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

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**SOME NOTES ON TACTICS**  
—in the—  
**EAST AFRICAN CAMPAIGN.**

BY

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1. The East African Campaign was, in many ways, abnormal. Never before had warfare on a large scale, with modern weapons, been waged within a few degrees of the Equator. Never, perhaps, had one consecutive series of operations been conducted over such a vast area, stretching from the Uganda Railway to the Zambesi, and from Lake Tanganyika to the Indian Ocean. German East Africa was twice the size of Germany; Portuguese East, from the Rovuma to Quelimane, was nearly as large as France.

Most abnormal of all were the health conditions. Few of the rank and file (except the indigenous African) lasted more than a year in the Field; and that year probably included several spells in hospital.

It took several months of actual experience before a man, accustomed to more open warfare, "found his feet" in the bush; and by the time he was getting really useful he generally began to go sick.

It was probably an exception for an Indian battalion to engage the enemy, with less than 30% of recruits in its ranks. We could not afford to leave many men in training camps, once the campaign of movement began; for the casualties were so heavy, partly in action and more from sickness, that every man was wanted at the front as soon as he was available.

2. There is perhaps no form of warfare that requires so much inherent pluck in the individual as bush fighting; especially when attacking—as we generally were—in unknown and

intensely difficult country. It was like fighting in a continual fog; and a fog, moreover, through which the enemy (knowing every inch of the country) could see.

The loneliness of the bush weighs heavily on the spirits. Two bodies of troops, ten miles apart, feel as far asunder as the Poles. A single soldier, twenty yards from his next file, feels as if he was alone in Africa.

The tactics of the bush approximate closely to those of night operations; and, when carried on for months at a stretch, test the nerves of the bravest.

Our enemy was of first-class fighting calibre. The German X Commander began to expand his forces the moment that war was declared. He had a much larger and more prolific recruiting area than we had. And not only did he enlist askari, but he also recruited a very large number of porters, mostly of the Wanyamwezi tribe, well known as the best carriers in Africa and stout fighting men as well. These porters were trained very nearly as carefully as the askari, and, later on, gave Gen: von Lettow Vorbeck an invaluable reserve of men naturally brave, and thoroughly "shot over", who needed very little additional training to make them fit to take their places in the ranks.

The German system was peculiar. Iron discipline ON duty—the utmost license OFF duty. It is a system that does not help to raise the African—"half devil and half child"—in the scale of civilization; but it was undoubtedly to his taste. Most Africans of warlike tribes are extraordinarily faithful, and, given a good fighting leader, and a free hand with loot and women, they will follow their commander anywhere and for any length of time. It says much for the character of the British Officer that the African follows him equally well *without* the license permitted by the Germans.

It takes 1½ to 2 years to train an African to a really high standard. But when fully trained he is (in his own bush country) as good a native soldier as exists.

3. By the beginning of 1916, the German Commander had X increased his African forces to about 12,000 askari. (Probably,

from first to last, he passed 16,000 Africans through his ranks). All of these were not of the same standard, but the bulk of them were very good indeed. To back these he had, in March 1916, rather over 2,500 Europeans.

His organization was specially designed for the peculiar conditions of bush warfare with modern weapons. The fighting unit was a completely self-contained Company. The strengths of these varied. The 13th Company (which was the German "Guard" Company in March 1916) then consisted of 30-40 whites, 230-240 askari, and 6 machine-guns. The average company was 160-180 strong, with at least 10% of whites, and 2-4 machine guns. These Companies normally fought in "Abteilungen" of three or more Companies. X

The German Company was a very handy unit in the bush; and was possibly better suited for the enemy's purpose, in this particular form of fighting, than our battalion organization would have been. X

The German organization was undoubtedly superior to ours in one most important detail—the disposal of their available Europeans. They had hardly any purely European formations. There were at first a few European "Schutzen" Companies of small strength, but these were soon expended into mixed Companies like the rest.

Our Indian battalions were severely handicapped in this respect. Rarely were more than half their officers effective at any one time; a battalion of, say, 600 men had therefore less than two per cent of white men, as against ten to fifteen per cent with the enemy. In fact, the whole German force in East Africa was a highly "specialized" force, organised and trained with a view to one particular form of warfare.

In terrain such as the bare hills of the North-West Frontier, it is very possible that a first-class Indian battalion could have fully held its own against an equal number of German askari, in spite of all advantages of white personnel; but in the bush of East Africa (and it must be remembered that the bush covered nine-tenths of the whole area of operations) there was no

doubt that the specially trained African troops, backed by a large percentage of whites and by the very numerous and well-served German machine-guns, were a match for the very best troops we could put against them.

4. While the German force was homogeneous, ours was heterogeneous in the extreme. We had, at one time or another, British battalions, South Africans (mounted and dismounted), Rhodesians, units from British East Africa, Cape Corps, King's African Rifles, Nigerians, Gold Coast, Indian regular battalions, Indian Imperial Service units, and many more. Some were trained, others were not. Hardly any, except the K. A. R. and troops from the West Coast, had any experience of bush warfare. The choice of troops was of course dictated by demands from other and more important theatres of war, and was naturally not perfect.

East Africa is by no means an ideal campaigning country for white Infantry; for, unless the European foot soldier is "well done", he goes sick very quickly. The German N. C. O. was allowed 8-10 porters for his kit, and carried very little on his person. The European Infantry of the 1st East African Brigade started the 1916 advance with 20 lbs of baggage per man. By August, this had been halved, and eventually went still lower.

Rations were often scarce, and occasionally approached the vanishing point; and it says much for their stoutness of heart and esprit de corps that 20% of the Europeans of the 1st Brigade who left MOSHI in May 1916 arrived, though absolutely "done in", on the banks of the Rufigi in January 1917.

Other white units had just as hard a time. It was perhaps unavoidable. We were always advancing, and lengthening our Lines of Communication, while the enemy was falling back on predisposed depots and regular lines of supply. Had we tried to give our European ranks even one porter load (50 lbs) apiece, we should probably never have got ahead in sufficient strength to push matters through.

The bulk of the East African Force began the 1916 campaign as amateurs in the special form of fighting that lay ahead of them.

Until Indian Expeditionary Force "B" arrived in East Africa, no British General had ever commanded a Brigade in the bush against an enemy trained on modern lines, and equipped with modern weapons; and the opportunities for operating in Brigade had since then been very few, owing to the fact that the troops defending British East Africa in 1915 were perforce strung out over a frontier 700 miles long.

5. In dealing with Brigade tactics I shall quote my own experiences freely, as I can criticize my own actions without hurting anyone's feelings.

In the earlier stages of the campaign of 1916, when Brigadiers had to train themselves as well as their troops, the "ring-fence" style of fighting a Brigade was a sound one. We were advancing day by day; and most of the fights, as far as we were concerned, were "encounter battles" i. e. we came on the enemy in the bush (nearly always entrenched) without having previously had time or opportunity to reconnoitre his position or strength. There was therefore considerable risk in launching a wide turning movement, for the country was generally very thick, and always unknown; and a battalion sent on such a mission, with no very definite objective, would infallibly have lost itself, and might have been cut up.

The points aimed at, therefore, were:-

(a) To keep the whole force under the close command of the Brigadier. To ensure this, the latter had to be fairly close up, i. e. within 400 to 800 yards of the firing line, according to the thickness of the bush. This gave the troops confidence; and, if a telephone wire broke, the G. O. C. was within easy reach of a messenger.

(b) To keep touch between units. And no one, who has not actually fought in thick bush, can have any conception of the difficulty of this.

(c) To initiate local turning movements to one or both flanks.

(d) To keep a good Reserve in hand. This was all-important, as the enemy's main defence lay in counter-attack. X

6. A good example of a difficult bush fight was the engagement at Mkalamo on June 9th 1916.


(See Sketch No. 1.)

Our orders were to try to reach Mkalamo, and to secure the trolley line and the bridge across the Pangani River there. The distance was said to be 16-20 miles; the guide was very hazy about the track; and reports re the enemy were unreliable, both with regard to his strength and whereabouts. The Brigade had five battalions; but it must be remembered that the average strength of a battalion seldom exceeded 400 rifles, and was often much less. A strong Advance Guard of 2 battalions started two hours ahead of the main body. This worked well; the Advanced Guard was strong enough to clear away minor opposition, and the main body and train had a clear run through, without interruptions. By four p. m. we had covered 18 miles, and the main body caught up the Advance Guard just as it became heavily engaged with the enemy in an entrenched position. The bush was so thick that one could literally not see thirty yards in any direction. There were only a couple of hours of daylight left. The men were tired. We did not know where we were, nor where Mkalamo was; and it was impossible to gauge the enemy's strength, though he appeared to have about ten machine guns in action. The best thing to do seemed to be to shove in hard and look out for counter-attacks. One battalion was kept in reserve; the weakest battalion was on baggage and rear guard. (Our Ammunition Column and train was perhaps two miles long, and of course extremely vulnerable on a narrow bush path).


We tried to turn the enemy's left flank, but found more entrenchments there. The enemy counter-attacked several times, but was beaten back by the Reserve and baggage guard. Finally, after pushing the enemy back a considerable distance, we dug in on the ground gained, as darkness was coming on. Next morning the enemy had decamped, and we found the trolley line and bridge intact. We found out afterwards that the enemy had six or seven companies against us; his casualties were heavier than ours.



This was the position as it appeared at about 5 p. m.  
(Sketch No. 1.)



This is the position as it is really was ;—  
Sketch No. 2.




## East African Campaign.

*Comments*—Without knowing it, we had very nearly turned the flank of the enemy's whole position, and were within a mile of the trolley line. It would have been better to have stopped the fire-fight at about 4-30 or 5 p. m., and to have pushed in with the bayonet. And, had stronger fighting patrols been sent from our right flank early in the action, they might have discovered the trolley line in time for us to get a force across it by nightfall. We might then have cut off a part, or even the whole of the enemy force.

7. When we were all better trained, we could afford to take more risk, and try for bigger results. An example of more elastic tactics than the "ring-fence" variety was afforded by a sector of the attack on the enemy's position South of the Mgeta River, on January 1st 1917.

The Brigade had been within a few miles of the enemy's position for nearly three months; so of course we knew the lie of the country and the position and strength of the enemy fairly accurately.

**Sketch No. 3.**



Daybreak on January 1st was the time fixed for the attack right along the line. A. B. C. was the left of the enemy's whole position. (The enemy's positions were generally prepared for a far larger number of men than actually held them, in order that a threatened sector could be reinforced to any extent).

The 1st Brigade sent its best battalion (400 strong) late on December 31st to cross the bridge at E, and make a circuitous night march to D, where it was to be dug in across the enemy's line of retreat by daybreak of January 1st. The rest of the Brigade camped at E. on the night of the 31st December, and attacked the enemy's extreme left flank B. C. very early on January 1st 1917. As we attacked, the enemy evidently heard of the battalion at D, for he vacated the position and went hard for D, where a very stiff fight took place. The Brigade followed as fast as possible, but was just too late to catch the enemy, who melted off in to the bush as we came up. The battalion at D, held its own well; and the nett result of the manoeuvre was that the enemy had to give up a position he had been fortifying for months, and got well hammered into the bargain. It would probably have been better to have sent two battalions instead of one to point D, but the night march was an extremely difficult one, and the larger force would have had less chance of getting to D, un-noticed by the enemy.

General Smuts was a great believer in wide turning movements, and made much use of them both strategically and tactically. They were very successful; and though, owing to the extreme difficulty of the country, we never succeeded in bringing off a Sedau, yet the enemy was frequently forced out of almost impregnable positions with heavier losses than ours. Very careful reconnaissance was necessary for the tactical turning movements as these had mostly to be done by night; and very good troops were necessary, as the enemy invariably attacked the "blocking" force most furiously.

### 8. Defence of an Exposed L. O. C. Sketch No. 3.

When holding the Mgeta line preparatory to the advance to the Rufigi, some 15 miles of our Line of Communication

## **East African Campaign.**


(motor-road) ran parallel to the enemy's positions, and only 9-4 miles from it; the only obstacle between being the Mgeta River, which was fordable at a good many points. The enemy naturally harried this bit of the L. O. C. pretty badly, sniping and attacking convoys, and laying mines in the road. Escorts and heavy patrolling were tried, but could not guarantee security, and used up a lot of men.

So we fell back on the frontier system of "permanent piquets". A succession of "impregnable posts" was made about halfway between the road and the enemy, and on the North of the river. By an "impregnable post" is meant one in which 50 men will cheerfully welcome the attack of five or six times their number without artillery. The posts were well hidden in the bush to avoid shelling. The garrisons varied from 50-200 men. When a raid took place, half the men of any post in the vicinity at once went out and got between the raiders and the river. Sometimes the raiders were killed, sometimes not, but they were always chased; and after a while they left us alone except for the mine-laying, which could be done by a single man at night.

We found this system of "permanent piquets", combined with light patrolling, was far less trying to the men than the heavy patrolling we tried at first, and vastly more effective. The mine-laying was a nuisance, but we got over it in rather a quaint way. The villages along the route were made responsible for stretches of road. It was no good threatening to hang the headmen if mines were laid, as the entire population would simply have cleared off into the bush had we tried "frightfulness". But the African has a sense of humour, and loves a bit of a gamble. So we called up the headmen, shewed them what a mine looked like and offered them 30 rupees per patrol of six men for every mine they found, and 30 with a "Kiboko" per patrol of six for every mine they missed. They thought this no end of a joke, and took it up at once. They found 12 mines between them, and secured Rs. 360.-; only one mine was missed, the patrol responsible (having duly got their "five" apiece) were chaffed

out of their lives by the rest; and we all parted the best of friends.

**9. The Crossing of The Rufigi at Kibambawe, January 1917.  
Sketch No 4.**



The 1st East African Brigade arrived at the Rufigi on January 5th, and was ordered to begin the crossing that night. We had only about 4 hours for reconnaissance, and were lucky to find a place which, though by no means ideal, was possible. The task was not an easy one. The river at the point selected was 500 yards wide, deep and swift. The landing-place was commanded on three sides by a concave ridge 1000 yards to a mile distant from it. Our sole means of crossing consisted of seven Berthon boats, (carrying three men each) which were by no means in their first youth. There were 5-7 Companies on the ridge C D E, with a couple of small field guns and the usual complement of maxims. And the river was full of crocodiles and hippos. Our only advantages lay in our heavy superiority in

Artillery, and the possession of Observation Hill, which commanded a good deal of the Southern bank.

We waited till dark, and got 80 men and 2 maxims across on the night of 5/6th; these dug themselves in amidst the high grass at A, and lay very quiet all the 6th. Next night we increased the force to 350 men and 4 maxims, having meanwhile got all our artillery into position, and "registered". Each night, we pretended to be mending the German bridge, and kept the attention of the enemy fixed there. On the 7th, the enemy spotted the real crossing for the first time, and immediately attacked. Our little force on the Southern bank had a rough time, but held the enemy off—the guns on Observation Hill being of the greatest assistance. Night by night, thereafter, more men were put across. A day crossing was tried once, but two boats were immediately put out of action by shrapnel. The hippos were a very real hindrance, as they frequently attacked the boats. One boat was sunk, and others injured. Owing to these and other accidents, there were seldom more than 5 boats working at any one time.

The troops on the Southern bank at A had a hard time. It was terribly hot by day, for the high reeds gave very little shade. All food had to be cooked on the Northern bank, and sent across at night, for any smoke on the Southern bank at once drew maxim fire, as did any movement by day. At last the force was across, except the guns; and the next consideration was, how to get up to the Ridge. Some of the enemy had by this time been drawn away towards the South African Brigade, which had made a surprise crossing unopposed 25 miles upstream; but there were enough enemy left at Kibambawe to make our "break-out" a ticklish business, unless we could hoodwink them in some way.


The advance was fixed for 3-30 a. m. on the 18th. Our Armoured Car Battery had a fairly powerful searchlight; this was taken to P. overlooking the German bridge, and was turned on at intervals during the night of the 17-18th. Every askari from E to D fired at it the first time it appeared; the Germans

jumped to the conclusion (as we hoped they would) that we were intending to force a crossing at I<sup>2</sup>, and took their whole force towards D; and the advance to C was unopposed. Once on the Ridge, we were on equal terms with the enemy.

10. **Formations.** It is almost impossible to lay down any stereotyped formation for use in bush warfare, because the nature of the bush varies so greatly with the locality and with the season of the year. A formation that would be suitable in September or October, when the bush has been burnt or has died down, would be totally inapplicable over the same ground in April, just after the rains. And it is impossible to devise a formation that would be equally applicable to thick thorn-bush, high elephant grass, and open forest.

(a) Sketch No. 5 shews the principle of "parallel columns" as applied to a normal Advanced Guard formation in average bush. By average bush is meant fairly open forest, where you can perhaps see for a hundred yards in all directions through the tree-trunks and bushes, and where the grass is about the height of a ripe hay-field in England.

**Sketch No. 5.**



The distances between A. B. C. D. depended entirely on the thickness of the bush, and how far one could see through it. I have known a main body find it very difficult to keep touch with the A. G., though the distance between them was less than 200 yards.

Extended order, in even average bush, is extremely tiring, as each man has to break his own way. It is therefore advisable to change the men in A. occasionally, and also the leading files of the small columns.

These small columns are handy and elastic, easy to control and easy to deploy from, and get over the ground at a good pace without unduly tiring the men. Constant intervals cannot be kept, as the columns have to wind about to avoid obstacles; but that matters little as long as touch is maintained. It is sound not to deploy until fire has to be opened; for a long extended line in the bush is extremely difficult to control.

Each Company had normally two Maxims and two Lewis guns. The main thing to be aimed at in an attack in bush country is to get round one or both of the enemy's flanks. Two of the above guns were therefore kept about the centre of B, while the other two were retained in hand to push round a flank. Most C.O.'s preferred the Maxims for the frontal attack, the lighter Lewis guns being kept ready for the flank.

If a Stokes gun was available, it was well placed at the head of C. It was a most effective weapon in the bush, as it could come into action very quickly and at short ranges.

(b) *Main body.* On a fairly good path, fours or file was the least tiring formation for the troops. The drawback was that the African porter has been accustomed, since about 10,000 B. C., to march in single file. And, however broad the road, it was sooner or later found that the carefully marshalled porter "fours" had melted into single file; which of course made the column enormously long, and correspondingly vulnerable.

Unless the bush was very thick, the parallel column system could be used to defeat this tendency, thus:—



*Forming up formation.*

*March formation*

S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S.—Sepoy.
S	S	S	S	S	S	S	S	P.—Porter.
P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	
P	P	P	P	P	P	P	P	

Even if the columns were only five paces apart, the porter would keep his formation perfectly, as he was back in his immemorial single file.

With both A. G. and main body, it was possible to ring the changes on details of the above, to any extent; but the principle of the parallel column was always sound.

11. **Attack and defence.** The experience of both sides shewed that, from first to last, astonishingly few casualties were caused by rifle-fire. Everyone fires high in the bush. There is seldom anything to aim at. A flitting figure might occasionally be seen among the tree-trunks; but, until an actual charge came on, very few enemy were ever visible. The fire-fighting weapon  $\times$  par excellence in the bush is the machine-gun; the Germans realized this very early in the campaign, and based their whole system of tactics on it.

Their method of defence was an extremely aggressive defence-offensive. For fire-effect they depended almost entirely on machine-guns, and the bulk of their askari were kept in reserve for counter-attack. These counter-attacks were sometimes local, i.e. directed at the flank of the attacking firing line; more often they were wider movements, aimed at the guns, the train, or even at the Force Reserve itself. They were delivered at a great pace, and were pushed in with the utmost determination; machine-guns very often accompanied the wider counter-attacks.  $\times$  When we had been able to reconnoitre the enemy's position, as at the Mgeta River (Sketch No. 3), we could minimize the danger of counter-attack by pushing in our own main attack quickly on the flank; for the enemy was just as susceptible to a flank attack as we were.

**East African Campaign.**

But, in the great majority of cases, we just "bumped" the enemy in the bush. The attacking commander had then to discover the enemy's position and strength, and (if possible) where the enemy's flanks rested, before deciding where he would push in his main attack.

This often took time; and, during this time, the enemy nearly always counter-attacked.

It was a mistake to build up too thick a firing-line in an attack. Once men were well down on their stomachs in the grass, firing (generally yards high) at an invisible foe, it was difficult to get them to advance—chiefly owing to the impossibility of adequately controlling a long extended line in the bush; while it was inadvisable to withdraw men or maxims from the firing line, as the smallest retrograde movement frequently led to a local withdrawal on a larger scale than was intended. The soundest plan in an "encounter" attack seemed to be.

(a). To develop only sufficient fire-effect to force the enemy to disclose his position, patrolling strongly at the same time to find his flanks.

(b) To keep the bulk of the attacking force in hand while (a) was taking place, and to be prepared to meet counter-attacks during this time.

(c) Having decided where to deliver the main attack (preferably on a flank), to push this in fast, and with as little fire-fighting as possible, seeking always to get in with the bayonet.

(d) Always to keep a Reserve in hand.

These rules may appear obvious, but they were very difficult to carry out, especially *d*.

Until troops (and their commanders) were experienced in bush warfare, they always exaggerated the strength of the opposing force, and generally asked for reinforcements early in the action. Unless the Commander of Brigade or Column was adamant on this point, it was not long before he found that the greater part of his Reserve had drifted away to the firing-line, and that he had but little in hand to meet a counter-attack or follow up a

success. Nearly every local reverse we met with in 1916 and 1917 could be traced to an inadequate Reserve.

The enemy's most favourite time for heavy counter-attack X was at dusk. If, therefore, the attacking commander saw no chance of a definite decision before dark, he was usually well advised to consolidate the ground won, and dig in, before the light failed.

It must always be remembered that, in nine cases out of ten, the enemy knew the ground and we did not. General Tighe's maxims of 1915 held good to the end.

Keep touch. Guard your flanks. Keep a Reserve in hand. When in doubt, use the bayonet.

12. **Artillery.** Of enemy guns, those that gave us most trouble were the 4.1" Königsberg naval guns, and the 4.1" howitzers.

The former had an effective range (on land) of about 14,000 yards; and, in addition to its ordinary H. E. shell, fired an H. E. shell with a time fuze. These guns often bothered us considerably in standing camp *i.e.* when we were halted for any length of time. Our own Mark VII 4" naval guns outranged the German 4.1", but transport was very seldom available to bring them to the front.

The enemy 4.1" howitzer was a very light, handy weapon, easily pulled by porters. It ranged up to 6,500', was very accurate, and fired shrapnel as well as H. E. It was a very effective weapon for bush warfare.

Our own Artillery was very mixed. Perhaps the most useful batteries were the 13 pr R. S.A. F.A., 5" howitzers, 2.75" B. L. mountain, and 3.7" mountain howitzers, all of which did excellent work.

Before the 2.75" B. L. arrived in East Africa, the old 10 pr. mountain guns did splendidly, and were frequently pushed right up into the firing line. This heartened the men, and many an enemy machine-gun was knocked out by direct hits.

The lot of the F. O. O. was by no means an enviable one, for he had frequently to get to within 200' or less of the enemy position, with no cover except that afforded by grass or bushes, before he could give his guns a target.

The great difficulty in the bush was to get sufficient clearance for artillery fire; the howitzer naturally gave less trouble than the gun in this respect.

The 3·7" pack howitzer proved an excellent weapon for bush warfare, and its H. E. shells had a very considerable effect on the rocky kopjes, where the enemy often took up his position. There is little doubt that the 3·7" has a future before it in Indian frontier warfare.

### **13. General Notes.**

(a) *Camps.* In the generality of cases, perimeter camp was best. It was very seldom that the enemy located a temporary camp in the bush with sufficient accuracy to shell it effectively. A good plan was to light dummy fires well away to a flank; these were frequently shelled while the camp itself remained immune.

When in touch with the enemy, it was sound to dig in, and make abattis; thorns on small trees were always available. This gave the troops a sense of security, and ensured restful nights. Standing patrols were of course placed on all tracks, and if possible connected with the camp by telephone. If there were commanding hills or knolls in the vicinity, they were held on the same principle as piquets in frontier warfare. It was best, however, to cut down the number of piquets and detached posts to the minimum, and make them very strong; for the enemy was wonderfully quick at detecting a weak post.

In open country, a normal outpost system could of course be used.

(b) *Compass reading by day or night,* was of the utmost importance. Every wide turning movement had to depend largely on the compass for its direction; likewise all marches across country, unless a pronounced road or track could be followed.

(c) Escorts with convoys should not be scattered singly along the convoy; but should be kept in formed bodies, with flankers well out.

(d) "Shorts" are out of place in a highly malarial country. A baggy knickerbocker is far more serviceable. It seems useless to insist on the use of mosquito nets, if the anopheles is invited to banquet at pleasure on your unprotected knees.

(e) *Quinine*. There are many differences of opinion on this subject. But, as a general working rule, it appeared decidedly beneficial, when in a malarial country, to give every man five grains a day, preferably in the evening.

(f) *The sun*. The tropical sun within a few degrees of the Equator, is peculiarly treacherous. We very seldom experienced anything like the fierce heat of a Punjab June; and there were often cloudy days when the sun appeared as innocuous as on a summer day in England. But the rays of the sun were there all the time; and any man who exposed his head for five minutes, between 7-30 a.m. and 5 p.m., was asking for trouble. A very great deal of the abnormal sickness in East Africa was due to carelessness in this respect.

(g) *Discipline*. There was at one time a most extraordinary, but somewhat widespread idea that, because the East African campaign was of an unusual type, and seemed to savour of "irregular" warfare, discipline and training were less important than in other theatres of war. I have heard the opinion mooted, and defended with some heat, that a collection of elephant-hunters, with no regimental training at all, would have done as well as a battalion of Guards. Never was there a more mistaken idea. Never was there a campaign where discipline was more essential, or produced better results. The elephant-hunter had his proper sphere as an Intelligence Agent or scout. Many of them did magnificent work as such.

But against an enemy of the calibre of Gen. von Lettow's troops, we could not afford to neglect any of the rules of war. Discipline had to be met by discipline. The fighting was severe, the conditions most exacting. And, when a considered and ac-



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