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SPEECH

OF

Verdict
MR. STEWART, OF PENNSYLVANIA,

ON THE

THREE MILLION APPROPRIATION BILL,

AND THE

MEXICAN WAR.

Delivered in the House of Representatives of the U. S., Feb. 13, 1847.

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SPEECH.

The House being in Committee of the Whole on the state of the Union on the Three Million Appropriation bill—

Mr. STEWART said he proposed, in the first place, to inquire briefly into the true purposes and objects of this bill; for it seemed to him that, in the course of the present debate, almost every thing else had been discussed but the bill itself. This bill grants the President what he demands, three millions of dollars to make a treaty with Mexico, and authorizes him to pay the money before the treaty is submitted to or approved by the Senate; and the Senate are thus required to ratify this treaty before they see it, or know what it is. Is it not in effect a ratification of the treaty beforehand? How can the Senate object to the treaty, no matter what is its character or provisions, after having authorized the payment of the three millions in advance? If they do, the money will be lost, and lost by their act, in authorizing its previous payment. He contended, therefore, that any treaty which the President might choose to make for the acquisition of Mexican territory, would in effect be at once binding upon this Government. Let this bill once be passed, and I say that neither this House, nor the Senate, can, with any consistency, object to the treaty. The appropriating power is the only control this House can exert over the Executive in the making and executing of treaties. This it is proposed to exercise beforehand, and thus surrender to the President the whole control of the treaty-making power. By this act we tie our hands and seal our lips. We have no right to object to any thing the President may do, and this is manifestly the object and design of this bill. In originating the present war without consulting Congress, then in session, the whole war power of this Government has been practically usurped by the President. He has carried it out in fact. He has made war while Congress was in session, without submitting the causes to their consideration, or asking or obtaining their concurrence. He did not ask us to declare war, but ordered the army to advance and bring on the war, and then called upon us to "recognise its existence," and appropriate money and men for its prosecution. Having thus seized upon the war-making power, he now wants us to surrender to him the treaty-making power also. As he began the war without the consent of Congress, so now he wants the means of making a peace without the aid or concurrence of either the House or the Senate.

By this law we authorize him to pay Santa Anna, or any body else, three millions to purchase a peace, which he has failed to conquer. And, if the Senate shall refuse to ratify it, the three millions are gone! This bill empowers the President to make a treaty when, how, and with whom he pleases. If he shall be pleased to make a treaty exchanging Oregon for California, to give northern for southern terri-

tory, to surrender free territory for the acquisition of slave territory, and give these three millions to boot as earnest money, what right has the Senate to object? If they do, may not the President say "what, do you object to the treaty? Did you not authorize me by law to make a treaty that should put an end to this war, and did you not give me three millions to do it? I made the treaty; Mexico has ratified it. I have paid her the three millions, and she has paid it to her army; and now, if you refuse to ratify it, the money is a dead loss, and worse," it has gone to "aid and comfort the enemy."

To obviate this objection, I have moved an amendment in the 11th line of the 2d section of the bill, inserting after "ratified by Mexico," the words "and the United States." This will, if adopted, keep the money in our own hands till the treaty has been approved by the Senate. But, if the amendment be adopted, the real intent and object of this bill will be defeated. For if you postpone, as you ought clearly to do, the payment of the money till the treaty is ratified by the Senate, what is the use of passing this bill? Can't Congress appropriate the money simultaneously, with the approval and ratification of the treaty? Certainly.

My objection to this bill is this, that, having surrendered the power to the President—having given up to him both the purse and the sword, I cannot consent, by this bill, to surrender to him the treaty-making power also, thus enabling him to impose on Congress and the country just such a treaty as suits himself. Is this to be tolerated? I trust not, unless it is resolved by the majority here to convert this free Government into a despotism, and sacrifice our liberties on the altar of arbitrary power.

I have voted, and I intend to vote, for all the men, money, and measures, that may be necessary, in my judgment, to bring this unhappy war to a speedy and an honorable conclusion; but this bill goes too far. I am ready to do whatever is proper and necessary to strengthen the Executive arm in maintaining the honor and interests of the country; but this bill proposes a surrender of more power into the hands of the Executive than I can consent to grant. So much for the bill and its objects.

And now, in regard to this Wilmot proviso. What is it? It is a proposition to prohibit the extension of slavery in the new territory we may acquire with these three millions of dollars, and which is now free territory. Where can be the objection to an object like this? Gentlemen say that this is not the time; that this is not the place; that it is a mere abstraction, and will have no practical operation. But I say it will have a practical and most salutary operation, as I shall show directly. But even if it were an abstraction, if it were merely a declaratory resolution, saying that Congress is in favor of liberty and opposed to slavery, how would gentlemen vote? Shall this American Congress, which claims to represent the freest people on earth, dwelling in the home, the citadel, the cherished land of liberty, vote that we are in favor of slavery? Let the South so vote, if they choose; he did not blame southern men for maintaining their own side of the question; but let northern men beware. For his own part, while he would faithfully abide by all the compromises of the Constitution, while he would not invade, in the slightest degree, any of the constitutional rights of the South, he would never extend, by any vote of his, slavery over one foot of territory now free. I will, then, vote for this proviso, not only because I think it right in itself, but because I believe it will have a more powerful effect in restoring peace than any other measure that can be adopted—peace abroad and peace at home. I beg gentlemen to recollect that the acquisition

of territory was the original design, and is now the declared object and purpose, of this war. The acquisition of New Mexico and California is, we are now told on all sides, the object of this appropriation. It was for this purpose that James K. Polk brought the war on in the first instance. It was a scheme, a notable scheme, for the acquisition of territory by conquest; but that object was to be concealed, and therefore he began the war without saying a word to Congress about it. He feared they would not sanction his scheme, and bring on a war for such a purpose. Here was the great error committed by the President, "a blunder worse than a crime." When Mexico refused to recognise our minister, the President instead of sending his army to the Rio Grande to bring on the war, should have sent his message to Congress, setting forth the causes, and recommending, if he chose, a declaration of war; and then, if Congress had declared war, it would have been constitutionally declared by the people's representatives, and they would have cheerfully sustained it. But, instead of adopting this course, though Congress was in session at the time, he ordered his army to march from Corpus Christi (where he himself says it had been posted for more than six months, without objection or molestation from Mexico) to the Rio Grande, into the disputed territory, directly opposite to Matamoras, a Mexican town, blockading the river, cutting off their supplies, and erecting a battery within gunshot of the city itself—an act of war, and producing war as a necessary and inevitable consequence. It did produce war. Battles were fought. Our brave little army was cut off from its supplies; and, when his plot had thus succeeded, then he called on us "to recognise the existence of the war," and provide men and money for its prosecution. And why did he not send us his message, and leave it to us to judge whether the nation had good cause of war or not? Because he was afraid to trust the House with the question. He knew that it never would sanction a war for the acquisition of territory; and that was the reason why he took it upon him to send his army to bully Mexico into a war.

Mr. MARTIN, of Tennessee, here interposed to inquire, whether war had not been declared against us by Mexico as early as April?

Mr. S. No, sir, no; she did not. No declaration of war was ever made by Mexico against the United States, or by the United States against Mexico. It is an Executive war—a war brought on by your President, without a declaration of war on either side. Mexico, wishing to avoid hostilities, sent, by her General in command, a notice to our commander (General Taylor) not to cross the Colorado, otherwise they would regard it as an act of war, and an invasion of Mexico. They were not only willing to leave our army undisturbed at Corpus Christi, but were willing we should march to the Colorado without resistance. No, sir, the Mexican Congress never declared war against us, and the President did not give us the chance to declare war against them. I tell the gentleman from Tennessee, (Mr. MARTIN,) who represents Mr. Polk on this floor, that this is a war made by this President, and, for all the consequences of which he is responsible to, and will be held responsible by, the American people. Peace is the true policy of this country; war, and especially wars of conquest and invasion, are dangerous to the character, integrity, and best interests of this Union. As a friend of peace, present and prospective, I am in favor of this proviso. The object of this war being the acquisition of southern territory, as long as there is a hope of accomplishing this object, there will be no peace. Put an end to this hope, and you at once put an end to the war, by defeating its object. The moment the President finds this proviso accompanying this grant of money, he will be for making peace; and so will all the South. They want no restricted territory. If the restriction is imposed, and the territory acquired is to be free,

from that moment the President would pay Mexico to keep her territory, rather than bring it in on such conditions. I am for the proviso, therefore, because it will bring us peace. Impose this restriction, and Mr. Polk will say he wants no territory—the South will say they want none; we say, agreed, we want none. Then, if Mexico is to lose no territory, she will be for peace; and if we are to acquire none, what are we fighting for? Then, impose this restriction, and the war will be promptly ended, to the great benefit and joy of both Republics.

But this restriction would not only terminate the war, but it will promote peace at home, domestic peace. It will avoid civil, and perhaps, in the end, servile wars.

The acquisition of unrestricted territory will be an "apple of discord" to the States of this Union. New questions will at once spring up—new lines of party distinction will be drawn, and the old ones obliterated. We shall be no longer divided as Whigs and Democrats. As long as our party distinctions are founded on abstract principles, and measures of internal policy, they never will divide this Union—never; but as soon as you make a geographical division—a free party and a slave party, a northern party and a southern party—you at once strike a fatal blow at the integrity of this Union. I want to shun all these dangers—dangers which, I believe, can be avoided only by keeping out foreign territory. But the President tells us, in his Message, that this war was not commenced, and is not prosecuted, for conquest. Sir, I am sorry he has said so. I am sorry for the credit and character of my country; for what man is there so blind as not to see that conquest is the whole and sole end and object of this war? Whether we look to the manner of its commencement, or the manner of its prosecution, every one must see that territory, the acquisition of territory, was the first and last, the cherished and darling object of the President. But the President tells us that Mexico began this war; that she struck first; that she invaded our territory, and "shed American blood on American soil." If this be true, it is sufficient. Then why go back twenty years to give what the President calls "a history of the causes that led to this war." Led who to this war? That led him to make it of course. Why rake up and cite, in order, this long string of old grievances and causes of quarrel, long since settled by treaty? Why dwell on Mexican outrages, and what Mexico owes us? She has acknowledged the debt, and has agreed to pay it; and did pay as long as she had the means. But will war bring the money? Or will it not rather destroy both the ability and disposition of Mexico to pay? Suppose a man living in Texas or Florida owes Mr. Polk, not \$3,000,000, but \$3,000; he sends a man over there to collect the money. The man acknowledges the debt, but says he can't pay. Mr. Polk flies in a passion, and says, "I'll make him pay." He hires a hundred men, agrees to pay them \$10 per month, gives them 160 acres of land, finds them horses, borrows \$50,000 to pay expenses, and away he goes. The man collects his neighbors, they have a fight; Mr. Polk, with the loss of half his men, gains a glorious victory; he burns the man's barn; he sets his stacks on fire; destroys his cattle, and kills his wife and children; and what is the result? Mr. Polk has ruined the man, and ruined himself; the debt is lost, and Mr. Polk's property is sold by the sheriff to pay the expenses of his folly, and that is the end of it. Such a course would be just as reasonable as this war upon Mexico to collect what she owes us. But who believes Mr. Polk to be in earnest? Who does not know that this is only the ostensible motive, the pretext, for the war, and that the true, the real object is, and was from the beginning, the acquisition of territory?

But the President insists, that Mexico struck first. Is this true? If so, that is enough; why assign twenty other insufficient reasons for this war? The course of the President puts me in mind of a case of outrageous assault and battery tried in the West. The defendant's counsel admitted the charge, but undertook to justify. He came into court with his plea, something like the message in length, containing twenty-four distinct grounds of defence. To the terror of the court he opened his volume, and commenced reading: "If the court please, our first ground of defence is, that the prosecutor *struck first*." "Stop," said the court, "stop—that's enough—prove that, and we want no more." "Aye, but," said the lawyer, "unfortunately for my client, that's just what we can't prove!" "Then, why did you put it in?" "To save appearances, if your honors please." Just so in this case—"To save appearances," the President says, Mexico "struck first;" but, not being able to prove it, he goes back twenty-odd years to give, what he calls, "a history of the causes that led to the war," instead of giving the true causes in a word, by saying, "first, the annexation of Texas; second, the acquisition of California."

But gentlemen dwell much upon the "glory" of this war. Glory!—is there any glory to be got by the conquest of these miserable demi-savage, down-trodden, and distracted Mexicans? Is it glory for an elephant to kill an ant, or a lion to murder a mouse? Glory? No, sir; that won't do. There would be more true glory in exercising generosity, magnanimity, and forbearance towards poor Mexico, than in killing her people, and robbing her of her territory. A war with Mexico can be glorious in no event, it may be disgraceful; victory over such an enemy is not glorious, while defeat would be the deepest disgrace.

Now, sir, though I disapprove of this war, in its origin and in its objects; though I condemn both the manner of its commencement and the manner of its prosecution, yet I have voted both the men and money asked for by the President to bring it to a speedy and honorable termination. And why? Because we had no escape. The President had plunged us into the war without our consent. Our brave little army was cut off from its supplies, and in danger of utter destruction. We were obliged to rescue them by sending them speedy succor. But I never voted to prosecute this war for the purpose of acquiring additional territory by conquest. No, sir, never. If we shall succeed in getting this territory, what shall we do with it? Shall we hold it by military occupation? By sending an army there, and keeping it there forever, with all its appendages and oppressive burdens of taxation, crushing the people of this country to the earth? Or shall we incorporate it into the Union? And, if we do, are those semi-barbarian, half-blood, negro, and mulatto Mexicans fit for freedom? Are they capable of being free? Can you force them to be free? No, sir; you know you cannot. But, even if you could, have you any right to force freedom upon these unwilling men? Are we to go and bring them in by force—drag these resisting people into our Union by the hair of their head? But, even if willing to come, what preparation have they? Are they qualified to exercise the rights of American citizens? But, more than that, they are in a state of the highest exasperation against us. Sir, I would as soon bring a den of exasperated rattlesnakes into the midst of my family, as attempt to force these treacherous and miserable Mexicans into political union with ourselves—unwilling and exasperated as they are. The result would be discord, strife, civil war, and, ultimately, and perhaps at no distant day, the dissolution of this now happy and glorious Union. I cannot sanction this appropriation for another reason. To do so would be to sanction the doctrine so boldly and unblushingly avowed here by the gentleman from Indiana, over the way, (Mr. Wick,) who

says, that we are here simply to give the Executive what he wants; and that, if we are not willing to grant it, and in the *form* in which he asks it, we ought to go home, and let the people send here those who are. That is the rule he prescribes for himself and all good Democrats. Yes, that is the doctrine openly preached on this floor—the floor of an American Congress—by the gentleman from Indiana, who assumes to be “Sir Oracle”—the official whipper-in of the Democratic party—the grand sheriff and head constable, set up and authorized to bring the Democracy to order. And has it come to this? Is this your modern progressive Democracy, that the President must have not only whatever he wants, but in the form he wants it? The purse and the sword he already has, and this bill adds the treaty-making power. A more despicably slavish creed never was taught under the dagger and the cord in the most grinding despotisms that ever has outraged the rights of man. What does it make of the representatives of a free people? The poorest, meanest, most sycophantic, subservient, and crawling slaves that ever licked the foot of arbitrary power. We must give the President all he asks! Indeed! what business, then, have we here? Why not go home, and save expense? *One man* is all we want. And yet that is modern Democracy, promulgated by a self-styled political philosopher, who prides himself greatly on his wisdom, but more on his transcendental Democracy. This is not Democracy; it is the reverse of the old and true Democracy to which I belonged, and still belong; it is the concentration of all power in the President; the one-man power; monarchy in fact, and, if not checked and chastised by the people, will soon be monarchy in *form* as well as in *fact*. But, sir, the day is now dawning in the East. The clouds and darkness that overshadow us are fast disappearing. The decree has gone forth. The time is at hand when the people will redeem themselves from the doings and the doctrines of this destructive Democracy.

Sir, I here venture to say, that if James K. Polk, when he came into power, had set himself down, in Cabinet council, to devise a system of measures to destroy, first, his country, and next, his party, he could not have contrived a system better calculated to achieve the object than the one he has adopted and carried out.

As to its effects upon the party, look at the scenes of this morning—look at the scenes that daily surround us—the divisions, dissensions, quarrels, and fights, that are daily occurring on this floor, between the belligerent divisions and regiments of the “harmonious Democracy.” Ask the Democrats from Pennsylvania, New York, and Ohio, what turned them out last fall, and they will tell you, and tell you truly, “it was Polk and his policy” that done it. As to its effects upon the country, look at its condition when he came into power, and look at it now. Who could have believed that such a change could have been effected in so short a time? Then the country was in the enjoyment of peace and prosperity, already both are destroyed. Then the national industry was protected and prosperous, and the revenue abundant under the tariff of ’42; now our national industry and our revenue have been both put down together by the infamous British tariff of ’46. True, sir, Providence has, to some extent, counteracted the destructive effects of the Polk policy, by visiting Europe with a famine, a failure of the potato crop in Ireland, and of the wheat crop throughout Europe, while we have been blessed with an unusual, a superabundant crop, to supply this deficiency. This has greatly increased our imports, and sustained, to some extent, the revenue; but this will be temporary. Yet, notwithstanding all these favorable circumstances, look at one great and undeniable fact: when Mr. Polk came into power the United States stock stood \$116 for \$100; now it is down to \$98. This fact speaks volumes as to the disastrous effects of his

policy on the public credit, at home and abroad. Polk found the country with a sound currency, now we have the Subtreasury and Treasury note bills. The one says we will *take* nothing but *specie*, the other says we will *pay* nothing but *paper*. Treasury notes are in fact the paper issues of a suspended non-specie paying bank. It is a national bank without specie in its vaults—it is this, and nothing else.

The Subtreasury and Treasury notes are inseparable; they have always come and went together. They came in with Van Buren, and they went out with Van Buren. They have come in with Polk and they will go out with Polk. It is a contrivance to get money after the Treasury is exhausted, to feast and fatten the hundreds and thousands of hungry partizans with offices and salaries, good contracts and jobs, at the expense of the honest, hard working, and tax-paying farmers and laborers of the country; and, to cover their extravagance, they get up a war, no matter with whom, what for, or how. Van Buren made a war something like the present in its origin and objects, to rob a few Indians in Florida of their land, because they would not sell it at his price; and this war has cost the people more than forty millions of dollars, and we are now supporting these Indians beyond the Mississippi at an expense of nearly a million a year. Well, Mr. Polk, following in the footsteps of his illustrious predecessor, has made war upon Mexico, with the same object in view, to acquire territory and give fat jobs, contracts, and offices to his partizans, at the expense of the people; but when, where, and how, the Polk war is to end, God only knows. What it is to cost in blood and treasure, no one can tell. One thing, however, we do know, the nation is being involved in debt at the rate of forty or fifty millions a year, without any measure of revenue proposed to discharge the debt, or even to pay the interest. Why not meet the crisis you have created like men? Why shrink and skulk from the responsibility? Two months after the declaration of the war against Great Britain, Congress promptly, and without hesitation, passed an act to double the duties on foreign goods, and imposed shortly afterwards internal duties to meet the expenses of the war; but now nothing can be done but pass enormous appropriation bills, issue Treasury notes, and divide the proceeds among greedy partizans, who stand with open mouths to seize the bread and bones distributed at the White House. The democratic plan seems to be to pass appropriation bills, take the money, and leave the Whigs to foot the bill as in 1840. The only legacy they will leave us when they die will be their debts, with the privilege of imposing taxes to pay them. The Democrats, it seems, have discovered Mr. Law's plan of getting clear of taxation. Some years ago, when taxes were very high in this city, my old friend Thomas Law, (brother of Lord Ellenborough,) who was very heavily taxed for unproductive property on Capitol Hill, one day gave out that he had discovered a plan to get rid of his taxes; his neighbors, who had a fellow-feeling on this subject, flocked in to find out what his plan was; after a great deal of importunity, the old gentleman at last said, "well friends, if you must know, I am going to *die*."

Now, the Democrats have found out that they are going to die soon, and they are determined to get all they can while their time lasts, and leave the Whigs to impose the taxes, and to pay them.

But we were told the other day, that the Democratic party had carried out all its measures, and the results would contrast favorably with those of the Whigs. I am glad to hear this admission. They confess that their system of measures is in full and successful operation, and we all can see the beautiful results. I will avail myself of the occasion which is thus presented to me, and will follow out the contrast a little farther.

But I must go back a little, and I mean to inquire what has been the effect of Whig policy on the prosperity, the character, and the credit of the country; and then what has been the result of the opposite?

In this inquiry, I shall deal with facts—I mean to speak from the record, and I challenge contradiction. Then I state, in the first place, that the average expenditures of the Government, during the four years of Mr. Adams's administration, was but twelve millions and a half a year, and part of this was to cover the expenses of an extensive system of internal improvements; and during the same four years, there were paid forty-five millions of the public debt, out of twenty-five millions of revenue. Mr. Adams was turned out for his extravagance, and Locofoco economy substituted. Mr. Van Buren came in as a personal embodiment of Locofoco principles, and what was the annual expenditure during his four years? The average, instead of twelve and a half, was twenty-eight millions; (in one year the expenditure reached thirty-seven millions.) Twelve and a half millions under Mr. Adams, twenty-eight millions under Mr. Van Buren; this is the difference between Whig and Locofoco policy. With a revenue of more than 30 millions, they paid not one dollar of the public debt, but increased it, in effect, thirty-one millions; the expenditures having exceeded the revenue during his term by that amount. Mr. Van Buren found in the Treasury a surplus of 45 millions; of this, 28 millions were deposited with the States, leaving 16 millions of available revenue, and to this add the proceeds of the sale of the Government bank stock, 8½ millions, making a surplus of 24½ millions; the whole of this, with all the revenues of the Government, was expended during Mr. Van Buren's four years, and a large debt left to the Whigs upon the accession of General Harrison to the Presidency in 1841.

When the Whigs came into power, they found in the Treasury, not a surplus of 45 millions, as did Mr. Van Buren, but they found, on the contrary, a large debt, and the revenue run down to less than half the amount of the expenditures. In 1840, the net revenue was but \$10,159,339. When the Whigs came in, they passed the Tariff of '42, (that tariff law which we, in our wisdom, repealed last winter,) and what did that law accomplish? It raised the net revenue to \$25,758,406 in 1844—it restored the credit of the nation—it raised up and protected the national industry, and made the nation prosperous. It paid off, in four years of its operation, (1842 inclusive,) 34 millions of the public debt, and left, in 1846, a balance of 6 millions in the Treasury; and raised the revenue from 12 to 27 millions a year.

This Whig Administration was turned out by frauds and deceptions of the grossest character. James K. Polk came in. Locofoco doctrine was again in the ascendant. The tariff of 1842 was repealed, and that of 1846 substituted, Texas annexed, and then, as was predicted, came war, with all its unhappy and disastrous consequences. Here are the fruits of Locofoco policy. What is the condition of the country now? It is worse than it was even under the ruinous reign of Martin Van Buren, whom the people turned out, head and heels. Mr. Van Buren spent for us twenty-eight millions a year; and how much is James K. Polk spending? God only knows. Just what he pleases to ask for—forty or fifty millions at least. We have given him men and given him money—millions upon millions—regiments upon regiments—treasury notes, loans, all he asks, and as fast as he asks; yet his friends here complain daily that the President is “not sustained” in his patriotic purpose! What have we refused him? We granted him ten millions of dollars and fifty thousand volunteers, who promptly tendered their services, and he has not called out much

more than half of them. What have we not done? And, after all, what has Mr. Polk done? Has he prosecuted this war as he ought to have done? No. He had authority to call out a sufficient force, but he declined to do it. We offered him troops enough, but he left them behind. And now, when the Mexicans have entrenched themselves, have strengthened their fortifications, put down their factions, and are united as one man, with their old and ablest chieftain, Santa Anna, at their head—*now*, after eight or nine months' delay, the President is ready to go forward; he is bustling about, and complaining of want of means. General Gaines, knowing that the true course was to strike quick and heavy blows, promptly called to the field all the forces at hand, to act with energy, before the enemy had time to harmonize and concentrate their strength, and thus to put an end to the war at once; and, for doing this, he has been court-martialled by the President, and removed from his command in the South. And what did the President do? Instead of striking vigorously at the heart of Mexico, he is found invading her remote and defenceless frontiers, in organizing civil governments, and in securing territory to be held as indemnity for the expenses of the war, as "pay for heating the poker." By taking possession of her frontier provinces, the President has essentially strengthened Mexico, by relieving her from the necessity of keeping up troops on her frontiers to hold in check the fierce and warlike savages of the North, who were continually making hostile incursions, and robbing and murdering her people. These Indians are now held in check by our troops, and Mexico has withdrawn hers to strengthen her defences at home. The whole of these movements show conclusively that the purpose and policy of the President, in the commencement and prosecution of this war, has been the acquisition of territory; and, although he may deny it in his message, who that looks to his acts can believe him? Now, I submit to my friends in the South, in all kindness, I ask them, ought they not to be satisfied? Have we not given them Florida at a cost of forty millions? Have we not purchased for them Louisiana, which has given them four or five States; and have we not recently annexed Texas, which will give them four or five more? All these vast territories have been acquired partly by the blood and treasure of the North, and have all been surrendered to the South; and yet it seems that southern men are not satisfied! Is this reasonable; is it right? When we claimed the whole of Oregon for the formation of free States, by a title declared by the President to be "clear and unquestionable," yet nearly one half of it was given up by him. I tell my friends in the South, that they had better stop in their course of acquisition, especially by conquest. If they proceed, they will establish a geographical line as a party line; and that will in the end destroy this Union. Suppose parties are divided by geographical lines, with northern candidates and southern candidates for the Presidential offices. Suppose the North should triumph in the struggle; will the South submit? We are told they will not; that they will nullify and set up a government of their own. But in a different result the North might do the same thing. These are fearful consequences; may they not follow the further acquisition of territory by conquest? These dangers may be remote; I trust they may never occur—that wisdom and moderation may forever avert them from our beloved country—but I fear nothing can stop them (if unrestricted territory is acquired by conquest) from swallowing up in the end all that is precious in our present happy Union and free institutions. Such are some of the sad consequences which I fear will flow from this war, if its original purposes and objects be carried out.

This war which is to be prosecuted at the sacrifice of all the other great interests of our country; for which internal improvements are to be arrested; private

claims vetoed and postponed ; in short, we are told by the President in his Message, that no appropriations that are not absolutely indispensable, are to be made while this war lasts. What would the money, already expended in killing those miserable Mexicans, have done for the improvement of our country ? It would have improved all our harbors, cleared out our rivers, and saved millions of property and hundreds of lives, lost for want of them ; it would complete a railroad from the Mississippi to the mouth of the Oregon ; it would have conferred countless blessings and benefits upon our beloved country in a thousand forms ; but instead of this, what has it done, and what will it do ? It has destroyed thousands of lives, the lives of many of our best men, by sickness and the sword—it has made hundreds of widows and orphans—it will destroy the health as well as the habits of hundreds and thousands of our best citizens—it will build up an enormous standing army and pension list to rest like an incubus upon the people for a generation to come, and perhaps in the end dissolve this Union, and with it destroy the last, best hope of liberty on earth ; and for what ? To gratify the lust of power and the lust of land—the ravenous appetite of James K. Polk, to acquire territory not his own, and signalize his Administration by the glories of war—war ! glorious war ! upon a weak, distracted, and unhappy sister Republic—and what for ? She owed us a debt of some two or three millions, which she was too poor to pay. She acknowledged the debt, and promised to pay it as soon as she could. Yet this is made by the President in his Message, the great and leading cause of war—how magnanimous ; how glorious ! We took Texas—she acquiesced. Not satisfied, Mr. Polk determines to have California. He sends Mr. Slidell to purchase it—they offer to treat with him as a commissioner, but not as a *minister*—which they said implied relations of amity and friendship which did not exist. Mr. Polk would not yield the point, or change the *name* from minister to commissioner, which, if done, might have prevented this war with all its horrors ; but rather than yield this point of etiquette, he ordered Mr. Slidell home, and immediately, and without consulting Congress then in session, ordered Gen. Taylor to march to the Rio Grande, blockaded that river, and brought on the war. Up to this time what had Mexico done ? Had she invaded Texas since its annexation ? No. Had she committed any act of hostility ? None—none whatever. None is pretended ; yet we are to exterminate Mexico and revel in the Halls of the Montezumas, and prosecute this Executive war at an expense of millions of money, and oceans of blood—is it right !—before God and man, is it right ?

And, to enable the President to prosecute this glorious war, he has sent us a message, which has just been received and read by the clerk, recommending the imposition of duties on tea and coffee. In his message at the commencement of the session, he spoke equivocally on this point ; but, as the revenue has fallen greatly short: the last quarter, up to the first of January, having yielded only \$3,645,000; less than it has been for many years past, he has at length come out and assumed the responsibility of avowing himself in favor of a tax on tea and coffee, as a revenue measure ; last session the doctrine of the Secretary, and of the Administration, was that the reduction of duties increased the revenue ; but now, finding a plentiful lack of revenue, they propose to do—what ? Reduce the duties still further ? Not at all. Hunger is very apt to bring people to their senses. And now they have at last admitted the truth of the Whig doctrine, that the way to get an increase of revenue is to increase the duties. This is quite new as a Democratic doctrine. Mr. Polk did not use to think so. At one time he was for destroying the whole system of internal improvements, because it furnished “a sponge,” to absorb the surplus, and keep up a high tariff.

But now he has found out another sponge, his extravagance and war furnish a sponge large enough to absorb all the revenue, and even as much more. Now, when he finds the revenue insufficient—when he discovers that the tariff is too low—having taken the duties off luxuries, he proposes to tax tea and coffee. That is now Democratic doctrine. The tariff of '46 takes duties off of the luxuries of the rich, and, to make up, it is proposed to tax the necessities of the poor; the tariff of '42 imposed high duties on luxuries, and no duties at all on tea and coffee.

(Mr. Cobb here inquired what duties on luxuries had been reduced by the tariff of 1845?)

Mr. S. said, the list was long, he could not recollect them all, but since he was called on, he would give the gentleman a few, and he would first mention brandy, and spirits distilled from grain. The duty on these, under the tariff of '42, was 162 per cent.; which Mr. Polk, and his omniscient Secretary, reduced, by the tariff of '46 sixty-two per cent. Under the tariff of '42, the revenue derived from brandy and distilled spirits was \$1,623,000 on the importations of 1845. Under the tariff of '46, the duties on the same would be but \$1,191,000; showing a loss of revenue on brandy and distilled spirits alone of \$432,000, and this loss is now to be made up by a duty on tea and coffee; and this is Democratic policy—to take duties off of the rich man's brandy, Irish whiskey, and Holland gin, and put them on the poor man's tea and coffee! If you want more money for your war, go back and restore these duties on brandies and foreign spirits, and other luxuries, and then talk about taxing the necessities of life.

(Mr. Cobb here inquired whether the tariff of 1846 had not raised the price of American grain?)

Mr. S. said, after the Yankee fashion, he would answer the gentleman's question by asking him another: Did the tariff of '46 produce the potato-rot in Ireland? Did it blight all the wheat crops of Europe, and produce a superabundant crop here? If it did, then the gentleman's notion was right, but not otherwise. He would tell the gentleman, that the tariff of '46 had about as much to do with the price of grain, as it had with the rising and setting of the sun—no more.

Mr. S. supposed the gentleman had been studying Mr. Walker's late profound tariff tables, in which he stated that the price of grain in the United States had increased, from the 1st of July to the first of December last, 115 millions of dollars, which he attributed to the tariff of '46, although it all took place under the tariff of '42, that of '46 not having then commenced its operation. But, I repeat, all his boasting about the increase of prices goes on the presumption that the tariff of '46 produced the potato-rot in Ireland, short crops abroad, and great crops at home.

Mr. Cobb next inquired, what had raised the price of cotton?

Mr. S. Was it the tariff of '46? What had it to do with cotton? He would tell the gentleman it was a short crop. The last crop of cotton, he understood, had fallen short fully one-third; while the demand was increasing, at home and abroad, a diminished supply, and an increased demand, had, as it always would, increased the price of cotton as of every thing else.

But, since the gentleman from Georgia had called his attention to cotton, he would remind the gentleman of what the Secretary of the Treasury, Mr. Walker, had said on this subject. He said we must take more British goods, or, if we did not, "she would have to pay us specie for our *breadstuffs*, and, not having it to spare, she will bring down the price of our cotton." This is the doctrine

of the Secretary. Now, sir, look at the facts. In this same report Mr. Walker states that, in 1845, we took \$45,600,000 worth of British goods, while she took but \$154,236 worth of our *breadstuffs*, (35,355 barrels of flour, 2,010 bushels of wheat, and one barrel of corn meal;) yet we are told officially that we must take more than forty-five millions of British goods, or she will have to pay us specie (\$154,000) for our breadstuffs, and, not having it to spare, will reduce the price of "*our cotton!*" Why, sir, it is mathematically true, that, if one-tenth part of the value of British goods consists of the "*breadstuffs*" consumed by the labor employed in the production of the raw materials, and afterwards in converting them into goods, then we imported in 1845, 30 times as much British breadstuffs in the form of goods as she took from us in its raw condition; for instance, in 1845 we imported \$45,600,000 worth of her goods, one-tenth of which is \$4,560,000, while she took but \$154,236 worth of our breadstuffs, being about one-thirtieth part. Assuming that one-tenth of the value of goods consists of breadstuffs, (and he believed this was short of the real amount,) and this result is undeniable. Yet gentlemen are constantly boasting of the importance of the English markets for American breadstuffs; and this, in fact, constituted the great topic of both the late message and Treasury report. And he would here state a fact that would astonish the American people, and especially the farmers of this country. It was this—that for the last twenty-five years, from 1821 to 1846, while we import from forty to fifty millions of dollars' worth of goods from Great Britain per annum, she took but one million of dollars worth of all the provisions and breadstuffs of this country. This fact was established by a table which he had made from the official reports on commerce and navigation, from their commencement, in 1821, down to this time, which he had had carefully revised and corrected by the librarian of this House, and which he intended to append to his speech. But the gentleman's interruption had withdrawn his attention from the subject he was discussing. When interrupted, he was enumerating some of the luxuries on which the duties had been reduced by the tariff of '46; he had mentioned brandy and spirits. The next item, though small, served to show the spirit and policy of that law; he referred to cards. The duty on visiting cards had been reduced from 80 to 30 per cent., and on playing cards from 257 to 30 per cent. They take seven-eighths of the tax off playing cards, and put it on tea and coffee; and this was Democratic policy, the policy of the tariff of '46. The duties by this act had been reduced on crown and cut glass, chandeliers, &c., used by the rich, from 90 to 30 per cent.; on pimento, cloves, cassia, dates, &c., from 60 and 80 down to 40 per cent.; on ready-made clothing, from 50 to 30; on silk hats and shoes, from 50 to 30. The duties on all these luxuries, and many others, consumed by the rich, are thus reduced, in most instances, more than one-half; and then the Secretary and President turn round and ask us to tax tea and coffee. No, sir, let them restore and increase the duties on luxuries, and then, if they have not revenue enough, let them talk about a duty on tea and coffee. Let them restore the three-and-a-half millions of revenue they have lost by the reduction of the duties on cotton goods; the two millions on iron and its manufactures; the million and a half they have lost on sugar; the million on woollens, and the million and a half on silk goods. Let them restore these protective and revenue duties—restore the nine and a half millions taken of these five articles. Let them restore the \$432,000 taken off brandy and spirits. Let them do this, and then talk to us about a duty on tea and coffee. He asserted that, with some modification, the tariff of '42 could be made to yield forty millions, not only without prejudice, but with positive benefit and advantage to the

country; not by doubling the duties, as at the commencement of the last war, but simply by increasing the duties on luxuries, and some others, for revenue and protection, extending them to some of the articles made free by the tariff of '42, and making them specific. Such a tariff, while it would give ample revenue and protection, would truly "cover the country with benefits and blessings," restore prosperity to every branch of the national industry, put the country upon its own vast and undeveloped resources, and give this Administration abundant means to sustain the public credit at this fearful crisis in our affairs. This was Whig policy; this was the measure the Whigs would adopt if they had the power, instead of this miserable and pitiful attempt to put a duty on tea and coffee—a measure alike improper, unnecessary, and inadequate. Sir, restore the Whigs to power to-morrow, and, as in 1842, they would soon lift up this down-trodden and prostrate country. Do this, and peace and prosperity would be soon restored. Do this, and—(Here the hour expired, and Mr. S. resumed his seat.)

DOMESTIC ARTICLES, the Growth and Produce of the United States, exported from the United States into Great Britain, from the commencement to the last of our Official Reports on Commerce and Navigation.

Year.	Beef, tallow, hides.	Butter, cheese.	Pork, hams, lard.	Wheat.	Flour.	Indian corn.	Meal.	Rye, oats, and small grain.	Apples.	Potatoes.
	Value.	Value.	Value.	Value.	Value.	Value.	Value.	Value.	Value.	Value.
1821	\$30,254	\$330	\$88	-	\$343,789	\$12,610	\$1,426	-	\$10,072	
1822	75,104	-	-	-	29,539	-	-	-	21,854	\$66
1823	169,996	-	-	-	406,855	417	-	-	5,602	
1824	136,792	-	50	-	108,142	364	-	217	13,764	
1825	165,719	-	34	-	73,334	12,788	88	-	28,430	
1826	126,255	-	271	-	260,313	335,345	14	-	7,667	
1827	87,021	-	22,834	-	111,871	68,432	1,222	6,839	9,798	2
1828	146,585	-	37,819	-	1,635,174	135,196	152	-	8,162	
1829	172,428	-	59,765	\$6,359	33,184	29,425	395	1,831	5,363	17
1830	140,408	-	16,238	33,184	1,544,194	133,447	145	1,830	4,264	
1831	40,766	3,416	1,833	482,680	4,331,951	180	30,514	41,546	9,583	2
1832	65,030	217	29,378	62,287	479,321	2,174	-	-	4,116	
1833	151,433	387	10,997	-	121,169	-	658	899	7,119	24
1834	131,036	999	498	-	96,834	-	-	5,864	14,126	3
1835	51,653	-	345	-	25,341	230	3,346	2,574	1,862	
1836	90,555	-	1,293	-	1,134	-	550	29,844	6,633	
1837	139,642	-	40	6	-	15	1,381	-	4,400	220
1838	73,444	-	88	-	62,510	110	6	-	4,013	
1839	18,696	-	241	11,033	1,326,637	467	3	1,015	24,044	10
1840	17,924	13,674	115	685,609	3,387,343	61,569	41	14,842	20,560	
1841	83,497	195,505	80,379	120,309	1,003,465	7,136	10	2,178	11,719	
1842	162,597	141,982	237,028	183,696	1,242,787	75,901	8	36,490	7,087	5
1843	381,769	207,390	305,294	-	84,815	43,893	102	2,751	11,801	
1844	777,906	338,647	643,705	20,160	744,436	67,882	5	8,996	21,387	37
1845	854,254	409,455	497,066	1,849	152,382	-	-	26,538	19,956	
Total	\$4,318,855	\$1,312,005	\$2,045,399	\$1,616,172	\$14,243,316	\$1,051,581	\$40,115	\$184,116	\$283,995	\$386
Av. p. an	\$172,754	\$52,480	\$81,816	\$64,647	\$569,732	\$42,063	\$2,205	\$7,364	\$11,360	

Whole amount \$25,095,554. Average per year, is \$1,003,822.

Average of bread stuffs—grain, and its products, apples, &c.

Do. of provisions—animals, and their products, &c.

\$697,155


\$96,667



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