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
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THE SPANISH COLONIAL SYSTEM

BY

WILHELM ROSCHER

TRANSLATION EDITED BY

EDWARD GAYLORD BOURNE

Professor of History in Yale University

NEW YORK
HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
1904

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ROBERT DRUMMOND, PRINTER, NEW YORK

PREFACE

The secular rivalry and conflict between the colonial interests of England and Spain which the United States inherited, the many points at which our history touches that of the former Spanish colonies, and the earlier and later absorption of Spanish possessions within our national boundaries make an intelligent appreciation of the work of Spain as a colonizing power an important object in the study of American history. Such a knowledge of the aims and work of Spain is no less necessary an adjunct to the understanding of the political problems of to-day in the West Indies and in the Philippines. The treatments of the subject in our ordinary text-books and in the popular narrative histories are at best inadequate and too often misleading through the prejudices or lack of knowledge of their authors. What is needed is a broad historical and comparative treatment of the subject such as will be found in the chapter here presented in English from Roscher's *Kolonien, Kolonialpolitik und Auswanderung* (Third Edition, Leipzig, 1885).

The great profit I have derived from the study of this admirable work has long made me wish it were available for class use and for collateral reading, and it is in the hope of making a useful addition to the materials for the study of our colonial history or the history of colonization in general that I have undertaken an English edition of this chapter which is complete in itself.

The translation is principally the work of Dr. Ernest H. Baldwin, but I have carefully revised it and am alone responsible for it in its present shape. To facilitate the consultation of Roscher's authorities for further reading or investigation short bibliographical notes have been added where they seemed likely to be useful.

In this connection it may not be out of place to remark that there is much that is still valuable in Robertson's account of the Spanish Colonial System as given in the eighth book of his *History of America*, especially in the notes; that the rich materials in H. H. Bancroft's *Central America* and *Mexico* are too often overlooked; and that Konrad Häbler's admirable chapters on the "Spanish Colonial Empire," in the first volume of Helmolt's *History of the World*, as the work of a scholar who has critically investigated the economic history of Spain, will amply reward careful study.

E. G. B.

New Haven, November, 1903



THE SPANISH COLONIAL SYSTEM

THE sixteenth century saw the accomplishment of two great historical events of world-wide importance: the exploration of the globe, and the reformation of the church. The latter task, belonging particularly to the spiritual realm, devolved chiefly on the Germanic peoples; the former, of a more material nature, on the Romance nations.

Italy's Share in Spain's Achievements.—During this entire century Spain was, undoubtedly, the foremost power of Europe; yet in all of her splendid achievements she had to rely upon Italy. For example, in the sphere of religion, the foundation of the Order of Jesuits and the Council of Trent took their origin from Spain and Italy, equally; upon the whole it would be difficult to say whether the restoration of the Catholic Church at that time—that violent recoil of the Reformation—is owing more to the Spaniards or to the Italians. How often the Spanish armies, in that age the leading troops of the world, were led by Italian generals! Recall only Spinola and Alexander of Parma, not to mention Pescara. And do not Spanish literature and art, which from the time of Philip II to that of Louis XIV unquestionably led those of all Europe, constitute in many respects a beautiful silver age of the art and literature of Italy? Similarly the discovery of the New World was effected not less by Italians (Columbus, Amerigo, Cabot) than by Spaniards. The former, as a rule, made the beginning on the sea; the latter, the actual conquest.

Under the Hapsburgs.—He who would study the Spanish colonial system in its peculiar completeness must keep in view the century and a half from the accession of Philip II to the end

of the Hapsburg male line.[1] During the conquest the government could do little more than gradually to develop its system, and, in contest with the unrestrained assertions of independence on the part of the conquistadores, to put it into effect step by step. On the other hand the Bourbon dynasty, in the administration of their colonies as in almost every other respect, disturbed the old Spanish order by imitating foreigners. We cannot properly explain the later colonial policy of the Spaniards as a natural development; it is rather partly derived from the old Spanish, and partly from the French and English policies of the eighteenth century.[2]

Agriculture not the Chief Aim of Spanish Colonization.—How little attention, on the whole, the conquistadores directed to agricultural colonies, considering their various services in the transplantation of domestic animals, cereals, and vegetables from the Old to the New World, is very clearly shown by Peter Martyr, who condemns the expedition to Florida with the words: "For what purpose do we need such products as are identical with those of southern Europe?"[3] It is true that Columbus's second voyage of discovery had a settlement in view, and for that reason was provided with domestic animals, seeds, etc. It was a failure, however, owing to the mutinous spirit of the Spaniards. The third expedition was directed in accordance with a very definite plan, with a stipulated number of laborers, peasants, and women; it was particularly unfortunate, however, that so many criminals were transported with it.[4] The regions which were best adapted

[1] More exactly from 1542, when Charles V proclaimed the celebrated "New Laws." [On these "New Laws" see Lea, *Yale Review*, Aug., 1899, "The Indian Policy of Spain."—B.]

[2] As the chief source for this whole section, I have used the excellent official codification: *Recopilacion de Leyes de los Reynos de las Indias*, 4 vols., fol., 3d edition, 1774.

[3] Peter Martyr, *Ocean. Dec.*, VIII, cap. 10. Cortes is an honorable exception to this. He introduced into Mexico the cultivation of sugar-cane, wool, and silk-growing, and devoted no excessive consideration to the production of precious metals. Compare Prescott, *Conquest of Mexico*, III, 294. [Peter Martyr's *Decades* are accessible in English in Lok's translation in vol. V of *Hakluyt's Voyages*, London, 1809–1812.—B.]

[4] Herrera I, 3, 2. [Herrera's *Historia General de los Hechos de los Castellanos en las Islas y Tierra-Firme de el Mar Oceano* is accessible in English in a somewhat abridged and inaccurate translation by John Stevens under the

to agricultural colonies, as, for example, Caracas, Guiana, Buenos Ayres, were neglected by the Spaniards for centuries. As they saw no advantage in the conquest of these countries, they seized the inhabitants to sell them as slaves.[1] In this way, the Spaniards, although they were always ashamed to engage in the negro slave trade themselves, by their traffic in Caribs exemplified all its horrors.[2]

Spanish Character.—The character of the Spanish people has, from the beginning, been prone to indolence and pride. All thrifty activity was regarded as despicable. No trader had a seat in the Cortes of Aragon. As late as 1781 the Academy of Madrid was obliged to offer as the subject for a prize essay the proposition that there was nothing derogatory in the useful arts. Every tradesman and manufacturer sought only to make enough money to enable him to live on the interest of it or to establish a trust fund for his family. If he was successful he either entered a cloister or went to another province in order to pass for a noble. In Cervantes we find the maxim: "Whoever wishes to make his fortune seeks the church, the sea (*i.e.*, service in America), or the king's house." The highest ambition of the nation in its golden age was to be to Europe just what the nobility, the clergy, and the army were to single nations. Consequently there was an enormous preponderance of personal service in the industrial organism, and much of this was purely for ostentation.

title *General History of the Continent and Islands of America*, London, 1725 and later.—B.]

[1] In Caracas, especially, this was extremely difficult because of the number and bravery of the natives; compare Depons, *Voyage à la Partie Orientale de la Terre-Ferme*, I, 96 ff. [Depons's *Voyage* was translated by Washington Irving under the title of *Voyage to the Eastern Part of Terra Firma or the Spanish Main*, 3 vols., New York, 1806. Later editions have varying titles.—B.]

[2] Benzoni, *Hist. del Mondo Nuevo*, 4, 7 ff. Humboldt, *R. H.*, I, 324. [Benzoni's *Historia del Nuevo Mondo* is accessible in English in the version by W. H. Smyth for the Hakluyt Society, London, 1857. On Benzoni as an authority see the note under his name in Larned's *Literature of American History*. Humboldt, *R. H.*, refers to Humboldt's *Relation Historique*, originally published in Humboldt and Bonpland, *Voyage aux régions Équinoxiales du Nouveau Continent, 1799–1804*, Paris, 1814. It is accessible in English as the *Personal Narrative of Travels*, etc., translated first by Helen Maria Williams, 7 vols., London, 1818–1829, and again by Thomasina Ross, 3 vols., London, 1852–1853, Bohn's Scientific Library.—B.]

Nowhere in the world were there so many nobles, so many officers, civil and military, so many lawyers and clerks, priests and monks, so many students and school-boys, with their servants. But as truly, nowhere in the world were there so many beggars and vagabonds.

Policy of the Crown in Behalf of the Natives.—The Spanish colonies were, originally, pure conquest colonies. Very early, however, the crown sought to interpose between the conquerors and the conquered, and to place the exploitation of the natives under restrictions that would be humane and lasting.[1] The frequent very violent conflicts of the government with the conquistadores in behalf of the natives may be compared with those of England against the planters in favor of the negroes, Hottentots, etc.[2] Charles V had such a scientific interest in the characteristics of his new subjects that he even established professorships of the Mexican language and antiquities.[3]

The Royal Encomenderos.—According to the constitutional law of the Indies the land and the soil in all colonies were the domain of the king; therefore the encomiendas, which were granted only to discoverers and other men of conspicuous merit, were to be considered not so much as landed estates as public offices.[4] The encomendero was appointed and sworn (law of 1532) for the express purpose of giving his Indians military protection (law of 1552) and of promoting politically and religiously their conversion to civilization (laws of 1509, 1554, 1580).[5] Whoever neglected to do this lost his encomienda (laws of 1536, 1551). It is characteristic that the Spaniards so readily combined the functions of discoverers, pacificators, and founders of settlements;[6]

[1] As early as the time of the Catholic Queen Isabella; cf. her will, *Recopilacion*, VI, 10, 1. Columbus's ruin was principally occasioned by his exportation of Indian slaves to Seville (*Ausland*, 1856, No. 40).

[2] Compare Humboldt, *Kritische Untersuchung*, II, 201 ff. Cortes is again an honorable exception; cf. his will in Prescott, III, 306.

[3] Wappäus, *Mittel- und Südamerika*, 37 ff.

[4] Compare *Recopilacion*, VI, 8, 9, 11.

[5] The king also had the right to attach pensions up to a certain amount, as a charge upon the encomiendas.

[6] Philip II had already forbidden the word "conquest" in his law concerning the *Poblaciones*. *Recop.*, IV, 1, 6.

as a matter of fact most of the Indian races were led to a civil life, in our sense of the word, by them.[1] In order to prevent extortion no encomendero could own a house in his village or stay there more than one night (law of 1609, 1618). Not even his nearest relatives or his slaves could enter the encomienda (law of 1574, 1550, and often). He was forbidden to maintain any industrial establishment in the encomienda (law of 1621), or to take into his house any of the inhabitants (law of 1528). That the Indians were free men, that they could not be sold by an encomendero, was recognized in many laws.[2] After the legislation of 1542 some of the Indians were the immediate subjects of the king, and the rest dependents attached to the encomiendas. The former paid three-fourths of their taxes to the treasury, and the latter the same proportion to their landlords. The right of holding an encomienda was granted, regularly, for two generations, except in New Spain, where, on account of the very unusual services rendered by the conquerors, it was granted for three and even four generations.[3] During the eighteenth century many of the families of the landlords died out and their possessions were not again granted. The authorities always interested themselves in the cause of the Indians, until at length Charles III abolished the encomiendas.[4]

Compulsory Services; the Mita.—From the beginning an effort was made to moderate the military power by means of jurists (so-called *licenciados*) and Philip II made the attorneys (*fiscales*) of the royal courts the official protectors of the Indians.[5] To insure impartiality, none of the higher civil officers who had

[1] In regard to Mexico, I will mention only two points: first that the number of yearly human sacrifices there before the conquest has been estimated at 20,000 (Prescott, I, 72); also that Cortes, at least, made an earnest effort not to impose more taxes on the conquered than they had paid to their former lords (*ibid.*, III, 305).

[2] *Recopilacion*, VI, 2, 1, 11.

[3] *Ibid.*, VI, 11, 14.

[4] Humboldt, *Neuspanien*, I, 144 ff. [Humboldt's *Essai Politique sur le Royaume de la Nouvelle Espagne*, first published as Part III of Humboldt and Bonpland, *Voyage*, etc., 1811. Four of the six *livres* of the original were translated into English by John Black, 2 vols., London, 1811.—B.]

[5] *Recopilacion* II, 18, 34; compare VI, 6.

to do with the administration of American affairs could have an encomienda, or even profit by the compulsory service of the Indians[1] (law of 1542, 1609, and often). The compulsory labor of the Indians was devoted to mining, road-making, maize culture, cattle-raising, and similar necessities; never to wine, sugarcane or like luxuries. In Peru not more than one-seventh, in Mexico not over four per cent. of the Indians could be summoned to service; for mining only such were drafted as lived within a certain distance of the mines.[2] Moreover, how far from oppressive the latter service, the so-called *mita*, was, is best seen in the fact that many, when it was not their turn, applied for it, and those bound to it (*mitayos*) often worked longer hours to gain the high wages promised for so doing.[3]

Treatment of Indians.—On the whole the treatment of the Indians was as humane, perhaps, as was practicable, considering that they were regarded as minors and in view of what was necessary to secure the Spanish sovereignty.[4] No Indian was to carry arms or learn the manufacture of them (law of 1501 and often); the possession of horses was also forbidden them (law of 1568); however, all such provisions were soon without force. If they were obliged to live in villages (law of 1551 and often) and forbidden to change their dwelling-place without the permission of the authorities (law of 1560, 1604, 1618), yet we can find in this only a salutary police regulation by which a relapse to the barbarism of a hunter's life might be prevented. As a matter of fact, the Indian is extraordinarily inclined to such relapses. The prohibition of the whites, mulattoes, etc., from settling among the Indians (law of 1536), and of the merchants from remaining longer than three days among them (law of 1600), was designed to protect them from ruthless exploitation by those of superior abilities. Every Indian village had a native cazique, whose office was often hereditary.[5] The government restricted his authority

[1] *Recopilacion*, VI, 12, 42; II, 3, 15.

[2] *Ibid.*, VI, 12.

[3] Ulloa, *Noticias Americanas*, cap. 14 (1772).

[4] *Recopilacion*, VI, 10: "Del Buen Tratamiento de los Indios."

[5] Mestizos were not eligible for it (law of 1526); also a very wise precautionary measure.

only to the extent of preventing him from abusing his subjects by means of white *corregidores*, or protectors, who were entrusted at the same time with the collection of the revenue.[1] Offences against an Indian were to be avenged more severely than if they affected a Spaniard (law of 1593). The Indians did not pay the oppressive tax of the alcavala; they were easily released from their direct tribute also.

The church treated the Indians with very exceptional mildness. The Inquisition never had to do with the Indians. Any heresies were to be tried before the bishops' courts (law of 1575), but there were never really any prosecutions. Because the Indians thought a great deal of their long hair, contrary to the Pauline injunction, they were not compelled to cut it off before baptism (law of 1581). As for confession, church penances, feast-days, the hearing of mass and fasts, in short almost every church requirement, they were treated with an indulgence which would have been quite impossible towards the Spaniards themselves. All this was "on account of their ignorance and their weak minds." An Indian could marry his godmother notwithstanding the *parentela spiritualis*; when necessary even the eating of human flesh by him was overlooked.[2] As late as Humboldt's time the laws of Isabella and Charles V were still in existence—laws which declared the Indians minors for life, so that, for example, they might not, on their own responsibility, contract debts of over five dollars. "No pueden tratar y contratar." Neither their real estate nor their personal effects could be sold except in due legal form (law of 1571), and the law gave its consent then only when it found the trade advantageous to the Indian.[3]

The Spanish Policy in Theory and in Practice.—The humaneness of this policy no one will fail to appreciate.[4] While the

[1] *Recopilacion*, VI, 7.

[2] Montenegro, *Itinerario de Parochos de Indios*, IV, 5, 9, No. 8; compare Depons, I, 330 ff. Cortes with a shrewd tolerance availed himself of the legend of King Quitzalcoatl, who had gone off to the East, and of the Aztec eagle which was identified with the dove of the Holy Ghost.

[3] But on the other hand it was required that in criminal cases guilt could be pronounced only on the agreeing testimony of six Indians because of their great and universally prevailing lack of truthfulness.

[4] Compare Depons, I, 321 ff. Even Merivale, *Lectures on Colonization and*

colonies of other European peoples regularly caused the extirpation of the barbarous natives wherever they encountered them,[1] the Spaniards succeeded not merely in preserving them but also in converting and civilizing them, besides fusing with them into strong mixed races. It is true the Spaniards in America committed outrages, like those of unrestrained soldiers in every war,[2] but only so long as the conquistadores remained independent of the power of the state which had contributed little to the conquest. A certain restraint over the colonists as well as over natives was essential to that beneficent purpose—a firm interposition, and separation of the two antagonistic elements by the state. Every colonizing nation that desires to treat the aborigines humanely may learn a great deal here from the Spanish policy; for example, the English in regard to their policy in New Zealand and towards the Kaffirs. To be sure humanity was perhaps not the only motive of the Spanish government. The principle of *Divide et impera* came into play, and in the Spanish colonial administration, especially, played an important part. Colonists and aborigines were to check each other. Therefore the whole system of treating the Indians as wards was designed manifestly

Colonies, London, 1842 (II, Lect. 18), is obliged to demand the appointment of protectors for the natives, who thus stand immediately under the authority of the motherland, as an essential obligation in every colony. Conversion to Christianity also seems to him the indispensable previous condition of all civilization; and for very barbarous primitive people he considers the Spanish system of holding them as minors as appropriate in order to prevent a contract for service becoming a form of slavery. On the other hand he condemns the separation of the natives from the colonists; the highest aim should be the amalgamation of the two races. For agricultural colonies I agree with this fully. In Spanish America, however, circumstances made such amalgamation impossible. The temperate tablelands were at first too thickly populated; the hot lowlands were much too unhealthy for hard-working Europeans to permit of a very considerable emigration from the motherland. Really in that case a mingling would have consisted only in a degeneration of the Europeans.

[1] Hence such distinguished authorities as Pöppig (article on Indians in the *Encyclopædia* of Ersch and Gruber) and Darwin speak of an inexplicable necessity of nature which caused the barbarous races to succumb before the settlements of highly civilized men in their neighborhood. That the fact to which they refer is to be otherwise explained has been shown by Merivale, II, 206 ff.

[2] Compare the famous work of Las Casas, *Relacion de la Destruycion de las Indias*, 1552. [In English in many forms; cf. Winsor, *Narr. and Crit. Hist. of Am.*, II, 333–342.—B.]

for permanence. Had the wards ever sought to attain maturity and real independence, for which it is very doubtful whether they were fitted, the Spanish system would have obstructed them at every step. And yet it is the chief object of education to make itself finally no longer necessary. How difficult the legal incapacity of the Indians in regard to borrowing must have rendered every industry! Their own caziques, more than anything else, contributed to keep them in dependence and ignorance. Laws were necessary to prevent caziques from treating their subjects as slaves.[1] In short, whoever considers the enormous extent and the thin population of all the Spanish colonies, the rapid succession of viceroys, their great distance from the superior administrative authorities in Europe, etc., cannot doubt but that in practice the treatment of the Indians was by no means always in accord with the beneficent purpose of the laws. For example, it was repeatedly forbidden to convert the Indians to Christianity by force (law of 1523, 1618), and yet as a matter of fact it was quite customary for missionaries, whenever slaves (*poitos*) seemed necessary, at the head of their soldiers and converted Indians (*Indios reducidos*) to make inroads upon the territory of the heathen in order to seize young people there (*entrada*, *conquista de almas*).[2] Humboldt also asserts that, among other things, the undoubted improvement of introducing camels to take the place of men as freight-carriers was hindered by the encomenderos, who feared it would endanger their feudal rights.[3] Just think of the enormous size of so many ecomiendas! When in Peru the kingdom was rudely overthrown by Gasca, single officers received as reward estates which paid a yearly income of 150,000 or 200,000 pesos.[4] The

[1] *Recopilacion*, VI, 2, 3. Compare especially the remarkable memorial of the bishop of Mechoacan in 1799, in Humboldt, *Neuspanien*, I, 149 ff.

[2] Compare Humboldt, *Relation Historique*, II, 274, 400, 471.

[3] Humboldt, *Relation Historique*, II, 93; compare *Recopilacion*, VI, 12, 9 ff. The principal work, for an understanding of these dark sides of the Spanish colonial system, is that by Antonio de Ulloa and Jorge Juan, *Noticias Secretas de America*, a secret report of these well-known travellers, to Ferdinand VI, which was printed in London in 1826.

[4] Gomara, *Hist. General de las Indias*, cap. 164; Vega, II, 6, 3. According to Herrera (*Decad.*, VII, 6, 3) the estates of Gonzalo Pizarro were more lucrative than those of the bishop of Toledo.

mayorazgo [entailed estate] of the Oaxaca valley (Cortes) in Humboldt's time consisted of four cities, forty-nine villages, and 17,700 inhabitants; its income, in Cortes's time,[1] was valued at sixty thousand ducats annually.[2]

Support given the Crown by the Church.—What supported the crown in its policy toward the Indians more than anything else was the influence of the church, which in Spanish America was not less important than in the motherland.[3] Hence in the *Recopi*-

[1] Humboldt, *Neuspanien*, II, 166; Prescott, III, 286.

[2] The Spaniards have always had the reputation of treating their negroes very mildly, and Adam Smith suggested as the explanation of this phenomenon the despotic authority of their rulers. But there were still other grounds. Because of the slight interest which Spaniards had in plantation colonies, their need of negro slaves was small; so all the severe measures of security were omitted —measures which were ordered elsewhere because of the great number of blacks. Humboldt estimates the whole number of negroes in the Spanish-American mainland for 1822 as 387,000, that is, a little more than a fifth of those in Brazil and not nearly so many as there were in the single state of Virginia (*R. H.*, III, 338) In the province of Caracas alone there were at the beginning of the nineteenth century 218,400 negroes (Depons, I, 241), so that there were very few in the chief colonies. Because of the great repulsion between negroes and Indians, the introduction of the former could serve as a means of safety for the Spanish rule. In general the slaves were not overworked for the same reasons that kept their masters from overwork. In some respects, on the contrary, the English or even the French slaves were much better off, for as to dress, food, and care in sickness the Spaniard took very little care of his slaves. On the other hand, however he used extraordinary care for their instruction in Christianity, and their public worship, etc. Unmarried negresses were usually shut up at night (Depons, *op. cit.*). While most of the other systems of legislation made emancipation as difficult as possible, it was very easy in Spain, and, especially by means of a will, quite customary (Humboldt, *Cuba*, I, 147). For the slightest abuse—blows from which any blood flowed were absolutely forbidden—the master could be forced to sell his slaves and even at the cost price, which, moreover, was never reckoned higher than 300 pesos, or in case the slave was already worn out the price was fixed by one of the judges at a very low figure. For this reason among others travellers were often begged by blacks on the street to buy them (Humboldt, *ibid.*, I, 326 ff.). The slave could acquire property, moreover, and if he wished to buy his own freedom with it, or that of his wife and child under stated conditions, then the master had to allow it. In every province there was a special officer appointed, who was to protect the slaves in their rights. To what extent this mildness was consonant with the old Spanish system and its former weakness one may see from the fact that in later times, since the economic improvement of Cuba has begun, the slaves there have been treated with the greatest harshness. Compare R. R. Madden, *The Island of Cuba*, London, 1849.

[3] In the colonies, as well as at home, for example, it was customary to measure

acion, I, 7, where the rights and duties of the bishops are treated, almost a third relates to their protection of the Indians. The cross was again to heal the wounds made by the sword.

We must remember the close union which existed in the motherland between the throne and the altar. Because no monarch of the world was esteemed so Catholic as the Spanish, so none had such a power over his country's church with the permission of the pope. Absolutism in Spain rested preferably upon spiritual foundations; upon the right of patronage of the king over bishops; upon his grand-mastership of the religious orders of knights; and finally upon the Inquisition. This influence was even much greater in America, a papal donation. No priest could go to America without the express permission of the king (law of 1522 and later). The ecclesiastical patronage of the whole of the Indies belonged exclusively to the crown; by it all bishops were nominated to the pope, and all canons to the prelates (law of 1508).[1] Again, no papal bull could extend to America except by permission of the council of the Indies.[2] One of the most important prerogatives was the royal sale of indulgences; similarly the annates flowed not into the papal but into the royal treasury.[3]

Las Casas's Plan of Colonization.—The plan of colonization of the celebrated Las Casas at Cumaná is especially noteworthy; to be sure, it was a failure, on the whole, but it is an instructive example of later missions, such as that of the Jesuits in Paraguay (1520). Las Casas would take with him only farmers, laborers, and priests. No soldier, particularly no Spanish soldier, was to go without his permission. The settlers themselves were to wear a peculiar uniform, and the whole enterprise was aimed at the conversion of the natives. Las Casas promised to convert ten thousand Indians in two years, and to pay the king fifteen thousand ducats annually, and after the expiration of ten years sixty thousand.[4]

Missions.—With few and insignificant exceptions, missionary

the importance of a town, not by the number of its inhabitants, but according to the number of its cloisters and churches: Depons, II, 148.

[1] *Recopilacion*, I, 6.

[2] *Ibid.*, I, 9; Herrera, I, 6, 19 ff.

[3] *Recopilacion*, I, 17, 20.

[4] Herrera, II, 4, 1.

enterprises did not really succeed until after the end of the period of conquest, that is, until the middle of the seventeenth century.[1] Many missions were founded in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, even; for example, the fine series which embraced upper California, between 1772 and 1784. Soon after their first establishment, they usually cost the state nothing. The interior of such a mission has been very graphically described by Humboldt and Duflot de Mofras.[2] The cabins were quite uniform and the streets straight and at right angles, all reminding one of the colonies of the Moravian Brethren. In addition to the labor performed on his own land, every adult Indian was required to work on the common land one hour every morning and evening (*conuco de la comunidad*); the produce of this labor was devoted, first, under the direction of the priest, to the church and service of God, and then a proportion was also applied to the needs of the Indians themselves. Near the coast the principal products were sugar, indigo, and hemp. In an open space in the centre of the mission was situated the church, school, the house of the missionaries, and the so-called Casa del Rey, a convenient inn for the free shelter of travellers. Scattered about the surrounding region for thirty or forty square leagues were perhaps fifteen or twenty isolated leased haciendas, generally devoted to cattle-raising; here and there, too, were solitary branch chapels.

Military Defence of Missions.—The so-called *presidios* were intended to serve as the military defence for a whole series of missions; these were small forts with an armament of perhaps eight guns and some seventy men who rode excellently (each one having seven horses) and were dressed in leather (*companias de la cuera*). From four to six of these soldiers were assigned to each mission, as well for its protection as for the purpose of forwarding despatches. The support which had to be provided

[1] A distinction should be made between the *curas* who labored in Spanish places, the *doctrineros* who lived with the converted Indians, and the *misioneros* sent to the barbarians. For the actual work of conversion they have always used monks only, who, Cortes, for example, declared, were alone useful for such work. *Relac.*, IV, in Lorenzana, 391.

[2] Humboldt, *Relation Historique*, I, 373. Duflot de Mofras, *Exploration du Territoire de l'Orégon, des Californies et de la Mer Vermeille* (1844), I, ch. 7.

for the presidios by the missions was afterwards made good to the latter by the government.

Missionary Enterprise.—The life of the Indians was regulated by the missionaries in every respect. For instance, on the Orinoco the inexhaustible stores of turtles' eggs were earlier exploited very irregularly, and perhaps, occasionally, most of them trampled upon. The Indians were greatly indebted to the missionaries in this matter and especially to the Jesuits, who always left remaining a nucleus of eggs, while their successors, the Franciscans, gave less attention to such permanent exploitation.[1] The number of inhabitants of a mission near the sea amounted to perhaps eight hundred to two thousand souls; farther inland, often to only a little over two hundred. The finest mission of New California, St. Gabriel the Archangel, numbered almost three thousand Indians in 1834, and possessed one hundred and five thousand head of horned cattle, twenty thousand horses, and over forty thousand sheep; they harvested annually twenty thousand *fanegas* [2] of corn, five hundred barrels of wine, and as much brandy.[3] Humboldt calls these settlements "états intermédiaires" between the real colony and the wilderness (I, 461). They were always somewhat like camps; I recall only the circumstance that they could be broken up and moved at every whim of the missionary who, perhaps, found the region unhealthful.[4] Of the forcible "entradas" I have already spoken above; they were especially favored by the Jesuits, less so by the Franciscans.[5] "El ecco de la polvora," says a Jesuit in the *Lettres Édifiantes*, must first sound if the knowledge of the cross is to find entrance.

Missionary Seclusion.—One chief aim of the monks was always directed towards the keeping of their true flocks from all intercourse with strangers and enlightened people, the so-called *gente de razon*. This was a point where the above-mentioned prohibitory laws, sharply separating the Indians and whites, were

[1] Humboldt, *Relation Historique*, II, 245.

[2] A Spanish dry measure varying from one to two bushels.—Tr.

[3] Humboldt, *Relation Historique*, II, 393. Duflot de Mofras, I, 350.

[4] Humboldt, *Relation Historique*, I, 403. In spite of the legal prohibition, *Recopilacion*, VI, 3, 13.

[5] Humboldt, *Relation Historique*, II, 274.

really observed. Even children of soldiers were forbidden in the settlements.[1] The famous hospitality of the missionaries was intimately connected with their aim to superintend the intercourse of travellers and compel them to go on as soon as possible. Usually one was allowed but a single night's lodging. Peddlers thought they noticed an intention to discourage them from coming again by the use of every sort of chicanery.[2] The missionary, who did not disdain to trade himself, was to form the only connection between his mission and the outside world. That this must have led to much friction with the secular authorities is self-evident; the Spanish government followed a pretty variable course in the matter, now on one side and now on the other.[3] Indeed the great remoteness of so many missions, perhaps, occasionally invited a good deal of insubordination against their spiritual lords, of which Humboldt relates a remarkable instance.[4]

Character of the Missionaries.—The missionaries were strictly forbidden to accept from their spiritual children any perquisites whatever beyond their pretty niggardly salary. Unfortunately they got around this prohibition quite frequently, since they sold pictures of the saints, rosaries, and the like, and in so doing only too often increased their sales by misusing their spiritual power.[5] That Humboldt [6] praises the administration of missions in general is not absolutely a denial of such abuses. A man like Pöppig, wholly removed from every hierarchical or Catholic bias, but possessing clear insight and a strong love of truth, praises "that remarkable spirit which, far removed from fanaticism, made the priests ready to endure the greatest hardships with almost indescribable resignation; that silent and pious enthusiasm, the work of which the traveller of to-day sees only in ruins, but in ruins which fill the beholder with respect for the exiled builders."

[1] Humboldt, *Neuspanien,* II, 239.
[2] Humboldt, *Relation Historique,* II, 327.
[3] *Ibid.*, especially II, 623 ff.
[4] *Ibid.*, II, 544.
[5] Depons, II, 136 ff. The dark side of the Spanish mission system is most glaringly pictured in Forbes, *A History of Upper and Lower California,* London, 1831; Beechey, *Narrative of a Voyage to the Pacific Ocean,* London, 1831.
[6] *Relation Historique,* I, 413.

Experience teaches that barbarous peoples who are unable to maintain their complete independence are most gently subjected by a strong church. Hence the popes, for instance, repeatedly demanded that the converted Prussians be treated humanely, at all events not worse than they were accustomed to in their pagan condition. What shepherd would not interest himself for his flock which is obedient to him with body and soul for this life and for that to come? Similar phenomena repeat themselves continually. Thus, for example, on the Cape, the Boers conceived the greatest hatred for the missionaries who tried to protect the natives.[1] It is very well known that in the English Antilles the cause of the negroes against the planters is strongly supported by the Baptist missionaries.

The Jesuit Missions in Paraguay.—The conquest by the sword and the cross which established the Spanish colonial system was continued on a small scale by the missions and *presidios* for centuries after the end of the period of the *conquista* properly so called. The most noteworthy example of this is, undoubtedly, the Jesuit mission in Paraguay (after 1609), where the above-described principles had the most extensive and intensive development.[2] In every mission the Indians chose their own *gobernador*, although, naturally, subject to the veto of the priest, to whom, likewise, all judicial punishments of the *gobernador* had to be submitted for sanction. These punishments had altogether the character of church penances. Usually the affairs of the mission were divided between two monks; the elder had the spiritual oversight, the younger the secular economic control. With great shrewdness the Indians were formed into military companies and, by the means of splendid uniforms and titles and such like, became a well-organized machine. All foreign necessities were

[1] Sprengel's Barrow, p. 345 ff. [The German trans. by M. C. Sprengel of Sir John Barrow's *Travels into the Interior of Southern Africa*, London, 1801. —B.]

[2] Compare Ulloa, *Viage à la America Meridional* (2 vols., 4to, 1748), II, 1, 15. Charlevoix, *Histoire du Paraguay*, II (Paris, 1757). [Ulloa's *Voyage* is accessible in English both by itself in various editions and in vol. 14 of Pinkerton's *Voyages*. Charlevoix's *Paraguay* has also been translated, London, 1769.—B.]

paid for by the sale of Paraguay teas which the order managed "because the Indians are too timid." Then, too, the laborers and such people worked under the direction of the priest, and even the public slaughter-house was managed by him. Work on the *conuco*[1] claimed two days of every week. The beginning and ending of a day's work were regulated by church ceremonies; likewise the hour and manner of meals, dress, and so on were arranged once for all by the mission. "The missionaries," says Duflot de Mofras, "had solved the great problem of making work attractive. They had brought the Indians to the realization that, grouped about the mission, they were safer from the attacks of hostile tribes, and that they could maintain themselves more comfortably and plentifully from the light and varying work of the mission than from the insecure and dangerous spoil of the chase and of robbery." In every mission there was a special house, called beaterio, where women of bad repute were kept under control; here also resorted childless married women during the absence of their husbands. In similar cloistered seclusion young maidens (*monjas*) were kept until marriageable age. The missionaries, too, had charge of the diversions, combining with them instruction in all kinds of vocal and instrumental music. One may see how ably the community of property which obtains among almost all barbarous peoples was retained here, and was freed from its natural defects by an admirably well-directed "organization of labor." In many missions, for example, in California, the arrangement of the mission house immediately reminds one of the phalansteries of Fourier.[2] The strict exclusiveness of the whole mission was designed to safeguard the innocent and not sufficiently established moral habits of the Indians from contagion.[3]

[1] [See above, p. 12.—B.]

[2] Compare Duflot de Mofras, I, 126 ff.

[3] The melancholy decline of missions, after the republican governments (in Mexico, 1832) robbed them of their estates, is depicted by Duflot de Mofras in impressive terms. The majority of the converted Indians have been scattered again, their laboriously acquired property plundered, and they themselves become more and more savage. The wild Indians have again commenced their raids upon the Spanish communities, as the powerful ecclesiastico-military frontier which formerly withstood them has been done away with. At first they rob

Different Policies of Different Orders.—The different orders adhered to very different principles regarding the missions. The Dominicans sought to make proselytes by fire and sword and purposely destroyed the monuments of earlier culture. The Franciscans attached little importance to science, but preached Christianity with fervent love. The Jesuits, according to circumstances, pursued sometimes this course, sometimes that, and did much for philology, geography, etc. To take one example, surrounded by a vast variety of Indian languages, they contributed a great deal toward making the language of the Incas the common language for South America.[1]

Population of Spanish America—Emigration Laws.—As for the population of Spanish America, it is in accordance with the nature of conquest colonies that immigration from the mother country, which in the sixteenth century was anything but overpopulated, could never be numerous. About 1546 there were in Peru upwards of 6,000 Spaniards;[2] four years later there are said to have been in all the New World only 15,000.[3] From the time of Charles V no Spaniard was permitted to go to America without the express permission of the crown, and this was usually given for only a stated time, perhaps two years.[4] Whoever sought this permission had not merely to furnish a sufficient reason, but present in addition satisfactory proofs regarding his morals and especially that neither he nor his ancestors for two generations had been punished by the Inquisition (law of 1518). The permission was also usually limited to a certain province, and the journey thence had to be very direct (law of 1566 and often). Even creoles who had been in Europe, perhaps for their education, required the same official permission to return (law of 1589). Every shipmaster had to make declaration on oath that he had

the creoles of their horses, as a result of which they are unable to pursue them, then of their remaining cattle, and, at last, of their women.

[1] Wappäus, *Mittel- und Südamerika*, 37 ff. Compare Tschudi, *Peru*, II, 352. [English trans. by Thomasina Ross, London, 1847.—B.]

[2] Herrera, VIII, 3, 1.

[3] Benzoni, III, 21. Yet in his *Historia General de las Indias*, C. 162, Gomara speaks of there being 20,000 Spanish families in Mexico a few years after its conquest by Cortes.

[4] *Recopilacion*, IX, 26.

no unlicensed person on board.[1] Depons (I, p. 185) actually estimates the number of those who annually emigrated from Spain to the Captaincy-General of Caracas, as 100 at the most. The majority remained a lifetime, because a similar license was required for the return from America (law of 1570, 1612); only the restless Catalonians and Basques felt homesick.

Composition and Distribution.—When Humboldt was in America there were in general for every 100 inhabitants: in the United States, 83 whites; in New Spain (excluding the so-called interior provinces), 16; in Peru, 12; in Jamaica, 10; and in the city of Mexico, 51. In New Spain, where, proportionately, there was the largest European element, there were 1,200,000 whites, of whom, at the highest estimate, 70,000 or 80,000 were native-born Spaniards, almost 2,500,000 Indians, and probably as many mestizos and some negroes.[2] Later the same writer tabulates the population of Spanish America as follows:[3]

	Indians.	Whites.	Negroes.	Mestizos.
In Mexico	3,700,000	1,230,000		1,860,000
In Guatemala	880,000	280,000		420,000
In Colombia	720,000	642,000	387,000	1,256,000
In Peru and Chile	1,030,000	465,000		853,000
In Buenos Ayres	1,200,000	320,000		742,000
In Cuba and Porto Rico		339,000	389,000	197,000
	7,530,000	3,276,000	776,000	5,328,000

The thorough investigations of Wappäus, which comprised the years 1860 to 1870, give for Mexico at least three-fifths pure Indians and about an eighth pure whites. In Central America, according to Squier and Scherzer, there are perhaps about 5 per cent. whites, 1 per cent. negroes, almost 38 per cent. mixed, and fully 56 per cent. Indians. In Panama, according to M. Wagner, there are 5.5 per cent. whites, 12.7 per cent. negroes, mulattoes, and zambos, 7.2 per cent. pure Indians, and the remainder mestizos. In New Granada there are probably 16.6 per cent. whites; in Venezuela 27.5 per cent. pure whites, 23.3 per cent. pure Indians, 5.2 per cent. pure blacks, the remainder mixed races; in Ecuador, at the most, 8 per cent. of whites and at least

[1] First ordered by Chas. V; *Recopilacion*, IX, 35, 20.

[2] Humboldt, *Neuspanien*, I, 165.

[3] Humboldt, *Relation Historique*, III, 339.



50 per cent. of pure Indians. In Peru, according to Miller, there are 14 per cent. whites, 57 per cent. Indians, 22 per cent. mestizos, 7 per cent. negroes and mixtures of negro blood.[1] Just like the Spaniards, the Spanish creoles have an extraordinary love for city life; a landlord, there, thinks he does very well if he makes one journey of recreation in a year to his possessions, without the least business motive.[2] Hence the white population is to be found only in the cities for the most part, and hardly at all in the country. In Lima, one hundred and forty years ago, there were from 16,000 to 18,000 whites; in Mexico, in 1790, something like 50,000 creoles and 2,300 peninsular Spaniards.[3] The government seems to have especially feared the rise of a creole peasantry. For this reason it held the more firmly to great entailed estates the more distant the province. In Chile the only exception allowed was on the frontier. Here Pöppig found the sturdiest and at the same time the most warlike population,[4] as was strikingly illustrated during the recent war with Peru and Bolivia.[5] This unmistakable superiority of Chile over all the rest of the Spanish-American world, which appears also in other fields, as, for example, statistics, public education, road-building, and particularly political freedom and order, may be due partly to the temperate climate of the country. The basis of it, however, is undoubtedly the ethnological preponderance of the whites themselves, who, according to Wappäus,[6] apparently form the majority, besides the fact that the white race already predominates among the mestizos and always will do so to an increasing degree.

Class Distinctions.—That conquest colonies naturally tend to divide the people into castes has been observed elsewhere.[7] In Spanish America this caste distinction on account of race and color was necessarily much sharper. The names chapetons

[1] Wappäus, *op. cit.*, especially 30, 243, 379, 407, 547, 603, 695.

[2] Depons, II, 313.

[3] Ulloa, *Viage*, II, 1, 5; Humboldt *Relation Historique*, I, 573.

[4] Pöppig, *Reise*, I, 108 ff.

[5] Compare Diego Barros Arana, *Histoire de la Guerre du Pacifique*, 1879–1880, II, 1881.

[6] *Op. cit.*, 774 ff.

[7] Roscher's *Kolonien*, etc., 6.

(gachupins), creoles, mestizos, mulattoes, tercerons, quadroons, zambos, and so on are quite well known. Marriage between the different degrees of color is considered a mesalliance and parents may prohibit it without further formality. It was the Spanish policy to encourage these class distinctions as much as possible, because it was rightly recognized as a chief means of making the dependence of the colonies on the mother country lasting. Each caste was extremely envious of the higher and correspondingly disdainful of the lower ones. This prevented any general union to shake off the common yoke; for the lowest class, which, to be sure, by a general uprising could only have gained, was extremely apathetic and at bottom revered the Spanish state and the church as protectors from the oppressors who were nearest and of whom they were most sensible.[1] Legally the creole was on complete equality with the chapeton; but, as a matter of fact, until 1637 only twelve of the three hundred and sixty-nine bishops had been creoles, and until 1808 only one of fifty viceroys of New Spain had been a creole.[2] Wappäus knew of only four creoles among one hundred and sixty viceroys, and only fourteen among six hundred and two captains-general or governors.[3] To the excluded this must have been all the more irritating, since they had in their midst a numerous and brilliant nobility [4] and since the preference of those born in the mother country was frequently due to the opinion that the whites quickly degenerated in the tropics. How often must the creole blood have boiled at that! Yet to accomplish their plans they had first of all to arm the mestizos, Indians, etc., and in a measure incorporate them with themselves; but the latter they disdained even

[1] Hence even to-day in most of those countries the aristocratic and priestly party is allied with the colored people.

[2] Robertson, *History of America*, II, 500. Humboldt, *Neuspanien*, II, 82.

[3] Wappäus, *Republiken von Südamerika*, I, 11

[4] In Lima from one-quarter to one-third of the whites were of noble blood, and among them were forty-five families of marquises and counts; one of these sprung, on the female side, from the old Incas (Ulloa, *Viage*, II, 1, 15). Moreover, there were in every colony two kinds of nobility: families whose ancestors at first for a short time had held high office and whose prominence was derived rather from old Spain; and those who descended from the conquistadores (Humboldt, *R. H.*, I, 592).

more than they hated the gachupins. Likewise the aversion between mulattoes and negroes was as great as that between whites and negroes.[1] The civil position of every class depended mainly and naturally upon the greater or less whiteness of their complexion. "*Todo blanco es caballero.*" Sometimes even now a traveller will give the most grievous offence if he does not recognize as perfectly white and noble a dark-brown half-naked woodsman, who, for want of a hut, can only fasten a hammock in the trees. Humboldt relates some amusing instances of this. It was therefore a successful device of Spanish policy to furnish men from the mixed castes, who, owing to their capacity and energy, might be dangerous, with a patent declaring them white. By this means the mestizos were deprived, in advance, of their natural leaders in any revolt. Of the same effect was the circumstance that the Indian caziques were regarded as equal to the Spaniards; the Tlascalans had great privileges, for example.[2]

Natural Antipathies.—There were also a great many apples of discord between the subject population which must have facilitated the government greatly in its policy of *Divide*. Everywhere in Spanish America there existed the most violent antipathy between the inhabitants of the coast and those of the mountains, as, for example, Vera Cruz and Mexico; the former were accused of being frivolous, the latter of being slow.[3] Few countries contain in themselves such numerous differences in climate and mode of living as the *tierra caliente* and *tierra fria* in Spanish America, the inhabitants of which despise each other heartily.[4] In addition there were the same great provincial distinctions which mark the Catalonians, the Andalusians, the Basques, and the mountaineers in old Spain, and which they stubbornly preserved even in America.[5] How very different, too, the individual colonies were from each other! Not merely because of their immense size and sparse population, but also because almost all the means of connection were naturally very bad. For example,

[1] Poussin, *Richesse Américaine*, II, 412. [For *Richesse* read *Puissance*.—B.]

[2] *Recopilacion*, VI, 1. 39.

[3] Humboldt, *Neuspanien*, IV, 319.

[4] Humboldt, *Relation Historique*, III, 30.

[5] *Ibid.*, especially I, 568.

the voyage between Peru and Mexico is so difficult, on account of the winds and currents, that it is considered the most tedious and irksome of the whole world.[1] We are told that while the Spaniards, in order to impede the intercourse by land between the provinces, had left isolated Indian races on the intervening frontiers intentionally unconquered, Indians speaking a different language intruded between the old settled places.[2] The excellent postal communication which Count Florida Blanca established from Buenos Ayres to California was considered by many men of the good old stamp as a highly dangerous innovation.[3] Discord was disseminated within every social circle. The tremendous pride and stiff ceremonialism which characterize the Spaniards in Spain had developed here incomparably more, so that all cordiality was smothered beneath it, and, more than that, numberless family quarrels, denunciations, etc., resulted from it.[4]

Aristocratic Ideas in Spanish America.—I have shown in another place that the principle of *Divide et impera* is the leading idea of every aristocratic system.[5] Aristocracy rules its subjects particularly by separating the people into a multitude of small and very exclusive cliques, every clique with special privileges. Its chief aid in accomplishing this object is a close union with the church, and in material affairs a very mild treatment of the lowest classes. It might seem strange that, in a perfectly unlimited monarchy such as that of Spanish America, so many aristocratic principles are met with. But in every state based on caste, be the form of government what it may, the basis of all political life is always aristocratic. Moreover, the government itself, if the king resides on the other side of the ocean and never

[1] Compare Humboldt, *Neuspanien*, IV, 330 ff. Ulloa relates a popular anecdote of a ship-captain who married a wife in Payta, but before he arrived in Callao had a son who was able to read; and the distance covered amounted only to 140 leagues (*Viage*, II, 2, 1).

[2] *Ausland*, 1844, No. 243. *Reise der Novara*, III, 372. [Eng. tr. London, 1861–1863.—B.]

[3] Humboldt, *Relation Historique*, I, 573.

[4] Depons, I, 189, 216.

[5] In my *Umrissen zur Naturlehre der drei Staatsformen* (second essay: "*Aristokratie*") which was published in the *Berliner allgemeine Zeitschrift für Geschichte* in 1847.

makes even the most hasty pleasure-trip to the country, must inevitably assume a strong aristocratic color. Spanish America is classic ground for the so-called official aristocracy. I mean by that that independent bureaucracy which existed in almost all the absolute monarchies from the middle of the sixteenth to the middle of the eighteenth century, and which was really the only bulwark against arbitrary despotism for a long time after the decline of the old provincial representative institutions. The French Parlements furnish the best-known example. It was the period of office-buying and fee-paying; which generally promoted incapacity, indolence, and avarice among officials, but which also maintained their independence of superiors. At that time the collegiate [1] system still prevailed with its imperfect division of labor and gradations of jurisdiction and appeals, its slowness, pedantry, and weakness, but also with its consideration and paternal clemency. The often very absurd red-tape connected with that system ought always to be regarded as a measure of safety against arbitrary power, and the class exclusiveness and arrogance of the numerous officials as a help to independence against temptation. This official system, with its good and bad features, had taken very early and deep root in Spain. It was closely connected with the temper of the people as depicted above. Many of the political elements of weakness from which we Germans have suffered so much—the large number of pedants and the excessive number of legal documents, secretiveness in public service, mania for rank and title, etiquette,[2] slow old ways, litigiousness—all that sort of thing is even more widely developed among the Spaniards, and especially in America.

The Viceroys.—At first the viceroys possessed the entire royal authority.[3] In course of time their authority was by degrees restricted so that districts lying at a distance were raised, one after another, to a separate and independent captaincy-general. The ceremonial maintained by the viceroys was pompous in

[1] [Collegiate in the sense in which College is used in Electoral College.—B.]

[2] One may compare the long section "*de las precedencias, ceremonias y cortesias*": *Recopilacion*, III, 15.

[3] *Recopilacion*, III, 3.

the extreme. They were served by pages, and every time they went out they were attended by their own guard on horseback.[1] In their palace they could eat only with their families, so they could enjoy the pleasures of good-fellowship only when travelling through the country. However, like every ceremonial, this one was also an important restraint. It prevented the viceroy from becoming too firmly established in his province, an event which, in the case of very distantly situated officials, is always a chief danger to the government. For that reason they never permitted them to remain in their offices very long—not over seven years at the most; and seldom were persons of very distinguished rank selected. An important check was also imposed by the so-called *visitas* which were instituted from time to time in the colonies,[2] but which seldom resulted in the immediate relief of the subjects. In addition every high official in the colonies, especially the viceroy, was subject, after retirement from his office, to a process known as the *residencia*.[3] The Council of the Indies appointed for this a particularly prominent jurist, who had to be ready for months to receive charges of every kind against the outgoing official. The justice of these charges was decided in Spain, and no viceroy or other officer could receive the slightest new appointment without first successfully meeting this test. The well-nigh proverbial ingratitude of the Spanish court towards its great discoverers and conquerors is at bottom nothing more than the painful introduction of the later colonial policy of permitting no one to become too powerful.[4]

Audiencias.—Associated with the governors were the *audiencias*.[5]

[1] One may find a brilliant description of the reception which was accorded the new viceroy of Peru in Ulloa, *Viage*, II, 1, 4. Something like it, only in less degree, was repeated every time the viceroy was to preside in person at the *audiencia*. Also in the case of captains-general. See Depons, II, 20.

[2] *Recopilacion*, II, 34.

[3] *Ibid.*, V, 15. Even Cortes had to put up with such a *juez de residencia*.

[4] The personal unworthiness of the first minister of the Indies, Fonseca, does not admit of question; compare Washington Irving, *Life and Voyages of Columbus*, append., 32.

[5] *Recopilacion*, II, 15 ff. An audiencia was associated with Cortes first in 1527, as the court recognized the impossibility of controlling so great a hero by

Properly speaking these were courts of appeal, but at the same time they were also to constitute a sort of council of state for all the more important and extraordinary affairs with a great restraining power over the governor. The audiencia could correspond with the king directly and without the knowledge of the governor (law of 1620); to it the Spanish government turned when special information was needed regarding the conduct of the governor. The commands of the audiencia were regarded as if they emanated from the king himself (law of 1530). But this circumstance was not to lessen the respect due the governor from the subjects nor affect the necessary unity of the supreme authority; for this reason the viceroys or captains-general formally presided over the audiencias, and the latter, like the old French Parlements, could oppose a definite command of its president only by representations, reports, and the like to Spain. In case of vacancies, the audiencia acted in place of the governor (law of 1600). Generally the members, because of their high rank and good salary, were placed in an independent position. To preserve their impartiality they had to lead a life withdrawn from the world; they could neither borrow nor loan on interest; they could acquire no landed property, or keep more than four slaves; they could make no marriage alliance in their jurisdiction, nor serve as godparent or act in any similar capacity.[1]

The Council of the Indies.—The supreme authority for all American affairs was vested in the celebrated Council of the Indies, founded in 1511 and finally organized in 1542.[2] This board originally embodied all financial, police, military, ecclesiastical, and commercial authority, and at the same time served as the high court of appeal in all civil actions of over 6,000 piastres. Endowed with the entire royal prerogative, it had, at all times, to remain in the neighborhood of the court. New laws could be passed only by a majority of at least two-thirds. For a century the Council of the Indies was universally and deservedly held in the greatest esteem. Its members were chosen prefer-

means of a single, and perhaps insignificant, man. Compare Herrera, *Decad.*, IV, 21, 3, 8; Prescott, *Conquest of Mexico*, III, 234.

[1] *Recopilacion*, II, 16, 38 ff.

[2] *Ibid.*, II, 2–15.

ably from those who had held high offices in America with distinction.[1] Only by means of such a body was made possible that firm adherence to proved principle, that uninterrupted and at the same time mild activity, "without haste but also without rest," upon which the Spanish dominion preferably depended.[2]

Fondness for Titles and Rank.—I have before described the litigiousness and the multiplicity of legal documents, which are unfortunately the usual accompaniments of the conditions described. Depons (II, 63 ff.) was able to make the paradoxical statement that the whole population of Spanish America was divided into two classes; those who ruined themselves by law-

[1] Depons, II, 13 ff.

[2] This well organized and truly Spanish system of Indian administration was undermined much more by the ideas of centralization of the eighteenth century which mounted the throne of Spain with the Bourbon dynasty than by foreign enemies. Of how little advantage centralization could be when the centre was over five thousand miles distant across the sea and every naval war completely broke the connection, the reader may judge for himself. For example, the crown insisted over against the viceroy on always exercising its right of appointment to all offices. On the other hand the audiencias were degraded; in case the office of governor fell vacant they were not to supply his place any more, but the officer of next lower grade (law of 1800). At the same time the influence of the governor as presiding officer was considerably increased by requiring from him an official report each year of all cases that had been tried or postponed under the pretext of expediting business (law of 1802). Compare Depons, II, 32, 37. The municipal liberties also of the so-called Cabildos, which in the time of Philip II had been granted so willingly, were always more jealously restricted rather than granted to new districts (Humboldt, *Relation Historique*, II, 52). In Spain, even, the Council of the Indies had to put up with the bureaucratic authority of the department ministers. First came the creation of a Ministry of the Indies, which naturally was in everlasting conflict with the Council of the Indies. For that reason, in the time of Charles III, the presidency of the latter was entrusted to the minister and so the importance of the council as an independent body was practically destroyed. Charles IV, to be sure, re-established this venerable collegiate body outwardly, and the Indian ministry was divided among five department ministers of war, navy, finance, foreign affairs, justice and pardons. (Bourgoing, *Tableau de l'Espagne*, I, 186 [Eng. trans., London, 1789].) But this only aggravated the evil, since the good results of the bureaucratic system were lost without regaining those of the collegiate system. No special officer in America could execute a command which had not reached him from his special minister. Cases occurred where the war minister ordered certain fortifications most urgently, but where nothing was done because the finance minister neglected to allot the sums for payment of the same (Depons, II, 16). How long could such a condition of affairs last?

suits and those who enriched themselves by the same means, or at least made their living by those means. In the single city of Caracas there were 600 judges, lawyers, and clerks in a population of 31,000 in all. Closely associated with this is the inordinate fondness for titles and rank which characterized the creoles. "There is no person of distinction who does not pretend to be a military officer, yet without having any of the preliminary and indispensable training for that noble occupation. There is no one, white or almost white, who does not intend to be a lawyer, priest, or monk; those who are unable to give such wing to their pretensions aim, at least, at being notaries, secretaries, clerks of church sacristans, or attachés of some religious community, such as lay brothers, pupils, or foundlings. Thus the fields lie deserted and their fertility is proof of our inactivity. Cultivation of the soil is despised. Every one wants to be a gentleman or live in idleness." [1] Very frequently militia colonels in uniform and decorated with orders could be seen behind the shop-counter.[2] Every man of rank was accustomed to maintain an agent in Madrid authorized to seek titles, orders, etc., for his employer at every opportunity that offered itself. Such an *apoderado*, naturally, took no step without being paid for it, and besides the authorities had to see ready money for every mark of favor. Innumerable persons fell deeply in debt in this way.[3] One may see in this a device of the Spanish court for keeping the creoles under their thumbs, as efficacious as it was cheap.

Secrecy in State Affairs.—A consequence in part of this overweening estimation of the green table, and in part, too, of the aristocratic, despotic methods of the government in general, was the profound secrecy with which all state affairs were veiled. The excellent Robertson, in 1777, had to derive his knowledge of Peruvian finances from a manuscript of 1614. The revenues

[1] Dr. Sanz, in Depons, I, 186.

[2] Humboldt, *Neuspanien*, V, 39.

[3] Depons, II, 314 ff. Much more salutary was the idea of Charles IV, who established at Madrid a company of his body guard out of creole nobles in order to bring together and fuse the two halves of his empire and to have hostages in the event of a colonial uprising. Unfortunately Ferdinand VII did away with this organization. Duflot de Mofras, I, 4.

of Mexico he estimates at only 4,000,000 piastres, although at that time they amounted to over 15,000,000.[1] Thus it was made a matter of serious reproach to Count Revillagigedo, and especially in America, that he made public the census of the population in New Spain and so brought to every one's knowledge the small number of peninsular Spaniards there.[2]

Restriction of Foreign Intercourse.—A state which conceals within itself numerous and important conflicting elements, and can remain master of them only by means of a very skilful governmental machinery, will always be inclined to restrict as much as possible the intercourse of its own people with foreigners. This is especially so with all despotic and aristocratic states, as soon as they have passed beyond the stage of merely natural development. I call to mind, for example, ancient Egypt and Lacedemonia, in modern times China and Japan, and to a certain extent Russia and Austria before 1848. Spanish America, for reasons easy to understand, especially developed this system of isolation. It was, at the beginning, an exceedingly natural feeling which sought to keep all non-Spaniards away from America. All Europe, at that time, looked upon America as a sort of Castle of Indolence, the enjoyment of which by the Spaniards everybody envied. The Spanish possessions were much too extensive, much too thinly populated, and much too distant from the mother country to be easily defended at all points by mere physical means. Therefore they fell back upon immaterial means of defence. All intercourse with foreigners, without express permission, was forbidden on penalty of death and confiscation.[3] Until the middle of the seventeenth century the Spaniards

[1] Compare Humboldt, *Neuspanien*, V, 9.

[2] Humboldt, *Relation Historique*, I, 573. In the colonies people were very much more concerned about such matters than in the mother country. Thus, for example, Humboldt, when he neared the frontiers of Brazil, ran the greatest danger of being arrested by the authorities there as a person dangerous to the state and sent to Europe, which the Portuguese government itself would only have regretted. *Ibid.*, II, 476.

[3] *Recopilacion*, IX, 27, 1, 4, 7 ff. These laws date back to Philip II. Earlier English traders were not uncommonly met with in the Canary Islands. Hackluyt, *Voyages*, III, 447, 454.

treated the entry of any foreign ship into American waters as a crime. Shipmasters who were stranded on their shores were frequently executed or sent to the Mexican mines for life. Even as late as the end of the seventeenth century the so-called coast-guards were not ashamed of similar outrages.[1] When the French tried to make a settlement in Florida between 1564 and 1567 they were nearly all killed by the Spaniards.[2] It ought not to be forgotten that, until the loss of the Invincible Armada, Spain was generally considered the first sea-power and, until the Thirty Years' War, even more generally as the first land power of the world. Even the valor of individual Spaniards was very greatly feared. Foreigners could really never hope to obtain permission to make an actual settlement during the period when the Spanish colonial power was in its prime. It was not until toward the end that the unconditional prohibition was replaced by a high tax. But even then the earlier policy of the government was only too firmly fixed in the habits of the people. Every foreigner was looked upon as a heretic, and, unless he disarmed the national prejudice by an extraordinary friendliness, had to fear daily charges of blasphemy, etc., witnesses of which were never wanting.[3]

Such Restriction Favored by Nature. — Moreover, in the Spanish colonies nature herself remarkably favored such an almost Chinese exclusiveness. Besides Vera Cruz and Campeche, the immense eastern coast of New Spain contains practically no harbors. Even these are only moderately good, and in addition they are completely commanded strategically from Havana. The kingdom of New Granada was connected with the sea only by the harbors of S. Marta and Cartagena and by a rushing stream. The Gulf of Mexico is difficult to navigate throughout the year because of the prevailing winds.[4] In all the provinces which formerly were of particular importance the coast regions are almost uninhabited, in Peru because of the

[1] Examples are given in B. Edwards, *History of the British West Indies*, I, 140 ff.

[2] Anderson, *Origin of Commerce*, II, under the year 1565.

[3] Depons, I, 184.

[4] Humboldt, *Relation Historique*, I, 569.

lack of rain,[1] in New Spain and New Granada because of their heat and unhealthfulness. The population is concentrated inland on the tablelands, and is accessible from the coast only by means of very steep and tiresome mountain roads. The yellow fever, too, which threatens every foreigner on the coast, is an especially formidable means of defence, and perhaps more efficacious than the Chinese wall.[2] The government sought to develop these natural conditions to the utmost, or at least to preserve them. For example, the chief city of Guiana was not allowed to be founded at the mouth of the magnificent river Orinoco, but eighty-five leagues back from the sea, for the sake of better defence; and the region between was to contain no important place.[3] For the same reason the very bad road from Caracas to the harbor of Laguayra was never improved.[4] Thus is explained the indifference with which Charles III scorned every plan for cutting through the Isthmus of Panama.[5] But the best bulwark for the whole west coast was its remote situation in the Antipodes of Europe. "As a matter of fact, as soon as the Spanish colonies became known foreigners began to intrigue to make them revolt against the mother country."[6] Those Spanish provinces which by their situation were more accessible to intercourse with the outside world, like Caracas and the regions of the Orinoco and of the Rio de la Plata, were always very much

[1] According to Tschudi, the Peruvian sand deserts are 440 leagues long (3° 35′ to 21° 48′ S. B.), but only three to twenty leagues wide.

[2] Compare Humboldt, *Relation Historique*, I, 550; also *Neuspanien*, IV, 376 ff.

[3] Humboldt, *Relation Historique*, II, 643.

[4] Depons, II, 72.

[5] Bourgoing, II. 256 ff. The Spanish Cortes ordered the cutting through of the isthmus in 1814. In this connection the difference between the enthusiastic enterprise of Charles V's time, when the Spanish colonial empire was won, and the conservative constructive period of Philip II, is very remarkable. Charles V in 1523 had ordered Cortes to search the coasts of New Spain for the "discovery of the secret" for which in 1524 Cortes fitted out five expeditions at the same time. Pizarro wanted a Panama canal for political reasons. On the other hand Philip II, who at the beginning cherished similar ideas, later forbade even the mere mention of such a canal (v. Scherzer, *Oesterreich. Zeitschr. f. d. Orient*, 1883, No. 9).

[6] Duflot de Mofras.

neglected by the mother country. Another important reason for this was the circumstance that Spanish colonization aimed at conquest, but that here the natives had previously not been used to work. Caracas with its splendid coast was in many respects an exception to the Spanish rule. There towards the end of the eighteenth century the cultured youth studied French and English, and the old Castilian costume gave place more and more to the new French styles.[1] It was there and in Buenos Ayres that the revolt from the mother country began.

Ecclesiastical Censorship.—In the ecclesiastical realm the Spanish system of isolation expressed itself particularly by a rigorous censorship. The great rôles which Philip II and Alba played in the general history of censorship is known. In America this tendency developed more freely. The entire control of the press was given into the hands of the Inquisition, and the prescriptions for its exercise as they are collected in the *Recopilacion*, I, 24, and Depons, II, 95 ff., are a real masterpiece in the bad sense of the word. A few lines will suffice for its characterization. For example, every bookseller had to have always on hand in his shop a catalogue of all prohibited books, under penalty of forty ducats. He had to hand in, annually, a catalogue of his stock with the declaration upon oath that he had nothing else. Whoever, even for the first time, sold a prohibited book was suspended from his business for two years, banished for the same length of time from his place of residence, and sentenced to pay a fine of 200 ducats. A traveller who, in crossing the frontier even, concealed a book brought with him suffered a fine of 200 ducats. The commissaries of the Inquisition might enter private houses even, at any hour of the day or night, for prohibited books or other similar articles.

Spanish Commercial Policy.—The Spanish commercial policy had the same end in view. Humboldt calls attention to the remarkable phenomenon that Mexican trade often flourished more in time of war than in time of peace, when the Spanish revenue ships could operate unhindered. Even in the years 1820–1822 Basil Hall was able to show the most surprising con-

[1] Depons, I, 196 ff.

trast between Lima, which still remained Spanish, and Valparaiso, which had thrown off Spanish rule. Here the harbor was full of ships, the warehouses full of goods; there was a large number of bookstores and travellers; no pass was necessary; nothing but modern European costumes were worn. In Lima the contrary was the case in everything; the custom house was empty and closed, the streets were deserted; the ships at Callao were in a corner of the harbor, close under the fort, surrounded by gunboats and closed in with a boom.[1] Wherever, subsequently, Spaniards reconquered, they threw all foreign merchants, Americans, Englishmen, and all, into the most horrible dungeons, such as the Morillo in Cartagena.[2]

Management of American Trade.—For the management of the American trade, the Casa de Contratacion[3] was established at Seville in 1503; a body at once administrative and judicial which soon became subordinated to the Council of the Indies. Charles V associated with this Casa lectures and instruction in nautical subjects; and the whole institution was, in his time, considered so excellent that, among others, Henry VIII speedily patterned one after it as closely as possible for his own realm.[4] No ship was permitted to sail from Spain to America, or land from there, until it had been inspected by the officers of the Casa and had received a license. Of everything a most careful register was kept.[5] Charles V had ordered, on pain of death and confiscation, that every Spaniard, embark where he would, must direct his journey back from America only to Seville; and soon the journey out was only permissible from Seville. In particular all gold and silver, all pearls and precious stones could be brought only to Seville.[6] This preference for Seville came from the fact that it was the only large place in the kingdom of Castile which could carry on ocean

[1] B. Hall, *Journal Written on the Coasts of Chili*, etc., I, 87 ff.

[2] *Ibid.*, I, 239 ff. Compare Robertson, *Letters on South America* II, 73 ff. (1843).

[3] *Recopilacion*, IX, 1 ff.

[4] Anderson, II, under the year 1512.

[5] *Recopilacion*, IX, 33–35. The officers of the ship had to swear that they would take no unregistered goods with them: IX, 15, 8.

[6] *Recopilacion*, IX, 1, 56.

commerce and at the same time had a considerable river trade. Then, again, since the kingdom of Castile alone had borne the expense and dangers of the discovery of America, it wanted to have all the profit of it.[1] After 1720 Cadiz took the place of Seville, because the Guadalquivir had grown so shallow that large ships could no longer navigate so far.[2]

In order to facilitate the control and, in times of danger, the convoy of ships, all trade was limited to two regular fleets. The galleons, consisting generally of twenty-seven ships destined for South America, went annually to Porto Bello, landing first in Cartagena; the fleets for Central America went to Vera Cruz every three years and usually numbered twenty-three ships.[3] The route of both fleets was determined with the greatest exactness and only for very pressing necessity could this be changed or a ship leave the convoy.[4] This was the case to some degree as early as 1526. All trade with Peru and Chile passed through Porto Bello. Their exports were brought by water in a similar fleet to Panama and then carried by mules over the Isthmus. The exchange took place at Porto Bello during a forty days' fair, on which occasion this otherwise quite desolate and unhealthy place was for a time enlivened to an extraordinary degree. Very

[1] The independence of the provinces of Spain was so great in this respect that, for example, the Portuguese, when their country was united with Spain, might not trade with the Philippines even from their own Moluccas (*Recopilacion*, IX, 27, 29; compare IX, 37, 12).

[2] Cadiz had always had some connection with American trade. Compare *Recopilacion*, IX, 4.

[3] [This statement that the flotas for New Spain sailed only once in three years is derived from J. Townsend's *Journey through Spain in the Years 1786 and 1787*, London, 1791, 2d ed., enlarged, 1792, II, 397, and is an error. The fleet went annually as a regular thing. The law of 1561 as given in the *Recopilacion*, lib. IX, tit. XXXVI, ley XIII, says: "La flota que hubiere de salir para Nueva España esté aprestada á primero de abril de cada un año en la barra de Sanlúcar," etc. The annual service became irregular in the later eighteenth century, and there were only eleven fleets in the years 1781–1800. (Bancroft's *Mexico*, II, 752.)—B.]

[4] *Recopilacion*, IX, 30 ff.: "Instruccion de Generales," 1597. Most of the ships were of 800 to 1,000 tons burden; the smallest about 550 (J. Townsend *Journey through Spain*, II, 371). When Peter Hein seized the galleons in 1618, the booty is said to have been worth twenty million pounds. (Anderson, sub anno.) Exact specifications of a cargo of a Spanish silver fleet and a corresponding Portuguese one are given in Anderson, under the years 1734 and 1737.

small booths were rented for 1,000 pesos or more, and single houses for 4,000 to 6,000 pesos. The remaining larger portion of the year was characteristically enough called the dead time of year.[1] The Spanish and Peruvian merchants appeared at the fair as two regular companies; the former under the admiral of the galleons, the latter under the president of Panama. The authorized agents of both companies meet together at the admiral's ship and fixed the price at which every one could buy wares. As soon as the ships arrived at Cartagena, the news had to be sent to the viceroy of Peru at once, and also on the return to the higher Spanish authorities. The same was true of the so-called silver fleet to Vera Cruz. Here, on account of the unhealthy climate, the actual sales took place in the nearest healthy city, Jalapa. On the return to Europe both fleets united at Havana.

Monopolies of Shipping.—It is easy to understand that the utilizing of this very limited opportunity of shipping soon became, necessarily, practically a monoply of some favored commercial houses. Especially so when the merchants of Seville from the time of Charles V, and those of Mexico and Lima from the time of Philip II, became privileged corporations with an elected prior and consuls at their head.[2]

For example, the trade with the silver fleet was in the sole possession of eight or ten large Mexican houses.[3] The Spaniards, in their trade with America, often made 100 to 300 per cent. profit.[4] Actually, towards the end of the eighteenth century Varinas tobacco cost, in Spain, four times, and in the rest of Europe seven times, as much as in America.[5] "The supplying of a great kingdom," exclaims Humboldt, "was carried on like the provisioning of a blockaded fortress!" We see here in many respects a prototype of the great commercial companies which, in England and Holland in particular, played such an important rôle from

[1] Compare Ulloa, *Viage*, I, 1, 9, and 2, 6.

[2] *Recopilacion*, IX, 6, 46. These *consulados* corresponded in many ways upon a small scale to the Casa de Contratacion.

[3] Humboldt, *Neuspanien*, IV, 352.

[4] Ulloa, *Rétablissement des Manufactures et du Commerce de l'Espagne*, II, 191.

[5] Brougham, *Colonial Policy*, I, 421.

the beginning of the seventeenth century. The similarity appears still greater when one remembers that the English East India Company first in 1612 formed a real stock company. Previously the members had traded "by several separate stocks." However, those Spanish *consulados* did not really receive an independent political power; that would have been altogether incompatible with the spirit of absolute monarchy and official aristocracy.[1] Moreover, the government avoided all communication with America outside the regular channels so much that the court sometimes first learned of the most important occurrences from foreigners.[2]

Staples, caravans, trading companies, are exactly the institutions which serve admirably for the beginnings of trade and for the lower stages of civilization; but Spain tried to perpetuate them in her colonies. But where not only the state, but society as a whole is established upon the basis of medieval ideas and institutions—the caste system, the impossibility of a separate nationality, the great power of the church—it is practically impossible to break away from them even in trade. Highly artificial governments, which are at the same time conscious of their weakness, have ever felt the need of limiting to as small an amount as possible trade which brings peoples together and which might bring, with foreign wares, foreign ideas and influences.

Effect on Development of National Wealth.—What effect such an artificial adherence to the lower stages of culture must have upon the development of national wealth is self-evident. In Spanish America this was aggravated by the fact that the mother country, to which the colonies were chained in all economic

[1] Compare Ustariz, *Teoria y Pratica del Commercio*, chs. 38, 39.

[2] Trade with the Philippines was restricted to a single galley which sailed annually from Manila to Acapulco. Ordinarily this was said to export only half a million piastres; but there were generally one and one-half to two millions. As soon as the ship was seen approaching along the coast, everybody hastened to Acapulco, where, however, again individual large houses bought up most of the cargo. In Manila, besides the merchants, the monastic houses especially took a share of it. Compare *Recopilacion*, IX, 45; Humboldt, *Neu-spanien*, IV, 331 ff. The great ship occasionally had 1,200 men aboard. (Anson's *Voyage*, 330.) The booty, when one was taken in 1762, according to Anderson, amounted to three million piastres.

matters, was, after the middle of the sixteenth century, really retrograding. For example, Caracas could not dispose of its enormous excess of hides in Spain, because she already received from Buenos Ayres and Montevideo more hides than were needed and those of Buenos Ayres were superior to those of Caracas in every respect.[1] When the trade of Seville was at the height of its prosperity both fleets did not carry more than 27,500 tons, while, for example, in 1836 the little island of Mauritius sent 17,690 tons to England and received 18,576 tons from her.[2] The last silver fleet arrived in 1778; previously, the annual exportation from Vera Cruz reached, on an average, 617,000 piastres; after 1787, 2,840,000 piastres annually.[3] The total exports to and imports from Spanish America in 1778 amounted to 148,500,000 reals; the number of ships was about 300, and duties amounted to about 6,500,000 reals. Ten years later the amount had risen to 1,104,500,000 reals and to about 55,000,000 in duties.[4] The trade with Cuba, which in 1765 required scarcely six ships, required over two hundred in 1778, after all Spaniards were allowed to share in it by paying a duty of six per cent. From 1765 to 1770 the income from duties at Havana trebled, while the exportation from the whole island increased fivefold. Before 1765 this magnificent island, which was able to provide all Europe with sugar, did not have even enough for the consumption of the mother country.[5]

Smuggling.—Naturally, those colonies which were situated at the greatest distance from the three large staple ports suffered most; for example, Chile, which had to have its whole trade conducted not merely through Porto Bello, but even through Peru. For New Spain and New Granada the restriction was not so great as appears at first glance, because the nature of their coast-line made the harbors of Vera Cruz and Cartagena

[1] Depons, II, 391.

[2] Campomanes, *Educ. Popul.*, I, 435; II, 110; Porter, *Progress of the Nation*, II, 177 ff. About 1849 the trade between Mauritius and Great Britain employed more than 65,000 tonnage.

[3] Humboldt, *Neuspanien*, IV, 352 ff.

[4] Bourgoing, II, 180 ff. Brougham, I, 445.

[5] Brougham, I, 438.

the chief ports. In the river regions of the La Plata and Orinoco the case was just the opposite: everywhere the finest opportunities to land, but nevertheless a thin population and neglect on the part of the Spaniards. It was therefore in these places that the Spanish revenue system received its most grievous wounds from smuggling.[1] The West Indian possessions of Holland, as well as those of England and France, were smuggling stations on a very large scale.[2] Shortly before 1740 the English alone are said to have had as much share in the Spanish colonial trade in ways prohibited as the Spaniards themselves had in the authorized ways.[3] If one can speak of honor among smugglers, it existed here in the highest degree. Although scarcely five per cent. of American necessities were furnished by Spanish manufacturers themselves, it is most remarkable that actually at no time did a Spanish agent ever betray his foreign business friend.[4] The trade of Caracas was surrendered to the company organized at Guipuscoa in 1728, because the government could no longer overcome smuggling; they now for the first time tried to appeal to the private interest of the merchants—Caracas produced the greatest amount of cocoa in the world and Spain consumed the most, but the cocoa trade was almost exclusively in the hands of Dutch smugglers.[5] The company, by arming its ships, really succeeded in exterminating a large part of this smuggling. Trade thus managed by a company is always very restricted; in this case it was, besides, on the Spanish side, limited to the harbors of San Sebastian and Cadiz. But in comparison with the earlier Spanish system, it could almost be considered free trade. Caracas, apart from the company, had connections with the Canary Islands by a registered ship and with Vera Cruz enjoyed free trade.[6] Within a short time the cattle business of the colony was trebled,

[1] Compare Robertson, II, 337.

[2] Depons, II, 336.

[3] Brougham, I, 423.

[4] Zavala, *Representacion al Rey D. Felipe V.*, 226. Compare Depons, II, 404 ff.

[5] In the sixteen years before 1728 not a single ship sailed from Caracas to Spain, and in twenty years only five from Spain to Caracas!

[6] Robertson, II, 413.

the cocoa trade doubled, and the price of cocoa in the mother country fell to one-half its former price.[1]

Increasing Difficulty of Maintaining the Spanish Commercial Policy.—The maintenance of the Spanish commercial policy necessarily became more difficult the more the colonial population, progressing in numbers and culture, learned to need European wares; the more foreign nations through the increase of internal competition were forced to seek new markets; and the less, in later years, the Spanish laws were supported by the old terror of the Spanish arms. The English war of 1739 against the Bourbon powers perhaps decided for all time the question whether, in the colonial world, the Germanic or Latin races should rule. In fact almost nothing was to be gained by individual concessions; rather was it true that every stone which was removed from the highly artificial structure had the inevitable result of bringing down another stone. This happened in the course of the eighteenth century, when the new ruling house which came from France departed from the old Spanish ways in so many particulars. Even during the war of the succession, because of the want of Spanish ships, the ports of Peru and Chile were opened to the merchants of St. Malo, but only until the beginning of the peace. Much more dangerous still than this deviation from the old rule was the so-called Assiento Treaty which was made with England in 1713; this provided that the English South Sea Company might not only import into the Spanish colonies 4,800 negro slaves annually, but also send a ship of 500 tons to the fair at Porto Bello. It was not enough that this number of tons was very soon exceeded in manifold ways,[2] but in addition the English established factories in the most important places. Through these they obtained an exact knowledge of the tastes and needs of the colonists, which had

[1] Brougham, I, 442 ff.; Depons, II, 343 ff.; Townsend, II, 376.

[2] This one ship could import from five to six times as much as one of the Spanish fleet (Townsend, II, 372). It was accompanied by several other ships which lay at anchor at some distance and renewed the cargo of the first as soon as it was discharged. More than that, single vessels, and occasionally whole squadrons, entered Spanish harbors under the pretext of provisioning, but in fact to smuggle in English goods. Compare Coxe, *Bourbon Kings of Spain*, III, 300.

previously been lacking, and, after that time, could extend their smuggling from Jamaica over an extraordinarily wide range. The galleons fell pretty rapidly from 15,000 to 2,000 tons [1] (about 1737). After 1740 permission was granted to fit out so-called "register ships" in the intervals from one fleet to another, especially to such as had a share in no fleet. About 1748 the galleons were entirely given up. Now one could sail directly to Chile and Peru around Cape Horn. Panama and Porto Bello declined. But on the other side trade was still fettered by the monopoly of Cadiz and paid high royal licenses.[2] Charles III, in 1764, established monthly mail packet-boats between Corunna and Havana, and these were permitted to transport goods to the extent of half their cargo. Every two months a similar packet-boat went to Buenos Ayres, and there were American post-routes connected with it. In 1765 came the great advance that intercourse with the West Indies was opened to all Spaniards and to a number of different ports under a duty of six per cent. In 1768 this was extended to Louisiana, in 1770 to Campeche and Yucatan, in 1778 to Peru, Chile, Buenos Ayres, New Granada and Guatemala, and at last in 1788 to New Spain. The more important a colony was for the motherland, the later was it resolved to open it to free trade. Furthermore, the duty on many classes of goods was lowered and in 1774 the previously existing prohibition of internal trade between Peru, Guatemala, New Spain, and New Granada was removed. Indeed, just as if all earlier maxims were to be exactly reversed, the American ports were now classified as *mayores* and *menores;* the former, naturally the more important and better situated, were burdened with higher duties, in order to equalize by such means the natural disadvantages of the latter.[3]

Profit of Spain from the Administration of her Colonies.— Finally there remains the question, what immediate profit did Spain get out of the administration of her colonial possessions?

[1] Campomanes, I, 436.

[2] In the year 1748 for a brief time trade was made free to all Spanish harbors. As numerous bankruptcies occurred as a result at Cadiz, the government soon after recalled its permission.

[3] Depons, II, 357.

I shall pass over, here, the advantages of a purely ideal nature, such as the political satisfaction which comes from the control of such an immense territory, the historic fame which results from the conversion, civilizing, and assimilation of so many peoples. Also the general advantages from every great colonization I must here presuppose to be understood. In distinction from these I will designate what economic net profit the government, the officials, priests, and knights, and finally the mercantile and professional classes of Spain obtained from America.

Advantage to the State.—The actual surplus which, in Humboldt's time,[1] flowed into the treasury at Madrid from the colonial administration was estimated at the following amounts: from New Spain, from 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 piastres annually; from Peru, 1,000,000 at the highest; from Buenos Ayres, from 600,000 to 700,000; and from New Granada, from 400,000 to 500,000. In the remaining provinces the expenditure was at least equal to the receipts; in fact, regular appropriations (*situados*) of probably 3,500,000 had to be sent annually to the Spanish West Indies, Florida, Louisiana, the Philippines, and Chile to help out their domestic administration. From Lima a contribution of 100,000 pesos went to Santiago and Concepcion every year, half in silver and half in supplies for the garrison there. Valdivia received annually 70,000 pesos likewise from Lima.[2] The supplementary contribution for San Domingo is said to have amounted to 200,000 silver piastres annually, or from the beginning of the eighteenth century to 1784, inclusive, to about 17,000,000.[3] Before the establishment of the Guipuscoa company two-thirds of the expenditure of Caracas, Maracaibo, and Cumaná had to be supplied from Mexico.[4] Taken all together the exports from Spanish America towards the end of the eighteenth century amounted to 9,800,000 piastres more than the imports. Whatever portion of this is not to be reckoned in the above-mentioned government surplus must have flowed into the hands of private individuals in Spain.[5]

[1] Humboldt, *Neuspanien*, V, 20 ff.

[2] Ulloa, *Viage*, II, 2, 8.

[3] Bourgoing, II, 215.

[4] Depons, III, 3.

[5] Humboldt, *Neuspanien*, IV, 375.

Advantages to Individuals.—The numerous civil and ecclesiastical officers in America were, for the most part, very well paid, so that the government of the mother country thus had a great many opportunities to enrich distinguished men or favorites. The viceroys of New Spain and Peru received fixed salaries of 60,000 piastres and those of New Granada and Buenos Ayres 40,000.[1] The captain-general of Caracas received 9,000 piastres and almost as much more in perquisites.[2] Individual viceroys, to be sure, extorted millions in a few years, as they demanded money for filling offices, conferring titles, privileges of trade, and concessions in connection with quicksilver royalties. But such abuses were possible only in so far as they had a strong party on their side at Madrid. The intendant of Caracas had an annual salary of 9,000 silver piastres and almost as much more from confiscations of smuggled goods, etc. The regent of the audiencia at Caracas received 5,300 piastres annually, each of the three Oidores and the two attorneys, 3,300 piastres.[3]

These advantages to the state as well as to private individuals were naturally most important in the first century of colonization. In everything, and especially in political affairs, the period of development is fuller of spontaneous activity than maturity and the standing still that follows. The streams of gold and silver which flowed from America to Spain had in the sixteenth century a greater effect, because the value of the precious metals had not then fallen so low as was the case later. What an impression it must have made, for example, when Pizarro paid, out of the ransom of the Inca Atahualpa, to every knight of his army 8,000 pesos, and to every foot-soldier 4,000![4] The more lasting sources of wealth, trade, and industry in which England and France so greatly outstripped Spain in the seventeenth century were, in the sixteenth century, not strong enough to counterbalance Potosi and Zacatecas. Hence I do not doubt for a

[1] Humboldt, *Neuspanien*, V, 18 ff.

[2] Depons, II, 23. One viceroy alone received some 60,000 pesos as a birthday gift: Robertson, II, 433.

[3] Depons, III, 6; II, 30.

[4] Robertson, II, 179.

moment that the treasures of America essentially promoted the world-wide tremendous power of Philip II not only in an immaterial but also in a material way, although the fact may hardly allow of an exact estimate.[1]

Industry in Spain.—That Spain, under the Hapsburg dynasty, adhered to the scientific mercantile system only lukewarmly and in an illogical way is sufficiently well-known. To be sure, the exportation of the precious metals was hindered as much as possible. But on the other hand they strove to lessen the exportation of commodities as much as possible and to increase their importation, especially that of manufactured goods. The Cortes[2] and the crown agreed that the prevailing rise in the price of all commodities resulted from the malice of the merchants, who wished to limit the quantity of wares by a heavy exportation. So, for example, the exportation of cattle, leather, and grain was forbidden. In 1552 Charles V ordered that every foreigner who exported raw wool should import a certain quantity of woolen stuffs. Similarly the importation of silk was allowed, the exportation prohibited. Spanish industry at that time was very unimportant. Philip II and with him the majority of his people valued industry so little that his laws regularly designated the work of tanners, shoemakers, and blacksmiths as "officios viles y baxos" (low and debasing occupations). To take up kitchen service did not disgrace a noble, if it was only temporary, but the exercise of a manual trade was an ineradicable stain.[3] Under such circumstances is it any wonder that the design of exploiting the colonies for the benefit of Spanish industry did not particularly interest the government?

Industry in the Colonies.—In 1545 Charles V expressly ordered that the governors should encourage the cultivation of hemp and flax and also spinning and weaving on the part of the natives.

[1] This was doubted by no one at that time. Compare W. Raleigh, *The Discovery of Guiane*, preface.

[2] Compare the resolutions of the Cortes between 1550 and 1560. L. v. Ranke, *Fürsten und Völker*, I, 400 ff. [In English as *The Ottoman and Spanish Empires in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*, tr. by W. K. Kelly, London, 1843.—B.]

[3] Prescott, *History of the Reign of Ferdinand and Isabella*, II, ch. 26.

In 1548 the exportation of raw hides to Spain was much favored by the same prince, and in 1572 the production of raw wool was considerably encouraged by his successor.[1] On the other hand the cultivation of the vine by the colonists was strictly forbidden; only those vineyards previously existing in Peru were allowed under a pretty high tax (law of 1595), but no Peruvian wine was permitted to be sold outside of South America.[2] In the year 1628 the law was enacted that every new manufacturing enterprise required the consent of not only the viceroy, but of the king himself; chiefly, as it appears, with the intention of protecting the Indians from new claims to service by their encomenderos.[3] But one may easily understand how effectually this law could be used to fetter every industrial activity, particularly during the eighteenth century. Such was the result, for example, in Humboldt's time, less in consequence of general measures than because of a mass of particular obstacles which were imposed upon industry by the authorities.[4] What industrial products the Indians required were supplied in great part by themselves by labor at home. This was the case in Quito, in Peru, and especially in Mexico.[5]

But a short time ago Mexico consumed scarcely four times as much of European commodities as Caracas, although its population was eight times as large—a natural result of the fact that a much larger proportion of the population were Indians.[6] The European stuffs which were wanted by the white people all had to come from Spain and for this reason were known as

[1] *Recopilacion*, IV, 18, 20, 23, 2. However, in 1621 Philip IV wished those skilled in manufacturing to know that they were excepted from the general prohibition that no foreigners should be found in America (IX, 27, 10). Moreover, that the minister Galvez, towards the end of the eighteenth century, established powder-factories in America was a violation of all earlier governmental maxims. (Bourgoing, II, 97.)

[2] *Recopilacion*, IV, 17, 18; IV, 18, 15, 18. Cortes, on the contrary, had encouraged vine-growing in New Spain as much as possible; in every *repartimiento* there was planted a certain number of vines (Prescott, *Conquest of Mexico*, III, 238).

[3] *Recopilacion*, IV, 26.

[4] Humboldt, *Neuspanien*, IV, 258.

[5] Ulloa, *Viage*, I, 6, 1; II, 1, 11.

[6] Humboldt, *R. H.*, III, 113.

Castilian goods.[1] It was chiefly in Seville that Spanish industry made use of American raw materials, and there most of the establishments were in the possession of the crown. For example, the manufacture of tobacco and of bronze ordnance and the coinage of the precious metals flourished at Seville.[2] Of the manufactures exported to America, the greater part (it is said nineteen-twentieths) was made in England, Holland, France, etc., and the Spaniards themselves, apart from their own illicit trade, had only two kinds of profit from it. In the first place the national treasury secured the considerable customs which had to be paid in transit through Spain. Second, the merchants, shipowners, etc., gained from the many charges which were added to the price of the goods and were paid again by the Americans. In order to avoid, at least, the customs an immense partial smuggling was carried on at Cadiz. The silk, stocking, calico, and wax manufactories there were apparently of only small capacity, but at the same time had an enormous output. In fact they served chiefly merely as a mask, under which their managers were able to send great quantities of foreign goods to America without incurring too great suspicion.[3] Moreover, the colonists had become so thoroughly accustomed to having the foreign commerce in the hands of the peninsular Spaniards that the internal trade of America, the retail shopkeeping, was carried on in great part by chapetons or Canary-Islanders. As is the case in many countries which possess little real productive and commercial enterprise, the shopkeeping class was decidedly overcrowded.[4]

As an important connecting link between the fiscal and the mercantile advantage derived by Spain from the colonies, the quicksilver royalty deserves to be mentioned. Nowhere in the world was so much quicksilver needed as in Spanish America, where the precious metal was separated from the ore almost solely by amalgamation. On the other hand, Spain of all countries of

[1] Ulloa, *Viage*, II, 1, 10.

[2] Bourgoing, III, 99 ff.

[3] *Ibid.*, 150.

[4] Ulloa, *Viage*, I, 27, 251. Depons, II, 425. For the information of the reader I present the following from the official list of exports and imports at

the Old World is by far the richest in quicksilver.[1] In America itself, until a short time ago, quicksilver was supplied only from the mines at Guancavelica. This, therefore, was a case of an important economic need where the mother country and colony were appointed for each other by nature itself.[2]

Causes of Spanish Colonial Decline.—The Spanish colonial empire did not die a natural death. The terrible shock given the mother country by Napoleon was, as is well-known, the principal cause for the revolt of the colonies: the captivity of the old royal house, the elevation of the Bonapartist dynasty, the frightful war with France, and finally the rapid alteration of

Vera Cruz for the year 1803, which Humboldt published in *Neuspanien*, IV, 305, 318. There came from Spain:

	Piastres.
Spanish raw products worth	2,010,423
(More than 1,546,000 piastres of this was wine, brandy, vinegar, etc.)	
Spanish manufactured products	8,604,380
(About 7,335,000 piastres of this was for cloths, in which the above-mentioned smuggling was especially extensive.)	
Foreign goods	7,878,486
(Of which again more than 7,500,000 were cloths.)	
Imports from other Spanish colonies	1,373,428
(The imports of wax alone were almost 462,000 piastres and for cocoa more than 700,000.)	
Total	19,866,717
The exports to Spain were worth	12,017,062
(More than 2,238,000 of this was cochineal, 263,729 indigo, sugar almost 1,500,000, gold 142,229, and silver 7,356,530.)	
Exports to other Spanish colonies	2,465,846
(Of which again 21,730 was gold and 1,834,146 silver.)	
Total	14,482,908

What was imported and exported on the government account was not included. The most important was an exportation of 6,200,000 piastres of gold, and an importation of 2,500 tons of quicksilver and 280,000 reams of paper for the use of royal tobacco manufacture.

[1] The total European production is estimated at about 1,460,000 kilograms annually, of which Almaden alone yields 1,100,000 (Duflot de Mofras, I, 50 ff.). [Later these amounts have been much changed by the increased production in Austria-Hungary, as well as in Spain. In 1895 the amount mined in Spain was 1,506,000 kilograms, and in 1898 California produced 1,058,000 kilograms.—B.]

[2] Compare Ulloa, *Noticias Americanas*, cap. 12–15. Spain lately derived from Mexico, through the rise in the price of quicksilver, almost as much as formerly from the right of coining. Why has Mexico not made the attempt to secure the lease of the mines of Almaden for herself instead of allowing it to be acquired by the Rothschilds?

absolutist and constitutional rule through revolution in Spain herself. As a result the old carefully transmitted structure of colonial institutions, ideas, and policy was completely thrown out of joint. The keystone was removed, as it were; this was particularly the case when many of the highest colonial officials vacillated between the legitimate kings and the usurper. When at the same time the mother country was in such pressing need of the political help of England, it was really impossible to prevent her invading the colonial markets. One hundred years earlier (during the war of the Spanish Succession) the old system of the Philips had successfully withstood similar dangers; the new Bourbon system, however, completely honeycombed from within, was no longer strong enough to do so. In addition, after the restoration of general peace in Europe, the English both privately (Lord Cochran) and as a part of public policy (Canning) favored according to their means the separation of the Spanish colonies from the mother country. The results have shown, unfortunately, that these colonies were by no means all ripe for freedom. It is much easier to win independence than worthily to maintain it. If I except the colonies of Caracas and Chile, which were neglected by the mother country, the condition of the remainder of Spanish America for sixty years has been such that one could only wish that they had remained for a longer time dependent. There was an immense decline in economic prosperity;[1] for example, the German linen trade suffered from this most keenly; insurrections of the troops have been unending, yet without high motives and even without any real bravery, as, for instance, in Buenos Ayres once, where fifteen presidents were overthrown within nine months, although every one of them was chosen for three years;[2] a perfect venality of justice has prevailed, and consequently such a contempt for law that the traveller often found more protection with the leaders of robber bands than with the authorities;[3] finally there has been an oppression of the

[1] Mexico had, for a long time, even in time of peace, an annual deficit of almost 3,000,000 piastres, while as a colony it was able to send an immense surplus to the mother country and other colonies (Duflot de Mofras, I, 62).

[2] Ch. Darwin, *Journal of Researches*, I, 141, 295.

[3] When the Swiss consul was robbed and murdered in Mexico in 1835, an adjutant of President Santa Anna was at the head of the band of robbers (Duflot de Mofras, I, 16).

natives, harder to endure, as it has been less systematic, which, some day, may lead to a war of extermination against the whole Spanish race. The sad picture which Duflot de Mofras, Ferry,[1] and others have presented of Mexico, Stephens of Central America, and Tschudi of Peru was fully justified during the war between Mexico and the United States. The Americans would find no stronger resistance, even as far as the southern boundary of the Spanish colonial empire, except possibly in Caracas and Chile and among the wild nomads of Buenos Ayres. Alexander von Humboldt, shortly before his death, said to Wappäus,[2] "The United States will absorb the whole of Mexico and then fall to pieces herself."

But I do not once think that, without the shock to the mother country, the mere logical adherence to the old Spanish system could have guaranteed the prosperity of the colonial empire. A state which discourages and must discourage every internal development will surely succumb, in the end, to some more highly developed foreign power. About 1792 the Spanish navy numbered 80 ships of the line, 48 frigates, and 79 corvettes, etc.;[3] how insignificant it is to-day! How little would it be in a position now to defend the old colonial dominions against peaceful or warlike attacks of the European sea powers! And how much more irresistibly still would her neighbor in North America, with her energy, activity, and recklessness, know how to put an end to the Spanish system of isolation! In 1803 the Vice-President of the United States, Aaron Burr, announced, openly, his intention to revolutionize and conquer New Spain.[4]

[1] [Gabriel Ferry, author of *Les Révolutions du Mexique*, Paris, 1864, *Souvenirs de Mexique et de Californie*, Paris, 1884, and other works in the same field.—B.]

[2] *Op. cit.*, 133.

[3] Bourgoing, II, 106–144.

[4] The most important survival of the old Spanish colonial system is to be found to-day in the Philippines, where especially the native Tagals are even now subject to a sort of life-long guardianship under the special care of the clergy. Compare Jurien de la Gravière, *Voyage en Chine*, etc., II, 1853. [On the great changes that have taken place in Mexico see C. F. Lummis, *The Awakening of a Nation: Mexico of To-day*, 1898; on Aaron Burr's project, W. F. McCaleb, *The Aaron Burr Conspiracy*, 1903; and on the Spanish Colonial System as exemplified in the Philippines, besides the works of Foreman and Jagor, the Historical Introduction by the writer to the great documentary publication *The Philippine Islands*, Cleveland, 1903, and the historical section of the article "Philippines" (also by the writer) in *The New International Encyclopædia*. In regard to Burr it should be remarked that it was in 1805, after he had ceased to be Vice-President, that he announced his intentions, and not strictly "openly" at that time.—B.]

How slight was the natural bond between old Spain and most of her colonies is to be seen most plainly in the present trade relations with Peru. In 1854 the exports of this country to Spain were worth only about 20,000 francs annually, but those to England fully 30,000,000. The importations from Spain were over 2,000,000, those from France 5,000,000, and those from England 18,000,000. The number of tons of Spanish shipping in the trade with Peru amounted to only 3,200, that of England 151,000 tons.[1] In the shipping reports for 1876 (incoming 338,547 tons, outgoing 404,462 tons) Spain is considerably behind Sweden and is included under "various," her shipping amounting in all to 8,154 tons. The same is true in Chile and Argentina.[2] In general one can say that if the Spanish colonies have developed so much more poorly than the English, it is due in great part to the fact that since the restoration of peace the former have remained almost wholly separated from Spain, while the latter very soon resumed their connection with England in every sphere except the political, and a connection highly advantageous for both.[3] But whence was this difference itself? Chiefly because Spain for a long time and in every respect had been a fallen nation, whose nationality, as such, no longer possessed power enough to hold together a hemisphere under the conditions of freedom.

[1] *Journal des Économistes*, May, 1854.

[2] Leroy-Beaulieu, *De la Colonisation*, 40 ff.

[3] Compare Wappäus, *Mittel- und Südamerica*, 117 ff.

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

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