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Griswold, Seneca, O.

Speech... on the resolutions  
relative to the suspension of the  
writ of habeas corpus and arrest  
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Book G-87









# SPEECH OF HON. S. O. GRISWOLD,

OF CUYAHOGA COUNTY,

*On the Resolutions Relative to the Suspension of the Writ of Habeas Corpus and arrest of Disloyal Persons,*

DELIVERED IN THE OHIO HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

JANUARY 29, 1863.

MR. SPEAKER:—At this late day in the discussion of these resolutions, it will not be expected that any new argument can be presented; but before any vote is taken, I desire to offer a few suggestions upon the matters under consideration. The debate has taken a very wide range. Almost every topic which at present agitates the country has been commented upon during the past week. But, instead of following in the track of those who have preceded me, I would recall the attention of the House to the original subject of this long discussion—to the resolutions of the gentleman from Franklin, Mr. Dresel. They do not purport to come from the petition, or upon the complaint of any of our constituents. None of “the eleven citizens” therein mentioned, ask for any action on the part of this General Assembly. The chief “martyr,” the member from Fairfield, (Dr. Olds,) expressly declares that he does not ask for any interposition on the part of this body. On the other hand, the preamble recites that the Governor of Ohio, in a recent speech, not delivered as Governor—not in his official capacity—but in an address as a private citizen, made certain statements. Is it proper or becoming this House to take action upon what the Governor may happen to say in his unofficial character? Indeed, sir, no practical action—no beneficial result is proposed by these resolutions. During the five long hours that, the member from Fairfield occupied the floor for the delivery of his tedious tirade and re-hash of old stump speeches, he did not suggest a single idea tending towards any practical result. To what end are we to make the investigations required, as to who was arrested—where confined—how dealt with—and when discharged? When these facts are ascertained, what further action do these resolutions propose? None, sir,—none whatever. True, it is declared that the honor

of our Governor requires this investigation, and that these enquiries are necessary for his vindication. I doubt not our worthy Executive would say of these new friends, “beware of Greeks bearing gifts.” [Not only, sir, is no beneficial action or result proposed, but on the very face of the matter, as well as from the course of this debate, the *animus* of the resolutions is apparent. Their object was to provoke political discussion, to increase party strife, to destroy our confidence in the chief Executive, and perchance weaken the power of the Government in this time of deadly peril. Even if I believed that the President had no right to suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus, and that the arrests of these alleged disloyal persons, was in fact, unlawful, I could have no sympathy with the spirit of these resolutions; I could in no manner lend myself to the accomplishment of any such purpose or intent. If the mere *policy* of these “arbitrary arrests,” as they are called, was legitimately before us, I should not hesitate to condemn it. In seizing ranting editors and broken down politicians, I think the Government has made a great blunder. The manner, too, in which it has been done, has not commended itself to the people. The exercise of this high power has necessarily been under the charge of the War Department; and in this matter, as well as in his control of the war news, the chief of that bureau has shown too great a lack of confidence in the intelligence and good sense of the people. If he had made public the causes of arrest and detention, I have no doubt his action would have been generally approved. But we are not called upon to express our opinion as to the good sense of the Secretary of War. The purport of these resolutions and the tenor of this debate reach far beyond that disbeliever in Jomini and the science of war—far beyond him; and would

have this General Assembly, so far as its action would go, arraign and impeach the President of the United States. Differing, as I do, with many of my brethren of the Union organization — believing their radical policy to be ruinous — yet to the purpose and intent of these resolutions, I can give no countenance. Whatever may be the errors of the Government, it needs the support of every loyal man. Admit, for the sake of argument, that the President has exceeded his lawful powers, yet his error has been upon the right side. It has grown out of his earnest devotion to the country — out of his desire to speedily and more surely put down the rebellion. It is an error which all men who desire the success of our arms can readily overlook and pardon.

But have the gentlemen who have argued in favor of these resolutions made a case against the President? Is it by any means clear that the power exercised by the President is not given him by the constitution? I do not propose to renew the argument. It has been ably and fully presented by my colleague, (Mr. Dickman,) and by the gentlemen from Logan and Montgomery, (Messrs. West and Odlin.) But, sir, some remarks have been made by the eloquent gentleman from Hamilton, (Mr. Sayler,) who has just taken his seat, to which I must give a passing notice. To the learning and eloquence of that gentleman I always listen with pleasure. I give him full credit for his avowal of loyalty and devotion to the Union. With much he has said I have full accord and sympathy; but, notwithstanding his learning and eloquence, it seems to me his conclusion was "lame and impotent." He argues that the President has no power to suspend the writ of Habeas Corpus upon three grounds, viz: From the history of the writ — from judicial decisions — and from the context of the constitution. In his argument from the history of the writ, he has given us a long disquisition on the struggles of the English nation to establish free institutions. It is history for all to read with pleasure and profit. Its lessons are apt for the present hour. The gentleman takes just pride to himself that he belongs to that Anglo-Saxon race, which, through long ages maintained its independence against the Plantagenets, the Tudors, the Stuarts, and finally, through innumerable conflicts on flood and field, established the civil liberties of England. Does he boast of belonging to such a race? I can well say in that respect, "I am a citizen of no mean city." My lineage, from the earliest days, have taken part in this great contest for free institutions. On the side of liberty their lives have been nobly offered, their blood has been freely shed. The gentleman more than once sought to impress upon our minds the aphorism that "from age to age history repeats itself." Did it not occur to the vivid imagination of the gentleman that both in magnitude and the consequences involved, the present great contest

surpasses anything that ever happened on British soil? Is not the great contest here reproduced in the United States, and as much enlarged as a continent exceeds an isle? Is the gentleman fully alive to the importance of this great American contest? In the mere temporary evil of an alleged usurpation of power by the President, does he lose sight of the infernal attempt of this great conspiracy to overthrow alike both President and constitution? The gentleman is fond of saying that he is "equally opposed to abolitionism on the one hand, and secession on the other." While I agree with him as to "abolitionism" as against "secession," I fear he is altogether too tame. What is to be feared of abolitionism? It is but a theory; it can never make the black man white. But "secession" is in arms; and its success will establish the most cruel and barbarous aristocracy that ever cursed the earth! I thank the gentleman for his historic readings. I wish their lessons could be impressed on every heart. My mind would glow with hope, if our whole northern people could be infused with the firm, sturdy spirit of old Anglo-Saxon freedom. But what lessons does the gentleman draw from this source of inspiration? What teachings does he impart? Not the clarion cry "to arms;" not "death rather than dishonor;" not that we should rally under our glorious flag, and with united force crush out the rebellion. Alas, no! In vain did I watch for such a strain. I only heard the feeble echo of what traitors and submissionists boldly declare. He is terribly exercised lest Abraham Lincoln will destroy our constitution. He fears that the President has exceeded the just bounds of that instrument, and that we should immediately throw around it the protection of this General Assembly.

But his logic is as faulty as his moral is puerile. His argument is that because the King of England has no power to suspend the Habeas Corpus, therefore the President of the United States is prohibited from exercising that power. I need not point out the distinction between the powers of our chief Executive and those of the Sovereign of England, or the falsity of the proposition — that whatever is prohibited to one is prohibited to the other; or the reason why the power in the given case should be withheld from the latter, while it might be safely entrusted to the former. This has already been ably done by the gentleman from Wood, (Mr. Cook.) I only allude to it in order to show the weakness of his syllogism — the non sequitur in his logic.

Again, he devotes a part of his six hour's speech to a review of judicial decisions and opinions to sustain his proposition. He admits that the precise question has never been adjudicated. On the other hand, I do not deny, that, so far as the dicta of judges and the opinions of law-writers are concerned, the weight of authority is in favor of that construction which would give to Congress and



not to the President the power of suspending the Habeas Corpus. It is easy, also, to see how this notion obtained force. Judging from the analogy of the common law, and that this power was vested in Parliament alone, they naturally aimed at this conclusion. But these opinions were arrived at without the crucial test of actual trial. It is only when the severe case arises that the whole depth is probed. These conclusions were arrived at in times of comparative peace; not when the very foundations of the government itself were shaken, and the minds of all men were aroused to find some "arm of safety." There has been an overhauling of old opinions and ideas; and the views of the best and wisest have undergone the greatest changes. When the President was first called upon to act in this matter, the Capitol and Maryland swarmed with secret traitors, and the rebels were counting on easy victory. Whom to trust was the great inquiry. Dishonor, ingratitude and treachery unparalleled, were suddenly displayed. The attack was sudden and the danger imminent. The President, honest — anxious to act rightly and for the best — sustained by the opinion of the Attorney General and other eminent jurists — decided that this great prerogative, to be exercised only in case of rebellion or invasion, and only then, when required by the public safety, belonged to the Executive department. Acting upon this decision, the secret traitors of Baltimore and Washington were arrested before their infernal plans could be executed, and Maryland was saved from civil strife, and forever lost to the armed confederates.

The power has since been exercised to prevent the mischief of those who would discourage enlistments, and who, mistakenly or otherwise, were giving aid and comfort to the rebellion. Whether this latter exercise was wise or unwise is not the question, but does this power belong to the President? Congress has virtually admitted that it does. The Judiciary have to pass upon it hereafter. But is it for this General Assembly to anticipate the Judiciary? Are we to set ourselves up as a high court of impeachment? Have we not been wasting our time in vain and unprofitable discussion? What authority is to decide that the construction of the constitution by the President is not the true one? In their eagerness to find fault and arraign the President, the gentlemen on the other side have forgotten the old doctrines of the Democracy. Much has been said of the *opinions of General Jackson*. It is claimed by the gentlemen on the one side, that his conduct and opinions are precedents for the present Executive, and on the other hand, much time has been devoted to explain away the facts so relied on.

The history and memory of General Jackson are, so far as this House is concerned, is the especial property of the gentleman from Hamilton. With him this is an inexhausti-

ble topic. Let me give you his views on the duty of the President to construe the constitution for himself. I read from his veto message of July 10, 1832, page 4:

"The Congress, the Executive and the Supreme Court, must each for itself be guided by its own opinion of the Constitution. Each public officer who takes an oath to support the Constitution, means that he will support it as he understands it, and not as it is understood by others. It is as much the duty of the House of Representatives, of the Senate and of the President, to decide upon the Constitutionality of any bill or resolution which may be presented to them for passage or approval, as it is for the Supreme Judges, when it may be brought before them for judicial decision. The opinion of the Judges has no more authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress has over the Judges, and on that point the President is independent of both."

Again, in his famous protest, in reply to the claim that the Senate might compel the President to yield his opinion by withholding appropriations, etc. "If the President should ever be induced to act, in a matter of official duty, contrary to the honest convictions of his own mind, in compliance with the wishes of the Senate, the constitutional independence of the Executive would be as effectually destroyed as if that end had been accomplished by an amendment of the Constitution. . . followed to its consequences, this principle will be found to effectually destroy one co-ordinate department of the Government, to concentrate in the hands of the Senate the whole executive power, and to leave the President as powerless as he would be useless."

It is admitted by all the gentlemen on the other side, that the precise question as to who should exercise the power of suspension of the Habeas Corpus, under the Constitution, has never been settled by any authoritative practice or decision. No man is bold enough, or so regardless of truth or decency as to charge Abraham Lincoln with corruption. How then stands the case, applying to it these doctrines of General Jackson? The rebellion existed. Secret traitors swarmed in every department of the Government. The public safety required that the writ should be suspended. It was a question of construction. The President, anxious to do his whole duty, with the best lights he could have for his guidance as a co-ordinate power in the Government, construed that section of the Constitution as giving himself the power of suspension. If this was his *honest conviction in a matter of official duty*, was he not bound to exercise the power? Was he not bound to act upon his understanding of the Constitution? In the matter of the exercise of power under a construction of a particular clause, is not the Executive Department equal to Congress or the Judiciary? How can

gentlemen—how can the Democracy, who follow, as by instinct,—the opinions of Andrew Jackson, complain of Abraham Lincoln? The cry of “tyrant”—“nsurper”—“a violation of the Constitution,” is cheap political capital. When General Jackson announced these doctrines which I have read, these very terms were used by the Whigs without stint. The whole vocabulary of abuse was exhausted by them, and poured out upon his devoted head. But, Sir, General Jackson was sustained by the people. These views of his, so bitterly denounced, have become, with proper limitations, the settled theory of our Government in regard to the independence of the Executive. So, I trust, it will be with Abraham Lincoln. By false party cries, by political deceit, the people may, for a time be divided, and led astray; but they are never to be led into submission to Southern despots. When these mists have cleared away, and the people shall see and know that the President has been actuated by a sincere purpose to save his country—to preserve the Government—he will go down to the latest day, not only as Lincoln “the honest,” but Lincoln “the faithful and true.”

The third and last point relied upon by the gentleman, and so confidently urged by him, is the argument based upon the context of the Constitution. He says that the clause relating to the suspension of the privilege of the writ, is a restriction upon the legislative department; and as the restriction is upon Congress, no power but the one restrained could lawfully exercise the right in the excepted cases. The argument would be conclusive if the assumption upon which it was based, rested upon fact. The gentleman saw the necessities of his case; and he boldly assumes that the whole of the 9th section of Article I is a restriction upon the powers of Congress. The clause in question is in the 9th section, and the conclusion therefore would be inevitable. But unfortunately for his argument, his major premise is false. It is true, that the 9th section of Article I is placed under the chapter entitled “Legislative Department;” and it is further true, that the 9th section contains restrictions upon the power of Congress. But the statement in its full length and breadth is not true. The 6th paragraph of the 9th section, viz: “No money shall be drawn but in consequence of appropriations made by law; and a regular statement of the receipts and expenditures of all public money shall be published from time to time,” is clearly a restriction upon the “Executive Department of the Government. The collection and expenditure of public money is an executive, not a legislative duty. So likewise is the succeeding paragraph, preventing the acceptance of any “title,” etc., a restriction, not upon Congress, but upon individual citizens.

The whole of the next section (10) is a restriction, not upon Congress, not upon the

Executive, not upon individuals, but upon the States of the Union. Here, then, we have in the context, limitations upon Congress, the Executive, the States and individual citizens. In the phraseology of the paragraph in regard to the suspension of the writ, there is no indication upon whom the limitation and restrictions are placed. Nothing is anywhere said by whom the power in the excepted cases is to be exercised. The conclusion that the Constitution itself declares that this peculiar power belongs alone to Congress and not to the President, is therefore an assumption, and we are left to ascertain the true intent and meaning of the particular clause, as in all other cases of doubtful import. The arguments resting upon policy, convenience, and the adaptation of the instrument itself to the necessities of the nation and the actual condition of affairs, are all entitled to their proper weight. So, also, the Constitution is to be taken as a whole; and if the denial of this power to the President renders other parts, or powers given, nugatory, then this denial is wrong in theory, and the power lawfully belongs to him.

We are therefore led to a consideration of the different grants of power, given in the Constitution. Every one must be struck, at the outset, with the difference between the grants of legislative and executive power. On the one hand, the subjects upon which Congress can legislate are specifically enumerated; and the action of Congress is specially limited to these particulars. Beyond these, Congress may not go. The language is, “All legislative powers *herein granted* shall be vested in a Congress.” On the other hand, no such limitation is placed upon the Executive Department. The language is, “The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” True, certain specified things are prohibited; but the general executive action has no limitations. No better or wiser men ever lived than the framers of our Constitution. They understood the business in which they were engaged. All the problems touching the perpetuity of free Government, were, by them profoundly considered; and none more anxiously than this question of executive power. The gentleman has cited us to the history of Rome, and to the jealous care and regard with which her institutions protected the rights of personal liberty, etc. The example of that ancient Republic was not lost upon our fathers. They knew how precious were these personal rights, and how their enjoyment made Rome the queen of the ancient world. But they remembered also the fate of Rome, that however glorious her government, it had been a failure. They remembered how, in times of great emergency and danger—when the Gaul was at her gates—when some civil commotion shook her walls—that, by common consent, the Senate, the Knights and the People alike surrendered themselves to absolute rule; that to some eminent

citizen power was given over life and death, and, as one man, the whole power of the State was hurled against the foe; and so the city was saved. They remembered, too, that through the abuse of this power, liberty was lost and the empire established. They saw that a permanent executive was needed, and that, by him, in extreme cases, great power must be exercised. The struggles between the Commons and the King of England were fresh in their minds. The name of King was odious; an aristocracy was intolerable; and a mixed Government of Kings, Nobles and Commons was entirely impracticable.

Its benefits they well understood, but in a New World a new Government was needed. The weakness of the old confederation had demonstrated the necessity of executive power. They saw, likewise, that it was impossible to penetrate the future, and prescribe an exact code for the Executive Department; and, placing around and over the President every reasonable guard, he was left free to act. He was made commander-in-chief of the army and navy; but it was left to Congress "to raise and support armies;" "to provide and maintain a navy." In like manner he was given the command of the militia of the States when in actual service, but it was left to Congress "to provide for calling forth the militia, to execute the laws, to suppress insurrections and repel invasions." I am no believer in this new doctrine of a "war power" outside of the Constitution; nor do I conceive it to be necessary to discover any hidden strength in the Presidential oath.

As I have said, the Executive Department is not placed under general limitations. The Executive power is vested in the President; and with certain special restrictions, he is left free to act, and is simply required and directed to "take care that the laws be faithfully executed." He is required to do everything necessary to accomplish that end. Let me not be misunderstood. I do not claim that his will is or can be law. But simply this: that in exercising the executive functions, he is free to act, subject only to this limitation, that he may not do the things specially forbidden, or do or perform any act inconsistent with the spirit of the Constitution. This, I conceive to be the true rule. This very subject of the militia of the States fully illustrates the argument. Power is given to Congress to provide for calling them forth, and in the commencement of the Government, Congress legislated on the subject, and made the necessary provisions in regard to the matter. There were three purposes for which they might be required to take the field, "to execute the laws," "to suppress insurrections," to repel invasions. But who had the power, or the right, to determine when the exigency had happened which would authorize their being called forth?

Let me call your attention to a few words of wisdom on this point. I read from Wheaton, S. C. Reports, Vol. 12, in the case of Martin

vs. Mott. "The power to call the militia into actual service is felt to be one of no ordinary magnitude. But it is not a power which can be executed without a corresponding responsibility. It is, in its terms, a limited power, confined to cases of actual invasion, or of imminent danger of invasion. If it be a limited power, the question arises, by whom is the exigency to be judged of and decided." "We are all of the opinion that the authority to decide whether the exigency has arisen, belongs exclusively to the President." "It is no answer, that such a power may be abused; for there is no power which is not susceptible of abuse. The remedy for this, as well as for all other official misconduct, if it should occur, is to be found in the Constitution itself." "The danger is (must be) remote, since, in addition to the high qualities which the Executive must be presumed to possess of public virtue, and honest devotion to the public interests, the frequency of elections and the watchfulness of the Representatives, carry with them all the checks which can be useful to guard against usurpation or wanton tyranny." So, in like manner is the President to decide in cases of insurrection. It is for him to determine whether the unlawful combinations are too powerful to be put down by the ordinary civil authority, or whether the insurrection can only be suppressed by the aid of the militia. No one can deny that, in the present rebellion, the exigency happened; or, that President Lincoln was justified in calling forth the militia. The rebels were already in arms, and when the militia responded to the call, a state of war was brought into existence.

By the constitution the President is the Commander in Chief of the forces of the United States. Shall it be said that he can not exercise all the necessary functions of a chief command because these things are not written out in the constitution, or that any new powers are given him because of this command? Neither view seems to me to be correct. The performance of the duties of a commander in chief is only another exercise of the executive power vested in him by the constitution. The rule I have before laid down governs him the same as in times of peace. Whatever powers necessarily belong to a general in chief in time of war, he must possess; otherwise the command is a nullity. In a state of war, to a certain extent, civil rights and privileges are in abeyance. When gentlemen admit that a commander in chief may, under any circumstances, proclaim martial law, they yield the whole case. But, say they, it must be confined to the lines of camp, and to the immediate presence of the hostile armies. Why must it be so limited? May the danger not be as great in Ohio as in Tennessee? A spy or traitor could do a thousand times more mischief on the Scioto than he could on the Cumberland. If the

power belongs to the President, the discretion as to its exercise is surely his. It can only apply to the rebels, or those who would give them aid and comfort; and beyond this the President has not attempted to go. The proclamation read by the gentleman expressly confines its application to this class of persons. True, the gentleman from Fairfield would altogether deny this power to the President. So, likewise, the logic of the gentleman from Hamilton leads to the same result. Let us push the argument to its natural consequences. They say that the amendments to the constitution; Articles IV, V and VI, guarantee to every individual sacred personal rights—the security of life, person and property—the right of a trial by one's peers—the right to be confronted by one's accusers—and a freedom from arrest, unless by warrant, supported by oath or affirmation, upon probable cause. And they further say, that by these arrests the constitution has been violated. The reading is plain and easily to be understood; for it is not to be denied that the persons arrested have been denied these guarantees. But, as I have said, in a condition of actual war, are not these rights in abeyance—and in such a condition of affairs the individual case must yield to the general benefit—and it does not follow that the constitution has been violated. What difference is there, I ask, between that territory which may lie between the armies of the Union and the rebel hosts, and any other portion of our country? Is it not one and indivisible? Is not the constitution alike sacred over all? Let me suppose that the space between the hostile forces is inhabited by Dr. Olds, and his auditors of the famous Berne meeting. It becomes necessary for the Union armies to move, and the line of their march leads across the premises of Dr. Olds. The order is given, but on his division line stands that worthy gentleman, and forbids the movement. He declares that he is entirely loyal and devoted to the government, but that it will be trespass to cross his land—the herbage will be trodden down—“his property cannot be taken without due course of law”—if the march is made, the constitution will be destroyed. Another of this worthy set might have concealed in his house arms, intended for the public enemies. He might be on the very eve of delivering them, but not as yet have committed the “overt act.” This traitorous design might be discovered; immediate action might be necessary; and the President orders a troop of cavalry to seize these arms. It might happen that this seizure would save the Union army from certain defeat. But the owner of these arms brings his writ of replevin against the President, and the case is set down to be tried before the member from Fairfield, whom we will suppose to be the justice of the peace for the neighborhood. Of what avail before this great legal light are all the arguments which the President might urge? Of what concern to him is it that this

seizure saved the lives of thousands of Union soldiers? He can see nothing but the constitution. He reads, as there laid down, “the right of the people is to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated; and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” No affidavit was made; no warrant was issued; it was a mere act of “tyrannical power,” and the plaintiff is entitled to be restored to his property, so wrongfully seized. So his judgment is entered up—“*Mr. President, you have violated the constitution. You must resign your office, and a Democrat must be put in your place.* I need not extend the illustration. If this logic be correct, it would protect every spy and traitor in the land—destroy every function of the commander in chief—and in the language of General Jackson, the President would be as “powerless as he would be useless.” I am ready to admit that the view which I have taken of the executive power does not necessarily determine his rights to suspend the privilege of the writ of Habeas Corpus. I only say that those who would arraign and impeach the President for exercising that power have failed to make a case. Their logic leads to absurdity; and their conclusion is one giving aid and comfort to the rebellion. It is, after all, a mere question of construction, and the President may be right. It is admitted that the power of suspension exists—that the occasion for its exercise has arisen.

Is it wise, therefore, or patriotic to stir up party strife—to divide the people, on the abstract question, whether the power rightfully belongs to the President or Congress? If it belongs to Congress alone to authorize a suspension of the writ, the performance of that duty is clearly an executive function. If by resolution, simply, Congress had directed the President to do what he has done, the mouths of his accusers would be closed. Because Congress has failed in its duty, or because the President has believed that the discretion was vested in himself, and not in Congress, shall he be denounced for doing that which the direction of Congress would have made perfectly loyal and proper? In our haste to make political capital over a supposed error or mistake of the Government, shall we bring our country to ruin? Is it not the only hope of the Confederates that the people of the Union shall be weakened by divisions, and that through our discord their independence may be accomplished? Surely, at this time the Executive needs the support of every loyal and patriotic man. Because evil counsels have prevailed, shall we withhold from the President our earnest and hearty co-operation? Because, in an unfortunate hour the Abolitionists appear to have gained sway, shall we yield up the Government, and all that, as a

nation, we hold dear, to the dominion of traitors? With the cry of "liberty" and "the Constitution," there are those that would surrender on dishonorable terms. Let us remember that, of old, with the name of "master" on his lips, the greatest of traitors perpetrated his crime. There are those, also, who are ready to divide the Country, and who would prefer to rule in a petty State rather than serve in a great nation. The President of the United State belongs to neither faction. His sole aim is to restore and preserve the Union. The path of duty, as it

seems to me, is straight and narrow. I would bury party strife; and, in every manner, and by every possible means, would give to the President a hearty and cordial support. I would give no countenance to submissionists on the one hand, or to fanatical abolitionists on the other; but, to whatever party or faction that may seek to divide or disgrace the Country, I would say, "Oh, my soul! come not thou into their secret: unto their assembly, mine honor, be not thou united."

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








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