





S P E E C H

OF

HON. JOHN C. BRECKINRIDGE,

VICE-PRESIDENT

OF THE

UNITED STATES,

AT ASHLAND, KENTUCKY, SEPTEMBER 5th, 1860,

REPELLING THE

CHARGE OF DISUNION AND VINDICATING

THE

NATIONAL DEMOCRACY.



# A D D R E S S .

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I beg you, my neighbors, friends and old constituents, to be assured that I feel profoundly grateful for the cordial welcome you have extended to me. The circumstances under which I appear before you are unusual; I do it in obedience to the request of friends whose wishes I have been accustomed to observe, and if it be an uncommon thing for a person in my position to address assemblages of the people, I can only say I hope to discuss the topics which I shall handle to-day, in a manner not altogether unworthy the attitude which I occupy. I shall certainly indulge in no language which, in my opinion, will fall below the dignity of political discussion. The condition of my health makes it impossible to extend my voice over this vast assembly, but I hope it will become stronger as I proceed.

I appear before you to-day, for the purpose, first, of repelling certain accusations which have been made against me personally, and industriously disseminated over other States; and next to show that the principles upon which I stand, are the principles of the Constitution and the Union; (great applause.) and surely, if at any time a justification could be found by any man for addressing the people in the position I occupy, it will be found in my case. Anonymous writers and wandering orators have chosen to tell the people that I am a disunionist and a traitor to my country, and they declare that the atrocious form in which I have exhibited that treason, makes, by comparison with it, Burr a patriot, and the memory of Arnold respectable.

But fellow-citizens, before I come to those topics, I desire to make a brief but comprehensive statement in regard to my position in connection with the Presidency of the United States. I have been charged with a premature ambition; I have been charged with intriguing for this nomination; I have been charged with leaping before the wishes of the people, and desiring to thrust myself before them for the highest office in their gift. To all this I answer that it is wholly untrue. I have written to nobody soliciting support. I have intrigued with nobody; I have promised nobody.

To these statements I challenge contradiction from any human being. (Cheers. A voice—"That's so, John C.") Nay, more, I did not seek or desire to be placed before the people for the office of President by any Convention or any part of any Convention. When I returned to the State of Kentucky in the spring of 1859, and was informed that some partial friends were presenting my name to the public in that connection, and certain editors, whose presence I see here, had hoisted my name for the Presidency, I said to them all—"Friends, I am not in any sense a candidate for the Presidency," and I desired that my name might be taken down from the head of their columns. It was done. A very eminent citizen of the Commonwealth of Kentucky was presented by his friends for that office; I was gratified to see it, and united cordially in presenting him for the suffrage of the American people. At no time, in or out of the State of Kentucky, did I do an act or utter a word which would bring my name in conflict with his, or that of any other eminent

American citizen who desired, or whose friends desired for him that position; and if you have taken the trouble to read the proceedings of the Charleston Convention, you will remember when I received the vote of Arkansas, one of my friends arose and requested that the vote might be withdrawn, declaring that I would not allow the use of my name in competition with that of the distinguished Kentuckian to whom I have referred.

And when that Convention assembled at Baltimore, my feelings and my conduct were still unchanged. After the disruption which took place there, my name, without any solicitation on my part, and against my expressed wishes, was presented to the country for the office of President by a Convention, and under circumstances which certainly deserved the most respectful consideration. No man could be vain enough to anticipate that his name would be placed before the country; but having heard that such a thing was possible, I constantly said that "I did not desire to be presented to the American people, but was content, and more than content with the honors which have been heaped upon me by my State and country." And I looked forward with pleasure to the prospect of serving Kentucky in the Senate of the United States for the next six years, (Cries of "Good.") My name, however, was presented, and I felt that I could not refuse to accept the nomination under the circumstances, without abandoning vital principles and betraying my friends. (Applause.)

It is said that I was not regularly nominated, and that an eminent citizen of Illinois was regularly nominated for the Presidency. But this is a question which I have not time to discuss to-day, and it has already been thoroughly exhausted before the people.

I refer you to the able letter of your delegates from this Congressional district; I refer you to the masterly and exhaustive speech recently delivered by my noble friend in whose grounds we have met. I can only say that the Convention which assembled at Front Street Theatre at Baltimore, in my judgment, was devoid not only of the spirit of justice, but even of the forms of regularity. (Cheers.) The gentleman whom it nominated, never received the vote required by the rules of the Democratic organization. Whole States were excluded and disfranchised in that Convention, not to speak of individuals. The most flagrant acts of injustice were perpetrated, for the purpose of forcing upon the Democratic organization a particular individual as the representative of a pernicious doctrine, which I shall be able to show is repugnant alike to reason and the Constitution. Owing to the gross outrage of these proceedings, a decided majority of the delegates from your own State withdrew from that Convention, declaring that it was not a National Convention of the real Democratic organization. Nearly the entire delegations from fifteen Southern States, and the entire delegations from California and Oregon, and large and imposing minorities from other States of the Union, making in whole, or in part, delegations from almost two-thirds of the

States of the Confederacy, denounced and separated themselves from that ill-starred body. The result furnishes a striking warning that the arts of political management are not always perfect substitutes for truth and justice.

But after all, the great question is what are the principles which ought to commend themselves to the American people, at issue in this canvass.

But, before I proceed further, I will group together and answer a number of personal accusations, some of which had their origin in the State of Kentucky, and others elsewhere, by which, through me, it is attempted to strike down the organization with which I am connected. It begets in me almost a feeling of humiliation to answer some of them, but as I have imposed upon myself the task, I will go through them all as briefly as I can. (Cheers.) (Voice—"Go on, John!")

I believe it has been published in almost every Southern newspaper of the Opposition party, that I signed a petition for the pardon of John Brown, the Harper's ferry murderer and traitor. This is wholly untrue. So much for that. (Cries of "Good!")

It has been extensively charged and circulated, that I was in favor of the election of General Taylor to the Presidency, and opposed to the election of Cass and Butler. This, also, is wholly untrue. (Cheers.)

In the year 1847, there was a meeting in the city of Lexington, in which I participated, by which General Taylor was recommended for the Presidency of the United States. A difference of opinion existed at that time as to the political sentiments of that distinguished gentleman. I was assured, in a manner satisfactory to me, that General Taylor's political opinions coincided in the main with those I held, and I united in the meeting. Soon afterward I went to Mexico. When I returned twelve months afterward, in 1848, I found the campaign in full blast, with Taylor the candidate of the Whigs, and Cass and Butler in nomination by the National Democracy. It is well known to thousands of those within the sound of my voice, that as soon as I returned home I took the stump in behalf of the Democratic nominees, and sustained them to the best of my ability. (A voice—"All right.")

It gives me pleasure to add that I worked all the more zealously because one of the gentlemen for whose success I labored, was a Kentuckian, my old commander and my friend. (Cheers.)

It is said, I was not present, and did not vote at the election in Lexington in 1848. That is true.—But with the statement there ought to have gone an explanation well known, but which my opponents never published, that is entirely satisfactory. You well know that at that time (before the adoption of the present constitution), a citizen might vote any where in the State. It so happened that after the labors of the canvass and the courts, I had gone on my annual hunting trip to the mountains. There was with me a party of six or eight gentlemen, all of them belonging to the Whig party; and on the day of election they proposed to me that instead of going, as I intended, to the nearest voting-place, some fifteen miles, we should devote the day to the chase. If they had voted, there would have been six or seven votes cast for Taylor, and but one for Cass and Butler. (Cheers.) I accepted the proposition, and we went hunting (laughter), and if every man had done as well as myself, we would have carried the State by forty thousand majority. (Applause.) Among those gentlemen, I remember the names of my friends, Thomas S. Redd, Nelson Dudley, George P. Jouett, and others—who will

doubtless recollect those facts, if anything were necessary beyond my word. (A voice—"None, nothing more needed here.")

Another charge, actively circulated throughout the Southern States, asserts that I was an emancipationist in 1849, or at least voted for an emancipationist. Gentlemen, in connection with this accusation, I feel it my duty to call your attention to a paper which I received last evening from one of the Southern States—called the *Taskegee* (Alabama) Republican, and which contains a letter written by one of our own citizens, in reference to my public position, and even in regard to my private affairs. It was written by Hon. George Robertson, to a Mr. Alexander, of Alabama, and is dated August 23d, 1860. I quote so much of it as I desire to comment upon:

"J. C. Breckinridge has not been counted here an emancipationist, however much he may have been suspected by some for sympathy with his uncle, the Rev. Robert J. Breckinridge. He does not keep house, and owns no slaves, unless he retains two that came by his wife. I know nothing of the investment in Ohio concerning which you inquire. But we all know here that he was committed to squatter sovereignty ever since his nomination in 1856, until, finding that Douglas would overwhelm him in the North, he changed his creed, and, in his Frankfort speech last January, turned Southerner and advocated protection by Congressional intervention."

As to the part of that letter relating to my personal affairs, I have to say that I do not envy the taste or character of a gentleman who would be engaged in writing letters through the Union touching the private business of his neighbors. Whilst he is incorrect in some of these statements, I will not merit the contempt of this audience, by entering into details in regard to my private affairs. (A voice—"That is mainly.")

That part of the letter which relates to Squatter Sovereignty, will be disposed of in answering the accusations of other men; but I am now on the question of emancipation. Observe the wording of the sentence: "John C. Breckinridge has not been counted here an emancipationist, however much he may have been suspected by some for sympathy with his uncle, Rev. Robert J. Breckinridge?"

Now, if there is an individual here, among the thousands within the sound of my voice, who ever heard or knew of my sympathizing with the doctrines advanced by Rev. R. J. Breckinridge, let him now speak, or forever hold his peace. (Cheers.) And when Hon. George Robertson will produce one respectable man, in or out of the county of Fayette, who will say he believed or suspected that I was an emancipationist, I will even confess that it was proper to write that letter. (Cheers.) If the gentleman means that there has always existed between Rev. Mr. Breckinridge and myself those relations of cordiality, respect and affection which are natural and proper, the insinuation is true. But that is not the purpose of the letter. It is in connection with the subject of emancipation that he was speaking, and he would convey the impression that I had been suspected of sympathy with my uncle upon that subject. That is the meaning of that letter. Judge Robertson, when called upon in regard to the authenticity of the letter, replied that it was genuine, but that it was a "confidential letter." (A voice—"Confidential to be published.") I don't think that mends the case much. It would have been even better to write it for the public, than as a confidential letter. Don't you think so? (A voice—"Yes.")

But I have other things to consume my time to-day than such "confidential" letters as that. (Laughter.) I come to the fact. The only time that the question of emancipation has been raised in Kentucky in my day, was in 1849, when we were electing delegates to the convention to form a new constitution. Then, Dr. Breckinridge and Mr. Shy were emancipation candidates. I, as a candidate for the legislature, canvassed the county to the best of my ability, in opposition to emancipation, believing the interests of both races in the commonwealth would be promoted by the continuance of their present relations, and on that issue, as you know, I was elected. At the polls, Dr. Breckinridge voted against me, and I voted against him (cheers), because we were representing opposite principles; and just so would it be again under similar circumstances. So much for that charge.

I have seen pamphlets published and circulated all over the Union; for the purpose of proving that I was a Know-Nothing in the year 1855, in the State of Kentucky. (Laughter.) I have no doubt that a very considerable proportion of those listening to me were members of that order; and if there is a man among you who belonged to the order, who ever saw me in one of your lodges, or who does not know that I was recognized from the beginning as one of the most uncompromising opponents, let him be good enough to say so now. (A voice—"He ain't here.") Why, gentlemen, I believe I was one of the first in Congress who took position against the organization; and when I returned to the State of Kentucky, in the spring of 1855, finding it was making great progress in the commonwealth, although I had withdrawn from public life to attend to my private affairs, I opposed it in repeated speeches all over this part of the State. (Cheers.) This statement may not be very acceptable to some gentlemen within the sound of my voice; but I do not want to deceive any man. I stand upon my principles, and am willing to avow them without the slightest regard to consequences. (Applause.)

Gentlemen, I am represented to this day as having declared that I would make a political discrimination between one of my own religious belief and another, and between a native and naturalized citizen. I never uttered such a sentiment. (Loud cheers.)

The underlying principle with me was this, that the condition of citizenship being once obtained, no question either of birth or religion should be allowed to mingle with political considerations. (Applause.) I deem it only necessary to make these statements here succinctly and pass on, because I am speaking to assembled thousands who know the injustice of the charges.

But, fellow-citizens, to come to more extended topics. It has been asserted that I, and the political organization with which I am connected, have abandoned the ground on which we stood, in regard to the Territorial question in 1854 and 1856; that we then occupied the position which is now occupied by Mr. Douglas and his friends. I deny it; and I shall now proceed to disprove it, both as to myself and as to the Constitutional Democratic party.

You have heard a good deal of what is called my Tippecanoe speech. I went to the States of Indiana, Michigan, and Pennsylvania, and addressed the people in the autumn of 1856. None of those speeches were ever written out beforehand, and no one of them prepared by me, except by the briefest notes; and of the reports which various persons chose to make, not one was ever revised or seen by me. I have been amused to see the various versions

of what they call the Tippecanoe speech. For example, I have in my hand a paper which represents me as saying at Tippecanoe, "The people of the Territories, under the Kansas-Nebraska act, have the full right to abolish or prohibit slavery, just as a State would, which principle is as old as republican government itself." Not only did I never utter such an opinion, but until recently, I had no reason to believe any body ever represented me as having uttered it. It is only within a few weeks that I remember to have seen it in any newspaper. But I have a very high accuser upon this subject—no less a person than the eminent Senator from Illinois. I have no time to spare in comments upon the propriety or delicacy of a gentleman who is before the country for the office of President, introducing the name of one who is also a candidate, and giving his personal testimony as to that gentleman's opinions. I shall waste no time in the discussion of the propriety of such a course. I wish to meet the accusation.

The Hon. Stephen A. Douglas, in a public address made recently in Concord, N. H., says:

"There is not an honest man in all America that will deny that James Buchanan and John C. Breckinridge, in 1856, were pledged to the doctrine of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in the Territories." Mark the word as it is there, "non-intervention." "I made speeches from the same stand with J. C. Breckinridge, in 1856, when he was advocating his own claims to the Vice-Presidency, and heard him go the extreme length in favor of popular sovereignty in the Territories." Then, speaking of certain other gentlemen from the South, who had addressed the people in the North, he says: "In every one of their speeches they advocated Squatter Sovereignty in its broadest sense."

Here, in the space of twelve lines, you have the words "non-intervention," "Squatter Sovereignty," and "Popular Sovereignty," all evidently intended to convey the same meaning. These terms are not synonymous, and this loose mode of employing language is well adapted to beget confusion. I held the doctrine of non-intervention as it was originally understood, and engrafted into the legislation of the country. (Cheers.) It was non-intervention in respect to slavery by Congress, and by its creature, the Territorial Legislature, leaving it to the people, when they should form a Constitution and become a State, to exercise the sovereign power of defining property, and admitting or excluding slave or other property. This was the non-intervention of 1850--this was the non-intervention of Henry Clay, as I may show presently in another connection.

But I assume that Mr. Douglas, in this statement, meant to declare that I, in 1856, from the same stand with him, advocated the doctrine that the Territorial Legislature has the right to exclude slave property pending the Territorial condition. I presume he uses all these expressions in that sense; and indeed that is the question which has been the whole bone of dispute.

Well, fellow-citizens, I have first my own statement to oppose to that of the distinguished Senator. At no time, either before or after the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, did I ever entertain or utter the opinion that a Territorial Legislature, prior to the formation of a State Constitution, had the right to exclude slave property from the common Territories of the Union, No. And no authentic utterance of mine can be found which sustains that charge. You find it stated in this extract, which I just now read to you, and which I never saw until the other day, an irresponsible statement made by

I know not whom, never revised nor seen by me, and, as I will show you, against the whole tenor of my public speeches. I have suffered a good deal by incorrect reports of my speeches. It would be well, perhaps, in some respects, since now, through the telegraph and the press, everything is dashed off by the first impression, to adopt the plan of gentlemen in the East, who write out their speeches before delivery. But I never do it. I speak as I am moved to do when I stand before the people. I do not doubt the competency, or desire to be correct, of the gentlemen making reports; but it may frequently happen, from the rapidity of utterance, or indistinctness of delivery, that they fail to catch the expressions and meaning of the speaker. Indeed, it is wonderful that the errors are not greater and more numerous. I would in this connection request of the reporters to give me an opportunity of revising what is said to-day.

Now, fellow-citizens, I will detain you briefly by as clear an exposition as I can make, of the circumstances under which the Kansas-Nebraska bill became a law, in 1854.

The friends of the measure, North and South, agreed that the Missouri line should be repealed, and the territory open to settlement. But there was one capital point on which they differed. Nearly all the Southern friends of the bill, and a few from the North, denied that the power existed in Congress or a Territorial legislature, to exclude any description of property recognized in the States, during the Territorial condition. Others, and among them Mr. Douglas, held that a Territorial Legislature might exclude slave property. It was a Constitutional question, and they agreed not to make it a subject of legislative dispute, but to provide a mode in the bill by which the question might be promptly referred to the Supreme Court of the United States for decision, and all parties were to abide by the decision of that august tribunal, as a final settlement of the Constitutional question. For this purpose, whilst ordinarily an appeal cannot be taken from a Territorial court to the Supreme Court of the United States, unless the matter in controversy amounts to a thousand dollars, a clause was inserted in the Kansas bill, providing that in any case involving the title to a slave, an appeal might be taken to the Supreme Court, without regard to the value of the amount in controversy.

Now, during the period between the passage of that bill and the decision of the Supreme Court, all persons on each side entertained their own opinions. We, in the South, held that the Territorial Legislature did not possess the power. Mr. Douglas and his friends held that the Territorial Legislature did possess the power. But on these points all were agreed—1st, that the action of the Territorial Legislature must be “subject to the Constitution of the United States.” 2d. That the limitations imposed by the Constitution should be determined by the Supreme Court; and 3d, that all should acquiesce in the decision when rendered. (Cheers.)

I think this is a plain and true statement, and for the purpose of showing you that was the view taken by the Southern friends of the measure in Congress, and certainly the view taken by myself, I proceed to read two or three extracts from a speech delivered by me in the House of Representatives, in 1854, before the bill passed Congress:

“We demand that all the citizens of the United States be allowed to enter the common Territory, with the Constitution alone in their hands. If that instrument protects the title of the master to his slave in this common Territory, you cannot complain; and if it does not protect his title, we ask no

help from Congress: and the relations of the Constitution to the subject we are willing to have decided by the courts of the United States.”

Again:

“It is contended, on one hand, upon the idea of the equality of the States under the Constitution, and their common property in the Territories, that the citizens of the slaveholding States may remove to them with their slaves, and that the local legislature cannot rightfully exclude slavery while in the Territorial condition; but it is conceded that the people may establish or prohibit it when they come to exercise the power of a sovereign State. On the other hand, it is said that slavery, being in derogation of common right, can exist only by force of positive law; and it is denied that the Constitution furnishes this law for the Territories; and it is further claimed that the local legislature may establish or exclude it any time after the government is organized. As both parties appeal to the Constitution, and base their respective arguments on opposite constructions of that instrument, the bill wisely refuses to make a question for judicial construction the subject of legislative conflict, and properly refers it to the tribunal created by the Constitution itself, for the very purpose of ‘deciding all cases in law and equity arising under it.’”

Then, in speaking of the equality of the States:

“Carry the idea to the territories. What are they? To whom do they belong? Who are to inhabit them, and what are their political relations to the rest of the confederacy? They are regions of country acquired by the common efforts and treasure of all the States; they belong therefore to the States for common use and enjoyment; the citizens of the States are to inhabit them, and when the population shall be sufficient they are to become equal members of the Union.”

I think this is sufficient to prove that at the period of the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska bill I did not hold the doctrine that a Territorial Legislature could exclude slave property from the Territory during the Territorial condition; but while I held precisely the opposite, I was willing to refer the question to the court, and to be bound by its decision.

The doctrines announced by me in that speech were just such as I have ever declared in Kentucky, such as I declared in every public address which I made in Ohio, Indiana, Michigan and Pennsylvania. Afterward, when it was understood that I had been reported to have admitted that this power belonged to the Territorial Legislature, in the month of September or October, 1857, the editor of the Kentucky Statesman, a Journal published in Lexington, in alluding to this charge, made the following statement, to which I beg leave to refer you. Remember, this speech was before the presidential election of 1856. “It was our pleasure to accompany Mr. Breckinridge on the occasion referred to, in his tour through Ohio and Indiana, and to witness the warm response of the National Democracy at Cincinnati, Hamilton, and Tippecanoe, to the avowal by him of exactly the sentiments we had often heard him proclaim in Kentucky, and which are clearly embodied in the platform of our party.

“He said it had been charged that the Democratic party intended to employ the Federal Government to propagate slavery, and that it was, in its federal relation, a pro-slavery party. This, he said, was not true. The Democratic party was neither a pro-slavery party nor an anti-slavery party, but a Constitutional party. It rejected the interferences of the Federal Government, whether to introduce or to ex-

clude slavery, and left the common Territories of the Union open to common settlement from all the States. He proceeded to say that each new State was entitled to form its Constitution, and enter the Union without discrimination by Congress, on account of the allowance of prohibition of slavery. Hence, if Kansas presented herself with slavery in her Constitution, she must be admitted; if without it, still she must be admitted. Any other principle, he added, would be subversive of the rights and equality of the States.

"The allegation that Mr. Breckinridge proclaimed the doctrine of Squatter Sovereignty is simply untrue. He said nothing upon which even a plausible charge of that nature could be based."

In the autumn of the same year, I received a slip from a Louisiana paper, containing remarks made by General Miles, a distinguished citizen of that State, who was at Tippecanoe and heard my speech, in which he denied I had admitted this doctrine of the Territorial power. He sent me a slip containing his speech. In the same month (October, 1856), some time before the Presidential election, in the course of a letter to him, I said:

"You have reported me correctly, and I thank you for it.

"I lands off the whole subject by the Federal Government (except for one or two protective purposes, mentioned in the Constitution)—the equal rights of all sections in the common Territory, and the absolute power of each NEW STATE to settle the question in ITS CONSTITUTION—these are my doctrines, and those of our platform, and, what is more, of the Constitution."

"I consider the assault upon me so absurd as to be unworthy of further notice."

The recollection of my letter to General Miles had wholly faded from my memory, and was revived only a few days since, when that gentleman printed it in a Southern journal, and sent me a copy.

Now, fellow-citizens, to the statement of the distinguished Senator from Illinois, in which he undertakes to prove allegations against me by himself. I thus oppose, first, my own statement. Next, the proof furnished by my speech in 1854, pending the Kansas-Nebraska bill in Congress; next, the testimony of the editor of the Kentucky Statesman, who is a gentleman of unquestioned intelligence and honor; next, the statement of General Miles, who heard my speech at Tippecanoe—and, finally, my letter to him, written to him prior to the Presidential election of 1856—all these proofs being consistent with each other, and, as I solemnly affirm, consistent also with my uniform opinions. (A voice—"Now you are talking.")

It would not be difficult to accumulate testimony on this point to any extent, but I think I have proved conclusively, that the charge is unfounded, and I will add, that this was the position held by nearly all the Southern friends of the "Nebraska bill," and by a portion of its Northern supporters. These were our opinions; and they were uttered on all proper occasions; but we did not attempt to force others to accept them. We had agreed to refer the question to the highest judicial tribunal in the Union. (Cheers.)

Go to the records of Congress: read the debates of that period. They will dispel the clouds and darkness with which a multitude of words has obscured this subject. No historical fact is more certain than that the South insisted on the repeal of the Missouri line to open the Territories to common colonization from all the States, and that when met

with the dogma of territorial power to exclude her, confident in the Constitutional strength of her position, she offered to test it by the opinion of the Supreme Court; and that offer was solemnly accepted, and the agreement placed on the records of the country.

And now, having vindicated myself and the Constitutional Democracy from the charge of having abandoned the position we held in 1854-56, I turn upon my accuser and undertake to show, that he himself abandoned the agreement he solemnly made at the time the Kansas-Nebraska bill passed the Congress of the United States: (Great Applause); and I do not make myself a witness against him to do it. I will prove it by *himself*." (Voice—"Good, good," and applause.)

In a debate in the Senate of the United States, on the 24 July, 1856, upon a bill to authorize the people of Kansas to form a Constitution and State Government, preparatory to admission into the Union as a State, when a question arose as to the true meaning of the Kansas-Nebraska bill, and the limitation on the power of the territorial government, Mr. Trumbull offered the following amendment, as an additional section to the bill:

"And be it further enacted, That the provision in the act to organize the territories of Nebraska and Kansas, which declares it to be the true intent and meaning of said act, 'not to legislate slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitution of the United States,' was intended to and does, confer upon, or leave 'to the people of the Territory of Kansas full power, at any time, through its territorial legislature, to exclude slavery from said territory, or to recognize and regulate it therein.'"

Against this amendment an overwhelming majority of the Senate voted, including General Cass, and Senator Douglas. Let me, however, do Mr. Douglas the justice to say he voted against it, not because he did not believe the territorial legislature had the right to exclude slavery from the territory, but because he did not believe it was consistent to decide the question legislatively, which they had agreed to leave to the Court. Gen. Cass says:

"The South consider that the Constitution gives them the right of carrying their slaves any where in the territories. If they are right, you can give no power to the territorial legislature to interfere with them. The major part of the North believe that the Constitution secures no such right to the South. They believe, of course, that this power is given to the legislature. I repeat that there is nothing equivocal in the act. The different constructions of it result from no equivocation in it, but from the fact that here is an important constitutional question, undetermined by the supreme judicial authority; and in the mean time, individuals in different sections of the Union put their own construction on it. We are necessarily brought to that state of things. There is no power which the Senator from Illinois can use—no words which he can put into an act of Congress, that will remove this constitutional doubt until it is finally settled by the proper tribunal."

Mr. Douglas, in the same debate, in speaking of the attempt of his colleague to coerce an opinion from him upon the question whether the territorial legislature had the power to exclude slave property before they became a State, said;

"My opinion in regard to the question which my



colleague is trying to raise here has been well known to the Senate for years. It has been repeated over and over again. He tried the other day, as those associated with him used to do, two years ago and last year, to ascertain what were my opinions on this point in the Nebraska bill; *I told him it was a judicial question.* This would not suit them. Why? Their object was to get me to express a judgment, so that they could charge me with having urged a different view at home, though I had expressed the same opinion here, pending that question, and though I had previously many times avowed the same thing. My answer then was, and now is, that if the Constitution carries slavery there, let it go, and no power on earth can take it away; but if the Constitution does not carry it there, no power but the people can carry it there. Whatever may be the true decision of the constitutional point would not have affected my vote for or against the Nebraska bill. I should have supported it just as readily if I thought the decision would be one way, as the other. He will also find that I stated I would not discuss the legal question, for by the bill we referred it to the courts."

Still later, on the 15th of May last, in the Senate, Mr. Douglas said:

"In the debate growing out of the Toombs bill, my colleague put the question to me after it had been answered over and over again in the previous speeches, whether or not a Territorial Legislature had the power to exclude slavery. He had heard my opinion on that question over and over again. I did not choose to answer a question that had been so often responded to, but referred him to the judiciary to ascertain whether the power existed. I believed the power existed; others believed otherwise. We agreed to differ; we agreed to refer it to the judiciary; we agreed to abide by their decision."

I think I have shown that upon the point of dispute between the friends of the Kansas bill, as to the power of a Territorial Legislature to exclude slave property, it was agreed to refer it to the Supreme Court, and when it had been judicially determined that we should abide by their decision, as a settlement of the constitutional question.

Now bear with me while I read a very little from the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, in the Dred Scott case rendered in the spring of 1857, and three years after the passage of the Kansas bill.

My friends, oceans of ink have been shed, and thousands of speeches have been made, all the catch-words of demagogues, and all possible forms of starting the question have been resorted to; eloquent appeals to the passions and prejudices of the people have been made in the discussion of this issue. Let us for a moment turn aside from this hot, seething, boiling, caldron of partisan and demagogue warfare, to the calm, enlightened, judicial utterance of the most august tribunal on earth. (Repeated applause.) This opinion was concurred in by all the judges, except two, and was delivered by the illustrious Chief Justice of the United States. In speaking of the acquisition of territory, the Court says:

"But as we have before said, it was acquired by the General Government, as the representative and trustee of the people of the United States, and it must therefore be held in that character for their common and equal benefit; for it was the people of the several States acting through their agent and representative, the general government, who, in fact, acquired the territory in question, and the

government holds it for their common use, until it shall be associated with the other States as a member of the Union."

No cant, no demagoguism, no trash there, but a simple, clear, lucid, dispassionate exposition of a constitutional truth. The Court proceed to say that until the time arrives when the territory is organized as a State, some kind of government is necessary; but as to the power of Congress, and in this connection, they say:

"But the power of Congress over the person or property of a citizen can never be a mere discretionary power under our Constitution and form of government. The powers of the government and the rights and privileges of the citizen are regulated and plainly defined by the Constitution itself. \* \* \* It cannot, when it enters a territory of the United States, put off its character and assume discretionary or despotic power, which the Constitution has denied to it.

"The territory being a part of the United States, the government and the citizen both enter it under the authority of the constitution, with their respective rights defined and marked out, and the Federal Government can exercise no power over his person or property, beyond what that instrument confers, nor lawfully deny any right which it has reserved."

Then proceeding with judicial exactitude:

"The rights of private property have been guarded with equal care. Thus the rights of property are united with the rights of person, and placed on the same ground, by the fifth amendment to the Constitution, which provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property, without due process of law. And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of the United States of his liberty or property, merely because he came himself, or brought his property into a particular territory of the United States, and who committed no offence against the laws, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of law.

"The powers over person and property of which we speak, are not only not granted to Congress, but are in express terms denied, and they are forbidden to exercise them.

"And if Congress itself cannot do this—if it is beyond the power conferred on the Federal Government—it will be admitted, we presume, that it could not authorize a territorial government to exercise them. It could confer no power on any local government established by its authority, to violate the provisions of the constitution."

Again:

"It seems, however, to be supposed, that there is a difference between property in a slave and other property, and that different rules may be applied to it in expounding the Constitution of the United States. And the laws and usages of nations, and the writings of eminent jurists upon the relation of master and slave, and their mutual rights and duties, and the powers which government may exercise over it, have been dwelt upon in the argument."

But, after showing that no law of nations stands between the people of the United States and their government—that the powers of the government and the rights of the citizens under it are positive and practical regulations plainly written down—and that no usages of other nations or reasoning of their jurists upon the relations of master and slave, can enlarge the powers of this Government, or take from the citizens the rights they have reserved,—

They say :

"And if the constitution recognizes the right of property of the master in a slave, and makes no distinction between that description of property and other property owned by a citizen, no tribunal acting under the authority of the United States, whether it be legislative, executive or judicial, has a right to draw such a distinction, or deny to it the benefit of the provisions provided for the protection of private property against the encroachments of the government.

"Now, as we have already said in an earlier part of this opinion, upon a different point, the right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the Constitution.

"And no word can be found in the Constitution which gives Congress a greater power over slave property, or which entitles property of that kind to less protection than property of any other description. The only power conferred is the power coupled with the duty of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights."

Now, my fellow-citizens, I cannot conceive of a simpler or clearer judicial exposition. The points of the opinion are briefly these: the Territories have been acquired and are held by Federal Government as trustee for the States, and the citizens of all the States may hold and enjoy their property in them until they take on the functions of sovereignty, and are admitted into the Union.

The citizen enters the common Territory with the Constitution in his hand, and the Federal Government can exercise no power over his person or property beyond what that instrument confers, nor lawfully deny any right which it has reserved; and since the Federal Government cannot do this, still less can it authorize a Territorial government to exercise those powers. It cannot confer on any local government, established by its authority, the power to violate the Constitution.

Between slave property and other property, no distinction exists; property in slaves is recognized by the Constitution of the United States, and there is no word in that instrument which gives Congress greater power over it, or which entitles it to less protection than other property; but the only power which Congress has, is the power, coupled with the duty, of guarding and protecting the owner in his rights.

I am content to stand upon these principles, thus announced by the Supreme Court of the Union.

Some disposition has been manifested to escape from these principles, because the case went up from a State and not a Territory; but in my opinion this evasion is too small to be answered. The decision we have been considering grew out of a proper case regularly carried up, and it determines every point of difference between the friends of the Kansas bill.

After this decision, we had arrived at a point where we might reasonably expect tranquillity and peace. The equality of rights of persons and property of all the States, in the common Territory, having been stamped by the seal of judicial authority, all good citizens might well acquiesce. The time seemed to be at hand when the agitation would be confined to a little handful of political abolitionists, which the conservative sentiment of the country would soon put down. Least of all was any renewal of agitation to be expected from any portion of those who had agreed by the Kansas bill to refer the Constitutional question to the Court. We seemed to be at the end of the struggle (assuming that the abolition party could not successfully prolong

it), and now patriots and statesmen might devote their energies to the development of the varied material interests of the Union. The spectre of slavery agitation seemed to be laid forever. But these hopes were destined to cruel disappointment. Twelve months afterward, the Senator from Illinois, who had "agreed to refer the question to the Supreme Court and to abide its decision," discovered a contrivance by which it was supposed the decision might be evaded, and rights which we thought secure, be turned to ashes. Let us see how it was to be done.

The opinion of the Supreme Court was delivered in 1857. In 1858, M. Douglas was a candidate for re-election from that State, and then for the first time we find the theory advanced that there is a mode by which a subordinate Territorial Legislature on a question of Constitutional right may evade, or may override the opinion of the highest judicial tribunal in the Union. The manner in which it may be done is pointed out in the following language, employed by Mr. Douglas in discussion with his competitor, Mr. Lincoln:

"The last question propounded to me by Mr. Lincoln is, Can the people of a Territory, in any lawful way, against the wishes of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from their limits prior to the formation of a State Constitution? I answer emphatically, as Mr. Lincoln has heard me answer a hundred times from every stump in Illinois, that, in my opinion, the people of a Territory can, by lawful means, exclude slavery from their limits prior to the formation of a State Constitution."

That question we agreed, in the Kansas bill, to refer to the Supreme Court of the United States. That question was decided, as I have just shown you, by the court the year before this speech was made by Mr. Douglas, in which decision they say neither Congress nor the Territorial Legislature has power to exclude; but their only right and duty are to guard and protect. I have shown you that Mr. Douglas agreed to submit the question to that court, and to abide by its decision.

I quote Mr. Douglas again concerning what he calls the "abstract question" of the constitutional right of Southern citizens to hold and enjoy their property in the Territories. The question may be called "abstract," but it is one involving the equality of the States of this Union and the vital rights of nearly half of the confederacy: (Applause.)

"It matters not," says Mr. Douglas, "what way the Supreme Court my hereafter decide as to the abstract question, whether slavery may or may not go into a Territory under the Constitution, the people have the lawful means to introduce or exclude it as they please, for the reason that slavery cannot exist a day or on hour anywhere unless it is supported by local police regulations."

It matters not as to the right to go into the Territories under the Constitution. The people may lawfully exclude it while yet in the Territorial condition. I have shown you that in 1856, in the Senate of the United States, he said:

"If the Constitution carries slavery there, let it go, and no power on earth can take it away." I would like to see these two statements reconciled. (Great applause.) Whether the Constitution did authorize it to go there and protect the individual in his property, was a question which he agreed to refer to the Court. This I have proved, not by myself, but by him. He now says, no matter which way the Court may decide it, it may be excluded. (Prolonged applause.) *This declaration has never been withdrawn, and he asserts to-day, that the people*

of a Territory may exclude the property of Southern people, prior to the formation of a Constitution, by territorial legislation against it. "No matter what the decision of the Supreme Court may be on that abstract question, still the right of the people to make a slave Territory or a free Territory is perfect and complete under the Nebraska bill!"!!

Gentlemen, in answer to the accusations against me of first holding and then abandoning this doctrine, and which I have disproved, I have to say that it is not statesmanlike to agree to refer a controversy on a Constitutional point to the Supreme Court of the country, and when the Court has decided against you, to say "no matter how it may decide, I will find means to evade it, if against me."

No. It is not for a statesman to point out to a subordinate legislative tribunal some device whether it be non-action or unfriendly legislation, by which it may destroy a constitutional right.

That looks almost as much like "higher law" as some other "higher law" we heard of further East. (Laughter and applause.)

And now, if I were disposed to imitate an eminent, but bad example, I might say, "there is not an honest man in all America," who can deny that when the friends of the Kansas bill differed upon the question of the power of Congress, or a territory, to exclude slave property during the territorial condition, they agreed to refer this constitutional question to the Supreme Court—that Mr. Douglas was a party to this agreement—that the Court decided upon a case properly arising, that neither Congress nor a territory, have the power to exclude Southern property from the common domain—and finally that Mr. Douglas, notwithstanding the agreement, yet declares that the legislature may expel slave property from the territories, and carefully points out the mode by which he supposed the decision of the Supreme Court may be evaded. (Loud applause.)

But I am content merely to state the facts, and let the public draw their own conclusions.

Fellow-citizens, the serious illness under which I have suffered for some days, makes it almost impossible for me to address this vast assemblage so as to be fully heard, and renders if necessary I should be brief. I pass on to a view of this subject in another aspect of it.

Now, gentlemen, how is this question met? Do not the Constitutional Democracy meet it by fair, manly appeals to the reason of the people and to the Constitution? Do we not state our principles fairly? Do we not state them in the very language of the Supreme Court of the United States itself? Do we not stand upon the Constitution as adjudicated by the Court, and do not we express our reasons in temperate, manly, and respectful arguments? The language in which the Supreme Court states the territorial question, and decides it, and the manner in which it is stated by the distinguished Senator from Illinois—how different! Here are questions upon which the highest intellects of the country are exercised, engaging the anxious attention of your wisest and best men, engaging the attention of your highest judicial tribunal, debated in the Senate, in the House of Representatives, before an anxious people who want to know the truth.

The question should be discussed on the strictest principles of the Constitution, divested of all prejudice and passion. Yet this is the style of appeal commonly employed by Mr. Douglas and the most heated of his followers:

"You shall not force slavery down the throats of an unwilling people."

The argument consists of an appeal to the passions of one section of the Union against the passions of another section of the Union. Mr. Douglas himself has sometimes admitted, that under our system, slave property stands upon the same footing with other property. The Supreme Court of the United States has, as I have shown, decided that under the Constitution it stands upon the same footing, and it has the same right to protection, and that all property alike must be guarded and protected in the common territories as other property. Yet we hear the accusation about "forcing slavery down the throats of an unwilling people." This is the mode of treating questions of Constitutional right and private property!

Substitute the word "property" for the word "slaves," since slave and other property have been shown to stand on the same footing, and see how it would read:

"You shall not force 'slavery' down the throats of an unwilling people."

"You shall not force 'property' down the throats of an unwilling people. (Laughter and cheers.)

Why, the Territorial authority is the creature of Congress; Congress is the creature of the Constitution; the Constitution is the creature of the States—and here you would have a little Territorial legislature three or four degrees removed from the original source of power, with the right to exclude all States of the Union with all their property from their own domains. (Applause.) This is the irresistible conclusion.—These are not the doctrines of the Constitutional Democracy. (Cheers.) These are not the doctrines of the Kentucky Opposition, or at least they were not last year. These are not the doctrines of the Constitution itself. These are sectional doctrines.—(Cheers) these are not the doctrines that make for the peace and harmony of the Union, of the States. (Cheers.) And forsooth because we will not take them and abandon the whole practice of the Government and the decision of the Supreme Court; because we will not bow down to a doctrine that deprives us of our rights—we are bolters, demagogues, secessionists, disunionists! (Continued applause.) The distinguished Senator of Illinois said at Norfolk we are a "faction and must be destroyed." When we are destroyed, they will have struck their daggers through and through the Constitution of their country. (Immense applause.)

Just here, my friends, I want to say a word about the doctrine of non-intervention, which is adroitly mixed up with the phrases "popular sovereignty" and "squatter sovereignty," with a view to confuse the people.

The names of Clay, Webster, and other eminent statesmen, have been invoked to sustain this doctrine of Territorial power, and the compromises of 1850 have been invoked for the same purpose. I assert that from 1848 down to the period when this false doctrine, repugnant alike to the Constitution and reason, was thrust upon the country, no respectable political party held the opinion that a Territorial Legislature had the right to define or exclude property, pending the Territorial condition. When did Clay ever hold such doctrines? When were such doctrines ever embodied in the compromise measures of 1850? The legislation of that period shows that non-intervention was meant to apply equally to Congress and to the Territorial Government.

The statesmen of that day looked to the period when they should come into the Union as a State, as the time when the Territorial authorities might

act on the subject of property, and hold or exclude the slave property of the South. (Applause.)

Time will not allow me to do much more than state these propositions, but I will read short extracts from the celebrated report made by the Committee of Thirteen (of which Mr. Clay was chairman), which resulted in the Compromise measures of 1850. It is calm, lucid, has no clap-trap phrases, and in its tone is like the clear and elevated language of the Supreme Court :

"It is high time that the wounds which it has inflicted should be healed up and closed, and that, to avoid in all future time the agitation which must be produced by the conflict of opinion on the slavery question—existing as this institution does in some of the States, and prohibited as it is in others, the true principle which ought to regulate the action of Congress in forming territorial governments for each newly acquired domain, is to refrain from all legislation on the subject in the Territory acquired, so long as it retains the territorial form of government, leaving it to the people of such territory, when they have attained to a condition which entitles them to admission as a State, to decide, for themselves the question of the allowance or prohibition of domestic slavery." (Applause—a voice, "That is true doctrine.")

That, gentlemen, was non-intervention in 1850. It was no interference to exclude by Congress, or the Territorial Legislature, but to leave the question to be decided by the people, when they come to form their State Constitution. It is as much a violation of the doctrine of non-intervention for a Territorial legislature under Mr. Douglas' bran new theory, to exclude slave property, as it would be for Congress to introduce it by positive law.

Here is the opinion of Webster, uttered about the same time in the Senate, upon this question of Territorial power :

"We have always gone upon the ground that these territorial governments were in a state of pupillage, under the protection or patronage of the general government. The territorial legislature has a constitution prescribed by Congress. They have no power not given by that Congress. They must act within the limits of the constitution granted them by Congress, or else their acts become void. The people under the territorial government are not a sovereignty; they do not constitute a sovereignty, and do not possess any of the rights incident to sovereignty. They are, if you so please to denominate it, in a state of inchoate government and sovereignty. If we well consider this question upon the ground of our practice during the last half century, I think we will find one way of disposing of it. It is our duty to provide for the people of the territory a government to keep the peace, to secure their property, to assign to them a subordinate legislative authority, to see that the protection of their persons and the security of their property are all regularly provided for, and to maintain them in that state until they grow into sufficient importance in point of population, to be admitted into the Union as a State upon the same footing with the original States."

Do you suppose that Daniel Webster, after the opinion of the Supreme Court which I have read to you, would have considered it becoming in him, as an American statesman, to point out some contrivance or device by which the territorial legislature could violate the Constitutional rights of the States. Not he! Nor would Mr. Clay, nor any of the great

and good men who illustrated the earlier days of your history. (Cheers.)

Why, how is it with these territorial governments? From the beginning they have been regarded as subordinate and temporary, without any attribute of sovereignty. Their judges, and governors, and most of the other officers, are appointed by the President and Senate and paid out of the public treasury; and even the daily expenses of the legislature which they invoke to exclude your property from the territories are paid out of the treasury from money to which that very property contributes by taxation! (Applause.) The practice of the government never has warranted this new doctrine. Take an illustration which has always seemed to me to be conclusive. The theory is, that in the common domain of the United States, the States and their citizens are on a footing of equality and entitled to the protection of their persons and property. This sounds like a national and constitutional doctrine. Now suppose that a vessel were going out of the port of Norfolk for another port, laden with freight, and having on board also a number of slaves. It is said that property in slaves under our system is local, and cannot get beyond State limits without special legislation. This ship gets beyond one league from shore, and is in the open sea, beyond the limits of any State. Can a British cruiser come up and take these slaves from the deck of the vessel and say they are free, because slavery is local and they are not within the limits of any State? No. What then protects them? Nothing but the deck of an American ship and the flag of the United States. The property is upon the common domain of the Union, and the flag of America protects it; and if it does it on the deck of a ship, it does it in the Territories, which are likewise the common domain of the Union. (Loud applause.)

One other word on this general subject. I see in a speech made by the Senator from Illinois, in Petersburg, Va., he uses the following language to the people of that State :

"You have the same right, under the Constitution, to go and carry your property in the territories that I have mine. You have the same right to carry your slaves, or your cattle, or your horses, that I have to carry any property that I possess. When you get there, you and I stand on a footing of exact equality under the law. You bring your property with you subject to the local law, and I bring mine with me subject to the same local law."

Observe, he says you have the same right, *under the Constitution*, to go and carry your property into the Territory that he has to carry his; and I have showed that he declared previously in the Senate that if the Constitution carried it there, no power on earth could take it away. Now, he says when you get there, it is subject to a local law, made by subordinate legislative authority, and the sum of it is that the moment it gets there, under the Constitution, they can drive it out against the Constitution. (Laughter and applause.) Gentlemen, what is this but the assertion of wholly inconsistent positions? What is it but trifling with the intelligence of the people?

Again, says that distinguished gentleman, in the same speech :

"Congress never yet passed a law for the protection of any man's property in a Territory. Every man who goes to a territory with his wife, his children, his servants, and his property, is subject to the local law, and relies upon local law for his protection."

Let us see if that is so. Congress has done it in many instances. I happened to meet, the other day, with a striking case, in which it did so. In 1834, when great statesmen were in the Senate and the House, and Jackson was President of the United States, and the territory of Florida undertook to lay a tax on the slaves of non-residents higher than on the slaves of residents. The non-residents of Virginia and other States appealed to Congress to oblige the Territorial Legislature to refrain from discriminating against their property. The committee of Congress say they "think that Congress should always protect the property of citizens of the United States when subjected to the operations of unjust legislation by territorial governments;" and they reported a bill enacting that all such acts as those complained of should be "null and void," and further that an attempt by any one to enforce said acts, passed by the Legislative Council of the Territory of Florida, should be punished by fine and imprisonment. The bill passed Congress, and was approved by President Jackson. Now would it not be an insult to your understandings to say that this was not an interference by Congress to protect property against the encroachments of the Territorial Legislature. Yet Mr. Douglas says that Congress "never yet passed a law for the protection of any man's property in a territory;" but that "he must always rely on the local law." Of course I do not doubt that he believes the statement; but I relieve his truth and integrity at the expense of his information. (Laughter. A voice, "I wouldn't care to be so relieved.")

Fellow citizens: The principles I have tried feebly to vindicate here, are the principles upon which the Constitutional Democracy stands to-day; and they are the only principles upon which any human beings will pretend to charge them with purposes of disunion. If they are the principles of the Constitution and the Union, then we are Constitutional and Union men. (Cries of "That's so.") And yet, for two or three months back, you have heard loud and incessant clamor that I, and those with whom I am connected, are a disunion organization, who seek to break up this Confederacy of States. My friends, I hardly know, so far as it is a personal charge against myself, how to answer it. (A voice, "Tell them it's a lie.")

The whole stock in trade of many anonymous writers and wandering orators all over the country, is "disunion"—"disunion."—"This man and his party attempt to break up the Union of the States." You may appeal to them by reason, but in vain. You say, these are the principles of the Constitution, as determined by the practice of the Government. The answer is—"disunion." You may say they are the principles of the Constitution as determined by the highest judicial tribunal of the land. The answer is—"disunion!" You may say, "we are asserting principles thus sanctioned, by means of reason and the ballot-box, and under the Constitution."

And still, the large number of young gentlemen who are engaged in enlightening the people upon the Constitution of the country, by the ringing of bells, with tongues as long and heads as empty as the bells they ring, shout—"disunion!" (Prolonged laughter and cheers.)

From sources yet more eminent comes the accusation, that I and the political organization with which I am connected, are laboring for the disruption of the Confederacy. I do not reply now to what Mr. Douglas says all over New England, in Virginia, and wherever he goes, because it may be quite natural for a gentleman who feels as profound a personal

interest as he does in pending questions, to think, that any man who opposes him, must be a disunionist. (Cheers and laughter.) Indeed, by his declaration, you must be all disunionists in Kentucky; for he declares that those who assert that the territorial legislature has no power to exclude slave property, and that Congress should interfere for its protection when necessary, are in effect disunionists; and that is what the whole Legislature and all the people of Kentucky said last year. (Applause.)

Fellow-citizens, even in our own State, where I certainly thought my character and antecedents were known, one of the oldest and most eminent of our public men has not indeed said that I am a disunionist, but intimated that if I am not one myself I am connected with an organization whose bone and body is disunion. I refer to Mr. Crittenden, and to a speech recently made by him at Louisville.

Gentlemen, I have known and admired Mr. Crittenden since I was a boy. He also has known me; towards him and his, I have ever cherished, and expect to cherish, relations of the most respectful and cordial esteem. There are reasons I do not care to allude to in public, which, even if I had grounds for an opposite course, would prevent any but the most perfect courtesy in reply. After speaking of Mr. Lincoln in terms fully as complimentary as his principles merit, and of Mr. Douglas in terms of warm eulogy, he comes to speak of his own fellow-citizen in the language following:

"We are now left only to compare Mr. Bell with the third candidate who stands in opposition—Mr. Breckinridge. And here again, as in respect to Mr. Douglas, my objection is not to the candidate as an individual. I should hope that Mr. Breckinridge was not a disunion man. (A voice—"Yes he is!") He ought not to be. He belongs to a tribe of faithful, devoted Union men—the tribe of Kentuckians. (Great applause.) He must have been seduced away from the path of his duty, far from the path in which all the impulses of his blood ought to carry him, if he has become a disunionist. But Mr. Breckinridge has made himself the head of a party. It is part and parcel of the present purpose of that party, and as in the case of Mr. Lincoln, we must judge of his public course by the party that he consents to represent."

Fellow-citizens, I thank my venerable and distinguished friend for the lingering hope he yet entertains that I am not a disunionist. (Laughter and applause.) Like a humane lawyer, he gives me personally the benefit of a doubt, and for this, too, I thank him. (Renewed cheers.) As to my connection with principles or a party which tends in that direction, I may speak of it presently. My object is now to relieve myself, personally, from the imputation of being a disunionist, and in this case I would greatly prefer to receive a strong and direct blow than to have it sound as it does, like the reluctant confession of a sorrowful friend. (Applause and laughter.) In passing, I may say, in regard to the distinguished gentleman associated with me as candidate for the Vice-Presidency, that his whole life is a refutation of the charge made against him. Born in North Carolina, reared in Kentucky, long living in Indiana, more recently from far off Oregon, he has been in all parts of his country, tried in all, honored in all. He has served his country with high distinction in peace and war, and bears on his person enduring memorials of his patriotism and courage. His last act of treason was to add another star to the galaxy of the Union. (Loud applause.)

When a man is before the people for public trust, a great deal depends on his personal character and antecedents. Much then depends on the fact whether I am a disunionist. (Cries of "You're not!") Born within sight of this spot where we are met, known to many of you for nearly forty years, your representative in the legislature of Kentucky, in the Congress of the United States, and other stations of public trust, I invite any one to point to any thing in my character or antecedents which would sanction such a charge or such an imputation. (Cheers.) I will not degrade the dignity of my declaration on this subject by epithets, but I proudly challenge the bitterest enemy I may have on earth to point out an act, to disclose an utterance, to reveal a thought of mine hostile to the Constitution and union of the States. (Loud cheers. A voice—"He couldn't do it!")

No, my friends, the man does not live, in or out of the Commonwealth of Kentucky, no matter how exalted his station or character, who has power enough to connect my name successfully with the slightest taint of disloyalty to the Constitution and union of my country. (Applause. A voice—"No, you'd die first!")

But, fellow citizens, if there be nothing in my character or antecedents to justify this accusation, what is there in the principles upon which I stand? It is not pretended that these resolutions which relate to the acquisition of Cuba, the Pacific Railroad, the rights of naturalized citizens, &c., contain disunion sentiments. It must then be, if anywhere, in the resolutions as to property in Territories, and its protection.—I will read these two resolutions, and you can judge whether they accord with the Constitution, the decision of the Supreme Court, and the practice of the Government as I have shown it today:

"1. *Resolved*, That the government of a Territory organized by an Act of Congress, is provisional and temporary, and during its existence all citizens of the United States have an equal right to settle with their property in the Territory, without their rights of either person or property being destroyed or impaired by Congressional or Territorial legislation.

"2. *Resolved*, That it is the duty of the Federal Government in all its departments to protect, when necessary, the rights of persons and property in the Territories, and wherever else its constitutional authority extends."

These are the principles we avow. Are they Constitutional? Are they just? Are they sectional? If they are Constitutional, they are not sectional. for the Constitution covers the whole Union. (Cheers.) Why, he who stands upon the Constitution, can neither be sectional nor a disunionist. I have shown you that these principles are taken almost word for word from the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United States, and we find they are supported by almost all the precedents and practice of the Government. They are principles upon which we may well live, and by which we may well be willing to die. (Cheers.) They are important, they are vital. They concern the rights of person and property. They cannot be abstract, they cannot be minute or unimportant, for they concern the honor and equality of the States. What has been the position of Kentucky upon that platform? You remember the position taken by the candidates for Governor of this State last year? Both held that Territorial Legislatures have no power to exclude our property, and each contended that every department of Government must protect it when it became necessary. Mr. Joshua F. Bell, I believe, went a

step further in thinking the time had now arrived when it was necessary for the Government to interpose. The Congressional conventions of both parties, with scarcely an exception, and their nominees for Congress, indorsed these principles. The State Democratic Convention, on the 8th of January last, adopted by an overwhelming vote the following resolution, which embraces precisely the same principles:

1. *Resolved*, That the Democratic party in Kentucky believe that the Government of the United States holds the public domain in trust for the benefit of all the citizens of the respective States, and that Congress possesses the power, and, in the faithful discharge of its trust, is bound to exercise the power, when it shall be necessary, to protect the citizens or inhabitants of any Territory in the use and enjoyment of every species of property; but that neither the Congress of the United States, nor any legislative agent of Congress can, by legislative enactment, or by unfriendly legislation, deprive the owner of his property, or restrict or restrain him in the use of the same."

Again:

The Senate of Kentucky, last winter, by a unanimous vote of both parties, declared these principles to be important, constitutional and true, by the following resolution, which I must read, it is so apt, so pertinent, so conclusive;

"*Resolved*, That the territories are the common property of the Union, and as a field for the expansion of the institutions and the development of the energies of an advancing and progressive people, are open to the citizens of all the States; and that there exists no power in the General Government or the government of a territory, during its continuance as such, and until having attained sufficient population it shall have formed a constitution and been admitted into the Union, to impair the right of any citizen migrating thereto in the ownership and enjoyment of any species of property which may be recognized by the laws of any one of the States, but that this right having been solemnly affirmed by the decisions of our highest judicial tribunals, should be guarded by suitable laws, faithfully administered; and if, in any case, a territorial government should assail that right by unfriendly legislation, or experience should show that existing laws are inadequate for its protection, it will then be the duty of the General Government in the exercise of its powers—legislative, judicial, and executive—each acting within its appropriate sphere, to provide such security and protection as the exigencies of the occasion may demand."

A similar resolution was unanimously agreed to in the House of Representatives of the Legislature.

What is all this, but adopting in principle and language, the opinion of the Supreme Court, and the resolutions I have read of the National Democratic Convention. Both parties in Kentucky, at the polls, twelve months ago, and by unanimous votes in both branches of the legislature, have declared that these principles are constitutional, and vital to the interests and honor of the State.

Surely I might pause here, but I want, in support of these principles, the individual authority of one of our most venerable statesmen. I want the authority of Mr. Crittenden himself. (Applause.) Gentlemen, whatever doubts he may have as to my fidelity to the Constitution and the Union of these States. I do not hesitate to say, that in my opinion, that eminent gentleman is devoted to the Union.

I do not believe *he* would advocate principles which he believed were unconstitutional or calculated to destroy the Union, and I can have his sanction and indorsement for the principles I advocate, surely it will go a great way in proving that they are constitutional, and the true Union principles. I held in my hand the Journal of the United States Senate, for the month of May last, when the following resolution was adopted by an overwhelming vote;

*Resolved*, That the Union of these States rests on the equality of rights and privileges among its members; and that it is especially the duty of the Senate, which represents the States, in their sovereign capacity, to resist all attempts to discriminate either in relation to persons or property in the territories, which are the common possessions of the United States, so as to give advantages to the citizens of one State which are not equally assured to those of every other State."

Mr. Crittenden's vote is on record, in the affirmative on that resolution. On the same day, the following resolution passed the Senate:

*Resolved*, That neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature, whether by direct legislation or legislation of an indirect or unfriendly character, possess power to annul or impair the constitutional right of any citizen of the United States to take his slave property into the common territories, and there hold and enjoy the same while the territorial condition remains."

Mr. Crittenden's vote is recorded in favor of this resolution.

On the same day, the following resolution also passed the Senate:

*Resolved*, That if experience should at any time prove that the judicial and executive authority do not possess means to insure adequate protection to constitutional rights in a territory, and if the territorial government should fail or refuse to provide the necessary remedies for that purpose, it will be the duty of Congress to supply such deficiency, within the limits of its constitutional powers."

Mr. Crittenden's name is recorded in favor of this resolution.

Then I have the vote of my respected friend declaring that these questions are not minute or unimportant—that the Union of the States rests upon equality of rights among its members; that neither Congress nor a Territorial Legislature has the power to annul or impair the constitutional right of any citizen of the United States to take his slave property into the common territories and there enjoy the same, while the territorial condition remains; and that if such right be assailed by the territorial legislature, it becomes necessary for Congress to interfere to protect it; precisely the principles upon which we stand to-day. (Cheers.)

Mr. Crittenden, a few days after, followed these resolutions by a speech in the Senate, which I find reported in the Daily "Globe," the official organ of that body. It is true, that Mr. Crittenden expressed a hope that the time might never come when it would be necessary for Congress to intervene to protect these rights in the territories. I also trust that the time may never come when any territorial authority will be so reckless of its constitutional obligations as to make it necessary for Congress or the other branches of the Government to interfere for the protection of personal rights and private property.—(Cheers.)

But in the speech to which I refer, he sustains the

position I occupy, in language which compares well with that of the Supreme Court itself. He says:

"My idea upon that subject, Mr. President, without a shadow of doubt, is that a territorial government is the mere creature of Congress, made and fashioned by Congress as it pleases, with what functions it pleases, with what power it thinks proper to confer; that all these powers are liable to be resumed at any time, or to be fashioned and controlled and changed at the pleasure of Congress, and according to its discretion. Of course, there is no sovereignty or particle of it in the Territory; all is a mere delegation of power, and is in subordination at all times to the Congress of the United States. I know of no sovereignty in this country, no supreme political power, except that originally vested in the people of the United States. They are the natural depositaries, they are the natural owners of every thing like supreme power or sovereignty. They have, to form this Government, delegated a certain portion of that sovereignty to the Congress of the United States. The whole, then, of this sovereignty exists, as to that part not delegated, in the people. As to that part which they have delegated, that is in Congress; and here is the disposition of the whole sovereign supreme power of this country. None has been delegated to any one else. None, certainly, has been delegated to the territorial governments."

Further on in the same speech, Mr. Crittenden employs the following language:

"As the territorial government has no sovereign or independent right to act on this subject, the Supreme Court of the United States, having determined that every citizen of the United States may go into that Territory carrying his slaves with him, and holding them there, my opinion is, that the Constitution, is to protect that property which it has authorized to go there. Of course, that is a logical conclusion. It seems to me it is unquestionable. To assert my right to go there, to carry my property there, and to enjoy that property, and then to say there is any body stronger or mightier or more sovereign than the Constitution, that can take from me that which the Constitution says I shall have and enjoy, or shall expel me from the place where the Constitution says I may go, I can imagine nothing so inconsistent and so contradictory. I say, therefore, when the proper or extreme case occurs: when property going there under the sanction of the Constitution, as interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, shall require such interposition, that it is the duty of Congress to interpose and grant protection. Give it, and give it adequately. That is my opinion."

Nobly and well said, in language worthy of his exalted character and reputation.

Mr. Douglas says, and makes the acceptance of it the condition on which he will consent to administer the government, that a Territorial Legislature, no matter what the decision of the Supreme Court may be, can lawfully exclude slave property from a territory; that you may take it there under the Constitution, but that the local legislature may then expel it by hostile laws. The Supreme Court says the Territorial Legislature can not exclude it, and Mr. Crittenden says that he can "imagine nothing so inconsistent and contradictory" as to say that you may take your property there by virtue of the Constitution, and then to say that there is some body stronger or mightier than the Constitution, that can take away that which the Constitution says you may hold and enjoy; and yet, unless Mr. Douglas can force half the States to accept this surrender of

their rights, he will rend and destroy as he goes. (Applause.) I derive some satisfaction from the fact that the Hon. John J. Crittenden, whose name and authority will go for in this Union, has declared, by his speeches and votes in the Senate, that the principles upon which we stand are constitutional and true. (Cheers.)

Fellow-citizens, I cannot enlarge; I appeal to you if I have not conclusively repelled the accusations against me, and if I have not shown that it is neither I nor the Constitutional Democracy, but Mr. Douglas who departed from the agreement of the Kansas bill?

Then passing to a more extended view, we have seen that these principles have been sanctioned by the practice of the Government, affirmed by the highest judicial tribunal in the world; voted to be true by both political parties in Kentucky in 1859; unanimously asserted by both branches of the Legislature, and by an overwhelming majority of the whole Democratic party in State Convention, and declared by Mr. Crittenden himself, in the most solemn form, to be not only constitutional, but to be sound and true, essential to the rights and equality of the States. (Cheers.) Surely these things make a pyramid of authority and argument in their support, which ought to commend them, if not to the adoption, certainly to the grave and candid consideration of all men who wish to know the truth. And I have tried to sustain them by legitimate facts and argument. I am not conscious of having appealed to any prejudice.

Fellow-citizens, these principles will give us peace and prosperity; they will preserve the equality and restore the harmony of the States. They will make every man feel that in his personal rights and rights of property he stands on a footing of equality in the domain common to all the States? (Cheers.) They have their root in the Constitution, and no party can be sectional which maintains constitutional principles. Are we to be driven from their maintenance? Is our State to be twisted round the fingers of politicians, as they would twist a gum-elastic thread? Are the people of Kentucky to be made to turn their backs to-day upon principles they thought true and constitutional last year, by loud and unreasonable clamor? Are they to be driven, terrified, staggered and bewildered by idle cries of "disunion," from maintaining their constitutional rights? And when Kentucky is asked to express her opinion of her own rights in this confederacy, has the spirit of the Commonwealth sunk so low that she dare not do it? (Cries of "No! no!" and cheers.) Such were not the men who laid the foundation of this State. Such were not those who maintained our independence in 1798. Now the question is one of the equal rights of persons and property in the territories, though, indeed, just behind this outpost lie all our other constitutional rights. Then it was a question of the freedom of speech, and whether the friendless foreigner might be driven from the country for reasons to be locked up in the breast of the President. Need I recite the glorious part Virginia and Kentucky played in that great drama? Many States replied to their resolutions by stigmatizing them as disunionists; but, undeterred by threats and false principles, they inaugurated a political revolution which saved the Constitution and your liberties. (Cheers.) Now, in 1860, does Kentucky dare to defend the Constitution against senseless outcries? Does she dare to assert the equality of the States, and her own rights in the Confederacy? They are hers by the current of our history; hers by the practice of the government; hers by the sanction

of judicial authority. Then will she fly from them, driven by the clamor of bells and noisy orators, or will she stand upon them brave and self-poised, and maintain alike her rights, the Constitution and the Union. (Cheers and cries, "We'll stand by them!")

Fellow-citizens, if my strength will last, can you bear with me a little longer? (A voice—"Yes, a week; go on!")

I know of but one political organization which asserts the principles I have attempted to defend. The Republican organization holds precisely opposite principles. They say we have no rights in the territories with our property. They say Congress has a right to exclude it, and it is its duty to do so; but they are somewhat indifferent on this point as long as they are quite sure it will be done by the territorial legislature.

In regard to the platform adopted by the Convention which nominated Mr. Bell, of Tennessee, and Mr. Everett, of Massachusetts, I have only to say that certainly it announces no principle at all upon this subject—gentlemen tell us they are advocating the claims of these distinguished men upon the principles of the Constitution, the Union, and the enforcement of the laws. I presume that there is scarcely a man in this assembly—perhaps very few, North or South, who will admit that they are opposed to the Union, the Constitution, and the enforcement of the laws; but they entertain the most diverse and opposite opinions as to the best mode of sustaining the Constitution, and the character of the laws to be enforced.

Mr. Seward, of New York, Mr. Burlingame, of Massachusetts, Mr. Giddings, of Ohio—all identified with the anti-slavery party—will tell you they are for the Union, but it is their own sort of Union they want. They say they are for the Constitution; but they construe the Constitution so as to take away our rights.—They tell you they are for the enforcement of the laws; but they are for laws which would take away our property. (Cheers.) For the "Union, the Constitution, and the Laws," they shake hands with you on that; but you cannot agree on a single thing under Heaven afterward. (Laughter and cheers.)

Then this platform, gentlemen, declares practically nothing, and I have nothing more to say about it. (Good! good!)

But, the platform I have read to you does contain a distinct enunciation of certain principles which touch the rights of property and person in the Territories, and which declare the equal rights of the States; and now, is Kentucky ready to meet the issue? We appeal to you, not in behalf of any individual, but to stand by your own principles, resting as they do on the Constitution of the United States. (Cries of "Good!")

Now, if it be true, that I am not a disunionist, and if it be true that the political principles I advocate are the principles of the Constitution, will it not be pretty difficult to fasten disunion on sound men, with Constitutional principles? (Cries of "That's so.")

That, gentlemen, would seem to exhaust the subject. Sound men, with Constitutional principles, which are affirmed in the mode recognized in American politics, and which we propose to maintain by reason and the ballot-box. Really this would seem to exhaust the question.

But, it is said, although I am not a disunionist, and the principles I maintain are Constitutional and true, yet the object of the organization by which I have been nominated is to break up this Confederacy! and I suppose they have selected me as the



tool with which to execute that scheme. (A voice—"A bad instrument!" Cheers.)

Gentlemen, I do not think any man will charge me, in my public address to the people, with want of candor. I have no doubt a great many gentlemen in the Southern States of the Union think that their Constitutional rights will never be recognized. A few are, perhaps, *per se*, disunionists; though I doubt if there are fifty such in the Union, aside from the Abolitionists of the Garrison school. Undoubtedly, a number of gentlemen who were dissatisfied with the Compromise measures of 1850, now prefer me for the Presidency, and sustain me on this platform; and if I could descend to count noses, I doubt not there are many more of the same character who sustain other gentlemen, upon platforms not so constitutional and desirable as mine. (Cheers.) What is the charge? Nearly the entire delegations of a majority of the States made this nomination, and it is sustained by the masses of the Southern Democracy, and by strong organizations in most of the Northern States. Do they mean to say that these masses were disunionists? Why, gentlemen, the country is in a bad way if this be so. But the charge is a reckless one. The entire delegations from California and Oregon united in my nomination, and affirmed our principles. Are these disunion States? They lie thousands of miles away from our domestic strifes. What have they said or done that could lead any man to suppose that they would break up the Union of the States? They are impartial arbitrators of this dispute; and they tell our Northern brethren they must do justice and give equality in the Union, and thus alone can they maintain the Union and the Constitution.

Are a majority of the Senators in Congress disunionists? Are three-fourths of the Democratic members of the House of Representatives disunionists? Are all the eminent men throughout the Union, who sustain this cause, disunionists? My friends, the charge is baseless and absurd.

Advantage has been taken of the loyalty of the people of Kentucky; and equally, to the surprise and delight of the gentlemen engaged in it, the scheme succeeded better than they expected. I am sure that the sober, second thought of the people will recall them to the maintenance of their well considered opinions. Kentucky will never abandon a principle which she has declared to be the principle of the Constitution and the Union. (Loud applause.)

I will not answer the newspaper accusations that this gentleman and the other gentleman who have held extreme opinions, support me. Gentlemen of far more extreme opinions support the other candidates. What, if A B C and D, whose opinions you do not like, thinking better of a certain set of principles than they do of a certain other set of principles, or no principles at all, (laughter and applause) choose to vote for me, will you, for this, fasten the stigma of disunion upon one-half the confederacy?

Gentlemen, it is unworthy. Judge men by their antecedents and by the principles supported by the mass of their advocates. Do that, and if you find the man unexceptionable, and the principles true, what brave man will be deterred from his support by a false clamor of disunion? I never could understand how it was sectional to assert a constitutional right, for I have always regarded the Constitution as covering the whole country. (Cheers.)

But, while you are wrangling among yourselves, there are disunionists all over the country, working, and working actively, for the overthrow of the Union of the States. They are those who deny constitutional rights; for upon the Constitution the

Union rests. They are those who all over the North are engaged to-day in trampling under foot, without shame, the plainest rights guaranteed to us by the Federal Constitution. (Cheers.) The Governor of the State of Ohio refuses to deliver up a man indicted for felony in Kentucky, because, he says, under the laws of Ohio it is no crime to steal a negro. To-day, in the State of Wisconsin, a man indicted for a forcible rescue from the custody of the Marshall of the United States, is protected by a mob, whose lawless proceedings seem to be sustained by public opinion. Where, in the North, can the fugitive slave law be executed, except here and there along the border? How many of the States in the North have passed laws making it an offense, to be punished by fine and imprisonment, to aid the officers of the United States in executing the law in regard to the return of fugitive slaves? Six or eight, I believe. Look at these things. Look at the concentration of anti-slavery opinion. Look at the gradual advance, year after year, of unconstitutional encroachments. See yourselves environed and closed in upon with steady and relentless steps. State after State enacting laws, making it penal in the people to assist the officers of the United States to execute the laws which protect your rights; armed mobs making rescues from the Marshal and refusing to surrender prisoners; a thorough anti-slavery opinion maturing and taking the form of political action in the Northern States; inroads in every direction—at Harper's Ferry; arson in Texas; the South environed and beset; the Constitution thrown with contempt into her face; the purpose avowed to exclude her from all the vast common domain of the Union, and thus to begin that "irrepressible conflict" which must end in the abolition of slavery in the States. (Applause.) And yet, when a political organization ventures to protest, in constitutional language—to ask for constitutional rights—those rights which you have said are yours, having no ear to hear, no eye to see, no voice of censure to rebuke these unconstitutional encroachments, you turn upon and stab, with clamorous cries of disunion, your own fellow-citizens, who are struggling for your own rights, (applause.) and like the Jews, when Titus besieged their city, instead of defending the temple of your liberties, you waste the precious hours in insane wranglings and mutual accusations. (Renewed cheers.)

A single word upon another point. It is said that Mr. Lincoln, representing the most offensive principles before the country, ought to be defeated, and that I am the only man in the way of his defeat. I agree he ought to be defeated. I agree that he represents the most obnoxious principles in issue in this canvass. I agree that his principles are clearly unconstitutional, and, if the Republican party should undertake to carry them out, they will destroy the Union. But does any one pretend that Mr. Lincoln will carry a single Southern State, in any event? Was Mr. Douglas willing to unite in the only practical mode for the defeat of Mr. Lincoln, as many of the wisest men in the East thought? Of the details of that I know nothing. Did not the Democratic State Convention in Pennsylvania, before the National Convention assembled, nominate an electoral ticket and place it before the people, and did not a large majority of the State Central Committee of Pennsylvania, after the disruption at Baltimore, propose that the people of Pennsylvania, should vote for this electoral ticket, without any change, and that those electors should vote for whoever could defeat Mr. Lincoln? Was not that recommended? and did not Mr.

Douglas, declaring that "oil and water could not mix," say his friends should not vote for this electoral ticket; but should nominate one devoted to him alone; which every child knows has not a chance to carry that State, while it is equally sure, if the recommendation of the State Central Committee had been acceded to, the united vote of those who prefer that gentleman and myself would defeat Mr. Lincoln. (Cheers.) The same thing may be predicated, in almost the same language, of New Jersey and other States. But no. We who stand upon the principles I have vindicated to-day, are disunionists, seceders, and they will have nothing to do with us! And so he breaks up the only mode by which, in the opinion of the regular organization of those States, Mr. Lincoln can be defeated.

Now, as I have said, Mr. Lincoln can in no event carry a single Southern State of this Union; and with them, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and California would make a majority, so that the defeat of Mr. Lincoln would be sure. If, perchance, he should be elected, nothing will have caused that result but the "rule or ruin" purpose—the restless ambition and almost insane policy of one man and his violent adherents. (Loud cheers.)

Not content with attempting to defeat at the North the surest mode by which the Democratic organization might control the result at the next election, this gentleman has turned his headlong course to the South. And what, I ask, is his object in coming South? Does he expect, do you expect, does any sane man expect, that he will carry a single Southern State? (Cries of "No! no!")

It is said his friends claim Missouri. I will not enter into particulars about that. Suppose he can. Yet I think he has no more chance for Missouri than I have for Massachusetts. What other State, from Maryland to the Rio Grande, will any honest gentleman say, he expects him to carry? And you, gentlemen of the Opposition party, who stand on principle, answer—what object do you think he must have in coming South. (A voice—"He can't carry five thousand in Tennessee.")

Some gentleman says he will not carry five thousand in Tennessee. Suppose he carries twenty thousand, does not every one know he has no chance for that State?

Is it not, then, his object in coming South to demoralize the Democratic organization in every State in the South, (A voice—"That's so), for the purpose of losing to the Democratic masses the organization of these States their candidates and their principles, and throwing the States into the hands of their political opponents—that purpose and none other. (Applause.)

It will be, gentlemen, for the Democracy of Kentucky, and for the gentlemen of the Opposition party, who believe our principles sound and constitutional, to determine whether they will countenance such a movement.

Fellow-citizens, it is impossible for me to follow out this line of remark, or to say many things I had intended to say. (Cries of—"Go on.") My physical indisposition makes it impossible for me to do so.

I am not ashamed of the principles upon which I stand.

I am not ashamed of the reasons by which they are sustained. I am not ashamed of the friends that support me. I am not ashamed of the tone, bearing and character of our whole organization. (Applause. A voice—"The truth will prevail.")

Yes, the truth will prevail. You may smother it for a time beneath the passion and prejudices of men, but those passions and prejudices will subside, and the truth will reappear as the rock reappears above the receding tide. I believe this country will yet walk by the light of these principles. Bright and fixed, as the rock-built light-house in the stormy sea, they will abide, a perpetual beacon, to attract the political mariner to the harbor of the Constitution. (Loud applause.)

People of Kentucky, you never abandoned a principle you believed to be right. You may be misled, but the stigma never rested on Kentucky that she abandoned principles she believed to be true. (Cries of, "We never will.")

For myself, conscious that my foot is planted on the rock of the Constitution—surrounded and sustained by friends I love and cherish—holding principles that have been in every form indorsed by my native commonwealth—with a spirit erect and unbroken I defy all calumny, and calmly await the triumph of the truth. (Prolonged applause.)



