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

SPECIMENS

OF

EXPOSITION AND ARGUMENT

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SPECIMENS

OF

EXPOSITION AND ARGUMENT

COMPILED BY

Oswin

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AND

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INSTRUCTORS IN ENGLISH IN OBERLIN COLLEGE

New York

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1908

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GIFT
Walter Morris Hart

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PREFACE

Any book that helps a student to write good English need not apologize for its publication. The present volume, while disclaiming any attempt on the part of its editors to introduce new theories in a subject so old as Composition, has in its make-up certain practical features which should prove helpful to those studying Exposition and Argument. These are of course the practical forms of discourse, in which the student must become proficient whether he practice the other forms or not.

The selections are designedly varied in length, to admit of different modes of treatment. And it is believed that the interest of the articles is sufficiently diversified to make sure of an appeal to every class of readers. It will be noted that many articles are the work of practical men of affairs rather than of men of letters. This should be in the nature of encouragement to those who do not expect to make letters their profession. Indeed, many of the selections admit of imitation both as to form and style.

One or two features of the book are, as far as the editors know, new to a work of this kind. Included among the arguments is an example of controversy,

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which is important as illustrating how opposite sides of the same question may be handled. It is hoped that the short treatises on *Introductions* and *The Brief* will be found of sufficient assistance to the student to justify their inclusion. They make no pretense at bringing forward any new material on those subjects; but a quite general haziness in the mind of the student in regard to those very necessary features of Composition, and the absence in the rhetorics of any correlated material on these points, has made this brief treatment of them seem advisable.

The order of the selections under Exposition begins with those which, while essentially expository, have still some narrative or descriptive features; proceeds with the practical and more common types of Exposition, as illustrated by the essays describing a process; is followed by examples of the distinction drawn in the rhetorics between definition and analysis; advances with some special forms (the historical, and the informal essay), which are adapted to class-room imitations; and closes with a particular type, criticism.

The order of the selections under Argument endeavors to proceed logically, from the more simple to the more complex, and is one the student might well observe in his own work in this subject. Beginning with examples of the broader division of the subject, Persuasion, there follows a specimen brief as indicating its relation to a complete argument. Examples of introductions appear next, a feature of Argument so

vital as to make necessary separate treatment here, and to suggest the emphasis with which it might well be treated by the student. There follow examples, of complete arguments, arranged, so far as may be, in the order of simplicity of structure and presentation. Refutation is illustrated first by itself and then also in the controversy which concludes the selections.

The punctuation of the selections has been unaltered.

The editors acknowledge very gratefully their obligations, equally to the authors who have consented to this use of their work, and to the publishers who have so graciously given permission to reprint. The indebtedness of the editors to the latter is indicated under each selection. The authors to whom thanks are due are Mr. John Corbin, Mr. John Burroughs, Professor A. E. Kennelly, Mr. Edwin T. Stiger, Professor George H. Palmer, President Arthur T. Hadley, Professor William James, President Charles W. Eliot, Mr. Frank A. Vanderlip, Mr. John La Farge, Mr. Arthur C. Benson, Professor Albert B. Hart, Professor George Santayana, Mr. Sidney Curtis, Mr. George E. Roberts, President Woodrow Wilson, Professor Felix Adler, Mr. Henry Arthur Jones.

M. P.
R. A. J.

New York, N.Y.,
August, 1908.

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SPECIMENS

OF

EXPOSITION AND ARGUMENT

EXPOSITION

A DAY IN AN OXFORD COLLEGE[1]

JOHN CORBIN

WHEN a freshman is once established in college, his life falls into a pleasantly varied routine. The day is ushered in by the scout, who bustles into the bedroom, throws aside the curtain, pours out the bath, and shouts, "Half past seven, sir," in a tone that makes it impossible to forget that chapel — or if one chooses, roll-call — comes at eight. Unless one keeps his six chapels or "rollers" a week, he is promptly "hauled" before the dean, who perhaps "gates" him. To be gated is to be forbidden to pass the college gate after dark, and fined a shilling for each night of confinement. To an American all this brings recollections of the paternal roof, where tardiness at breakfast meant, perhaps, the loss of dessert, and bedtime an hour earlier. I remember once, when out of training, deliberately cutting chapel to see with what mien the good dean performed his nursery duties. His calm was unruffled, his dignity unsullied. I soon came to find that the rules about rising were bowed to and indeed respected by all con-

[1] Reprinted by permission from "An American at Oxford." Copyright, 1902. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

cerned, even while they were broken. They are distinctly more lax than those the fellows have been accustomed to in the public schools, and they are conceded to be for the best welfare of the college.

Breakfast comes soon after chapel, or roll-call. If a man has "kept a dirty roller," that is, has reported in pyjamas, ulster, and boots, and has turned in again, the scout puts the breakfast before the fire on a trestle built of shovel, poker, and tongs, where it remains edible until noon. If a man has a breakfast party on, the scout makes sure that he is stirring in season, and, hurrying through the other rooms on the staircase, is presently on hand for as long as he may be wanted. The usual Oxford breakfast is a single course, which not infrequently consists of some one of the excellent English pork products, with an egg or kidneys. There may be two courses, in which case the first is of the no less excellent fresh fish. There are no vegetables. The breakfast is ended with toast and jam or marmalade. When one has fellows in to breakfast, — and the Oxford custom of rooming alone instead of chumming makes such hospitality frequent, — his usual meal is increased by a course, say, of chicken. In any case it leads to a morning cigarette, for tobacco aids digestion, and helps fill the hour or so after meals which an Englishman gives to relaxation.

At ten o'clock the breakfast may be interrupted for a moment by the exit of some one bent on attending a lecture, though one apologizes for such an act as if it

were scarcely good form. An appointment with one's tutor is a more legitimate excuse for leaving; but even this is always an occasion for an apology, in behalf of the tutor of course, for one is certainly not himself responsible. If a quorum is left, they manage to sit comfortably by the fire, smoking and chatting in spite of lectures and tutors, until by mutual consent they scatter to glance at the *Times* and the *Sportsman* in the common-room, or even to get in a bit of reading.

Luncheon often consists of bread and cheese and jam from the buttery, with perhaps a half pint of bitter beer; but it may, like the breakfast, come from the college kitchen. In any case it is very light, for almost immediately after it everybody scatters to field and track and river for the exercise that the English climate makes necessary and the sport that the English temperament demands.

By four o'clock every one is back in college tubbed and dressed for tea, which a man serves himself in his rooms to as many fellows as he has been able to gather in on field or river. If he is eager to hear of the games he has not been able to witness, he goes to the junior common-room or to his club, where he is sure to find a dozen or so of kindred spirits representing every sport of importance. In this way he hears the minutest details of the games of the day from the players themselves; and before nightfall — such is the influence of tea — those bits of gossip which in America are known chiefly among members of a team have ramified the

college. Thus the function of the "bleachers" on an American field is performed with a vengeance by the easy-chairs before a common-room fire; and a man had better be kicked off the team by an American captain than have his shortcomings served up with common-room tea.

The two hours between tea and dinner may be, and usually are, spent in reading.

At seven o'clock the college bell rings, and in two minutes the fellows have thrown on their gowns and are seated at table, where the scouts are in readiness to serve them. As a rule a man may sit wherever he chooses; this is one of the admirable arrangements for breaking up such cliques as inevitably form in a college. But in point of fact a man usually ends by sitting in some certain quarter of the hall, where from day to day he finds much the same set of fellows. Thus all the advantages of friendly intercourse are attained without any real exclusiveness. This may seem a small point; but an hour a day becomes an item in four years, especially if it is the hour when men are most disposed to be companionable.

In the evening, when the season permits, the fellows sit out of doors after dinner, smoking and playing bowls. There is no place in which the spring comes more sweetly than in an Oxford garden. The high walls are at once a trap for the first warm rays of the sun and a barrier against the winds of March. The daffodils and crocuses spring up with joy as the gar-

dener bids; and the apple and cherry trees coddle against the warm north walls, spreading out their early buds gratefully to the mild English sun. For long, quiet hours after dinner they flaunt their beauty to the fellows smoking, and breathe their sweetness to the fellows playing bowls. "No man," exclaims the American visitor, "could live four years in those gardens of delight and not be made gentler and nobler!" Perhaps! though not altogether in the way the visitor imagines. When the flush of summer is on, the loiterers loll on the lawn full length; and as they watch the insects crawl among the grass they make bets on them, just as the gravest and most reverend seniors have been known to do in America.

In the windows overlooking the quadrangle are boxes of brilliant flowers, above which the smoke of a pipe comes curling out. At Harvard some fellows have geraniums in their windows, but only the very rich; and when they began the custom an ancient graduate wrote one of those communications to the *Crimson*, saying that if men put unmanly boxes of flowers in the window, how can they expect to beat Yale? Flower boxes, no sand. At Oxford they manage things so that anybody may have flower boxes; and their associations are by no means unmanly. This is the way they do it. In the early summer a gardener's wagon from the country draws up by the college gate, and the driver cries, "Flowers! Flowers for a pair of old bags, sir." *Bags* is of course the fitting term for English trousers —

which don't fit; and I should like to inform that ancient graduate that the window boxes of Oxford suggest the very badge of manhood.

As long as the English twilight lingers, the men will sit and talk and sing to the mandolin; and I have heard of fellows sitting and talking all night, not turning in until the porter appeared to take their names at roll-call. On the eve of May day it is quite the custom to sit out, for at dawn one may go to see the pretty ceremony of heralding the May on Magdalen Tower. The Magdalen choir boys — the sweetest songsters in all Oxford — mount to the top of that most beautiful of Gothic towers, and, standing among the pinnacles, — pinnacles afire with the spirituality of the Middle Ages, that warms all the senses with purity and beauty, — those boys, I say, on that tower and among those pinnacles, open their mouths and sing a Latin song to greet the May. Meantime, the fellows who have come out to listen in the street below make catcalls and blow fish horns. The song above is the survival of a Romish, perhaps a Druidical, custom; the racket below is the survival of a Puritan protest. That is Oxford in symbol! Its dignity and mellowness are not so much a matter of flowering gardens and crumbling walls as of the traditions of the centuries in which the whole life of the place has deep sources; and the noblest of its institutions are fringed with survivals that run riot in the grotesque.

If a man intends to spend the evening out of college,

he has to make a dash before nine o'clock; for love or for money the porter may not let an inmate out after nine. One man I knew was able to escape by guile. He had a brother in Trinity whom he very much resembled, and whenever he wanted to go out, he would tilt his mortarboard forward, wrap his gown high about his neck, as it is usually worn of an evening, and bidding the porter a polite good-night, say, "Charge me to my brother, Hancock, if you please." The charge is the inconsiderable sum of one penny, and is the penalty of having a late guest. Having profited by my experience with the similar charge for keeping my name on the college books, I never asked its why and wherefore. Both are no doubt survivals of some mediæval custom, the authority of which no college employee — or don, for the matter of that — would question. Such matters interest the Oxford man quite as little as the question how he comes by a tonsil or a vermiform appendix. They are there, and he makes the best of them.

If a fellow leaves college for an evening, it is for a foregathering at some other college, or to go to the theatre. As a rule he wears a cloth cap. A "billycock" or "bowler," as the pot hat is called, is as thoroughly frowned on now in English colleges as it was with us a dozen years ago. As for the mortarboard and gown, undergraduate opinion rather requires that they be left behind. This is largely, no doubt, because they are required by law to be worn. So far as the undergraduates are concerned, every operative statute of the

university, with the exception of those relating to matriculation and graduation, refers to conduct in the streets after nightfall, and almost without exception they are honored in the breach. This is out of disregard for the Vice-Chancellor of the university, who is familiarly called the Vice, because he serves as a warning to others for the practice of virtue. The Vice makes his power felt in characteristically dark and tortuous ways. His factors are two proctors, college dons in daytime, but skulkers after nightfall, each of whom has his bulldogs, that is, scouts, employed literally to spy upon the students. If these catch you without cap or gown, they cause you to be proctorized or "progged," as it is called, which involves a matter of five shillings or so. As a rule there is little danger of progging, but my first term fell in evil days. For some reason or other the chest of the university showed a deficit of sundry pounds, shillings, and pence; and as it had long ceased to need or receive regular bequests, — the finance of the institution being in the hands of the colleges, — a crisis was at hand. A more serious problem had doubtless never arisen since the great question was solved of keeping undergraduates' names on the books. The expedient of the Vice-Chancellor was to summon the proctors, and bid them charge their bulldogs to prog all freshmen caught at night without cap and gown. The deficit in the university chest was made up at five shillings a head.

One of the Vice-Chancellor's rules is that no under-

graduate shall enter an Oxford "pub." Now the only restaurant in town, Queen's, is run in conjunction with a pub, and was once the favorite resort of all who were bent on breaking the monotony of an English Sunday. The Vice-Chancellor resolved to destroy this den of Sabbath-breaking, and the undergraduates resolved no less firmly to defend their stronghold. The result was a hand-to-hand fight with the bulldogs, which ended so triumphantly for the undergraduates that a dozen or more of them were sent down. In the articles of the peace that followed, it was stipulated, I was told, that so long as the restaurant was closed Sunday afternoons and nights, it should never suffer from the visit of proctor or bulldog. As a result, Queen's is a great scene of undergraduate foregatherings. The dinners are good enough and reasonably cheap; and as most excellent champagne is to be had at twelve shillings the bottle, the diners are not unlikely to get back to college a trifle buffy, in the Oxford phrase.

By an interesting survival of mediæval custom, the Vice-Chancellor has supreme power over the morals of the town, and any citizen who transgresses his laws is visited with summary punishment. For a tradesman or publican to assist in breaking university rules means outlawry and ruin, and for certain offenses a citizen may be punished by imprisonment. Over the Oxford theatre the Vice-Chancellor's power is absolute. In my time he was much more solicitous that the undergraduate be kept from knowledge of the omnipresent

woman with a past than that dramatic art should flourish, and forbade the town to more than one excellent play of the modern school of comedy that had been seen and discussed in London by the younger sisters of the undergraduates. The woman with a present is virtually absent.

Time was when no Oxford play was quite successful unless the undergraduates assisted at its first night, though in a way very different from that which the term denotes in France. The assistance was of the kind so generously rendered in New York and Boston on the evening of an athletic contest. Even to-day, just for tradition's sake, the undergraduates sometimes make a row. A lot of B. N. C. men, as the clanny sons of Brazenose College call themselves, may insist that an opera stop while the troupe listen to one of their own excellent vocal performances; and I once saw a great sprinter, not unknown to Yale men, rise from his seat, face the audience, and, pointing with his thumb over his shoulder at the soubrette, announce impressively, "Do you know, I rather *like* that girl!" The show is usually over just before eleven, and then occurs an amusing, if unseemly, scramble to get back to college before the hour strikes. A man who stays out after ten is fined threepence, after eleven the fine is sixpence. When all is said, why shouldn't one sprint for threepence?

If you stay out of college after midnight, the dean makes a star chamber offense of it, fines you a "quid" or

two, and like as not sends you down. This sounds a trifle worse than it is; for if you must be away, your absence can usually be arranged for. If you find yourself in the streets after twelve, you may rap on some friend's bedroom window and tell him of your plight through the iron grating. He will then spend the first half of the night in your bed and wash his hands in your bowl. With such evidence as this to support him, the scout is not apt, if sufficiently retained, to report a suspected absence. I have even known fellows to make their arrangements in advance and spend the night in town; but the ruse has its dangers, and the penalty is to be sent down for good and all.

It is owing to such regulations as these that life in the English college has the name of being cloistral. Just how cloistral it is in spirit no one can know who has not taken part in a rag in the quad; and this is impossible to an outsider, for at midnight all visitors are required to leave, under a heavy penalty to their host.

NATURE IN ENGLAND[1]

John Burroughs

The dominant impression of the English landscape is repose. Never was such a restful land to the eye, especially to the American eye, sated as it is very apt to be with the mingled squalor and splendor of its own landscape, its violent contrasts, and general spirit of unrest. But the completeness and composure of this outdoor nature is like a dream. It is like the poise of the tide at its full: every hurt of the world is healed, every shore covered, every unsightly spot is hidden. The circle of the horizon is brimming with the green equable flood. (I did not see the fens of Lincolnshire nor the wolds of York.) This look of repose is partly the result of the maturity and ripeness brought about by time and ages of patient and thorough husbandry, and partly the result of the gentle, continent spirit of Nature herself. She is contented, she is happily wedded, she is well clothed and fed. Her offspring swarm about her, her paths have fallen in pleasant places. The foliage of the trees, how dense and massive! The turf of the fields, how thick and uniform! The streams and rivers, how placid and full,

[1] Reprinted by permission from "Fresh Fields." Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

showing no devastated margins, no widespread sandy wastes and unsightly heaps of drift bowlders! To the returned traveler the foliage of the trees and groves of New England and New York looks thin and disheveled when compared with the foliage he has just left. This effect is probably owing to our cruder soil and sharper climate. The aspect of our trees in midsummer is as if the hair of their heads stood on end; the woods have a wild, frightened look, or as if they were just recovering from a debauch. In our intense light and heat, the leaves, instead of spreading themselves full to the sun and crowding out upon the ends of the branches as they do in England, retreat, as it were, hide behind each other, stand edgewise, perpendicular, or at any angle, to avoid the direct rays. In Britain, from the slow, dripping rains and the excessive moisture, the leaves of the trees droop more, and the branches are more pendent. The rays of light are fewer and feebler, and the foliage disposes itself so as to catch them all, and thus presents a fuller and broader surface to the eye of the beholder. The leaves are massed upon the outer ends of the branches, while the interior of the tree is comparatively leafless. The European plane tree is like a tent. The foliage is all on the outside. The bird voices in it reverberate as in a chamber.

> The pillar'd dusk of sounding sycamores,

says Tennyson. At a little distance, it has the mass and solidity of a rock. The same is true of the European maple, and when this tree is grown on our side of

the Atlantic it keeps up its Old World habits. I have for several years taken note of a few of them growing in a park near my home. They have less grace and delicacy of outline than our native maple, but present a darker and more solid mass of foliage. The leaves are larger and less feathery, and are crowded to the periphery of the tree. Nearly every summer one of the trees, which is most exposed, gets the leaves on one side badly scorched. When the foliage begins to turn in the fall, the trees appear as if they had been lightly and hastily brushed with gold. The outer edges of the branches become a light yellow, while, a little deeper, the body of the foliage is still green. It is this solid and sculpturesque character of the English foliage that so fills the eye of the artist. The feathery, formless, indefinite, not to say thin, aspect of our leafage is much less easy to paint, and much less pleasing when painted.

The same is true of the turf in the fields and upon the hills. The sward with us, even in the oldest meadows, will wear more or less a ragged, uneven aspect. The frost heaves it, the sun parches it; it is thin here and thick there, crabbed in one spot and fine and soft in another. Only by the frequent use of a heavy roller, copious waterings, and top dressings, can we produce sod that approaches in beauty even that of the elevated sheep ranges in England and Scotland.

The greater activity and abundance of the earthworm, as disclosed by Darwin, probably has much to do with the smoothness and fatness of those fields when

contrasted with our own. This little yet mighty engine is much less instrumental in leavening and leveling the soil in New England than in Old. The greater humidity of the mother country, the deep clayey soil, its fattening for ages by human occupancy, the abundance of food, the milder climate, etc., are all favorable to the life and activity of the earthworm. Indeed, according to Darwin, the gardener that has made England a garden is none other than this little obscure creature. It plows, drains, airs, pulverizes, fertilizes, and levels. It cannot transport rocks and stone, but it can bury them; it cannot remove the ancient walls and pavements, but it can undermine them and deposit its rich castings above them. On each acre of land, he says, "in many parts of England, a weight of more than ten tons of dry earth annually passes through their bodies and is brought to the surface." "When we behold a wide, turf-covered expanse," he further observes, "we should remember that its smoothness, on which so much of its beauty depends, is mainly due to all the inequalities having been slowly leveled by worms."

The small part which worms play in this direction in our landscape is, I am convinced, more than neutralized by our violent or disrupting climate; but England looks like the product of some such gentle, tireless, and beneficent agent. I have referred to that effect in the face of the landscape as if the soil had snowed down; it seems the snow came from the other

direction, namely, from below, but was deposited with equal gentleness and uniformity.

The repose and equipoise of nature of which I have spoken appears in the fields of grain no less than in the turf and foliage. One may see vast stretches of wheat, oats, barley, beans, etc., as uniform as the surface of a lake, every stalk of grain or bean the size and height of every other stalk. This, of course, means good husbandry; it means a mild, even-tempered nature back of it, also. Then the repose of the English landscape is enhanced, rather than marred, by the part man has played in it. How those old arched bridges rest above the placid streams; how easily they conduct the trim, perfect highways over them! Where the foot finds an easy way, the eye finds the same; where the body finds harmony, the mind finds harmony. Those ivy-covered walls and ruins, those finished fields, those rounded hedgerows, those embowered cottages, and that gray, massive architecture, all contribute to the harmony and to the repose of the landscape. Perhaps in no other country are the grazing herds so much at ease. One's first impression, on seeing British fields in spring or summer, is that the cattle and sheep have all broken into the meadow and have not yet been discovered by the farmer; they have taken their fill, and are now reposing upon the grass or dreaming under the trees. But you presently perceive that it is all meadow or meadow-like; that there are no wild, weedy, or barren pastures about which the herds toil; but that they are in grass up to

their eyes everywhere. Hence their contentment; hence another element of repose in the landscape.

The softness and humidity of the English climate act in two ways in promoting that marvelous greenness of the land, namely, by growth and by decay. As the grass springs quickly, so its matured stalk or dry leaf decays quickly. No field growths are desiccated and preserved as with us; there are no dried stubble and seared leaves remaining over the winter to mar and obscure the verdancy of spring. Every dead thing is quickly converted back to vegetable mold. In the woods, in May, it is difficult to find any of the dry leaves of the previous autumn; in the fields and copses and along the highways, no stalk of weed or grass remains; while our wild, uplying pastures and mountain tops always present a more or less brown and seared appearance from the dried and bleached stalks of the growth of the previous year, through which the fresh-springing grass is scarcely visible. Where rain falls on nearly three hundred days in the year, as in the British islands, the conversion of the mold into grass, and *vice versa*, takes place very rapidly.

HOW BOOKS ARE MADE[1]

EDWIN T. STIGER

EACH year the American publishers place on the market something over eight thousand new publications, the editions of which range from the aristocratic few of the expensive limited editions to the hundreds of thousands of the "best sellers." Each one of these new books represents an individual effort on the part of the author and the publisher to place something new in a new way before the public, to turn out a book which some appreciable portion of the millions of book-buying inhabitants of this country can be made to think that it wants.

Did it ever occur to you as a reader of a portion of this great output that the laying out and manufacture of this mass of reading matter calls for the employment of an immense force of professionally trained minds outside of the thousands who labor in the carrying out of the details arranged for them; that every new book which appears means the study and application of ideas stored away in the brain of some one man or some little group of men who are spending their lives in the work of producing books attractive to the purchaser, and

[1] Reprinted by permission from *The Independent.*

that each of these men must have a general knowledge, at least, of all branches of work that enter into the making of a book, not only of the idiosyncrasies of the English language, with its shading of punctuation, of types and typographical eccentricities, of the technicalities of electrotyping, paper-making, photo-engraving, printing and bookbinding, but of every one of these and its related branches?

Here, then, is the story of the making of a book.

When a publisher receives a manuscript from an author he gives it out to one of his readers, one of a force upon which he relies for opinions as to the advisability of publishing or probable salability after publishing. These readers are generally persons who have been well trained in the merits or demerits of popularity or authority, and in spite of occasional errors of judgment inseparable from work of this nature, have developed exceptional ability in this line. If the manuscript appears hopeless for this particular publisher's use it will probably pass through the hands of but one or two readers. If, however, it shows prospects of success, it will be placed before several of these experts, each of whom will deliver an opinion, and it will go for final consideration to the head of the editorial force or a member of the publishing firm. Let us consider that the manuscript has been accepted and the contract drawn up and signed by the author and the publisher. The next step is the sending of the manuscript to the head of the manufacturing depart-

ment of the publishing house. This gentleman generally tries to talk the book over with the author, in an effort to include as many of his ideas in the production as may be possible considering the limits and the cost of manufacture. He is then ready to begin the building of the book.

Of course, if a new volume is to be added to a series which has already been begun, or if it is to be patterned after some book which has already been made, the plan of procedure is simple, the work to a great extent merely mechanical. If the book, however, must be constructed on lines of its own, the first thing to be done is to obtain a count of the number of words the manuscript contains. This is necessary as giving a gauge from which to determine the size of type and of the type page, and to arrive approximately at the number of pages the book will make. This counting is not as easy as it sounds, and it is quite an art to do it accurately, since manuscript will vary considerably in different parts, and often the "copy," as the manuscript now becomes called, is made up of writing by different hands, or of magazine or newspaper extracts of varying sizes pasted or laid in. Then, too, the different sizes of types to be used must be considered, for long quotations or correspondence must be set in a different size from the text, and the estimator will also find that portions of the same manuscript will vary materially, according to the nature of the subject. For instance, in a novel, a part given up to broken or short conversa-

tion will carry more words to a page than a similar amount of longer worded description. The words having been counted, the next proceeding is to decide on the type and type page.

While in the selection of type there are many fonts from which to choose, most of them, except for the more ornamental styles often used for booklets and special gift books, narrow themselves down to adaptations of three or four faces, their variations being due to peculiarities in the cut of the letters belonging to one or the other of these few standard styles. Some of these adaptations will get more letters on a line of a given length, and some less, than others set in the same size of type. In addition to the changes of types the manufacturing man is allowed some leeway by the "leading," or blanks between the lines of type. Having decided whether the book is to be of approximately the size known by the book-buying public as "octavo" or "12mo," or some such designation, it is his work to settle upon a type and type page which will not run the book to such a length as to make its publishing too expensive, or, on the other hand, to make a book so small that the buyer will feel that he is not getting the worth of his money. In all of this he is bound down by the fact that his type page, whatever it is, must not be laid out contrary to certain proportions which the good taste of the past has made definite. After getting these matters worked out he sends the manuscript to the printer with instructions for a sample page to be set to confirm him in his deci-

sion, and often with a request to the printer to count the words and verify his estimate of the number of pages. Very often this sample page must be juggled, a line added, a fraction of an inch taken off, a page number put at the foot, a running head changed in style, or even an entirely new start made on an entirely different basis before an O. K. can be given. It might be said here that unless a manuscript offers unusual features a publisher does not necessarily ask the printer for an estimate of cost, for the manufacturing man has a schedule of the printer's prices and can figure this out for himself as closely as the printer himself could do it.

The sample page having finally been approved, the order is given to begin the work, the printer is told how many proofs will be required and where they are to be sent, and the last details about any irregularities to be met in the work are put in his hands. The printer starts his compositors to work, or, if the book is to be set by machine, arranges for the machines and operators who are to begin the composition, and the kind of progress that can be seen commences. Then follows the period of proofs and proof reading. The first proof, which is a galley proof, or one "pulled" (printed) on long slips of paper without any division into pages, is read and corrected several times before it leaves the printer's hands and is then read and marked for correction by the author and by some of the publisher's editorial force before its return to the printer. If the corrections required are many, it is customary to have

further galley proofs, or "galley revises," sent out, so that the changes may be reduced to a minimum before the matter is made up into pages, when all corrections are apt to be more expensive to the publisher or author than if made in the galleys. Then, all the palpable errors having been corrected, and all the additions and excisions made which have up to that time been discovered by the author, the type is put into page form, the running heads and the page numbers added, and the proper sinkage allowed for the beginnings of chapters. More proofs follow, and perhaps page revises, before the final word is given that everything is correct and that electrotypes of the pages may now be made. Even then a plate proof is often required and oftentimes late corrections are sent to be made in the plates themselves — an expensive proceeding, and one avoided whenever possible.

A word should here be said about this matter of corrections, for there is probably no one thing which causes as much friction between the author and the publisher, and the publisher and printer, as alterations from copy. The author, when he sees his work in type, naturally sees many things which escaped his notice in manuscript form. Moreover, there are often new developments of his subject or suggestions from friends brought to his notice, all of which he is anxious to include in his first edition. He cannot understand why just a few words added here or a line taken out there should, when repeated now and then, make such a seemingly excessive

bill of errors. Such changes, however, which appear to him to be very slight, and which are so judging by their length, may require the changing of words and spaces throughout several lines, or, after paging, the re-adjustment of a number of pages. All of this takes a compositor's time, the printer has to pay the compositor for this time, and at the end of the work a considerable bill is rendered. If the author or editor will only remember that where a word or a sentence is taken out, another word or sentence as near the same length as possible should be inserted whenever it can be done, or if he can cut out enough old matter to allow space for new he may wish to add, much wear and tear of feelings might be saved.

The making of the electrotype plates, although an intensely interesting process, need not be taken up in this article. It is enough to say of it that the type is pressed in page form into a waxen mold, that the mold is placed in a bath having copper in solution, that this copper is deposited on the mold by an electric current and chemical action, taking an exact impression of it, and that this copper shell, when backed with metal and trimmed to the required size, is ready for the printing press.

All this time, while the proofs are going back and forth, while the corrections are being made, and while the electrotypes are being produced, the manufacturing man is busily arranging the later details of the book. He is ordering the paper, seeing that it is delivered in time,

arranging with the artist for illustrations if the book is to be embellished in that way, deciding upon the cover decoration and the binding, and perhaps even getting out partially finished books showing the binding and a few pages of printed matter from which the salesmen can take orders.

As soon as enough of the book is in type to insure accuracy as to the number of pages, or often merely taking the original estimate as a basis for the order, steps must be taken to have the paper on hand as soon as the electrotyping has been finished. When the size of the edition will permit it, the paper is generally made to order, a process requiring from two weeks up, according to the amount of business the paper mills are handling at the time. If the edition is small, or if such a paper is to be used as may readily be found in the stock regularly carried by a paper dealer, the paper is ordered from this stock, cutting it down to the proper size if the sheet required is smaller than the sizes ordinarily sold. The manufacturing man must decide upon the quality of the paper to be used, its size, weight and finish, where it is to be obtained, how much is to be paid for it, and how large a quantity is to be used. He must obtain samples from different mills, consider these in relation to the price asked, make his decision and place his order, and then, often the hardest work of all, follow up the paper men incessantly to make sure that it is on the spot when it is wanted. The type page being fixed, he allows for the proper margins, considers whether he

will print eight, sixteen, thirty-two or sixty-four pages at one impression, and then figures the quantity by a scale which allows enough extra sheets for spoilage in the printing and binding. While all of this work may sound as a simple proposition, it is often far from that, for the paper must be chosen with some regard for the face of type which is to be used upon it, and it must very often be selected with a view toward making a too fat book thin and easy to hold, or toward padding out a small, insignificant book into something worth while to a prospective purchaser.

While the proofs are shuttling back and forth and while the paper is being made, it is also time for the supervisor of the work to be closing in any of the illustrative and decorative portions of the book. If cuts are to print with the text, the drawings and the cuts must be made in advance, in order not to hold back the paging; if, however, the cuts are to print separately and are to be pasted in by the binder, the work may be carried on while the composition is being done, the manuscript having been given the artist to read in advance of its being sent to the printer, or an early set of proofs sent him, that he may choose the situations that appeal to him for illustration. In a general way it may be said that the illustrative processes are two in number, although these branch out into infinity in their variations, and although there are more than these two and their variations required in special work. The two in question, used in the general run of books sold at retail, are the

line cut, or zinc etching, made from line drawings and drawings with solid blacks and whites, and the half tone, made from photographs and wash drawings. Both of these cuts, or engravings, are made by photography and chemical action, both may be reduced, or even enlarged to a certain degree, to any size proportional to the original subject, and both may be printed at the same time as the text pages, except for the fact that the finish of the paper must be adapted to the cuts. The line cut may be used on any paper whose surface is smooth enough to print without breaking the printed line, but the half tone, on account of its delicacy of line, may be used only on a coated paper or a paper of high finish. The printing of colored illustrations is simply the adaptation of one or the other of these two processes, breaking up the colors of a picture in such a way as to produce practically any of the colors of the spectrum — a complete art in itself and often carried out by printers who do no other kind of work, or else the arbitrary division of a picture into two or three colors and the printing of portions in each color, without regard to the fact that the combination of two certain colors will produce a third. Unless a book is so filled with cuts as to require a highly finished or a coated paper throughout, it is customary to print the cuts separately from the text.

Another of the artistic features to be looked after before the presswork has been completed is the designing of the cover and the making of the brass dies from which the binder stamps the design on the outside of

the book. The artist to whom is delegated the work of making the cover design submits a scheme in its colors, usually painted on cloth or paper of the color suggested for use, so that an idea may be had of the general effect and a tentative estimate made of the cost. In general, the artist is held down to as few colors as possible, and is restricted in the use of gold and silver, on account of the extra cost of dies and stamping in the former case, and of precious gold and silver leaf in the latter. When the design is finally accepted it is given into the hands of the manufacturing man, who, determining the size of the cover and the thickness of the book, passes it along to the die cutter in order that the design or lettering may be cut in hard brass, from which any quantity of covers may be stamped or printed without showing any evidence of wear on the part of the die itself. Of late the cover inset has come into much vogue, this inset being generally an illustration printed on paper in one or more colors and pasted on the cover in relation to some part of the stamped design, thus giving an added attraction to the cover and making it more in keeping with the book, while at the same time holding down the cost.

Let us consider, then, that the electrotype plates are now ready for the press and that the paper is in the printer's hands. The book is ready to be printed. The publisher therefore tells the printer how large an edition he requires and the signal is given to begin the printing. Any one unacquainted with the work and going into a

pressroom for the first time must be struck by the large number of presses seemingly lying idle when he has been given to understand that a pressroom is always a scene of whirring activity. This seeming quiet is on account of what is known as the "make ready" — the principal cause for expense in printing and the work which brings out the pressman's art and skill. This is the labor required to get the eight, or sixteen, or thirty-two, or sixty-four pages ready to be printed. The pressman lays out his form on the bed of his press, using a large block upon which the electrotypes may be placed and fastened, or else a number of small blocks, one to a page, arranged in their proper positions by wooden or metal strips laid between the blocks — "furniture," as these are called. As type matter or plates can never be absolutely even on the top, it is necessary for the pressman to build up the low spots and cut down the impression where it is too black. After placing the form on press, therefore, he runs a trial sheet of paper through the press, from which he is able to know where in the form his work of evening the impression is required. Then he starts this work, which is known as the "make ready," a labor which may require an hour or even two or three days, according to the character of the form or the quality of the work desired. Pieces of thin paper are pasted on the cylinder of the press in such positions as to touch certain spots in the form at the point where the cylinder carrying the sheet of paper to be printed meets the plates, thus increasing the strength of the impression at

that point, while other pieces are cut in the right size and shape and pasted under the plate, between it and the block, to gain a similar end. The former method is known as "overlaying" and the latter as "underlaying." This same process is carried out in printing the illustrations, only to a greater degree and generally with more care. When the "make ready" has been finished, the sheets of blank paper are lifted up on the press and fed one by one on to the cylinder, which carries them in its revolution against the plates, after which they are deposited in a pile to be removed, printed again on the other side, counted and packed for shipment to the binder. Similar work to this is carried out for every form of the book until it is all printed, when the scene is shifted to the bindery.

The first step in the binding is the folding of the sheets. While this was generally done in the past by hand by girls working with a flat piece of smooth ivory or similar substance, it is now almost universally executed by ingenious machines which take the sheet of paper, cut it, fold it accurately, insert one folded sheet within another if necessary, and deliver the folded signatures, as each single folded sheet is called, ready for the next process. These signatures are next "gathered," either by hand or machinery, in the order in which they are to appear in the finished book, and they are then "collated," that is, verified, the collator making sure that all signatures are arranged in proper order and that none is missing. They are then sent to the

sewing machines, which stitch the signatures together in one continuous row, making no division between the volumes, which have to be cut apart by hand. If the books are to have gilt tops it is here that this work comes in, the gilder placing a number of books in his press, squeezing them up very tightly, with the edge to be gilded uppermost, scraping this edge very smooth, painting on it a thin albumen size, and then laying on the thin gold leaf, which is burnished down to smooth brilliancy by a tool worked by the hand of the gilder. The sewed and gilded book then moves along to be rounded and backed; that is, to be given the circular effect shown on the back of the book and to have the edge of the back, where the sewing is, forced out by pressure to make a groove in which the covers may have play. A piece of coarse, tough cloth, reënforced by a pasted strip of paper, is glued on the back, the edges of the cloth overhanging the edges by an inch or so on each side, a flexible glue is smeared on the back to strengthen it and to hold the signatures more closely together, and the book is ready for the cover, which in all probability has been made while this other work was going on in order to save time at the end.

Although machines are now generally used for the making of the cover itself, or "case," as it is called in the trade, they have simply adopted the method of the hand worker with more uniformity and speed. The plan of this work begins with the cutting of the stiff pasteboard into pieces of the proper size for each side,

a similar cutting of the book cloth for the entire cover, the gluing of the inner surface of the cloth, the placing of the pieces of board in their proper positions and of a strip of paper down the back, and the turning over of the edges of the cloth upon the board to give a finished edge and strengthen the case. The case then goes to the stamper, who places the brass dies the publisher has supplied for the lettering and the design on a metal block, inks them with colored ink, or, if gold or some other foil is to be used, has this foil stuck on with a size to the cover, and prints the design or lettering on it with his stamping press. If foil is used the dies are hot stamped against the foil, and the waste foil which has not received the impression is rubbed off, collected and remelted. The book is then fitted into the case or cover, the blank pages at each end of the book which have been pasted on for this purpose are pasted back on the cover, and the book is finished. These pasted leaves, together with the reënforcing cloth, are all that hold the book to the cover in ordinary "edition work," as this style of binding is called, but that they are sufficient for all customary use is shown by the amount of hard usage one of these volumes will stand.

The books are now placed in a press and subjected to heavy pressure for a day or a night or more in order to set the mold, as one might say, and give them a proper chance to dry, after which they are packed in cases and shipped away to the market. In the selling of the

product another department of the publishing house begins its work, while the manufacturing man gives a sigh of relief, comments perhaps to himself, perhaps to the printer or binder, on some details which had not worked out in just the way he had intended, and devotes his attention to the finishing of the next book on the publication list.

A SIMPLE EXPLANATION OF WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY[1]

A. E. Kennelly

Wireless telegraphy is one of the most recent wonders of our wonder-revealing age. The public has not yet had time to grasp the principles of this latest achievement. It is commonly supposed that the subject of wireless telegraphy is too intricate for any one except a specially trained scientist to grasp. Nevertheless, the fundamental principles of wireless telegraphy are simple, and may be readily apprehended by all who are interested in this fascinating inquiry, however abstruse and difficult the details may be.

Wireless telegraphy employs electric waves which are invisible to the eye, but which run over the surface of the sea and land at an immense speed.

A fair analogy to wireless telegraph waves is presented, on a small scale, in the waves artificially created on the surface of a pond by throwing in a stone. We are all familiar with the series of events following the fall of a stone into the middle of a previously smooth sheet of water. First we have a big disturbance or splash where the stone falls. Then we see one or more ring waves spreading out in all directions from the

[1] Reprinted by permission from *The Independent*.

splash over the surface of the pond. These waves continue to advance radially in every direction — north, south, east and west — at a steady rate, and if attentively watched they may be seen to go on, getting fainter and weaker as they run, until finally they strike the banks of the pond, or any prominent obstacle, such as a stake stuck in the mud and projecting above the water. Where the wave strikes either one of the banks, or the stake, it raises a little splash or disturbance of the water. This little splash, on the arrival of the wave, is much feebler than the original splash due to the impact of the stone in falling on the water, because the wave spreads out into such a long contour that only a small portion of the original disturbance can be imparted to an obstacle in its path. In fact, if the pond is sufficiently large, the wave may be so feeble by the time that it approaches the banks that no splash on arrival can be discerned. In other words, if the wave on reaching the bank is to be capable of producing a discernible disturbance, it must have an appreciable strength and not be reduced by expansion to microscopic dimensions.

From the standpoint of wireless telegraphy, the impact splash of the falling stone corresponds to an electric signal sent out from the mast of a sending station, and the faint little splash on the arrival of the wave at a bank, or an obstacle, corresponds to the faint electric disturbance or signal detected at a distant receiving station as soon as the electric wave arrives there.

If we suppose that two boats are quietly anchored in the pond at a suitable distance apart, it might be feasible for a man in one boat to send signals to a friend in the other by striking a succession of short and long blows on the water, in conformity with the telegraph Morse alphabet. The letter *a* would be formed by a short blow followed by a long one, the letter *b* by a long blow followed by three short ones, and so on. Each blow on the water at the sending boat would send out a new wave in all directions over the pond, and the letters of the message would lie in successive expanding rings on the surface of the water. The man in the receiving boat would intercept these expanding ring waves at some point of their circle. He might be able to watch the little splashes they formed on his anchor chain, or other obstacle, and so might be able to read the message, each letter being received a few seconds later than it was hammered out by the sender. Practically, of course, this plan would have little chance of success, if only because the least ruffle of breeze would prevent the wave signals from being discerned. Moreover, the range of water wave signaling would be very small, even in calm weather.

In the case of pond-wave telegraphy, as above suggested, the waves would be emitted from a sending station by producing there a relatively powerful disturbance of the pond or liquid medium. The disturbances would move off as waves in all directions, with a definite speed. At any point, within the working range,

a receiving station could intercept and perceive the disturbances caused by the waves on their arrival, and could thus spell out messages. The receiving boat might be north, south, east or west of the sending boat, but if its distance away was the same it should be able to decipher the water waves equally well.

Electric wave telegraphy, or wireless telegraphy, operates in a somewhat similar way. Instead of using water waves it uses electric waves traveling through the ether over the earth's surface. The electric splash or disturbance is created at the sending station by the sudden electric charge or discharge of a wire or wires on a tall mast, while the expanding waves, being invisible, have to be detected by a delicate electric responsive device connected to a tall receiving mast placed at any point within the working range. The advancing electric waves strike the receiving mast and produce feeble electric splashes, or disturbances, in the wire or wires suspended there.

It is necessary to regard the wireless telegraphy waves as running through the ether, rather than through the air, even though they appear to be carried by the air. If the waves were carried by the air, they would be sound waves, which have quite different properties, and which, moreover, are only capable of being detected ordinarily at relatively short distances. There is every reason to believe that if the air which surrounds the globe could somehow be completely removed, so as to leave only so-called empty space on its surface, the

electric waves would still be able to run over it, substantially as they do now with the air present. It is universally admitted that so-called empty space, or interstellar space, must be occupied by something invisible, which is called the ether, and which transmits light, heat and electric disturbances generally. This ether permeates all matter, and the atmosphere is permeated by it. Consequently, the wireless telegraph waves run through the atmosphere, but are borne by the underlying invisible ether.

Those who have witnessed that magnificent spectacle, a total eclipse of the sun, from a favorably placed viewpoint, say the top of a mountain, will remember that as the sun's disk becomes obscured gradually by the moon, the sunlight on the landscape steadily dwindled, but without any sudden changes, until the first instant of totality, when the sun was completely hidden behind the moon. The observer watching for this moment discerns a black shadow on the horizon, like a dark veil or curtain, spreading from earth to sky and running toward him at great speed. The wall of shadow sweeps over the landscape in a stealthy, majestic rush and passes by the observer, leaving him in the semi-obscurity of the total eclipse. This is perhaps the nearest approach that nature gives to our senses of the phenomenon of electric wave movement. It conveys only a weak image of that phenomenon, because the speed of the moon's shadow, which the eye sees running over the landscape, is only a few thousand miles per hour, while

the speed of the electric waves is known with practical certainty to be almost the same as that of light in free space, *i.e.*, 186,000 miles per second, or sufficient to run seven and one half times round the world in one second by the clock.

If, however, we assume that our eyes could see an electric wave of wireless telegraphy running over the earth, just as we actually see the waves running over a pond, or the shadow of a cloud running over a landscape, we should expect to see a hemispherical wave thrown out from the sending mast every time an electric spark discharge was produced there. The hemisphere would cover the land like an inverted bowl, and would expand in all directions like the upper half of a gigantic swelling soap bubble, at the speed of 186,000 miles a second. At the upper portions of the hemisphere, and particularly at the top, the wave would be very thin and weak. It would be denser and stronger in the lower portions, and especially in the lowest portion that spreads over the ground like a ring.

In the celebrated Marienfeld-Zossen railroad experiments, made in Germany a few years ago, the highest attainable train speeds were striven for, and speeds of 120 miles per hour were reached over portions of the road. An observer stationed near the straight track and on the lookout for the car with his unaided eyes would see it coming on the horizon, would watch it approach, pass and vanish on the opposite horizon all within thirty seconds, or half a minute of time. This

assumes that he would lose sight of the car half a mile away from him. But if the speed of a passing wave, instead of being 120 miles an hour, were 670 millions of miles per hour, how small would be our chance of getting a look at the passing wave, even though it reached from the earth to the sky? A twinkling of an eye would be a relatively long and dreary delay in comparison with the time of passage.

By way of example, suppose the sending mast were located in the Brooklyn Navy Yard just off Manhattan Island, and suppose a single spark discharge, or electric splash, were made at this mast, corresponding to a "dot" signal in wireless telegraphy. Immediately we should see, if we possessed the imagined powers of vision, a hemispherical wave rush off from the mast in all directions over the earth. Strictly speaking, there would not be just one wave. A stone thrown into a pond generally produces one principal wave followed immediately by a train of successively smaller waves. So an electric splash, or spark discharge from the sending-mast wire, usually produces a train of waves, of which the first is strongest and the rest are successively weaker. But ignoring this detail, if we confined attention to the first or leading wave, we should expect to see a nearly vertical wall running over the sea and land, north, south, east and west with the speed of light. The wave would, indeed, be made up of two successive walls, say first a "positive" wall and then a "negative" wall, with a clear space between, just as a water wave is made

up of a positive wall, or crest, and then a negative wall, or trough, immediately behind, with a mean-level space between them. The length of the wave would depend upon the height of the sending-mast wire, and with a plain vertical wire, the wave, including both positive and negative walls, would stretch over, or cover, a distance on the ground about four times the height of the wire. Consequently a mast 150 feet high would throw off a wave about 600 feet long, the positive wall being 300 feet thick, and the negative wall also 300 feet thick. In practice, however, coils of wire are included in the discharge path of sending-mast wires, and these artificially increase the virtual height of those wires, so that a 150-foot mast may act as though it were much higher, say even a mile high. In the latter case, the outgoing wave would cover four miles of ground, or its wave length would be four miles.

If we transported ourselves somehow in a flying machine over the earth's surface at the speed of light, Jules Verne's celebrated flying projectile being hopelessly too slow for our imagination in this respect, we could keep up with the outgoing wave and watch what happened to it as it ran. What happens far up above the earth would lie beyond our ken, and we need not attempt to follow the wave upward. But along and near the earth's surface we should expect to see the wave bend over the globe, so as to keep advancing over it like a nearly vertical wall. The wave in its westward progress would be expected, after starting, to reach the

Great Lakes in 1-270th of a second, and the Pacific Coast in the 1-90th of a second. If we followed it in our airship eastward, we should expect to reach Europe in about 1-50th of a second, and the distant shores of the Levant in about 1-35th of a second. If we took our imaginary aerial automobile northward with the wave, we should expect to see the wave pass the north pole in about 1-50th of a second. If, on the other hand, we selected the southerly direction of flight, we should expect to see the wave pass the south pole in about 1-20th of a second.

One naturally inquires how long could the imaginary aerial chase be kept up. If it could be kept going for a single second of time, the wave would have passed New York on the seventh time around the world. The answer is that possibly in theory the chase of an ultra-microscopic ripple might be kept up as long as one pleased, but that, in practice, the waves have not yet been detected at distances exceeding a few thousand miles from their source. The reason is that they weaken so much as they expand. Just as the wave expanding over a pond spreads and weakens until it is rapidly lost to sight, so the wireless telegraph waves, being spread over such immense distances, become diluted to inappreciable residuals. Not only do they suffer in intensity by spreading over a continually widening area, but they are also weakened by absorption into the surface of the ground. If the ground were a perfect electric conductor, the electric waves, or the vertical walls that

our imagination depicts them, would skim over the ground or ocean without being absorbed therein. But the earth's superficial layers are far from being a perfect conductor, and so the earth is always swallowing up or absorbing the wave, to some extent, at the ground surface, and the upper portions of the wave feed down energy into the lower portions to try to make good the defect as the wave runs along; but the result is to make the wave disappear so much the sooner. The salt water ocean conducts electrically much better than the dry land and also presents a smoother general contour. On this account wireless telegraph signals can ordinarily be detected much farther over the sea than over the land. For a given electric splashing power, or discharging disturbance power, at the sending mast, there is a certain range over the sea and over the land at which high receiving masts can pick up the disturbance of the passing waves and make them appreciable to our senses by the aid of a very delicate electric apparatus. The bigger the sending splashing, the higher the masts at both sending and receiving stations, and the more delicate the electric receiving apparatus, the greater is this range. At present the range extends right across the Atlantic Ocean.

Wherever a vertical wire is placed in the path of an electric wave an electric disturbance will be created up and down this wire during the passage of the wave, and this disturbance, if strong enough, can act on suitable electric apparatus so as to register a signal. A

single wave may pass by a mast in, say, one millionth of a second, according to the length of the wave. But this brief disturbance suffices. In sending a wireless message, every dot and dash involves a succession of waves, or an individual wave train. This train is short for a dot and long for a dash. Dots and dashes, in proper sequence, spell out the message.

What is the nature of the wave, or of these vertical walls, that we imagine to fly across the landscape at such an enormous speed? If we carried our imaginary aerial automobile into one, so as to travel in the wall and examine it leisurely before it dwindled away to insignificant remains, we should expect to find that in the advancing wave there was a feeble vertical electric force, so that an electrically charged pithball suspended from the aerial automobile would be attracted either vertically upward or downward, according as we examined the positive or negative wall. Moreover, there would be an accompanying feeble horizontal magnetic force, so that a delicately poised compass needle on board our flying car would be deflected either to the right or to the left, according to whether we traveled in the positive or negative wall. Such are the warp and the woof of the electro-magnetic fabric which constitutes these waves. They are not tissued of matter, but of electricity and of magnetism.

But how are we to distinguish at any receiving station between waves coming simultaneously from New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Chicago, San Francisco, London,

Paris, Vienna, Bombay and Pekin without invidious disregard of other places and ships at sea? The more remote places take care of themselves at present, because their waves are too feeble and exhausted to reach us. The nearer places might well conflict, but by tuning the apparatus at our receiving mast to respond only to waves say 500 yards long, all waves save those of the particular station or stations which emit that length of wave will not be audible. Besides, there are other modes of securing artificial selection of signals, otherwise a modern tower of Babel would be erected in the circumambient air.

Manifestly, wireless telegraphy is destined to become a great civilizing and socializing agency, because the firmament of the world is the common property of all nations, and those who use it for signaling inhabit it, in a certain sense. When all nations come to inhabit the firmament collectively they will be brought into closer communion for their mutual advantage. A new upper geography dawns upon us, in which there is no more sea, neither are there any boundaries between the peoples.

Now that wireless telegraphy has entered the commercial field of transoceanic telegraphy, it becomes of interest to inquire whether it is likely to supplant the submarine telegraph cables, some 250,000 miles of which engirdle the oceans of the world. Wireless telegraphy has an undisputed territory on the ocean in maintaining telegraph communication with mov-

ing vessels, where submarine cables cannot reach them. Now wireless telegraphy proposes to compete with cables for messages from continent to continent. It may be safely said that, up to the present time, wireless telegraphy has helped the ocean cables, by bringing messages to them from ships at sea, much more than it has hurt them by robbing them of messages. If wireless telegraphy were to remain stationary, and make no further technical progress, it is very doubtful whether, with its present capabilities, it could reduce materially the traffic over submarine cables. On the other hand, however, wireless telegraphy is still very young, and its limitations have by no means been determined. It is, therefore, conceivable that at some distant date it may attain such a degree of development as to render ocean cables no longer necessary.

ARTIST AND MORALIST[1]

James Russell Lowell

We may admit, with proper limitations, the modern distinction between the Artist and the Moralist. With the one, Form is all in all, with the other Tendency. The aim of the one is to delight, of the other to convince. The one is master of his purpose, the other mastered by it. The whole range of perception and thought is valuable to the one as it will minister to imagination; to the other only as it is available for argument. With the moralist use is beauty, good only as it serves an ulterior purpose; with the artist beauty is use, good in and for itself. In the fine arts the vehicle makes part of the thought, coalesces with it. The living conception shapes itself a body in marble, color, or modulated sound, and henceforth the two are inseparable. The results of the moralist pass into the intellectual atmosphere of mankind, it matters little by what mode of conveyance. But where, as in Dante, the religious sentiment and the imagination are both organic, something interfused with the whole being of the man, so that they work in kindly sympathy, the moral will insensibly suffuse

[1] Reprinted by permission from "Literary Essays." Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

itself with beauty as a cloud with light. Then that fine sense of remote analogies, awake to the assonance between facts seemingly remote and unrelated, between the outward and inward worlds, though convinced that the things of this life are shadows, will be persuaded also that they are not fantastic merely, but imply a substance somewhere, and will love to set forth the beauty of the visible image because it suggests the ineffably higher charm of the unseen original.

RELIGION AND MORALITY[1]

George Herbert Palmer

These considerations seem to show that however close the two fields are, religion and morality, they are still distinct. But I feel that here, far more than in any preceding case, it is difficult to mark the separation. As a fact, we have seen they differ. Why, and in what respects, we must now try to discover.

The points of difference come out most obviously when we set a great religious cry side by side with a great moral one; and by a cry I mean the utterance of a distressed and aspiring soul yearning for moral or religious power. Take, for example, the cry of the Psalmist, "Against Thee, Thee only, have I sinned!" and the cry of Wordsworth in the "Ode to Duty," "Oh, let my weakness have an end!" The two refer to the same matter. Each person feels his imperfection. Each mourns a departure from righteousness. In each a finite person is recognized as connected with what is infinite, a connection felt to be not accidental but essential. As we have already seen, neither in religion nor morality can the finite detach itself from the infinite. In both cases the

[1] Reprinted by permission from "The Field of Ethics." Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

finite person, perceiving his imperfection, seeks refuge in the perfect one.

But if the substance of the two cries is the same, if they refer to similar spiritual conditions, wherein do they differ? The point of view is different, that is all. While each expresses the essential union of the finite or imperfect being with the infinite or perfect one, yet in the religious case the stand is taken at the point of view of the perfect one; while the moral man looks at it from the opposite end, the point of view of the imperfect one. To the mind of the Psalmist the horror of his sin consists in this, that he — the little imperfect creature — has attempted a blow against the all-perfect One. He cannot think of his sin as damaging his brother man, nor even as damaging himself. He himself, his fellow-men, all imperfect existences, are beings of no account. The only being of worth whom he contemplates is the Most High. And the sin is wrought against Him. He, the one being of worth, has been by the Psalmist's deed declared unworthy. That is the shocking thing, that he has raised his imperfect hand against perfection.

Plainly there is nothing of this in the cry of Wordsworth. On the contrary, he is conceiving of himself as so important as to require additional strength. "Oh, let my weakness have an end!" The being in whom he is specially interested is himself, the imperfect one, the finite. He longs to have a full con-

nection established between himself and the perfect one not for the sake of the perfect, but of himself, the imperfect. No less than the Psalmist he recognizes the need of being interlocked with the eternal. But he starts from his own side. His view is manward; the religious view is Godward. There is, accordingly, a sharp contrast while each still acknowledges the same two elements essentially conjoined. Neither finds one of these elements of any account parted from the other. But the conjunction is reckoned of consequence by the religious mind because of the Most High; by the moral mind, because of us struggling, needy, imperfect, finite creatures. And this contrast is fundamental. Everywhere the religious soul seeks after God as all in all. We are of no consequence. "What is man, that Thou art mindful of him?" To lose ourselves in Him, to abolish separation, this has been the aspiration of religion in every age and under every type of religious belief. It is that ὁμοίωσις τῷ θεῷ, or absorption into God, for which Plato and the mystics long.

"VALUE"[1]

Arthur Twining Hadley

The word "value" is used in a number of wholly different meanings, but this idea of a permanent standard or cause of price, as distinguished from a temporary or accidental phenomenon, lies at the basis of them all. Sometimes value is used in the sense of utility — for instance, when I say that an article has a value to me out of all proportion to the amount for which I could sell it. Sometimes it means purchasing power in the abstract, as distinct from concrete measures of this power; for instance, when I say that an article has value, though I do not know just what its price may be. Sometimes it means purchasing power measured in commodities instead of in money. In countries with a paper currency there is frequent occasion for using the word in this sense. If the currency is doubled by act of the legislature, the prices of goods measured in this currency will tend to double also; but we are justified in saying that there is no increase of real value corresponding to this change in nominal price. Sometimes the term "value" means average probable price. If I say that a certain rail-

[1] Reprinted by permission from "Economics." Copyright, 1896, by G. P. Putnam's Sons.

road stock is selling below its true value, I simply mean that in the long run it is, in my opinion, likely to command a higher price than it does now. Finally, the word "value" often means a *proper and legitimate* price, as distinct from an unfair or extortionate one. The last is much the commonest and most important sense of the word in commercial usage, and there seems to be no good reason against our adopting it. In this sense, the substantive value corresponds exactly to the adjective worth. If we say that a man is charging a higher price for an article than it is worth, we mean that he is putting the buyer on an unfair disadvantage.

The price of an article or service, in the ordinary commercial sense, is the amount of money which is paid, asked, or offered for it. The value of an article or service is the amount of money which may properly be paid, asked, or offered for it. A theory of price puts us in a position to explain the transactions of commercial life. A theory of value undertakes to pass judgment upon their advisability or their morality.

PATHOS[1]

Coventry Patmore

Neither Aristotle nor Hegel, the two great expositors of the relation of the emotions to art, has discussed the nature of that which is understood by moderns as "pathos." Aristotle has described in his "Rhetoric," with the greatest acuteness and sensibility, the conditions and modes of exciting pity. But pity includes much that is excluded by pathos; and it may be useful to endeavor to ascertain what the limitations of the latter are, and what are its conditions in relation more particularly to art, in which it plays so important a part.

Pity, then, differs from pathos in this: the latter is simply emotional, and reaches no higher than the sensitive nature; though the sensitive nature, being dependent for its power and delicacy very much upon the cultivation of will and intellect, may be indefinitely developed by these active factors of the soul. Pity is helpful, and is not deadened or repelled by circumstances which disgust the simply sensitive nature; and its ardor so far consumes such obstacles to merely emotional sympathy, that the person who truly pities

[1] Reprinted from "Principle in Art." London, George Bell & Sons.

finds the field of pathos extended far beyond the ordinary limits of the dainty passion which gives tears to the eyes of the selfish as well as the self-sacrificing. In an ideally perfect nature, indeed, pity and pathos, which is the feeling of pity, would be coextensive; and the latter would demand for its condition the existence of the former, with some ground of actual reality to work beneficially upon. On the other hand, entire selfishness would destroy even the faintest capacity for discerning pathos in art or circumstance. In the great mass of men and women there is sufficient virtue of pity — pity that would act if it had the opportunity — to extend in them the *feeling* of pity, that is, pathos, to a far larger range of circumstances than their active virtue would be competent to encounter, even if it had the chance.

Suffering is of itself enough to stir pity; for absolute wickedness, with the torment of which all wholesome minds would be quite content, cannot be certainly predicated of any individual sufferer; but pathos, whether in a drawing-room tale of delicate distress or in a tragedy of Æschylus or Shakespeare, requires that some obvious goodness, or beauty, or innocence, or heroism should be the subject of suffering, and that the circumstance or narration of it should have certain conditions of repose, contrast, and form. The range of pathos is immense, extending from the immolation of an Isaac or an Iphigenia to the death of a kitten that purrs and licks the hand

about to drown it. Next to the fact of goodness, beauty, innocence, or heroism in the sufferer, contrast is the chief factor in artistic pathos. The celestial sadness of Desdemona's death is immensely heightened by the black shadow of Iago; and perhaps the most intense touch of pathos in all history is that of Gordon murdered at Khartoum, while his betrayer occupies himself, between the acts of a comedy at the Criterion, in devising how best he may excuse his presence there by denying that he was aware of the *contretemps* or by representing his news of it as non-official. The singer of Fair Rosamond's sorrows knew the value of contrast when he sang: —

> Hard was the heart that gave the blow,
> Soft were the lips that bled.

Every one knows how irresistible are a pretty woman's tears.

> Nought is there under heav'n's wide hollowness
> That moves more dear compassion of mind
> Than beauty brought to unworthy wretchedness.

It is partly the contrast of beauty, which is the natural appanage of happiness, that renders her tears so pathetic; but it is still more the way in which she is given to smiling through them. The author of the "Rhetoric" shows his usual incomparable subtilty of observation when he notes that a little good coming upon or in the midst of extremity of evil is a source of the sharpest pathos; and when the shaft of a passionate female sorrow is feathered with beauty and

pointed with a smile, there is no heart that can refuse her her will. In absolute and uncontrolled suffering there is no pathos. Nothing in the "Inferno" has this quality except the passage of Paolo and Francesca, still embracing, through the fiery drift. It is the embrace that makes the pathos, "tempering extremities with extreme sweet," or at least with the memory of it. Our present sorrows generally owe their grace of pathos to their "crown," which is "remembering happier things." No one weeps in sympathy with the "base self-pitying tears" of Thersites, or with those of any whose grief is without some contrasting dignity of curb. Even a little child does not move us by its sorrow, when expressed by tears and cries, a tenth part so much as by the quivering lip of attempted self-control. A great and present evil, coupled with a distant and uncertain hope, is also a source of pathos; if indeed it be not the same with that which Aristotle describes as arising from the sequence of exceeding ill and a little good. There is pathos in a departing pleasure, however small. It is the fact of sunset, not its colors — which are the same as those of sunrise — that constitutes its sadness; and in mere darkness there may be fear and distress, but not pathos. There are few things so pathetic in literature as the story of the supper which Amelia, in Fielding's novel, had prepared for her husband, and to which he did not come, and that of Colonel Newcome becoming a Charterhouse pensioner. In each of these cases, the pathos

arises wholly from the contrast of noble reticence with a sorrow which has no direct expression. The same necessity for contrast renders reconciliations far more pathetic than quarrels, and the march to battle of an army to the sound of cheerful military music more able to draw tears than the spectacle of the battle itself.

The soul of pathos, like that of wit, is brevity. Very few writers are sufficiently aware of this. Humor is cumulative and diffusive, as Shakespeare, Rabelais, and Dickens well knew; but how many a good piece of pathos has been spoiled by the historian of Little Nell by an attempt to make too much of it! A drop of citric acid will give poignancy to a feast; but a draught of it —! Hence it is doubtful whether an English eye ever shed a tear over the "Vita Nuova," whatever an Italian may have done. Next to the patient endurance of heroism, the bewilderment of weakness is the most fruitful source of pathos. Hence the exquisitely touching points in "A Pair of Blue Eyes," "Two on a Tower," "The Trumpet-Major," and other of Hardy's novels.

Pathos is the luxury of grief, and when it ceases to be other than a keen-edged pleasure it ceases to be pathos. Hence Tennyson's question in "Love and Duty," "Shall sharpest pathos blight us?" involves a misunderstanding of the word; although his understanding of the thing is well proved by such lyrics as "Tears, idle tears," and "O well for the fisherman's boy." Pleasure and beauty — which may be

said to be pleasure visible — are without their highest perfection if they are without a touch of pathos. This touch, indeed, accrues naturally to profound pleasure and to great beauty by the mere fact of the incongruity of their earthly surroundings and the sense of isolation, peril, and impermanence caused thereby. It is a doctrine of that inexhaustible and (except by Dante) almost unworked mine of poetry, Catholic theology, that the felicity of the angels and glorified saints and of God Himself would not be perfect without the edge of pathos, which it receives from the fall and reconciliation of man. Hence, on Holy Saturday the Church exclaims, "O felix culpa!" and hence "there is more joy in heaven over one sinner that repenteth than over ninety and nine righteous who need no repentance." Sin, says St. Augustine, is the necessary shadow of heaven; and pardon, says some other, is the highest light of its beatitude.

THE SOCIAL VALUE OF THE COLLEGE-BRED[1]

WILLIAM JAMES

OF what use is a college training? We who have had it seldom hear the question raised — we might be a little nonplussed to answer it offhand. A certain amount of meditation has brought me to this as the pithiest reply which I myself can give: The best claim that a college education can possibly make on your respect, the best thing it can aspire to accomplish for you, is this: that it should *help you to know a good man when you see him.* This is as true of women's as of men's colleges; but that it is neither a joke nor a one-sided abstraction I shall now endeavor to show.

What talk do we commonly hear about the contrast between college education and the education which business or technical or professional schools confer? The college education is called higher because it is supposed to be so general and so disinterested. At the "schools" you get a relatively narrow practical skill, you are told, whereas the "colleges" give you the more liberal culture, the broader outlook, the historical perspective, the philosophic atmosphere, or some-

[1] Reprinted by permission from *McClure's Magazine* for February, 1908.

thing which phrases of that sort try to express. You are made into an efficient instrument for doing a definite thing, you hear, at the schools; but, apart from that, you may remain a crude and smoky kind of petroleum, incapable of spreading light. The universities and colleges, on the other hand, although they may leave you less efficient for this or that practical task, suffuse your whole mentality with something more important than skill. They redeem you, make you well-bred; they make "good company" of you mentally. If they find you with a naturally boorish or caddish mind, they cannot leave you so, as a technical school may leave you. This, at least, is pretended; this is what we hear among college-trained people when they compare their education with every other sort. Now, exactly how much does this signify?

It is certain, to begin with, that the narrowest trade or professional training does something more for a man than to make a skillful practical tool of him — it makes him also a judge of other men's skill. Whether his trade be pleading at the bar or surgery or plastering or plumbing, it develops a critical sense in him for that sort of occupation. He understands the difference between second-rate and first-rate work in his whole branch of industry; he gets to know a good job in his own line as soon as he sees it; and getting to know this in his own line, he gets a faint sense of what good work may mean anyhow, that may, if circumstances favor, spread into his judgments elsewhere. Sound

work, clean work, finished work: feeble work, slack work, sham work — these words express an identical contrast in many different departments of activity. In so far forth, then, even the humblest manual trade may beget in one a certain small degree of power to judge of good work generally.

Now, what is supposed to be the line of us who have the higher college training? Is there any broader line — since our education claims primarily not to be "narrow" — in which we also are made good judges between what is first-rate and what is second-rate only? What is especially taught in the colleges has long been known by the name of the "humanities," and these are often identified with Greek and Latin. But it is only as literatures, not as languages, that Greek and Latin have any general humanity-value; so that in a broad sense the humanities mean literature primarily, and in a still broader sense the study of masterpieces in almost any field of human endeavor. Literature keeps the primacy; for it not only *consists* of masterpieces, but is largely *about* masterpieces, being little more than an appreciative chronicle of human master-strokes, so far as it takes the form of criticism and history. You can give humanistic value to almost anything by teaching it historically. Geology, economics, mechanics, are humanities when taught with reference to the successive achievements of the geniuses to which these sciences owe their being. Not taught thus, literature remains grammar, art a

catalogue, history a list of dates, and natural science a sheet of formulas and weights and measures.

The sifting of human creations! — nothing less than this is what we ought to mean by the humanities. Essentially this means biography; what our colleges should teach is, therefore, biographical history, not that of politics merely, but of anything and everything so far as human efforts and conquests are factors that have played their part. Studying in this way, we learn what types of activity have stood the test of time; we acquire standards of the excellent and durable. All our arts and sciences and institutions are but so many quests of perfection on the part of men; and when we see how diverse the types of excellence may be, how various the tests, how flexible the adaptations, we gain a richer sense of what the terms "better" and "worse" may signify in general. Our critical sensibilities grow both more acute and less fanatical. We sympathize with men's mistakes even in the act of penetrating them; we feel the pathos of lost causes and misguided epochs even while we applaud what overcame them.

Such words are vague and such ideas are inadequate, but their meaning is unmistakable. What the colleges — teaching humanities by examples which may be special, but which must be typical and pregnant — should at least try to give us, is a general sense of what, under various disguises, *superiority* has always signified and may still signify. The feeling

for a good human job anywhere, the admiration of the really admirable, the disesteem of what is cheap and trashy and impermanent — this is what we call the critical sense, the sense for ideal values. It is the better part of what men know as wisdom. Some of us are wise in this way naturally and by genius; some of us never become so. But to have spent one's youth at college, in contact with the choice and rare and precious, and yet still to be a blind prig or vulgarian, unable to scent out human excellence or to divine it amid its accidents, to know it only when ticketed and labeled and forced on us by others, this indeed should be accounted the very calamity and shipwreck of a higher education.

The sense for human superiority ought, then, to be considered our line, as boring subways is the engineer's line and the surgeon's is appendicitis. Our colleges ought to have lit up in us a lasting relish for the better kind of man, a loss of appetite for mediocrities, and a disgust for cheapjacks. We ought to smell, as it were, the difference of quality in men and their proposals when we enter the world of affairs about us. Expertness in this might well atone for some of our awkwardness at accounts, for some of our ignorance of dynamos. The best claim we can make for the higher education, the best single phrase in which we can tell what it ought to do for us, is, then, exactly what I said: it should enable us to *know a good man when we see him.*

That the phrase is anything but an empty epigram follows from the fact that if you ask in what line it is most important that a democracy like ours should have its sons and daughters skillful, you see that it is this line more than any other. "The people in their wisdom" — this is the kind of wisdom most needed by the people. Democracy is on its trial, and no one knows how it will stand the ordeal. Abounding about us are pessimistic prophets. Fickleness and violence used to be, but are no longer, the vices which they charge to democracy. What its critics now affirm is that its preferences are inveterately for the inferior. So it was in the beginning, they say, and so it will be world without end. Vulgarity enthroned and institutionalized, elbowing everything superior from the highway, this, they tell us, is our irremediable destiny; and the picture papers of the European continent are already drawing Uncle Sam with the hog instead of the eagle for his heraldic emblem. The privileged aristocracies of the foretime, with all their iniquities, did at least preserve some taste for higher human quality and honor certain forms of refinement by their enduring traditions. But when democracy is sovereign, its doubters say, nobility will form a sort of invisible church, and sincerity and refinement, stripped of honor, precedence, and favor, will have to vegetate on sufferance in private corners. They will have no general influence. They will be harmless eccentricities.

Now, who can be absolutely certain that this may not be the career of democracy? Nothing future is quite secure; states enough have inwardly rotted; and democracy as a whole may undergo self-poisoning. But, on the other hand, democracy is a kind of religion, and we are bound not to admit its failure. Faiths and utopias are the noblest exercise of human reason, and no one with a spark of reason in him will sit down fatalistically before the croaker's picture. The best of us are filled with the contrary vision of a democracy stumbling through every error till its institutions glow with justice and its customs shine with beauty. Our better men *shall* show the way and we *shall* follow them; so we are brought round again to the mission of the higher education in helping us to know the better kind of man whenever we see him.

The notion that a people can run itself and its affairs anonymously is now well known to be the silliest of absurdities. Mankind does nothing save through initiatives on the part of inventors, great or small, and imitation by the rest of us — these are the sole factors active in human progress. Individuals of genius show the way, and set the patterns, which common people then adopt and follow. *The rivalry of the patterns is the history of the world.* Our democratic problem thus is statable in ultra-simple terms: Who are the kind of men from whom our majorities shall take their cue? Whom shall they treat as rightful leaders? We and our leaders are the x and the y

of the equation here; all other historic circumstances, be they economical, political, or intellectual, are only the background of occasion on which the living drama works itself out between us.

In this very simple way does the value of our educated class define itself: we more than others should be able to divine the worthier and better leaders. The terms here are monstrously simplified, of course, but such a bird's-eye view lets us immediately take our bearings. In our democracy, where everything else is so shifting, we alumni and alumnæ of the colleges are the only permanent presence that corresponds to the aristocracy in older countries. We have continuous traditions, as they have; our motto, too, is *noblesse oblige;* and, unlike them, we stand for ideal interests solely, for we have no corporate selfishness and wield no powers of corruption. We ought to have our own class-consciousness. "Les intellectuels!" What prouder club name could there be than this one, used ironically by the party of "red blood," the party of every stupid prejudice and passion, during the anti-Dreyfus craze, to satirize the men in France who still retained some critical sense and judgment! Critical sense, it has to be confessed, is not an exciting term, hardly a banner to carry in processions. Affections for old habit, currents of self-interest, and gales of passion are the forces that keep the human ship moving; and the pressure of the judicious pilot's hand upon the tiller is a relatively insignificant energy. But the

affections, passions, and interests are shifting, successive, and distraught; they blow in alternation while the pilot's hand is steadfast. He knows the compass, and, with all the leeways he is obliged to tack toward, he always makes some headway. A small force, if it never lets up, will accumulate effects more considerable than those of much greater forces if these work inconsistently. The ceaseless whisper of the more permanent ideals, the steady tug of truth and justice, give them but time, *must* warp the world in their direction.

This bird's-eye view of the general steering function of the college-bred amid the driftings of democracy ought to help us to a wider vision of what our colleges themselves should aim at. If we are to be the yeast cake for democracy's dough, if we are to make it rise with culture's preferences, we must see to it that culture spreads broad sails. We must shake the old double reefs out of the canvas into the wind and sunshine, and let in every modern subject, sure that any subject will prove humanistic, if its setting be kept only wide enough.

Stevenson says somewhere to his reader: "You think you are just making this bargain, but you are really laying down a link in the policy of mankind." Well, your technical school should enable you to make your bargain splendidly; but your college should show you just the place of that kind of bargain — a pretty poor place, possibly — in the whole policy of man-

kind. That is the kind of liberal outlook, of perspective, of atmosphere, which should surround every subject as a college deals with it.

We of the colleges must eradicate a curious notion which numbers of good people have about such ancient seats of learning as Harvard. To many ignorant outsiders, that name suggests little more than a kind of sterilized conceit and incapacity for being pleased. In Edith Wyatt's exquisite book of Chicago sketches called "Every One his Own Way," there is a couple who stand for culture in the sense of exclusiveness, Richard Elliot and his feminine counterpart — feeble caricatures of mankind, unable to know any good thing when they see it, incapable of enjoyment unless a printed label gives them leave. Possibly this type of culture may exist near Cambridge and Boston, there may be specimens there, for priggishness is just like painter's colic or any other trade disease. But every good college makes its students immune against this malady, of which the microbe haunts the neighborhood-printed pages. It does so by its general tone being too hearty for the microbe's life. Real culture lives by sympathies and admirations, not by dislikes and disdains — under all misleading wrappings it pounces unerringly upon the human core. If a college, through the inferior human influences that have grown regnant there, fails to catch the robuster tone, its failure is colossal, for its social function stops: democracy gives it a wide berth, turns toward it a deaf ear.

"Tone," to be sure, is a terribly vague word to use, but there is no other, and this whole meditation is over questions of tone. By their tone are all things human either lost or saved. If democracy is to be saved it must catch the higher, healthier tone. If we are to impress it with our preferences, we ourselves must use the proper tone, which we, in turn, must have caught from our own teachers. It all reverts in the end to the action of innumerable imitative individuals upon each other and to the question of whose tone has the highest spreading power. As a class, we college graduates should look to it that *ours* has spreading power. It ought to have the highest spreading power.

In our essential function of indicating the better men, we now have formidable competitors outside. *McClure's Magazine*, the *American Magazine*, *Collier's Weekly*, and, in its fashion, the *World's Work*, constitute together a real popular university along this very line. It would be a pity if any future historian were to have to write words like these: "By the middle of the twentieth century the higher institutions of learning had lost all influence over public opinion in the United States. But the mission of raising the tone of democracy, which they had proved themselves so lamentably unfitted to exert, was assumed with rare enthusiasm and prosecuted with extraordinary skill and success by a new educational power; and for the clarification of their human sympathies and elevation of their human preferences, the people at

large acquired the habit of resorting exclusively to the guidance of certain private literary adventures, commonly designated in the market by the affectionate name of ten-cent magazines."

Must not we of the colleges see to it that no historian shall ever say anything like this? Vague as the phrase of knowing a good man when you see him may be, diffuse and indefinite as one must leave its application, is there any other formula that describes so well the result at which our institutions *ought* to aim? If they do that, they do the best thing conceivable. If they fail to do it, they fail in very deed. It surely is a fine synthetic formula. If our faculties and graduates could once collectively come to realize it as the great underlying purpose toward which they have always been more or less obscurely groping, great clearness would be shed over many of their problems; and, as for their influence in the midst of our social system, it would embark upon a new career of strength.

A NEW DEFINITION OF THE CULTIVATED MAN[1]

CHARLES WILLIAM ELIOT

To produce the cultivated man, or at least the man capable of becoming cultivated in after life, has long been supposed to be one of the fundamental objects of systematic and thorough education. The ideal of general cultivation has been one of the standards of education. It is often asked: Will the education which a given institution is supplying produce the cultivated man? Or, can cultivation be the result of a given course of study? In such questions there is an implication that the education which does not produce the cultivated man is a failure, or has been misconceived or misdirected. Now if cultivation were an unchanging ideal, the steady use of the conception as a permanent test of educational processes might be justified; but if the cultivated man of to-day is, or ought to be, a distinctly different creature from the cultivated man of a century ago, the ideal of cultivation cannot be appealed to as a standard without preliminary explanations and interpretations. It is the object of

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this paper to show that the idea of cultivation in the highly trained human being has undergone substantial changes during the nineteenth century.

I ought to say at once that I propose to use the term "cultivated man" in only its good sense — in Emerson's sense. In this paper he is not to be a weak, critical, fastidious creature, vain of a little exclusive information or of an uncommon knack in Latin verse or mathematical logic: he is to be a man of quick perceptions, broad sympathies, and wide affinities, responsive but independent, self-reliant but deferential, loving truth and candor but also moderation and proportion, courageous but gentle, not finished but perfecting. All authorities agree that true culture is not exclusive, sectarian, or partisan, but the very opposite; that it is not to be attained in solitude, but in society; and that the best atmosphere for culture is that of a school, university, academy, or church, where many pursue together the ideals of truth, righteousness, and love.

Here some one may think this process of cultivation is evidently a long, slow, artificial process. I prefer the genius, the man of native power or skill, the man whose judgment is sound and influence strong, though he cannot read or write — the born inventor, orator, or poet. So do we all. Men have always reverenced prodigious inborn gifts, and always will. Indeed, barbarous men always say of the possessors of such gifts — these are not men; they are gods. But we teachers,

who carry on a system of popular education, which is by far the most complex and valuable invention of the nineteenth century, know that we have to do, not with the highly gifted units, but with the millions who are more or less capable of being cultivated by the long, patient, artificial training called education. For us and our system the genius is no standard, but the cultivated man is. To his stature we and many of our pupils may in time attain.

There are two principal differences between the present ideal and that which prevailed at the beginning of the nineteenth century. All thinkers agree that the horizon of the human intellect has widened wonderfully during the past hundred years, and that the scientific method of inquiry, which was known to but very few when the nineteenth century began, has been the means of that widening. This method has become indispensable in all fields of inquiry, including psychology, philanthropy, and religion, and, therefore, intimate acquaintance with it has become an indispensable element in culture. As Matthew Arnold pointed out more than a generation ago, educated mankind is governed by two passions — one the passion for pure knowledge, the other the passion for being of service or doing good. Now, the passion for pure knowledge is only to be gratified through the scientific method of inquiry. In Arnold's phrases, the first step for every aspirant to culture is to endeavor to see things as they are, or "to learn, in short,

the Will of God." The second step is to make that Will prevail, each in his own sphere of action and influence. This recognition of science as pure knowledge, and of the scientific method as the universal method of inquiry, is the great addition made by the nineteenth century to the idea of culture. I need not say that within that century what we call science, pure and applied, has transformed the world as the scene of the human drama; and that it is this transformation which has compelled the recognition of natural science as a fundamental necessity in liberal education. The most convinced exponents and advocates of humanism now recognize that science is the "paramount force of the modern as distinguished from the antique and the mediæval spirit" (John Addington Symonds — "Culture") and that "an interpenetration of humanism with science and of science with humanism is the condition of the highest culture."

A second modification of the earlier idea of cultivation was advocated by Ralph Waldo Emerson more than two generations ago. He taught that the acquisition of some form of manual skill and the practice of some form of manual labor were essential elements of culture. This idea has more and more become accepted in the systematic education of youth; and if we include athletic sports among the desirable forms of manual skill and labor, we may say that during the last thirty years this element of excellence of body in the ideal of education has had a rapid, even an

exaggerated, development. The idea of some sort of bodily excellence was, to be sure, not absent in the old conception of the cultivated man. The gentleman could ride well, dance gracefully, and fence with skill; but the modern conception of bodily skill as an element in cultivation is more comprehensive, and includes that habitual contact with the external world which Emerson deemed essential to real culture. We have lately become convinced that accurate work with carpenters' tools, or lathe, or hammer and anvil, or violin, or piano, or pencil, or crayon, or camel's-hair brush, trains well the same nerves and ganglia with which we do what is ordinarily called thinking. We have also become convinced that some intimate, sympathetic acquaintance with the natural objects of the earth and sky adds greatly to the happiness of life, and that this acquaintance should be begun in childhood and be developed all through adolescence and maturity. A brook, a hedgerow, or a garden is an inexhaustible teacher of wonder, reverence, and love. The scientists insist to-day on nature study for children; but we teachers ought long ago to have learned from the poets the value of this element in education. They are the best advocates of nature study. If any here are not convinced of its worth, let them go to Theocritus, Virgil, Wordsworth, Tennyson, or Lowell for the needed demonstration. Let them observe, too, that a great need of modern industrial society is intellectual pleasures, or pleasures which, like music,

combine delightful sensations with the gratifications of observation, association, memory, and sympathy. The idea of culture has always included a quick and wide sympathy with men; it should hereafter include sympathy with Nature, and particularly with its living forms — a sympathy based on some accurate observation of Nature. The bookworm, the monk, the isolated student, has never been the type of the cultivated man. Society has seemed the natural setting for the cultivated person, man or woman; but the present conception of real culture contains not only a large development of this social element, but also an extension of interest and reverence to the animate creation and to those immense forces that set the earthly stage for man and all related beings.

Let us now proceed to examine some of the changes in the idea of culture, or in the available means of culture, which the last hundred years have brought about.

1. The moral sense of the modern world makes character a more important element than it used to be in the ideal of a cultivated man. Now character is formed, as Goethe said, in the "stream of the world" — not in stillness or isolation, but in the quick-flowing tides of the busy world, the world of nature and the world of mankind. At the end of the nineteenth century the world was wonderfully different from the world at the beginning of that eventful period; and, moreover, men's means of making acquaintance with the world were vastly more ample than they were a hundred

years earlier. To the old idea of culture some knowledge of history was indispensable. Now history is a representation of the stream of the world, or of some little portion of that stream, one hundred, five hundred, two thousand years ago. Acquaintance with some part of the present stream ought to be more formative of character, and more instructive as regards external nature and the nature of man, than any partial survey of the stream that was flowing centuries ago. We have, then, through the present means of reporting the stream of the world from day to day, material for culture such as no preceding generation of men has possessed. The cultivated man or woman must use the means which steam and electricity have provided for reporting the play of physical forces and of human volitions which make the world of to-day; for the world of to-day supplies in its immense variety a picture of all stages of human progress, from the Stone Age, through savagery, barbarism, and mediævalism, to what we now call civilization. The rising generation should think hard and feel keenly, just where the men and women who constitute the actual human world are thinking and feeling most to-day. The panorama of to-day's events is not an accurate or complete picture, for history will supply posterity with much evidence which is hidden from the eyes of contemporaries; but it is nevertheless an invaluable and a new means of developing good judgment, good feeling, and the passion for social service, or, in other words, of secur-

ing cultivation. But some one will say the stream of the world is foul. True in part. The stream is, what it has been, a mixture of foulness and purity, of meanness and majesty; but it has nourished individual virtue and race civilization. Literature and history are a similar mixture, and yet are the traditional means of culture. Are not the Greek tragedies means of culture? Yet they are full of incest, murder, and human sacrifices to lustful and revengeful gods.

2. A cultivated man should express himself by tongue or pen with some accuracy and elegance; therefore linguistic training has had great importance in the idea of cultivation. The conditions of the educated world have, however, changed so profoundly since the revival of learning in Italy that our inherited ideas concerning training in language and literature have required large modifications. In the year 1400 it might have been said with truth that there was but one language of scholars, the Latin, and but two great literatures, the Hebrew and the Greek. Since that time, however, other great literatures have arisen, the Italian, Spanish, French, German, and above all the English, which has become incomparably the most extensive and various and the noblest of literatures. Under these circumstances it is impossible to maintain that a knowledge of any particular literature is indispensable to culture. Yet we cannot but feel that the cultivated man ought to possess a considerable acquaintance with the literature of some great language,

and the power to use the native language in a pure and interesting way. Thus, we are not sure that Robert Burns could be properly described as a cultivated man, moving poet though he was. We do not think of Abraham Lincoln as a cultivated man, master of English speech and writing though he was. These men do not correspond to the type represented by the word "cultivated," but belong in the class of geniuses. When we ask ourselves why a knowledge of literature seems indispensable to the ordinary idea of cultivation, we find no answer except this: that in literature are portrayed all human passions, desires, and aspirations, and that acquaintance with these human feelings, and with the means of portraying them, seems to us essential to culture. These human qualities and powers are also the commonest ground of interesting human intercourse, and therefore literary knowledge exalts the quality and enhances the enjoyment of human intercourse. It is in conversation that cultivation tells as much as anywhere, and this rapid exchange of thoughts is by far the commonest manifestation of its power. Combine the knowledge of literature with knowledge of the "stream of the world" and you have united two large sources of the influence of the cultivated person. The linguistic and literary element in cultivation therefore abides, but has become vastly broader than formerly — so broad, indeed, that selection among its various fields is forced upon every educated youth.

3. The next great element in cultivation to which I ask your attention is acquaintance with some parts of the store of knowledge which humanity in its progress from barbarism has acquired and laid up. This is the prodigious store of recorded, rationalized, and systematized discoveries, experiences, and ideas. This is the store which we teachers try to pass on to the rising generation. The capacity to assimilate this store and improve it in each successive generation is the distinction of the human race over other animals. It is too vast for any man to master, though he had a hundred lives instead of one; and its growth in the nineteenth century was greater than in all the thirty preceding centuries put together. In the eighteenth century a diligent student with strong memory and quick powers of apprehension need not have despaired of mastering a large fraction of this store of knowledge. Long before the end of the nineteenth century such a task had become impossible. Culture, therefore, can no longer imply a knowledge of everything — not even a little knowledge of everything. It must be content with general knowledge of some things, and a real mastery of some small portion of the human store. Here is a profound modification of the idea of cultivation, which the nineteenth century has brought about. What portion or portions of the infinite human store are most proper to the cultivated man? The answer must be, those which enable him, with his individual personal qualities, to deal best and

sympathize most with Nature and with other human beings. It is here that the passion for service must fuse with the passion for knowledge. It is natural to imagine that the young man who has acquainted himself with economics, the science of government, sociology, and the history of civilization in its motives, objects, and methods has a better chance of fusing the passion for knowledge with the passion for doing good than the man whose passion for pure knowledge leads him to the study of chemical or physical phenomena, or of the habits and climatic distribution of plants or animals. Yet, so intricate are the relations of human beings to the animate and inanimate creation that it is impossible to foresee with what realms of nature intense human interests may prove to be identified. Thus the generation now on the stage has suddenly learned that some of the most sensitive and exquisite human interests, such as health or disease and life or death for those we love, are bound up with the life histories of parasites on the blood corpuscles or of certain varieties of mosquitoes and ticks. When the spectra of the sun, stars, and other lights began to be studied, there was not the slightest anticipation that a cure for one of the most horrible diseases to which mankind is liable might be found in the X-rays. While, then, we can still see that certain subjects afford more obvious or frequent access to means of doing good and to fortunate intercourse with our fellows than other subjects, we have learned from nineteenth-

century experience that there is no field of real knowledge which may not suddenly prove contributory in a high degree to human happiness and the progress of civilization, and therefore acceptable as a worthy element in the truest culture. 5

4. The only other element in cultivation which time will permit me to treat is the training of the constructive imagination. The imagination is the greatest of human powers, no matter in what field it works — in art or literature, in mechanical invention, in science, 10 government, commerce, or religion; and the training of the imagination is, therefore, far the most important part of education. I use the term "constructive imagination" because that implies the creation or building of a new thing. The sculptor, for example, 15 imagines or conceives the perfect form of a child ten years of age; he has never seen such a thing, for a child perfect in form is never produced; he has only seen in different children the elements of perfection, here one element and there another. In his imagi- 20 nation he combines these elements of the perfect form, which he has only seen separated, and from this picture in his mind he carves the stone, and in the execution invariably loses his ideal — that is, falls short of it or fails to express it. Sir Joshua Reynolds points 25 out that the painter can picture only what he has somewhere seen; but that the more he has seen and noted the surer he is to be original in his painting, because his imaginary combinations will be original. Con-

structive imagination is the great power of the poet as well as of the artist; and the nineteenth century has convinced us that it is also the great power of the man of science, the investigator, and the natural philosopher. What gives every great naturalist or physicist his epoch-making results is precisely the imaginative power by which he deduces from the masses of fact the guiding hypothesis or principle.

The educated world needs to recognize the new varieties of constructive imagination. Dante gave painful years to picturing on many pages of his immortal Comedy of Hell, Purgatory, and Paradise the most horrible monsters and tortures and the most loathsome and noisome abominations that his fervid imagination could concoct out of his own bitter experiences and the manners and customs of his cruel times. Sir Charles Lyell spent many laborious years in searching for and putting together the scattered evidences that the geologic processes by which the crust of the earth has been made ready for the use of man have been, in the main, not catastrophic, but gradual and gentle, and that the forces which have been in action through past ages are, for the most part, similar to those we may see to-day eroding hills, cutting cañons, making placers, marshes, and meadows, and forming prairies and ocean floors. He first imagined, and then demonstrated, that the geologic agencies are not explosive and cataclysmal, but steady and patient. These two kinds of imagination — Dante's and Lyell's

— are not comparable, but both are manifestations of great human power. Zola, in "La Bête Humaine," contrives that ten persons, all connected with the railroad from Paris to Havre, shall be either murderers or murdered, or both, within eighteen months; and he adds two railroad slaughters criminally procured. The conditions of time and place are ingeniously imagined, and no detail is omitted which can heighten the effect of this homicidal fiction. Contrast this kind of constructive imagination with the kind which conceived the great wells sunk in the solid rock below Niagara that contain the turbines that drive the dynamos that generate the electric force that turns thousands of wheels and lights thousands of lamps over hundreds of square miles of adjoining territory; or with the kind which conceives the sending of human thoughts across three thousand miles of stormy sea instantaneously on nothing more substantial than ethereal waves. There is no crime, cruelty, or lust about these last two sorts of imagining. No lurid fire of hell or human passion illumines their scenes. They are calm, accurate, just, and responsible, and nothing but beneficence and increased human well-being results from them. There is going to be room in the hearts of twentieth-century men for a high admiration of these kinds of imagination, as well as for that of the poet, artist, or dramatist.

Another kind of imagination deserves a moment's consideration — the receptive imagination which

entertains and holds fast the visions which genius creates or the analogies of nature suggest. A young woman is absorbed for hours in conning the squalid scenes and situations through which Thackeray portrays the malign motives and unclean soul of Becky Sharp. Another young woman watches for days the pairing, nesting, brooding, and foraging of two robins that have established home and family in the notch of a maple near her window. She notes the unselfish labors of the father and mother for each other and for their little ones, and weaves into the simple drama all sorts of protective instincts and human affections. Here are two employments for the receptive imagination. Shall systematic education compel the first but make no room for the second? The increasing attention to nature study suggests the hope that the imaginative study of human ills and woes is not to be allowed to exclude the imaginative study of Nature, and that both studies may count toward culture.

It is one lesson of the nineteenth century, then, that in every field of human knowledge the constructive imagination finds play — in literature, in history, in theology, in anthropology, and in the whole field of physical and biological research. That great century has taught us that, on the whole, the scientific imagination is quite as productive for human service as the literary or poetic imagination. The imagination of Darwin or Pasteur, for example, is as high and productive a form of imagination as that of Dante, or

Goethe, or even Shakespeare, if we regard the human uses which result from the exercise of imaginative powers, and mean by human uses not merely meat and drink, clothes and shelter, but also the satisfaction of mental and spiritual needs. We must, therefore, allow in our contemplation of the cultivated man a large expansion of the fields in which the cultivated imagination may be exercised. We must extend our training of the imagination beyond literature and the fine arts, to history, philosophy, science, government, and sociology. We must recognize the prodigious variety of fruits of the imagination that the nineteenth century has given to our race.

It results from this brief survey that the elements and means of cultivation are much more numerous than they used to be; so that it is not wise to say of any one acquisition or faculty — with it cultivation becomes possible, without it impossible. The one acquisition or faculty may be immense, and yet cultivation may not have been attained. Thus it is obvious that a man may have a wide acquaintance with music, and possess great musical skill and that wonderful imaginative power which conceives delicious melodies and harmonies for the delight of mankind through centuries, and yet not be a cultivated man in the ordinary acceptation of the words. We have met artists who were rude and uncouth, yet possessed a high degree of technical skill and strong powers of imagination. We have seen philanthropists and statesmen whose minds have played

on great causes and great affairs, and yet who lacked a correct use of their native language, and had no historical perspective or background of historical knowledge.

On the other hand, is there any single acquisition or faculty which is essential to culture, except indeed a reasonably accurate and refined use of the mother tongue?

Again, though we can discern in different individuals different elements of the perfect type of cultivated man, we seldom find combined in any human being all the elements of the type. Here, as in painting or sculpture, we make up our ideal from traits picked out from many imperfect individuals and put together. We must not, therefore, expect systematic education to produce multitudes of highly cultivated and symmetrically developed persons; the multitudinous product will always be imperfect, just as there are no perfect trees, animals, flowers, or crystals.

It has been my object to point out that our conception of the type of cultivated man has been greatly enlarged, and on the whole exalted, by observation of the experiences of mankind during the last hundred years. Let us as teachers accept no single element or kind of culture as the one essential; let us remember that the best fruits of real culture are an open mind, broad sympathies, and respect for all the diverse achievements of the human intellect at whatever stage of development they may actually be — the stage of

fresh discovery, or bold exploration, or complete conquest. Let us remember that the moral elements of the new education are individual choice of studies and career among a great, new variety of studies and careers, early responsibility accompanying this freedom of choice, love of truth now that truth may be directly sought through rational inquiry, and an omnipresent sense of social obligation. These moral elements are so strong that the new forms of culture are likely to prove themselves quite as productive of morality, high-mindedness, and idealism as the old.

THE YOUNG MAN'S FUTURE[1]

Frank A. Vanderlip

Bankers are more or less given to prediction, to the making of forecasts and prophecies. They must form opinions in regard to the future. It is a part of their business to have definite ideas as to whether money is to be easy or close, whether business will be active or dull, whether collections will be good or otherwise.

Financial prophecy, however, is full of difficulties. There are many currents and cross currents to be reckoned with. The whole field of action is so much larger than any man's vision that inadvertently he may leave out of consideration matters of vital importance. The course of affairs may be completely altered by psychological conditions which cannot be weighed in the most carefully prepared tables of statistics. At best the keenest and wisest observers must write "E. & O. E." in large letters after their attempts to divine the financial future. These distinguished bank officers who have dined with you this evening are undoubtedly skilled in such a correct grouping of facts as

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enables them to draw accurate conclusions in regard to the financial future.

There is another line of prophecy, however, which is, I believe, quite as interesting, and far easier. If I were forced to turn seer and to undertake to forecast future events, and could I have my choice of fields, I would keep quite clear of any attempt at forecasting future financial affairs, and would adopt the easier course of attempting to predict the measure of success or of failure that is likely, with added years, to come to a young man. Men ought to be as interesting as markets. I am certain that a prediction can be made regarding the future of a young man, if we have at hand the necessary data, with as much accuracy as we can predict the future of the market. There are many bank officers here who could, I have no doubt, predict, with correctness, the future course of money rates, of bank reserves or of gold imports, but with still greater chances of accuracy, I believe, they could predict the future careers of some of the members of this chapter of the American Institute of Bank Clerks.

I believe it is possible to formulate certain rules and principles which, applied to the data in regard to a young man's capacity, character, and tendencies, will enable one to make an accurate estimate of his chances of success or his dangers of failure. If it is possible to lay down such rules, then some knowledge of those rules ought to be of value to young men. That is so because it is within the power of each young man to

change in a large measure the character of the data in his case. Young men are not foreordained to failure or success. Their future is, in the main, of their own making. If they comprehend that certain characteristics or tendencies which they are forming will have an enormous influence upon their future, if they clearly see that their career is in but small measure a matter of chance, and is in large measure the result of those early formed habits, characteristics, and tendencies, they will be less likely to feel that they must wait for some brilliant opportunity to prove themselves; they will be more likely to understand that success must be won by sincere effort applied to each day's work.

Without doubt there is among the young men who are members of this chapter of the American Institute of Bank Clerks the future president of a great bank. I believe I can pick out the man. I shall not name him; you can do that better than I; but I am going to tell you exactly who he is. This young man has, of course, certain fundamental qualities which are and must be common to every successful man. He started out with good physique, and he has not abused that heritage, for no man can be permanently successful without having an extraordinary capacity for work, — and health and working capacity are one. He has been naturally endowed with a personality which will permit him to work coöperatively with his fellows, a personality which will permit him to win their regard, as well as lead him to recognize merit in others.

Then, as a matter of course, he has at least a fair education; he is diligent, capable, and has already a character so well formed that there is every reason to believe that he will have integrity, uprightness, and honor so ingrained in him that men who know him will come to recognize that he is worthy of a trust.

But all those characteristics, necessary as they are, by no means serve to designate the man. Those characteristics are general, and ought to be possessed by every young man.

There are additional characteristics possessed by the young man I am picking out, and they are the ones which will enable me more definitely to designate him.

Given first those sound fundamentals, — good health, good character, at least a fair education, industry, and capacity, — we have then only determined the general class from which we will pick our man. This man I am indicating does his regular work well, but he has recognized that he must, as a matter of course, make his ordinary day's work a matter of constant good records. He sees that he is not entitled to special credit, and is not likely to receive extraordinary rewards for merely a record of ordinary good work, and so he has to come to recognize that those lines which mark the limits of his daily task are not barriers to his further effort. Those lines merely mark the work he has first to do. He has learned that every occasion that is offered, every opening that he could himself make, which would permit him

to break through those lines which mark his special daily duty and give him a chance to do other work, is an opportunity of the greatest importance. That statement is no platitude; data bearing on that phase of a young man's character form one of the most illuminating guides we have in forecasting a career. It tells the measure of the man's coming usefulness; it tells how quickly he will learn the whole detail of his business; it tells whether he has that invaluable spirit of coöperation without which great success cannot be built. The man we are picking out has learned that lesson. He knows that of all things necessary for his development opportunity is one of the most essential, — opportunity to work, opportunity to learn. He has found that doing some other man's work in addition to his own, when occasion offered, has made him master of some other man's knowledge, and has added greatly to his own capabilities and his value. He has found that his true salary is made up of two parts; that the money he receives is but one part of it, the opportunity to learn is the other. He has not feared he would work too much for the salary he was getting, because he has found that working is learning, and that what he is learning is after all by far the more valuable part of his salary.

When a young man has learned that an added duty is a new opportunity of great value, when he has learned that an added task is something to be welcomed with enthusiasm, he has marked himself for promotion, he has separated himself from those of his fellows who

believe in making their services just balance their salaries; he has opened the door of opportunity and his progress is likely to be rapid toward a complete mastery of the details of his business.

I wish I had the eloquence fully to emphasize the strength of my belief in the practical, hard-headed sense of these assertions — to emphasize my faith in the result of an everyday application of them. If I understand correctly any single principle on which success is based, I know that a true one is this: Do more than you have to do that you may learn more than you need to know for doing your own simple daily task, and with this broader doing and wider learning you will be laying the substantial foundation that is required for any career of eminence.

There is another lesson of great value which has been learned by this young man whom I am designating to you as a future bank president. He has learned systematically to use the time which is available outside of his regular work. You will find that this young man whom I am singling out has not been satisfied with the progress he has made in the course of his regular work. He may have started with a broad, sound education; but even so, he soon found he would need a more specialized education if he were thoroughly to master the principles of his business. He attacked this problem of a specialized education with the same energy and enthusiasm which he has brought to his daily work at the bank. There has been noth-

ing desultory and intermittent about his method. The work has been systematically planned and constantly carried on. The work in itself has been a pleasure in the doing; in its result it has given to this young man a specialized knowledge and a grasp of principles which in the future will be of a value to him greater than he now can comprehend.

There is one more characteristic which the young man possesses and to which I want to call your attention. It is a characteristic which might lead some of you to doubt that he was marked for large success. You may perhaps have thought that he lacked a certain shrewdness, that his ambition for personal advancement was not keen enough, that he was a little slow-going when it came to forcing recognition of his own abilities and hard work. Just there is where you may be wrong. This man's interest in the work has been greater than his interest in himself. To get the thing rightly done has been his thought rather than merely to get the credit for doing it. In traveling along the road leading to success a man should not have his eyes solely on the milestones; in straining to see the milestone, which is too far ahead, one may fail to avoid the obstacle directly in the path. That advice does not alone apply to the progress of the young man. It is a truth that he may well heed, even after he has reached a position of much influence and power. The great man in commerce to-day is the coöperative man, the man who sees clearly the right thing to be

accomplished and is willing to sink his individuality to accomplish it; the man who is more interested in getting the thing done than he is in getting credit for doing it. We must give great prominence to that quality of patience which our future bank president possesses. Patience to wait for personal reward, patience to work coöperatively with others, a patience which rises to self-abnegation before a great work to be done — a self-abnegation which sees only the one thing, and that is the thing to be accomplished, and is willing to sink for the time the gratification of ambition, personal pride, and personal reward.

Here then is the man: He has health, character, ability, industry. More than that, he has learned to welcome new work as new opportunity, and he has learned systematically to use his time outside of his regular work in gaining a specialized knowledge which will give him a thorough grasp of the principles of his business; and then above all that, he has taken greater interest in his work than in himself. He has cared more for getting the thing done right than he has for getting the personal credit of doing it.

I have laid before you the data which will enable you, with almost unerring accuracy, to name the man. Unless there is some defect of personality or some accident of opportunity, the man who best fits this outline will in a decade stand out from among his fellows a leader; he will be wearing the honors of distinction and carrying the burdens of responsibility.

THE CHARACTER OF THE INDIAN[1]

Francis Parkman

Of the Indian character, much has been written foolishly, and credulously believed. By the rhapsodies of poets, the cant of sentimentalists, and the extravagance of some who should have known better, a counterfeit image has been tricked out, which might seek in vain for its likeness through every corner of the habitable earth; an image bearing no more resemblance to its original than the monarch of the tragedy and the hero of the epic poem bear to their living prototypes in the palace and the camp. The shadows of his wilderness home, and the darker mantle of his own inscrutable reserve, have made the Indian warrior a wonder and a mystery. Yet to the eye of rational observation there is nothing unintelligible in him. He is full, it is true, of contradiction. He deems himself the center of greatness and renown; his pride is proof against the fiercest torments of fire and steel; and yet the same man would beg for a dram of whisky, or pick up a crust of bread thrown to him like a dog, from the tent door of the traveler. At one moment, he is wary and cautious to the verge of cowardice; at the next, he abandons himself to a very insanity of recklessness;

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and the habitual self-restraint which throws an impenetrable veil over emotion is joined to the unbridled passions of a beast or a madman.

Such inconsistencies, strange as they seem in our eyes, when viewed under a novel aspect, are but the ordinary incidents of humanity. The qualities of the mind are not uniform in their action through all the relations of life. With different men, and different races of men, pride, valor, prudence, have different forms of manifestation, and where in one instance they lie dormant, in another they are keenly awake. The conjunction of greatness and littleness, meanness and pride, is older than the days of the patriarchs; and such antiquated phenomena, displayed under a new form in the unreflecting, undisciplined mind of a savage, call for no special wonder, but should rather be classed with the other enigmas of the fathomless human heart. The dissecting knife of a Rochefoucault might lay bare matters of no less curious observation in the breast of every man.

Nature has stamped the Indian with a hard and stern physiognomy. Ambition, revenge, envy, jealousy, are his ruling passions; and his cold temperament is little exposed to those effeminate vices which are the bane of milder races. With him revenge is an overpowering instinct; nay, more, it is a point of honor and a duty. His pride sets all language at defiance. He loathes the thought of coercion; and few of his race have ever stooped to discharge a menial office. A wild love of

liberty, an utter intolerance of control, lie at the basis of his character, and fire his whole existence. Yet, in spite of this haughty independence, he is a devout hero-worshiper; and high achievement in war or policy touches a chord to which his nature never fails to respond. He looks up with admiring reverence to the sages and heroes of his tribe; and it is this principle, joined to the respect for age springing from the patriarchal element in his social system, which, beyond all others, contributes union and harmony to the erratic members of an Indian community. With him the love of glory kindles into a burning passion; and to allay its cravings, he will dare cold and famine, fire, tempest, torture, and death itself.

These generous traits are overcast by much that is dark, cold, and sinister, by sleepless distrust, and rankling jealousy. Treacherous himself, he is always suspicious of treachery in others. Brave as he is, — and few of mankind are braver, — he will vent his passion by a secret stab rather than an open blow. His warfare is full of ambuscade and stratagem; and he never rushes into battle with that joyous self-abandonment with which the warriors of the Gothic races flung themselves into the ranks of their enemies. In his feasts and his drinking-bouts we find none of that robust and full-toned mirth which reigned at the rude carousals of our barbaric ancestry. He is never jovial in his cups, and maudlin sorrow or maniacal rage is the sole result of his potations.

Over all emotion he throws the veil of an iron self-control, originating in a peculiar form of pride, and fostered by rigorous discipline from childhood upward. He is trained to conceal passion, and not to subdue it. The inscrutable warrior is aptly imaged by the hackneyed figure of a volcano covered with snow; and no man can say when or where the wildfire will burst forth. This shallow self-mastery serves to give dignity to public deliberation, and harmony to social life. Wrangling and quarrel are strangers to an Indian dwelling; and while an assembly of the ancient Gauls was garrulous as a convocation of magpies, a Roman senate might have taken a lesson from the grave solemnity of an Indian council. In the midst of his family and friends, he hides affections, by nature none of the most tender, under a mask of icy coldness; and in the torturing fires of his enemy, the haughty sufferer maintains to the last his look of grim defiance.

His intellect is as peculiar as his moral organization. Among all savages, the powers of perception preponderate over those of reason and analysis; but this is more especially the case with the Indian. An acute judge of character, at least of such parts of it as his experience enables him to comprehend; keen to a proverb in all exercises of war and the chase, he seldom traces effects to their causes, or follows out actions to their remote results. Though a close observer of external nature, he no sooner attempts to account for her phenomena than he involves himself in the most

ridiculous absurdities; and quite content with these puerilities, he has not the least desire to push his inquiries further. His curiosity, abundantly active within its own narrow circle, is dead to all things else; and to attempt rousing it from its torpor is but a boot- 5 less task. He seldom takes cognizance of general or abstract ideas; and his language has scarcely the power to express them, except through the medium of figures drawn from the external world, and often highly pic- turesque and forcible. The absence of reflection makes 10 him grossly improvident, and unfits him for pursuing any complicated scheme of war or policy.

Some races of men seem molded in wax, soft and melting, at once plastic and feeble. Some races, like some metals, combine the greatest flexibility with the 15 greatest strength. But the Indian is hewn out of a rock. You can rarely change the form without de- struction of the substance. Such, at least, has too often proved the case. Races of inferior energy have possessed a power of expansion and assimilation to 20 which he is a stranger; and it is this fixed and rigid quality which has proved his ruin. He will not learn the arts of civilization, and he and his forest must perish together. The stern, unchanging features of his mind excite our admiration, from their very immu- 25 tability; and we look with deep interest on the fate of this irreclaimable son of the wilderness, the child who will not be weaned from the breast of his rugged mother. And our interest increases when we discern in the

unhappy wanderer, mingled among his vices, the germs of heroic virtues — a hand bountiful to bestow, as it is rapacious to seize, and, even in extremest famine, imparting its last morsel to a fellow-sufferer; a heart which, strong in friendship as in hate, thinks it not too much to lay down life for its chosen comrade; a soul true to its own idea of honor, and burning with an unquenchable thirst for greatness and renown.

The imprisoned lion in the showman's cage differs not more widely from the lord of the desert than the beggarly frequenter of frontier garrisons and dram-shops differs from the proud denizen of the woods. It is in his native wilds alone that the Indian must be seen and studied. Thus to depict him is the aim of the ensuing History; and if, from the shades of rock and forest, the savage features should look too grimly forth, it is because the clouds of a tempestuous war have cast upon the picture their murky shadows and lurid fires.

HENRY DAVID THOREAU: HIS CHARACTER AND OPINIONS[1]

Robert Louis Stevenson

Thoreau's thin, penetrating, big-nosed face, even in a bad woodcut, conveys some hint of the limitations of his mind and character. With his almost acid sharpness of insight, with his almost animal dexterity in act, there went none of that large, unconscious geniality of the world's heroes. He was not easy, not ample, not urbane, not even kind; his enjoyment was hardly smiling, or the smile was not broad enough to be convincing; he had no waste lands nor kitchen-midden in his nature, but was all improved and sharpened to a point. "He was bred to no profession," says Emerson; "he never married; he lived alone; he never went to church; he never voted; he refused to pay a tax to the State; he ate no flesh, he drank no wine, he never knew the use of tobacco; and, though a naturalist, he used neither trap nor gun. When asked at dinner what dish he preferred, he answered, 'the nearest.'" So many negative superiorities begin to smack a little of the prig. From his later works he was in the habit of cutting out the humorous pas-

[1] From "Familiar Studies of Men and Books." New York, Charles Scribner's Sons.

sages, under the impression that they were beneath the dignity of his moral muse; and there we see the prig stand public and confessed. It was "much easier," says Emerson acutely, much easier for Thoreau to say *no* than *yes;* and that is a characteristic which depicts the man. It is a useful accomplishment to be able to say *no*, but surely it is the essence of amiability to prefer to say *yes* where it is possible. There is something wanting in the man who does not hate himself whenever he is constrained to say *no*. And there was a great deal wanting in this born dissenter. He was almost shockingly devoid of weaknesses; he had not enough of them to be truly polar with humanity; whether you call him demi-god or demi-man, he was at least not altogether one of us, for he was not touched with a feeling of our infirmities. The world's heroes have room for all positive qualities, even those which are disreputable, in the capacious theater of their dispositions. Such can live many lives; while a Thoreau can live but one, and that only with perpetual foresight.

He was no ascetic, rather an Epicurean of the nobler sort; and he had this one great merit, that he succeeded so far as to be happy. "I love my fate to the core and rind," he wrote once; and even while he lay dying, here is what he dictated (for it seems he was already too feeble to control the pen): "You ask particularly after my health. I *suppose* that I have not many months to live, but of course know nothing about it.

I may say that I am enjoying existence as much as ever, and regret nothing." It is not given to all to bear so clear a testimony to the sweetness of their fate, nor to any without courage and wisdom; for this world in itself is but a painful and uneasy place of residence, and lasting happiness, at least to the self-conscious, comes only from within. Now Thoreau's content and ecstasy in living was, we may say, like a plant that he had watered and tended with womanish solicitude; for there is apt to be something unmanly, something almost dastardly, in a life that does not move with dash and freedom, and that fears the bracing contact of the world. In one word, Thoreau was a skulker. He did not wish virtue to go out of him among his fellow-men, but slunk into a corner to hoard it for himself. He left all for the sake of certain virtuous self-indulgences. It is true that his tastes were noble; that his ruling passion was to keep himself unspotted from the world; and that his luxuries were all of the same healthy order as cold tubs and early rising. But a man may be both coldly cruel in the pursuit of goodness, and morbid even in the pursuit of health. I cannot lay my hands on the passage in which he explains his abstinence from tea and coffee, but I am sure I have the meaning correctly. It is this: He thought it bad economy and worthy of no true virtuoso to spoil the natural rapture of the morning with such muddy stimulants; let him but see the sun rise, and he was already suffi-

ciently inspirited for the labors of the day. That may be reason good enough to abstain from tea; but when we go on to find the same man, on the same or similar grounds, abstain from nearly everything that his neighbors innocently and pleasurably use, and from the rubs and trials of human society itself into the bargain, we recognize that valetudinarian healthfulness which is more delicate than sickness itself. We need have no respect for a state of artificial training. True health is to be able to do without it. Shakespeare, we can imagine, might begin the day upon a quart of ale, and yet enjoy the sunrise to the full as much as Thoreau, and commemorate his enjoyment in vastly better verses. A man who must separate himself from his neighbors' habits in order to be happy, is in much the same case with one who requires to take opium for the same purpose. What we want to see is one who can breast into the world, do a man's work, and still preserve his first and pure enjoyment of existence.

Thoreau's faculties were of a piece with his moral shyness; for they were all delicacies. He could guide himself about the woods on the darkest night by the touch of his feet. He could pick up at once an exact dozen of pencils by the feeling, pace distances with accuracy, and gauge cubic contents by the eye. His smell was so dainty that he could perceive the fœtor of dwelling houses as he passed them by at night; his palate so unsophisticated that, like a child, he dis-

liked the taste of wine — or perhaps, living in America, had never tasted any that was good; and his knowledge of nature was so complete and curious that he could have told the time of year, within a day or so, by the aspect of the plants. In his dealings with animals, he was the original of Hawthorne's Donatello. He pulled the woodchuck out of its hole by the tail; the hunted fox came to him for protection; wild squirrels have been seen to nestle in his waistcoat; he would thrust his arm into a pool and bring forth a bright, panting fish, lying undismayed in the palm of his hand. There were few things that he could not do. He could make a house, a boat, a pencil, or a book. He was a surveyor, a scholar, a natural historian. He could run, walk, climb, skate, swim, and manage a boat. The smallest occasion served to display his physical accomplishment; and a manufacturer, from merely observing his dexterity with the window of a railway carriage, offered him a situation on the spot. "The only fruit of much living," he observes, "is the ability to do some slight thing better." But such was the exactitude of his senses, so alive was he in every fiber, that it seems as if the maxim should be changed in his case, for he could do most things with unusual perfection. And perhaps he had an approving eye to himself when he wrote: "Though the youth at last grows indifferent, the laws of the universe are not indifferent, *but are forever on the side of the most sensitive.*"

THE DESCENT FROM THE CROSS[1]

John La Farge

Thus, then, for the Corporation of the Church of St. Walburga, and for the Guild of the Arquebusiers of Antwerp, he painted, between 1610 and 1612, the great paintings of the "Raising of the Cross" and the "Descent from the Cross." The latter is the more famous picture — perhaps one of the few best-known paintings in the world. In it Rubens fixed the type of the subject, absorbing in his work the impressions received from earlier masters; so that, whatever the merits of others, however touching, however beautiful, however great, one feels in his extraordinary achievement a result which can never be dispensed with. The reminiscence of the big painting placed with almost no separation on the high, cold wall is that of a large, dark space, almost black, down which slips a column of white — the sheet that carries the body of the Christ into the arms of loving friends. All their grief is contained: they are attending to those last physical duties we pay to the departed; and in the dramatic expression of their feeling this exact balance is most beautifully and truthfully observed. The fear of a

[1] Reprinted by permission from *McClure's Magazine*, for June, 1902.

fall that would shock the sense of reverence to the dead animates all the figures, each one in a different degree. Thus, according to the part they play in the simplest of all dramas, the care for our dead, even the workmen who detach the body have in their business just the proportionate sympathy. It is this feeling of contained emotion, difficult and rare in the work of a man of exuberant feelings, that distinguishes this painting of Rubens, unless we should except that other last scene, the "Death Communion of St. Francis," where again one feels the contained struggle against outward emotion that fills the attendants who help the dying saint in a last homage to his Redeemer. "The Descent from the Cross" is, then, a wise and balanced work, composed of marvelous adjustments of planes and lines, so that each motion, each fold, even the outbalanced foot of the man at the arms of the cross, who has just let slip from his shoulder the body of the Christ, helps to form a pattern as ingeniously combined as that of any ornamentation or brocade, meant merely for the soothing of the eye. But none of these subtleties is insisted upon to the detriment of the dramatic story, and, as in most of Rubens's paintings, we are unaware of the subtlety and combinations of lines and surfaces which make the artistic structure of what seems to us a mere rendering of nature, or the sweep of exuberant and poetic passion. For Rubens is really calm when he executes: he is like the conductor of a great orchestration, who directs

the expression of stormy or gentle emotion according to a scheme, carefully devised and elaborated by a mind that reduces all necessities to a single effect. The deep religious feeling animating the great painting is not that of a mystical or of a self-inquiring or sentimental mind; it is that of the Rubens we know in all the diversity of his likings, but here contained in manly obedience to the simple probabilities of such a scene, and in their expression is a single type. Hence the great standing of the painting and the permanence of its fame. It is built to last forever.

HABITS[1]

A. C. Benson

Walter Pater says, in his most oracular mood, in that fine manifesto of a lofty Epicureanism which is known as the *Conclusion* to the *Renaissance* essays, that to form habits is failure in life. The difficulty in uttering oracles is that one is obliged for the sake of being forcible to reduce a statement to its simplest terms; and when one does that, there are generally a whole group of cases, which appear to be covered by the statement, which contradict it. It is nearly impossible to make any general statement both simple enough and large enough. In the case of Pater's pronouncement, he had fixed his mental gaze so firmly on a particular phenomenon that he forgot that his words might prove misleading when applied to the facts of life. What he meant, no doubt, was that one of the commonest of mental dangers is to form intellectual and moral prejudices early in life, and so to stereotype them that we are unable to look round them, or to give anything that we instinctively dislike a fair trial. Most people in fact, in matters of opinion, tend to get infected with a species of Toryism by the time that

[1] Reprinted by permission from "From a College Window." Copyright, 1906, by G. Putnam's Sons, New York and London.

they reach middle age, until they get into the frame of mind which Montaigne describes, of thinking so highly of their own conjectures as to be prepared to burn other people for not regarding them as certainties. This frame of mind is much to be reprobated, but it is unhappily common. How often does one meet sensible, shrewd, and intelligent men, who say frankly that they are not prepared to listen to any evidence which tells against their beliefs. How rare it is to meet a man who in the course of an argument will say, "Well, I had never thought of that before; it must be taken into account, and it modifies my view." Such an attitude is looked upon by active-minded and energetic men as having something weak and even sentimental about it. How common it is to hear people say that a man ought to have the courage of his opinions; how rare it is to find a man who will say that one ought to have the courage to change one's opinions. Indeed, in public life it is generally considered a kind of treachery to change, because people value what they call loyalty above truth. Pater no doubt meant that the duty and privilege of the philosopher is to keep his inner eye open to new impressions, to be ready to see beauty in new forms, not to love comfortable and settled ways, but to bring the same fresh apprehension that youth brings to art and to life.

He is merely speaking of a mental process in these words; what he is condemning is the dulling and encrusting of the mind with prejudices and habits,

the tendency, as Charles Lamb wittily said, whenever a new book comes out, to read an old one, to get into the fireside-and-slippers frame of mind, to grumble at novelty, to complain that the young men are violating all the sacred canons of faith and art.

This is not at all the same thing as knowing one's own limitations; every one, whether he be artist or writer, critic or practitioner, ought to take the measure of his forces, and to determine in what regions he can be effective; indeed it is often necessary for a man of artistic impulses to confine his energies to one specific department, although he may be attracted by several. Pater was himself an instance of this. He knew, for instance, that his dramatic sense was weak, and he wisely let drama alone; he found that certain vigorous writers exercised a contagious influence over his own style, and therefore he gave up reading them. But within his own region he endeavored to be catholic and sympathetic; he never tied up the contents of his mind into packets and labeled them, a task which most men between thirty and forty find highly congenial.

But I desire here to go into the larger question of forming habits; and as a general rule it may be said that Pater's dictum is entirely untrue, and that success in life depends more upon forming habits than upon anything else, except good health. Indeed, Pater himself is an excellent instance in point. He achieved his large output of beautiful literary work, the amaz-

ing amount of perfectly finished and exquisitely expressed writing that he gave to the world, by an extreme and patient regularity of labor. He did not, as some writers do, have periods of energetic creation, interrupted by periods of fallow idleness. Perhaps his work might have been more spontaneous if he could, like Milton's friend, have been wise enough "of such delights to judge, and interpose them oft." But the achievement of Pater was to realize and to carry out his own individual method, and it is upon doing this that successful productivity depends.

I could name, if I chose, two or three friends of my own, men of high and subtle intelligence, admirable humor, undiminished zest, who have failed, and will fail, to realize their possibilities, simply by a lack of method. Who does not know the men whom Mr. Mallock so wittily describes, of whom, up to the age of forty, their friends say that they could do anything if they only chose, and after the age of forty that they could have done anything if they had chosen? I have one particular friend in my eye at this moment, the possessor of wealth and leisure, who is a born writer if any man ever was. He has no particular duties, except the duties of a small landowner and the father of a family; he is a wide reader, and a critic of delicate and sympathetic acuteness. He is bent on writing; and he has written a single book crammed from end to end with good and beautiful things, the stuff of which would have sufficed, in the hands of a facile

writer, for half a dozen excellent books. He is, moreover, sincerely anxious to write, but he does nothing. If you ask him — and I conceive it to be my duty at intervals to chide him for not producing more — what he does with his time, he says with a melancholy smile: "Oh, I hardly know: it goes!" I trace his failure to produce simply to the fact that he has never set apart any particular portion of the day for writing; he allows himself to be interrupted; he entertains many guests whom he has no particular wish to see; he "sets around and looks ornery," like the frog; he talks delightfully; an industrious Boswell could, by asking him questions and taking careful notes of his talk, fill a charming volume in a month out of his shrewd and suggestive conversation; of course it is possible to say that he practices the art of living, to talk of "gems of purest ray serene" and flowers "born to blush unseen" and all the rest of it. But his talk streams to waste among guests who do not as a rule appreciate it; and if there is any duty or responsibility in the world at all, it is a duty for men of great endowments, admirable humor, and poetical suggestiveness, to sow the seed of the mind freely and lavishly. We English are of course the chosen race; but we should be none the worse for a little more intellectual apprehension, a little more amiable charm. If my friend had been a professional man, obliged to earn a living by his pen, he would, I do not doubt, have given to the world a series of great books, which would have

done something to spread the influence of the kingdom of heaven.

Of course there is a sense in which it is a mistake to let habits become too tyrannical; one ought not to find one's self hopelessly distracted and irritated if one's daily programme is interfered with at any point; one ought to be able to enjoy leisure, to pay visits, to converse volubly. Like Dr. Johnson, one ought to be ready for a frolic. But, on the other hand, if a man takes himself seriously — and I am here not speaking of people with definite engagements, but of people, like writers and artists, who may choose their own times to do their work — he ought to have a regular though not an invariable programme. If he is possessed of such superabundant energy as Walter Scott possessed, he may rise at five, and write ten immortal octavo pages before he appears at breakfast. But as a rule the vitality of ordinary people is more limited, and they are bound to husband it, if they mean to do anything that is worth the name; an artist then ought to have his sacred hours, secure from interruption; and then let him fill the rest of the day with any amusement that he finds to be congenial.

Of course the thing is easy enough if one's work is really the thing in which one is most interested. There is very little danger, in the case of a man who likes and relishes the work he is doing more than he relishes any form of amusement; but we many of us have the unhappy feeling that we enjoy our work very

much, if we can once sit down to it, only we do not care about beginning it. We read the paper, we write a few letters, we look out an address in *Who's Who*, and we become absorbed in the biographies of our fellow-men; very soon it is time for luncheon, and then we think that we shall feel fresher if we take a little exercise; after tea, the weather is so beautiful that we think it would be a pity not to enjoy the long sunset lights; we come in; the piano stands invitingly open, and we must strike a few chords; then the bell rings for dressing, and the day is gone, because we mistrust the work that we do late at night, and so we go to bed in good time. Not so does a big book get written!

We ought rather to find out all about ourselves — when we can work our best, how long we can work continuously with full vigor; and then round these fixed points we should group our sociability, or leisure, our amusement. If we are altruistically inclined, we probably say that it is a duty to see something of our fellow-creatures, that we ought not to grow morose and solitary; there is an abundance of excuses that can be made; but the artist and the writer ought to realize that their duty to the world is to perceive what is beautiful and to express it as resolutely, as attractively as they can; if a writer can write a good book, he can talk in its pages to a numerous audience; and he is right to save up his best thoughts for his readers, rather than to let them flow away in diffuse conversation. Of course a writer of fiction is bound to make

the observation of varieties of temperament a duty; it is his material; if he becomes isolated and self-absorbed, his work becomes narrow and mannerized; and it is true, too, that, with most writers, the collision of mind with mind is what produces the brightest sparks.

And then to step into a still wider field, there is no sort of doubt that the formation of reasonable habits, of method, of punctuality, is a duty, not from an exalted point of view, but because it makes enormously for the happiness and convenience of every one about us. In the old-fashioned story-books a prodigious value, perhaps an exaggerated value, was set upon time; one was told to redeem the time, whatever that might mean. The ideal mother of the family, in the little books which I used to read in my childhood, was a lady who appeared punctually at breakfast, and had a bunch of keys hanging at her girdle. Breakfast over, she paid a series of visits, looked into the larder, weighed out stores, and then settled down to some solid reading or embroidered a fire screen; the afternoon would be spent in visits of benevolence, carrying portions of the midday dinner to her poorer neighbors; the evening would be given to working at the fire screen again, while some one read aloud. Somehow it is not an attractive picture, though it need not have been so dull as it appears. The point is whether the solid reading had a useful effect or not. In the books I have in view, it generally led the mater-

familias into having an undue respect for correct information, and a pharisaical contempt for people who indulged their fancy. In "Harry and Lucy," for instance, Lucy, who is the only human figure in the book, is perpetually being snubbed by the terrible hard-headed Harry, with his desperate interest in machinery, by the repellent father who delights to explain the laws of gravity and the parabola described by the stone which Harry throws. What was undervalued in those old, dry, high-principled books was the charm of vivid apprehension, of fanciful imagination, of simple, neighborly kindliness. The aim was too much to improve everybody and everything, to impart and retain correct information. Nowadays the pendulum has swung a little too far the other way, and children are too much encouraged, if anything, to be childish; but there is a certain austere charm in the old, simple, high-minded household life for all that.

The point is that habit should be there, like the hem of a handkerchief, to keep the fabric together, but that it should not be relentlessly and oppressively paraded; the triumph is to have habits and to conceal them, just as in Ruskin's celebrated dictum, that the artist's aim should be to be fit for the best society, and then that he should renounce it. One ought to be reliable, to perform the work that one undertakes without ceaseless reminders, to discharge duties easily and satisfactorily; and then, if to this one can add the grace of apparent leisureliness, the power of never ap-

pearing to be interrupted, the good-humored readiness to amuse and to be amused, one is high upon the ladder of perfection. It is absolutely necessary, if one is to play a satisfactory part in the world, to be in earnest, to be serious; and it is no less necessary to abstain from ostentatiously parading that seriousness. One has to take for granted that others are serious too; and far more is effected by example than by precept, in this, as in most matters. But if one cannot do both, it is better to be serious and to show it than to make a show of despising seriousness and decrying it. It is better to have habits and to let others know it than to lose one's soul by endeavoring to escape the reproach of priggishness, a quality which in these easy-going days incurs an excessive degree of odium.

SOCIAL LIFE IN AMERICA[1]

Albert Bushnell Hart

Outside of the contrast between the native and the immigrant, the Eastern man and the Western, the farmer and the city man, lies the question of American ideals of conduct. Social life is a part of history, both because "the short and simple annals of the poor" make up the record of the great majority of mankind; and because the way we live affects and deflects political happenings. People eat and drink, and have very decided opinions as to taxes on breadstuffs and the excise on beer. People like to be in the fashion; yet in a spirit of patriotic self-denial our revolutionary ancestors boycotted English goods. People half a century ago fed the hungry and protected the oppressed; and therefore saw no reason why they should be held back by a fugitive-slave law. People came to understand the importance of education; and statutes against child labor sprang into existence. In a thousand different ways social and domestic life, especially of the common people, finds its expres-

[1] From "National Ideals Historically Traced," by Albert Bushnell Hart. Vol. 26 of *The American Nation*. Copyright, 1907, by Harper & Brothers.

sion in the legislation and the government of the country.

So it has ever been. The daily life of the seventeenth century in the colonies helps to make the history of that time picturesque. Who would not have hobnobbed with Judge Samuel Sewall, to be entered in his diary as "an entertaining gentleman"? Who would not have liked to discuss with Colonel William Byrd the points of a good negro field hand? Who would not have enjoyed sitting with William Penn over his proposed constitution for Pennsylvania? The colonies had their agreeable side. Notwithstanding the diseases of the New World, it was a cleaner and healthier place than the court of King James I, who never washed his hands, but sometimes wiped them on a damp napkin. Yet the fathers lived in poverty and hardship, with few houses which people would nowadays think even comfortable; with hand-wrought nails, hinges, and locks; with clothes of homespun, eked out with small importations of foreign linen and cloth; with scanty amusements of any kind, except cockfighting and similar sports for the coarser sort. Yet people had their courtings and weddings and christenings and comely funerals, with abundant store of drinkables. They even joked in a stately way, and boys called after a famous divine, "John Cotton, thou art an old fool." If social life was thin and eventless, people were the more interested in the affairs of Church and State, and liked to complain of "novelties, oppression, atheism,

excess, superfluity, idleness, contempt of authority, and troubles in other parts to be remembered." [1]

Against the narrowness of social life, the South always protested, and in the eighteenth century all the colonies got away from it. The few rich men lived handsomely in houses like the Vassall mansion in Cambridge, later the Longfellow House, and always the most beautiful place of residence in America. They had velvet suits, which they carefully bequeathed by will to their sons; they had coaches and four; they had silver services like that of John Hancock, and proper glasses and no lack of Madeira to fill them; they wore the crimson smallclothes which still adorn the portraits of colonial worthies. Alongside these magnates were the professional men, of whom none but the ministers were well educated or much respected. The doctors, to judge by the account of one of them,[2] were a rude and untutored set, much given to uproarious quarrels over the merits of schools of medicine of which they understood little; the lawyers in New England were still under suspicion down to the Revolution, as a useless set of fellows.

Professional men lived much like the well-to-do farmers, in comfortable houses, surrounded with those families of ten and twelve children which put far into the future the shadow of race suicide. Life was simple and easy because there was little to do. Servants were few,

[1] Eliot, "American Contributions to Civilization," 357–359.
[2] Hamilton's "Itinarium," *passim*.

because the older children brought up the younger. The men of the eighteenth century lived in a world rapidly enlarging, with every year more commerce, more travel, more ships, more imports, more contact with the world, and a corresponding rise of discontent. It was in its way an artistic period; many of the public buildings of that time still stand to show the excellent taste of our ancestors in architecture, and the skill of the workman in reproducing English types of the Georgian period. The architecture like the people was for the most part plain, practical, and infused with common sense; there are no majestic buildings or stately public monuments out of that period. The woodwork and furniture of the houses show the same influence of good English taste; and the eighteenth-century portrait artists, Smibert, Stuart in his successive brandy-and-water style and claret-and-water style, and Copley, if they created no school, with credit carried out their function as painters in the prevailing English style.

It would be a mistake to suppose that colonial life was simply a small copy of the English social life of that time. America had no capital, no baths and frequented resorts, no cities, and little of the bustle, gayety, and fashion of even the English county towns. America was provincial, and differed widely from provincial England because there was no titled aristocracy; considering the part played in other English colonies by men of rank, it is surprising how few ever found their way to America, and that only one hereditary title even of baronet was

held there. With that sheet anchor gone, the galley of fashion could be boarded by anybody who raised himself above his fellows; and the governors, the representatives of official dignity, had to make terms with parvenus by creating them councilors. The colonies contained few owners of landed estates living on their rents; and in no communities of the world have the poor been so well off and the well-to-do so little encumbered with prosperity. Morally it was a rude and boisterous community, with a great deal of hard drinking.[1] Even in Puritan communities there was much sexual immorality, and quarrels and riots were frequent; but the drunkard was pardoned, the libertine felt sorry when he went to church, and the trend of society was towards honesty, thrift, and godliness.

The status of colonial women was much like that of their English sisters, respected, free, safe, good-humored, but painfully ignorant. Occasionally arose a woman like the poetess Anne Bradstreet, the traveler Madame Knight, or that most delightful of new women, Eliza Lucas, of South Carolina, to prove by their pens that women could think. To the great majority of colonial women, however, life was as a later descendant of the Puritans has described it: "Generations of them cooked, carried water, washed and made clothes, bore children in lonely peril, and tried to bring them up safely through all sorts of physical exposures without medical or surgical help, lived themselves in terror of savages, in terror

[1] Goelet, in Hart's "Contemporaries," II, No. 84.

of the wilderness, and under the burden of a sad and cruel creed, and sank at last into nameless graves, without any vision of the grateful days when millions of their descendants should rise up and call them blessed." [1]

American social life after the Revolution was subject to several new influences which modified it. A few frontier and isolated communities like the eastern shore of Virginia and Cape Cod remained in the colonial condition. Where the population thickened up, city life began and two currents of foreign influence were felt. The first, from 1778 to 1793, was the French, which much affected the American habits of life: the lively French officer with his admiration for the American pretty girl, and the French merchant with his tasteful goods, for a time held the market; then, when the Napoleonic wars began, Great Britain resumed her intellectual and commercial sway. It was impossible that the old social forms should continue; and the first evidence of a great change was the sudden growth of associations of every kind: the churches received a national organization; secret orders, especially the Free Masons, began to flourish, and societies for social reform multiplied, such as the Colonization Society and the Washingtonian temperance societies.[2]

As the country developed, people started new industries, wealth accumulated, labor was cheap, lumber and brick abundant; and throughout the United States,

[1] Eliot, "American Contributions to Civilization," 358.
[2] Cf. Tocqueville, "Democracy in America" (Spencer ed.), II, 111.

especially in the northern sections, building went forward rapidly and the cities began to widen out. This was the Greek temple period when the marble portico of the Acropolis was imitated in sandstone and stucco throughout the United States; and Bulfinch's combination of the classic and the romanesque in the Capitol at Washington produced the first monumental building in the United States. After 1815 house architecture began to run down, and the plastic arts down to 1860 were at a very low ebb. Trumbull's exaggerated historical pictures and a few portraits are almost the only artistic memorials of that time which are valued by posterity.

In social life the most noteworthy thing was the sudden growth of domestic conveniences. Up to 1800 people lived much like their ancestors three hundred years before, in houses many of which had but a single great fireplace. Now came a series of improvements which put household life on an entirely different footing. The common use of friction matches after 1830 saved an infinitude of pains to the cook, the workman, and the smoker; instead of the iron pots and Dutch ovens came the air-tight cook stove, an unspeakably good friend to the housewife; for the open fire was substituted the wood stove, and then the coal stove, which leaked gas but saved toil and trouble; for the labor of the needle, which has kept feminine fingers employed from the time of Penelope, came the sewing machine, rude enough at first, which revolutionized the making of clothing. The term "Yankee notion" became known in trade, and

included patent sausage mills, apple parers, flatirons, and a hundred other household labor savers, which relieved the cares of life and helped to prolong for another generation the era of large families.

In deeper respects the sixty years in which 1830 is the mid-point are significant; and Tocqueville minutely photographed and fixed the characteristics of this time. He finds the American remarkably grave, taking thought for the future life and government of his people. American manners seem to him easy and sincere: "They form, as it were, a light and loosely woven veil, through which the real feelings and private opinions of each individual are easily discernible." He is struck by an inborn feeling of social equality, such that the American does not easily suppose that his company is declined. Society is "animated because men and things are always changing: but it is monotonous, because all these changes are alike." People move about little, and European travel is uncommon. Young people are treated with confidence and freedom, and early strike out their own course of life. The American girl fascinates the Frenchman, and the philosopher sums up his deliberations by saying: "I have nowhere seen women occupying a loftier position; and if I were asked . . . to what the singular prosperity and growing strength of that people ought mainly to be attributed, I should reply — to the superiority of their women." The picture painted by this competent observer is of a busy, thoughtful folk, among whom all aptitudes have their

part, and who give free scope to the individual, yet are somehow oppressed by their own spirit, and know not how to get out of a monotonous and not very wide or interesting life.[1]

The social changes of the earlier nineteenth century were accented after the Civil War, and caused a larger feeling of national life. The war threw several million men into new combinations, widened their horizons, taught them to know one another, broke up barriers. The West, still farther extending, carried people across the mountains and to the Pacific. A flood of immigration brought new ideas, and travel on a large scale took people of American birth to Europe. The South, while distinctly American, had kept up a stricter social system with caste distinctions, but was now opened up for the commercial traveler and the health-seeker; so that the parts of the Union were as never before interfused with one another.[2]

As in the previous era, the "American passion for physical well-being" brought about refinements of domestic life. Cheap transportation distributed fuel, and that made possible a variety of new forms of heating hotels, private houses, and public and office buildings. The hard coal base burner, the hot-air furnace, steam coils, hot-water pipes, and electric radiators,

[1] Tocqueville, "Democracy in America" (Spencer ed.), II, 182, 202–211, 224–236, 242; cf. MacDonald, "Jacksonian Democracy," Chap. I; Smith, "Parties and Slavery," Chap. XIX (*American Nation*, XV, XVIII).

[2] Shaler, "United States," II, 310.

each in turn seemed the summit of human convenience and comfort. So it was with lights: for the old-fashioned tallow candle was substituted the whale-oil lamp and the gas burner, then the kerosene lamp, then incandescent gas and the various forms of electric lighting. In colonial days people communicated by express riders; then came mails carried by men on horseback; in the thirties the mail train; in the forties the electric telegraph; in the seventies the telephone; in the nineties wireless telegraphy. It was the same in household supplies: time was when very respectable people, before they killed a steer, notified their neighbors and sold pieces all round, so that everybody might have fresh beef. The parallel inventions of the sealed provision can, which came in after the Civil War, and of transportation and storage on ice, brought perishable goods and delicacies within everybody's reach; while the old-fashioned country store, where everything is sold, was developed on a great scale in the city department stores. The foreign system of snug and cramped quarters was introduced into buildings called tenements, flats, or apartments, according to their cost and comfort. The Philadelphia World's Fair of 1876 waked Americans up to a knowledge of the possibilities in table service, silver, glass, and furniture, so that luxuries long enjoyed by the favored few and nurtured by foreign travel were suddenly multiplied and sometimes vulgarized. Poor indeed is the American family which does not every day

gaze upon its own antique rug (possibly made in Philadelphia), its stained-glass window, and its hand-painted oil picture! Remote the hamlet from which at least one person has not gone forth during the last ten years to stay overnight at the Waldorf-Astoria! 5

The amusements of the people have undergone a similar transformation: before the war the theater to many good people was a forbidden thing, like a pagan sacrifice to an early Christian; and those who went were drawn, not by the decorations, but by the act- 10 ing, while orchestral concerts were the esoteric delight of the few. Nowadays amusements are distributed wholesale. The old stock companies which could play anything from "King Lear" to "Bombastes Furioso" have disappeared, and their place is taken by musical 15 performances on a descending scale from grand opera to light opera, from light opera to opera bouffe, from opera bouffe to musical farce, from musical farce to vaudeville. Americans are far from being an artistic people, but there has developed an interest in and 20 knowledge of the arts which the country never knew before, due to an impetus which has come from foreign schools and scenes; and distinct American schools of painting, sculpture, and architecture have grown up. Perhaps the three most distinguished exhibitors in Eng- 25 land of late years have been the Americans Abbey, Sargent, and Whistler; in sculpture, MacMonnies and Saint-Gaudens stand in the front rank of the world's artists; in architecture, people ceased to imitate feebly

the Capitol at Washington; and the weak Gothic of Vaux and the pseudo-classic Greek Temple gave place to the broad and simple plans of Richardson and McKim, who struck out styles of their own admirably fitted to the American conditions of climate. The Americans have also developed a grandiose tower architecture which makes the spine of New York bristle like that of San Gemignano. Such temples as Trinity Church in Boston and the Cathedral of St. John the Divine in New York; such groups of academic structures as those of Stanford University and the Harvard Medical School; such railway stations as the Broad Street in Philadelphia; such public buildings as the Boston and New York public libraries, the Chicago post-office and the Texas state capitol — these show what the New World has power to do.

EMERSON[1]

George Santayana

Those who knew Emerson, or who stood so near to his time and to his circle that they caught some echo of his personal influence, did not judge him merely as a poet or philosopher, nor identify his efficacy with that of his writings. His friends and neighbors, the congregations he preached to in his younger days, the audiences that afterward listened to his lectures, all agreed in a veneration for his person which had nothing to do with their understanding or acceptance of his opinions. They flocked to him and listened to his word, not so much for the sake of its absolute meaning as for the atmosphere of candor, purity, and serenity that hung about it, as about a sort of sacred music. They felt themselves in the presence of a rare and beautiful spirit, who was in communion with a higher world. More than the truth his teaching might express, they valued the sense it gave them of a truth that was inexpressible. They became aware, if we may say so, of the ultra-violet rays of his spectrum, of the inaudible highest notes of his gamut, too pure and thin for common ears.

[1] Reprinted by permission from "Poetry and Religion." Copyright, 1900, by Charles Scribner's Sons.

This effect was by no means due to the possession on the part of Emerson of the secret of the universe, or even of a definite conception of ultimate truth. He was not a prophet who had once for all climbed his Sinai or his Tabor, and having there beheld the transfigured reality, descended again to make authoritative report of it to the world. Far from it. At bottom he had no doctrine at all. The deeper he went and the more he tried to grapple with fundamental conceptions, the vaguer and more elusive they became in his hands. Did he know what he meant by Spirit or the "Over-Soul"? Could he say what he understood by the terms, so constantly on his lips, Nature, Law, God, Benefit, or Beauty? He could not, and the consciousness of that incapacity was so lively within him that he never attempted to give articulation to his philosophy. His finer instinct kept him from doing that violence to his inspiration.

The source of his power lay not in his doctrine, but in his temperament, and the rare quality of his wisdom was due less to his reason than to his imagination. Reality eluded him; he had neither diligence nor constancy enough to master and possess it; but his mind was open to all philosophic influences, from whatever quarter they might blow; the lessons of science and the hints of poetry worked themselves out in him to a free and personal religion. He differed from the plodding many, not in knowing things better, but in having more ways of knowing

them. His grasp was not particularly firm, he was far from being, like a Plato or an Aristotle, past master in the art and the science of life. But his mind was endowed with unusual plasticity, with unusual spontaneity and liberty of movement — it was a fairyland of thoughts and fancies. He was like a young god making experiments in creation: he blotched the work, and always began again on a new and better plan. Every day he said, "Let there be light," and every day the light was new. His sun, like that of Heraclitus, was different every morning.

What seemed, then, to the more earnest and less critical of his hearers a revelation from above was in truth rather an insurrection from beneath, a shaking loose from convention, a disintegration of the normal categories of reason in favor of various imaginative principles, on which the world might have been built, if it had been built differently. This gift of revolutionary thinking allowed new aspects, hints of wider laws, premonitions of unthought-of fundamental unities to spring constantly into view. But such visions were necessarily fleeting, because the human mind had long before settled its grammar, and discovered, after much groping and many defeats, the general forms in which experience will allow itself to be stated. These general forms are the principles of common sense and positive science, no less imaginative in their origin than those notions which we now call transcendental, but grown prosaic,

like the metaphors of common speech, by dint of repetition.

Yet authority, even of this rational kind, sat lightly upon Emerson. To reject tradition and think as one might have thought if no man had ever existed before was indeed the aspiration of the Transcendentalists, and although Emerson hardly regarded himself as a member of that school, he largely shared its tendency and passed for its spokesman. Without protesting against tradition, he smilingly eluded it in his thoughts, untamable in their quiet irresponsibility. He fled to his woods or to his "pleachèd garden," to be the creator of his own worlds in solitude and freedom. No wonder that he brought thence to the tightly conventional minds of his contemporaries a breath as if from paradise. His simplicity in novelty, his profundity, his ingenuous ardor must have seemed to them something heavenly, and they may be excused if they thought they detected inspiration even in his occasional thin paradoxes and guileless whims. They were stifled with conscience and he brought them a breath of Nature; they were surfeited with shallow controversies and he gave them poetic truth.

Imagination, indeed, is his single theme. As a preacher might under every text enforce the same lessons of the Gospel, so Emerson traces in every sphere the same spiritual laws of experience — compensation, continuity, the self-expression of the Soul in the forms of Nature and of society, until she finally recog-

nizes herself in her own work and sees its beneficence and beauty. His constant refrain is the omnipotence of imaginative thought; its power first to make the world, then to understand it, and finally to rise above it. All Nature is an embodiment of our native fancy, all history a drama in which the innate possibilities of the spirit are enacted and realized. While the conflict of life and the shocks of experience seem to bring us face to face with an alien and overwhelming power, reflection can humanize and rationalize that power by conceiving its laws; and with this recognition of the rationality of all things comes the sense of their beauty and order. The destruction which Nature seems to prepare for our special hopes is thus seen to be the victory of our impersonal interests. To awaken in us this spiritual insight, an elevation of mind which is at once an act of comprehension and of worship, to substitute it for lower passions and more servile forms of intelligence — that is Emerson's constant effort. All his resources of illustration, observation, and rhetoric are used to deepen and clarify this sort of wisdom.

Such thought is essentially the same that is found in the German romantic or idealistic philosophers, with whom Emerson's affinity is remarkable, all the more as he seems to have borrowed little or nothing from their works. The critics of human nature, in the eighteenth century, had shown how much men's ideas depend on their predispositions, on the charac-

ter of their senses and the habits of their intelligence. Seizing upon this thought and exaggerating it, the romantic philosophers attributed to the spirit of man the omnipotence which had belonged to God, and felt that in this way they were reasserting the supremacy of mind over matter and establishing it upon a safe and rational basis.

The Germans were great system-makers, and Emerson cannot rival them in the sustained effort of thought by which they sought to reinterpret every sphere of being according to their chosen principles. But he surpassed them in an instinctive sense of what he was doing. He never represented his poetry as science, nor countenanced the formation of a new sect that should nurse the sense of a private and mysterious illumination, and relight the fagots of passion and prejudice. He never tried to seek out and defend the universal implications of his ideas, and never wrote the book he had once planned on the law of compensation, foreseeing, we may well believe, the sophistries in which he would have been directly involved. He fortunately preferred a fresh statement on a fresh subject. A suggestion once given, the spirit once aroused to speculation, a glimpse once gained of some ideal harmony, he chose to descend again to common sense and to touch the earth for a moment before another flight. The faculty of idealization was itself what he valued. Philosophy for him was rather a moral energy flowering into sprightliness of thought

than a body of serious and defensible doctrines. In practicing transcendental speculation only in this poetic and sporadic fashion, Emerson retained its true value and avoided its greatest danger. He secured the freedom and fertility of his thought and did not allow one conception of law or one hint of harmony to sterilize the mind and prevent the subsequent birth within it of other ideas, no less just and imposing than their predecessors. For we are not dealing at all in such a philosophy with matters of fact or with such verifiable truths as exclude their opposites. We are dealing only with imagination, with the art of conception, and with the various forms in which reflection, like a poet, may compose and recompose human experience.

A certain disquiet mingled, however, in the minds of Emerson's contemporaries with the admiration they felt for his purity and genius. They saw that he had forsaken the doctrines of the Church; and they were not sure whether he held quite unequivocally any doctrine whatever. We may not all of us share the concern for orthodoxy which usually caused this puzzled alarm: we may understand that it was not Emerson's vocation to be definite and dogmatic in religion any more than in philosophy. Yet that disquiet will not, even for us, wholly disappear. It is produced by a defect which naturally accompanies imagination in all but the greatest minds. I mean disorganization. Emerson not only conceived things

in new ways, but he seemed to think the new ways might cancel and supersede the old. His imagination was to invalidate the understanding. That inspiration which should come to fulfil seemed too often to come to destroy. If he was able so constantly to stimulate us to fresh thoughts, was it not because he demolished the labor of long ages of reflection? Was not the startling effect of much of his writing due to its contradiction to tradition and to common sense?

So long as he is a poet and in the enjoyment of his poetic license, we can blame this play of mind only by a misunderstanding. It is possible to think otherwise than as common sense thinks; there are other categories besides those of science. When we employ them we enlarge our lives. We add to the world of fact any number of worlds of the imagination in which human nature and the eternal relations of ideas may be nobly expressed. So far our imaginative fertility is only a benefit: it surrounds us with the congenial and necessary radiation of art and religion. It manifests our moral vitality in the bosom of Nature.

But sometimes imagination invades the sphere of understanding and seems to discredit its indispensable work. Common sense, we are allowed to infer, is a shallow affair: true insight changes all that. When so applied, poetic activity is not an unmixed good. It loosens our hold on fact and confuses our intelli-

gence, so that we forget that intelligence has itself every prerogative of imagination, and has besides the sanction of practical validity. We are made to believe that since the understanding is something human and conditioned, something which might have been different, as the senses might have been different, and which we may yet, so to speak, get behind — therefore the understanding ought to be abandoned. We long for higher faculties, neglecting those we have, we yearn for intuition, closing our eyes upon experience. We become mystical.

Mysticism, as we have said, is the surrender of a category of thought because we divine its relativity. As every new category, however, must share this reproach, the mystic is obliged in the end to give them all up, the poetic and moral categories no less than the physical, so that the end of his purification is the atrophy of his whole nature, the emptying of his whole heart and mind to make room, as he thinks, for God. By attacking the authority of the understanding as the organon of knowledge, by substituting itself for it as the herald of a deeper truth, the imagination thus prepares its own destruction. For if the understanding is rejected because it cannot grasp the absolute, the imagination and all its works — art, dogma, worship — must presently be rejected for the same reason. Common sense and poetry must both go by the board, and conscience must follow after: for all these are human and relative. Mysticism will be satisfied only

with the absolute, and as the absolute, by its very definition, is not representable by any specific faculty, it must be approached through the abandonment of all. The lights of life must be extinguished that the light of the absolute may shine, and the possession of everything in general must be secured by the surrender of everything in particular.

The same diffidence, however, the same constant renewal of sincerity which kept Emerson's flights of imagination near to experience, kept his mysticism also within bounds. A certain mystical tendency is pervasive with him, but there are only one or two subjects on which he dwells with enough constancy and energy of attention to make his mystical treatment of them pronounced. One of these is the question of the unity of all minds in the single soul of the universe, which is the same in all creatures; another is the question of evil and of its evaporation in the universal harmony of things. Both these ideas suggest themselves at certain turns in every man's experience, and might receive a rational formulation. But they are intricate subjects, obscured by many emotional prejudices, so that the labor, impartiality, and precision which would be needed to elucidate them are to be looked for in scholastic rather than in inspired thinkers, and in Emerson least of all. Before these problems he is alternately ingenuous and rhapsodical, and in both moods equally helpless. Individuals no doubt exist, he says to himself. But, ah! Napoleon is in

every schoolboy. In every squatter in the Western prairies we shall find an owner —

> Of Cæsar's hand and Plato's brain,
> Of Lord Christ's heart, and Shakespeare's strain.

But how? we may ask. Potentially? Is it because any mind, were it given the right body and the right experience, were it made over, in a word, into another mind, would resemble that other mind to the point of identity? Or is it that our souls are already so largely similar that we are subject to many kindred promptings and share many ideals unrealizable in our particular circumstances? But then we should simply be saying that if what makes men different were removed, men would be indistinguishable, or that, in so far as they are now alike, they can understand one another by summoning up their respective experiences in the fancy. There would be no mysticism in that, but at the same time, alas, no eloquence, no paradox, and, if we must say the word, no nonsense.

On the question of evil, Emerson's position is of the same kind. There is evil, of course, he tells us. Experience is sad. There is a crack in everything that God has made. But, ah! the laws of the universe are sacred and beneficent. Without them nothing good could arise. All things, then, are in their right places and the universe is perfect above our querulous tears. Perfect? we may ask. But perfect from what point of view, in reference to what ideal? To its own? To that of a man who renounc-

ing himself and all naturally dear to him, ignoring the injustice, suffering, and impotence in the world, allows his will and his conscience to be hypnotized by the spectacle of a necessary evolution, and lulled into cruelty by the pomp and music of a tragic show? In that case the evil is not explained, it is forgotten; it is not cured, but condoned. We have surrendered the category of the better and the worse, the deepest foundation of life and reason; we have become mystics on the one subject on which, above all others, we ought to be men.

Two forces may be said to have carried Emerson in this mystical direction; one, that freedom of his imagination which we have already noted, and which kept him from the fear of self-contradiction; the other the habit of worship inherited from his clerical ancestors and enforced by his religious education. The spirit of conformity, the unction, the loyalty even unto death inspired by the religion of Jehovah, were dispositions acquired by too long a discipline and rooted in too many forms of speech, of thought, and of worship for a man like Emerson, who had felt their full force, ever to be able to lose them. The evolutions of his abstract opinions left that habit unchanged. Unless we keep this circumstance in mind, we shall not be able to understand the kind of elation and sacred joy, so characteristic of his eloquence, with which he propounds laws of Nature and aspects of experience which, viewed in themselves, afford but an equivocal support to moral enthusiasm. An optimism

so persistent and unclouded as his will seem at variance with the description he himself gives of human life, a description colored by a poetic idealism, but hardly by an optimistic bias.

We must remember, therefore, that this optimism is a pious tradition, originally justified by the belief in a personal God and in a providential government of affairs for the ultimate and positive good of the elect, and that the habit of worship survived in Emerson as an instinct after those positive beliefs had faded into a recognition of "spiritual laws." We must remember that Calvinism had known how to combine an awestruck devotion to the Supreme Being with no very roseate picture of the destinies of mankind, and for more than two hundred years had been breeding in the stock from which Emerson came a willingness to be, as the phrase is, "damned for the glory of God."

What wonder, then, that when, for the former inexorable dispensation of Providence, Emerson substituted his general spiritual and natural laws, he should not have felt the spirit of worship fail within him? On the contrary, his thought moved in the presence of moral harmonies which seemed to him truer, more beautiful, and more beneficent than those of the old theology. An independent philosopher would not have seen in those harmonies an object of worship or a sufficient basis for optimism. But he was not an independent philosopher, in spite of his belief in independence. He inherited the problems and the preoccupations of the theology from

which he started, being in this respect like the German idealists, who, with all their pretense of absolute metaphysics, were in reality only giving elusive and abstract forms to traditional theology. Emerson, too, was not primarily a philosopher, but a Puritan mystic with a poetic fancy and a gift for observation and epigram, and he saw in the laws of Nature, idealized by his imagination, only a more intelligible form of the divinity he had always recognized and adored. His was not a philosophy passing into a religion, but a religion expressing itself as a philosophy and veiled, as at its setting it descended the heavens, in various tints of poetry and science.

If we ask ourselves what was Emerson's relation to the scientific and religious movements of his time, and what place he may claim in the history of opinion, we must answer that he belonged very little to the past, very little to the present, and almost wholly to that abstract sphere into which mystical or philosophic aspiration has carried a few men in all ages. The religious tradition in which he was reared was that of Puritanism, but of a Puritanism which, retaining its moral intensity and metaphysical abstraction, had minimized its doctrinal expression and become Unitarian. Emerson was indeed the Psyche of Puritanism, "the latest-born and fairest vision far" of all that "faded hierarchy." A Puritan whose religion was all poetry, a poet whose only pleasure was thought, he showed in his life and personality the meagreness, the constraint, the frigid and con-

scious consecration which belonged to his clerical ancestors, while his inmost impersonal spirit ranged abroad over the fields of history and Nature, gathering what ideas it might, and singing its little snatches of inspired song.

The traditional element was thus rather an external and unessential contribution to Emerson's mind; he had the professional tinge, the decorum, the distinction of an old-fashioned divine; he had also the habit of writing sermons, and he had the national pride and hope of a religious people that felt itself providentially chosen to establish a free and godly commonwealth in a new world. For the rest, he separated himself from the ancient creed of the community with a sense rather of relief than of regret. A literal belief in Christian doctrines repelled him as unspiritual, as manifesting no understanding of the meaning which, as allegories, those doctrines might have to a philosophic and poetical spirit. Although as a clergyman he was at first in the habit of referring to the Bible and its lessons as to a supreme authority, he had no instinctive sympathy with the inspiration of either the Old or the New Testament; in Hafiz or Plutarch, in Plato or Shakespeare, he found more congenial stuff.

While he thus preferred to withdraw, without rancor and without contempt, from the ancient fellowship of the church, he assumed an attitude hardly less cool and deprecatory toward the enthusiasms of the new era. The national ideal of democracy and freedom had his

entire sympathy; he allowed himself to be drawn into the movement against slavery; he took a curious and smiling interest in the discoveries of natural science and in the material progress of the age. But he could go no farther. His contemplative nature, his religious training, his dispersed reading, made him stand aside from the life of the world, even while he studied it with benevolent attention. His heart was fixed on eternal things and he was in no sense a prophet for his age or country. He belonged by nature to that mystical company of devout souls that recognize no particular home and are dispersed throughout history, although not without intercommunication. He felt his affinity to the Hindoos and the Persians, to the Platonists and the Stoics. Like them he remains "a friend and aider of those who would live in the spirit." If not a star of the first magnitude, he is certainly a fixed star in the firmament of philosophy. Alone as yet among Americans, he may be said to have won a place there, if not by the originality of his thought, at least by the originality and beauty of the expression he gave to thoughts that are old and imperishable.

PERSUASION

ON THE READING OF NEWSPAPERS[1]

Henry David Thoreau

I do not know but it is too much to read one newspaper a week. I have tried it recently, and for so long it seems to me that I have not dwelt in my native region. The sun, the clouds, the snow, the trees, say not so much to me. You cannot serve two masters. It requires more than a day's devotion to know and to possess the wealth of a day.

We may well be ashamed to tell what things we have read or heard in our day. I do not know why my news should be so trivial, — considering what one's dreams and expectations are, why the developments should be so paltry. The news we hear, for the most part, is not news to our genius. It is the stalest repetition. You are often tempted to ask why such stress is laid on a particular experience which you have had, — that, after twenty-five years, you should meet Hobbins, Registrar of Deeds, again on the sidewalk. Have you not budged an inch, then? Such is the daily news. Its facts appear to float in the atmosphere, insignificant as

[1] Reprinted by permission from the "Miscellanies," pp. 274–280. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin & Co.

the sporules of fungi, and impinge on some neglected *thallus*, or surface of our minds, which affords a basis for them, and hence a parasitic growth. We should wash ourselves clean of such news. Of what consequence, though our planet explode, if there is no character involved in the explosion? In health we have not the least curiosity about such events. We do not live for idle amusement. I would not run round a corner to see the world blow up.

Not without a slight shudder at the danger, I often perceive how near I had come to admitting into my mind the details of some trivial affair, — the news of the street, and I am astonished to observe how willing men are to lumber their minds with such rubbish, — to permit idle rumors and incidents of the most insignificant kind to intrude on ground which should be sacred to thought. Shall the mind be a public arena, where the affairs of the street and the gossip of the tea table chiefly are discussed? Or shall it be a quarter of heaven itself, — an hypæthral temple, consecrated to the service of the gods? I find it so difficult to dispose of the few facts which to me are significant, that I hesitate to burden my attention with those which are insignificant, which only a divine mind could illustrate. Such is for the most part the news in newspapers and conversation. It is important to preserve the mind's chastity in this respect. Think of admitting the details of a single case of the criminal court into our thoughts, to stalk profanely through their very *sanctum sanctorum* for an hour, ay, for

many hours! to make a very bar-room of the mind's inmost apartment, as if for so long the dust of the street had occupied us, — the very street itself, with all its travel, its bustle and filth, had passed through our thoughts' shrine! Would it not be an intellectual and moral suicide? When I have been compelled to sit spectator and auditor in a court room for some hours, and have seen my neighbors, who were not compelled, stealing in from time to time, and tiptoeing about with washed hands and faces, it has appeared to my mind's eye that, when they took off their hats, their ears suddenly expanded into vast hoppers for sound, between which even their narrow heads were crowded. Like the vanes of windmills, they caught the broad but shallow stream of sound, which, after a few titillating gyrations in their coggy brains, passed out the other side. I wondered if, when they got home, they were as careful to wash their ears as before their hands and faces. It has seemed to me at such a time that the auditors and the witnesses, the jury and the counsel, the judge and the criminal at the bar, — if I may presume him guilty before he is convicted, — were all equally criminal, and a thunderbolt might be expected to descend and consume them all together.

By all kinds of traps and signboards, threatening the extreme penalty of the divine law, exclude such trespassers from the only ground which can be sacred to you. It is so hard to forget what it is worse than useless to remember! If I am to be a thoroughfare, I pre-

fer that it be of the mountain brooks, the Parnassian streams, and not the town sewers. There is inspiration, that gossip which comes to the ear of the attentive mind from the courts of heaven. There is the profane and stale revelation of the barroom and the police court. The same ear is fitted to receive both communications. Only the character of the hearer determines to which it shall be open, and to which closed. I believe that the mind can be permanently profaned by the habit of attending to trivial things, so that all our thoughts shall be tinged with triviality. Our very intellect shall be macadamized, as it were, — its foundation broken into fragments for the wheels of travel to roll over; and if you would know what will make the most durable pavement, surpassing rolled stones, spruce blocks, and asphaltum, you have only to look into some of our minds which have been subjected to this treatment so long.

If we have thus desecrated ourselves, — as who has not? — the remedy will be by wariness and devotion to reconsecrate ourselves, and make once more a fane of the mind. We should treat our minds, that is, ourselves, as innocent and ingenuous children, whose guardians we are, and be careful what objects and what subjects we thrust on their attention. Read not the Times. Read the Eternities. Conventionalities are at length as bad as impurities. Even the facts of science may dust the mind by their dryness, unless they are in a sense effaced each morning, or rather rendered fertile by the dews of fresh and living truth. Knowledge

does not come to us by details, but in flashes of light from heaven. Yes, every thought that passes through the mind helps to wear and tear it, and to deepen the ruts, which, as in the streets of Pompeii, evince how much it has been used. How many things there are concerning which we might well deliberate whether we had better know them, — had better let their peddling carts be driven, even at the slowest trot or walk, over that bridge of glorious span by which we trust to pass at last from the farthest brink of time to the nearest shore of eternity! Have we no culture, no refinement, — but skill only to live coarsely and serve the Devil? — to acquire a little worldly wealth, or fame, or liberty, and make a false show with it, as if we were all husk and shell, with no tender and living kernel to us? Shall our institutions be like those chestnut burs which contain abortive nuts, perfect only to prick the fingers?

THE SPIRIT OF DEVOTION[1]

Arthur Twining Hadley

And David longed, and said, Oh that one would give me to drink of the water of the well of Bethlehem, which is by the gate!

And the three mighty men brake through the host of the Philistines and drew water out of the well of Bethlehem, that was by the gate, and brought it to David: nevertheless he would not drink thereof, but poured it out unto the Lord.

And he said, Be it far from me, O Lord, that I should do this: is not this the blood of men that went in jeopardy of their lives? Therefore he would not drink it.

Judged by material standards, this is a tale of folly from beginning to end. It was foolish for David to utter his wish; it was doubly foolish for his captains to risk their lives to compass it; it was trebly foolish for him to waste the gift which had been won at so much risk.

I do not mean that all who read the story would criticise it in this way. In an episode like this, we instinctively feel that there is something which makes such criticism inadequate and impertinent. But when we are dealing, not with some exceptional matter of ancient history, but with this everyday world of the twentieth century, and are valuing little deeds of heroism

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instead of great ones, we are prone to use material standards, and call them by the specious name of common sense. We are apt to judge work by its definite and measurable results; to make these results the motive of service and the criterion of success; and to condemn as misplaced sentiment anything which sacrifices or risks a tangible chance of physical comfort and security for an intangible manifestation of loyalty or devotion. Amid much that is good in our twentieth-century spirit, this overvaluation of material enjoyment and of tangible success constitutes a grave danger. All the achievements of modern science and of modern democracy will be worth little if, in the long run, they teach people to regard knowledge for the sake of the return which it will bring, and to measure success in life by the concrete results with which men can credit themselves.

I am not going to make this material view of life the subject of argument or criticism. I am going to call your attention to the fact that we do not really hold it; and that when we allow ourselves to be carried on with the current of popular judgment so as to pretend that we hold it, we are letting the best side of our own nature be suppressed, and our best possibilities of personal growth and public service be stunted and withered.

I do not believe that there is a single man in this audience who values life primarily as a means of securing comfort. We value it as a field of action. We care for the doing of things. Signal achievement in itself appeals to our imagination and interest. We admire

Nansen because he succeeded in getting so much nearer the North Pole than anybody ever did before him; we do not admire him in the least for his weak efforts to justify his expedition on the basis of its scientific results. A man who tries to go to the North Pole is engaged in a glorious play, which justifies more risk and more expenditure of life than would be warranted for a few miserable entomological specimens, however remote from the place where they had been previously found. It is of far less material use to go to the North Pole than to raise a hundred thousand bushels of wheat; but every man of you, if he had the choice between going to the North Pole and raising a hundred thousand bushels of wheat, would take the former.

Turn back over the pages of history to the stories which have most moved men's hearts, and what are they? They are stories of action, deeds of daring, where the risk habitually outweighed the chance of practical results. Nay, the most inspiring of them all are often manifestations of hopeless bravery, where the likelihood of success was absolutely nothing. When we read of the soldiers of Gustavus Adolphus's regiment at Lützen, who after the loss of their king stood firm in the ranks until the line of dead was as straight and complete as had been the line of the living on dress parade; when we hear of the *Cumberland* at Hampton Roads, waging the hopeless fight of wood against iron, and keeping the flag afloat at the mainmast head when the vessel and all who remained in her

had sunk; when we remember the tale of the Alamo, in whose courtyard and hospital a handful of American frontiersmen fought against the army of Mexico, without hope of victory, but without thought of retreat or surrender, till they earned by the very completeness of their annihilation the glory of that monumental inscription: "Thermopylæ had its messenger of defeat; the Alamo had none"; then do we see how hollow is our pretense of valuing things by results when we are brought face to face with the really heroic struggles of life. It is the doing that makes the deed worthy of record, not the material outcome.

This is my first point: that we value life as a field of action. The second point that I want to make is that we value those lives highest which are marked by the habit of unselfish action. Doing makes the deed; unselfish doing makes the man. Even for those who are cast in heroic mold, and start with the habit and the power of accomplishing great things, there is something about selfishness which seems to deaden the power and deface the model. Napoleon had a character which gave the promise of heroism; but its climax is at the beginning, not at the end. To the student of the heroic in history, he shines brightest in his Italian campaign. From Rivoli to the Pyramids, from the Pyramids to Austerlitz, from Austerlitz to Moscow, and from Moscow to Waterloo, we find successive stages of a decadence poorly concealed even when widening material prosperity was most splendid. But with a man

like Washington or Lincoln, who worked for others and not for himself, you will find in each stage of his career a growth of mind and heart which made his followers love him more and which makes history yield him a larger meed of admiration. The successes of Napoleon left him each year smaller. The failures of Washington or Lincoln left them larger.

In the verdict of history the question whether a man possessed this unselfishness counts for more than any peculiarities of his intellect or character, or than any arguments as to the rightfulness of the cause he advocated. Never were there two men more utterly and radically different in character, in intellect, and in position, than the great Civil War leaders, Grant and Lee. But as we are passing somewhat from the heat of passion and narrowness of vision engendered by war, we see that the dominant trait of each of these men was that he counted his cause for everything and himself for nothing. It was this trait which gave them their greatest power as commanders of their respective armies, and which distinguished them from many other generals, perhaps equally able, in securing them a common tribute of personal respect from the children of friend and foe. Nor is it in war alone that the power of unselfishness to make the man comes conspicuously to the front. In every line of life work, whether commercial or political, professional or charitable, we see and feel the distinction between the man who is looking out for himself and the man who forgets himself in looking out

for others. We suspect the man of the former type, even when he is doing things which seem desirable. We honor the man of the latter type, even when we regard his methods as mistaken and his aims as chimerical.

But really unselfish action in peace or war does something more than make a man himself great. It helps others to be like him. Where the leader is tainted with selfishness, the followers will be selfish too. Where the leader works for other men, each of those other men, according to the measure of his power, will be stimulated to go outside of himself and work for a common cause. The fact that Washington could bear his burdens so patiently in dealing with Congress and with commissioners, was a powerful influence in helping the soldiers of his army to bear their totally different burdens of hunger and cold in the winter at Valley Forge. Unselfish leadership gives an inspiration which people sometimes catch with surprising quickness, and habitually hold with yet more surprising tenacity. There is in the human heart a capacity for hero-worship which is the chief thing that makes political progress possible. People will not hazard their comfort for a new theory. They are suspicious of philosophic argument. But once let them see a man who is living for something better than that which they have seen before, and they will follow him to the ends of the earth.

The really great leader, we may say with all reverence, is the revelation of God to his followers. If he, with

his wide vision and large powers, subordinates himself to an unselfish purpose — be it the alleviation of the sufferings of his fellow-men, or the emancipation of a downtrodden race from its conquerors, or the development of a new social order — others are ready to accept his leadership and to regard his sayings and doings as revelations of the divine purpose. When David poured out upon the rocks the water which had been brought through so much peril, it was the token that he was working for the Lord, and not for himself. It was just because his soldiers' blood was destined by him for the Lord's service and not for his own that they were ready to shed that blood in the fulfillment of his slightest wish. It was his devotion which made their devotion, and which enabled him and his soldiers together to establish the glorious kingdom of Judah. And when, centuries later, the Christ who might have made himself king of the Jews and surrounded his disciples with all the pleasures of kingly authority, offered himself as a sacrifice for his work, it was the pouring out of his blood which made possible among those disciples that new understanding of religion which founded a kingdom that was not of this world, but was greater far than anything which the fishermen of Galilee or the populace of Jerusalem had ever conceived.

The revelation of God in the life of Jesus Christ meant more to the world in teaching the possibilities of religion than all the theology that was ever written. And in the measure that our life is like his, we have the

same power to reveal God to others. None of us lives to himself. Every act of self-subordination, however small; every sacrifice of convenience and interest to the comfort of those about us; every renunciation of personal ambition in order to promote ideals which shall remain when we have passed away — is, in ways often unseen, a lesson and a help to others to go and do likewise. Not in large things only, but in small things, is it true that the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church. We are sometimes tempted to wonder, in the midst of the fatigues and perplexities of trying to do right, what all this struggle may be worth. No man is free from these moments of doubt and weariness. Jesus himself in the garden of Gethsemane prayed that the cup might pass from him. But if through trial and weakness a man preserves his steadiness of purpose, content to leave to others the selfish gains and visible results of achievement, he will oftentimes find — perhaps as a ray of light at the moment, or perhaps not till years afterward — that some one who saw his perplexities and discouragements has been thereby led to a new conception of duty and a new ideal of life which he never could have learned by seeing him in prosperity. It is harder to keep a straight course in the nighttime than in the daytime, and it shows less; but it means more.

Gentlemen of the graduating class: You are ambitious, and justly ambitious, to be leaders of men. There are two ways in which you can prove your right to exercise that leadership: by good judgment, or by heroism.

The opportunities for the exercise of judgment are obvious to every man. The development of civil liberty and industrial organization has made them larger than they ever were before. It is a good thing that it should be so. It is a good thing that men should be free to seek happiness in their own way; and that you, if you can calculate more accurately where their political and industrial advantage lies, should be allowed to guide them. Just as long as your calculations are right, you may be certain that every selfish man will follow you with the same fidelity with which the gambler stakes his money on the success of him whom he believes to be the shrewdest card player. Success and fidelity of this kind are so conspicuous and so widely heralded that some people seem to think there is no other success or fidelity worth considering.

But they are wrong. The world is more than a game of cards. History is more than a record of gambling operations. Fidelity is more than selfish belief in the accuracy of another man's predictions. To a community which has no higher ideals than these, destruction is approaching rapidly. If it were true, as some metaphysicians tell us, that all action is necessarily selfish, the only difference being that some people admit their selfishness, others try to conceal it from the rest of the world, and a few go so far as to conceal it from themselves — the whole social order would centuries ago have gone to pieces. If it were true, as a large section of the community seems to believe, that a man's success is

measured by the money and the offices which he can command, or that the test of a good education is to be found in the fact that it fits a man to make money and to get offices, the American republic would be fast approaching its end.

In the face of conditions like these, we need to insist more than ever before on the possibility — nay, on the absolute duty — of that devotion to ideals which underlies social order and social progress. You will have failed to learn the best lesson of your college life unless you have caught that spirit which teaches you to value money and offices and other symbols of success for the sake of the possibilities of service which they represent, and to despise the man who thinks of the money or offices rather than of the use he can make of them. It is this way of estimating success which makes a man a gentleman in his dealings with others, which makes him a patriot when his country calls for his services, which makes him a Christian in his conception of life and his ideals of daily living. These are the things which count in the long run. If you value the world simply for what you can get out of it, be assured that the world will in turn estimate your value to it by what it can get out of you. A man who sets his ambition in such a narrow frame may have followers in prosperity, but not in adversity. He can secure plenty of sycophants, but no friends. That man, on the other hand, who values the world for what he can put into it; who deals courteously with his associates, patriotically with

his country, and who, under whatsoever creed or form, has that spirit of devotion to an ideal which is the essential thing in religion — that man makes himself part of a world which is bound together by higher motives than the hope of material success. If you pursue truth, people will be true to you, and you will help to make them truer to all their ideals. If you love others, others will love you, and you will help to teach them a wider charity in all their dealings with the world. If you take the honors and emoluments of your leadership, not as a privilege of your own, but as a trust to be consecrated to the Lord, even as David poured out upon the rocks the water that represented the lifeblood of his followers, then may you be sure that each man who was devoted before will be doubly devoted thereafter, and will find, brought home to his heart, the true meaning of success in life, as no material prosperity or intellectual argument could bring it. "The Jews require a sign, and the Greeks seek after wisdom: but we preach Christ crucified, unto the Jews a stumbling-block, and unto the Greeks foolishness; but unto them that are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God." Such it has proved itself for nearly two thousand years. May it be our privilege still to preach this gospel of self-sacrificing action, and still to share in revealing the meaning of this gospel to the generations which are to come.

BRIEF[1]

Sidney Curtis

Resolved: That within a year the United States should turn the Philippine Islands over to the Filipinos for independent self-government.

INTRODUCTION

I. Last June the Philippine Independence Commission appealed to both political parties to make, in the national conventions, a promise of Independence to the Filipinos.

II. The appeal thus made was based upon a petition signed by leaders in the college world, eminent clergymen, business men, by judges and philanthropists.

III. Mr. Taft and other prominent men feel that we should hold to the present policy of indefinite retention of the Islands until the Filipinos have reached a condition in which they can safely be trusted with their own government.

IV. Mr. Taft has stated that though the traditions of the American policy originally justified the

[1] It should be noted that this brief was originally drawn in December, 1904.

anticipation that the United States would refuse to govern the Islands as a dependency, yet to withdraw now would be to subject them to a much worse fate than to have turned them over to Spain.

V. Since 1898, therefore, the discussion has been as follows: —

A. One side to this discussion has stood for the theory that we are a superior people, that the Filipinos are inferior; that it is our duty to keep absolute control over them, teach them our language, our religion, our science, and bring them to our level, giving them, from time to time, such rights as we think them fitted to use wisely.

B. The other side has stood for the freedom of the Filipinos on the basis of their record in the war with Spain, on the theory that they have for some time been able to govern themselves, and on the strength of President McKinley's remark that "Forcible annexation, according to our American code of morals, would be Criminal Aggression."

VI. The question then arises, How soon ought the United States grant the Filipinos their independence and withdraw from the Philippine Islands?

VII. The affirmative contends

A. That the Filipinos are a civilized people.

B. That in 1898 the Filipinos were capable of satisfactory self-government.

C. That within a year they could get back the conditions of their self-government of 1898, or could obtain a better government than that of 1898.

VIII. The negative contends

A. That a large percentage of the Filipinos are uncivilized.

B. That the Filipinos are not capable of administering independent self-government.

C. That the present form of government, extended indefinitely, is more to the advantage of the Filipinos in their endeavor to establish independent self-government than any form that could be established within a year.

IX. The term "one year" is used merely to indicate the difference between immediate independence (allowing a little time for details) and an independence granted after a longer period of United States' sovereignty.

X. Independent self-government is complete government by the Filipinos without the exercise of a protectorate by the United States except in so far as to prevent deliberate land grabbing by outside nations without just cause.

XI. By satisfactory government, we mean a government, like the government of civilized nations, which will

(*a*) Establish law and order.

(*b*) Protect private rights. 5

(*c*) Provide for general education.

(*d*) Promote necessary internal improvements.

(*e*) Guard commercial interests.

XII. It is admitted 10

A. That the United States is, at this time, responsible for the internal and external affairs of the Islands.

B. That in or out of the Islands the United States could protect them against foreign 15 aggression.

C. That independence should be granted to the Filipinos if they are capable of exercising it wisely.

XIII. Moral and international questions concerning 20 the assumption of the Islands by the United States are waived.

XIV. The commercial value of the Islands to the United States shall not enter this discussion.

XV. In the light of the definition of "satisfactory 25 self-government" (XI) and of the admitted matter (XII) which places the responsibility of the United States and fixes the basis upon which independence ought to be granted,

the contentions of both sides can be settled by

XVI. The following *special issues:*—

A. Will the Filipinos, in a year, be capable of exercising a satisfactory government, in that

(1) Can they establish law and order?

(2) Can they protect private rights?

(3) Can they provide for education of the people?

(4) Can they provide satisfactory internal improvements?

(5) Can they guard their commercial interests?

PROOF

I. The Filipinos can establish law and order, for

A. "They are naturally a law-abiding people." (The Schurman Commission.)

B. "These people are far superior in their intelligence and more capable of self-government than the natives of Cuba, and I am familiar with both races."

(Admiral Dewey to Secretary of Navy, June 27, 1898.)

C. In 1898 they were capable of satisfactory self-government, for

1. "They devised an excellent constitution, they had a congress, they had

courts, they had a president, they had a cabinet."

(Senator Hoar before the Senate, April, 1900. Constitution submitted in evidence.) 5

2. An active, representative government was exercised at Malolos, in which

(*a*) There was a constitution.

(Constitution published, Sen. Doc. 208, p. 107.) 10

(*b*) All the provinces were represented.

(Sixto Lopez, "Tribes in the Philippines.")

3. Under the Philippine Constitution the 15 people throughout Luzon and the Visayas were in the enjoyment of a quiet and orderly government.

(Senator Hoar, *supra.*)

4. Though it is said that Americans fill 20 highest offices, yet "the fact is that the Philippine Commissioners have always been able to find natives capable of filling any position from justice of the Supreme Court down 25 to policemen. It was their boast that so many natives filled positions high and low.

(Hoar, *supra.*)

II. The Filipinos can protect private rights, for

A. "The Philippine government has (1898) an organized military force in every province we have visited."

(Report of Wilcox and Sargent filed with War Department.)

B. "There are no Spaniards here (Cayagan and Isabella provinces) with the exception of two or three merchants. One of these we have met. He is pursuing his business entirely unmolested."

(Report of W. and S., *supra.*)

C. Governor Taft's testimony before the Senate Committee on the Philippines shows that the Malolos Constitution was made up by a reference to the Mexican and Argentine Republican Constitutions, and by a comparison with that of the United States.

(pp. 386–387.)

D. John Barrett, our Minister to Siam, said: — "It" (the Filipino government) "has a properly formed cabinet and congress; the members compare favorably with Japanese statesmen. They show a knowledge of debate and parliamentary law that would not compare unfavorably with the Japanese parliament."

(Extract from Moorfield Storey's speech before North Carolina Bar, Jan. 16, 1903.)

III. They can provide for education of the people, for

A. "The Filipinos opened elementary schools in almost every village. They also founded high schools and university colleges throughout the archipelago; also a university, two large normal schools for male and female teachers, and five large schools for women in Manila."

(Sixto Lopez, evidence presented to the Senate, June 3, 1902.)

B. "Education in this country is very far advanced both in the primary grades and the university grades."

(Testimony of the President of the Royal University of Manila before the Schurman Commission.)

C. "At the Manila University 5000 students are in attendance" (Congressman Shafroth in his account of his visit to the Islands), "and there were 2100 schools in the Islands."

D. There are 112 Filipinos in 31 universities or colleges in the United States, including Georgetown, Holy Cross, M. I. T., and Cornell University.

(*New York Evening Post*, Nov. 17, 1904.)

E. "You will find quite a number of Filipinos who have studied and hold degrees from the most celebrated of the German Uni-

versities,—Berlin, Leipzig, Heidelberg, and Göttingen."

Congressman Greene in the House of Representatives, Mar. 12, 1902. He visited the Islands.)

F′. Although it may be argued by the negative that the civilized portion is small, yet "the provincial people, who constitute more than nineteen twentieths of the entire population of the archipelago, belong to one race and all of them are Christian people practicing the morals and arts of civilization, and speaking dialects which are as similar to each other as the dialects of the different provinces in England."

(Sixto Lopez, "Tribes in the Philippines.") (Senator Hoar before the Senate, April 17, 1900.) (President Schurman of the first Philippine Commission.)

F″. The one twentieth can be taken care of by those who are civilized.

F‴. Governor Taft before the Senate Committee said, "The Christian persons amount to something over 5,000,000, perhaps 6,000,000." (There were then 7,000,000 people in the Islands.)

(Moorfield Storey in his address to South Carolina Bar, p. 19.)

G. Notwithstanding Spanish indifference and monastic opposition, the Filipinos have opened elementary schools in almost every village. They have also founded high schools and university colleges throughout the archipelago, and a university and two large normal schools for male and female teachers, and five large schools for women in Manila.

(Hon. Edw. W. Carmack, United States Senate June 3, 1902.)

H. Though Mr. Atkinson, Superintendent of Instruction in the Philippines, in a recent number of the *Outlook*, states that "since the coming of Americans, private schools have sprung up like mushrooms," yet this impression of American activity is wrong; in most cases these schools formerly existed but had been closed by the war.

(Hon. Edw. W. Carmack, United States Senate, June 3, 1902.)

I. Schurman Commission declares: A system of free schools for the people has been an important element in every Filipino programme of reforms.

J. Congressman Shafroth testified that on his visit to the Islands he found "Filipinos compounding medicines taken from bottles labeled in Latin, natives acting as

bookkeepers in large banks, Filipino clerks in almost all lines of business, engineers on railroads, musicians rendering high-class music; he found them making observations and intricate experiments at the Manila Observatory, and he was told that prior to the instruction there were 2100 schools in the Island and 5000 students in attendance at the Manila University."

IV. The Filipinos can provide for satisfactory internal improvements, for

A. They had before American rule "a cable connecting the capital with Hongkong, an internal telegraph system extending to all the important towns of the Islands of Luzon, a railroad 125 miles in length, tramways, electric lights, and, in the capital city, a well-constructed water plant."

(Congressman Greene to the House of Representatives, Mar. 12, 1902.)

B. "The Visayas raise their own food, consisting mainly of rice, fish, and fruit. . . . The women of many of the islands are expert weavers, using the hand loom entirely and making the celebrated pina and hoosic cloth; also mats and cotton and hemp cloth."

(Greene, *supra.*)

V. The Filipinos can guard commercial interests, for

A. The War Correspondence of 1898 shows them a capable people.
(Sen. Doc. 375, 57th Cong. 1st Sess.)

B. They have had courts. 5

C. The recent conflicts with Spain and the United States show that power to enforce decrees would be possible.

D. The Filipino army was 30,000 strong and constantly increasing. 10
(Senator Hoar, Sen. Rep. 53.)

E. Though Admiral Dewey once felt that a force of 5000 men was all that was necessary to reduce the Islands to our complete control, at present 36 war vessels, 15 2051 officers, and 63,483 men are found necessary.
(Senator Hoar, *supra.*)

VI. The contention of the Negative "that the present form of government extended indefinitely is 20 more to the advantage of the Filipinos" is absurd, for

A. No ruler will stay there and no white families will be founded there. (Standing Order of Army and Navy for relays for soldiers 25 every two years on account of climate.)
(Mr. Townsend, "Asia and Europe," p. 86.)

B. Our policy does not lead to Filipino independence, for

1. If Americans invest in the Islands under United States sovereignty, acquire mines, forests, great tracts of land and public franchises, the strongest possible barrier against Filipino independence is established, because
   (*a*) Our citizens may well say: "You invited us to the Islands; you told us capital was needed; we accepted your invitation; you must stay here as guardian of our property.
2. Beet-sugar producers control our policy in Cuba.
3. The alliance between financial and political interests stirred up the Boer War.

C. Americans and Filipinos have no mutual sympathy, for
   1. Secretary Taft told the Chamber of Commerce that "the American merchants" there "easily caught the feeling of hostility and contempt felt by many of the soldiers for the Filipinos."
   2. An urgent petition was mailed, Oct. 10, 1901, from a committee of Filipinos at Hongkong to the President

of the United States, praying for immediate independence.

3. Twenty Filipinos in London joined in a petition to express confidence in the sincerity of the Filipino movement for independence.

4. As far back as Sept. 24, 1898, the *London Times* printed the account of the Filipino struggle for freedom and a request by the Filipino National Assembly to recognize the independence of the Philippines.

D. The Islands are for American capital. (Taft.)

E. "We make no hypocritical pretense of being interested in the Philippines solely on account of others."

(Senator Lodge, Republican Convention in Philadelphia.)

F. The form of government given is not suited to the needs of the Filipinos.

(Mr. Ireland, *Atlantic Monthly*, November, 1904.)

G. G. F. Seward, N. Y., Professor Henry Van Dyke, N. J., Charles F. Adams, Mass., and President Charles W. Eliot of Harvard University, signing the petition to the national conventions said, "Neither do we indulge in the delusion that their (Filipino) government will be all that we might de-

sire, but the Cubans have done well since they were left to themselves, and Mexico, Argentina, Chili, and Brazil after years of turmoil and confusion have at last succeeded in establishing governments commanding the esteem of the world."

H. The policy will sap the resources of the dependency, since

1. India is sapped by the English.

(J. S. Mill, History of India.")

2. American capitalists will have no regard for the welfare of the native population.

(The case of Porto Rico. Testimony of a senior in the Cornell Law School.)

I. The present position of the negative, regarding ignorance of the people governed, was urged in 1822 against Henry Clay when he advocated the recognition of the South American republics.

CONCLUSION

Since the Filipinos

I. Can establish law and order;

II. Can protect private rights;

III. Can provide for education of the people;

IV. Can provide satisfactory internal improvements; and

V. Can guard their commercial interests;

Therefore, within a year the United States should turn the Philippine Islands over to the Filipinos for independent self-government. 5

INTRODUCTIONS

THE CURRENCY BILL[1]

Theodore Gilman

Now that the method of issuing bank currency through voluntary corporations composed of associated national banks has been made part of the banking laws of the United States, by the enactment of the Aldrich-Vreeland bill, with the object of preventing monetary panics, it devolves upon those who approve of the principle of the measure to show its place in republican banking legislation, and to establish its claim to be wise, safe, and efficient. This law is without precedent, because never before in the history of the financial world has there been an attempt to construct a banking system of, by, and for the people. A departure from precedents, especially in banking methods, is so unusual as to constitute an era in banking; and it is well to pause at the threshold of the subject to inquire into the reasons for this radical change. Does it stand the test of the principles laid down by the authorities? Is it in the nature of an experiment, and, above all, can it be justified by experience?

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RACE-TRACK GAMBLING

The Outlook

Next week the New York Legislature will meet in extra session to consider, primarily, the bills aiming to abolish race-track gambling. These bills, at the regular session, passed the Assembly by an almost unanimous vote, but were defeated in the Senate on a vote of 25 to 25. What is the issue presented by these measures? In 1895 an amendment to the State Constitution was adopted which read as follows:—

> Nor shall any lottery or the sale of lottery tickets, pool-selling, book-making, or any other kind of gambling hereafter be authorized or allowed within this State; and the Legislature shall pass appropriate laws to prevent offences against any of the provisions of this section.

In the same year the Legislature amended the Penal Code so as to make it a felony to engage in pool-selling or bookmaking, at any time or place, or to record bets or to keep or occupy any place or stand for such purpose. This provision would have operated to put an end to all gambling on horse races anywhere in the State, if a provision had not been added that this classification as a felony should not apply in any case where an exclusive penalty was provided in some other law. At the same time the so-called Percy-Gray Law was passed, which

provided that the exclusive penalty for bookmaking and pool-selling on authorized race tracks, provided no memorandum or token of the bet was delivered, should be the forfeiture of the amount wagered, to be recovered in a civil action. The action of the Legislature created an anomalous condition in the State. The man who manages a pool room in New York City, for instance, and accepts wagers on the races to be run at Sheepshead Bay, is guilty of a felony, and may be punished by a fine of not more than $2000, or by imprisonment in a State prison for not more than two years; while the man within the inclosure of a race track, who does precisely the same act as his fellow-bookmaker in New York City, is liable to have the loser of a bet sue him and recover the amount of his wager, and he is liable to *no other penalty*. Gambling on horse races outside a race-track fence is a felony, for which a man may go to prison; identically the same kind of gambling on the same horse races within the charmed circle of the race-track fence is practically permitted under the protection of the law, for the penalty imposed is so inadequate that it is never invoked. The bills which were introduced, at the recommendation of Governor Hughes, place gambling in and out of the race tracks on the same footing. They make bookmaking and pool-selling everywhere in the State a misdemeanor, punishable by imprisonment for not more than one year.

The arguments in favor of the continuation of the existing state of affairs and the permitting of book-

making within race-track inclosures are, as far as we apprehend them, as follows: —

1. The Court of Appeals has decided that the Percy-Gray Law is Constitutional. It has declared that the Constitution has clothed the Legislature with the right to determine what laws are "appropriate" for carrying into effect the provision of the Constitution in regard to gambling; that the Percy-Gray Law is "in a sense appropriate to accomplish the purpose of that provision"; and that, "it being in a degree appropriate," there is no principle of Constitutional law which would authorize the Court to condemn it as invalid or unconstitutional. Since the Legislature, by passing laws which in its judgment are "appropriate" to prevent offenses against the provision of the Constitution quoted above, has complied with the Constitutional mandate, it has no duty now to reverse its action.

2. Gambling is an evil which cannot be entirely done away with. Men will gamble. Since we cannot abolish it, let us regulate it by confining it to race tracks where conditions are healthful, and where the sport is carried on in an orderly, honest fashion. By so doing we will diminish the number of pool rooms in the cities, for the Jockey Club does everything in its power to keep the news of the results of the races from the outside gambling establishments.

3. Without gambling the sport of horse-racing cannot be continued. Without horse-racing the breed of horses cannot so rapidly and so surely be improved.

In addition to these general arguments certain specific objections are made to the present bills: —

4. To make bookmaking outside of race tracks a misdemeanor where it is now a felony is to encourage the increase of pool rooms. 5

5. To make the penalty for gambling imprisonment only, without the alternative of a fine, is too drastic. The offense is not such a serious one as to call for such a penalty.

6. The bills are unfair because they go into effect 10 immediately on their passage. It is the usual custom for amendments to the Penal Code to become operative on September 1. Many contracts have been entered into for the present racing season in reliance upon the present law. It would entail great loss on owners of racing 15 stables and would be practically confiscation to close the race tracks before the season is over.

To these arguments, which are the strongest that have been offered, we would reply as follows: —

1. There may be a wide difference between a law 20 which does not violate the Constitution, and one which in good faith carries out a provision of the Constitution. The Court decided that it found no reason to declare the law unconstitutional, not that it found that the law sincerely complied with the Constitutional mandate. 25 Since it found the law "in a degree appropriate," it was not called upon to pronounce on the question whether it was appropriate to the point of efficiency. The Legislature, under the clever guidance of astute law-

yers, complied with the letter of the Constitution with the narrowest possible margin between their action and non-compliance. That it utterly failed to comply with the spirit of the Constitution is proved by the fact that the provision was inserted in the Constitution for the express purpose of making impossible the allowing of race-track gambling, which had been going on for seven years under the Ives Law, and by the fact that the Percy-Gray Law has not in the slightest degree incommoded gamblers in the practices which the framers of the Constitution sought to suppress.

2. Those who believe that gambling should be regulated have a right to their opinion, but when they suggest that the regulation be done under the pretense of prohibition, by a trick, an evasion of the intent of the fundamental law of the State, they ostracize themselves from the company of law-abiding men. The Percy-Gray Law is not a regulating act. It does not pretend to be. If it purported to regulate gambling by permitting it under certain conditions, it would be unconstitutional on its face. Let those who want to regulate gambling, and by so doing minimize its evils, try to secure an amendment to the Constitution to that end. If the abolition of race-track gambling increases the number of pool rooms, so be it. It is better to have pool rooms in violation of the law, than race-track gambling by legislative evasion and nullification of the Constitution.

3. If to improve the horse we must deteriorate men by

making vice easy and pleasant for them, and must degrade our ideals of respect for law and the sovereign will of the people, let the horse go to destruction. The price is too high to pay.

4. Experience would indicate that to make bookmaking a misdeameanor will not encourage the increase of pool rooms, but rather the contrary. With gambling a felony, juries will not convict. Laws without convictions under them are worse than none.

5. A penalty, to be adequate, must be heavy enough to act as a deterrent. The gambler does not fear a fine. He counts it in as an expense of his business, and goes on gambling.

6. The duty of carrying out the intent of the Constitution admits of no postponement. Contracts which depend for their profitable carrying out on the continuance of illegal practice (illegal even under the present law) have no right to consideration. As Governor Hughes has said, "Under what provision of the Constitution or the laws is there any vested right in maintaining gambling privileges? Are we to recognize vested rights in the profits of lawbreaking?"

Stripped of the sophistries and side issues with which those who profit from the protection of race-track gambling seek to confuse the question, it is a very simple issue which confronts the State of New York. Are the people and their Constitution supreme in the State, or are the gamblers and their associates to defy them in maintaining their special privilege in vice?

NATIONAL CONTROL OF INTERSTATE RAILWAYS

Seth Low

The railway situation in the United States at the present time deserves the most earnest consideration. The movement of merchandise has outstripped present facilities, and the railways would like to enlarge; but they find it difficult to get the necessary money. The public wants the railways to enlarge; but it will not furnish the money. Ordinarily, the promise of a good return on the investment would secure ample funds. Why is it that, in a time of great commercial activity, the funds are not forthcoming? Doubtless there are many reasons, and one of the most evident is that so much money is needed that it is hard to get enough. But, back of all that, there lie two influences which certainly have to be reckoned with. The plain man understands that business enterprises and good service are entitled to fair earnings. What he does not understand is, in what respect railway business so far differs from any other business that those upon the inside can honestly and honorably become multi-millionaires, while those upon the outside so often find themselves the owners of worthless stock. He observes that the direc-

[1] Reprinted by permission from *The Outlook*.

tors of savings banks do not become rich in that way. He suspects, therefore, that the many millions of the few have, in many cases, been made at the expense of those for whom these few have been trustees. He thinks that there has been in railway boards of direction a widespread loss of the sense of trusteeship; and he is more and more coming to demand of railway directors the same sort of self-abnegation that the law demands of a private trustee as towards his ward. The law allows a trustee reasonable compensation; but it does not allow the personal enrichment of the trustee at the expense of the ward. It is true that railway directors and railway stockholders buy and sell upon an open market. But whenever a director buys upon private information obtained by him as a director, the question must arise in the domain of conscience, Would his stockholder sell if he had the same information? That, in my judgment, is the sort of feeling that underlies a great deal of criticism of high finance; the feeling that the investment public, not the inside few but the outside many, are entitled to the same sort of protection from the law that the law gives as towards trustees for individuals. Hence the demand for Government control on the side of railway financiering.

The same demand for Government control comes, also, from those who use the railways — that is to say, from the general public. But this demand, I think, and the troubles that confront the railways because of it, spring largely from different considerations. A radical

change is taking place in the public conception of what a railway is. Up to recent times it has been taken for granted that railroading is a branch of private business. That has been substantially the conception embodied in law; and that has certainly been the conception of those building and operating railways. But, if that is the correct conception of railroading, what is the objection to rebating? It is a well-established characteristic of commercial business that goods can be moved in a wholesale way more cheaply than at retail. If, then, railroading is a private business, why should it not be all right for the largest shipper to be given the lowest rates? Experience, on the other hand, has made it clear that the railways, upon whom everybody is dependent, by practicing rebating make it possible for the favored shipper to drive all competitors out of the market. Hence the belief is becoming general, outside perhaps of railway and investment circles, that railways are not to be looked upon as conducting a private business; they are rather to be thought of as private agents conducting a part of the business of the state. In other words, what the public wants in railway management is the public quality, as distinguished from the business quality. That is to say, it wants equality of treatment for all alike, large shippers and small, instead of the discriminations that are usual and to be expected in private business. The importance of the distinction can be well illustrated by the tariff. An importer who brings into the country $1,000,000 worth of silk goods must pay exactly the

same rate of duty as the importer who brings in only $1000 worth. That equality of treatment indicates the public quality of the tariff. Suppose, on the other hand, that, after the manner of business, the tariff charged the large importers only 40 per cent, and made the little ones pay 60 per cent, is it not clear that the large importers could drive all the little ones out of business? But that is precisely what the railways have been doing with their rebates; and that is why the public are no longer willing to admit that railroading is a private business. That is why the people demand that the railways themselves should recognize that they are only private agents doing a part of the public business; and that is why the public demand that the law henceforth shall proceed upon this new view of what railways are. The demand heard in some quarters that railways shall belong to the Government and be operated by the Government, presumably does not spring from any special desire to have the Government do this business directly instead of through private agencies; but it springs principally from the notion that in no other way can railway service be stamped with the public quality that means absolute equality of treatment of big and little shippers and big and little places; in a word, that all shall be treated alike. Personally, I do not believe that public ownership or public operation are either the only ways or the best ways to obtain the desired results. Two things, however, remain to be said. The first is that it rests very largely with railway directors and managers

themselves whether the country is driven into public ownership and operation of the railways, or whether the country can continue to avail of private initiative, private enterprise, and private capital in this department of the public service. The second is that, if the private management of railways is to be indefinitely continued, Government regulation both of railway finances and of railway service is absolutely essential. It may be taken for granted that the public will insist, unceasingly, on having the public quality of equal treatment for all predominate in all the relations of the railways to the public, as distinguished from the business quality of discrimination on the basis of the volume of business. Government regulation may indeed lead to the non-production of multi-millionaires as a by-product of railroading, but it ought also to mean, to investors, increasingly safe returns.

But regulation by law in the United States raises another question. Shall it be regulation by the States or by the United States, or by both? For the most part, this question is argued from the constitutional point of view. It is easy to say that the jurisdiction of the United States is limited to inter-State commerce, and the jurisdiction of each State to commerce within itself. But that leaves open the question, What are the limits of inter-State commerce? To answer that question one must consider both history and present fact. There are two clauses in the Constitution of the United States, as Judge Amidon recently pointed out, and not one only,

that bear upon the subject. The first is the clause forbidding any State to levy duties on imported merchandise; and the second is the clause placing inter-State commerce under the control of the General Government. In other words, the framers of the Constitution, having seen how ready each State was, in the days preceding our present Union, to advantage itself by laying burdens upon its neighbors, inserted these two clauses to obviate this danger. They forbade, explicitly, direct attacks by one State on the commerce of another, in the form of duties; and then, recognizing that what the States could do directly they could also do indirectly, the whole subject of inter-State commerce was placed under the general control, in order to make it impossible for any one State to injure another.

So much for history. Now for the present fact. . . .

SCIENCE AND A FUTURE LIFE[1]

F. W. H. Myers

To the question, "What has science to say as to man's survival of death?" the chief spokesmen of modern science are inclined to answer, "Nothing at all." The affirmative answer she holds as unproved, and the negative answer as unprovable.

Nevertheless, in spite of, and by reason of, her studied neutrality, the influence of science is every year telling more strongly against a belief in a future life. Inevitably so; since whatever science does not tend to prove, she in some sort tends to disprove; beliefs die out, without formal refutation, if they find no place among the copious store of verified and systematized facts and inferences which are supplanting the traditions and speculations of prescientific days as the main mental pabulum of mankind.

And the very magnitude of the special belief in question renders it, in one sense, the more easily starved. Men feel that, if it were true, there would surely be far more to be said for it than they have ever heard. The silence which surrounds the topic is almost more discouraging than overt attack. At first, indeed, in the early days of the scientific dominion, *savants* were wont

[1] Reprinted by permission from "Science and a Future Life." New York, The Macmillan Company.

to make some sort of apology, or disclaimer of competence, when their doctrines seemed too obviously to ignore man's hope of a future. Then came open assaults from audacious and confident *savants* — to whom the apologetic and optimistic *savants* seemed to have nothing particular to reply. And gradually the educated world — that part of it, at least, which science leads — is waking up to find that no mere trifles or traditions only, but the great hope which inspired their fathers aforetime, is insensibly vanishing away.

Now it is important that a question so momentous should not thus be suffered to go by default. There should be an occasional stock-taking of evidence, an occasional inquiry whether, among the multifarious advances of science, any evidence has been discovered bearing on a question which, after all, is to science a question of evidence alone.

It seems to me that, even during this generation — even during the last few years — discoveries have, in fact, been made which must gradually revolutionize our whole attitude towards the question of an unseen world, and of our own past, present, or future existence therein.

Some of the discoveries of which I speak — in the realm of automatism and of human personality — have already commanded wide scientific assent, although their drift and meaning have, as I hold, been as yet very imperfectly understood. Other discoveries, which I regard as equally valid, are as yet disputed or ignored; but they are, in fact, so closely linked with what is

already admitted, that all analogy (I think) leads us to suppose that, in some form or other, these newer views also are destined profoundly to modify scientific thought.

The discoveries of which I speak are not the result of any startling novelties of method. Rather, they are examples of the fruitful results which will often follow from the simple application of well-known methods of research to a group of phenomena which, for some special historical reason, has hitherto been left outside the steady current of experiment and observation.

Now, the whole inquiry into man's survival has thus far, if I may so say, fallen between two stools. Neither those who support the thesis, nor those who impugn it, have thus far made any serious attempt to approach it by scientific method.

On the one hand, materialistic science has, naturally enough, preferred to treat the subject as hardly capable of argument. There is the obvious fact that, when a man dies, you hear nothing more from him. And there is the fact — less obvious, indeed, but more and more fully established — that to every mental change some cerebral change corresponds; with the inference that, when the brain decays, the mind is extinct as well.

This strong negative argument forms the basis of the popular treatises — Büchner's "Kraft und Stoff" and "Das Künftige Leben" may serve as examples — which urge mankind definitely to set aside all thought of a life to come. The argument is, necessarily, a purely negative one; it rests on the absence of positive testimony to

any mental energy with which some cerebral change is not directly concomitant. The negative presumption will, therefore, be *shaken* if accepted notions as to man's personality are shown to be gravely defective, while it will be at once *overthrown* if positive evidence to man's survival of bodily death can in any way be acquired.

To the arguments of Materialism, Philosophy and Religion have replied in ways of their own. As regards the nature of human personality, philosophy has had much to say; and man's immortality has been the very corner stone of the Christian faith. But, with rare exceptions, neither philosophy nor religion has discovered, or even sought for, facts and arguments which could meet materialistic science on its own ground. The spokesmen of religion, indeed, have generally preferred, for ecclesiastical or for moral reasons, to leave the question of man's survival, or, as they have termed it, man's immortality, to the domain of faith. On ecclesiastical grounds, they have naturally desired to retain the monopoly of spiritual teaching; they have been less concerned to prove by carnal methods that an unseen world exists, than to impress their own crowning message or revelation upon men who already believed in that world as a reality. On moral grounds, also, they have felt it dangerous to allow a dogma so essential as man's future life to be thrown into the caldron of speculation. So long, indeed, as the earthly prosperity of the righteous was held sufficient to prove the moral government of the world, man's destiny after death

might remain an open field for primitive questionings. But when earthly justice was too plainly seen to fail, then the doctrine of future reward and punishment became necessary in order to justify the ways of God to men.

Since, then, the thesis of man's survival has been far oftener defended with an ethical than with a merely scientific interest, it is no wonder that the moral and emotional arguments should have assumed almost complete predominance.

With those arguments I have in this essay nothing to do. I am expressly laying aside all support which the belief in a future life receives either from "natural religion," from philosophy, or from revelation. I wish to debate the matter on the ground of experiments and observations such as are appealed to in other inquiries for definite objective proof.

ARGUMENTS

ASSUMPTIONS ARE NOT PROOF[1]

LYMAN ABBOTT

BEFORE the Legislature of New York there are two bills "To prevent cruelty, by regulating experiments on animals." Though one is more drastic than the other, both undertake to prescribe conditions under which such experiments shall be conducted. These measures concern the whole Nation. If either of them was to be passed, the researches conducted by some of the most eminent medical and surgical men in the country would be seriously affected.

A correspondent, who announces his dissatisfaction with the present laws on the subject, gives, from a non-medical point of view, on another page, a résumé of some of the incalculable benefits that have flowed from vivisection. Those who question these benefits are either not informed or are beyond the reach of argument. The real question is not as to the merits of vivisection, but as to the proper safeguards with which the law should surround it.

At present the law of New York State applies to experiments upon animals the same principle that it applies to surgical operations upon men, women, and

[1] Reprinted by permission from *The Outlook*.

children. It does not attempt to prescribe the conditions under which either experiments or operations should be conducted; but it does prescribe the standards of fitness which every person who may lawfully engage in surgery and which every person who may lawfully engage in animal experimentation must meet. It penalizes with fine or imprisonment or both the unjustifiable injuring, mutilating, or killing of animals; and it confines to regularly incorporated medical colleges and universities of the State the authority under which animal experimentation may be conducted.

The burden of proof rests upon those who would have the State abandon this principle and substitute for it the principle of prescribing the conditions of scientific investigation. It rests upon them to prove, in the first place, that the present law is inadequate. It is not sufficient for them to produce lawyers who give opinions that the law is not efficient. There are lawyers of the highest standing in the State who declare that it is efficient. The only adequate mode of proof would be by the prosecution of an actual abuse. So far as we have been able to learn, only one authentic case of alleged unjustifiable experimentation has been brought forward by the supporters of the bills. This is certainly not proof that the present law is inadequate.

In the second place, the burden of proof rests upon them to show that legal restrictions on the methods of science would not vitiate investigations, and would not therefore entail upon human beings greater suffering

than would otherwise be inflicted upon animals. Our correspondent is, we are sure, in error when he implies that an attitude of lofty disdain characterizes the men of the medical profession. The patient and painstaking public arguments presented in the newspapers and before the Legislature by medical men should save any one from implying anything of this sort. A letter signed by forty-one of the most eminent physicians and surgeons and two authorities in physiology in New York City (a list of names that for standing in the profession could probably not be duplicated in the city) has been published in the metropolitan press; it states affirmatively that the present law is adequate. Medical authority of the highest rank has pointed out that the prescribing in advance of the class of cases in which anæsthetics must be used, the class of cases in which animals must be killed after operations, and the formal publication of reports, would frustrate the purposes of important experiments fraught with untold benefit to humanity. Dr. Curtis, as Secretary of the Committee on Experimental Medicine of the Medical Society of the State of New York, declares that one of these bills "would abolish, in three lines of print, the sciences of physiology, pathology, pharmacology, and much of practical medicine and surgery, within the State of New York," and that even according to the less drastic of the two bills, if it had been law, "certain fundamental physiological facts, which form part of the scientific basis of medicine, could not lawfully have been discovered." Of the two measures to which our corre-

spondent refers, the English law, according to so eminent and humane a leader as Sir Lauder Brunton, "has interfered to an enormous extent with physiologic work," so that investigators have had to go to Paris and elsewhere to perform important experiments — and with this testimony that of such men as Lord Lister and Sir Michael Foster agrees; and the bill introduced into Congress somewhat over five years ago by Senator Gallinger would have had, if it had passed, a very harmful effect.

The cruel man, callous to the suffering of either his fellow human beings or his fellow-creatures of the brute creation, belongs to the lowest orders of humanity. Around such a man the law should put inflexible bands of restraint. The *Outlook* honors those who desire to alleviate the sufferings of animals as well as of men. But there are times when the infliction of suffering is not cruelty but mercy. It is because the *Outlook* is convinced by overwhelming evidence that the practice of vivisection has not increased suffering but has rather widened immeasurably the merciful ministrations of medicine and surgery that it regards as dangerous unintelligent interference with vivisection, and urges the maintenance of the principle underlying the present New York law.

Altogether apart from the motives of those who are pressing for new legislation, the two anti-vivisection bills now before the New York Legislature are contrary to public policy and ought to be decisively defeated.

OBJECTIONS TO A POSTAL SAVINGS BANK[1]

George E. Roberts

The sentiment in favor of a Postal Savings system is prompted by a most commendable desire to furnish absolute security for the small depositor, who, by resolution and self-denial, has laid up something against old age or a rainy day. The interest of the State and community in such accumulations is perfectly apparent, and the importance of having in every locality convenient and absolutely safe depositaries for them is too evident to require lengthy argument. There is scarcely any experience through which a community can pass that is more distressing and disheartening than the failure of a bank which involves wiping out the painfully won savings upon which hundreds of men and women are relying for the needs of old age. There is scarcely another service which modern society can render to the masses that is more helpful and stimulating than this of encouraging and safeguarding small savings.

It does not, however, follow that, in the United States, the Federal Government is the agency best qualified to

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assume this task. The idea of a savings bank in the Post Office Department comes to us from Europe, and it has not been closely scrutinized as to its adaptability to conditions here. It has three features which commend it — to wit: cheapness of administration, the convenience to the public of an office in each post office and the security of the Government obligation. For European countries there is another consideration, viz.: it furnishes a large market for Government loans. There are reasons why the Postal Savings Bank is not as suitable an institution for the United States as for Great Britain, or for the other countries where it has worked successfully. These reasons have their basis mainly in the territorial extent of this country and the differences that exist in the wealth and industrial development of its various sections. The injury that would result to this country from having a considerable portion of its capital drained from the outlying districts to a center, for investment in a limited line of securities, is deserving of very serious consideration. Great Britain is a small country compared with the United States, and every part of it, besides being reasonably well supplied with local capital, is not far distant from the financial metropolis; but the disadvantage of the withdrawal of savings deposits from local use is observed even there. The London *Bankers' Magazine* for February, 1899, discussing the comparative services in a community of a branch office of the postal bank and a branch office of one of the great commercial banks, says: —

The branches of the Post Office Savings Bank convey all the savings of the district which they receive straight up to the central office in London. This money is employed there in purchases of the public funds of the country; it is thus removed from the district in which it originates, and incidentally assists in raising the price of the funds to so high a point that the Postmaster-General is unable to invest the amount collected on such terms as to obtain back the interest which he covenants to allow his depositors, and to obtain also a sufficient margin to meet the working expenses.

The deposits in the Post Office Savings Banks thus eventually cause an expense to the country. There was a deficiency in the Savings Bank Funds last year which had to be made up out of the public taxation. The deposits in the branch of a bank in a small town or village are, on the other hand, a source of gain to the country; they are of great service in developing the trade of the place in which the bank exists, and in assisting the inhabitants in their business. The habit of keeping an account with a bank is now general even among very small traders, and in very remote districts. This habit could scarcely exist were it not for the existence of branch banking offices. Any one engaged in business can scarcely keep his account at a place very distant from the locality in which his business is carried on. There are so many occasions on which any one carrying on a really active business has to refer to his banker, and when a personal interview is convenient if not essential, that proximity is most desirable. Other results, also affecting the economic development of the country, follow. The advantages of the use of 'credit,' that most powerful factor in the growth of trade and industry, are extended to dwellers in the most remote districts. With proper precautions and care in making advances, great advantages to the country districts result. Minor, but not unimportant, advantages follow; the use of specie and of notes is economized, while the trade of the country is increasingly carried on by means of checks. None of these

advantages take place in the case of the opening of a new branch of the Post Office Savings Bank. They are mentioned here as they sometimes escape the attention of our public men, even of those acquainted with other descriptions of business. They think merely of the savings banks as showing the power of the country to put by and save, and they do not think of the other side of the picture.

The Postal Savings deposits, at all offices throughout the British system, are sent up to the central office in London and invested in British consols; and complaint is above made that the constant purchases for the Postal Bank had, in 1899, forced up the price of the consols and made the return on the investment so low that the Bank was running behind. Since then the British Government has been forced to issue many millions of new obligations, and the price of consols has fallen so that the situation of the Bank, as respects income on recent purchases, has improved. Nevertheless, the statement is instructive as showing the natural effect of gathering funds from all over a country for investment in a restricted class of securities.

Below is an extract from the London *Statist* of December 22, 1906, in which are described the ill effects upon the industries of Ireland resulting from the constant drain of Postal Savings deposits to London. If these deposits had been made in local savings banks, and invested locally, they would have contributed to the development of Ireland's resources and the employment of the Irish people, instead of being tied up in consols. The *Statist* says:—

Ireland is a very poor country. Her resources are quite undeveloped. Practically, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that she has not yet entered upon an economic life. . . . Naturally, therefore, she requires abundant capital and abundant labor. . . . In June of the present year the Irish deposits in the Savings Banks were in round numbers, 13 millions sterling, and this (for Ireland) very large sum is employed not in developing any Irish industry, but in bolstering up the credit of the United Kingdom. . . . Nobody will dispute that the Irishman of enterprise is seriously handicapped by the fact that so much Irish money is drawn away from Irish to Imperial purposes. Just as Ireland has been laying out large sums annually for sixty-five years in rearing young men and women to export them, without getting any return, to the United States and the Colonies, to create there vast wealth, so in finance Ireland is pinching and saving about 13 millions of money to export it to London for the purpose of bolstering up an amateurish system of finance, which has brought the national credit to the pitch at which we see it.

What would be the result of opening a savings bank in connection with every post office in the United States, and of remitting all the deposits to Washington for investment in a limited list of securities? In the first place, what would be the effect upon the communities from which these moneys were withdrawn? The last report of the Comptroller of the Currency shows the amount of deposits in savings banks at that time to have been over $3,000,000,000. Of course there is no probability that all of this money would be transferred to the Postal Savings Banks; but, on the other hand, there are many deposits in national and State banks, and with trust companies and other institutions, which might

be attracted to the Government's strong box. The extent of the displacement would, doubtless, depend somewhat upon the rate of interest paid, and there would be some danger of that being more or less involved in politics, reluctance to reduce the rate being shown in England where the system has an annual deficit. If we believe that the system would meet a general need, we must assume that it would draw a large sum in the aggregate. This money is now invested locally. It is an important part of the capital upon which each community is doing business. It is loaned largely upon real estate mortgages, partly upon personal security, it is partly invested in local bonds or real estate. It is being used in the locality where it is owned and contributing to the development of that locality, the support of its industries and the employment of its people. If this capital is removed to Washington for investment, what will be the effect upon the communities from which it is taken?

The authorities at Washington cannot redistribute this capital by investments to the same sections from which it came. The discretion allowed any board of managers in the investment of such funds would undoubtedly be quite restricted. Government bonds, State bonds and municipal bonds would probably constitute the list. Perhaps railway bonds would have to be included; but the making up of a list of eligible railway bonds would be a delicate task. In brief, the investments of the Postal Savings Bank would be in

securities of a high class, which yield a low return, and which now find a market only in the wealthier sections of the country, among people who are not so much interested in the interest rate as in the security of the principal. It is not likely that any savings bank in a State like Iowa has to-day a dollar of investments that would be accepted by a Postal Savings Bank. There are bond issues in Iowa that the latter institution might accept, but they are of such a high class, the competition for them from outside the State is so keen and the returns from them so low that banks within the State can do better in investments of a more local character. Capital owned in Iowa is not at present invested in low interest-bearing securities. It is likely, therefore, that all the deposits diverted from Iowa banks to the Postal Savings Bank would be so much capital lost to that State while on deposit. It would be brought down to the already congested money markets of the East, to multiply the demand for the limited supply of choice securities that have a national and international market. The result must be an economic loss to the country; for capital is transferred from where it is most needed to where it is least needed. To the extent in which this transfer occurred — that is, to the extent in which the system became popular and effective — its influence would be to reduce the earnings of these savings, widen the difference in interest rates between different sections of the country, retard the distribution of industries and population and check the development of the country.

The question is, Is it necessary to bring about these undesirable effects in order to accomplish the end sought, viz.: the security of the small depositor? Let it be agreed that he should have complete protection. Can it not be provided without the forced removal of this capital from the locality to which it belongs, where perhaps it is affording employment to its owners, and where it can be utilized most advantageously to all concerned?

There are industries and lines of enterprise which can be advantageously centralized, but the investment of great sums of popular deposits cannot. These investments should follow natural channels, with only such restrictions as are necessary to obtain safety. There should be no enforced removal of funds that can be avoided. With capable managers who are familiar with the values of real estate in their own neighborhoods and with all local conditions, local institutions can invest these deposits safely, and much more serviceably to the whole country than any central board at Washington can do it. Granted that reform in banking laws and methods is needed, let financiers and social reformers direct their aims to securing a reform that is consistent with the most effective use of our capital, and that will promote rather than retard the harmonious development of all sections of the country.

It will be a very weak and unscientific treatment of the problem in hand to consider only the sentimental phase and dispose of the whole matter by unloading it on the Federal Government, the one political organization

of all least qualified to deal with it. This is one of our problems, and not the only one, which our people should deal with at home, instead of petitioning for relief from afar.

Several States have already shown how the subject may be dealt with successfully. New York, Massachusetts and Connecticut have mutual savings banks, conducted wholly for the benefit of depositors, and so well safeguarded that no serious losses have occurred for many years. All of the earnings, after expenses are paid and a surplus fund has been accumulated, are distributed in dividends to the depositors. Most of these banks are now earning 4 per cent for the depositors. On July 1, 1906, there were 134 savings banks in the State of New York, holding $1,335,093,053.62. The only losses that have been suffered by savings-bank depositors in that State in the twenty-eight years since January, 1879, have been due to the scaling of deposits in five banks, by order of the Courts, to make good losses that had been sustained in two cases by the dishonesty of employees, in two cases by the failure of national banks in which funds were on deposit and in one case by bad loans. The cases in which losses occurred were as follows: —

1. Ulster County Savings Institution. Defalcation discovered in 1891. Deposits were scaled 15 per cent. The bank is still in business and prosperous; on July 1, 1906, it held deposits aggregating $3,284,554.92, had a surplus of $138,672.39, and it paid dividends to depositors in 1906 at the rate of 3½ per cent.

2. National Savings Bank, Buffalo. Defalcation in 1892. Deposits were scaled 22 per cent and bank reorganized as Empire State Savings Bank. Went out of business in 1902, and the Superintendent of Banks reports that there may be a further loss of 2 or 3 per cent.

3. Southern Tier Savings Bank, a small institution (afterwards Elmira Savings Bank). Suffered a loss in 1893 by the closing of a national bank in which it had a deposit of $42,704.67. Deposits were scaled 20 per cent. The business after that date was kept separate from the old, and the bank is now prosperous, paying dividends in 1906 at the rate of 3½ per cent. Some further distribution will be made on the old loss.

4. Chenango Valley Savings Bank. Found to be insolvent in 1895. Deposits were scaled about 15 per cent. The bank continues in business and paid dividends in 1906 of 3 per cent.

5. Carthage Savings Bank. Dragged down in 1898 by failure of a national bank with which it had a deposit. Has paid 95 per cent of its deposits.

It will be seen that the Carthage case, in which there was a loss of 5 per cent, is the only one which occurred within the last ten years. The entire showing for the system under the present law is an encouraging one.

The Massachusetts and Connecticut systems are similar to that of New York. The savings banks in these three States, to use the language of Mr. Jay, of Massachusetts, describing those of his own State, "have no paid-up capital; they are not banks at all, but mutual investment associations, the depositors paying their deposits to the trustees, who invest the money and declare in dividends to the depositors substantially all that

they are able to earn on the money. The balance goes to form a surplus or guaranty fund."

No system can be pronounced perfect so long as losses occur; but, when the advantages of higher returns to depositors and employment of the moneys at home are considered, there is no reason why the people of either of these States should want to exchange their system for a Postal Savings Bank. They will do better by holding to what they have and remedying existing defects. Not only will it be better for depositors and the communities financially, but it is not to be forgotten that self-help is always to be preferred to outside aid or control. What a State or local community can do for itself it should not want the United States Government to meddle with. Those functions of organized society which may be performed by local associations are part of the social life of the people, and they ought to participate in them. The experience thus acquired has an educational value, helping to qualify the body of the people for other and larger undertakings of a coöperative character.

THE TRAINING OF INTELLECT[1]

Woodrow Wilson

Mr. Toastmaster, Mr. President, and Gentlemen: — I must confess to you that I came here with very serious thoughts this evening, because I have been laboring under the conviction for a long time that the object of a university is to educate, and I have not seen the universities of this country achieving any remarkable or disturbing success in that direction. I have found everywhere the note which I must say I have heard sounded once or twice to-night — a note of apology for the intellectual side of the university. You hear it at all universities. Learning is on the defensive, is actually on the defensive, among college men, and they are being asked by way of concession to bring that also into the circle of their interests. Is it not time we stopped asking indulgence for learning and proclaimed its sovereignty? Is it not time we reminded the college men of this country that they have no right to any distinctive place in any community, unless they can show it by intellectual achievement? that if a university is a place for distinction at all it must be distinguished by the conquests of the mind? I for my part tell you plainly that that is my motto, that I have entered the

[1] An address before the Phi Beta Kappa Society of Yale University.

field to fight for that thesis, and that for that thesis only do I care to fight.

The toastmaster of the evening said, and said truly, that this is the season when, for me, it was most difficult to break away from regular engagements in which I am involved at home. But when I was invited to a Phi Beta Kappa banquet it had an unusual sound, and I felt that that was the particular kind of invitation which it was my duty and privilege to accept. One of the problems of the American university now is how, among a great many other competing interests, to give places of distinction to men who win distinction in the class room. Why don't we give you men the Y here and the P at Princeton, because, after all, you have done the particular thing which distinguishes Yale or Princeton? Not that these other things are not worth doing, but they may be done anywhere. They may be done in athletic clubs where there is no study, but this thing can be done only here. This is the distinctive mark of the place.

A good many years ago, just two weeks before the mid-year examinations, the faculty of Princeton was foolish enough to permit a very unwise evangelist to come to the place and to upset the town. And while an assisting undergraduate was going from room to room one undergraduate secured his door and put this notice out, "I am a Christian and am studying for examinations." Now I want to say that that is exactly what a Christian undergraduate would be doing at that time of the year. He would not be attending religious meetings, no matter

how beneficial it would be to him. He would be studying for examinations, not merely for the purpose of passing them, but from his sense of duty.

We get a good many men at Princeton from certain secondary schools which say a great deal about their earnest desire to cultivate character among their students, and I hear a great deal about character being the object of education. I take leave to believe that a man who cultivates his character consciously will cultivate nothing except what will make him intolerable to his fellow-men. If your object in life is to make a fine fellow of yourself, you will not succeed, and you will not be acceptable to really fine fellows. Character, gentlemen, is a by-product. It comes, whether you will or not, as a consequence of a life devoted to the nearest duty, and the place in which character would be cultivated, if it be a place of study, is a place where study is the object and character the result.

Not long ago a gentleman approached me in great excitement just after the entrance examinations. He said we had made a great mistake in not taking so and so from a certain school which he named. "But," I said, "he did not pass the entrance examinations." He went over the boy's moral excellencies again. "Pardon me," I said, "you do not understand. He did not pass the entrance examinations. "Now," I said, "I want you to understand that if the Angel Gabriel applied for admission to Princeton University and could not pass the entrance examinations, he would not be admitted.

He would be wasting his time." It seemed a new idea to him. This boy had come from a school which cultivated character, and he was a nice, lovable fellow with a presentable character. Therefore, he ought to be admitted to any university. I fail to see it from this point of view, for a university is an institution of purpose. We have in some previous years had pity for young gentlemen who were not sufficiently acquainted with the elements of a preparatory course. They have been dropped at the examinations, and I have always felt that we have been guilty of an offense, and have made their parents spend money to no avail and the youngsters spend their time to no avail. And so I think that all university men ought to rouse themselves now and understand what is the object of a university. The object of a university is intellect; as a university its only object is intellect. As a body of young men there ought to be other things, there ought to be diversions to release them from the constant strain of effort, there ought to be things that gladden the heart and moments of leisure, but as a university the only object is intellect.

The reason why I chose the subject that I am permitted to speak upon to-night — the function of scholarship — was that I wanted to point out the function of scholarship not merely in the university but in the nation. In a country constituted as ours is the relation in which education stands is a very important one. Our whole theory has been based upon an enlightened citizenship and therefore the function of scholarship must be for the

nation as well as for the university itself. I mean the function of such scholarship as undergraduates get. That is not a violent amount in any case. You cannot make a scholar of a man, except by some largess of Providence in his make-up, by the time he is twenty-one or twenty-two years of age. There have been gentlemen who have made a reputation by twenty-one or twenty-two, but it is generally in some little province of knowledge, so small that a small effort can conquer it. You do not make scholars by that time, you do not often make scholars by seventy that are worth boasting of. The process of scholarship, so far as the real scholar is concerned, is an unending process, and knowledge is pushed forward only a very little by his best efforts. It is evident, of course, that the most you can contribute to a man in his undergraduate years is not equipment in the exact knowledge which is characteristic of the scholar, but the inspiration of the spirit of scholarship. The most that you can give a youngster is the spirit of the scholar.

Now the spirit of the scholar in a country like ours must be a spirit related to the national life. It cannot, therefore, be a spirit of pedantry. I suppose that it is a sufficient working conception of pedantry to say that it is knowledge divorced from life. It is knowledge so closeted, so desecrated, so stripped of the significances of life itself, that it is a thing apart and not connected with the vital processes in the world about us.

There is a great place in every nation for the spirit of

scholarship, and it seems to me that there never was a time when the spirit of scholarship was more needed in affairs than it is in this country at this time.

We are thinking just now with our emotions and not with our minds, we are moved by impulse and not by judgment. We are drawing away from things with blind antipathy. The spirit of knowledge is that you must base your conclusions on adequate grounds. Make sure that you are going to the real sources of knowledge, discovering what the real facts are before you move forward to the next process, which is the process of clear thinking. By clear thinking I do not mean logical thinking. I do not mean that life is based upon any logical system whatever. Life is essentially illogical. The world is governed now by a tumultuous house of commons made up of the passions, and we should pray God that the good passions should outvote the bad passions. But the movement of impulse, of motive, is the stuff of passion, and therefore clear thinking about life is not logical, symmetrical thinking, but it is interpretative thinking, thinking that sees the secret motive of things, thinking that penetrates deep places where are the pulses of life.

Now scholarship ought to lay these impulses bare just as the physician can lay bare the seat of life in our bodies. That is not scholarship which goes to work upon the mere formal pedantry of logical reasoning, but that *is* scholarship which searches for the heart of a man. The spirit of scholarship gives us catholicity of thinking,

the readiness to understand that there will constantly swing into our ken new items not dreamed of in our philosophy; not simply to draw our conclusions from the data that we have had, but that all this is under constant mutation, and that therefore new phases of life will come upon us and a new adjustment of our conclusions will be necessary. Our thinking must be detached and disinterested thinking.

The particular objection that I have to the undergraduate forming his course of study on his future profession is this — that from start to finish, from the time he enters the university until he finishes his career, his thought will be centered upon particular interests. He will be immersed in the things that touch his profit and loss, and a man is not free to think inside that territory. If his bread and butter is going to be affected, if he is always thinking in the terms of his own profession; he is not thinking for the nation. He is thinking of himself, and whether he be conscious of it or not, he can never throw these trammels off. He will only think as a doctor, or a lawyer, or a banker. He will not be free in the world of knowledge and in the circle of interests which make up the great citizenship of the country. It is necessary that the spirit of scholarship should be a detached, disinterested spirit, not immersed in a particular interest. That is the function of scholarship in a country like ours, to supply, not heat, but light, to suffuse things with the calm radiance of reason, to see to it that men do not act hastily, but that they act con-

siderately, that they obey the truth. The fault of our age is the fault of hasty action, of premature judgments, of a preference for ill-considered action over no action at all. Men who insist upon standing still and doing a little thinking before they do any acting are called reactionaries. They want actually to react to a state in which they can be allowed to think. They want for a little while to withdraw from the turmoil of party controversy and see where they stand before they commit themselves and their country to action from which it may not be possible to withdraw.

The whole fault of the modern age is that it applies to everything a false standard of efficiency. Efficiency with us is accomplishment, whether the accomplishment be by just and well-considered means or not; and this standard of achievement it is that is debasing the morals of our age, the intellectual morals of our age. We do not stop to do things thoroughly; we do not stop to know why we do things. We see an error and we hastily correct it by a greater error; and then go on to cry that the age is corrupt.

And so it is, gentlemen, that I try to join the function of the university with the great function of the national life. The life of this country is going to be revolutionized and purified only when the universities of this country wake up to the fact that their only reason for existing is intellectual, that the objects that I have set forth, so far as undergraduate life is concerned, are the only legitimate objects. And every man should crave

for his university primacy in these things, primacy in other things also if they may be brought in without enmity to it, but the sacrifice of everything that stands in the way of these.

For my part, I do not believe that it is athleticism which stands in the way. Athletics have been associated with the achievements of the mind in many a successful civilization. There is no difficulty in uniting vigor of body with achievement of mind, but there is a good deal of difficulty in uniting the achievement of the mind with a thousand distracting social influences, which take up all our ambitions, which absorb all our thoughts, which lead to all our arrangements of life, and then leave the university authorities the residuum of our attention, after we are through with the things that we are interested in. We absolutely changed the whole course of study at Princeton and revolutionized the methods of instruction without rousing a ripple on the surface of the alumni. They said those things were intellectual, they were our business. But just as soon as we thought to touch the social part of the university, there was not only a ripple, but the whole body was torn to its depths. We had touched the real things. These lay in triumphal competition with the province of the mind, and men's attention was so absolutely absorbed in these things that it was impossible for us to get their interest enlisted on the real undertakings of the university itself.

Now that is true of every university that I know any-

thing about in this country, and if the Faculties in this country want to recapture the ground that they have lost, they must begin pretty soon, and they must go into the battle with their bridges burned behind them so that it will be of no avail to retreat. If I had a voice to which the university men of this country might listen, that is the endeavor to which my ambition would lead me to call.

CHILD LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS GREAT ATTENDANT EVILS[1]

FELIX ADLER

THERE are many centenaries that have received attention of late; there is one that has been almost ignored, and yet it well deserved to be remembered. Two years ago a hundred years had elapsed since the first act was passed by the British Parliament to abate the evils of child labor. England industrially is the most advanced country in the world, and English economic history shows the good and evil sides of industrial civilization writ large. A momentary glance at the conditions which called forth the Factory Act of 1802 and the legislation that followed will serve as a useful introduction to our subject. Briefly, the facts were these:

The pauper children of London workhouses were being fed to the machine, almost as the children in the ancient idolatry were fed to Moloch. Pauper children whom nobody owned, deserted waifs, orphans left on the parish — a burden on the ratepayers — were sent by hundreds and thousands to supply the demand for cheap labor on the part of the factories, which at this time were everywhere springing up. These puny laborers — many of them not over seven years of age — were

[1] Reprinted by permission of the National Child Labor Association.

worked to death. But that hardly mattered, because the workhouse supply was sufficient to fill up the depleted ranks. The workhouses at first even paid a small premium to the manufacturers for taking their wards off their hands. The children were lodged in rough barracks, were cruelly driven by their taskmasters while at work, their food was of the worst description, they were forced to labor often fourteen hours, and they were decimated by disease. It was this stage of things that provoked the law of 1802, but this law was the barest beginning. The law applied only to pauper children, and it was soon found necessary to protect children also against the pitiless egotism or the desperation of their own parents. The law applied only to certain industries, and it was found necessary to extend it to others. With the substitution of steam for water power, manufactories were transferred to cities, and the demand for cheap labor grew apace. It was felt that an age limit of some kind — below which children might not be employed — must be set. The efforts to do so were strangely hesitant and inadequate, but at least the principle of an age limit came to be recognized. In 1833 it was estimated that 56,000 children between nine and thirteen were employed in factories, a whole army of child workers; but nine was a high limit compared with what in many branches had been customary. Before the Children's Employment Committee a man named Apsden testified. Pointing to his boy, he said: "This boy when he was seven years old, in winter I carried on my shoulders

across the snow to his place of work, and he would work for sixteen hours." What a picture; the man rousing a child of seven from his sleep, forcing him out of bed in the dark winter morning, trudging with him on his back across the snow, and depositing the little fellow, seven years old, to work for sixteen hours. And then another picture, for he adds: "I have often knelt at his side and given him food while he was working because he was not allowed to leave the machine." If you wish to realize what child labor means, think of the inmates of London workhouses systematically done to death in the Yorkshire factories. Think of Apsden and his seven-year-old boy, and then think — if you can bear to do so — of another picture! For till now only the factories and not the mines had been touched. In the year 1842 evidence was taken as to the state of things in the coal mines. Children began their work in the mines sometimes as early as at five years of age. Little girls were found to make ten or twelve trips a day up steep ladders to the surface, carrying heavy loads of coal in wooden buckets on their shoulders. For the development of little girls into womanhood, what an admirable device! Women and girls, half nude, worked side by side with boys and men wholly so; every consideration of human decency was flung to the winds. And in Mr. Cheyney's book on "The Industrial History of England," which usefully summarizes these facts, you will find a picture representing a woman crawling on all fours, dragging through a passageway about two feet

high a car containing three or four hundredweight of coal by a chain attached to a girdle around her waist. And this is described as a common form of labor. This is the third picture which I would ask you to bear in mind. Progress has been made since then; the regulation of the labor of women and children — with the latter alone we are concerned now — has been more and more extended, though the task is not yet completed. The problem of production in the sweating trades has not yet been solved, and there are still other problems to be met.

And now I wish to pause a moment to ask a question, for it is not my purpose at this time to dwell on the horrors that prevailed in the past, and as you will presently learn prevail amongst us to-day to no inconsiderable extent, any more than I can help for the purposes of the argument and the plea which I want to submit to you. But I do want to ask a question which constantly obtrudes itself on my mind: How is it that members of the human species can behave with such cruelty as did the mine owners who employed women to drag coal cars, creeping on hands and knees with a chain attached around their waist, and how is it that manufacturers can be so merciless — I suppose many of them had children of their own, and must have known what a tender thing a child of seven years is — as to drive the little Apsden boy and his fellows for sixteen mortal hours in the mill; or so lost to all respect for human life as those employers who fed the workhouse children to their

machines? I take no comfort in denouncing such men, or those who follow in their footsteps at the present day. There is a vulgar proverb that he who cuts off his nose disfigures his own face. These persons are men of the same human species as ourselves; their conduct reflects dishonor upon us all. Are we then still so brutal? is the belief that there is a better nature latent in us merely a pleasant fiction?

Perhaps an explanation is possible which will leave us a margin of hope for the future. It appears to me that periods of sudden expansion are the times in which the greatest moral recklessness is exhibited and the ordinary moral scruples are most apt to be set aside. This thought might be illustrated by the history of colonial expansion, of military expansion, even of artistic expansion — as at the time of the Renaissance; but especially by the history of industrial expansion. New machines are invented, the forces of nature, such as steam and electricity, are drafted into the service of economic ends; new markets are opened, and as a consequence tens of thousands of energetic men see opening before them the opportunity of securing riches. In the previous comparatively stationary state of society their energies had been repressed; small gains, slowly accumulated by much labor and self-denial, had been the rule; the number of very wealthy persons before the industrial revolution set in was relatively small. But now, as a result of the new conditions, the gates of opportunity are thrown wide open, the glittering prize dangles

before every eye, and every active forward-pressing person may hope to secure it. He who looks steadfastly and continuously at some burnished object like a metallic doorknob will presently find himself hypnotized. The same is true in the case of brilliant objects of endeavor that stand out before the imagination. And the essence of this hypnotic effect is that it excludes all other objects or ideas from the mental viewpoint, and this it seems to me explains the conduct of the class of employers and mine owners to whom I have referred. It was gold, the unexpected chance of securing Aladdin's treasure, that riveted their attention, that hypnotized them. The cry of the children they did not hear, the degradation of women they did not see, or if they saw it, it made no impression on their impervious minds; the social evils consequent upon their predatory conduct were excluded from their sphere of vision; a kind of monomania took possession of them, they were the victims of a fixed idea. The periods of industrial expansion are peculiarly fruitful of such fixed ideas, and they are therefore the danger points in the development of human society. But what is the hope? The hope is that the results of such a reckless course of action will appear to the eye too plainly to be ignored; that the morally sound elements in the community, if the community be still sound at core, will take alarm; that a powerful reaction will set in, and that as a result certain forms of industrial iniquity which had previously been overlooked or had remained unrecognized will be stig-

matized and forbidden; and that the general moral standard with respect to the evils that have appeared will be definitely raised to a higher point than it had reached before those evils had set in. This is the hope; it is founded on the morally sound elements in the community and on their reaction; I believe that in American communities such elements still abundantly exist.

But it is of child labor in the United States that I am to speak, and here again I shall restrict myself to a few outstanding facts sufficient to establish that we are not fighting windmills, but that the evils which so earnestly challenge a remedy are widespread.

At the beginning of 1903 it is estimated that there were in the factories of the South — chiefly cotton factories — about 20,000 children under the age of twelve. Twelve is a very early age at which to begin work; but under the age of twelve, and 20,000, and in the United States of America — who would have credited it? And these children, too, not the children of foreign immigrants, but for the most part the offspring of the purest American stock of this continent; and some of these children, as eye witnesses attest, were at their work even more than twelve hours, as much as thirteen and fourteen hours a day. Where are our instincts of mercy, where is the motherliness of the women of this country, whither is the chivalry of our men that should seek a glory in protecting the defenseless and the weak? Within the last two years child-labor laws have been passed which have doubtless reduced the number of

children under twelve years of age in the factories; how great the reduction is, it is impossible to say. But the South is by no means singular, though it has of late been more conspicuous in its employment of child labor than other sections of the country. And there is no excuse for adopting a pharasaical attitude toward the southern communities and saying: "We are glad that we are not like these." For, in the first place, in not a few instances it is northern capital invested in southern mills that shares the responsibility for the conditions named; and then again, while the proportion of child to adult labor in the South is greater than anywhere else in the country, the absolute number of children employed is greater in the industrial centers of the North.

The lack of adequate statistical inquiries makes it impossible to express in figures the extent of the evil of child labor. But wherever investigation is undertaken, wherever the surface is even scratched, we are shocked to find to what an extent the disease is eating its way underneath, even in those states in which legislation on the subject is almost ideal. The laws are admirable, but the enforcement is defective. Thus, glancing over the reports recently transmitted to the National Child Labor Committee by its agents, I find that in New Jersey, in one of the woolen mills, 200 children under the legal age are at work. In the glass industry of Ohio, Pennsylvania, and West Virginia, the evils of premature work and of night work are combined. A boy, Willie Davis, for instance, thirteen years old, works on alter-

nate nights from 6.30 P.M. to 4.30 A.M., earning ninety cents a day. In one of the glasshouses of Wheeling, W. Va., forty boys were seen by the agent, apparently from ten to twelve years of age; one child looked not over nine years old, "but was too busy to be interviewed." In this place 3000 children of the school age were found to be out of school. In this town there are also many cigar factories that employ children. And speaking of the tobacco industry reminds me of the case of a child worker just reported from Pittsburgh. The boy is employed in a toby factory — "tobies" being a cheap kind of cigar — in rolling tobies. He is twelve years of age; he has already been at work for seven months; the hours of labor are from 6 A. M. to 8 P. M., intermission for lunch fifteen minutes, for supper twenty minutes, in all thirty-five minutes in fourteen hours. He works Saturday nights from seven until midnight, and sometimes until two Sunday morning; does not work Saturdays, but works Sundays. The room in which he rolls his "tobies" is described as dark and poorly ventilated; the atmosphere is charged with tobacco dust. The boy seems gentle and uncomplaining, but he coughs; and when he was asked whether he was well, he pointed to his chest and to his back and said: "I have a pain here and there."

And in our own State of New York, which in point of legislation is in advance of all the rest, the infractions of the law that occur are frightful enough, as the petition for the removal of the present factory inspector sent

to the governor by the Child Labor Committee of New York plainly proves. In a single one of the canning factories where abuses are particularly flagrant, the foreman himself estimated the number of children at work in violation of the law to be 300. Children as young as ten, nine, and seven were found to be at work side by side with their mothers, from 9 A.M. to 9 P.M. In the Chelsea jute mills of Brooklyn, an establishment which acquired an unenviable notoriety in connection with the Annie Ventre case some months ago, there are reported to be at the present time 85 children at work under the legal age. In the sweated trades the evils are the same, or if possible worse. The report further states that the number of violations, not of the child labor laws in particular but of the factory laws in general, is alarmingly on the increase: 33,000 reported in 1901, 50,000 in 1903.

I must again repeat that the number of law-defying employers cannot be estimated with any exactness. Sweeping arraignments, sensational generalizations, are unjust in this as in other cases. There are employers, not a few, who on their own initiative endeavor to enhance the safety, the comfort and the well-being of their employees beyond anything that the law requires of them. But the mischief wrought by the lawless minority, affecting as it does so many thousands of human lives, is intolerable; and there is always the danger that in a competitive system the lowering of the standard by the unscrupulous will tend to undermine and to drag down the higher standard which those whose intentions are

honorable are attempting to maintain. There is need of efforts gradually to raise the age limit of employment where that limit is too low; and it has been found also that there is need of a kind of national steering committee to promote the movement on behalf of child protection — in view of the fact that states hitherto agricultural are more and more entering the column of the industrial states — for the purpose of guiding as far as possible this transition, and enabling the newer industrial communities to profit by the lessons of experience, and preventing in their case the needless repetition of the evils which have marked the initial stages of industrial development in the older countries and commonwealths. Such a committee has now been created. But in addition to good laws, there is need of a vigorous and imperative public sentiment in favor of the enforcement of the laws, for without the pressure of public sentiment the best laws remain dead letters, as the example of New York State demonstrates. But public sentiment cannot be maintained without public interest in the question; and it is to aid in developing such interest with a view to maintaining such a sentiment that I have brought the matter before you in this address.

And now let us briefly consider some of the arguments that are advanced in favor of child labor, and the grounds upon which they are to be rejected. The first argument is, that necessity knows no compunction; that however undesirable it may seem to harness young children to the yoke of toil, it is impossible to do without

them, because if child labor laws are enforced certain important branches of industry will cease to be profitable. For instance, in the glass industry. It is said that this industry cannot be carried on without the aid of young boys, and of the textile industries in the South the same has been averred. This argument is as old as human avarice, and it appears again and again in modern economic history. It is fallacious, for the reason that cheap labor is not really cheap, and that higher paid labor — in this case the labor of adults as compared with that of children — is not really more expensive. The prohibition of the cheap labor of the child is favorable to the invention and use of labor-saving devices; it challenges and promotes a more efficient organization of the business; and it imparts a higher value to the product, because of the greater skill, vigor and interest of the labor that enters into the product. As a matter of fact, at the time when the two principal industries of England — the textile and the coal-mining industries — were prohibited from employing children, there was a tremendous outcry, and it was freely predicted that those branches would cease to be profitable, and especially that England would cease to be able to compete in the matter of textiles and coal with foreign countries. But what has been the event? That England is stronger to-day — not in spite of, but because she has forbidden, child labor — in just those two branches of industry than she was at the time when those sinister predictions were uttered. And so if it is said that the glass

industry cannot be carried on without child labor there is the fact to be noted that the largest glasshouse in the State of Ohio is carried on without child labor, and does not appear to be conducted at a loss.

A second argument is the attempt to block a humanitarian movement for a seemingly humanitarian reason, the reason being that the labor of these little hands is necessary to relieve the poverty of their families, and that it is cruel to deprive the poor of that increase of their weekly earnings — even if it be only two or three dollars — which little children are able to supply. In answer to this plea it must be said that the actual state of the case is sometimes quite different from what is supposed. For instance, I have in mind the case of a boy who, though fifteen years of age, was sadly overworked, his hours being from 6 A.M. to 10 P.M. The father of this boy earns from six to seven dollars a day. Surely this is not a case in which the necessity of the parent excuses the overtaxing of the strength of a young boy. In other cases parents are found to lead a parasitic life, reversing the order of nature, the adults living at the expense of the children. Economically it is brought home to us, that the wage earned by children is not really an increase of the family earnings; that where there is competition between children and men the wages of the men are thereby reduced; so that a family in which man, woman, and child are breadwinners may not earn more — sometimes earn less — than the income gained by the man when the man alone

was the breadwinner. And again, in those cases of genuine hardship which undoubtedly occur, especially where women have been left widowed with the care of a family upon their hands, and where the small earnings of children ten and eleven years of age do make an appreciable difference (cases have occurred of loyal little men under the age limit coming to the mills with tears in their eyes and begging to be allowed to labor for their mothers' sake); I say in such cases it is wiser for society to commend indeed the loyalty of these little fellows, but to send them to school, and to follow the example of Ohio, which has spread a law upon its statute books looking to the public relief of destitute families of this kind. It is better for the State to furnish outright relief than to see the standard of living of whole sections of the population lowered by child competition.

These are the two main arguments. There is one other argument, so un-American and so inhuman that I am almost ashamed to quote it, and yet it has been used, and I fear is secretly in the minds of some who would not openly stand for it. A manufacturer standing near the furnace of a glasshouse and pointing to a procession of young Slav boys who were carrying the glass on trays, remarked: "Look at their faces, and you will see that it is idle to take them from the glasshouse in order to give them an education; they are what they are, and will always remain what they are." He meant that there are some human beings — and these Slavs

of the number — who are mentally irredeemable, so fast asleep intellectually that they cannot be awakened; designed by nature, therefore, to be hewers of wood and drawers of water. This cruel and wicked thing was said of Slavs; it is the same thing which has been said from time immemorial by the slave owners of their *slaves*. First they degrade human beings by denying them the opportunity to develop their better nature; no schools, no teaching, no freedom, no outlook; and then, as if in mockery, they point to the degraded condition of their victims as a reason why they should never be allowed to escape from it.

These are the arguments advanced for child labor. What I have summarily said may suffice for their refutation; but I shall not content myself merely with the negative attitude of meeting our opponents, and I should like, in approaching the close of my address, to present the grand positive reason why child servitude should be abolished throughout the length and breadth of this land. The battle is sometimes put on what are called sentimental grounds. Any one who has children of his own cannot help enduring a certain anguish in thinking of such cases as those of the little children treading up and down those stairs of the inferno of the English coal mines with buckets of coal on their backs, or of the little children in the mills returning to their squalid homes at 2.30 in the morning, or of the little boy rolling "tobies" in the dark and ill-ventilated room for fourteen mortal hours, coughing, with a pain "here and there."

And when we picture these things and realize what they mean we are apt to cry out in a sort of wild indignation, saying: "These things must stop; we will not permit them to go on." In other words, we think of the individual children; and as we are men and women capable of sympathetic feeling, our hearts bleed for them.

But in addition we must never forget that beyond the individual interest there is a vast social interest at stake, the interest of American civilization, of human civilization, of all those generations that are to succeed us. The reason why child labor must be abolished, apart from the sufferings of individuals, is one which biology and ethics combine to enforce upon us. The higher the type of living being, the finer the organism, the longer the period of time required for its maturing. The young of birds and of the lower animals are full grown after a few days or a few weeks. They acquire with incredible rapidity the use of inherited instincts, and after the shortest infancy are ready to take up the struggle for existence after the fashion of their species. The human being requires a period of preparation extending over years before he is ready to take up the struggle for existence after the human fashion. First infancy, then childhood, then early youth; and during all that period he must remain dependent on the protection and the nurture of adult kinsfolk. If that period is curtailed, the end of Nature in this highest type of living being — man — is thwarted. It is for this reason that premature toil is such a curse. The child

must develop physically, and to do so it must play; the child must develop mentally, and to do so it must be sent to school; the child must develop morally, and to do so it must be kept within the guarded precincts of the home.

The physical effects of precocious childhood are arrest of growth, puny, stunted stature, anæmia, thin, emaciated limbs, sunken cheeks and hollow eyes; and diseases of all kinds — of the lungs, of the joints, of the spine — for arrest of development does not mean mere arrest, but means malformation.

The mental effects of precocity labor are likewise arrest of mental development; and this, too, means not only a stopping short but a development in the wrong direction. The brilliant but short-lived intelligence of many newsboys, their high-strung excitability, their sinister anticipation of world knowledge, followed often by torpor and mental exhaustion later on, are an instance in point. We laugh at and applaud their sallies of wit, their quick repartee, their seeming ability to play the game of life on a par with adults; we do not look beyond the moment, nor count the cost they pay.

And the moral effects, as is to be expected, are of the same sort; loosening of family ties, roving the streets, familiarity with vice and the haunts of vice, a startling independence before the moral nature is fit to maintain independence, a process of selection so trying that while sometimes it leads those subjected to it to distinguished achievement, more often it leads to ruin.

The finer the type the longer the period needed for

the maturing of it. In the case of youths dedicated to the professions, the period of preparation at present extends far into the twenties. In the case of all who are to be component members of this American nation, to carry on its great traditions and help in solving its tremendous problems, the period of preparation should not be cut short below the sixteenth year. This is the standard toward which we are working, toward which we hope to approximate — more rapidly in the older communities, more patiently and with a due regard to all the interests involved in the less advanced communities. But we look forward to the day when the standard shall be adopted in all the American commonwealths, and the total abolition of child labor in every form shall be the honorable achievement of the entire American people.

The emancipation of childhood from economic servitude is a social reform of the first magnitude. It is also one upon which we can all unite. There are so many proposed reforms upon which it is impossible to secure agreement, different minds, though alike honest, inevitably differing with regard to them. But here is a reform upon which we can agree, which must appeal to every right-thinking person, and which is urgent. And one particular advantage of it I should like to point out, namely, that it is calculated to be the best induction into the right spirit of social reform, that it will attune the community in which it is achieved to a favorable reception of sane and sound social reforms generally.

Because if once it comes to be an understood thing that a certain sacredness "doth hedge around" a child, that a child is industrially taboo, that to violate its rights is to touch profanely a holy thing, that it has a soul which must not be blighted for the prospect of mere gain; if this be once generally conceded with regard to the child the same essential reasoning will be found to apply also to the adult workers; they, too, will not be looked upon as mere commodities, as mere instruments for the accumulation of riches; to them also a certain sacredness will be seen to attach, and certain human rights to belong, which may not be infringed. I have great hopes for the adjustment of our labor difficulties on a higher plane, if once we can gain the initial victory of inculcating regard for the higher human nature that is present potentially in the child.

And there is one additional word which, if I may so far encroach upon your patience, I should like to say: It is not enough to shut the children out of the factory, we must also bring them into the school, and compel parents, if necessary, to send them to school; the movement for compulsory education everywhere goes hand in hand, and must go hand in hand, with the child-labor movement.

The child-labor movement has for its object to fence off an open space within which the educational institutions of the country may do their perfect work. The school has for its object to win from the human beings confided to it the human qualities latent in them, im-

agination, taste, skill, appreciation, vigorous reasoning, will power, character; to fulfill the ends of Nature in the finest organism, the highest type of living being which she has yet produced. A more convincing appeal than comes to us from these two movements jointly, 5 the child labor and the educational movements, in my judgment, cannot be conceived of. And without the former the latter cannot succeed.

THE CORNER STONES OF MODERN DRAMA[1]

Henry Arthur Jones

If we throw one sweeping glance over the whole past history of the drama, we are deeply impressed by two main, commanding features. The first of these is the perennial and universal existence of the dramatic instinct, always and everywhere seeking expression, always and everywhere pushing up its shoots into the national life. Often repressed, often debased, often childish, often vulgar, often obscene, often the emptiest, silliest bauble; formless; ribald; violent; grotesque; a feast of indecencies, or a feast of horrors, there has yet rarely been a time, or a country, where some kind of drama has not been fitfully and precariously struggling into existence. That is the first main feature in the world's dramatic history. The second main feature is inverse and complementary. Twice in the past the drama has splendidly emerged, has seized, possessed, inflamed and interpreted the whole spirit of the nation, has become the supreme artistic achievement of the age and people. Twice it has thus emerged — once in Greece, and once in Elizabethan England. But a Frenchman would say that three times, and a Spaniard would claim that four

[1] An address delivered at Harvard University, October 31, 1906.

times in the world's history have there been great creative outbursts of drama. Well, we who possess Shakespeare will generously allow that there have been four such great creative outbursts which have left standing these towering mountain ranges of drama for us to wonder at. France, in the seventeenth century, was the scene of the last of these great creative outbursts, and the incomparable Molière was the head and front of its glory.

This brings me to the purpose of my lecture, which is, indeed, to ask this practical question, "By what means can a worthy art of the drama be fostered and developed in America and England to-day?" I think we may best get an answer to this question by comparing the history and status of the drama in France and in England from the time of Molière down to the twentieth century — down to the modern drama of the day before yesterday.

Let us look at England first. Immediately after Molière we have Dryden, and the brilliant and corrupt Restoration Comedy, largely drawing its inspiration from France and Molière. But our leading Restoration dramatists had not the immense advantage of Molière's practical acquaintance with the theater; and their plays, compared with Molière's, are badly and loosely constructed. Further, there is a profound, instinctive, all-pervasive morality in Molière. Molière's morality is sure, intrinsic, inevitable; like Dante's, like Ibsen's, like Nature's morality. Our English Restoration Comedy is arid, heartless, degrading; essentially mischievous, cor-

rupt and depraved. Our love for Charles Lamb must not tempt us for a moment to accept his ingenious and audacious excuse for Restoration Comedy. We will not withdraw our censure from these Restoration heroes and heroines on the curious plea that they are fairy rakes and harlots living in a fairy land of cuckoldry; in spite of Charles Lamb we will, if you please, very heartily and wholesomely condemn them, and feel all the better and more self-righteous for having done it.

Our Restoration Comedy, then, has vanished from our stage, on the score of bad construction and bad morality; more, I fear, because of its bad construction than of its bad morality. But though the Restoration Comedy no longer holds our stage, the splendor of its wit, and the vividness of its portraiture of town life insure it a lasting place in English literature.

Since the Restoration Comedy, what place has the English drama held in English literature?

I was dining the other night with a book-collecting friend. He brought out first editions of "The Rivals," "The School for Scandal," and "She Stoops to Conquer." "There!" he exclaimed, "that's all the harvest of your English drama for the last two hundred years." Those three little volumes were all that a wealthy collector thought worthy to preserve of the dramatic art of the Anglo-Saxon race in the past two hundred years — that Anglo-Saxon race which during that same two hundred years has held sovereign sway and masterdom in literature, in science, and in arms; which

once held the sovereignty of the world in drama; a race of restless and inexhaustible achievement in almost every field; a race of action, and therefore essentially a dramatic race; a race whose artistic instincts would irresistibly find their natural and triumphant outlet on the stage. And in two hundred years all that the Anglo-Saxon race has produced of drama worthy to be preserved as literature is contained in those three tiny volumes. Why have we made such a beggarly mess of our drama?

Now if we turn from England to France, and survey the French theater and the French drama, we shall find that there has been an almost continuous stream of great writers for the stage from Molière onwards to the present time. In the seventeenth century, Molière stands not only at the head of the French drama, but also at the head of French literature; holding the same relative place as did Shakespeare in England half a century earlier. If France were asked, "Who of your sons since Molière dare claim the garland of eternal and universal renown? Who in your later days is fit to stand in the circle of Homer, Virgil, Dante, Shakespeare, Milton, and Goethe?" — if France were asked that question, I suppose she could only send in the names of two candidates — Voltaire and Victor Hugo. But these, her two most famous men of letters in the eighteenth and in the nineteenth centuries, are also her leading playwrights. As Molière in his century headed both literature and drama, so do Voltaire and Victor Hugo in theirs. But

what a crowd of illustrious companions swarm round these great men. Look down the long list of them — Regnard, Marivaux, Beaumarchais, Dumas, Alfred de Musset, Casimir Delavigne, Dumas fils, Augier, Labiche, not to mention half a dozen living writers who are yearly throwing out powerful dramas dealing faithfully, sincerely, and searchingly with the vital characters, scenes, and issues of our modern social life. Take the long list of French writers of the first rank, and you will scarcely find one who has not been more or less successful on the stage. The French theater has not been merely in constant touch with French literature; the French theater and French literature have been wedded to each other for the last two hundred years, bone of one bone and flesh of one flesh. Every play by a leading French playwright is not only eagerly discussed and judged in the theater; it is immediately published and eagerly discussed and judged as literature. A year or two ago, I remember taking up at a little wayside French bookstall a copy of the two hundred and eightieth thousand of Cyrano de Bergerac.

Further, during those two centuries there has been a constant method of training actors and actresses. Acting is known to be a great art in France. The all-round performance of a strong emotional play in Paris is immeasurably above the all-round performance of a strong emotional play in London; while the exhibition of quite amateur performers in leading parts, such as is not rarely seen on the London stage, would be a thing

disgraceful or impossible in any leading city of France, to say nothing of Paris.

Again, in France the drama is reckoned as a fine art, and is judged on that level; that is, as a means of providing amusement by the representation and interpretation of life. The French are a nation of cultivated playgoers, alert to seize the finest shades of the actor's and the author's meaning. In England, the great mass of playgoers have lost all sense that the drama is the art of representing life, and go to the theater mainly to be awed by scenery, or to be tickled by funny antics and songs and dances that have no relation to life, and merely provide a means of wasting the evening in entertainments not far removed from idiocy.

If the English drama for two hundred years makes a beggarly show when looked at by itself, how abject and meager and utterly despicable does it appear when compared with the drama of France in the same period! Once more we are brought round to the same question, "What are the causes of the present pitiable condition of the Anglo-American drama to-day?" Again I claim that the Anglo-American race is naturally and instinctively a dramatic race; a race of action; a race fitted for great exploits on the outer and larger stage of the world's history, and also for great exploits on the inner and smaller stage of the theater. We have proved our mettle on both stages. We hold the world's prize for drama. Why then are we so far to seek? Why are we lagging behindhand in this our own native art of the drama,

where by right we should lead the other nations at our heels? How is it that these three poor thin volumes of plays are all that we have to show for two hundred years; while of living, serious, operative, modern drama to-day America and England have barely a fragment that will stand the final test of a quiet hour in the study?

The fundamental reason is to be found in the character of our race. We are a dramatic race: we are also a deeply religious race. Religion easily runs riot to fear and meanness and madness, and creates abominable hells in its panic. After the mellow pomp of the Elizabethan age, religion ran riot in England. We owe the imbecility and paralysis of our drama to-day to the insane rage of Puritanism that would see nothing in the theater but a horrible, unholy thing to be crushed and stamped out of existence. Let our Puritan friends ask themselves how far their creed is responsible, by the natural and inevitable law of reaction, for the corruption of the national drama at the Restoration, and for its pitiable condition ever since. The feeling of horror and fright of the theater, engendered at the Restoration, is even to-day widely prevalent and operative among religious classes in England and America. It muddles and stupefies our drama, and degrades it from the rank of a fine art to the rank of a somewhat disreputable form of popular entertainment.

I have pointed out what I believe to be the underlying cause of the intellectual degradation of the Anglo-American drama to-day. But, attendant on this

primary cause, are those other secondary and resultant causes and signs of degradation which we have glanced at in comparing the English and French drama. I will repeat them in the order of their importance.

(1) The divorce of the English drama from English literature, of which it is indeed the highest and most difficult form, and of which it should be chief ornament. Accompanying this divorce of literature and the drama is the contempt of English men of letters and literary critics for the theater; their utter ignorance of the difficulties of the dramatist; their refusal to recognize the modern drama as literature, which refusal again reacts upon the dramatist, and tends to lower the quality of his work, inasmuch as he is left without encouragement, and without any appeal to high standards of literature and good taste.

(2) The general absence from the English theater and from modern English plays of any sane, consistent, or intelligible ideas about morality; so that, while the inanities and indecencies of musical comedy are sniggered at and applauded, the deepest permanent passions of men and women are tabooed, and the serious dramatist is bidden to keep his characters well within the compass of that system of morality which is practiced amongst wax dolls.

(3) The divorce of the English drama from its sister arts; its deposition from any assured place in the intellectual and artistic life of the nation.

(4) The absorption of the English drama into popular

amusement; the absence of any high standard whereby to judge acting or plays; the absence of all great traditions; the absence of all pride in the drama as a fine, and humane, and dignified art.

(5) The want of a training school for actors — the want of any means for giving promising novices a constant practice in varied rôles, that they may gradually acquire a sure grip of their art, and make the best of their natural gifts; and that the author may have a sufficient supply of competent actors to interpret his characters in such a way that his play may be seen to good advantage.

(6) The elevation of incompetent actors and actresses into false positions as stars, whereby, in the dearth of any general level of experienced and competent all-round acting, the possessor of a pretty face or a fine physique is able to dominate the situation, and to rule what plays shall be produced, and how they shall be cast and mounted; the general lack of all interest in the play, or in the author's study of life and character, apart from their being the vehicle for some star actor to put or keep himself in a leading position, with his actor brothers and sisters as his satellites.

(7) A widely spread dependence upon translations and adaptions of foreign plays, inasmuch as they can be bought at a cheap rate, and, in the absence of any general care or knowledge as to what a natural drama should be, are just as likely to provide the actor with a personal and pecuniary success, while they also largely set him

free from all obligations to that objectionable and interfering person, the author.

Now all these discouraging symptoms and conditions of our modern drama which I have glanced at are inextricably related to each other; many of them are, indeed, only different aspects of the same facts; they are woven all of a piece with each other, and with that Puritan horror of the theater which I believe to be the cardinal reason, that neither America nor England has to-day an art of the drama at all worthy the dignity, the resources, and the self-respect of a great nation. Many of these discouraging symptoms and conditions are perhaps more widely prevalent, and more pronounced, in England than in America. But I hope you will not think I have given an ill-natured or exaggerated sketch of the present condition of the Anglo-American drama. If I have wounded your susceptibilities, I have done it with the good intention of rendering you some small help in your noble design of building up a great national school of American drama. And, as an Englishman, I must regretfully own that I see a great chance of your having a national theater and a national drama, while we are left fumbling about amongst the grotesque futilities of French adaptations, and the imbecilities of musical farce.

Now, if I have struck my finger on the place in pointing to the religious dread of the theater, and the consequent abstention from it of the best and soundest elements of our nations — if I have traced our difficulties

and shortcomings to their true source, it is clear that before we can hope for any signal advance in dramatic art, we must win over a large body of public opinion to our views.

In their attitude towards the theater and the drama, we may, I think, make a rough division of the Anglo-American public into three classes. Both in England and in America we have large masses, who may be counted by millions, of mere amusement seekers, newly enfranchised from the prison house of Puritanism, eager to enjoy themselves at the theater in the easiest way, without traditions, without any real judgment of plays or acting; mere children, with no care or thought beyond the delight of the moment in finding themselves in a wonder house where impossibly heroic and self-sacrificing persons make love and do prodigious deeds, and marry and live happily ever afterwards; or in a funny house where funny people do all sorts of funny things. These form the great bulk, I think, of American and English playgoers. Then we have a very large class of moderate, reasonable, respectable people, who go to the theater occasionally, but with some feeling of discomfort at having done a frivolous, if not a wicked thing; who are not actively hostile to the drama, perhaps, but who are quite indifferent to its higher development and to its elevation into a fine art. This class contains many refined, cultivated people — that is, they seem to be cultivated and refined in all subjects except the drama. It is a constant puzzle to me why

men and women who are thoroughly educated and developed in every other respect should suddenly drop to the mental range of children of five the moment they think and speak about the drama.

Again, we have a third class, a very large class, which contains some of the soundest and best elements of the Anglo-Saxon race: very influential, very respectable, very much to be regarded, and consulted, and feared. And this large, influential, religious class is in more or less active hostility to the theater, and to the drama, and to everything and everybody connected therewith. We may call these three classes respectively the amusement-seeking class; the moderate, reasonable, indifferent class; the hostile, religious class. This is the very roughest and loosest division, and of course all these classes blend and shade into each other without any rigid line of distinction. I do not know how actively hostile to the drama are the religious elements in American society. I am told that while the religious prejudice against the theater is dying away in the eastern sea-board states, it is still most potent and aggressive in the West. But a story that was told me before leaving England will, I think, convince you that this religious prejudice is still a terrible hindrance to the highest development of your drama. There is nothing in which Americans can more legitimately take pride than in the magnificent public spirit shown by their wealthy citizens. Englishmen stand agape and envious at the large sums given by your millionaires to advance and

endow all kinds of scientific, artistic and social enterprises. I am told that a very large amount was designed by a wealthy American to found and endow a national American theater on a most lavish scale; but he was persuaded by a religious friend to hold his hand and shut his pocket, because of the evil that a national theater might work in your midst. Consider what mischief was done to the whole American community by the frustration of that most wise, most humane, most benevolent scheme! Consider how many hundreds of thousands of your fellow-citizens will in consequence waste their evenings in empty frivolity when they might have been drawn to Shakespeare or Goethe. Therefore we must still count that the hostile, religious spirit is very active and potent on your side of the Atlantic, as upon ours. It everywhere sets up a current of ill-will and ill-nature towards the drama throughout the two entire nations: it everywhere stimulates opposition to the theater: it keeps alive prejudices that would otherwise have died down two hundred years ago: and it is, in my opinion, the one great obstacle to the rise and development of a serious, dignified, national art of the drama. I fear there will always be a crew of unwholesome, religious fanatics in America and England who will be doomed at their birth to be hostile to the drama. It is useless to argue with them. You cannot argue the jaundice out of a man, and advise him that it is foolish to have a sickly green complexion. He needs something far more drastic than advice and argument.

We must leave the fanatics to rave against the theater, and against all art and beauty.

But among this actively hostile religious class, and also among the moderate, reasonable, indifferent class, there must be thousands who, having been nurtured to regard the theater as frivolous and empty and evil, have adopted the ideas current around them, and have never taken the trouble to examine their stock prejudices against the drama, and to inquire whether there is any ground for them. To this large body of American and English citizens; to the heads and leaders of all those religious sects in America and England who are now hostile to the drama; and especially to that large allied class of influential, educated men in both countries, who, if not actively hostile, are supercilious, and cold, and indifferent, and blind to the aims and possibilities of this fine art — to all these citizens representing the best and soundest elements in the Anglo-American race, we may make a strong and friendly appeal. I propose that we shall say to them: —

"Brother Puritans, Brother Pharisees, the dramatic instinct is ineradicable, inexhaustible; it is entwined with all the roots of our nature; you may watch its incessant activity in your own children; almost every moment of the day they are acting some little play; as we grow up and strengthen, this dramatic instinct grows up and strengthens in us; as our shadow, it clings to us; we cannot escape from it; we cannot help picturing back to ourselves some copy of this strange, event-

ful history of ours; this strange, earthly life of ours throws everywhere around us and within us reflections and re-reflections of itself; we act it over and over again in the chambers of imagery, and in dreams, and on the silent secret stage of our own soul. When some master dramatist takes these reflections, and combines them, and shapes them into a play for us, very Nature herself is behind him, working through him for our welfare. So rigidly economical, so zealously frugal is she, that what is at first a mere impulse to play, a mere impulse to masquerade and escape from life — this idle pastime she transforms and glorifies into a masterpiece of wisdom and beauty; it becomes our sweet and lovable guide in the great business and conduct of life. This is what she did for us in Shakespeare and Molière. Consider the utility of the theater, you practical Americans and Englishmen! You have noticed cats teaching their kittens to play at catching mice. But this is their great business and duty in after life. You have noticed puppies pretending to hunt, and shake, and kill game. But this is their great business and duty in after life. That is what all children and young things do. They play at their father's business. So that their play time is not wasted, but is indeed a wise, amusing way of preparing for life. So Nature teaches us, her children, to play at life in the theater, that we may carelessly and easily learn the great rules of conduct; that we may become insensibly instructed in the great art of living well; insensibly infected with a hatred for things base

and ungentle and foul; insensibly infected with a passion for whatsoever things are true, and honest, and just, and pure, and lovely, and of good report.

"This, then, is the use of the theater, that men may learn the great rules of life and conduct in the guise of a play; learn them, not formally, didactically, as they learn in school and in church, but pleasantly, insensibly, spontaneously, and oftentimes, believe me, with a more assured and lasting result in manners and conduct. Is not that a wise form of amusement?

"Look at the vast population of our great cities crowding more and more into our theaters, demanding there to be given some kind of representation of life, some form of play. You cannot quench that demand. During the next generation, hundreds of theaters will be opened all over America and England. If you abstain from visiting those theaters, you will not close them. Millions of your countrymen, the vast masses, will still frequent them. The effect of your absence, and of your discountenance, will merely be to lower the moral and intellectual standard of the plays that will then be given. Will you never learn the lesson of the English Restoration, that when the best and most serious classes of the nation detest and defame their theater, it instantly justifies their abuse and becomes indeed a scandal and a source of corruption? Many of you already put Shakespeare next to the Bible, as the guide and inspirer of our race. Why then do you despise his calling, and vilify his disciples, and misunderstand his art? Do

you not see that this amusement which you neglect and flout and decry is more than an amusement: is indeed at once the finest and the most popular of all the arts, with an immense influence on the daily lives of our fellow-citizens? Help us, then, to organize and endow this fine art in all the cities of our Anglo-American race, wherever our common tongue is spoken, from London to San Francisco. Help us to establish it in the esteem and affections of our fellow-countrymen, as the measure of our advance in humanity and civilization, and in that knowledge of ourselves which is the end and flower of all education!"

Some such appeal may, I think, be made to the more seriously minded of our countrymen on both sides the Atlantic. I have given it great prominence in these lectures, because I feel that before we begin to build, we need to clear the ground of the rank growths of prejudice and Puritan hatred which still choke the drama. Both in England and America we seem to be waiting for some great national impulse, some word of command, for a general forward movement towards a creative school of drama. In spite of many discouragements and humiliations during the last ten or twelve years; in spite of the hatred of the religious world, the indifference and contempt of the educated and artistic classes, the debased frivolity of the multitude, the zealous envy and rage of those whose ignoble trade and daily bread it is to keep the drama on a degraded level — in spite of all these hindrances, I believe that word of command will

be spoken, and that we shall march to it. But if there is to be any stability and permanence in the movement, it must be a national one. We must engage the sympathies and coöperation of all classes. We have many schisms and sects in religion: let us have none in the drama. I have taken much time, and, I fear, I have taxed your patience in thus clearing the ground. But having cleared the ground, we can begin to lay the corner stones. I have already told you what seem to me to be the corner stones of any school of drama, worthy to be called national in such countries as America and England. Perhaps I may here repeat them in the order of their importance. They are these: —

(1) The recognition of the drama as the highest and most difficult form of literature: the establishment of definite and continuous relations between the drama and literature.

(2) The acknowledged right of the dramatist to deal with the serious problems of life, with the passions of men and women in the spirit of the broad, wise, sane, searching morality of the Bible and Shakespeare: his release from the hypocritical fiction that his fellow-creatures are large wax dolls, stuffed with the sawdust of sentimentality and impossible self-sacrifice. To sum up, the establishment of definite and continuous relations between the drama and morality.

(3) The severance of the drama from popular entertainment: the recognition of it as a fine art which, though its lower ranges must always compound with

mere popular entertainment, and be confused with it, is yet essentially something different from popular entertainment, transcends it, and in its higher ranges is in marked and eternal antagonism to popular entertainment. To sum up, the establishment of definite and continuous relations between the drama and her sister arts.

(4) The establishment of those relations between actor and author which shall best aid the development of the drama: the recognition by the public that there is an art of the drama as well as an art of acting: the assignment of their due place, and functions, and opportunities to each: the breaking down, so far as may be possible, of the present deadening system of long runs: the provision of training schools for actors so that they may get constant practice and experience in varied rôles, so that the auxiliary arts of the drama and the theater may keep pace and tune with each other, so that the art of acting may not languish for lack of new plays, and that the art of the drama may not languish from the lack of competent and serious actors. To sum up, the establishment of rigidly definite relations and well-marked boundaries between the art of the drama, and the art of acting, to the benefit and advancement of both actor and author.

These seem to me to be the four corner stones upon which we must build, if we are ever to raise, in England and America, an art of the drama with any real influence, and import, and dignity in Anglo-American civilization.

When I was in America last autumn after an absence of twenty years, I could not help feeling myself in the presence of immense forces that are gradually shifting the foundations, and changing the drift of Anglo-American civilization. I could not help feeling that the scepter of material prosperity is slipping from our hands into your vigorous, remorseless grasp. I could not avoid the uneasy presentiment that in a few generations the center and seat of whatever system of Anglo-American civilization may then be current, will be irrevocably fixed on this side the Atlantic. That cannot be other than a saddening, chilling thought to an Englishman who loves his country. I cannot but think it will bring some sympathetic regret to many Americans. Yet, after all, your chief feeling must be one of pride and triumph in your young nation, and you will chant over us your Emerson's ringing notes: —

> The lord is the peasant that was,
> The peasant the lord that shall be:
> The lord is hay, the peasant grass,
> One dry, one the living tree.

But the Empire of Mammon sucks after it other empires; perhaps in our modern commercial world it will suck after it all other empires, all arts, all interests, all responsibilities, all leaderships. Yet we must still trust that in days to come, as in days of old, it will not be the scepter of material prosperity that will finally hold sway over the earth. Granted that, in a short time as reckoned by the life of nations, we shall have

to hand over to you, with what grace we may, the scepter of material prosperity, shall we not still hold that other magic wand, shadowy, invisible, but more compulsive than scepters of gold or iron — the scepter of literary, intellectual and artistic dominion? Or will you wrest that also from us? May we not rather hope to see both nations united in a great assay to build one common monument of graceful, wise, beautiful, dignified, human existence on both sides the Atlantic? Your nation has, what all young nations have, what England is losing, the power to be moved by ideas, and that divine resilient quality of youth, the power to be stirred and frenzied by ideals. If a guest whom you have honored so much, if your most fervent well-wisher may presume to whisper his most fervent wishes for a country to whom he is so deeply indebted, he would say, "As you vie with us in friendly games and contests of bodily strength, may you more resolutely vie with us for the mastership in art and in the ornament of life; build statelier homes, nobler cities, and more aspiring temples than we have built; let your lives be fuller of meaning and purpose than ours have lately been; have the wisdom richly to endow and unceasingly to foster all the arts, and all that makes for majesty of life and character rather than for material prosperity and comfort. Especially foster and honor this supreme art of Shakespeare's, so much neglected and misunderstood in both countries: endow it in all your cities; build handsome, spacious theaters: train your actors: reward your dramatists, sparingly

with fees, but lavishly with laurels; bid them dare to paint American life sanely, truthfully, searchingly, for you. Dare to see your life thus painted. Dare to let your drama ridicule and reprove your follies and vices and deformities. Dare to let it mock and whip, as well as amuse, you. Dare to let it be a faithful mirror. Make it one of your chief counsellors. Set it on the summit of your national esteem, for it will draw upwards all your national life and character; upwards to higher and more worthy levels, to starry heights of wisdom and beauty and resolve and aspiration."

IS MUSIC THE TYPE OR MEASURE OF ALL ART?[1]

John Addington Symonds

Mr. Matthew Arnold's definition of poetry as "at bottom a Criticism of Life," insisted somewhat too strenuously on the purely intellectual and moral aspects of art. There is a widely different way of regarding the same subject-matter, which finds acceptance with many able thinkers of the present time. This ignores the criticism of life altogether, and dwells with emphasis upon sensuous presentation, emotional suggestion, and technical perfection, as the central and essential qualities of art. In order to steer a safe course between the Scylla of excessive intellectuality and the Charybdis of excessive sensuousness, it will be well to examine what a delicate and philosophical critic has published on this second theory of the arts. With this object in view, I choose a paper by Mr. Walter Pater on "The School of Giorgione."[2] The opinion that art has a sphere independent of intellectual or ethical intention is here advocated with lucidity, singular charm of style, and characteristic reserve.

[1] From "Essays Speculative and Suggestive." London, Smith, Elder & Co. New York, Charles Scribner's Sons.

[2] *Fortnightly Review*, October, 1877.

Mr. Pater opens the discussion by very justly condemning the tendency of popular critics "to regard all products of art as various forms of poetry." "For this criticism," he says, "poetry, music, and painting are but translations into different languages of one and the same fixed quantity of imaginative thought, supplemented by certain technical qualities of color in painting, of sound in music, of rhythmical words in poetry." "In this way," he adds, "the sensuous element in art, and with it almost everything in art that is essentially artistic, is made a matter of indifference." He then proceeds to point out that each of the fine arts has its own sphere, its own untranslatable mode of expression, its own way of reaching the imaginative reason through the senses, its own special responsibilities to its material.

So far, every intelligent student of the subject will agree with him. Nor will there be any substantial difference of opinion as to the second point on which he insists — namely, that each of the arts, while pursuing its own object, and obeying its own laws, may sometimes assimilate the quality of a sister-art. This, adopting German phraseology, Mr. Pater terms the *Anderstreben* of an art, or the reaching forward from its own sphere into the sphere of another art. We are familiar with the thought that Greek dramatic poetry borrowed something of its form from sculpture, and that the Italian romantic epic was determined to a great extent by the analogy of painting. Nor is it by any means an inno-

vation in criticism to refer all the artistic products of a nation to some dominant fine art, for which that nation possessed a special aptitude, and which consequently gave color and complexion to its whole æsthetical activity. Accordingly, Mr. Pater, both in the doctrine of the independence of each art, and also in the doctrine of the *Anders-streben* of one art toward another, advances nothing which excites opposition.

At this point, however, he passes into a region of more questionable speculation. Having rebuked popular criticism for using poetry as the standard whereby to judge the arts, he proceeds to make a similar use of music; for he lays it down that all the arts in common aspire "towards the principle of music, music being the typical, or ideally consummate art, the object of the great *Anders-streben* of all art, of all that is artistic, or partakes of artistic qualities."

The reason for this assertion is stated with precision:[1]

> *All art constantly aspires towards the condition of music.* For while in all other works of art it is possible to distinguish the matter from the form, and the understanding can always make this distinction, yet it is the constant effort of art to obliterate it. That the mere matter of a poem, for instance, its subject, its given incidents or situation; that the mere matter of a picture, the actual circumstances of an event, the actual topography of a landscape, should be nothing without the form, the spirit of the handling; that this form, this mode of handling, should become an end in itself, should penetrate every part of the matter; this is what all art constantly strives after, and achieves in different degrees.

[1] *Fortnightly Review*, p. 528. The italics are Mr. Pater's.

Having illustrated the meaning of this paragraph by references to painting, poetry, furniture, dress, and the details of daily intercourse, Mr. Pater proceeds as follows:[1] —

Art, then, is thus always striving to be independent of the mere intelligence, to become a matter of pure perception, to get rid of its responsibilities to its subject or material; the ideal examples of poetry and painting being those in which the constituent elements of the composition are so welded together that the material or subject no longer strikes the intellect only; nor the form, the eye or ear only; but form and matter, in their union or identity, present one single effect to the imaginative reason, that complex faculty for which every thought and feeling is twin-born with its sensible analogue or symbol.

It is the art of music which most completely realises this artistic ideal, this perfect identification of form and matter, this strange chemistry, uniting, in the integrity of pure light, contrasted elements. In its ideal, consummate moments, the end is not distinct from the means, the form from the matter, the subject from the expression; they inhere in and completely saturate each other; and to it, therefore, to the condition of its perfect moments, all the arts may be supposed constantly to tend and aspire. Music, then, not poetry, as is so often supposed, is the true type or measure of consummate art. Therefore, although each art has its incommunicable element, its untranslatable order of impressions, its unique mode of reaching the imaginative reason, yet the arts may be represented as continually struggling after the law or principle of music, to a condition which music alone completely realises; and one of the chief functions of æsthetic criticism, dealing with the concrete products of art, new or old, is to estimate the degree in which each of those products approaches in this sense to musical law.

[1] *Fortnightly Review*, p. 530.

If this means that art, as art, aspires toward a complete absorption of the matter into the form — toward such a blending of the animative thought or emotion with the embodying vehicle that the shape produced shall be the only right and perfect manifestation of a spiritual content to the senses, so that, while we contemplate the work, we cannot conceive their separation — then in this view there is nothing either new or perilous. It was precisely this which constituted the consummate excellence of Greek sculpture. The sculptor found so apt a shape for the expression of ideal personality, that his marble became an apocalypse of godhood. It was precisely this, again, which made the poetry of Virgil artistically perfect. In the words of the most eloquent of Virgil's panegyrists: "What is meant by the vague praise bestowed on Virgil's unequalled style is practically this, that he has been, perhaps, more successful than any other poet in fusing together the expressed and the suggested emotion; that he has discovered the hidden music which can give to every shade of feeling its distinction, its permanence, and its charm; that his thoughts seem to come to us on wings of melodies prepared for them from the foundation of the world." [1]

But it does not seem that Mr. Pater means this only. We have the right to conclude from passages which may be emphasised, that he has in view the more questionable notion that the fine arts in their most con-

[1] "Essays, Classical," by F. W. H. Myers, p. 115.

summate moments all aspire toward vagueness of intellectual intention — that a well-defined subject in poetry and painting and sculpture is a hindrance to artistic quality — that the delight of the eye or of the ear is of more moment than the thought of the brain. Art, he says, is "always striving to be independent of the mere intelligence, to become a matter of pure perception, to get rid of its responsibilities to its subject or material." "Lyrical poetry," he says, "just because in it you are least able to detach the matter from the form without a deduction of something from that matter itself, is, at least artistically, the highest and most complete form of poetry. And the very perfection of such poetry often seems to depend in part *on a certain suppression or vagueness of mere subject, so that the definite meaning almost expires*, or reaches us through ways not distinctly traceable by the understanding." [1]

This is ingenious; and it cannot be denied that the theory has a plausible appearance. Yet, were we to carry Mr. Pater's principles to their logical extremity, we should have to prefer Pope's "Verses by a Person of Quality" to the peroration of the "Dunciad," and a noble specimen of Japanese screen painting to Turner's Téméraire or Raphael's School of Athens.

So far as the art of poetry goes, he seems to overstate a truth which is finely and exactly expressed by Mr. Myers in the essay on Virgil from which I have al-

[1] *Fortnightly Review*, p. 529. Here the italics are not Mr. Pater's but mine.

ready quoted. The passage is long; but it puts so well the point which Mr. Pater has perhaps exaggerated, regarding the importance of the sensuous and suggestive elements in poetry, that I venture to think my readers will be glad to be reminded of it:[1]— 5

The range of human thoughts and emotions greatly transcends the range of such symbols as man has invented to express them; and it becomes, therefore, the business of Art to use these symbols in a double way. They must be used for the direct representation of thought and feeling; but they must also be combined by 10 so subtle an imagination as to suggest much which there is no means of directly expressing. And this can be done; for experience shows that it is possible so to arrange forms, colors, and sounds as to stimulate the imagination in a new and inexplicable way. This power makes the painter's art an imaginative as well 15 as an imitative one; and gives birth to the art of the musician, whose symbols are hardly imitative at all, but express emotions which, till music suggests them, have been not only unknown, but unimaginable. Poetry is both an imitative and an imaginative art. As a choice and condensed form of emotional speech, it pos- 20 sesses the reality which depends on its directly recalling our previous thoughts and feelings. But as a system of rhythmical and melodious effects — not indebted for their potency to their associated idea alone — it appeals also to that mysterious power by which mere arrangements of sound can convey an emotion which 25 no one could have predicted beforehand, and which no known laws can explain.

And, indeed, in poetry of the first order, almost every word (to use a mathematical metaphor) is raised to a higher power. It continues to be an articulate sound and a logical step in the 30 argument; but it becomes also a musical sound and a center of

[1] "Essays, Classical," pp. 113–115.

emotional force. It becomes a musical sound — that is to say, its consonants and vowels are arranged to bear a relation to the consonants and vowels near it — a relation of which accent, quantity, rhyme, assonance, and alliteration are specialized forms, but which may be of a character more subtle than any of these. And it becomes a center of emotional force; that is to say, the complex associations which it evokes modify the associations evoked by other words in the same passage in a way quite distinct from grammatical or logical connection. The poet, therefore, must avoid two opposite dangers. If he thinks too exclusively of the music and the coloring of his verses — of the imaginative means of suggesting thought and feeling — what he writes will lack reality and sense. But if he cares only to communicate definite thought and feeling according to the ordinary laws of eloquent speech, his verse is likely to be deficient in magical and suggestive power.

This is right. This makes equitable allowance for the claims alike of the material and the form of art — the intellectual and emotional content, the sensuous and artificial embodiment.

But to return to Mr. Pater. His doctrine that art is "always striving to be independent of the mere intelligence," his assertion that the perfection of lyrical poetry "often seems to depend in part on a certain suppression or vagueness of mere subject," contradict the utterances of the greatest craftsmen in the several arts — Milton's sublime passages on the function of Poetry; Sidney's and Shelley's Defences of Poesy; Goethe's doctrine of "the motive"; Rossetti's canon that "fundamental brain work" is the characteristic of all great art; Michael Angelo's and Beethoven's observations upon their own

employment of sculpture and music. Rigidly applied, his principles would tend to withdraw art from the sphere of spirituality altogether. Yet, considered as paradoxes, they have real value, inasmuch as they recall attention to the sensuous side of art, and direct the mind from such antagonistic paradoxes as the one propounded by Mr. Matthew Arnold in his preface to Wordsworth.

It is difficult to see in what way Mr. Pater can evade the strictures he has passed upon his brethren, the popular critics. Whether a man selects poetry or selects music as the "true type or measure of consummate art," to which "in common all the arts aspire," will depend doubtless partly upon personal susceptibilities, and partly upon the theory he has formed of art in general. Both the popular critics and Mr. Pater take up their position upon equally debatable ground. The case stands thus. Mr. Pater is of opinion that the best poetry is that in which there is the least appeal to "mere intelligence," in which the verbal melody and the suggestive way of handling it are more important than the intellectual content. He thinks that the best pictures are those in which the "mere subject" is brought into the least prominence. Holding these views, he selects music as the "true type and measure of consummate art." Herein he is consistent; for music, by reason of its limitations, is the least adapted of all arts for the expression of an intellectual content. The popular critic, on the other hand, is of opinion that the best poetry is

that which has the clearest, the most human, and the most impressive motive. He thinks that the best pictures are those which, besides being delightful by their drawing and color, give food for meditation and appeal to mental faculty. Holding these views, he selects poetry as the "true type and measure of consummate art." Herein he too is consistent; for poetry, by reason of its limitations, is the best adapted of all arts for appealing to intelligence and embodying motives with lucidity.

Mr. Pater and the popular critic are equally right or equally wrong. We are, in fact, confronting two different conceptions of art, each of which is partial and one-sided, because the one insists too strongly on the sensuous form, the other on the mental stuff, of art.

Suppose a man does not accept Mr. Pater's doctrine; supposing he starts from another point of view, and demands some defined conception in a work of art as well as a sensuous appeal to our imaginative reason; supposing he regards art in its highest manifestation as a mode of utterance for what is spiritual in man, as a language for communicating the ideal world of thought and feeling in sensible form; then he will be tempted to select not music but poetry as his type and measure. Thus it is manifest that critics who refer to the standard of poetry, and critics who refer to the standard of music, differ in this mainly that they hold divergent theories regarding the function of art in general.

The debatable point for consideration is whether

either the popular critic rebuked by Mr. Pater or Mr. Pater himself can legitimately choose one of the arts as the "type and measure" for the rest. I maintain that both are expressing certain personal predilections, whereby the abiding relations of the arts run some risk of being overlooked. What the matter really comes to is this: while the one proclaims his preference for sensuous results, the other proclaims a preference for defined intelligible content. Each does violence by his selection to one or other of the arts. The critic who demands a meaning at any cost, will find it hard to account for his appreciation of music or architecture. Mr. Pater, in order to complete his theory, is forced to depreciate the most sublime and powerful masterpieces of poetry. In his view drama and epic doff their caps before a song, in which verbal melody and the communication of a mood usurp upon invention, passion, cerebration, definite meaning.

Just as the subjectivity of any age or nation erects one art into the measure of the rest, so the subjectivity of a particular critic will induce him to choose poetry or music, or it may be sculpture, as his standard. The fact remains that each art possesses its own strength and its own weakness, and that no one of the arts, singly and by itself, achieves the whole purpose of art. That purpose is to express the content of human thought and feeling in sensuously beautiful form by means of various vehicles, imposing various restrictions, and implying various methods of employment. If we seek the maxi-

mum of intelligibility, we find it in poetry; but at the same time we have here the minimum of immediate effect upon the senses. If we seek the maximum of sensuous effect, we find it in music; but at the same time we have here the minimum of appeal to intelligence. Architecture, in its inability to express definite ideas, stands next to music; but its sensuous influence upon the mind is feebler. As a compensation, it possesses the privilege of permanence, of solidity, of impressive magnitude, of undefinable but wonder-waking symbolism. Sculpture owes its power to the complete and concrete presentation of human form, to the perfect incarnation of ideas in substantial shapes of bronze or stone, on which light and shadows from the skies can fall; this it alone of all the arts displays. It has affinities with architecture on the one hand, owing to the material it uses, and to poetry on the other, owing to the intelligibility of its motives. Painting is remote from architecture; but it holds a place where sculpture, poetry, and music let their powers be felt. Though dependent on design, it can tell a story better than sculpture and in this respect painting more nearly approaches poetry. It can communicate a mood without relying upon definite or strictly intelligible motives; in this respect it borders upon music. Of all the arts, painting is the most flexible, the most mimetic, the most illusory. It cannot satisfy our understanding like poetry; it cannot flood our souls with the same noble sensuous joy as music; it cannot present such perfect

and full shapes as sculpture; it cannot affect us with the sense of stability or with the mysterious suggestions which belong to architecture. But it partakes of all the other arts through its speciality of surface-delineation, and adds its own delightful gift of color, second in sensuous potency only to sound.

Such is the prism of the arts; each distinct, but homogeneous, and tinctured at their edges with hues borrowed from the sister-arts. Their differences derive from the several vehicles they are bound to employ. Their unity is the spiritual substance which they express in common. Abstract beauty, the *ἰδέα τοῦ καλοῦ*, is one and indivisible. But the concrete shapes which manifest this beauty, decompose it, just as the prism analyzes white light into colors. "Multæ terricolis linguæ cœlestibus una."

It is by virtue of this separateness and by virtue of these sympathies that we are justified in calling the poetry of Sophocles or Landor, the painting of Michel Angelo or Mantegna, the music of Gluck or Cherubini, sculpturesque; Lorenzetti's frescoes and Dante's "Paradiso," architectural; Tintoretto's Crucifixion and the Genius of the Vatican, poetical; Shelley's lyrics in "Prometheus Unbound" and Titian's Three Ages, musical; the façade of the Certosa at Pavia, pictorial; and so forth, as suggestion and association lead us.

But let it be remembered that this discrimination of an *Anders-streben* in the arts, is after all but fanciful. It is at best a way of expressing our sense of something subjec-

tive in the styles of artists or of epochs, not of something in the arts themselves. Let it be still more deeply remembered that if we fix upon any one art as the type and measure for the rest, we are either indulging a personal partiality, or else uttering an arbitrary, and therefore inconclusive, æsthetical hypothesis. The main fact to bear steadily in mind is that beauty is the sensuous manifestation of the idea — that is, of the spiritual element in man and in the world — and that the arts, each in its own way, convey this beauty to our percipient self. We have to abstain on the one hand from any theory which emphasizes the didactic function of art, and on the other from any theory, however plausible, which diverts attention from the one cardinal truth: namely, that fine and liberal art, as distinguished from mechanical art or the arts of the kitchen and millinery, exists for the embodiment of thought and emotion in forms of various delightfulness, appealing to what has been called the imaginative reason, that complex faculty which is neither mere understanding nor mere sense, by means of divers sensuous suggestions, and several modes of concrete presentation.

REFUTATION

I

GEORGE WILLIAM CURTIS

But, gentlemen, when you come to address yourselves to these primary public duties, your first surprise and dismay will be the discovery that, in a country where education is declared to be the hope of its institutions, the higher education is often practically held to be almost a disadvantage. You will go from these halls to hear a very common sneer at college-bred men — to encounter a jealousy of education as making men visionary and pedantic and impracticable — to confront a belief that there is something enfeebling in the higher education, and that self-made men, as they are called, are the sure stay of the State. But what is really meant by a self-made man? It is a man of native sagacity and strong character, who was taught, it is proudly said, only at the plow or the anvil or the bench. He was schooled by adversity, and was polished by hard attrition with men. He is Benjamin Franklin, the printer's boy, or Abraham Lincoln, the rail-splitter. They never went to college, but nevertheless, like Agamemnon, they were kings of men, and the world blesses their memory.

So it does; but the sophistry here is plain enough, although it is not always detected. Great genius and force of character undoubtedly make their own career. But because Walter Scott was dull at school, is a parent to see with joy that his son is a dunce? Because Lord Chatham was of a towering conceit, must we infer that pompous vanity portends a comprehensive statesmanship that will fill the world with the splendor of its triumphs? Because Sir Robert Walpole gambled and swore and boozed at Houghton, are we to suppose that gross sensuality and coarse contempt of human nature are the essential secrets of a power that defended liberty against tory intrigue and priestly politics? Was it because Benjamin Franklin was not college-bred that he drew the lightning from heaven and tore the scepter from the tyrant? Was it because Abraham Lincoln had little schooling that his great heart beat true to God and man, lifting him to free a race and die for his country? Because men naturally great have done great service in the world without advantages, does it follow that lack of advantage is the secret of success? Was Pericles a less sagacious leader of the State, during forty years of Athenian glory, because he was thoroughly accomplished in every grace of learning? Or, swiftly passing from the Athenian agora to the Boston town meeting, behold Samuel Adams, tribune of New England against Old England — of America against Europe — of liberty against despotism. Was his power enfeebled, his fervor chilled, his patriotism relaxed, by his college education?

No, no; they were strengthened, kindled, confirmed. Taking his Master's Degree one hundred and thirty-four years ago, thirty-three years before the Declaration of Independence, Samuel Adams, then twenty-one years old, declared in a Latin discourse — the first flashes of the fire that blazed afterward in Faneuil Hall and kindled America — that it is lawful to resist the supreme magistrate if the commonwealth cannot otherwise be preserved. In the very year that Jefferson was born, the college boy, Samuel Adams, on a Commencement day like this, on an academical platform like this on which we stand, struck the key-note of American independence, which still stirs the heart of man with its music.

Or, within our own century, look at the great modern statesmen who have shaped the politics of the world. They were educated men; were they therefore visionary, pedantic, impracticable? Cavour, whose monument is United Italy — one from the Alps to Tarentum, from the lagunes of Venice to the gulf of Salerno: Bismarck, who has raised the German empire from a name to a fact: Gladstone, to-day the incarnate heart and conscience of England: they are the perpetual refutation of the sneer that high education weakens men for practical affairs. Trained themselves, such men know the value of training. All countries, all ages, all men, are their teachers. The broader their education, the wider the horizon of their thought and observation, the more affluent their resources, the more humane their policy. Would Samuel

Adams have been a truer popular leader had he been less an educated man? Would Walpole the less truly have served his country had he been, with all his capacities, a man whom England could have revered and loved? Could Gladstone so sway England with his serene eloquence, as the moon the tides, were he a gambling, swearing, boozing squire like Walpole? There is no sophistry more poisonous to the State, no folly more stupendous and demoralizing, than the notion that the purest character and the highest education are incompatible with the most commanding mastery of men and the most efficient administration of affairs.

—"The Public Duty of Educated Men."

II

MACAULAY

I BELIEVE, sir, that it is the right and the duty of the State to provide means of education for the common people. This proposition seems to me to be implied in every definition that has ever yet been given of the functions of a government. About the extent of those functions there has been much difference of opinion among ingenious men. There are some who hold that it is the business of a government to meddle with every part of the system of human life, to regulate trade by bounties and prohibitions, to regulate expenditure by sumptuary laws, to regulate literature by a censorship, to regulate religion by an inquisition. Others go to the opposite extreme, and assign to Government a very narrow sphere of action. But the very narrowest sphere that ever was assigned to governments by any school of political philosophy is quite wide enough for my purpose. On one point all the disputants are agreed. They unanimously acknowledge that it is the duty of every government to take order for giving security to the persons and property of the members of the community.

* * * * * *

This then is my argument. It is the duty of Government to protect our persons and property from danger. The gross ignorance of the common people is a principal cause of danger to our persons and property. Therefore, it is the duty of the Government to take care that the common people shall not be grossly ignorant.

And what is the alternative? It is universally allowed that, by some means, Government must protect our persons and property. If you take away education, what means do you leave? You leave means such as only necessity can justify, means which inflict a fearful amount of pain, not only on the guilty, but on the innocent who are connected with the guilty. You leave guns and bayonets, stocks and whipping posts, treadmills, solitary cells, penal colonies, gibbets. See then how the case stands. Here is an end which, as we all agree, governments are bound to attain. There are only two ways of attaining it. One of those ways is by making men better and wiser and happier. The other way is by making them infamous and miserable. Can it be doubted which we ought to prefer? Is it not strange, is it not almost incredible, that pious and benevolent men should gravely propound the doctrine that the magistrate is bound to punish and at the same time bound not to teach? To me it seems quite clear that whoever has a right to hang has a right to educate. Can we think without shame and remorse that more than half of those wretches who have been tied up at

Newgate in our time might have been living happily, that more than half of those who are now in our gaols might have been enjoying liberty and using that liberty well, that such a hell on earth as Norfolk Island need never have existed, if we had expended in training 5 honest men but a small part of what we have expended in hunting and torturing rogues?

—Speech on Education.

III[1]

LOWELL

We cannot but think that there is something like a fallacy in Mr. Buckle's theory that the advance of mankind is necessarily in the direction of science, and not in that of morals. No doubt the laws of morals existed from the beginning, but so also did those of science, and it is by the application, not the mere recognition, of both that the race is benefited. No one questions how much science has done for our physical comfort and convenience, and with the mass of men these perhaps must of necessity precede the quickening of their moral instincts; but such material gains are illusory, unless they go hand in hand with a corresponding ethical advance. The man who gives his life for a principle has done more for his kind than he who discovers a new metal or names a new gas, for the great motors of the race are moral, not intellectual, and their force lies ready to the use of the poorest and weakest of us all. We accept a truth of science so soon as it is demonstrated, are perfectly willing to take it on authority, can appropriate whatever use there may be in it without the least understanding of its processes, as men send messages by the electric telegraph; but every truth of

[1] Reprinted by permission of Houghton, Mifflin & Company.

morals must be redemonstrated in the experience of the individual man before he is capable of utilizing it as a constituent of character or a guide in action. A man does not receive the statements that "two and two make four," and that "the pure in heart shall see God," on the same terms. The one can be proved to him with four grains of corn; he can never arrive at a belief in the other till he realize it in the intimate persuasion of his whole being. This is typified in the mystery of the incarnation. The divine reason must forever manifest itself anew in the lives of men, and that as individuals. This atonement with God, this identification of the man with the truth, so that right action shall not result from the lower reason of utility, but from the higher of a will so purified of self as to sympathize by instinct with the eternal laws, is not something that can be done once for all, that can become historic and traditional, a dead flower pressed between the leaves of the family Bible, but must be renewed in every generation, and in the soul of every man, that it may be valid.

—"Literary Essays."

IV[1]

ABRAHAM LINCOLN

And now, if they would listen — as I suppose they will not — I would address a few words to the Southern people.

You say we are sectional. We deny it. That makes an issue; and the burden of proof is upon you. You produce your proof; and what is it? Why, that our party has no existence in your section — gets no votes in your section. The fact is substantially true; but does it prove the issue? If it does, then in case we should, without change of principle, begin to get votes in your section, we should thereby cease to be sectional. You cannot escape this conclusion; and yet, are you willing to abide by it? If you are, you will probably soon find that we have ceased to be sectional, for we shall get votes in your section this very year. You will then begin to discover, as the truth plainly is, that your proof does not touch the issue. The fact that we get no votes in your section is a fact of your making, and not of ours. And if there be fault in that fact, that fault is primarily yours, and remains so until you show that we repel you by some wrong principle or practice. If we do repel you by any wrong principle or practice, the

[1] Reprinted by permission from the Hay and Nicolay edition of Lincoln's Works. New York, The Century Company.

fault is ours; but this brings you to where you ought to have started — to a discussion of the right or wrong of our principle. If our principle, put in practice, would wrong your section for the benefit of ours, or for any other object, then our principle, and we with it, are sectional, and are justly opposed and denounced as such. Meet us, then, on the question of whether our principle, put in practice, would wrong your section; and so meet us as if it were possible that something may be said on our side. Do you accept the challenge? No! Then you really believe that the principle which "our fathers who framed the government under which we live" thought so clearly right as to adopt it, and indorse it again and again, upon their official oaths, is in fact so clearly wrong as to demand your condemnation without a moment's consideration.

Some of you delight to flaunt in our faces the warning against sectional parties given by Washington in his Farewell Address. Less than eight years before Washington gave that warning, he had, as President of the United States, approved and signed an act of Congress enforcing the prohibition of slavery in the Northwestern Territory, which act embodied the policy of the government upon that subject up to and at the very moment he penned that warning; and about one year after he penned it, he wrote Lafayette that he considered that prohibition a wise measure, expressing in the same connection his hope that we should at some time have a confederacy of free States.

Bearing this in mind, and seeing that sectionalism has since arisen upon this same subject, is that warning a weapon in your hands against us, or in our hands against you? Could Washington himself speak, would he cast the blame of that sectionalism upon us, who sustain his policy, or upon you, who repudiate it? We respect that warning of Washington, and we commend it to you, together with his example pointing to the right application of it.

But you say you are conservative — eminently conservative — while we are revolutionary, destructive, or something of the sort. What is conservatism? Is it not adherence to the old and tried, against the new and untried? We stick to, contend for, the identical old policy on the point in controversy which was adopted by "our fathers who framed the government under which we live"; while you with one accord reject, and scout, and spit upon that old policy, and insist upon substituting something new. True, you disagree among yourselves as to what that substitute shall be. You are divided on new propositions and plans, but you are unanimous in rejecting and denouncing the old policy of the fathers. Some of you are for reviving the foreign slave trade; some for a congressional slave code for the Territories; some for Congress forbidding the Territories to prohibit slavery within their limits; some for maintaining slavery in the Territories through the judiciary; some for the "gur-reat pur-rinciple" that "if one man would enslave another, no third man should

object," fantastically called "popular sovereignty"; but never a man among you is in favor of Federal prohibition of slavery in Federal Territories, according to the practice of "our fathers who framed the government under which we live." Not one of all your various plans can show a precedent or an advocate in the century within which our government originated. Consider, then, whether your claim of conservatism for yourselves, and your charge of destructiveness against us, are based on the most clear and stable foundations.

—Speech at Cooper Institute.

CONTROVERSY

SCIENCE AND CULTURE[1]

THOMAS H. HUXLEY

FROM the time that the first suggestion to introduce physical science into ordinary education was timidly whispered, until now, the advocates of scientific education have met with opposition of two kinds. On the one hand, they have been pooh-poohed by the men of business who pride themselves on being the representatives of practicality; while, on the other hand, they have been excommunicated by the classical scholars, in their capacity of Levites in charge of the ark of culture and monopolists of liberal education.

The practial men believed that the idol whom they worship — rule of thumb — has been the source of the past prosperity, and will suffice for the future welfare of the arts and manufactures. They were of opinion that science is speculative rubbish; that theory and practice have nothing to do with one another; and that the scientific habit of mind is an impediment, rather than an aid, in the conduct of ordinary affairs.

I have used the past tense in speaking of the practical

[1] Reprinted from Huxley's "Science and Education," by special permission of D. Appleton & Company.

men — for although they were very formidable thirty years ago, I am not sure that the pure species has not been extirpated. In fact, so far as mere argument goes, they have been subjected to such a *feu d'enfer* that it is a miracle if any have escaped. But I have remarked that your typical practical man has an unexpected resemblance to one of Milton's angels. His spiritual wounds, such as are inflicted by logical weapons, may be as deep as a well and as wide as a church door, but beyond shedding a few drops of ichor, celestial or otherwise, he is no whit the worse. So, if any of these opponents be left, I will not waste time in vain repetition of the demonstrative evidence of the practical value of science; but knowing that a parable will sometimes penetrate where syllogisms fail to effect an entrance, I will offer a story for their consideration.

Once upon a time, a boy, with nothing to depend upon but his own vigorous nature, was thrown into the thick of the struggle for existence in the midst of a great manufacturing population. He seems to have had a hard fight, inasmuch as, by the time he was thirty years of age, his total disposable funds amounted to twenty pounds. Nevertheless, middle life found him giving proof of his comprehension of the practical problems he had been roughly called upon to solve, by a career of remarkable prosperity.

Finally, having reached old age with its well-earned surroundings of "honor, troops of friends," the hero of my story bethought himself of those who were making

a like start in life, and how he could stretch out a helping hand to them.

After long and anxious reflection this successful practical man of business could devise nothing better than to provide them with the means of obtaining "sound, extensive, and practical scientific knowledge." And he devoted a large part of his wealth and five years of incessant work to this end.

I need not point the moral of a tale which, as the solid and spacious fabric of the Scientific College assures us, is no fable, nor can anything which I could say intensify the force of this practical answer to practical objections.

We may take it for granted, then, that, in the opinion of those best qualified to judge, the diffusion of thorough scientific education is an absolutely essential condition of industrial progress; and that the College which has been opened to-day will confer an inestimable boon upon those whose livelihood is to be gained by the practice of the arts and manufactures of the district.

The only question worth discussion is, whether the conditions, under which the work of the College is to be carried out, are such as to give it the best possible chance of achieving permanent success.

Sir Josiah Mason, without doubt most wisely, has left very large freedom of action to the trustees, to whom he proposes ultimately to commit the administration of the College, so that they may be able to adjust its arrange-

ments in accordance with the changing conditions of the future. But, with respect to three points, he has laid most explicit injunctions upon both administrators and teachers.

Party politics are forbidden to enter into the minds of either, so far as the work of the College is concerned; theology is as sternly banished from its precincts; and finally, it is especially declared that the College shall make no provision for "mere literary instruction and education."

It does not concern me at present to dwell upon the first two injunctions any longer than may be needful to express my full conviction of their wisdom. But the third prohibition brings us face to face with those other opponents of scientific education, who are by no means in the moribund condition of the practical man, but alive, alert, and formidable.

It is not impossible that we shall hear this express exclusion of "literary instruction and education" from a College which, nevertheless, professes to give a high and efficient education, sharply criticised. Certainly the time was that the Levites of culture would have sounded their trumpets against its walls as against an educational Jericho.

How often have we not been told that the study of physical science is incompetent to confer culture; that it touches none of the higher problems of life; and, what is worse, that the continual devotion to scientific studies tends to generate a narrow and bigoted belief in the

applicability of scientific methods to the search after truth of all kinds? How frequently one has reason to observe that no reply to a troublesome argument tells so well as calling its author a "mere scientific specialist." And, as I am afraid it is not permissible to speak of this form of opposition to scientific education in the past tense, may we not expect to be told that this, not only omission, but prohibition, of "mere literary instruction and education" is a patent example of scientific narrow-mindedness?

I am not acquainted with Sir Josiah Mason's reasons for the action which he has taken; but if, as I apprehend is the case, he refers to the ordinary classical course of our schools and universities by the name of "mere literary instruction and education," I venture to offer sundry reasons of my own in support of that action.

For I hold very strongly by two convictions — The first is, that neither the discipline nor the subject-matter of classical education is of such direct value to the student of physical science as to justify the expenditure of valuable time upon either; and the second is, that for the purpose of attaining real culture, an exclusively scientific education is at least as effectual as an exclusively literary education.

I need hardly point out to you that these opinions, especially the latter, are diametrically opposed to those of the great majority of educated Englishmen, influenced as they are by school and university traditions. In their belief, culture is obtainable only by a liberal

education; and a liberal education is synonymous, not merely with education and instruction in literature, but in one particular form of literature, namely, that of Greek and Roman antiquity. They hold that the man who has learned Latin and Greek, however little, is educated; while he who is versed in other branches of knowledge, however deeply, is a more or less respectable specialist, not admissible into the cultured caste. The stamp of the educated man, the University degree, is not for him.

I am too well acquainted with the generous catholicity of spirit which pervades the writings of our chief apostle of culture to identify him with these opinions; and yet one may cull from one and another of those epistles to the Philistines, which so much delight all who do not answer to that name, sentences which lend them some support.

Mr. Arnold tells us that the meaning of culture is "to know the best that has been thought and said in the world." It is the criticism of life contained in literature. That criticism regards "Europe as being, for intellectual and spiritual purposes, one great confederation, bound to a joint action and working to a common result; and whose members have, for their common outfit, a knowledge of Greek, Roman, and Eastern antiquity, and of one another. Special, local, and temporary advantages being put out of account, that modern nation will in the intellectual and spiritual sphere make most progress, which most thoroughly carries out this programme.

And what is that but saying that we too, all of us, as individuals, the more thoroughly we carry it out, shall make the more progress?"[1]

We have here to deal with two distinct propositions. The first, that a criticism of life is the essence of culture; the second, that literature contains the materials which suffice for the construction of such criticism.

I think that we must all assent to the first proposition. For culture certainly means something quite different from learning or technical skill. It implies the possession of an ideal, and the habit of critically estimating the value of things by comparison with a theoretic standard. Perfect culture should supply a complete theory of life, based upon a clear knowledge alike of its possibilities and of its limitations.

But we may agree to all this, and yet strongly dissent from the assumption that literature alone is competent to supply this knowledge. After having learned all that Greek, Roman, and Eastern antiquity have thought and said, and all that modern literatures have to tell us, it is not self-evident that we have laid a sufficiently broad and deep foundation for that criticism of life, which constitutes culture.

Indeed, to any one acquainted with the scope of physical science, it is not at all evident. Considering progress only in the "intellectual and spiritual sphere," I find myself wholly unable to admit that either nations or individuals will really advance, if their common outfit

[1] "Essays in Criticism," p. 37.

draws nothing from the stores of physical science. I should say that an army, without weapons of precision and with no particular base of operations, might more hopefully enter upon a campaign on the Rhine, than a man, devoid of a knowledge of what physical science has done in the last century, upon a criticism of life.

When a biologist meets with an anomaly, he instinctively turns to the study of development to clear it up. The rationale of contradictory opinions may with equal confidence be sought in history.

It is, happily, no new thing that Englishmen should employ their wealth in building and endowing institutions for educational purposes. But, five or six hundred years ago, deeds of foundation expressed or implied conditions as nearly as possible contrary to those which have been thought expedient by Sir Josiah Mason. That is to say, physical science was practically ignored, while a certain literary training was enjoined as a means to the acquirement of knowledge which was essentially theological.

The reason of this singular contradiction between the actions of men alike animated by a strong and disinterested desire to promote the welfare of their fellows, is easily discovered.

At that time, in fact, if any one desired knowledge beyond such as could be obtained by his own observation, or by common conversation, his first necessity was to learn the Latin language, inasmuch as all the higher

knowledge of the Western world was contained in works written in that language. Hence, Latin grammar, with logic and rhetoric, studied through Latin, were the fundamentals of education. With respect to the substance of the knowledge imparted through this channel, the Jewish and Christian Scriptures, as interpreted and supplemented by the Romish Church, were held to contain a complete and infallibly true body of information.

Theological dicta were, to the thinkers of those days, that which the axioms and definitions of Euclid are to the geometers of these. The business of the philosophers of the middle ages was to deduce from the data furnished by the theologians, conclusions in accordance with ecclesiastical decrees. They were allowed the high privilege of showing, by logical process, how and why that which the Church said was true, must be true. And if their demonstrations fell short of or exceeded this limit, the Church was maternally ready to check their aberrations; if need were, by the help of the secular arm.

Between the two, our ancestors were furnished with a compact and complete criticism of life. They were told how the world began and how it would end; they learned that all material existence was but a base and insignificant blot upon the fair face of the spiritual world, and that nature was, to all intents and purposes, the playground of the devil; they learned that the earth is the center of the visible universe, and that man is the

cynosure of things terrestrial, and more especially was it inculcated that the course of nature had no fixed order, but that it could be, and constantly was, altered by the agency of innumerable spiritual beings, good and bad, according as they were moved by the deeds and prayers of men. The sum and substance of the whole doctrine was to produce the conviction that the only thing really worth knowing in this world was how to secure that place in a better which, under certain conditions, the Church promised.

Our ancestors had a living belief in this theory of life, and acted upon it in their dealings with education, as in all other matters. Culture meant saintliness — after the fashion of the saints of those days; the education that led to it was, of necessity, theological; and the way to theology lay through Latin.

That the study of nature — further than was requisite for the satisfaction of everyday wants — should have any bearing on human life was far from the thoughts of men thus trained. Indeed, as nature had been cursed for man's sake, it was an obvious conclusion that those who meddled with nature were likely to come into pretty close contact with Satan. And, if any born scientific investigator followed his instincts, he might safely reckon upon earning the reputation, and probably upon suffering the fate, of a sorcerer.

Had the Western world been left to itself in Chinese isolation, there is no saying how long this state of things might have endured. But, happily, it was not

left to itself. Even earlier than the thirteenth century, the development of Moorish civilization in Spain and the great movement of the Crusades had introduced the leaven which, from that day to this, has never ceased to work. At first, through the intermediation of Arabic translations, afterwards by the study of the originals, the western nations of Europe became acquainted with the writings of the ancient philosophers and poets, and, in time, with the whole of the vast literature of antiquity.

Whatever there was of high intellectual aspiration or dominant capacity in Italy, France, Germany, and England, spent itself for centuries in taking possession of the rich inheritance left by the dead civilizations of Greece and Rome. Marvelously aided by the invention of printing, classical learning spread and flourished. Those who possessed it prided themselves on having attained the highest culture then within the reach of mankind.

And justly. For, saving Dante on his solitary pinnacle, there was no figure in modern literature at the time of the Renaissance to compare with the men of antiquity; there was no art to compete with their sculpture; there was no physical science but that which Greece had created. Above all, there was no other example of perfect intellectual freedom — of the unhesitating acceptance of reason as the sole guide to truth and the supreme arbiter of conduct.

The new learning necessarily soon exerted a profound influence upon education. The language of the

monks and schoolmen seemed little better than gibberish to scholars fresh from Virgil and Cicero, and the study of Latin was placed upon a new foundation. Moreover, Latin itself ceased to afford the sole key to knowledge. The student who sought the highest thought of antiquity, found only a second-hand reflection of it in Roman literature, and turned his face to the full light of the Greeks. And after a battle, not altogether dissimilar to that which is at present being fought over the teaching of physical science, the study of Greek was recognized as an essential element of all higher education.

Then the Humanists, as they were called, won the day; and the great reform which they effected was of incalculable service to mankind. But the Nemesis of all reformers is finality; and the reformers of education, like those of religion, fell into the profound, however common, error of mistaking the beginning for the end of the work of reformation.

The representatives of the Humanists, in the nineteenth century, take their stand upon classical education as the sole avenue to culture, as firmly as if we were still in the age of Renaissance. Yet, surely, the present intellectual relations of the modern and the ancient worlds are profoundly different from those which obtained three centuries ago. Leaving aside the existence of a great and characteristically modern literature, of modern painting, and, especially, of modern music, there is one feature of the present state of the civilized world which separates it more widely from the Re-

naissance, than the Renaissance was separated from the middle ages.

This distinctive character of our own times lies in the vast and constantly increasing part which is played by natural knowledge. Not only is our daily life shaped by it, not only does the prosperity of millions of men depend upon it, but our whole theory of life has long been influenced, consciously or unconsciously, by the general conceptions of the universe, which have been forced upon us by physical science.

In fact, the most elementary acquaintance with the results of scientific investigation shows us that they offer a broad and striking contradiction to the opinion so implicitly credited and taught in the middle ages.

The notions of the beginning and the end of the world entertained by our forefathers are no longer credible. It is very certain that the earth is not the chief body in the material universe, and that the world is not subordinated to man's use. It is even more certain that nature is the expression of a definite order with which nothing interferes, and that the chief business of mankind is to learn that order and govern themselves accordingly. Moreover this scientific "criticism of life" presents itself to us with different credentials from any other. It appeals not to authority, nor to what anybody may have thought or said, but to nature. It admits that all our interpretations of natural fact are more or less imperfect and symbolic, and bids the learner seek for truth not among words but among things. It warns

us that the assertion which outstrips evidence is not only a blunder but a crime.

The purely classical education advocated by the representatives of the Humanists in our day, gives no inkling of all this. A man may be a better scholar than Erasmus, and know no more of the chief causes of the present intellectual fermentation than Erasmus did. Scholarly and pious persons, worthy of all respect, favor us with allocutions upon the sadness of the antagonism of science to their mediæval way of thinking, which betray an ignorance of the first principles of scientific investigation, an incapacity for understanding what a man of science means by veracity, and an unconsciousness of the weight of established scientific truths, which is almost comical.

There is no great force in the *tu quoque* argument, or else the advocates of scientific education might fairly enough retort upon the modern Humanists that they may be learned specialists, but that they possess no such sound foundation for a criticism of life as deserves the name of culture. And, indeed, if we were disposed to be cruel, we might urge that the Humanists have brought this reproach upon themselves, not because they are too full of the spirit of the ancient Greek, but because they lack it.

The period of the Renaissance is commonly called that of the "Revival of Letters," as if the influences then brought to bear upon the mind of Western Europe had been wholly exhausted in the field of literature. I think

it is very commonly forgotten that the revival of science, effected by the same agency, although less conspicuous, was not less momentous.

In fact, the few and scattered students of nature of that day picked up the clew to her secrets exactly as it fell from the hands of the Greeks a thousand years before. The foundations of mathematics were so well laid by them, that our children learn their geometry from a book written for the schools of Alexandria two thousand years ago. Modern astronomy is the natural continuation and development of the work of Hipparchus and of Ptolemy; modern physics of that of Democritus and of Archimedes; it was long before modern biological science outgrew the knowledge bequeathed to us by Aristotle, by Theophrastus, and by Galen.

We cannot know all the best thoughts and sayings of the Greeks unless we know what they thought about natural phenomena. We cannot fully apprehend their criticism of life unless we understand the extent to which that criticism was affected by scientific conceptions. We falsely pretend to be the inheritors of their culture, unless we are penetrated, as the best minds among them were, with an unhesitating faith that the free employment of reason, in accordance with scientific method, is the sole method of reaching truth.

Thus I venture to think that the pretensions of our modern Humanists to the possession of the monopoly of culture and to the exclusive inheritance of the spirit of antiquity must be abated, if not abandoned. But I

should be very sorry that anything I have said should be taken to imply a desire on my part to depreciate the value of classical education, as it might be and as it sometimes is. The native capacities of mankind vary no less than their opportunities; and while culture is one, the road by which one man may best reach it is widely different from that which is most advantageous to another. Again, while scientific education is yet inchoate and tentative, classical education is thoroughly well organized upon the practical experience of generations of teachers. So that, given ample time for learning and estimation for ordinary life, or for a literary career, I do not think that a young Englishman in search of culture can do better than follow the course usually marked out for him, supplementing its deficiencies by his own efforts.

But for those who mean to make science their serious occupation; or who intend to follow the profession of medicine; or who have to enter early upon the business of life; for all these, in my opinion, classical education is a mistake; and it is for this reason that I am glad to see "mere literary education and instruction" shut out from the curriculum of Sir Josiah Mason's College, seeing that its inclusion would probably lead to the introduction of the ordinary smattering of Latin and Greek.

Nevertheless, I am the last person to question the importance of genuine literary education, or to suppose that intellectual culture can be complete without it. An exclusively scientific training will bring about a mental

twist as surely as an exclusively literary training. The value of the cargo does not compensate for a ship's being out of trim; and I should be very sorry to think that the Scientific College would turn out none but lop-sided men.

There is no need, however, that such a catastrophe should happen. Instruction in English, French, and German is provided, and thus the three greatest literatures of the modern world are made accessible to the student.

French and German, and especially the latter language, are absolutely indispensable to those who desire full knowledge in any department of science. But even supposing that the knowledge of these languages acquired is not more than sufficient for purely scientific purposes, every Englishman has, in his native tongue, an almost perfect instrument of literary expression; and, in his own literature, models of every kind of literary excellence. If an Englishman cannot get literary culture out of his Bible, his Shakespeare, his Milton, neither, in my belief, will the profoundest study of Homer and Sophocles, Virgil and Horace give it to him.

Thus, since the constitution of the College makes sufficient provision for literary as well as for scientific education, and since artistic instruction is also contemplated, it seems to me that a fairly complete culture is offered to all who are willing to take advantage of it.

LITERATURE AND SCIENCE[1]

Matthew Arnold

Practical people talk with a smile of Plato and of his absolute ideas; and it is impossible to deny that Plato's ideas do often seem unpractical and impracticable, and especially when one views them in connection with the life of a great workaday world like the United States. The necessary staple of the life of such a world Plato regards with disdain; handicraft and trade and the working professions he regards with disdain; but what becomes of the life of an industrial modern community if you take handicraft and trade and the working professions out of it? The base mechanic arts and handicrafts, says Plato, bring about a natural weakness in the principle of excellence in a man, so that he cannot govern the ignoble growths in him, but nurses them, and cannot understand fostering any other. Those who exercise such arts and trades, as they have their bodies, he says, marred by their vulgar businesses, so they have their souls, too, bowed and broken by them. And if one of these uncomely people has a mind to seek self-culture and philosophy, Plato compares him to a bald little tinker, who has scraped together money, and has got his release from service, and

[1] From "Discourses in America."

has had a bath, and bought a new coat, and is rigged out like a bridegroom about to marry the daughter of his master who has fallen into poor and helpless estate.

Nor do the working professions fare any better than trade at the hands of Plato. He draws for us an inimitable picture of the working lawyer, and of his life of bondage; he shows how this bondage from his youth up has stunted and warped him, and made him small and crooked of soul, encompassing him with difficulties which he is not man enough to rely on justice and truth as means to encounter, but has recourse, for help out of them, to falsehood and wrong. And so, says Plato, this poor creature is bent and broken, and grows up from boy to man without a particle of soundness in him, although exceedingly smart and clever in his own esteem.

One cannot refuse to admire the artist who draws these pictures. But we say to ourselves that his ideas show the influence of a primitive and obsolete order of things, when the warrior caste and the priestly caste were alone in honor, and the humble work of the world was done by slaves. We have now changed all that; the modern majority consists in work, as Emerson declares; and in work, we may add, principally of such plain and dusty kind as the work of cultivators of the ground, handicraftsmen, men of trade and business, men of the working professions. Above all is this true in a great industrious community such as that of the United States.

Now education, many people go on to say, is still mainly governed by the ideas of men like Plato, who lived when the warrior caste and the priestly or philosophical class were alone in honor, and the really useful part of the community were slaves. It is an education fitted for persons of leisure in such a community. This education passed from Greece and Rome to the feudal communities of Europe, where also the warrior caste and the priestly caste were alone held in honor, and where the really useful and working part of the community, though not nominally slaves as in the pagan world, were practically not much better off than slaves, and not more seriously regarded. And how absurd it is, people end by saying, to inflict this education upon an industrious modern community, where very few indeed are persons of leisure, and the mass to be considered has not leisure, but is bound, for its own great good, and for the great good of the world at large, to plain labor and to industrial pursuits, and the education in question tends necessarily to make men dissatisfied with these pursuits and unfitted for them!

That is what is said. So far I must defend Plato, as to plead that his view of education and studies is in the general, as it seems to me, sound enough, and fitted for all sorts and conditions of men, whatever their pursuits may be. "An intelligent man," says Plato, "will prize those studies which result in his soul getting soberness, righteousness, and wisdom, and will less value the others." I cannot consider

that a bad description of the aim of education, and of the motives which should govern us in the choice of studies, whether we are preparing ourselves for a hereditary seat in the English House of Lords or for the pork trade in Chicago.

Still I admit that Plato's world was not ours, that his scorn of trade and handicraft is fantastic, that he had no conception of a great industrial community such as that of the United States, and that such a community must and will shape its education to suit its own needs. If the usual education handed down to it from the past does not suit it, it will certainly before long drop this and try another. The usual education in the past has been mainly literary. The question is whether the studies which were long supposed to be the best for all of us are practically the best now; whether others are not better. The tyranny of the past, many think, weighs on us injuriously in the predominance given to letters in education. The question is raised whether, to meet the needs of our modern life, the predominance ought not now to pass from letters to science; and naturally the question is nowhere raised with more energy than here in the United States. The design of abasing what is called "mere literary instruction and education," and of exalting what is called "sound, extensive, and practical scientific knowledge," is, in this intensely modern world of the United States, even more perhaps than in Europe, a very popular design, and makes great and rapid progress.

I am going to ask whether the present movement for ousting letters from their old predominance in education, and for transferring the predominance in education to the natural sciences, whether this brisk and flourishing movement ought to prevail, and whether it is likely that in the end it really will prevail. An objection may be raised which I will anticipate. My own studies have been almost wholly in letters, and my visits to the field of the natural sciences have been very slight and inadequate, although those sciences have always strongly moved my curiosity. A man of letters, it will perhaps be said, is not competent to discuss the comparative merits of letters and natural science as means of education. To this objection I reply, first of all, that his incompetence if he attempts the discussion but is really incompetent for it, will be abundantly visible; nobody will be taken in; he will have plenty of sharp observers and critics to save mankind from that danger. But the line I am going to follow is, as you will soon discover, so extremely simple, that perhaps it may be followed without failure even by one who for a more ambitious line of discussion would be quite incompetent.

Some of you may possibly remember a phrase of mine which has been the object of a good deal of comment; an observation to the effect that in our culture, the aim being *to know ourselves and the world*, we have, as the means to this end, *to know the best which has been thought and said in the world.* A man of science, who is also an

excellent writer and the very prince of debaters, Professor Huxley, in a discourse at the opening of Sir Josiah Mason's College at Birmingham, laying hold of this phrase, expanded it by quoting some more words of mine, which are these: "The civilized world is to be regarded as now being, for intellectual and spiritual purposes, one great confederation, bound to a joint action and working to a common result; and whose members have for their proper outfit a knowledge of Greek, Roman, and Eastern antiquity, and of one another. Special local and temporary advantages being put out of account, that modern nation will in the intellectual and spiritual sphere make most progress, which most thoroughly carries out this programme."

Now on my phrase, thus enlarged, Professor Huxley remarks that when I speak of the above-mentioned knowledge as enabling us to know ourselves and the world, I assert *literature* to contain the materials which suffice for thus making us know ourselves and the world. But it is not by any means clear, says he, that after having learned all which ancient and modern literatures have to tell us, we have laid a sufficiently broad and deep foundation for that criticism of life, that knowledge of ourselves and the world, which constitutes culture. On the contrary, Professor Huxley declares that he finds himself "wholly unable to admit that either nations or individuals will really advance, if their outfit draws nothing from the stores of physical science. An army without weapons of precision, and with no particular

base of operations, might more hopefully enter upon a campaign on the Rhine, than a man, devoid of a knowledge of what physical science has done in the last century, upon a criticism of life."

This shows how needful it is for those who are to discuss any matter together, to have a common understanding as to the sense of the terms they employ, — how needful, and how difficult. What Professor Huxley says, implies just the reproach which is so often brought against the study of *belles lettres*, as they are called: that the study is an elegant one, but slight and ineffectual; a smattering of Greek and Latin and other ornamental things, of little use for any one whose object is to get at truth, and to be a practical man. So, too, M. Renan talks of the "superficial humanism" of a school course which treats us as if we were all going to be poets, writers, preachers, orators, and he opposes this humanism to positive science, or the critical search after truth. And there is always a tendency in those who are remonstrating against the predominance of letters in education, to understand by letters *belles lettres*, and by *belles lettres* a superficial humanism, the opposite of science or true knowledge.

But when we talk of knowing Greek and Roman antiquity, for instance, which is the knowledge people have called the humanities, I for my part mean a knowledge which is something more than a superficial humanism, mainly decorative. "I call all teaching *scientific*," says Wolf, the critic of Homer, "which

is systematically laid out and followed up to its original sources. For example: a knowledge of classical antiquity is scientific when the remains of classical antiquity are correctly studied in the original languages." There can be no doubt that Wolf is perfectly right; that all learning is scientific which is systematically laid out and followed up to its original sources, and that a genuine humanism is scientific.

When I speak of knowing Greek and Roman antiquity, therefore, as a help to knowing ourselves and the world, I mean more than a knowledge of so much vocabulary, so much grammar, so many portions of authors in the Greek and Latin languages; I mean knowing the Greeks and Romans, and their life and genius, and what they were and did in the world; what we get from them, and what is its value. That, at least, is the ideal; and when we talk of endeavoring to know Greek and Roman antiquity, as a help to knowing ourselves and the world, we mean endeavoring so to know them as to satisfy this ideal, however much we may still fall short of it.

The same also as to knowing our own and other modern nations, with the like aim of getting to understand ourselves and the world. To know the best that has been thought and said by the modern nations, is to know, says Professor Huxley, "only what modern *literatures* have to tell us; it is the criticism of life contained in modern literature." And yet "the distinctive character of our times," he urges, "lies in the

vast and constantly increasing part which is played by natural knowledge." And how, therefore, can a man, devoid of knowledge of what physical science has done in the last century, enter hopefully upon a criticism of modern life?

Let us, I say, be agreed about the meaning of the terms we are using. I talk of knowing the best which has been thought and uttered in the world; Professor Huxley says this means knowing *literature*. Literature is a large word; it may mean everything written with letters or printed in a book. Euclid's *Elements* and Newton's *Principia* are thus literature. All knowledge that reaches us through books is literature. But by literature Professor Huxley means *belles lettres*. He means to make me say, that knowing the best which has been thought and said by the modern nations is knowing their *belles lettres* and no more. And this is no sufficient equipment, he argues, for a criticism of modern life. But as I do not mean, by knowing ancient Rome, knowing merely more or less of Latin *belles lettres*, and taking no account of Rome's military, and political, and legal, and administrative work in the world; and as, by knowing ancient Greece, I understand knowing her as the giver of Greek art, and the guide to a free and right use of reason and to scientific method, and the founder of our mathematics and physics and astronomy and biology,—I understand knowing her as all this, and not merely knowing certain Greek poems, and histories, and treatises, and speeches, — so as to the knowledge

of modern nations also. By knowing modern nations, I mean not merely knowing their *belles lettres*, but knowing also what has been done by such men as Copernicus, Galileo, Newton, Darwin. "Our ancestors learned," says Professor Huxley, "that the earth is the center of the visible universe, and that man is the cynosure of things terrestrial; and more especially was it inculcated that the course of nature has no fixed order, but that it could be, and constantly was, altered." But for us now, continues Professor Huxley, "the notions of the beginning and the end of the world entertained by our forefathers are no longer credible. It is very certain that the earth is not the chief body in the material universe, and that the world is not subordinated to man's use. It is even more certain that nature is the expression of a definite order, with which nothing interferes." "And yet," he cries, "the purely classical education advocated by the representatives of the humanists in our day gives no inkling of all this!"

In due place and time I will just touch upon that vexed question of classical education; but at present the question is as to what is meant by knowing the best which modern nations have thought and said. It is not knowing their *belles lettres* merely which is meant. To know Italian *belles lettres* is not to know Italy, and to know English *belles lettres* is not to know England. Into knowing Italy and England there comes a great deal more, Galileo and Newton amongst it. The

reproach of being a superficial humanism, a tincture of *belles lettres*, may attach rightly enough to some other disciplines; but to the particular discipline recommended when I proposed knowing the best that has been thought and said in the world, it does not apply. In that best I certainly include what in modern times has been thought and said by the great observers and knowers of nature.

There is, therefore, really no question between Professor Huxley and me as to whether knowing the great results of the modern scientific study of nature is not required as a part of our culture, as well as knowing the products of literature and art. But to follow the processes by which those results are reached, ought, say the friends of physical science, to be made the staple of education for the bulk of mankind. And here there does arise a question between those whom Professor Huxley calls with playful sarcasm "the Levites of culture," and those whom the poor humanist is sometimes apt to regard as its Nebuchadnezzars.

The great results of the scientific investigation of nature we are agreed upon knowing, but how much of our study are we bound to give to the processes by which those results are reached? The results have their visible bearing on human life. But all the processes, too, all the items of fact by which those results are reached and established, are interesting. All knowledge is interesting to a wise man, and the knowledge of nature is interesting to all men. It is very interesting

to know, that, from the albuminous white of the egg, the chick in the egg gets the materials for its flesh, bones, blood, and feathers; while, from the fatty yolk of the egg, it gets the heat and energy which enable it at length to break its shell and begin the world. It is less interesting, perhaps, but still it is interesting, to know that when a taper burns, the wax is converted into carbonic acid and water. Moreover, it is quite true that the habit of dealing with facts, which is given by the study of nature, is, as the friends of physical science praise it for being, an excellent discipline. The appeal, in the study of nature, is constantly to observation and experiment; not only is it said that the thing is so, but we can be made to see that it is so. Not only does a man tell us that when a taper burns the wax is converted into carbonic acid and water, as a man may tell us, if he likes, that Charon is punting his ferry boat on the river Styx, or that Victor Hugo is a sublime poet, or Mr. Gladstone the most admirable of statesmen; but we are made to see that the conversion into carbonic acid and water does actually happen. This reality of natural knowledge it is, which makes the friends of physical science contrast it, as a knowledge of things, with the humanist's knowledge, which is, they say, a knowledge of words. And hence Professor Huxley is moved to lay it down that, "for the purpose of attaining real culture, an exclusively scientific education is at least as effectual as an exclusively literary education." And a certain President of the Section for Mechanical

Science in the British Association is, in Scripture phrase, "very bold," and declares that if a man, in his mental training, "has substituted literature and history for natural science, he has chosen the less useful alternative." But whether we go these lengths or not, we must all admit that in natural science the habit gained of dealing with facts is a most valuable discipline, and that every one should have some experience of it.

More than this, however, is demanded by the reformers. It is proposed to make the training in natural science the main part of education, for the great majority of mankind at any rate. And here, I confess, I part company with the friends of physical science, with whom up to this point I have been agreeing. In differing from them, however, I wish to proceed with the utmost caution and diffidence. The smallness of my own acquaintance with the disciplines of natural science is ever before my mind, and I am fearful of doing these disciplines an injustice. The ability and pugnacity of the partisans of natural science make them formidable persons to contradict. The tone of tentative inquiry, which befits a being of dim faculties and bounded knowledge, is the tone I would wish to take and not to depart from. At present it seems to me, that those who are for giving to natural knowledge, as they call it, the chief place in the education of the majority of mankind, leave one important thing out of their account: the constitution of human nature. But I put this forward on the strength of some facts not

at all recondite, very far from it; facts capable of being stated in the simplest possible fashion, and to which, if I so state them, the man of science will, I am sure, be willing to allow their due weight.

Deny the facts altogether, I think, he hardly can. He can hardly deny, that when we set ourselves to enumerate the powers which go to the building up of human life, and say that they are the power of conduct, the power of intellect and knowledge, the power of beauty, and the power of social life and manners, — he can hardly deny that this scheme, though drawn in rough and plain lines enough, and not pretending to scientific exactness, does yet give a fairly true representation of the matter. Human nature is built up by these powers; we have the need for them all. When we have rightly met and adjusted the claims of them all, we shall then be in a fair way for getting soberness and righteousness, with wisdom. This is evident enough, and the friends of physical science would admit it.

But perhaps they may not have sufficiently observed another thing: namely, that the several powers just mentioned are not isolated, but there is, in the generality of mankind, a perpetual tendency to relate them one to another in divers ways. With one such way of relating them I am particularly concerned now. Following our instinct for intellect and knowledge, we acquire pieces of knowledge; and presently, in the generality of men, there arises the desire to relate

these pieces of knowledge to our sense for conduct, to our sense for beauty, — and there is weariness and dissatisfaction if the desire is balked. Now in this desire lies, I think, the strength of that hold which letters have upon us.

All knowledge is, as I said just now, interesting; and even items of knowledge which from the nature of the case cannot well be related, but must stand isolated in our thoughts, have their interest. Even lists of exceptions have their interest. If we are studying Greek accents, it is interesting to know that *pais* and *pas*, and some other monosyllables of the same form of declension, do not take the circumflex upon the last syllable of the genitive plural, but vary, in this respect, from the common rule. If we are studying physiology, it is interesting to know that the pulmonary artery carries dark blood and the pulmonary vein carries bright blood, departing in this respect from the common rule for the division of labor between the veins and the arteries. But every one knows how we seek naturally to combine the pieces of our knowledge together, to bring them under general rules, to relate them to principles; and how unsatisfactory and tiresome it would be to go on forever learning lists of exceptions, or accumulating items of fact which must stand isolated.

Well, that same need of relating our knowledge, which operates here within the sphere of our knowledge itself, we shall find operating, also, outside that sphere. We experience, as we go on learning and

knowing, — the vast majority of us experience, — the need of relating what we have learned and known to the sense which we have in us for conduct, to the sense which we have in us for beauty.

A certain Greek prophetess of Mantineia in Arcadia, Diotima by name, once explained to the philosopher Socrates that love, and impulse, and bent of all kinds, is, in fact, nothing else but the desire in men that good should forever be present to them. This desire for good, Diotima assured Socrates, is our fundamental desire, of which fundamental desire every impulse in us is only some one particular form. And therefore this fundamental desire it is, I suppose, — this desire in men that good should be forever present to them, — which acts in us when we feel the impulse for relating our knowledge to our sense for conduct and to our sense for beauty. At any rate, with men in general the instinct exists. Such is human nature. And the instinct, it will be admitted, is innocent, and human nature is preserved by our following the lead of its innocent instincts. Therefore, in seeking to gratify this instinct in question, we are following the instinct of self-preservation in humanity.

But, no doubt, some kinds of knowledge cannot be made to directly serve the instinct in question, cannot be directly related to the sense for beauty, to the sense for conduct. These are instrument-knowledges; they lead on to other knowledges, which can. A man who passes his life in instrument-knowledges is a specialist.

They may be invaluable as instruments to something beyond, for those who have the gift thus to employ them; and they may be disciplines in themselves wherein it is useful for every one to have some schooling. But it is inconceivable that the generality of men should pass all their mental life with Greek accents or with formal logic. My friend Professor Sylvester, who is one of the first mathematicians in the world, holds transcendental doctrines as to the virtue of mathematics, but those doctrines are not for common men. In the very Senate House and heart of our English Cambridge I once ventured, though not without an apology for my profaneness, to hazard the opinion that for the majority of mankind a little of mathematics, even, goes a long way. Of course this is quite consistent with their being of immense importance as an intrument to something else; but it is the few who have the aptitude for thus using them, not the bulk of mankind.

The natural sciences do not, however, stand on the same footing with these instrument-knowledges. Experience shows us that the generality of men will find more interest in learning that, when a taper burns, the wax is converted into carbonic acid and water, or in learning the explanation of the phenomenon of dew, or in learning how the circulation of the blood is carried on, than they find in learning that the genitive plural of *pais* and *pas* does not take the circumflex on the termination. And one piece of natural knowledge is added to another, and others are added to that, and at

last we come to propositions so interesting as Mr. Darwin's famous proposition that "our ancestor was a hairy quadruped furnished with a tail and pointed ears, probably arboreal in his habits." Or we come to propositions of such reach and magnitude as those which Professor Huxley delivers, when he says that the notions of our forefathers about the beginning and the end of the world were all wrong, and that nature is the expression of a definite order with which nothing interferes.

Interesting, indeed, these results of science are, important they are, and we should all of us be acquainted with them. But what I now wish you to mark is, that we are still, when they are propounded to us and we receive them, we are still in the sphere of intellect and knowledge. And for the generality of men there will be found, I say, to arise, when they have duly taken in the proposition that their ancestor was "a hairy quadruped furnished with a tail and pointed ears, probably arboreal in his habits," there will be found to arise an invincible desire to relate this proposition to the sense in us for conduct, and to the sense in us for beauty. But this the men of science will not do for us, and will hardly even profess to do. They will give us other pieces of knowledge, other facts, about other animals and their ancestors, or about plants, or about stones, or about stars; and they may finally bring us to those great "general conceptions of the universe, which are forced upon us all," says Professor Huxley, "by the progress of physical science." But still it will be

knowledge only which they give us; knowledge not put for us into relation with our sense for conduct, our sense for beauty, and touched with emotion by being so put; not thus put for us, and therefore, to the majority of mankind, after a certain while, unsatisfying, wearying.

Not to the born naturalist, I admit. But what do we mean by a born naturalist? We mean a man in whom the zeal for observing nature is so uncommonly strong and eminent, that it marks him off from the bulk of mankind. Such a man will pass his life happily in collecting natural knowledge and reasoning upon it, and will ask for nothing, or hardly anything, more. I have heard it said that the sagacious and admirable naturalist whom we lost not very long ago, Mr. Darwin, once owned to a friend that for his part he did not experience the necessity for two things which most men find so necessary to them, — religion and poetry; science and the domestic affections, he thought, were enough. To a born naturalist, I can well understand that this should seem so. So absorbing is his occupation with nature, so strong his love for his occupation, that he goes on acquiring natural knowledge and reasoning upon it, and has little time or inclination for thinking about getting it related to the desire in man for conduct, the desire in man for beauty. He relates it to them for himself as he goes along, so far as he feels the need; and he draws from the domestic affections all the additional solace necessary. But then Darwins

are extremely rare. Another great and admirable master of natural knowledge, Faraday, was a Sandemanian. That is to say, he related his knowledge to his instinct for conduct and to his instinct for beauty, by the aid of that respectable Scottish sectary, Robert Sandeman. And so strong, in general, is the demand of religion and poetry to have their share in a man, to associate themselves with his knowing, and to relieve and rejoice it, that probably, for one man amongst us with the disposition to do as Darwin did in this respect, there are at least fifty with the disposition to do as Faraday.

Education lays hold upon us, in fact, by satisfying this demand. Professor Huxley holds up to scorn mediæval education, with its neglect of the knowledge of nature, its poverty even of literary studies, its formal logic devoted to "showing how and why that which the Church said was true must be true." But the great mediæval universities were not brought into being, we may be sure, by the zeal for giving a jejune and contemptible education. Kings have been their nursing fathers, and queens have been their nursing mothers, but not for this. The mediæval universities came into being, because the supposed knowledge, delivered by Scripture and the Church, so deeply engaged men's hearts, by so simply, easily, and powerfully relating itself to their desire for conduct, their desire for beauty. All other knowledge was dominated by this supposed knowledge and was subordinated to it, because of the

surpassing strength of the hold which it gained upon the affections of men, by allying itself profoundly with their sense for conduct, their sense for beauty.

But now, says Professor Huxley, conceptions of the universe fatal to the notions held by our forefathers have been forced upon us by physical science. Grant to him that they are thus fatal, that the new conceptions must and will soon become current everywhere, and that every one will finally perceive them to be fatal to the beliefs of our forefathers. The need of humane letters, as they are truly called, because they serve the paramount desire in men that good should be forever present to them, — the need of humane letters to establish a relation between the new conceptions, and our instinct for beauty, our instinct for conduct, is only the more visible. The middle age could do without humane letters, as it could do without the study of nature, because its supposed knowledge was made to engage its emotions so powerfully. Grant that the supposed knowledge disappears, its power of being made to engage the emotions will of course disappear along with it, — but the emotions themselves, and their claim to be engaged and satisfied, will remain. Now if we find by experience that humane letters have an undeniable power of engaging the emotions, the importance of humane letters in a man's training becomes not less, but greater, in proportion to the success of modern science in extirpating what it calls "mediæval thinking."

Have humane letters, then, have poetry and elo-

quence, the power here attributed to them of engaging the emotions, and do they exercise it? And if they have it and exercise it, *how* do they exercise it, so as to exert an influence upon man's sense for conduct, his sense for beauty? Finally, even if they both can and do exert an influence upon the senses in question, how are they to relate to them the results, — the modern results, — of natural science? All these questions may be asked. First, have poetry and eloquence the power of calling out the emotions? The appeal is to experience. Experience shows that for the vast majority of men, for mankind in general, they have the power. Next, do they exercise it? They do. But then, *how* do they exercise it so as to affect man's sense for conduct, his sense for beauty? And this is perhaps a case for applying the Preacher's words: "Though a man labor to seek it out, yet he shall not find it; yea, further, though a wise man think to know it, yet shall he not be able to find it."[1] Why should it be one thing, in its effect upon the emotions, to say, "Patience is a virtue," and quite another thing, in its effect upon the emotions, to say with Homer,

τλητὸν γὰρ Μοῖραι θυμὸν θέσαν ἀνθρώποισιν —[2]

"for an enduring heart have the destinies appointed to the children of men"? Why should it be one thing, in its effect upon the emotions, to say with philosopher Spinoza, *Felicitas in eo consistit quod homo suum esse conservare potest* — "Man's happiness consists in his

[1] Ecclesiastes, viii. 17. [2] "Iliad," xxiv. 49.

being able to preserve his own essence," and quite another thing, in its effect upon the emotions, to say with the Gospel, "What is a man advantaged, if he gain the whole world, and lose himself, forfeit himself?" How does this difference of effect arise? I cannot tell, and I am not much concerned to know; the important thing is that it does arise, and that we can profit by it. But how, finally, are poetry and eloquence to exercise the power of relating the modern results of natural science to man's instinct for conduct, his instinct for beauty? And here again I answer that I do not know *how* they will exercise it, but that they can and will exercise it I am sure. I do not mean that modern philosophical poets and modern philosophical moralists are to come and relate for us, in express terms, the results of modern scientific research to our instinct for conduct, our instinct for beauty. But I mean that we shall find, as a matter of experience, if we know the best that has been thought and uttered in the world, we shall find that the art and poetry and eloquence of men who lived, perhaps, long ago, who had the most limited natural knowledge, who had the most erroneous conceptions about many important matters, we shall find that this art, and poetry, and eloquence, have in fact not only the power of refreshing and delighting us, they have also the power, — such is the strength and worth, in essentials, of their authors' criticism of life, — they have a fortifying, and elevating, and quickening, and suggestive power, capable of wonderfully helping us to relate

the results of modern science to our need for conduct, our need for beauty. Homer's conceptions of the physical universe were, I imagine, grotesque; but really, under the shock of hearing from modern science that "the world is not subordinated to man's use, and that man is not the cynosure of things terrestrial," I could, for my own part, desire no better comfort than Homer's line which I quoted just now,

τλητὸν γὰρ Μοῖραι θυμὸν θέσαν ἀνθρώποισιν—

"for an enduring heart have the destinies appointed to the children of men!"

And the more that men's minds are cleared, the more that the results of science are frankly accepted, the more that poetry and eloquence come to be received and studied as what in truth they really are, — the criticism of life by gifted men, alive and active with extraordinary power at an unusual number of points; — so much the more will the value of humane letters, and of art also, which is an utterance having a like kind of power with theirs, be felt and acknowledged, and their place in education be secured.

Let us therefore, all of us, avoid indeed as much as possible any invidious comparison between the merits of humane letters, as means of education, and the merits of the natural sciences. But when some President of a Section for Mechanical Science insists on making the comparison, and tells us that "he who in his training has substituted literature and history for natural science has chosen the less useful alternative,"

let us make answer to him that the student of humane letters only, will, at least, know also the great general conceptions brought in by modern physical science; for science, as Professor Huxley says, forces them upon us all. But the student of the natural sciences only, will, by our very hypothesis, know nothing of humane letters; not to mention that in setting himself to be perpetually accumulating natural knowledge, he sets himself to do what only specialists have in general the gift for doing genially. And so he will probably be unsatisfied, or at any rate incomplete, and even more incomplete than the student of humane letters only.

I once mentioned in a school report, how a young man in one of our English training colleges having to paraphrase the passage in *Macbeth* beginning,

> Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased?

turned this line into, "Can you not wait upon the lunatic?" And I remarked what a curious state of things it would be, if every pupil of our national schools knew, let us say, that the moon is two thousand one hundred and sixty miles in diameter, and thought at the same time that a good paraphrase for

> Canst thou not minister to a mind diseased?

was, "Can you not wait upon the lunatic?" If one is driven to choose, I think I would rather have a young person ignorant about the moon's diameter, but aware that "Can you not wait upon the lunatic?" is bad, than

a young person whose education had been such as to manage things the other way.

Or to go higher than the pupils of our national schools. I have in my mind's eye a member of our British Parliament who comes to travel here in America, who afterwards relates his travels, and who shows a really masterly knowledge of the geology of this great country and of its mining capabilities, but who ends by gravely suggesting that the United States should borrow a prince from our Royal Family, and should make him their king, and should create a House of Lords of great landed proprietors after the pattern of ours; and then America, he thinks, would have her future happily and perfectly secured. Surely, in this case, the President of the Section for Mechanical Science would himself hardly say that our member of Parliament, by concentrating himself upon geology and mineralogy, and so on, and not attending to literature and history, had "chosen the more useful alternative."

If then there is to be separation and option between humane letters on the one hand, and the natural sciences on the other, the great majority of mankind, all who have not exceptional and overpowering aptitudes for the study of nature, would do well, I cannot but think, to choose to be educated in humane letters rather than in the natural sciences. Letters will call out their being at more points, will make them live more.

I said that before I ended I would just touch on

the question of classical education, and I will keep my word. Even if literature is to retain a large place in our education, yet Latin and Greek, say the friends of progress, will certainly have to go. Greek is the grand offender in the eyes of these gentlemen. The attackers of the established course of study think that against Greek, at any rate, they have irresistible arguments. Literature may perhaps be needed in education, they say; but why on earth should it be Greek literature? Why not French or German? Nay, "has not an Englishman models in his own literature of every kind of excellence?" As before, it is not on any weak pleadings of my own that I rely for convincing the gainsayers; it is on the constitution of human nature itself, and on the instinct of self-preservation in humanity. The instinct for beauty is set in human nature, as surely as the instinct for knowledge is set there, or the instinct for conduct. If the instinct for beauty is served by Greek literature and art as it is served by no other literature and art, we may trust to the instinct of self-preservation in humanity for keeping Greek as part of our culture. We may trust to it for even making the study of Greek more prevalent than it is now. Greek will come, I hope, some day to be studied more rationally than at present; but it will be increasingly studied as men increasingly feel the need in them for beauty, and how powerfully Greek art and Greek literature can serve this need. Women will again study Greek, as Lady Jane Grey did;

I believe that in that chain of forts, with which the fair host of the Amazons are now engirdling our English universities, I find that here in America, in colleges like Smith College in Massachusetts, and Vassar College in the State of New York, and in the happy families of the mixed universities out West, they are studying it already.

Defuit una mihi symmetria prisca, — "The antique symmetry was the one thing wanting to me," said Leonardo da Vinci; and he was an Italian. I will not presume to speak for the Americans, but I am sure that, in the Englishman, the want of this admirable symmetry of the Greeks is a thousand times more great and crying than in any Italian. The results of the want show themselves most glaringly, perhaps, in our architecture, but they show themselves, also, in all our art. *Fit details strictly combined, in view of a large general result nobly conceived;* that is just the beautiful *symmetria prisca* of the Greeks, and it is just where we English fail, where all our art fails. Striking ideas we have, and well-executed details we have; but that high symmetry which, with satisfying and delightful effect, combines them, we seldom or never have. The glorious beauty of the Acropolis at Athens did not come from single fine things stuck about on that hill, a statue here, a gateway there; — no, it arose from all things being perfectly combined for a supreme total effect. What must not an Englishman feel about our deficiencies in this respect, as the sense for beauty, whereof this symmetry is an essential element, awakens and strength-

ens within him! what will not one day be his respect and desire for Greece and its *symmetria prisca*, when the scales drop from his eyes as he walks the London streets, and he sees such a lesson in meanness as the Strand, for instance, in its true deformity! But here we are coming to our friend Mr. Ruskin's province, and I will not intrude upon it, for he is its very sufficient guardian.

And so we at last find, it seems, we find flowing in favor of the humanities the natural and necessary stream of things, which seemed against them when we started. The "hairy quadruped furnished with a tail and pointed ears, probably arboreal in his habits," this good fellow carried hidden in his nature, apparently, something destined to develop into a necessity for humane letters. Nay, more; we seem finally to be even led to the further conclusion that our hairy ancestor carried in his nature, also, a necessity for Greek.

And therefore, to say the truth, I cannot really think that humane letters are in much actual danger of being thrust out from their leading place in education, in spite of the array of authorities against them at this moment. So long as human nature is what it is, their attractions will remain irresistible. As with Greek, so with letters generally: they will some day come, we may hope, to be studied more rationally, but they will not lose their place. What will happen will rather be that there will be crowded into education other matters besides, far too many; there will

be, perhaps, a period of unsettlement and confusion and false tendency; but letters will not in the end lose their leading place. If they lose it for a time, they will get it back again. We shall be brought back to them by our wants and aspirations. And a poor humanist may possess his soul in patience, neither strive nor cry, admit the energy and brilliancy of the partisans of physical science, and their present favor with the public, to be far greater than his own, and still have a happy faith that the nature of things works silently on behalf of the studies which he loves, and that, while we shall all have to acquaint ourselves with the great results reached by modern science, and to give ourselves as much training in its disciplines as we can conveniently carry, yet the majority of men will always require humane letters; and so much the more, as they have the more and the greater results of science to relate to the need in man for conduct, and to the need in him for beauty.

NOTES

A FEW words in explanation of the nature of the notes may not be out of place. The aim throughout has been to suggest how each selection may profitably be studied, rather than to state didactically its essential characteristics. Such a method obviates the student's tendency to acquire a superficial knowledge of the passage without reading it, which would entirely defeat the purpose of the book; and it also enables the instructor to supplement and adapt the treatment indicated, in any manner he may wish. If a rhetoric is being studied in conjunction with these specimens, the various principles of Composition, both structural and stylistic, may well be illustrated by reference to the separate selections. The longer selections may perhaps best be studied for principles of structure, paragraph transition, and the other broader principles of Composition; while the shorter passages will afford practice in analysis for the various qualities of style, sentence structure, etc.

A DAY IN AN OXFORD COLLEGE

Narrative becomes expository when single occurrences of a similar kind are blended into a composite; when, instead of a specific instance, there is reported a generalized account of some incident or sequence of

incidents. In this selection the narrative adapts itself to a typical rather than to an actual day at Oxford. The dinner in Hall, the evening on the lawn, are described in terms which convey a general impression of those occurrences, — not with the specific accuracy which would characterize the single event. The narrative is not generalized, however, to the point of vagueness, but is made vivid and interesting by the occasional use of concrete illustrations, *e.g.* the crafty brother of the Trinity man, p. 7, l. 4; the anxious *Crimson* correspondent, p. 5, l. 20. In expository narrative such illustrations must of necessity be subordinated.

The selection will repay study for the way in which the diction reflects the subject-matter. The author's thorough sympathy with the Oxford spirit now shows itself in humorous turns of phrase in dealing with the lighter side of college life; and again approaches to eloquence in its appreciation of the nobler traditions of the university. The slang serves to enliven the narrative.

The specimen lends itself readily to imitation by the student.

NATURE IN ENGLAND

Description becomes expository under the same general conditions that narrative does. This selection, for instance, instead of bringing before the mind a sharply outlined impression from which a picture might be drawn, portrays the features common to English

landscape in general, as they presented themselves to the author's accurate and appreciative observation.

The description begins with a general impression whose component parts are taken up in turn and treated in some detail. Is this the natural order in description? The transitional sentences are worthy of notice.

This selection may profitably be studied for its style: its figures (*e.g.* p. 12, l. 7), its diction (p. 12, l. 10), and its sentence structure (p. 16, l. 15). There are many other examples of these qualities which the student will do well to discover for himself.

The Tennyson quotation on p. 13 is from "Audley Court."

HOW BOOKS ARE MADE

The opening paragraphs arouse the reader's interest by appealing to his curiosity in regard to the various processes of publication of which he previously had little knowledge or interest. The order, as in most explanations of a process, is chronological, thus making smooth paragraph transition easy and natural. The style is such as should be at the command of every educated man, for this is just the kind of composition he is likely to be called upon to write.

A SIMPLE EXPLANATION OF WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY

In this selection the author assumes a general interest in his subject, and endeavors to overcome the average reader's prejudice against the technicality of most scientific exposition. The order is not, as in the

previous selection, chronological, but advances from the more simple to the more complex. The style is admirable for its freedom from technicality in the elucidation of an involved subject. The explanation is aided by carefully elaborated analogies which depend for their effectiveness on accuracy and ease of comprehension. It should be noted that no difficulty in the explanation has been shirked; even the details, such as the nature of the electric wave, are made clear by the same method. Such a method may well be used as a model by the student attempting this very practical form of Exposition.

The second paragraph, though it consists of but one short sentence, is justifiable because it states an analogy that is elaborated at considerable length in succeeding paragraphs. It may be compared in its purpose with the third paragraph of the preceding selection.

ARTIST AND MORALIST

The first half of the paragraph is chiefly notable for its parallel construction, a form appropriate in drawing distinctions. The student should note, moreover, the varied emphasis given to this construction in order to avoid monotony. Observe, for example, the recurrence of *the one — the other*, but with varying degrees of sentence emphasis. Can you find another example of this construction in the paragraph?

The final sentence should be studied minutely for its rhythm, diction, and the proportion of its parts.

RELIGION AND MORALITY

The outline of the definition is this: first, the inherent unity of the terms is brought out; then, in a single sentence, the distinction is indicated (p. 50, l. 5), which is steadily developed until it can be concisely summarized (p. 51, l. 6); and finally, this summary is enforced by further amplification.

The clearness of this distinction between abstract terms is made possible by the effective use of aptly chosen concrete illustrations.

VALUE

This definition is notable for its inclusion of the various possible meanings of the term "value" and the explanation of each by concrete illustration. The clinching of the thought in a final paragraph illustrates the principle of Emphasis.

PATHOS

The introductory paragraph should be studied and imitated for its direct statement of the scope and emphasis of the theme. The last sentence indicates both the division of the subject and the sequence of topics.

p. 54, l. 12. This paragraph has two main divisions: the definition in the abstract, and the relation of the definition to the person. This second division has three parts, which the student should discover for himself.

Though the sensitive nature, l. 14. What is the

purpose of the repetition of this phrase here and in the following sentence? Find also in the following sentence a variant phrase for the same idea.

helpful, l. 18. To what adjective in the preceding sentence does this correspond? What rhetorical purpose does the correspondence of position serve?

In an ideally perfect nature . . ., p. 55, l. 4. *Entire selfishness . . .*, l. 9. *In the great mass of men and women . . .*, l. 11. Note how the movement of thought is made clear by the parallel construction.

that is, pathos, l. 14. What effect has this phrase on the unity and emphasis of the paragraph?

l. 17. This paragraph relates the abstract definition to the field of art, and secures, with many illustrations from literature, the emphasis indicated in the introduction. What effect have these illustrations on the clearness and convincingness of the definitions?

Fair Rosamond's sorrows, p. 56, l. 12. William Warner: "Albion's England," Book 8, Chapter 41.

Nought is there, etc., l. 18. Spenser's "Faery Queene," Book I, Canto 3.

tempering extremities, etc., p. 57, l. 6. "Romeo and Juliet," Prologue to Act II.

crown, l. 9.

Comfort? comfort scorn'd of devils! this is truth the poet sings,
That a sorrow's crown of sorrow is remembering happier things.
— TENNYSON'S "Locksley Hall."

p. 58, l. 7. Do you notice any violation of unity in this paragraph?

The final paragraph recalls the definitions of pathos, and justifies its wide occurrence in art.

THE SOCIAL VALUE OF THE COLLEGE-BRED

The selection, after the introductory paragraph, falls into three main divisions: first, the definition of the function of college training; second, the relation of that training to democracy; finally, the *importance* of this relationship. The address easily and naturally assumes the persuasive tone in the closing division; none of the forms of composition needs wholly to exclude the others, and the persuasive element is particularly appropriate in public address.

How is the method of presentation adapted to the occasion? Would the abrupt opening and the immediate answer to the question therein propounded be so appropriate in an essay not delivered orally? Would the homely but striking metaphors be so likely to abound in an essay intended for reading? Is the interrogative form used more frequently than would be natural in written discourse?

A NEW DEFINITION OF THE CULTIVATED MAN

The clear and firm outlines of this selection are obviously the result of cogent thinking before composition was undertaken.

These outlines, although so apparent, should be drawn up in detailed tabular form by the student, under the general headings of Introduction (with its subdivisions), Body, and Conclusion. In longer compositions this is the clearest method of making evident the skillful coördination of parts.

THE YOUNG MAN'S FUTURE

The outlines are very clear. Are they too much emphasized? How is the introduction adapted to the occasion? Compare it with the introduction to Professor James's article. Would the paragraphs p. 93, l. 7 and l. 11, be better combined? Find a paragraph which employs repetition for the sake of emphasis.

E. & O. E., p. 90, l. 16, signifying "Errors and Omissions Excepted," are very old terms which are used for the purpose of showing that the account rendered is not binding and is subject to correction.

THE CHARACTER OF THE INDIAN

Observe the outlines of the selection. They are not so obtrusive as those of the preceding specimen. Are they as clear?

The essay should be studied especially for (1) coherence, (2) diction, and (3) the rhythmical balance of its sentences. We give one or two examples of each; the student should find others for himself.

(1) The sentence beginning, *Among all savages . . .*, p. 101, l. 20.

(2) *tricked out*, p. 98, l. 5.

(3) *In the midst of his family . . .*, p. 101, l. 14.
Ambition, revenge . . ., p. 99, l. 22.

HENRY DAVID THOREAU

The somewhat biased attitude toward Thoreau in the essay of which this is the beginning is modified in the preface to the "Familiar Studies."

The brilliancy of style and the precision of phrase should be observed. Let the student discover examples of aptly chosen words and phrases. He might also endeavor to find some dominant trait of Thoreau's character in which all others blend, and which gives rhetorical unity to the selection.

THE DESCENT FROM THE CROSS

This illustrates a kind of work which may be profitably undertaken by students who find it congenial. They should note that the painting is portrayed for the eye, as well as interpreted to the mind.

HABITS

The danger in writing upon an abstract subject lies in the tendency to become diffuse and vague. The danger, moreover, in the informal style of writing is to allow the conversational tone to lead one into digressions from which there is no return to the main subject. In this essay vagueness is avoided by relating the

abstract subject to Mr. Pater's dictum, and then by employing concrete illustrations; discursiveness is avoided by such phrases as, *the point is*, by careful though unobtrusive paragraph transitions, and by the summary in the concluding paragraph.

Milton's friend, p. 115, l. 7. Sonnet entitled "To Mr. Lawrence."

SOCIAL LIFE IN AMERICA

This selection illustrates how ease of style may be combined with accuracy and fullness of information. This is partly the result of a thorough assimilation of the material. The selection has a narrative basis which the student should analyze.

Such students as may have had the requisite preparation might well undertake this kind of essay, noting not only its structure and style but also its careful citation of references.

EMERSON

This essay is remarkable for its critical penetration, and for the exquisite harmony of its style. We advise the student to read this selection aloud in order to cultivate his appreciation of rhythm and diction.

latest born, etc., p. 147, l. 25. Keats's "Ode to Psyche."

ON THE READING OF NEWSPAPERS

The eloquence of this selection, and the fact that it appeals to the hearer's emotion rather than to his reason, are among the qualities which make it Persuasion rather than Argument. How would an argument on the same subject differ?

THE SPIRIT OF DEVOTION

This passage contains a more substantial basis of thought than the preceding; and yet it is Persuasion because it is hortatory in tone, and appeals to the ideals of its hearers. Even so, must it not be less effective in print than when originally delivered?

Can you summarize the thought of the address in a sentence? Can you draw a brief from it? What does this suggest as to a distinction between Persuasion and Argument?

THE BRIEF

Introduction: The most important part of the introduction is the finding of the special issues on which the proof of the question is to rest. The question in its wider aspect is thus resolved into its elements, and the writer is enabled to see just what the points of contention are and how they may best be arranged and proved. The importance of thus defining the special issues is perhaps exceeded, from the student's point of view, by its diffi-

culty. He knows, of course, that they result from the clash of the affirmative and negative contentions, yet he rarely achieves a brief in which they are drawn simply and logically from these contentions, without evasion of some of them, or the introduction of material not duly accounted for. We therefore suggest a method which, if practiced with such flexibility as the conditions of different cases may determine, will result in a well-correlated introduction. It should be remembered that we do not have in mind the preparation of a brief for a debate in which the opposing parties have agreed on the meaning of ambiguous terms and the scope of the question, but for a written argument which is to be an independent contribution to the discussion of the question.

We will assume that the student, by careful reading and thinking, has gained a reasonable mastery of his subject, and has made note, in the progress of his study, of the contentions on both sides, trying at the same time to distinguish between those which may be called the main contentions and those which are subordinate. His problem now is to determine, by comparing and combining the opposing arguments, the "special issues" on which the discussion of the question is going to turn. This may profitably be done in the following manner: —

He should set down the main contentions on each side in columns headed respectively Affirmative and Negative, and then compare them in detail with a view to combining those which correspond. The important

fact to be remembered in this process is that no issue can result from the conflict of unlike contentions, but only from opposing statements on the same contention. In this connection the student would do well to note Lincoln's method, and even to memorize his words, p. 290, l. 4: "You say we are sectional. We deny it. That makes an issue; and the burden of proof is upon you." Or, to take an example from the brief here printed, the headings A, B, and C of Section VII exactly oppose the corresponding headings in Section VIII. The separate contentions stand in this case in unusually close relations with one another, and yet heading A under Section VII would not make an issue with heading B of Section VIII. This principle will not, however, embarrass the student in his task of combining the contentions in the opposing columns, but will really assist him. Even though the columns show an unequal number of contentions, the task can readily be accomplished. We will suppose, to illustrate the process, that the student finds five contentions in the Affirmative column and three in the Negative. He is pretty sure to find, on comparison, that the three negative contentions will squarely oppose, at least with some slight changes in the phrasing, three of the affirmative contentions, and resolve themselves into "special issues." The question now is what to do with the two remaining affirmative contentions. A number of solutions are to be considered. One or both of the contentions may be found to deal with phases of the question which are to be

declared outside the present discussion, and should be relegated to the section of the introduction devoted to the questions waived. Or these contentions may be found to be such as the negative will choose to concede, and will accordingly be placed under the section of the introduction devoted to concessions or mutual agreements. Or it may be that these contentions will be regarded by the negative as fallacious, in which case they will be reserved for special refutation in the proof. Finally, and perhaps most likely, the lack of opposing statements for these contentions may be found to be the result of an imperfect knowledge of the question, and must be made the basis of further investigation, in the pursuance of which the contrary evidence will be discovered, the opposing contentions phrased, and these two, like the others, will resolve themselves into "special issues." These issues will then be arranged in the order which seems most effective, ambiguous terms will be defined, a topical history of the question will be placed at the beginning, and the result will be a logical and symmetrical introduction which will form a secure basis for extended proof.

Proof: In the body of the brief the special issues should be taken up in the order of their arrangement in the introduction, and substantiated by appending the evidence in concise and suggestive sentences which stand in causal relation to the main headings. If the special issues are at all complex, they must be broken up into their component parts, each of which will be

proved in turn. The purpose of such analysis is not to make a more complex tabulation, but to reduce each statement to its lowest terms, so that the student may see just what it involves, and just how he may prove it most effectively and avoid the many pitfalls of fallacious reasoning. In the brief here printed, the special issues are not subdivided, this having been already done in the introduction, in the fivefold definition of a "satisfactory government."

INTRODUCTIONS

Perhaps no part of a composition, whether it be expository or argumentative, presents more difficulty than the opening paragraph or paragraphs. In Exposition the function of the introduction is to state the subject-matter, and indicate the method of treatment. As a rule this can be done in a single paragraph, as it is done, for example, in the essay on Pathos, and in the Explanation of Wireless Telegraphy. At times, of course, special conditions may call for a more extended introduction, as did the circumstances under which Mr. Vanderlip's address was delivered, and the argumentative element of President Eliot's address. But the typical merits of an expository introduction are naturalness, directness, and conciseness. Often, indeed, a formal introduction may be dispensed with altogether. Mr. Benson entered naturally and easily upon his theme by simple reference to Mr. Pater's pronouncement; Stevenson and Parkman moved directly, yet not abruptly, into

their subjects within the limits of a single sentence. Varied in length as the introduction may be, the problem is, in Exposition, comparatively simple. It is to state in as natural, concise, and direct a manner as the subject and the relation of the subject to readers or hearers will allow, the thing to be explained and the method of explanation.

In Argument the introduction is a much more complex matter. The student must not baldly state the question and proceed at once to defend or to oppose it, as he is wont to do. No debatable question can be intelligently discussed until it has been adequately explained; in short, the argument itself must be preceded by an essay in exposition. How long this prefatory matter shall become depends upon the question at issue and the proposed manner of treatment. It may be a relatively brief statement of why the question is to be discussed, or it may be an elaborate explanation of the question together with its past and present significance. This range of material is illustrated both in the introductions to the arguments and in the special introductions, and perhaps deserves a few words of comment here.

One of the simplest methods of introduction is to state the timeliness of the subject, why it has been chosen, or what makes it important. This serves as a natural and easy entrance upon the question to be discussed, and to arouse interest — a factor not to be disregarded in any statement of opinion. Mr. Gilman has done this in the first specimen.

The *Outlook* article states the contentions of each side. This method is valuable as a means of placing before the reader or hearer sufficient information to enable him to follow, with more interest and understanding, the question in debate. It also makes clear the writer's plan of refutation, should he employ any. Its main importance consists in helping to define the issue. Defining the issue is perhaps the most necessary function of the entire introduction. Everything that has preceded will prove fruitless if there does not follow a lucid statement of the exact point or points upon which the proof is to be based. The issue is derived from the conflicting opinions adduced by both sides, and serves as a focus for the opposing arguments.

When a question can best be understood in its present significance by a knowledge of the attitude that has previously been accorded it, a review of its history in as concise and succinct a manner as possible is advisable. This forms a logical and coherent sequence of thought in which there naturally follows a statement of the attitude to be assumed by the present writer. He states his position by excluding whatever may be extraneous, and so limits the subject to serve his special purpose. Mr. Low and Mr. Myers have done this admirably.

The introduction is often made the place for concession. This helps to clear the ground of what the writer considers unessential to the successful discussion of the subject under debate.

Of course any terms in the statement of the proposition which might be misleading or ambiguous must be defined. Unless this is done, argument will prove futile, for until the exact meaning of the terms of the proposition are agreed upon, no intelligent decision can be reached.

There is no intention to imply that every introduction to an argument should include all these elements. In every introduction, however, there should appear a formal presentation of the subject to be treated; and this can only be done by employing some one or more of the elements here indicated.

ASSUMPTIONS ARE NOT PROOF

The effectiveness of this argument is largely dependent on the careful construction, which should be minutely studied in a brief. The title of the argument, and the method by which it is conducted, illustrate a very important principle of argumentation.

OBJECTIONS TO A POSTAL SAVINGS BANK

This argument is admirably constructed, and the student will gain proficiency in briefing by reducing it to brief form.

The whole weight of the argument is thrown upon one line of proof, — that the proposed innovation is not the wisest that could be adopted, —supported positively by analogies drawn from England and Ireland, and negatively by the success of other methods in this coun-

try. Both sides of this argument are enforced by the introduction of evidence. Elaboration of one line of evidence is more effective than a larger number of undeveloped arguments.

Note the concession in the introductory paragraph and at the close. Does this strengthen or weaken the argument as a whole?

THE TRAINING OF INTELLECT

This passage has the vigor of phrasing which makes a spoken address effective. Some students may wish to refute the argument or to uphold it by original proof.

CHILD LABOR IN THE UNITED STATES

The restrained eloquence of the style of this argument is appropriate to the subject treated.

The nature of the question is such that refutation is of more importance than adducing positive proof.

What is the purpose of the extended history of the question?

THE CORNER STONES OF MODERN DRAMA

The introduction supplies a full and elaborated history of the question on which the entire argument is based. The body is notable for its analysis of the "primary" and "secondary" causes of the weakness and degradation of the drama, of the general public and its relation to the theater, and of the "corner stones." The conclusion is persuasive and enforces the preceding

arguments by an eloquent emotional appeal. Here and in the exhortation to those who are indifferent to the theater is illustrated the frequent and effective union of the appeal to the emotions and to the reason.

The quotation on p. 264 is from "Woodnotes," part II.

IS MUSIC THE TYPE OR MEASURE OF ALL ART?

The student might well imitate in his own refutation the full and fair statement of the opposing view illustrated in this selection.

At the very beginning two opposing views of the purpose of art are indicated, and this antithesis is carried on until, each having been refuted in turn, a third view is suggested and defended.

The paragraph beginning, *Just as the subjectivity*, p. 277, l. 19, is noteworthy for its nice distinctions.

REFUTATION

A few examples of refutation are included because it is so often neglected by the student, and because it is in itself a valuable mental exercise. Number I illustrates the "reductio ad absurdum"; Number II, the "dilemma"; Number III, "exposing a fallacy." Number IV so abounds in practical illustrations of argumentative principles, that the student should be asked to discover them for himself.

Our fathers who framed the government . . ., p. 291, l. 12. The full significance of this phrase, which is repeated for the sake of irony, may be appreciated by

noting this excerpt from the beginning of the speech. "In his speech last autumn at Columbus, Ohio, as reported in the New York *Times*, Senator Douglas said: 'Our fathers, when they framed the government under which we live, understood this question just as well, and even better, than we do now.'

"I fully indorse this, and I adopt it as a text for this discourse."

SCIENCE AND CULTURE

The unity and coherence of this argument are obtained by logical analysis. The whole subject of scientific education is first divided into the attitude taken toward it by the practical man and by the humanist. The first topic, as being of relatively less importance, presently yields to the weightier arguments of the humanist. His position, as typified by Mr. Arnold, is again divided into two distinct propositions, the first of which is conceded, and the second refuted at length. The main argument, which is introduced by the paragraph on p. 301, is supported by extended and forceful proof, except for the loophole which Mr. Arnold so ingeniously discovered.

LITERATURE AND SCIENCE

This argument, like Professor Huxley's, is also remarkably unified and coherent. How are these qualities obtained? The first division of the argument turns on a definition of terms, which illustrates the

practical value of making clear the exact meaning of all ambiguous words or phrases.

We quote Mr. Gates's admirable note on this selection.[1] "The lecture is a temperate but comprehensive and vigorous plea for the humanities in education; to many believers in 'the classics' its arguments seem still unanswered. The students should note particularly its easy conversational tone, and its method of 'winding into a subject,' its concreteness and close adherence to life, its pleasant use of illustrations, its delicately venomous irony, its mocking repetition of catch words and quotations, and its fine sanity and sublimated worldly wisdom; in all these respects it is a thoroughly characteristic piece of Arnold's prose at its best."

Diotima . . . once explained, p. 326, l. 6. See the "Symposium"; Jowett's "The Dialogues of Plato," I. 451, etc. (Gates).

[1] Selections from Matthew Arnold. Henry Holt & Co.

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