Napoleon established the Grand Duchy of Warsaw in 1807, the Polish kingdom appeared to have been revived on a small scale, but with the fall

POLAND

Boundary of Poland at the Union of Lublin, 1569

The Partition of Poland, 1772-1795.

of the Napoleonic empire that creation disappeared, and the Treaty of Vienna made a fresh partition of

the land. The greater part of the former kingdom of Poland went to Russia. Twice during the nineteenth century Poland rose in rebellion against the rule of the Czar. In 1830 the news of the Paris Revolution started the insurrection, which was only put down after a severe battle at Ostrolenka in 1831. A second rebellion broke out in 1863, which was suppressed with even greater difficulty after a three days' battle at Grokowiska. Poland was thereafter exposed to a systematic tyranny which aimed at the suppression of all further attempts at independence. The Russian language was made official throughout Poland, thousands of Poles were exiled to Siberia, and heavy fines were imposed on the Roman Catholic population. Discontent, however, could not be suppressed, and the disaffection of the Poles was such as to invite an attack on that part of Russia by Germany and Austria. When the great European war broke out in 1914, the Germans declared that they would liberate Poland from the Russian oppressor, and the Czar Nicholas II accordingly issued a proclamation to the Poles in which he promised them a separate Constitution and the reunion under his own Government of all the old provinces of the Polish kingdom.

Many illustrations of the workings of the rivalry of the great Powers might be drawn from the history of the lesser states of Europe. The Concert of Europe can be seen at work in Spain, where Louis XVIII was sent to the aid of Ferdinand VII; in Greece, where the Powers interfered to secure its independence and to extend its frontiers; in Switzerland, where the movements of the Sonderbund war were carefully watched by the neighbouring states;

in Denmark, where succession questions distracted the Government; and in Belgium, where the Powers intervened to secure King Leopold in power. Colonial rivalries, too, bring into the foreground the question of the lesser states as colonising agencies, the fall of the Spanish overseas empire, the separation of Brazil from Portugal, the formation of the Congo Free State and its eventual annexation by Belgium. The lesser states, too, have played their part in the great events which led up to the great war of 1914, and we must remember that it was a question relating to one small state, namely Serbia, that led to the outbreak of the war, while it was a question relating to another small state, namely Belgium, that led to the entrance of Great Britain into the struggle.

Before we close our survey of recent European history we must turn back to our own country and consider how the history of Europe reacted upon and influenced our history, what our attitude towards the great movements on the Continent has been, and what principles have ruled our foreign policy in relation to the states of the European continent.

CHAPTER XIV

GREAT BRITAIN AND EUROPE

From her position as an insular Power, Great Britain enjoyed a certain freedom from continental entanglements. It is true that in the course of the eighteenth century her forces intervened with great effect in the various European wars of the time, but her main attention was usually given to domestic and colonial questions. She had realised that the command of the sea would secure both herself and her oversea dominions from attack, and was therefore mainly interested in continental politics merely as they affected the maritime situation. If there was one particular question on which she had consistently shown great interest it was that of the Netherlands. Threatened for long by the increasing military and naval strength of France, she bent every effort to combating the aggressive schemes of the Bourbon kings in the Low Countries. Her policy as regards Europe therefore resolved itself into three main efforts: to prevent France from annexing Belgium and Holland (with their great ports facing London), to prevent the increase of French territory elsewhere, and to prevent the formation of alliances between France and other maritime Powers. Of these the question of Belgium figured first and foremost; for this had she gone to war in 1742 and 1756, for this she joined in the Revolutionary war in 1793.

The French Revolution was at first hailed with delight in England, partly because it appeared to be at its initiation a movement intended to create a constitutional state of the English pattern across the Channel, a state with which friendly relations might be possible, partly because the disturbances of France were likely to weaken her for aggressive purposes. But when the mild Constitutionalism of 1789 developed into the Reign of Terror, and the apparent weakness of the armies gave place to the conquests of the end of 1792, England seriously took alarm. The seizure of Antwerp, the annexation of Belgium and the opening of the Scheldt drove the Pitt Ministry into war, and, as we have seen, the war did not really end (in spite of the truce of Amiens) until the French had been driven out of Belgium.

In the course of this great struggle—a struggle of twenty-two years—Great Britain had to bear enormous burdens and perform great deeds. Her taxes rose, her armies had to be increased and their numbers maintained, her commerce had to be guarded against the hosts of privateers sent out from the hostile ports, her allies had to be fed with money, her coasts had to be protected by a watchful fleet against the threatened danger of invasion. Throughout the long struggle the mass of the nation behaved itself with noble enthusiasm and patriotism. Some dark blots smirched the page of our history during those critical years: the factious opposition of the New Whigs under Charles James Fox to the efforts of the national Government, the seditious plots of a few fanatical Democrats, the angry violence of the Irish rebellion and its bloodthirsty conclusion, the perilous mutiny of the sailors in that moment of greatest danger

when, in 1797, the combined fleets of France, Spain and Holland were prepared to sweep down on our coasts with an invading army. Yet some such bitter shadows seem bound to fall across the brilliant struggles of great nations, and, taken as a whole, this great contest with France was a brilliant struggle. As our Prime Minister, William Pitt, expressed it, England saved herself by her exertions and Europe by her example.

The close of the Napoleonic war left the country disturbed, heavily taxed and deeply in debt. It was felt that a period of peace was required. There grew up a demand that in future England should not interfere in continental affairs unless its interests were vitally threatened, though as a matter of fact this really represented the policy of Great Britain as it had been for centuries. The idea of non-intervention was stimulated by the separation of the crowns of Great Britain and Hanover in 1837, owing to the German dynastic law refusing to sanction the accession of a woman whilst our law knew no such limitation to prevent Victoria ascending the throne. The separation was hailed quite as a relief, for Hanover had always had entire self-government, and it had often been complained that England was being dragged into continual embroilments on the Continent for the benefit of the Hanoverians. It would form an interesting speculation for those who delight in following up the unfulfilled destinies of history to calculate what would have been the result of the accession of the male line of the House of Guelf in England had Queen Victoria not lived to rule. Would England have refused to assist Hanover against Prussia in 1866? Would this have brought Napoleon III into

the field against England as Prussia's ally? Would the union of the crowns of Great Britain and Hanover have prevented the union of Germany under the House of Hohenzollern till the present day? Such speculations are interesting and amusing, but it may be as well to point out that they are almost useless, for so complex are the forces which mould history that the shifting of one factor in international politics may cause the most extraordinary and incalculable results on the others.

But while England lost what interest she had in Hanover she developed other interests in other parts of Europe. Already in 1789 she held Gibraltar, thanks to its magnificent defence by Lord Heathfield a few years earlier. The Treaty of Vienna gave her Malta and the Ionian Islands in the Mediterranean and Heligoland in the North Sea, whilst in 1878 she acquired Cyprus. The Ionian Islands and Heligoland were lost during the century, the latter in exchange for Zanzibar and Witu in 1890, the former ceded to Greece in 1864. On the whole Great Britain has devoted her attentions outside her own borders to colonial questions, and since the failure of the Hundred Years War in the fifteenth century she has never seriously thought of conquering an empire on the mainland of Europe.

As a counterbalance to the idea of non-intervention, there grew up in the early nineteenth century a contrary doctrine of intervention, though it was based on rather novel ideas. The old policies of intervention had been confessedly self-interested, and had as their avowed aim the spread of English power and influence; the new policy of intervention was set forth to be the outcome of a sense of moral

duty and ungrudging altruism, though it often gave the appearance of being the old wolf of aggression in disguise. This doctrine, however, undoubtedly originated in unselfish motives, just as a similar movement in revolutionary France had done; the idea was that all those states and peoples who were struggling for liberty and national independence should receive the support of Great Britain as the great champion of freedom and national liberty. The first noted exponent of this policy was George Canning, who, however, never lost sight of the advantages accruing from the pushing forward of England's name everywhere and from the appearance of British fleets in force at foreign harbours. Lord Palmerston was the next minister to adopt this policy of militant Liberalism, and he too was known always to keep an eye to the increase of Britain's influence in Europe. With the third great advocate of this policy, William Gladstone, the unselfish motive undoubtedly predominated, for throughout his career that statesman always made a great point of urging the claims of Christian ethics, even though on some occasions they conflicted with opportunities for national aggrandisement.

The most celebrated example of Gladstone's "moral" policy was the cession of the Ionian Islands to Greece. Those islands became British in 1815, by the Treaty of Vienna. They provided a convenient point of vantage in the eastern Mediterranean, they possessed at least one fine harbour, they had a profitable export trade; on the other hand, the inhabitants were Greeks and expressed a violent desire for union with Greece. While acting as Commissioner or Governor of the islands, Gladstone acquired a

sympathy with the demands of the people, and in 1864 he prevailed upon Lord Palmerston to hand the islands over to the King of Greece. The act has been censured by many as an act of undue national sacrifice, though others have defended it on grounds of Christian goodwill and morality.

If Britain attempted to have her say in the democratic movements of the Continent, she in her turn was somewhat influenced by continental Democracy. The first French Revolution evoked a very considerable outburst of democratic sentiment in the country, until the discrediting horrors of Robespierre's rule and the blatant militarism of Napoleon drove public opinion in the opposite direction. The French Revolution of 1830, however, distinctly influenced affairs in this country, for it was the example of the Paris insurrection that encouraged the Reformers, threatened the Tories and terrified King William. The "year of revolutions," too, produced a corresponding movement in these islands; the Chartists organised the monster petition in England and the Irish malcontents attempted an armed rising. But on the whole England may claim to have exerted more influence on the Continent than any continental movements did on England.

During the early and middle part of the nineteenth century, Great Britain shared the general distrust of France. She opposed Louis Philippe's intervention in Belgium and she protested violently against the Orleanist marriage in Spain. She increased her defences when Napoleon III became emperor, cast disapproving eyes on the Mexican expedition and formed corps of volunteers to prepare against a possible French invasion. When Lord Palmerston

brought in his Conspiracy Bill in 1858 to prevent the recurrence of plots like Orsini's, which had been organised by Italians in London, Parliament drove the minister from power for truckling to the national enemy, Napoleon III. It was not until the news of Sedan arrived that the French danger was seen to be a matter of past history.

But if fear of France occupied a prominent place in English foreign policy down to 1870, fear of Russia figured even more prominently still. There were several reasons why Great Britain stood in dread of Russian aggression. In the first place, Russia was considered to be a baby giant who had not yet learnt to use his strength, and it was feared that that vast Slavonic population might be one day turned loose on the other nations of Europe with the result of overthrowing that balance of power which was the best guarantee for peace and national security. In the second place, Russia's face was always turning towards Constantinople, and it was believed that if the Czar once got a footing on the Mediterranean English naval and commercial interests in the Aegean and the Levant would suffer, especially after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, when the main route to India was diverted to the Mediterranean. In the third place, Russia's possessions stretched out towards our Indian dominions, and there was a strong feeling against allowing her to push her frontiers right up to ours in that region so that her troops could march direct upon British India.

For all these reasons Great Britain felt herself to be the enemy of Russia, and she consequently adopted the policy of opposing Russian aggression everywhere, especially in Turkey and on the Indian frontier.

Thus from the days of the Greek war of independence to the days of the Berlin Treaty our efforts were used to maintain the strength and territory of Turkey against "the Bear." It was for this that we intervened in Greece and fought the battle of Navarino; it was for this that we first supported and then fought against Mehemet Ali; it was for this that we entered upon the Crimean war; it was for this that London rang with the "Jingo" song in 1878. It was not until the discovery that the Balkan Christians could snap their fingers at the Czar that British anxieties on this score were laid more or less at rest.

Our fears for India nearly led us into war with Russia over the Penjdeh incident in 1885, and actually did lead us into war with the Afghans, whom we suspected of playing into the hands of the Russians in 1838 and in 1878. The former of these wars witnessed the disastrous retreat from Cabul through the Jugdulluk Pass, when the British host was reduced to a single man; the latter war (which we might have avoided had we accepted the Amir's offer of a protectorate in 1873) made the reputation of the future Earl Roberts.

Colonial rivalry also played its part in other spheres of British action. The opening of the Suez Canal brought with it a renewed interest in Egypt, which we had occupied in 1801 only with the object of expelling the French expedition. This led to the purchase of the Khedive's Canal shares by Disraeli in 1875 and the occupation of Lower Egypt in 1882, followed up, after a pause, by Kitchener's conquest of Upper Egypt and the Soudan at the end of the century. In Indo-China we came into conflict with French claims in 1893, and there were other disputes

about boundaries on the west coast of Africa. There was some slight friction with Germany over their planting of African colonies in 1884, and the Australians were particularly sore when England allowed the Germans to get a foothold in New Guinea. England also took part in the "scramble for China" at the end of the nineteenth century, when all the Powers set out to gain ports in the Celestial Empire. Whilst Russia got Port Arthur and Germany got Tsing-tao, Great Britain secured Wei-hai-wei as her share of the plunder. There were even disputes with Portugal over the frontiers in east and west Africa, and during the 'nineties much ill-feeling towards the English was produced in Lisbon.

But with the beginning of the twentieth century arose a new factor in England's foreign policy. The rapid growth of German commerce and naval strength became a menace to our security. Though there were no specific reasons for quarrelling, ill-feeling grew between the two nations, especially after the outburst of hostility against us in Germany at the time of the Boer war. The avowed aim of the German Navy League, to crush the fleets of Britain, made hostilities a matter of probability, and the diplomatic opposition of Germany over the Moroccan and Bosnian questions still further embittered the relations between the two countries. A secret official report issued in Germany in March 1913 contained the following bellicose passage: "Neither the ridiculous shriekings for revenge by French patriots, nor the Englishmen's gnashing of teeth, nor the wild gestures of the Slav peoples will divert us from our aim of protecting and extending German influence all over the world." Still Great Britain refused to

commit herself to any definite treaty of alliance with the Powers hostile to Germany. Agreements were come to with France in 1904 and Russia in 1907, but these merely composed outstanding differences and gave no definite promise of help against any other Power.

When at last the great European war broke out, at the end of July 1914, Great Britain felt that a critical time had arisen when she might be called upon to act. Sir Edward Grey made a last effort to induce Austria to accept mediation on the subject of the dispute with Serbia, but his pleading fell on deaf ears. Then came the embroilment of Russia, Germany, and France in the dispute, and England was called upon to render assistance to the other members of the Entente in their hour of peril. But England was by no means anxious for a war, and it may be doubted if she would have come into the fight for a long time had not the German invasion of Belgium forced her hand. All that Sir Edward Grey would do was to promise to guarantee the French commerce and coasts from attack by a German fleet or invading army and to promise that if Germany neglected her warning on this point she would join France as an ally.

As we have seen, the German plan of campaign necessitated a march through Belgium, and this move would, it was thought, almost certainly force Britain to side with France. It has been pointed out what considerations induced Germany to ignore the British protest. The German Chancellor, von Bethmann-Hollweg, sounded the British ambassador at Berlin on the subject, and on July 29 told him that in any case Belgium would be restored to her full independence

and freedom when the war was over, and appealed to him for a promise of neutrality. This promise was, of course, refused, and the British attitude on the Belgian question became firm. On August 2 the German troop-trains moved up to the Belgian frontier and an ultimatum from the Kaiser's Government demanded free passage for his troops through Belgium to France. Belgium, alarmed for her own security in the event of the triumph of her powerful neighbour, strenuously refused the desired permission, and orders were given to the Belgian troops to resist the German invasion by all the strength in their power. German troops immediately crossed the frontier, and the King of the Belgians forthwith sent an appeal to King George to come to his assistance. After an ultimatum had been presented by Great Britain to Germany demanding the suspension of the invasion of Belgium, we declared war, on August 4, 1914.

We may conclude, perhaps, with a quotation from Mr. Asquith's speech of November 9, 1914. "We shall never sheath the sword which we have not lightly drawn until Belgium recovers in full measure all and more than all she has sacrificed, until France is adequately secured against the menace of aggression, until the rights of the smaller nationalities of Europe are placed upon an unassailable foundation, and until the military domination of Prussia is wholly and finally destroyed. That is a great task worthy of a great nation. It needs for its accomplishment that every man among us, old or young, rich or poor, busy or leisurely, learned or simple, should give what he has and do what he can."

APPENDIX I

RULERS OF THE CHIEF EUROPEAN STATES, 1789–1914

Great Britain and Ireland

(*The United Kingdom*, 1801)

1760. George III.
1820. George IV.
1830. William IV.
1837. Victoria.
1901. Edward VII.
1910. George V.

France

1774. Louis XVI.
[1792. First Republic.]
1804. Napoleon I, Emperor.
1814(1815). Louis XVIII.
1824. Charles X.
1830. Louis Philippe.
[1848. Second Republic.]
1852. Napoleon III, Emperor.
[1870. Third Republic.]

Prussia

1786. Frederick William II.
1797. Frederick William III.
1840. Frederick William IV.

PRUSSIA (*continued*)

1861. William I (German Emperor, 1870).
1888. Frederick III.
1888. William II.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY

1780. Joseph II (Holy Roman Emperor since 1765).
1790. Leopold II.
1792. Francis II (Francis I, Emperor of Austria, 1804).
[The title Holy Roman Emperor was abandoned in 1806.]
1835. Ferdinand I.
1848. Francis Joseph.

RUSSIA

1762. Catherine II.
1796. Paul.
1801. Alexander I.
1825. Nicholas I.
1855. Alexander II.
1881. Alexander III.
1894. Nicholas II.

SARDINIA (*Italy*)

1773. Victor Amadeus III.
1796. Charles Emmanuel IV.
1802. Victor Emmanuel I.
1821. Charles Felix.
1831. Charles Albert.
1849. Victor Emmanuel II (1861 Victor Emmanuel I, King of Italy).
1878. Humbert.
1900. Victor Emmanuel II of Italy.

APPENDIX II

BRITISH PRIME MINISTERS AND FOREIGN MINISTERS, 1789–1914

Prime Ministers.	*Foreign Ministers.*
1783. William Pitt.	Duke of Leeds.
1791. ,, ,,	Lord Grenville.
1801. Henry Addington.	Lord Hawkesbury.
1804. William Pitt.	Lord Harrowby.
1805. ,, ,,	Lord Mulgrave.
1806. Lord Grenville.	Charles James Fox.
1806. ,, ,,	Viscount Howick.
1807. Duke of Portland.	George Canning.
1809. Spencer Perceval.	Earl Bathurst.
1809. ,, ,,	Marquis Wellesley.
1812. ,, ,,	Viscount Castlereagh.
1812. Earl of Liverpool	Viscount Castlereagh (created Marquis of Londonderry, 1821).
1822. ,, ,, ,,	George Canning.
1827. George Canning.	Viscount Dudley.
1827. Viscount Goderich.	Viscount Dudley (created Earl, 1827).
1828. Duke of Wellington.	Earl Dudley.
1828. ,, ,,	Earl of Aberdeen.
1830. Earl Grey.	Viscount Palmerston.
1834. Viscount Melbourne.	,, ,,
1834. Sir Robert Peel.	Duke of Wellington.
1835. Viscount Melbourne	Viscount Palmerston.

1841.	Sir Robert Peel.	Earl of Aberdeen.
1846.	Lord John Russell.	Viscount Palmerston.
1851.	,, ,, ,,	Earl Granville.
1852.	Earl of Derby.	Earl of Malmesbury.
1852.	Earl of Aberdeen.	Viscount Palmerston.
1855.	Viscount Palmerston.	Sir George Grey.
1858.	Earl of Derby.	Earl of Malmesbury.
1859.	Viscount Palmerston.	Lord John Russell (Earl 1861).
1865.	Earl Russell.	Earl of Clarendon.
1866.	Earl of Derby.	Earl of Malmesbury.
1868.	Benjamin Disraeli.	,, ,,
1868.	William Gladstone.	Earl of Clarendon.
1870.	,, ,,	Earl Granville.
1874.	Benjamin Disraeli.	Earl of Derby.
1878.	(Earl of Beaconsfield, 1876).	Marquis of Salisbury.
1880.	William Gladstone.	Earl Granville.
1885.	Marquis of Salisbury.	Marquis of Salisbury.
1886.	William Gladstone.	Earl of Rosebery.
1886.	Marquis of Salisbury.	Earl of Iddesleigh.
1886.	,, ,,	Marquis of Salisbury.
1892.	William Gladstone.	Earl of Rosebery.
1894.	Earl of Rosebery.	Earl of Kimberley.
1895.	Marquis of Salisbury.	Marquis of Salisbury.
1900.	,, ,,	Marquis of Lansdowne.
1902.	Arthur Balfour.	,, ,,
1905.	Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman.	Sir Edward Grey.
1908.	Herbert Asquith.	,, ,, ,,

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