
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

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BY

HERBERT ANTCLIFFE

AUTHOR OF "LIVING MUSIC," "BRAHMS," "SCHUBERT," "THE SUCCESSFUL MUSIC TEACHER," ETC.

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CONTENTS

PREFACE

THE Origin and Nature of Music are subjects upon which most scientists and all sentimentalists have their own theories. The following essays attempt neither to teach the one nor to guide the other, but merely to suggest some lines of thought for the average thinking person who is interested in the subject. Most of them have passed the primary test of editorial scrutiny, others have been delivered as lectures to audiences, alike learned and unlearned, in many different places in England and Ireland, some of the original papers being modified as the result of discussions following the publicity so afforded.

The longer ones have generally appeared as several distinct articles, sometimes in journals of widely differing scope. To the Editors of the *Musical Quarterly*, *Musical Times* (that severe critic, but genial and unvarying friend, the late Dr. W. G. McNaught), *New*

Music Review, *Educational Times*, *British Review*, *Musical News* and *Musical Opinion*, an acknowledgment is due for their kind permission to reprint.

While the essays claim to be unified by their endeavour to discover or state one or other aspect of the Nature of Music, of its essential qualities, its constitutent materials and the methods in which such materials are employed, each essay is complete in itself. This has involved a certain amount of overlapping, which, however, has been avoided so far as is agreeable with a complete statement of the theory or fact set forth.

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF MUSIC

SIX SHORT ESSAYS

TO

O. G. SONNECK

THE ESSENTIAL NATURE OF MUSIC

When we come to a serious study of the position taken by music in the polity of human life, there are two points which are most obvious. The first of these is that the art, in its elemental forms chiefly, but also in a less degree in those more highly developed, has had a widespread and an effective influence on nearly all departments of human life. Secondly, that that influence is the most unaccountable and erratic of all the influences to which human life is subject. It is an influence of which no science has yet given any adequate explanation, and least of all those sciences which are most applicable to the subject, the sciences of psychology and sociology.

It is not improbable that its very universality has been the cause of its neglect by psychologists and sociologists and also by historians. So often is it difficult to see the importance of that which works in a subtle way among all classes, that there is always a temptation to ignore it, especially where, as with music, it

has left no landmarks on history, and no outstanding characteristics in psychology. Music is the one art in which all find pleasure, and by which all are inspired. Shakespeare was not a musician, yet he had some pungent remarks as to "the man that hath no music in his soul." If such a being did or could exist he would be fit only for the grossest evils of which we have any knowledge; but it is well-nigh impossible that he should ever appear in human guise. Nevertheless, the greater our lack of the sense or appreciation of music, so much the greater, as a rule, is our lack of the saving graces of humanity. Without being a pathologist it is comparatively easy to see why the curative qualities of music are now being increasingly recognised. Its qualities as a physical as well as a mental refreshment and food cannot be ignored by those who realise the relation that exists between mind and body. Its expressive power is supplemental to that of speech, but it is just as necessary as speech itself to our health and happiness. We may live without either speech or music, but living so is life maimed of two of its most precious faculties. The lack of speech is usually either the cause or the consequence of some physical or mental disorder, and equally so—though less apparently so—is the lack of musical feel-

ing and expression. From the crooning of its sorrows by the infant weakling to the spontaneous outburst of song by the young man rejoicing in his strength, and from this to the recollection by the aged imbecile of songs sung years before, music is inseparable from our lives. We can do without the graphic and plastic arts, for they are not essential or elemental to our nature. They are the products of long ages of growth and development, and are imitative in their scope and intent. Music in its present state of development is no doubt largely artificial; but in its primary and essential form it is an elemental and original quality of man's nature. High and low, rich and poor, good and bad, old and young, learned and unlearned, wise and foolish, all find in it a means of expression of their joys and a solace in their woes. Without music man could not exist, for he would destroy himself in his melancholy, if he did not wither and pine away in the lack of cheer and solace. He would go mad for want of a means for expressing the emotions which fill the every moment of his life, and for the grotesque ugliness with which the world would be filled.

That it is necessary at all times and in all circumstances I do not suggest. Many people get more music than is good for them; they

hear so much as to stultify their critical faculties, which is one great reason why there is so much trivial music heard in the great centres of population. Does not the same condition obtain in the matter of speech and conversation? The people who cannot live without constant conversation, who are miserable and dissatisfied when left for a short time to their own thoughts, usually fill up their time with scandal and levity, or at the best in repeating other people's remarks which they only half understand or do not understand at all. To all of us, however, not only speech but conversation is so necessary that without it we should go mad or die of some equally distressing complaint. And this applies still more strongly to music, in which are the elements of beauty of sound, motion and form; without it beauty ceasing to exist and life becoming death.

Yet if we approached half a dozen of the world's greatest thinkers and asked each of them the question, "What is Music?" we should probably get half a dozen answers of such varied characters as to leave us no wiser, and possibly to leave us even more bewildered than before. It is also pretty certain that not one of such answers would be a satisfactory one, even viewed apart from the conflict of

idea arising out of so many different standpoints. Each would define it according to the science or philosophy which is his particular study, or according to his peculiar trend of thought. The mathematician would define it as the sounds resultant on certain regular and controlled vibrations of the air or the ether; the idealist philosopher would explain it as a supernatural gift the source and extent of which we cannot reach on this side of the grave; one would show it to be a development of speech, and another would prove it independent of but supplementary to speech. Of these two latter views, Herbert Spencer the sociologist and Richard Wagner the musician-dramatist would seem to be the most redoubtable of the champions of the speech theory, while Jules Combarieu, Richard Wallaschek, Ernest Newman and others have made out what would appear to be a strong case for the theory of independent development.

It is all but impossible, however, to prove the nature of the origin of what, if it is not quite as ancient as is the human race itself, is pretty nearly so. Probably neither of these theories so ably contested by great debaters is exclusively in the right, though equally probably both have a certain amount of truth in them. As things exist now the two faculties

of speech and song are so intimately related that, while each still retains its independence, there seems to be little practical purpose to be served by ascertaining, if it were possible to ascertain, the origin of either or both. Each is the natural and perfect complement (i.e., completement) of the other, and lacking either we are unable to express in any full degree our entire mental and spiritual natures. Whereas each is a natural means of expressing thought and emotion, one is mainly the means of expressing thought and the other mainly (and primarily) the means of expressing emotion. There are instances in which both express precisely the same thing; yet generally each has a power to express something of which the other fails. When words and music are combined, whether by means of joint utterance in song or chorus, or by the suggestive means which we call "Programme Music," it is generally the words which express the ideas and supply the mental framework, while the music expresses the underlying emotion.

All expression, whether of thought or emotion, is either deliberate or spontaneous; intentional or accidental. It may be crude and fulfil its purpose very imperfectly, as when an uneducated person attempts to speak of

something outside his or her previous experience; or it may be highly developed so that it delivers its message fully and completely, as when an orator whose knowledge and control of language are each perfect in their day. Artistic expression is never entirely spontaneous, because art implies deliberation. Exactly how and when deliberation takes place varies according to circumstances. The spontaneity of art expression comes from previous deliberation, so that direct deliberation may not be necessary. Nature is not art until art is second nature; but always art is something more than nature. It must be sincere and without cant or mere artificiality; though artifice has its place in art it is one of complete subservience, while a merely spontaneous utterance is never art. So when we speak of the Art of Music we speak of something that has extended beyond, though it has not moved away from, its original and primary functions.

Music may be crude in two respects; either in its emotionalism or in its artificiality. Crudity in the former respect occurs among comparatively uncivilised nations, whose art is undeveloped and whose general ideas are of a primitive nature. Crudity in the latter respect occurs among the uneducated classes in civilised nations or in those races whose

civilisation has been developed entirely along intellectual lines. For instance of the first we must now-a-days look to a few African and South Sea tribes whose chief idea of music is to drive away evil spirits. Among the lower and middle classes of the European nations are to be found many instances of the second class, while of the third no more striking instance could be wished than the wonderfully elaborate theories and the crude practice of the musicians of China and some parts of India.

In its first beginnings there is little doubt that music was a means of expression; not necessarily in the same manner or to the same extent as speech; but nevertheless really a means of making known to others, of giving audible sign of, emotion and thought. It is also equally certain that it always has been chiefly a means for the expression of emotion as distinct from thought.

Two kinds of music are to be found among races which are still more or less in a primitive condition. One, which is frequently almost toneless, depends for its effect upon its rhythm, upon regular or irregular pulsations, usually produced upon a drum which gives out only just sufficient tone to be heard clearly by a number of people at one time. The other, which is usually vocal, consists of tones, not

so clearly defined or so varied as even the simplest of our present day European music, but still sufficiently defined and varied to be unmistakeably tonal. Both kinds are emotional in two ways; they express emotions and they appeal to emotions. Even the emotional appeal may be made in two essential, elemental ways; through the senses and through the imagination. An example of this twofold appeal occurs in the primitive use of the drum. Mr. Henry George Farmer in his little book on *The Rise and Development of Military Music* has told us that "the drum became a particular object of worship. Like the ark of the Hebrews, it was taken into battle 'to give victory over enemies,' and the warrior had but to rub it on his thighs, and he was immediately endowed with irresistible strength, whilst the voice of the god or spirit was found most efficacious in creating fear and dismay in his enemies." Here we have the emotion of courage aroused by the imagination when the thighs are rubbed by the drum, and the actual sensible emotion of fear aroused by its clamour. Other instances right down the ages might be given of the manifold appeal to the emotions and of how its artistic side has grown by slow degrees upon the employment of this function of sound.

The statements of the immanence—the everywhereness—of music made by Carlyle and the similar but different references to its omnipresence by those who hear in every sound of nature a musical note may be explained in two ways. The former are mystic, spiritual or religious, and are made by analogy or by a literal assumption of the idea that all nature is living and that its life is centred in the heart of man. Such an analogy is that in the book of Job, "When the morning stars sang together and all the sons of God shouted for joy." The aim is to bring the infinite within the comprehension of finite minds.

The latter on the other hand are realistic—almost materialistic. Their analogy is brought about by a desire to explain everything according to the measured and organised art of human civilisation in its present state. At its highest it is an attempt to do a similar work with regard to the natural as the former does for the supernatural. At its worst it forms a sense of comparison which has never risen above a crude imitationalism.

Before it is an art, therefore, we see that music is a means of expression, whether in a crude, undeveloped state or in one fully developed and regulated. In its simplest and most elemental forms it is a means of expression

of pure emotion. The possibility of there being states of pure emotion, of feeling without thought, about which psychologists argue need not detain us here. We often hear of or experience what are known in common parlance as "thoughts too deep for words." These, whether momentary or continuing are merely emotions or feelings unmixed with thought or incapable of being shaped by thought, and consequently inexpressible in words. When thought is employed some verbal utterance, adequate or inadequate, becomes possible. Because music is the one means of expression of pure emotion it is the only one which may be entirely spontaneous.

Inarticulate, unordered sound is the primary and elemental expression of emotion. The shriek of pain, the cry of joy, the wail of grief —these are the natural and most effective utterances of certain things that cannot be expressed in words. "I am afraid," or the corresponding words in any language, uttered in the most terror-stricken tones, is almost expressionless compared with the formless and unspellable wail of terror that inspires the feeling which it also expresses. What is more expressive than the grunt of the satisfied gourmand? No words will convey even a meagre suggestion of the feeling which this

unmeasured and indeliberate sound so vividly portrays.

Brought down to its primary and most elemental conditions it is into this that all the elaborate development of art music resolves itself. It is the expression of feelings to which no words can do adequate justice, and while the application of intellectual formulæ has made it more understandable by others, it is its spontaneity first of all that makes it so fully expressive of that which bears but little relation to thought, and therefore to speech. "Words will not express" many emotions which other sounds express quite clearly and forcibly. To some extent we can trace this back to the sounds made by the lower animals, at least by inference if not by actual genealogy. In the purring of the cat and the tiger, the growling and barking of the dog, the roaring of the lion, even, possibly, in the croak of the frog and the chirp of the grasshopper, we have expressions of emotion—of contentment or discontent, of pleasure or pain or anger. Doubtless in many of these animals such sounds arise largely from physical emotions; but the dividing line between physical and psychological emotion has yet to be determined. Nor are these sounds music as we usually understand it, any more than the sound

of the waves on the sea shore or of the waterfall or the rustling branches of the trees are music. They are, nevertheless, the elemental sounds out of which music is formed, and apparently they arise from emotions which in more highly developed beings are expressed in sounds more ordered, though as an inevitable consequence, more artificial. Humming and crooning are a species of spontaneous music that is closely related to art music, because the melodies used are commonly those in the construction of which art has been employed.

There is bound to be this relation in all even of the most spontaneous and the least ordered of the utterances of civilised peoples. We cannot, even in our wildest moments, cast off altogether the tradition and growth of centuries; and, therefore, consciously or unconsciously, we express the least controlled of our emotions in the terms, the ordered sounds, of art. Those persons who have the least control of their emotions, who are possessed of few emotions, or who are in the habit of concealing their emotions, seldom or never indulge in such practices as humming, crooning, whistling, etc. Such indulgence is a sure sign that emotion is the ruling force; the restraint of it generally, though not invariably, is a sign that thought or mentality is the ruling force. Those

who have little capacity for thought and whose circumstances have compelled them to restrain their emotions—such, for instance, as many among the poorest classes of labourers in both town and country, to whom long hours and poor living are the daily round—also refrain from this indulgence. In this case it is the restraint of emotion, not the lack of thought which causes the suppression of such sounds, for the youthful peasant characterized in the popular song *A Careless Whistling Boy am I* is usually all emotion.

To other proofs of the essentially emotional character of music we must add the fact that it is, more than anything else, a means of collective expression. Collective thought—and particularly thought on the part of a large crowd—is so rare as to be almost non-existent. Collective emotion is constantly at work, and is the cause of all great social movements, whether made by sudden impulse or by gradual and slow development. And collective emotion is a force of which it is impossible to estimate either the direction or the impetus, the character or the power. There is a cause for this which can best be ascertained by deduction from the effect.

Collective expression is not, as some conceive it to be, the mere expression on the same

subject of thoughts and feelings possessed in common by a number of individuals. There is a certain character about collective thought, feeling and expression, that is not the mere agglomeration of the thoughts and emotions of the individuals of which the collective body is composed. The conjunction of two individual temperaments produces a third collective temperament (a kind of joint temperament possessed by two persons acting in sympathy) which exists only in the conjunction of the two. The possession by two minds of a unity of thought is rare; but the possession by two or more souls of a unity of emotion is so frequent as to be a commonplace. When a large number of temperaments (of emotional dispositions) are conjoined, the result is a new temperament still more widely separated in character from that of any individual, and of deeper intensity, though usually short-lived.

Upon those who come into contact with such a collective temperament, whether as contributing separate atoms to its constitution, in opposition to it, or merely as observers, the effect is more rapid and frequently more vital than that produced by contact even with the strongest and most distinctive of individual temperaments. This quick influence is seen most in music, in which numbers have a more

direct and powerful influence than in other matters.

Proportionately with the number of occasions on which it is possible, a spontaneous burst into song is more common on the part of collective temperaments than on the temperaments of individuals. This, however, is in inverse ratio to the size of the body out of which the collective temperaments arises, and a small party is more ready to sing than is a large crowd. Half a dozen individuals sharing a common emotion and unrestrained by the artificial conventions of society, very readily express in song the common emotion which they feel, particularly if that emotion is one of joy or pleasure. The previous association of the music may have had little or nothing to do with the emotion it is called upon to express. (The use of *Tipperary* is a striking and appropriate illustration of this). This association is a matter of little or no importance, though the character of the music will probably be in some degree suited to the emotion.

What happens is that the emotion is expressed in the terms which come most readily to hand, and which best fit it at the moment. Probably those who so express themselves have no thought of the fitness or unfitness of what they are doing. They exercise no process of

selection, for they have no standard by which to select, and possibly no variety of emotional expression by which they may give vent to varied emotions. They express themselves in music because it is the one method of giving utterance to their emotions, and serves the same purpose no matter what such emotions may be. At the same time, one reason why large bodies are not so quick at expressing their emotions in song is that, though there may be perfect unity of emotion, to obtain a unity of expression does require a certain degree of thought. This thought is supplied, not infrequently, by a leader whose one qualification for the office is a quicker and more spontaneous thought than that possessed by his followers.

Rhythm is one of the most important elements in music for various reasons. It is one of the commonest forms of elementary music, and it is also the means by which emotional or natural sounds are converted into the materials of art. It is the latter largely because it is the means by which sound may be measured and stored away or remembered by the non-scientific hearer. We say now-a-days that "time" is the means by which rhythm may be measured; but long before time measurement was invented or developed on an orderly system rhythm was employed not only in the making of music, but

as a system of teaching and learning notes unrememberable without it.

From the foregoing it is possible to construct a short formal definition which will serve to unify considerations of the nature and utility of the art. Music is that art which expresses in an orderly manner the emotions of human beings collectively or individually, whether such emotions be combined with thought or not. Its pleasurable sensations are caused sometimes by its actual beauty of construction, but more often by the fact that it arouses a certain sympathy between the one responsible for its expression (either composer or performer) and the one upon whom the impression is made, that is, the hearer. Sounds which do not arouse this sympathy fulfil only the minor functions of music, and however beautifully constructed the music containing them may be, it is quickly condemned by all save the pedant. In considering the subject of the expressiveness of music, therefore, we are compelled by its nature to see chiefly how far and in what manner it expresses and arouses these emotions.

But there is one other point also to be considered; that is the necessity and utility of the limitations of the art.

Limitation, the exclusion of some matter or of some method or methods, is of the very

essence of intelligence and therefore of art. It is the most important function of the faculty of selection. To bring them within the comprehension of finite beings all things must be limited. It is because of the nature and character of these limitations that one art, or one science, is distinct from every other. If music were free from the limitations which prescribe its expression to the emotions, or to matters connected more or less directly with the emotions, it would lose much of its force as an emotional expression. Its power as emotional expression rests mainly on the fact that its limitations exclude from its expressiveness matters which, though sometimes an aid, are more often an encumbrance to the emotions. And as limitation is necessary for comprehension, so selection is for effective expression. Therefore art progresses as the power of selection increases; which happens with the general increase of knowledge and experience.

The development of music as a means of expression may be said to pass through five different stages, viz., Pure emotional sound, with no artistic or intellectual selection or control, and therefore, though in some degree expressive, lacking any force or direct aim in its expressiveness; Crude undeveloped art; Art developed mainly upon artificial lines, or me-

chanical art; "Art for art's sake," which is somewhat the same, but with a deeper and more spiritual beauty than the last; and, its ultimate aim, a complete and forceful means of expression of all emotions and moods.

Although this is what might be called a historical order, it is not necessarily a chronological one; for several of its stages may exist at one and the same time and in a single work. For this reason we have to separate the study of musical expression from our ordinary historical studies, nevertheless co-ordinating the two at various points and always remembering their correlation. It is one of the weaknesses of the ordinary historians that they have neglected entirely to observe the effect of art, and particularly of music, upon the progress of human life. They have looked upon the arts as being purely ornamental rather than essential to life, of both the individual and the community. Consequently history as it is now presented is the dryest and least useful of studies, and sociology is an infant science, the bulk of whose professors are on the wrong tack. If, as the foregoing considerations seem to indicate, music is one of the essential constituents of human life, neither psychology nor sociology, which are the root sciences of history, will achieve its purpose till both give a

fuller and more scientific recognition to the fact, and employ it accordingly.

THE RETURN TO NATURE

If we study the religions and philosophies that have governed men's lives at all times and in all places we shall find that all are agreed on one point. This is, that all created things return in due course to the source of their origin. There is, for instance, the Pagan idea of man's return to the womb of Mother Earth, just as there is the Buddhist belief in "Nirvana," that is, the return to the Universal Spirit from which we have all sprung by the extinction of individual desires. Christianity recognises the same principle in the oft-repeated dictum "dust unto dust," and in the doctrine that our destiny is fulfilled only in complete union with the Godhead. And many scientists tell us that everything from the motion of the worlds to the supply of water for the meanest stream, and from the complete history of the world to the hereditary history of a single family, progresses by revolutions and in cycles. Every detail, it may therefore be assumed, is at least affected by, even if it does not actually

perform or take part in such revolutions. And in all we can see some trace of either the complete revolution, or of some part of it which shows clearly that such revolution is actually in progress.

From this we may gather that it is for the purposes of development alone that things depart from their source; we cannot see their full fruition until they shall have completed their full course and returned to that from whence they issued. This is a very important consideration in viewing the progress of an art, and especially in viewing an art such as that of music, with its seemingly unlimited resources and variations, its strange developments, its sudden starts and rapid retardations, its unexpected beauties and its apparent uglinesses, which in course of time come to be regarded as beauties.

Music began in its elementary stages with a close and intimate union with Nature, being merely one of the least independent forces employed by Nature for certain ends. In order that it might develop its individuality and become a greater force it separated from Nature so far that there were times when all trace of the relation existing between the two seemed to be lost. It became an entirely artificial and apparently useless amusement. Its return to

Nature is just as certain, and there are many signs that such return has commenced; that once more it is drawing nearer to Nature instead of, as before, moving away from it. By what ways or by what processes is this drawing together being effected?

In answering this question we must first of all remember that such return is to Nature itself, not to the crude forms which the art took when first it broke away. Immediately before it is re-united, and when the re-union takes place, the art will be and must be, as perfect as it is possible to be without the actual completion of such re-union. This is the essential point which many forget in their endeavours either to hasten such re-union or to discover the signs of such re-union taking place. When Beethoven composed the "Pastoral" Symphony and included in it the imitations of the sounds of the stream and the songs of the birds he was not helping forward such union, but rather delaying it. When he wrote the C minor, borrowing the theme from the Yellow Ammer and then explaining it by the mystic dictum "Thus Fate knocks at the door," he was going little or no further along the road. When, however, he conceived these works each as a complete expression of something which neither he nor others could express

in words but which all felt and desired to express, he was carrying the art a step further than it had been carried before towards its complete fulfilment as the outward expression of essential Nature. What he said as to "Fate knocking at the door," too, was one of the signs of the unconscious desire for such return; of the desire for a conscious expression of the forces of life by means of the art most suited for such expression.

One of the greatest and most important signs of the return of music to nature is that there is a general demand that it should be and that it is being made a means of expressing all the emotions and thoughts of both the individual and the community. We have ceased to imagine that everything is expressible in words, that words are the sole medium of clear and definite expression. We now realise that there is something in humanity and in the individual human being which calls for expression and which is expressible only in the forms of sound which we call music. This is probably the surest sign of the return of music to its source in Nature.

That such return is not yet completed is clear from the many crudities which still exist in the art, and from the misunderstanding, even by musicians themselves, of its object and capa-

bilities. Inspiration by Nature is generally recognised as one of the essentials of a composer. Too often it is thought to be an ability to imitate or suggest the external properties of Nature; instead of which it is a receptivity which allows him to hear and understand her most intimate secrets and to express them, not necessarily that all may entirely understand them, but at least that all may be edified by them.

Of course, so long as it is at all expressive, music is more or less natural, and also the fact of its appeal to any emotion is a sign that it is not entirely separated from Nature. Mere cleverness is in some degree a natural expression, though the link with pure Nature in this case is a small and slender one.

THE UNIMPORTANCE OF MELODY

NOTHING is easier to define for text book purposes than is the word "melody;" while for general æsthetic purposes there is no word more difficult of definition. The question, "What is Melody?" has been asked and answered well-nigh as often as Pilate's more notorious question, "What is truth?" Yet in spite of this we do not find that any common

agreement has been arrived at which will enable us to recognise at once that any particular succession of notes comes, or does not come, within the term. And, of course, it must be remembered that in dealing with the subject of melody we must refer to it only in relation to the *art* of music; that is, not to the merely spontaneous evocation of sweet sounds, but to that which has some intellectual appeal by reason of its ordered expression.

In spite of the Pastoral Symphony, the Cuckoo and Nightingale Concerto, the Don Quixote Variations, and all their kin, it does not matter in the slightest whether the songs of the birds and brooks, of the wind in the trees or across the moors and valleys, are melodies or not. Philomel, with his breast against the thorn, emits sounds which sometimes are of the rarest beauty; but a discussion as to whether or not these sounds can be called a melody will aid us very little, if at all, in the practice of the art of music. Art is not art when it deals with such matters as this. It may be science, or curiosity, or an interesting pastime, or anything else under the sun, except that it is not Art. Art is *applied* Nature; that is, Nature does not become Art until it is again applied by man after long eras of previous application and development. To repeat what

I have said in the previous essay, Nature is not Art until Art is second Nature. And melody, as practical and unsentimental musicians have to do with it, is essentially a question of Art.

The familiar story of Rossini's difficulty in finding the melody of Wagner's *O holder Abendstern*, hackneyed and of very doubtful authenticity though it be, is nevertheless evidence of how widely and generally acknowledged is the fact of such varied and uncertain definition. Yet we are all liable to make mistakes such as this with music that is of a type in advance of the period in which it is written, whatever our opinions may be as to the position of melody in the polity of art.

Most people agree, however, each applying his or her own definition of the term, that without melody is no music. It is easy to believe that Mozart might make the remark frequently attributed to him, that "Melody is the essence of Music," for to him, and in his works, it was undeniably and entirely so. If he had said that "Melody is *of the essence* of music" there are few who would disagree with him at all; for a thing may be essential, it may belong to the very nature and spirit of that in which it is comprised, without being important, that is without holding a position which makes

it necessary that its appearance should take the precedence of other matters in order that the utility of the whole may be evident.

But even the most modern spirited of our young composers will usually admit, theoretically at any rate, that melody is not only an essential constituent of music, but that it is one of the most important of such constituents. In practice, however, many of them either entirely disregard their own theory, or else their ideas of what melody is are so widely divergent from those generally held by musicians and music-lovers alike as to deceive everyone except themselves into thinking they do so. Nevertheless some of their music is so beautiful in concept and execution that the question is forced upon us whether, after all, melody is as important a contributory to beauty and effectiveness in music as is generally supposed, and even whether it is essential to the existence of music in either its highest or its most elementary forms. Can we have music without melody, and if not, what is its position in the order of musical affairs?

It must not be forgotten, of course, that melody, like all other mundane matters, is evolutionary and progressive, and that where we fail to find anything that in our present state of musical development we can reasonably

call by the name of melody, future generations may see a melodic form of the most perfect type. This is constantly being proved by reference to recent history. There are few who cannot remember the objection on this score to the works of Wagner, quite apart from extreme cases such as that of Rossini to which reference has already been made. Even living composers against whom a charge of lack of melody was brought only a few years ago are now recognised as melodists of a clear and virile type, if not as inexhaustible sources of the purest streams of melody.

If we turn back the pages of history a little further, and carefully seek out the melody in the surviving works of earlier periods, we may find that the present age is not unique in its disregard of the importance of melody, using the term in its broadest sense. We shall perhaps even come to the conclusion that some of the greatest composers, and some of the most popular, have regarded it as comparatively unimportant.

Yet while we look at what has happened in the past to assist us in realising the necessities and the possibilities of the present and the future, we must not make the mistake of taking what has gone before as an absolute criterion of what is now in being or what is to come.

What may be a positive necessity where means are limited, may with extended means become a matter of indifference and unimportance, and even an obstruction to progress. We see this constantly in our everyday life, and in these revolutionary days we are finding the same is true in matters of art.

There may be,—I am sure there are,—certain eternal principles of art; but we must not confound materials and manners (or modes) with principles. The same principles may govern the formation of works composed of the very opposite kinds of material and in manners wider asunder than the poles. Whether melody is or is not used is not a question of principle, but simply one of what is the best and most suitable material. Melody is merely one of the materials available for use in the construction of music, and the principles of beauty and expressiveness must be applied whether we use it or not.

Mr. Rutland Boughton, one of the most thoughtful as well as one of the cleverest among musicians of to-day, has said that "the awakening of the imagination is perhaps the finest function of all the arts." Can we say that it is not? And if we say that it is—and I personally should put it much stronger and say that the awakening of the imagination is the

chief as well as the finest of artistic functions —must we assert that for the awakening of the imagination by means of music melody is a necessity?

Let us endeavour to ascertain, so far as is possible, what is the exact position and function of melody in the art of music of to-day—that is, in the composition of new works and in the performance of old ones.

To say, as one famous composer and critic has done, and thereby added to the already unnecessarily large number of tags available for superficial debaters, that "Music is Melody," is simply to beg the question. We might just as well say that Music is Harmony, or Music is Rhythm, or any other of its separate component parts. Music is many things, but it is not one of them to the exclusion of the others; and there are few of them that are necessary at all times and in all circumstances to its existence.

Then we must remember that a certain thing may be of essential importance and yet of relative unimportance. It may be absolutely necessary to the existence of that of which it forms a part, yet at the same time it may take quite a minor part in the exercise of the functions of the whole. Let us take an instance from another art.

In the tragedy of *Macbeth* the parts of the Three Witches are indispensable to the psychological development of the drama—they are an essential part of the emotive tissue; yet when we consider the relative importance of the various rôles quite a considerable number—Duncan, Macbeth, Lady Macbeth, Malcolm and MacDuff at least—take precedence of them. Or to take a more commonplace example. In the erection of a building cement, mortar, staples, beams and nails are all necessary to the stability of the work. Yet they do not come within the architect's design, and the observer is, or should be, unconscious of their presence. So also in the construction of a musical work, the essential is often of comparatively minor importance.

And from this we may turn to the actual practice of the art of music ever since it took a form by which we of to-day can recognise and utilise it, and see what has been the relative importance or otherwise of the position of melody in its constitution. For this purpose we need go no further back than the end of the seventeenth century, for it was during the boyhood of Bach and Handel, when our own Purcell was at the height of his powers, or very shortly before then, that music began to assume definitely its modern form and character. One

remembers in this connection the constant reiteration made by teachers of the end of the last century of the statement that the great composers whose works were to be taken as models, aimed first at getting a dignified movement in the bass with a strong and pure harmonic progression. I am not going to use this as an argument to prove the unimportant position taken by melody in the construction of music, even in the degenerate days from which we emerged finally with the close of the Great War. Such an argument would be scarcely convincing, for it must be confessed that, however suitable a dictum it may be for the guidance of young students at a certain period of their studies (and its suitability at any time is debatable), it is only partially and occasionally true.

Some of the classic masters may have aimed chiefly at this, though I cannot find that any of them have constantly and consistently kept this aim before them. Others have certainly worked horizontally only, with rare exceptions putting melody and the combination of melodies before all else; while some have hung their chords as pendants from the notes or successions of notes of which the topmost part is composed.

Handel, for instance, who although the

greatest of his school was nevertheless a typical and representative member of it, frequently left a bare sketch of his bass and the harmonic fabric to be raised upon it, and yet wrote out in full his desires in the way of melody. The statement, therefore, has sufficient truth in it to draw attention to the fact that, generally speaking, melody has taken at the most only a secondary position in the construction of certain kinds of music. The late Sir Hubert Parry, in one of his lectures, made some very appropriate remarks as to this. "Melody alone," he said, "is length without breadth, and however much it may please the initiated as well as the uninitiated, it takes time to deliver its message. Harmony on the other hand, is capable of conveying decisive meanings almost instantly; and when it is combined with tune it can give and enforce its meaning almost decisively."

Although Handel, as has been instanced, in some of his compositions made the melody the one essential part, in others—the great choruses of his oratorios, most notably—he took care that the general structural outline and the harmony were each well-balanced and complete, and left to chance the question whether melody resulted or not.

There are two ways of accounting for this.

The first is that he worked in this way because he considered—if he considered the question at all, which is doubtful, as he worked largely by his feelings alone—that in these cases melody was entirely unessential and unimportant and could be disregarded or omitted from the scheme altogether. Personally I am inclined to think this view is the correct one, though I am still open to conviction by the alternative view. This is that he considered all musicians would, or should, in their interpretation discover the melodic possibilities created by the harmonic structure, and would create their effect by means of the *continuo* or organ part, or by bringing into prominence as occasion should require, the voice or instrument which would most effectively carry out that purpose. In one respect, at any rate, he considered it unnecessary that the composer should insist upon the details of his own conception being followed; that is, in the particular curve and figuration of the melody. While he made the melody the most important and essential part in the solos, and insisted upon singers following exactly his written or implied notes, in his choruses, if it took a place at all in his considerations it took one quite in the background.

With Bach, who was even more exact in the

manner in which he wrote down his harmonic and melodic requirements, this was still more marked. Many movements cannot by any widening of the term be called either melodious or melodic, for they depend entirely upon their form, harmony and tone colouring, or upon their declamation for the effect which they produce. This applies particularly to the long recitatives, both solo and choral, and to many fugues and imitational movements, not only of Bach himself, but of all composers up to his time and for nearly a generation after.

It was not, in fact, until professional soloists began to exercise their powers tyrannically that melody was regarded by any as the be-all and end-all of music. These obnoxious creatures—the professional singers who misapply their great influence and power—have been responsible for many misconceptions and much evil of this kind. Partly through them, and partly owing to the shallowness of popular musical appreciation, works of high merit have been brought into despite by the too great realisation of their melodic characteristics at the expense of matters of more lasting and greater importance.

Haydn, who suffered a great deal from this tyranny, proved, in such a work as *L'Isola*

disabitata, that, freed from it, he could produce music in which melody played quite an inferior part. Fine work as this is in many respects, there is little in it which could be included in any definition of the word "melody." And Haydn shares with Schubert and Mozart the honours of being the world's greatest melodist! Even Schubert himself, the melodist *par excellence*, did not always employ this means of making music. In the well-known *Impromptu* in A flat (Op. 142, No. 2), the Trio is decidedly not melodic in construction, and if there is in it the melody which some people think they discover, it is there by accident and not by design. This unmelodic manner is clearly intended in contrast to the main section which depends for its effect upon its suave and beautiful tune.

Turning again to vocal music, we find that declamation has always been an important factor in its structure and interpretation. Sometimes this has been effected by means of melody; more often it has been effected in spite of melody, or by a total disregard of its demands. Many examples could be supplied, from the works of different composers and different periods, of the sacrifice of melody to dramatic fitness. Perhaps the most striking example of a greater importance being attached

to declamation than to melody is given in the *History of Mendelssohn's 'Elijah,'* written some years ago by the late Mr. F. G. Edwards.

All the many alterations made or proposed by the composer, and the extraordinarily large number of which made such a history possible, have reference to the expressive use of the words. "The accent is the thing," Mendelssohn himself said, and he was perhaps the suavest, if also the most sentimental, melodist of all time! The fact that some now consider Mendelssohn quite an inferior composer, as one whose works have died or are dying of premature senility, does not weaken this illustration; for whether he be great or small, his popularity has depended largely upon the melodious character of his music. Neither is the illustration weakened by the fact that in a number of cases the alteration actually improved and strengthened the melody as melody. Such improvement and strengthening is merely incidental and accidental, and has nothing to do with the composer's desires and intentions, or with the way in which the music carries them out. One might as well say that beauty is the aim of the engineers who design locomotive engines because all the alterations and improvements have tended to gracefulness of outline, and the engines of to-day are things

of perfect beauty compared with those designed and constructed eighty years ago.

Of course, music of this nature, that is, music in which declamation forms the chief feature, is more practicable now than it was a century or more ago. This is owing to the greater regard paid by both artists and amateurs to the meaning and effect of the words employed. Expressive accent and outline now count for much more than does mere sensuous melody, and such music is understood and appreciated, or at least enjoyed, by the general public as well as by the musician. If proof of this be demanded we can point to the success not only on the Continent of Europe and in America but even in England, of such works as Charpentier's *Louise* and Debussy's *Pelléas et Mélisande*.

The onomatopœian effects produced by Handel in *Israel in Egypt*, and, though to a much less degree, in other works, make good music of a kind that can be understood and enjoyed equally with the broad melodic outlines of his airs by both performer and auditor. Yet few of them, if any, can be said to be melodic, or even merely ornamental additions to a melodic ground-work. Handel's methods in the work named have been employed by many composers since, and by more than one

before him, and with varying relations to melody as well as with varying success. In nearly all cases where these methods have been employed the result has been a temporary banishment of melody, and where they have been developed to any high degree melody has usually disappeared altogether. But whether this were the case or not, the mere fact of its being employed as one of the recognised resources of a composer means that melody is not always the first or the main object to be sought. For it is not possible to consider such effects merely as adjuncts to melody or even chiefly so. If sounds in imitation of the sounds of nature or of other external sounds are to be employed they must, to be effective, have precedence of other matters, otherwise they are more than a little liable to degenerate into unmeaning noises.

What purely musical interest exists in works of this nature is created by the regulated movement of all parts; by the fact that while a perfectly free motion, suggesting various extraneous matters, is in progress, such motion is under control, and is checked, accelerated or retarded at exactly the right juncture. It is the same kind of interest as is excited by purely rhythmical works, as well as by works in which sensuous feeling, both in melody and

rhythm, is suppressed. The latter kind of music, that in which sensuous rhythm is suppressed is found chiefly in the contemplative church compositions of the sixteenth century, in which emotion, passion, variety, and other qualities which might suggest the active world outside, were carefully avoided. It has continued, however, to some extent in fugal works, and in the use of ground-basses and sequences and other devices in which the complete structure of a phrase, or of an entire work, forms the centre of interest. Of course rhythm more than melody, is one of the essential constituents of music, though at the same time many of the highest examples of the art of music hold their position because of the subtlety of their rhythm, or because it is involved in other matters to an extent which makes its nature unobservable until the work is analysed. Unless readily observable melody is rarely present.

With Handel a new force came into music; a force that has developed in our own day to an extraordinary extent. This force is tone colour. It is somewhat difficult for us, who live in an age when the question of tone colour seems almost to swamp all others, to realise that what appears to us as the slightly varied drab of Handel's orchestration was startlingly varied and vivid in comparison with that of

most of his contemporaries. Although we are constantly talking about it, we seldom recognise the fact that the constitution of the orchestra was totally different in those days from what it is now; that the string instruments both in tone and numbers now double those of Handel's time, and that the wind instruments were not only more crude than those of to-day, but were less varied in character and fewer in kind. Moreover, the very variety of tone colour to which we are now accustomed, and on which we so often pride ourselves, closes our ears to the more subtle varieties which earlier composers produced. The same spirit which caused Handel to introduce the "plague" music into *Israel in Egypt*, also caused him to utilise to the fullest extent the resources of the orchestra available in his day. This is the spirit which allies him with the advance guard of the twentieth century. With the development of programme music of all kinds, from the delicately suggestive to the aggressively descriptive, this quality has increased in importance, and the composer or interpreter who has no command of tone colour is seriously lacking in either education or natural talent; probably in both.

It may be objected that all the arguments and instances so far educed, except that as to

programme music, relate entirely to vocal music or to music directly associated with words, and that purely instrumental music claims a somewhat different consideration. That instrumental music cannot be considered from exactly the same standpoint as can vocal music is true, yet the difference between the two is less wide than is frequently supposed. Such as it is, too, it makes melody less essential to instrumental music than to that for voices. The means of producing beautiful and impressive sounds, and of expressing emotions and thoughts in vocal music are much more limited than in instrumental music. Consequently in vocal music we are more dependent upon the more obvious methods than in instrumental music.

A writer possessed of exceptional critical acumen and literary talent once described melody as music's most definite feature. In this description we see one of the greatest dangers pertaining to the employment of melody. That which is most definite is the most liable to degenerate into the merely obvious; and music which is merely obvious is of all music the least musical.

Yet even in the parts of a work which should be most definite, that is, in the themes or motives of a large work, we find the practice

of the great masters as to the use of melody, has varied considerably. Brahms,—and even those who do not class him with the greatest composers will, I think, admit his greatness in some degree,—Brahms rarely wrote a theme that was not melodic in structure and melodious in idea; and the same may be said of Haydn and Mozart. Beethoven on the other hand gave us themes that are not only totally unmelodious but are also unmelodic. No one could, I think, call the themes of the first movement of the C minor Symphony or of the Choral Symphony melodious, nor that of the Scherzo of the latter work. In this respect he has been followed by Wagner to a small extent, and to a greater extent by a host of modern composers.

We shall thus see that melody may, and frequently does, take quite an inferior or subsidiary position even in the best music. We can place before it in order of importance, without lowering the ideals formed by our study of the works of the great masters, first, Harmony; second, Form or Structure; third, Movement or Rhythm; fourth, Expressive accent, or Declamation; while in Programme Music both ancient and modern comes also, fifth, Tone Colour.

Melody is to music what her face is to a

woman. We all admire a pretty or a beautiful face, and a woman who does not do all she can to preserve the beauty of her face lacks something of the saving grace of her womanhood. But the chief source of beauty must be the character; or as we commonly say, the beauty must come from within. Mere surface beauty charms but for a moment if it charms at all. So with melody. It must be the result of these other matters and inspired by beauty of thought and feeling. Shallow melody is that of the street song which is forgotten after a few weeks of popularity. We can on occasion do without melody if the other qualities and characteristics of the music are good, but it is not often we can do without at least the first three of these others.

There are, of course, occasions and circumstances when melody rightly forms the most important factor in music. One would not think, for instance, of attempting to lull a child to sleep with music that is not essentially and entirely melodious, however commonplace the melody might be, any more than we should think of asking a body of soldiers to march to music not obviously rhythmical. And more strictly art-works written on the lines of lullabies and marches will, of course, follow the same rules. Yet while objects such as these

are perfectly legitimate for the employment of music, they prove nothing as to the importance or otherwise of the chief feature of the music they employ. Nor is the supply of pieces for these objects the highest function of the Art of Music.

Lastly there is one suggestion to be offered as to the bearing which this question has on the interpretation of music, whether by the greatest artists or the humblest amateurs, by the conductor of choruses and orchestras which number their membership by the hundred, or by the self-taught pianist who laboriously picks out simple pieces on a decrepit piano. We are all of us—performers and listeners—interpreters for our own edification or for that of others, while comparatively few of us are composers; and those who are composers usually prefer to go their own way without criticism, advice or suggestion. Frequently we are told, and the younger ones amongst us particularly are told, to "look for the melody." If the deductions I have made in this very short study of a very great subject are correct ones, then, before we do this we must look for a number of other features, and see what is their proper position and how best to place and keep them in it. If my deductions are entirely wrong, then the melody will look after itself.

In any case, however, it is clear that other matters, all of them of the highest importance, must be considered alongside that of melody, and in many cases before it. When by study and practice we are in a position to consider *as a whole* every work which we have occasion to interpret, all these matters will fall into their right places, and the question of which is the greatest or the least important will disappear in the perfect balance which will result. But such a position requires a lifetime to achieve.

SPEECH AND MUSIC

A WORDY conflict of no ordinary strenuousness and interest took place some years ago between the later Herbert Spencer and the eminent critic Mr. Ernest Newman, as to what was the origin of music. The great sociologist and philosopher contended that music is derived from speech, while Mr. Newman asserted that it arose as a quite independent means of emotional expression. In a previous essay I have referred briefly to this debate and have pointed out how nearly impossible it is for either to prove the correctness of his theory. It is scarcely necessary to reiterate that whatever

their origin, whether one arose out of the other or both sprang into existence from quite different and independent sources, they now have developed into two different methods of expression with different, if similar, objects. Each has its own work as an independent force, and each has work which is supplementary to the other. We see the independent work in the contrast between a scientific discourse and a moving piece of abstract music, one of which appeals entirely to the intellect and the other entirely to the emotions, yet both being shaped by the exercise of a high degree of intellectuality. We see an obvious and elementary exercise of their mutual functions in the way in which music is employed in the melodrama of the popular theatre. When emotion beyond the expression of words is required to be presented, whether that emotion be the violent passion of the villain thwarted in his nefarious designs, or the simple-hearted but intense yearning of the heroine towards her lover, the aid of music is called in to form a background to the words or even to take their place. In an equally obvious and elementary way words are used to draw attention to certain points and methods in descriptive music of the lower kinds. Both, by higher artistry and deeper emotion may be raised to a high plane of art; but even

in these, in the incidental music of a Beethoven to the plays of a Shakespeare or in the programme music of Elgar, Bantock or Debussy, inspired by Shakespeare, Shelley, Lamb, Dante or Mallarmé, the principle of interdependence is the same.

Yet, though, as has been pointed out, there are a few cases in which their functions are interchangeable, it is easy to see how for ordinary purposes this is impossible. Thought unmixed with emotion cannot be expressed in music, as we observe in the impossibility of even suggesting anything in the nature of scientific or mathematical problems through the medium of music. And conceding the greater importance of speech in the ordinary affairs of life, in the ordering of dinner or the ratification of peace terms, the greatest masters of speech have attempted and have failed to express or arouse the same emotion as is expressed and aroused by great music, so that the latter and less definite art at one bound overleaps all the limitations of the fuller and more normal means of expression.

Because they are both such powerful means of expression, speech and music are, singly or combined, dramatic. They may be so in the broader acceptance of the word, which implies a forceful and striking expressiveness, in which

the element of the picturesque has a part. They are so more particularly in the narrower sense of the word by which we imply "something relating to the drama." Dramas and stage plays of various kinds in which the use of words is dispensed with are from time to time constructed. In these plays music usually takes a more important position than when words also are used, for it is called upon to suggest not only the finer shades of emotion, nor even merely emotion in all its shades, but actual conditions otherwise suggested by the words. Drama in words, but without music, is more common, though this is rarely completely satisfactory save to the pedant (the pedant, it must be said, of a rare and extreme type) who is entirely intellectual and unemotional. Very rare instances do occur of drama without either words or music, that is drama consisting entirely of pantomime; but these are so exceptional as to be for all practical purposes a negligible quantity.

When Richard Wagner conceived his theory of the combination of all the arts, he appears to have overlooked one essential fact. While speech and music are personal matters, for the full means of exercising which Nature has provided man with the necessary organs and the power to use them in himself, all the other

arts are concerned with matters external to ourselves. A man cast naked on a desert island has the means of making the wilds ring with oratory and music; but he cannot suffuse them with a glow of colour, or change their contour to answer the artistic instinct of his eye.

Yet to be in any degree worthy of the name of Art both speech and music must have that apparent spontaneity which comes only from the utmost deliberation. Extempore speaking, singing or playing are only for the intimate intercourse of mutually sympathetic spirits, except on rare occasions and by a combination of exceptional circumstances. All have the gift of spontaneity to some extent, but to use it with pleasure and satisfaction to others it must be possessed in a large degree and must also be assiduously cultivated. Both speech and music are abominably maltreated by those who imagine they possess a greater degree of it than is the case, or who possess a fair measure of it but do not prize it as they should. The man who "makes his instrument talk," or who moves other men to great deeds by his verbal eloquence, is not the man who acts or speaks on the spur of the moment, but the one who has diligently and with pains prepared for this work beforehand. Were this not so the drama would lose its power, and the improvisatore

would rank highest among poets and players.

In one other respect the relation of the two greatest powers of human expression is made manifest. This is in the possibility of being listened to with a certain degree of sensuous pleasure, even where there is no understanding of either the message which is intended to be conveyed or of the mere means of expression. Numberless instances of this occur everyday with regard to music. Were it otherwise we should not have that constant worship of the virtuoso which is the bane of the artist's life, but upon which alone most of the education of the people in matters of artistic, religious or moral import has to be built. For evidence of the capacity of ununderstood speech to supply this pleasure we have to seek further. We find it in some degree in the popularity of certain speakers (generally lecturers or preachers, but sometimes statesmen and politicians) who can gain a hearing from huge audiences possessing no knowledge and but little capacity for knowledge of the kind they have to expound. To most people, too, who are not possessed of exceptional linguistic ability there come occasions when it is necessary to listen to speeches in an unknown tongue, which convey to them nothing but the sense of carefully chosen and well-modulated sounds, but which nevertheless

give considerable pleasure. With this relationship comes, of course, the corresponding one of a capacity of creating a full appreciation only in the understanding mind and the sympathetic spirit. Without the spirit which goes out to meet that conveyed by the words of the speaker even verbal utterances cannot be fully appreciated, and the utmost love of music will not bring its full intent to us unless we have also an understanding of what it is and how its power of expression is impelled.

STYLE AND SUBSTANCE IN MUSIC

STYLE in anything is the outward character by which we judge whether a man or a work is distinctive or common. A person whose style is superior to that of his fellows we say has a distinctive air or style, while he whose style is inferior is a low sort of fellow. In art we speak of an individual style, a modern style, a classical style, an ecclesiastical style or an operatic style, a florid style, a sober style or an erratic style. By these styles we are able to judge something of the character of the art which is the motive force of the work, and it may be also something of its quality. An in-

dividual style rarely covers a prosaic substance; if it does so it generally degenerates into a style that is extravagant or merely eccentric.

In music we use the term technically in referring to the two chief methods of composition; that is, we speak of the polyphonic or contrapuntal style and the homophonic or harmonic style. There are various technical styles in the interpretation of music, whether it be in singing, in playing some instrument or in conducting the singing or playing of others. But technical style is dead unless it is vitalised by a style arising from right feeling and broad culture. Just as the old saying is that "Manners makyth man," we might also say that it is style that makes music.

The preacher who utters the noblest thoughts in an undistinguished and commonplace manner does not carry the conviction that one does whose style is more impressive. Similarly fine musical thoughts put together in a way which any ordinary college graduate could do are forgotten long before the less striking thoughts expressed by a master of style. Handel is recognised as one of the two greatest geniuses of his time, not because of his ability to invent striking new themes and beautiful new melodies, but because of his ability to take the most commonplace thoughts of others and infuse into

them the magic of his style. It is in regard to this question of style that the arts of music and literature have most affinity.

All the arts, I suppose, are in some way related, because they all spring from the same desire for expression of our higher nature. Those of music and literature, however, are more closely related to each other than either of them is to other arts. Their relationship is something like that of painting and sculpture —each has its own characteristics and attributes in common with the other, while their points of difference are few and but of comparatively slight importance. Their relationship with other arts is not so close, because, while they have few things in common their differences are manifold and wide. The affinity of the two closely related arts is a psychological one, and not merely a likeness in externals. All the other arts are imitative and selective only; their chief object, or their primary one, is that of copying nature, and, incidentally, the removal of what appear to be flaws or excrescences and the making of natural things more comprehensible by the human senses. Music and literature are expressive arts; they are practised for the purpose of giving utterance to our thoughts and emotions. When the utterance is made for the purpose of expressing to others

the effect of external objects on our senses or emotions, then they become to a certain extent descriptive. This is, however, supplemental to the nature of these arts, and not of its essence. The plastic arts require something to mould and form which is not self-contained in the artist. The graphic arts require something with which and on which to work. Not so with the two sonorous arts of music and literature. The thought and the means of utterance are possessed by the artist from nature. It is true he has something to learn from his surroundings, from his teachers and his fellows. It is also true that he may come in time to conceive utterances which he cannot make unaided—or at least the musician may, for the *littérateur* is dependent alone on his inner consciousness, of which his memory forms an important part, and his power to express himself audibly. It is easy in these days of pen, ink and paper, to overlook the fact that literature is essentially a sonorous art. We read and write so much for the eye only that we are apt to forget that, for its pleasing effect, literature must primarily make its appeal through our sense of what will satisfy the ear. Rhythm, that is accent and cadence, is as necessary to literature as it is to music. This is generally recognised with regard to

poetry, though it is not so readily recognised with regard to prose.

Dr. Johnson said that Sir William Temple was "the first writer who gave cadence to English prose," and we rarely find anything before his time which we can esteem for its literary merit. Since then writers generally have recognised the principle that prose composition becomes an art only when rules formed on the natural laws of sound are observed.

In the early ages, when men's emotions and their expression in art were both more elementary and more elemental than now, literature and music were rarely separated. The bards and minstrels of ancient Europe deemed themselves to be the exponents of one art—the art of song—which comprised the composition and recitation of both words and music. They recounted their stories in musical phrases, the notes being sung and played in order to add tonal intensity to the rhythmic utterance of their words. As time has progressed the ways of the two have diverged to some extent, and they have appeared in many and various ways, so that frequently we find that one or other is reduced to a state of unmeaning sound so that the other may carry an unnatural force. Yet in the combination of the two, in the illustration

of one by the other, and in matters of terminology we constantly show our realisation of their relationship. When for instance, we speak of a "recital" in reference to both music and elocution, we recognise the fact that both have the same means of making their effect, that of sound, and the same objects of their existence. Pleasing sound as well as forceful personality is an important factor in the interpretation of both words and music, of speech and song.

Who is there amongst us who would not hear a book read, a poem recited, or a play spoken by an artist, rather than sit down and merely read to ourselves? What few there are who prefer the latter are either artists of a very high degree of inward perception, or are lacking entirely the true appreciation of the arts of literature. Either they are gifted with an artistic imagination which enables them to grasp the euphonious effect by a mental process unaided by physical means, or they have not the sense of beauty of sound which is so important to the artistic temperament. Similarly with music, we find those who rather than hear a work played or sung, prefer to sit in their own studies, score in hand, analysing the technical construction of the work, or forming in their own minds the effects of its

performance. These, like the mere reader of literature, are either technicians whose sole delight is in mental problems, or they are artists whose training and natural gifts have placed them above any dependence upon their physical senses.

This, of course, leaves out the question of bodily comfort, which is a factor in the growth of the reading habit. It is this consideration, usually one of physical or mental sloth or luxuriousness, which causes so many to prefer a book by the fire to a play in the theatre or a lecture or concert in a public hall. The gramaphone and the electrophone are doing something to give us this at the same time as the higher artistic pleasure—which is a doubtful benefit, for art is always the better when it has to be worked for and striven for.

The greatest composer of vocal music is he who gives us the most perfect combination of notes and words. The greatest poet, or the greatest prose writer, even, is not he who only gives utterance to deep and mighty thoughts, but he who expresses such thoughts in the most sonorous and well-compacted, or the most strikingly beautiful language. It is the measured flow of accent and cadence, regular or irregular, and the beauty of their words and phrases which have made the works of the

poets of ancient Greece to live so long, and to form models for writers in all ages and all languages. The beauty of their phraseology has caused the writings of such thinkers as Ruskin and Carlyle and other philosophers to be quoted on subjects of which they knew little or nothing as if their thoughts were great ones, when it is their words only which are great.[1]

But if literature depends for so much of its force upon the qualities usually attributed to music, music in its turn must contain something of the expressive power of literature. It was Ruskin who, with that rare insight which bespeaks the true philosopher, in one place spoke of "The great purpose of music, which is to say a thing you mean deeply in the strongest and clearest possible way." And to say this thing strongly and clearly we must have some of the outward forms of expression, as well as the inward spirit and meaning of what is commonly expressed badly in words.

The marks of mere dynamic expression, such as *forte* and *piano*, are indications of some of these forms. As a speaker expresses his thoughts in words, his voice rises and falls, and when he writes these words for others to

[1] Of course, many of the thoughts of these and similar writers are great ones; but there are many instances, also, where the thought is much inferior to the expression.

read the mental effect to his readers is of the same rise and fall. Whether the music be vocal or instrumental matters little. The force, the weight, the power of tone, the regularity or irregularity in the variations, speed and accent, the sections and periods, are all on the same basis as those in literature. The periodical accent and the occasional emphasis on a note or phrase are just the same as those which we use in well-considered prose and verse.

Onomatopœia, that is the reproduction of external sounds, is a possession both of language and music, but it belongs more particularly to the latter, while the limitations of literature, that is of written language, still further exclude it. In a limited degree, however, it belongs to literature, because we have many words which are obviously onomatopœan, such as "buzz," "hum," "hiss," etc., and others less obviously so which nevertheless convey the sense of sound to the careful reader. The relationship in this respect is sometimes closer than in any other physical matter; but it is still merely a physical one. The real affinity, the psychological relationship between music and literature is that both are the outcome of the desire to express, in well-ordered utterance, the thoughts and emotions which

are too deep for merely passing speech. The two arts are the results of long-continued development of the means of giving vent to that desire.

There have always been those who have considered music as merely a "concourse of sweet sounds," while others have sought to make it take the place of the sister art. It is by taking the course between these two, by recognising that while the affinity is very close and that they are in very deed "sister arts," and yet recognising their essential differences, that we can learn to appreciate or to expound the full beauty of either. Even where they are united in the closest communion of a perfect song, each remains a separate work, which depends only upon the other for its perfect realisation.

The relative values of style and substance have always been a matter of difference, if not of dispute, between artists; and still more so between critics of the arts. To what extent this difference is caused by the necessary lack of clearness in the definition of artistic terms it is impossible to say. That it is so to a large extent is undeniable. Still more is it caused by the fact that it is impossible to decide where matter ends and manner begins; that is, what exactly is essential and what accidental or

circumstantial. These differences and difficulties are more acute in the art of music than in any other art, owing to its generally illusory character. It was one of the most brilliant and sane of our English music critics who a few years ago was responsible for the statement that "it is style more than substance that keeps art and literature alive." On the other hand we know that in music we have had Franz Liszt, and in literature so redoubtable a champion as John Ruskin, who have held views to the contrary. In one of his famous long-winded sentences Ruskin has said, "So far as it leads people to prefer gracefulness of dress, manner and aspect, to value of substance and heart, liking a *well-said* thing better than a sincere one, and a delicately-formed face better than a good-natured one,—and in all other ways setting custom and semblance above everlasting truth; . . . just so far, . . . the feeling induced by what is called 'a liberal education' is utterly averse to the understanding of noble art."

Yet, as is often the case, the opinion of Ruskin is not the popular one among artists and critics; for how often do we read of "the heresy of theme," "the truth that in art the treatment is of the first importance," that "style is of the essence of thinking" and last,

but by no means least, that "manners makyth man." Goethe seemed to be desirous of progressing on a *via media* when he wrote that "the style of a writer is almost always the faithful representative of his mind; therefore, if any man wish to write a clear style, let him begin by making his thoughts clear; and if any would write a noble style, let him first possess a noble soul." Robert Louis Stevenson also considered that style arose from the inward nature of the man as well as from his education. "To these homely subjects," he said, writing of the poems of Robert Burns, "he communicated the rich commentary of his nature; . . . and they interest us not in themselves, but because they have passed through the spirit of so genuine and vigorous a man. Such is the stamp of living literature."

One of the causes of these differences, which appears to the superficial observer to be a terminological one, but which actually lies much deeper, is the common confusion of substance and material. In art more than in other matters, these are widely different. Especially is this so in the sonorous arts of music and oratory. The substance of artwork is the message, edifying or amusing, which the artist is impelled by forces within him to deliver. Not of necessity the message which he imagines

his circumstances demand that he should utter; such message is oft-times lost in the feebleness of the utterance or the wrongful direction of its force. The conscious message may in a short time be lost and forgotten, while the underlying substance may live on unseen and unobserved, but working for good or ill, through successive generations. The conscious endeavour to do great things, to deliver a message greater and more noble or newer than that of others, often creates a grandiloquence of style which at the moment is mistaken for strength and which increases the apparent importance of the subject. The writer such as Burns, who deals with simple subjects in a simple style, is liable to be regarded as one of little worth. Yet we know that this is not so. The noblest style, the liveliest style, will not give life to that which has it not. It may preserve the life which exists in simple thoughts, but it will not give life to a substance of no inherent vitality. It will keep alive the germ of art in works which otherwise would quickly cease to live, but it will not give life to the mere dry skeleton which does not contain this germ.

The most commonplace material, however, —phrases, lines, tones, which any schoolboy might use,—may be revitalised by an original style, and made to deliver a message, to bear

a substance, which it is impossible they could have done without such style. Even a strikingly original style, if it be backed by no serious and fruitful substance, becomes flaccid and inconsequential, and degenerates into mere virtuosity, or worse, into mere eccentricity. The substance of the art of Michael Angelo was not the clay and stone he used; these were his materials, as were the pigments of Rubens or Botticelli. The substance of their art was the truth to nature and the feeling which expressed itself in beautiful forms and designs, and compelled the thoughtless to think and the careless to consider. Shakespeare obtained his materials from earlier writers; but the substance of his works was the large humanity which he infused into dead or moribund words and characters. In his case we see style welding his substance and material into a living unity; but without the substance his style and materials would have formed only a striking but lifeless figure. Handel's style was that of his contemporaries; his materials the same commonplace turns of melody, the same successions of chords; yet his work lives because its substance is a message of life and art which none but he had received for the edification of mankind. The style of Hummel's works made them to be classed by some of the best judges

of their day as superior to those of Beethoven, but their lack of substance has caused them to wither and die when tested by the flames of time. Mendelssohn's style is incomparably finer than that of Schumann; yet it now seems as though the excellent intentions and remarkable facility in composition which brought about this style will not give his works the same life which the stronger substance of those of Schumann gave to them.

Nor is substance necessarily the same thing as theme. The theme is usually part of the plastic material in which the artist works. The poet takes as his theme the wayside flower, and makes us breathe anew the fragrance that is dead. Yet the substance of his words is not that the flower was beautiful to see and sweet to smell, but the greatness of the Creator in allowing so small a creature to be so great a delight.

Originality in theme, in subject, in the details of thought even, is practically impossible. The popular saw about there being nothing new under the sun is true in this respect. Therefore to find originality we must look to the style, and perhaps to a small degree to the uncommonness of the thought. "Le style c'est l'homme même," said Buffon. The thought itself is gathered, consciously or unconsciously,

from others. It has been in the mind of man through long ages; man cannot create, his function in all matters is merely that of procreation. But the manner and form which make such thought expressible and understandable and so bring about what we call style may be, indeed must be, if they are to be effective, original so far as originality is possible for finite beings. May we not therefore say that style is the food, or the breath, of thought, which, though it does not create art (art being always the expression of thought or emotion), yet supports and maintains it and gives to it activity and effectiveness. Style is the energic force of an art infused with living thought and feeling.

DELICACY AND THE ORCHESTRA

A PLEA FOR THE IDEAL

From generation to generation the cry of the elders arises that we degenerate from the standards of themselves and their fathers; that coarseness and noise, if not cacophony itself, are taking the place of quiet dignity; and that sweetness and purity and delicacy have departed with the prime of the composers they

have known at their best. We have become so used to this complaint, we know that it has been made with every forward movement in the art of music, and we realise so fully the futility of endeavouring to stay that movement by it, that its influence has become one of encouragement rather than of restraint.

With regard to the last of these qualities, to that of delicacy, we are apt to think that with our appreciation of the increased force and pressure of sound we have also become more fastidious as to its nuances of expression and of tone quality. We pride ourselves that the high development of our instruments and of our instrumental technique and our increased knowledge of the effects produced by the instruments individually or in combination enable us to obtain varieties and subtleties of tone that our predecessors could scarcely have dreamed of.

This view of our position so far as it concerns possibilities is certainly a correct one, but its truth is by no means so evident when we look at our achievements. In the matters of variety and subtlety we have a larger scope than ever before; but the opportunities of the former are more often than not sadly misused, and those of the latter ignored. Even where advantage is taken of them it must be confessed

that subtlety is often contrasted with an obviousness that is neither artistic nor pleasant. When we enquire on the subject of delicacy we are forced to give the palm to other days, and even to admit that with the larger proportion of both composers and executants delicacy barely exists. During the last decade or so the growth of an earnest and able school of Chamber Music composers has resulted in increased delicacy in this branch of the art; but such delicacy has not extended beyond the bounds of the art in which it has first appeared.

And if we sometimes succeed in obtaining a greater delicacy than before, how far we fall from our aims and ideals in this respect! Perhaps, too, these aims and ideals are not what they might be because we have trained our ears away from any desire for extremes of delicacy or from any keen appreciation of the refinements of tone quality. Our ears have been coarsened by the clash of huge orchestras, whose tone reverberates from the walls of the buildings in which they play. Consequently we do not know, or do not realise, how much we miss from the lack of the most delicate tones and the most subtle changes of tone which, even when they are heard are seldom heeded as they should be.

We should, however, remember that delicacy

is not a matter of the quantity of tone produced, no more than is subtlety of effect. The loudest passages may be more delicate than the extremely quiet ones; and everyone has experienced something of how coarse a whispered tone may be. This is why some of us have been disappointed and almost disillusioned, after previously reading the scores, at the hearing of works composed for a large modern orchestra. In reading the score we imagined the character of the tones of the various instruments and combinations to be produced in a manner which was the most perfect obtainable, if it were not ideal. At the performance has been clash and clangour which with all its nobility often hurt our ears and still more hurt our artistic susceptibilities.

No composer ever lived, unless he were entirely fleshly and sensual in his nature, who conceived his music as it is heard when played by the orchestras and in the halls of to-day. Many composers will express their pleasure and satisfaction at the way their works are performed. They have good reason for so doing when they take into consideration the necessary limitations of instruments and players, and the equally necessary imperfection in the acoustical qualities of our buildings. Still more have they reason to do so when they

remember the natural or circumstantial defects in the appreciative capacities of most hearers. Yet these performances which are rightly praised are only very material representations of the composers' ideals. At their best they are about as near the perfection of their inspiration as is a rough chalk line to its geometrical definition, "length without breadth."

Even in the representation of more or less material things this is true. Sir Edward Elgar has afforded an instance of this in one of his most striking and effective passages. This, which is only taken as a single example from among many, is The Dawn scene in *The Apostles*. The introduction, the accompaniment to the words "The face of all the East," and the instrumental passage following certainly suggest very vividly the gorgeous colours and brilliant light of an Eastern dawn; they probably give the tones most nearly related to the scene described which it is possible to provide with musical instruments. The tones which the composer heard in his imagination, however, were I venture to think, far more brilliant than those produced by the instruments, and they spread over an illimitable void, as does light itself. Those we hear when the work is performed are limited alike in quan-

tity and quality by the imperfections of the instruments and the players (even when the latter are the finest in the world, which frequently they are not) and are confined within a space which, with rare exceptions, is far too narrow. Consequently though they are infinitely less powerful than those imagined by the composer, they are neither so rich nor so delicate: and they are much more noisy. Some of them hurt the ears quite as much as the brilliant sunrise hurts the eyes, without giving the compensating feeling of ecstasy and exhilaration. And this is one of the most perfect attempts at transferring light and colour into sound that has yet been made!

Or to take another and widely different instance. It is scarcely possible to believe that the late Alexandre Scriabin thought of the apparently cacophonous passages contained in his tone-poem *Prometheus* in the boiler-shop terms he has presented them. He aimed at getting something full and rich and powerful beyond anything that had been done before, which the limitations of the available instruments, as well as of his own technique, made him attempt in a manner that results very largely in noise, in sounds which conflict too violently one with the other to be effectively musical. The ideas which the work presents,

and the way in which most of them are presented, compel a thoughtful listener to this conclusion.

If then, our most modest and artistic composers, as well as those who write as much by way of experiment as for the purposes of expression, are practically compelled either to indulge more or less in noise, or to be content to restrict the descriptiveness of their music, it is not unreasonable to ask whether after all the case is not hopeless. Reasonable as is the question, the answer if we have retained our ideals at all, is decidedly in the negative. Even in so technical a matter as instrumentation it is possible to "follow the gleam." Once the ideal is lost, once the composer becomes materialistic in his instrumentation, "elephantiasis" and noise ensue. And without the loss of our ideals these are real and ever-present dangers.

That it is possible to treat even the modern orchestra with delicacy has been proved by a few modern composers, chief among whom are Claude Debussy and some of his followers in his own and other lands. Without making invidious comparisons, it may safely be said that the further a composer gets from these ideals, at least in these matters, so much less great is his utterance in music.

But orchestras themselves also are usually too large for their circumstances. There are few halls at present in existence which will carry the sound of an orchestra of a hundred players with satisfactory results. And this number is quite a modest demand as things go now-a-days. It is a hopeful sign that at least one of our British conductors has realised this, and is endeavouring to restrain the lust of noise in composers and audiences. His example may well be followed by others to the lasting benefit of the art.

It is also open to question whether our vaunted orchestral technique is so great as we imagine. Some few possess a technique as composers and conductors that seems to make almost all things possible. When Richard Strauss,[1] for instance, conducts a fine orchestra through any of his Symphonic Poems we realise something of this. Under his hands the noise and harshness disappear; but few or no other conductors are able to produce the same effect in these or similarly scored works. A composer's technique in these matters is of little avail without a corresponding technique on the

[1] This was originally written before the Great War, when Herr Strauss was a visitor to this country. As it is merely an example of combined technique I have allowed it to stand notwithstanding the change of circumstances.

part of the conductor. And this, at present is rare indeed, though there are signs that such technique is becoming more general. Efforts are made to bring into prominence every detail of every score, not by the restriction of tone in some parts, but by reinforcing the tone of the detail which it is desired to make prominent at the moment. We are all too much like the orchestral players who on the new conductor pointing out that a passage was *forte* played it louder than before, and on his repeating his request for a literal observance of the marking played it louder still. "No, no, gentlemen," said the conductor; "you do not seem to realize. I want the passage *forte*, not *fortissimo*. It should be not so loud as you played it at first, and you are playing it louder!"

It would seem, therefore, that it may be necessary we should readjust our observance and valuation of dynamic markings. At one time *ff* was the mark for the loudest possible tone, and by Handel and his contemporaries was rarely employed. Now we use *ffff*, so that *ff* indicates a degree of loudness by no means the maximum obtainable. On the other side there is room for a similar readjustment of our pianissimos, though not perhaps to the same degree, for if we can make the sound smaller without attenuating it too much, so

much the better, because so much the clearer will be the resultant outlining. The reason for the latter readjustment is that a thinning out of tone often means a lessened stability, with a consequently rougher and therefore noisier quality. Against this the fining voicing of our modern instruments provides to a certain extent; but not entirely. Consequently it often may be that the *pp* of to-day will be something slightly louder than the same marking by composers of a generation or two ago, because we must have a good firm quality of tone where the composer doubles or trebles the sign.

With this modification of our reading of the extreme markings must come, of course, a subtler and more exact adjustment of the intervening degrees of sound. How far it is possible to measure degrees of sound depends largely upon the individual attempting it and upon the immediate circumstances of performance; that is, upon the size and proportions of the producing and resonating *media*, upon the proportionate numbers, size and quality of the instruments and the acoustic properties of the place in which they are heard. The ability to measure these degrees of sound is a gift of nature, and like all other natural gifts it is bestowed in very varying quantities on different individuals. It is one that all have to some

extent, and it is one, therefore, that can be and should be developed by all, whether performers or listeners.

The present tendency is merely to increase the capacity for appreciating the two extremes of sound, though there are notable exceptions. It would be foolish to deny the utility of this, of course, but the danger, if it is not already a catastrophe, lies in making this the chief end of modern tonal and technical developments. We all can now appreciate the many brilliant varieties of tone which are obtainable on the modern orchestra. How many can appreciate the many subtle varieties obtained from smaller means by composers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries—even by Handel, who in this respect was the most modern and brilliant-scoring composer of his day? If we are developing on the right lines we should appreciate these more fully than ever. But so far from this being the case, such appreciation is left to a few who are students of the subject, or to still fewer who in quietness and confidence pass their lives untouched by the stress of modern life. To the majority this old-fashioned instrumentation appears drab and dull except where a trumpet solo occasionally throws a shaft of brilliance across the darker background.

On the lines of the appreciation of classical music, as well as on those of the extension of the means available for general musical expressiveness, there is no doubt we are advancing. In neither have we yet learnt, however, the great and important lessons of restraint and delicacy, of subtlety and exactitude. Yet by the greater exercise of these on the part of interpreters much of the most "advanced" of modern music would sound far more musical than it does by present methods of interpretation; and classical music would prove its lasting modernity.

THE TRUE PROGRAMME MUSIC

(NOTE.—The principal part of this paper was prepared as a supplement to, and after reading Mr. Ernest Newman's essay on "Programme Music" contained in his *Musical Studies,* and was read at a meeting of the Musical Association in London. There are, therefore, a number of references to that essay, while a large number of points which would ordinarily be dealt with in a study of the subject are omitted as having been dealt with very fully by Mr. Newman. The only serious difference of opinion between that distinguished writer and myself is that I consider he might well have gone further in his study of the psychological aspect of the matter.)

TO

SIR W. H. HADOW

THE TRUE PROGRAMME MUSIC

THE questions of the possibilities and limitations of music as a descriptive or suggestive medium are as much psychological as they are musical, and possibly even more so. The technical resources, the capability of certain instruments or combinations of instruments, to imitate the sounds of nature, or other sounds not essentially musical, or to give definite aural sensations corresponding to those possessed by the optic sense, are merely incidental to the deeper forces which make music successful or unsuccessful in the carrying out of these objects. Some part of the effect of all art, and that frequently an important part, is dependent upon association and suggestion arising from, but not actually contained in the artist's expressed intention. For this reason the terminology of art is important; though it is not possible in an art so ductile yet so elusive, so esoteric yet so nearly universal as is music, that the terminology should always be exact or exempt from

the necessity of explanation. The name "Programme Music," or its French equivalent, "Musique à Programme," was invented in the early days of the Victorian era, and Franz Liszt who was not only the first great exponent of the principles covered by the title but the one who was also the first consciously and deliberately to apply those principles in his own compositions, gave a definition of what he meant by the word "Programme." It should be he said, "only some foreword couched in intelligible language added to purely instrumental music, by which the composer has the intention of preserving his work against any arbitrary poetical interpretation, and of directing his attention in advance towards the poetical idea of the whole and some particular point in it." If we follow this definition further we shall find that it implies two main arguments: (i) that the programme is primarily an æsthetic means of unifying the composer's own work and moulding it to the most expressive form; and (ii) that it does not appear desirable that all the details of the inspiring force should be made known to the hearer except so far as the music itself reveals them.

But music has travelled far in many directions beyond the most advanced positions of the days of Liszt, and since his death in 1886

his ideas have been developed and corrected, misinterpreted and disproved, according to their qualities and according to the conditions of art existing at the moment and according to the general advance which has been made. Yet in spite of radical changes in methods, and even in principles so far as details are concerned, the central principle remains the same, as it has done from the beginning of things.

All art, whatever its nature or kind, its form or its circumstances, must be associated with life itself, and most of it with the accidents of life. Pattern weaving as a study in technique is a useful occupation; for its own sake it is at the best a harmless pastime, at the worst a waste of energy, a lowering of ideals and a dissipation of brain and soul-power. The constant reference to "Art for Art's sake" which was so common in the middle of last century has now become a dead letter, and in its place we have the statement that "Everything in life is relative;" a saying containing more truth, yet for that very reason being more full of danger.

In looking at the history of music we find that from the earliest days in which it is possible to trace any direct relation with the art of to-day, the two objects of music, that of expressing

emotion and that of expressing things and conditions external to itself have existed side by side. Although much of what was originally intended to be the mere weaving of pleasant sounds still exists and is regarded by all as belonging to the greatest utterances of all time, its continued vitality and existence is due to a cause very different from the original intention of its author. Into all truly great art the author, consciously or unconsciously, works a large portion of himself. Some characters do so always unconsciously, whatever their circumstances; others are rarely conscious of anything save the external technical or æsthetic processes they deliberately and with set intention employ, while few only have a deliberately psychological aim. Æsthetic instinct and æsthetic judgment are not always the same and are sometimes actually opposed one to the other, while the greatest and most sincere artists are rarely masters of both and frequently of neither. Consequently we often find them unconsciously and unintentionally indulging in forms of art of which they constantly condemn by their words. Brahms in his day and Sir Edward Elgar a quarter of a century later are instances of those who oppose the programme spirit and yet exercise it in their own art. It is true that the former did

not go so far in his verbal indications as does the latter, but he was bound to admit from time to time that much of his inspiration came from no mere desire to show his skill at thematic jugglery, or to provide executive artists with means of display, or even to make successions of pleasing sounds. Some of his pianoforte music has just the indication which falls within Liszt's definition of "programme." And the reason why he did this is at the root of all association or descriptiveness in any art not primarily representative; that is, of all programme music from the most delicately and subtly suggestive to the most crudely and obviously descriptive, and whether the composer declares the source of his inspiration in words or not.

If it were possible to separate our thoughts from our emotions, to express either without reference to the other, there would be no need or occasion for programme music in any form. It is the failure to recognise the inseparability of the two that has brought about the misunderstandings on the part of both composers and critics with regard to programme music. Programme music is, or should be, that expression of the emotions which cannot be effected without reference to the circumstances of such emotions. Pure emotion, in the present state

of human development is almost, though not quite, impossible. Purely abstract music is therefore equally nearly non-existent.

Yet in most cases, because music is an appeal from the emotions to the emotions, the programme should be unnecessary to all save the composer. At present we call this abstract music, though with the search which some audiences, and particularly some critics, make for every detail of suggestiveness which a work may possibly contain, the presence of a mental programme is frequently apprehended even where it is not expressed.

That there is some relation between emotion and representation, between emotion and portraiture, is evident if we consider the reasons for the success of pictorial artists. Frequently we can find two pictures of the same person or place equally well-drawn in every respect. Yet in one of them is an indescribable element which we call by various names—individuality, soul, genius, distinctiveness, tone, and so on. When we come to investigate its cause we are equally at a loss, and are compelled to fall back on the theory that there is something in every individual which is entirely intangible and undefined, which enables each to do what no other person can do. The force which puts it into operation must be emotion, and there-

fore emotion has a place in every work of every kind which we do.

And what is caricature but an expression of the emotion of mirth, or of irony, by means of a portrait in which the artist has exercised his powers of selection? Sometimes it is a subtle emotion which is felt by few, but which the artist in expressing it helps others to feel. At other times it is an obvious emotion which the street urchin feels in common with the man of culture and artistic sense. Occasionally it is an emotion of pure and indefinable sympathy or even of gentle pity; more often it is one of ironic anger, which is closely related to laughter. (Certain anthropologists tell us that laughter originated in the snarl of the triumphant but still angry beast).

The question of what may be termed "sympathetic music" is also not without its bearing on the subject. That which is expressive of certain feelings will arouse sympathetic feelings in others, and it is in the nature of man to seek for sympathy, especially in the extremities of emotion. For this reason what appeals strongly to one kind of character will appeal less strongly or not at all to others. Yet there is a certain common sympathy which binds humanity into one, and which is expressed and aroused by music. We thus find that when

we wish for consolation in grief we ask for music of a sad and quiet character; when we are happy that cheerful, quiet music is our pleasure; and when we are merry something more exuberant and boisterous is desired. This raises another question, the answer to which affords a striking illustration of the expressive power of music.

Can our emotions be expressed by sounds of which we are neither the immediate nor the ultimate cause? In other words, can I call upon another person to express for me the emotions which I cannot express for myself? Within certain limits this can be done, just as within similar limits another person may express my thoughts; but in each case there is a certain risk of misexpression. (The story of the golfing Bishop who, when he broke one of his clubs desired some layman to say something "appropriate to the occasion" is surely evidence of the general belief that such vicarious expression is possible). It may be possible to find an exact expression of either thoughts or feelings in sounds invented or arranged by a second person and emitted by a third; but there is always a great chance of some of the sounds not coinciding exactly with such thoughts and feelings. This risk exists too, and often more acutely, if we attempt to

make our own expression. How many are there who can express their thoughts, which are much easier to express than are feelings, in the most suitable words, even in the most satisfactory way to themselves, much less with perfect intelligibility to others? If most of us could do this the preacher, the lawyer and the scholar would be short of occupation; for sermons, judgments and erudition are only imperfect explanations of other people's imperfect expressions.

It has been said of James McNeill Whistler that "he held truly it is the province of art to interpret—not to imitate." He attempted to avoid, in an art which in its primary and most elementary functions at the least, is a representative one, everything which could fall under the head of realism or mere reproduction; just as many composers, in an art which is primarily emotional, attempt to bring into being a reproduction of matters not necessarily or usually productive of emotional feeling.

Whistler failed, where he did fail, in the same manner, though not perhaps to the same degree as these composers, only in that he explained too much. Emotion has its place not only in music but, as we have seen, in all other arts, while a certain amount of representation or description is not without its place

in music. Where however what is a primary function of one art appears as a secondary or ancillary function of another, the relation between the two should appear by the mere exercise of that which is the immediate means of expression, and no explanation by means of words or by analogy of other matters would in ideal circumstances be necessary.

Now the highest type of programme music is generally acknowledged to be that which interprets life so faithfully as to reproduce in others the emotions and sometimes the thoughts, aroused in the composer by certain circumstances or conditions of life—material or psychological. Descriptive writing, or what we call realism, has often no part and at the most only a small part in such interpretation. Realism, too, as we now know it usually bears but a small and insignificant relation to reality, as it is a presentation of only the most superficial qualities of reality .

The desire merely to imitate or represent external matters (from which the composition of this descriptive music arises), is, however, the first instinct of all art, and we see it in the art of childhood and savagery; the desire to originate comes only with the development of mind and soul towards that perfection which we call the Deity; the desire and impulse to

interpret at first hand is given only to the prophet and seer. All save these interpret, so far as they do interpret, not with authority, but merely as teachers of that which they have received from others.[1]

It is nevertheless true that the faithfulness of any interpretation expressed through the medium of musical art depends to some extent upon the composer's ability to realise the relationship of musical sounds to external nature or to circumstances outside the nature and accidents or manner of those sounds.

Mr. Lawrence Gilman, the eminent American critic, some time ago expressed the opinion that there are some composers (he mentioned four at the time—Debussy, d'Indy, Loeffler and MacDowell) who have not only realised, but have effectively utilised, this relationship. To them, he said, "The world of external nature is no longer merely a group of phenomena, lovely or terrible, whose picturesque aspects, or the moods which they awaken, are to be sympathetically recorded. . . . It

[1] Discussing this question with the late Dr. W. H. Cummings after this paper had been read before the Musical Association he expressed the opinion that the title "Associated Music" would be more apposite and appropriate to that which we now call "Programme Music." The suggestion undoubtedly was a good one, at least with regard to many cases, but it does not go far enough. It is only a little more general than those of "Landscape Music" and "Poetic Music," which are rarely accurate and are often misleading, as is also that of "Generic Music."

is Nature made sympathetic and psychical, Nature suffused with subjective emotion."

A condition such as this is the result of as well the deliberate training of a temperament naturally responsive to the appeal of nature, as of environment conducive to the development of such a temperament. Man is by nature provided with five primary senses from which must be evolved any more subtle and acute sensibilities necessary or desirable for a successful career through life. Mr. Newman speaks, for instance, of certain mystics apprehending the universe "through a kind of sixth sense that is an instantaneous blend of the ordinary five." This is an ideal unity to which the majority can never attain; we can, however, go some little distance towards its attainment, by blending two or more of the senses which are keenest and most subtle in our individual natures, and thus forming what conveniently may be called "secondary senses."

The appreciation of musical sounds at all is one of these secondary senses. It is not, however, as are many of them, a blend of two or more of the primary senses, but a development of only one of them. Being the result of the evolution or development of that one, caused by its intelligent use, rather than a direct endowment of nature, it is found not only in

varying degrees but also in quite different qualities, in different nations and different individuals.

The sense of programme in music—the appreciation of an ultimate distinctiveness in sounds—is a still further development of this secondary sense, and is a blend of the senses of sight and hearing, brought about by their co-relationship to all or several of the various arts. It is possessed in some degree by practically all who have educated and cultivated the best of their natural tendencies, though in some natures it is more pronounced than in others. Like all artistic sensibilities it is more subtle in its higher than in its lower forms. It shows itself in its crudest form in the desire to make all music descriptive or imitational, and to work upon the emotions by the suggestion of external matters only.[1]

[1] To prevent any misunderstanding which may arise in the mind of the casual reader by the use of the word "crude," it may be pointed out that crudeness does not by any means exclude cleverness; in fact the two often go together in a truly marvellous and intimate companionship. But it does generally exclude subtlety and insight into the essence of that of which it treats. Mere physical portraiture for this reason must always be crude, whether it be made by photography, painting, sculpture, verbal description or musical suggestion, but the more subtle the means employed the more crude it becomes. Consequently a musical description of a Cathedral does not suggest its physical appearance so completely as does a drawing to scale, though, music being an emotional art, its employment may possibly—I do not say of necessity it will—reproduce more exactly on the hearer the psychological effect of a visit to the Cathedral than does a drawing or a photograph.

Another sign of the existence of this sense in a crude state is seen in the attempts, so common among slightly educated music-lovers, to give to all music a meaning expressible in words. This crude and improperly developed sense is responsible for the names which have been and are given to works which the composer, often with the deliberate intention of avoiding any suggestion of programme, has omitted to give any title. Instances known to everybody occur in Beethoven's "Moonlight" Sonata, "The Bee's Wedding" and "Spring Song" of Mendelssohn, Chopin's "Raindrop" Mazurka, some of Haydn's Chamber Music, and countless other pieces. Unfortunately many composers, some even of high ability and attainments have not hesitated to pander to the cruder, and sometimes to the more debased conditions of this sense, with the consequence that the thing itself, as well as the name, of "Programme Music" was for many years, and to a smaller extent still is, despised and rejected by the very men who should have been cultivating and directing both the sense and its progeny.

Nations and races, like individuals, have each their own degree and quality of this, as of every other sense, varying according to

temperament, to development of other arts and of their artistic sensibilities generally, and to all the varied accidents of artistic life. We find it most evident and less subtle in the less romantic, and what are called the more practical nations—in the Teutonic and Anglo-Saxon nations.

In the French and the Irish, and indeed in all the Celts, it is of a subtler and more refined quality, but it is none the less existent and vital; the human romance of the former people and the faëry life to which everything connected with the latter is referred, only give to it a lighter touch and a more delicate feeling. The singing for sheer joy or sadness of life—the music which flows from the heart and lips of the people individually and collectively without deliberate intention or effort on their part—which is the peculiar characteristic of the romance nations of Southern Europe, and chiefly of the Italians, all but excludes this sense or the desire for its exercise from their nature. In the Sclavic races, with their passion and youthlike ardour, we find it elementary yet sensitive and active.

A simple, yet at the same time subtle, form of this sense is the susceptibility to colour suggestions from tonal pitch or quality, which is possessed by some either as a natural dis-

position or by force of early circumstances and associations. Beethoven possessed it with regard to tonality and key-relationship, as did also Schumann, though in a degree not quite so exact. Alfred de Musset had it in respect of single notes, and in a less degree of human voices.

Some pseudo-scientific philanthropists have attempted to bring this association of tone and colour into practical utility, in order to assist the deaf to appreciate the beauties of sound, and the blind the beauties of colour. How far they may yet be successful it is impossible to forecast. What was in the case of Beethoven, and still more in the case of de Musset, an exceptional thing, is now not at all uncommon. In some cases—perhaps in the majority—it is affected, especially by musical critics and writers on music, who would have difficulty otherwise in describing what they hear; in other cases, however, there is no doubt it is unaffected and intuitional, and, by force of usage tradition and heredity, it will in all probability become more so. Schumann said that "the mental process in which a composer is engaged when he choses this or that key to express his feelings is as unaccountable as the action of genius itself." With the advance in the study of psychophysiology it may be said now that

it is as accountable as that action is, or is likely to be with further progress in the study. This does not mean that genius will ever be reduced to a mere application of certain principles; genius is that which rises above principles. It does mean, however, that the work of genius will be more readily analysed, and the methods of each individual genius made available for general use more quickly than has hitherto been the case. The attempts of the late Alexandre Scriabin on the artistic side and of Dr. Rimington on the scientific side are earnests of what yet may be done, but their near relation to music is that of association and not in any essential manner that of conversion or transmutation.

The psychological condition mentioned by Mr. Gilman as being that of the composers he names is an ideal one, though in its fullest fruition it would extend still further, and apply not only to the relation of art to nature, but to its relation to all the artificial conditions of life as well. It is a condition towards which all composers might well strive, and the fact that it is impossible to agree entirely with Mr. Gilman as to its complete existence in the four composers named does not contravert its possibility or desirability. One can agree with him to this extent, that each of these composers,

with Frederick Delius and one or two younger composers, has arrived sufficiently near it to suggest that another generation, in spite of the return to actualities caused by the recent war, may attain something of this nature which the present generation can but dream of.

The programmatic sense cannot, however, in any of its degrees or qualities, be called an absolute one. That is to say, the composer will never, unless music should develop some characteristics or capabilities which in its present state of development it shows no evidence of possessing, be able to indicate definitely and unmistakeably to the normal mind, either from his own standpoint or that of the hearer, the scenes or verbal imagery which have inspired him.

"It must always remain an open question how far music is able of itself to influence the mind's eye, for the simple reason," as has been pointed out by Mr. Frederick Corder, "that some imaginations are vastly more susceptible than others and can therefore find vivid pictures where others can see and hear nothing;" that is, because of the vast difference in the quality and quantity of this sense as possessed by different persons.

Oscar Wilde, with his keen sense of the beauty and expressiveness of sounds, declared

that "Music can never reveal its ultimate secret;" a statement which would appear almost certainly to be true, because music is as near being infinite as anything which exists in this finite world. By the constant association of certain sounds with corresponding ideas, however, it may be that some day a power of definite indication or suggestion will be achieved approximately, but it is impossible to suggest that an absolute association of sounds with scenes or even with sensations, will ever come into existence. It is not at all improbable that the late Dr. Cummings was right when he suggested that there may be sounds, just as there are lights, in the heavens which take many thousands of years coming to us; and that these can only be appreciated, at least in the first instance, by those to whom the Almighty has given the super-sense of genius.

The condition of music as a means of expression of other matters, appears in its present state to be that it is dependent upon outside assistance for its ability to stir more than one emotion at one time, while what we require of a perfect condition of that which we call "Programme Music" is that it shall arouse, without such assistance, emotions or sensations of a multiple or complex nature.

Mr. Newman in his essay on "Programme Music" gives an example of this by comparing the effect of Tschaikovski's *Romeo and Juliet* Overture on "the man who knows and the man who does not know the programme." A nearly parallel case might be drawn with Elgar's *In the South*, Bantock's *The Pierrot of a Minute* or *Fifine at the Fair*, Debussy's *L'Apres-midi d'un Faun*, or almost any other really successful modern programme work. Without doubt these works are thoroughly enjoyable even when any reference to or knowledge of their programmatic basis is lacking; some of them equally as enjoyable as some of the finest abstract music that has been written. But there are added to this enjoyment by the knowledge of the programme new emotions and new intellectual workings, having reference first to the events of the programme itself and secondly to the manner in which it and the music are related. Without the programme there are pleasures of emotional and even of intellectual kinds; with it these are doubled or even trebled. In Mr. Newman's words, the one who knows the programme is richer than the one who does not "by two or three emotions." His "nature is stirred on two or three sides instead of only one."

It is the lack of power to stir or to express

these several emotions instead of the one only, that shows the limitation not so much of the art of music as of the sense of programme. The fact that it develops, and the way in which it does so, is seen by reference to the history of music during the period from about 1840 onwards, in which time it has arisen from, at its highest, a subconscious and unrecognised existence, into one of the most important qualifications of the composer and the critic.

It may be questioned why this "sense of programme" as I have called it, should be especially a qualification of the critic. The answer is that the critic is or should be the highly trained listener in whose hands to a great extent rests the education of the tastes of others. He is the one upon whom the impression must be made first of all. And the amount of conviction which a piece of programme music carries, depends upon the development of this sense not only in the composer and the interpreter, but also in the hearer. The progress of this class of music therefore must be affected more by the æsthetic training, in a right or wrong direction, of this sense, than by the development of the merely mechanical or technical means of musical expression.

The almost entire lack of it, and the in-

vincible ignorance displayed of its existence as a natural (though not a primary) faculty, have more than once seriously impeded the progress of music, and have been the causes of much of the bitterest and most futile criticism in the past. The too great desire to exploit it in themselves and in others has on the other hand caused many present day artists and critics to go too far towards the other extreme. They fail to see that not only, like all other human faculties, has it distinct limitations, but that within those limitations it must develop by slow degrees, and cannot arrive at fruition by any sudden leap. On its realisation and proper adjustment depend the proper adjustment and realisation of the relations of the two great branches of instrumental music.

In studying music written at the time when the art was only beginning to develop into a passionate and emotional one, we see the embryonic development of this programmatic sense, with occasional definite signs of life, and of its recognition and exploitation by composers who were born before their time. It may in the first instance have been the result of a mental effort rather than of a psychological condition; but it certainly has become the latter now. We cannot, of course, say to which of these earliest attempts to write programme

music, or to read a programme into music not primarily intended to express one, are to be attributed; for neither as purely emotional sounds nor as merely derivative or imitational ones, do they make any appeal to our modern senses. Kuhnau, when he wrote his Bible Sonatas, undoubtedly possessed this sense, and in a somewhat highly developed state; but the means for exercising it at his command were totally inadequate for its proper expression.

That Purcell possessed it is evident from the way in which he treated the adaptation from Lully's *Isis* of chattering teeth and shivering limbs as suggestive points in the frost scene of *King Arthur*. The effects employed by Handel in the plague music of *Israel in Egypt*, though not themselves programme music or directly connected with it, could only have been written by a composer with a well-defined sense of what is proper in that branch of his art, and the same applies to many of the accompaniments in Haydn's *Creation*. A composer in whom this sense was less developed would have made these suggestions less effective both musically and in descriptive power.

As with music lovers of the lower types, so also with composers of less strength and originality; it is usually to be observed that they who possess less real power and realisa-

tion of tonal relation to external matters, or who possess it in a cruder and more superficial degree, are the most ready to call in the aid of verbal directions or other adjuncts to prevent any misapprehension of their intentions. Like other possessions it frequently happens that they who possess the least are the most anxious to make the appearance of having much.

Beethoven and Schumann both possessed it in a high degree; yet when the former indulged it to any serious extent he half apologised, and endeavoured to explain away what he had done; while Schumann was content with a word or a title here and there to show the direction of his thoughts. But Beethoven was compelled by his natural honesty and frankness to acknowledge that inspiration came from no mere desire to sing for singing's sake; and like other composers who were less great than himself in both spirit and expression, he confessed to his friend Neate, "Ich habe immer ein Gemaelde in meinen Gedanken, wenn ich am componiren bin, *und arbeite nach demselben.*" ("I have always a picture in my mind when I am composing, *and work according to the same*"). Spohr had little of this sense, but thought himself rich in it, and so tried to prove his affluence by indulging in large subjects

and embellishing his works with titles which convey everything or nothing.

The common idea that the failure of so many programme works to effect their object is caused by the lack of realisation of the limitations of music and its accidents is only partially correct. Quite as many of such works fail owing to the smallness of this sense, or the lack of its proper development in the composer, as to any lack on his part of technical knowledge or intuition; and perhaps as many to the lack or distortion of its development in those who listen to the works. Some have so keen a sense of programme that without an appeal to it their creative faculties remain unstirred, and this in spite of their own admiration for the works of those who have had or have used little of it. Sir Edward Elgar, in the instance I have already referred to, after expatiating on the higher order of music which exists (or which he imagines exists) in that which has no programme, replied to his critics who demanded to know why, in view of his opinions, he indulged in the composition of programme music, that he was personally unable to do anything else, and felt himself to be a composer of lower rank because of this. There is no reason for believing that he was otherwise than honest in what he said, and that it was actually as well

as potentially true. It gives, however, a very concrete example of how a natural or hereditary sense may have the upper hand of intellectual principles.

In its higher and more subtle forms it appears sometimes in the works of those who, not only in principle, but also in practice are the strictest and most conscientious of absolutists, proving the statement made earlier that no one is entirely devoid of it. In the case of Brahms, for instance, we see it in some of his pianoforte music and in the suggestiveness of some of the accompaniments to *A German Requiem* and the *Song of Destiny*. In Schubert (*le musicien le plus poéte que fût jamais*, as Liszt called him), we see it reflected from his songs to his symphonies, which express the innermost workings of a soul strangely stirred by his surroundings.[1] What wonder, therefore, that we find it tinging some even of the chamber music of such modern minds as those of M. Vincent d'Indy, Mr. Holbrooke, M. Ravel and the younger men such as Eugene Goossens and Herbert Howells.

[1] With regard to Schubert's failure to seize and interpret the poetic character of more than the first stanza of many of the poems he set to music, it may be pointed out that, like many other highly sensitive minds, his was one of little tenacity, and, consequently, he frequently failed to get beyond a sudden outburst of the highest inspiration.

There is one class of programme works which grew rapidly at one period, but which has not since progressed far, which the foregoing considerations touch only very slightly. This is the class of works dealing with some problem of psychology or philosophy, and includes Bantock's *Dante and Beatrice*, and, though to a less extent, *Fifine at the Fair*, Strauss' *Also sprach Zarathustra*, Scriabin's *Prometheus* and many other works of the advanced schools. Where they most succeed, and many of them do succeed to a signal degree, is where the composer has been content to say, "The way in which such and such a character or such and such an idea affects my emotions or appeals to my sense of beauty is . . ."

Music will never be able to do more than touch the fringe of philosophy, simply because philosophy is a matter of thought and reason, though itself being fringed with emotion it does not entirely elude musical treatment. Psychological studies, on the other hand, are comparatively easy to translate into music, for music seizes the essence of psychology, which is emotion, and expresses it in a way which nothing else can do.

MUSICAL FORM AND THE SYMPHONIC POEM

TO

RUTLAND BOUGHTON

MUSICAL FORM AND THE SYMPHONIC POEM

THE greatest bane of the person who studies music with any seriousness of purpose is that of the looseness of its terminology. Especially is this to be observed in the two terms "Musical Form" and "Symphonic Poem." Therefore the chief object of this essay is to assist in the search for a clear definition of these terms which will be more or less permanent—at any rate sufficiently permanent to be of practical use to serious students of that most perplexing of all subjects, the structural principles of modern music.

Form in music is not the following of certain rules which have been laid down once and for all in the works of the great masters of the past; much less is it the following of text books which have been compiled by theorists, who, as a rule and in the nature of things, must be a generation or so behind the practical professors of composition. It is the relation of all

the different parts of a work each to each and all to all, from the smallest successions of notes and chords to the division of the work into complete movements. Every work has some form, even though it be an irregular and a crude one. The misunderstanding of this is the reason why so many modern works are haphazard and indefinite in structure, and why so many more are condemned by formalists and appreciated only by a narrow circle of students and critics. The strictest adherence to rules may result in a crude form, while freedom properly used will result in a highly finished and beautiful structure, for it requires a strong control of formal matters to exercise freedom, while the application of rules is within the capacity of the feeblest if only reasonable time and diligence be applied to the learning of them.

A Symphonic Poem is not in its nature either formless or crude. As things stand at present the term, "Symphonic Poem," with its equivalents in other languages, may include any programmatic work, from one written in a form approximating to that of the classical symphony to one constructed in a loose, rhapsodical manner in one movement only. It may and does include on the one side works of the slightest suggestiveness, and on the

other choral works in which the orchestral parts merely support and enforce the significance of those of the voices, as well as obviously descriptive pieces. As the fugue was the culmination of all that had been previously achieved in polyphonic music either on its own direct lines or on smaller or less strongly compacted scale, and the sonata held a similar position with regard to homophonic music, so the Symphonic Poem may well be the form in which our modern ideas of the combination of polyphony and homophony, together with the feeling for the relation of music to external matters and the higher developments of tone-colour and contrast, must find its consummation. The Symphonic Poem, if it be not wrongly named, is a form in which the architectonic principles of symphonic music are combined with the freedom of expression which the association of two or more arts brings about. A writer in one of the English Reviews has told us that "a purely musical form must grow, organically, out of the characteristic qualities of the musical medium, and be determined solely by these." This indubitably is true; and it is also true, as I have pointed out in a previous essay, that "where what is the primary function of one art appears as a secondary function of another, the relation

between the two should appear by the mere exercise of that which is the immediate means of expression."

But the Symphonic Poem cannot be, certainly is not, a "purely musical form." For this we must look to other lines of development. While it makes its appeal primarily and chiefly through the music, in both contents and form it must be conditioned of necessity by literary, pictorial or other matters outside the art of music, but not unrelated to it. It must be a form belonging entirely to "Programme Music" as defined in the foregoing essay on the subject, or the title is meaningless.

The most conservative among us cannot blind ourselves to the fact that during the last century and more there has been on all sides a growing demand for a wider means of expression than is afforded by the classical forms in their widest application. Liszt, with his keen sense of all that is vital, not only in his own but in every other Fine Art, was the first definitely to state his conviction of the fact, and to endeavour to find a new form which should meet this demand. Aristocrat in taste and feeling, and with a fine despite of all commercialism and the bourgeoisie who exercised it, Franz Liszt was nevertheless in his art essentially utilitarian. There was nothing he did or

omitted to do but was calculated to a nicety to serve his purposes. These conflicting qualities are shown quite clearly in his invention of the form and title of the Symphonic Poem. No one knew better than he did that he was simply adapting to his purposes the means employed by his predecessors for expressing emotions and facts not primarily within the province of music, and it was with a definite purpose that in going a step further than others had done he allowed himself to be set up as the inventor of a new form. He certainly was the inventor, in so far that he gathered up the threads of other men's work and placed them together in a single realisable and usable whole. He was not, however, ignorant of the fact that this, and the giving of a name and a scope for the method of announcing the association of inspiring motive and resultant expression, was the full extent of his invention. Even his system of metamorphosis of thematic material was not new, though he specialised this method and carried it farther than others had done. Weber's *Concertstück* was not the only work which had appeared in something very like the form and nature of those which Liszt put forward under the title of Symphonic Poem, and we have to go no farther back than Mendelssohn's *Calm Sea and a Prosperous Voyage* overture

to find a definite tone-poem conceived and developed on much the same lines as those of Liszt, and not improbably the immediate artistic inspiration of those works. (I purposely avoid reference to the works of Berlioz in this connection as, though they were Programmatic Symphonies, they were not in any real sense of the term Symphonic Poems).

Liszt was exceptionally late in developing his creative faculties, and although in middle life at the time when he wrote these works, he was still in his imitative period. This does not at all impair the fact that they were also the outcome of his previous work (particularly his song-transcriptions) and of his strong literary tastes and inclinations. Rather, one statement strengthens the other. His earlier attempts at composition had served not only as studies in technique, but also as a proof to himself that his *forte* lay in the development of new forms rather than of the old ones. In spite of his lack of strength, if not actual incompetence, in the handling of the old forms, his comparative success in the invention of a new one has been admitted by practically everybody. Some there are still who consider his work in the light of a mere episode in the history of music which will soon pass into oblivion without having made any serious

difference—helpful or detrimental—to the art of music. Yet even these do not deny him a temporary success, and there are others who have seized at what the conservatives of Liszt's own generation regarded as a straw, and have found at least some slight support in the tumultuous sea of modern art development.

One of the most important facts that has been impressed very forcibly upon us by the development of the art of music during the last two or three generations is that of the very close and intimate relationship between tone-colour and musical form. Even the most casual study of musical history will reveal this, as we observe that the colourless smoothness of the old ecclesiastical polyphonists avoided, on the same grounds and by the same means as they avoided variety of *timbre*, any approach to a defined musical architecture. As the recognition of differential tone-qualities became more general the feeling for definable and easily recognisable principles and methods of tonal structure proportionately increased. The need of a new form or new forms, or perhaps of a new basis of structure generally, has become not only more evident but also more urgent as it has become more nearly possible with the development of the possibilities and appreciation of the qualities which we now know as

tone-colour. And, of course, closely linked with this is the question of the possibility and the appreciation of Programme Music. Once admit that music possesses any powers of description or suggestion of external matters and we must also admit the need for principles of structure which can be put into practice in a manner independent of that of the classical or merely architectural forms. The means by which this has been affected up to the present have been tone-colour and the new rhythmic development (if it can be called development in view of the narrow technical use of that word for classical methods of structure) invented by Liszt, and the use of leading motives.

But we must not be misled into the idea that the beginning of Programme Music was the beginning of the Symphonic Poem. Programme Music had achieved considerable success before the Symphonic Poem in its most elementary and embryonic form made its appearance. It was known long before works of symphonic nature and dimensions were possible, and in spite of certain attempts in that direction and indications of such a genus being possible, we cannot claim the title of Symphonic Poem for any work which was composed before the period of Beethoven and Weber.

With the latter of these two, however, we may fairly say that works of the class to which Liszt gave the name appeared. They were still issued under the titles of the older forms, and were not disassociated from them in structural principle, but the motive power and its expression were of the character which brought into being the new form.

Before we go any further it may be well to attempt a definition of the term, "Symphonic Poem," based upon what was evidently intended by Liszt, and what his successors and the ordinary musician of to-day understand by the term. It is, then, an orchestral work, the dimensions of which, as well as its quality, entitle it to rank with other works of the highest importance, and the intention and inspiration of which are outside the scope of mere formal design.

It will be seen that this does not insist in any way upon the necessity for the work being developed throughout from one set of themes, nor does it exclude works in which the composer expresses himself most naturally and clearly in classical forms, so long as his aim is not a mere putting together of certain musical sounds in such forms. To do so would be to exclude several of Liszt's own works to which he gave the title, and also a large number

of works of his most ardent and able disciples and their followers which are generally, and rightly, regarded as coming under the designation.

The application of this definition will, as I have said, take us back to Weber's *Concertstück*, to the same composer's *Oberon* Overture, to Beethoven's *Battle of Vittoria*, the Ninth Symphony, and possibly also to the *Eroica* and the *Pastoral*. It will not, however, include the C minor, in spite of its poetical ideas, or the famous quartet with the suggestive motto, "Muss es sein? Es muss sein," as the intention of those works was primarily to carry out a musical design and not to express anything extraneous to the music, and the indications of programmatic ideas were added as an afterthought. With Mendelssohn, Berlioz and Sterndale Bennett we get more of the spirit that inspired Liszt himself.

It must be remembered, however, that before Liszt few composers wrote, or attempted to write, pure programme music, and consequently we must always regard the most advanced works of this nature as still belonging to the earlier methods and forms. Richard Wagner credited Weber with "the invention of a new kind of music, 'the dramatic fantasia,' of which the overture of *Oberon* is one of the

noblest examples." It may well be asked in this connection what is the difference between a "dramatic fantasia" and a "symphonic poem." The only possible answer to this is that the difference is practically the same as between a drama (or a dramatic work of any dimensions) in words and a poem of any description. The former is restricted to a somewhat narrow form and expression, while the latter is wider in its application and may include dramatic, lyric, elegiac, and any other poetical form. While the former cannot comprise the latter, the latter can, and frequently does, comprise the former.

The first attempts at anything of the kind were made when orchestral music was still in its earliest infancy—in Italy, the country where melody alone has always been considered of higher importance than is the case in other countries! Antonio Vivaldi, whose reputation to-day rests mainly on the inspiration his works afforded to J. S. Bach, but who was a really great master of form, and also one of the first to write orchestral accompaniments in his concertos, was the composer of a series of concertos which he called "Le quattro staggioni, ovvera il Cimento dell, armonia e dell' invenzione in 12 concerti a quattro e cinque" ("The Four Seasons, or

the Trial of Harmony and Invention in twelve concertos in four and five parts"). Generally speaking, however, this kind of music was confined to instrumental solos, and chiefly to music written for the clavier instruments, and we get no orchestral music worthy of consideration in this respect until we reach the end of the eighteenth century, the period of Beethoven and Weber.

In spite of Beethoven's position, apart from his sheer creative genius, as the one who did more than any other individual to establish what we term the classical forms, and particularly the sonata form, several of his works are indubitably symphonic poems in the strictest sense of the definition already given. This applies particularly to the "Choral Symphony," which is confessedly the result of a desire to transcribe into musical terms the sentiments of Schiller's poem. Its freedom from restraint of conventional form has rarely, if ever, been exceeded by the most advanced of modern programme writers, and it was only by his mastery of abstract form rather than of individual forms that the composer was able to use this freedom successfully. It would be impossible for anyone else to write another work in the same form except with the same intention, and no one would think of attempt-

ing to define the form in which it is written, or of justifying its structure by applying the rules upon which his earlier works are based. This fact, combined with that of its inspiration being directly attributable to a literary source, makes it possible to say that the greatest symphonic poem, probably of all time, was completed twenty years or more before the title was invented or a separate art form suggested by Liszt.

The desire to express in brief the main features and characteristics of an opera or drama in the overture which preceded it resulted in the "dramatic fantasia" of Weber and Wagner, which took the beginnings of the form outside the isolated examples of an occasional world-genius, and placed the development on the line of the least resistance.

With Berlioz the desire for the reform and extension of the bounds of musical structure became more evidently expressed, though the eccentricities of this composer and his lack of self-control took him more or less out of the line followed by the men of greater and better-balanced powers, and made his expression of such desire less clearly articulate. Poetic extravagances with an outward conformity to the outlines of the classical forms make his work to be classed more with the early attempts

at programme music than with the reform of structural principles. Had he been as great a master of form as he was of orchestration his works would have been the greatest contribution to the progress of musical form in the nineteenth century. As it is the works of Berlioz as a whole mark an interesting episode in rather than an epoch of the history of that progress, in spite of the fact that a number of them are undoubtedly symphonic poems in intention if not in form. Or perhaps it would be more correct to say that they are a contribution to the development of programme music alone without aiding the discovery or creation of a form or series of forms in which its expression can best be contained.

Spohr stands in somewhat the same position in this respect, though without the power or feeling for definite programme-writing which Berlioz possessed. His fourth (*Die Weihe der Toene*), seventh (*Irdisches und Gottlisches in Menschenleben*) and last (*The Four Seasons*) of his symphonies are not altogether successful attempts to write symphonic poems, while his overture to *Faust* more successfully embodies the early principles of the form, and may be classed under the designation given by Wagner to Weber's overtures.

Faust seems to have been the inspiring force of quite a number of attempts in this direction. Of these, however, only Spohr's and Wagner's overtures and Liszt's own symphony come within the period we are now considering. The two latter, and of those two particularly Wagner's work, are distinctly orchestral tone poems of the highest type, in which the emotional content, while deciding and making the form of the work, is not allowed to run riot with the ground principles of tonal structure. After the Choral Symphony they are the strongest and most sane of those works which both indicated and assisted the trend of feeling which existed in the period to which they belong.

The delicate suggestiveness of Mendelssohn's and Bennett's Overtures would bring these works more into line with our subject if they were more extended in their dimensions. It would require a new adjustment of meanings to include any of them under the title of symphonic works. They are, however, distinctly tone-poems of a highly elaborate type, and led on definitely to, even if they were not, as I have suggested, the direct musical inspiration of Liszt's works. With these closes the older period of programme and programmatic music,

after which could only come the more direct methods of Liszt and Wagner.

Liszt's own symphonic poems were of necessity, as were most of his other works, to a large extent tentative. Had he been a greater composer it is quite possible he would have had less occasion to experiment, but it is equally possible, nay, it is almost certain, we should not have had the benefit of the invaluable experiments which he did make. Thwarted in his attempts at spontaneous and cohesive symphonic music on the old lines, and with a poetic imagination running riot in all he did, his work for music of this type was to point a road in which it could develop new facets of beauty and expressiveness, without being able to follow that road very far in his own works. Nevertheless, the new era of the Symphonic Poem, the era in which it was to become a recognised and independent cabinet for the exhibiting of definite principles of musical structure, began in 1835 when according to Lina Raman, the biographer of Liszt, "the idea of symphonic poesy . . . dawned within him." We are safe in fixing this date as that on which the Lisztian poems first came into being, for, although it was not until some twelve years later that the idea was fully developed and brought forward in the first of the

symphonic poems, it was in relation to the subject of that work, Victor Hugo's *Ce qu'on entend sur la montagne*, that the idea occurred.

Since he finished these attempts to emancipate music from the thraldom of formalism and to place on a firm ground of expressive potency the principles of musical structure and of the interrelation of the arts for which he so earnestly contended, there have been numberless works in old and new forms and in no form at all (if such can be called works) which have professedly been following his principles and have been given the designation he invented. There are also many works to which the composers have not given this title but to which it has been given by common consent. The orchestral works of Richard Strauss are a good and well-known example of this. Among his own descriptions of his works are "Fantastic Variations," "Symphonic Fantasia," "Rondo Form" and "Symphony," yet all these works are known by the general public, critical or otherwise, as "Symphonic Poems," or "Tone Poems." Camille Saint-Saëns, of course, frankly and openly acknowledges his indebtedness to Liszt for both the title and the form. His contribution to the number of symphonic poems has, therefore, little effect upon the development of musical form, or of this par-

ticular form, except that by the effectiveness and popularity of some of the works the Lisztian principles have been more firmly established on the rock foundation of popular acceptance. So far as Liszt's method is concerned the best brief description of it is that of the late Professor Ebenezer Prout in his handbook on "Applied Forms." It may best be described, he says, "as a free application and modification of the variation form." The objection to this description or definition is that it may be applied with some degree of appropriateness to practically every form that is not based upon actual repetition or complete divergence of thematic material. Almost all musical forms are based on this principle of variation, and many on the actual lines of distinct, though undivided, variations of a particular theme. In this case the principle is that of Variation as opposed to Development, using the two terms in their technical sense.

After this long gestatory period the idea sprang to birth fully developed for a rapid growth. It was one of the failings pointed out by contemporary critics that the musical themes were not developed, that the alterations did not proceed from any inevitable musical sequence. This criticism would have fallen to the ground had the composer succeeded en-

tirely in correlating exactly the music and the story it was intended to tell. As a matter of fact he was too much of a musician and too little of a literary man to do this, and consequently in the eyes of his contemporaries he fell between two stools with ignominious results. Those of us who come at a sufficient distance of time after him to see his work in its right perspective can see that this is not the case, though we are bound to admit certain failures arising from inexperience and lack of a strong sense of musical form.

The difference between Liszt's method and that adopted in ordinary variations is that the former is to change the entire theme by transposition of pitch, time or rhythm, while the latter allows of actual alteration of notes and intervals and of repetition of figures and motives and variation of intervals. This "metamorphosis of themes" is the basic principle upon which later composers have, generally speaking, erected their multifarious edifices of formal experiment. Mr. J. A. Fuller-Maitland, the editor of the later edition of Grove's *Dictionary of Music and Musicians*, yielding to his own predilection in favour of absolute music, speaks of the symphonic poem in somewhat disparaging terms, and supplies little information as to its developments. The

term, he says, "apparently is always held to imply the presence of a 'programme,' in which the function of the music is to illustrate the poetical material, not to be self-subsistent, as in all classical compositions. At present, too, it would seem that the absence of any recognisable design in the composition is considered essential to success, and Liszt's design of transforming his themes and presenting them in new disguises, rather than of developing them according to the older principles, seems to be the rule of the form. As existing specimens from Liszt to Richard Strauss in Germany and from Saint-Saëns to Debussy in France have so very little in common with the design of the true symphony, the term 'tone-poem' or 'Ton-dichtung' is preferred by some composers, who very likely feel relieved of all responsibility by the adoption of the vaguer title." It was by this type of criticism that writers of this frame of mind and of the earlier generation doubtless felt relieved of all responsibility to study thoroughly the works of which they were writing and the principles upon which such works were constructed.

However, apart from the unnecessary sneer at the "absence of any recognisable design," Mr. Fuller-Maitland would seem to have apprehended the more obvious features of the

construction of most symphonic poems. What "the design of the true symphony" may be, might, however, be a question not easy to answer. It may be that of the symphonies of Haydn, Mozart, Mendelssohn, Brahms or Elgar, or even of Bruckner or Mahler, and in each case the design is different. And if we say that of Beethoven, then the question arises whether it is that of the fourth or the ninth, or of which of the others. Earlier in this essay I have pointed out that the Choral Symphony has all the essential characteristics of the symphonic poems except that of transformation of themes. In the same way we might say that *Ein Heldenleben* has the essential characteristics of the symphony in its three contrasted principal sections. *Don Quixote* (according to Mr. Newman "the most revolutionary work of our generation"), on the other hand is symphonic only in dimensions, and not in either form or spirit. In main structural principles the composer has gone to Liszt and Beethoven, and adopted a combination of the variation forms of both. Elgar's *Falstaff*, described as a "Symphonic Study," is in all essentials a Lisztian symphonic poem, while Bantock's "orchestral drama," *Fifine at the Fair*, is almost as much a symphony as is Beethoven's Ninth. Beethoven and Mendel-

ssohn were followed by others in their employment of choruses and solo voices to increase and vary the tone of their symphonies. Partisans of the new form go further than this, and some of them, Rutland Boughton, for instance, have written words in which the choir takes an important, and sometimes the most important part throughout, and called these Symphonic Poems.

The orchestral tissue of Wagner's music-dramas, too, not infrequently is spoken of as the symphonic poem, and by this term distinguished from the vocal narrative and dialogue. The title is not at all unsuitable when we consider Wagner's methods, and that he was not unaware or unwilling to make use of the potentialities of theme-transformation when it suited his purpose; witness the evident relations of the themes of the Mastersingers and the Apprentices, and that less evident but indubitable relation between the Love Feast and Grail themes of *Parsifal*, as well as the modification of all his various motives to meet the exigencies of varying circumstances.

One of the difficulties of saying what the symphonic poem is or is not arises from the fact that, unlike most art-forms, it is used as a means of freedom, and sometimes of licence, and not as a means of restraint. Strauss has,

in *Tod und Verklaerung* and in *Ein Heldenleben*, adopted a sequence of movements or sections which, though based on the poetic requirements of the programme, follow the main principles of classical form, and may possibly be the germ of future cyclic forms. Vincent d'Indy has in one case, that of *Istar*, simply written a series of variations and then reversed them so that the theme, an unharmonised melody, comes at the end instead of at the beginning of the work. This is done to represent the gradual divestiture of the heroine who was compelled to part with a garment at each gate of the road to the *Pays immuable*, the abode of death, and to appear naked on the goal being reached.

Perhaps the most important, and certainly to many of us the most interesting question is that of what is to be the future of the symphonic poem. We are not at the moment concerned with the question whether music should or should not be self-explanatory. Yet it may be asked of those who consider that it should be so whether this consummation is not more likely to be fulfilled if it follows well-defined rules of form, and for each considerable variation has a distinct name, than if it is otherwise. Surely it will not help a work to be self-explanatory if the composer has to confine his

expression of thoughts and emotions demanding freedom of form within the limits of the symphony laid down at the beginning of the nineteenth century; nor if he is bound by artistic convention to call a long orchestral work taking, say, fifty minutes in performance, and that without any break or distinct sections by the same name as the twenty-five minutes' work written by Mozart in three or four separate movements. Music is self-explanatory only when it follows the natural laws of its being and is allowed to free itself from unnecessary and worn-out conventions, but yet does not depart from the principles which make art and language understandable to others besides the one who gives them utterance. Any such new form as has been indicated, if it is to be permanent and useful, must have the same plasticity as well as the same restraining power as the old ones; and it must be known by its own name. The Symphonic Poem has the name; it has the still more important feature of plasticity; but I fear we must acknowledge that at present it has little or no restraining power or influence. For nearly eighty years it has been the cause of much freedom, and of not a little license; but in no case can I find that it has been a means of restraint. In other words, there has been an inevitable loosening of the

bonds of form with consequent results of both loss and gain. "We want free speech in music," said Claude Debussy on this subject; "infinite melody, infinite variation, and freedom of musical phrase. We want the triumph of natural, free, plastic, and rhythmical music."

We see this to a very marked degree in the transition that has taken place in the works of British composers. Only a generation or so ago the land was filled with flat inanities in classical forms, often perfectly constructed from the theoretical point of view but entirely lacking any spirit which could make them of any interest except as studies. To-day no country is more full of composers who send forth a constant stream of works which are full of vitality, though often lacking the controlling force of a carefully designed or slowly developed form. In place of the mourant spirit of a few decades ago we have an exuberant robustness which delights alike in dirt and cleanliness, in order and disorder, in morbidity and cheerfulness, or on the other hand a delicacy and piquancy of expression and a fineness of thought that stirs every listener, but both of which nearly always lack that restraint and concentration of force without which it is impossible to achieve our highest powers. The question, therefore, is whether

the principle of the symphonic poem is going to provide, or to assist in providing, a means by which such restraint and concentration may be imposed on those who place their thoughts within its mould.

That it is going to do so, that in some cases it is already doing so, seems not improbable; but before it can be as potent in this respect as we could wish it there will have to be some considerable clearance of the ground both with regard to the form itself and with regard to the employment of the title. When we find the same designation with regard to the form used for a long orchestral work constructed in a very extended *aria* form, another in the form of reversed variations, and a third in the simple form of a choral ballad, merely to mention three out of scores of forms, we are hardly in a position to blame those who agree with Mr. Fuller-Maitland in his conclusion that the absence of any recognisable design in the composition would seem to be considered essential to success. To realise this fully it must be noted that in the three forms mentioned I have selected for widely divergent examples instances from the works of men who have a stronger grasp of the principles of form than have most of the composers of to-day; and if the restraint upon them is so small, how much

less is it on the weaker but often wilder composers who prefer license to restraint. For the composers instanced and for others of similar strength and originality the chief benefits conferred by the example of Liszt are a single addition to their constructional resources, and a title by which their attempts to realise the innate poetical qualities of music may be appropriately labelled. For the rest the benefits conferred or offered for their acceptance may well be greater, though the price may be an exceeding heavy one; and it is for this larger class that the chief benefit is to be sought. It is not the geniuses, the giants, of any era who are the most essential to its well-being and progress, but the multitude of ordinary beings who wander round their feet, often unobservant or ignorant of the existence of the giants and their work.

In the construction of musical works, just as in the construction of all other works, there are certain eternal necessities. The chief of these is balance; balance in form and logic or inevitable sequence in idea. Every new form must possess these, or the potentialities of these, to be worthy of consideration, and its various examples must produce definite results of definite methods which in their main characteristics are agreed. We can, for instance,

point to certain works by the Haydns and the later Bachs and their contemporaries, and say "Here, in the common agreement as to the shape and order of the different movements, the Sonata came into separate and distinct life." Before this it had been shaping itself in the experiments of various composers, but it was not until this common agreement was arrived at that it became a self-contained and self-supporting form.

Can it be said that in these days there is a sufficiently common agreement between composers to enable us to define any particular work as a Symphonic Poem, or to lead us to think that such will be the case in a not remote future? The former is distinctly not yet the case; but the latter, I think, is. The mere possibility of such a definition of the title as I have just given being formed from the characteristics observed in the study of actual well-known works is evidence of the likelihood of a more perfect and general agreement in the future. Apart from the use of theme-transformation there is an increasing basis of operation for the musical analyst, a strengthening and co-ordination of the bonds of form. The use of what conveniently may be called "rhythmic dissonances," which require resolution by ultimate rhythmic consonance, is one

of the minor developments available, and actually utilised, by the greatest composers, in the classical forms. But without it the possibilities and effectiveness of programme music, either in respect of its suggestive powers or its abstract beauty of sound, would be considerably limited.

That the principle involved in Liszt's idea of theme-transformation is considerably affecting the development of musical form generally is evident in the increasing number of works in which a motto theme is employed, in the enlarged scope of theme development and in the construction of several themes on the same notes, such as we get in Elgar's First Symphony. To those who have employed the Symphony form as the vehicle for carrying programmatic ideas we can look more than to any others for the lines upon which a single new form is likely to be evolved; for their hold upon the past combined with their clear outlook into the future makes them surer in their progress as well as more understandable to those who study their works. With all the faults and nastiness of his later works it is to Richard Strauss more than to any other individual that we can look for a clear indication of this form. His very lack of originality helps us, for he is undeniably a master of form,

and can use the material supplied by others for his purposes and can gather up the general ideas of his time and employ them in a characteristic manner. His greatest weakness as a musical architect is in the multiplicity of his themes. His strength lies in his control of them and in the practical respect he has for the older forms. In his largest work described as a Tone Poem, as also in the one which contains the greatest proportion of abstract beauty —in *Ein Heldenleben* and in *Tod und Verklaerung*, we find both these sources of strength and weakness combined. And in these two works it is probable we see the beginnings, the first clear outline, of the Symphonic Poem of the future. In saying this I do not overlook the works, some if not all of them works of deeper inspiration than these, of Tschaikovski, Debussy, Bantock, Elgar and other of his contemporaries; but such works are generally more notable as individual works rather than as types of a general form. Roughly Strauss has, in the two works named, taken the short song form and extended it to huge dimensions by the use of a combination of a large number of themes developed on Lisztian lines, and has obtained greater variety by emotional variation and varied *tempo*, and by adding a prologue and an epilogue, or in musical termin-

ology, an introduction and a coda, of importance and considerable length. What Liszt and his successors have provided or made possible by the use of the term with all its suggestiveness, and by the varied details of their methods has been, first a sense of freedom, with an embryonic but rapidly developing means of exercising such freedom without allowing it to degenerate into license; secondly, a recognised means of combining poetical and musical ideas without necessarily combining with the music anything more precise than a statement of general poetic ideas; and thirdly, a new basis of thematic variation.

The effect upon classical forms, and particularly upon that of the symphony of this desire for new formal principles and methods has not been inconsiderable. I have already referred to the motto themes of Elgar, Tschaikovski and others, but it goes much further than this. The welding into one continuous movement of the whole symphony and the use of theme-transformation are results which cannot be regarded as arising otherwise than from the spirit, and sometimes from the direct imitation of the work of Liszt. Even Brahms used the latter tentatively in his Second Symphony, and later composers, finding the two schools agreeing have naturally developed the system

in every direction. But the modified continuous symphony, in which theme transformation is employed, is more truly a symphonic poem than is any other form.

This question of the title, though it comes last, is by no means the least. The terminology and nomenclature of any art are of importance, and though it is impossible, especially in so elusive an art as music, that they should be exact, yet the less precise they are so much less useful are they. Both before and since Liszt there are many instances of attempts to define in a word or two the form of a musical work for which there is no generally recognised title. Félicien David's "Symphonic Ode" is perhaps the best known instance. The term "psychological-dramatic-variations" employed by Felix Weingartner to describe certain methods is fairly comprehensive, though it would hardly be exact in some of these works. Moreover it is a somewhat too cumbersome and involved description for every-day use. We have now the Ballade for Orchestra, the Nocturne for the same, the Concerto Poem, the Tableau Symphonique and Ballade Symphonique, Idylls, Legends, symphonic and otherwise, Reveries, Elegies, Scenes and Studies. Why should we not place things on a better and more orderly

basis, and, while retaining in different works the ground principles of the form, give to each work its proper title according to its dimensions and character? The title "symphonic poem" should surely be retained only for cyclic works containing several movements, though those movements may be linked by connecting phrases. We do not call a single movement a symphony, even though it be constructed on symphonic principles, but we name it Overture, Rondo, Scherzo, or whatever is most appropriate. Tone-poem must of necessity be still more comprehensive and include everything in music of a poetic character, from the shortest lyrical pieces to the longest cycle such as that of twenty-four symphonic poems projected in his youthful enthusiasm by Granville Bantock but never completed. Symphonic Ode, already mentioned as having been used by Félicien David and Symphony Cantata used by Mendelssohn describe themselves sufficiently. In purely orchestral music is there any reason why we should not have a Tone-epic, a Sonnet, based on the same rhythmic and rhyming principles as the verse form of that name, or any other poetic form adapted to music and called by its appropriate title? It is not necessary, of course, that the programme of a symphonic or other tone-poem

should have been expressed previously in other one of the other arts, in painting, poetry or sculpture, or literature. The most satisfactory from a purely musical point of view of all Strauss's poems *(Tod und Verklaerung)* was conceived and executed before any idea of putting it into words was suggested. Several of Liszt's pianoforte tone-poems, too, were the source of inspiration for pictures by his artist friends and not the outcome of such pictures. In view of what appears to be the case the following definition of the term "symphonic poem" would appear to be suitable: "A piece of music in one or more movements written for orchestra (with or without the addition of human voices) and based upon ideas not in themselves essentially or merely musical, and constructed on the principles of theme-transformation developed and first definitely put into practice by Franz Liszt."

The definition will probably require amendment in a few years' time whether the suggestion for the allotment of other titles for separate forms of varying length and proportions be adopted or not, but it appears to cover the ground of all known works bearing this designation. With all probable developments of the idea concealed (or perhaps more correctly, exposed) in the practice of calling works

by their name, however, it hardly seems likely that any composer will find it feasible to adopt E. A. Baughan's suggestion and make it "an entirely musical production." The suggestive and descriptive capabilities of music have extended far; but not yet so far as this.

MUSIC AS AN EDUCATIONAL FORCE

TO

THE RIGHT HON. H. A. L. FISHER

(IN MEMORY OF DAYS IN SHEFFIELD)

MUSIC AS AN EDUCATIONAL FORCE

Music as a means of education, that is the manner in which it may be employed to help in the teaching of the facts, a knowledge of which is necessary or desirable for the performance of our daily work, is a subject we cannot afford to ignore. But it is well we should sometimes look deeper and consider music as a force in education; that we should look at music as the power itself, and not merely as the medium through which to set that power in motion. We have all long since ceased to look upon education merely as a matter of teaching certain rules and formularies. We realise that it is a development of our mental and spiritual powers for which tuition is only one of the means, though possibly the principal and most direct one. We go even further than the old Danes who said that a man is not educated until he has forgotten all he ever learnt; for we realise that much of our education comes not only from things we do not learn, but from things we never know, or at least never con-

sciously know. Even the strongest opponents of the systems of such reformers as Dr. Maria Montessori seem to be agreed on this point. And it is in this respect that the potency of music as an educational factor or influence is most real and effective.

Music frequently is most educative when intellectually we know least about it, and always when we are least conscious of the manner of its influence. When it produces an immediate and obvious sentimentality—whether its sentiments be virile or effeminate, morose or cheerful—it is least educational. When its influence is more subtle it is always deeper and more lasting. Yet even the more obvious and shallow influences of music make an ineffaceable mark on our characters, and for that reason it is as dangerous when misapplied as it is helpful when applied rightly. Of course, all aesthetic exercise or study has resultant educational influences which are frequently of a most subtle character and upon the methods of application, as well as upon the subjects themselves, depends to some extent the good or evil results of such education.

But it is important we should realise what the character of the influence exercised by music is. Without a knowledge of this it is quite possible to employ music in various ways

in education, but it is not possible to use it to its greatest extent or in the most effective and economical manner. As a matter of fact it is to-day used very largely by many different schools of educationists whose methods of employing it vary to a very great extent. Yet in the majority of cases it is used in such a manner as to cause a great waste of the time and energy of the pupil and of the teacher, but not of the force of the music itself.

That force is mainly an emotional one, and hardly touches the intellect at all. The intellect only comes in as an aid to teaching the subjects necessary to set the force in motion, not as having any direct power in assisting the force. The intellectual side of music, therefore, has its place, but it does not make music itself any more of an educational force than it would be without it. Some of those upon whom the music has the greatest power for good, in submitting themselves to its influence have acquired no knowledge of even the elements of musical notation or musical statement; much less likely are they to imagine anything of the science of music.

The inherent qualities of music seek for response in the soul—in the character—rather than in the mind. This is why the Greek philosophers condemned certain modes and

commended others for the education of youth. This is also the reason why the continuing melodies of the centuries are the best adapted for teaching purposes, and why the restless passing melodies of the day serve so ill for these purposes. It is so difficult to tell which of those of to-day contain the everlasting and always beneficial emotional force of great art-work, that it is usually better we should not employ them at all. Those which have lasted, even though it be but for a single generation beyond that of their creation, have proved, by the fact of their lasting so long, that they contain within themselves some of the better qualities that make for continuous appeal to the emotions which is of a worthy nature. And the longer the endurance, provided always that it is a real and vital and not merely a theoretical endurance, the greater the proof of the possession of these qualities.

Yet it may also be said that the educational force of music is not necessarily diminished even though it be not increased, by the development of its intellectual side. The intellectual musician—the musical scientist—is often as profoundly moved for good or ill by the music itself as is the person in whom this side is totally neglected. We might just as well say that a knowledge of medicine makes

a physician less susceptible to its influence as contend that a knowledge of the laws of music deadens its emotional effect. It neither enhances nor decreases such effect, except that a thorough knowledge of the whole subject enables the one who possesses it to choose that which is most beneficial. As with other subjects it is the little knowledge, the knowledge that creates an ill-considered confidence, that is dangerous.

Music is educative in the same manner, and generally speaking to the same degree, as is oratory—and there are few who do not gladly admit the force of the latter in respect of education. The term "oratory" used in this connection has, of course, a wide application, and is not restricted to public speech or the addressing of large numbers of people. The persuasive accents of the class teacher are as much oratory, though of a different type, as is the passionate appeal of the politician or preacher.

One great reason why music frequently appears to be less educative than oratory is that we are so often content with a standard of music that we would not tolerate for an instant in oratory. It is unfortunately true that in the pulpit we get the weakest specimens of oratory; yet the worst preacher is more easily

understood, more tolerable to the educated listener, than are the large majority of amateur and quasi-professional musicians who sing and play for the benefit and edification of others. He is, consequently, more forceful and effective. And both music and oratory are alike in this respect; that when presented in their most forceful and striking manners they have a greater effect on a large body of hearers than on a small one. Similarly also, the bad speaker and the bad musician are more effective in the presence of a small company only than in the presence of a large one.

Some of the effectiveness of music as an educational force depends, as does that of all other subjects, upon the manner of its employment. It cannot be a power for good, it cannot stimulate the mental or moral powers, if it is employed in an improper way. Of itself music is quite amoral or unmoral; it cannot have the same direct moral or immoral force as can words and phrases. At the same time nothing is more suggestive, not so much of thought as of feeling, than is music. Herein lies its power as a force in the moral education of youth, especially at the most susceptible ages. More than half the task of the educator is the education of the feelings. Man is by nature a sensuous animal; he lives by his feel-

ings. It is perfectly true that the difference between man and the beasts is that man employs his reason in his actions. But reason is only the controlling medium of the feelings. Action is life, and inaction the cessation or suspension of life. By the indulgence or restraint of our feelings, each in a greater or less degree, we act; that is, we live.

Music thus has a moral or an immoral tendency which is no less powerful because it is indirect. That which encourages feelings of energy and of nobility is of a moral tendency, while that which encourages those of sloth, or the indulgence of the sensual appetites, has an immoral tendency. Some music excites tendencies which at their proper time and in their proper place are entirely good. Such, for instance, is the feeling of lassitude which in the schoolroom or the workshop is out of place, but in the home, and when work is finished and rest is required, may be beneficial to every part of our nature. Therefore when we say that the effectiveness of music as an educational force depends upon the manner of its employment, we imply also the choice of music to be employed and the time for its employment.

The responsibility attending the choice of music to be employed in education is a great

one, for the simple reason that the power of music is so great. One reason for this is that the effect of music is always provocative; it is never restrictive. Indirectly it may have a restrictive influence; as in the favourite type of story for sensational melodrama, where the hearing of a hymn or song recalls to the villain's mind the memory of his mother, and so restrains his evil intention. Amusing as this appears to the average intellectual person, it is often strictly true to life, particularly among the classes of lower intelligence who live by their feelings with little more rational control than that of the beasts. But its direct force on the emotions is to encourage to action, and as such alone it can be employed with any certainty of result.

The educational force of music is always subtle, because music itself is one of those forces which frequently makes an impression of which we are not cognisant at the time, and always makes an impression greater than that of which we are conscious. The immediate exhilaration of a good march quickly passes, but it leaves in the sub-consciousness of the hearer the sensation of regular rhythm which forms a criterion not only of other sounds, but of sights and physical sensations of all kinds. With music of a more

emotional but less sensuous type the effect is not merely mental, it is in the strictest sense psychological; it is impressed on that part of us which is so very real, but is yet undefined and unlocateable, on the soul.

In contravention of such arguments as these in support of the educational power of music, obvious and well-known cases are often quoted. Musicians, it is said, have frequently a low outlook on life, a lack of general culture, and a depraved sense in matters not directly referable to their art. This statement is one that is essentially and entirely true. It is one that is true also of those engaged in every other art, every science and every profession; and it is one that is less true of musicians than of any other class. Other things being equal, the musician is in the majority of cases the best educated and most cultured man of his class, and is not infrequently one whose life compares favourably in other respects with those with whom he is most in contact. This state, too, usually arises from the sheer educative force of music itself, and is found among all grades of musicians and in every class of society. Beethoven, to take as an instance the greatest genius in the art, was born in the humblest circumstances and received little schooling in a general way. When his genius

had developed, however, he was able to take a place among men of considerable culture and intellectuality, and to meet them on terms very nearly, and often entirely, on their own level; and this notwithstanding the uncouthness of his manners and frequent lack of self-control, which arose partly from his nature and partly from the rough character of his upbringing. It is seldom one finds a similar degree of culture in the successful manufacturer or tradesman with whom, and not with the so-called "upper classes," the average musician must be compared. Place Beethoven, Schubert, Brahms (one omits names of living musicians, quite a large number of whom are equally striking instances of the cultural power of music) and their professional colleagues, in line with John Brown or Samuel Fox of Steel fame, George Stephenson the inventor of the locomotive engine, or other similar geniuses, and it is not difficult to compare the musicians very favourably with the scientists and trade organisers; nor need we forget that even so highly educated and cultured a person as Dr Samuel Johnson was not free from uncouthness of manner and unreasoning prejudice.

In a totally different social caste, also, we have the instance of Mendelssohn. All the evidence goes to show that he was every whit

as well educated and as highly cultured as the other members of his family and social circle, and he was certainly most versatile in matters of ordinary social and artistic interest. In other words, the development of his musical character did not interfere with his receptivity in matters of general education, while it gave him a wider and fuller appreciation of the tastes and characters of people in stations different from his own. Moreover the moral characters of these men were unimpeachable, which cannot be said of all their compeers in other walks of life.[1]

The same thing happens in our own day and in our own country. Among the working classes of England, whether the workers be smiths, clerks or orchestral players, the proportion of those who raise themselves by means of their intellectual attainments to a status superior to that in which their childhood is passed is certainly taken as largely from that section which cultivates its musical powers as from any other section, and in all probability more largely. It often happens that the least cultured person in certain circles is the

[1] It must not be supposed that I am placing the genius of Mendelssohn on the same plane as that of Beethoven. They are named together simply as musicians of exceptional talent drawn from totally different social, and therefore educational, circumstances.

musician; but the reason is not that he has failed to take advantage of his education to the same extent as the others, but that he has raised himself through his music into a position among those who have had superior educational advantages. So that the " practical " examples of the effect of music on the mind and character support entirely the theory as to the educational value of the art.

This conclusion being arrived at we may consider some of the aspects of music as a factor in general education.

It has of late years become a truism that everything in life is relative, that nothing is self-subsistent or independent, but that everything depends upon everything else not only for its effect but for its very character and existence. Whatever it may have been in the past (and I think I have shown in previous essays that this condition has always obtained to some extent in music) by its recent developments the art, and to a certain extent the science of music has become closely related to life in every one of its aspects. There is hardly a phase of our lives, however small or great, however obvious or subtle, but affects and is affected by our music. All music, from the great choral and orchestral works of the highly trained composer to the scarcely-

conscious, half-sung, half-spoken prattle of the child, owes its inspiration to something outside itself. Once uttered, its influence, like that of all other utterances, is eternal and illimitable. This is most clearly seen in the songs and ballads of the people, which in all ages and circumstances have had a personal character brought about by events or by a condition of mind resulting from events.

A little thought will make it clear that this is equally true of all kinds of music, and that the greatest art-music is great not so essentially to the intellectual power required in its construction, though that may be a minor contributing factor, as to the fact that it expresses the highest emotions, in which all have a share. This being so, it follows that music as a study, that is, apart from its force as education of and through the emotions of which I have so far been speaking, invariably has or should have a place in every "liberal education." Utilitarian instruction, such as that relating to the technique of trade or science, we can afford to ignore in this connection, as being only the narrow application of the principles of education to a limited purpose. Even in this, however, it is interesting to note that so eminent and practical an educationist as Mr. H. A. L. Fisher condemns the restriction to mere

"necessaries" of the curriculum of Trade Continuation Schools, of which he is so able an advocate. Equally can the specialised study of music necessary for those who wish to be "musicians" in a greater or less degree be ignored, for we are now only concerned with education in its broader sense as the preparation of the mind of youth for future activities of all sorts and degrees.

Because music in its essence is an emotional art, its relation with the purely intellectual or scientific pursuits which are commonly included under the title of Education, is sometimes remote and difficult to see. For physical drill and other physical and sensuous purposes its uses are obvious, and are acknowledged by all. How far the art itself and its study may be made of use in other matters is not so obvious, and may well be a matter of careful investigation. This consideration of the possibilities of the study of music as an aid to other studies, through some strange psychological freak of nature, seems to have been sadly overlooked by educationists, and especially by those of England. Music has been employed in conjunction with words, usually with verses of a feeble character, to impress on the memories of young children facts which they might otherwise too readily forget; but in its higher and

broader aspects, and in its relation to higher studies the utility and effectiveness of the study of music has been too much neglected and too often entirely ignored.

Unfortunately the blame is assessable not only to the non-musical educationist, for in the past the musician himself has been very culpable in this matter, and still is to a certain extent to-day. Too often the musician is blissfully unconscious of the psychological problems presented to him by those whom he has to teach, and of the necessity of knowing each of his pupils as a complete and separate individual with a nature and interests different from all others, and with interest and potentialities outside the mere study of music. Much has been done and is being done, however, on all sides, while still more seems likely to be done, largely through the efforts and influence of individual teachers. How much we owe and always must owe to the individual teacher, whether in school or college or engaged in private practice, will probably never be fully recognised.

The study of music may usually be made from four main standpoints. These are (i) the purely aesthetic; (ii) the mechanical; (iii) the formal; and (iv) the historical. Of these the first is the most advanced and calls from the

student for a considerable technical knowledge of music itself, and for a wide knowledge of, and sympathy with art in general, a wide outlook on life and some knowledge and appreciation of the main principles of psychology. The study of the mechanics of music, of its production and reproduction, is the most elementary, and includes everything from the simple playing of a single tune to the direction of a large body of performers, or the detailed production of a great artwork. In some degree it is impartible to those least responsive to the higher qualities of the art, and by reason of the opportunities of display which it affords it is the one most open to abuse. The formal aspect is one that affects chiefly the would-be composer, and for similar reasons it has been abused in only a less degree than the last, but like all other arts and sciences of construction, a knowledge of its principles is an aid to complete appreciation of the finished work. Last, but widest of all, is the historical aspect, which must of necessity be brought in to aid the others. When these aspects of study are tabulated in this way, the various ways in which it may be employed as an aid to other studies, and in which they may be employed to assist in the study of music, may appear more plainly.

The branch of music which is most readily joined to other studies is that of history. To all it must be evident that the bare skeleton of the history of a nation and of its art is the same in essence, though not in details; namely, that of dates and events. Yet it is not a little remarkable that, in spite of the position which music holds in the life of the nations, it is usually ignored by teachers and writers of history. While reference (though often too little reference) is made to scientists, to orators and preachers, to painters, sculptors and writers, even sometimes to poets and novelists, it is seldom that any reference is made to composers or musicians of any kind, or to the character or manner of the music of the period studied. How many children learning history in our British schools know anything, for instance, of "Lilliburlero" and its composer, Henry Purcell? Yet the author of the absurd doggerel to which it was sung claimed that it had "sung a deluded prince out of three nations," and its composer, though a young man at the time of his death, took no mean place among the men of his day, and is the one British composer whose original genius has been considered worthy of a place alongside of the great classic masters.

The reference to this song and the results of

its popularity makes evident what an important bearing music has upon the life of a nation. It was the music more than the words that made history in this case and in others, though often it is the combination of the two that does this, or which serves as a means of making a permanent record of historical events. No other subject appeals quite so much to what, for want of a better term, we may call the imaginative aspect of history, as does music. When we speak of the imaginative aspect of history we do not refer to any distortion or misrepresentation of facts, or to any substitution of facts by theories or romance. Rather the term implies a deeper insight into the facts which dates and events represent; a knowledge of the real life of the people which makes, and is itself, history.

Because music is bound up with the life of the people, some knowledge of its conditions and workings is not only desirable but is absolutely necessary for a thorough appreciation of the history of such people. It may be that for the earliest periods in history this is not so, but certainly for all periods from the twelfth century onwards it is necessary, and for some of the earlier ones it is an aid. What a light on the life of the people the story of Israelitish music throws, for instance, and on the history

of Western Europe the records of the Troubadours, the Trouvères, the Meistersingers, the Minnesingers and the Minstrels, and of the popular songs of various periods have no small bearing. Historians of music, too, commonly omit any serious reference to the history of the people of whose music they are treating. This is a mistake also, which it is pleasing to find is being more and more avoided by modern teachers and writers of musical history. The essay which follows this is an attempt to suggest more of the lines of comparison between musical history and general history.

When we turn to the study of Geography we find that the relation is more subtle and difficult to trace, but no less intimate. "France; that is where they sing the Marseillaise," is a boy's answer which might well lead to a true and full appreciation of the real facts of both history and geography, as well as to a wider knowledge of music. History, and what is known as Political Geography are almost inseparable, and the study of the two is in constant correlation. Yet political geography cannot be studied without reference to the natural contour and physiology of the land, and each has a reflex bearing upon the other.

To plumb the depths of such a subject as

that of nationality in music is a task beyond the powers of the greatest psychologists and sociologists. Yet to float upon its surface to a fuller realisation of the bearing upon life of its circumstances is not so difficult as at first sight might appear. Especially is this so with children, who by simply hearing it will often acquire a very remarkable insight into the character of music, which in its turn enables them to realise the character of the people from whom it springs. Physical conditions, of course, have no direct bearing upon the music of a nation, but they have an indirect bearing in stamping the character of themselves upon that of the people. One could hardly expect the people who have to eke out a bare and hard living on the wild rocks of Montenegro to have the same ideas of art at all as have their near neighbours and cousins the Italians, who live in a land of comparative ease and plenty. So also is it with our English music. Our insular position gives us a musical expression different from that of any of the races from which our ancestors sprang, even though something of the same race feeling still exists. A still more detailed division is that of the different kinds of music which exist in our island, and which we observe most acutely between English, Scottish and Welsh music; and in the three

styles of music some relation to the geographical and climatic conditions may be traced.

Thus it is possible, as it is frequently necessary, to work backward from effect, that is from music, to cause, that is to the character of the people as largely moulded by the physical conditions which surround them.

The employment of the mechanical and formal aspects of music as a rule must be in less usual, though no less useful, subjects than these. By way of analogy and comparison, however, Grammar and particularly Prosody, may well be correlated with music. "The Grammar of Music" is really grammar and not merely a series of rules which carry a strong analogy with those of the Grammar of Speech. How close is the relation between the analysis of a verbal sentence and a musical one may be seen by a parallel of the terms employed:

sentence	phrase	word	letter
sentence	phrase	motive	note or chord.

The sentence in each case is a complete statement able to stand alone; the phrase is an incomplete, partial statement, dependent upon something else; the word and the motive may each convey some meaning, but have varied significations as they are variously employed; while a single letter or a single note or chord is meaningless, except when on rare occasions

it is employed to suggest or indicate something more than itself.

Then, too, as analogy between music and other subjects may be employed in the teaching of either, so their variation either from other may also be employed with profit. Each subject and each person possesses some characteristics entirely different from all others, and in wide opposition to some other. The pupil with tastes and talents lying in the direction of music will learn certain things more easily by seeing their contrast with, as well as their likeness to, that which is most frequently in his thoughts. Or conversely, the young mathematician will more quickly grasp the full meaning of his music lessons by learning not only the mensuration of music and its precise formal construction, but its emotional qualities which contrast with these. Comparison and contrast are both powerful weapons in the hands of the teacher, and music affords many and very varied opportunities for the employment of both.

These suggestions as to the manner in which music may be employed in the teaching of other subjects are, of course, merely exemplary, and are not intended to form the basis of any actual lessons. The exact manner of its employment must depend very largely upon

the immediate circumstances of the lesson, and may be the result of careful preparation or of spontaneous inspiration. Neither would anyone seriously suggest that every teacher can employ it in the same manner or to the same extent, much less with the same results, as every other teacher. One of the most curious facts in relation to this subject is that the best musicians are frequently not those who in their teaching can correlate their subject with others. This is why we so often find that fine musicians —and also, it must be said, clever artists, mathematicians, historians and other specialists —are poor teachers. Yet it would be absurd to pretend that anything short of a thorough knowledge of the subject taught is desirable. In the teaching profession more than in any other, "a little knowledge is a dangerous thing," and this little knowledge is often all of music that is possessed by teachers of other subjects.

Yet music is a subject upon which much information is readily obtainable without the necessity of any practical ability. Where any considerable knowledge of the theory and practice of music and of its history is not practicable to the teacher of other subjects, and frequently also where it is so, there should be a constant and regular co-operation between him

and the music teacher. This applies both ways, and the most successful music teacher, from the artistic and psychological points of view, if not from the commercial one, is the one who takes the greatest interest in the pupil's general education. The less earnest teacher of music is content with teaching what in the majority of cases is only an inferior kind of musical interpretation, while he would be much better employed in developing the faculties of appreciation possessed by his pupils.

These two words, "appreciation" and "interpretation," are very often wrongly defined, and are nearly always employed in a limited sense, if not in a wrong one. The appreciation of a work of art is the taking it into and making it part of one-self. Literally it is the grasping or taking hold of it. We employ the term rightly when we speak of appreciating the irony of remarks or circumstances, just as when we speak of appreciating a compliment or the benefit of anything pleasant or good. Interpretation on the other hand is the action of one who goes between. The most familiar example of this is that of language. To interpret a language we must have a full knowledge of it, and very often the knowledge of another language and of the subject on which it is employed. We can fre-

quently translate with only a slight knowledge of a language, with the aid of a good dictionary; but we cannot interpret the language without a wide and deep knowledge of its idioms. We even have to have interpreted to us, sometimes, statements made in our own language, and in words with which we are quite familiar. In these cases it is the subject or the specialised use of the words which makes interpretation necessary. Interpretation, therefore, is the going between a statement and one who does not appreciate it, or only partially appreciates it, in order to create or to deepen appreciation.

It is possible to appreciate without being able to interpret; indeed, this is quite a common condition with those of keen artistic sensibility but of small artistic education, or who are seldom called upon to assist the appreciation of others. We can appreciate our own language very often, for instance, in its most refined and subtle forms. Yet, unless we have a knowledge of another language we cannot interpret it to foreigners, nor even to our own countrymen if we or they have no knowledge of the subject upon which it is employed, or if we have no knowledge of the limits of their appreciation.

And this same rule applies to music.

Beethoven said that his music must speak "from the heart to the heart." But the heart of the composer is frequently separated from the heart of the average listener by a great intellectual or emotional gulf. Therefore the message must pass that gulf by easy stages represented by the sense and the imagination. The ultimate and direct aim of all art, great or small, is to stir the imagination and the emotions, and where an art falls short of this it fails of its purpose, though it may, and it generally does this by appealing first of all to the senses. The way in which it does this may conveniently, if somewhat roughly, be compared to a railway train passing from one important centre to another. A "direct express" does not stop at any of the intermediate stations, but it does pass through them just as much as does the omnibus train which travels at quarter the speed; and picks up or sets down passengers every mile or two. The best music, like the express train, goes direct to the imagination and thence to the heart; the poorer types stop at the senses; but all has to pass by means of the senses whether it stays there or not. This being so, much the same analogy may be employed on another side of the subject.

We cannot get to appreciation without first

passing through liking or preference and thence through different kinds of knowledge to the ultimate end of being moved to joy or sorrow, to mirth or martial ardour, or whatever sentiment may be contained in the music, in sympathy with the composer.

Now each person has his or her own likings, and each person has likings of various kinds and degrees. Some people enjoy tune alone, or at least to a degree out of all proportion with any other characteristic of music; others like something in which rhythm is the dominant feature; while tone-colour and varied harmony are what others prefer; and humour, sadness or sentiment in some other pronounced form appeals to the special likings of others according to their temperaments. The first stage on the road to Appreciation then is that of the preference of each person, and it is rare indeed that a full appreciation can be given except by a primary appeal to them. It is by realising these preferences, these likings, and passing through them to something higher, that the best kind of teacher achieves success. The questions of how they arise and of their nature may help considerably in this matter, and while some of them have to be developed, others must be expunged by slow degrees in order to create a right appreciation.

The different kinds of knowledge which are necessary before we can get to a full appreciation of music vary considerably according to the class of work to be appreciated and the circumstances which are to lead to its appreciation. A simple slumber song or *morceau de salon*, for instance, does not require the same amount or the same kind of knowledge as does a symphony, a symphonic poem, or even a large descriptive piece. Between descriptive and programme music, as I have pointed out in the essay on that subject, there is a real and vital difference; nevertheless, they have this in common, that for their understanding some knowledge of the composer's intention is requisite. For the understanding of a work of the proportions and style of a symphony, on the other hand, at least some knowledge of the general principles of musical architectonics is desirable.

Of course, for all music as full a knowledge as is obtainable is desirable, and the fuller and more complete it is the more likely is our appreciation to be complete. One warning in this matter may be advisable, however. The knowledge that is required is that of the music itself and not of its accidents and incidents. All the anecdotes in the world will not help unless they have some bearing of a character

more or less direct upon the form or emotion of the music itself.

Knowledge which is necessary for the appreciation of music in general is divisible into two main classes. The first of these is what we may call continuing knowledge, or, as we usually call it, education; the other is the immediate knowledge in respect of each separate work.

To obtain these two kinds of knowledge we must employ both our intellects and our emotions; which again divides knowledge into two further classes, to which reference is made later. We get, as a matter of course, some education in all subjects with which we come into contact, and as a rule the best education is that which is obtained without any formal attempt to develop it. In matters of art we obtain education for the emotions through the intellect. That is, to put it in commonplace language, we learn what to like by being told what is good. Therefore, in the matter of artistic education, as soon as we are in a position to learn anything at all about definite artworks we learn something of the Classics, and from them we proceed by slow degrees to learn something of the best contemporary work and of the methods by which we may judge for ourselves what is the best.

It may rightly be asked in this connection, What is a Classic? A Classic is not necessarily classical in form or substance. There are many definitions of the word classical, both in relation to music and other matters, but none of them necessitates the inclusion of every classic. A classic is merely something which is generally acknowledged as a universal model, in principle or in construction, upon which other works may be based. The reason why we proceed from the classics to modern and unestablished works is that in the former are exemplified certain principles of beauty which are in no serious degree or manner disputed. In modern work there is always an uncertainty whether what we most admire at present will be acknowledged as good by the next generation, or whether even we ourselves may not find reason for changing our views with the change of feelings which years bring upon us. A classic receives approval as such from the combined influences of several generations.

When we have realised the principles of beauty which have made these works continue and become classics, we are more or less in a position to appreciate, to grasp, what is good and what is bad in more modern and less-known works; though we can never absolutely

judge for ourselves, and must always share our judgment with that of other people.

This kind of knowledge is not necessarily either obtained or retained consciously. As has been said by an American writer, "one can hear and even with practice closely follow counterpoint without having studied it," and other matters are equally realisable without direct or formal study.

The two kinds of knowledge which have been spoken of as being necessary, are so for different reasons.

Intellectual knowledge is necessary because "emotion creates, while intellect selects and shapes." We have all from time to time emotions which we wish to express to others. And it is the existence of these emotions and of the desire for expression that brings into being the thought and the matter of its expression. But it is the intellect, the power of ordering and controlling the thought, which decides how much of the emotion is such as may be expressed and what is the best medium and manner of its expression. We often hear wonder expressed that a person is able to think in a foreign language, and those who express this wonder say that they themselves can think only in their own language. But even this is untrue, for it is only the rapid application of

thought which finds the words to shape the thoughts and emotions. We do not think in words, but the thought brings into use the expressive formula.

This, then, is practically the whole of the case with regard to the necessity of knowledge in the interpretation of thoughts not in themselves musical through the medium of music.

When we turn to the question of appreciation in its relation to interpretation as well as in its relation to enjoyment, we find that knowledge is necessary to enable the interpreter or listener to get into sympathy with the composer. It has been pointed out that there is an intellectual understanding and there is an emotional understanding. The intellectual understanding is useful in directing aright the emotional understanding; the understanding of the mind may aid the understanding of the soul. A great work of art will always in time compel the emotional attention to its main character and will "speak for itself." To the artistically uneducated, nevertheless, it will take a longer time than to the artistically educated. Nearly always we find that those who have little or no artistic understanding, though they may "like" pictures, music or other forms of art, grasp at unimportant details rather than at the

complete work. They may find interest and amusement in such details, but they avoid the main issue, or narrow it down to a mere portraiture or an expression which is only incidental to or even quite beside the artistic intention. A great work of art makes all its details, however many or few, lead up to its main issue. If it has many details the uneducated observer sees some of them and is distracted at first by those which he sees. The educated observer sees more of these details and is not distracted by them, because he can correlate them with each other and with the central feature of the design. He is thus able to understand the artwork more readily than the one who has not been educated to do so, even though proportionately to his education he may have a smaller natural capacity for understanding.

If this is true—and it is difficult to imagine anyone saying otherwise—it is evident that the person who teaches art in any of its forms has a very complex task. He may teach all the technicalities of form, perspective, colour, or of prosody or harmony and orchestration, or whatever may be the particular subject required, without arousing the understanding of what lies behind these technicalities. And of course those who would learn an art may acquire all these and lack the necessary grasp

of the subject. We have to teach or to learn so much of these, and in such a way, as will enable us to "get beneath the surface." It is only when technique helps us to appreciate the fullness of idea or feeling that it is an aid to understanding in its real sense. If a knowledge of "how it is done" does not help us to know *and feel* "why it is done," we are better without it. But properly applied it does help this way.

But there is a still further aspect of music which does not bear so directly on the subject as what has gone before, but without which a study of the relations of Music and Education would be incomplete. This is that of the relation of Music to Recreation and Relaxation.

If one were to ask the average person what is the object of such an art as music, the reply, given after hesitation, would probably be that its object is to amuse and to entertain. Art, except the applied arts, is generally regarded as a means of recreation, and though there are few who would deny the propriety of certain persons making a profession of it, for the purpose of direct or indirect teaching, the majority regard the professional artist in much the same light as they regard the professional sportsman or the professional comedian. He is a person, they think, who spends all his time and energy

doing that which it is not worth the while of the ordinary person to do except in a casual way, and which it is usually much more entertaining to get someone else to do than to do one-self. After a day's work in the City, behind the counter, at the desk, or in the foundry, it is pleasant to be able to sit down in a comfortable chair and listen to agreeable sounds which require no thoughts to appreciate, or which stir the thoughts and imagination in a mild degree and a restful manner. If an expert at the art of producing these sounds is available it is much nicer, because he doesn't make so many mistakes as the daughter at home, and "there's something about him that makes it different." But if we cannot have a professional, the efforts of one's own family are quite acceptable, and they even have their own advantage because of their appeal to one's personal pride.

And this sort of person, it must be confessed, has a certain amount of right on his side. Music, as well as the other arts, has its functions as a means of recreation and relaxation, and to deny or ignore these is to limit its uses and restrict its powers. It is, in fact, difficult to say where recreation ends, and the higher and more active scope of art, that of edification begins.

Perhaps the misunderstanding between the serious artist and the man in the street is more often caused by the difference of meaning applied to the same words than by anything else. The two words which lead to the greatest differences are the two which refer most directly to the subject, "art" and "recreation," and an attempt at definition may therefore be useful. Art is that process of selection and construction which discovers whatever is most beautiful and most edifying in nature, and places it before us in the manner and forms by means of which it has its most forceful and beneficial effect. Recreation, as the word implies without any study of etymology, is the readjustment and rebuilding of the powers of the mind and body which have become vitiated or useless. And, just as when we are going to rebuild a wall we usually pull down the remnants of brick and stone that remain in order that we may have the whole strong and newly built, so when we re-create any part of the mind and body we begin by a relaxation which brings them into a clean and healthy condition.

With these definitions we may safely say that art may be a means of recreation without losing its dignity. Nay, we must go even further, and say that it fails to fulfil its objects

completely if it is not a means of recreation. To those whose chief interests by force of circumstances or by personal predilection lie in other directions, in its lighter aspects it forms a proper relaxation.

Primarily music is a sensuous art, though not a sensual one; its appeal is never merely to the senses, though it is always made by means of the senses. The first thing that music expresses, and therefore the first emotion which it arouses, is pleasure. Now pleasure is in itself a relaxation, and the reason why we are able to pursue certain studies, to do certain kinds of work, so much better and with so much less effort than others, is that they have within themselves the means of relaxation; or, as we express it in colloquial terms, they give us pleasure.

Yet at its highest not even music is entirely a relaxation; it is never merely a loosening of the reins of the mind. We see the general recognition of this in the association of the various factors of life. We do not couple, for instance, arts and pastimes, or music and entertainments, so much as we do sports and pastimes, music and what we honour by the exclusive title of Art, painting and sculpture. But it must always be a recreation, a loosening of some strain in order that the faculties may

be freshly and more firmly braced and built up for their work.

Although the art of music has developed to so vast an extent since the days of Greek learning, in essentials it has remained the same. It was then as it is now a means for the expression of the emotions and of an appeal to the emotions. And the ancient Greeks, who were surely the source if not the flood of all worldly wisdom, recognized this, and recognized also how high a position it should take in the scheme of life, and how great a work it should do.

Most of their philosophers had some theory or other with regard to the effect of different modes, that is scales or keys, upon the human passions. That they did not always agree as to these effects does not affect their general observation that music was a matter dealing with the emotions. In general, too, their theories agree. The Dorian mode (that is the scale which has as its lowest note what is the third of our present scale) was considered to inspire "respect of the law, obedience, courage, self-esteem, and independence." The Lydian mode (which was similar in form to our ordinary major scale) Plato wished to prohibit entirely, as he thought that it, and the melodies founded upon it, had "a voluptuous, sensual and ener-

vating tendency"; but Aristotle, a little later, considered this scale to have the power of awakening "the love of modesty and purity." He also attributed to the Phrygian mode (rising D to D) the qualities of "repose and dignity." Pythagoras, a century before this, is said to have suggested the use of certain melodies as antidotes to special passions. It is even related that on one occasion by using a certain melody he brought back the reason of a youth deranged by love and jealousy. And of course the stories of Arion, whose music caused the dolphins to save him from drowning, and of Orpheus who charmed all things, animate and inanimate, with his lute, are based upon such theories. Both Plato and Aristotle regarded music as the means by which could be given to the soul a similar strength and vigour to that which gymnastics give to the body. But also, like exhilarating wine or refreshing sleep, they thought it should afford enjoyment and recreation. And even to-day the pathological qualities of music are not entirely ignored, for during the great war the medical profession has not failed to make use of it to assist in the cure of nervous complaints brought on by shell shock and strain, and musical therapeutics is a science that is rapidly passing out of the hands of quacks and

dabblers into those of serious researchers and practitioners.

There are, of course, some matters which we cannot in any respect utilise for the purposes of relaxation, or employ as aids to it. They are in their nature too great a strain on our minds or on our feelings. The necessary, but necessarily material, matters by which the majority have to earn their daily bread, for example, have to be cast aside before any relaxation is possible. (But is it not a serious reflection on our modern civilisation that this should be so—that we should have to spend so much of our time and energy on matters which our nature tells us are matters of the least importance. Surely one—but not the only one—of the evidences of the high place that art should take in our lives is its adaptability to so many different purposes. It performs at least the double duty of pulling down and rebuilding, of relaxing and recreating, and, not infrequently the third function of aiding the work done by others. That is, it stretches away from the individual and becomes impersonal.)

As this essay is written at the close of the greatest war of history one cannot pass without reference to the use of music in military matters, in which the recognition of both its laxative and its recreative power has been

universal with regard to time if not with regard to place. In primitive times music had attributed to it some almost miraculous powers. The drum gave courage to the army to whom it belonged and fear to the opposing forces. By rubbing it upon the thighs it gave not only courage but strength to the individual to overcome his foes. The trumpet was used to stir the passions of the fighters, but the Greeks, who were communists in war as in politics, believed in restraining individual ardour, and for this reason employed the flute. Throughout the long middle ages military music developed and was used to create and support amenities between opposing leaders during periods of truce, as well as to give fresh heart to the fighters or to recruit new ones to the ranks. As war became more complex music was gradually put further and further away from it, though it has always retained its association with armies as an assistance to marching and a means of relaxation and entertainment to officers and men at convenient times.

This double effect of music is the reason why those who are musicians, professional or amateur, do not often find it necessary to get away from the subject which takes so much of their thoughts and energy at ordinary times. The musician is often a subject for humour

because he so frequently takes what is called a "busman's holiday." Many musicians who work hard for eight or ten hours a day during ten or eleven months of the year (and this for seven days in the week) spend their short holidays listening to other musicians or discussing technical or professional matters with others who are interested. There are many who have taken no other holiday for many years; yet they have suffered little or not at all from the continuous attention to this one subject. Naturally this can be, and sometimes is, overdone. Some years ago a famous conductor and teacher boasted that he had worked seven days every week and fifty-two weeks every year for all his life. But he died, worn out with overwork, fifteen years before he reached the allotted span of three score years and ten. What would have been the result had he been able to devote the same time to the art rather than to the business of music one can only conjecture. But observation of other instances suggests very strongly that it would have been less disastrous.

Impression and expression are as necessary for recreation, even for relaxation, as they are for growth. For this reason music may be either a cause or an effect of relaxation, for it may be used as a means of either impression

or expression. By listening to certain kinds of music we may find that inactivity without vacuity of mind which is so necessary from time to time. On the other hand, by indulgence in the composition or interpretation of music we may find a congenial activity to relieve our minds of the monotony of *dolce far niente*.

If we recognize music as a means of expression at all, and this need not be laboured here as it has been dealt with in earlier essays, we must realise this. It may, however, be repeated that music does not express the same things as does language, or in the same way. Primarily and generally words may be said to express thoughts while music expresses emotion. Therefore music is more useful as a relaxation than is literature, for slight emotions are more natural and healthful than are slight thoughts. The question (which is the ultimate problem of most psychologists) whether a state of pure emotion is possible does not necessarily enter here, though it might have some bearing on the wider one of the complete object of music.

It is hardly necessary to point out that what at one time and in certain circumstances may be a relaxation, at another time and in other circumstances may be a great strain—more-

over that what causes a relaxation of one set of faculties may cause a strain upon others. Therefore in considering the practical aspect of the matter we cannot lay down certain rules as to the class of music which may be employed or the manner of its employment. Cases are not infrequent in which the actual playing of difficult, intellectual music causes a greater relaxation than the passive listening to light and simple music. Strange as this appears at first sight, the reason is a simple one. A certain degree of mental or emotional satisfaction is a necessity before either mind or body can be entirely at ease. Anything which irritates puts a strain upon both mind and body. Therefore to the serious musician the hearing of music of the type which forms the larger proportion of the light music of to-day has a result the opposite of what it should be.

Light music should be a means of relaxation to all who hear it; and most of it should also be a means of relaxation to those who take part in it. All the greatest musicians of history have realised this, and everyone of them has endeavoured to supply some music which carries out these conditions. Some, such as Verdi, Mozart, Sullivan and Massanet, have devoted a large amount of their energies to this class of work, while others have by force of

circumstances or their nature done very little of it. The aim of light music is as much the relief of those who perform it as of those who listen to it. This must not be taken to imply that all those who take part in light opera, for instance, should feel physically or mentally refreshed immediately their part is done. The effect in this respect is a subsequent and continuing one, not an immediate and passing one. Consequently professional light music should form the smallest proportion, not the largest proportion of it as is so often the case to-day. The justification for professional music, light or heavy, at its best or at its worst, is that music, and particularly music in which a number of people take part, makes its effect by impression on those who hear it rather than on those who take part in it. This is always the case with the combined arts, and where the artist sees or hears little of the complete effect. Light music is in its nature that which we enjoy in our own homes, as we go about the streets, as we meet friends in social concourse; and as such it carries out its object in affording delight alike to participators and hearers.

Classical music is commonly supposed to be too serious for purposes of relaxation. There is, however, a large quantity of music that is both classical and light—that is, which may be

taken as a standard model of how to write, and which, nevertheless, requires little strain on the part of the performer and none on the part of the listener. Some even is humorous; but the bulk is merely cheerful, and requires no effort to appreciate, and yet causes no unnecessary or unhealthy excitement. Audiences of uneducated and degenerate paupers and of neglected slum children have been known to stamp and cheer for a repetition of instrumental music by Johann Sebastian Bach—a composer of whom many people are afraid because of his severe classicism. And this, too, at a first hearing! They would scarcely have done so if the music were in any degree a strain on their feelings or mentality.

Opera, by its combination of words, action and scenery, has naturally a greater hold of the unintelligent and unimaginative; but the cases referred to are of music without the aid of any of these additions.

The misunderstanding of the work of the great composers generally arises from two conditions. First is the fact that by the time their position among the classics is secure the idiom of much of what they have written is more or less out of date. Secondly, the study of those works which form the best models of intellectual work has generally shut out of

sight their lighter works. In times of leisure it is quite natural to turn right away from even the mere names of the authors whose works we employ in scholastic work. We do not seek for our recreation in the works which at school we have parsed and analysed and dissected and reconstructed and transcribed and been questioned upon *ad nauseam*. And not unnaturally we associate the names of their authors with the dry studies of certain of their works. But this is a great mistake, especially in matters of music. It would not be a very difficult matter to compile a long list of light music by such composers as Bach, Handel, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert, Weber, Schumann, Mendelssohn, and even the severe Brahms and the philosophic Wagner. But because they were primarily serious artists most of it would be from their less-known works.

While we cannot make strict rules as to the class and manner of music to be employed for the purposes of relaxation, we can at least find certain general characteristics which aid all music in its qualities as a relaxation. The most obvious of these characteristics is a sound and regular rhythmic construction. All rhythmic music is not an aid to relaxation. So far from being so, some of it is quite fatiguing.

We must not be misled into thinking that regular rhythm means strongly marked rhythm. Strongly marked rhythm has this advantage—it is easily understood and grasped. It is also by its nature associated with physical recreation. For this reason it is useful for providing mental relaxation by means of physical exercise. This point has already been referred to and is the one that is generally recognised in the teaching profession. It may be, however, that some do not realise how great an aid it may be towards physical relaxation, and particularly how greatly vocal music may aid physical work by the relief it gives to the feelings.

In Germany particularly, but in other countries including our own to a somewhat smaller extent, there is, or was before the war, a definite school of thought whose motto was *Arbeit und Rhythmus*. As a matter of fact this cult (for it is that) is simply drawing fresh attention to eternal facts which in these materialistic days have been largely lost sight of. For centuries work and music went hand in hand, because each helped the other, music providing constant relief to brain and hands, and thus preventing undue fatigue; while work provided a basis of rhythm for the music. Soldiers and sailors discovered the relaxing

qualities of strongly rhythmical music ages ago, and one of the greatest mistakes ever made by the authorities ruling our military and naval forces was the suppression of marching and working songs and shanties. Fortunately the mistake has been found out and to some extent rectified.

Sometimes, however, both body and mind require the relaxation which strongly marked rhythm does not give. Nothing proves how tiring strongly marked rhythm may be (though it is not always so) than a long ride in a railway train or a tramcar over rails that have been well worn. The mere regularity of the pulsations is one of the most tiring features of such a journey.

Nevertheless soothing music must be rhythmical to a high degree; though its rhythm must be more or less subtle. Its pulsations must not be broken up or disjointed, but must flow smoothly on from point to point so that the whole is one complete entity, and any mental effort to connect its parts is entirely unnecessary. Other qualities may help, such as melodiousness, smoothness of harmony, and most of all a psychological or subjective calmness, but these are less essential. Thought may enter as it does into games and light con-

versation, provided it is in no degree strenuous. And with relaxation comes the possibility of recreative and of creative education.

HISTORY AND MUSIC

TO

DANIEL GREGORY MASON

HISTORY AND MUSIC

It has been said that History is not a pageant of Kings; it is a study of the evolution of a people. If this be true, what a large proportion of our historians have pursued the wrong lines in their labours! Which of us in our schooldays was not driven from all interest in the histories of our respective countries by the long lists of rulers, with the dates of their birth, accessions and deaths, the statistics, dates and results of battles, the lengths of continuance of governments and international coalitions, and other details which had neither interest or utility. Similarly the history of music has been regarded largely as the history of a number of the most prominent composers and performers of each period, with the dates of completion and first performance of outstanding compositions. Even a writer of such deep insight into the real state of things as the late Sir C. Hubert H. Parry fell to some extent into this error. In the volume he contributed to the magnificent and useful *Oxford History*

of Music he says that "the 17th century is, musically, almost a blank, even to those who take more than an average interest in the Art." Now, few of us would dare to question the dictum of so eminent an authority, were it not that he gives his reason for it; and this reason is that "bare a score of composers' names during the whole time suggest anything more than a mere reputation to modern ears." He does not actually say that the period was a comparatively unmusical one, but the implication is a fairly obvious one, as he seems to judge the condition of the time by such remains as are accessible to the average man. Yet there was considerable activity in musical production of one kind and another; people sang and played, and some of them even composed music which their contemporaries admired and considered epoch making. That little remains until now is not really a sign that music was by any means non-existent or weak then.

In recent years a change has come over the methods of study, and, so far as music is concerned efforts have been made to trace the development of the art as a whole apart from the mere succession of geniuses. The book from which I have quoted (*The Oxford History of Music*) in spite of one or two slips of that nature, is a serious and well-informed

attempt to do this. Except, however, for the specialised study of folksong and folk-dancing, little or nothing has been done to trace the development of music in its relation to the life of the people. That is, historians have failed to see the essential nature of music, with its uses and objects. Other arts have received more attention, which may be accounted for by the fact that some of them at least are concerned with the recording of events, and also by their lack of dependence such as belongs to music, after their completion upon any personal element. "It is the logical and discriminating interpretation of facts from the evolutionary bird's-eye view that makes for history," says Mr. O. G. Sonneck, "and the happy faculty to lay bare the influences that, so to speak, forced the musical tree to take on its own characteristic shape and no other." Music that is not living, that is not sung or played and heard makes little or no record of its existence. The other arts, and especially the graphic and plastic arts, remain evident whether they are alive or dead. Nevertheless we can trace the history of music itself in some degree, and these notes are an attempt to set forth lines on which it may be done.

In the most primitive ages of every race we find that the life of the people was very much

centralised. Each little tribe or clan had its leader or chief, and very often each group had its king. From this chief or king, and towards him, the life of the people was regulated and governed. Therefore we may learn what was the state of art amongst certain primitive peoples by examining the records that remain of the arts of their chiefs and the households of such chiefs. As civilisation advances, and with the increase of the population makes life more complex, this is not so easy. The art of the people, just as their life, becomes less close and intimate with that of their rulers. It is true that the ideal king is he who sums up in himself the character of his people. But there have been few ideal kings, and very frequently the life of the people has flowed in precisely the opposite direction from that of its king. Even to-day, when there seems a serious desire and endeavour to revert to the "fatherhood" principle of the monarchy, we could hardly judge the music of England by that presented to King George, or that of Italy, Holland or Arabia, by the tastes and practice of the individual monarchs of these countries. Both kings and their people are too conscious of their personal identity to permit of this.

And very much the same conditions exist with regard to geniuses and the common folk.

Music is the most democratic of all the arts, and therefore we must not be content to study merely the lives and works of the greatest composers, nor yet the effect produced by certain works or types of work. Everyone should know something of the history of music, whether they know anything of the history of musicians and schools of music or not. The history of music is at least as important as the histories of wars and of governments. Music has a direct bearing on the life of the people, which even the most important of political events have not. And even on these latter music has not been without influence, and especially on that of war. He would be a bold man who would deny that music has played an important rôle in the Great War of the twentieth century, for every officer and every private soldier in the vast armies that have been contending would stand up and proclaim its influence and usefulness.

Of the old time use of the drum to create conflicting emotions of courage and fear, and of the trumpet and flute to create those of ferocity and steadiness mention has already been made. The Ancient Britons sang and made strange hideous noises to frighten their foes. They had songs also that were most affecting and peaceful. One Greek writer

tells how on occasion after two armies were all ready for the charge, some of the British bards, with peaceable motives, stepped in between the fighting lines and "by their soft and fascinating songs calmed the fury of the warriors, and prevented bloodshed," and since then music has had an intimate association with the history of our land. As the life of the people has become more involved it has also become less musical, and therefore the national history, and particularly the political history of the country, in later times is less closely approached by music. We have our modern prototypes of the gleemen who in the reign of Edward the Confessor, "sang in manlier tones of the long peace and the glory of his reign." But we have nothing to compare with Taillefer, the minstrel to William the Conqueror, who opened the Battle of Hastings with a song and then rushed forward to fall first among the heroes of the day.

It might even be said that we have some of the same type as King Alfred the Great, who can make use of their music in acting as spies, for there are not lacking those serving in the Secret Service of all nations who make use of their musical gifts to help them in obtaining entrance to political circles by social methods. We have also our composers and artists,

like Sir C. Villiers Stanford, Mr. Rutland Boughton, Miss Ethel Smyth, who on occasion use their art for the purpose of propagating their political opinions. Nevertheless, it is hardly likely we shall soon revert to the former intimacy of life and art.

Ignorance of and lack of interest in music is an essentially modern development which belongs almost entirely to the wealthier classes. Among the lower classes music has always been a great power, as it still is to-day. The singing of Augustine and his fellow missionaries seems to have been one of the principal things that appealed to the common people of Kent. Caedmon, the swineherd, who was afterwards to be the first English poet, left the feast when he saw the harp, because he was ashamed to admit he could not use it. Bede and Dunstan, saints of the Saxon Church, were skilled in ecclesiastical chant, and the latter also learnt in the hall of his father, Heorstan, to love "the vain songs of ancient heathendom, the trifling legends, the funeral chants." Canute was a poet and a lover of music, though we do not know that he was a practical musician. The leader of a revolt of the lords of Aquitaine against Richard Cœur de Lion was a troubadour, Bertrand de Born, just as his saviour from captivity was

Blondel the minstrel. Henry the Third was skilled as a troubadour, and it was through his desire for a spread of musical knowledge that Aristotle became a classical study in England. Edward the Third, most of the Tudors, and particularly Henry the Eighth and Anne Boleyn were musicians, as were also some of the House of Brunswick, including the last of them, Victoria.

But all this, though it refers to those whose positions in history are prominent and important, has little direct bearing upon history itself. After the Roman invasion and the Norman Conquest, the first account of the influence of music on history comes from Wales in the twelfth century. A couple of the most striking passages I have met with come from J. R. Green's *Short History of the English People*. "At the hour of its lowest degradation," says the author, "the silence of Wales was suddenly broken by a crowd of singers. The new poetry of the twelfth century burst forth, not from one bard or another, but from the nation at large," and quoting "a shrewd English observer of the time," "In every house strangers who arrived in the morning were entertained till eventide with the talk of maidens and the music of the harp." After

the curious remark that " It is strange to pass from the world of actual Welsh history into such a world as this," he continues : " But side by side with this wayward, fanciful stream of poesy and romance ran a torrent of intenser song. The old spirit of the earlier bards, their joy in battle, their love for freedom, their hatred of the Saxon, broke out in ode after ode, turgid, extravagant, monotonous, often prosaic, but fused into poetry by the intense fire of patriotism which glowed within it. The rise of the new poetic feeling indeed marked the appearance of a new energy in the long struggle with the English conqueror."

Although this refers particularly to poetry, its significance can be gauged only when we remember that at that time poetry and song were one and the same thing, melody and verse being inseparable, and that it is much easier to quote the poetry than the music, because the former was written down, while the latter was merely traditional.

How great was the influence of music in the work of the Reformation it would be impossible to estimate, and the Reformation was one of the most significant of historical events, and had a tremendous effect upon the history of the nations in which it took place. Luther knew

the power of music as well as anyone who ever lived, and he did not fail to use it to the fullest extent to help him in his purposes. In England Cromwell also realized the power of music, and saw that it was used only for the purposes which he favoured. The way in which he suppressed it in certain circumstances was as great a tribute to its power, social and political as well as religious, as was his encouragement of it in other circumstances.

The decline of music as a social power dates about from this time, although it retained much of that power for a long period. That single songs by their invigorating effect or by their dissemination of political ideas and emotions have an effect on history may be seen from "Lilliburlero" and "When the King enjoys his own again," right down to "Tipperary." The teaching of history has also formed an important function of art music as well as folk music, for the ideas of many on various points in history are based as much on historical operas and cantatas and upon songs recording facts or imagined facts, as upon the novels of Walter Scott, Manville Fenn, or Gilbert Parker.

This latter function, that of recording history as well as inspiring it, may be traced a

very long way back in history. In the song of triumph sung by Miriam after the passage of the Red Sea, and in the laments of the Psalmist by the Rivers of Babylon or the long narration of the disobedience and restoration of Judah, we find records which were intended to impress the minds of the people by past history so that their future history might be governed aright. Other nations than Israel have employed song in the same manner, and we find in the ancient folksongs of all nations of the world something of the same character. And are we not doing the same in our songs of the war of yesterday?

"If I could but make the songs of a nation," a wise man is reported to have said, "I care not who should make its laws." It is difficult to imagine a better summing up of the often forgotten fact of the tremendous influence song has on the history of the nations and therefore of the world. In some respects the influence of music and of poetry has declined as civilisation has advanced, and this decline is generally most marked in times when communal life is most artificial and least spontaneous in its movements. But as long as human nature remains what it is, both music and poetry will continue to exercise an influence on human life which nothing else can.

The reason is, of course, that man is as much a being of feeling and emotion as he is of thought.

"We live in deeds, not years; in thoughts, not breaths,
In feelings, not in figures on a dial.
We should count time by heart-throbs. He most lives
Who think most, feels the noblest, acts the best."

In turning to the question of the effect of history upon music we are assailed at once by the difficulties of legendary, tradition and romantic stories. Certain it is that each Westward invasion the successful invaders have carried their music, or some of it, with them. Equally certain is it that in degenerate days the art of music has declined with the life of the people. Certain isolated events have had their individual effect also. One of the best known and possibly one of the most pregnant with results, good and bad, was the succession of the runaway Handel's employer, the Elector of Hanover, to be King George I. of England. Had that not happened, it is probable Handel would have continued to peregrinate Europe, and the mutual influence of Handel on the British composers and of the

British composers on Handel would have been lost. Oratorio would in all likelihood never have become the national form of art music in England which it has done; which would have been some loss as well as some gain. It was political events which caused Haydn to write his Austrian hymn, and so led to his variations upon it, and other political events which drove Wagner from Prussia and entirely changed his career.

Songs are themselves only small compositions, but they have a large influence, and it is through them that history has largely affected music. Our own national anthem owes something to several earlier songs, notably to *Franklin has Fled Away;* and *God Save the King* has inspired many composers to fine efforts in the larger forms. The Marseillaise was a political song and has had an influence on art music almost as great as that of *God Save the King.* We can seriously question whether it was not the series of political events which delayed for nearly a hundred years the advance of partwriting in the thirteenth century, so that instead of a volume of fine music of that kind there remains an isolated but remarkable example, *Sumer is i-cumen in.* Even the Agincourt Song, sung in defiance of the wishes of King Henry V. was the result of

a historical event, and has had some influence, if not a great one, on art music and folk music. The Thirty Years War resulted in an outbreak of song in Germany that was the foundation of modern Teutonic music. And if we look at contemporary history, is it not likely that the events of 1914 and subsequent years will have an effect on music the character of which none can foresee, but which will be a great and drastic one? Already it has accounted for a number of compositions from *Tipperary* to such great works as Elgar's *Carillon* and *Polonia*, and has drawn the sympathies of British and American composers from Germany to the Latin countries, while social and economic conditions have made almost inevitable a new start by many individuals and bodies concerned in the composition and production of music. And with the new start will come ideas different, it may be better or it may be worse, than those before the break.

The study of history therefore shows very clearly that music expresses, in the aggregate, the spirit of the age to which it belongs. It is not that the most popular music, or that which is most heard, necessarily expresses this spirit, or that any particular class of music at all expresses it. Some music expresses nothing but the momentary feeling of the individual or

the crowd. Some other is merely intellectual or technical and serves no purpose save that of proving the possibilities of new developments or of exercising the facility of the writer. But the aggregate of the music of an age expresses the aggregate of the spirit of that age, so far as it is expressible in music. Ragtime and its relations did not express the spirit of the days before the great war, any more than *Tipperary* expressed that of the Winter of 1914-1915; but they did express the spirit of the pleasure-loving classes who demanded them. Similarly, the complex art-music which is composed and heard with appreciation by the art-loving classes expresses the complex spirit of the higher civilisation of its day.

The question of expression through music is one to which psychologists have devoted too little attention. It is one that has been left too much to technical musicians who are frequently the least qualified of all persons to discuss it. Such expression is what may be called a borrowed one, for, as a rule, it does not emanate, in the first instance at least, from those whose feelings it most adequately expresses. Many examples of this might be given, from Beethoven down to the purveyor of the sentimental balderdash which expresses

the vacuity of those who gush over its folly. The people of an age, or of a district or a class, usually without intention and without consciously doing so, adopt a type of musical expression invented or evolved by one man or by a body of men who possibly has little or no sympathy with them. By such adoption they make such music their own, though it be only for a time.

For this reason a very thoughtful and thought provoking writer has declared that the music composed in any age, being the expression of the spirit of that age, is for the time being and for contemporary musicians the most important of all music. This statement is true in some respects and to a certain extent. Unless and until music of any particular type is adoptable and adopted by a considerable section of the community as a natural means of expression, however, it is of little or no importance. If and when it is so adopted it immediately rises to a first-class importance; for good or for ill.

Many of the sturdier sort of music-lovers ask whether it would not be better that music should be something else than an expression of such spirit. They hear the music of an earlier day, with its comparative calm simplicity and dignity, and say: "This is the kind

of music we want; would it not be better if the music of to-day were similar?"

Two reasons there are for such questions as these. One is the natural discontent of human nature, which creates the constant desire for something different from what it has and is, and points to the nearest or the most sympathetic attraction. It is the spirit which at its worst leads to strikes and revolutions, to anarchic writing and playing, and at its best to sanity and progress in art and in life. The other is the remnant of the older spirit, which still survives in nearly all who have not resigned themselves to the mercy of passing fashions.

It may be said at once that this desire is a good and natural one, but it is one that cannot well be fulfilled except by a change in the spirit of the age. There exists a definite desire for such a change, for a return to the simpler and more dignified life (though there is also an affectation of the "simple life" which is more complex than the most complex modernism), and the demand for the older style of music is merely one aspect of it. We find something the same kind of feeling in the inability of the older generations to appreciate music later than that of their own early days, or even of an earlier generation; which spirit

is the cause of the opposition to all modern musicians from Handel and Mozart to Delius and Ravel.

The spirit of an age must of necessity find its outlet, that is it must express itself, through various *media;* and none is safer than is that of music. Music is a comparatively safe medium because bad music passes into oblivion more quickly than any other form of bad art, whilst that which is good continues, as a rule, for a longer period than other forms of good art, and reaches farther into all the ramifications of social life. This very desire for a return to the music of earlier days is a proof of the truth of such statement. The music that has come to us from our forbears is of their best. That which our posterity will receive from us will be our best; and we find that it is only those who are consciously or unconsciously the real seekers after what is best who have this desire for the older forms. Surely this is a sufficient reason why music should express the spirit of the age; that our children and grandchildren should know the best of what is in us, and that the worst should disappear as we do ourselves.

But the reflexive character of music as an expression is also another reason why it should continue to express the spirit of each and every

age. Nothing else stirs collective sentiment so readily or so deeply as does music. "A verse may reach him whom a sermon flies," and that verse when joined to the right kind of music will not only reach but will stay with such an one (who is the kind of individual most representative of the communal feeling), and will soon become a means of natural expression of his own thoughts and feelings. But it does not create the sentiment it expresses, though it may deepen and intensify it. What it does is to bring to the surface and expand that which already exists, just as all other means of expression do when properly employed.

In considering this subject as a whole there is one danger that must be avoided. We must not assume that the music of any age is necessarily or only that which is composed in such an age. The music of an age is that which is used by that age, whether composed by contemporary composers or by those who have lived in previous ages. Bach's music, to take what is perhaps the most striking example, is much more the music of the present age than it was of his own age, and more so than is that of many clever composers who are still at work and are in touch with the tendencies of modern life and art. Whether it should be so or not

is a matter which lends itself to endless technical and psychological debate, which must be left to its own proper sphere.

RELIGIOUS EMOTION AND MUSIC

TO

C. J. E. BOSMANS

RELIGIOUS EMOTION AND MUSIC

Music is the universal expression of religious emotion, and though sometimes that emotion finds a partial expression in other matters, its complete expression always includes music. Religion and music are the two matters which all possess in some degree or kind. "Music, the handmaid of religion," is no mere saying with regard to one religion only. Music is the handmaid of every religion, of the religious instinct; but it is also more than the handmaid. It is the highest as well as the most obvious expression of religious emotion, that is, of the purely human side of religion as apart from any divine revelation and apart from the question of personal sacrifice and devotion, as well as its prompter. Probably this is the reason why each type of religion has its own type of music.

It is true that many religious bodies have borrowed their music from others, or from secular matters, but they have invariably adapted it to their own purposes. More often,

too, music originally intended for religious purposes or inspired by religious feeling has been appropriated for secular purposes. This does not refer, obviously, to individual works, but rather to the systems of music evolved and regulated by religious bodies.

The observant person will notice how that nearly always the most natural expression of religious emotion is in some form of plainsong. This is true not only with regard to the formal types of religion, and among those who are the conservators of religious rites and ceremonies. Were it confined to these people the obvious reason would be that of the following of tradition, in its pure or its debased forms. Those whose nature calls forth the expression of religious emotion (and whose nature does not?) find in some one or other of the various forms of plainsong the most ready means of such expression. Among those who do not naturally express their religious emotions the majority fall back more upon the measured utterances of music in its recent forms, because an unready expression adopts a more or less stilted form. Neither of these classes find it in the most modern idioms and forms, and the few people who express their religious emotions in the latest styles of music are usually spirits of rare mysticism like César

Franck, or of exceptional vehemence, like several of the younger composers of the twentieth century.

The use of the word "plainsong" in this connection is not, it may be said, the common restricted one which binds it down to the melodies and musical formulæ of the Catholic Church or to the traditional melodies confined within the limits of the old so-called ecclesiastical modes. The word is used in the fuller sense of music which has an irregular and fluctuating accent and phrase, based upon verbal or tonal nuance.

Plainsong is, of course, and always has been, used for other expressions than those of religious feeling, but it has not been so used to such a large extent. There are those who consider that plainsong is the only suitable music for religious purposes, and the number of those who think so is sufficiently large to give rise to the question whether there is not a psychological cause for such a view.

The man that hath no music in his soul, Shakespeare tells us, is fit for all sorts of terrible things. Some of us would go further than this, and say that such a man does not, and probably never did exist. Some sense of music, dull it may be, or distorted beyond recognition, but never absolutely crushed,

exists in everyone. And so also does what we may call the sense of religion. The most worldly-minded, the most carnal-minded, the most frivolous-minded, have this sense, which in these cases most often becomes superstition. And this refers not only to the broader meaning of the term Religion, which is simply that which is of the greatest and most lasting importance, or to which we give, rightly or wrongly, the most serious consideration. It refers also to the narrower meaning of the term, which relates to the tenets held, and the rites and ceremonies practised by certain divinely or humanly constituted bodies, or to our own direct relations with the Deity and the unseen world.

And as these two senses—the sense of Religion and the sense of Music—are possessed by all, so also are they intimately related in the minds of most people. Though a merely emotional religion is as shallow and futile a form as it is possible to call by the name, religion without emotion is impossible. And music is the most natural and universal expression of emotion—of the emotions of joy and sorrow, of faith, love, hope, despair; and of worship. Not infrequently religious emotion finds expression in other matters, and when we speak of music being its highest ex-

pression it must be taken that this does not include the active carrying out of the duties and sacrifices it involves. Music is the expression of the elementary and elemental emotion of religion, of the natural feeling for something and Someone above and beyond our present power of comprehension, and from this abstract expression follows in its due place the positive expression of personal devotion and sacrifice. The full and complete expression of the most intimate relation with the unseen world, however, must and does always include expression in music; and if one traces the personal history of the most ascetic hermit or monk of East or West music will always be found to have had a place at one time or another in his spiritual development. That such persons are able and desirous to dispense with it simply shows that it is a means to an end, and not an essential attribute of their religion, and the most enthusiastic supporter of the use of music in religion would not go further than this.

Music has always been regarded, by pagans and true worshippers alike, as a directly heaven-sent gift, and therefore one to be employed chiefly in the services of religion. In the old pagan religions there was usually a god of music, or some hero or demi-god par-

ticularly gifted with the talent of music. Such were Osiris of the Egyptians, Apollo and Orpheus of the Greeks, and Narada and Bharata of the Hindus; and Christianity has its patron saints of music, and its actual and figurative references to the music of eternity.

Throughout the long history of the Chinese Empire we find music intimately connected with its various religions. Ancestor worship (so essentially religious in its character that Herbert Spencer was led into thinking it the origin of all religions) and Emperor (or more strictly Law) Worship, lend themselves to the ceremonial regulation of its use and disuse. The theoretic tendencies of the Chinese are apparent in these. Modern developments have changed much, but for centuries there was no change. Music, they said, is the harmony between heaven and earth; and therefore the scale consisted of five notes, the number 3 being the symbol of heaven and 2 the symbol of earth. The names of the notes were those of the state, from the Emperor downwards, though they considered what we should call down to be up, and *vice versâ*, our idea of gravity of tone being theirs of dignity and elevation. The larger tones, approximately our whole tones, were masculine, that is, according to their ideas, complete and inde-

pendent; semi-tones were feminine, that is incomplete and dependent. But their abstruse and theoretical methods enabled them to divide the scale and place it in so many different positions as to give them many more notes, at least on paper, than we possess in our Western systems of music.

From the most ancient times on record in native literature, music was forbidden to mourners. Musical instruments were always interred with Emperors and grandees during "certain dynasties." When in mourning they did not even speak of music. Attempts to suppress Buddhism were made by suppressing the music of that religion. Japanese music was more secular. Not so that of the Hindus, however. The Hindus trace their music in its present form right back to the earliest times when it was supposed to be a direct gift from their gods. They ascribe to it many supernatural powers, and it is through their priests and monks that much Hindu music has been preserved. Much the same may also be said of the Brahmins. These religions, too, not only preserve their music entire, but make great efforts (greater than any of those made by St Ambrose, St Gregory or Pope Pius IV.) to preserve its purity. Moral and even penal laws exist which forbid the altering or adapt-

ing of any melody to other purposes than those for which it is intended, and certain melodies are permitted to be sung by privileged persons alone. What a boon to both religion and art it would be if such laws could be applied to some of the melodies sung in places of worship in the Western hemisphere!

From the days of Jubal, who was "the father of all such as handle the harp and the organ," music figured constantly in religious exercises under the Old Dispensation. How far it was spontaneous and how far deliberate and ordered in the earliest days it is impossible to say. The earliest record we have of any particular sacred psalm is that of Moses after the passage of the Red Sea. The record of the words and the repetition of the psalm by Miriam and the other women suggest that it was almost as deliberate as our methods of today. There are other cases on parallel lines right through the Old Testament, in which deliberate composition upon well recognised lines seems to have been the rule. Yet none seems to have doubted the reality and sincerity of the expression. Nearly always the references to music contained in the Bible, and particularly in the Old Testament speak of it as a formal and ordered matter, and generally as the expression of joy. When sorrow came

music was banished. "By the rivers of Babylon, there we sat down, yea we wept; Upon the willows in the midst thereof we hanged up our harps." Thus wrote the psalmist in the day of sorrow; but in the day of joy his cry is to "Praise the Lord with the sound of the trumpet," . . . the psaltery and harp, the timbrel, the stringed instruments and pipe, and the loud and high sounding cymbals. This is more than a little interesting when we compare it with the modern Chinese method of having no music in the time of mourning for the dead. It is also something of a forecast of the Catholic practice of having no instrumental music during penetential seasons.

With the advent of Christianity the music of the Jewish Church was developed into that of its successor. We have, of course, the highest authority and example for the use in Christian worship of music of a liturgical character. Not only was Christ Himself a constant worshipper at the Temple, where music formed an integral part of the worship. "On the same night that He was betrayed," we read immediately after the institution of the Blessed Sacrament, He and His disciples sang a hymn. That hymn, almost certainly, was the psalm *In exitu Israel*, which still is

connected with the Christian Passover—with Easter. Paul and Silas sang in prison; the former urges the Ephesians to speak among themselves in psalms and hymns and spiritual songs, singing and making melody in their hearts to the Lord; and to the Colossians he recommends the use of psalms and hymns and spiritual songs for teaching as well as for worship, while St James tells those who are merry to indulge their mirth in this manner. Most of the hymns and songs to which reference is intended in these passages are those of the Jews. But the music itself was not always so. "The glossolalia, or 'speaking with tongues,' upon which St. Paul discourses in *1 Cor. xiv*," Mr. Edward Dickinson tells us in his useful little handbook on *The Growth and Development of Music*, "was a sort of textless ebullition poured forth under the stress of religious excitement. This practice may be traced back to ancient times in Greece and Egypt; it was analogous to the long flourishes still common in Oriental music, and has perhaps survived in the 'jubilations' or 'melismas' of the Catholic Church."

The earliest Christian music was only to quite a small extent that of Jewry, being mainly that of Greece and Italy. The reason for this, of course, was that Greece was the

paramount intellectual power, as Rome was that of politics. Nevertheless we read that Christian music was broader and simpler as befitted its employment by congregations, as well as sweeter and tenderer as befitted its subjects, than was the pagan music from which it was adapted. Congregational music, if one may call it so, that is the music of the whole body engaged in any act of worship, would develop earlier than that for choirs or instruments. One respect in which the earliest records show that Jewish methods were retained was in that of antiphonal singing, either between precentor and congregation or between women and men. Instruments were probably not employed, at least to any serious extent, until after the invention of organs suitable for accompanying voices. This did not take place till the fourth century or later. It happened to coincide approximately with the period when other instruments were used to such debased purposes as to be forbidden to all faithful Christians. The use of the organ did not become general, however, until many years after this.

During the terrible times of the great persecutions there was little music, for fear of discovery of the Churches by the persecutors. Even then, however, it was not altogether sup-

pressed, and the tradition was continued till more peaceful times.

What we may for convenience call modern Christian music came into existence in the fourth century, when St. Ambrose first invented a system of tonality and chant that was usable by both East and West. An order of the Council of Laodicea that only those who were appointed for the purpose should sing in the churches made this an opportune time for the establishment of a new system. Schools were founded and attempts made to write down the sounds. There is no need to give a description of the music writing here, as the only effect it had on the relations of religion and music was that it aided the spread of a uniform Christian song for all parts. It also helped to increase the number of hymns and tunes available, which was now larger owing to the admission of original hymns. Before then only the Psalms, the great Canticles (which had just come to include the *Te Deum*) and a few traditional hymns had been admitted into public worship.

The history of music was for many centuries bound up with the history of the Church. This is true both of sacred and secular music, as we shall see. The earliest musical theorists under systems which at all apply to modern

music were monks. A single line, then two, three and eventually four, were used to indicate the rise and fall of the priest's or cantor's part.

A letter notation was invented early in the eleventh century by Guido, a monk of Arezzo. He also developed the line notation invented by Hucbald of St. Amand in Flanders. It was Guido, too, who invented the practice of what we call solmisation or solfeggi; that is the singing of the notes of the gamut to certain syllables. This method arose out of the practice of singing a verse as an exercise. The verse selected by Guido was the first of the hymn for St John the Baptist's Day, commencing *Ut queant laxis*. This exercise eventually developed into a regular hymn tune, of which one or other versions is still sung in Catholic churches, the first syllable of each line commencing on a note higher than the previous one. He had also many other methods of teaching, and was in fact the greatest theorist of his day.

Methods of measuring music, of fixing approximately the length time each note was to be held, were invented by Franco of Cologne, also primarily for ecclesiastical purposes. So far as the general use of music is concerned, and particularly of secular music,

the greatest glory belongs to the Church in England. This is in the preservation of the remarkable Round or Part-song, *Sumer is i-cumen in*, which dates from early in the thirteenth century.

The earliest copy now existing was made in the monastery at Reading, and the music seems to have been adapted to sacred words as well as to the original secular ones. Whether it was an isolated example appearing long before its time, or whether there were other pieces of a similar type and cleverness which have been lost it is now impossible to guess. So far as our knowledge goes it was a very early forerunner of the style of music which only became at all general a hundred years or more after it. Whichever may have been the case, it is a testimony to the care of the Church for education and the arts.

This line of history need be proceeded with no further here, but left for each to pursue independently through other means. Most of us know how the Church was for centuries the chief, if not the only centre of education. In its own formularies, in the ways evolved of teaching the people the great truths which it had to present, and in its fatherly care of the recreations of its children whereby it endeavoured to prevent innocent amusements

from becoming debased and sinful, the Catholic Church has pursued and promulgated the best and purest music. It has not always, in fact it has only seldom been in the van of movements in art. Such matters must of necessity be proved before they can receive the assent of religion. It is not the work of religion, even of religion in the abstract and without regard to the question of the Christian or any other defined religion, to experiment either in essential truth or in the matters which appertain to it.

But with this necessary conservatism we can look to the greatest works of art, and particularly of the art of music, as originating from the Christian religion. Of these the greater part have a direct connection with the worship of the Church or with some of its cardinal doctrines, and there are few indeed but have arisen from the innate religious feeling of which mention was made at the beginning of this essay. Where would be the art of Palestrina, of Pergolesi, of Bach and Handel, of Mozart and Purcell, of Byrd and Gibbons, if it had not been inspired by the services of the Church or the words of Holy Writ? What was generally, in fact almost universally, regarded as the greatest utterances in music are such works as Palestrina's *Missa Papæ Marcelli*, Bach's

The Passion according to St. Matthew and his B minor Mass, Handel's *The Messiah*, Purcell's *Te Deum and Jubilate*, Mozart's *Requiem* and his three last symphonies, Beethoven's two Masses and his Symphony in C minor, Berlioz' *Te Deum*, and Verdi's *Requiem*.

Others there may be of equally high standing; but none take a higher place in the estimation of all who care for music. By far the greater part of this music, it will be observed, is set to the words of the Church services, or to scriptural excerpts relating directly to the great truths of the Incarnation and the Atonement. Handel, Purcell and Mozart all wrote much that is great in operas and other secular works, but it is by their sacred music they are most intimately bound up with human life as a whole. And it is much the same with composers of a somewhat lower rank in the kingdom of art.

But it may be said, all this about the great individual composers, about music in which only a few of us can take part and which not all of us can appreciate, has only a small bearing on a great subject. Religion is a matter for the most ignorant and poor as well as for those who have had education and opportunities of hearing these great works. What is the

relation between Religion and Music among those to whom these famous compositions are little or nothing more than names?

In reply to this it may be pointed out that this type of music—what we call Art-music—has a wider and stronger influence than might appear from a superficial observation. It permeates all classes. It is surprising how one constantly finds associated with certain words, in the minds of those who have the least opportunity of hearing it, the music set to such words by the great composers.

The emotion of the majority, however, with rare exceptions is somewhat shallow; and consequently their music, the expression of their emotion, is also shallow. But it is worthy of note that the deepest religious emotion finds its utterance in what even the most scholastic musician would call the best music. To put it in another way, "namby-pamby" music usually means namby-pamby religion; noble music means pure and noble religion. So much is this the case that I have no hesitation in saying that one of the reasons, possibly one of the great reasons, why religious missions and revivals have so short-lived an effect is the badness of their music.

One mistake is frequently made on this subject, against which it is well to guard; that

is the mistake of assuming that good music must have some degree of elaboration. Good music, even noble music is not necessarily elaborate; often it is quite simple. The best music, it has been said, is that which is most appropriate for the occasion for which it is employed. And could anyone say that in dealing with Eternal Verities, with the most serious things in this world and the next, the sugary sentimentality of much of the music that is so often employed to-day is the most appropriate? Not only in the Catholic Church, but in nearly all religions, nominally Christian or frankly opposed to Christianity, it has been the most usual thing to guard against this by an insistence upon the worthiness of that which tradition has most valued. Reference has already been made to some of the religions of the East, and to the way in which they have preserved certain melodies or types of melody as direct gifts from the gods. The Mohammedans have also strictly traditional melodies and chants for their religious observances, which those who have heard them state are most dignified and impressive. Jewish worship music is of a more strictly traditional character than is most, and the ritual music of the synagogue is of an exceptionally noble type. The ministers who sing

it unfortunately (like many Christian ministers) have often little care for the nobility of the music or the sacredness of the words, but this cannot hide their intrinsic worth, though it may and does reduce much of the emotional effect. This is one of the dangers of tradition which lacks authoritative oversight. But employed in the right way the custom of using traditional music for much of the service is simply a complete recognition of the necessity of emotional expression, but also of the necessity of that emotion being under proper control when large numbers are engaged in worship together.

THE END

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