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THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION  
MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE

Y 4. R 86/2: S. HRG. 104-40

The Smithsonian Institution Managen...

RINGS

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON  
RULES AND ADMINISTRATION  
UNITED STATES SENATE  
ONE HUNDRED FOURTH CONGRESS  
FIRST SESSION

ON

THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION  
MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE



MAY 11 AND 18, 1995

Printed for the use of the Committee on Rules and Administration

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

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# THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION: MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE

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THURSDAY, MAY 11, 1995

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION,  
Washington, DC.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:30 a.m., in Room 106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators Stevens, Ford, and Pell.

Staff Present: Christine Ciccone, Deputy Chief Counsel; Mark C. Mackie, Chief Counsel; Virginia C. Sandahl, Chief Clerk; and Kennie L. Gill, Special Counsel for the Minority.

## OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ALASKA

The CHAIRMAN. I want to welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses, General Charles Sweeney, the only pilot who flew on both the Hiroshima and Nagasaki missions and was the commander of the Nagasaki mission; Colonel Charles Cooper, the director of publications for The Retired Officers Association; Mr. Herman Harrington, the chairman of the National Internal Affairs Commission of The American Legion; Mr. R. E. Smith, national president of the Air Force Association; and Mr. Bob Manhan, assistant director of legislation for the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

The hearing today and the one next Thursday on the Smithsonian's future management practices are held as a result of the controversy over the Smithsonian's *Enola Gay* exhibit originally scheduled to open this month. Museums play a crucial role in our society. The processes of our democracy enable succeeding generations to judge actions taken by those who exercised sovereign power before they arrived. Museums are essential to this process and we must preserve the artifacts of our past. Those artifacts, together with facts proven at the time of the decisions, permit judgments of history to be fair and unbiased.

We are here today because the Smithsonian decided to present an interpretation of the history of the *Enola Gay's* historic flight. The veterans in this country reacted strongly, for good

reason, to the scripts that emerged from the Smithsonian. In the 50 years since World War II ended, and recently, there has been a constant erosion of the truth of what really happened during that war. This type of erosion is one of the reasons that the Holocaust Museum, which was built with private funds, is so important. It is there to ensure that history is not rewritten and that the atrocities committed against Jews and others in the Nazi death camps will never be forgotten.

On March 24 last year I initiated, along with Senator Ford, who was chairman then, Senator Dole, Senator Helms, Senator Cochran, and Senator McConnell, a letter to Dr. Harwit, the director of the Air and Space Museum at that time, expressing our concern that the Smithsonian's *Enola Gay* exhibit not lead to a revisionist view of history. It is not clear whether our concerns were taken seriously by the museum. It was only a couple of months after our letter that the proposed script attracted national attention due to the efforts of veterans groups.

This week we remember one of the most devastating periods in world history. We are here today to review what went wrong with the Smithsonian's process, particularly what led the Smithsonian to propose a view of the events that took place at the end of World War II that is contrary to the memory of those who lived through the war.

There are two people who have worked diligently over the last year to provide this committee, veterans, and the public with information on the exhibit. I want to express our thanks to Mr. Frank Rabbitt, a volunteer guide of 9 years at the Smithsonian's Paul Garber Restoration Facility. Mr. Rabbitt, who is here in the audience, is partially responsible for uncovering the museum's bias in the original scripts and bringing that bias to the attention of this committee.

In addition, we are indebted to Colonel Robert Schuh who provided the committee with other information and guidance. Unfortunately, the colonel met a tragic death last week. His family should know our thoughts are with them and we thank them for their efforts to continue the colonel's work.

A number of veterans groups have been involved with this issue. Due to time constraints they cannot all testify today. However, we have asked those organizations to submit written statements which will be included in the official hearing record.

[Additional statements are included in the Appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. Next Thursday we will receive testimony from the Smithsonian, and an individual who is both a scholar and a historian. The purpose of these hearings is not to tear down the Smithsonian but to ensure continuing public support of that great institution. This committee has oversight jurisdiction of the Smithsonian. I believe it is our duty to preserve the Smithsonian as the central depository of the artifacts of our Nation's history. I think the public should know that we waited



until now to hold these hearings at the specific request of the Smithsonian. We delayed them at the Smithsonian's request.

Our first witness is General Charles Sweeney. We are going to hear the testimony of all of the witnesses first and then we will ask questions from the panel. Gentlemen, would you take the seats at the table and let me call on my good friend, Senator Ford.

**OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WENDELL H. FORD,  
RANKING MEMBER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE  
OF KENTUCKY**

Senator FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. Since its founding more than a century ago the Smithsonian Institution has created exhibits about a great number of subjects and events in its effort to carry out the provisions of James Smithson's will "for the increase and diffusion of knowledge." As might be expected of an institution with such a broad mission, some of its exhibits may be controversial and raise concerns or objections by some people.

Last year I heard from people who were concerned about the proposed *Enola Gay* exhibit. Many of those who expressed concerns were veterans of the Second World War whose lives were especially affected by the events to be covered by that exhibit. I was impressed by the sincerity and depth of the feeling of those who conveyed their concerns to me. I felt that their concerns should be brought to the attention of and addressed by the Smithsonian.

Consequently, last year I joined with you, Mr. Chairman, as you already stated, and other members of this committee in a letter to the former director of the National Air and Space Museum regarding this exhibit. We requested that the Smithsonian be sensitive to the memory of those who gave their lives for our continued freedom. Although the Smithsonian has substantially revised the proposed exhibit some questions remain unresolved.

These hearings will serve the useful purpose of providing a public forum for the presentation and consideration of the issues and concerns that were raised regarding the planning of the exhibit. Mr. Chairman, the issues raised in these hearings touch on broader issues of Smithsonian management. It is important that these concerns be aired so that this matter can be put behind us and the Smithsonian can continue to move forward. I hope that these hearings will be beneficial to all parties and serve as a basis for moving on with our relationship with the Smithsonian in a positive and constructive manner.

I thank you for the opportunity to make this statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. As I am sure most people realize, every member of this committee is either a chairman or ranking member of some committee. I know that Senator Hatfield has other committee meetings. Senator Cochran

expresses his regrets that he cannot be here. He is chairing a conference committee. I am not certain how many people will show up here this morning, gentlemen. It is a busy period for the Senate, but we do appreciate your coming to appear before us.

Let me state that we have asked witnesses to limit their oral presentations to 10 minutes. We will print your full written statements in the record. We are going to waive the time limit, however, for General Sweeney. We feel that his role is so historic in this matter, and both Senator Ford and I have read the statement he has given the committee. So with your indulgence, we are going to give the general complete leeway to present his statement in the way he wishes to do so, and put the 10-minute limitation on the rest of you if that is all right. Thank you.

General?

Senator FORD. That is called discrimination.

[Laughter.]

The CHAIRMAN. That is discrimination, but in view of the historic role that General Sweeney played in this controversy, I would wish that the public at large could hear every word of what he has written, but it is even longer than 15 minutes. General, we turn the time over to you, please, sir.

#### **TESTIMONY OF MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES W. SWEENEY, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE, RETIRED**

General SWEENEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the committee. I am Major General Charles W. Sweeney, United States Air Force, retired. I am the only pilot to have flown on both atomic missions. I flew the instrument plane on the Hiroshima mission, and 3 days later on August 9, 1945 commanded the second atomic mission over Nagasaki. Six days after Nagasaki the Japanese military surrendered and the Second World War came to an end.

Fifty years ago millions of my fellow citizens served our country in a time of national crisis—a crisis which engulfed our panel; a crisis in which the forces of fascism were poised to extinguish the democracies of the world. It was a crisis in which the forces of evil were clearly defined, or at least I thought so until last fall when I read the first accounts from the Air Force Association of the proposed script for the exhibit of the *Enola Gay* at the Smithsonian Institution.

It was obvious to me that the *Enola Gay* was being used to advance a theory about atomic missions and the United States' role in World War II that transformed the Japanese into victims and cast the United States as a vengeful aggressor engaged in a war to destroy an ancient culture. My first reaction was, as you can imagine, personal disbelief. I just could not believe that the Smithsonian, an institution whose very name signifies honesty and integrity in the preservation of American artifacts, could be so wrong.

Like the overwhelming majority of my generation I did not want a war. We are not a Nation of warriors. There is no warrior class, no master race, no Samurai. Yet during the years when my generation and our parents were struggling through the Great Depression, the Japanese were engaged in the conquest of their neighbors. That is an unfortunate fact of history. Without the slightest remorse or hesitation the Japanese military slaughtered innocent men, women, and children. In the end, they would kill over 20 million of their Asian neighbors.

The sneak attack on Pearl Harbor, timed for Sunday morning to inflict the maximum loss of ships and human life, thrust the United States into a war in the Pacific whose outcome then was far from certain. Seventeen hundred sailors are still entombed in the hull of the U.S.S. *Arizona* that sits on the bottom of Pearl Harbor. Many, if not all, died without ever knowing why.

The fall of Corregidor and the resulting treatment of Allied prisoners of war dispelled any remaining doubt about the inhumaneness of the Japanese army even in the context of war. The Japanese military considered surrender a dishonor to one's self, one's family, one's country, and one's God, and thus they showed no mercy.

This was the true nature of the enemy we faced. This was the reality which President Harry Truman confronted as he considered sending yet even more American soldiers, sailors, and airmen into the horror of the war in the Pacific. Declassified transcripts of the secret codes which we had broken during the war and were available to President Truman and his military advisors underscore the Japanese attitude 50 years ago. The transcripts show the Japanese had no intention of surrendering unconditionally. They were stalling for time and fully prepared to continue to sacrifice their own citizens. And as time passed more Americans died.

The Japanese military was fully prepared to fight on, even after the Hiroshima mission. In fact, even after the Nagasaki mission, some Japanese military leaders were still advocating fighting on.

We know that in a pre-invasion meeting at the White House on June 18, 1945 Admiral William Leahy predicted to President Truman, based on the experience of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, 30 to 35 percent of the 770,000-man invasion force would be killed or wounded in the first 30 days of an invasion of the Japanese mainland. That calculates out to about a quarter of a million American men. President Truman remarked that the invasion would create another Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other; one of the most horrendous battles we ever fought. Now it would be expanded the whole length of Kyushu, the southern island of the four main islands of Japan.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed. General MacArthur's chief surgeon, Brigadier General Guy Dennett, estimated that in the 120-day campaign to invade and occupy only the island of

Kyushu, 395,000 casualties would be sustained. For President Truman, for me and for my crew, the probability of so many casualties was not an abstraction but a sobering reality.

The world is a better place because German and Japanese fascism failed to conquer. Japan and Germany are better places because we were benevolent in our victory. The youth of Japan and the United States, spared from further needless slaughter, went on to live and have families and grow old. Today millions of people in America and Japan are alive because we ended the war when we did. This is not to celebrate the use of atomic weapons. Quite the contrary. It is my fervent hope that my mission is the last such mission ever flown. But that does not mean that back in 1945, given the events of the war and the recalcitrance of our enemy, President Truman was not obliged to use all the weapons at his disposal to end the war.

Now, 50 years later after their defeat, some Japanese officials claim they were the victims, ignoring the clear evidence of their own brutality and mind set. Incredibly, how can any American academic support such a proposition, thus aiding and giving support to a 50-year attempt by the Japanese to rewrite their own history and ours in the process. Such an effort to rewrite history does a disservice to both countries. There is an entire generation of Japanese who do not know the full extent of their country's conduct during World War II.

By forgetting our own history we contribute to Japanese amnesia, to the detriment of both nations. Unlike the Germans who acknowledge their guilt, the Japanese persist in the fiction that they did nothing wrong. That they were the victims of circumstances. This only forecloses any genuine prospect that the deep wounds suffered by both nations can be healed. We must know and remember history.

I have always had the utmost respect for the Smithsonian Institution and its mission. I do not understand how it could have planned to so unfairly mistreat the United States' role in World War II, to denigrate the bravery of our American soldiers, sailors, and airmen and the courage of President Truman. By canceling the proposed exhibit and simply displaying the *Enola Gay*, has the truth won out? Maybe not. Maybe this exhibit reveals a deeper problem.

Imagine taking your children or grandchildren to the original proposed exhibit. Would they learn of the sacrifices their fathers and grandfathers endured in that war in the Pacific so that all of us could be free in 1995, free to visit the Smithsonian or anywhere else we choose? Would they understand the important historical context which led the President of the United States to make the decision to end that brutal conflict using all the weapons at his disposal? I think not.

In the end, what would our children and grandchildren think that their country stood for? In trying to understand the reason why the Smithsonian did this I certainly do not get any clue from

the stated reason the director gave for canceling the proposed exhibit. As I recall, he said the Smithsonian realized that it had been too ambitious by combining a highly emotional commemorative event for veterans with an historical analysis. This reason is at best condescending to the veterans. I suggest that the forces behind the revisionism of our history at the Smithsonian were flat out wrong in their analysis, and they should have said so.

The soul of a nation, its essence, is its history. It is that collective memory which defines what each generation thinks and believes about itself and its country. For this reason the facts must always be preserved. This does not mean debate should be stifled. It does mean that any debate must be founded upon a recognition of all the facts. At the Smithsonian there was an absence of some rather basic facts and a conclusion which was unsupported by those basic facts.

My fellow veterans and I were impelled to ask how could the Smithsonian have been so terribly wrong about the true nature and meaning of the war in the Pacific and the atomic missions? Fortunately, this threat to our national identity was aired out in the open because the proposed exhibit of the Enola Gay was so devoid of factual support. Other historic events may be too subtle to be seen as clearly. Certainly the country was fortunate that millions of veterans of the war, and citizens of the United States who are not necessarily veterans, were still alive to report on what really happened. I might point to one specific class of Americans, and they are the ones whose husbands, sons, loved ones were poised to conduct, to participate in that invasion.

So I come before this committee to ask you as Members of Congress to do all in your power to protect and preserve the integrity of the process by which our national identity is formed and debated. Our history is a precious asset. In a free society such as ours there must always be an ongoing debate about who we are and what we stand for.

The key question, however, is what role is appropriate for the Smithsonian in this ongoing debate and what process is to be employed in making decisions about historic interpretation at the Smithsonian? Of course, this assumes that the Smithsonian should expand its role beyond the preservation and exhibition of significant American artifacts—American artifacts.

The fact that you are holding these hearings is an encouraging sign for many Americans that such an inquiry will prevent future attempts to revise, rewrite, or slant our historical record in any way by any Government-supported agency. I would like to ask this committee to help the American people understand how the decisions as to what history the Smithsonian will display are made. Are these decisions based on ideology or some agenda, or are they the product of careful review and presentation of historical facts?

The issue is not that a group of pesky, aging veterans raised questions about a proposed exhibit. The issue is one of trust. Can the American people trust the Smithsonian ever again to be objective and unencumbered by ideology? This is an important debate and I thank this committee for holding these hearings.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of General Sweeney follows:]

STATEMENT OF MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES W. SWEENEY, USAF (RET.)

I am Maj. Gen. Charles W. Sweeney, United States Air Force, Retired. I am the only pilot to have flown on both atomic missions. I flew the instrument plane on the right wing of General Paul Tibbets on the Hiroshima mission and 3 days later, on August 9, 1945, commanded the second atomic mission over Nagasaki. Six days after Nagasaki the Japanese military surrendered and the Second World War came to an end.

The soul of a nation, its essence, is its history. It is that collective memory which defines what each generation thinks and believes about itself and its country.

In a free society, such as ours, there is always an ongoing debate about who we are and what we stand for. This open debate is in fact essential to our freedom. But to have such a debate we as a society must have the courage to consider all of the facts available to us. We must have the courage to stand up and demand that before any conclusions are reached, those facts which are beyond question are accepted as part of the debate.

As the 50th anniversary of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki missions approaches, now is an appropriate time to consider the reasons for Harry Truman's order that these missions be flown. We may disagree on the conclusion, but let us at least be honest enough to agree on basic facts of the time, the facts that President Truman had to consider in making a difficult and momentous decision.

As the only pilot to have flown both missions, and having commanded the Nagasaki mission, I bring to this debate my own eyewitness account of the times. I underscore what I believe are irrefutable facts, with full knowledge that some opinion makers may cavalierly dismiss them because they are so obvious—because they interfere with their preconceived version of the truth, and the meaning which they strive to impose on the missions.

This evening, I want to offer my thoughts, observations, and conclusions as someone who lived this history, and who believes that President Truman's decision was not only justified by the circumstances of his time, but was a moral imperative that precluded any other option.

Like the overwhelming majority of my generation the last thing I wanted was a war. We as a nation are not warriors. We are not hell-bent on glory. There is no warrior class—no Samurai—no master race.

This is true today, and it was true 50 years ago.

While our country was struggling through the great depression, the Japanese were embarking on the conquest of its neighbors—the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperty Sphere. It seems fascism always seeks some innocuous slogan to cover the most hideous plans.

This Co-Prosperty was achieved by waging total and merciless war against China and Manchuria. The Japanese, as a nation, saw itself as destined to rule Asia and thereby possess its natural resources and open lands. Without the slightest remorse or hesitation, the Japanese Army slaughtered innocent men, women and children. In the infamous Rape of Nanking up to 300,000 unarmed civilians were butchered. These were criminal acts.

THESE ARE FACTS.

In order to fulfill its divine destiny in Asia, Japan determined that the only real impediment to this goal was the United States. It launched a carefully conceived sneak attack on our Pacific fleet at Pearl Harbor. Timed for a Sunday morning it was intended to deal a death blow to the fleet by inflicting the maximum loss of ships and human life.

1,700 sailors are still entombed in the hull of the U.S.S. Arizona that sits on the bottom of Pearl Harbor. Many if not all, died without ever knowing why. Thus was the war thrust upon us.

The fall of Corregidor and the resulting treatment of Allied prisoners of war dispelled any remaining doubt about the inhumaneness of the Japanese Army, even in the context of war. The Bataan Death March was horror in its fullest dimension. The Japanese considered surrender to be dishonorable to oneself, one's family, one's country and one's god. They showed no mercy. Seven thousand American and Filipino POW's were beaten, shot, bayoneted or left to die of disease or exhaustion.

THESE ARE FACTS.

As the United States made its slow, arduous, and costly march across the vast expanse of the Pacific, the Japanese proved to be a ruthless and intractable killing machine. No matter how futile, no matter how hopeless the odds, no matter how certain the outcome, the Japanese fought to the death. And to achieve a greater glory, they strove to kill as many Americans as possible.

The closer the United States came to the Japanese mainland, the more fanatical their actions became.

Saipan—3,100 Americans killed, 1,500 in the first few hours of the invasion

Iwo Jima—6,700 Americans killed, 25,000 wounded

Okinawa—12,500 Americans killed, total casualties, 35,000

These are facts reported by simple white grave markers.

Kamikazes. The literal translation is DIVINE WIND. To willingly dive a plane loaded with bombs into an American ship was a glorious transformation to godliness—there was no higher honor on heaven or earth. The suicidal assaults of the Kamikazes took 5,000 American Navy men to their deaths.

The Japanese vowed that, with the first American to step foot on the mainland, they would execute every Allied prisoner. In preparation they forced the POW's to dig their own graves in the event of mass executions. Even after their surrender, they executed some American POW's.

THESE ARE FACTS.

The Potsdam Declaration had called for unconditional surrender of the Japanese Armed Forces. The Japanese termed it ridiculous and not worthy of consideration. We know from our intercepts of their coded messages, that they wanted to stall for time to force a negotiated surrender on terms acceptable to them.

For months prior to August 6, American aircraft began dropping fire bombs upon the Japanese mainland. The wind created by the firestorm from the bombs incinerated whole cities. Hundreds of thousands of Japanese died. Still the Japanese military vowed never to surrender. They were prepared to sacrifice their own people to achieve their visions of glory and honor—no matter how many more people died.

They refused to evacuate civilians even though our pilots dropped leaflets warning of the possible bombings. In one 3-day period, 34 square miles of Tokyo, Nagoya, Kobe and Osaka were reduced to rubble.

THESE ARE FACTS.

And even after the bombing of Hiroshima, Tojo, his successor Suzuki, and the military clique in control believed the United States had but one bomb, and that Japan could go on. They had 3 days to surrender after August 6, but they did not surrender. The debate in their cabinet at times became violent.

Only after the Nagasaki drop did the Emperor finally demand surrender.

And even then, the military argued they could and should fight on. A group of Army officers staged a coup and tried to seize and destroy the Emperor's recorded message to his people announcing the surrender.

THESE ARE FACTS.

These facts help illuminate the nature of the enemy we faced. They help put into context the process by which Truman considered the options available to him. And they help to add meaning to why the missions were necessary.

President Truman understood these facts as did every service man and woman. Casualties were not some abstraction, but a sobering reality.

Did the atomic missions end the war? Yes . . . they . . . did.

Were they necessary? Well that's where the rub comes.

With the fog of 50 years drifting over the memory of our country, to some, the Japanese are now the victims. America was the insatiable, vindictive aggressor seeking revenge and conquest. Our use of these weapons was the unjustified and immoral starting point for the nuclear age with all of its horrors. Of course, to support such distortion, one must conveniently ignore the real facts or fabricate new realities to fit the theories. It is no less egregious than those who today deny the Holocaust occurred.

How could this have happened?

The answer may lie in examining some recent events.

The current debate about why President Truman ordered these missions, in some cases, has devolved to a numbers game. The Smithsonian in its proposed exhibit of the *Enola Gay* revealed the creeping revisionism which seems the rage in certain historical circles.

That exhibit wanted to memorialize the fiction that the Japanese were the victims—we the evil aggressor. Imagine taking your children and grandchildren to this exhibit.

What message would they have left with?

What truth would they retain?

What would they think their country stood for?

And all of this would have occurred in an American institution whose very name and charter are supposed to stand for the impartial preservation of significant American artifacts.

By cancelling the proposed exhibit and simply displaying the *Enola Gay*, has truth won out?

Maybe not.

In one nationally televised discussion, I heard a so-called prominent historian argue that the bombs were not necessary. That President Truman was intent on intimidating the Russians. That the Japanese were ready to surrender.

The Japanese were ready to surrender? Based on what?

Some point to statements by General Eisenhower years after the war that Japan was about to fall. Well, based on that same outlook Eisenhower seriously underestimated Germany's will to fight on and concluded in December, 1944 that Germany no longer had the capability to wage offensive war.

That was a tragic miscalculation. The result was the Battle of the Bulge, which resulted in tens of thousands of needless Allied casualties and potentially allowed Germany to prolong the war and force negotiations.

Thus the assessment that Japan was vanquished may have the benefit of hindsight rather than foresight.

It is certainly fair to conclude that the Japanese could have been reasonably expected to be even more fanatical than the Germans based on the history of the war in the Pacific.

And, finally, a present-day theory making the rounds espouses that even if an invasion had taken place, our casualties would not have been a million, as many believed, but realistically only 46,000 dead.

**ONLY 46,000!**

Can you imagine the callousness of this line of argument? **ONLY 46,000**—as if this were some insignificant number of American lives.

Perhaps these so-called historians want to sell books.

Perhaps they really believe it. Or perhaps it reflects some self-loathing occasioned by the fact that we won the war.

Whatever the reason, the argument is flawed. It dissects and recalculates events ideologically, grasping at selective straws.

Let me admit right here, today, that I don't know how many more Americans would have died in an invasion—AND NEITHER DOES ANYONE ELSE!

What I do know is that based on the Japanese conduct during the war, it is fair and reasonable to assume that an invasion of the mainland would have been a prolonged and bloody affair. Based on what we know—not what someone surmises—the Japanese were not about to unconditionally surrender.

In taking Iwo Jima, a tiny 8 square mile lump of rock in the ocean, 6,700 marines died—total casualties over 30,000.



But even assuming that those who now KNOW our casualties would have been ONLY 46,000 I ask—

Which 46,000 were to die?

Whose father?

Whose brother?

Whose husband?

And, yes, I am focusing on American lives.

The Japanese had their fate in their own hands, we did not. Hundreds of thousands of American troops anxiously waited at staging areas in the Pacific dreading the coming invasion, their fate resting on what the Japanese would do next. The Japanese could have ended it at any time. They chose to wait.

And while the Japanese stalled, an average of 900 more Americans were killed or wounded each day the war continued.

I've heard another line of argument that we should have accepted a negotiated peace with the Japanese on terms they would have found acceptable. I have never heard anyone suggest that we should have negotiated a peace with Nazi Germany. Such an idea is so outrageous, that no rational human being would utter the words. To negotiate with such evil fascism was to allow it even in defeat a measure of legitimacy. This is not just some empty philosophical principal of the time—it was essential that these forces of evil be clearly and irrevocably defeated—their demise unequivocal. Their leadership had forfeited any expectation of diplomatic niceties. How is it, then, that the history of the war in the Pacific can be so soon forgotten?

The reason may lie in the advancing erosion of our history, of our collective memory.

Fifty years after their defeat, Japanese officials have the temerity to claim they were the victims. That Hiroshima and Nagasaki were the equivalent of the Holocaust.

And, believe it or not, there are actually some American academics who support this analogy, thus aiding and giving comfort to a 50-year attempt by the Japanese to rewrite their own history, and ours in the process.

There is an entire generation of Japanese who do not know the full extent of their country's conduct during World war II.

This explains why they do not comprehend why they must apologize—

- for the Korean comfort women,
- for the Medical experimentation on POW's which match the horror of those conducted by the Nazi's,
- for the plans to use biological weapons against the United States by infecting civilian populations on the West Coast,
- for the methodical slaughter of civilians,
- and for much more.

In a perverse inversion, by forgetting our own history, we contribute to the Japanese amnesia, to the detriment of both our nations.

Unlike the Germans who acknowledged their guilt, the Japanese persist in the fiction that they did nothing wrong, that they were trapped by circumstances. This only forecloses any genuine prospect that the deep wounds suffered by both nations can be closed and healed.

One can only forgive by remembering. And to forget, is to risk repeating history.

The Japanese in a well orchestrated political and public relations campaign have now proposed that the use of the term "V-J Day" be replaced by the more benign "Victory in the Pacific Day". How convenient.

This they claim will make the commemoration of the end of the war in the Pacific less "Japan specific."

An op-ed piece written by Dorothy Rabinowitz appearing in the April 5 Wall Street Journal accurately sums up this outrage:

The reason it appears, is that some Japanese find the reference disturbing—and one can see why. The term, especially the "J" part, does serve to remind the world of the identity of the nation whose defeat millions celebrated in August 1945. In further deference to Japanese sensitivities, a U.S. official (who wisely chose to remain unidentified) also announced, with reference to the planned ceremonies,

that "our whole effort in this thing is to commemorate an event, not celebrate a victory."

Some might argue so what's in a word—Victory over Japan, Victory in the Pacific—Let's celebrate an event, not a victory.

I say **everything** is in a word. Celebrate an **EVENT!**

Kind of like celebrating the opening of a shopping mall rather than the end of a war that engulfed the entire Earth—which left countless millions dead and countless millions more physically or mentally wounded and countless more millions displaced.

This assault on the use of language is Orwellian and is the tool by which history and memory are blurred. Words can be just as destructive as any weapon.

Up is Down.

Slavery is Freedom.

Aggression is Peace.

In some ways this assault on our language and history by the elimination of accurate and descriptive words is far more insidious than the actual aggression carried out by the Japanese 50 years ago. At least then the threat was clear, the enemy well defined.

Today the Japanese justify their conduct by artfully playing the race card. They were not engaged in a criminal enterprise of aggression. No, Japan was simply liberating the oppressed masses of Asia from WHITE Imperialism.

**Liberation!!!** Yes, they liberated over 20 million innocent Asians by killing them. I'm sure those 20 million, their families and the generations never to be, appreciate the noble effort of the Japanese.

I am often asked was the bomb dropped for vengeance, as was suggested by one draft of the Smithsonian exhibit. That we sought to destroy an ancient and honorable culture.

Here are some more inconvenient facts.

One, on the original target list for the atomic missions Kyoto was included. Although this would have been a legitimate target, one that had not been bombed previously, Secretary of State Henry Stimson removed it from the list because it was the ancient capital of Japan and was also the religious center of Japanese culture.

Two, we were under strict orders during the war that under no circumstances were we to ever bomb the Imperial Palace in Tokyo, even though we could have easily leveled it and possibly killed the Emperor. So much for vengeance.

I often wonder if Japan would have shown such restraint if they had the opportunity to bomb the White House. I think not.

At this point let me dispel one of many longstanding myths that our targets were intended to be civilian populations. Each target for the missions had significant military importance—Hiroshima was the headquarters for the southern command responsible for the defense of Honshu in the event of an invasion and it garrisoned seasoned troops who would mount the initial defense.

Nagasaki was an industrial center with the two large Mitsubishi armaments factories. In both Hiroshima and Nagasaki the Japanese had integrated these industries and troops right in the heart of each city.

As in any war our goal was, as it should be, to win. The stakes were too high to equivocate.

I am often asked if I ever think of the Japanese who died at Hiroshima and Nagasaki?

I do not revel in the idea that so many on both sides died, not only at those two places but around the world in that horrible conflict. I take no pride or pleasure in the brutality of war whether suffered by my people or those of another nation. Every life is precious.

But it does seem to me such a question is more appropriately directed to the Japanese war lords who so willingly offered up their people to achieve their visions of greatness. They who started the war and then stubbornly refused to stop it must be called to account. Don't they have the ultimate responsibility for all the deaths of their countrymen?

Perhaps if the Japanese came to grips with their past and their true part in the war they would hold those Japanese military leaders accountable. The Japanese

people deserve an answer from those that brought such misery to the nations of the Far East and ultimately to their own people. Of course this can never happen if we collaborate with the Japanese in wiping away the truth.

How can Japan ever reconcile with itself and the United States if they do not demand and accept the truth?

My crew and I flew these missions with the belief that they would bring the war to an end. There was no sense of joy. There was a sense of duty and commitment that we wanted to get back to our families and loved ones.

Today millions of people in America and in southeast Asia are alive because the war ended when it did.

I do not stand here celebrating the use of nuclear weapons. Quite the contrary. I hope that my mission is the last such mission ever flown.

We as a nation can abhor the existence of nuclear weapons.

I certainly do.

But that does not then mean that, back in August of 1945, given the events of the war and the recalcitrance of our enemy, President Truman was not obliged to use all the weapons at his disposal to end the war.

I agreed with Harry Truman then, and I still do today.

Years after the war Truman was asked if he had any second thoughts. He said emphatically, "No." He then asked the questioner to remember the men who died at Pearl Harbor who did not have the benefit of second thoughts.

In war the stakes are high. As Robert E. Lee said, "it is good that war is so horrible, or we might grow to like it."

I thank God that it was we who had this weapon and not the Japanese or the Germans. The science was there. Eventually someone would have developed this weapon. Science can never be denied. It finds a way to self-fulfillment.

The question of whether it was wise to develop such a weapon would have eventually been overcome by the fact that it could be done. The Soviets would have certainly proceeded to develop their own bomb. Let us not forget that Joseph Stalin was no less evil than Tojo or his former ally Adolf Hitler. At last count, Stalin committed genocide on at least 20 million of his own citizens.

The world is a better place because German and Japanese fascism failed to conquer the world.

Japan and Germany are better places because we were benevolent in our victory.

The youth of Japan and the United States, spared from further needless slaughter, went on to live and have families and grow old.

As the father of ten children and the grandfather of 21, I can state that I am certainly grateful that the war ended when it did.

I do not speak for all veterans of that war. But I believe that my sense of pride in having served my country in that great conflict is shared by all veterans. This is why the truth about that war must be preserved. We veterans are not shrinking violets. Our sensibilities will not be shattered in intelligent and controversial debate. We can handle ourselves.

But we will not, we cannot allow armchair second guessers to frame the debate by hiding facts from the American public and the world.

I have great faith in the good sense and fairness of the American people to consider all of the facts and make an informed judgment about the war's end.

This is an important debate. The soul of our nation, its essence, its history, is at stake.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, General.  
Colonel Cooper?

## TESTIMONY OF COLONEL CHARLES D. COOPER, DIRECTOR OF PUBLICATIONS, THE RETIRED OFFICERS ASSOCIATION

Colonel COOPER. Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members, this statement is submitted on behalf of The Retired Officers

Association (TROA) which has its national headquarters at 201 North Washington Street in Alexandria, Virginia. TROA has a membership of more than 400,000 active duty, retired, and reserve officers of the seven uniformed services, including approximately 65,000 auxiliary members who are survivors of former members of that association.

On behalf of all the TROA members we would like to thank the chairman and the other distinguished members of the Senate Committee on Rules and Administration for holding these important hearings and inviting us to share our concerns with you.

The Retired Officers Association became involved in the *Enola Gay* issue in the spring of 1994 after many of its members, especially the World War II veterans, including Colonel Schuh, became aware of the direction that was being taken by the curators at the National Air and Space Museum. In April of 1994, Admiral Tom Kilcline, president of The Retired Officers Association, contacted Dr. Martin Harwit, director of the National Air and Space Museum, to discuss the issue. Dr. Harwit suggested a luncheon meeting at the Smithsonian with some of the curators to talk about what they were planning to do.

Admiral Kilcline requested that representatives of the other veterans associations be included in that discussion. That meeting came to pass on July 13, 1994. In attendance at that meeting were representatives of the Air Force Association, the American Legion, Disabled American Veterans, the Military Order of the World Wars, The Retired Officers Association, and the Veterans of Foreign Wars as well as staff members of the Air and Space Museum, the Department of Defense 50th Anniversary Commemorative Committee, and the House Veterans Affairs Committee.

Following a briefing by the curatorial staff, a lively discussion of the then-existing show script ensued, but since the Air Force Association and The Retired Officers Association were the only two outside organizations that were privileged to have copies of the script in hand, the discussion was rather limited and very non-productive. Scripts were later provided to the other associations with a request to get back to NASM with comment.

The Retired Officers Association responded on July 19 providing Dr. Harwit with extensive, in-depth written recommendations that dealt with historical accuracy, context, and objectivity. Specifically, we were concerned with the lack of historical background to define the events that led up to the decision to use the A-bomb. We were disturbed by the lack of balance in imagery portraying the casualties of the Hiroshima bombing as compared to the brutal deaths from Japanese aggression that preceded America's entry into the war as well as the escalating battle deaths as the war proceeded. Finally, we were appalled by the extensive section expounding upon the

post-war heritage of the nuclear age that was totally unrelated to the advertised theme of the display, "The Final Act."

On September 8 the curators provided a third script. While it offered some minor tweaks it still failed to address the basic philosophical disagreements that had been raised in our earlier communications with the museum. On September 23 Admiral Kilcline met with the Undersecretary of the Smithsonian, Constance Newman, who explained that she was assuming the role of oversight for the Enola Gay exhibit "to get the Smithsonian off the front page of the news." Newman also advised Kilcline of her separate and ongoing negotiations with the American Legion.

In a September 27 letter to Dr. Harwit, Admiral Kilcline provided an extensive list of ongoing concerns raised by the third script that were still being ignored. He further expressed the Association's concern that the reputation of the Air and Space Museum was being placed in jeopardy by the recalcitrance of the museum staff.

Version four of the script came out on October 3, 1994 and again there was some progress. But things that had been fixed in earlier versions were put back in. At the invitation of the Undersecretary, representatives of the Air Force Association and The Retired Officers Association met at the Smithsonian and additional fine-tuning was applied to address specific philosophical and factual problem areas.

On October 26 Undersecretary Newman provided script revision five. While we could still not fully endorse it, significant progress was being made. During these many months, and especially since Newman had assumed the active role in the discussions, the earlier offensive script had been bowdlerized. Gone were the references to the U.S. "war of vengeance against a nation attempting to preserve its unique culture." Gone were the controversial political arguments of the post-war nuclear age. Finally we thought we saw a glimmer of hope that an excellent exhibit was close at hand.

In early December, at the insistence of several associations negotiating with the Smithsonian, scripting for a new 4,000-square-foot introductory display was produced. This new section defined the course of events from the early 1930's to just before the Hiroshima bombing. Those changes provided the essential historical background of Japan's brutal aggression, clarification of the driving forces behind the nuclear decisions, and a modicum of balance to the planned visual materials.

An added video finale to the exhibit incorporated the remembrances of the actual crew members, bringing a poignant personal perspective to the story of this fateful mission. With these modifications there was a growing consensus, at least among the reviewers of the Air Force Association, The Retired Officers Association, and the VFW, that the exhibit would have been found acceptable by most veterans. This sense was

conveyed to Undersecretary Newman and Dr. Harwit at a joint meeting at the Smithsonian on December 15, 1994.

Sadly, any sense of mutual agreement and understanding was shattered in early January when Dr. Harwit fired yet another shot across the bow of our Nation's veterans. In a letter sent only to the American Legion, excluding the other military-related associations that had been striving to work to bring this exhibit to fruition, Harwit without a "by-your-leave" or "let's talk about this", reinserted into the show script new and radically minimized casualty numbers for the planned invasion of the Japanese home islands. This clear breach of faith cast grave doubt upon his perspective and leadership ability and provided further evidence of his lack of sensitivity to the Smithsonian's reputation for integrity.

At this point the discussions between Harwit and the Legion went to critical mass. Upon receipt of the letter the Legion abruptly and publicly called for the outright cancellation of the exhibit and raised the ante calling for these congressional hearings. We share the Legion's frustration in trying to deal with Dr. Harwit's recurring recalcitrance. Nonetheless, we believe that with the continued patience of Job that some of the associations had shown we were at the point where a satisfactory solution could have been reached. But regrettably, that door was slammed shut. There would be no further opportunity for discussion to rebut the so-called newly found information.

On January 30, Secretary Heyman called an end to the rancorous debate over the planned *Enola Gay* exhibit. Rather than continue the controversial effort to conduct a wallboard-and-artifact academic extravaganza during this significant World War II commemorative year, he announced his intention to take personal charge of the exhibition. His plan called for the simpler, scaled-back display limited to only the already restored fuselage, appropriate signage, and possibly a video treatment reflecting some of the crew comments.

While we understand the secretary's rationale, The Retired Officers Association sincerely regrets the need for that decision. As a result of the severe gutting of the display, future generations of Americans and the world have lost a golden opportunity to learn anything more except the barebones history of the *Enola Gay* and its role in bringing to an end a brutal and emotional war, one of the defining events in world history.

Further, because of this dragged out brouhaha, the high stature of our Nation's most respected institution and its funding has been unnecessarily put to a test. While the eviscerated *Enola Gay* exhibit has put the role of America's national museum squarely in a spotlight of distrust and distaste, The Retired Officers Association stands ready to work with the Smithsonian to restore to its prestigious pedestal this gem of America's historical tiara.

That concludes my presentation, Mr. Chairman, and I am prepared to answer questions from you and the distinguished members of the committee.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Colonel Cooper.

We have been joined by Senator Pell. Senator, did you have an opening statement?

Senator PELL. No opening statement.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Harrington?

**TESTIMONY OF HERMAN G. HARRINGTON, CHAIRMAN,  
NATIONAL INTERNAL AFFAIRS COMMISSION, THE  
AMERICAN LEGION**

Mr. HARRINGTON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, my name is Herman Harrington. It was my privilege to serve as National Commander William Detweiler's designated representative during the line by line review and discussions of the Air and Space Museum exhibit. I would be remiss if I did not extend to you the commander's sincere regrets that he is unable to be here today. As you may know, he is in Moscow as a member of the President's official party participating in the commemoration of V-E Day.

We appreciate this opportunity to present our views on the controversy, its causes and possible remedies for the future. We have submitted our written testimony for your consideration and for the next few minutes I would only draw attention to our more prominent concerns and recommendations.

It is altogether apparent from the events surrounding the planned display of the historic aircraft, the *Enola Gay*, that the institution has sustained serious blows to its reputation, the causes of which unless discovered and corrected will only be repeated to the detriment of the Smithsonian, the Nation, and our society. We were accused of censorship, but it was not we who wanted only one view included. And we were accused of political arm-twisting, but we did little more than seek from our Government a redress of grievance. Our involvement is proof that our system works. It should be an inspiration and not a threat to those who value constitutional government and the democratic process.

Our first involvement came when we agreed to listen to the museum's point of view and were not convinced. We later agreed to suspend our opposition to the exhibit pending a line by line review of the script. We spent nearly 40 hours on three separate occasions clarifying language, questioning artifacts and narratives, arguing historical fact and exchanging research.

We ended our discussions only when it became apparent that the curators, and most especially the director, could not be relied upon to honor their commitments to us and that any script that we agreed upon could be, and most likely would be, changed without our knowledge right up to the opening of the exhibit.

Our approach was open, honest, and scholarly. We have included in our written testimony some of the sources we relied on. Yet despite our efforts the answer to one question eluded us: Why? Why did this Nation's most revered, most respected, most visited museum undertake such an exhibit? Why was an exhibit devoted to international concerns over the proliferations of nuclear arms spawned in a museum dedicated to America's achievements in flight and space exploration? Even if the answer is never given, Congress nevertheless can ensure that the institution uses its position and the funds Congress provides in a manner consistent with the institution's congressional mandate.

What is most disconcerting to the American Legion and perhaps most telling to the mind set of those at the institution is that when challenged for failing to present the service and sacrifice of American servicemen and women as described in Title 20, Section 80a of the U.S. Code, officials claimed that their museum is not required to comply with that language.

The American Legion was also condemned for questioning the museum's employment of a non-citizen in a key curatorial position. We have done so only because we see it as further evidence of the Air and Space Museum's disdain for, and defiance of congressional oversight. Title 20, which we have cited in our written testimony, clearly requires U.S. citizens to have preference in hiring for key positions unless no U.S. citizen is qualified. We still wonder why the Nation's historians have not complained about that, given its implications.

The American Legion recommends that Congress take steps immediately to either conform its mandate to the realities of the Smithsonian Institution or to enforce its intent and mandates as contained in Title 20 as they pertain to personnel practices. At a minimum, the American Legion recommends that Congress, among other measures: One, clarify the personal and professional goals of future museum directors; two, receive regular information on the use to which museum resources are put; three, ensure that docents and volunteers are treated with dignity and respect; and four, be aware of the relationship of the National Air and Space historians to a particular school of historic and political thought when such relationships become exclusive of knowledge rather than inclusive.

We also strongly recommend that this committee ask why the archives concerning Stimson, Marshall, Truman, and MacArthur were not contacted, and why the acknowledged experts and biographers of such men were not consulted. The American Legion successfully contacted many such institutions and individuals in the course of its research and found them to be accessible and readily cooperative.

At the center of this controversy rests the history of B-29 *Enola Gay*. Much has been said and written about casualties, President Truman's motives, the military and diplomatic



intentions of the Imperial Japanese Government and whether or not lives were indeed spared by the mission of *Enola Gay*. But little has been said about the cynical use of this aircraft to justify the presence of an exhibit in the National Air and Space Museum that fails to conform to the museum's broad mandate.

Is it the intent of Congress that after 46 years this aircraft be shelved for another 10 years until those alive when she flew are gone? The American Legion recommends that Congress direct the loan or the transfer of the *Enola Gay* to another Federal facility where it can be displayed properly without commentary or controversy. We respectfully suggest that *Enola Gay* join her sister ship, *Bock's Car*, at the Air Force Museum at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio. Or failing that, at any of the other facilities that have expressed an interest in displaying the aircraft.

The American Legion is not in the business of tearing down American institutions nor do we concern ourselves with the persons or personalities of those involved in vital national enterprises. But we are in the business of protecting and preserving our American heritage. As the battle over the *Enola Gay* has demonstrated, we are willing to invest our time, our money, and if need be, our reputation, to fight for the principles we espouse.

We believe in honesty, in integrity, in fair play. We believe in honoring the service and sacrifice of those who took up arms in defense of the Nation. We believe in passing a sense of America's unique role in world history and a sense of its greatness on to future generations. And we believe the National Air and Space Museum consciously and intentionally violated every one of those principles by setting out to alter our citizens' view of themselves. We believe that those responsible for the exhibit did so in a most cynical and insensitive way by using the very aircraft that thousands of World War II veterans credited with saving them from death on the beaches of Japan, to suggest that their lives were purchased at the price of vengeance of racism.

In summary, the American Legion's recommendations for the future of the Smithsonian Institution and for the management guidelines are simple, common sense safeguards. We recommend: One, congressional oversight and review of the museum's plans and practices; two, periodic review by independent professionals and knowledgeable laypersons; three, tighter review and control over the use of appropriated funds; four, improved management controls and establishment of reporting disciplines; and five, redefinition and clarification of the roles of the Smithsonian museums in American society and the establishment of measures to guarantee compliance.

Mr. Chairman, that concludes the testimony of the American Legion and I would at this time be happy to answer any questions you may have. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Harrington follows:]

STATEMENT OF HERMAN G. HARRINGTON, CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL  
INTERNAL AFFAIRS COMMISSION, THE AMERICAN LEGION

The American Legion considers the future management and oversight of the Smithsonian Institution and its subordinate museums, most particularly the National Air and Space Museum, to be a matter of singular significance to the people of the United States. For that reason, we welcome the opportunity to bring the views of our organization before the committee. It is our hope and intent that the net effect of these hearings will be to restore the Smithsonian Institution to a position of respect and reverence among all our citizens, and to preserve the bonds of our common history which bind us as a nation. It is altogether apparent, from the events surrounding the planned display of the historic aircraft, *Enola Gay*, that the institution has sustained serious blows to its reputation, the causes of which, unless discovered and corrected, will only be repeated to the detriment of the Smithsonian, the Nation, and our society.

This testimony of The American Legion has been prepared at the direction of and under the review of our National Commander, William M. Detweiler, who currently is among the President's official entourage in Moscow where he will participate in commemorations of the 50th anniversary of V-E Day. Commander Detweiler participated in all face-to-face discussions between the National Air and Space Museum and The American Legion. He communicated and corresponded directly with both the Secretary and the Under Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, and presented the position of The American Legion time and again to the media, professional historians, the general public and members of The American Legion. His experience on this issue is real, and this testimony has his full support and approval—and thus, represents the position of the more than 3.1 million men and women who comprise Legion membership.

The American Legion comes to these hearings in precisely the same spirit with which it participated in the discussions and review process with officials of the National Air and Space Museum. It was then our stated goal to work with NASM officials to protect the legacy of those who fought and died during World War II; to assure future generations of Americans access to historically accurate information and artifacts; and to assist in the restoration of public confidence in the institution. Today, in the wake of the controversy, the admission by the Secretary that the original exhibit was "flawed from the beginning," and the cancellation of the original exhibit, it also is among the goals of The American Legion to do what it can to help identify and establish safeguards which can reasonably be expected to prevent such future catastrophes.

That, in our opinion, can best be accomplished by identifying what went wrong and what factors contributed to it. The American Legion will present to you applicable information gained from our participation in the review process, but further, will recommend lines of inquiry in instances where our efforts to gather information were unsuccessful.

The qualifications of The American Legion and those who participated in the discussions—the very idea of the participation of The American Legion in this controversy—has been questioned and soundly criticized in many circles. Most, if not all, criticism contains implications which are both offensive and repugnant to those who truly respect our form of government. The American Legion was qualified by rights guaranteed to all Americans, and credentialed by dint of diligent effort and sound reliance on divinely granted talents and abilities.

We have been accused of censorship, but most certainly we do not have the power to censor.

What is curious is that those who most loudly accuse us of censorship are the very ones most opposed to including our views in the discussion and the display. It remains a fact that the original exhibit proposed one interpretation of history at the exclusion of all others. We asked only that all views be included, ours as well as theirs. Who sought to censor whom?

We have been accused of historical naiveté, at best; ignorance at worst.

But what is curious is that the very historians whose task it is to record and pass on our history, the very men and women whose books we read and whose

research we poured over, seem to have little confidence in how well they are doing their job. Where is the freedom of thought and inquiry and to whom would they have it reserved?

We have been accused of grandstanding the news media.

Again, what is curious is that those who so vociferously oppose our public statements are those who so totally depend on the freedom of expression by which their books are published, their speeches made and their academic courses free from restraint. Where would they have truth and falsehood grapple?

We have been accused of political arm-twisting.

Even again, what is curious is that only the successful effort to enlist Congressional support is seen as arm-twisting. It was not only our side seeking the support of the peoples' elected representatives. We were aggrieved by the action of an arm of our government, and we petitioned the government for redress of that grievance. Our critics were aggrieved by us, yet they sought redress not from us, but from government—a blatant and repugnant effort to silence dissent.

What right did we have to do what we did, question who we questioned and say what we said? We claim the rights of every citizen, successfully and aggressively exercised. Our success, painful as it may have been to those whose real intent was to prevent the expression of any view but their own, is proof that our system works. It should be an inspiration, not a threat, to those whose very livelihoods depend on our fundamental freedoms.

Our involvement came at the request of the Under Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution who, when the exhibit began to encounter rising opposition from the Air Force Association and other groups of veterans, wisely sought to establish communication and consensus among the exhibit's critics and supporters. The effort came too late. Many groups were increasingly suspicious of NASM officials, and increasingly frustrated by the lack of response and progress. The American Legion was on record in opposition to the exhibit, but standing apart from the fray. Once the controversy erupted into public disgust with the museum, we became deeply concerned that not only was the reputation of World War II veterans at risk, but also that the entire institution was losing ground among the general public.

We first agreed to listen to the museum's point of view, and were not convinced. We later agreed to suspend our opposition to the exhibit pending a line-by-line and face-to-face review of the script with the curators and the museum director. We spend a total of 36 hours in three separate sessions, clarifying language, questioning artifacts and narratives, arguing historical fact, and exchanging research.

We did not at any time object to the portrayal in the exhibit of the effects of nuclear detonation. We asked only for balance and the elimination of needlessly repetitious images. We did not object to objects or narratives unless their validity could not be established, and where such was the case, objects were removed. We presented facts born of original and other research which raised legitimate questions of interpretation and conclusion, and requested their addition to the script. We successfully argued for a longer view of history than the original script presented, including the history of Japanese aggression and expansionism which planted the seeds of the Pacific war. That portion of the exhibit was being prepared when our discussions broke down.

We ended our discussions with NASM officials only when it became apparent that they would not conform to the directions of their superiors and only after we learned, in correspondence from the former director, that he intended to include unilateral changes to the script that violated agreements and understandings we had reached with him. By the end of the discussions, The American Legion fully understood that the curators and director could not be relied upon to honor their commitments to us and that any script that we agreed upon could be—and most likely would be—changed without our knowledge right up to the opening of the exhibit.

We could not let our support or lack of opposition be so cynically manipulated and remain true to our responsibilities to our members and to the thousands of veterans who were relying on us.

Our approach was open, honest and scholarly. Our research included, but was not limited to, the sources listed below:

**The Making of the Atomic Bomb**

Rhoades, Richard; Simon and Schuster, New York; 1986

**The Last Battle**

Ryan, Cornelius; Simon and Schuster, New York; 1966

**Manhattan Project**

Groueff, Stephane; Little, Brown and Company, Boston & Toronto; 1967

**The Great Decision**

Amrine, Michael; G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York; 1959

**James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age**

Hershberg, James; Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., New York; 1993

**The Invasion of Japan**

Skates, John Ray; University of South Carolina Press, Columbia, S.C.; 1994

**The Wages of Guilt: Memories of War in German and Japan**

Baruma, Ian; Farrar, Straus, Giroux, New York; 1994

**Fighting to a Finish: The Politics of War Termination in the United States and Japan**

Sigal, Leon V.; Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London; 1988

**MacArthur's Ultra: Codebreaking and the War against Japan, 1942-1945**

Drea, Edward J.; University Press of Kansas; 1992

**Brassey's Encyclopedia of Military History and Biography**

Margiotta, Franklin D. Ed.; Brassey's, Washington and London; (annual)

**Codename Downfall: The Secret Plan to Invade Japan—and Why Truman Dropped the Bomb**

Allen, Thomas B. and Polmar, Norman; Simon & Schuster, New York; 1995  
(Publisher's Proof)

**Marching Orders: The Untold Story of World War II**

Lee, Bruce; Crown Publishers, Inc., New York; 1995

In addition, The American Legion researched a number of original sources, some uncovered in original research and others provided by historians, museums, biographical libraries and archives, and the NASM curators themselves. They include:

—Copies of documents and minutes from official meetings of government leaders

—Copies of military orders, communiqués, and intelligence reports

—Accounts of diplomatic and tactical code-breaking operations

—Direct conversations with the Army and Air Force Historians

—Conversations with and written reports from other historians

—Conversation and correspondence with veterans of the 509th Composite Bomb Group

—Professional Journals

—Scholarly Papers

It is singularly significant that very little among our research documents is of Japanese origin. The explanation is simple: The Japanese government continues to restrict release and access to its archives of the time, not only to us, but to most of the world's historians. We repeatedly pointed out to NASM curators that, as a result of Japanese recalcitrance, only half the history can be known. NASM officials, like paleontologists building a dinosaur from a jawbone, had no choice but to fill in the gaps from best guesses, speculation and incomplete understanding of Japanese intentions in the summer of 1945. Those gaps now are being filled by new research, and the picture being painted of Japanese actions and intentions points to significantly different conclusions than those drawn by NASM for this exhibit.

Yet, during our own research, we gained the answers to many questions about the exhibit and the history it sought to portray. We learned something about the curators and others who informed the exhibit. But one question remains unanswered: Why?

Why did this Nation's most revered, most respected, most-visited museum undertake such an exhibit? Why was the museum permitted to proceed so far into the realm of conjecture and condemnation? Why was an exhibit devoted to

international concerns over the proliferation of nuclear arms spawned in a museum dedicated to America's achievements in flight and space exploration? And why were Americans, through their tax dollars, expected to underwrite such propaganda parading as history?

The people of the United States deserve answers to these questions. As their representatives, you deserve answers. And as lawmakers entrusted with the stewardship of our wealth, you have a responsibility to ensure that the Smithsonian Institution's museums use the funds Congress provides for the purposes and in a manner consistent with the Institution's Congressional mandate.

That mandate is contained in 20 U.S.C., Chapter 3. The Smithsonian as a whole is charged with an approach to its collections, displays and educational activities that not only informs, but enriches and uplifts. What is most disconcerting to The American Legion—and perhaps most telling of the mindset of some at the Institution—is that, when challenged for failing to present the service and sacrifice of American service men and women as described in 20 U.S.C. 80a, NASM officials claimed that they are not required to comply with that language since, they say, it applies to an as yet unbuild museum.

Nevertheless, the language is clear and specific, applying itself not to some obscure museum of the future, but to the entire Institution:

The *Smithsonian Institution* shall commemorate and display the contributions made by the military forces of the Nation toward creating, developing and maintaining a free, peaceful, and independent society and culture in the United States of America. The valor and sacrificial service of the men and women of the Armed forces shall be portrayed as an inspiration to the present and future generations of America . . . The extensive peacetime contributions the Armed Forces have made to the advance of human knowledge in science, nuclear energy, polar and space exploration, electronics, engineering aeronautics, and medicine shall be graphically described. (Emphasis added.)

NASM's argument that it is not subject to that language is an astounding defense and a tacit admission that it does not so comply. NASM's position is not that it does so portray the service positive contributions of American veterans, but that it is not required to. Nevertheless, it is the position of The American Legion that the language in 20 U.S.C. 80a, Subsec. (a), is quite clear in applying that standard to "the Smithsonian Institution" and not to just one of its museums. Perhaps the best question is what compels NASM to want to do otherwise?

The American Legion recommends that the Congress closely review the language of the applicable codes, clarify its intent and direct all museums of the Institution to comply with it.

The American Legion has been condemned for inquiring as to the propriety of the National Air and Space Museum's employment of a non-citizen in a key curatorial position. Is this latent xenophobia? Evidence of jingoism? Not at all. It is simply a question of why the National Air and Space Museum did not comply with another of the strict intents of Congress, as stated in 20 U.S.C. 46a:

The Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, subject to adequate security and other investigations as he may determine to be appropriate, and subject further to a prior determination by him that *no qualified United States citizen is available for the particular position involved*, is authorized to employ and compensate aliens in a scientific or technical capacity . . . (Emphasis added)

Clearly, in light of that language only three explanations exist:

1. Management was ignorant of its duties and responsibilities;
2. The museum disdains and defies the intent of Congress;
3. No U.S. citizen is as well educated, trained, and experienced as the Canadian historian who was one of two primary curators on the exhibit—an explanation that reasonably could be expected to raise the concern of American historians, but so far doesn't seem to have done so.

Not one of those explanations is sufficient for The American Legion, nor do we believe any should be sufficient to the American people or to Congress.

The American Legion once again simply recommends that Congress take steps immediately to either conform its mandate to realities at the Smithsonian Institution or to enforce its clear intent and mandate.

During the course of our discussions with NASM we became aware that, although NASM curators have repeatedly declared the original script was never meant for public consumption, the museum itself sent the script to the Japanese peace museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki for review and comment pending loan of artifacts to NASM. Officials described it as nothing more than a courtesy, but it was, in fact, more than that. It was deceit, either of the Japanese or of the American people.

If the script was not to be taken as the basis for the exhibit, then the Japanese were being asked to make decisions about the loan of artifacts on an incomplete understanding of what they were being asked to do. On the other hand, if the script was a legitimate basis on which the Japanese were to reach a lending decision, then subsequent statements downplaying the first script were disingenuous. NASM cannot have it both ways.

Moreover, NASM denies the existence of a prior agreement or understanding between the Nagasaki and Hiroshima museums regarding the original exhibit. However, it is generally understood by informed members of the public—and most certainly by professional historians and museum curators with international connections and experience—that those museums are, in effect, Japanese “Holocaust” museums, and that no artifacts would be loaned to museums or exhibits that did not conform to their philosophy and message. NASM curators and officials surely knew what was expected of any exhibit that benefited from loans of artifacts from those museums, and it can be concluded that if they did not intend to conform to the Japanese perspective, they would never have sought the artifacts in the first place.

It is known that the former director and one, if not both, primary curators visited Japan and the peace museums many times in preparation for this exhibit. What is not known is the frequency, cost and purpose of those visits, and the extent to which that purpose conforms to the intent of Congress.

The American Legion strongly recommends that this Committee open that line of inquiry and based on what is discovered, set guidelines requiring the disclosure of the purpose and outcome of such travel.

More disturbing, however, and a line of inquiry which The American Legion was wholly unsuccessful in following, is whether or not the conditions of the cooperative agreement between the Nagasaki and Hiroshima museums were put into writing. This Committee should be given every opportunity to review any such document, should it be proven to exist.

The American Legion recommends that this committee seek information to either confirm or put to rest this recurring speculation among a number of veterans organizations and news reporters.

It is not and never has been The American Legion’s practice to pursue individuals in the course of policy or issue disagreements. Throughout this controversy, we have refrained from asking for resignations or suggesting motives for one course of action or another. Still, it seems to us that a prudent course of action for Congress to take is to review the personnel policies and practices at the Smithsonian Institution to insure that employees and volunteers there not only meet their responsibilities but also retain and enjoy their rights as citizens.

At a minimum, The American Legion recommends that:

1. The personal and professional goals of future museum directors be clarified and determined to conform to the intent of Congress before their visions are permitted to affect the direction of a museum. It is clear that, in the case of the former NASM director, his goals, plans and intentions to reform the museum were reasonably well known inside the museum and to readers of *The Washington Post* at the time of his appointment, and may well have led to the controversy over the *Enola Gay*.
2. Congress oversee and seek regular information on the use to which museum personnel, physical resources and funds are put,

with an eye to containing the lines of inquiry to those included in the museums' charge.

3. Congress insure that docents and volunteers retain their rights and dignity as essential resources for the efficient operation of museums, and not sanctioned for their opinions.
4. Congress be aware of the relationship of NASM historians to a particular school of historic and political thought, when such relationships become exclusive of knowledge, rather than inclusive.
5. Congress review periodically the role of experienced military professionals in informing the displays and exhibits mounted by NASM, and take appropriate measures to assure a balance between practical knowledge of history and academic understanding, both in hiring and in the utilization of human resources.
6. Congress implement review procedures by which only those curators with professional and academic credentials applicable to the subject of an exhibit be assigned to curate a display.
7. Congress solicit from among the employees and volunteers at NASM comments and experiences relating to the way in which the museum has been administered, heed their concerns and take immediate steps to assure that the museum operates in conformity with sound management and personnel practices.

Additionally, The American Legion notes with some concern that much of the outside information and analysis brought to bear on the *Enola Gay* exhibit came from a limited number of historians and specialists whose expertise have little or nothing to do with air and space, but more to do with diplomacy, ethics, and philosophies of government and intergovernmental relationships. It is noteworthy that historians exclusively from the revisionist school were consulted on the *Enola Gay* exhibit—historians such as Alperovitz, Bird, Bernstein and others—and that the curators made little or no contact with historians and institutions which might have provided information and analysis contrary to the exhibit they were planning.

The American Legion strongly recommends that this Committee inquire as to why no contact for the exhibit was made with the archives concerning Stimson, Marshall, Truman or MacArthur, and why few, if any, of the acknowledged experts and biographers of such men were contacted. The American Legion successfully contacted many such institutions and individuals in the course of its research and found them to be accessible and readily cooperative.

Finally, The American Legion is deeply concerned about future use of the canceled exhibit's artifacts and script, and the future of the historic aircraft itself.

It is the view of our organization that the exhibit, declared "flawed from the beginning" by Secretary Heyman himself and admitted by former NASM Director Harwit to contain many errors, should not be resurrected and presented by any other institution, unless and only after it is subjected to rigorous review by a broad cross-section of acknowledged historians. This is not an effort to restrain freedom of expression, but rather an effort to quash propaganda presented in the guise of history—propaganda researched and prepared at the expense of the American people.

At a minimum, The American Legion recommends that Congress satisfy itself as to the status of the script and artifacts, and determine if plans to loan the exhibit to institutions such as The American University for public display, conform to Congress' view of the best interest of our country.

At the center of this controversy, and often overlooked as the central cause by many commentators, rests the historic B-29, *Enola Gay*. Much has been said and written about casualties, President Truman's motives, the military and diplomatic intentions of the Imperial Japanese Government, and whether or not lives were indeed spared by the mission of *Enola Gay*. Those are legitimate lines of academic inquiry which may never be settled to the agreement of all historians.

But little has been said about the cynical use of this aircraft to, in our view, justify the presence of an exhibit in the National Air and Space Museum that otherwise fails to conform to the museum's broad mandate. And little has been

said about the Smithsonian's thinly-veiled efforts to hold the aircraft as ransom for future appropriations and, in the process, withholding it from the view of the public and a generation of veterans which has waited for half a century to see it displayed proudly.

First, the Smithsonian Secretary's insinuation that failing to approve the FY 1996 appropriations request would further jeopardize the planned NASM extension at Dulles International Airport is disturbing. That certainly was the message he brought to hearings in the House concerning future Congressional funding. Perhaps it is true. But there is no need whatsoever for the *Enola Gay* to repose unreassembled and undisplayed until some distant date in the future when the now twice-delayed Dulles facility is complete. The *Enola Gay* has undergone a complete restoration, at a cost far in excess of what would have been necessary if the aircraft had been properly cared for when it was delivered, fully operational, by then-Col. Paul Tibbets in 1949.

The extensive restoration is described in a NASM video production and the original exhibit script contains a description of the restoration in which the aircraft was characterized as completely restored, but not re-assembled. The exhibit of *Enola Gay* now planned for the Air and Space Museum will include only 56 feet of the forward fuselage, perhaps an engine or two, and some other components.

However, is it the intent of Congress that after 46 years, this aircraft repose another 10 or more years—until all those alive when she flew are gone—in either pieces or obscurity? Does the Congress feel the same sense of shame about this historic aircraft that the Smithsonian Institution seems to have felt for nearly half a century?

The American Legion recommends that Congress direct, and provide funding specifically for, the loan or transfer of *Enola Gay* to another federal facility with the will and the means to display it properly without commentary and controversy. We respectfully suggest that *Enola Gay* join her sister ship *Bock's Car* at the Air Force Museum at Wright Patterson Air Force Base near Dayton, Ohio, or failing that, at any of the other facilities that have expressed an interest in doing so.

We are aware that Smithsonian officials have rejected this option, but we also believe that NASM's misuse of the aircraft and the Smithsonian's historic disdain for it disqualify officials there from having the final say. Just as those officials have argued that loan and exchange of artifacts between museums is a common practice—so held in defense of their efforts to surround *Enola Gay* with artifacts from Hiroshima and Nagasaki—we would argue that loan of this particular artifact to another American museum poses no threat to the aircraft.

Thousands of World War II veterans believe, with solid justification, that they owe their lives to *Enola Gay* and her historic mission. They have asked repeatedly that they be given an opportunity to see her and to reflect on the meaning of her mission in their lives. The American Legion strongly urges the Congress to fund and direct such a loan of the aircraft. There is an entire generation soon to pass from the scene which has waited long enough.

In this, the 50th anniversary of their victory over the enemies of freedom, it would be a fitting and inexpensive tribute. It would protect this artifact from the Smithsonian's feared deterioration due to underfunding. And more important, it would be a gesture of good faith by the Institution. For the Smithsonian to unselfishly make this aircraft available for our people to visit, immediately, would go a long way to restoring the American people's faith in an institution described by Secretary Heyman in his testimony before the Appropriations Subcommittees on the Interior as, "a unique and revered institution which represents the best of America and its people. The Smithsonian is the mirror in which we, as Americans, see our history and culture from the past, in the present, and towards the future."

The American Legion is not here to address any aspect of funding for the Smithsonian Institution other than that specifically concerning the display of *Enola Gay*. We do not ask for or support the idea of withholding legitimate funding for the Smithsonian. The American Legion is not in the business of tearing down American institutions, nor do we concern ourselves with the per-



sons or personalities of those involved in vital national enterprises. But we are in the business of protecting and preserving our American heritage. As the battle over *Enola Gay* has demonstrated, we are willing to invest our time, our money and, if need be, our reputation to fight for the principles we espouse. We believe in honesty, in integrity, in fair play. We believe in honoring the service and sacrifice of those who took up arms in defense of the Nation. We believe in passing a sense of America's unique role in world history, and a sense of its greatness, on to future generations.

And we believe the National Air and Space Museum consciously and intentionally violated every one of those principles, by setting out to alter our citizens' view of themselves. We believe that those responsible for the exhibit did so in a most cynical and insensitive way: by using the very aircraft that thousands of World War II veterans credit with sparing them from death on the beaches of Japan, to suggest that their lives were purchased at the price of vengeance and racism.

If such as we believe is proven to be the case, then it is our view that the National Air and Space Museum has forfeited, for the time being, any legitimate claim on the generosity of the American people. The museum ceases to be an American museum and becomes something else entirely—and as such should depend for its funding on those who share its views. It should not enjoy the support of our citizens, and indeed, evidence is mounting that this exhibit, along with several others in recent history, has resulted in a drastic reduction in Smithsonian memberships, individual and corporate contributions, and even the willingness of major contributors to be publicly associated with their donations.

Nevertheless, we encourage Congress to be skeptical of Smithsonian claims that prudent cuts in the institution's funding levels would adversely affect its ability to care for its collections. Recent revelations of the disappearance of World War I artifacts would indicate that even with full funding, the museums are doing a poor job of protecting their collections. Certainly, the nearly \$300,000 spent on the *Enola Gay* exhibit, and now gone for nearly no good purpose, would indicate room for improvement under tighter funding controls. And the cancellation of many of the Institution's near-term plans and exhibits suggests more funds expended for nothing. It is our opinion that tighter funding should not adversely affect the collections, but should instead impose some discipline on free-spending curators and administrators.

We see no reason to fund the Smithsonian Institution according to its whims under the thinly veiled threat that failure to do so would result in deterioration of collections or decline in the physical plant or plans, until such time that the Institution has demonstrated the will and the ability to manage its finances more responsibly.

In summary, The American Legion's recommendations for the future of the Smithsonian Institution and for management guidelines are few in number and relatively simple, common sense safeguards common to prudent management of any public institution. They are:

1. Congressional oversight and review of museum plans and practices
2. Periodic review by independent professionals and knowledgeable lay persons
3. Tighter review and control over the use of appropriated funds
4. Improved management controls and establishment of reporting disciplines
5. Redefinition and clarification of the role of Smithsonian museums in American society, and establishment of measures to guarantee compliance

This concludes the testimony of The American Legion, presented on behalf of its more than 3 million members and, we trust, of countless other Americans.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Harrington.

Next we will hear from R. E. Smith, president of the Air Force Association. Mr. Smith?

## TESTIMONY OF R. E. SMITH, NATIONAL PRESIDENT, AIR FORCE ASSOCIATION

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, ladies and gentlemen. I am Gene Smith, national president of the Air Force Association and I appreciate the opportunity to give you the Air Force Association's view on the controversy at the National Air and Space Museum.

AFA was the first major group to challenge the museum and its parent organization, the Smithsonian Institution, on their plans for the exhibition of the *Enola Gay*, the B-29 that dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima in 1945. AFA has also been the source for much of the data that has been cited in the course of this debate. We would like to submit for inclusion in the record of this hearing a compendium that we have assembled of relevant reports, memos, letters, statements, and other documents. I believe this material will help you determine the facts of what happened.

[The materials are maintained in the committee's files.]

AFA's involvement dates back to August 1993 when our staff began checking up on reports from a small group of B-29 veterans who told us the Air and Space Museum was going wrong with its plans for exhibition of the *Enola Gay*. We discovered that the B-29 veterans were right. The museum was working up an exhibit that was blatantly biased and severely lacking in balance and historical context.

For the next several months we tried talking and reasoning with the museum director and the curators. But like others before us, we found that our comments did not count for much. We decided that the only way to get change was to take our case to the public, which we did beginning in March of 1994. We did this first in a report and then in a condensed version in our monthly journal, *Air Force Magazine*.

You will hear it said that we jumped prematurely on a raw first draft of the exhibition plan and that the curators would have fixed it themselves if we had let them alone. In fact, the script we exposed was the fourth planning document, not the first. It flowed directly from, and picked up the worst features of, the three concept plans that went before. Museum officials showed no inclination to change. To the contrary. They fought change until the pressure from public opinion and Congress became too great to bear.

In April 1994, at the request of a congressional subcommittee we did our first detailed content analysis of the *Enola Gay* script. We have done similar analyses of every script the museum has produced. These analyses have supplied many of the statistics that have been cited in the news. I will mention two examples for the benefit of those who have not been through the documents package.

We reported, for example, that an earlier script had 49 photos of Japanese casualties but only 3 photos of American casualties, demonstrating the emphasis the curators put on Japanese suffering. Analyzing a revised script found that the curators had given less than 1 text page out of a total of 295 text pages to Japanese military activity prior to 1945. That was the extent of the context in their plan on Japan's 15-year war of atrocity and aggression, Pearl Harbor, the Bataan Death March, the torture and killing of POW's, and all the rest.

Our position, which we began stating early in the debate, was that the exhibition would not be acceptable if it continued to emphasize any of the following themes that were apparent in the first script: one, that the Japanese were victims in World War II, defending their nation and culture against western aggression; two, that the Americans were ruthless invaders, driven by racism, revenge, and blood lust; three, that the death, suffering and horrors of war were borne unilaterally or unfairly by a passive Japan; and four, that the roles of Japan and the United States in World War II were morally equivalent.

At no time did AFA seek to dictate the exact details of the script, and we consistently declined to be part of line-by-line negotiating on the script. Our standards were balance, context, and fairness.

The issue caught fire in August 1994 when about 30 members of Congress issued statements saying that the exhibit planned was biased. The Smithsonian took a more direct hand in the matter after I. Michael Heyman became secretary in September. The salvage effort broke down in January. Mr. Heyman cancelled the exhibition that was planned. He said that the museum would show the forward fuselage of the *Enola Gay* in a simpler, straightforward display that he would oversee personally. We have not seen the details of that exhibit but we are hoping for the best.

Despite that, we are concerned. The question does not end with the *Enola Gay* exhibit. What about the next exhibit and the one after that? We would like to see the museum putting its main effort on its primary mission which is to collect, preserve, and display historic aircraft, spacecraft, and aeronautical artifacts.

There are most certainly indications of change; the main one being the resignation of the director of the Air and Space Museum. It was unfortunate that matters came to that, but it was probably inevitable. We welcome new leadership at the museum and the chance the museum now has to learn from the lessons of the past and rebuild for the future. It is important, though, to be sure that the Smithsonian and the museum learn the right lessons from this experience.

When Secretary Heyman cancelled the problem exhibit he said, "I have taken this action for one overriding reason: I have concluded that we made a basic error in attempting to couple a historic treatment of the use of atomic weapons with the 50th

anniversary commemoration of the end of the war." In our opinion, Secretary Heyman made the right decision for the wrong reason. The problem was not the coupling of history with commemoration. It was that history had been given a counter-cultural spin. The problem was not that the exhibit was analytical. The problem was that the analysis was distorted.

The theme of "history versus nostalgia" has been picked up and elevated to extreme levels by activists in the academic community. They use language like "historical cleansing" and "censorship." They would have you believe that the issue is a contest between honest scholarship and blind patriotism. That is simply not true. Our concerns from the start have always centered around balance and context.

It is rare that we find ourselves on the same side of the issue as *The Washington Post*, so it is worth noting that the editorial for January 20, 1995 reaches the same conclusion we do in this regard. The *Post* said that the earlier drafts of the *Enola Gay* script were "incredibly propagandistic and intellectually shabby." It also said that the curators had repeatedly made the controversy worse by their "misplaced condescension and refusal to see their criticisms as anything but the carping of the insufficiently sophisticated." The problem with the *Enola Gay* exhibit in many ways was the result of refusal by the curators to accept constructive criticism from a wide range of experts, including but not limited to military historians and scholars, who put forth a mainstream view of the circumstances surrounding President Truman's decision to drop the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Instead they put great reliance and undue weight on the radical scholarships and assessments that are, to put it mildly, not universally shared by those who are well informed on the subject.

As we pointed out in our very first report on the *Enola Gay*, this is not the first flawed exhibit at the Air and Space Museum or within the Smithsonian complex. We believe that actions should be taken to ensure that curators in our national museums have the benefit of review and comment by a full range of recognized experts and that mechanisms be put into place to ensure that this happens. Only then will the American public be assured that our national museums reflect the broad scholarship that might reasonably be expected.

We applaud the efforts taken to date by Secretary Heyman. He has initiated a management review of the Air and Space Museum and has shown himself willing to hear advice. As we see it, a consensus is developing that says curators need to pay particular attention to their audiences.

Finally, let me say that we, like most Americans, regard the Smithsonian as a national treasure. As you might imagine, our highest regard has traditionally been for the National Air and Space Museum. For those of us in the aerospace community this museum is special beyond compare. Our natural position is to be

in strong support of the Air and Space Museum, not fighting with it. We sincerely hope that a new era is about to begin at Air and Space, and with it a rededication to the principles and purposes that will allow us to once again become an advocate for the museum, not its adversary.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Smith.

Our next witness is Mr. Bob Manhan, who is the assistant director of the National Legislative Service for the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Mr. Manhan?

**TESTIMONY OF BOB MANHAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR,  
NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE SERVICE, VETERANS OF FOR-  
EIGN WARS**

Mr. MANHAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for inviting Veterans of Foreign Wars to appear here this morning.

Of our 2.1 million members, approximately half of them are veterans of World War II. While all of them did not necessarily see service in the Asiatic-Pacific theater of operation, our entire membership unanimously agrees that President Truman on the 14th of June 1945 made the correct political, strategic decision to drop atomic bombs on Japan. The facts that were available to President Truman then are still well-documented today. In essence it boils down to the fact that Imperial Japan was not ready to unconditionally surrender and that a physical land invasion of Japan would cause horrifying American casualties.

My own qualification for being here this morning is the fact that I participated in reviewing four of the Smithsonian's scripts, I participated in a working luncheon one-on-one with Dr. Martin Harwit, and I attended three working sessions at the Smithsonian headquarters. In addition, about 2 months after Dr. Heyman cancelled the exhibit I did attend the jointly sponsored symposium at the Ann Arbor campus of the University of Michigan wherein Dr. Heyman conducted a post-mortem study on what went wrong with this exhibit.

Having said that, and having the opportunity now to be the last one up at the plate, I want you to know that the VFW agrees with everything that my predecessors have said up until this point. This allows me to touch on our own very brief seven-page written testimony that we submitted. It is structured, as you have already seen, to provide you with four basic managerial questions that you may consider asking next week when the Smithsonian tells their side of the story.

Our first question is: How could scholars and technicians at the Smithsonian have offered their flawed initial broad-based concept without receiving any peer group pressure or review? And once it was obvious that they were controversial, why weren't managerial corrections made sooner?

The second question: Why was Dr. Martin Harwit chosen in the first place for this particular exhibit?

The third question: What roles were played by Dr. Michael Neufeld and Chairman Tom Crouch throughout this exhibit? Both are Air and Space Museum employees and were involved to some degree in the first script. The first script was not made available at any time to the Veterans of Foreign Wars.

The fourth and last question is: Why didn't Dr. Heyman, the Secretary of the Smithsonian, take action sooner to correct the exhibit rather than to simply cancel the show?

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. This concludes the VFW's presentation.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Manhan follows:]

STATEMENT OF BOB MANHAN, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR OF LEGISLATIVE SERVICES, VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES

Thank you for inviting the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States (VFW) to participate in this very important hearing. Because of the thrust of this hearing the VFW offers four basic managerial questions that impact directly on the *Enola Gay* Exhibit. We believe the answers, which can only be provided by the Smithsonian, will help establish guidelines to preclude that institution from again getting bogged down in a similar incident; i.e., one that confuses feelings with facts and lacks leadership. The questions are:

1. How could scholars and technicians at the Smithsonian have offered their flawed initial broad-based concept without receiving any peer group review and, once in trouble, why weren't management corrections made?
2. Why was Dr. Martin Harwit chosen in the first place for this particular exhibit?
3. What roles were played by Dr. Michael Neufeld and Chairman Tom Crouch throughout this exhibit? Both are Air and Space Museum employees and were involved to some degree with the first script.
4. Why didn't Dr. Heyman, the Secretary of the Smithsonian, take action sooner to correct the exhibit rather than to simply cancel the show?

The remainder of our testimony is structured to provide background information on each of these questions.

About half of our 2.1 million members are veterans of World War II. While all did not necessarily fight in the Asiatic-Pacific theatre of operations, all members firmly believe that President Truman on June 14, 1945, made the correct decision to authorize the dropping of Atomic bombs on Japan. The facts that were known fifty years ago are still well documented today. In essence, we knew that the Japanese would never surrender unconditionally and that a military invasion would inflict horrifying casualties on American troops.

The VFW qualifications to participate at this hearing are based on the fact that we worked with all the principles on the Smithsonian Institution's Air and Space Museum's planned exhibit titled, *The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II*, from May 1994 to January 30, 1995, and a representative attended the post-mortem symposium sponsored jointly by the Smithsonian Institution and The University of Michigan in mid-April of 1995. During this eleven month period of time the VFW provided corrections and commentaries to exhibit scripts two and three. We then reviewed script number four which was primarily an American Legion effort that proved unsatisfactory to all concerned, including the Legion. The VFW again worked with The Air Force Association (AFA) and The Retired Officers Association (TROA) on the Smithsonian's script number five and a follow-on new sixth introductory section of the military situation in the Asian-

Pacific area from the 1930's to December 1944. This last script was issued on December 15, 1994, and Secretary Heyman cancelled the entire effort about a month later on January 29, 1995. During this same period of time the VFW attended three meetings at "The Castle" or Headquarters of the Smithsonian Institution. Under Secretary Constance Newman was at every meeting, Secretary Heyman was at one meeting, and Dr. Martin Harwit also attended one of these sessions. The veterans organizations attending all three meetings were the VFW, the AFA, and TROA. As an aside, in mid-October Dr. Martin Harwit invited just myself and Bob Currie, the Executive Director of the VFW, to a working luncheon at the Air and Space Museum. Also present was the Smithsonian's Director of Government Relations, Mr. Mark Rodgers. In summary, the VFW's position was to tell Dr. Harwit that after going through three scripts we believed that the media was becoming involved on the side of historical accuracy rather than accepting the revisionist approach the Smithsonian was taking at that point in time. The VFW also added that there was a real possibility the Republican Party would be the majority in the new 104th Congress and that Republicans generally would support a strong national defense and would be less likely to accept a revisionist concept for the *Enola Gay* exhibit. Dr. Harwit agreed with both comments.

Secretary Heyman cancelled this exhibit on January 30, 1995. This was announced at the third and last meeting at "The Castle." The rationale of doing this boiled down to this one overriding reason: "I have concluded that we [the Smithsonian Institution] made a basic error in attempting to couple an historic treatment of the use of atomic weapons with the 50th anniversary commemoration of the end of the war. Exhibitions have many purposes, equally worthwhile. But we need to know which of many goals is paramount, and not to confuse them."

There was general agreement between the VFW, AFA, and TROA that the fifth script was a fairly decent package but not yet to the point where any of us would endorse it. However, after all the time, effort, and money that had been expended up to this point on presenting a balanced exhibit, Dr. Heyman's decision was a surprise, at least to the VFW.

The symposium held about two and a half months later on the campus of the University of Michigan was titled "Presenting History: Museums In A Democratic Society." This all day affair was divided into the following three sessions:

Exhibiting Controversial Subjects;

The *Enola Gay* Exhibit: A Case Study in Controversy; and,  
Museums in a Democratic Society.

It is interesting to note that Thomas D. Crouch, the Chairman of the Department of Aeronautics at the National Air and Space Museum, was the "Smithsonian's" person during the *Enola Gay* case study session. Please recall that Dr. Harwit had not yet resigned. A total of some 26 eminently qualified scholars, researchers, and historians participated in the symposium. It was the collective judgment of this group that whenever and wherever it is possible to deal with persons who participated in an historical event they should be interviewed and their position(s) clearly stated. In focusing on the *Enola Gay* Exhibit the group felt the effort was handled poorly throughout. Oddly enough, Tom Crouch did not concur. In the judgment of the VFW his position was simply that one can't make the American veterans "feel good" and, at the same time, present a meaningful exhibit on the use of atomic bombs in 1945.

First, how could scholars and technicians at the Smithsonian have offered their initial broad-based concept without any peer group review? Please recall the title was "The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II." Ostensibly, this was to have been scheduled for a late May 1995 opening date to commemorate, well, the end of World War II. However, the VFW concluded that the portion titled The Atomic Bomb was to be the vehicle the Smithsonian would use to make the case that nuclear weapons should never be used and that America was absolutely wrong in doing so. They were to make their case by presenting the results of Hiroshima and Nagasaki from the victim's viewpoint.

Second, just what real role did Dr. Martin Harwit play as a revisionist historian or as an opponent of atomic weapons? It is a fact that he was formerly a professor

of Astronomy at Cornell University and had been Director of the National Air and Space Museum since 1987. It is also true that while serving in the U.S. Army from 1955 to 1957, Dr. Harwit was assigned to work on nuclear weapons testing at Eniwetok and Bikini. Dr. Harwit had said that this experience inevitably influenced his thoughts about the *Enola Gay* exhibit. Knowing this, was Dr. Harwit in charge or was he being used as a front-man for someone else's agenda? Also, knowing Dr. Harwit's views, why was he given this exhibit mission in the first place and subsequently allowed to struggle with four or five revised scripts?

Third, what roles were played by Dr. Michael Neufeld and Tom Crouch? Both were associated with the National Air and Space Museum and the first *Enola Gay* script which was never shown to any veterans service organization but was reviewed by unknown parties in Japan. Another facet to this question is, what was the managerial role of the Chairman Tom Crouch to the Director, Martin Harwit?

Fourth and last, why didn't Dr. Heyman, the Secretary of the Smithsonian, take a more immediate and decisive position earlier in this controversy? In all fairness, we know that Dr. Heyman joined the Smithsonian in September of 1994; however, he certainly should have been aware of the on-going *Enola Gay* controversy if only by reading newspaper editorials and surely by receiving information from his Under Secretary, Ms. Constance Newman, who was present for most of the *Enola Gay* campaign. While it is a fact that Dr. Heyman was previously a law professor and chancellor of the University of California at Berkeley, he is no stranger to power and politics of Washington, DC. He was once counselor to Secretary of the Interior, Bruce Babbitt, and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Policy in the Department of the Interior. It is also a fact that Secretary Heyman received congressional criticism beginning in mid-December 1994 from members of the House of Representatives, to include Sam Johnson, Peter Blute, Duncan Hunter, and Bob Dornan among others. Then, on January 19, 1995, Congressman Sam Johnson and Peter Blute issued a press release that was extremely critical of the National Air and Space Museum's attempt to revise previously agreed upon American casualty estimates for a land invasion of Japan. The following day, January 20, 1995, the Air Force Association issued their own press release that also eloquently summarized the VFW's position by stating:

We [the Air Force Association] have continued our discussions with senior Smithsonian officials in the hope that the *Enola Gay* exhibit could be salvaged. We had been assured that no unilateral actions would be taken by curators and officials of the National Air and Space Museum, in whom we lost faith long ago. It now appears that, on the side and behind the scenes, the curators are still working their political agenda. This is unacceptable. Museum officials have failed in their stewardship and responsibilities.

Apparently, Dr. Heyman took this statement and the congressional criticism to heart and 10 days later cancelled the exhibit. This action, in the VFW's opinion, was not justified when we recall the expended time and effort and the fact the Air and Space Museum received about \$13 million in 1994 from Congress. Certainly all this money didn't go into the *Enola Gay* fiasco, but for \$13 million we do expect first-class management that as a minimum has an objective in mind and a timetable to meet deadlines and make decisions. This brings us full circle for the requirement to have Congress conduct an inquiry into how and why this debacle was ever allowed to happen in the first place.

This concludes the VFW's formal statement, Mr. Chairman. I will be happy to respond to any questions you or the committee members may have. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Mr. Manhan, I shall ask those questions next week. We will get their answers on the record.

Mr. MANHAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me just make a few comments and turn the questioning over to my colleague, the former chairman. We have lived through this process together. I appreciate the



restraint that you gentlemen have used with regard to the problems we have had on this exhibit with the Smithsonian.

First let me ask you, General Sweeney, were you contacted by any of the historians at the Smithsonian with regard to your participation in these historic flights before it became a controversy publicly?

General SWEENEY. No, sir, I was not.

The CHAIRMAN. You said that you learned about it first through a publication, the Air Force Association's publication?

General SWEENEY. Yes, when I first learned—

The CHAIRMAN. We need your microphone, General.

Senator FORD. We are frugal. We do not have one for everybody.

[Laughter.]

General SWEENEY. Your question was, I first learned about it through a publication, the Air Force Association publication, the Air Force Magazine, which is true. Mr. Correll wrote an article in there and just sent signals to my eyes when the Smithsonian is purported—and I am sure it did say that the script said—implied—I think said that we were trying to destroy another nation's culture and that we were an imperialistic Nation.

Now to the latter I say, I do not think we wanted any of their territory or any other territory in Asia. I do not think we were setting up satellites in other parts of the world or that we were fighting for that reason.

Then as to the culture, we certainly were not trying to do anything with their culture. We were trying to preserve it and not destroy it. We were just trying to get our men home; get the war over with and get our men home. I must suggest to you and remind perhaps everybody that on the original list of targets for the nuclear weapons, Kyoto somehow or other appeared on there. Secretary Stimson struck that immediately because that is considered to be the seat of Japanese culture, religious culture, or whatever you want to call it. So Secretary Stimson struck that from the list immediately.

Also, every bomber pilot in the 20th Air Force in the theater in the Pacific had orders not to ever bomb the Imperial Palace, even as a target of opportunity. Certainly we could have wiped out the Imperial Palace—I do not mean our group, but some group could very easily have wiped out the Imperial Palace if we were trying to destroy their culture. Secretary Stimson said no, never; no pilot will ever, no crew will ever go near that Imperial Palace.

Thank you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You raise a very interesting point for me. I was on the Burma Road between Chongqing and Xian taking a convoy of gas trucks up to Chengdu which was a new base to fly B-29's out of. We were preparing to have an assault on Japan flying in from the west. I know full well the impact of the word,

the feelings we had, when we learned that you had dropped the bomb, General. You are right, it was just 8 days later that we were turned around and told to go to another destination, the war was over.

Someone asked me the other day, how can you remember all that? You just do not forget that.

General SWEENEY. Yes, how can you forget?

The CHAIRMAN. Colonel Cooper, I note that you also are distinguished with your record of over 9,000 hours of flying in the Air Force. I do appreciate your attendance. I do not have any questions for you. I want to thank you for coming.

Mr. Harrington, I think the role of the Legion in this from the very first was constructive in trying to bring about a presentation that did comply with the law. I am alarmed that the Smithsonian Institution indicated it does not feel bound by the provisions of Section 80 of Title 20 of the U.S. Code. I just want to read it into this record and we will put the complete history of this section in the hearing.

We intend to have these hearings printed, because I think that we should preserve a record of this attempt to change the history of the *Enola Gay*.

The law provides that the Smithsonian Institution is a study center of historical collections.

The Smithsonian Institution shall commemorate and display contributions made by the military forces of the Nation towards creating, developing, and maintaining a free, peaceful, and independent society and culture in the United States of America. The valor and sacrificial service of the men and women of the Armed Forces shall be portrayed as an inspiration to the present and future generations of America. The demands placed upon the full energies of our people, the hardships endured, and the sacrifice demanded in our constant search for world peace shall be clearly demonstrated. The extensive peacetime contributions the Armed Forces have made to the advance of human knowledge in science, nuclear energy, polar and space exploration, electronics, engineering, aeronautics, and medicine shall be graphically described. The Smithsonian Institution shall interpret through dramatic display significant current problems affecting the Nation's security. It shall be equipped with a study center for scholarly research into the meaning of war, its effect on civilization, and the role of the Armed Forces in maintaining a just and lasting peace by providing a powerful deterrent to war. In fulfilling its purposes, the Smithsonian Institution shall collect, preserve, and exhibit military objects of historical interest and significance. [20 U.S.C. 80a]

Now, that was passed originally on August 30, 1961.

As I understand it, those of you who had negotiations with the Smithsonian have indicated that you called the attention of the Smithsonian to that law and they said they were not bound by it?

Mr. HARRINGTON. It was our understanding, sir, that they insinuated that that section of the law applied to a museum that was being contemplated and had been put on the back burner for the time being and did not apply to the institution in general. That is my understanding, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Next week we shall get the background of who gave them the opinion that they are not bound by that 1961 law. Mr. Harrington, on behalf of the committee I want to thank you for your persistence in pursuing this matter. We have taken note of your recommendations. I am not sure that this committee has the jurisdiction to pursue all of the recommendations, but we shall review them.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith, many of us were involved behind the scenes in trying to straighten this out, but it was your association that really brought it to the forefront. I must say, I join in the regret that the Smithsonian's exhibit will not be as robust as it should have been. It has now been scaled down. The result of the controversy is that it appears they just want this subject to go away. So I hope that you will continue to maintain your concern about the exhibit and help us eventually bring about an exhibit that is meaningful with regard to this event.

Lastly, Mr. Manhan, as I indicated to you, we will ask those questions next week and we will see to it that you get answers to them. They are very good questions. I really do not have any questions because I was in agreement with you from the very beginning.

Senator Ford?

Senator FORD. We both signed the letter so I guess we were in agreement also. Let me tell you what bothers me some right now. I have five great, wonderful grandchildren and before me is history, personal, real, you can put your hand on it. I think our responsibility is to be sure that this real reflection on what actually happened—and I underscore real and personal—is projected into the future and not sanitized.

And I could bring up a little something that if we had term limits, Senator Stevens would not be here. He would not be chairman if we had term limits. Here is a man who participated in World War II, General, and got his mission changed because you were successful. He was going to back you up and come from the other way. We were getting ready to flank them; the strategy was laid out. I was there. I am a veteran of World War II, not as active as some, more active than others maybe.

So somehow or another I want the institutional memory to stay as long as we can till we get it right. That is my problem

today, and that is what I am going to try to work on with my good friend—and he is my good friend—the chairman of the committee.

I would like to ensure that the Smithsonian does not repeat the errors that it has made in developing the *Enola Gay* exhibit. Based upon the experience of this group here, do other panel members—I believe the American Legion and the VFW have set out specifics—have suggestions or questions that we might use next week as it relates to the Smithsonian? Mr. Smith?

Mr. SMITH. The Air Force Association feels just exactly like they did. We have discussed those—

Senator FORD. I think that was kind of a mutual agreement, but I wanted to be sure—

Mr. SMITH. Yes, it was. Let me build on what you said, Senator Ford, too. I think we missed a wonderful opportunity to display appropriately one of the significant events in the last 100 years for our grandchildren to learn from, and we did it wrong. That is what this is all about. That is why John Correll, who is the editor of the Air Force Association, who I would like to make sure that this committee knows was the one that actually discovered the script the first time and started the work that we did.

Senator FORD. I think everybody understands that we are all on the same wavelength. We are together, and prevention is going to be important in the future. I do not mind somebody disagreeing with me. We all have interpretations, and that is what I have been doing up here for a few years now. We do not agree all the time. But we still try to work things out. And where we do agree, we go gung-ho.

I do not mind having different opinions and different interpretations. But it is awfully hard to refute General Sweeney. It is awfully hard because he was there, and he seems to be of sound mind and all that here today. I feel comfortable with his testimony. I believe if he signed his will today it would be a good one. So under those circumstances, I believe what you tell me, and I want that in the record and I want that unsanitized.

Colonel COOPER. Senator Ford, if I may?

Senator FORD. You sure may. Get me started and it is hard to stop me sometimes.

Colonel COOPER. It has been brought to my attention by an associate who was deeply involved with the National Air and Space Museum directly that at the present time there are three major galleries in the downtown museum that have no actual air or space artifacts in them. Yet just this week we opened a Barbie doll display at the National Air and Space Museum, which I have a little bit of a problem figuring out just what the important aviation artifact is—

Senator FORD. Was Barbie a female pilot?

[Laughter.]

Colonel COOPER. I really cannot answer that question, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. The general has given us a copy of his new video, which is one of the 50th Anniversary commemorative videos on the war's end. We thank you for that, General. I hope to see that we get one of these for each member of the Congress. We will talk to you about that.

Mr. HARRINGTON. Mr. Chairman, if I may please, before you conclude. There was mention made of the Smithsonian's deviation and dereliction from Title 20 of the United States Code. We do have a letter from Secretary Heyman citing that particular exemption that he claims is applicable to the institution and we would be glad to provide that to you, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, we would like to have that. The scope of this hearing, as I said at the beginning, is to look into the decision-making processes of the Smithsonian to see if we can find a way to be assured that the intent of Congress in helping to create the Smithsonian is met. It is on the Smithsonian's future management practices.

This is not the first time that this committee has had difficulty with the Smithsonian. We had difficulty over one exhibit that was called "The Underclass", which in order to enter it, one had to lie down on a slab like it was a morgue and go through a wall. It was a very traumatic experience really for children that were going through that exhibit.

Secondly, we had difficulty with the Smithsonian over its insistence on assisting Professor Luis Fuentes in getting national recognition of his theory that our Government stole California, Arizona, and Texas from the Mexican people and ought to look into finding some way to redress the wrongs. With the increasing Mexican population in those areas, you can understand our concern about anyone who might be fomenting great dissatisfaction in that area of our country.

We have had a series of these revisionist concepts with the Smithsonian, and it is a management concern. Two members of our committee are on the board of directors, but it is such an enormous institution now and there seems to be such great leeway in determining how the space is to be used for exhibits, and in the content of the exhibits, that it raises serious management questions. I think this is a management problem; the problem of determining whether the research that was conducted prior to planning the exhibit was adequate. We hope that we are understood here.

I am pleased, as I said, that you gentlemen have joined in the concept of trying to demonstrate our concern about the future of support for the Smithsonian. Had this exhibit gone on as it was originally brought to my attention, I swear that no veteran of the United States would have ever contributed to the Smithsonian again. Now that is what the board must understand. It was not true history. It was a distorted reflection of the endeavors of General Sweeney pursuant to the Commander-in-Chief's orders.

You have contributed to our process of trying to bring about some change in the management practices of the Smithsonian and I want to thank each of you for attending here today. Thank you very much.

Whereupon, at 10:43 a.m., the committee was adjourned.

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# THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION: MANAGEMENT GUIDELINES FOR THE FUTURE

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THURSDAY, MAY 18, 1995

U.S. SENATE,  
COMMITTEE ON RULES AND ADMINISTRATION,  
*Washington, DC.*

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m., in Room 301, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Ted Stevens, chairman, presiding.

Present: Senators Stevens, Warner, Cochran, Ford, Pell, and Feinstein.

Staff Present: Christine Ciccone, Deputy Chief Counsel; Mark C. Mackie, Chief Counsel; Virginia C. Sandahl, Chief Clerk; and Kennie L. Gill, Special Counsel for the Minority.

## OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, CHAIRMAN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF ALASKA

The CHAIRMAN. Let me make a preliminary statement here, if I may. Part of it is procedural. We have had a decision now from the Supreme Court that indicates that unsworn statements before the Congress cannot be the subject of further action. I intend to send a letter to all of the chairmen and ranking members of Senate committees to put them on notice that, in my judgment, that means that if there is any question that might be raised concerning testimony, that my advice to them—and I think my good friend, the Vice Chairman and Senator from Kentucky, will join in this—that the advice is that witnesses appearing before the committees who have not been sworn in as we have, should be. Members of Congress and Federal employees are under oath when they appear before our committee. We will start the practice of asking witnesses who appear before this committee to take an oath.

Again, I want to say, I believe that members of the Federal Government have taken an oath, as we have taken an oath, and are subject to prosecution if we do not testify truthfully here. I hope that those who appear before us will understand. It is my intention to ask witnesses who have not taken an oath, as employees or otherwise, to take an oath. I remind those who

appear before us that they are under oath when they testify if they are members of the Federal Government.

Our first witness this morning is the Honorable Sam Johnson, who is a member of the Smithsonian Board of Regents. Professor Edward Linenthal, Professor of Religion and American Culture at the University of Wisconsin-Oshkosh will follow Congressman Johnson. Mr. Linenthal served on the advisory board of the *Enola Gay* exhibit.

We shall also hear testimony from the Secretary of the Smithsonian, Michael Heyman; Dr. Tom Crouch, the curator on the *Enola Gay* exhibit; and Dr. Maxine Singer, chairman of the Commission on the Future of the Smithsonian.

Now this is the second hearing which we have called regarding the Smithsonian's future management practices. Last week we heard from several veteran's groups. I want to reiterate what I said at that hearing last week. These hearings are not being held to tear down the Smithsonian. We believe, I believe, it is our duty to help preserve the Smithsonian as the central depository of the artifacts of our Nation's history.

Those artifacts, together with the facts proven at the time of the decisions, permit judgments of history to be fair and unbiased. They allow succeeding generations to learn from history and to question it.

What happened with the *Enola Gay*, in my judgment, is that the Smithsonian produced an exhibit that was not fair or unbiased. It was a revisionist view of the events that took place at the end of World War II. Some of those individuals who took part in those events, and I am one of them, are still around to challenge the Smithsonian's account.

The exhibit resulted in an intense public controversy and has created a chasm, again in my opinion, between a major segment of the public, particularly the veterans of this country, which account for 26.5 million people. That is approximately 10 percent of the population and when you add their families and friends that number adds up very quickly.

In addition, the whole controversy has now resulted in the resignation of one of the Smithsonian's top officials, Dr. Martin Harwit, the director of the Air and Space Museum.

Sadly, the *Enola Gay* exhibit is not the first exhibit at the Smithsonian that has raised public concern. There were also the "West as America" exhibit, the "Etiquette of the Underclass" exhibit, and the "Buried Mirror" video that featured Carlos Fuentes. Each time that an exhibit shocks the sensibilities of the general public, support for the Smithsonian is diminished.

Approximately 85 percent of the Smithsonian's budget comes from the Federal treasury. The balance is from non-appropriated funds, such as private gifts and donations. Since the 1950's, the percentage of the Smithsonian's budget that comes from private sources has diminished from 31 percent to 15 percent. Each year



the Smithsonian projects its budget request and the request is consistently for increased Federal funding.

In 1992, the projection that was presented to this committee was that the Smithsonian would need \$1.1 billion in Federal money between 1992 and the year 2001 to fund their projects. Since that time, they have lowered their projections, but at the same time the portion of the Smithsonian's budget that comes from private sources continues to drop. In a time when we face in this country, and particularly here in the Federal Government, severe budget cuts, the Smithsonian will be in greater need of increased private donations to sustain its operations.

Eroding public support threatens the ability of the Smithsonian to continue to be the central depository of our nation's artifacts. It is my hope that these hearings will set the record straight, and quiet down this controversy concerning this exhibit and the events of the past.

We want to provide the Smithsonian with a public forum to explain what went wrong with their management practices, and to reassure us that steps have been taken to correct what I would call the revisionist and politically correct bias that was contained in some of these exhibits of the past, particularly the original script for the *Enola Gay* exhibit.

I hope that will be done, and if it is done, we will put this behind us.

Senator Ford, do you have an opening statement, sir?

Senator FORD. Just briefly, Mr. Chairman.

#### **OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. WENDELL H. FORD, RANKING MEMBER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF KENTUCKY**

First, let me say I support your opening statement as it relates to swearing in of witnesses. Several of the committees on which I serve do that automatically, and I do not think it would be an extension too much of what is now the practice. So I will support that effort, and witnesses should be alerted to the Supreme Court decision.

Mr. Chairman, last week this committee heard testimony from a number of individuals and groups representing both active and retired military who had been involved, in various ways, with the development of the *Enola Gay* exhibit. That testimony raised some very disturbing issues about how the Smithsonian management went about soliciting input on this important exhibit and determining the scope of the exhibit.

I recognize that Secretary Heyman came to the Smithsonian at the end of this process. Testimony by some of the witnesses last week indicated that he made a valiant, though ultimately unsuccessful, effort to resolve this controversy and get the exhibit back on track.

I commend the Secretary for his efforts. However, I am afraid that the experience with the *Enola Gay* exhibit is not an isolated example and indicates a general misunderstanding of the relationship between the Smithsonian and the American public. Experiences such as that with the *Enola Gay* undermine the broad support for the Smithsonian and jeopardize its unique role, and I underscore unique role, as America's museum.

It is vital to the continued congressional support of the Smithsonian that the management flaws that led to this situation not be repeated. The Smithsonian must understand that, as an institution supported with Federal funds, it is ultimately accountable to the American public, whose lives and history its exhibits reflect.

I look forward to hearing the response of the Smithsonian to the issues raised last week, and the Secretary's proposals to prevent a recurrence of such a controversy in the future. It will also be helpful to our consideration of this matter to hear from the other witnesses who bring different perspectives to this discussion. The Smithsonian will not be able to move forward until we have fully aired these issues and management has taken steps to ensure that this situation will not be repeated.

I thank the Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feinstein, do you have an opening statement?

Senator FEINSTEIN. I do not, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Congressman Johnson, as I stated, I believe that we who serve in the Congress are all under oath. We will be happy to have your statement.

#### TESTIMONY OF HON. SAM JOHNSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, sir. I appreciate it, and I thank you for giving me the opportunity to participate in this very important hearing.

From what has been said already, I just want to emphasize that you represent those who fought for us in World War II and were able to respond to the *Enola Gay* episode, I think, more emotionally than some of the Americans who were not involved in that conflict. Being a military man, I appreciate the posture that you have taken and I thank you for your patriotic approach. I think that the Smithsonian does reflect, and will reflect in the future, the values that America so greatly loves.

Last summer, amid great controversy, I became involved in the development of the *Enola Gay* exhibit. I became involved because I was, like you, disturbed by the biased and unbalanced text of the script, and by the assumptions that were made by a few individuals questioning America's actions in ending World War II.

Through the tenacity and perseverance of Members of Congress, staff, veterans, and outside groups, a series of constructive negotiations were held and I felt that some progress was being made to rewrite the script. I was wrong.

The problems continued and were exacerbated by the uncooperative spirit of the museum's director and curators, and their inability to understand the reasons for the opposition toward the exhibit. It seemed that they were willing to disregard history in order to promote their own ideological agenda.

While the revised scripts did move closer to a balance, the museum director and curators persisted with their questioning of American intentions, while maintaining the innocence of the Japanese. When these differences could not be reconciled, Secretary Heyman, who became Secretary as you know only in September, responded quickly and responsibly. He cancelled the exhibit as planned and put himself personally in charge of revising the *Enola Gay* exhibit.

At that same time, I was honored when the Speaker appointed me to sit on the Smithsonian's Board of Regents. Unfortunately, over the past few years, I believe that the Board of Regents was not as diligent as it should have been in its oversight and guidance of the various museum directors, curators, and other Smithsonian personnel. We must remember that it is the Board of Regents in whose hands the Institution and all its museums have been entrusted, with the help of the Secretary.

Today, however, I am pleased to tell you that it is a very different Smithsonian than the one that existed just a few months ago. There is a renewed interest and energy on behalf of the Secretary and the Board of Regents that I am proud to be a part of.

Although we found that the *Enola Gay* was not the only exhibit that had been overcome by political correctness and revisionism, which you stated, I do want to stress that the majority of the exhibits at the Smithsonian are very impressive and historically accurate. I am confident that under the leadership of Secretary Heyman, the entire Smithsonian Institution will get back on track.

I would like to outline a few of the Secretary's reforms. First, he has initiated a full management review of the entire Smithsonian Institution. Second, he has taken a hands-on role by placing himself in the position to oversee and ensure that every exhibit is of the highest caliber. Finally, he has renewed and stressed that the Board of Regents take an active role in the operations of the Smithsonian. That is what has been the problem—there has been no involvement. I feel secure about the direction of the Smithsonian's future with Dr. Heyman at the helm.

I think we must be extremely mindful in our oversight and management of the Smithsonian Institution and its exhibits, because we are talking about our national museum. It is vitally

important, in my view, that all of the exhibits are factually correct and properly reflect the values that this great country is based upon. Most importantly, museums have an incredible responsibility to our nation's children. Our national museums must, at the very least, surround and teach them, I believe, what is good about America.

I am proud to say that after working with Secretary Heyman and the other regents, I am confident and excited about the prospects for this great institution in the future. We recognize the financing problems and we are out, along with the Secretary, to find some private funding to help us get over the hump. We are on the path to restoring the Smithsonian to its once prominent state and we, as regents, have a solemn trust to the nation to do that, and I am very honored to be a part of it.

Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for having these hearings, and allowing me to participate. I would be happy to answer some of your questions.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We are proud, too, that you are there. I am delighted to have your statement. We have found the same relationship with the Secretary, and I hope that we can put this issue behind us.

Do you have any questions?

Senator FORD. I have no questions for the Congressman. We do thank you for being here and thank you for your fine efforts.

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you for allowing me to be here.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson, let me tell you that the legal advisor to the Senate has just sent me word, through my staff, that I am incorrect. Members of Congress take an oath to support the President of the United States, but they do not take an oath to testify truthfully at every instance.

So, do you swear that the testimony you have just given is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. JOHNSON. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, sir.

Our next witness is Dr. Edward Linenthal. Professor, you are going to be the first one to do this before us officially.

Do you swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I do.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We are happy to have your statement, Professor, please proceed.

**TESTIMONY OF EDWARD T. LINENTHAL, PROFESSOR OF RELIGION AND AMERICAN CULTURE, UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-OSHKOSH, OSHKOSH, WISCONSIN**

Mr. LINENTHAL. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee, I am very pleased to be here this morning.

I served on the advisory committee for the National Air and Space Museum's proposed exhibit, "The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II" because of my engagement with a number of controversial historic sites and issues, particularly the changing interpretation of the Little Big Horn Battlefield National Monument, my experience working at the U.S.S. *Arizona* Memorial at Pearl Harbor during the 50th anniversary events, and a recently published book on the creation of the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.

The Little Big Horn is one of the great success stories of American public history, as visitors learn that different, often clashing, stories can be told at a historic site and that these clashing voices deepen rather than impoverish our understanding of the events of 1876. At Pearl Harbor and at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, I felt the power of the commemorative voice which speaks with the authority of the witness, "I was there. I know what happened because I saw it and felt it." As a historian, part of my obligation is to attend to this voice, to listen carefully in this instance to Pearl Harbor veterans and Holocaust survivors.

Scholars, including museum professionals, are obliged to provide a comprehensive and balanced rendering of the human experience. Frequently, there is a tension between the commemorative voice and the historical voice, which seeks to discern motives, understand actions, and discuss consequences that were impossible to analyze during the event itself. It is a voice that to some can feel condescending, even when no condescension is intended. It can feel detached, even when those who speak out of this voice view their work as a way to deepen our understanding of an event.

The National Air and Space Museum tried, unsuccessfully, to represent both these perspectives in one exhibit. In hindsight, there were too many complicating factors — the presence of what many considered a sacred relic, the *Enola Gay* itself; the expectations of many that 50th anniversary events should privilege the commemorative perspective; the strongly held and sometimes irreconcilable belief about the use of atomic weapons; and fundamental disagreements about the function of the National Air and Space Museum. Should it be a place for uncritical celebration of technological prowess, or should it inform the public about the economic, social, and political context of the museum's artifacts? In my opinion, it is certainly not "gratuitous social commentary," as some have charged, that the museum, for example, reminds visitors that the V-2 rocket is more than a "milestone in the progress of rocket technology," what an old label read. Rather, that thousands of concentration camp prisoners died building it, and that it "killed 7,000 people and terrorized millions."

The museum tried to balance what historian John Dower has called the heroic and tragic narrative of the Bomb. Veterans and

many others envisioned and expected an exhibit that portrayed the use of the Bomb as the culmination of the Pacific war, saving many lives. The appropriate historical context was the pre-Bomb horror of the Pacific war. The commemorative message was, "remember what we did and what it cost." The tragic narrative, clearly dominant in the museum's exhibition, sought to freeze a moment widely considered a turning point in history, in much the way the Holocaust Museum froze an event for examination. While acknowledging the Bomb's role in ending the war, one appropriate historical context in this tragic narrative was the post-war legacy of the nuclear arms race, and a host of controversial issues that had occupied historians for 50 years. The commemorative message was "never again." Historians' perspective on the Bomb emerge out of both of these stories. Some emphasize the fact that the Bomb ended the war and view it as a positive act. Others see it also as the first act of the Cold War and view it much more ambivalently.

The first script, which was just that, a draft, understood by its creators to be subject to revision and ensuing consultations, became a lightning rod for criticism. In the spring and summer of 1994, there was thoughtful criticism from military historians, including those of another review body appointed by Martin Harwit, the "Tiger Team," which included several Air Force veterans and was chaired by retired Air Force Brigadier General William Constantine. There were several major concerns: one, that its sections about historical controversies were too speculative and, for some, tendentious; two, that a much fuller presentation of the Pacific war was necessary in order to help visitors appreciate the decision to drop the Bomb; and three, that there was an imbalance in the script because of this lack of context, evident in many more photographs of Japanese Bomb victims than American combat casualties, an imbalance that fostered forgetfulness of the Japanese as perpetrators of barbaric acts in the war, and remember them only as victims of the Bomb.

Over the summer of 1994, the script underwent substantial changes. For example, of the 42 specific recommendations of the Tiger Team, 30 were fully implemented, 7 were partially implemented, 5 were not. Other military historians were also consulted, and their advice taken seriously. On July 14, 1994, retired Brigadier General David A. Armstrong, the Director for Joint History, Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and also a professional historian, wrote Dr. Alfred Goldberg, historian of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Substantial revisions have been made . . . Some attempt has been made to address virtually every criticism raised at the April 13 meeting between Joint History and Service historians and Smithsonian curators, although in some cases the fixes have been minor." Several months later, on September 19, 1994, Alfred Goldberg wrote, "The first three sections of this draft should dispose of most of the negative criticism of the first two drafts. They

present an informed and balanced picture of events. The issue of racism, strategic bombing policy, decision to drop the bomb, and invasion plans and casualties, are handled with acceptable objectivity. The section on the effect of the atomic bombs will no doubt continue to draw critical comment as being too long, too detailed, and too sympathetic to the Japanese, but the exhibit would be incomplete and much less meaningful without it." Despite these changes, media criticism and the campaign organized by the Air Force Association intensified.

Media coverage of this issue has been distressingly irresponsible. The museum and curators were accused of anti-American impulses, of creating a script that exhibited disregard for veterans. Interestingly, however, the museum's strongest critic, the Air Force Association, noted early on that the first script treated the men of the 509th, "extensively and with respect." Let me offer one example of the way the press poisoned the debate. The Wall Street Journal spoke of the "oozing romanticism with which the ... show's writers describe the kamikaze pilots ... These were, the script elegiacally relates, 'youths, their bodies overflowing with life.'" The Journal has taken a quote from a kamikaze pilot in the script and implied that these are the curators' words. The curators included this quote to provide, they commented, "insight into [the kamikaze's] suicidal fanaticism, which many Americans would otherwise find incomprehensible." Ken Ringle of The Washington Post quoted the Journal's paragraphs, repeating for his readers the false accusation.

As script after script deleted material about historical controversies regarding the decision to drop the bomb, added photographs of mushroom clouds and structural damage, and removed most photographs of dead Japanese, historians and peace activists met with museum officials to argue for what they believed should be restored or newly incorporated. The scripts were a kind of Rorschach test. People were concerned with different questions, paid attention to different "facts," and interpreted the same facts differently. In the end, everyone believed their history had been "stolen," resulting either in a "revisionist" exhibit or in one showing a disregard for the complexity and irony of history.

Reaction to the exhibit remains troubling in many respects. Some critics folded this exhibit into the culture wars, into an anti-intellectual attack, arguing that elite historians had "stolen" the "people's" history, and that the museum had fallen victim to the delusions of "revisionism." This argument conveniently ignores the fact that historians have opened up American history to the voices of many different Americans. It also seeks to portray "revisionism" as a morally dubious activity, akin to the practices of Holocaust deniers (formerly called Holocaust revisionists). And yet, is it not the job of historians to continually reconstruct the past in great detail, to continually revise our

interpretations of the past according to new research and new insight? Are we not pleased when Ken Burns deepens and broadens, therefore revises, our understanding of the Civil War or the history of baseball when he allows so many forgotten people to speak? Do we not see this as an act of historical enrichment, reminding us of the fact that history is never as simple as it seems, but as complex, ironic, and therefore endlessly fascinating?

It was also troubling that our advisory committee and the museum failed to be more sensitive to the passions aroused by this story, troubling that the museum failed to respond publicly to the media caricature of script and curatorial motive, and troubling that the museum was willing to enter into negotiations with the American Legion, which had virtual veto power over the content of the exhibit. Museums, particularly public museums, have a responsibility to listen carefully to voices of various groups in the shaping of public exhibitions, but the integrity of the scholarly enterprise, be it in a book or a museum exhibit, that seeks careful rendition of the past, is threatened when any interest group becomes an arbiter of public history.

In recent years, many museums have succeeded in engaging visitors in conversation about controversial issues in order to help fill the much lamented "naked public square" in American life. The cancellation of this exhibit sets a chilling and dangerous precedent, if the message is that only "officially" sanctioned history is acceptable. With all due respect to Representative Peter Blute of Massachusetts, I am troubled by his comment about the *Enola Gay* exhibit. He said, "I don't want 16-year-olds walking out of there thinking badly of the U.S." Surely Representative Blute would agree that the presentation of history is not to function as therapy, used to puff up the self-esteem of individuals or nations. Surely Representative Blute would object to the very idea that there should be a patriotic litmus test for a public museum in the Nation's Capital, or that young people should not be confronted with the complexities of history. I am sure that Representative Blute would never mean to imply that such a test could lead to opposition for appropriated funds for the Holocaust Museum. There, visitors learned that Americans encountered and liberated the camps and many Holocaust survivors found a home in America. They also learn, however, about official anti-Semitism that kept thousands of European Jews from legally emigrating to this country. They learn that the S.S. *Saint Louis* was turned away from American shores in 1939, resulting in the deaths of many passengers in the Holocaust. At that museum, visitors are judged to be mature enough to be able to confront a complex story. Surely they had the ability to do the same at the National Air and Space Museum.

Unlike totalitarian countries, we never want to give fuel to the impulse to sanitize history, to turn away from engaging our



past in all of its complexity. This would be anathema to the democratic principles we all hold sacred. Surely, we can find ways to both honor the commemorative voice and respect the historical voice as we continue to create public history exhibits designed to both inspire and challenge.

Mr. Chairman, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. I noticed that two of our colleagues have arrived. Senator Cochran is also a member of the Smithsonian Board. Do you have a statement, Senator?

Senator COCHRAN. No, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Warner, do you have a statement?

Senator WARNER. I have one I would like to insert in the record.

[The prepared statement of Senator Warner follows:]

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN WARNER, A U.S. SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VIRGINIA

I would like to thank the chairman for holding this very important hearing.

As a member of the Smithsonian Institution Board of Regents during the period in which the *Enola Gay* exhibit controversy developed, I worked closely with the Institution and with various military groups as they strove to resolve their differences. Progress was being made until mid-January of this year when discussions between the parties broke down and The American Legion called for the cancellation of the planned exhibit.

Following that, on January 20, 1995, Senator Dole and I wrote to Chairman Stevens requesting hearings focused on the controversy surrounding the *Enola Gay* exhibit. Ten days later, on January 30, 1995, Smithsonian Secretary Heyman announced that the planned exhibit had been cancelled and replaced with a smaller display featuring the forward section of the *Enola Gay* and a limited script.

The cancellation of the exhibit and all of the controversy surrounding it has, unfortunately, damaged the Smithsonian Institution's reputation. We now have a responsibility to the American people to ensure that such an incident never occurs again. We must then put this unfortunate chapter behind us and look to the future.

The Smithsonian Institution is a national treasure that belongs to us all. We must address the mistakes that were made, correct them and then immediately focus our attention on how we can all work together to strengthen the Institution. To do otherwise would be a disservice to all Americans.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. No opening statement, thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand you are writing a history on this controversy. Is that right?

Mr. LINENTHAL. That is correct.

The CHAIRMAN. A book on this whole subject we are exploring?

Mr. LINENTHAL. My own contribution will be a chapter of the history of this controversy in a book of essays that will explore other museum controversies, but will focus on the *Enola Gay* exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that when the Smithsonian prepares an exhibit on an event in military history that military

historians and the records of the Department of Defense ought to be consulted?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I think that in the creation of any public history exhibit, a wide variety of voices, particularly of people who are invested in the story, should be consulted. I have wondered, this is of course a hypothetical question, and it is a different museum so it is hard to draw precise analogies, but at the Holocaust Museum, there was a content committee made up of museum people, historians, and Holocaust survivors. That content committee had something to do with evaluating the script, making suggestions.

I have wondered, in retrospect, given the volatile nature of this story, whether some kind of a content committee for this exhibit might, in fact, have allayed some of the anger of veterans and others who felt that their voices were not a part of this originally, and that they did not own the story in the ways that they wanted to.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor, do you believe that the committee that met on the Holocaust should have included Nazis?

Mr. LINENTHAL. No, I do not.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that this group, who prepared this exhibit, should have gone to Japan to consult with Japanese veterans before they consulted with American veterans?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I do not know that that is the case, Senator. I know that the museum went to Japan on several occasions and, from the materials that I have seen from the Smithsonian—and I still have documents to go through, of course—the materials that I have seen, the Smithsonian went there to consult with the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and several museums about artifacts. I am not aware of consultation with Japanese veterans.

I do know, as well, that there were some discussions with Japanese victims. I also know, and you perhaps have the dates of this, that early on in this process, the men of the 509th were, in fact, a part of this process as well.

The CHAIRMAN. The information we have is that military historians were not consulted until the summer of 1994. In your history, do you know how many scripts were actually prepared on this exhibit?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I have a number of scripts in my office.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me how many?

Mr. LINENTHAL. Quite a few. I have six or seven in my office.

The CHAIRMAN. We have asked for all of them to be delivered to this committee. I hope that we have the same scripts that you have.

You stated that the American Legion had veto power over the context.

Mr. LINENTHAL. The content.

The CHAIRMAN. The content. I thought you meant content and context of this exhibition. If that is so, why did it take so many

drafts before they got to the point that it reflected any part of their opinion?

Mr. LINENTHAL. Well, the American Legion was asked by the Smithsonian to come in rather late in this game. I think, frankly, that given what very distinguished military historians in Washington said about two of the earlier scripts—particularly I believe it was August of 1994—that that script was one that displayed, as Alfred Goldberg and David Armstrong said, an acceptable balance that included many voices.

By the time the American Legion became involved, and they were asked to become involved, so it was at that point something they were willing to do, the public situation was, as you know, the controversy had erupted already. I simply think that while museums must take great care to include a variety of voices in the creation of scripts so that various people are engaged in and own the story in various ways, in situations of duress, when any interest group—whether it be the American Legion or the Fellowship of Reconciliation—are in positions to dictate what goes in scripts, that that is a bad precedent set.

So here I am not simply picking on the American Legion. I would feel the same way were it any group with a particular agenda telling a public museum what should and should not be in an exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. One should not get too personal about these things, but I remember when I was a high school student in Senator Feinstein's beautiful state, that right after Pearl Harbor we lost 40 percent of the students in our high school because they were Japanese. They were my good friends. Those of us who lived at that time were able to draw a distinction between how we felt about the Japanese military and how we felt about Japanese people.

Do you think this exhibit demonstrated that feeling at the time, which was not anti-Japanese, but anti-Japanese military?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I am not entirely sure that that was the case as the war went on.

The CHAIRMAN. I am talking about this exhibit. Do you think it exhibited the feeling in the United States at the time, of just total antipathy towards those who controlled Japan, as compared to the Japanese people, per se?

Mr. LINENTHAL. Well there were, in the first script, certainly statements about the activities of the Japanese in China and their activities toward American prisoners of war. I think, speaking personally, that the issue of context, that since so many Americans—especially younger people, the Smithsonian found out—did not have the proper context into which to put this story, the idea of placing this in the wider context of the Pacific war was, in fact, a wise one. And the Smithsonian moved, I think, relatively quickly to do that. So I think that was very wise.

As I said, working out of the tragic narrative of the bomb, the Smithsonian tried to show what the bomb did on the ground.

Many people thought that this helped kind of “misremember” this—that the Japanese were being remembered only as victims.

The way I read that part of the script, with pictures of the dead Japanese, it did not make me misremember the war. I had no trouble remembering what the Japanese did in China, at the rape of Nanking, or the beheading of Australian prisoners of war, the barbaric treatment of American prisoners of war. I saw those photographs as representing really the civilian victims of World War II throughout the theaters, and also in some ways the first victims of the nuclear age.

So that is very much how I read those.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you a member of the Tiger Team?

Mr. LINENTHAL. No, I was not a member of the Tiger Team.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you know how many times the Tiger Team met?

Mr. LINENTHAL. No, I have the Tiger Team’s reports. I do not know how many times they met.

The CHAIRMAN. If I told you I was advised that the advisory board only met once, and that six of the nine members attended, no notes were taken, and no report was ever issued, could you question that in terms of your history?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I could, indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. Can you tell me what your history shows?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I have a history of what the Tiger Team did. There’s a large report that the National Air and Space Museum has, that I have in my files, that shows what the Tiger Team did, and what the various issues were that the Tiger Team took up, what issues were negotiated between the museum and the members of the Tiger Team. So I do have that, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not want to monopolize this. I will just ask you two more questions. Have you read Manchester’s “Goodbye Darkness”?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I have, indeed.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you question his judgment of history, as one who participated in it?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I do not question—Senator, I was asked at the 50th anniversary ceremonies at Pearl Harbor, there was a conference in Honolulu on the legacy of Pearl Harbor, in which I participated. And after I was done with my talk, which was a history of the changing interpretation of the U.S.S. *Arizona* Memorial at Pearl Harbor, the son of a survivor of the Bataan Death March asked me a question from the audience, “What would you tell my father about reconciling with the Japanese?”

I said to him what I hope I would be wise enough to say and have, in fact, responded to Holocaust survivors—that there are some things you do not comment on out of human decency. That I had no business telling someone who had survived the Bataan Death March anything about reconciliation with the Japanese.

I have, as a member of the advisory board, had people say that I had forgotten who were the good guys and the bad guys

in World War II. When I was writing my history of the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum, I walked on the ashes of my family members at the death camp at Auschwitz and Buchenwald. My father was a doctor during the war who helped work on quinine, to develop medicine for malaria that saved many lives.

I have absolutely no problem remembering what was at stake at World War II and what would have happened had the darkness descended.

I think that historians and people like William Manchester and yourself, who were involved in this and bring the feel and texture of history, both of those voices are necessary. And it is my moral obligation as a historian to pay attention to those voices, to listen to those voices; and also my obligation as a historian to say that there is a sense of perspective and a sense of insight that can be gained years after working in archives, working with materials from a distance.

The history without either one of those voices is incomplete and shallow.

The CHAIRMAN. My last question, and then I will be happy to yield, is this. We are holding this hearing to determine how we can be assured that these events cannot happen again. We want to protect the Smithsonian from the loss of support, as I said.

We were not consulted on the other exhibits I mentioned to you. All of them caused substantial controversy. When we got notice of this proposed exhibit, Senator Ford and I, and several others here, joined together and asked the Smithsonian to review it and give us information about it. That request was literally ignored.

What would you do to this management system to assure that the interests whom you indicate should have been consulted, are in fact consulted. Veterans were not consulted until this thing went off the wall. Military historians were not consulted until it was a matter of substantial public controversy. Congress was not consulted until we had veterans groups and a lot of other groups banging at our door.

Now, we are responsible for oversight of this institution. What would you do to the system to assure that, as you say, these people are properly consulted and their viewpoints are taken into consideration? I would add, as a footnote to this, that if this exhibit had not been interrupted, it would have hit the public right about the time that we were commemorating the victory of the United States after 50 years. If it resounded throughout the whole United States community the way it did within the small community that did get hold of it, I think the Smithsonian would have faced overwhelming opposition to its even continuing in existence.

What would you do to change this management scheme?

Mr. LINENTHAL. Let me say first off, I think that there were veterans, I think 20th Air Force and men of the 509th, were

consulted about this. I do not know the details of that consultation. Perhaps Secretary Heyman and certainly Martin Harwit and Tom Crouch who will testify later today can say something about that.

I also will not be pompous enough to say what I would do were I in charge of a museum. However, after having written the history of the Holocaust Memorial Museum and appreciated very much the tremendous difficulties and volatility of placing a memory like that on American soil, and all of the issues of location and representation that come up, and the sensitivity with with Holocaust survivors looked at the story, there was a balance. And often many clashes, enduring and bitter clashes, between Holocaust survivors, museum professionals, and historians that were often not a question of right or wrong but a question of sensibility.

Should women's hair from Auschwitz be displayed in the permanent exhibition? Well, for a historian like myself and for museum people, the clear answer was yes. This showed one of the revolutionary aspects of the Holocaust, that the Nazis mined the bodies of their victims for insulation in submarines, socks for the Wehrmacht. This is what hair was used for, and the Russians found thousands of kilos of it in Auschwitz.

The museum brought some of that hair to Washington when they were collecting artifacts, and wanted to put it in the permanent exhibition. As a historian, it seemed clear to me that this was important and dramatic and part of the pedagogical importance of the museum.

Some survivors on the content committee objected bitterly on the grounds that this simply was wrong to do. One woman said, on the committee, a survivor, this could be my mother. You cannot display my mother at the museum. I think wisely, Shaike Weinberg, the director of the museum, left the hair out of the permanent exhibition.

Now when I talk about this in the book, and also when I lecture about the museum, people say was this a right decision or a wrong decision? It was a decision of honoring a certain kind of sensibility.

The CHAIRMAN. But I do not see that sensibility in this at all, Professor. I hope you write the history, in part at least, in the way that the veterans see it because we veterans were ignored when we raised the question here in the Congress. And as far as I can see, the veterans organizations were ignored until we got into it even further.

Mr. LINENTHAL. I think that in any museum, particularly in a public museum, particularly in the Nation's Capital, and particularly in a museum whose very purpose is contested, one has to be very careful about the inclusion of many voices in the creation of the exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. We will have to go on some other people. Senator Ford?

Senator FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I was enjoying the questions and response of the professor.

Several weeks ago I had a very emotional moment. That emotional moment was a statement made by Senator Bumpers from Arkansas relating to the 50th anniversary of the Marines. Senator Heflin stood; he was wounded. We had Senator Inouye, who lost an arm. We had Senator Dole, who was injured seriously, and others. Looking around that Senate chamber and having a memory of World War II and what transpired there, I knew that the ability to relate that history to this institution was dwindling.

I thought to myself, my children will understand it because I could relate it to them. My grandchildren can understand it some, because I can relate it to them. They are more of the Vietnam era. We are spending lots of money in my home town to put in a museum. I thought if they would pattern it after the Smithsonian as best they could, my home town folks would be well served.

Then I listened to your statement here this morning, Professor, and I just want to tell you I respectfully disagree. I appreciate your perspective, but I respectfully disagree with your conclusion that Congressman Blute's concerns are misplaced. I think it is appropriate that a 16-year-old leave this exhibit, or would have left this exhibit, or any other exhibit as a matter of fact, understanding the full ramifications of the war, but still somehow feeling good about the role that the United States played in ending the war.

That is precisely the role of the Smithsonian management, I think, to balance the perspectives but remember that this is our history. We mix it all up, I guess, but it is our history as we see it. When you start mixing in other countries' perspectives and so forth, I wonder. I want our citizens to have it all, because history is awfully important, and those who opposed war the most are those who served.

I just wanted to add that, too, because I saw that in the next 2 years we will lose the distinguished Senator from Alabama as a member of the United States Senate. Senator Heflin has announced that he will not seek reelection, so there is someone with a valuable institutional memory that we will lose.

We all have our problems, and there has to be a final decision. So what we are trying to do here today is to be of assistance when that final decision is made, so that it will meet the standards that all of us would like to have as it relates to history.

But as I say, I appreciate your position. I regret that I must disagree with it, or disagree with your conclusions, as you agreed with something and then you said that the decision made at the Holocaust Museum was the proper one. We all have to make a decision, and we have been used to that around here. Sometimes they are good and sometimes they are bad, and we pray that they are all good.

So I thank you for a very interesting statement this morning. I enjoyed it. I understand it, I think. I understand where you are coming from. Let us hope that we can all lay these things out on the table and that the ultimate decision is the right one. I thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell?

Senator PELL. I just find myself interested in the discussion. Seeing the model for the Holocaust Museum I think back to the World War II days. I came back myself in a hospital ship sick, not wounded. I remember my feelings when I heard that the bomb went off. I happened to be on Pennsylvania Avenue and right opposite the White House by coincidence, and wondered if we, too, might expect the same.

I have no strong view one way or the other. I think you are doing the best you can, and I wish you well.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cochran?

Senator COCHRAN. Professor, I am curious. Who selected you to be on the Advisory Board of the *Enola Gay* exhibit?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I was asked by Martin Harwit. I had come to know one of the curators who I had consulted with when I was writing my book on the Holocaust Museum, because I was interested in the way the museum presented the bombing of Auschwitz and the interpretation of that in the Holocaust Museum. So I talked with one of the curators who had, in fact, had a panel on this at the National Air and Space Museum.

After I got to know him some, and also Martin Harwit a little bit, I was asked, given my work on some of these other controversial historic sites, to be on the advisory committee and I said yes.

Senator COCHRAN. Had you served on any other advisory boards for the Smithsonian Museums before?

Mr. LINENTHAL. No, I have not. I have done some consulting work with the National Park Service in training sessions for park historians and managers on how to interpret controversial historic sites.

Senator COCHRAN. I am interested in the parallel that you seem to draw between the victims of the Holocaust in Europe and the victims of the holocaust in Japan. To you there is a parallel, is there not?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I do not know that I would draw a direct parallel. I guess the parallel I was trying to draw was how the Holocaust Museum had to struggle and deal with what I have called these different voices, all of whom are passionately involved in the story.

Senator COCHRAN. And all of whom were victims. You were talking about the victims, were you not, in the Holocaust Museum? The victims of the mass murder.

Mr. LINENTHAL. The Holocaust Museum, in fact, one of the interesting interpretive dilemmas they had was that many of the survivors really did not want a Nazi presence in the permanent



exhibition at all. What that did was to leave the permanent exhibition as if the Jews were going to the death by themselves. There were no—

Senator COCHRAN. Did you come to conclude that the perpetrators of Hiroshima and Nagasaki were on a parallel with Nazi Germany?

Mr. LINENTHAL. No, absolutely not. Absolutely not. Absolutely not. That thought would never enter my mind.

Senator COCHRAN. I have no further questions.

Mr. LINENTHAL. The thought would never enter my mind.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Warner?

Senator WARNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I look at this issue from two perspectives, one personal. I enlisted in World War II just following the Battle of the Bulge with a great many others from my high school class. Given at that time, there was such uncertainty on both fronts of the future of our military campaigns and there was a need to have a very heavy influx of young people at that time.

Of course, in the course of events in 1945, the spring of 1945, hostilities ceased both in Europe and eventually in Japan. But my particular group of naval persons were headed into the invasion of Japan. We were explicitly trained for that invasion. One of the most controversial features of this regrettable chapter was the level of casualties that were likely to be shouldered by the American public and other allies as a consequence of a full scale invasion of Japan.

Did you work on that issue? And were you able to reconcile some of the differing views?

Mr. LINENTHAL. On the *Enola Gay* exhibit?

Senator WARNER. Yes, on the casualty levels.

Mr. LINENTHAL. Yes. I will tell you how I feel about the casualty issue, which I think is a very regrettable controversy in this whole thing. It seems to me that the arguments over the number of casualties is close to obscene. That if the number of casualties would have been very low, an American president still would have been justified in deciding to use the bomb. It does not matter whether it is 10,000 or 800,000 or 350,000. These arguments became symbolic of the much larger struggle that was going on over the exhibit and the fact that there were historical correctives made and these numbers were seen to be very important by certain people,

I think this is not a happy story. I am quite comfortable myself believing that everybody knew that there would be casualties, that the casualties would be high, and a specific number was not terribly important. These casualty numbers, when we deal with these volatile historical issues, become icons in themselves.

When the great Holocaust historian Raul Hilberg lowered the figures slightly in his magisterial work in 1961, "The Destruction of the European Jews", from 6 million to I think he said 5.1

million, he was virtually called a Holocaust denier because he had challenged the sacred figure.

Chinese and Japanese are involved in bitter debates over the numbers of deaths in Nanking. I think there the Chinese say anything less than 300,000—

Senator WARNER. Without going into all that detail, there is no doubt that the potential casualties by the U.S. and our allies would have been very, very high.

Mr. LINENTHAL. [Nodding affirmatively.]

Senator WARNER. And it is no doubt that that invasion did not take place as a direct consequence of the utilization of this weapons system by President Truman.

Mr. LINENTHAL. Certainly one of the hot buttons in the exhibit were the historical controversy panels in section 200, I believe. And yet, even in the first script, if one looks at what the curators said in their ultimate judgment about these things, they basically say many historians believe that the primary judgment had to do with ending the war and saving lives, but that there were a number of subsidiary issues here as well.

I think that the casualty issue became one, again, in which veterans saw that the museum was trying to take away their story. And I do not think the museum meant to do that at all.

Senator WARNER. One other facet of this, we have in the Rotunda of the United States Capitol today, a flag symbolizing America's great concern for POW's. There was much written with regard to the potential destruction of those lives in those camps if that invasion had taken place. Did you do any research to verify that?

Mr. LINENTHAL. I have read accounts in oral histories of World War II about that, that a number of people in camps said that we were told or we knew that the minute the invasion took place we were going to die. So yes, I have read that, indeed.

Senator WARNER. I thank the witness and I thank the chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. As a footnote to history, I flew on the first plane into Peking after World War II and was there when the Doolittle flyers came out of their prison camp. I believe almost every one of them said to us if that bomb had not dropped, they would have been killed.

Mr. LINENTHAL. Senator Stevens, it has occurred to me, in response to one of your earlier questions about the veterans' voice in this exhibit. Everyone I have talked to who has seen the final film, which was a very short film about the men of the 509th talking about their own stories, that will now not be a part of the exhibit, has said it was an absolutely stunning and powerful film.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, I think it will be a part of the exhibit.

Mr. LINENTHAL. Not the old one, I understand. Perhaps I am mistaken. So that was one way that the museum did try certainly to include the veterans' voice.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Feinstein?

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I find this a very, very challenging discussion.

When I was the mayor of San Francisco, I had a small incident somewhat similar. This leads to the question. It was when we were building a convention center. A bust of my predecessor, who had been assassinated, was selected. It was done by a very famous contemporary sculptor by the name of Arneson. But the bust in itself had editorial comment. It had blood on it, "Twinkies defense," epithets, et cetera. A firestorm developed.

I grappled with that firestorm, and I elected to have the Art Commission remove the bust from the convention center with the view that it was appropriate for a private collection or a private museum, but this was a taxpayer supported convention center, and with it came some different values.

That is really what I want to talk to you about for a moment, Professor. It seems to me that where institutions get into these troubles is where there is opinion, interpretation, and editorial comment. You mentioned in your last statement, and I quote, "What the curator said, in his ultimate judgment."

My question to you is, is it really the role to interpret history, rather than just simply to put forward historical facts based on the validity of the fact and the historical value? It seems to me that I would look at a curator to determine historic value and validity of that value, but not to interpret, not for their editorial comment. It seems to me in public facilities we have to begin to grapple with that, because we are seeing more and more. Whether it is NEA moneys for a Mapplethorpe, or this situation, or my little situation back there, the public role of a museum is a different thing than the private role.

I wonder if you would comment on that?

Mr. LINENTHAL. Certainly. It is an interesting question and deals with a number of things, the role of history, the relation of fact and interpretation, curatorial responsibility and freedom.

First of all, Senator, I think there are certainly things that we could consider incontrovertible fact. That Paul Tibbets piloted the *Enola Gay* is an incontrovertible fact. When you begin to put any story into a narrative of any kind, you are already doing interpretation. Do you select a heroic narrative of the bomb? Do you select the tragic narrative?

At the Holocaust Museum, what narrative do you pick? Does it focus on the victim's stories? Does it focus on the process of extermination? There is already interpretive work going on. Any time you ask, I think, the meaning of events, you are already into the realm that all historians practice, and that is interpretive history.

The question is whether the Smithsonian is a university in which curators have the same kind of freedom, say that I do, to write a book? Whether there is a different kind of responsibility in a public exhibition funded by public monies. And perhaps there is a different kind of code. Yes, perhaps realistically that is the case. Perhaps in controversial historical exhibits, I think the curatorial voice is very important and there needs to be a scholarly freedom. Perhaps as part of the exhibits that are controversial, the history of the exhibit itself should become part of the exhibit so that various voices are represented.

Perhaps there needs to be a curatorial code of ethics. Now I do not think the curators did anything wrong in this exhibit. I think all of us on the advisory committee were insensitive to the nature of the 50th, to the passions that were held, and that is part of this. So that is one response to that. Curators, museums have responsibilities to the public the same way I, when I write my books, have responsibilities to the materials. All history is, in many ways, interpretive. It is put into a narrative, into a framework of meaning.

When you are working in a public museum, obviously you must be very sensitive to the inclusion of many voices in the creation of this.

Senator FEINSTEIN. But I think, you know I have seen history change. I was a history major. In the days when I studied history the text, for example, on American diplomatic history by a very famous professor by the name of T.A. Bailey, was essentially a recitation of fact, leaving the reader to draw their own analysis. Now what you see is a writer's interpretation of fact, which is different.

I think in a sense what happened with the *Enola Gay* was interpretation. People really reacted to that interpretation in a very violent way. I wonder about the wisdom in presenting any interpretation.

Mr. LINENTHAL. I understand. The example that I used in my presentation this morning, how do you present the V-2 in the National Air and Space Museum? You can either frame it, as the Air and Space Museum did, in a section on civilian space technology and talk about booster rockets and how it led to the evolution of booster rockets. Well, that is a way of talking about the V-2 that deals with certain kinds of facts.

The way the museum now displays it, which I think is eminently more responsible, is to put it into the context that the V-2 was a horrendous weapon used by Nazi's. That many more concentration camp prisoners died building it than died at the other end. Those are also facts about the V-2.

I also think, in response to several comments, that controversy over volatile stories is, in many ways, inevitable. We could easily memorialize and remember what we do not really care about. Could you create a U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum without a certain level of controversy because of the passionate

engagement? Was there a way to create an exhibit on the dropping of the atomic bomb and the end of the war without certain kinds of controversies? Probably not.

I suppose this is another issue, whether controversy is altogether a negative thing. I know that, Senator Stevens, you were a strong opponent of the "West as America" show, and I have, in the museum world, interesting friends some of whom detested the show, that it was preachy and tendentious and told people what they had to think now about these works, as opposed to how they were presented before; others who thought it was stimulating and important.

From my perspective, what was more important than either of those voices, was the very fruitful discussion that went on in the public about history, about the history of the American West, about how we are to look at it. That that, in a sense, was a kind of unintended, positive outcome of what was a very controversial museum exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you finished, Senator?

Senator FEINSTEIN. I am. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Ford, did you have another question?

Senator FORD. I just wanted to make a comment and follow up on my friend's question and the position she was in. It seems the professor now is writing a chapter as it relates to this controversy. Whoever reads it is going to have his interpretation of who the bad guys are and who the good guys are, who wore the black hats and who wore the white hats. I think I have got a pretty good idea from listening to your comments this morning who the white hats are going to be and who the black hats are going to be.

Your interpretation of this incident is going to be read by a lot of people, and they are going to believe it because it is the only one they have read. I understand what the distinguished Senator from California is saying. I could almost write it down on a piece of paper and put it in an envelope and seal it and, from your comments this morning, know what the outcome and your interpretation is going to be.

I hope I am wrong, but I do not think so. So I just want to let you know that is part of the problem that the distinguished Senator has brought out. You start interpreting what happened here from all the reading, and we have some information, you have other information. Maybe we both do not have the same information. So you write yours from yours, and we make our judgment from ours.

And you will not, in your chapter, talk about the information we have, and what our distinguished chairman relates, and his experience. Do not forget that you have a chairman here who has pretty good experience as it relates to this and understands it probably better than most.

We are all caught in a Catch 22, and the politician will get the blame. You will get a royalty, and I hope that it is controversial enough that you make a lot of money.

Mr. LINENTHAL. Senator, I would never claim, as a historian, to have the last word on anything. And I have always been interested——

Senator FORD. You will have the last word in that chapter. You might write another one. It is like Harry Truman said, he wanted a one-armed economist.

Mr. LINENTHAL. My job as a historian in this is certainly to make my own judgments about this event, but also to lay out what I see as the variety of issues that arose here, to help people understand the texture and the complexity of this issue. There is a difference between writing a history and an op-ed piece. I take that responsibility very seriously.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor, let me read you one comment from your statement today. "Museums, particularly public museums, have a responsibility to listen carefully to voices of various groups in the shaping of public exhibitions. But the integrity of the scholarly enterprise, be it in a book or a museum exhibit, that seeks a careful rendition of the past is threatened when any interest groups become an arbiter of public history."

I have two questions for you. One is, are you saying to us that public funds, taxpayers' money, could be used and ought to be used without any comment, by people who seek to be revisionists as far as the accepted view of history? And secondly—this is personal—I have a Japanese daughter-in-law and I have a grandson. I know that in her country they are teaching that in the history of World War II, we were, in fact, the aggressors. I am going to bring my grandson to this museum. I have taken all my children, and now I am going to start taking my grandchildren to this museum. I do not want my grandson to walk out of that museum and ask me why I was one who was the aggressor, and why did I try to kill Japanese babies.

Now, on what basis do you justify an interpretation of the history of this event so different from those of us who lived through it? On the basis of scholarly enterprise?

Mr. LINENTHAL. The way that I read even the first script, I never interpreted the first script in that way. It would never have occurred to me, in reading that first script, to look at Americans as aggressors. Of course, public museums have a responsibility to those who pay the bills. And those who pay the bills, I would hope, would trust those who are charged with creating public exhibitions with a certain level of professional expertise.

The CHAIRMAN. Wait a minute now. Let us get very specific. The statement in the script was "For most Americans it was a war of vengeance. For most Japanese, it was a war to defend their unique culture against Western imperialism."

Mr. LINENTHAL. Right.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you want my grandson to read that and look me in the eye and say Grandpa, why did you do that?

Mr. LINENTHAL. Can I speak to that issue?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. LINENTHAL. First of all, everyone recognized that that was a very clumsy and badly written label. It went out after the first script. And yet, for months and months thereafter, that phrase was used by the media to show what they called the pro-Japanese bias of the curators.

Now what I would like to do briefly, Senator, is to address each of those issues, because I think frankly, standing on their own, each one of those statements is not anywhere near—

The CHAIRMAN. I would like you to defend your own statement, that we should allow taxpayers' funds to be used to support a book or a museum exhibit on the basis of scholarly enterprise, despite the fact that it goes against the commonly accepted viewpoint as to the interpretation of the history of the event?

Mr. LINENTHAL. The question of—

The CHAIRMAN. That is what you are telling me in that statement, is it not?

Mr. LINENTHAL. History is always contested.

The CHAIRMAN. But you say in that statement that I should have stayed out of this, because scholarly judgment should rule in the use of public money, to support the exhibition if it is accepted by the people who have been selected to supervise this presentation from a scholarly point of view?

Mr. LINENTHAL. No, I do not think you needed to stay out of it at all. I think that there are ways—

The CHAIRMAN. But it gets around to that point of view, because that is what you are saying to us.

Mr. LINENTHAL. No, I think there are ways of being involved that may have asked, for example, the museum or the curators what was meant by this. Now that last statement, that this war was a war of vengeance and that the Japanese were defending themselves against Western imperialism and all of this, at the end of the war almost every public opinion poll cited said that roughly 13 percent of the American population wanted the Japanese exterminated as a race.

Was there not good reason, during the war, for a sense of righteous vengeance on the part of Americans for what had been done in Nanking, for Pearl Harbor, for the Bataan Death March, for the barbaric treatment of American prisoners of war? The beloved war correspondent Ernie Pyle, when he went to the Pacific Theater near the end of the war, said this is a very different war and we look upon this enemy in a very different way than we do in Europe. In Europe, we saw them as human beings, here we do not.

Now that is Ernie Pyle speaking and not me. Virtually every Pacific—

The CHAIRMAN. You fail to differentiate between the way we felt about the Japanese military and the way we felt about the Japanese people. That is an unfair interpretation of the history of my generation. We did not hate the Japanese. We do not hate the Japanese. We did hate the people who were conducting that war in such a brutal way. There is a distinction, I think, that veterans still feel today, in the way we feel about the former Japanese military and the way we feel about the Japanese people. And that poll reflected the way we felt about the Japanese military.

Mr. LINENTHAL. Well, all I can say, Senator, every Pacific war veteran that I have interviewed said to me that they understood this war as fundamentally different from the war in Europe. Edwin C. Bearss, a very respected historian, a Pacific war combat veteran who was a member of our advisory committee and someone I am proud to claim as a friend, for whom I worked at the 50th anniversary of Pearl Harbor, said to me you know, for all of us in the Pacific war, the war was to the knife, and the knife was to the hilt.

So what I am saying to you is that that phrase was meant to suggest that the war in the Pacific had a particular kind of anger and vengeance of the racist policies of the Japanese toward other Asians and toward Americans, with American views of the Japanese.

And the second part of that, that this was a war for the Japanese to defend themselves against American imperialism was a very clumsy way of the curators trying to say this is why the Japanese were fighting so ferociously and almost senselessly at the end of the war. Now put together in the way that it was, it could in fact have been read as an indictment. And everybody recognized that and said look, this is going to be misinterpreted, this is going to be read wrong. You have got to take it out. The curators understood it themselves.

That phrase went out after the first script and 6, 7, 8 months later that phrase was still being used by people to pillory the museum and the curators. That, I think, is unfair.

Yes, of course, you have a responsibility and an obligation to be involved. I would have hoped that the involvement of the public would have first have been to think perhaps about the volatility of these issues, these different narratives that the Smithsonian was trying to balance, the heroic and the tragic, and not immediately jump to accusing the curators as being anti-American. I think that was unfortunate.

The CHAIRMAN. Professor, that is what this hearing is about. The question has to be why is the Smithsonian, the pre-eminent depository of our history and the artifacts thereof, hiring someone who writes that first draft? You do not see it the way we do.

Mr. LINENTHAL. No, I do not.



The CHAIRMAN. The first draft was not scholarly, it was revisionist and did not belong in the Smithsonian to start with. And that has been admitted by the changes.

We will go on to the next witness. Thank you very much, sir.

Mr. LINENTHAL. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Now we are going to turn to Secretary Heyman, Dr. Crouch, and Ms. Newman, please. Do you swear the testimony you are about to give is the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help you God?

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes, sir.

Mr. CROUCH. Yes, sir.

Ms. NEWMAN. Yes, sir.

**TESTIMONY OF I. MICHAEL HEYMAN, SECRETARY,  
SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC, AC-  
COMPANIED BY CONSTANCE B. NEWMAN, UNDER SEC-  
RETARY, SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, AND THOMAS  
D. CROUCH, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR AERONAUTICS,  
NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE MUSEUM**

Mr. HEYMAN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am Michael Heyman, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, and I am accompanied by Constance Newman, who is the Under Secretary, and Thomas Crouch, who is the Assistant Director for Aeronautics of the National Air and Space Museum, and was involved with the *Enola Gay* exhibition. On the next panel, I will be joined by Dr. Maxine Singer, chair of the Commission on the Future of the Smithsonian Institution.

Before answering questions, I would like to make a few observations. As you know, I became Secretary of the Smithsonian on the 19th of September of 1994, so I have been there about 8 months. I began my tenure at a time of considerable controversy over the exhibition of the *Enola Gay*. I had some great concerns about and disagreement with the first script. In fact, it was not any secret to anyone because I commented in my installation address that our first script was deficient. I believed then, and I believe now, that too much of the context of the use of the atomic bomb was taken for granted, and that the proposed exhibition was out of balance, hence appearing to be historically inaccurate.

It was my view that in late October we had turned that corner. We benefitted by a long consultation with knowledgeable representatives of the American Legion, observations by other veterans organizations, and a substantial revamping by curatorial staff of the proposed exhibit that produced a much more balanced script. The revamped exhibit included a new 4,000 square foot section on the war in the Pacific, and extensive revisions to the script throughout. While these organizations did not endorse the exhibit, in part waiting for its finishing touches, they did not oppose it. Thus in January, I believed that we could

mount that exhibit. I was wrong. Shortly thereafter, a controversy once again erupted between the Smithsonian and the American Legion over the changing of one of the labels dealing with potential casualties. At that point, it became clear to me that we could not proceed, given renewed efforts to have the exhibition cancelled. I recognized that the problem was more than a question of balance and our efforts to achieve balance would not resolve the issue. The fundamental flaw, in my view, lay in the concept of the exhibition itself. The basic error was attempting to couple an historical dialogue centering on the use of atomic weapons with the 50th commemoration of the end of the war.

I have observed here today what I observed during this whole controversy, that people, especially those who were participants in the Second World War, remembered with vividness and with emotion their participation and their sacrifice, what happened to their lives in relationship to that. I think when you are dealing with a subject matter of this sort, where those who have in fact experienced have to be looked to, and you have to—if you are going to have a commemoration exhibition—you have to organize it consistently with those remembrances and those recollections. Moreover, in terms of the exhibition itself, as has been already testified, we could not escape the negative characterizations of the original script, which repetitively appeared in the media.

On January 30, I shared with the Board of Regents my decision to replace the *Enola Gay* exhibition. The central feature of the new exhibition, which is scheduled to open sometime in June or early July, will be a display permitting the *Enola Gay* and its crew to speak for themselves. In addition, it will contain materials on the history of the B-29 aircraft, and the restoration of the *Enola Gay* by the Smithsonian. It will include memorabilia from the 509th, and it will include a video of interviews with survivors of the 509th, which is not yet finished but ought to be finished in the next week and a half, or at least put into rough form so that I can take a look at it. I also announced that I would undertake a management review of the Air and Space Museum, paying particular attention to an examination of the museum's mission. That review is being conducted already by the National Academy of Public Administration, and those findings will come to us in September for consideration of the regents and the administration at the Smithsonian.

It is evident that I have to have, and I do have, concerns beyond the one controversial exhibit that we are talking about. The Institution has an obligation to be historically accurate and balanced in all of its exhibitions. We have an obligation to consider the opinions of the interested public in the framing of the exhibitions. To that end the Smithsonian needs to establish policies on exhibitions. We are doing that right now. We are developing guidelines that will establish appropriate

parameters within which museum directors and curators will collaborate on the choice and design of exhibitions, the processes for review and intervention, including a role for the Secretary's office, the extent to which historical exhibitions should speak within the context of the time, and ways to assure that our multiple audiences feel that their own ideas are being respected.

When I decided to replace the *Enola Gay* exhibition, I indicated that the Institution had much to learn from the experience. On April 19, the University of Michigan co-sponsored, with the Smithsonian, a day-long symposium entitled, "Presenting History: Museums in a Democratic Society." Participants included representatives from the historical community, veterans organizations, journalists and museum professionals. The purpose of the symposium was to examine issues surrounding controversial exhibitions. Discussions ranged from the evolution of the role of museums, and their responsibilities, including the differentiation potentially of the responsibilities of public museums and private museums, their responsibilities to various constituencies, and how to define controversy. These discussions, which we are summarizing right now, will help the Institution in putting together our guidelines.

I obviously have a number of regrets about this whole situation. One is that it has gotten in the way of the commemoration of our nation's victory over aggression 50 years ago. We at the Smithsonian did not want this controversy to overshadow the recognition that our veterans so richly deserve.

In that vein, we will be opening a display at the Museum of American History in June that focuses both on the war front and the home front during World War II. That museum has worked with the Center for Military History to design a unique exhibit where primary focus is to elicit memories and personal experiences from those who lived during the war years. In this way, the exhibit will become part of the history itself by capturing and preserving personal histories that otherwise might be lost to the ages.

In addition to that, there are other exhibits in American History and elsewhere, and other programs commemorative of the end of the Second World War.

I also regret that the *Enola Gay* controversy has led some to doubt the value of historical inquiry by museums. I believe that important artifacts of American history ought to be exhibited in historical context. I think that it makes them much more understandable. I think that great care has to be taken in the definition of that context and the reviewing process which I indicate is the manner in which to assure that that occurs.

Finally, an important point to be made is that in singling out a few examples of the Smithsonian's exhibitions and public programs, it is possible to draw a conclusion that does not reflect the fact that the Institution produces hundreds and hundreds of

exhibits and programs each year which are well received by the general public. Taken in their entirety, they provide a balanced and stimulating array of viewpoints on a myriad of subjects. More importantly, the Institution has great respect for its visitors and their abilities to appreciate the museum experience in their own way.

Dr. Crouch has a brief statement and I thought it best, with your permission, if he gave that statement and then we began to answer questions, if that is all right with you, Mr. Chairman.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Heyman follows:]

STATEMENT OF IRA MICHAEL HEYMAN, SECRETARY, THE SMITHSONIAN  
INSTITUTION

Good morning, Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee. I am Michael Heyman, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution. Today, I am accompanied by Constance B. Newman, Under Secretary, and Thomas Crouch, Assistant Director for Aeronautics, the National Air and Space Museum. On the next panel I will be joined by Dr. Maxine F. Singer, Chair of the Commission on the Future of the Smithsonian Institution.

Before answering your questions, let me make a few observations. As you know, I became Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution on the 19th of September of 1994. I began my tenure at a time of considerable controversy over the exhibiting of the *Enola Gay*. I had great concerns about and disagreement with the first script. In fact, this was no secret to anyone because I commented in my installation address that our first script was deficient. I believed then and I believe now that too much of the context for the use of the atomic bomb was taken for granted and that the proposed exhibition was out of balance, hence appearing to be historically inaccurate.

It was my view that a month later we had turned the corner regarding the controversy. Working throughout the summer and fall, the staff had substantially revamped the proposed exhibit, producing a fifth script that was more balanced. The revamped exhibit included a new 4,000-square foot section on the war in the Pacific and extensive revisions to the script throughout. I believed that we could mount that exhibit. I was wrong. Shortly thereafter, a controversy once again erupted between the Smithsonian Institution and The American Legion over one of the labels dealing with potential casualties. At that point, it became clear to me that we could not proceed given renewed efforts to have the exhibit cancelled. I recognized that the problem was more than a question of balance and our efforts to achieve balance would not resolve the issue. The fundamental flaw, in my view, lay in the concept of the exhibition itself. The basic error was attempting to couple an historical dialogue of the use of atomic weapons with the 50th commemoration of the end of the war. In this important anniversary year, veterans and their families were expecting, and rightly so, that the nation would honor and commemorate their valor and sacrifice. We did not give enough thought to the intense feelings surrounding such an event.

On January 30 of this year, I shared with the Board of Regents my decision to replace the *Enola Gay* exhibition. The central feature of the new exhibition, which is scheduled to open in June, will be a display, permitting the *Enola Gay* and its crew to speak for themselves. In addition, it will contain materials on the history of the B-29 aircraft and the restoration of the *Enola Gay* by the Smithsonian. I also announced that I would undertake a management review of the National Air and Space Museum, paying particular attention to an examination of the museum's mission. The review is being conducted by the National Academy of Public Administration. The Academy will present its findings by the end of September of this year.

I, however, have concerns beyond the one controversial exhibit at the National Air and Space Museum that is now a part of the public debate. The Institution has an obligation to be historically accurate and balanced in all of its exhibitions.

We have an obligation to consider the opinions of the interested public in the framing of the exhibitions. To that end, the Smithsonian needs to establish policies on Exhibitions. And we are doing just that. We are developing guidelines that will establish appropriate parameters within which museum directors and curators will collaborate on the choice and design of exhibitions; the processes for review and intervention, including a role for the Secretary's office; the extend to which historical exhibitions should speak within the context of the time; and ways to assure that our multiple audiences feel that their own ideas are being respected.

When I decided to replace the *Enola Gay* exhibition, I indicated that the Institution had much to learn from our experience. On April 19, the University of Michigan co-sponsored with the Smithsonian, a day-long symposium entitled, "Presenting History: Museums in a Democratic Society." Participants included representatives from veterans organizations, historians, journalists, and museum professionals. The purpose of the symposium was to examine issues surrounding controversial exhibitions. Discussions ranged from the evolution of the role of museums and their responsibilities to their various constituencies, to freedom of speech, and defining "controversy." Those discussions will help the Institution in its development of the guidelines.

On May 2, Dr. Martin Harwit, Director of the National Air and Space Museum, resigned believing that the welfare and future of the museum required that action. In his resignation announcement he noted that 3 months after the cancellation of that planned exhibition, the controversy still continued. He said:

I believe that nothing less than my stepping down from the directorship will satisfy the museum's critics and allow the museum to move forward with important new projects, such as the extension to be built at Washington's Dulles International Airport to provide better care for the collections.

I want to express my gratitude to Dr. Harwit for his contributions to the Smithsonian over the 8 years that he served as the Director of the National Air and Space Museum. That museum is the most visited museum in the nation with over 8 million visitors annually. During his tenure, Dr. Harwit most notably broadened the museum's agenda, especially in deepening research and exhibitions concerning scientific aspects of space and the cosmos.

I have a number of regrets about this situation. One is that it has gotten in the way of the commemoration of our Nation's victory over aggression 50 years ago. We at the Smithsonian do not want this controversy to overshadow the recognition that our veterans so richly deserve.

In that vein we will be opening a display at the Museum of American History in June that focuses both on the warfront and homefront during World War II. The NMAH has worked with the Center for Military History to design a unique exhibit where primary focus is to elicit memories and personal experiences from those who lived during the war years. In this way, this exhibit will become part of the history itself by capturing and preserving personal histories that otherwise might be lost to the ages.

I also regret that the *Enola Gay* controversy has led some to doubt the value of historical inquiry by museums. I believe that important artifacts of American history ought to be exhibited in an historical context. I believe that is what the American public expects of this great national institution and they deserve no less.

Finally, an important point to be made is that in singling out just a few examples of the Smithsonian's exhibitions and public programs, it is possible to draw a conclusion that does not reflect the fact that the Institution produces hundreds upon hundreds of exhibits and programs each year which are well received by the general public. Taken in their entirety, they provide a balanced and stimulating array of viewpoints on a myriad of subjects. More importantly, the Institution has great respect for its visitors and their abilities to appreciate the museum experience in their own way.

Dr. Crouch has a brief opening statement. Then we are prepared to answer your questions on the exhibition.

Senator FORD. Mr. Chairman, if I understand, the Secretary's statement is broken down into two phases, with a first panel and a second panel. Now we are not going to have the testimony that way, as I understand. We are just going to have testimony on *Enola Gay* and then we are going to have—then they are going to come back? We have kind of jockeyed back and forth. I have some questions and I did not want to lose you.

Mr. HEYMAN. No, I will be on that second panel also. So long as I can make a 2:50 plane to San Francisco where I have to give a speech tonight if that is at all possible. Or would you prefer to have questions first—

The CHAIRMAN. As long as you are prepared to come back next week, Doctor.

Mr. HEYMAN. No, I am prepared to stay here for a good period of time. I just wanted you to know—

The CHAIRMAN. We have other things scheduled, too. That is all right, we will proceed with Dr. Crouch if that is your desire.

Mr. HEYMAN. Then I thought we would both answer questions.

The CHAIRMAN. I intend to continue this until we get answers to our questions and until we get some understanding of what the management situation is at the Smithsonian. If you wish to have Dr. Crouch testify now, Dr. Crouch, we will listen to you.

#### TESTIMONY OF THOMAS D. CROUCH, ASSISTANT DIRECTOR FOR AERONAUTICS, NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE MUSEUM

Mr. CROUCH. Thank you, Senator. I am grateful for this opportunity to discuss matters related to the exhibition that was to be entitled, "The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II." Those of us who were involved with that project hoped to tell the story of the *Enola Gay* and the bomb that it carried in a full, honest, balanced fashion. We sought to explore a moment in time, a turning point in the history of our world, an event that ended one era and inaugurated another. At the very least, we were guilty of having failed to understand the depth and intensity of American attitudes toward Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To all of those who have been hurt or angered by this controversy, I apologize for that misjudgment.

The committee has asked me to clarify the roles and the responsibilities of the individuals involved in developing the content of the exhibition. As head of the department of aeronautics, I supervised the work of the curatorial team. Michael Neufeld, the lead curator, reported to me and supervised the two curatorial assistants assigned to the project. I reported to Martin Harwit, director of the National Air and Space Museum who established the general direction of the project and approved the various documents produced by the curators.

I certainly acknowledge that the first draft of the script completed in January 1994 was imperfect. It was short on context, although not so short I think as some of the critics have suggested. The Rape of Nanking and other Japanese atrocities against Asian people, the Japanese reliance on slave labor, and their brutal treatment of prisoners-of-war, Pearl Harbor, biological experiments on human subjects were all noted in the script. The fanaticism of Japanese troops, their preference for death rather than surrender, the kamikaze campaign, and rising Allied casualties in the Pacific in 1944 and 1945 were focal points of the first unit.

Still, it is clear that we should have provided much fuller coverage of those subjects and underscored the roots of Japanese militarism and imperialism.

In addition, the introductory unit and some other sections of the scripts contained a number of sentences that became genuine hot buttons. Believe me, I wish they had never seen the light of day. Those sentences were removed from the script at the time of the first review.

I would ask the committee to recognize the fact that the script was genuinely a first draft subject to a process of careful revision that began with the appointment of an extraordinarily strong advisory committee. That group included Pulitzer Prize winning authors. It included an ex-president of the American Historical Association. It included some of the leading scholars in the field; individuals who had spent their lives studying the topic.

We also wanted to ensure that a variety of points of view would be represented on the advisory committee. Richard Hallion, chief historian of the Air Force and his deputy would speak for the Air Force. Dr. Ed Bearss, a distinguished military historian, wounded veteran of the war in the Pacific, and chief historian of the Park Service was also represented on the panel. Ed Linenthal, who had worked closely with the Park Service, the Holocaust Museum, and other organizations seeking to understand the nature of commemoration was present for the same reason. We were honestly confident that this group could assist us in developing an accurate script, and also help us to understand how it might be received by a wide range of visitors.

While the group offered useful suggestions for improving the draft script, they were also very generous in their praise of the document. The comments of Harvard professor Akira Iriye, ex-president of the American Historical Association are typical. "I do think that you and your colleagues have been subject to unfair criticism. The script as originally drafted was an excellent one reflecting current historical scholarship. I applaud your valiant effort to present an informative, balanced story of the atomic bombing."

Ed Bearss, historian of the Park Service concurred with that judgment. "As a World War II combat veteran I commend you

and your colleagues." And so on and so forth. I will not read all of the quotes here. They are in the written testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. You are not reading your whole statement. Do you want it to appear in the record as you presented it or as you are reading it?

Mr. CROUCH. As presented, Senator. I am cutting it down because of the length of time. I do not want to try the committee's patience.

In spite of the work of the advisory committee, as early as 1993 leaders of the Air Force Association had registered strong opposition to the draft proposal describing the exhibition. This is before the script was issued. The group received a copy of the script at the same time that it went out to the advisory committee along with a request for comment and an invitation to discuss concerns and participate in the process of revision. The Air Force Association published the first of a series of critical articles in the April 1994 issue of *Air Force Magazine* that in one way or another I think represented the beginning of the deep controversy at any rate.

Determined to respond to the criticism in an open and positive way, the museum turned to the Pentagon-based World War II Commemorative Committee which assisted us in obtaining the advice and comment of historians employed by the military services. In addition to those efforts, Dr. Harwit created a Tiger Team, the six members of which were asked to identify any signs of imbalance in the script.

The new script issued in June 1994 incorporated a very high percentage of the changes suggested by all of the group which had read the document to date. Some of the leading military historians and several members of the Tiger Team expressed satisfaction with the new version. Dr. Alfred Goldberg, the historian of the Office of Secretary of Defense remarked, "My overall impression of the *Enola Gay* script was favorable. It shows evidence of careful research and an effort to realize a balanced presentation."

But the new script did not satisfy the most vocal critics. In mid-July a veterans review committee composed of representatives of the Air Force Association and leading U.S. veterans organizations was invited to give the script an additional review. From mid-summer to the end of the year continued discussions with all of these organizations led to a steady stream of additional script changes.

The Smithsonian now attempted to regain control of the situation. A large introductory unit very much expanded our coverage of the Pacific war, which had been growing at any rate through the earlier script modifications. The videotape recollections of atomic mission crew members, originally intended to appear inside the gallery, was moved to a theater at the exit where it would draw more attention.



Finally, the under secretary of the Institution and the director of the museum invited leaders of the American Legion to sit down with those of us on the exhibition team and work our way through the script. That effort produced the final version, as you know, which some critics regarded as acceptable. But it did not resolve the controversy. As a result, Secretary Heyman cancelled the original project in January.

Most of our critics, obviously, blame the failure of the project on the deficiencies of the original script. As I have acknowledged, the first draft was imperfect and I am sorry for that. I would remind you, however, that that document had the support of the members of the distinguished advisory committee and a substantial number of other authorities in the field. The revised script issued in June attracted even broader support. I believe that the very positive comments of leading scholars refutes the charge that early versions were bad history.

Criticism of the script has centered on the question of balance. Those of us who developed the exhibit certainly believe that the experience of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is an essential element in the whole telling of the story. I think most of our critics agree with that point of view. Moreover, all of us can certainly agree that the atomic bombing of Japan has to be understood within the context of the justice of the Allied cause and the incredible heroism of those who fought and died to push the forces of Japanese tyranny back across the Pacific.

Professor John Dower of MIT expressed the hopes and the intentions of the curatorial team when he commented that, "The original script had a great potential to convey a larger dimension of tragic ambiguity without denying the bravery of individual American fighting men or the worthiness of the fight against Japan. It would have been an immense challenge to pull this off, but I thought the first script gave every promise of doing so."

Our critics took issue with the ambiguity to which Professor Dower refers. While the exhibit was never intended to attack the justification for the use of the bomb, for example, it did suggest that the decision had been the subject of considerable study and analysis over the past half-century. Most of all, I think, we failed to appreciate the deep and powerful links that bind memory of the bomb to the incredible sense of joy and relief at the end of the war. As individuals and as an institution, those of us at the museum have paid a high price for that misjudgment.

In closing, I simply want to assure you that I remain committed to the mission of the National Air and Space Museum and to the mandate of the Smithsonian to increase and diffuse knowledge. I appreciate the opportunity to appear today and will do my best to answer any questions the committee may have.

Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Crouch follows:]

STATEMENT OF TOM D. CROUCH, CHAIRMAN, DEPARTMENT OF  
AERONAUTICS, NATIONAL AIR AND SPACE MUSEUM

I am grateful for this opportunity to discuss matters related to the exhibition that was to be entitled, "The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of WW II." We hoped to tell the story of the *Enola Gay* and the bomb that it carried in a full, honest, and balanced fashion. We sought to explore a moment in time; a turning point in the history of our world; an event that ended one era and inaugurated another. At the very least, we were guilty of having failed to understand the depth and intensity of American attitudes toward Hiroshima and Nagasaki. To all of those who have been hurt or angered by this controversy, I apologize for that misjudgment.

The Committee has asked me to clarify the roles and responsibilities of the individuals involved in developing the content of the exhibition. As head of the Department of Aeronautics, I supervised the work of the curatorial team. Michael Neufeld, the lead curator, reported to me, and supervised the two curatorial assistants assigned to the project. I reported to Martin Harwit, Director of the National Air and Space Museum, who established the general direction of the project, and approved the various documents produced by the curators.

The first draft of the exhibition script, completed in January 1994, was produced by the four members of the curatorial team. I was the primary author of one of the five units of the document. Dr. Neufeld prepared two of the units. The other two units of the script were the product of joint effort. As curator of the exhibition, Dr. Neufeld edited all of this material into a coherent document.

I certainly acknowledge that the first draft, completed in January 1995, was imperfect. It was short on context, although not as short as some of our critics have suggested. The Rape of Nanking and other Japanese atrocities committed against Asian peoples, the Japanese reliance on slave labor and their brutal treatment of prisoners of war, Pearl Harbor and biological experiments on human subjects were all noted in the script. The fanaticism of Japanese troops, their preference for death rather than surrender, the Kamikaze campaign, and rising Allied casualties in the Pacific in 1944 and 1945 were focal points of the first unit. Still, I acknowledge that we should have underscored and provided fuller coverage of the roots and earlier phases of the struggle to defeat Japanese militarism.

In addition, the introductory unit contained two "hot button" sentences that I wish had never seen the light of day. "For most Americans, this war was fundamentally different than the one waged against Germany and Italy—it was a war of vengeance. For most Japanese, it was a war to defend their unique culture..."

While both nations had other goals, surely Americans were justifiably determined to avenge Pearl Harbor and the Bataan Death March, and the Japanese, facing defeat in 1945, were determined to protect what they regarded as their unique culture. Moreover, those two sentences appeared in a label calling attention to the "naked aggression and extreme brutality of Japanese expansionism." Still, they were very clumsy and did not express the thought intended. We removed them from the script immediately after the first review.

The script was a first draft, subject to a process of careful revision that began with the appointment of an extraordinarily strong advisory committee. That group included Akira Iriye, Richard Rhodes, Martin Sherwin, Stan Goldberg, Barton Bernstein and other leading scholars in the field.

We also wanted to insure that a variety of points of view would be represented. Richard Hallion, Chief Historian of the USAF, and his deputy, Herman Wolk, would speak for the Air Force; Ed Bearss, a distinguished military historian and a wounded veteran of the War in the Pacific, had, as chief historian of the National Park Service, handled veterans complaints regarding programs at Pearl Harbor; Ed Linenthal has worked closely with the Park Service, the Holocaust Museum and other organizations seeking to understand the nature of commemoration. We were confident that this group could assist us in developing an accurate script, and also help us to understand how it might be received by a wide range of visitors.

While the group offered useful suggestions for improving the draft script, they were also very generous in their praise of the document. The comments of Harvard Professor Akira Iriye, an ex-president of the American Historical Association, one of our most distinguished students of the Pacific War, and a leading member of the advisory committee, are typical.

I do think that you and your colleagues have been subject to unfair criticism. The script as originally drafted was an excellent one reflecting the current historical scholarship. I . . . applaud your valiant effort to present an informative, balanced story of the atomic bombing.

Ed Bearss, Chief Historian of the National Park Service, concurred with that judgement.

As a World War II combat veteran, I commend you and your colleagues who have dared to go that extra mile to address an . . . internationally significant event in an exhibit that, besides being enlightening, will challenge its viewers . . . The superior quality of the label texts and of the objects and illustrations. . . sets a pattern that all aspire to but few achieve.

Professor Barton Bernstein of Stanford University regarded the script as: ". . . fair, balanced, and historically informed," noting that it "reflected current scholarship on the war, the bombing and the use of the atomic bombs. . . ." Stanley Goldberg has called attention to "the unanimous agreement at the advisory board meeting that the initial approach of the curators was sound," and congratulated members of the team on "a careful and professional job." A great many other scholars who were not initially involved in the project have also expressed their support for the early drafts.

As early as November 1993, however, leaders of the Air Force Association (the AFA) had registered strong opposition to a draft proposal describing the exhibition. The group received a copy of the script at the same time that it went out to the advisory committee, along with a request for comment and an invitation to discuss their concerns and participate in the process of revision. The AFA replied in April 1994 with the first of several critical articles in Air Force magazine.

Determined to respond to the criticism in an open and positive way, the museum turned to the Pentagon-based World War II Commemorative Committee, which assisted us in obtaining advice and comment from historians employed by the military services. In addition to these efforts, Dr. Harwit created a "Tiger Team," the six members of which were asked to identify "any signs of imbalance" in the script.

A new script issued in June 1994 incorporated a very high percentage of the changes suggested by all of the groups which had read the document to date. Some of the leading military historians and several members of the "Tiger Team" expressed satisfaction with the new version. Dr. Alfred Goldberg, the historian of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, remarked: "My overall impression of the Enola Gay script is favorable. It shows evidence of careful research and an effort to realize a balanced presentation. . . ."

But the new script did not placate the most vocal critics. In mid-July a Veterans Review Committee, composed of representatives of the AFA and leading U.S. veterans organizations, was invited to give the script an additional review. From mid-summer to the end of the year, continued discussions with all of these organizations led to a steady stream of additional script changes.

The Smithsonian now attempted to regain control of the situation. A large introductory unit expanded our coverage of the Pacific War. The video-taped recollections of atomic mission crew members, originally intended to appear inside the gallery, was moved to a theater at the exit where it would draw more attention. Finally, the Undersecretary of the Smithsonian and the Director of museum invited leaders of the American Legion to sit down with members of the exhibition team and work their way through the script. That effort produced a final version of the script which some critics regarded as acceptable, but it did not resolve the controversy. As a result, Secretary Heyman cancelled the original project in January 1995.

Most of our critics blame the failure of the project on the deficiencies of the original draft script. As I have acknowledged, the first draft was imperfect. I

would remind you, however, that the document had the support of most of the members of a distinguished advisory committee and a substantial number of other authorities in the field. The revised script issued in June attracted even broader support. I believe that the very positive comments of leading scholars refutes the charge that the early versions of the script were "bad history."

Criticism of the script has centered on the question of balance. Those of us who developed the exhibition believe that the experience of the people of Hiroshima and Nagasaki is an essential element of any full telling of this story. I think most of our critics agree with that point of view. Moreover, all of us agree that the atomic bombing of Japan must be understood within the context of the justice of the Allied cause, and the incredible heroism of those who fought, and died, to push the forces of Japanese tyranny back across the Pacific.

Professor John Dower of MIT expressed the hopes and intentions of the curatorial team when he commented that: "the original script had a great potential to convey . . . [a] larger dimension of tragic ambiguity . . . without denying the bravery of individual American fighting men, or the worthiness of the fight against Japan. It would have been an immense challenge to pull this off, but I thought the first script gave every promise of doing so."

Our critics took issue with the ambiguity to which Professor Dower refers. While the exhibition was never intended to attack the justification for the use of the atomic bomb, it did suggest that the decision has been the subject of considerable study and analysis over the past half-century. Moreover, we failed to appreciate the deep and powerful links that bind memory of the bomb to the incredible sense of joy and relief at the end of the war. As individuals and as an institution, those of us at the museum have paid a high price for that misjudgment.

In closing, I want to assure you that I remain committed to the mission of the National Air and Space Museum, and to the mandate of the Smithsonian Institution to increase and diffuse knowledge. I appreciate the opportunity to appear today, and will do my best to answer any questions that the Committee may have. Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.

Secretary Heyman, I want you to know we recognize that you came into this matter after it started and if you want to defer to others to answer questions, we would be happy to have you do that. I will try to limit mine on the first round here, but I do have a series of questions I want to get answers to, if we can.

Does the Smithsonian intend now to display the *Enola Gay* on a permanent basis anywhere after the scaled-down exhibit is over?

Mr. HEYMAN. We certainly intend to exhibit it, sir, when we have a place to exhibit it. We cannot put it in the Air and Space Museum because it is too big. So the intention has been to exhibit it at Dulles as the extension begins to be built out.

The CHAIRMAN. There are members of the groups that have criticized the Smithsonian who have urged that you place it on display at another prominent area. There are several prominent areas for display of artifacts of the air war of World War II. Have you considered doing that?

Mr. HEYMAN. My view about that is that when we take this exhibit down, if there is an opportunity to lend the *Enola Gay* to another place and we can work out the expenditures for getting it there and getting it back and its maintenance, we would certainly take quite seriously a request for it to be lent and exhibited elsewhere.

The CHAIRMAN. Then you would be receptive to a request from these organizations that it be displayed just as an artifact somewhere in the country?

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes, sir. But we would like to retain ownership of it for its eventual display as part of our collection.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you envision someday the museum would be large enough to hold that as a permanent exhibit?

Mr. HEYMAN. I think if we build out what we intend to build out at Dulles, the extension of the Air and Space Museum, we will have the requisite room. That is the plan.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not really view the Dulles site and facility as being very accessible to many people. But that is another question; we will deal with that later.

In your letter to Congressman Johnson you stated that you were conducting an examination of how the exhibits are framed philosophically at the outset. Could you tell us the status of that examination?

Mr. HEYMAN. What I am trying to put together is a procedure so that prospective exhibitions are quite well reviewed. The first step in that, in my view, is for those within a museum to deal with, to be consulted on, to discuss fully the plan of any curator or curators for an exhibition, to look at what the purpose is, to get a full explication of how it is supposed to work, and to start to make judgments with regard to whether or not it is framed properly in order to be accurate and full and balanced.

Let me give you an example. My biggest problem with the first script of the *Enola Gay* is how it was framed. It was an inquiry into the use of atomic weapons with a sidebar, a secondary look at the *Enola Gay* and the use of the atomic weapons in ending the Second World War. I think that, at least now that I have become more sophisticated about this, if I had been involved at all at the outset, and if I had thought about it very hard, I think I could begin to predict some of the problems that would arise if that is the way an exhibit was to be framed to be held at the time that it was.

I want the museums in the first instance to really take that seriously. I want to be put on notice whenever an exhibit is begun to be discussed which could be a controversial exhibition in the terms that we are talking about or perhaps other ones. Then secondly, I want those procedures to state quite clearly that—and we are talking about historical exhibitions here basically—that not only should we be putting together an historian's committee to assure accuracy, but that if there are special groups that are specially affected by an exhibition, that they are consulted meaningfully too, and early enough so that that consultation affects the design of the exhibition.

I want to put those in writing. We are getting close to being able to do that. I want an elaboration of them from each of the museums. I want accountability with regard to whether or not they are being followed. And I want to be informed personally,

and certainly persons other than me who are on staff in the Secretary's office, with regard to whether there are exhibitions contemplated that raise special problems of this sort. I want to know about that early in the game.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the status of this examination to find out how the exhibits are framed philosophically at the outset?

Mr. HEYMAN. I do not know if philosophically is the right word, but I really mean—

The CHAIRMAN. It is not my word; it is yours.

Mr. HEYMAN. What I mean by that is, how—I gave the example for the *Enola Gay*. I would like to know what the purpose and the story line of the exhibition is, and I would like explicit conversation about that at the outset.

The CHAIRMAN. You also said that you are satisfied there has been no fundamental effort at the Air and Space Museum, or any Smithsonian museum, to do exhibitions only of the newer sort. What is the "newer sort"?

Mr. HEYMAN. I think that was the discussion Senator Feinstein was having. Let me just give this as a little bit of—

The CHAIRMAN. Is it what we would call revisionist—

Mr. HEYMAN. No.

The CHAIRMAN. —or politically correct? What is "newer sort"?

Mr. HEYMAN. "Newer sort" is—let me start this way. Historically, at least in my view, what our museums and museums in general have done is to show objects. And they have shown objects with not a lot of signage. It has essentially been, you look at the object. You get a little bit of an idea what it is. You bring to that object and you understand that object in relationship to seeing it.

The newer sort is what is occurring now in a lot of museums around the country where in historical exhibitions we are beginning to write books on the wall. We are beginning to have so much signage that it overwhelms, at least in my view—and this is a lively argument—but it overwhelms the objects that are the centerpieces of the exhibition. That is the tendency. That is the trend.

I have some problems, all aside of what the messages are, whether or not exhibitions that are primarily made up of an awful lot of text that is put up on the wall are very effective exhibitions with respect to visitors.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you looked into the question of copyright? Does the Smithsonian have the copyright to scripts that are prepared by people you hire with Federal money?

Mr. HEYMAN. I believe we do.

The CHAIRMAN. That it not my understanding. It is my understanding that the work of Federal employees under your control is not copyrightable; that under the authority of the Smithsonian there is no copyright protection for scripts that are written for the Government.

Ms. NEWMAN. I will have to get the general counsel's ruling on that, but my understanding is——

The CHAIRMAN. Respectfully, Ms. Newman, I do not want your legal opinion. I want to know what you have been doing. Are these scripts copyrighted?

Ms. NEWMAN. Yes, some of them are.

The CHAIRMAN. When?

Ms. NEWMAN. At what point in time?

The CHAIRMAN. At what point in time do they become Federal property with copyright protection?

Ms. NEWMAN. At the point that the script is final and the exhibit is going on the wall.

The CHAIRMAN. They are copyrighted then?

Ms. NEWMAN. But it varies. I know, Mr. Chairman, that you do not want me to talk to the general counsel about this, but the reason I——

The CHAIRMAN. No, I just do not want another opinion. I want to see what has been done. I am told it has not been done.

Ms. NEWMAN. What I have to do is—frankly, there are some issues before the courts now that affect this question of yours and I do not want to put us in an awkward position with regard to our issues before the court. So I would like, respectfully——

The CHAIRMAN. I respect that. But we have been told that you have copyrighted these, and there is a serious question here as to protection of public property.

Ms. NEWMAN. May I explain? What has happened is a number have gone into texts that are published by the press. Some of the scripts have gone into texts published by the press in catalogs, and that is copyrighted.

The CHAIRMAN. I believe that you should get an opinion of your counsel. I think your law is not adequate to give us the protection we should have for scripts prepared at public expense under your jurisdiction. Because of the unique status of the Smithsonian, I am told that you have not sought copyright protection in some instances, and that is one of the things we should look into while we are looking into the management concepts of the Smithsonian.

Mr. Secretary, you appointed Mr. Hoffman, the acting provost, as the temporary director of the Air and Space Museum. Did you discuss this exhibit with Mr. Hoffman in connection with that appointment?

Mr. HEYMAN. The *Enola Gay* exhibit, sir?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. HEYMAN. We have been so close for the 8 months that I have been here, we have discussed the *Enola Gay* exhibit a lot of times. So I did not have a special conversation with him at the time I appointed him as the temporary director.

The CHAIRMAN. What role did the Air and Space Museum advisory board have in the preparation or review of these

scripts? I am told there are 10 members of that; 3 appointed by the President.

Mr. HEYMAN. I do not think much of a role, sir. I met with the advisory committee this past week. As a matter of fact, I asked them and they will take a preliminary look at the exhibition that I am in charge of, the new *Enola Gay* exhibition. But I know they discussed the *Enola Gay* exhibition at their last meeting. They only have historically met once a year. But I do not think they went through the script in any detail.

The CHAIRMAN. What is the role of this advisory group? Were they consulted, Dr. Crouch, at the beginning of this exhibit?

Mr. CROUCH. Yes, Senator. There were repeated discussions of the exhibition at advisory committee meetings over a period of at least 2 years.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there any record of their expression of views?

Mr. CROUCH. Yes, Senator. In the minutes of the advisory committee.

Mr. HEYMAN. Are you speaking of the statutory advisory committee?

Mr. CROUCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. On that group was Lieutenant General William Forester, who is military deputy assistant to the Secretary of the Army, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, the deputy chief of staff for aviation, Rear Admiral William C. Donnell, Rear Admiral Brent Binnett, General John Daly. Were they consulted at the beginning of this exhibit?

Mr. CROUCH. Yes, sir. The plans for the exhibition were discussed at meetings of the mandatory advisory committee.

The CHAIRMAN. They saw the script in the beginning?

Mr. CROUCH. I do not believe so, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. That is what we are getting at in terms of management. At what point do the advisors who are appointed to try and protect you against this kind of controversy come into this process, Doctor?

Mr. HEYMAN. If you had been at the meeting that I had with the advisory committee this week, which obviously you would not, I told them that I really looked forward to a rather deep, consultative relationship between that advisory committee and NASM, and we are going to do that.

The CHAIRMAN. You have a series of directives, regulations, et cetera. Is there any sort of directive to those who are managing the Air and Space Museum that they shall consult with these advisors before they undertake matters of public controversy?

Mr. HEYMAN. I do not know, but the under secretary says that we do not have stated policies that directly give that directive.

The CHAIRMAN. I think that it is unfortunate, when you have high-caliber public members such as Mr. Thomas Hall, Susan Woo, and several others, who are there in order to give advice to the museum to prevent the kind of controversy that developed,



and they are not involved. I urge you to discuss it and give us some response on how the advisory committee is going to be used. If it is not going to be used, maybe we should abolish it. But the real problem is that they were not used.

Now tell me this. I am sure you heard the comments that were made last week by the veterans organizations. What percent of the Air and Space budget has been spent on actual restoration of aircraft or aerospace vehicles over the past 3 years? Do you have any idea?

Ms. NEWMAN. I would have to submit that for the record. There was \$1 million spent on the restoration of the *Enola Gay*. But if you are asking for all of the dollars spent on restoration, I would have to submit that for one other reason. Some of the restoration is done by third parties. We get the aircraft to them and they expend their resources. So I would have to split it out for you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Tell me this, any one of you who wants to answer—In a period when we are trying to celebrate the history and the contributions to the preservation of our democracy made by those who lost their lives in World War II—those of us who served do not feel we require any recognition. We survived. We are trying to remember those who gave their lives—Why do we have a Barbie doll exhibit in the Air and Space Museum instead of exhibits commemorating those who gave their lives? What is the Barbie doll doing there in the first place?

Mr. CROUCH. The curator would have to answer that question directly, Senator. When it comes to exhibitions of this sort at the museum, a curator proposes an idea for a project. That proposal is discussed at an exhibition committee meeting which includes the leading managers of the museum. Decisions are made and passed on as advice to the director.

The Barbie doll exhibit is a very small case exhibit. I would call your attention too to the fact that 1 week ago tonight we had a marvelous Charles Lindbergh memorial lecture commemorating victory in Europe, particularly those who participated in the air war in Europe. We filled the Langley Theater in the museum, in fact to overflowing. We had to move in extra seats.

I think if you look at the record of our museum over the past years in terms of exhibitions—

The CHAIRMAN. Doctor, if you do not see the difference between having a Lindbergh lecture in a theater and a permanent exhibit proposed on the *Enola Gay* which would portray us as the aggressors, I do not think we are going to get very far in this hearing.

Mr. CROUCH. Our next exhibition, I would point out, Senator, is the F6F Hellcat, a World War II Navy fighter.

Mr. HEYMAN. Senator, on the Barbie dolls. I do remember a little bit about it. It is two small cases. It is temporary. It is about \$6,000 that was paid by outside sources, or most of it was. The

notion was to have something there that got young people's attention. Largely what it is, by looking at the dolls—I am told, although I have not seen it—you can see an evolution of the role of women in aviation and aeronautics simply by the way that Barbie dolls were clothed over a 20-year period. It is not a very central exhibition, but it seems to—but that is its intention.

The CHAIRMAN. I am going to have to yield in a minute. But let me ask, Doctor, what is the exhibit, "Beyond the Limits"? What is that exhibit?

Mr. CROUCH. It is an exhibition that has to do with computers, electronics, avionics, Senator, in modern aviation; the way in which they have revolutionized flight technology.

The CHAIRMAN. You sought and obtained four contributions from Japanese interests and Japanese nationals to put that in our national museum. Why?

Mr. CROUCH. It was not my exhibition, Senator. I could not respond to that question.

The CHAIRMAN. I would like to know. I will have some other questions later. I will yield to my colleagues. I do want you to know, Dr. Crouch, that those of us who lived through World War II have great admiration for Lindbergh's accomplishment in flying across the Atlantic; but we have no regard whatsoever for his position as a collaborator with our enemies during World War II.

Senator?

Senator FORD. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Doctor, I want to bridge over here just a little bit. I want you to look at me as a friendly enemy because I do not want to do anything to downgrade the Smithsonian because it is too valuable. The only thing I want to do here is to help you improve it. So not being a professional, I come as a member of the jury. It appears that you, sir, recognize the direction of the *Enola Gay* exhibit was inappropriate from the start, and perhaps in hindsight you agree that the exhibit did not reflect the experience of those who lived in this history.

I understand, Doctor, that the Museum of American History will display an exhibit this summer to commemorate the end of the war. What assurance can you give this committee and the public that the American History Museum exhibit has been developed differently so as to avoid the problems we faced in this one? And have you applied your new procedures to this exhibit?

Mr. HEYMAN. I have read the script, Senator Ford, and I am satisfied with it.

Senator FORD. How did you apply your new procedures to it?

Mr. HEYMAN. These procedures are being formulated presently. Certainly in the interim I am asking if we are going to have an exhibit in an area that might be controversial that the script of it be shared with me. This was and I have—it is a relatively short script. I have read it and I think it is quite good.

Senator FORD. This could be another sensitive thing and I want to be sure that we are going in the right direction.

Mr. HEYMAN. I do not think you will find it is. It is one that really has paintings and objects that really evoke memories. It does not tell stories. It really is very object-based and not one in which there are a lot of wallboard labels.

Senator FORD. Doctor, let me step into your next panel if I may for minute. I apologize for having to do that but I am an hour late to where I was supposed to go. You mentioned trends a while ago as it related to history and that sort of thing — trends. I did not know we had any "trends" in history, unless it was the improvement of knowledge or additional facts that would be added on, not interpretation. But you mentioned the word "trends" and that bothered me a little bit, whether it is politically correct or not or whatever.

Now the study of NAPA that you referred to in your statement, was that in process before you came on board?

Mr. HEYMAN. No, sir, that was instituted after I came aboard.

Senator FORD. That is just the Aeronautics and Space Museum and not anything else?

Mr. HEYMAN. That is correct.

Senator FORD. I read in here that during the tenure of Dr. Harwit he most notably broadened the museum's agenda, especially in deepening research and exhibitions concerning scientific aspects of the space and the cosmos. Now also you say in here, that the Smithsonian's usefulness to our citizens should not be about that one class visit in the 10th grade. Without taking on the impossible, we must be about carrying our mission across the country. We must find ways to deliver to the American people, wherever they live, the wonders of the institution they have supported for over one and a half centuries.

Now I am troubled. I am troubled because of the Barbie doll exhibit. I do not know if they are all dressed up in aviation uniforms and all that, but the Barbie doll, we have to get that straightened out. Communication is probably the hardest thing we have to do. You have an art section and you have a batik cloth exhibit with abstract paint; is that correct, Dr. Crouch? I saw you inhale real quick. Is that correct?

Mr. CROUCH. We did, Senator, have an exhibition batiks created by artist Mary Edna Frazier. They are based on aerial photography. The artist is a pilot who makes use of those images——

Senator FORD. You tell me that it looks like, and I am not a professional. If you have a stream and some trees behind it, I understand it. You may understand abstract art. But it was on batik cloth, right?

Mr. CROUCH. Yes, sir.

Senator FORD. And it was abstract; is that correct?

Mr. CROUCH. Well, they are based on aerial photographs, Senator. What the artist sees from the sky as she flies.

Senator FORD. All right. You are going to have to draw me another picture because I did not understand it that way, Doctor. I do not think many people who come through there understand it either. You may understand it and sit up there in that six-by-six with a 60-watt bulb and green shade on and say, the world is great out there. But there are a lot of people who come through that Aeronautics and Space Museum, one of the most visited museums in the world, and it has to be the best. No question about that, it has to be the best. And the best you can do is when people leave there they understand it. They do not understand batik cloth and abstract paint, most of them.

Now we get back to the education, Doctor, spreading it out. I understand that in the educational realm of Aeronautics and Space you are being community selective. You are going into communities, maybe where they are unfortunate or I do not know what the level is that you picked, and you are concentrating on that. Now you say here you want to spread it out all over to the country, but you are selecting the communities and it is not a national effort. That bothers me some.

Mr. HEYMAN. First of all—

Senator FORD. I have talked to the people that do it, Doctor, so do not try to—

Mr. HEYMAN. No, I am trying to tell you what I was saying in the document from which you read. What I am saying is that we are seeking to take the Smithsonian into the electronic world and have our exhibitions and a lot of information that is contained in the Smithsonian available in electronic form. We just went on the Internet with about 20 or 25—more than that—a huge amount of information that is being built up in the various museums, also including a very good exhibition called, "Ocean Planet." In the first 3 or 4 days that we were on the Internet we recorded over 2 million visits. In other words, 2 million people tuned in.

I see that—it is still a limited audience. There are about 30 million who are on the Internet around. But I see that, probably as it combines with the television medium, as being a very extraordinary way to reach an awful lot of people so that they can, in a way, partake of what we have at the Smithsonian and not have to be there.

The other is that we are taking what I think is going to be an absolutely wonderful exhibition as part of our 150th anniversary called, "America's Smithsonian." We are going to travel that around the country and that is going to contain a lot of our really fine objects. I think that people who have not been able to come to Washington are going to be able to get a very good sense of the Smithsonian by visiting that. That is what I meant in those references from which you were reading.

Senator FORD. Do you have any knowledge, or do your colleagues there have any knowledge, of the selected communities now?

Ms. NEWMAN. I know, Senator, throughout the institution there is an effort to work with school systems around the country. We have a math and science program. Each of the museums has a program. What has happened is that some of the museums, and Air and Space in particular, have programs for the Washington area, just because it is physically easier to get the students in the Washington area into the museums. But if you are suggesting that it is selective in that they are not interested in all of the schools in the area, that is not true.

Senator FORD. I am talking about the country. This is a national museum, not an area.

Ms. NEWMAN. Within the country, the programs that I talked to you about on the science and math are throughout the country. We have curriculum materials that go throughout the country. I can show you by each State which of the schools are benefiting from these various programs, and I would like very much to do that.

Senator FORD. Fine, I will be glad to accept it. But when you select the communities and the criteria you have by which you select the communities disturbs me because the programs ought to be universal and not selective. And the criteria that you have down there for your people who make these decisions, the criteria they go by limit the where and how much of the exhibits and the education and the communication. So I hope that maybe my questions today will give you an opportunity to revisit some of those things and perhaps redirect it.

Now, Doctor, you have got a raft of assistants at Air and Space Museum. Do you think you need all of them or are you going to wait until the NAPA comes? You have got half a dozen there or more.

Mr. HEYMAN. I am clearly going to wait until I get a really—I will keep you posted, Senator.

Senator FORD. It is like the football coaches in my hometown. They never fired them, they became assistant superintendents. We had a lot of football coaches that retired from coaching and became assistant superintendents. They do that all over the state. Somehow or another, we just like to take care of our sports figures. I do not want you to get loaded up with a lot of assistants, and then you get five different points of view. That may be good, but somehow, at some point you have got to say, we can be more efficient. You have a director, and he has an assistant and they have certain things to do. Then you can put that big shadow over their shoulder.

Mr. HEYMAN. Right. Senator, I think we are beginning now to try to look at these issues since obviously we are going to start to—I have to live on leaner budgets. Clearly, 85 percent or so of our budget is in personnel. Clearly, if we are going to have to tighten our belts it is going to have to be that we are going to have to thin out numbers of people.

Senator FORD. So it may come automatically.

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes. One of the things though I do want to—this is just really by way of information. I am sitting on 17 museums and galleries and 4 or 5 very large research institutes. So I just want you to know that these efforts are going to have to be systematic.

Senator FORD. I understand that. As I said earlier, if I am viewed as an enemy, I would like to be a friendly enemy because I think what you are doing is so important. If I am critical, I hope it is constructive. What I have done is talked personally to people. I have not just taken a piece of paper and read it and this is the report. I have talked to people at the Air and Space Museum who participate every day in what you do down there.

So I have not just come here with a piece of paper staff shoved under my nose and said, you ask him these questions. I have got them personally because I thought it was so important.

Mr. HEYMAN. I understand that.

Senator FORD. At some point we will grade you. When I first came here your board was never brought before the Congress. They would just send the names up and we would approve them. Senator Mathias decided we ought to see who is going on the board, and get their background, have a little financial statement like all the rest of the appointments around here, because you do handle a lot of money and you are important to the country. Now we are beginning to give you some oversight, and you are going through some of the problems other agencies are going through.

Mr. HEYMAN. I realize that, sir. But do not forget my Board of Regents because they are—

Senator FORD. I understand your Board of Regents. I hear from your Board of Regents almost daily. I want to tell you, they are on your side. And I happen to be on their side because we are trying to do the same thing. They defend you strongly. When that defense goes away you had better—

Mr. HEYMAN. I will be in trouble.

Senator FORD. You will.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Pell, do you have any questions?

Senator PELL. Yes, thank you. Speaking of the regents, I think one of the stupidest things I have ever done was when I thought I had a conflict of interest and resigned from the board. I have regretted it ever since, sought to get on it and have not succeeded. I think that the exhibition you are talking about is great. As one who was in the North Atlantic convoy duty in the North Atlantic, I would hope that you might honor the anti-submarine warfare there as well, have an exhibition.

I also note your statement that the Smithsonian has "an obligation to consider the opinions of the interested public" in framing your exhibitions. My question is, are there limits to the extent to which the Smithsonian should be responsive to public opinion? And does the Smithsonian reserve for itself an area of judgment that will honor opinions that might not necessarily be

popular? I realize I am coming at it from a slightly different angle than you have received so far.

Mr. HEYMAN. Senator Pell, I think any institution of our sort has to reserve the final decision. But I think we have to be sensitized to viewpoints that otherwise we might not get if we did not make the kinds of consultations and seek the sort of advice that I am speaking about there. But no, we have got to make the final decision.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much.

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Cochran?

Senator COCHRAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Dr. Crouch, you may have heard Mr. Linenthal say when he was talking about an exhibit of the V-2 rocket that in order to really show what the V-2 rocket was all about, what it did needed to be shown and was shown to fully explain the context of that artifact. I suppose that the same kind of thinking went into the development of the *Enola Gay* exhibit, that to show the context of the airplane that dropped the bomb, you had to show the results.

Is this something that has been followed over time at the Air and Space Museum? And do you see it as something that will continue to be a part of every exhibit? For example, you mentioned the Hellcats. I just wondered, are you going to show the damage and the results of the weapons system that the Hellcat was in order for people to understand why it was made, and what it was for, and how it was used? Is that going to be an important part of that exhibit, or any part at all?

Mr. CROUCH. I think exhibitions perform a great many functions, Senator. When people ask me what I think the National Air and Space Museum does best, I usually say that we inspire wonder and awe and an appreciation for the past. But the museum also teaches, I think, something about the context in which those objects that people see in the museum were used.

The Hellcat exhibit is commemorative, for the most part. It is the airplane, labels, and images of the airplane in use, and the men who flew it.

Senator COCHRAN. No dead people lying around in photographs?

Mr. CROUCH. No, sir, not that I—

Senator COCHRAN. None at all?

Mr. CROUCH. Not that come to mind.

Senator COCHRAN. Why not? Why would you consider it to be a complete exhibit if you do not show the people it killed or the damage that was done by the use of the Hellcat? Why is that different?

Mr. CROUCH. I think the exhibition of the Hellcat does show the complete story of that airplane. It is a fighter airplane, Senator. That exhibition was not designed to deal with a turning point in history.

Senator COCHRAN. I do not remember when I have gone through the museums that it is commonplace to show the victims of weapons systems in ways that would be repulsive or alarm or disgust or enrage, all the other emotions that we get when we see someone who has been killed, particularly in a pretty graphic scene. The Vietnam War is a very good example of what happens, I think, to all of us when we see that kind of thing on television or in photographs or pictures. It has quite an impact.

Is the Air and Space Museum going to consider, for example, in the future showing some of the airplanes that were used in Vietnam and what was done in the use of those planes, the napalm? Are these things that we can look forward to in the future?

Mr. CROUCH. No, Senator. An exhibition on the air war in Vietnam has been under discussion. It is on hold at this point. We still have to reach a decision with regard to that one, as the Secretary has commented in the past.

I really thought and think of the exhibition on the *Enola Gay* as a genuine departure from what had come before at the museum, and did see it as an attempt to tell a story, perhaps in a different way than the museum had before.

Senator COCHRAN. I am disturbed about the possibility of a trend setting in where this is the kind of thing that we can expect at the Air and Space Museum. I certainly disapprove of that mind set and that attitude. We all regret war. We regret we have to defend ourselves and spend all the money we do for national defense. But the security of our country is important, and our citizens security is uppermost in the minds of this Congress. It is probably the number one obligation that we have as a Government.

To see it ridiculed, or those who have been involved in protecting the security of our country demeaned in some indirect way—even though there certainly may not be a conscious effort to do that—by our own national museum is very disturbing. I think that is what comes from this experience.

I hope that those who are involved in thinking about what the role of the museum is, and what the goals are, and the mission, use good common sense and good judgment for a change. I think that is what we are asking you to do. All the regulations and guidelines and everything are going to be helpful maybe. But I think just good common sense and good judgment will be required.

Mr. CROUCH. Senator, I have been at that museum for 21 years and it is today, as it was on the day we opened, the most popular museum in the world. Certainly no one wants to endanger that or to alter the fundamental course of that museum. There is nothing related to this controversy that I regret more than the suggestion that that Institution which I love, which I helped to build, has somehow devalued the heroism and sacrifice of American veterans. That was certainly, and I hope obviously,



never the intention. My own father is a veteran of the Pacific war and I would never, and neither would anyone else involved in this project, wish to do anything other than to honor the soldiers, sailors, and airmen who defeated Japanese tyranny.

Mr. HEYMAN. Do not forget the Marines.

Mr. CROUCH. I am sorry, Mr. Secretary. I apologize for that.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I have to get back to the statutory authorization for the National Air and Space Museum. I want to call your attention to that. It says, in Section 77, Title 20 of the U.S. Code, "There is hereby established under the Smithsonian Institution a bureau to be known as the National Air and Space Museum, which shall be administered by the Smithsonian Institution with the advice of a board to be composed of the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, or his designee, the Chief of Naval Operations, or his designee, the Chief of Staff of the Army, or his designee, the Commandant of the Marine Corps, or his designee, the Commandant of the Coast Guard, or his designee, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, or his designee, the Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration, or his designee, the Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, and three citizens of the United States appointed by the President from civilian life . . ."

Now, as I understand it, before this exhibit started there was no reference to that board for advice. Is that correct?

Mr. HEYMAN. I cannot really tell you. I can only tell you that at the meeting that we had this week it was told to me by members of that advisory committee that at the meeting they had had the last year, which I guess was in April or May of last year, there was discussion at that meeting about the *Enola Gay* exhibition. I do not know what the nature of that discussion was. I do not know the extent to which what that exhibit was to be or looked like in the first draft was discussed. I just do not know the nature of it. I just can tell you that is what they told me when I saw them this week.

The CHAIRMAN. I think you miss my point. My point is, the statute says you run this with the advice of this board. It is a specifically designated advisory board, composed primarily of the military advisors to the President of the United States. They are the chairmen of the individual services, the chiefs of staff. But I do not see anything in your procedure which follows this law. You do not get their advice except once a year.

Mr. HEYMAN. I do not know whether our procedures state it. They probably do not. We will rectify that. But I want you to know that my own intention, which I discussed with them this week, was of a much closer advisory relation between that board and the museum. So you and I are on the same wavelength.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope we are. You and I are not going to be here forever, and I do not want the Smithsonian to be destroyed by revisionists or people who are seeking some way to express their own point of view to the world despite the official policy

of the United States when using taxpayer money. Now the problem with this is that the law also says this is the function of the museum. This is the law that gave you the authority to build this museum and spend taxpayers' money to support it:

The National Air and Space Museum shall memorialize the national development of aviation and space flight; collect, preserve and display aeronautical and space flight equipment of historical interest and significance; serve as a repository for scientific equipment and data pertaining to the development of aviation and space flight; and provide educational material for the historical study of aviation and space flight.

Now, Dr. Crouch, how do you go about planning an exhibit which primarily is to raise the question of the use by the United States of atomic weapons under that statute? You were involved in this.

Mr. CROUCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not think he was there at that time, but you were there when it started. I do not think you have any authority under this law to proceed with the exhibit that you planned, which basically was to raise the issue of the correctness of our use of atomic weapons at the close of World War II. That has nothing to do with the *Enola Gay*.

But I do not think you get our point. Suppose we gave you the F117 today, which was the classic weapon used in the Persian Gulf. Are you going to show pictures of the people who were in the way of those weapons they used so effectively and efficiently? Are you going to show those people who unfortunately suffered death because of the policy of their government in Iraq? Or are you going to show it to be a scientific instrument, really one of the best weapons in history and one of the key functions of our system to win the war in the Persian Gulf? Are you going to go out on the streets of Iraq and get pictures of babies it killed or are you going to show the pilots who flew it?

Mr. CROUCH. Senator, we did an exhibition on the air war in the Persian Gulf.

The CHAIRMAN. I saw it. But you miss the point. As Senator Cochran said, I do not remember seeing pictures of dead Iraqis.

Mr. CROUCH. Agreed, sir. I do not think there were.

The CHAIRMAN. So your exhibit was an exhibit that tried to raise the issue of the correctness of the decision of the President of the United States to use atomic weapons to end World War II.

Mr. CROUCH. No, Senator. We did not regard the exhibition that way. This was an attempt to say something about the airplane as a player in a turning point in world history. I do not think you can understand the meaning of that airplane, which has become such a symbol of so many things for people, without seeing it as having an historic role.

The CHAIRMAN. It delivered the final weapon of World War II, but there are a lot of other weapons that killed many more people than it did; the Hellcats for example. How many people were killed by the Hellcats strafing operations?

Mr. CROUCH. I am sure a great many, Senator.

The CHAIRMAN. But you are not going to show those. What were you doing in terms of the *Enola Gay* exhibit? We want to know, how are we going to prevent the kind of judgment that was made to use taxpayer's money beyond the authority of the Smithsonian and beyond the authority that created the museum that you spent 21 years in?

Mr. CROUCH. I can assure you, Senator, we did not think we were going beyond the authority of the museum or the Smithsonian. I tried to indicate the sorts of procedures that we passed through in the development of the project.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me read you another portion of the law, and I am sure I will get the answer I have gotten before. In the middle of President Kennedy's first year, I believe he actually sent this language to Congress and asked that it be enacted:

The Smithsonian Institution shall commemorate and display the contributions made by the military forces of the Nation towards creating, developing, and maintaining a free and peaceful and independent society and culture of the United States. The valor and sacrificial service of the men and women of the armed forces shall be portrayed as an inspiration to the present and future generations of America. The demands placed upon the full energies of our people and the hardships endured, the sacrifice demanded in our constant search for world peace shall be clearly demonstrated. The extensive peacetime contribution that the armed forces have made to the advance of human knowledge in science, nuclear energy, polar and space exploration, electronics, engineering, aerospace, and medicine shall be graphically displayed. The Smithsonian shall interpret through dramatic display significant current problems affecting the Nation's security. It shall be equipped with a study center for scholarly research into the meaning of war, its effect on civilization, and the role of the armed forces in maintaining a just and lasting peace by providing a powerful deterrent to war. In fulfilling its purpose, the Smithsonian shall collect, preserve, and exhibit military objects of historical interest and significance.

Now, Mr. Secretary, I am informed that section was never complied with. Is that right?

Mr. HEYMAN. It is complied with in many ways. There are a lot of exhibitions at the Smithsonian that fulfill exactly the purposes that are stated there.

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that. But did you ever develop such an armed forces display?

Mr. HEYMAN. No, and we also never got an armed forces museum which was the subsection under which that statute was included.

The CHAIRMAN. But you did get the Air and Space Museum.

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes, we had gotten the Air and Space Museum before that statute was enacted.

The CHAIRMAN. You did not get it before 1961. I beg to differ.

Mr. HEYMAN. Then I am incorrect. I guess the authorization for the Air and Space Museum had been passed before that because there's reference in that statute, as I recall, that it does not affect the provisions relating to the Air and Space Museum.

But putting all that aside, I believe that we will do our best to——

The CHAIRMAN. I think you are right. I think you got the authorization for the Air and Space Museum in 1946. You did not get the actual museum until substantially later.

Mr. HEYMAN. That is correct, sir. What I am saying is that putting aside technical arguments about applicability of that statute, we really do try, and I think successfully so in many regards, to fulfill the statements that are in that section. We could submit, sir, if you would like for the record, a history of exhibitions that we think are related to the words in that section.

The CHAIRMAN. I think I am going to put in the record the letter that you wrote to Congressman Sam Johnson on April 4 of this year when he raised the same question.

[The letter is included in the Appendix.]

The CHAIRMAN. I understand that the position of the Smithsonian is that the legislative language quoted pertaining to the National Armed Forces Museum was authorized but never funded, and you take it that this section that I just read was not intended to apply to the National Air and Space Museum. I have to tell you, we will correct the statute. I believe the intention of President Kennedy was one the American public wanted to see in that Air and Space Museum.

Now let me go back, if I may, to questions on the future. What policies are you establishing that will change old policies with regard to advice from advisory committees that have been authorized by Congress or the President pertaining to new exhibits?

Mr. HEYMAN. Sir, I know what I want to do but I have not written them yet. We are going to write them this summer and I will submit them to this committee for information and for advice. But my intention is what I stated before which is, certainly in the case of statutory advisory committees, that they play a very real role in terms of the policies that are established respecting the museums for which they are created. This is true with the Hirshhorn. This is true at the Freer. This is true on a number of the museums where we have—the Museum of the

American Indian—where there are specific statutes that create specific advisory boards and the same is true.

It could well be, sir, and I certainly would follow the kind of advice you are giving, that we should state the procedures by which that becomes effective rather than just leave it to the statutory language.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you have directives or regulations that pertain to the use of Federal funds or Smithsonian funds to travel? Who approves the travel of museum directors, curators, and other Smithsonian employees? Who approves the hiring of people in the separate museums? Are there regulations and directives on that?

Ms. NEWMAN. Mr. Chairman, there are regulations. There are delegations from the Secretary to responsible officials. There is a system in place that assures that the travel is in accordance with the Federal laws. We do have a system whereby the directors notify the provosts or me of their plans to travel. Now with the new Secretary, those are often discussed with the Secretary. And I have a sign-off.

The CHAIRMAN. Are you aware of the complaint of the various veterans and aviation organizations that the employees hired at the Air and Space Museum by Dr. Harwit had no background in aviation, aviation history, aviation engineering, or air and space museum management? They were in fact going towards a revisionist concept of history. How do we protect against that if it is true?

Ms. NEWMAN. There is a system whereby panels review the qualifications of people who are hired by the institution, and there is to be a matching of their credentials with the job requirements. You are telling me something that I had not heard: that there are large numbers of people who are in positions for which they are not qualified, which is different from saying that they may not agree with their position on certain issues.

The CHAIRMAN. That is correct. They are saying that a large number of the employees of the Air and Space Museum had no background in either aviation, aviation history, aviation engineering, or air and space museum management, and that they were hired for the purpose of this exhibit. Is that true, Dr. Crouch?

Mr. CROUCH. May I make a comment, Senator? The last curator I hired is a retired Air Force colonel, an SR-71 pilot, who retired after a full career in the Air Force. We were happy to get him. His operational experience, his knowledge of aircraft, and his cockpit time and so on and so forth are obviously the kinds of skills and experiences that the National Air and Space Museum has to have to do its work. There are other kinds of skills as well, and when you need those you advertise for a different sort of person.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you the lead curator on the *Enola Gay* exhibit?

Mr. CROUCH. No, sir, Dr. Neufeld was. I am his supervisor.

The CHAIRMAN. Who?

Mr. CROUCH. Michael Neufeld. I am his supervisor.

The CHAIRMAN. You were the supervisor of the lead curator?

Mr. CROUCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. What did you believe was the basic purpose of that exhibit?

Mr. CROUCH. As I said, Senator, to tell the story of that turning point in human history in the most honest, balanced way we could.

The CHAIRMAN. Who created the name, "A More Perfect Union" for the exhibit?

Mr. CROUCH. I misunderstood, Senator. I thought you were still talking about the *Enola Gay*. You are talking about the exhibition, "A More Perfect Union" in American History?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Mr. CROUCH. Yes, I was the lead curator for that exhibition.

The CHAIRMAN. It is my understanding that because of that exhibit you were selected to lead the *Enola Gay* exhibit. Is that not right?

Mr. CROUCH. No, sir, that is not true. Let me correct, now that I understand your question. I was——

The CHAIRMAN. "A More Perfect Union" was concerned about the Japanese who were placed in camps in our own country, right?

Mr. CROUCH. Japanese Americans, yes, sir. I was the curator of that exhibition, yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Who determined the scope and title of the exhibit that caused this controversy?

Mr. CROUCH. This one?

The CHAIRMAN. The *Enola Gay* exhibit.

Mr. CROUCH. The scope and——?

The CHAIRMAN. ——title of the exhibit.

Mr. CROUCH. The final title of the exhibition went through various iterations. It was the result of a group decision that everyone, including then-Secretary Adams, was willing to accept. The scope of the exhibition developed through early planning documents and discussions.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it true that members of your staff are now, either in an official or unofficial capacity, assisting American University and others in a teach-in or some program for use of the artifacts and materials that were in the original plan of the *Enola Gay* exhibit and that this exhibit will be farmed out, in effect, to other universities in other areas in the country?

Mr. CROUCH. Not to my knowledge, Senator. I am aware that someone at American University has been reported in the newspapers as doing that. But certainly to my knowledge, we have not been involved.

The CHAIRMAN. That is not with any help from the Smithsonian or the personnel who assisted in the creation of this exhibit?

Mr. CROUCH. Again, not to my knowledge, Senator.

Mr. HEYMAN. I asked specifically the curator of the exhibit, Michael Neufeld, and he indicated to me that he is playing absolutely no role and having no discussions with the people at American University.

The CHAIRMAN. Do we know who was the author of the statement in the script that said, "For most Americans it was a war of vengeance; for most Japanese it was a war to defend their unique culture against western imperialism"? Who authored that?

Mr. CROUCH. I am really not sure, Senator. In terms of authorship, I supervised the project but I also wrote one unit; not the one in which that statement appeared. Dr. Neufeld wrote two units. The remaining two units of the exhibition were the result of a joint effort between Dr. Neufeld and the curatorial assistants, and that statement was in one of those units.

The CHAIRMAN. You took the trips to Japan and you were the one who requested the loan from the city of Nagasaki of the artifacts to be displayed, the head of an angel, an infant's dress, a Madonna and child, leaflets dropped from American planes, pictures of the keloid scars of individuals rather than surgically removed keloid scars? You are the one who made the decision to obtain those for the exhibit, right?

Mr. CROUCH. No, those decisions were group decisions. I signed the letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Was there a group of you in Japan, Doctor?

Mr. CROUCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. How many?

Mr. CROUCH. Well, we did not make that decision in Japan. The first trip Dr. Harwit led and I went with him. On the second occasion I took the curator and the designer of the exhibition to Japan to look at materials and to gather information about objects that we might request for loan. But the decisions were all made after we had returned.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you meet Mr. Takahashi on your trips to Japan?

Mr. CROUCH. I believe so. Hiroshima?

The CHAIRMAN. Do you agree with what Dr. Harwit wrote to him, "For most of us in America the *Enola Gay* is an uncomfortable symbol. It represents a destructive act which many of us feel to be incompatible with our perceived national character"? He also states that you will be visiting with Dr. Takahashi. Did you meet with him to discuss that letter?

Mr. CROUCH. I met with him, yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you discuss that point of view expressed by Dr. Harwit?

Mr. CROUCH. No, not in those words, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Were you aware of it?

Mr. CROUCH. Someone read that letter to me yesterday and I did not recall having——

The CHAIRMAN. When you went over there were you familiar with the correspondence that had been sent by your superior to Japan?

Mr. CROUCH. For the most part, Senator. But that was a couple of years ago. I honestly do not remember having seen that letter.

The CHAIRMAN. Did you give the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki a promise that they could film a statement in which they were free to say anything they chose for inclusion in the exhibit?

Mr. CROUCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You object to the statements of American veterans, and they have been accused of trying to seek a veto, yet you gave the mayors of two Japanese cities a free license to say whatever they wanted to. Is that right?

Mr. CROUCH. No, Senator. No, it is not correct.

The CHAIRMAN. It is not right?

Mr. CROUCH. When we first went to Japan, one of the first questions that was posed to Dr. Harwit was, will this exhibition, in one way or another, express opposition to the use of nuclear weapons? Dr. Harwit told the Japanese that, of course, we could not do that. The National Air and Space Museum does not make national policy. But he said he would consider the possibility of filming short statements from both mayors in which they could express their own point of view, and those statements would be used in a videotape that would include opposition points of view, also unedited. So that visitors to the exhibition——

The CHAIRMAN. American veterans were to be able to put their views in this exhibit unedited. Is that your statement?

Mr. CROUCH. Yes, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. You made that offer to the veterans groups?

Mr. CROUCH. I believe that Dr. Harwit did, or intended to.

Ms. NEWMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I intervene here just for a second?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes.

Ms. NEWMAN. But I, on the other hand, made it clear that if the videos covered subjects and matters that were of concern to the institution that the videos would not play. Dr. Harwit was present with me in discussing that matter with representatives from Japan.

The CHAIRMAN. Again I get back to management, Ms. Newman. How are the veterans groups to understand that the commitment made by the curator is not the policy of the Smithsonian unless we have some responsibility somewhere? I get the feeling I am playing with a feather pillow. Every time we ask a question we are told, no, it is over here. Then we go over here and ask Dr. Crouch and they say, oh no, over here, I vetoed that. Do you see our problem, Dr. Heyman?



Mr. HEYMAN. Yes, I understand, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Is it a valid one? I am getting pilloried at home by some people who believe that I am somehow attacking the Smithsonian. I got that viewpoint too when I questioned the exhibit on the west, and I got that when I questioned the statements and the toadstool you gave to Professor Fuentes. It is part of the life we lead.

But I think you need some management structure. You run the equivalent of two divisions in the Army, and it appears that all your regiments are going off in different directions. Is that wrong?

Mr. HEYMAN. It is very hard for me to answer that. I do not know whether it is wrong or not. I can tell you that the Smithsonian has been a place that has been analogized, and certainly was by my predecessor, very much to a university in which museums and research institutes are viewed like schools in colleges that make an awful lot of their own decisions for themselves.

I think the undertaking that I am making at the moment, for instance, with regard to exhibition policy and exhibition review is a little shocking to a number of my colleagues, and we are going to have an awful lot of conversation with respect to that. As I am doing this, if I come across, in relationship to what you are saying, processes that really ought to be put on paper, we will put those on paper if they are not on paper yet.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you for that.

Mr. HEYMAN. But I do understand your frustration. I really do.

The CHAIRMAN. I do thank you for that. I am worried, because we are going to discuss the budget for the next 5 years, and there is not room in that budget for the projection you have made to manage the institution you have. I am sure you know that. I believe you should have the money, and we have to find ways to raise money from the public.

Let me tell you, I believe you should have the money you outlined in your last presentation—not the one in 1992, but the last one—for the management of the facilities you have and for the exhibits that you have planned. I do not know how we are going to get it from the public. I can tell you, you will not get it from this Congress if we have controversies like this. You cannot expect to have dramatic increases in funding at the time of controversies of this size.

I am worried that you seem to be turning to foreign sources for support of the Smithsonian. I do not want to get into that now, but there are lots of rumors running around here now about the extent to which you are turning to foreign sources for the support of our institution. That is a unique American institution. I have to tell you, I think the American people will be very, very upset if it is determined that substantial foreign contributions are made in a way that might influence exhibits like this.

Mr. HEYMAN. My view is that contributions ought not to influence any exhibit.

The CHAIRMAN. You have three exhibits in Japan now, right?

Mr. HEYMAN. We just have one on gems.

The CHAIRMAN. I thought you had three going over there. Are the others back now?

Mr. HEYMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were they paid for by Japan?

Ms. NEWMAN. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. Were the same curators who went over there on the *Enola Gay* exhibit also a part of those exhibits?

Ms. NEWMAN. No. The one exhibit that was in Japan that was funded by NHK and Yomiuri Shimbun took many of our major objects and talked about American culture based on a desire on the part of the funding that this generation of Japanese do not understand the culture and the contributions of this Nation, of the United States, to science and technology. Therefore, they funded completely the exhibit that took the ruby slippers and things like that to Japan. That exhibit no longer exists. That was for a short period of time in 1994.

The CHAIRMAN. Have you any further questions, Senator?

Senator COCHRAN. No, I do not, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, I am still disturbed by the letter you sent to Congressman Johnson indicating that you believe the law applies to a museum that was never funded when it specifically says the Smithsonian Institution shall take action. That has been on the books for over 30 years. I do believe it is a function that is required.

I am going to ask the Congress to modify the statute to make clear our intent because I believe it might help settle this controversy if we did have a fulfillment of the original instruction of the Congress and the President to the Smithsonian to take the action required to commemorate the service of the men and women of the armed forces, and to portray them as an inspiration to present and future generations. That is not me. That is, as I recall, President Kennedy's request to the Congress.

I do not know what it is going to take to have you live up to that law, but I do think that would go a long way towards meeting the problem that has been brought out by this hearing. Do you have any further comments, sir?

Mr. HEYMAN. No, I do not, sir. But we were going to make another presentation on the Commission for the Future. We could do that at another time if you wish, or we could do it now.

The CHAIRMAN. I think Dr. Singer is here and we are prepared for that, yes.

Mr. HEYMAN. Fine, thank you. This is Dr. Maxine Singer, president of the Carnegie Institution, who has been the chair of our Commission on the Future which is a commission of 26 people of enormous quality, intellectually and otherwise, who undertook to look at the Smithsonian in its present form, and to

try to look at the future and to try to give ideas and directions with respect to how the Smithsonian most profitably, for the benefit of the country, should face that future.

I had a longer prepared statement, but I would just put that in the record, sir, and just introduce Dr. Singer.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Heyman follows:]

STATEMENT OF I. MICHAEL HEYMAN, SECRETARY, SMITHSONIAN  
INSTITUTION

I would like to have Dr. Maxine Singer join me. Dr. Singer served as the Chair of the Commission on the Future of the Smithsonian Institution. In September 1993, the Board of Regents established the Commission and charged it with the task of examining the Institution, its mandate and roles. The Commission was additionally charged to examine the cultural, societal, and technological factors that influence the Institution's capacity to act. I would like to thank Chairwoman Singer and the members of her commission for their invaluable service to the Institution. I am committed to studying these recommendations and to working with the Regents, the administration and my staff in the months ahead to respond to the challenges presented in the report. I will ask Maxine Singer to provide the committee with the highlights of the report. However, I'd like to comment briefly on several initiatives that are responsive to the Commission's recommendations.

We are committed to developing institution-wide an ability to make our collections and information available to more of America, directly and through technology.

On May 8, 1995, the Smithsonian officially went "on-line" with our "home page" to the Internet. This single event takes a giant step toward my goal of a "Smithsonian without walls" and delivers the Institution's vast resources to Americans throughout the country. People around the world can now view portions of our collections as well as enjoy those exhibitions which we are putting on line in their own homes.

Moreover, teachers can design curriculum relying upon our extensive collections, research, and exhibitions. This ability will be enhanced as more of our materials are put in digital form. I'm pleased to report that the Smithsonian home page on the World Wide Web logged over 2 million "visitors" since its first day.

While a great number of visitors come to the Mall each year, we recognize that many Americans can never get here and those who do can manage the trip at best once or twice in a lifetime. The Smithsonian's usefulness to our citizens should not be just about that one class visit in the 10th grade. Without taking on the impossible, we must be about carrying our mission across the country; we must find ways to deliver to the American people, wherever they live, the wonders of the institution they have supported for one and a half centuries.

One of my first decisions as Secretary was to authorize the creation of an exhibition of some of the Institution's treasures that we can take around the country beginning in our 150th anniversary year, 1996. With the aid of corporate support which we are now seeking, we will bring "America's Smithsonian" to locations around the United States. This is as it should be if we are to "increase and diffuse knowledge."

Thank you. I would like to ask Dr. Singer to make a few remarks.

The CHAIRMAN. Let me, if I may, correct the record to a certain extent. In June of 1961, the Kennedy Administration did support the bill that led to the direction to the Smithsonian to authorize an expansion to portray the contributions of the armed forces of the United States. That idea, however, was based on a report from President Eisenhower to the Committee on the American Armed Forces Museum. He had stated very succinctly the reasons for such action by the Smithsonian, but it was apparently

an idea that was carried over from 1960 into 1961, and was supported by both administrations.

Dr. Singer?

**TESTIMONY OF MAXINE F. SINGER, CHAIRMAN, COMMISSION ON THE FUTURE OF THE SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, PRESIDENT, CARNEGIE INSTITUTION OF WASHINGTON**

Ms. SINGER. Good morning, sir. I thank you for giving me this opportunity to speak to the committee. Like all the members of the commission, I come from the world outside the Smithsonian. I myself am a biochemist, and as Secretary Heyman has told you, I am the president of the Carnegie Institution of Washington which is an independent institution that carries out research in astronomy, biology, and earth sciences. The institution is based here in Washington, DC, where I reside.

Two years ago I was asked by the regents of the Smithsonian to chair a commission of private citizens charged with an examination of the Smithsonian, its mandate, and its roles, and an examination of the cultural, societal, and technological factors that influence its capacity to act. Based on these examinations we were to provide alternative approaches to the issues facing the Smithsonian rather than making specific recommendations. Nevertheless, with a commission composed of a large number of independent people, making some recommendations was a temptation that the commission found impossible to resist.

The names of the 22 commission members are listed on page 3 of our report which we submitted to the regents earlier this month, and copies of the report have been submitted to the committee in lieu of written testimony. I thank the committee on behalf of the commission for this opportunity to describe the results of our work. I would like to summarize how we organized our efforts and the major points in our report.

Funds for the commission's work were provided by grants from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation and the Andrew W. Mellon Foundation. At our first meeting in September of 1993 we determined the scope of our work and established three independent working groups to investigate in-depth three major areas: First, programs; second, outreach, audience and electronic communication; and third, management, administration and finance. The entire commission met on three additional occasions to hammer out a consensus.

In addition, members of the commission visited comparable institutions in Canada, England, and France. Throughout we had the full cooperation of the Smithsonian's Secretary and staff in providing information. Our study was broad and our focus was

on the future. We tried to peer out 10 to 20 years, although we recognized that we had no reliable crystal ball.

Remarkably, in view of the range of geographic and professional, not to mention social and political experiences, represented among the commission members we reached consensus. Perhaps this was because the Smithsonian represents to all of us our great and vibrant Nation in all of its perplexities and complexity. Perhaps this is also the reason that we found Twyla Tharp's words such an apt title for the report, "E Pluribus Unum: This Divine Paradox."

Our Nation, of course, has thousands of public and private museums, as you have already pointed out. But the Smithsonian is distinctive because it is the Nation's institution. It is also a part of a vast international network of cultural and scientific institutions and we can be proud of its outstanding reputation abroad for the excellence of its collections, exhibitions, research, collaborative efforts with many scholars in countries all over the globe, and exemplary training programs for young scholars and museum professionals.

Our Nation is a very different one from the young country that it was in 1846 when the Congress accepted James Smithson's bequest and established the Smithsonian as an institution for the "increase and diffusion of knowledge." Those words nevertheless remain sound guides, although the Smithsonian too has changed enormously and will continue to do so as the Nation and the world change.

Among the changes at the Smithsonian is a shift in the emphasis given to these two aspects of Smithson's instruction. Fifty years ago, the emphasis was on scholarly research; the increase in knowledge. Today there is more of an equilibrium between research and the diffusion of knowledge; that is, education. The commission supports this shift.

Because enhancing the education of both children and adults is a high priority need in our country, the commission would even emphasize new educational initiatives, especially ones that reach out across the Nation. These can be through modern electronic means, partnerships, traveling and collaborative exhibitions, and public programs. We stress the opportunities provided by electronic information technology and urge that they be made a priority throughout the institution. We can see the beginnings of that effort, in fact, in Speaker Gingrich's participation last week in the inauguration of the Smithsonian home page on the Internet as well as some of the things that Secretary Heyman has already mentioned to you this morning.

Education is one of the four interrelated core activities of the Smithsonian. The other three are collections, research, and exhibitions. The commission believes that the collections that have been amassed over the last 150 years are central to all the activities and to the significance of the institution. But already

storage and care of the collections is a major headache because of limited space and funds.

Moreover, the collections will not stand still. They will grow as the great events and discoveries of the future expand our Nation's history and accomplishments. A master plan for future collections management is essential. Criteria and timetables that are flexible with respect to intellectual and financial considerations will be needed.

Without research, the objects in the collection are of little educational, cultural, or scientific value. This does not mean, however, that the way research is organized and carried out need be stagnant. America now has many excellent research organizations. The Smithsonian should emphasize its unique research opportunities, including the collections, areas of particular excellence, and long term global projects that are hard to do in other places.

Outstanding research requires an excellent research staff. The commission asks whether the current rigidities of Federal personnel practices can be replaced by a more flexible system that better balances the interests of the institution and the individual researchers; for example, by facilitating temporary appointments of scholars interested in particular collections. This could help the institution face the often painful issue of how programs and people that have already realized their potential or failed in their tasks can be redirected or released.

Priorities need to be established for restoration, renewal and expansion of existing permanent exhibitions. The need is acute. In addition, there are now so many specialized museums around the country that the Smithsonian can use its resources for unique exhibitions that are not possible in those other settings.

Museums in general, and the Smithsonian in particular are, as we certainly heard this morning, increasingly flashpoints in the debates that characterize our Nation's transition from a society that depends for coherence on a single accepted set of values and practices to one that derives its strength and unity from a deep tolerance of diversity. This happens because museums, to fulfill their missions, must prepare exhibitions that record and illuminate this transition. Sometimes this engenders acrimonious and contentious debate.

The Smithsonian's position, as we have seen this morning and in the past months, is especially challenging because it is a national institution. The commission suggests several ideas that might help forge a more tranquil path while still allowing a full and fair debate. For example, we hope that the institution will increasingly be recognized as an intellectual forum rather than a cultural or scientific authority, or even a home for congratulations.

Also, a mechanism for broader and independent review of proposed exhibitions could be established, striving for balance between constructive judgments and criticism of an exhibition's

content and the desirable independence of the curators and scholars who are responsible for the exhibition. Such a process should distinguish between the need to protect the intellectual freedom of those individuals in their own scholarly work and publication and the public responsibilities of the Smithsonian in its exhibitions. Such mechanisms and others that we mention in the report could help release the tension within the institution regarding how it responds to the public, the Congress, and the media on controversial issues.

Mindful of the programmatic issues, the commission addressed questions of governance, management, and financial need and resources. We recognize the ongoing need for the regents' guidance to the fullest possible extent. For this reason, we urge creation of standing committees of regents and that individual regents interface with one or more of the advisory boards to the museums and centers on a regular basis.

We also suggest in our report, which echoes some of the things that were said this morning, that advisory boards be appointed for all the museums and centers, and that the regents define the role of those boards, thereby strengthening them and their ability to provide both the Secretary and the directors of the individual museums and centers with the advice and support they need as well as enhancing fund-raising capabilities. It is only by giving the advisory boards a clear and useful role that it will be possible to attract highly talented leaders from around the country to serve on them.

The commission examined internal organizational structures and considered whether they were optimal for the coming decades. In particular, we were concerned with the appropriate balance of responsibility between the Secretary and the central administrative staff and the directors of the individual components. Each of the Smithsonian's major museums is the size and complexity of many independent institutions. Each has a different mission and a different culture. The Secretary must preside over all. Moreover, the Secretary also deals with an institution that depends both on public appropriations and private funds, including fund-raising.

Built into any system this complex is the tension between central control and unit autonomy. There was broad agreement in the commission that in this situation much is to be gained by decentralizing decision-making authority. The more autonomous the decision-makers in the various museums and centers, the easier it will be to recruit outstanding individuals to lead those entities, and the better the resulting decisions. In addition, the decisions and the people making them will be more accountable.

Of course, this oversimplifies a very complex matter. The commission recognized how difficult it is to weigh the cost and benefit of standardization against the potential payoffs from local initiatives, but we think this needs to be done. Obviously,

there are things the central administration must do. Foremost, the Secretary must articulate a broad vision and convey that vision effectively to the Smithsonian's various constituencies.

The Secretary must guide the development of strategies and priorities with the advice of regents. Equally important are the responsibilities to attract and select the very best people to direct the museums and research centers and to allocate human and financial resources among the several units. The commission also points out ways to improve the assessment procedures in the institution in order to assure better quality.

Virtually all of the commission's comments were made with an eye to assuring the future of this marvelous national resource in an era of stringent financial considerations. This is why, for example, we put so much emphasis on outreach by electronic means and partnerships with other institutions, museums, research centers, and K through 12 education programs rather than building new Smithsonian outposts around the country. Similarly, the commission calls for a moratorium on the construction of new museums in Washington except where firm legislative and financial commitments exist as in the case of the National Museum of the American Indian.

Rather, we stress the need to devote resources to the rehabilitation and maintenance of the aging existing facilities. The magnificent vista along the Mall hides major needs for renovation, restoration, and modernization. Without prompt attention to this, the Smithsonian risks becoming a dilapidated monument to the past. We also believe that new exhibition space can be generated if facilities for the storage of collections were constructed outside of central Washington. This approach could also provide modern storage for precious items.

Nevertheless, the growth of the Smithsonian in size and complexity over the past several decades has outpaced the resources available to sustain the high quality of the very programs that we all enjoy. This problem is exacerbated by inflation, by federally mandated expenditures such as pay increases, and a decrease in revenues from activities that depend on a healthy economy. Very significant decreases in staff and postponements of maintenance have already been made. This gap really needs to be made up if there is to be incentive for making the necessary difficult choices.

Changes in federally mandated rules can, as I pointed out, help increase efficiency. At the same time, the commission stresses that additional expansion of the facilities and programs, even if the funds were available, is not necessarily the best way to assure the institution's critical role in our national life.

Even with all these internal measures, the commission found that additional funds for operations and capital needs are required over and above the current budgets. We analyzed all possible sources of funds. We urge, for example, increased and optimized efforts to attract private funds. There was on the



commission substantial collective experience in fund-raising. We concluded that in the present economic climate of the Nation, even with the very best of efforts and maximum possibility of success, it is unrealistic to think that private fund-raising can meet the institution's needs.

We also studied the financial implications of charging entrance fees. Our information suggests that it is highly problematic whether fees would generate really substantial net gains, especially in view of the virtual certainty that such fees would effectively discourage many Americans from visiting an institution that in fact belongs to them. We also offered suggestions for enhancing the yields of commercial enterprises, particularly by restructuring them to capture the advantages of entrepreneurial endeavors.

But all of these efforts together will not do even the restricted job that we outline. The Smithsonian cannot achieve the Nation's expectations on its own. It requires the full understanding and support of the American people and the Congress. The actual incremental amount of funds needed is a very small proportion of the Federal budget; about \$125 million annually. Currently, Federal Government appropriations amount to less than \$1.50 for each of the 262 million people in the country. If we could raise that to \$1.96—a bargain price to most Americans—the extra \$125 million would be available.

The Smithsonian is the result of a lucky and glorious accident; James Smithson's gift. Parts of it are the result of subsequent generous gifts; the Freer and Sackler Galleries, the Hirshhorn Museum. We expect that other magnificent gifts will be forthcoming in the future. But the core of support must be from the Nation's people by appropriations and contributions.

Like the expansion of our Nation, future expansion of the Smithsonian's programs must come from our human and natural resources, not from real estate. Our modern world offers ways to do this that past generations could not even imagine. By using them, the Smithsonian will assure its vital role as a teacher, a recorder, and a shaper of our vibrant national outlook.

Thank you, Senator.

[See Appendix VI for information on how to obtain a copy of the report of the Commission on the Future of the Smithsonian Institution.]

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. That is a positive note to end our hearings. We are very familiar with the commission that you chaired and want to congratulate you and the members of that commission for spending the time you did on the future of the Smithsonian. I have seen a copy of your report before, and I have another in front of me now.

You did ask for establishing operating principles. You asked to establish a framework for setting institutional priorities, including regular meetings with assembled leaders of the museum and other Smithsonian components; to reinvigorate the

advisory boards and museums and other Smithsonian components; to engage citizens throughout the Nation. You urged the development of procedures for rigorous review and advice on plans for major new exhibitions to help ensure the quality and balance of the exhibitions as well as the integrity of staff scholarship. You have also asked that there be a procedure to establish priorities and to remember the lessons of history in terms of the value of research.

I think this is a very wonderful report. My closing comments would be, Mr. Secretary, that I think I will still be chairman next year. We shall have an oversight hearing next year and we will want to hear from you, what you have done to comply with the commission's suggestions. They are some of the same suggestions we have had this morning. I think ours have been more subjective and theirs have been more objective; but as a practical matter, we are on the same wavelength. To assure the future of the museum you have to find some way to assure that controversies of the types we have been through in the last few years are avoided to the maximum extent possible.

We are going to have conflicts within our society, but if people want to be revisionist, if people want to have an opportunity to have politically correct exhibits, then I think they should get private sector money to do it. As long as we are dealing with public money I think we have to be responsible to the public process. In effect, I think that is what Dr. Singer's commission is telling the Smithsonian.

I also agree with her that we ought to find some way to increase the money that is flowing towards you. As I said, I do not expect that we can envision that in this 5 years ahead of us. It may be that we can work it out. I think that the budget proposals being considered by both houses reduce your funds. So as a practical matter, those of us who have tried to support the future of the Smithsonian have a tough job.

I know a lot of you do not think I believe in the Smithsonian. I bet I have spent more time in the Smithsonian in my time here than any other Member of the Senate. We do not go and get you to take us through; we wander through with our kids or our friends. My friends who come in from Alaska all want to go to the Air and Space Museum. The one place they have to visit while they are here that is more relevant in our life than many Americans, is the Air and Space Museum.

So I hope you will be ready a year from now, Mr. Secretary, to show us. With the assistance of my colleague here from Mississippi, I am sure that the board of regents will reflect a similar request—that we establish some procedures, particularly procedures for establishing priorities, and that we use these advisory committees for advice so we do not end up appearing to criticize you from committee tables like this. Instead we can go argue with our colleagues about increasing the money so you

can continue to do what we think is necessary with regard to the institution.

Senator COCHRAN. Mr. Chairman, may I make just a brief statement before you adjourn, if you are about to adjourn?

The CHAIRMAN. Yes, sir, please do.

Senator COCHRAN. I want to join you in commending Dr. Singer for her statement and for being here today to present this description of the excellent report of the Commission on the Future of the Smithsonian. I also want to compliment Dr. Heyman and Connie Newman for their contributions to our hearing, and to commend Dr. Heyman especially for his conscientious effort to take charge of this institution and set it on a course that responds not only to its historic mission, but to make it a more prominent national resource in the years ahead.

Thank you.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. I must tell you that on this committee, unfortunately for the chairman, every member is either chairman or ranking member on a full committee or an important subcommittee and we hardly ever have full attendance.

We have had requests from several senators that we keep the record open for 10 days in order that they may submit questions to you for your response for the record. We also want to keep the record open for 10 days for additional statements from you or others who were witnesses, and we will review any other statements we receive in that 10 days to see whether they should be made a part of the record.

Do you have any last comments, Dr. Heyman?

Mr. HEYMAN. No, sir, I do not. I thank you for the attention you have paid and I look forward to seeing you next year.

The CHAIRMAN. I hope I see Connie Newman sitting next to you next year, too. I hear vicious rumors she is about ready to leave us again and go somewhere else.

Mr. HEYMAN. That is an absolutely vicious rumor. That is incorrect.

The CHAIRMAN. The District of Columbia can get along without you, Ms. Newman. We need you where you are.

Mr. HEYMAN. We might have to share her, but we are not going to lose her.

The CHAIRMAN. I would not even share her. I think this is a critical period for the Smithsonian, Dr. Heyman. We know the plans you have for expansion of some of these museums, and we know the problem you have that has been mentioned by Dr. Singer that every Federal agency faces—the problem of accumulated maintenance and repair and upgrading. You certainly are going to be in the position of asking us for more and more money each year and I hope we can find it.

But clearly, we have to establish some procedures that will get the public the greatest possible institution for the least cost. As Senator Ford said, the days of just approving your regents

without question and approving your budget request without question are unfortunately over. So we would like to work with you.

Dr. Singer, as I said, I admire your work and that report. I wish we could send a copy of it to every American citizen as a matter of fact. It might help the institution.

Ms. SINGER. Sir, in response to that. The report is on the Internet. It is one of the things that is available through the Smithsonian home page.

The CHAIRMAN. That is good. I agree with you also about using the Internet and World Wide Web. I think that through the Library of Congress you have the greatest access to the world that we have ever had. We want you to be able to continue to meet those demands, but also not neglect the preservation of our artifacts because of this incessant demand for information from the people who come onto the Internet.

Thank you very much.

[Whereupon, at 12:56 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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[To obtain a copy of the script of the proposed exhibit, "The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II," make your request in writing to Mr. James Douglas, Office of the General Counsel, Smithsonian Institution, MRC 028, Washington, DC 20560. Due to its substantial size, there is a charge of \$37.00 to cover the costs of reproduction, binding and mailing. Make checks payable to the Smithsonian Institution.]

## APPENDICES

## APPENDIX I

**Martin Harwit**  
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**Washington, DC 20024**  
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May 15, 1995

Statement of Martin Harwit  
 Former Director of the National Air and Space Museum  
 For the Committee on Rules and Administration  
 United States Senate  
 104th Congress  
 Hearings on  
 The Smithsonian Institution's  
 Future Management Practices

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:

In testimony delivered before you on May 11, 1995, the National Air and Space Museum, and I, as its Director during the planning of the exhibition *The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II*, were accused of mounting an exhibition that dishonored the memory of the brave young Americans who fought for truth and liberty in World War II. We were accused of portraying the Japanese as victims and the United States as the aggressor. These are distortions of the record which must be refuted because they are an injustice to one of the nation's greatest museums.

I attach four pages of detailed quotations from the final script of the exhibition as it stood on January 30, 1995, the day the exhibition was canceled. They speak for themselves. If members of the Committee doubt that they are representative of the document as a whole, the entire script can be made available, at the Committee's request.

One further note may be in order. The American Legion's testimony accuses me of intending to "include unilateral changes to the script that violated agreements and understandings" reached with them. I want to point out that I proposed the cited changes only on finding that a historian, whose research the script was quoting, had misinterpreted the minutes of a June 18, 1945 meeting on casualties expected in an invasion of Japan -- attributing to Chief of Staff Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, a casualty estimate which directly contradicted both Leahy's diary entry for that day and his later memoirs. Had I wished to perpetrate some kind of deceit, we at the Museum could have made the changes without immediately notifying the Legion. However, I knew of the Legion's interest and felt I should let them know, as soon as possible, that the label as previously discussed was now likely to be attacked as inaccurate. In concluding my letter to them I wrote, "If you have any concerns or comments, I'd greatly appreciate your letting me know." I do not know how else I could have broached the subject.

Sincerely yours,

Martin Harwit

## "THE LAST ACT: THE ATOMIC BOMB AND THE END OF WORLD WAR II"

The following are verbatim excerpts from the FINAL label script (Jan. 18, 1995) of the exhibition planned for the National Air and Space Museum. The exhibition was cancelled at the urging of critics who claimed that the script was "pro-Japanese" and "portrayed the United States as a racist aggressor and Japan as the victim" in the war. [Note: the first digit in brackets is the script section, followed by the page number.]

\*Japanese expansionism was marked by naked aggression and extreme brutality... Civilians, forced laborers, and prisoners of war were subject to brutal mistreatment, biological experiments, and execution. [001]

\*[In] the Chinese capital of Nanking... Japanese soldiers went on an unprecedented rampage. Some 200,000 to 300,000 Chinese were slaughtered (more than were killed at Hiroshima and Nagasaki combined), and 20,000 women of all ages were raped. The staff of the German Embassy in Nanking reported on the atrocities and described the Japanese army as "bestial machinery." [005]

\*[Photo captions] (1) A December 1937 issue of the Tokyo Daily News reported that these two Japanese sergeants, competing in a contest, beheaded 105 and 106 Chinese civilians in Nanking. (2) Chinese being buried alive in Nanking. [005]

\*The Pearl Harbor attack plunged the United States into a just war against Japanese aggression in the Pacific. [007]

\*[Photo caption] Only 289 of the 1,466 men aboard the USS Arizona survived the attack. Of the 1,104 Navy men and 73 Marines killed, only 150 bodies were recovered. More than 900 others remain entombed in the hull of the ship. [007]

\*The Japanese were brutal toward the American and Filipino soldiers captured at Bataan... More than 600 Americans and 5,000 to 10,000 Filipinos perished during what became known as the March of Death. Of almost 20,000 Americans captured during the fall of the Philippines, over 40 percent would never return. [013]

\*[Photo captions] (1) Treated by their captors with a mixture of contempt and cruelty, American prisoners await their fate during the Bataan Death March. (2) American dead during the Bataan Death March. [014]

\*[Photo caption] A burial party prepares graves for fellow Marines who died during the battle on Bougainville. The fight cost the Marines 423 dead and 1,418 wounded. [025]

\*[Photo caption] American dead, Peleliu, September 1944. The Marines and Army suffered 9,804 casualties, including 1,794 dead. Only 301 of 10,695 Japanese surrendered. [038]

•[Photo caption] ...Japanese troops systematically destroyed [Manila] and slaughtered about 100,000 civilians out of a population of 1 million. Men, women, and children alike were burned to death, blown up, bayoneted, shot, or beheaded in their homes, hospitals, churches, schools, and streets. [044]

•"In a shallow defilade to our right...lay about twenty dead Marines, each on a stretcher and covered to his ankles with a poncho -- a commonplace, albeit tragic, scene to every veteran...Every crater was half full of water, and many of them held a Marine corpse. The bodies lay pathetically just as they had been killed, half submerged in muck and water, rusting weapons still in hand. Swarms of big flies hovered over them." E.B. Sledge, 1st Marine Division, describing a scene on Okinawa, 1945 [105]

•The Two-Thousand-Yard Stare by Tom Lea, a painting made during the vicious fighting on the island of Peleliu. Lea's note states: "He left the States 31 months ago. He was wounded in his first campaign. He has tropical diseases...He half-sleeps at night and gouges Japs out of holes all day. Two thirds of his company has been killed or wounded...he will return to attack this morning. How much can a human being endure?" [114]

•Starting in June 1945, American aircraft dropped millions of leaflets like this one over dozens of Japanese cities, including Hiroshima, warning people to leave cities that were to be bombed. The leaflets were intended to save lives and counter Japanese accusations of "indiscriminate bombing of civilians." [133]

•The Japanese government turned to slave labor to ease severe manpower shortages and provide prostitutes for its troops. Some 667,000 Koreans and 38,000 Chinese who had labor contracts to work in Japan ultimately became slave laborers or were forced to be "comfort girls." ...Protests were punished by beating, flogging, and execution. During the war, an estimated 67,000 Korean and Chinese laborers died in Japanese custody. By 1945 some 10,000 of almost 26,000 American prisoners of war had died or been executed. Those held in Japan were also treated as slave laborers. Like their compatriots in Japanese camps overseas, they were often starved, beaten, tortured and executed. [144]

•Truman saw the bomb as a way to end the war and save lives by avoiding a costly invasion of Japan. He wanted, he said, to prevent casualties on the scale of "an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other." [201]

•...there is little doubt that if Japan (or Germany) had been able to construct such [an atomic] weapon, it would have been used against the Allies. [206]

•[Truman] saw the atomic bomb principally as a means to end the war quickly and save American lives. [221]

•American military intelligence [learned] in the summer of 1945

that the Japanese had achieved an alarming buildup of forces in southern Japan -- precisely in the area American forces were scheduled to invade late in the year. Thus, despite the peace initiative, Japan was preparing to fight to the bitter end. [229]

•Truman's decision to drop the atomic bomb was based on saving American lives and shortening the war. [231]

•Estimates of the number of American casualties -- dead, wounded and missing -- that the planned invasion of Japan would have cost varied greatly. In a June 18, 1945, meeting, General Marshall told President Truman that the first 30 days of the invasion of Kyushu could result in 31,000 casualties. But Admiral Leahy pointed out that the huge invasion force could sustain losses proportional to those on Okinawa, making the operation much more costly. Had the Kyushu invasion failed to force Japan to surrender, the United States planned to invade the main island of Honshu, with the goal of capturing Tokyo. Losses would have escalated. [250-51]

•After the war, Truman often said that the invasion of Japan would have cost half a million or a million American casualties. The origin of these figures is uncertain, but Truman knew that Japan had some two million troops defending the home islands. He believed, along with the many Americans who would have had to invade Japan, that such a campaign might have become, in his words from June 18, 1945, "an Okinawa from one end of Japan to the other." Added to the American losses would have been several times as many Japanese casualties -- military and civilian. The Allies and Asian countries occupied by Japan would also have lost many additional lives. For Truman, even the lowest of the casualty estimates was unacceptable. To prevent an invasion and to save as many lives as possible, he chose to use the atomic bomb. [250-51]

•[Document] These pages from the original minutes of the June 18, 1945 meeting between President Truman and the Joint Chiefs of Staff discuss the American losses expected in "Operation Olympic". On the second page, General Marshall endorses a figure of about 31,000 casualties for the first 30 days of the Kyushu invasion...On the third page, Admiral Leahy asks whether this figure is too low, based on the bloody battle for Okinawa. [252]

•[Photo caption] For aircrew, capture meant imprisonment in horrible conditions and even execution. Like this Australian intelligence officer, Allied flyers were sometimes beheaded. [321]

•A HERO'S RETURN. Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz awards Paul Tibbets the Distinguished Service Cross for his historic flight. [370]

•This leaflet, warning of the atomic bomb, was dropped on Nagasaki and two other Japanese cities the day before the second atomic bomb. It was largely disregarded because the Japanese people did



not yet understand what had happened to Hiroshima. [374]

• HIROSHIMA: A MILITARIZED CITY ...the Second General Headquarters, which was to plan and lead the defense against the expected American invasion, was established in Hiroshima. Supplies for Imperial forces in China, Southeast Asia and the Pacific had passed through the...port throughout World War II. [405]

• NAGASAKI AT WAR. Nagasaki...was a major industrial center. One of the most important shipyards in the nation was located in the harbor. The great naval base of Sasebo was nearby...The city was also home to a variety of factories critical to the war effort, including the Mitsubishi Steel Works. The torpedoes used in the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 were manufactured in Nagasaki. [411]

• "The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki put an end to the Japanese war. It stopped the fire raids, and the strangling blockade; it ended the ghastly specter of the clash of great land armies." Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson [501]

• Prime Minister Suzuki told his American interrogators after the war that the atomic bomb had enabled his military colleagues to surrender honorably. To surrender when one's powers of resistance remained was dishonorable; to surrender to a force of overwhelming power was acceptable without loss of face. No brigades of children with bamboo spears, no kamikazi attacks, no spiritual strengths could overcome such might...The bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the prospect of more to come, compelled Japan to surrender, lest it be destroyed forever. This was the argument that Hirohito made in council to his government, and it ended the war. [511]

• "When the atom bombs were dropped and the news began to circulate that...we would not be obliged in a few months to rush up the beaches near Tokyo assault-firing while being machine-gunned, mortared and shelled...we broke down and cried with relief and joy. We were going to live. We were going to grow to adulthood after all." Paul Fussell, U.S. Army infantryman in Europe, from "Thank God for the Atom Bomb" [512]

• The introduction of atomic bombs and their first use at Hiroshima and Nagasaki left a powerful legacy. For the Allies and Japan, a horrendous war was brought to an abrupt end. For the world, the new weapon was a double-edged sword. It offered both the hope of preventing another global war and the danger that a failure of deterrence could destroy civilization...The atomic bomb cannot be uninvented. But the atomic bombings that ended World War II provide grim evidence of the devastating potential of these weapons -- and perhaps the most compelling reason why they have not been used since. [516]

## APPENDIX II

STATEMENT OF  
THE NAVY LEAGUE OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of this committee:

I am Evan S. Baker, president of the Navy League of the United States, a patriotic organization dedicated to educating the American people about the importance of sea power, both naval and commercial, and about the continuing need for a strong national defense program across the board. I thank you, on behalf of the Navy League and its more than 68,000 members throughout the United States and overseas, for inviting the Navy League to submit a written statement during these important hearings.

My statement reflects my personal views. But I am convinced, from correspondence received at our national headquarters, and from conversations I have had with several past national presidents, most of our current national officers, and numerous Navy League council presidents, that it accurately reflects the views of the vast majority of our members as well.

From the beginning, those members have been concerned, as I have been, with the way in which the Smithsonian Institution handled the Enola Gay exhibit--which, as originally planned, was not only an insult to the dignity and honor of the many brave American and Allied servicemen who fought and died in the war with Japan, but also an affront to truth. Fortunately, this abortive attempt to distort truth and make it more politically correct was quickly recognized for what it was--a covert attempt by a small group of revisionist intellectuals to rewrite history to fit their own preconceived and devoutly held political agendas.

Thanks to the alertness and public-spirited efforts of such patriotic organizations as the Air Force Association and the American Legion, these intellectuals eventually failed in this effort. It is nonetheless instructive to consider in detail what they were trying to do. By virtually ignoring the fact that Japan had started the war by a surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, and by playing down both the Japanese record of atrocities throughout occupied Asia and the Japanese military's suicidal use of its own troops in last-ditch defenses of Saipan, Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and other islands, they gave undeserved and disproportionate prominence to a number of revisionist theories and suppositions about supposed U.S. "responsibility" for the war in the Pacific and about President Truman's courageous decision to use the atomic bomb as perhaps the only way to end the war quickly, thus saving many hundreds of thousands of *Japanese* as well as American lives.

There were numerous other distortions in the planned exhibit of what really happened during the war--and even more errors of omission. Following are but a few examples: The portraying of Japan's actions, particularly toward the end of the war, as simply a reaction to American "imperialism"; the glossing over of Japan's brutal attack on China, and other nations in the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere"; the outright murder of hundreds of thousands of Chinese and other Asian civilians, many of them women and children, both before U.S. entry into the war and on an even more massive scale during the war; the previously mentioned surprise attack on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, a date that will remain in infamy; the prominent display of the anguished victims of the Hiroshima bomb--but no parallel display of the thousands of military prisoners tortured, mutilated, and killed--often by beheading--by the Japanese, or of the estimated tens of thousands of Asian women and teenage girls forced to serve the Japanese military as "comfort girls".

I commend the Senate for its unanimous passage, on 23 September 1994, of the Sense of the Senate Resolution introduced by Sen. Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.), and I concur wholeheartedly in the Resolution language that describes the revised Enola Gay script as being, even with some minor cosmetic changes included, "revisionist, unbalanced, and offensive." And I commend the members of this committee for seeking to determine not only what happened, and why, but also what corrective actions might need to be taken to protect the public interest in any similar situations that might occur in the future.

And there is a very real, extremely significant public interest involved in what has become known as the Enola Gay controversy. The Smithsonian Institution receives 77 percent of its funding from the federal government and, while it operates with a remarkable degree of autonomy, is ultimately accountable to Congress and, through Congress, to the American people. Millions of Americans, and hundreds of thousands of foreign visitors, visit the Smithsonian each year. They have a right to expect that the exhibits they see, and the information they are provided--whether in print, visual, or graphic form--be both accurate in its content and balanced in its context. Neither the original Enola Gay script nor any of the several revisions drafted under the pressure of public outrage could reasonably be described as either objective or balanced.

The decision made by the Smithsonian's senior officials to abandon any further attempts to revise the script and to scale down

the exhibit to a simple presentation, virtually without commentary, of a few artifacts, including part of the Enola Gay fuselage, may have defused the controversy to some extent, but it also, in my opinion, introduces an error of another kind. Rather than distorting history, it seeks to avoid history, insofar as possible.

This policy is in my mind almost as reprehensible as the Smithsonian's earlier Enola Gay policy and once again perverts truth in the name of diplomacy and in the end will do much more harm than good. It is one thing simply to ignore the lessons of history--and we as a nation have done just that, many times in the past. It is another and much more serious matter to deliberately conceal history from ourselves and our posterity.

Americans, and foreign visitors to our nation's capital, traditionally have regarded the Smithsonian's Museums as the storehouse of our nation's history. They do not expect the Smithsonian to allow itself to be corrupted by politically correct revisionists who seek to further their own preferred political or social agendas by distorting the presentation of historical events or eras.

But that is what has happened with distressing frequency--and specifically at the Smithsonian, which in recent years has allowed itself to be used numerous times by special interest groups, and which has displaced some of its major traditional displays for others of less historical significance, but which are deemed by the Institution's anonymous arbiters to be more socially or politically fashionable.

But even that is not the worst aspect of the Enola Gay controversy. Danger to the institution aside, the real danger of this attempt to manipulate history is that it undermines the people's confidence in, and respect for, all public institutions. The Enola Gay issue is but one instance of what seems to be a continuing trend along these lines. Two other instances that immediately come to mind are the President's Pearl Harbor Commemoration announcement that made no mention of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, and the more recent White House statement that the term "V-J Day" would not be used in U.S. observances commemorating the end of World War II in the Pacific.

It has been reported numerous times that Americans are

frustrated and disillusioned with their institutions and government. If they are, it is at least partially because of the disrespect, bordering on contempt, for public opinion that is demonstrated by misguided and ill-advised attempts, such as those enumerated here, to manipulate and distort history.

The American people have a right to insist that, if their tax dollars are going to be used to provide financial support for institutions like the Smithsonian, those institutions display American history in a way that reflects mainstream American views. That is not what happened in this instance. Instead, Smithsonian officials seem to have decided, in planning the original Enola Gay exhibit, that concerns over the sensitivities of the Japanese government outweigh the scholarly need for accuracy and the moral obligation to portray American decision makers of the WWII era fairly and in context.

Today, Japan is an ally and friend of the United States. But it was not always so. History must reflect what was, not what certain intellectual elites think should have been, or what they would have liked it to be. This precept is desirable, if not legally enforceable, in privately funded museums; it is mandatory in museums, such as the Smithsonian, funded by taxpayer dollars.

On behalf of the Navy League of the United States, I thank you again for the opportunity to comment on this important public issue.

May 15, 1995

Chair and Members  
 U.S. Senate Rules Committee  
 Russell Bldg, Rm 305  
 Washington, DC 20510

Dear Committee Members:

As an individual, longtime member of the World War II Studies Association--formerly the American Committee on the History of the Second World War--I was deeply concerned by the implications of the Smithsonian Institution's intended, distorted depiction of the Asian Pacific War and our dropping of the atom bombs. (For an excellent article on Hirohima and the historical battles about it, please see Penn State professor Robert J. Maddox's "The Biggest Decision: Why We Had to Drop the Atomic Bomb," in the May-June 1995 issue of American Heritage magazine.) The exhibit text's intimation that Japanese militarism was simply a reaction to the racism of European colonialism would have been utterly ludicrous, considering the even worse racism the Japanese aggressors exhibited toward the Chinese and other Asian peoples they were supposedly "liberating"--to say nothing of the ruthless sexism demonstrated by their enslavement of Asian and European "comfort women."

The Japanese' barbaric treatment of prisoners (and, on occasion, of their own would-be rescuers/captors) and their penchant for suicide established the savage, no-mercy tone of the entire war. Their Pearl Harbor "sneak attack," on a Sunday morning even while they were conducting peace negotiations in Washington, revealed a dimension of viciousness and treachery by the Japanese' governing militarists which earned the profound--if not permanent--rage and distrust of the American people and their leaders.

Travesties like the Smithsonian's intended omission of these essential facts are not only bad history: coming from a governmental agency, they have additional weight and credibility. A distortion of the motives for our use of the atom bombs by an "official" historian/agency, like this, can lead many Japanese people to consider themselves victims of the Allies rather than of their own militarists. This could relieve much of the Japanese people's postwar recrimination against militarism which has so far stifled any resurrection of that evil.

Unfortunately, this kind of "omissive history" is becoming all too typical of the historical profession in the United States. At the American Historical Association convention in Chicago in January, I stood up to challenge the "one-sided, hind-sighted, and all too 'academic'" panel presentation on Hiroshima, chaired by Dartmouth professor, Dr. Marty Sherwin. (The panel's presenters abetted various "revisionist" claims: that the American people didn't support unconditional surrender, that a substantive Japanese peace overture had been made and was known to President Truman, that a primary reason the bombs were dropped was that their creators simply wanted to see if they worked--ergo, regardless of the human grief/consequences--etc.)

While "liberal" professors probably outnumber "conservative" in academia, they have generally respected and encouraged a diversity of opinion in their classes, to judge by my own experience as a graduate student at Western Illinois University in Macomb. However, the new generation of historians taking over the profession exhibits far less perspective, balance, and tolerance, and "politically correct" history is proliferating throughout American education and bureaucracies. This cancer to truth will require decisive measures to monitor and remedy.

Even on a few of the Internet discussion groups for academic historians, I have seen (and experienced) editorial bias/censorship against conservative viewpoints, on occasion--despite the efforts of people (like "H-Net" organizer Richard Jensen of the University of Illinois, for example) to make sure issues like Hiroshima are being addressed in a balanced and tolerant manner. (The power of Internet is inestimable!, and it has moved the United States to the position of ultimate leadership of international academic/intellectual life. Congress would do well to support it fully, as a public works institution, while making sure that the open and balanced freedom of ideas and expression is maintained.)

To AHA's credit, I was given fair opportunity to raise questions and participate from the floor. However, it is easy for some of the more extreme /outrageous "academic exercises" being held there to be given undue credence in the media, at home and abroad. Indeed, Dr. Sherwin has made trips to Japan, presumably to publicize and coordinate his Hiroshima "teach-ins" being held on campuses over here.


Not to AHA's credit, exasperation was expressed at our meeting of the World War II Studies Association--attended by such military history luminaries as Dr. Gerhard Weinberg and Marine Corps historian Ben Frank--about the contemptuous way our request for a "50th anniversary" military history panel (on amphibious warfare) was denied by the AHA. (The "unofficial" panel put on by the World War II Studies Association itself, then, was excellent--including presentations on Carlson's "Marine Raiders," Tarawa, and other topics.)

It is very easy for other countries and peoples to become confused and misled by the contradictory dialogues of our country's "open forum" approach to academic and political discourse and debate. Congress' passage of the prewar Draft by only one vote was a key factor which led Japanese militarists to believe that Americans wouldn't have the stomach to wage war in the Pacific and would capitulate to Japanese demands after a knockout blow at our Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor.

This is why I have proposed an International Historical Commission on the Asian Pacific War. (Please see the attachment.) It is important that Pacific nations achieve a final "official" resolution and reconciliation of the truth about that tragic war and its various issues. Japan is on the verge of strategic superpower status, and it is vital that the Japanese people understand that it is not just Americans who need them to acknowledge and forswear--in their educational programs, as well as the rest of their society--the evil of their World War II militarism. Any veto by Japan of the historical findings of this commission (or of the educational dissemination of those findings) should directly impact any consideration of Japan for U.N. Security Council status.

Thank you for your time and consideration of my concerns.

Respectfully,

  
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January 5, 1995

PROPOSAL: An International Historical Commission on the Asian Pacific War

Fifty years ago, the soldiers and civilians of many nations died in the Pacific War. The peoples of China, the Philippines, and Japan suffered especially. The battles were many and reflected the bitter antipathy of the adversaries. Regrettably, much of that bitter antipathy remains as a poison to Pacific nations' relations and future.

The Japanese government and educational system has frequently refused to acknowledge responsibility for the initiation of the Pacific War or for atrocities perpetrated by Japanese militarists against not only Allied servicepeople but also against civilians in Asian lands. Filipino deaths alone, due to Japanese atrocities and the war, have been estimated as high as one million. Instructional omission or misrepresentation by Japanese educators of important Pacific War events like "The Rape of Nanking" (1937) have raised international concerns.

Meanwhile, some people believe the American dropping of the atom bombs to have been unjustified and to have been crimes against humanity as serious in principle as any others in the Pacific War. In the United States, the intellectual Left is marshalling its forces to prove Hiroshima was an unnecessary and possibly racist tragedy. This may lead Japanese to consider themselves victims of the Allies rather than of their own militarists, and it could relieve much of the postwar public feeling and pressure against militarism in Japan which has so far stifled any resurrection of that monster.

Similarly, rumors of Allied atrocities--against Okinawan civilians in 1945, for example--should be investigated objectively and resolved fairly.

In general, the German people and government have done far more to remember and condemn the aggression and atrocities of the Nazis, than the Japanese have done in regard to Imperial Japanese militarism. Recent revelations in Russia about the Soviet Union's aggression and atrocities during World War II have shown a willingness by Russians to face some unpleasant truths about Soviet conduct and its consequences.

In 1991, lingering bitterness led some American veterans to refuse Mitsuo Fuchida--the strike commander of the Japanese naval air squadrons which attacked Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941--direct participation in the 50th year memorial service. This happened despite Fuchida's postwar conversion to Christianity and his repentance for his role in that massacre of 3,000 young American servicemen and civilians. An important opportunity for reconciliation was lost.

In America, the World War II generation rightly takes great pride in having won "The Just War"--sometimes even overlooking credit due to the World War I generation for its leadership and planning. However, the "blood, sweat, toil and tears" of the actual battles and victories will all be lost, if their cruelly earned lessons are distorted and/or forgotten. The true history of war is the most important memorial to those who have suffered the ultimate price for it. As survivors of the Jewish Holocaust would tell us, "Never again!" means "Never forget!" Thus we are now engaged in a second World World War II: for the Truth.



## The Proposed Commission

I therefore suggest that an international historical commission be convened to investigate the basic facts and issues of the Asian Pacific War, to achieve a final resolution of those, and to produce a basic position paper and video presentation for continuing dissemination to students of all the participating countries by their governments. A similar commission constructively addressed historical differences between the Polish and Soviet peoples in the mid-1980s.

With regard to war efforts, roles, and losses, the commission should be composed of five major, voting blocs: China, Japan, Pacific Rim Allies, other nations/peoples of Asia and Oceania, and European Allies. Each bloc could exercise veto power against any final consensus. However, in view of the United Nations' birth from the struggle against Axis militarism and aggression, Japan's exercise of its veto power on this historical commission should directly and decisively impact any present or future consideration of it for membership on the UN Security Council.

Although, logically, historians should make up most of the delegations' membership, room should be allowed for actual veterans, journalists, etc. Members should be truly representative of their countries and selected by their national legislatures. Decisions within the blocs could be by simple or two-thirds majority. The blocs' membership could be composed as follows:

China:	15	members
People's Republic of China and Hong Kong	10	
Republic of China	5	
Japan and Okinawa	12	
Pacific Rim Allies	12	
Canada	1	
Russia/Commonwealth of Independent States	1	
United States	10	
Other Asian and Pacific nations:	16	
Australia	2	
Philippines:	3	
Burma	1	
India	1	
Indochina	1	
Indonesia	1	
Malasia	1	
New Zealand	1	
North and South Korea	1	
Oceania	1	
Pakistan/Bengladesh	1	
Singapore	1	
Thailand	1	
European Allies	7	
France	1	
Great Britain	4	
Netherlands	2	
	62	

A country could request membership in a different bloc.

For membership in the United States delegation, for example, I would expect Congress to draw heavily from a professional association like the World War II Studies Association.

Questions, criticisms, and comments on this proposal are welcome.

FACTS ON W.W. II AND JAPAN RELEVANT TO HEARINGS ON  
SMITHSONIAN EXHIBIT

FROM: VICTOR FIC  
TOKYO CORRESPONDENT  
ASIAN DEFENSE JOURNAL

TRUTHS ABOUT HIROSHIMA

1) THE IMPERATIVE OF ACCURACY

Hiroshima was such a pivotal event in human history that it will still spur discussion centuries from now. I would like to contribute to a proper interpretation of the bombing because:

a) the men who ordered and carried out the bombing have a right to be judged fairly, and not be wrongly considered guilty of errors and crimes for ages to come. In any free society, a person has the inalienable right to be declared guilty or innocent according to the evidence, and those who wield the gavel have an obligation to ensure objectivity and fair-mindedness. But surely these nostrums have added significance in this case, as an unfounded condemnation could lead to the blackening of a name for ages hence.

b) humanity must understand the accurate moral and political lessons of the bombing, such as the inherent dangers of despotic rule, the suicidal ramifications of mindless conformity, and the need for good to resist evil. If propaganda or falsehoods reign, future generations will lack the clear lenses for seeing the diplomatic and moral challenges they face.

c) Japan wants a warped interpretation of the bombing to prevail to buttress its immoral conviction that it was the victim of American racism and aggression in the war. Opposing Japan on W.W. II is important to me simply because:

i) any professional analyst must seek the truth;

ii) the prevailing Japanese view of Hiroshima and W.W. II is driven by a self-pity and an Orwellian propensity to manufacture "truth", among other dysfunctional values (please note enclosed

short articles on this theme). These characteristics will not encourage Japan to be a responsible actor on trade, security or human rights issues. Whenever Japan displays these tendencies, whether on Hiroshima or car imports, the U.S. must signal to Japan that it will be exposed and rebuffed, firmly yet fairly, in the name of veracity, stability or equity.

2) THE CORRECT VIEW OF HISTORY

i) Why Japan Would Not Surrender

a) Social Structure Promotes Public Fictions and Conformity

Revisionist historians assert that in mid-1945, Japan was "already defeated and on the verge of surrender", or words to such effect. This is not true.

The revisionists cardinal error is assuming that the Japanese think and feel like Americans do, and so were about to exit the war because of their depleted military might and widespread suffering. That is, they made a rationalistic cost/gain/risk calculation, undergirded by norms that exalt life over death, compromise with foes and diplomatic pragmatism.

The simple truth is that the Japanese have always behaved like Japanese. Japanese society even in peacetime is intrinsically conformist in the name of harmony, the supreme virtue. People face intense social pressures to maintain societal taboos, think, speak and behave like others (some Japanese high schools, in the 1990's, still force girls with natural red or brown hair to carry cards certifying that they did not use dye to look different). They are socialized from birth to perceive and to espouse the public fiction and to keep secret - very secret - their sense of the reality behind that fiction.

The public facade is known as "tatemae", while the sincere conviction is called "honne".

During the war, these social values assumed pathological dimensions. While many in 1945 knew or suspected that Japan lacked the weapons and men to win, they suppressed their sentiments. Instead, they acted on the public, nation-wide fiction that Japan, with its samurai spirit and divine protectors, would defeat the mongrel-raced Americans.

Japanese are not Americans - their radically dissimilar social structure and mass attitudes have a 1,500 year history. It is intellectually debased to speculate or predict what the Japanese would have done in 1945 by imputing to them a value system derived from Judeo-Christian ethics, the legacy of the Western European enlightenment, and the individualistic spirit of post-agrarian America.

b) Paranoid Fear of the Americans

Yet another factor compelling the Japanese to resist to the bitter end was the propaganda that had made the entire nation paranoid about their post-defeat fate. The authorities had drummed into the people's heads that when American troops land, they will forcibly prostrate women and children in a line and crush them under tanks. Obviously, this hideous scenario would induce people to pray to the war gods for superhuman prowess - unless unfathomable force, rendered more painful because of its surprise value, made capitulation seem like the lesser of two evils.

c) The Japanese Hero is Self-Abnegating

For centuries, Japanese literature, drama and philosophy have propagated the ideal of the self-abnegating hero. The archetypical American hero follows his conscience, is true to himself, and is willing to confront a disapproving majority.

However, the Japanese hero is someone torn between duty to the self and to the group, be it the family, business firm, military unit or nation. He agonizes over the choices, generally in a private world, before ultimately submerging his inclinations, even those rooted in primordial human instinct for survival and comfort, for the collective. Japanese is full of proverbs that warn that American-style heroes will be castigated; "the nail that sticks up gets hammered down" is the best known, and is told to kindergarten students.

To be sure, the Japanese model of the hero, held explicitly or implicitly in the minds of millions, bred a "never surrender" outlook. The kamikaze pilots were the very apotheosis of this ideal: many wrote regretfully about their imminent death, their natural desire to return to their sweethearts, and the hopelessness of the kamikaze strategy. Some even had to climb into the cockpit drunk to force themselves to overcome their love of life and revulsion at a futile self-annihilation for the group. But almost none of them abandoned their post, or turned back; virtually every one elected to make the fiery crash that snuffed out his young life the very symbol of his love for Japan.

It required unbearable pain in the form of the atomic bombs for this ideal to be supplanted with the elemental urge for survival and comfort.

d) Survival is Shameful...

A corollary to the hero model is the notion that Japanese people who escape suffering should feel embarrassed or even ashamed. The West also has the phenomenon of survivors guilt, but in Japan, this emotion is infinitely more commonplace and embedded in the minds of average people. Survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have written or said that they felt extremely guilty that they had survived the bombings to the point of wanting to hide away.

This psychology also colored views of the home front towards the soldiers still fighting in the Pacific. It was a powerful impediment to the masses choosing life through surrender, given the privation that their rifle-bearing sons and brothers were enduring, and the misery of their fellow citizens being pounded by hordes of deadly B-29 bombers.

e) The Left Wing Joins the Fight

As the militarists seized power in the 1930's, and during W.W. II, the Japanese left not only failed to protest and oppose what it was seeing, it actively supported the new jack-booted regime headed by Tojo. Japanese communists, including Stalinists and Trotskyites, labor leaders, pacifists and intellectuals underwent the process of "tenko". This means a dramatic recantation of beliefs, involving the soul as well as the mind, and the embracing of a previously opposed ideology. For about twelve years, ending in 1945, the left jettisoned its principles to herald the dawning of the Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Of course, in American politics, one can also cite instances of defections. But the Japanese example is different in degree and implication: hardened leftists, champions of international

socialist revolution and world peace, became among the most impassioned defenders of an imperialistic war that left some 30 million Asians dead.

Admittedly, some leftists never defected; they suffered social persecution, torture and execution. Others broke down under ghoulish torture. But a great many abandoned their long commitment to proselytizing socialism and pacifism. They asserted in their public utterances, diaries, articles and broadcasts that they realized they had been like errant children, but were now rushing to be embraced again by the warm and tender arms of the national Mother.

Along with the leftists, Christian groups, centralist intellectuals and journalists also advocated the national war aims. A few retreated into hapless silence as a means of non-violent resistance. The Buddhists' conformity was especially appalling, as Japan was then killing co-religionists in countries - China and Korea - that were the very womb and cradle of Japanese civilization. Imagine Americans uncritically supporting the United States in the 1940's as the Marines feverishly massacred the British, forced British women into prostitution, and conducted diabolical medical experiments on British prisoners.

There are several conclusions to be drawn:

- a) the forces of conformity were so powerful in Japan as it fought the war that they overrode almost every deductive, moral principle derived from religion, ideology or intellectual theory.
- b) if even Stalinists were willing to support the emperor system and an imperial war, it is safe to surmise that the average Japanese person, inculcated with nationalistic propaganda from

birth, was even more of a die hard. This observation does not point to the conclusion that the Japanese were on the verge of making a rational decision to surrender in 1945, when there were still 80 million people on the home front, armed with weapons, driven by patriotism mixed with wrenching fear.

ii) Why Truman Could Not Guarantee the Emperor

Several historians, like Professor Barton J. Bernstein of Stanford, have argued that Japan was putting out peace feelers, and that it would have quit the war if the U.S. had agreed with the Japanese request that the emperor system be preserved. This view is wrong.

It would have been impossible for Truman to back away from the pledge made by all allied leaders at the war's outset, and again at Potsdam, for an unconditional surrender of fascism. He could not have left in power a man, namely Hirohito, denounced as an Asian Hitler any more than Churchill could have agreed to a Nazi capitulation on the proviso that Hitler would remain the undisputed leader of Germany.

True, after the war, Hirohito was left on the throne. But, by then, passions had cooled: America had won the war; the fascist dragon was dead for good in Japan and elsewhere; the emperor was needed as a figurehead to implement the Occupation; and the public's attention shifted rapidly to demobilization and prosperity at home. Finally, Americans were prepared to manifest the magnanimity and generosity towards defeated opponents which is a hallmark of the American character.

iii) Casualties from Invasion



Invasion deaths would have been astronomical. At the very least, 400,000 men would have died, because Tokyo had ordered the wardens of p.o.w. camps to slaughter all prisoners upon an invasion. Even if not a single invading allied soldier have been killed, the prompt death toll among the Western armies would still have been four times higher than the 100,000 or so who died instantly at Hiroshima.

There is also ample evidence that the Japanese were planning a defense to the death of their homeland. Kenzaburo Oe, the Nobel prize winning writer, for example, has written that after Emperor Hirohito made his surrender broadcast, Japanese people began to wrap up swords and hunting rifles, which they furtively buried in forests. He has recalled how high school students practiced charging at straw dummies with pointed bamboo poles. And he recollects that when teachers asked him as a boy what he would do if Emperor Hirohito commanded him to die, he shouted, "I would cut open my belly."

The very survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have asserted in books like Hiroshima and The Bells of Nagasaki that they were swinging sharpened bamboo spears in the days before the atomic attacks, and that they never thought they would hear their divine leader calling upon the benighted "fatherland" to surrender. These same survivors have been lionized as heroes by the so called peace movement, but in fact, they were ardent supporters of fascism; they were willing to commit suicide in resisting the expected American invasion, taking with them to the next world as many Marines as they could skewer eight inches above the testicles. The atomic bombings, however tragic and gruesome, saved countless numbers of American - and Japanese - lives.



Historians'

Committee for Open Debate on Hiroshima

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Martin J. Sherwin

May 18, 1995

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Jon Wiener  
Blanche Wiesen Cook  
Alfred Young  
Marilyn B. Young  
et al

Sen. Ted Stevens  
Chairman  
Committee on Rules & Administration  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Sen. Stevens,

With the understanding that the Committee has agreed to accept written statements for the record, we wish to submit the enclosed memo and several published articles. The memo is a chronological analysis of the Washington Post's coverage of the Enola Gay/Smithsonian controversy. The memo demonstrates how the media in general has inappropriately framed the debate over the Smithsonian's planned exhibit on the Enola Gay. It was recently sent to the Washington Post, whose editorial director, Meg Greenfield, replied to us in a letter dated May 10, 1995 defending her newspaper's editorials. (Since then, this copy of the memo has been slightly edited for two minor factual errors.)

Given the fact that you have found time for only one historian to testify in proceedings which are of a major concern to professional historians, we request that these materials be printed together with any other testimony pertaining to this Senate hearing.

Sincerely,

Kai Bird & Martin Sherwin  
Co-Chairs

May 18, 1995

Washington Post Coverage of the Enola Gay Controversy

(Submitted by the Historians' Committee for Open Debate on Hiroshima to the Senate Rules and Administrative Committee Hearings on the Smithsonian Institution.)

Summary:

The Post's coverage of the Enola Gay was unbalanced: the newspaper reported the controversy as a dispute between thousands of veterans--armed with their irrefutably authentic memories--and a handful of wooly-headed curators. The Smithsonian's curators are described as men of a younger generation who never saw combat, and in some cases were not even American-born or citizens of America. The curators, according to the Post, were influenced by left-wing revisionists, the anti-Vietnam war movement and a latent anti-Americanism. The script they produced was sympathetic to the Japanese and painted the Americans as villains in a "war of vengeance." In the Post's coverage, historians were rarely quoted, and the historical evidence was rarely cited. (See the attached quotes from various archival documents and memoirs which are well known to any university student studying the end of the Pacific war, but which were never quoted in the Post's reporting on this controversy over a contentious historical event.) In stark contrast to the Post, the New York Times editorialized that the curators should be left alone to do their job, and the Times reporters frequently quoted both historians about the controversy and quoted from some of the key archival documents.

Chronology of Articles with Commentary

May 31, 1994: Guy Gugliotta reports that "curators also are contending with skeptical veterans..." The basis of the story is the fact that the editor of Air Force Magazine, John T. Correll, has accused the museum of "politically correct curating." Gugliotta interviews Martin Harwit, the director of the museum and one of the curators, Tom Crouch. But no historian of the Hiroshima decision is quoted. Gugliotta concludes his reporting by saying, "...it is clear the museum will continue to have difficult and perhaps impossible time presenting any atom bomb display that will satisfy the vets. This is probably understandable. A sizable percentage of American males spent nearly four years of their youth getting frightened out of their wits in horribly unpleasant places because of Imperial Japan. Forgive, maybe. Forget, never. On the other hand, for the United States a nation that has never been fire-bombed, strafed,

napalmed, rocketed or mini-gunned in anger, there is something to be said for an exhibit that suggests that warplanes are not simply expensive sporting devices to be used for movie props or flyovers at presidential funerals."

July 21, 1994: Eugene L. Meyer writes in his lead sentence, "The Smithsonian Institution has failed to mollify critics of its controversial exhibit..." Correll, Harwit and Crouch are again quoted. Richard Hallion, an Air Force historian is quoted as being critical of the planned exhibit. But Meyer fails to report that Hallion, who was a member of the exhibit advisory board of historians, had previously approved the museum's basic draft script of January 1994. In written remarks given to the museum, Hallion actually wrote of the script, "Overall, this is a most impressive piece of work, comprehensive and dramatic, obviously based upon a great deal of sound research, primary and secondary."

Several other veterans are quoted, including Col. Paul W. Tibbets. Retiring Smithsonian Secretary Robert McC. Adams, is reported as raising questions about the exhibits balance. But no other historians are quoted. Meyer flatly asserts, "In fact, some military planners estimated upwards of 800,000 American casualties would result from a planned two-stage invasion in the fall of 1945 and spring of 1946." When queried over the phone about where this figure came from, Meyer said it came from an Air Force document. But a phone call to the Air Force historian who provided the document revealed that the document in question was written in 1994 and was merely this Air Force historian's personal estimate, extrapolated from casualty rates suffered during the battles of Okinawa and Iwo Jima. Kai Bird sent a letter to the editor correcting this "fact" but it was never published. Shortly after Meyer's piece was published, Kai Bird sent him a copy of J. Samuel Walker's survey of the scholarly literature on the Hiroshima bombings, published in Diplomatic History. Meyer never referred to the Walker essay in any of his subsequent reporting. As chief historian for the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Walker is certainly not a revisionist, but he concluded in his survey of the scholarly literature, "Careful scholarly treatment of the records and manuscripts opened over the past few years has greatly enhanced our understanding of why the Truman administration used atomic weapons against Japan. Experts continue to disagree on some issues, but critical questions have been answered. The consensus among scholars is that the bomb was not needed to avoid an invasion of Japan and to end the war within a relatively short time. It is clear that alternatives to the bomb existed and that Truman and his advisers knew it. . . It is certain that the hoary claim that the bomb prevented one-half million American combat deaths is unsupportable." Meyer decided this expert opinion was not newsworthy, even to provide a context for the debate taking place between the veterans and the museum's curators.

August 7, 1994: Martin Harwit Op Ed piece.

August 14, 1994: Washington Post Editorial attacks Harwit, the Smithsonian and "fashionable and wrong academic notion that all presentations of complex issues must be politically tendentious."

August 14, 1994: Five letters to the editor are published, including one by John T. Correll, the editor of Air Force Magazine. All five letters are critical of the exhibit.

August 19, 1994: Charles Krauthammer, columnist, charges that the museum has "fallen to the forces of political correctness and historical revisionism."

August 23, 1994: Chalmers M Roberts, retired Post reporter, publishes Op Ed, justifying atomic bombing based on casualty estimates given Truman in the event of an American invasion.

August 30, 1994: Ken Ringle reports Smithsonian acts to "defuse criticism." Ringle quotes Congressman Peter Blute, a critic of the museum, the Wall Street Journal, Smithsonian Secretary Adams--and not a single historian. Worse, he repeats a factual error published by a Wall Street Journal editorial of the previous day. The Journal editorial found it "especially curious to note the oozing romanticism with which the [exhibit's] writers describe the kamikaze...suicide pilots [as] 'youths, their bodies overflowing with life.'" Ringle reproduces this quote from the Journal in its entirety. The quote "youths, their bodies overflowing with life" is attributed to the curators, when actually this is a quote from a written Japanese source, which the curators were using in an attempt to explain how the Japanese militarists motivated such young men to volunteer for these suicide missions. It is an outrageous distortion to attribute this quote to the curators, and clearly demonstrates that Ringle once again has not read the script.

Sept. 30, 1994: Eugene Meyer reports "Smithsonian Bows to Critics..." Quotes Harwit, American Legion internal affairs director Hubert R. Dagley II, Air & Space Museum spokesman Mike Fetters, an aide to Sen. Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.), Rep. Peter Blute, Stephen P. Aubin (communications director of the Air Force Association---and one historian, Gar Alperovitz. The historian quoted, Gar Alperovitz, is the author of Atomic Diplomacy, one of the major critical studies of the Hiroshima decision. But Meyer did not bother to identify Alperovitz and merely quoted him innocuously saying that the Smithsonian was bowing to "a great deal of pressure." Meyer also reports as fact, "Earlier scripts had glossed over the estimated losses from a two-stage invasion of the Japanese home islands..." This was incorrect. Meyer's report leaves the impression that the Smithsonian was merely correcting an historical script which "some critics believed would portray the Japanese as innocent, even noble victims of

Americans hellbent on revenge for Pearl Harbor." Again, no reading of the first, second or third scripts could possibly leave any one with this impression. Meyer does not seem to have read the scripts, and has instead relied on the Air Force Association's and American Legion's characterization of the scripts as sympathetic to the Japanese.

Sept. 20, 1994: Colman McCarthy, columnist, says that while he is of the opinion that the United States "committed unprovoked war crimes that caused the slaughter of 200,000 Japanese, mostly civilians...But I hold with deep regard the feelings of those who see Hiroshima and Nagasaki differently." Paraphrasing David McReynolds from the War Resisters League, McCarthy then suggests that "debating the history of 1945 is futile."

Sept. 26, 1994: Ken Ringle: reports in a front-page story that "2 Views of History Collide Over Smithsonian A-Bomb Exhibit." Ringle says that for the curators who designed the exhibit the Hiroshima decision is "old history, a scholarly abstraction composed of archival records, argumentative books and the fading, flickering images on black and white film. For veterans like Grayford C. Payne, 74, of Annandale, who survived the Bataan death march...and slave labor in five Japanese prison camps, it was something else." Ringle then quotes Payne on how there was a notice posted in his POW camp signed by Japanese Prime Minister Hideki Tojo. The notice announced that all POWs would be shot the moment American forces landed in Japan. Payne is then quoted as saying that is why "all of us who were prisoners of war in Japan...revere the Enola Gay. It saved our lives." Powerful reporting, you might say, except for the fact that by the time the Enola Gay dropped its weapon on Hiroshima, Tojo had been ousted as prime minister for nearly four months. Ringle doesn't report this fact, or the fact that the Truman Administration's Japanese experts, including Acting Secretary of State Joseph Grew, had characterized the new Japanese government as being led by a moderate faction opposed by the hardline militarists. For Ringle, the only history that counts is the view from the foxhole (or the POW camp); what the President of the United States might be saying in his diary or what his aides might be telling the president about how to end the Japanese war is "old history, a scholarly abstraction composed of archival records, argumentative books..." And certainly for Ringle there is no space in his reporting for any description of that archival evidence.

Ringle reports, "The first script...laid heavy emphasis on the horrors of the atomic bombing, little on the Japanese aggression and atrocities that produced it." This is stated as fact when it is clearly Ringle's opinion. Again, any one who has read the entire script would be hard put to come to this conclusion, which suggests that Ringle, like Meyer, probably relied on the veterans' characterization of the script. Recall that even Air Force historians Richard Hallion and Herman Wolk initially praised the early script.

Ringle's long piece quotes Harwit, the various curators, Secretary Adams, Harry Truman's memoirs (but not his contemporaneous diary), Air Force historian Richard Hallion, the Air Force Association and---David McCullough. The author of a highly admiring biography of Harry Truman, McCullough is quoted at length. Martin Sherwin, the author of the critically acclaimed A World Destroyed: The Atomic Bomb and the Grand Alliance, is not quoted, but is referred to by curator Tom Crouch as having thought that "any display whatever of the Enola Gay was obscene because it would amount to a celebration of the bombing." Ringle does not bother to identify Sherwin as the author of a book which Time magazine called "definitive" and which is used in many college courses on the end of the war. (Sherwin was a member of the museum's historical board of advisors.)

Instead, Ringle chooses to quote McCullough at length justifying the bombing based on the argument that Truman was given high casualty estimates which persuaded him that the bomb would save lives. Ringle does not report in this story or any where else that McCullough has gone on the record to retract a crucial footnote in his book which wrongly suggested that Truman was given a military estimate of 500,000 to one million lives saved if an invasion was avoided. McCullough incorrectly attributes this archival document to say that it "shows that figures of such magnitude were then in use at the highest levels" when in fact the document in question actually shows that military leaders at the highest levels labeled such figures as exaggerations. Since the veterans groups often relied on McCullough's book to sustain their critique of the Smithsonian, this is no small matter. Ringle never addresses it in his reporting. (Note, however, that a reporter for Defense Week, Tony Capaccio, published a piece which reported all of the above facts about McCullough's retraction.)

Neither can Ringle claim ignorance. Like Meyer, he too was sent a copy of the J. Samuel Walker survey of the scholarly literature. He neither responded to a letter from Kai Bird nor referred to any of the scholarly literature cited by Walker in his reporting.

Ringle's piece also contains basic errors of logic: he reports for instance that the initial script "devotes many pages to academic speculation about whether the bomb was really necessary to force a Japanese surrender." Logically, however, the same word--"speculation"--can be used to describe the entire argument of those veterans who say there would have been an invasion if the bomb had not been dropped. Both arguments rest on a "what if." The invasion of the Japanese home islands never happened. But historians have documented that many of Truman's aides were telling him that the Japanese were ready to surrender. That did happen, and should have been treated by Ringle as part of the historical evidence and part of any historical context for an exhibit attempting to depict what happened at Hiroshima.

Ringle further suggests that the first script failed to note that the Strategic Bombing Survey--which concluded that the

Japanese would have surrendered without the atomic bomb, without the Soviet entry into the war, and without an invasion--was "based" on the "escalation of massive conventional firebombing..." This is simplistic. A decision was made to end the firebombing of cities late in the summer of 1945, partly because the U.S. Army Air Force was running out of suitable targets, and partly because military planners has concluded that it would be more effective to target railroads. (see USSBS report, "The Effects of Strategic Bombing on Japan's War Economy" released in December 1946, p. 65, footnote 13.)

Instead of reporting the controversy as a debate over historical evidence, Ringle chooses to report it as a "generational" conflict between veterans who have authentic memories and a younger generation motivated by their anti-Vietnam war sentiments and their fear of atomic holocaust.

In short, Ringle is clearly biased in his reporting; he is determined to portray what the veterans remember as historical "fact" and what the historians write as "scholarly abstraction" at best and "left-wing", "anti-American" and "historical revisionism" at its worst. Again, why is your reporter ostensibly reporting on an event of historical controversy, refusing to interview and quote the historians who have studied this issue?

October 16, 1994: Gar Alperovitz, op ed on the "historians' new consensus." The first piece published in the Washington Post which gives their readers any sense of the historical scholarship on this issue. Notice, however, that the editors of the Outlook Section decide to package the Alperovitz piece with another Op Ed by Chalmers Roberts, entitled, "Our Boys or the Bomb?" (This is Roberts' second op ed piece on the subject.)

October 21, 1994: Eugene Meyer reports that "anti-war activists" are now weighing in on the controversy. He reports, "Until now, the anti-war counter-attack has been mainly in the form of letters to the editor and Op-Ed page pieces that have appeared in recent weeks in the New York Times and the Washington Post." Here, Meyer is vaguely referring to Op-Eds written by Kai Bird in the Times and Alperovitz in the Washington Post? These are the only Op Eds published on this issue and Meyer labels them "anti-war." Why? Why are either historians--who happen to have written important books in the field that deal with these issues--labeled as "anti-war"? Like Ringle, Meyer clearly wants to suggest that critics of the Hiroshima bombing, even if they be historians, are nevertheless motivated by some kind of generational, 1960s anti-war sentiments. (For the record, Alperovitz's book was written in the early 1960s and published in 1965, long before the anti-Vietnam war movement was more than blip on the horizon. In 1965-66, Alperovitz was an official in the State Department.)

November/December issue of Bulletin of Atomic Scientists: Eugene Meyer writes a signed opinion piece on the Enola Gay controversy.



Meyer says the veterans groups were right, the museum's script needed to be rewritten.

Nov. 18, 1994 - Eugene Meyer: "Academics Blast Revised Script" / Meyer reports on news conference organized by historians critical of the museum's cave in to "historical cleansing." Here is Meyer's opportunity to give the other side, but his reporting is brief and perfunctory. He does not bother to report the news--contained in the letter released at the press conference--that the Executive Board of the Organization of American Historians has issued a forceful condemnation of the Smithsonian's action. He doesn't report that even conservative historians--including historians like John Lewis Gaddis who believe the Hiroshima bombing was probably necessary--signed the letter protesting the museum's censorship. No effort is made to report any of historical evidence used by critics of the Hiroshima bombing: Eisenhower is not quoted, Admiral Leahy is not quoted, Truman's diary is not quoted. All these quotes were referred to by the historians at this press conference. But in the judgment of Meyer, this was not news.

Nov. 30, 1994: Robert P. Newman, Op Ed, "What New Consensus?" attacks Gar Alperovitz's previous op ed, taking up a full half-page.

Dec. 16, 1994: Eugene Meyer / reports on "peace activists" meeting with Air & Space Museum officials and their disappointment with the results of the meeting.

Jan. 19, 1995: Eugene Meyer, reports "veterans asked museum to cancel the Enola Gay exhibit." Meyer reports: "But in the months since, critics of the early exhibit scripts have grown increasingly restive as some historians and anti-war groups have mounted a counter-attack, meeting with curators and holding news conferences to denounce what they termed 'historical cleansing.'" At least one of those contacts bore fruit when Barton Bernstein, a Stanford University academician, convinced Martin Harwit, director of the Air and Space Museum, that the anticipated casualty figures in the revised exhibit text were too high."

Jan 20, 1995: Washington Post editorial: describes the Smithsonian becoming "bogged down from the first in denunciations of its incredibly propagandistic and intellectually shabby early drafts and then in denunciations of the denunciations from defenders of those drafts on the other side." The editorial goes on to describe the initial drafts as "tendentiously anti-nuclear and anti-American."

"...Never mind how a museum of the Smithsonian's stature and seriousness could have slipped into the absurdity of negotiating its labels. What it needs to do now is clear this mess off its screen...Get a couple of respected historians of the period, a military expert or two and some people who know about mounting

good exhibits , and charge them with getting a reasonable commemorative exhibit to the museum."

The editorial writers seem unaware that what they are proposing actually happened: initially, the museum had a few knowledgeable curators write a script in consultation with a board of historical advisors representing a broad range of views and institutional constituencies.

Jan 20, 1995: Ken Ringle and Eugene Meyer: report that three congressmen are calling for Harwit to resign, calling the exhibit script an "insult" to veterans. The story casts Harwit's predicament entirely from the perspective of the veterans groups: "For more than a year, veterans groups and others have charged that the Enola Gay script written by Harwit and other Air and Space Museum curators tends to present the Japanese as hapless victims of American aggression and racism in World War II instead of as militarists who brought on the atomic bomb by starting the war." This characterization of the script, and the debate, is factually inaccurate and slanderous. But since it is what the veterans organizations think, perhaps it should be reported. But why didn't Ringle and Meyer report what other parties to this dispute think? Why was no effort made to balance this statement by quoting a historian? If they had picked up the phone and asked Martin Sherwin, who sat on the museum's advisory board for the script, they could have easily obtained a quote which would have provided some balance. Or any of a dozen other historians who have written on this subject and followed the Enola Gay controversy. But this is typical of Ringle's and Meyer's reporting. They could have reported that from the perspective of a great many knowledgeable individuals, Dr. Harwit was clearly being hounded by a biased interest group (the American Legionnaires) and several right-wing, know-nothing Congressmen who haven't read any books on the subject and have no idea what they are talking about. But they preferred to report what these politicians said as fact.

Jan 26, 1995: George Will, columnist, praises the Washington Post's coverage of the Enola Gay controversy, which should be prime evidence of bias: "Washington knows what the Smithsonian is up to, thanks to the reporting of the Post's Ken Ringle and The Post's editorials."

Jan 27, 1995: Eugene Meyer: "Smithsonian May Drop A-Bomb Exhibit"  
Meyer reports, "When Harwit lowered the number [the casualty estimate number], based on a single historian's interpretation of one document, the American Legion last week demanded cancellation of the entire exhibit." Meyer is suggesting that Harwit capriciously amended the casualty estimate, and did so based on the advice of merely one historian. He fails to report that Harwit really had no choice unless he wished to consciously include in the exhibit a "fact" which he now knew to be untrue. Meyer fails to report that the historian in question, Barton

Bernstein, is the author of the single most authoritative journal article on this rather narrow and obscure question: what was Harry Truman told about casualty estimates and when? His work on this question has been thoroughly debated and inspected and still is considered the authoritative judgment on the matter. Meyer completely misses a great story here. He could have reported how Bernstein persuaded Harwit. It was in fact quite dramatic. Bernstein turned to Harwit in the November meeting with the delegation of historians and said, "We have our documents [on this casualty estimate question], where are yours to justify your figure?" Harwit had to admit he didn't have any documents. To suggest, in this context, that Harwit was caving in to the opinion of merely "one historian" is an outrageous distortion of what happened.

Jan 30, 1995: Eugene Meyer: an admiring profile of Paul Tibbets: "Target: Smithsonian / The Man who dropped the bomb on Hiroshima wants Exhibit scuttled." This piece is full of invective against "revisionist arguments" and makes no attempt to balance its admiring portrait of an admittedly likeable guy (Tibbets) with any questions about his obviously questionable view of historical events. It is a presentation of history from the perspective of the foxhole (or in this case, the cockpit) with no attempt to portray how the battle looked from the perspective of those making decisions in the White House. It is one-sided. For example, Meyer writes, "'It was a beautiful military target,' Tibbets says, referring to Hiroshima. It sounds harsh, but this is above all a military man speaking." A military man speaking? This is a great quote and Meyer is fully right to include it. But what are the facts? He quotes Tibbets saying Hiroshima was "the center of everything being done to resist an [Allied] invasion." Now is this true? What do historians think of this assertion? Well, if Meyer had called any of the historians who have written any of the books on this subject in the last twenty years, he would have been told that Tibbet's assertion was questionable, debatable at the very least, and probably an outright falsehood. Hiroshima did have some munitions factories on the outskirts of the city. But Tibbets was instructed to target the bomb on the center of the city. Hiroshima did contain one military headquarters for one of the home island armies. But its military significance can be judged by the fact that the city remained at the bottom of the Air Force's target list throughout the war. Hiroshima, in fact, became a target for the atomic bomb precisely because of its low military significance; it had been untouched by previous bombings and was therefore an ideal target on which to demonstrate the destructive force of the new weapon. Meyer is clearly ignorant of all of this. In his ignorance he is reduced to being a pure propagandist for an official version of history.

Jan 31, 1995: Eugene Meyer: "Smithsonian Scuttles Exhibit"  
Meyer quotes the reaction of one military historian, one

member of a "peace group" but no historians of the atomic bombings. They are clearly irrelevant.

Feb. 1, 1995: Washington Post editorial: "The Smithsonian Changes Course" This editorial begins by admitting that the cancellation "is an intellectual abdication..." But the edit then says, "It is important to be clear about what happened at the Smithsonian. It is not, as some have it, that benighted advocates of a special interest or right-wing point of view brought political power to bear to crush and distort the historical truth. Quite the contrary. Narrow minded representatives of a special interest and revisionist point of view attempted to use their inside track to appropriate and hollow out a historical event that large numbers of Americans alive at that time and engaged in the war had witnessed and understood in a very different --and authentic--way." In fact, the Post editorial writer got it backwards. The know-nothings did use political power to distort history, and worse to censor historical documents from a tax-payer funded museum. Why they did so with the support of The Washington Post's editorial board is a mystery.

Feb. 1, 1995: Joel Achenbach : "The Pabulum Museum" In an otherwise funny feature on the cancellation, this reporter writes, "For some reason academics have a natural lefty bent. They're intellectual southpaws: They throw left, catch left, teach left, think left. What is considered left by most people is considered orthodox in many academic circles. Gar Alperovitz, a historian who argues that it was unnecessary to drop the bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, contended yesterday that his view is mainstream in academia." He then quotes Alperovitz, and concludes, "Regular people don't want to see America trashed at the Air and Space Museum." This is all very amusing. Unfortunately, its affect is Joe McCarthy doing a comic routine. The aim here is clearly to marginalize Alperovitz, label him as a lefty, anti-American, intellectual insanelly bent on trashing America. It warns readers that anyone with such historical views risks being labeled in the same manner.

Feb. 4, 1995: Gar Alperovitz, op ed, "taking exception" replies two months later to the attack on him in Robert Newman's Nov. 30th op ed. It is certainly commendable that the Post found room to publish the author of one of the classic books on the decision to drop the bomb. But by using only Alperovitz, and by not soliciting op eds from Sherwin, Goldberg, Messer, et al. they make it easier for to suggest that Alperovitz is a party of one. (Why, for instance, didn't the editors or reporters of the Washington Post interview McGeorge Bundy or ask him for an op ed on? If they had, they would have learned that Bundy, the author of the first defense of the bombing decision, published in Harper's in 1947, now has retracted much of what he wrote nearly fifty years ago. That would have been interesting and news-

worthy. But it would not have fit into the perspective the Post editors obviously wanted to push on the Enola Gay controversy.)

This is hammered into the reader of Alperovitz's reply by the fact that the Post editors decided to package his piece with yet another Op Ed by Edwin Yoder, Jr. entitled, "...Or Hiroshima Cult?" Yoder's thesis is a continuation of Acherbach's comic McCarthyism. For Yoder, who is actually relying on Newman, those historians who are critical of the Hiroshima bombings are merely part of a "Hiroshima Cult." "Those who are content with cults, whether celebratory or derogatory, will worship as they like. Those who want history will read Newman." Yoder regurgitates Newman's thesis that "revisionist views of Harry Truman and the atomic bomb sprang from the tragic national division over Vietnam..." In fact, revisionist arguments about the bomb began much earlier and came directly as a consequence of the declassification or release from private archives of such critical pieces of archival evidence as Henry Stimson's diary (released by McGeorge Bundy in 1960) and Harry Truman's diary (discovered in 1978). Yoder's piece is merely a McCarthyite attempt to label critics of the Hiroshima decision as illegitimate. (Does Yoder believe Mac Bundy--or for that matter, Gen. Eisenhower--is part of this "Hiroshima Cult"?)

Feb. 7, 1995: Colman McCarthy, columnist, commenting on the cancellation, McCarthy writes, "Faced with posturing politicians and ranting militarists, the Smithsonian caved...Why this catering to American Legionnaires and similar groups who demand a one-sided version of history?"

Feb. 19, 1995: James Van de Velde, Op Ed, "Enola Gay Saved Lives, Period."

March 30, 1995: Eugene Meyer attends a panel discussion and press conference on the Enola Gay controversy at the annual meeting of the Organization of American Historians. But he publishes nothing. A tape-recording of this event is available and clearly demonstrates that this was an electrifying event attended by over three hundred historians who listened as a panel of historians lacerated the Smithsonian's censorship and the Washington Post's shoddy reporting. A letter with over a hundred signatories calling for a national teach-in on Hiroshima was released. Another letter was released by a delegation of Japanese historians which called for exhibits in Japan depicting Japanese atrocities during the war and exhibits in America depicting the tragic victims of the world's first atomic bombing. None of this was reported on by Meyer.

April 15, 1995: Washington Post editorial: "Apologies for Hiroshima?" The editorial writers assert without any evidence, "The chances of an early and voluntary surrender in the homeland were poor." They argue, "The nuclear bombs were a success in the crucial sense that they were followed by an immediate end to the

fighting with no further American deaths." No apologies are necessary and President Clinton need not have even added the "cautious qualification" that President Truman made the correct choice 'based on the facts he had before him.'" In other words, there should be no doubts raised about the decision.

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Historians'

Committee for Open Debate on Hiroshima

## QUOTES FROM VARIOUS DOCUMENTS AND MEMOIRS ON HIROSHIMA

### Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

It is my opinion that the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender...

My own feeling was that in being the first to use it, we had adopted an ethical standard common to the barbarians of the Dark Ages. I was not taught to make war in that fashion, and wars cannot be won by destroying women and children...<sup>1</sup>

### Joseph C. Grew, Undersecretary/Acting Secretary of State

The greatest obstacle to unconditional surrender by the Japanese is their belief that this would entail the destruction or permanent removal of the Emperor and the institution of the Throne. If some indication can now be given the Japanese that they themselves, when once thoroughly defeated and rendered impotent to wage war in future, will be permitted to determine their own future political structure, they will be afforded a method of saving face without which surrender will be highly unlikely.

The President said that he was interested in what I said because his own thoughts had been following the same line....<sup>2</sup>

### Shunichi Kase, Japanese Minister to Switzerland

A May 12, 1945 memorandum from O.S.S. Chief "Wild Bill" Donovan to President Harry S Truman detailing an approach by the Japanese Minister to Switzerland, notes that Kase reportedly:

believes that one of the few provisions the Japanese would insist upon would be the retention of the Emperor as the only safeguard against Japan's conversion to Communism. Kase feels that Under Secretary of State Grew, whom he considers the best US authority on Japan, shares this opinion.<sup>3</sup>

### General Dwight D. Eisenhower,

The first full public statement by Eisenhower (beyond the brief mention in Crusade in Europe) is contained in the book the president wrote immediately after leaving office, his 1963 Mandate for Change. In it Eisenhower also recalled the meeting at which Stimson told him about plans to use the bomb--and added the following information:

During his recitation of the relevant facts, I had been conscious of a feeling of depression and so I voiced to him my grave misgivings, first on the basis of my belief that Japan was already defeated and that dropping the bomb was completely unnecessary, and secondly because I thought that our country should avoid shocking world opinion by the use of a weapon whose employment was, I thought, no longer mandatory as a measure to save American lives. It was my belief that Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of "face." The Secretary was deeply perturbed by my attitude, almost angrily refuting the reasons I gave for my quick conclusions.<sup>4</sup>

In an interview with Newsweek reporter Jacquin Sanders Eisenhower said:

We'd had a nice evening together at headquarters in Germany, nice dinner, everything was fine. Then [Secretary of War Henry L.] Stimson got this cable saying the bomb had been perfected and was ready to be dropped. The cable was in code, you know the way they do it, "The lamb is born" or some damn thing like that. So then he told me they were going to drop it on the Japanese. Well, I listened, and I didn't volunteer anything because, after all, my war was in Europe, and it wasn't up to me. But I was getting more and more depressed just thinking about it. Then he asked for my opinion, so I told him I was against it on two counts. First, the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing. Second, I hated to see our country be the first to use such a weapon. Well . . . the old gentleman got furious. And I can see how he would. After all, it had been his responsibility to push for all the huge expenditure to develop the bomb, which of course he had a right to do and was right to do. Still, it was an awful problem.<sup>5</sup> <sup>1</sup>

### Army Air Force General Henry H. Arnold

In his 1949 memoirs Gen. Arnold observed that

...it always appeared to us that, atomic bomb or no atomic bomb, the Japanese were already on the verge of collapse.<sup>6</sup>

### Henry L. Stimson, Secretary of War

Byrnes was opposed to a prompt and early warning to Japan...<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Emphasis and ellipsis both in the original.



**Harry S Truman, President**

After his initial pre-conference meeting with Stalin on July 17--and after Stalin reported on his negotiations with Chinese Foreign Minister T.V. Soong on the Yalta understandings concerning the Far East--the president observed:

Most of the big points are settled...

Truman then went on to record Stalin's confirmation that:

He'll be in the Jap War on August 15.

Finally, the president noted his own judgment:

Fini Japs when that comes about.<sup>8</sup>

The next day Truman wrote in a private letter to his wife:

... I've gotten what I came for--Stalin goes to war August 15 with no strings on it. He wanted a Chinese settlement--and it is practically made--in a better form than I expected. Soong did better than I asked him....I'll say that we'll end the war a year sooner now, and think of the kids who won't be killed! That is the important thing.<sup>9</sup>

The president's journal entry of July 18, 1945:

P.M. [Churchill] & I ate alone. Discussed Manhattan (it is a success). Decided to tell Stalin about it. Stalin had told P.M. of telegram from Jap Emperor asking for peace. Stalin also read his answer to me. It was satisfactory. Believe Japs will fold up before Russia comes in.<sup>10</sup>

**Ralph Bard, Undersecretary of the Navy**

Ralph Bard is the only person known to have formally dissented from the use of the atomic bomb without advance warning. In a June 27, 1945 memorandum Bard declared:

Ever since I have been in touch with this program I have had a feeling that before the bomb is actually used against Japan that Japan should have some preliminary warning for say two or three days in advance of use. The position of the United States as a great humanitarian nation and the fair play attitude of our people generally is responsible in the main for this feeling.

During recent weeks I have also had the feeling very definitely that the Japanese government may be searching for some opportunity which they could use as a medium of surrender. Following the three-power conference emissaries from this country could contact representatives from Japan somewhere on the China Coast and make representations with regard to Russia's position and at the same time give them some information regarding the proposed use of atomic power, together with whatever assurances the President might care to make with regard to the Emperor of Japan and

the treatment of the Japanese nation following unconditional surrender. It seems quite possible to me that this presents the opportunity which the Japanese are looking for.<sup>11</sup>

### John J. McCloy, Assistant Secretary of War

At Potsdam, John J. McCloy heard of another Japanese peace feeler, this time delivered to Allen Dulles, the U.S. O.S.S. representative in Geneva. As Dulles reported it, Tokyo was hesitating only over the term "unconditional surrender":

They wanted to keep their emperor and the constitution, fearing that otherwise a military surrender would only mean the collapse of all order and of all discipline...<sup>12</sup>

John J. McCloy thought this report so significant that he had Dulles flown up to Potsdam to report personally on the peace feeler. He noted in his diary of July 27, 1945:

Maybe the Secretary's big bomb may not be dropped--the Japs had better hurry if they are to avoid it.<sup>13</sup>

On May 28, 1945 McCloy recommended that the phrase "unconditional surrender" be eliminated:

I feel that today Japan is struggling to find a way out of the horrible mess she has got herself into;...Unconditional surrender is a phrase which means loss of face and I wonder whether we cannot accomplish everything we want to accomplish in regard to Japan without the use of that term....<sup>14</sup>

McCloy later recalled that the day before the June 18, 1945 White House meeting:

I said, Mr. Stimson, it seemed to me that we were now at a point where our superiority was so vast over the Japanese; there were no more cities to bomb, no more carriers to sink or battleships to shell; we had difficulty finding targets; we had this tremendous moral and physical ascendancy which resulted from our win in Germany and our moving across the Pacific from the treachery of Pearl Harbor to the very doors of Japan; and I thought there must be some other means that ought to be explored in terminating the war without further bloodshed....he said he was inclined to think that this was right....<sup>15</sup>

McCloy expressed ethical concerns about the bomb:

God give us the intelligence and character to use it for good purpose.<sup>16</sup>

We should have given the Japs warning at least of what we had.<sup>17</sup>

**General of the Army George C. Marshall**

In a memo dated May 29, 1945, Marshall stated that the atomic bomb should:  
 first be used against straight military objectives such as a large naval installation....<sup>18</sup>

And that if the Japanese still did not capitulate:

we ought to designate a number of large manufacturing areas from which people would be warned to leave--telling the Japanese that we intended to destroy such centers.... every effort should be made to keep our record of warning clear.... We must offset by such warning methods the opprobrium which might follow from ill-considered employment of such force...<sup>19</sup>

**Leo Szilard, Manhattan Project Physicist**

Mr. Byrnes did not argue that it was necessary to use the bomb against the cities of Japan in order to win the war...Mr. Byrnes's...view [was] that our possessing and demonstrating the bomb would make Russia more manageable in Europe...<sup>20</sup>

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## FORGETTING THE BOMB

# The Assault On History

MARTIN J. SHERWIN

On January 30, I, Michael Heyman, Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution, bowing to pressure from veterans' organizations and Congressional critics, announced the drastic revision of a controversial exhibit at the National Air and Space Museum, "The Last Act: The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II." Perhaps no other public controversy in recent times demonstrates so clearly how much influence the sensibilities of 1945 still have on the politics of 1995, and how fifty years of the cold war have kept the need alive for Americans to be defined by World War II and, in turn, to protect its reputation.

To Americans, the defining characteristic of World War II was its lack of ambiguity. It was not just "the good war," it was the model war, the ideal war, the unifying war. Most Americans, public opinion polls conclusively demonstrated, were happy about how it ended. The atomic destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki seemed an appropriate and just

finale to a war against a vicious enemy that had launched a surprise attack on American territory.

But that atomic ending soon raised troubling questions. John Hersey's *Hiroshima* created sympathy for the victims. Reports that the Japanese had been seeking ways to surrender created doubts about the necessity of using atomic bombs. Hanson Baldwin, military editor of *The New York Times*, Norman Cousins, editor of the *Saturday Review of Literature*, and David Lawrence, editor of *U.S. News*, discussed alternatives to both the atomic bombings and an invasion.

By the fall of 1946 questions about the atomic bombings had become so prevalent that James Conant, the president of Harvard University and the former senior science administrator of the Manhattan Project, urged former Secretary of War Henry Stimson to write an article explaining why the atomic bombings were both justified and necessary. Stimson's article, "The Decision to Use the Atomic Bomb," was published in the February 1947 issue of *Harper's Magazine*. Arguing that the bomb was used to end the war quickly in order to save American lives, Stimson neglected to make reference to the many notations in his diary—which he otherwise relied upon—that suggested the advantages of using the atomic bomb during the war in order to deal more effectively with the Soviet Union afterward. Nor did he comment in this article—as he did in his autobiography published a year later—on the option of ending the war just as quickly, without using the atomic bomb, by modifying the demand for unconditional surrender. "It is possible, in the light of the final surrender," Stimson wrote in *On Active Service in Peace and War*, "that a clearer and earlier exposition of American willingness to retain the Emperor would have produced an earlier ending to the war" [Emphasis added.] The suggestion that the war could have ended earlier, without the use of the atomic bomb, was as upsetting in 1947 as it is in 1995.

The ambiguities introduced into the discussion of the atomic bomb in 1946 by Hersey, Baldwin, Cousins, Lawrence and Stimson, among others, were quickly submerged by the rising tide of the cold war, McCarthyism and the Korean War. The cold war forced everything that questioned "the good war" into the far left corner of our political basement. The critical histories of Hiroshima and Nagasaki that were written were either ignored by the mainstream press or tainted as leftist and revisionist. The natural discussion of this important issue was stifled. Thus the battle over the Enola Gay exhibit was not a debate over interpretations of history. It was, as Edward Linenthal has written, a struggle between popular memory and history, between the commemorative and the historical, cut off by fifty years of the cold war.

I was a member of the historical advisory board for the Enola Gay exhibit. My strong impression of the first draft of the script for the exhibition, which I shared with the other advisers, was that its historical section was inadequate. No one taking the trouble to study carefully the documents that were to be displayed would understand why so many historians challenge what President Truman and Secretary of War Stimson told the public about why the atomic bombs were used. The draft script offered only a glimpse into the declassified top-secret documents that have compelled historians to rewrite

the wartime history of the atomic bomb project. To those of us familiar with those documents it appeared as if the curators were giving undue attention to established myths at the expense of historical research. In a word, the draft script was *cautious*, which explains why the Air Force historians on the committee inquiry praised it as "a most impressive piece of work."

This view of the exhibit was not shared by John Correll, the editor of *Air Force Magazine*. Furious at director Martin Harwit for presumably masterminding the transformation of the Air and Space Museum from an Air Force showcase into something more serious, he published a critical review of the exhibit, "War Stories at Air and Space," in the April 1994 issue of *AFM*. Counting pictures of dead Japanese versus dead Americans, and affirming that veterans believed that the museum had become "an unpatriotic institution," Correll condemned the exhibit as pro-Japanese. Editorialists for *The Washington Star* and, astonishingly, for *The Washington Post* as well, swallowed Correll's bait, encouraging politicians running for re-election to join the attack.

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## *The attack on the Enola Gay exhibit is part of the 'culture wars' raging through America.*

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By means of a Senate resolution, and a threatening letter from the relevant committee chairman and his colleagues, the two houses of Congress joined forces to threaten the curators' jobs and the museum's funding. In taking this action, Representative Peter Blute of the Committee on Public Works and Transportation, Senator Nancy Kassebaum and the other Congressional critics of the Enola Gay historical exhibit laid the foundations for a post-cold war form of McCarthyism

in which the Japanese were substituted for the Soviets. Old McCarthyite smears such as "unpatriotic," "left wing" and "anti-American" were recycled in this deceitful campaign to decree an official history of the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

To say that this assault on a cautious presentation of the history of the debate over the atomic bombings is part of the turmoil within our political culture, or part of the "culture wars" that are raging through America, is to state the obvious. It is one with the general attack by the right on the news media, the National Endowment for the Arts, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Corporation for Public Broadcasting and the National History Standards report. It is an assault on the professional standards of a new generation of curators, whose training (not their politics) in history and curatorial science obliges them to present new and competing scholarly perspectives along with the expected and familiar.

Conservatives have been attacking the Smithsonian's museums regularly since 1988, arguing that the museums are merely "the nation's attic," where artifacts should be displayed but not evaluated, interpreted or contextualized. Those who have followed this campaign will recall, perhaps with a touch of irony, that the first target was the 1988 exhibit, "Toward a More Perfect Union," which documented the forced removal of Japanese-Americans to relocation camps during World War II. Thus another objection of the museum's critics is the subjects themselves: America's dirty laundry should not be hung in Washington, they insist.

In light of the events surrounding the Enola Gay exhibit, we might want to consider revising Santayana's famous aphorism: "Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it." A more appropriate formulation for the current state of affairs might read: "Those who insist only on their memories of the past are condemning the rest of us to avoid it." Of course, that is exactly the objective of the 1995 attacks on the history of 1945. □

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*Martin J. Sherwin is director of the John Sloan Dickey Center for International Understanding at Dartmouth College and Walter S. Dickson Professor of History at Tufts University. He is the author of A World Destroyed: Hiroshima and the Origins of the Arms Race (Random House).*



## ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES ARMY

2425 WILSON BOULEVARD, ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22201-3385 (703)841-4300

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JACK N. MERRITT, USA RET., PRESIDENT

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of this committee:

The Association of the United States Army (AUSA) is pleased to have the opportunity to submit a written statement on behalf of its 115,000 members giving voice to concerns about the Air and Space Museum's handling of the special Enola Gay exhibit.

AUSA has been associated with the Air Force Association and the American Legion's effort to get the Air and Space Museum to put forth an exhibit which demonstrated balance, put the Enola Gay in the proper context of the period, and included fairness when dealing with the decision of the political and military leaders of the time. We applaud the cancellation of the original exhibition and we are encouraged that the museum will now show a forward fuselage of the Enola Gay in a simpler, straightforward display. We hope the new exhibit will have the balance, context, and fairness that the brave Americans who participated in the events that the Enola Gay stands for truly deserve.

I want to applaud the Senate for its unanimous passage, on 23 September 1994, of the Senate Resolution which described the Enola Gay script as being "revisionist, unbalanced, and offensive". The American people who think of the Smithsonian Institution as its repository of America's history have a right to expect that displays and information provided will be balanced in context and accurate in content.



AUSA is in complete and unqualified support for the decisions of President Harry Truman and the direction and execution of the resulting missions by our military leaders. We offer no apology, no contrived justification for the two concluding acts that brought an end to the conflict. We believe that lives were saved, that greater and more populous areas of Japan were spared wartime carnage, and that the treasure of many nations was conserved by ending the drain of resources caused by combat operations.

We at AUSA, reflecting the convictions and sentiments of its World War II veterans, believe that only the shock promulgated among the Japanese people by the nuclear holocaust, could have caused their leaders to surrender precipitately. Conventional weapons, firestorms, and obscene casualty figures had not changed Japanese policy. We can speculate that a last-ditch sacrifice of the Japanese nation in a pattern with the Germany of Adolf Hitler was the promised alternative.

For these reasons, AUSA believes that the employment of atomic weapons at the termination of World War II was momentous and deserves special historical note by the Smithsonian. We believe that a factual presentation of what was done and the results achieved need not be qualified or embellished by what might have been or, in some views, should have been. We believe that President Truman, based upon what he knew at the moment, demonstrated the willingness to decide that is the mark of the great leaders of history.

Perhaps the greatest tragedy associated with the events that have surfaced with this exhibit is the perception given to the American people that another public institution cannot be trusted. We cannot stand by and allow anyone who would distort history to their own political agenda go unchallenged. The American people have a right to expect that any institution which receives tax payer dollars for support must be responsible enough to show accuracy and balance when writing about or demonstrating history.

On behalf of the Association of the United States Army, I thank you for providing an opportunity to comment on this important issue.

## APPENDIX III

## ENOLA GAY CHRONOLOGY 1993-1995

- AUGUST 20, 1993** The Air Force Association Executive Director discusses the planned exhibit with the Director of the Air & Space Museum. The Director of the Air & Space Museum sends the Air Force Association a copy of the first planning document for our review and suggestions.
- SEPTEMBER 10, 1993** The Air Force Association Executive Director expresses concerns over lack of balance to the Director of the Air & Space Museum.
- NOVEMBER 23, 1993** Air Force Association and Air & Space Museum officials meet to discuss the lack of balance in the exhibit. Museum officials counter that the exhibit is balanced.
- JANUARY 31, 1994** The Director of the Air & Space Museum forwards a copy of the first script to Air Force Association.
- FEBRUARY 8, 1994** The Editor of AIR FORCE Magazine interviews the Director of the Air & Space Museum for an article on the exhibit.
- MARCH 15, 1994** The Air Force Association releases the first special report on Script 1.
- MARCH 16, 1994** Air Force Association Press Release -- "Politically Correct Curating at the Air & Space Museum."
- MARCH 22, 1994** The Director of the Air & Space Museum submits a letter to the editor of AIR FORCE Magazine, which was accepted.
- APRIL 1, 1994** AIR FORCE Magazine feature article on the Enola Gay exhibit. "War Stories at the Air & Space," by John T. Correll, editor in chief.
- APRIL 1, 1994** AIR FORCE Magazine historical companion piece, "The Decision That Launched the Enola Gay," by John T. Correll, editor in chief.
- APRIL 15, 1994** Air Force Association directors meet with Congressional committee.
- APRIL 16, 1994** The Director of the Air & Space Museum in an internal memo agrees with critics that the exhibit does lack balance.
- MAY 4, 1994** The American Legion adopts a resolution condemning the exhibit.

- SEPTEMBER 1, 1994 AIR FORCE Magazine feature article on the Enola Gay exhibit. "The Last Act at Air & Space," by John T. Correll, editor in chief.
- SEPTEMBER 1, 1994 Smithsonian and Air & Space Museum officials travel to the American Legion National Convention to request Legion participation in a line-by-line review process of Script 3.
- SEPTEMBER 9, 1994 Air Force Association analysis of Script 3.
- SEPTEMBER 12, 1994 Air Force Association Press Release -- "AFA Says Enola Gay Revisions Must Go Further."
- SEPTEMBER 12, 1994 Delegates to the Air Force Association 1994 Convention unanimously adopts a resolution calling Script 3 "the beginning of a continuing process of revision."
- SEPTEMBER 27, 1994 Air Force Association Executive Director letter to the Director of Air & Space explaining time is running out and it is time to fix the flawed exhibit.
- OCTOBER 1, 1994 AIR FORCE Magazine follow-up article on the Enola Gay exhibit. "Museum Promises to Change Enola Gay Exhibition," by John T. Correll, editor in chief.
- OCTOBER 3, 1994 Air & Space Museum releases Script 4.
- OCTOBER 17, 1994 Air Force Association completes analysis of Script 4 and forwards with letter of explanation to the Under Secretary of the Smithsonian.
- OCTOBER 19, 1994 Air Force Association, The Retired Officers Association and the Veterans of Foreign Wars meet with Smithsonian and Air & Space leadership to discuss ways to make Script 4 less political and more historical.
- OCTOBER 20, 1994 Air Force Association Press Release -- "Enola Gay Exhibit Improved, but Significant Work Remains."
- OCTOBER 26, 1994 Air & Space Museum releases Script 5.
- OCTOBER 28, 1994 Air Force Association analysis of Script 5.

- MAY 25, 1994** The Tiger Team, an internal independent group assembled by the Air and Space Museum releases its critique of Script 1.
- MAY 31, 1994** The Air & Space Museum releases Script 2.
- JUNE 9, 1994** General Tibbetts, the pilot of the Enola Gay, calls the exhibit "a package of insults."
- JUNE 21, 1994** Dr. Neufeld of the Air & Space Museum in a letter proclaims Script 2 final unless there are minor suggestions.
- JUNE 23, 1994** Air Force Association finally receives a copy of Script 2.
- JUNE 28, 1994** Air Force Association analysis on Script 2.
- JULY 12, 1994** Office of Air Force History questions the lack of balance and context in Script 2.
- AUGUST 10, 1994** Air Force Association Press Release -- "Air & Space Museum Continues Revisionist Line on World War II."
- AUGUST 10, 1994** Congressmen Blute and Johnson with two dozen members of Congress send a letter to the Secretary of Smithsonian condemning the exhibit and urging solutions be found.
- AUGUST 17, 1994** Senior Air Force officials, Air Force Association leadership, the Director of the Air & Space Museum and senior military historians meet at the Pentagon to discuss the problems with Script 2.
- AUGUST 22, 1994** Air Force Association releases an update paper on the developments concerning Script 2.
- AUGUST 23, 1994** Letter from the Director of the Air & Space Museum to the Executive Director of the Air Force Association requesting line-by-line change recommendations to Script 2.
- AUGUST 24, 1994** Air Force Association Executive Director responds by letter to the Director of the Air & Space Museum accusation that the Association has not clearly specified the problems with the script. AFA declines to make line-by-line changes.
- AUGUST 31, 1994** Air & Space Museum releases Script 3.

- NOVEMBER 1, 1994 AIR FORCE Magazine article on the Enola Gay exhibit. "The Three Doctors and the Enola Gay," by John T. Correll, editor in chief.
- NOVEMBER 3, 1994 Letter from the Air Force Association Executive Director to the Under Secretary of the Smithsonian with analysis of Script 5.
- NOVEMBER 17, 1994 Concerned historians write to the Director of the Air & Space Museum voicing their concerns that veterans groups are promoting propaganda versus history.
- NOVEMBER 23, 1994 Air Force Association meets with the Under Secretary of the Smithsonian to discuss ways to make the exhibit less political and more historical.
- DECEMBER 1, 1994 AIR FORCE Magazine editorial on the proposed Enola Gay exhibit, "Airplanes in the Mist," by John T. Correll, Editor in chief.
- DECEMBER 13, 1994 Congressmen convey deep concern to Smithsonian and request to see a sixth script in February.
- DECEMBER 15, 1994 Air Force Association, The Retired Officers Association and the Veterans of Foreign Wars meet with Smithsonian and Air & Space leadership to discuss ways to make the exhibit less political and more historical.
- JANUARY 9, 1995** Air & Space Museum changes label on number of estimated invasion casualties.
- JANUARY 18, 1995 American Legion calls for cancellation of exhibit.
- JANUARY 19, 1995** Eighty-one Congressmen ask for the resignation of the Director of the Air & Space Museum.
- JANUARY 20, 1995** Air Force Association Press Release -- "AFA Blasts the Air & Space Museum on Enola Gay Reversal."
- JANUARY 20, 1995 Air Force Association calls for cancellation of the exhibit.
- JANUARY 30, 1995** Smithsonian scraps the Enola Gay exhibit.

## APPENDIX IV



SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION  
 Washington, D.C. 20560  
 U.S.A.

April 4, 1995

Honorable Sam Johnson  
 United States House of Representatives  
 Washington, D.C. 20515-4303

*Sam*  
 Dear Mr. Johnson:

Your letter of March 22 provides the Smithsonian with an opportunity to set the record straight with respect to the several remaining issues stemming from our once-planned exhibition on the end of World War II, better known as the Enola Gay exhibition. As you know, on January 30, 1995, I announced the replacement of that exhibition with a more straightforward display of the airplane and ancillary materials on its mission and its crew.

To provide as complete a record as possible, I will repeat each of your questions and reply to them in the order they were asked.

1. To what extent did the now canceled exhibit conform to the charge of the Smithsonian Institution, as stated in 20 USC, Ch. 3 Para #80? NASM officials respond to that requirement to present "the service and sacrifice of America's service men and women as an inspiration to the future generations" applies only to the National Armed Forces Museum -- which was never built. However, the language in the cited section clearly states that "*The Smithsonian Institution shall....*" Absent case law to clarify the intent of the legislation, no prevailing interpretation of that language exists, it appears that NASM is citing an interpretation designed to free their hands from responsibility as probably intended by Congress.

The legislative language quoted pertained to a National Armed Forces Museum which was authorized but never funded. The statute containing it specifically provided that that statute was not intended to apply to the National Air and Space Museum. As stated in 20 USC §80:

The provisions of this subchapter [Subchapter X- National Armed Forces Museum Advisory Board] in no way rescind subchapter VII of this chapter, which established the National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution, or any other authority of the Smithsonian Institution.

It is worth noting at this point the language from Subchapter VII §77 which addresses the "functions" of the National Air and Space Museum as follows:

The national air and space museum shall memorialize the national development of aviation and space flight; collect, preserve, and display aeronautical and space flight equipment of historical interest and significance; serve as a repository for scientific equipment and data pertaining to the development of aviation and space flight; and provide educational material for the historical study of aviation and space flight.

As you know from my statement on January 30, I am undertaking a management review of the National Air and Space Museum, and one of our goals is to review a mission statement for the Museum to make sure that it is responsive to this statutory provision. I will discuss with the Regents the parameters of this management review on May 8, 1995, and I expect to have the review completed by September 1995.

2. To what extent did the municipal museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki enter into a prior agreement with NASM concerning the now-cancelled exhibit? It was reported in the Washington Times, without verification or citation, that a prior, four-point agreement was extant. We have not been able to put our hands on that agreement. The Mayor of Nagasaki, in an AP dispatch published around the nation last month, is reported to have said if NASM will not display "their exhibit" they will find another museum that will. This tends to underscore the significance of the Nagasaki Peace Museum catalog, which parallels the original NASM exhibit beyond an extent explicable by coincidence.

I am assured that no formal agreement ever was drawn up between the National Air and Space Museum and the municipal museums in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. However the Air and Space Museum wished to borrow a number of artifacts from the two municipal museums, and those museums were willing, in principle, to loan them. Both sides, however, saw difficulties. The Air and Space Museum did not wish to cede authority over the script to the Japanese side, and the Japanese did not wish to make a loan if they did not agree with the thrust of the exhibition. Eventually a tacit understanding was reached that:

- (1) The National Air and Space Museum would be the sole judge on the contents of the exhibition. NASM would write a script for the exhibition, which, if necessary, would be mounted without the use of any loans from Japan.

- (2) The Hiroshima and Nagasaki museums were under no obligation to loan artifacts to the Air and Space Museum if they did not find the proposed exhibition acceptable. On the assumption of a positive outcome, however, they were willing to receive a request listing artifacts, images and video tapes that might be used in the exhibition, so that they could rapidly prepare to loan materials to the National Air and Space Museum, if they chose to respond favorably.



As it turned out, the Japanese did have objections to the script that never were clearly specified, even as late as January 1995, when the exhibition was cancelled. At that time, less than four months before the scheduled opening of the exhibition, no agreement on the loan of any materials had been reached.

Initially, the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki also asked that the destruction of their cities should serve the purpose of warning the world of the dangers of nuclear weapons. The Museum countered that it cannot be an advocate on such issues. As time went on, the Japanese seemed to lose interest in this request, and the Museum independently determined that a topic as complex as nuclear policy was beyond inclusion in an exhibition that already was growing in size and needed to be pared back.

As you might expect, we incurred certain costs for the translation and transmission of draft scripts in the course of these discussions. At no time, however, were any monies paid to the municipal museums. The total cost of these services amounted to \$15,898 which was considered a legitimate expense of developing the exhibition.

3. How often, when, and why did NASM Curators travel to Nagasaki and Hiroshima in connection with this exhibit? We know that curators and the Director made at least three trips to Japan in connection with the exhibit, the first occurring in 1988.

Three trips to Japan occurred in connection with this exhibition and the desire of the National Air and Space Museum to borrow objects from Nagasaki and Hiroshima. It is important to note, however, that at all times the Museum officials made it clear that there would never be in the hands of the Nagasaki and Hiroshima museums the authority to veto any portion of the script. The only power invested in the Japanese museums was to loan the objects or not.

None of these trips took place in 1988. Museum Director Martin Harwit and Chairman of the Museum's Aeronautics Department, Tom Crouch, were in Japan in early April, 1993. Dr. Crouch, exhibition curator Michael Neufeld, and exhibition designer William Jacobs returned for a second visit in late May, 1993, and Martin Harwit made a final trip in August, 1993.

4. What is the significance, if any, to NASM Director Martin Harwit's travel to the Netherlands in early December 1994?

Martin Harwit has been a member of the Science Team working on the European Space Agency's Infrared Space Observatory, an astronomical satellite to be launched in September 1995. This is part of a NASA effort to minimize the costs of space ventures through international collaboration. Work by the science team began in 1985, and regular meetings have taken place four times a year since then. The December 1994 meeting was the 36th of these regularly-held meetings. NASA funds Harwit's participation.

5. Why did NASM fund the exhibition totally from non-appropriated funds?
6. Were there specific donors for the exhibit? What is the source of the non-appropriated funds?

Most of the Museum's exhibitions are funded largely through support from industry, although the salaries of staff working on the exhibitions are largely Federally funded. This exhibition was no exception in that regard. Half of the funds came from a Smithsonian Special Exhibition Fund administered centrally, and the other half was provided by the Museum, largely from unrestricted, non-appropriated funds. The Museum felt that for this exhibition it would be inappropriate to seek funding from an outside sponsor. The Museum wished to avoid the appearance that the exhibition's contents could in any way have been influenced by such a sponsor. The Museum's non-appropriated funds come largely from earnings from the operations of its wide-screen theater, from revenues generated by the museum shop and public restaurant, and from special events co-sponsored with professional associations and corporations.

7. Why was Michael Neufeld, a Canadian National, hired by NASM? What are his philosophical and political underpinnings?

I am informed that Michael Neufeld was hired for his broad knowledge of World War II, as displayed in his prize-winning book on the development of the V-2 rocket, *The Rocket and the Reich*, published in 1994. The book won the "best book of the year" award from the American Institute for Aeronautics and Astronautics, and was critically acclaimed in the New York Times Book Review (see Attachment A).

Before embarking on the exhibition of the Enola Gay, Dr. Neufeld had already curated a World War II commemorative exhibition on the Republic P-47 Thunderbolt, affectionately known as "The Jug." In the same commemorative series he curated a display on the German Arado, the first operational jet bomber which was used also for reconnaissance.

I do not know Dr. Neufeld's political affiliations or philosophical propensities. These are not matters that the Smithsonian inquires about.

8. Why was Tom Crouch, an early aviation history specialist, assigned as a curator? Why was he assigned to curate the American History Museum [exhibition] which focuses on the internment of Japanese American Citizens? Why is there language in the American History exhibit that is verbatim that which is contained in NASM's now-canceled exhibit?

Curators at the National Air and Space Museum are expected to be able to curate a wide variety of aviation or space-related exhibitions. Like most other museums, NASM does not have more than one specialist in any particular area. Large exhibitions, however, tend to require three or four additional curators working with one leading specialist. This was especially true of the "Last Act" exhibition, where Dr. Thomas Crouch and two other curators, Joanne Gernstein and Tom Dietz, aided Michael Neufeld on this project.

Tom Crouch joined the National Air and Space Museum as a curator, in the early 1970s, and helped to install the initial galleries for the Museum's opening in 1976. In the mid-1980s, he made a career change, leaving NASM for a curatorial position in the National Museum of American History. There, at the request of NMAH's then Director, he curated a gallery on the internment of Japanese American citizens, among other projects. In 1989, he was recruited back to the National Air and Space Museum by Director Harwit as chair of the Department of Aeronautics.

The Air and Space Museum has indicated that its very first script for the Enola Gay exhibition had a label on the Japanese American internment which used the same quote about American hatred of the Japanese as had been used in the exhibition in the American History Museum. It should be noted, however, that by May 31, 1994 (the second draft script for the Enola Gay exhibition) the quote was dropped from the script, and the entire matter of the internment of the Japanese Americans was dropped from the fifth draft script (October 1994).

9. Why does Martin Harwit maintain an astrophysics laboratory in NASM, devoting sums and personnel to that endeavor, and dispatching staffer to Europe on related business when the Smithsonian already has a similar lab in Cambridge Massachusetts?

Most of the Smithsonian Institution's Museums are directed by leading scholars, principally historians, scientists, and art scholars with various areas of expertise. Secretary Adams' decision to hire Martin Harwit as Director of the National Air and Space Museum was prompted by his desire to bring a recognized scholar into that position as well. This was not a radical departure from earlier practice. Among the three previous directors, Michael Collins was an astronaut, Noel Hinners a planetary geologist, and Walter Boyne a retired Air Force officer.

The terms under which Martin Harwit was hired as director of the Museum sought to assure that he could continue providing scholarly leadership in space science and astrophysics, where many of the nation's most sophisticated and costly spacecraft currently are making the United States a world leader. His letter of appointment specified that he would be provided an astrophysics laboratory so that he and colleagues could bring to the Museum expertise in space research, which has made America this century's pioneer in the discovery of our place in the Universe. This team is now designing an exhibition, tentatively titled "Universe," in which space telescopes and instrumentation will be displayed together with clear explanations of the discoveries they have helped bring about to increase our understanding of the nature of space and the structure and evolution of the universe. In this fashion, the Air and Space Museum complements work carried out at the Smithsonian Astrophysical Observatory in Cambridge, Massachusetts, some of whose discoveries and achievements have already been displayed in the Museum's galleries.

10. Have the military veterans who are on staff as historical consultants and acknowledged military historians in their own rights been systematically excluded from the decision making on such exhibits as the one at issue?

The military veterans on the Museum's staff have made major contributions to the exhibitions mounted in the past few years:

- Tim Wooldridge, a former aircraft carrier pilot and retired U.S. Navy captain, in recent years instituted a major modernization of the Museum's Sea-Air Operations Gallery, made possible with the support of the Association of Naval Aviation.
- Tom Dietz, a young U.S. Navy veteran, was one of the four curators on the "Last Act" exhibition.
- Tom Alison, a retired Air Force colonel, who had come to the Museum in late May, 1993, after the "Last Act" exhibition already was under way, was later asked to curate an introductory section to that exhibition. It covered "The War in the Pacific," and was added because the Museum found that many young people no longer know the history of World War II.
- Working with Alison on this section were Tim Wooldridge and Lt. Col. Don Lopez (USAF Ret.), who had recently retired as Senior Advisor to the Museum's Director.

11. Why did curators rely on historians only from the revisionist school, such as Bird, Alpervitz, Bernstein, and why did curators not contact established experts in the era and the key people involved?

In compiling a list of Advisory Committee members for the exhibition the Museum, tried to assemble a set of experts with a broad range of backgrounds and a variety of points of view. These established experts were initially brought in to provide the curators with constructive criticism and advice. They included:

- Edwin Bearss, Chief Historian at the National Park Service, a decorated disabled veteran of the Guadalcanal campaign. He was in charge of the 50th anniversary commemoration at Pearl Harbor.
- Barton Bernstein, a Professor of History at Stanford University.
- Victor Bond is a radiation physiologist, expert on the radiation effects of atomic bombs.
- Stanley Goldberg who is completing a biography on Gen. Leslie Groves, who headed the successful Manhattan project.
- Richard Hallion, an Air Force Historian and a former curator at the National Air and Space Museum, with extensive experience in exhibitions.

- Akira Iriye is Professor of History at Harvard and a recognized expert on 20th century relations between the U.S. and Japan.
- Edward Linenthal, a Professor of Religious Studies at the University of Wisconsin at Oshkosh. He had written about the controversies that attended the commemorations of the 50th anniversary of Pearl Harbor and was asked to serve in the hope that he could help the Museum anticipate and steer clear of such difficulties.
- Richard Rhodes, a Pulitzer Prize-winning author of *The Making of the Atomic Bomb*.
- Martin Sherwin, an historian and Director of the John Sloane Dickey Center at Dartmouth College.

Though they may have made their perspectives known in the media, Drs. Bird and Alperowitz had no role in developing the exhibition, nor were they ever invited to participate. Both men, however, often berated the Museum's script in the media.

One might wonder, as I often do, how it was that with a balanced set of advisors we seemed to have developed a script which was imbalanced. I suspect that the explanation is not only complex but also entirely worthy of extensive exploration, which we intend to give it at the symposium we have planned with the University of Michigan, "Presenting History: Museum in a Democratic Society," Ann Arbor, MI, April 19, 1995.

12. Why did Harwit fire docent Frank Rabbitt, for speaking about the exhibit?

Director Harwit informs me as follows:

Frank Rabbitt, a long-time volunteer who gave guided tours at the National Air and Space Museum, was first suspended from his duties for interfering with legitimate inquiry into the exhibition of the Enola Gay by a Baltimore Sun journalist. While on duty at the Museum, he had heard the reporter tell him he had an appointment the next day to see General Tibbets in Columbus, Ohio. Rabbitt then called some of the General's friends to warn him not to see the reporter, and when the reporter appeared at General Tibbets's house, he was met at the door and sent away.

Mr. Rabbitt's suspension was not aimed at his rights to free speech. The action was taken to reaffirm that individuals affiliated with the Museum have no right to interfere with legitimate inquiries into the Museum's activities by the press.

Shortly after his three-month suspension, Mr. Rabbitt was found to be openly soliciting signatures in opposition to the Museum's exhibition of the Enola Gay. At that juncture, he was dismissed from his volunteer duties, since volunteers are brought to the Museum to help ongoing activities, not to oppose them. In abrogating his services, the Museum told Mr. Rabbitt in writing that it was not challenging his right to speak out as he

saw fit. His activities simply were seen as more of a hindrance than a help to the Museum. Service as a volunteer at the Museum is not a right; it is a privilege that many applicants seek and few are accorded.

On January 30, 1995, immediately following the Secretary's decision to change the exhibition, Martin Harwit wrote Mr. Rabbitt, stating that there now was no reason to deny his return to the Museum, since the main object of his opposition had been removed, and since he had served the Museum loyally for many years. Mr. Rabbitt promptly accepted that offer to return and has been fully reinstated.

13. Has it been Harwit's intent since his hiring to "radicalize" and "redirect" NASM? Does revision conform to the charge and intent of Congress?

Director Harwit responds that the National Air and Space Museum, as initially conceived and realized by its first director, Astronaut Michael Collins, has been the most visited museum in the world, ever since it opened its doors to the public in July 1976. Given this popular appeal, it would make no sense to attempt any radical changes. Nevertheless, the Museum cannot stay static. It needs to comply with changing national demands. When the present director came on board, a number of alterations meeting new priorities seemed in order:

a. At a time when many youngsters are turning away from careers in science and technology, and the number of licensed pilots in the United States is rapidly declining, it seemed incumbent on the Museum to show youngsters the opportunities for space exploration that might be open to them when they grow up. The "Where Next, Columbus?" gallery, opened in 1992, asks what explorers like Columbus might be doing in the next 500 years. What goals would they set? What challenges will have to be overcome for us to explore further and deeper in space?

b. To date it has been possible to go through the entire Museum without ever learning what keeps balloons aloft, aircraft flying, and satellites from tumbling down to earth. For a nation that is placing renewed emphasis on science and technology education, that deficiency seemed in need of correction. A new gallery called "How Things Fly" has been in preparation for several years. It will answer those questions and feature numerous interactives that will help youngsters to understand the most fundamental scientific and technological aspects of flight. The gallery will open in the summer of 1996.

c. The awe-inspiring machines exhibited at the Museum are more than technological wonders. They provide a cross section of America's history and our nation's contribution to human civilization in the twentieth century. Airplanes and spacecraft have radically altered the ways in which we travel, trade, wage war, communicate across the globe, predict weather, monitor the state of our planet, and view our place in the Universe. Each machine carries

a unique story in that regard, which the Museum should strive to tell. Flying machines are not just technology devised for its own sake. They provide opportunities and services to humanity that were never available before. America's history can be vividly told through these national treasures that the Museum displays. Their stories are fascinating and convey the essence of America's role in changing life in the 20th century. In recent years, the Museum has attempted to place greater weight on those stories, in a balanced way, as it displays the artifacts.

I would add that none of these changes are radical; rather, they are designed to enrich the Museum's offering to a public eager for additional information. Still, some exhibitions in the Air and Space Museum may appear to depart significantly from earlier ones; for instance, a few exhibitions have taken a new critical approach, but they are hardly characteristic of the whole museum.

But when the question remains whether there is an appearance of some sort of bias in our museum presentations, the answer leads inevitably to an exploration of our exhibition review processes and, indeed, a thorough examination of how exhibitions are framed philosophically at the outset. I am conducting a study of these matters across the board at the Smithsonian, but I am satisfied in the meanwhile that there has been no fundamental effort at the Air and Space Museum or at any Smithsonian museum to do exhibitions only of the newer sort.

14. What comprises the exhibit now touring Japan, entitled "The Smithsonian's America"?

The exhibit, "The Smithsonian's America," is not now touring Japan. However, from July 9 through August 31, 1994, there was on view such an exhibition created by the Smithsonian Institution for the American Festival at the Nippon Convention Center in the Chiba Prefecture near Tokyo. That exhibition used artifacts, historic images and film footage to tell the rich and complex story of the United States. Examples of the subjects and objects in the exhibition are as follows:

- Photographs and artifacts representing American icons suggesting the cultural richness and ideals of the American people.
- A high-definition television presentation introducing the American landscape and the ways in which Americans have explored its incredible beauty and enormous natural resources. Part of the exhibition covered the fact that America is a land of many faces and cultures with unifying experiences such as military service, popular culture, education and work. The highlights of that section of the exhibition included: a Crow feather headdress; a Mohawk baby carrier; a French spinning wheel brought to the United States in the early 1800s; and a vest embroidered in a traditional Hungarian style by a young immigrant.

- Other subjects covered in the exhibit included: the national popular culture; the Western Frontiers; conquering time and space; Americans at Home; Looking American (focussing on clothing); and a section on Commodore Perry's visit to Japan and subsequent events.
- Some of the objects included were: the ruby slippers worn by Judy Garland in *The Wizard of Oz*; a 19th-century ballot box; George Washington's mess kit; the compass used by Lewis and Clark; Apollo 15 spacesuit; a Morse telegraph key and receiver; a 1920s cowboy hat made by Stetson; a hat from Commodore Matthew Perry.

During the first two weeks of the American Festival, the Smithsonian presented a series of concerts from eight musical groups from bluegrass to Cajun to Native American music and from gospel to the blues.

The Festival was sponsored by the Japan Broadcasting Corporation (NHK) and The Yomiuri Shimbun. The Media International Corporation, an affiliate of NHK, coordinated the planning activities.

In addition, an exhibition titled "The Smithsonian Exhibition of Grand Gems and Minerals" began touring in Japan in the fall of 1994 and will continue through January, 1996. The exhibition was organized jointly by the Smithsonian's National Museum of Natural History, the Japan Frontier Association and the Association of Space Development and Information.

15. What is the status of the companion volume on the now canceled exhibit? How does Secretary Heyman intend to stop this? What will happen to the 10,000 copies said by an unidentified spokesperson at the Press to exist? Do they? If so, have they been distributed to anyone? How will they be recalled?

There has been no publication of the catalogue that was to have accompanied the Enola Gay exhibition. No catalogue has been printed, published or distributed that must be recalled. The Acting Director of the Smithsonian Press reports that the Press did not even keep copies of the draft manuscript.

In response to my decision regarding the Enola Gay exhibition and the decision to cancel the publication of *The Last Act*, the Smithsonian Press took the following steps:

- Sent a memorandum to all sales representatives throughout the world informing them of the cancellation. The same memorandum went to key wholesale accounts.
- Placed a message in the system at the warehouse that automatically informs customers who order the book that it has been canceled.
- Sent a letter to book reviewers and other media that informed them that the publication has been canceled. That information was included in a routine letter from the publicist to the key media contacts.



16. Does Secretary Heyman intend to honor his promise to cancel all related materials? More important, is he positioned properly to effectively control the actions of NASM personnel?

I fully intend to honor my promise to cancel all related materials. The only material that may be in the public purview are copies of the various draft scripts that were out for comment prior to the decision to cancel the exhibition. The Institution has received some requests for the first and last scripts. We are referring those requests to the Office of General Counsel. There is, however, no basis to deny people access to the documents that had already been made public. To date there have been very few requests of the General Counsel to supply copies of any of the draft scripts.

17. How has the Enola Gay controversy effected fund-raising?

During the time of the controversy, there were concerns raised about the impact on our fund-raising ability. Some potential major donors waited to see the outcome before making a commitment to the Institution. However, the level of funds that have been raised this fiscal year has increased over the first quarter of last year and thus deleterious impact, if any, has been remedied.

18. Why does one major corporate donor insist on anonymity despite the Institution's offer of on-exhibit acknowledgements to all donors?

I am not aware that any major corporate donor to any of our exhibitions or programs has insisted on anonymity.

19. How many subscribers have withdrawn their membership and financial support? What is the extent of the loss?

During the height of the controversy, we received letters from members and subscribers of the Magazine indicating that they intended to cancel their subscription and withdraw their support from the Institution. In each case, we explained what we were doing to respond to the criticism. In most instances, the members/subscribers decided to reserve judgment. You should know that there is always a percentage of the Magazine subscribers who do not renew their subscription. We do not know what percentage of those were affected by the Enola Gay controversy, but the number is not significant.

It is worth noting that from February 16 to 19, 1995, Peter D. Hart Research Associates conducted a nationwide survey among a representative cross section of 1,003 Americans. The poll has a margin of error of  $\pm 3.2\%$ . Among its findings were the following:

There has been much discussion and commentary about the Air and Space Museum's World War II exhibit that features the B-29 bomber *Enola Gay*, and the survey includes two questions designed to gauge the American public's familiarity with and reactions to this controversial exhibit. Sixty-one percent of Americans overall have heard of the story, while 38% have not heard about it.

The most significant finding reveals that the situation has made little or no difference to most adults' perception of the Institution: just 14% of Americans have a less favorable opinion of the Smithsonian because of the way it handled the *Enola Gay* situation, while 5% say they have a more favorable opinion of the Institution because of it. A plurality of the public say that the controversy has not really affected their opinion of the Smithsonian: 31% say the situation did not affect their opinion of the Smithsonian, and another 7% say that it did not make much difference either way.

Despite the coverage of this controversy in the press, it seems to have made little difference to the American public, with 86% of adults saying the situation has not adversely affected their opinion of the Smithsonian, including 39% who either have not heard or are not sure whether they have heard about the *Enola Gay* story. In the open-ended question about their impressions of the Smithsonian, a mere 1% of adults volunteered *Enola Gay* comments.

20. Are the safeguards and oversight sufficient to ensure the Smithsonian Institution uses taxpayer dollars in the way that Congress intends?

The Institution is subject to and complies with all laws and regulations that govern the use of appropriated funds. We have an Inspector General who reports regularly to the Institution's Board of Regents through the Audit and Review Committee and responds to Congress, providing information through a semi-annual report as well as upon request. In addition, the Institution has an independent auditor who reports annually to the Audit and Review Committee of the Board of Regents on the financial management of the Institution. We also voluntarily comply with the provisions of the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990 as well as other financial requirements of federal agencies such as the Federal Managers Financial Integrity Act, even though we are not subject to them by law.

All of these elements combine to provide a significant degree of oversight. I believe the Institution has put into place the safeguards that are essential to protect the Institution and to ensure that we are using all funds as they are intended whether they be appropriated by the Congress or generated in the private sector. We are also looking at our exhibition review processes to determine whether further measures are needed to ensure that our activities, including exhibitions, meet not only the letter but also the spirit of Federal expectations. Again, I expect that the April 19 symposium at the University of Michigan, with its focus on "Museums in a Democratic Society," will shed important light on these matters.

21. Why did the Institution send all complaining members a "form letter" that falsely implied no problem with the *Enola Gay* exhibit?

I am not sure that I know the letter that is being referenced here. I do know that during the process of the controversy my predecessor attempted in various communications to explain what was being done to address the problem. Early in the process, there was a letter sent to some saying that the various advisory groups were in the process of reviewing the script and that problems would be addressed in that process. During the Fall of 1994, I, too,

wrote a letter indicating that the changes and the review by the American Legion made me very optimistic. I was wrong. Once I canceled the exhibition, the Institution informed those who had written about my actions and enclosed a copy of my statement.

22. Why do Smithsonian personnel have business cards that have their name transcribed in Japanese on the back of them?

Those Smithsonian personnel who travelled to Japan in connection with the American Festival in 1994 had business cards with their names transcribed in Japanese on the back. There were many negotiations regarding the exhibition with various business entities. As you know, the exchange of business cards in Japan is an important first step in a business meeting and American businessmen characteristically carry such cards.

23. With regard to new employees, what is the hiring criteria with regard to background and experience in the air and space field? Is any on the job training occurring instead of hiring qualified and experienced personnel?

New professional staff of the Air and Space Museum are hired according to criteria which vary in accordance with each position. The Museum seeks people with expertise appropriate to specific fields, and that expertise may be largely academic or more practical depending on the needs of the Museum at that time. The Museum sometimes hires and trains promising younger professionals right out of college or graduate school; this is often more economical than hiring fully experienced professionals. On the other hand, the Museum also hires professionals already in their mid- to late-careers, when the positions would benefit from their specialized experience and when those individuals' salary requirements can be met.

24. Are any NASM staff currently teaching in the Washington D.C. public school system? If so, how is this funded?

As is typical of other major Smithsonian museums, the National Air and Space Museum, through its Educational Services Department, provides a range of public services to fulfill its educational mission. However, those services do not include teaching in schools, and we are not aware of NASM personnel serving as teachers in school classrooms.

The Museum conducts workshops for teachers on-site at the Museum to help them strengthen their science and history teaching with current research and with interactive, inquiry-based approaches for students. It is rare for these workshops to happen in the schools. The Museum also produces aviation- and space-flight-related curricula for use in the classroom. All produced to date have been funded with external support from corporations and foundations.

In addition, through two other programs, also funded by external grants, the "Museum Explainers" and "Sin Limites: The Latin American Experience in Aviation," NASM has been able to allow schools to come to the Museum and experience a more extended relationship with the Museum.

Several partnership schools also work with NASM to test materials, integrate galleries and collections into school requirements, and view the IMAX films and public programs the Museum offers. Generally, the schools pay or external funders pay for any services that have attached costs.

25. Have NASM personnel participated in visits to space shuttle launches? If so how often, and how are they funded?

Three or four members of the Museum's staff each year accept NASA invitations to attend Shuttle launches. Transportation to these events is on NASA-provided aircraft. Where occasional overnight stays have been necessary, the Museum has borne the per diem cost. Seeing at least one Shuttle launch seems entirely in line for Museum staff who daily deal with a public interested in aviation and space flight.

26. Is it true that Mr. Harwit is working on a book addressing strategic bombing? If so, how is it funded, is it going to be an official Smithsonian publication and what will the review process be?

Dr. Harwit is not working on a book addressing strategic bombing.

However, attached is a copy of a book proposal on that subject by Tami Davis Biddle (see Attachment B). The book in question, *The Legacy of Strategic Bombing*, will be a collection of essays based upon papers given at a series of symposia on the topic, held at the Air and Space Museum between September 1989 and December 1990, and funded by the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation. The book will be edited by Ms. Biddle, who was a Museum fellow in 1989-90 and one of the organizers of the symposia. Ms. Davis is now an assistant professor of military history at Duke University and is completing a doctoral dissertation at Yale on the history of strategic bombing.

Among the participants in the symposia who will have essays in the book are General Curtis LeMay, Freeman Dyson, Paul Nitze, John Kenneth Galbraith, Kurt Vonnegut, Max Hastings, and former Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr.

Portions of the draft manuscript for *The Legacy of Strategic Bombing* were recently submitted to the Smithsonian Institution Press for a decision on publishing the book. The manuscript will undergo the usual review process at the Press, which includes review by outside scholars familiar with the topic but unaffiliated with the Smithsonian or the Air and Space Museum. No funds from the Air and Space Museum will be used in the publication of the book.

27. How many people are currently employed by the NASM? How many are directly involved in restoration, preservation and display versus those involved on administration and side studies? Please itemize.

The vast majority of the Museum's staff of 239 Federal employees, an additional 145 largely part-time Trust employees, and roughly 420 volunteers are dedicated to restoration, preservation and display.

The collections management staff, numbering 45, registers acquisitions, monitors the status of artifacts, recommends preservative measures, undertakes preservations and restorations, collects and archives supporting documentation, answers public and professional inquiries about individual artifacts, and ships and receives items that are loaned out to other museums that care for and display artifacts from the Museum's collections. Within the total of 45 collections management staff, 12 are devoted to airplane restoration, an additional post is filled by a supervisor, and several additional conservators advise the restoration staff on the work to be done.

The exhibition staff of 41 designs and produces exhibitions in collaboration with the Museum's curatorial staff, and oversees additional exhibitions produced for the Museum by external contractors.

The building management staff of 82 cleans artifacts and has the enormous task of daily cleaning up and providing maintenance in the wake of the eight to nine million visitors who come to the Museum annually.

A staff of roughly 20 provides educational services to teachers and students from all over the country coming to see the exhibitions and wishing to acquire educational materials to enrich their school curricula through the insertion of aviation and spaceflight, as displayed by the Museum.

Staff dedicated to research and curatorial activities number 58. Curators are expected to spend approximately 30% of their time dedicated to the collections in their care, 30% to exhibitions for which they are responsible, 30% on research, and 10% on public service. While individual curators might spend close to 100% of their time on a major exhibition during the year of two before it opens and then spend a correspondingly large amount of time on their collections or research in subsequent years, these percentages indicate characteristic averages for the activities of this group.

Approximately 100 part-time staff members also service the theater that daily shows popular wide-screen, IMAX films on aviation and space flight, which the Museum produces with support from NASA and the aerospace industry.

Of the 420 volunteers, 220 work as docents, giving guided tours through the exhibitions for visitors. About 120 others work behind the scenes as restorers or research aides, while about 80 more answer the thousands of public inquiries that pour in annually.

The NASM administrative staff is comprised of 15 Federal employees and 15 trust employees. Computers throughout the Museum are served by an additional 7 staff members.

28. Why was the script of *The Last Act, The Atomic Bomb and the End of World War II* advertised in the Smithsonian's Spring Catalogue after I had been told by Under Secretary Newman that this advertisement would have a "canceled" mark through it?

The Spring Catalogue of the Smithsonian Institution Press anticipated such a volume and had already been printed and put in the distribution channel by the time of my January 30 announcement. The Catalogue becoming available in mid-April will not include reference to the *Enola Gay* book. However, as I detailed in response to Question 15, in the interim there has been significant effort to inform people of the cancellation of this publication.

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I hope these responses are helpful to your greater understanding of the circumstances of the National Air and Space Museum. Like you, I trust they will assist us both in clearing up any misunderstandings that may be lingering in the wake of my cancellation of the exhibition.

Sincerely,



I. Michael Heyman  
Secretary

# Sins of the Rocketeers

The Nazi missile scientists of 1944 became the American space technologists of 1945 and after.

## THE ROCKET AND THE REICH

Peenemünde and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era  
By Michael J. Neufeld  
Illustrated, 368 pp., New York  
The Free Press, 1975

By Richard J. Evans

IN September 1944 Hitler's Third Reich launched its newest wonder weapon, the V2 rocket, against Britain in an effort to rescue itself from an increasingly desperate military situation. The rockets shot up to the edge of the earth's atmosphere, then plunged down at terrifying speed to crash onto London without warning, exploding on impact and causing considerable panic and devastation. There was no possible defense. Hitler expected great things from this new device. But in practice it failed to make any real impact on the course of the war. Only 3,200 of the rockets were ever launched and, contrary to popular belief, more of them fell on Belgium than on England. The main consequences of the V2 program were longer lasting. At the end of the war, many of the scientists who worked on it were captured by American forces or by the Russian Army and shipped off to begin the American and Soviet ballistic missile and space exploration programs. In the course of their work during the 1950's and 60's, their involvement in the military activities of the Third Reich was conveniently forgotten. They successfully portrayed themselves as politically neutral scientists whose main interest during the Hitler years had been space flight, but who had been reluctantly coopted by the Nazis into working toward the use of rocketry for military purposes.

In "The Rocket and the Reich," an absorbing new book, Michael J. Neufeld, who is curator of World War II history at the National Air and Space Museum of the Smithsonian Institution in Washington, uses thorough research into the archives of the German rocketry establishment at Peenemünde, together with a wide range of other sources, to provide a full account of the V2 and other programs pursued there. In the course of doing so he effectively demolishes the accounts given in what he rightly calls the "dishonest and self-serving" memoirs of many of those involved, from the rocket scientist Werner von Braun to Hitler's wartime Armaments Minister, Albert Speer.

The German rocket program had its unpromising origins. Mr. Neufeld shows, in the activities of groups of enthusiasts in the 1920's. One such group managed to obtain money from a film company to launch a rocket simultaneously with the opening of Fritz Lang's science fiction film "The Woman in the Moon" in 1929. The attempt was a fiasco. These amateurish groups were suppressed after the Nazi seizure of power, as the program came under military direction. Continually playing off the army against the air force in their search for backers, the rocketeers obtained greatly increased funding for their experiments and had more substantial progress by the outbreak of the war.

Hitler, however, did not give them his full backing until the military situation began to deteriorate after the battle of Stalingrad in 1943. He never really understood the idea of the rocket, regarding it as a sort of huge shell, and he once demanded a mass attack of 5,000 rockets launched on London, all at the same time. Yet rockets would remain ineffective as long as they did not possess nuclear warheads. The rocketeers hugely overestimated the military potential of their product. So, too, did their masters. As the war went on, vast resources were poured into Peenemünde, but the Reich's leaders only succeeded in diverting funds from other, more important areas like fighter plane manu-

Richard J. Evans is the author of the forthcoming "Rituals of Retribution: Capital Punishment in German Politics and Society Since the 17th Century."



Albert Speer, right, Germany's Armaments Minister, watching a launching of a V2 rocket with Joseph Goebbels, left, Minister of Propaganda.



A German A3 rocket, a predecessor of the V2 in the launching pad in 1937. The tall figure on the right is Werner von Braun at 25.

facture jet propulsion, radar and the atomic bomb. Ultimately the resources of the nation was simply insufficient to sustain all these programs at once.

Among those resources was the labor of thousands of slaves drafted from Heinrich Himmler's concentration camps to man the underground production facilities constructed for the V2 in central Germany after Allied bombing raids had made the manufacture of the rockets at Peenemünde impracticable. Werner von Braun and other rocketeers later claimed that the use of slave labor was forced on them by the SS. But Mr. Neufeld provides documentary evidence to show that leading figures in the project, like Arthur Rudolph — the chief engineer at Peenemünde, who went on to become project manager of the American Saturn 5 moon rocket program in the 1960's — were enthusiastic advocates of the employment of camp inmates. The harsh, unsanitary and brutal conditions under which the workers were kept led to an extremely high death rate which was compounded by executions and massacres carried out by the SS at the end of the war. All together, 10,000 slave laborers were killed working on the rocket. This gave the V2 a unique status among weapons, for, as Mr. Neufeld remarks, "More people died producing it than died from being hit by it."

The poor condition of the workers, which was compounded by acts of sabotage and resistance (punished by mass public hangings by the SS), slowed down six jet production and further hampered the program's effectiveness. Mr. Neufeld refutes claims made by Albert Speer, Werner von Braun and other leading figures that they tried to introduce more humane conditions among the workers. Von Braun was not an apolitical space scientist but an ardent technocratic opportunist who cared little about the human consequences of what he was doing. Such cavalier attitudes were shared by the American and Soviet Governments after the war. Far from being ignorant of the crimes in which the rocketeers had been involved, they consciously chose to ignore them and to put "expediency above principle" in the new arms race.

This is a hard-hitting book, but it is also a fair and scholarly one that does equal justice to all aspects of the German rocket program — technical, political, moral and human. It bids fair to become the standard work on this subject for many years to come.

The Legacy of Strategic Bombing

Tami Davis Biddle, editor

## Book Proposal

Concept

From September 1989 to December 1990, the National Air and Space Museum sponsored (in conjunction with the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation) a symposium and lecture series on the history of strategic bombing. Invited to give lectures and panel presentations were not only some of the best scholars in the field of aviation history, but also some of the men who helped to shape the history of strategic bombing. This formidable list of individuals included: General Curtis LeMay, Freeman Dyson, Paul Nitze, John Kenneth Galbraith, Lord Zuckerman, and former Supreme Court Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr. Prominent scholars and writers participating included: Paul Fussell, Barton Bernstein, Kurt Vonnegut, Jr., Max Hastings, Michael Sherry, Wesley Wark, and David Rosenberg.

Over the course of the 16-month series, these individuals offered their thoughts and reflections on one of the most important military developments in modern times: the evolution of long-range bombardment. The purpose of the proposed volume is to bring their essays and speeches together in one place, and to bracket these contributions with a scholarly overview essay on the history of strategic bombing, and an up-to-date and detailed bibliographic essay on the scholarly literature on strategic bombing.

In planning the lecture series, the Museum staff set itself an ambitious goal: to examine the history of aerial bombardment from its roots in pre-World War I theory to its postwar manifestation as the agent of superpower armageddon. The contributions, which cover this entire time span, contain some unique additions to the literature. General LeMay's speech, for instance, was the last one he gave in public before his death in October 1990.

Contributors

Contributors to the volume include some of the most prominent scholars in the field of air power history, as well as notable individuals who had important roles to play in that history. The attached proposed table of contents contains a complete list.

Contents

The volume, which should appeal not only to general audiences but also to more specialized scholars as well, will consist primarily of: an introductory essay of about thirty-five pages; a series of individual essays which will vary in length from several pages (most) to up to fifteen pages (a few); and a bibliographic essay of roughly twenty pages.

## Order of Materials:

--Biographies of the Contributors

--Introductory Essay

Tami Davis Biddle

This essay by Biddle, a former historian at the National Air and Space Museum and now a professor at Duke University, will provide a comprehensive overview of the history of strategic bombing. The essay will not only offer an important primer on the subject, but will tie together the many and varied essays which will appear in the pages to follow. Professor Biddle has



recently published an essay "Air Power and the Law of War," in Michael Howard, et al., (eds.) The Laws of War, (Yale University Press, 1994), and she has a long essay on strategic bombing appearing in the spring 1995 issue of The Journal of Strategic Studies. She is currently at work on a book titled Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare: The Evolution of British and American Ideas about Strategic Bombing, 1917-1945.

--Chronology of the History of Strategic Bombing  
Tami Davis Biddle

--Contributions of the Symposium Participants (see Table of Contents)  
These will be presented in (rough) chronological order, from the pre-World War I era to the post-World War II era.

--Bibliographic Essay  
Tami Davis Biddle  
This essay will offer an in-depth survey of the scholarly literature on strategic bombing that has been produced in Britain, the United States, Italy, and Germany between the late Victorian era and 1994.

--Index

--Appendices  
Some statistics from the history of strategic bombing.

### Approach

The final manuscript will be approximately 300 to 350 pages in length. The book will also include one section of black and white photographs from the Museum's collection, some never before published. These will be captioned by the editor. In addition, a few of the essays included in the main body will require graphs and charts. The volume should be produced in both a hardback edition, for libraries, and a paperback edition for students and Museum visitors.

### Market

The book ought to have a strong market among general readers with an interest in military history, as well as scholars with a more detailed knowledge of the subject. As the history of the Second World War, and the history of strategic bombing in particular, of are interest to many people, the book should sell well. The volume will be broad in scope and accessible to the lay reader. In addition, the volume should be suitable as reading for college courses in military history.

The Journal of American History, the Journal of Strategic Studies, and the Air Force Journal should be interested in the book. The National Air and Space Museum tapped into huge interest (albeit negatively) in strategic bombing with the Enola Gay controversy. The combination of essays by people such as LeMay, Vonnegut, Galbraith, Nitze, and Zuckerman as contributors is quite powerful.

### Editor

While Professor Biddle will serve as the editor of the volume, it will also be overseen by Dr. Gregg Herken, chairman of the Museum's Space History Department, and the author of The Winning Weapon, Councils of War and Cardinal Choice; and Dr. Tom Crouch, chairman of the Museum's Aeronautics Department, and the author of A Dream of Wings, The Eagle Aloft, and The Bishop's Boys.

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APPENDIX V

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RESPONSES OF DR. I. MICHAEL HEYMAN, SECRETARY,  
SMITHSONIAN INSTITUTION, TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY  
HON. JESSE HELMS, MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON RULES AND  
ADMINISTRATION

1. **Question:** Do you agree with the Commission on the Future of the Smithsonian Institution in its May 1995 report, "E Pluribus Unum: This Divine Paradox", that one of the primary goals of the Smithsonian Institution should be to "devote attention and resources to the rehabilitation and maintenance of existing facilities?"

**Answer:** The Smithsonian's Board of Regents, which is the governing body of the Institution, has established a Committee on Policies and Programs. Its initial goal is to review the recommendations in the Report of the Commission on the Future of the Smithsonian Institution, which was appointed by the Board of Regents in 1993. Thus, while I am happy to respond to your questions, it must be understood that these responses reflect my personal view rather than any policy direction of the Board of Regents.

With that in mind, I can say that I am in full agreement with the idea that the Institution must devote attention and resources to the rehabilitation and maintenance of existing facilities. I was a member of the Board of Regents when it approved the FY 1996 budget for the Institution that sought an increase of more than \$10 million in order to accelerate its ability to deal specifically with rehabilitation and maintenance issues.

2. **Question:** The Smithsonian Institution has been called "America's attic." Do you agree that the Smithsonian should be first and foremost a national--as opposed to a local Washington, D.C. and metropolitan area--museum?

**Answer:** The Smithsonian Institution consists, of course, of a number of museums, many of which carry the word "National" in their titles. Although the provisions of Mr. Smithson's Will required that the Institution be established in Washington, his purpose--the increase and diffusion of knowledge among men--has from the outset been interpreted as being global in its application. In the course of my tenure, I hope to make the Smithsonian more truly national, taking it beyond the boundaries of the Mall into schools, libraries, and homes across the country by means of the new communications technologies that are increasingly available.

3. **Question:** On page 3 of its report, the Commission states that "steps have been and are being taken to make the museums inviting, interesting, and

relevant to (visitors from Washington, D.C. and the surrounding area)." Do you agree? If so, what steps are you planning to ensure that the primary focus of the museum as a national museum will be carried out?

**Answer:** Smithsonian museums must be interesting, inviting, and relevant to all of their visitors. We want people to visit our museums--electronically or on the Mall--knowing that they will be welcome and made comfortable by finding there ideas and objects that are familiar icons of America's heritage, as well as those that may be less so, but which will stretch the horizons of their imaginations. This, I believe, is more and more the case, particularly in the National Museums of American History and American Art that quite consciously reflect and extend the multiplicity of traditions that make us a nation.

**4. Question:** Please provide a breakdown of the exhibitions which, according to page 12 of the Commission report, are in "need for restoration, renewal, and expansion."

**Answer:** I do not know which exhibitions the Commission had in mind in making the statement quoted. However, I can report that in the National Air and Space Museum and the National Museum of Natural History there are a number of areas that are out-dated in terms of design and the information that they convey. As an example, the Hall of Gems and Minerals in the latter currently is undergoing a major rehabilitation that, among other things, will include a section on plate tectonics, which has transformed our understanding of earth science in the last 30 or 40 years. In the National Air and Space Museum, which has been open for nearly 20 years, there has been nothing to explain the principles of flight to the general public in a clear and systematic way. That, too, is now being remedied.

**5. Question:** The Commission states that "investments in these activities and facilities should have high priority." Do you agree?

**Answer:** I do agree. Museum exhibitions are the primary means by which the Institution shares knowledge with the public. Thus, investment in them is essential. However, permanent exhibitions are very expensive and require long periods of time to plan and create. As the previous examples illustrate, they must be based on the most current information available, and also suggest where new ideas might lead. Furthermore, they must be designed with the needs and interests of the visiting public in mind.

**6. Question:** In regard to operating budgets, the Commission states that "The Institution has responded by significantly decreasing staff size and postponing needed improvements to facilities. The gap needs to be corrected; it is already threatening the vitality of the Smithsonian." The former Secretary of the Smithsonian, Dr. Adams, had also alluded to the need of downsizing at the Institution. In the Washington Times (September 24, 1993), he is quoted as saying, the downsizing is "affecting every aspect of what we do,

from the size and extent of our exhibition programs to the educational programs . . . to our ability to acquire objects."

Please share with the Committee your plans for downsizing the Smithsonian.

**Answer:** At present I am engaged in a planning process to review various aspects of the Institution's operations and get a better sense of how we can most effectively deploy available resources in protecting the collections and facilities of the Institution, while also meeting our obligation to serve the public on the Mall and beyond in a lively and intelligent manner. In addition, I have taken steps to remove layers of management and to consolidate functions where possible. Soon after I became Secretary, I reorganized the Institution's central administration into two major groups: operations, which are within the purview of the Under Secretary, and programs. The offices of three assistant secretaries were combined into a small, cohesive programmatic unit under a single Provost. A fourth assistant secretary position was eliminated. This approach to reorganization through consolidation and delayering levels of management is intended to serve as a model for the various units of the Smithsonian as they undertake their own reorganization efforts.

**7. Question:** In light of the downsizing, do you believe the Smithsonian should engage in creating new museums?

**Answer:** The issue of creating new museums is closely tied to the needs of collections, overall Institutional priorities, and, most particularly, authorizations by the Congress. Certainly, new museums cannot be created at the rate of the recent past, but one should not foreclose that option in case unique opportunities arise. At this point, I have no plans to propose any new museums. However, I believe it is important to fulfill the obligations inherent in P.L.101-185, which authorized establishment of the National Museum of the American Indian, because an incomparable collection of immense significance to the American people is at risk. Not only must that collection be protected in a physical sense, it also must be articulated intellectually, so that the fullness of the heritage of America's original people can be understood.

**8. Question:** The Commission also recommends "the elimination of (unspecified) programs or facilities." Do you feel this is going to be necessary, and if so, what programs or facilities do you think would have to be eliminated?

**Answer:** While it ultimately may be necessary to eliminate programs or close facilities in order to keep resources available for the core activities of the Institution, it is not possible at this time to say if and where that will happen. The Regents' considerations most certainly will be brought to bear on this matter, and my own views will be informed by the results of studies planned and now underway.

**9. Question:** I am concerned about what the Commission describes as a "large and growing" "deferred maintenance problem." What is this maintenance problem and what steps are you going to take to assure Smithsonian resources are used to maintain exhibits and artifacts already in the possession of the Smithsonian before actively pursuing new objects for new exhibits or museums?

**Answer:** The deferred maintenance problem to which the Commission referred is, I believe, that associated with the Institution's facilities and referenced in Question No. 1. Appropriations simply have not been sufficient to cover the backlog of repair and restoration requirements. While I recognize the difficulties of the present fiscal environment, we will continue to seek adequate funding for this purpose. We also will continue to apply resources that are available to the care and protection of the collections with which we have been entrusted and to the maintenance of existing exhibitions.

**10. Question:** On page 26 of its report, the Commission states "continued capital expansion in the early decades of the next century..is out of the question. The Smithsonian should essentially assume a moratorium on new museums." Do you agree?

**Answer:** While the statement quoted is not an unreasonable one, as I indicated above, I would not want to foreclose the option of addressing an unique opportunity for the Smithsonian and the American people, should one arise. I am more in sympathy with the statement further on in the same paragraph on page 26 of the Commission Report that states: "New construction should be undertaken only if the funds are assured for capital and operating costs."

**11. Question:** How much taxpayers' money is being spent on the Smithsonian in FY 1995 and what percentage of total Smithsonian receipts does this amount to?

**Answer:** For fiscal year 1995 \$371.1 million has been appropriated. It is expected that this will be about 70% of the Institution's total net receipts.

**12. Question:** In light of the need to reduce the size of the federal debt, which stood at \$4,885,256,391,108.42 on May 18, 1995, how much money do you believe can and should be cut from the federal contribution to the Smithsonian for FY 1996?

**Answer:** The Smithsonian cannot sustain any reduction in the Federal contribution for its activities in fiscal year 1996 without correspondingly reducing its level of public services by limiting museum hours; rifting employees, among whom will be some of those who repair and maintain exhibitions and facilities; and postponing needed repairs to the buildings on the Mall.



**13. Question:** What previously appropriated funds does the Smithsonian currently have in its base budget for general planning?

**Answer:** The Smithsonian currently has \$1.1 million in previously appropriated funds for general planning.

**14. Question:** Due to the current budget situation and the size of our federal debt, should such funds appropriated in prior years be used for current operating expenses, therefore reducing the current federal contribution to the Smithsonian?

**Answer:** The Institution would welcome the availability of unexpended prior year appropriations. Instead of using those funds for current operating expenses, we would propose applying them to the backlog of repair and restoration requirements without reduction in the level of the current Federal contribution.



APPENDIX VI.  

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**C**ARNEGIE INSTITUTION  
OF WASHINGTON*Extending the Frontiers of Science*

OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

May 15, 1995

Senator Ted Stevens  
ATTEN: Christine Ciccone  
305 Russell Office Building  
Committee on Rules and Administration  
United States Senate  
Washington, D.C. 20510 6325


Dear Senator Stevens:

I am pleased to enclose copies of the report of the Commission on the Future of the Smithsonian Institution, released earlier this month. This will stand as my written testimony for the hearing on the *Smithsonian Institution: Management Guidelines for the Future*, on Thursday, May 18, 1995.

I had the honor to chair this Commission of independent citizens, which was established by the Regents of the Smithsonian. Commission members came from around the nation and represented many fields of endeavor. It met and worked over the last 20 months, studying in depth various aspects of program, governance, finances, and administration of the Institution. The written report describes the Commission's final ideas about how the Smithsonian can best prepare for the future, considering a time frame of 15 to 10 years.

In my oral presentation at the hearing, I will emphasize those aspects of the report that are pertinent to the management of the Institution. I thank you, on behalf of the Commission, for the opportunity to describe our findings.

Sincerely,

  
Maxine F. Singer

MFS/sb

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